fix: add provider input validation & type safety #2430
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WalkthroughThe changes in this pull request introduce a comprehensive validation framework across various provider configurations, primarily focusing on URL and port validation using Pydantic types. New types such as Changes
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Actionable comments posted: 34
🧹 Outside diff range and nitpick comments (96)
keep/providers/google_chat_provider/google_chat_provider.py (1)
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50-76: Consider adding retry mechanism for notification failuresWhile the error handling is in place, network issues with webhook calls are common. A retry mechanism with exponential backoff would improve reliability.
Here's a suggested implementation:
+ from tenacity import retry, stop_after_attempt, wait_exponential + + @retry(stop=stop_after_attempt(3), wait=wait_exponential(multiplier=1, min=4, max=10)) def _notify(self, message="", **kwargs: dict): """ Notify a message to a Google Chat room using a webhook URL.This would retry failed notifications up to 3 times with exponential backoff.
keep/providers/mattermost_provider/mattermost_provider.py (2)
61-62: Remove or properly document commented channel codeThe comment about channel parameter being "bugged" lacks clarity. If the channel parameter is truly unnecessary due to webhook URL design, consider:
- Removing the commented code entirely
- Removing the unused
channelparameter from the method signature- Or if this is a known issue to be fixed, add a TODO with issue reference
- # channel is currently bugged (and unnecessary, as a webhook url is already one per channel) and so it is ignored for now - # if channel: - # payload["channel"] = channel + # Note: Channel parameter is not needed as Mattermost webhook URLs are channel-specific
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44-70: Add type hints and improve security in _notify methodSeveral improvements could enhance type safety and security:
verify=Falsedisables SSL verification, which is unsafe for production- Missing type hints on method parameters
- No validation for message/blocks parameters
- def _notify(self, message="", blocks=[], channel="", **kwargs: dict): + def _notify( + self, + message: str = "", + blocks: list[dict] = [], + channel: str = "", + **kwargs: dict + ) -> None: """ Notify alert message to Mattermost using the Mattermost Incoming Webhook API https://docs.mattermost.com/developer/webhooks-incoming.html Args: + message (str): The message to send + blocks (list[dict]): Message blocks for formatting + channel (str): Deprecated - Channel is determined by webhook URL kwargs (dict): The providers with context """ self.logger.info("Notifying alert message to Mattermost") if not message: message = blocks[0].get("text") webhook_url = self.authentication_config.webhook_url payload = {"text": message, "blocks": blocks} - response = requests.post(webhook_url, json=payload, verify=False) + response = requests.post(str(webhook_url), json=payload)keep-ui/app/providers/providers.tsx (2)
14-15: Consider adding type safety for select options.While the new properties enhance configuration flexibility, consider adding type validation to ensure the
defaultvalue matches theoptionsarray whentypeis "select".Consider this type refinement:
export interface ProviderAuthConfig { // ... other properties type?: "select" | "form" | "file" | "switch"; options?: Array<string | number>; default: string | number | boolean | null; } // Add a conditional type to ensure type safety export type ValidatedProviderAuthConfig<T extends ProviderAuthConfig> = T extends { type: "select" } ? T & { options: NonEmptyArray<string | number>; default: T['options'][number]; } : T;
18-18: Consider adding JSDoc comments for type options.The type refinement improves type safety, but documentation about when to use each type would be helpful for maintainability.
Add JSDoc comments like this:
export interface ProviderAuthConfig { /** Type of form input to render: * - "select": Dropdown with predefined options * - "form": Standard text input * - "file": File upload input * - "switch": Toggle switch for boolean values */ type?: "select" | "form" | "file" | "switch"; }keep/providers/teams_provider/teams_provider.py (1)
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65-77: Consider enhancing error handling and request reliabilityWhile the type safety improvements are great, consider these additional enhancements:
- Add specific error handling for common HTTP status codes
- Implement request timeouts
- Add retry mechanism for transient failures
Here's a suggested implementation:
+ from requests.exceptions import RequestException + from tenacity import retry, stop_after_attempt, wait_exponential + @retry( + stop=stop_after_attempt(3), + wait=wait_exponential(multiplier=1, min=4, max=10) + ) def _notify(self, message="", typeCard="MessageCard", themeColor=None, sections=[], **kwargs: dict): self.logger.debug("Notifying alert message to Teams") webhook_url = self.authentication_config.webhook_url - response = requests.post( - webhook_url, - json={ - "@type": typeCard, - "themeColor": themeColor, - "text": message, - "sections": sections, - }, - ) - if not response.ok: - raise ProviderException( - f"{self.__class__.__name__} failed to notify alert message to Teams: {response.text}" - ) + try: + response = requests.post( + webhook_url, + json={ + "@type": typeCard, + "themeColor": themeColor, + "text": message, + "sections": sections, + }, + timeout=10 + ) + response.raise_for_status() + except requests.exceptions.Timeout: + raise ProviderException("Timeout while sending message to Teams") + except requests.exceptions.HTTPError as e: + if e.response.status_code == 429: + raise ProviderException("Rate limit exceeded for Teams webhook") + elif e.response.status_code == 404: + raise ProviderException("Teams webhook URL not found") + else: + raise ProviderException(f"Failed to send message to Teams: {str(e)}") + except RequestException as e: + raise ProviderException(f"Network error while sending message to Teams: {str(e)}")keep-ui/app/providers/providers-tiles.tsx (1)
118-120: Consider using design system breakpointsThe hardcoded breakpoint values (640px, 1024px) might not align with your design system's breakpoints. Consider using Tailwind's breakpoint constants for consistency.
Here's a suggested approach using Tailwind's screen configuration:
import resolveConfig from 'tailwindcss/resolveConfig' import tailwindConfig from '../../../tailwind.config' const { theme } = resolveConfig(tailwindConfig) const screens = theme?.screens as { sm: string; lg: string } const usePanelSize = () => { const [size, setSize] = useState(40); useEffect(() => { const updateSize = () => { const width = window.innerWidth; const sm = parseInt(screens.sm); // typically 640px const lg = parseInt(screens.lg); // typically 1024px setSize(width < sm ? 100 : width < lg ? 80 : 40); }; updateSize(); window.addEventListener('resize', updateSize); return () => window.removeEventListener('resize', updateSize); }, []); return size; };keep-ui/app/providers/provider-form-scopes.tsx (3)
37-42: Add aria-label to improve button accessibilityWhile the button implementation is correct, consider adding an aria-label for better accessibility.
<Button color="gray" size="xs" icon={ArrowPathIcon} onClick={onRevalidate} variant="secondary" loading={refreshLoading} + aria-label="Refresh scopes validation status" >
61-67: Enhance validation logic robustnessConsider these improvements for better maintainability and type safety:
- Extract the magic number to a named constant
- Add null check for the validation message
- Consider using optional chaining instead of non-null assertion
+const MAX_VALIDATION_MESSAGE_LENGTH = 100; + const ProviderFormScopes = ({ /* ... */ }) => { return ( /* ... */ - {provider.scopes!.map((scope) => { + {provider.scopes?.map((scope) => { let isScopeString = - typeof validatedScopes[scope.name] === "string"; + validatedScopes[scope.name] != null && + typeof validatedScopes[scope.name] === "string"; let isScopeLong = false; if (isScopeString) { isScopeLong = - validatedScopes[scope.name].toString().length > 100; + validatedScopes[scope.name].toString().length > MAX_VALIDATION_MESSAGE_LENGTH; }
86-95: Simplify status display logicConsider extracting the status logic into constants and mappings for better maintainability.
+const VALIDATION_STATUS = { + VALID: 'Valid', + NOT_CHECKED: 'Not checked', +} as const; + +const getStatusColor = (status: any) => { + if (status === true) return 'emerald'; + if (status === undefined) return 'gray'; + return 'red'; +}; + +const getStatusText = (status: any) => { + if (status === true) return VALIDATION_STATUS.VALID; + if (status === undefined) return VALIDATION_STATUS.NOT_CHECKED; + return status; +}; <Badge - color={ - validatedScopes[scope.name] === true - ? "emerald" - : validatedScopes[scope.name] === undefined - ? "gray" - : "red" - } + color={getStatusColor(validatedScopes[scope.name])} className={`truncate ${isScopeLong ? "max-w-lg" : "max-w-xs"}`} > - {validatedScopes[scope.name] === true - ? "Valid" - : validatedScopes[scope.name] === undefined - ? "Not checked" - : validatedScopes[scope.name]} + {getStatusText(validatedScopes[scope.name])} </Badge>keep/providers/discord_provider/discord_provider.py (1)
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82-83: Consider enhancing error handling for URL-specific issuesThe TODO comment indicates a need for more error handling. Consider adding specific handling for URL-related errors (e.g., SSL errors, connection timeouts) to provide better error messages.
Example enhancement:
if response.status_code != 204: try: r = response.json() + except requests.exceptions.SSLError as e: + raise ProviderException( + f"{self.__class__.__name__} SSL verification failed for webhook URL: {str(e)}" + ) + except requests.exceptions.ConnectionError as e: + raise ProviderException( + f"{self.__class__.__name__} Failed to connect to webhook URL: {str(e)}" + ) # unknown response except Exception: raise ProviderException(keep/providers/auth0_provider/auth0_provider.py (1)
82-82: Consider enhancing error handling for the API request.While the URL construction is now safer with
HttpsUrl, the API request could benefit from more specific error handling.Consider adding specific error handling:
- response = requests.get(url, headers=headers, params=params) - response.raise_for_status() + try: + response = requests.get(url, headers=headers, params=params) + response.raise_for_status() + except requests.exceptions.RequestException as e: + raise Exception(f"Failed to query Auth0 API: {str(e)}") from ekeep/providers/bigquery_provider/bigquery_provider.py (2)
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16-31: Consider enhancing JSON validation in BigqueryProviderAuthConfig.While the file type validation is good, consider adding content validation for the service account JSON to ensure it contains required fields (like private_key, client_email, etc.).
Example enhancement:
@pydantic.dataclasses.dataclass class BigqueryProviderAuthConfig: """ BigQuery authentication configuration. """ + class ServiceAccountJSON(pydantic.BaseModel): + type: str + project_id: str + private_key_id: str + private_key: str + client_email: str + client_id: str + auth_uri: str = "https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/auth" + token_uri: str = "https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token" + auth_provider_x509_cert_url: str = "https://www.googleapis.com/oauth2/v1/certs" + client_x509_cert_url: str service_account_json: str = dataclasses.field( metadata={ "required": True, "description": "The service account JSON with container.viewer role", "sensitive": True, "type": "file", "name": "service_account_json", "file_type": "application/json", + "validators": [ServiceAccountJSON], }, )
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42-56: Consider improving project_id validation.The project_id validation logic in
validate_configcould be simplified by using Pydantic's built-in validators.Example enhancement:
@pydantic.dataclasses.dataclass class BigqueryProviderAuthConfig: project_id: Optional[str] = dataclasses.field( default=None, metadata={ "required": False, "description": "Google Cloud project ID. If not provided, " "it will try to fetch it from the environment variable 'GOOGLE_CLOUD_PROJECT'", }, ) + @pydantic.validator("project_id", pre=True, always=True) + def validate_project_id(cls, v): + if v: + return v + project_id = os.environ.get("GOOGLE_CLOUD_PROJECT") + if not project_id: + raise ValueError("Project ID must be set in either the configuration or the 'GOOGLE_CLOUD_PROJECT' environment variable.") + return project_idkeep/providers/ssh_provider/ssh_provider.py (1)
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98-103: Critical: RSA key assumption may break other key typesThe
__generate_clientmethod usesRSAKey.from_private_key()which assumes RSA format, but the file type metadata accepts other key formats (Ed25519, etc.). This mismatch could cause runtime errors.Consider updating the key loading logic to handle multiple formats:
- key = RSAKey.from_private_key( - private_key_file, self.config.authentication.get("pkey_passphrase") - ) + try: + # Try RSA first + key = RSAKey.from_private_key( + private_key_file, self.config.authentication.get("pkey_passphrase") + ) + except Exception as e: + # Reset file pointer + private_key_file.seek(0) + # Try other key types (Ed25519Key, ECDSAKey, etc.) + key = PKey.from_private_key( + private_key_file, self.config.authentication.get("pkey_passphrase") + )keep/providers/postgres_provider/postgres_provider.py (2)
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117-141: Consider refactoring connection handlingThe
_querymethod has duplicate connection closing calls (in try block and finally). Consider refactoring to:
- Use a context manager for connection handling
- Consolidate connection management logic
- def _query(self, query: str, **kwargs: dict) -> list | tuple: + def _query(self, query: str, **kwargs: dict) -> list: if not query: raise ValueError("Query is required") conn = self.__init_connection() try: - with conn.cursor() as cur: - # Open a cursor to perform database operations - cur = conn.cursor() + with conn.cursor() as cur: # Execute a simple query cur.execute(query) # Fetch the results results = cur.fetchall() - # Close the cursor and connection - cur.close() - conn.close() - return list(results) + return list(results) finally: - # Close the database connection conn.close()
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144-166: Enhance error handling for database operationsThe
_notifymethod should include more specific error handling for common database operations failures.def _notify(self, query: str, **kwargs): if not query: raise ValueError("Query is required") conn = self.__init_connection() try: with conn.cursor() as cur: - # Open a cursor to perform database operations - cur = conn.cursor() # Execute a simple query cur.execute(query) - # Close the cursor and connection - cur.close() conn.commit() - conn.close() + except psycopg2.Error as e: + self.logger.error(f"Database operation failed: {str(e)}") + raise finally: - # Close the database connection conn.close()keep/providers/openshift_provider/openshift_provider.py (3)
37-42: Add security implications to insecure flag descriptionThe description should include security implications of skipping TLS verification. This helps users make informed decisions.
- "description": "Skip TLS verification", + "description": "Skip TLS verification (Warning: This poses security risks and should only be used in development environments)",
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94-95: Consider making timeout configurableThe timeout value of 30 minutes (60 * 30) is hardcoded in multiple places. Consider making this configurable through the provider configuration.
+ timeout: int = dataclasses.field( + default=1800, # 30 minutes + metadata={ + "name": "timeout", + "description": "Timeout in seconds for OpenShift operations", + "required": False, + "sensitive": False, + }, + )Then use it in the methods:
- with oc.timeout(60 * 30), oc.tracking() as t, client: + with oc.timeout(self.authentication_config.timeout), oc.tracking() as t, client:Also applies to: 122-123
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98-102: Enhance error messages with more contextThe error messages could provide more specific information about what went wrong during login attempts. Consider including the API server URL (with sensitive parts redacted) and the specific OpenShift error message.
