Update dependency hono to v3.11.7 [SECURITY] #472

renovate · 2023-12-15T04:13:33Z

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Adoption	Passing	Confidence
hono (source)	`3.11.4` -> `3.11.7`

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2023-50710

Impact

The clients may override named path parameter values from previous requests if the application is using TrieRouter. So, there is a risk that a privileged user may use unintended parameters when deleting REST API resources.

TrieRouter is used either explicitly or when the application matches a pattern that is not supported by the default RegExpRouter.

The code to reproduce it. The server side application:

import { Hono } from 'hono'
import { TrieRouter } from 'hono/router/trie-router'

const wait = async (ms: number) => {
  return new Promise((resolve) => {
    setTimeout(resolve, ms)
  })
}

const app = new Hono({ router: new TrieRouter() })

app.use('*', async (c, next) => {
  await wait(Math.random() * 200)
  return next()
})

app.get('/modules/:id/versions/:version', async (c) => {
  const id = c.req.param('id')
  const version = c.req.param('version')

  console.log('path', c.req.path)
  console.log('version', version)

  return c.json({
    id,
    version,
  })
})

export default app

The client code which makes requests to the server application:

const examples = [
  'http://localhost:8787/modules/first/versions/first',
  'http://localhost:8787/modules/second/versions/second',
  'http://localhost:8787/modules/third/versions/third',
]

const test = () => {
  for (const example of examples) {
    fetch(example)
      .then((response) => response.json())
      .then((data) => {
        const splitted = example.split('/')
        const expected = splitted[splitted.length - 1]

        if (expected !== data.version) {
          console.error(`Error: exprected ${expected} but got ${data.version} - url was ${example}`)
        }
      })
  }
}

test()

The results:

Error: exprected second but got third - url was http://localhost:8787/modules/second/versions/second
Error: exprected first but got third - url was http://localhost:8787/modules/first/versions/first

Patches

"v3.11.7" includes the change to fix this issue.

Workarounds

Don't use TrieRouter directly.

// DON'T USE TrieRouter
import { TrieRouter } from 'hono/router/trie-router'
const app = new Hono({ router: new TrieRouter() })

References

Router options on the Hono website: https://hono.dev/api/hono#router-option

CVE-2024-32869

Summary

When using serveStatic with deno, it is possible to directory traverse where main.ts is located.

My environment is configured as per this tutorial
https://hono.dev/getting-started/deno

PoC

$ tree
.
├── deno.json
├── deno.lock
├── main.ts
├── README.md
└── static
    └── a.txt

source

import { Hono } from 'https://deno.land/x/[email protected]/mod.ts'
import { serveStatic } from 'https://deno.land/x/[email protected]/middleware.ts'

const app = new Hono()
app.use('/static/*', serveStatic({ root: './' }))

Deno.serve(app.fetch)

request

curl localhost:8000/static/%2e%2e/main.ts

response is content of main.ts

Impact

Unexpected files are retrieved.

CVE-2024-43787

Summary

Hono CSRF middleware can be bypassed using crafted Content-Type header.

Details

MIME types are case insensitive, but isRequestedByFormElementRe only matches lower-case.

https://github.com/honojs/hono/blob/b0af71fbcc6dbe44140ea76f16d68dfdb32a99a0/src/middleware/csrf/index.ts#L16-L17

As a result, attacker can bypass csrf middleware using upper-case form-like MIME type, such as "Application/x-www-form-urlencoded".

PoC

<html>
  <head>
    <title>CSRF Test</title>
    <script defer>
      document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", () => {
        document.getElementById("btn").addEventListener("click", async () => {
          const res = await fetch("http://victim.example.com/test", {
            method: "POST",
            credentials: "include",
            headers: {
              "Content-Type": "Application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
            },
          });
        });
      });
    </script>
  </head>
  <body>
    <h1>CSRF Test</h1>
    <button id="btn">Click me!</button>
  </body>
</html>

Impact

Bypass csrf protection implemented with hono csrf middleware.

Discussion

I'm not sure that omitting csrf checks for Simple POST request is a good idea.
CSRF prevention and CORS are different concepts even though CORS can prevent CSRF in some cases.

Release Notes

honojs/hono (hono)

`v3.11.7`

Compare Source

Security Update

This release includes a security patch that fixes the vulnerability in TrieRouter.

If you are using the default preset or hono/quick, or specifying the router as TrieRouter, you must upgrade to this version 3.11.7 immediately.

How to upgrade

For Deno

Just increment the version specifier to v3.11.7.

import { Hono } from 'https://deno.land/x/[email protected]/mod.ts'
import { serveStatic } from 'https://deno.land/x/[email protected]/middleware.ts'

For Node.js

Upgrade the hono package via npm:

npm install hono

// OR

yarn add hono

// OR

pnpm up hono

You may not update the hono package with npm update, so please use npm install.

The vulnerability detail

The clients may override named path parameter values from previous requests if the application is using TrieRouter. So, there is a risk that a privileged user may use unintended parameters when deleting REST API resources.

TrieRouter is used either explicitly or when the application matches a pattern that is not supported by the default RegExpRouter.

The advisory: GHSA-f6gv-hh8j-q8vq

Our Approach to Security

If you discover such a vulnerability, please contact us immediately. We will respond immediately; we have enabled GitHub's private vulnerability reporting feature, so please use that.

https://github.com/honojs/hono/security/advisories

Thanks.

Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v3.11.6...v3.11.7

What's Changed

fix(context): set headers values correctly by @yusukebe in https://github.com/honojs/hono/pull/1808
docs(readme): update hono/tiny size by @ryuapp in https://github.com/honojs/hono/pull/1809
fix(context): c.json() allows object and returns JSONParsed by @yusukebe in https://github.com/honojs/hono/pull/1806

New Contributors

@ryuapp made their first contribution in https://github.com/honojs/hono/pull/1809

Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v3.11.4...v3.11.5

Configuration

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If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box

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Update dependency hono to v3.11.7 [SECURITY]

a165246

renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-hono-vulnerability branch from 98574bd to a165246 Compare April 3, 2024 21:50

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Update dependency hono to v3.11.7 [SECURITY] #472

Update dependency hono to v3.11.7 [SECURITY] #472

renovate bot commented Dec 15, 2023 •

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Update dependency hono to v3.11.7 [SECURITY] #472

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Update dependency hono to v3.11.7 [SECURITY] #472

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renovate bot commented Dec 15, 2023 • edited Loading

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2023-50710

Impact

Patches

Workarounds

References

CVE-2024-32869

Summary

PoC

Impact

CVE-2024-43787

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Discussion

Release Notes

v3.11.7

Security Update

How to upgrade

For Deno

For Node.js

The vulnerability detail

Our Approach to Security

v3.11.6

What's Changed

v3.11.5

What's Changed

New Contributors

Configuration

renovate bot commented Dec 15, 2023 •

edited

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`v3.11.7`

`v3.11.6`

`v3.11.5`