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seL4 · Jul 7, 2024 · 69fdb48 · 69fdb48
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diff --git a/PR_372/Foundation/Summit/2024/abstracts2024.html b/PR_372/Foundation/Summit/2024/abstracts2024.html
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     Presented by Nils Wistoff, <span class="summit-abstract-affiliation">ETH Zurich</span>
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-    <mark>content TBC by author</mark><br>
     Timing channels enable information leakage across address spaces, bypassing an operating system’s security boundaries. They can result from any shared microarchitectural state that depends on previous execution and affects a system’s timing. Closing timing channels (aka “time protection”) requires strict partitioning of microarchitectural state, which is not feasible (or extremely expensive) in current ISAs.
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         Presented by Nils Wistoff, <span class="summit-abstract-affiliation">ETH Zurich</span>
     </p>
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-        <mark>content TBC by author</mark><br>
         Timing channels enable information leakage across address spaces, bypassing an operating system’s security boundaries. They can result from any shared microarchitectural state that depends on previous execution and affects a system’s timing. Closing timing channels (aka “time protection”) requires strict partitioning of microarchitectural state, which is not feasible (or extremely expensive) in current ISAs.
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