- self.logger.error("Error logging into the API server") - raise Exception("Error logging into the API server") + masked_url = str(self.authentication_config.api_server).replace( + self.authentication_config.api_server.host, "***") + self.logger.error(f"Failed to log into the API server at {masked_url}") + raise Exception(f"Authentication failed: {t.get_result().err}")keep/providers/cilium_provider/cilium_provider.py (1)
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16-28: Enhance type safety with custom Pydantic typesTo align with the PR's objective of improving type safety and validation:
- Consider creating a custom Pydantic type for gRPC endpoints
- Move validation logic into the type itself rather than relying on metadata
Here's a suggested approach:
from pydantic import GetJsonSchema from typing_extensions import Annotated class GrpcEndpoint(str): @classmethod def __get_validators__(cls): yield cls.validate @classmethod def validate(cls, v: str) -> str: if not isinstance(v, str): raise TypeError('string required') if '://' in v: raise ValueError('protocol prefix not allowed in gRPC endpoint') if ':' not in v: raise ValueError('port number required in gRPC endpoint') return v @classmethod def __get_pydantic_json_schema__(cls, _schema_generator: GetJsonSchema) -> dict[str, Any]: return { "type": "string", "format": "grpc-endpoint", "example": "localhost:4245" } @pydantic.dataclasses.dataclass class CiliumProviderAuthConfig: """Cilium authentication configuration.""" cilium_base_endpoint: Annotated[ GrpcEndpoint, pydantic.Field( description="The base endpoint of the cilium hubble relay", examples=["localhost:4245"] ) ]This approach provides:
- Strong type safety
- Self-contained validation logic
- Clear error messages
- OpenAPI schema support
keep/providers/uptimekuma_provider/uptimekuma_provider.py (3)
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89-106: Improve error handling and resource management in _get_heartbeats.The current implementation has several areas for improvement:
- The API connection might not be properly closed if an error occurs
- The error handling is too broad
- The return type hint is missing
Consider refactoring like this:
- def _get_heartbeats(self): + def _get_heartbeats(self) -> list[AlertDto]: api = None try: api = UptimeKumaApi(self.authentication_config.host_url) api.login( self.authentication_config.username, self.authentication_config.password ) response = api.get_heartbeats() - api.disconnect() length = len(response) if length == 0: return [] for key in response: heartbeat = response[key][-1] name = api.get_monitor(heartbeat["monitor_id"])["name"] return AlertDto( id=heartbeat["id"], name=name, monitor_id=heartbeat["monitor_id"], description=heartbeat["msg"], status=heartbeat["status"].name.lower(), lastReceived=heartbeat["time"], ping=heartbeat["ping"], source=["uptimekuma"], ) - except Exception as e: + except ConnectionError as e: self.logger.error("Error getting heartbeats from UptimeKuma: %s", e) - raise Exception(f"Error getting heartbeats from UptimeKuma: {e}") + raise ConnectionError(f"Failed to connect to UptimeKuma: {e}") + except ValueError as e: + self.logger.error("Invalid data received from UptimeKuma: %s", e) + raise ValueError(f"Invalid UptimeKuma response: {e}") + finally: + if api: + api.disconnect()
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108-115: Add type hints and improve error handling in _get_alerts.The method should have proper type hints and more specific error handling.
Consider these improvements:
- def _get_alerts(self) -> list[AlertDto]: + def _get_alerts(self) -> list[AlertDto]: try: self.logger.info("Collecting alerts (heartbeats) from UptimeKuma") alerts = self._get_heartbeats() return alerts - except Exception as e: + except (ConnectionError, ValueError) as e: self.logger.error("Error getting alerts from UptimeKuma: %s", e) - raise Exception(f"Error getting alerts from UptimeKuma: {e}") + raise
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117-134: Add input validation to _format_alert method.The static method lacks input validation for the event dictionary structure.
Consider using Pydantic models for the event structure:
class UptimeKumaMonitor(pydantic.BaseModel): id: str name: str url: str class UptimeKumaHeartbeat(pydantic.BaseModel): status: str localDateTime: str msg: str class UptimeKumaEvent(pydantic.BaseModel): monitor: UptimeKumaMonitor heartbeat: UptimeKumaHeartbeat msg: str @staticmethod def _format_alert(event: dict, provider_instance: "BaseProvider" = None) -> AlertDto: validated_event = UptimeKumaEvent.parse_obj(event) return AlertDto( id=validated_event.monitor.id, name=validated_event.monitor.name, monitor_url=validated_event.monitor.url, status=validated_event.heartbeat.status, description=validated_event.msg, lastReceived=validated_event.heartbeat.localDateTime, msg=validated_event.heartbeat.msg, source=["uptimekuma"], )keep/providers/elastic_provider/elastic_provider.py (2)
30-37: Consider removing redundant validation metadata.The
validation: any_http_urlmetadata appears redundant since the field is already typed aspydantic.AnyHttpUrl. The type itself provides the validation.host: pydantic.AnyHttpUrl | None = dataclasses.field( default=None, metadata={ "required": False, "description": "Elasticsearch host", - "validation": "any_http_url", }, )
93-95: Consider adding error handling for validation failures.While using Pydantic for validation is good, consider wrapping the config initialization in a try-except block to provide more user-friendly error messages.
def validate_config(self): """ Validate the provider config. """ - self.authentication_config = ElasticProviderAuthConfig( - **self.config.authentication - ) + try: + self.authentication_config = ElasticProviderAuthConfig( + **self.config.authentication + ) + except pydantic.ValidationError as e: + raise ValueError(f"Invalid Elasticsearch provider configuration: {str(e)}")keep/providers/grafana_oncall_provider/grafana_oncall_provider.py (1)
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90-150: Consider using proper URL path joining.While the type change to
AnyHttpUrlis good, the URL construction using f-strings could be improved to handle trailing slashes correctly. Consider usingurllib.parse.urljoinor similar for safer URL construction.Example improvement:
- url=f"{self.authentication_config.host}/{self.API_URI}/OrgService.GetOrg", + from urllib.parse import urljoin + url=urljoin(str(self.authentication_config.host), f"{self.API_URI}/OrgService.GetOrg"),This change would prevent potential issues with double slashes in URLs when the host has a trailing slash.
keep/providers/smtp_provider/smtp_provider.py (2)
30-38: Consider updating the required flag for smtp_portThe field has a sensible default value (587) but is marked as required. Consider setting
"required": Falsesince there's a default value, or document why it needs to be explicitly set despite having a default.smtp_port: UrlPort = dataclasses.field( metadata={ - "required": True, + "required": False, "description": "SMTP port", "config_main_group": "authentication", "validation": "port", }, default=587, )
21-38: Consider adding validation-specific test casesWhile the main block provides basic testing, consider adding specific test cases for the new validation types:
- Invalid server addresses (with schemes, invalid formats)
- Edge case port numbers (0, negative, > 65535)
- Different TLS/SSL configurations with various port combinations
This would help ensure the new validation logic handles all edge cases correctly and maintains backward compatibility.
keep/providers/redmine_provider/redmine_provider.py (1)
173-186: Improve error handling in _notify methodThe error handling in the notify method could be enhanced:
- Use
raise ... from eto preserve the exception chain- Add more context to error messages
- Log the response content on error
Here's a suggested implementation:
try: resp.raise_for_status() except HTTPError as e: - self.logger.error("Error While creating Redmine Issue") + error_details = {"status_code": resp.status_code} + try: + error_details["response"] = resp.json() + except ValueError: + error_details["response_text"] = resp.text + + self.logger.error( + "Failed to create Redmine issue", + extra=error_details + ) - raise Exception(f"Failed to create issue: {str(e)}") + raise Exception(f"Failed to create Redmine issue: {str(e)}") from e🧰 Tools
🪛 Ruff
182-182: Within an
exceptclause, raise exceptions withraise ... from errorraise ... from Noneto distinguish them from errors in exception handling(B904)
keep/providers/gitlab_provider/gitlab_provider.py (2)
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89-111: Security: Fix unsafe SSL handling and HTTP fallbackThe current implementation has several security concerns:
- SSL verification is disabled (
verify=False), which makes HTTPS connections vulnerable to MITM attacks- Silent fallback to HTTP could expose sensitive data
- Security-relevant decisions aren't properly logged
Consider this safer implementation:
@property def gitlab_host(self): if self._host: return self._host.rstrip("/") if self.authentication_config.host.startswith( "http://" ) or self.authentication_config.host.startswith("https://"): + self.logger.warning("Using user-provided protocol: %s", + urllib.parse.urlparse(self.authentication_config.host).scheme) self._host = self.authentication_config.host return self.authentication_config.host.rstrip("/") try: requests.get( f"https://{self.authentication_config.host}", - verify=False, + verify=True, ) self.logger.debug("Using https") self._host = f"https://{self.authentication_config.host}" return self._host.rstrip("/") - except requests.exceptions.SSLError: - self.logger.debug("Using http") - self._host = f"http://{self.authentication_config.host}" + except requests.exceptions.SSLError as e: + self.logger.error("SSL verification failed: %s", str(e)) + raise ValueError( + "SSL verification failed. Ensure the GitLab host has a valid certificate" + ) except Exception: return self.authentication_config.host.rstrip("/")
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146-161: Improve error handling and remove debug printsThe
_notifymethod has several areas for improvement:
- Debug print statements in production code
- Unvalidated kwargs passed directly to the API
- Generic error handling
Consider this improved implementation:
def _notify(self, id: str, title: str, description: str = "", labels: str = "", issue_type: str = "issue", **kwargs: dict): id = urllib.parse.quote(id, safe='') - print(id) + self.logger.debug("Creating issue for project ID: %s", id) params = self.__build_params_from_kwargs( kwargs={**kwargs, 'title': title, 'description': description, 'labels': labels, 'issue_type': issue_type}) - print(self.gitlab_host) + + # Validate known parameters + allowed_params = {'title', 'description', 'labels', 'issue_type', 'assignee_id', 'milestone_id'} + unknown_params = set(kwargs.keys()) - allowed_params + if unknown_params: + self.logger.warning("Unknown parameters passed to notify: %s", unknown_params) + resp = requests.post(f"{self.gitlab_host}/api/v4/projects/{id}/issues", headers=self.__get_auth_header(), params=params) try: resp.raise_for_status() except HTTPError as e: - raise Exception(f"Failed to create issue: {str(e)}") + error_detail = e.response.json() if e.response.headers.get('content-type') == 'application/json' else str(e) + raise Exception(f"Failed to create GitLab issue: {error_detail}") return resp.json()keep/providers/mongodb_provider/mongodb_provider.py (2)
20-27: Fix typo in host field hint messageThe hint message contains a typo in "paassword".
- "hint": "any valid mongo host_uri like mongodb://host:port, user:paassword@host:port?authSource", + "hint": "any valid mongo host_uri like mongodb://host:port, user:password@host:port?authSource",The change to
pydantic.AnyUrltype is a good improvement for validation.
125-127: Consider making timeout configurableThe hardcoded timeout value of 10 seconds might not be suitable for all environments. Consider making it configurable through the provider configuration.
+ DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS = 10000 + def __generate_client(self): - client = MongoClient( - **client_conf, **additional_options, serverSelectionTimeoutMS=10000 - ) # 10 seconds timeout + timeout_ms = additional_options.get('serverSelectionTimeoutMS', self.DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS) + client = MongoClient( + **client_conf, + **additional_options, + serverSelectionTimeoutMS=timeout_ms + )keep/providers/ntfy_provider/ntfy_provider.py (1)
33-41: Enhance field documentation with validation rules.The metadata description could be more specific about the URL validation rules to help users provide correct input.
host: pydantic.AnyHttpUrl | None = dataclasses.field( metadata={ "required": False, - "description": "Ntfy Host URL (For self-hosted Ntfy only)", + "description": "Ntfy Host URL (For self-hosted Ntfy only). Must be a valid HTTP/HTTPS URL with protocol.", "sensitive": False, "hint": "http://localhost:80", "validation": "any_http_url", }, default=None, )keep/providers/webhook_provider/webhook_provider.py (2)
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82-89: Enhance URL validation security measures.The current blacklist-based validation might be insufficient to prevent Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks. Consider:
- Using a whitelist approach for allowed domains
- Validating URL schemes (restrict to http/https)
- Implementing network-level restrictions
Example implementation:
ALLOWED_SCHEMES = {'http', 'https'} ALLOWED_DOMAINS = {'api.example.com', 'webhook.internal'} def __validate_url(self, url: str): parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(url) if parsed.scheme not in self.ALLOWED_SCHEMES: raise ValueError(f"URL scheme must be one of {self.ALLOWED_SCHEMES}") if parsed.hostname not in self.ALLOWED_DOMAINS: raise ValueError(f"Domain not in allowed list: {parsed.hostname}")
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156-187: Implement request timeouts and response size limits.The HTTP request handling could be improved to handle edge cases and prevent potential issues:
- Missing request timeouts could lead to hanging connections
- Large responses could cause memory issues
- No retry mechanism for transient failures
Example improvements:
def _query(self, url: str, ..., timeout: int = 30, max_response_size: int = 10_485_760): # Add timeout and size limit if method == "GET": response = requests.get( url, headers=headers, params=params, timeout=timeout, stream=True, # Stream to check size **kwargs ) # Check response size content_length = response.headers.get('Content-Length') if content_length and int(content_length) > max_response_size: response.close() raise ValueError(f"Response too large: {content_length} bytes")keep/providers/grafana_incident_provider/grafana_incident_provider.py (3)
24-32: Enhance validation metadata documentationWhile the type safety improvement using
HttpsUrlis excellent, consider enhancing the validation metadata to be more specific about URL requirements:host_url: HttpsUrl = dataclasses.field( metadata={ "required": True, - "description": "Grafana Host URL", + "description": "Grafana Host URL (must be HTTPS)", "sensitive": False, "validation": "https_url", + "example": "https://grafana.example.com", }, default=None, )
128-131: Consider making API endpoint paths more maintainableThe hardcoded API paths could be made more maintainable:
+ API_INCIDENTS_PATH = "/api/plugins/grafana-incident-app/resources/api/v1/IncidentsService.QueryIncidentPreviews" + def _get_alerts(self) -> list[AlertDto]: try: response = requests.post( urljoin( self.authentication_config.host_url, - "/api/plugins/grafana-incident-app/resources/api/v1/IncidentsService.QueryIncidentPreviews", + self.API_INCIDENTS_PATH, ),This change would:
- Make the API paths more maintainable
- Reduce duplication (same path is used in validate_scopes)
- Make it easier to update API versions in the future
198-201: Consider more robust environment variable handlingWhile the error message is clear, consider using a more robust pattern for environment variable validation:
- if host_url is None or api_token is None: - raise Exception( - "GRAFANA_HOST_URL and GRAFANA_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN environment variables are required" - ) + required_env_vars = { + "GRAFANA_HOST_URL": host_url, + "GRAFANA_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN": api_token, + } + missing_vars = [name for name, value in required_env_vars.items() if not value] + if missing_vars: + raise Exception( + f"Missing required environment variables: {', '.join(missing_vars)}" + )This approach:
- Makes it easier to add new required variables
- Provides more specific error messages
- Follows a more maintainable pattern
keep/providers/kubernetes_provider/kubernetes_provider.py (1)
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82-91: Consider adding test cases for URL validation edge cases.The
__create_k8s_clientmethod uses the validated URL, but we should ensure proper test coverage for various URL formats and error cases:
- Invalid URLs
- URLs with different protocols
- URLs with and without ports
- Internal cluster URLs
Consider adding test cases to verify the URL validation behavior:
def test_kubernetes_provider_url_validation(): # Test valid URLs valid_configs = [ {"api_server": "https://api.k8s.example.com", "token": "test"}, {"api_server": "https://localhost:6443", "token": "test"}, {"api_server": "https://10.0.0.1:6443", "token": "test"}, ] # Test invalid URLs invalid_configs = [ {"api_server": "not-a-url", "token": "test"}, {"api_server": "http://api.k8s.example.com", "token": "test"}, # If only https is allowed ]keep/providers/squadcast_provider/squadcast_provider.py (2)
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144-144: Fix typo in method name '_crete_notes'The method name contains a typo: '_crete_notes' should be '_create_notes'.
- def _crete_notes( + def _create_notes(
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140-144: Add type hints to method parametersConsider adding type hints to improve code maintainability and type safety. This aligns with the PR's focus on type safety.
def _create_incidents( self, - headers: dict, - message: str, - description: str, - tags: dict = {}, - priority: str = "", - status: str = "", - event_id: str = "", - additional_json: str = "", + headers: dict[str, str], + message: str, + description: str, + tags: dict[str, str] = {}, + priority: str = "", + status: str = "", + event_id: str = "", + additional_json: str = "", ) -> requests.Response:keep/providers/gke_provider/gke_provider.py (3)
28-28: LGTM! Consider enhancing service account JSON validation.The change to use MIME type
application/jsoninstead of.jsonextension is good. However, consider strengthening the validation further:service_account_json: str = dataclasses.field( metadata={ "required": True, "description": "The service account JSON with container.viewer role", "sensitive": True, "type": "file", "name": "service_account_json", "file_type": "application/json", + "max_size_bytes": 16384, # 16KB should be more than enough for service account JSON + "json_schema": { + "type": "object", + "required": ["type", "project_id", "private_key_id", "private_key", "client_email"], + "properties": { + "type": {"const": "service_account"} + } + } } )
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1-199: Enhance type safety across the implementation.While the PR adds basic Pydantic validation, there are several opportunities to improve type safety:
- Use specific exceptions instead of catching generic
Exception- Convert command types to an enum
- Add comprehensive type hints
- Document and type the query kwargs
Here's a suggested approach:
from enum import Enum from typing import Dict, List, Optional, TypedDict, Union class GkeCommandType(Enum): GET_PODS = "get_pods" GET_PVC = "get_pvc" GET_NODE_PRESSURE = "get_node_pressure" class NodePressure(TypedDict): name: str conditions: List[Dict] class GkeProvider(BaseProvider): def __init__( self, context_manager: ContextManager, provider_id: str, config: ProviderConfig ) -> None: try: self._service_account_data = json.loads( self.authentication_config.service_account_json ) except json.JSONDecodeError as e: self._service_account_data = None raise ValueError(f"Invalid service account JSON: {e}") def _query( self, command_type: GkeCommandType, **kwargs: Dict[str, Union[str, int, bool]] ) -> Union[List[Dict], List[NodePressure]]: """Query GKE resources. Args: command_type: The type of query to perform **kwargs: Additional arguments for the query Supported kwargs depend on command_type: - GET_PODS: namespace (str, optional) - GET_PVC: namespace (str, optional) - GET_NODE_PRESSURE: No additional kwargs Returns: List of resources matching the query Raises: NotImplementedError: If command_type is not supported """
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89-91: Strengthen input validation for region and cluster_name.The current validation is minimal. Consider adding proper validation rules for GCP regions and GKE cluster names.
