[New Rule] AWS S3 Object Encryption Using External KMS Key (elastic#3861

)

* [New Rule] AWS S3 Object Encryption Using External KMS Key

Identifies encryption events for S3 bucket objects using an AWS KMS key from an external account. Adversaries with access to a misconfigured S3 bucket and the proper permissions may encrypt objects with an external KMS key to deny their victims access to their own data.

* Update impact_s3_object_encryption_with_external_key.toml

* Update impact_s3_object_encryption_with_external_key.toml

* missing coma after tag

* missing backslash on technique reference

rules/integrations/aws/impact_s3_object_encryption_with_external_key.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2024/07/02"
+integration = ["aws"]
+maturity = "production"
+min_stack_comments = "ES|QL rule type in technical preview as of 8.13"
+min_stack_version = "8.13.0"
+updated_date = "2024/07/02"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Identifies `CopyObject` events within an S3 bucket using an AWS KMS key from an external account for encryption. Adversaries with access to a misconfigured S3 bucket and the proper permissions may encrypt objects with an external KMS key to deny their victims access to their own data.
+"""
+false_positives = [
+    """
+    Administrators within an AWS Organization structure may legitimately encrypt bucket objects with a key from an account different from the target bucket. Ensure that this behavior is not part of a legitimate operation before taking action.
+    """,
+]
+from = "now-9m"
+language = "esql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "AWS S3 Object Encryption Using External KMS Key"
+note = """
+
+## Triage and Analysis
+
+### Investigating AWS S3 Object Encryption Using External KMS Key
+
+This rule detects the use of an external AWS KMS key to encrypt objects within an S3 bucket. Adversaries with access to a misconfigured S3 bucket may use an external key to copy objects within a bucket and deny victims the ability to access their own data.
+This rule uses [ES|QL](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/rules-ui-create.html#create-esql-rule) to look for use of the `CopyObject` operation where the target bucket's `cloud.account.id` is different from the `key.account.id` dissected from the AWS KMS key used for encryption.
+
+#### Possible Investigation Steps:
+
+- **Identify the Actor**: Review the `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn` and `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.access_key_id` fields to identify who performed the action. Verify if this actor typically performs such actions and if they have the necessary permissions.
+- **Review the Request Details**: Examine the `aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters` to understand the specific details of the `CopyObject` action. Look for any unusual parameters that could suggest unauthorized or malicious modifications or usage of an unknown KMS keyId.
+- **Analyze the Source of the Request**: Investigate the `source.ip` and `source.geo` fields to determine the geographical origin of the request. An external or unexpected location might indicate compromised credentials or unauthorized access.
+- **Contextualize with Timestamp**: Use the `@timestamp` field to check when the object was copied. Changes during non-business hours or outside regular maintenance windows might require further scrutiny.
+- **Correlate with Other Activities**: Search for related CloudTrail events before and after this action to see if the same actor or IP address engaged in other potentially suspicious activities.
+- **Check for Object Deletion or Access**: Look for `DeleteObject`, `DeleteObjects`, or `GetObject` API calls to the same S3 bucket that may indicate the adversary accessing and destroying objects including older object versions.
+- **Interview Relevant Personnel**: If the copy event was initiated by a user, verify the intent and authorization for this action with the person or team responsible for managing S3 buckets.
+
+### False Positive Analysis:
+
+- **Legitimate Administrative Actions**: Confirm if the `CopyObject` action aligns with scheduled updates, maintenance activities, or legitimate administrative tasks documented in change management systems.
+- **Consistency Check**: Compare the action against historical data of similar activities performed by the user or within the organization. If the action is consistent with past legitimate activities, it might indicate a false alarm.
+
+### Response and Remediation:
+
+- **Immediate Review**: If the activity was unauthorized, search for potential ransom note placed in S3 bucket and review the bucket's access logs for any suspicious activity.
+- **Enhance Monitoring and Alerts**: Adjust monitoring systems to alert on similar `CopyObject` actions, especially those involving sensitive data or unusual file extensions.
+- **Educate and Train**: Provide additional training to users with administrative rights on the importance of security best practices concerning S3 bucket management and the risks of ransomware.
+- **Audit S3 Bucket Policies and Permissions**: Conduct a comprehensive audit of all S3 bucket policies and associated permissions to ensure they adhere to the principle of least privilege.
+- **Incident Response**: If there's an indication of malicious intent or a security breach, initiate the incident response protocol to mitigate any damage and prevent future occurrences.
+
+### Additional Information:
+
+For further guidance on managing S3 bucket security and protecting against ransomware, refer to the [AWS S3 documentation](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/Welcome.html) and AWS best practices for security. Additionally, consult the following resources for specific details on S3 ransomware protection:
+- [ERMETIC REPORT - AWS S3 Ransomware Exposure in the Wild](https://s3.amazonaws.com/bizzabo.file.upload/PtZzA0eFQwV2RA5ysNeo_ERMETIC%20REPORT%20-%20AWS%20S3%20Ransomware%20Exposure%20in%20the%20Wild.pdf)
+- [S3 Ransomware Part 1: Attack Vector](https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/)
+"""
+references = [
+    "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/UsingKMSEncryption.html/",
+    "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/APIReference/API_GenerateDataKey.html/",
+    "https://www.gem.security/post/cloud-ransomware-a-new-take-on-an-old-attack-pattern/",
+    "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/",
+]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "ab8f074c-5565-4bc4-991c-d49770e19fc9"
+setup = "AWS S3 data event types need to be enabled in the CloudTrail trail configuration."
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Cloud",
+    "Data Source: AWS",
+    "Data Source: Amazon Web Services",
+    "Data Source: AWS S3",
+    "Data Source: AWS KMS",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Impact",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "esql"
+
+query = '''
+from logs-aws.cloudtrail-*
+
+// any successful copy event
+| where event.dataset == "aws.cloudtrail" 
+    and event.provider == "s3.amazonaws.com" 
+    and event.action == "CopyObject" 
+    and event.outcome == "success"
+
+// abstract key account id, key id, encrypted object bucket name and object name
+| dissect aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters "{%{?bucketName}=%{target.bucketName},%{?x-amz-server-side-encryption-aws-kms-key-id}=%{?arn}:%{?aws}:%{?kms}:%{?region}:%{key.account.id}:%{?key}/%{keyId},%{?Host}=%{?tls.client.server_name},%{?x-amz-server-side-encryption}=%{?server-side-encryption},%{?x-amz-copy-source}=%{?bucket.objectName},%{?key}=%{target.objectName}}"
+
+// filter for s3 objects whose account id is different from the encryption key's account id
+// add exceptions based on key.account.id or keyId for known external accounts or encryption keys
+| where cloud.account.id != key.account.id 
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1486"
+name = "Data Encrypted for Impact"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0040"
+name = "Impact"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/"
+