chore(deps): update rust crate built to 0.7.0 #403
Security advisories found
3 advisory(ies)
Details
Vulnerabilities
RUSTSEC-2023-0071
Marvin Attack: potential key recovery through timing sidechannels
Details | |
---|---|
Package | rsa |
Version | 0.7.2 |
URL | RustCrypto/RSA#19 (comment) |
Date | 2023-11-22 |
Impact
Due to a non-constant-time implementation, information about the private key is leaked through timing information which is observable over the network. An attacker may be able to use that information to recover the key.
Patches
No patch is yet available, however work is underway to migrate to a fully constant-time implementation.
Workarounds
The only currently available workaround is to avoid using the rsa
crate in settings where attackers are able to observe timing information, e.g. local use on a non-compromised computer is fine.
References
This vulnerability was discovered as part of the "Marvin Attack", which revealed several implementations of RSA including OpenSSL had not properly mitigated timing sidechannel attacks.
RUSTSEC-2024-0336
rustls::ConnectionCommon::complete_io
could fall into an infinite loop based on network input
Details | |
---|---|
Package | rustls |
Version | 0.20.9 |
URL | GHSA-6g7w-8wpp-frhj |
Date | 2024-04-19 |
Patched versions | >=0.23.5,>=0.22.4, <0.23.0,>=0.21.11, <0.22.0 |
If a close_notify
alert is received during a handshake, complete_io
does not terminate.
Callers which do not call complete_io
are not affected.
rustls-tokio
and rustls-ffi
do not call complete_io
and are not affected.
rustls::Stream
and rustls::StreamOwned
types use
complete_io
and are affected.
RUSTSEC-2023-0065
Tungstenite allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service
Details | |
---|---|
Package | tungstenite |
Version | 0.17.3 |
URL | snapview/tungstenite-rs#376 |
Date | 2023-09-25 |
Patched versions | >=0.20.1 |
The Tungstenite crate through 0.20.0 for Rust allows remote attackers to cause
a denial of service (minutes of CPU consumption) via an excessive length of an
HTTP header in a client handshake. The length affects both how many times a parse
is attempted (e.g., thousands of times) and the average amount of data for each
parse attempt (e.g., millions of bytes).