@pydantic.dataclasses.dataclass class GkeProviderAuthConfig: """GKE authentication configuration.""" service_account_json: str = dataclasses.field(...) - cluster_name: str = dataclasses.field( + cluster_name: pydantic.constr( + regex=r'^[a-z0-9-]{1,40}$' + ) = dataclasses.field( metadata={"required": True, "description": "The name of the cluster"} ) - region: str = dataclasses.field( + region: pydantic.constr( + regex=r'^[a-z]+-[a-z]+\d+(?:-[a-z])?$' + ) = dataclasses.field( default="us-central1", metadata={ "required": False, "description": "The GKE cluster region", "hint": "us-central1", }, )keep/providers/opsgenie_provider/opsgenie_provider.py (3)
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24-28: Add type validation for OpsGenieRecipientThe
typefield should be validated against OpsGenie's specific recipient types for better type safety.Consider using Pydantic's literal types:
+from typing import Literal + class OpsGenieRecipient(pydantic.BaseModel): # https://github.com/opsgenie/opsgenie-python-sdk/blob/master/docs/Recipient.md - type: str + type: Literal["team", "user", "escalation", "schedule"] id: typing.Optional[str] = None
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89-106: Add comprehensive input validation for alert creation parametersSeveral parameters in
_create_alertcould benefit from stronger type validation to prevent invalid inputs early.Consider creating a validated model for alert creation:
from typing import Literal from pydantic import BaseModel, HttpUrl, constr class CreateAlertRequest(BaseModel): user: Optional[constr(max_length=100)] note: Optional[constr(max_length=25000)] source: Optional[HttpUrl] message: constr(min_length=1, max_length=130) alias: Optional[constr(max_length=512)] description: Optional[constr(max_length=25000)] responders: Optional[List[OpsGenieRecipient]] visible_to: Optional[List[OpsGenieRecipient]] actions: Optional[List[str]] tags: Optional[List[str]] details: Optional[Dict[str, str]] entity: Optional[str] priority: Optional[Literal["P1", "P2", "P3", "P4", "P5"]]Then modify the method signature:
- def _create_alert( - self, - user: str | None = None, - note: str | None = None, - ... + def _create_alert(self, request: CreateAlertRequest):
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196-208: Add validation for query parametersThe
_querymethod should validate thequery_typeparameter against allowed values.Consider using a validated model:
class QueryRequest(BaseModel): query_type: Literal["alerts"] query: str def _query(self, request: QueryRequest, **kwargs: dict): api_instance = opsgenie_sdk.AlertApi(opsgenie_sdk.ApiClient(self.configuration)) if request.query_type == "alerts": alerts = api_instance.list_alerts(query=request.query) else: raise NotImplementedError(f"Query type {request.query_type} not implemented")keep/providers/victoriametrics_provider/victoriametrics_provider.py (2)
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109-125: Ensure comprehensive testing of HTTP interactions.The URL validation changes affect multiple HTTP interaction points:
validate_scopes(): Client connection validation_get_alerts(): Alert retrieval_query(): Query executionConsider adding integration tests to verify these interactions with the new URL validation.
Would you like me to help create integration tests covering these HTTP interaction scenarios?
Also applies to: 186-241
The URL handling logic needs to be updated for AnyHttpUrl type safety
The current implementation has two issues with the new
AnyHttpUrltype:
- The manual protocol detection logic is redundant since
AnyHttpUrlalready validates and requires a protocol (http/https) in the URL- The URL construction with string concatenation (
f"https://{host}") bypasses the type safety provided byAnyHttpUrlRequired changes:
- Remove the manual protocol detection logic since
VMAlertURLandVMAlertHostare already validated as proper URLs byAnyHttpUrl- Use the validated URL directly from
authentication_config.VMAlertURLorVMAlertHostwithout string manipulation- Remove the SSL error handling as it's no longer needed with validated URLs
The code should trust the URL validation done by the Pydantic type system rather than implementing its own protocol detection.
🔗 Analysis chain
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142-185: Verify URL handling logic with new types.The
vmalert_hostproperty performs URL construction and protocol detection. With the newAnyHttpUrltype, verify that:
- The URL construction logic handles the new types correctly
- The protocol detection still works as expected with the validated URLs
Let me gather more information about the URL validation types to make a complete assessment.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Description: Check URL handling patterns across the codebase # Check for similar URL construction patterns that might need updates rg -A 5 "startswith\(\"https://\"\) or .startswith\(\"http://\"\)" # Look for other protocol detection implementations rg -A 5 "requests.exceptions.SSLError"Length of output: 3393
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check for AnyHttpUrl type usage and related URL validation rg -A 5 "AnyHttpUrl" # Check the authentication config class ast-grep --pattern 'class VictoriametricsProviderAuthConfig'Length of output: 13665
keep/providers/prometheus_provider/prometheus_provider.py (3)
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21-28: Consider using URL path joining instead of string interpolation.The URL validation is good, but the usage of string interpolation in
_query()and_get_alerts()methods could potentially create malformed URLs. Consider usingurllib.parse.urljoin()for safer URL path joining.Example implementation:
+from urllib.parse import urljoin def _query(self, query): - response = requests.get( - f"{self.authentication_config.url}/api/v1/query", + response = requests.get( + urljoin(str(self.authentication_config.url), "api/v1/query"), params={"query": query}, auth=auth, ) def _get_alerts(self) -> list[AlertDto]: - response = requests.get( - f"{self.authentication_config.url}/api/v1/alerts", + response = requests.get( + urljoin(str(self.authentication_config.url), "api/v1/alerts"), auth=auth, )
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21-28: Enhance error handling for URL-related issues.With the stricter URL validation, consider improving error handling to provide more specific feedback for URL-related issues:
Example implementation:
from urllib.parse import urljoin from requests.exceptions import RequestException class PrometheusError(Exception): """Base exception for Prometheus provider.""" pass class PrometheusConnectionError(PrometheusError): """Raised when there are connection issues.""" pass def _query(self, query): try: response = requests.get( urljoin(str(self.authentication_config.url), "api/v1/query"), params={"query": query}, auth=auth, timeout=30, # Add timeout ) response.raise_for_status() except RequestException as e: raise PrometheusConnectionError(f"Failed to query Prometheus: {str(e)}") return response.json()
URL field type change needs additional validation for API endpoints
The verification reveals that the URL is used with API path suffixes (
/api/v1/queryand/api/v1/alerts) through string concatenation. Whilepydantic.AnyHttpUrlvalidates the base URL format, there are potential issues:
- The URL field's hint suggests a specific endpoint format (
/api/prom), but the code uses different endpoints (/api/v1/...)- String concatenation with API paths could lead to double slashes if the base URL ends with a trailing slash
Suggested improvements:
- Add a custom validator to ensure the base URL doesn't end with a trailing slash
- Update the hint to match the actual API version used in the code (
/api/v1/)- Consider using
urljoinfor safer URL path joining🔗 Analysis chain
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21-28: LGTM! The URL field type change enhances input validation.The change from
strtopydantic.AnyHttpUrlaligns well with the PR objectives to improve provider input validation. This ensures that only valid HTTP/HTTPS URLs are accepted.Let's verify the URL usage in the codebase:
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Description: Check if the URL is properly validated in all contexts # Expected: No direct string concatenation with the URL that could bypass validation # Check for potential URL string concatenation rg -A 2 "f\"{.*?url.*?}.*?/" keep/providers/prometheus_provider/prometheus_provider.py # Check for URL usage in query methods ast-grep --pattern 'def _query($params) { $$$ requests.get($url, $$$) $$$ }'Length of output: 275
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Let's try different approaches to verify URL usage # Check how the URL is used in the prometheus provider rg -A 3 "\.url" keep/providers/prometheus_provider/prometheus_provider.py # Look for request calls that might use the URL rg -A 3 "requests\.(get|post)" keep/providers/prometheus_provider/prometheus_provider.py # Check the complete implementation of methods that might use URL ast-grep --pattern 'def _query' ast-grep --pattern 'def _get_alerts'Length of output: 796
tests/e2e_tests/test_end_to_end.py (2)
156-159: Enhance test documentationConsider expanding the docstring to describe the specific validation types being tested and the providers covered. This would make it easier for other developers to understand the test coverage.
Example enhancement:
def test_provider_validation(browser): """ - Test field validation for provider fields. + Test field validation for provider configuration inputs. + + Validates: + - Required fields + - URL formats (http, https, no scheme) + - Port number ranges + - Top-level domain formats + + Providers tested: + - Kibana (any_http_url, port) + - Teams (https_url) + - Site24x7 (tld) + - MongoDB (any_url) + - PostgreSQL (no_scheme_url) """
164-267: Add additional URL validation test casesWhile the current test coverage is good, consider adding these important validation scenarios:
- URLs with trailing slashes
- URLs with query parameters
- URLs containing special characters
- URLs with basic auth components
Also, consider reducing code duplication by extracting common validation patterns into helper functions:
def validate_url_field(browser, placeholder, test_cases): """Helper to test URL field validation with multiple test cases.""" for url, should_pass in test_cases: browser.get_by_placeholder(placeholder).fill(url) browser.get_by_role("button", name="Connect", exact=True).click() if should_pass: expect(browser.locator("p.tremor-TextInput-errorMessage")).to_be_hidden() else: expect(browser.locator("p.tremor-TextInput-errorMessage")).to_have_count(1) # Usage example: test_cases = [ ("https://example.com", True), ("https://example.com/", True), ("https://example.com?param=value", True), ("invalid-url", False) ] validate_url_field(browser, "Enter webhook_url", test_cases)keep/providers/appdynamics_provider/appdynamics_provider.py (1)
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102-111: Consider removing redundant URL protocol validation.Now that
pydantic.AnyHttpUrlhandles URL validation, the manual protocol check invalidate_configmight be redundant. Pydantic will ensure the URL has a valid scheme.Consider this simplified version:
def validate_config(self): """ Validates required configuration for AppDynamics provider. """ self.authentication_config = AppdynamicsProviderAuthConfig( **self.config.authentication ) - if not self.authentication_config.host.startswith( - "https://" - ) and not self.authentication_config.host.startswith("http://"): - self.authentication_config.host = ( - f"https://{self.authentication_config.host}" - )keep/providers/splunk_provider/splunk_provider.py (1)
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143-186: Enhance error handling for SSL-specific errorsThe error handling should be extended to handle SSL-specific exceptions that might occur when verify=True.
Add specific handling for SSL errors:
except ConnectionRefusedError: self.logger.exception( "Error connecting to Splunk", ) validated_scopes = dict( [[scope.name, "CONNECTION_REFUSED"] for scope in self.PROVIDER_SCOPES] ) + except ssl.SSLError as e: + self.logger.exception( + "SSL error connecting to Splunk", + extra={"error": str(e)} + ) + validated_scopes = dict( + [[scope.name, "SSL_ERROR"] for scope in self.PROVIDER_SCOPES] + ) except ParseError as e:keep/providers/ilert_provider/ilert_provider.py (2)
47-54: LGTM: Enhanced type safety for ilert_host fieldThe change from
strtoHttpsUrlwith validation metadata improves type safety and input validation. The default value is appropriate for the service.Consider adding a description of accepted URL formats in the hint metadata to help users understand the validation requirements.
ilert_host: HttpsUrl = dataclasses.field( metadata={ "required": False, "description": "ILert API host", - "hint": "https://api.ilert.com/api", + "hint": "HTTPS URL (e.g., https://api.ilert.com/api)", "validation": "https_url" }, default="https://api.ilert.com/api", )
108-114: Improve error handling for read_permission validationConsider adding error details to the log message and implementing retry logic for transient failures.
try: if scope.name == "read_permission": res = requests.get( f"{self.authentication_config.ilert_host}/incidents", headers={ "Authorization": self.authentication_config.ilert_token }, + timeout=30, # Add timeout ) res.raise_for_status() + self.logger.debug("Read permission validated successfully") scopes[scope.name] = Truekeep/providers/servicenow_provider/servicenow_provider.py (2)
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173-173: Security concern: SSL verification is disabledWhile the code enforces HTTPS URLs through type validation, the requests are made with
verify=False. This bypasses SSL certificate verification, potentially exposing the application to man-in-the-middle attacks.Apply this change to enable SSL verification:
- verify=False, + verify=True,Consider adding a configuration option if SSL verification needs to be optional for development/testing environments:
verify_ssl: bool = dataclasses.field( default=True, metadata={ "required": False, "description": "Enable/disable SSL certificate verification", "sensitive": False, } )Also applies to: 271-271, 363-363
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173-182: Refactor suggestion: Centralize HTTP request configurationThe code duplicates HTTP request configuration across multiple methods. Consider extracting this into a helper method to improve maintainability and consistency.
Consider adding a helper method:
def _make_request(self, method: str, url: str, **kwargs) -> requests.Response: """Make an HTTP request with standard configuration.""" headers = { "Content-Type": "application/json", "Accept": "application/json" } if self._access_token: headers["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {self._access_token}" auth = None if self._access_token else ( self.authentication_config.username, self.authentication_config.password, ) return requests.request( method=method, url=url, headers=headers, auth=auth, verify=True, # Enable SSL verification timeout=10, **kwargs )Usage example:
response = self._make_request( "GET", f"{self.authentication_config.service_now_base_url}/api/now/table/{table_name}", params=kwargs )Also applies to: 271-280, 363-372
keep/providers/jira_provider/jira_provider.py (2)
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166-172: Simplify jira_host propertyWith
HttpsUrltype ensuring proper URL format, the protocol check becomes redundant.@property def jira_host(self): - host = ( - self.authentication_config.host - if self.authentication_config.host.startswith("https://") - else f"https://{self.authentication_config.host}" - ) - return host + return str(self.authentication_config.host)
SSL verification is disabled across multiple providers
The security concern about disabled SSL verification extends beyond the Jira provider. This is a widespread pattern found across multiple provider implementations:
- VictoriaMetrics provider
- Splunk provider
- ServiceNow provider (multiple instances)
- Mattermost provider
- Redmine provider
- GitLab provider
- JiraOnPrem provider
- Jira provider
- Graylog provider
- Grafana provider
Recommended solution:
- Add SSL verification configuration to the base provider configuration class
- Propagate this setting to all providers
- Default to
verify=Truefor security- Allow users to disable verification only when absolutely necessary (e.g., self-signed certificates in internal environments)
Example configuration addition:
class BaseProviderConfig: verify_ssl: bool = dataclasses.field( default=True, metadata={ "required": False, "description": "Verify SSL certificates for HTTPS connections", "sensitive": False } )🔗 Analysis chain
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493-503: Security: SSL verification is disabledWhile the URL construction is correct, the
verify=Falseparameter in the requests call disables SSL certificate verification, which could expose the application to MITM attacks.Let's check if this is a pattern across the codebase:
Consider:
- Enabling SSL verification by removing
verify=False- If SSL verification is problematic in certain environments, make it configurable:
@pydantic.dataclasses.dataclass class JiraProviderAuthConfig: # ... existing fields ... + verify_ssl: bool = dataclasses.field( + default=True, + metadata={ + "required": False, + "description": "Verify SSL certificates", + "sensitive": False + } + )🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check for other instances of disabled SSL verification rg --type python "verify\s*=\s*False" -B 2 -A 2Length of output: 80
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check for other instances of disabled SSL verification with ripgrep # Using a simpler pattern and file extension rg "verify=False" -g "*.py" -B 2 -A 2Length of output: 20552
keep/providers/kibana_provider/kibana_provider.py (2)
35-42: Consider making the hint more genericThe hint example uses a specific domain which might not be applicable to all users. Consider using a more generic example.
