This is a repository of publicly-available tests used for testing ComplianceAsCode/content on Red Hat Enterprise Linux.
-
FMF - Flexible Metadata Format, a test metadata format used by TMT
-
TMT - Test Management Tool, a framework and a related CLI tool for running tests, see also user docs here or Under The Hood which explains the basic much better
-
"test" is a FMF object with a
test:
in its YAML definiton, ie./hardening/oscap/stig
- (In this case, one directory
/hardening/oscap
defines multiple tests, all sharing the same source code, parametrized using environment variables inmain.fmf
.)
- (In this case, one directory
-
"result" is a piece of data reported by a test, containing
name
- either a test name, or a test name with something appended to it, ie./hardening/oscap/stig
or/hardening/oscap/stig/some_rule_name/etc
status
- one ofpass
,fail
,info
,warn
orerror
note
- additional freeform text details about the resultlog
- a list of logs associated with the result
-
CONTEST_VERBOSE
- Set to
1
to make Beaker/TMT report all results, incl.pass
,warn
andinfo
. These are suppressed by default to avoid huge result sets.
This applies to sub-results (/something
after a test name), results for tests themselves (as seen by TMT) are always reported.
- Set to
-
CONTEST_WAIVERS
- Specify a
conf/waiver-
suffix for a waiver file name insideconf
to be used for waiving results. Ie.CONTEST_WAIVERS=upstream
to useconf/waivers-upstream
. Defaults toreleased
.
- Specify a
-
CONTEST_LEAVE_GUEST_RUNNING
- Set to
1
to break gurantees provided byclass Guest()
, that is make the context manager not honor__exit__
by leaving running guests (VMs) behind. - This is useful for debugging a failing OpenSCAP rule as you get the running virtual environment, as it was scanned, without an extra OS startup.
- SSH instructions will be provided on stdout (python log output).
- Alternatively, use
virsh domifaddr contest
to get the VM's IP address andssh
into it asroot
withcontest
as password.
- Alternatively, use
- However any tests that use more than 1 VM and rely on a shut-down VM
state between two context-managed blocks, will break.
- Because the VM was left running after the first context manager block.
- Fortunately, no such test currently exists (the use case is rare).
- Set to
Note that as the relevant TMT plan says in its description, this is just a convenience feature, it shouldn't be relied upon.
Normally, you would run this test suite via tmt
as ie.
tmt \
-c distro=rhel-9.2 \
run -vvva \
plans -n /plans/default \
provision -h ... \
discover -h fmf -t '/hardening/anaconda/stig$' \
report -h html
and this simply uses content shipped in whatever distro you specify to
provision
, or whatever distro is already installed if you use
provision -h connect ...
.
To install latest available upstream content as an RPM (built cca 15 minutes
after every push/merge to the upstream content repository), simply specify
the /plans/upstream-copr
TMT plan instead of /plans/default
.
In this context, "to waive" means to label a failing result as known-bad, something we have seen before and expect to fail.
Read WAIVERS.md to see where/how you can set up rules to automatically waive failures.
(TODO: Find a better place for this?)
The VM-using /hardening
tests do two hacks to allow login after hardening:
-oPermitRootLogin=yes
inOPTIONS
of/etc/sysconfig/sshd
- This is to bypass ssh-denied root login. Doing this seems easier than trying
to bypass several sudo-related rule remediations that disable
NOPASSWD
in/etc/sudoers
and impose other limitations. - Fortunately, current content doesn't check
/etc/sysconfig/sshd
, so no rules are failing as a result of this. :)
- This is to bypass ssh-denied root login. Doing this seems easier than trying
to bypass several sudo-related rule remediations that disable
chage -d 99999 root
- This resets the password-changed time for root, allowing us to log in again without actually changing the password (and going through pwquality checks).
The chage
specifically needs a bit more context - the binary itself has some
advanced SELinux checking for /sys/fs/selinux/access
and throws
Permission denied
even when it actually could do the change. This is why we
- set
virt_qemu_ga_t
as a permissive domain (during OS install), allowing the qemu-guest-agent (ga) to run any commands without SELinux denials - execute
setenforce 0
prior tochage
via the guest agent, foolingchage
into thinking SELinux is disabled
As a TODO, consider using sed
to edit /etc/shadow
, instead of chage
,
to avoid this complex situation.
Note that we need qemu-guest-agent to execute the chage
for us - we cannot do
it via SSH, as we get locked out the second a remediation finishes. This is fine
for oscap
, as we can simply do oscap xccdf eval ... ; chage ...
in the same
shell, but Ansible remediation cannot do this.
So we need a simple side-channel that can run chage
after ansible-playbook
finishes.
These have some unfortunate metadata, such as
- hardcoded network interface names
- unnecessarily large
/var/log/audit
size - oscap Anaconda addon configuration using
scap-security-guide
which are removed by translate_ssg_kickstart()
in virt.py.
(TODO: probably move to its own document?)
Anaconda-based remediation can be debugged on a virtual machine by issuing
virsh domifaddr contest
(where contest
is the default VM name) to acquire
an IP address of the guest (which gets assigned just before Anaconda launches)
and doing ssh root@that-ip-addr
from the host running the test itself (and
hosting the VM).
There is no password for the Anaconda environment, so this will just log you in.
Unless specified otherwise, any content within this repository is distributed under the GNU GPLv3 license, see the COPYING.txt file for more.