Issue H-1: Anyone can call VVVVCTokenDistribution::claim
function by utilizing ClaimParams
signed by the signer
Source: #187
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Legimate users can claim their reward with the ClaimParas
signed by the signer. However, The VVVVCTokenDistribution::claim
function just checks the validity of the signed params
and doesn't check the caller is the right claimer. Hence anyone can claim the legimate users' rewards by front-running the signed ClaimParams
and because of the nonce increasement legimate users can't claim their reward.
N/A
Legimate users call claim
function with signed params.
The VVVVCTokenDistribution::claim
function is as follows:
File: VVVVCTokenDistributor.sol
106: function claim(ClaimParams memory _params) public {
107: if (claimIsPaused) {
108: revert ClaimIsPaused();
109: }
110:
111: if (_params.projectTokenProxyWallets.length != _params.tokenAmountsToClaim.length) {
112: revert ArrayLengthMismatch();
113: }
114:
115: if (_params.nonce <= nonces[_params.kycAddress]) {
116: revert InvalidNonce();
117: }
118:
119: if (!_isSignatureValid(_params)) {
120: revert InvalidSignature();
121: }
122:
123: // update nonce
124: nonces[_params.kycAddress] = _params.nonce;
125:
126: // define token to transfer
127: IERC20 projectToken = IERC20(_params.projectTokenAddress);
128:
129: // transfer tokens from each wallet to the caller
130: for (uint256 i = 0; i < _params.projectTokenProxyWallets.length; i++) {
131: projectToken.safeTransferFrom(
132: _params.projectTokenProxyWallets[i],
133: msg.sender,
134: _params.tokenAmountsToClaim[i]
135: );
136: }
137:
138: emit VCClaim(
139: _params.kycAddress,
140: _params.projectTokenAddress,
141: _params.projectTokenProxyWallets,
142: _params.tokenAmountsToClaim,
143: _params.nonce
144: );
145: }
At L119, the function check the validity of the input params.
The _isSignatureValid
function is as follows:
File: VVVVCTokenDistributor.sol
157: function _isSignatureValid(ClaimParams memory _params) private view returns (bool) {
158: bytes32 digest = keccak256(
159: abi.encodePacked(
160: "\x19\x01",
161: DOMAIN_SEPARATOR,
162: keccak256(
163: abi.encode(
164: CLAIM_TYPEHASH,
165: _params.kycAddress,
166: _params.projectTokenAddress,
167: _params.projectTokenProxyWallets,
168: _params.tokenAmountsToClaim,
169: _params.nonce,
170: _params.deadline
171: )
172: )
173: )
174: );
175:
176: address recoveredAddress = ECDSA.recover(digest, _params.signature);
177:
178: bool isSigner = recoveredAddress == signer;
179: bool isExpired = block.timestamp > _params.deadline;
180: return isSigner && !isExpired;
181: }
The function just checks if the signature is signed by the signer. The VVVVCTokenDistribution::claim
function doesn't check if the msg.sender
is the kycAddress
and this leads to anyone can claim legimate kycAddress
reward by front-running the params. Besides at L124, it increases the nonce of the kycAddress
to prevent the double claim, hence the legimate claimer
can't claim their rewards.
Though, front-running maybe hard on L2 but this leads to loss of fund to users and it will be deployed on Ethereum
also.
Anyone can claim other legimate users' rewards and the legimate users can't claim their rewards.
It is recommended to send the reward to the kycAddress
not the msg.sender
.
File: VVVVCTokenDistributor.sol
function claim(ClaimParams memory _params) public {
if (claimIsPaused) {
revert ClaimIsPaused();
}
if (_params.projectTokenProxyWallets.length != _params.tokenAmountsToClaim.length) {
revert ArrayLengthMismatch();
}
if (_params.nonce <= nonces[_params.kycAddress]) {
revert InvalidNonce();
}
if (!_isSignatureValid(_params)) {
revert InvalidSignature();
}
// update nonce
nonces[_params.kycAddress] = _params.nonce;
// define token to transfer
IERC20 projectToken = IERC20(_params.projectTokenAddress);
// transfer tokens from each wallet to the caller
for (uint256 i = 0; i < _params.projectTokenProxyWallets.length; i++) {
projectToken.safeTransferFrom(
_params.projectTokenProxyWallets[i],
- msg.sender,
+ _params.kycAddress,
_params.tokenAmountsToClaim[i]
);
}
emit VCClaim(
_params.kycAddress,
_params.projectTokenAddress,
_params.projectTokenProxyWallets,
_params.tokenAmountsToClaim,
_params.nonce
);
}