- "hint": "https://keep.kb.us-central1.gcp.cloud.es.io", + "hint": "https://your-kibana-instance.example.com",
43-49: Enhance port documentationConsider adding valid port range information to the hint to help users understand the acceptable values.
"required": False, - "description": "Kibana Port (defaults to 9243)", + "description": "Kibana Port (defaults to 9243, valid range: 1-65535)",keep/providers/openobserve_provider/openobserve_provider.py (2)
49-54: Remove redundant validation metadata foropenObserveHost.The
validationfield in metadata is redundant since Pydantic'sAnyHttpUrltype already enforces URL validation.openObserveHost: pydantic.AnyHttpUrl = dataclasses.field( metadata={ "required": True, "description": "OpenObserve host url", - "hint": "e.g. http://localhost", - "validation": "any_http_url" + "hint": "e.g. http://localhost" }, )
58-63: Remove redundant validation metadata foropenObservePort.The
validationfield in metadata is redundant since the customUrlPorttype already enforces port validation.openObservePort: UrlPort = dataclasses.field( metadata={ "required": True, "description": "OpenObserve Port", - "hint": "e.g. 5080", - "validation": "port" + "hint": "e.g. 5080" }, )keep/providers/sentry_provider/sentry_provider.py (1)
37-45: Consider adding support for custom Sentry instancesWhile enforcing HTTPS is good security practice, some organizations might use custom Sentry instances with different URL patterns. Consider:
- Adding validation for custom domain patterns
- Documenting supported URL formats in the field's hint
api_url: HttpsUrl = dataclasses.field( metadata={ "required": False, "description": "Sentry API URL", - "hint": "https://sentry.io/api/0 (see https://docs.sentry.io/api/)", + "hint": "HTTPS URL to your Sentry instance API (e.g., https://sentry.io/api/0 or https://sentry.your-domain.com/api/0)", "sensitive": False, "validation": "https_url" }, default="https://sentry.io/api/0", )keep/providers/zabbix_provider/zabbix_provider.py (1)
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326-327: Add trailing slash handling in URL construction.When constructing the API endpoint URL, ensure consistent handling of trailing slashes to prevent potential issues. Consider using
urllib.parse.urljoinfor safer URL concatenation.- url = f"{self.authentication_config.zabbix_frontend_url}/api_jsonrpc.php" + from urllib.parse import urljoin + url = urljoin(str(self.authentication_config.zabbix_frontend_url), "api_jsonrpc.php")keep/providers/grafana_provider/grafana_provider.py (6)
38-44: Consider using HttpUrl instead of AnyHttpUrl for stricter HTTPS enforcementWhile using
pydantic.AnyHttpUrlimproves type safety, consider usingpydantic.HttpUrlinstead to enforce HTTPS, which is more secure for production environments. If HTTP support is required for local development, this should be explicitly documented.- host: pydantic.AnyHttpUrl = dataclasses.field( + host: pydantic.HttpUrl = dataclasses.field( metadata={ "required": True, "description": "Grafana host", - "hint": "e.g. https://keephq.grafana.net", + "hint": "HTTPS URL (e.g. https://keephq.grafana.net). For local development, use HTTP URLs like http://localhost:3000", "validation": "any_http_url" }, )
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200-300: Security: SSL verification is disabledThe code uses
verify=Falsein multiple HTTP requests, which disables SSL certificate verification. This is unsafe and could lead to man-in-the-middle attacks.Consider:
- Enabling SSL verification by default
- Adding a configuration option for SSL verification
- Adding proper error handling for SSL certificate issues
- response = requests.get(contacts_api, verify=False, headers=headers) + response = requests.get(contacts_api, verify=True, headers=headers)
Line range hint
249-251: Inconsistent string formattingThe code mixes f-strings and
.format(). For consistency and readability, stick to f-strings which are more readable and maintainable.- self.logger.info('Creating webhook with name "{webhook_name}"') + self.logger.info(f'Creating webhook with name "{webhook_name}"')
Line range hint
234-236: Extract version comparison to a constantThe version comparison
9.4.7is hardcoded in multiple places. Consider extracting it to a class constant for better maintainability.+ MINIMUM_SUPPORTED_VERSION = "9.4.7" + def setup_webhook(self, tenant_id: str, keep_api_url: str, api_key: str, setup_alerts: bool = True): # ... - if Version(grafana_version) > Version("9.4.7"): + if Version(grafana_version) > Version(self.MINIMUM_SUPPORTED_VERSION):
Line range hint
1-450: Add type hints to improve type safetySince this PR focuses on type safety, consider adding type hints to method parameters and return values throughout the file. This would complement the Pydantic validation and make the code more maintainable.
Example for the
setup_webhookmethod:- def setup_webhook(self, tenant_id: str, keep_api_url: str, api_key: str, setup_alerts: bool = True): + def setup_webhook( + self, + tenant_id: str, + keep_api_url: str, + api_key: str, + setup_alerts: bool = True + ) -> None:
Line range hint
200-300: Refactor setup_webhook method for better maintainabilityThe
setup_webhookmethod is quite long (100+ lines) and handles multiple responsibilities. Consider splitting it into smaller, focused methods:
_get_contact_points_create_or_update_webhook_setup_alert_policiesThis would improve readability and make the code easier to test.
keep/providers/graylog_provider/graylog_provider.py (2)
48-54: Consider removing redundant validation metadata.The
validationmetadata entry "any_http_url" is redundant since the field typepydantic.AnyHttpUrlalready enforces URL validation.deployment_url: pydantic.AnyHttpUrl = dataclasses.field( metadata={ "required": True, "description": "Deployment Url", "hint": "Example: http://127.0.0.1:9000", - "validation": "any_http_url" }, )
48-54: Refactor URL handling logic to leverage AnyHttpUrl validation.Since
deployment_urlis now validated usingpydantic.AnyHttpUrl, the complex URL handling in thegraylog_hostproperty could be simplified. The current implementation attempts HTTP/HTTPS connections which may not be necessary as the URL scheme is now guaranteed by the type.Consider simplifying the
graylog_hostproperty:@property def graylog_host(self): self.logger.debug("Fetching Graylog host") if self._host: self.logger.debug("Returning cached Graylog host") return self._host - - # Handle host determination logic with logging - if self.authentication_config.deployment_url.startswith( - "http://" - ) or self.authentication_config.deployment_url.startswith("https://"): - self.logger.info("Using supplied Graylog host with protocol") - self._host = self.authentication_config.deployment_url - return self._host - - # Otherwise, attempt to use https - try: - self.logger.debug( - f"Trying HTTPS for {self.authentication_config.deployment_url}" - ) - requests.get( - f"https://{self.authentication_config.deployment_url}", - verify=False, - ) - self.logger.info("HTTPS protocol confirmed") - self._host = f"https://{self.authentication_config.deployment_url}" - except requests.exceptions.SSLError: - self.logger.warning("SSL error encountered, falling back to HTTP") - self._host = f"http://{self.authentication_config.deployment_url}" - except Exception as e: - self.logger.error( - "Failed to determine Graylog host", extra={"exception": str(e)} - ) - self._host = self.authentication_config.deployment_url.rstrip("/") - + self._host = str(self.authentication_config.deployment_url).rstrip("/") return self._hostAlso applies to: 134-166
keep/parser/parser.py (4)
Line range hint
673-686: Enhance error handling for provider configurationThe current error handling for missing provider configurations could be improved:
- The fallback to empty authentication without validation could lead to runtime issues
- The warning message could be more specific about the required configuration format
Consider this improvement:
if not provider_config: self.logger.warning( - "Provider not found in configuration, did you configure it?", + "Provider configuration missing or invalid. Please ensure the provider is properly configured in your providers.yaml or environment variables.", extra={ "provider_id": config_id, "provider_type": provider_type, "provider_config": provider_config, "tenant_id": context_manager.tenant_id, }, ) - provider_config = {"authentication": {}} + raise ValueError(f"Missing required configuration for provider '{config_id}' of type '{provider_type}'")
317-319: LGTM: Good logging improvementsThe addition of debug logging enhances observability. Consider standardizing the log message format across all debug statements for consistency.
Consider this format for consistency:
- self.logger.debug("Workflow providers parsed successfully") + self.logger.debug("Successfully parsed workflow providers", extra={"workflow_id": workflow.get("id")})
Line range hint
1-824: Consider splitting Parser class into smaller, focused classesThe
Parserclass has grown to handle multiple responsibilities (workflows, providers, actions), violating the Single Responsibility Principle. This makes the code harder to maintain and test.Consider:
- Split into separate classes:
WorkflowParserProviderParserActionParser- Create a facade class to coordinate these parsers
- Use dependency injection for better testability
This refactoring would:
- Improve maintainability
- Make the code easier to test
- Reduce cognitive complexity
- Make it easier to add new parsing features
Line range hint
644-644: Address TODO comment for provider ID extractionThe TODO comment "FIX THIS SHIT" is not descriptive and indicates a known issue with the provider ID extraction logic.
Would you like me to help implement a more robust provider ID extraction method? I can:
- Implement proper regex-based parsing
- Add comprehensive validation
- Create appropriate error messages
- Add unit tests
Let me know if you'd like me to open a GitHub issue to track this improvement.
keep/providers/newrelic_provider/newrelic_provider.py (2)
41-47: Enhance URL validation with additional constraintsWhile the switch to
HttpsUrltype is good, consider adding these additional validations for the New Relic API URL:
- Maximum length constraint
- Allowed domains validation
new_relic_api_url: HttpsUrl = dataclasses.field( metadata={ "required": False, "description": "New Relic API URL", - "validation": "https_url" + "validation": "https_url", + "max_length": 255, + "allowed_domains": ["newrelic.com", "eu.newrelic.com"] }, default="https://api.newrelic.com", )
Line range hint
1-600: Consider implementing rate limiting for API callsThe code makes multiple API calls to New Relic's GraphQL endpoint but doesn't implement rate limiting. This could lead to hitting API rate limits during high-frequency operations.
Consider implementing a rate limiter using a token bucket algorithm or similar approach to manage API request rates. This would help prevent hitting New Relic's API rate limits and ensure stable operation.
Example implementation approach:
- Add a rate limiter utility class
- Wrap API calls with rate limiting logic
- Make rate limits configurable via provider config
keep/providers/datadog_provider/datadog_provider.py (4)
16-17: Consider consistent line wrapping for importsThe import statements have inconsistent line wrapping and indentation. Consider using parentheses for cleaner multi-line imports.
-from datadog_api_client.exceptions import (ApiException, ForbiddenException, - NotFoundException) +from datadog_api_client.exceptions import ( + ApiException, + ForbiddenException, + NotFoundException, +) -from datadog_api_client.v1.api.webhooks_integration_api import \ - WebhooksIntegrationApi +from datadog_api_client.v1.api.webhooks_integration_api import ( + WebhooksIntegrationApi, +) -from datadog_api_client.v2.api.service_definition_api import \ - ServiceDefinitionApi +from datadog_api_client.v2.api.service_definition_api import ( + ServiceDefinitionApi, +)Also applies to: 22-23, 28-29
Line range hint
673-674: Move imports to the top of the fileThe
randomandhashlibimports should be moved to the top of the file with other imports.+import hashlib +import random class DatadogProvider(BaseTopologyProvider): """Pull/push alerts from Datadog.""" - # Choose a random alert type - import hashlib - import random
Line range hint
724-761: Consider extracting service processing logicThe
pull_topologymethod contains complex nested data processing logic. Consider extracting the service processing into a separate method for better maintainability and testability.def _process_service_definition(self, service_definition, environment: str) -> TopologyServiceInDto: """Process a single service definition and return a TopologyServiceInDto.""" name = service_definition.attributes.schema.info.dd_service return TopologyServiceInDto( source_provider_id=self.provider_id, repository=service_definition.attributes.schema.integrations.github, tags=service_definition.attributes.schema.tags, service=name, display_name=service_definition.attributes.schema.info.display_name, environment=environment, description=service_definition.attributes.schema.info.description, team=service_definition.attributes.schema.org.team, application=service_definition.attributes.schema.org.application, email=service_definition.attributes.schema.contact.email, slack=service_definition.attributes.schema.contact.slack, )
Line range hint
191-193: Add @staticmethod decoratorThe
convert_to_secondsmethod should be decorated with@staticmethodsince it doesn't use any instance attributes.+ @staticmethod def convert_to_seconds(s): seconds_per_unit = {"s": 1, "m": 60, "h": 3600, "d": 86400, "w": 604800} return int(s[:-1]) * seconds_per_unit[s[-1]]keep/providers/centreon_provider/centreon_provider.py (3)
88-89: Useurllib.parse.urljoinfor safe URL constructionConcatenating URLs using string operations can lead to incorrect URLs, especially if the
host_urldoes not end with a slash or ifparamsstarts with a slash. Usingurllib.parse.urljoinensures that the URL is constructed correctly and handles edge cases gracefully.Apply this diff to implement safe URL construction:
+import urllib.parse def __get_url(self, params: str): - url = self.authentication_config.host_url + "/centreon/api/index.php?" + params + base_url = urllib.parse.urljoin( + self.authentication_config.host_url, "/centreon/api/index.php" + ) + url = f"{base_url}?{params}" return url
122-122: Set timeouts for HTTP requests to prevent hangingThe
requests.getcalls do not specify a timeout, which can cause the application to hang indefinitely if the Centreon API becomes unresponsive. Specifying a timeout ensures that your application can handle such scenarios gracefully by raising a timeout exception after a specified period.Apply this diff to add a timeout to your HTTP requests:
response = requests.get(url, headers=self.__get_headers()) + timeout=10)You may adjust the timeout duration (
10seconds in this example) as appropriate for your application's requirements.Also applies to: 156-156
119-152: Refactor duplicate code in__get_host_statusand__get_service_statusBoth methods share similar logic for making API requests and processing responses. Refactoring the common functionality into a helper method can reduce code duplication and improve maintainability.
Consider creating a generic method like
__get_status:def __get_status(self, object_name: str, id_field: str) -> list[AlertDto]: # Shared logic for fetching and parsing statusThen modify
__get_host_statusand__get_service_statusto utilize this helper method.Also applies to: 153-185
🧰 Tools
🪛 Ruff
151-151: Within an
exceptclause, raise exceptions withraise ... from errorraise ... from Noneto distinguish them from errors in exception handling(B904)
keep/providers/base/base_provider.py (1)
334-335: Consider moving the import to the top level to enhance code clarityImporting
ProvidersFactorywithin theformat_alertmethod may be necessary to prevent circular dependencies. However, if possible, consider reorganizing the code to import it at the module level to improve readability and maintainability.keep-ui/app/providers/provider-form.tsx (2)
327-331: Avoid assignments within expressions to enhance readability.Assigning values within a ternary expression can be confusing and reduce code clarity. It's better to separate the assignment from the expression.
Refactor the code as follows:
Object.entries(validation.error.format()).forEach(([field, err]) => { - err && typeof err === "object" && !Array.isArray(err) - ? (errors[field] = err._errors[0]) - : null; + if (err && typeof err === "object" && !Array.isArray(err)) { + errors[field] = err._errors[0]; + } });🧰 Tools
🪛 Biome
[error] 329-329: The assignment should not be in an expression.
The use of assignments in expressions is confusing.
Expressions are often considered as side-effect free.(lint/suspicious/noAssignInExpressions)
1085-1087: Simplify null checks using optional chaining.You can streamline the null checks by utilizing optional chaining, which improves code conciseness.
Apply this diff to refactor the code:
function handleChange(e: React.ChangeEvent<HTMLInputElement>) { - if (e.target.files && e.target.files[0]) { + if (e.target.files?.[0]) { setSelected(e.target.files[0].name); } onChange(e);🧰 Tools
🪛 Biome
[error] 1085-1085: Change to an optional chain.
Unsafe fix: Change to an optional chain.
(lint/complexity/useOptionalChain)
keep-ui/app/providers/form-validation.ts (2)
35-35: Typo in error message: "protocol-relavie" should be "protocol-relative"In line 35, there's a typo in the error message for
relProtocolError. The word "relavie" should be "relative".Apply this diff to correct the typo:
-const relProtocolError = error("A protocol-relavie URL is not allowed"); +const relProtocolError = error("A protocol-relative URL is not allowed");
108-177: Consider using the built-inURLclass for URL parsing and validationThe custom
isURLfunction implements complex URL parsing logic, which can be error-prone and hard to maintain. Consider utilizing the built-inURLclass for robust and standard-compliant URL parsing.Here's how you might refactor the
isURLfunction:function isURL(str: string, options?: Partial<URLOptions>): ValidatorRes { const opts = mergeOptions(defaultURLOptions, options); try { const url = new URL(str); // Validate protocol const protocol = url.protocol.slice(0, -1); // Remove the trailing ':' if ( opts.protocols.length && !opts.protocols.includes(protocol.toLowerCase()) ) { return getProtocolError(opts.protocols); } // Validate port if (opts.requirePort && !url.port) { return missingPortError; } if (url.port) { const port = parseInt(url.port, 10); if (port <= 0 || port > 65_535) return portError; } // Validate host const host = url.hostname; if (!host) return hostError; if (isIP(host)) return { success: true }; const fqdnValidation = isFQDN(host, opts); if (!fqdnValidation.success) return fqdnValidation; return { success: true }; } catch { return urlError; } }This approach leverages the standard
URLparsing, reducing the complexity and potential bugs in custom parsing logic.
📜 Review details
Configuration used: CodeRabbit UI
Review profile: CHILL
⛔ Files ignored due to path filters (1)
keep-ui/package-lock.jsonis excluded by!**/package-lock.json
📒 Files selected for processing (61)
keep-ui/app/providers/form-validation.ts(1 hunks)keep-ui/app/providers/provider-form-scopes.tsx(3 hunks)keep-ui/app/providers/provider-form.tsx(21 hunks)keep-ui/app/providers/providers-tiles.tsx(1 hunks)keep-ui/app/providers/providers.tsx(1 hunks)keep-ui/app/workflows/workflow-tile.tsx(0 hunks)keep-ui/package.json(1 hunks)keep/parser/parser.py(1 hunks)keep/providers/appdynamics_provider/appdynamics_provider.py(1 hunks)keep/providers/auth0_provider/auth0_provider.py(5 hunks)keep/providers/base/base_provider.py(3 hunks)keep/providers/bigquery_provider/bigquery_provider.py(1 hunks)keep/providers/centreon_provider/centreon_provider.py(1 hunks)keep/providers/cilium_provider/cilium_provider.py(2 hunks)keep/providers/clickhouse_provider/clickhouse_provider.py(6 hunks)keep/providers/datadog_provider/datadog_provider.py(2 hunks)keep/providers/discord_provider/discord_provider.py(1 hunks)keep/providers/elastic_provider/elastic_provider.py(4 hunks)keep/providers/gcpmonitoring_provider/gcpmonitoring_provider.py(1 hunks)keep/providers/gitlab_provider/gitlab_provider.py(1 hunks)keep/providers/gke_provider/gke_provider.py(1 hunks)keep/providers/google_chat_provider/google_chat_provider.py(2 hunks)keep/providers/grafana_incident_provider/grafana_incident_provider.py(6 hunks)keep/providers/grafana_oncall_provider/grafana_oncall_provider.py(2 hunks)keep/providers/grafana_provider/grafana_provider.py(2 hunks)keep/providers/graylog_provider/graylog_provider.py(3 hunks)keep/providers/ilert_provider/ilert_provider.py(3 hunks)keep/providers/jira_provider/jira_provider.py(4 hunks)keep/providers/jiraonprem_provider/jiraonprem_provider.py(1 hunks)keep/providers/kafka_provider/kafka_provider.py(1 hunks)keep/providers/kibana_provider/kibana_provider.py(4 hunks)keep/providers/kubernetes_provider/kubernetes_provider.py(2 hunks)keep/providers/mattermost_provider/mattermost_provider.py(2 hunks)keep/providers/mongodb_provider/mongodb_provider.py(4 hunks)keep/providers/mysql_provider/mysql_provider.py(1 hunks)keep/providers/newrelic_provider/newrelic_provider.py(3 hunks)keep/providers/ntfy_provider/ntfy_provider.py(1 hunks)keep/providers/openobserve_provider/openobserve_provider.py(3 hunks)keep/providers/openshift_provider/openshift_provider.py(3 hunks)keep/providers/opsgenie_provider/opsgenie_provider.py(1 hunks)keep/providers/postgres_provider/postgres_provider.py(4 hunks)keep/providers/prometheus_provider/prometheus_provider.py(1 hunks)keep/providers/redmine_provider/redmine_provider.py(5 hunks)keep/providers/sentry_provider/sentry_provider.py(2 hunks)keep/providers/servicenow_provider/servicenow_provider.py(1 hunks)keep/providers/site24x7_provider/site24x7_provider.py(2 hunks)keep/providers/slack_provider/slack_provider.py(1 hunks)keep/providers/smtp_provider/smtp_provider.py(1 hunks)keep/providers/splunk_provider/splunk_provider.py(4 hunks)keep/providers/squadcast_provider/squadcast_provider.py(4 hunks)keep/providers/ssh_provider/ssh_provider.py(2 hunks)keep/providers/teams_provider/teams_provider.py(1 hunks)keep/providers/uptimekuma_provider/uptimekuma_provider.py(1 hunks)keep/providers/victoriametrics_provider/victoriametrics_provider.py(2 hunks)keep/providers/webhook_provider/webhook_provider.py(1 hunks)keep/providers/zabbix_provider/zabbix_provider.py(1 hunks)keep/validation/fields.py(1 hunks)keep_clickhouse_e53b19ac051549aeb333e9c07cb25db8(1 hunks)keep_prometheus_06e9495272b34630b4170634336ba8e1(1 hunks)keep_victoriametrics_c77ff2c5e09d4ec38335f752cd4f8a39(1 hunks)tests/e2e_tests/test_end_to_end.py(3 hunks)
💤 Files with no reviewable changes (1)
- keep-ui/app/workflows/workflow-tile.tsx
✅ Files skipped from review due to trivial changes (5)
- keep/providers/gcpmonitoring_provider/gcpmonitoring_provider.py
- keep/providers/site24x7_provider/site24x7_provider.py
- keep_clickhouse_e53b19ac051549aeb333e9c07cb25db8
- keep_prometheus_06e9495272b34630b4170634336ba8e1
- keep_victoriametrics_c77ff2c5e09d4ec38335f752cd4f8a39
🧰 Additional context used
🪛 Biome
keep-ui/app/providers/provider-form.tsx
[error] 106-106: Avoid the use of spread (...) syntax on accumulators.
Spread syntax should be avoided on accumulators (like those in .reduce) because it causes a time complexity of O(n^2).
Consider methods such as .splice or .push instead.
(lint/performance/noAccumulatingSpread)
[error] 115-115: Avoid the use of spread (...) syntax on accumulators.
Spread syntax should be avoided on accumulators (like those in .reduce) because it causes a time complexity of O(n^2).
Consider methods such as .splice or .push instead.
(lint/performance/noAccumulatingSpread)
[error] 329-329: The assignment should not be in an expression.
The use of assignments in expressions is confusing.
Expressions are often considered as side-effect free.
(lint/suspicious/noAssignInExpressions)
[error] 1085-1085: Change to an optional chain.
Unsafe fix: Change to an optional chain.
(lint/complexity/useOptionalChain)
🪛 Ruff
keep/providers/centreon_provider/centreon_provider.py
151-151: Within an except clause, raise exceptions with raise ... from err or raise ... from None to distinguish them from errors in exception handling
(B904)
184-184: Within an except clause, raise exceptions with raise ... from err or raise ... from None to distinguish them from errors in exception handling
(B904)
keep/providers/grafana_incident_provider/grafana_incident_provider.py
181-181: Within an except clause, raise exceptions with raise ... from err or raise ... from None to distinguish them from errors in exception handling
(B904)
keep/providers/redmine_provider/redmine_provider.py
182-182: Within an except clause, raise exceptions with raise ... from err or raise ... from None to distinguish them from errors in exception handling
(B904)
🔇 Additional comments (83)
keep/providers/google_chat_provider/google_chat_provider.py (3)
1-11: LGTM! Imports are properly structured
The addition of HttpsUrl from the validation fields module aligns with the PR's objective to enhance type safety.
Line range hint 40-43: LGTM! Validation leverages Pydantic's type system
The simplified validate_config method properly utilizes Pydantic's built-in validation through the GoogleChatProviderAuthConfig class.
18-24: Verify webhook URL pattern compatibility with test environments
The switch to HttpsUrl enforces HTTPS protocol, which improves security but might affect development/testing scenarios.
✅ Verification successful
Let me gather more information about test files and webhook URL patterns.
Let me try one more search to specifically look for Google Chat webhook URL patterns in test files with a corrected regex.
Based on the results from all our searches, I can now provide the final response:
HTTPS URL validation is appropriate for Google Chat webhook URLs
The codebase analysis shows:
- No test cases are currently using non-HTTPS URLs for Google Chat webhooks
- The e2e tests demonstrate proper HTTPS URL validation for similar webhook providers (Teams)
- Google Chat webhooks are exclusively HTTPS in production environments
The switch to HttpsUrl type is safe and aligns with Google Chat's security requirements, as there's no evidence of HTTP usage in development or testing scenarios.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Check for webhook URL patterns in test files
echo "Searching for webhook URL patterns in tests..."
rg -g "test_*.py" "GOOGLE_CHAT_WEBHOOK_URL.*=.*" -A 2
# Check for environment variable usage
echo "Checking environment variable usage..."
rg "GOOGLE_CHAT_WEBHOOK_URL" -A 2
Length of output: 582
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Search for test files related to Google Chat provider
echo "Searching for Google Chat provider test files..."
fd "test.*google.*chat.*\.py$"
# Check for any HTTP/HTTPS URL patterns in test files
echo "Checking URL patterns in test files..."
rg -g "test_*.py" "(http|https)://" -A 2
# Look for mock or fixture data for webhook URLs
echo "Checking for mock/fixture data..."
rg -g "test_*.py" "(mock|fixture).*webhook" -A 2
# Check for environment variable setup in test files
echo "Checking test environment setup..."
rg -g "test_*.py" "environ\[(\"|\')GOOGLE_CHAT_WEBHOOK_URL(\"|\')]" -A 2
Length of output: 9113
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Search for Google Chat webhook patterns in test files
echo "Searching for Google Chat webhook patterns..."
rg -g "test_*.py" "webhook.*google.*chat|google.*chat.*webhook" -B 2 -A 2
# Check for environment variables in test setup with fixed regex
echo "Checking environment variables in tests..."
rg -g "test_*.py" "environ.*(GOOGLE_CHAT|webhook)" -B 2 -A 2
# Look for Google Chat provider test setup
echo "Looking for Google Chat provider setup..."
rg -g "test_*.py" "google.*chat.*provider" -i -B 2 -A 2
Length of output: 485
keep/providers/mattermost_provider/mattermost_provider.py (1)
16-22: 🛠️ Refactor suggestion
Consider using stricter URL validation for webhook_url
While pydantic.AnyHttpUrl provides basic URL validation, consider using a more restrictive type for enhanced security:
- Restrict to HTTPS-only URLs (except for development)
- Add max length validation
- Consider blocking internal/localhost URLs in production
- webhook_url: pydantic.AnyHttpUrl = dataclasses.field(
+ webhook_url: pydantic.HttpsUrl = dataclasses.field(
metadata={
"required": True,
"description": "Mattermost Webhook Url",
"sensitive": True,
- "validation": "any_http_url",
+ "validation": "https_url",
+ "max_length": 2048,
}
)keep-ui/app/providers/providers.tsx (2)
20-21: Verify group hierarchy implementation and add documentation.
The new grouping properties allow for better organization, but please ensure:
- Sub-groups are always associated with valid main groups
- The UI correctly handles these groupings
Let's check the implementation:
✅ Verification successful
Based on the code analysis, I can now provide a final response regarding the group hierarchy implementation:
Group hierarchy is properly implemented with validation and UI handling
The implementation shows:
- Groups are properly organized through
getConfigGroupfunction that handles both main and sub-groups - Sub-groups are always rendered within their parent main group using a tab interface
- Form validation is handled through Zod schema (
getZodSchema) - UI clearly separates and organizes fields by their groups using Cards and TabGroups components
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Verify group hierarchy implementation
# Expected: Find UI components that render these groups and their relationship
# Search for group-related rendering logic
rg -t typescript -t javascript "config_(main|sub)_group"
# Search for group-related tests
rg -t typescript -t javascript "describe.*config.*group" -A 10
Length of output: 193
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's try with ripgrep without file type filters
# Search for group-related rendering logic and implementation
rg "config_(main|sub)_group"
# Search for files that might handle configuration groups
rg -l "(main|sub).*group.*config"
# Look for any UI components that might render configuration
fd -e tsx -e ts | xargs rg "render.*config"
Length of output: 2985
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's examine the provider-form.tsx implementation to understand how groups are handled
cat keep-ui/app/providers/provider-form.tsx
# Also check if there are any validation functions
rg -A 5 "validate.*config" keep-ui/app/providers/
Length of output: 36558
5-11: LGTM! Well-defined validation types for URLs and related inputs.
The validation types are comprehensive and align well with the PR objectives for enhanced input validation.
Let's verify the consistent usage of these validation types across the codebase:
✅ Verification successful
Based on the search results, I found that the validation types are implemented in keep-ui/app/providers/form-validation.ts, which shows the validation logic for each type:
if (config.validation === "any_url") {
if (config.validation === "any_http_url") {
if (config.validation === "https_url") {
if (config.validation === "no_scheme_url") {
if (config.validation === "tld") {
if (config.validation === "port") {Let me verify the implementation details:
Based on the implementation in form-validation.ts, I can now provide a final response:
The validation types are well-implemented with comprehensive URL validation logic
The validation types are properly implemented with thorough validation logic:
any_url: Basic URL validation with configurable optionsany_http_url: Enforces http/https protocolshttps_url: Strictly enforces https protocol with TLD requirement and max length of 2083no_scheme_url: Allows URLs without protocol specificationtld: Validates top-level domains with regex patternport: Validates port numbers within range 1-65535
The implementation includes proper error handling, comprehensive URL parsing, and validation for various URL components including protocols, IPv6 addresses, ports, and hostnames.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Check for consistent usage of validation types in provider configurations
# Expected: All provider configurations should use these validation types
# Search for validation type usage in provider configurations
rg -t typescript -t javascript '"validation":\s*"(any_url|any_http_url|https_url|no_scheme_url|port|tld)"'
Length of output: 143
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's try a different approach to search for validation types usage
# First, let's find all TypeScript/JavaScript files
fd "\.(ts|tsx|js|jsx)$" | while read -r file; do
echo "=== $file ==="
# Search for validation types in each file
rg "validation.*(?:any_url|any_http_url|https_url|no_scheme_url|port|tld)" "$file" || true
done
# Also search for any validation-related configuration or schema definitions
rg -g "*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}" "validation\s*[=:]\s*['\"]" -A 2 -B 2
Length of output: 103608
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Check the validation implementation
echo "=== Validation Implementation ==="
cat keep-ui/app/providers/form-validation.ts
Length of output: 9356
keep/providers/teams_provider/teams_provider.py (2)
13-13: LGTM: Clean import addition
The HttpsUrl import is properly placed and aligns with the PR's objective of enhancing type safety.
20-27: Excellent enhancement of webhook URL validation!
The change from str to HttpsUrl with proper metadata improves type safety and validation. The sensitive flag is a good security practice for webhook URLs.
Let's verify the impact on existing configurations:
✅ Verification successful
Type change to HttpsUrl appears safe to implement
The verification shows:
- No instances of non-HTTPS Teams webhook URLs in tests or configurations
- The documentation needs to be updated as it still shows
webhook_urlas typestr - All found webhook URL examples are either environment variables or HTTPS URLs
The change to enforce HTTPS URLs is safe to implement as there's no evidence of HTTP usage in the codebase. However, the documentation in docs/providers/documentation/teams-provider.mdx should be updated to reflect the new type.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Search for Teams webhook URL patterns in test files and configurations
# to ensure they comply with the new HTTPS requirement
echo "Checking test files for webhook URL patterns:"
rg -l "TEAMS_WEBHOOK_URL.*=.*['\"]http://"
echo "Checking configuration files for non-HTTPS Teams webhook URLs:"
rg -l "webhook_url.*['\"]http://" --type yaml --type json
Length of output: 344
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's check for any existing webhook URL patterns in tests and configurations
# This time with a broader search to see all URL patterns
echo "Checking test files for Teams webhook URL patterns:"
rg -A 2 "TEAMS_WEBHOOK_URL.*="
echo "Checking configuration files for Teams webhook URLs:"
rg -A 2 "webhook_url.*:" --type yaml --type json
echo "Checking test files for Teams provider configuration:"
rg -A 5 "TeamsProviderAuthConfig"
Length of output: 2166
keep-ui/package.json (2)
102-102: LGTM! Good choice for schema validation.
The addition of Zod is appropriate for implementing robust input validation, and it integrates well with your existing TypeScript and react-hook-form setup.
102-102: Verify Zod version for security vulnerabilities.
Let's verify if version 3.23.8 has any known security issues.
✅ Verification successful
Zod version 3.23.8 is secure and up to date
The current version (3.23.8) is:
- The latest available version from npm
- Not affected by the known DoS vulnerability (CVE fixed in 3.22.3)
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Check for security advisories and latest versions of the zod package
# Check npm for latest versions
echo "Latest version from npm:"
npm view zod version
# Check for security advisories
echo -e "\nSecurity advisories from GitHub:"
gh api graphql -f query='
{
securityVulnerabilities(first: 5, ecosystem: NPM, package: "zod") {
nodes {
advisory {
summary
severity
publishedAt
}
vulnerableVersionRange
firstPatchedVersion {
identifier
}
}
}
}'
Length of output: 710
keep/providers/mysql_provider/mysql_provider.py (2)
Line range hint 82-91: Verify MySQL connector compatibility with URL-formatted hosts
The mysql.connector.connect method expects different host formats based on the connection type. Using pydantic.AnyUrl might require parsing before passing to the connector.
✅ Verification successful
Let me generate additional scripts to verify the MySQL host handling implementation.
Based on the search results, I can now provide a final response:
MySQL host validation is correctly implemented with pydantic.AnyUrl
The MySQL provider's authentication configuration correctly uses pydantic.AnyUrl for host validation, which is the appropriate choice for MySQL connections as it:
- Accepts both URL-formatted and plain hostname inputs
- Handles host-only formats (e.g., "localhost") and URL formats (e.g., "mysql://hostname")
- Is less restrictive than
AnyHttpUrlwhich is used by HTTP-based providers
The MySQL connector is compatible with both formats and will correctly parse the host value from the URL if provided.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Search for MySQL connection patterns in tests
echo "Searching for MySQL connection patterns in tests..."
rg -A 5 'mysql\.connector\.connect' --type py --glob '*test*.py'
# Search for connection handling in similar providers
echo "Searching for host handling in other providers..."
rg -A 5 'host.*=.*authentication_config\.host' --type py
Length of output: 9106
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Check MySQL authentication config and validation
echo "Checking MySQL authentication config..."
rg -A 10 'class .*MySQLAuthenticationConfig' --type py
# Check MySQL provider initialization and validation
echo "Checking MySQL provider initialization..."
rg -A 10 'class .*MySQLProvider' --type py
# Look for any URL validation or parsing
echo "Checking URL validation..."
rg -A 5 'AnyUrl|HttpUrl|parse_url|urlparse' --type py
Length of output: 24512
24-29: Verify the impact on existing configurations
The stricter validation might break existing valid configurations. Let's verify the current host values in use.
✅ Verification successful
The previous search found some MySQL host configurations, but let's gather more context about how the MySQL provider is configured in tests and actual usage to better understand the impact of the stricter validation.
Let's gather more information about how the MySQL provider is used in tests and documentation to understand the impact of the URL validation.
Based on the search results from all the scripts executed, I can now provide a final response:
The stricter URL validation appears safe to implement
From the codebase analysis:
- The only MySQL host configuration found is through environment variable
MYSQL_HOSTinmysql_provider.py - Test configurations use simple localhost URLs (e.g., "localhost:3306")
- No complex or potentially incompatible host values were found in the codebase or documentation
The change to pydantic.AnyUrl validation should not break existing configurations as:
- Environment variable-based configuration allows for standard host formats
- Test cases use standard localhost URLs that are compatible with URL validation
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Search for MySQL host configurations in the codebase
echo "Searching for MySQL host configurations in code..."
rg -A 1 'MYSQL_HOST|mysql.*host' --type py
echo "Searching for MySQL connection examples in documentation..."
rg -A 1 'mysql.*host|MYSQL_HOST' --type md --type txt
Length of output: 902
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Search for MySQL configuration examples in test files and configuration files
echo "Searching for MySQL configuration examples in test files..."
rg -A 5 'mysql_provider.*config' --type py
echo "Searching for MySQL environment variable usage..."
rg -B 2 -A 2 'MYSQL_HOST' --type py
echo "Searching for MySQL connection strings or URLs..."
rg -A 1 'mysql[+].*:\/\/' --type py --type yaml --type env
Length of output: 1377
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Search for MySQL connection strings with proper escape sequence
echo "Searching for MySQL connection strings..."
rg -A 1 "mysql\+" --type py --type yaml --type env
# Search for test configurations of MySQL provider
echo "Searching for MySQL provider test configurations..."
fd -e py -x grep -A 10 "class.*MysqlProviderTest" {}
# Search for example configurations in documentation
echo "Searching for MySQL configuration examples in docs..."
fd -e md -e rst -x grep -A 5 -i "mysql.*configuration" {}
Length of output: 522
keep-ui/app/providers/provider-form-scopes.tsx (1)
26-26: Props refactoring improves type safety!
Good improvements in the component interface:
- Replacing
triggerRevalidateScope: anywithonRevalidate: () => voidprovides better type safety - Using
provider.installeddirectly instead of a separate prop reduces prop drilling
Also applies to: 31-31
keep/providers/discord_provider/discord_provider.py (2)
14-14: LGTM: Import of validation field type
The addition of HttpsUrl import aligns with the PR's objective to enhance input validation for provider configurations.
21-27: LGTM: Enhanced webhook URL validation
The change from str to HttpsUrl with explicit validation metadata improves type safety and ensures only HTTPS URLs are accepted.
Let's verify the error handling for invalid URLs:
✅ Verification successful
LGTM: Webhook URL validation and error handling are properly implemented
The change from str to HttpsUrl with validation metadata is well implemented with proper error handling:
-
Input validation:
- Uses
HttpsUrltype with "https_url" validation - Marked as required and sensitive
- Validated during config initialization
- Uses
-
Error handling in notify method:
- Validates required parameters (content/components)
- Handles HTTP response codes
- Detailed error messages for different failure scenarios
- Proper exception handling for JSON parsing
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Check error handling implementation for invalid webhook URLs
# Search for error handling related to webhook URL validation
rg -A 5 "webhook.*url" --glob "!*.pyc"
# Look for related test cases
rg -l "test.*webhook.*url|webhook.*url.*test" --glob "**/*test*.py"
Length of output: 194165
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's check for error handling implementation in the discord provider
ast-grep --pattern $'class DiscordProvider {
$$$
notify($$$) {
$$$
}
$$$
}'
# Let's also check for validation tests
rg -A 5 "def test.*discord.*webhook" --glob "**/*test*.py"
Length of output: 149
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's check the discord provider implementation for error handling
rg -A 10 "class DiscordProvider" --glob "**/*.py"
# Also check for any validation related code
rg -A 5 "HttpsUrl.*webhook" --glob "**/*.py"
Length of output: 1885
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's check the notify method implementation for error handling
rg -B 5 -A 15 "def notify" keep/providers/discord_provider/discord_provider.py
# Also check the validation_config method
rg -B 2 -A 10 "def validate_config" keep/providers/discord_provider/discord_provider.py
Length of output: 502
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's check the entire discord provider file content
cat keep/providers/discord_provider/discord_provider.py
# And check for any base provider validation code
rg -A 10 "class BaseProvider" --glob "**/*.py"
Length of output: 5384
keep/providers/auth0_provider/auth0_provider.py (2)
32-38: LGTM! Token field metadata improvements are helpful.
The updated description and hint provide clear guidance for users to locate their Auth0 API token.
14-14: LGTM! Domain field validation enhancement looks good.
The transition to HttpsUrl type with detailed metadata improves type safety and user guidance. The validation rule ensures proper HTTPS URL format.
Let's verify the HttpsUrl implementation:
Also applies to: 23-29
✅ Verification successful
HttpsUrl validation is consistently implemented across providers
The verification shows that:
HttpsUrlis properly implemented inkeep/validation/fields.pyas a subclass ofHttpUrlthat strictly enforces HTTPS scheme- The type is consistently used across multiple providers for URL validation:
- Auth0: domain field
- Datadog: domain field
- ServiceNow: service_now_base_url field
- Teams, Slack, Discord: webhook_url field
- And several other providers
The implementation aligns with security best practices by enforcing HTTPS-only URLs.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Check if HttpsUrl is consistently used across other providers
ast-grep --pattern 'domain: HttpsUrl = dataclasses.field'
Length of output: 59
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's try a broader search for HttpsUrl usage
rg "HttpsUrl" -A 3 -B 3
# Also check for domain field definitions across providers
ast-grep --pattern 'domain: $_ = dataclasses.field'
# And check the HttpsUrl implementation
cat keep/validation/fields.py
Length of output: 18277
keep/providers/bigquery_provider/bigquery_provider.py (1)
29-29: LGTM! The MIME type change improves precision.
The change from ".json" to "application/json" is a good improvement as it more accurately specifies the expected file format using standard MIME type notation.
Let's verify consistency across other providers:
✅ Verification successful
MIME type is consistently used across providers
The verification confirms that all GCP-related providers (gke_provider.py and gcpmonitoring_provider.py) consistently use the MIME type "application/json" for JSON file inputs. This change aligns the BigQuery provider with the existing standard in the codebase.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Check if other providers use consistent MIME types for JSON files
# Expected: All JSON file inputs should use "application/json" MIME type
rg -A 3 'file_type.*json' --glob '!keep/providers/bigquery_provider/**'
Length of output: 724
keep/providers/clickhouse_provider/clickhouse_provider.py (4)
15-15: LGTM: Import of custom validation types
The addition of custom validation types aligns with the PR's objective of enhancing input validation.
24-28: LGTM: Enhanced security metadata
Good addition of the sensitive flag for the password field, which helps in proper handling of sensitive data.
76-79: LGTM: Method improvements and proper use of typed fields
The changes improve code readability while maintaining functionality:
- Proper whitespace around SQL execution
- Clear variable assignments using typed fields
- Consistent method signature formatting
Also applies to: 104-108, 137-137
30-42: Verify validation behavior for host and port fields
The type changes from str to NoSchemeUrl and UrlPort look good and align with the PR objectives. Let's verify the validation behavior:
✅ Verification successful
Validation implementation for host and port fields is properly implemented
The validation for both fields is well-implemented and secure:
UrlPortis defined as a constrained integer (using pydantic'sconint) with valid port range 1-65535NoSchemeUrlextends pydantic'sAnyUrlwith custom build logic to handle URLs without schemes- Both types are used consistently across multiple providers (SSH, Splunk, SMTP, Postgres, etc.)
- End-to-end tests verify the validation behavior for both field types:
- Port validation tests check for invalid ports and out-of-range values (0)
- NoSchemeUrl validation tests verify that URLs with/without schemes are properly handled
The type changes in the Clickhouse provider align with the established validation patterns in the codebase.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Verify the validation behavior of NoSchemeUrl and UrlPort types
# Look for test files that cover these validations
# Search for test files related to these fields
echo "Searching for related test files..."
fd -e py -e pytest test_clickhouse
# Search for validation test cases
echo "Searching for validation test cases..."
rg -A 5 "NoSchemeUrl|UrlPort" --type py
# Look for any existing validation error handling
echo "Searching for validation error handling..."
rg -A 5 "ValidationError.*clickhouse" --type py
Length of output: 11614
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's check the validation implementation and test coverage
# Check the NoSchemeUrl implementation
echo "Checking NoSchemeUrl implementation..."
ast-grep --pattern 'class NoSchemeUrl { $$$ }'
# Check the UrlPort definition and usage
echo "Looking for UrlPort validation..."
rg -A 2 "UrlPort = " --type py
# Look for test files
echo "Looking for validation tests..."
fd -e py test_validation
fd -e py test_fields
# Check for any validation tests in the test files
echo "Checking validation test content..."
rg -A 5 "test.*NoSchemeUrl|test.*UrlPort" --type py
Length of output: 2502
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's check the actual validation implementation and any test files
# Check the NoSchemeUrl class implementation
echo "Checking NoSchemeUrl class implementation..."
rg -A 10 "class NoSchemeUrl" --type py
# Check for validation tests in tests directory
echo "Looking for validation tests in tests directory..."
fd -e py -d 1 . tests/
rg -A 5 "test.*validation" tests/ || true
# Check for pydantic validation usage
echo "Checking pydantic validation usage..."
rg -A 5 "from pydantic.*validation" --type py
rg -A 5 "@validator.*NoSchemeUrl|@validator.*UrlPort" --type py
# Check for any validation error handling in providers
echo "Checking validation error handling in providers..."
rg -A 5 "ValidationError.*host|ValidationError.*port" keep/providers/ || true
Length of output: 5670
keep/providers/ssh_provider/ssh_provider.py (3)
16-16: LGTM! Import of validation types aligns with PR objectives
The addition of NoSchemeUrl and UrlPort imports supports the enhanced input validation requirements.
23-28: Verify validation behavior for edge cases
The type changes from str to NoSchemeUrl for host and int to UrlPort for port enhance input validation. Let's verify the validation behavior:
Also applies to: 33-35
44-45: Verify SSH key format support and security implications
The expanded file type support now includes various SSH key formats. However, we should verify:
- Coverage of all common SSH key formats (RSA, DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519)
- Security implications of accepting
application/octet-stream
keep/providers/postgres_provider/postgres_provider.py (3)
14-14: LGTM: Validation fields import added correctly
The addition of custom validation fields aligns with the PR's objective to enhance input validation and type safety.
29-34: LGTM: Enhanced type safety for host field
The change from str to NoSchemeUrl with proper validation metadata improves type safety and input validation.
40-46: Verify localhost and protocol handling
While the type safety improvements are good, please verify:
- How does
NoSchemeUrlhandle localhost connections? - Are there any implications for existing connections using localhost?
✅ Verification successful
Let me gather more specific information about URL handling in the codebase.
Let me check the actual implementation of NoSchemeUrl to understand its localhost handling.
Based on the gathered information, I can now provide a final response about the localhost and protocol handling concerns.
NoSchemeUrl safely handles localhost connections
The implementation of NoSchemeUrl is a subclass of AnyUrl that simply strips the scheme from the URL while maintaining all standard URL validation. This means:
- Localhost connections are handled exactly like any other host
- The class inherits Pydantic's robust URL validation
- It preserves all URL components (user, password, host, port, path, query, fragment) while only removing the scheme
Looking at the usage across providers:
- Splunk provider explicitly supports localhost as default value
- Other providers (Postgres, Clickhouse, SSH) handle localhost identically to any other host
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Search for existing localhost usage patterns
rg -l 'localhost' --type py
# Check NoSchemeUrl implementation for localhost handling
ast-grep --pattern 'class NoSchemeUrl {
$$$
}'
Length of output: 1273
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Search for NoSchemeUrl usage and implementation
rg -A 10 "NoSchemeUrl" --type py
# Search for URL validation and localhost handling patterns
rg -A 5 "def.*validate.*url" --type py
rg -A 5 "localhost.*validation" --type py
# Look for URL-related tests
fd "test.*url" -e py --exec cat {}
Length of output: 9768
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Get the full implementation of NoSchemeUrl class
rg -A 30 "^class NoSchemeUrl" --type py
# Check for any URL-related tests specifically for localhost scenarios
rg -A 5 "localhost.*test" --type py
rg -A 5 "test.*localhost" --type py
Length of output: 2502
keep/providers/cilium_provider/cilium_provider.py (1)
10-11: LGTM!
The import statement is correctly formatted and maintains the required functionality.
keep/providers/uptimekuma_provider/uptimekuma_provider.py (1)
22-28: Verify UptimeKuma API compatibility with AnyHttpUrl.
The change to pydantic.AnyHttpUrl improves type safety and validation. However, we should verify that this works correctly with the UptimeKuma API client.
Also, consider adding custom validation to ensure UptimeKuma-specific URL requirements:
@pydantic.validator('host_url')
def validate_uptimekuma_url(cls, v):
# Add specific validation for UptimeKuma URL requirements
if not str(v).strip('/'): # Example validation
raise ValueError("UptimeKuma URL cannot be empty after stripping slashes")
return v✅ Verification successful
The change to pydantic.AnyHttpUrl is safe and beneficial
The verification shows that UptimeKumaApi is used with self.authentication_config.host_url directly, and pydantic.AnyHttpUrl automatically converts to a string when used in string operations. This type change:
- Improves input validation for URLs
- Maintains compatibility with the
uptime_kuma_apipackage - Aligns with similar patterns used in other providers (e.g., Centreon provider)
No additional validation is needed as pydantic.AnyHttpUrl provides sufficient URL validation.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Search for UptimeKumaApi usage patterns to verify URL handling
ast-grep --pattern 'UptimeKumaApi($url)'
Length of output: 42
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's search for UptimeKumaApi class usage with more context
rg -l "UptimeKumaApi"
# Then look for the actual implementation and usage
rg "UptimeKumaApi" -A 5 -B 5
Length of output: 3102
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's check the uptime_kuma_api package usage to understand URL handling
rg -p "from uptime_kuma_api import" -A 10 -B 10
# Also check if there are any existing URL validations
rg -p "host_url" -A 5 -B 5
Length of output: 6266
keep/providers/elastic_provider/elastic_provider.py (4)
7-7: LGTM: Import changes align with type safety improvements.
The addition of typing import is appropriate for the new optional type annotations.
38-41: LGTM: Improved type safety for cloud_id.
The use of typing.Optional[str] with a None default is a good practice for optional fields.
45-47: LGTM: Clear validation logic.
The validator properly handles the mutual exclusivity of host and cloud_id fields with a descriptive error message.
72-74: LGTM: Clean client initialization.
The code cleanly accesses the typed fields from the authentication config.
keep/providers/grafana_oncall_provider/grafana_oncall_provider.py (2)
4-4: LGTM: Import placement is correct.
The pydantic import is appropriately placed with other third-party imports and is necessary for the type validation changes.
31-37: Type change looks good, but let's verify backward compatibility.
The change from str to pydantic.AnyHttpUrl enhances type safety and validation. However, we should verify that this change doesn't break existing code that might be accessing the host field directly.
Let's check for direct string operations on the host field:
Note: The validation metadata key might be redundant since AnyHttpUrl already implies URL validation. However, it's not harmful and might be useful for frontend form generation.
✅ Verification successful
Type change from str to pydantic.AnyHttpUrl is safe to proceed
After analyzing the codebase usage of host field across providers, the change is safe because:
- All providers that use string operations on the host field (like
startswith(), concatenation) already handle both string and URL types by converting the host to string format when needed. - The AppDynamics provider specifically handles URL validation by checking for
http://andhttps://prefixes and adding them if missing, which aligns well withAnyHttpUrltype. - The
pydantic.AnyHttpUrltype provides string-compatible operations through its__str__method, ensuring backward compatibility.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Search for direct string operations on the host field that might break with AnyHttpUrl
# Look for string operations on host field
rg -l 'authentication_config\.host\.' keep/providers/
# Look for direct string concatenation with host
rg -l 'authentication_config\.host \+' keep/providers/
# Look for string format operations with host
rg -l 'authentication_config\.host %' keep/providers/
rg -l 'authentication_config\.host\.format' keep/providers/
Length of output: 496
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's check the actual usage in the files that showed string concatenation
rg -A 2 'authentication_config\.host \+' keep/providers/redmine_provider/redmine_provider.py keep/providers/jiraonprem_provider/jiraonprem_provider.py keep/providers/jira_provider/jira_provider.py keep/providers/gitlab_provider/gitlab_provider.py keep/providers/appdynamics_provider/appdynamics_provider.py
# Also check if there are any direct assignments or comparisons with host
rg -A 2 'authentication_config\.host\s*=' keep/providers/
rg -A 2 'authentication_config\.host\s*==' keep/providers/
# Let's also check if the host is used in URL construction
rg -A 2 'urljoin.*authentication_config\.host' keep/providers/
Length of output: 797
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's check the actual implementation of the AppDynamics provider to understand the host usage better
cat keep/providers/appdynamics_provider/appdynamics_provider.py
# Also let's check if there are any other string manipulations with host that our previous patterns might have missed
rg -A 2 'authentication_config\.host' keep/providers/
Length of output: 29531
keep/providers/smtp_provider/smtp_provider.py (2)
16-16: LGTM: Import of validation fields
The addition of custom validation field types aligns with the PR's objective to enhance input validation.
21-27: Verify compatibility with existing SMTP server configurations
The change from str to NoSchemeUrl enhances type safety but could affect existing configurations.
Let's verify the impact:
✅ Verification successful
The previous results show only the field definition and usage within the SMTP provider itself. Let's gather more context about test cases and example configurations to better understand the impact of this change.
The previous results show an SMTP test endpoint but we need to understand the validation and type conversion logic to assess the compatibility impact. Let's check how NoSchemeUrl is implemented and used in tests.
The previous results show that NoSchemeUrl is widely used across different providers for host fields, but we need to understand its implementation to assess backward compatibility. Let's check how it validates URLs and if it's lenient enough to handle existing SMTP server configurations.
Based on the gathered information, I can now provide the final response:
The change to NoSchemeUrl type is backward compatible
The NoSchemeUrl type is specifically designed to handle URLs without schemes, making it compatible with existing SMTP server configurations. Evidence from the codebase shows:
- NoSchemeUrl is a common pattern used across multiple providers (SSH, Splunk, Postgres, Clickhouse)
- The implementation inherits from AnyUrl but overrides it to explicitly allow URLs without schemes
- No existing test cases or configurations in the codebase use scheme-prefixed SMTP URLs
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Search for SMTP server configurations in test files and examples
rg -g '!*.pyc' -g '!*.git*' "smtp_server.*=" -A 2
# Look for potential SMTP server patterns that might break
rg -g '!*.pyc' -g '!*.git*' "smtp://|smtps://"
Length of output: 934
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's check test files for SMTP server configurations and test cases
rg -g '*.py' -g '!*.pyc' "smtp.*test" -B 2 -A 5
# Look for any example configurations or documentation
fd -e md -e yaml -e yml -e ini -e conf | xargs rg -l "smtp.*server"
# Check for any default configurations
rg -g '*.py' "default.*smtp" -A 2
Length of output: 650
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's check the SMTPSettings model and its usage
ast-grep --pattern 'class SMTPSettings'
# Look for any validation logic or type conversion
rg -g '*.py' "NoSchemeUrl" -B 2 -A 2
# Check for any configuration examples in tests
rg -g '*test*.py' "smtp_server" -B 2 -A 2
Length of output: 4501
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's check the NoSchemeUrl implementation details
rg -g 'fields.py' -A 10 "class NoSchemeUrl"
# Check if there are any example configurations in documentation
fd README.md | xargs rg "smtp"
# Look for any environment variable usage patterns
rg "SMTP_SERVER.*=" -A 2 -B 2
Length of output: 842
keep/providers/redmine_provider/redmine_provider.py (2)
109-110:
Security: Avoid disabling SSL verification
The code disables SSL verification (verify=False) when testing HTTPS connectivity. This is unsafe as it makes the application vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks.
Consider:
- Always verifying SSL certificates
- Providing a way to configure custom CA certificates
- Adding a configuration option for users to explicitly allow insecure connections (not recommended)
requests.get(
f"https://{self.authentication_config.host}",
- verify=False,
+ verify=True,
)Likely invalid or redundant comment.
20-27: 🛠️ Refactor suggestion
Consider aligning URL validation with actual usage
While the switch to pydantic.AnyHttpUrl improves type safety, there's an inconsistency between the validation and the actual code behavior. The hint suggests http://localhost:8080 (with protocol), but the code in __redmine_url handles URLs without protocols. Consider using a custom Pydantic type that matches your URL handling logic.
Here's a suggested implementation:
from pydantic import AnyHttpUrl, validator
from typing import Union
class RedmineUrl(AnyHttpUrl):
@classmethod
def validate(cls, value: Union[str, AnyHttpUrl]) -> AnyHttpUrl:
if not value.startswith(('http://', 'https://')):
value = f"https://{value}"
return super().validate(value)keep/providers/gitlab_provider/gitlab_provider.py (1)
21-28: Verify consistency with other provider implementations
Let's ensure this implementation aligns with the validation patterns used in other providers.
✅ Verification successful
Let me try another search pattern since the previous one had incorrect path patterns.
Based on the search results, I can now provide a final response as the verification is complete.
URL validation implementation is consistent with other providers
The implementation of host field in the GitLab provider using pydantic.AnyHttpUrl with the validation metadata is consistent with other providers in the codebase. Similar patterns are found in:
- Grafana provider
- Redmine provider
- Jira OnPrem provider
- AppDynamics provider
and many others.
The metadata structure including required, description, sensitive, hint, and validation fields follows the established pattern across the codebase.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Check URL validation patterns across other providers
# Find all provider auth configs using Pydantic URL types
echo "Searching for URL validation patterns in other providers..."
rg -l "pydantic\.(AnyHttpUrl|HttpUrl|PostgresDsn|RedisDsn)" "keep/providers/**/[a-z]*_provider.py"
# Find validation hints for URL fields
echo "Searching for URL validation hints..."
ast-grep --pattern 'host: $_ = dataclasses.field(
metadata={
$$$
}
)'
Length of output: 471
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Search for all provider files first
echo "Finding provider files..."
fd "provider.py$" keep/providers
# Then search for URL validation patterns
echo -e "\nSearching for URL validation patterns..."
rg "pydantic\.(AnyHttpUrl|HttpUrl|PostgresDsn|RedisDsn)" -A 5
# Search for host field definitions
echo -e "\nSearching for host field definitions..."
rg "host.*=.*dataclasses\.field" -A 5
Length of output: 27747
keep/providers/mongodb_provider/mongodb_provider.py (2)
13-13: LGTM: Import addition for exception handling
The addition of ProviderConfigException import aligns with the enhanced validation requirements.
Line range hint 1-148: Verify secure handling of sensitive data
Let's ensure all sensitive fields are properly marked and handled securely.
✅ Verification successful
Let me verify the secure handling of sensitive data in the MongoDB provider. I'll check for consistent handling of sensitive fields and potential password logging issues.
Let me try a different approach to verify the security handling in the MongoDB provider.
Secure handling of sensitive data verified
The MongoDB provider properly handles sensitive data:
- Password field is correctly marked with
sensitive: Truemetadata - No sensitive data is logged (only debug logs for additional options parsing)
- Credentials are safely handled in client configuration:
- Credentials are passed directly to MongoClient without logging
- Proper cleanup in dispose() method
- No exposure of sensitive data in error messages
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Check for sensitive field handling across the codebase
# Look for other sensitive field declarations to ensure consistent handling
rg -A 2 'sensitive.*True'
# Check for potential password logging
rg -i 'password.*log'
# Verify all authentication fields are properly marked
ast-grep --pattern 'dataclasses.field.*metadata.*sensitive'
Length of output: 163569
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Check for sensitive field handling in MongoDB provider
rg -A 2 'password.*log' keep/providers/mongodb_provider/mongodb_provider.py
# Check for proper sensitive field marking in MongoDB provider
ast-grep --pattern 'dataclasses.field.*metadata.*sensitive.*True' keep/providers/mongodb_provider/mongodb_provider.py
# Check for any password/credential logging in MongoDB provider
rg -i 'password.*debug|password.*info|password.*warning|password.*error' keep/providers/mongodb_provider/mongodb_provider.py
# Check for proper handling of credentials in client generation
ast-grep --pattern 'def __generate_client(self):
$$$
client_conf = {
$$$
}
$$$' keep/providers/mongodb_provider/mongodb_provider.py
Length of output: 470
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Check the full MongoDB provider implementation for sensitive data handling
cat keep/providers/mongodb_provider/mongodb_provider.py
# Check for any logging statements in MongoDB provider
rg "self\.logger\." keep/providers/mongodb_provider/mongodb_provider.py
# Look for credential handling in client configuration
rg "client_conf" -A 5 keep/providers/mongodb_provider/mongodb_provider.py
Length of output: 7333
keep/providers/ntfy_provider/ntfy_provider.py (1)
33-41: Verify URL string operations compatibility.
The __send_alert method performs string operations on the host URL. Let's verify that pydantic.AnyHttpUrl maintains string compatibility with these operations.
✅ Verification successful
Let me search for the specific usage of host URL in the ntfy provider to verify the string operations.
String operations on pydantic.AnyHttpUrl are safe in this implementation
The code performs simple string operations (endswith, string concatenation) on the host URL which are compatible with pydantic.AnyHttpUrl as it can be coerced to a string. The operations are also safely wrapped in a null check. The urljoin function from urllib is used correctly for URL composition.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Search for all string operations on the host URL
rg -l "AnyHttpUrl" | xargs rg "host\." -A 2
Length of output: 8475
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Search for the __send_alert method and any host URL operations in ntfy provider
rg -A 10 "__send_alert" keep/providers/ntfy_provider/ntfy_provider.py
Length of output: 807
keep/providers/webhook_provider/webhook_provider.py (1)
Line range hint 91-106: Verify webhook validation test coverage.
The validate_scopes method tests with a simple payload, but should be expanded to cover:
- Different URL formats
- Authentication methods
- Error cases
keep/providers/grafana_incident_provider/grafana_incident_provider.py (1)
6-15: LGTM! Clean import organization
The imports are well-organized and the addition of HttpsUrl aligns with the PR's type safety objectives.
keep/providers/kubernetes_provider/kubernetes_provider.py (3)
2-10: LGTM: Import changes are appropriate.
The addition of pydantic and reorganization of imports support the new type validation features.
40-44: LGTM: Improved metadata for the insecure field.
The updated description is more concise, and the addition of the "switch" type improves UI integration.
17-26: Verify compatibility with all Kubernetes API server URL formats.
While pydantic.AnyHttpUrl provides robust URL validation, please verify it supports all valid Kubernetes API server URL formats, including:
- Local development clusters (e.g., localhost:8443)
- Custom ports
- Internal cluster URLs
✅ Verification successful
Let me gather more information about the URL validation implementation and test cases.
Let me check the URL validation implementation in the codebase to understand how it handles different URL formats.
Based on the gathered information, I can now provide a final response about the URL validation compatibility:
The URL validation implementation supports all required Kubernetes API server URL formats
The codebase uses pydantic.AnyHttpUrl with a frontend validation layer that:
- Accepts both HTTP and HTTPS protocols via
getBaseUrlSchema({ protocols: ["http", "https"] }) - Supports custom ports (as seen in URL validation tests)
- Handles localhost URLs (validated in e2e tests with "http://localhost")
- Validates internal and external URLs without TLD requirements
The implementation is consistent with other infrastructure providers (OpenShift, Cilium) that also use the same URL validation approach for API server endpoints.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Check for existing API server URL patterns in tests and examples
# Search for API server URL patterns in test files
echo "Searching for API server URL patterns in tests..."
rg -A 1 'api_server.*=' tests/
# Search for URL patterns in example configurations
echo "Searching for example configurations..."
rg -A 1 'KUBERNETES_URL' .
# Search for URL-related test cases
echo "Searching for URL-related test cases..."
rg -A 3 'test.*url' tests/
Length of output: 2341
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Check URL validation implementation and test cases
# Search for URL validation related code
echo "Searching for URL validation implementation..."
rg -A 5 'any_http_url' .
# Search for kubernetes provider test files
echo "Searching for kubernetes provider tests..."
fd "test.*kubernetes.*\.py" tests/
# If test files exist, show their content
echo "Content of kubernetes provider test files..."
fd "test.*kubernetes.*\.py" tests/ -x cat {}
# Check for URL validation in the provider implementation
echo "Checking provider implementation..."
rg -A 5 "class KubernetesProvider" .
Length of output: 13096
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Check URL validation implementation details
# Search for URL validation implementation
echo "Searching for URL validation implementation..."
rg -A 10 'getBaseUrlSchema' .
# Search for any URL-related validation tests
echo "Searching for URL validation tests..."
rg -A 10 'test.*url.*validation' .
# Check for any URL-related utilities
echo "Checking for URL-related utilities..."
fd -e ts -e py -x rg -l 'url.*valid|valid.*url' {}
Length of output: 10162
keep/providers/squadcast_provider/squadcast_provider.py (2)
16-16: LGTM: Import for enhanced type safety
The addition of HttpsUrl import aligns with the PR's objective to improve input validation and type safety.
38-46: Verify backward compatibility of webhook_url type change
The change from str to HttpsUrl enhances type safety but could potentially break existing configurations. Please ensure that:
- Existing webhook URLs in production are HTTPS compliant
- Migration documentation is updated if needed
✅ Verification successful
Type change for webhook_url is safe and properly validated
The test file demonstrates that the code already validates and rejects non-HTTPS URLs:
- HTTP URLs (both localhost and example.com) trigger error messages
- Only HTTPS URLs are accepted
This indicates the type change from str to HttpsUrl is formalizing existing behavior rather than introducing breaking changes. No migration documentation is needed since HTTPS was already required.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Search for webhook_url usage patterns in tests and configurations
rg -l 'webhook_url.*http:'
rg -l 'webhook_url.*localhost'
Length of output: 131
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Check the actual webhook_url usage in the test file
rg -A 5 'webhook_url.*http:|webhook_url.*localhost' tests/e2e_tests/test_end_to_end.py
Length of output: 511
keep/providers/slack_provider/slack_provider.py (3)
16-16: LGTM: Import of HttpsUrl validation field
The addition of the HttpsUrl import aligns with the PR's objective to enhance input validation for provider configurations.
23-29: Verify the impact of removing the default value
The removal of the default value for webhook_url could potentially break existing code that relies on it. Let's verify the usage across the codebase.
✅ Verification successful
Based on the results, I can now generate the final response:
Removing the default value for webhook_url is safe
The search results show that SlackProviderAuthConfig is only instantiated once in the codebase (in slack_provider.py) and it's created using the **self.config.authentication pattern, which means the webhook_url is provided through configuration. There are no instances of direct instantiation that might rely on default values.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Search for instances where SlackProviderAuthConfig is instantiated without webhook_url
ast-grep --pattern 'SlackProviderAuthConfig($$$)'
# Search for direct references to webhook_url
rg -A 2 'webhook_url\s*=' --type py
Length of output: 4349
23-29: Verify error handling with the new HttpsUrl type
The change to HttpsUrl type affects multiple integration points. Please ensure:
- The
validate_configmethod properly handles HttpsUrl validation errors - The
_notifymethod correctly handles the HttpsUrl type when making requests - Error messages are clear when invalid URLs are provided
✅ Verification successful
Let me gather more information about the validation and error handling in the slack provider.
HttpsUrl validation and error handling are properly implemented
The verification shows that the code handles the HttpsUrl type appropriately:
- The
validate_configmethod checks for either webhook_url or access_token presence - The
_notifymethod properly handles the webhook_url:- Uses requests.post with the validated URL
- Raises ProviderException with clear error message on request failure
- The HttpsUrl type is properly imported and used with dataclass field validation
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Check error handling patterns in the codebase
rg -A 5 'raise (ProviderException|Exception).*url' --type py
# Look for similar HttpsUrl validation patterns in other providers
ast-grep --pattern 'class $name:
$$$
webhook_url: HttpsUrl = $$$
$$$
'
Length of output: 2007
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Check the validation and error handling in slack provider
rg -A 10 'def validate_config|def _notify' keep/providers/slack_provider/slack_provider.py
# Check for HttpsUrl usage and validation
rg -A 5 'HttpsUrl' keep/providers/slack_provider/slack_provider.py
# Look for request handling with webhook_url
rg -A 5 'webhook_url' keep/providers/slack_provider/slack_provider.py
Length of output: 2949
keep/providers/victoriametrics_provider/victoriametrics_provider.py (2)
10-10: LGTM: Import changes align with type safety objectives.
The addition of AnyHttpUrl and UrlPort imports supports the enhanced type validation requirements.
Also applies to: 16-16
30-35: LGTM: Enhanced type safety for configuration fields.
The changes properly implement stronger type validation for URLs and ports:
VMAlertHost: Now validates HTTP/HTTPS URLsVMAlertPort: Uses customUrlPorttype for port validationVMAlertURL: Ensures valid URL format
The metadata updates provide clear examples and validation hints.
Also applies to: 42-47, 54-61
keep/providers/kafka_provider/kafka_provider.py (2)
25-32: 🛠️ Refactor suggestion
Add comprehensive connection validation during config initialization
The current implementation validates the URL format but doesn't validate the actual connection details until runtime in validate_scopes(). This could lead to configurations passing initial validation but failing during operation.
Consider moving the connection validation logic to the validate_config() method:
def validate_config(self):
"""
Validates required configuration for Kafka provider.
"""
self.authentication_config = KafkaProviderAuthConfig(
**self.config.authentication
)
# Validate connection configuration early
conf = self._get_conf()
try:
# Test connection with initial security protocol
consumer = KafkaConsumer(
group_id="keephq-validation",
**{k: v for k, v in conf.items() if k != 'group_id'}
)
consumer.close()
except NoBrokersAvailable:
# Retry with SASL_PLAINTEXT
try:
conf["security_protocol"] = "SASL_PLAINTEXT"
consumer = KafkaConsumer(
group_id="keephq-validation",
**{k: v for k, v in conf.items() if k != 'group_id'}
)
consumer.close()
except NoBrokersAvailable as e:
raise ValueError(f"Could not connect to Kafka at {self.authentication_config.host}: {str(e)}")
except KafkaError as e:
raise ValueError(f"Invalid Kafka configuration: {str(e)}")This ensures configuration issues are caught early during provider initialization rather than during operation.
Let's check for similar validation patterns in other providers:
Also applies to: 156-177
Line range hint 156-177: Enhance security protocol handling and sensitive data logging
The current implementation has several security considerations that should be addressed:
- The automatic fallback to SASL_PLAINTEXT could expose credentials over an unencrypted connection
- Connection errors might log sensitive information
- The security protocol selection logic is duplicated
Consider the following improvements:
- Add explicit security protocol configuration:
@pydantic.dataclasses.dataclass
class KafkaProviderAuthConfig:
# ... existing fields ...
security_protocol: str = dataclasses.field(
default="SASL_SSL",
metadata={
"required": False,
"description": "Security protocol",
"hint": "SASL_SSL, SASL_PLAINTEXT, PLAINTEXT",
"validation": "enum",
"enum_values": ["SASL_SSL", "SASL_PLAINTEXT", "PLAINTEXT"]
}
)- Remove automatic fallback to PLAINTEXT:
def _get_conf(self):
if self.authentication_config.security_protocol == "PLAINTEXT":
self.logger.warning("Using unsecured PLAINTEXT protocol")
basic_conf = {
"bootstrap_servers": self.authentication_config.host,
"security_protocol": self.authentication_config.security_protocol,
# ... rest of the configuration
}- Ensure sensitive data is not logged:
def validate_scopes(self):
try:
consumer = KafkaConsumer(self.authentication_config.topic, **conf)
except NoBrokersAvailable as e:
self.err = "Could not connect to Kafka broker"
self.logger.warning(self.err, extra={
"error": str(e),
"host": self.authentication_config.host.split("@")[-1] # Remove credentials from URL if present
})Let's check for sensitive data logging patterns:
Also applies to: 192-207
tests/e2e_tests/test_end_to_end.py (1)
39-39: LGTM: Import statement correctly added
The expect import from playwright.sync_api is appropriately placed and necessary for the validation assertions in the new test.
keep/providers/appdynamics_provider/appdynamics_provider.py (2)
61-66: LGTM! Enhanced URL validation using Pydantic.
The change from str to pydantic.AnyHttpUrl improves type safety and provides built-in URL validation. The hint example and validation metadata are well documented.
61-66: Verify the impact on existing AppDynamics instances.
Since we're enforcing stricter URL validation, let's verify that this change won't break existing AppDynamics instances that might have non-standard URLs.
✅ Verification successful
URL validation change appears safe for AppDynamics instances
Based on the codebase analysis:
- The only AppDynamics URLs found follow the standard format
https://{account}.saas.appdynamics.com - The example URL in the code matches this pattern:
https://baseball202404101029219.saas.appdynamics.com - No non-standard or legacy URL formats were found in tests, documentation, or configuration files
- The
pydantic.AnyHttpUrlvalidation will accept any valid HTTPS URL, which is compatible with AppDynamics' URL format
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Search for AppDynamics host configurations in test files and documentation
# to ensure compatibility with the new validation
echo "Searching for AppDynamics host examples in tests..."
rg -g '!*.pyc' -g '!*.git*' "appdynamics.*host.*="
echo "Searching for AppDynamics URLs in documentation..."
rg -g '*.md' -g '*.rst' "appdynamics.*\.saas\.appdynamics\.com"
Length of output: 342
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's try a broader search for AppDynamics configurations and tests
# Search for any AppDynamics host/URL patterns in the codebase
echo "Searching for AppDynamics URL patterns..."
rg -g '!*.pyc' -g '!*.git*' -i "https?://[^\"'\s]*appdynamics\.com"
# Search for test files related to AppDynamics
echo -e "\nSearching for AppDynamics test files..."
fd -t f "test.*appdynamics.*\.(py|yaml|json)$"
# Search for AppDynamics configuration examples
echo -e "\nSearching for AppDynamics configuration examples..."
rg -g '!*.pyc' -g '!*.git*' "host.*appdynamics" -A 2 -B 2
Length of output: 2340
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's check for any existing AppDynamics configurations in test data or fixtures
# Search for test data files
echo "Searching for AppDynamics test data..."
fd -t f "(test|fixture).*\.(yaml|json|toml)$" -x rg -l "appdynamics"
# Search for any URL validation related tests
echo -e "\nSearching for URL validation tests..."
rg -g "test_*.py" "AnyHttpUrl|URLValidator|validate.*url" -A 3 -B 3
# Check for any existing AppDynamics configurations
echo -e "\nSearching for AppDynamics configuration examples in tests..."
rg -g "test_*.py" "appdynamics.*provider" -A 5 -B 5
Length of output: 507
keep/providers/splunk_provider/splunk_provider.py (2)
16-16: LGTM: Import of custom validation types
The addition of custom validation types aligns with the PR's objective of enhancing input validation for provider configurations.
29-35: LGTM: Enhanced type safety for host and port fields
The migration from basic types (str, int) to custom validated types (NoSchemeUrl, UrlPort) improves input validation and type safety. The metadata and defaults are preserved, maintaining backward compatibility.
Also applies to: 36-42
keep/providers/ilert_provider/ilert_provider.py (1)
19-19: LGTM: Import of HttpsUrl validation field
The addition of the HttpsUrl import aligns with the PR's objective to enhance type safety and input validation.
keep/providers/servicenow_provider/servicenow_provider.py (2)
17-17: LGTM: Import for enhanced type validation
The addition of HttpsUrl import aligns with the PR's objective of improving type safety for provider inputs.
24-31: LGTM: Enhanced URL validation with HttpsUrl type
The transition from str to HttpsUrl type enhances input validation and type safety. The metadata provides clear guidance with an appropriate example.
keep/providers/jira_provider/jira_provider.py (1)
17-17: LGTM: Type safety enhancement for host field
The change from str to HttpsUrl type with additional metadata improves type safety and provides better user guidance through the hint field.
Also applies to: 41-49
keep/providers/sentry_provider/sentry_provider.py (2)
19-19: LGTM! Import aligns with validation enhancement goals
The addition of HttpsUrl import supports the transition to stronger type validation for URL fields.
37-45: LGTM! Enhanced type safety for api_url field
The transition to HttpsUrl type enforces HTTPS-only URLs, improving security. The default value is appropriate and consistent with the SENTRY_DEFAULT_API constant.
Let's verify that no HTTP URLs are currently in use:
✅ Verification successful
No HTTP Sentry URLs found in the codebase, type safety enhancement verified
The verification confirms that there are no non-HTTPS Sentry API URLs in use throughout the codebase, making the HttpsUrl type change a safe enhancement that aligns with existing practices.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Search for potential HTTP Sentry API URLs in the codebase
rg -l "http://[^s].*sentry\.io" || echo "No HTTP URLs found"
# Check for any environment variables or configuration files that might override the API URL
rg -l "SENTRY_API_URL.*http://[^s]" || echo "No HTTP URLs in environment configurations"
Length of output: 213
keep/providers/zabbix_provider/zabbix_provider.py (1)
Line range hint 673-674: Update test configuration to use HTTPS URL.
The test configuration uses an HTTP localhost URL which would fail if we enforce HTTPS URLs. Consider updating it to use HTTPS or adding a development-only exception for localhost URLs.
keep/providers/graylog_provider/graylog_provider.py (1)
Line range hint 1-700: Implementation looks good overall!
The changes enhance input validation by leveraging Pydantic's URL validation, which aligns well with the PR objectives. The implementation maintains good error handling and logging practices throughout the codebase.
keep/providers/newrelic_provider/newrelic_provider.py (3)
19-19: LGTM: HttpsUrl import aligns with validation enhancement goals
The addition of the HttpsUrl import from keep.validation.fields supports the PR's objective of enhancing input validation.
165-165: LGTM: Improved scope validation feedback
The change from False to "Invalid" provides more descriptive feedback for invalid scopes.
Line range hint 32-38: Verify error handling for URL validation
The code should properly handle and report URL validation errors to users.
Also applies to: 41-47, 165-165
✅ Verification successful
Based on the gathered information, I can now provide a final response:
URL validation is properly handled through HttpsUrl type and field validation
The code uses the HttpsUrl type (from keep/validation/fields.py) which inherits from HttpUrl and enforces HTTPS scheme validation. The URL field in the NewRelic provider is defined with:
- Type annotation as
HttpsUrl - Metadata including
"validation": "https_url" - Required field validation
This ensures proper URL validation and error reporting to users through the validation framework.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Check error handling for invalid URLs across the codebase
# Test 1: Search for URL validation error handling patterns
rg -A 3 "raise (ProviderConfigException|ProviderException|ValueError).*URL"
# Test 2: Search for URL validation in tests
rg -A 5 "def test.*url.*invalid" tests/
Length of output: 470
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's check how URLs are validated in the NewRelic provider and similar providers
# Check URL validation in NewRelic provider
rg -A 5 "url.*=|URL.*=" keep/providers/newrelic_provider/
# Check URL-related validation in provider base classes
rg -A 5 "(validate|check).*url" keep/providers/
# Look for URL validation patterns in the NewRelic tests
rg -A 5 "(test|check|validate).*url" tests/providers/newrelic_provider/
# Check for URL field definitions and validations
ast-grep --pattern 'url: str = dataclasses.field($$$)'
Length of output: 14249
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's check for HttpsUrl type definition and validation
# Check for HttpsUrl type definition
rg -A 5 "class HttpsUrl"
# Check for URL validation in the base provider
rg -A 5 "def validate" keep/providers/provider.py
# Check for URL-related exceptions
rg -A 3 "class.*Exception" keep/providers/
# Look for URL validation in config validation
rg -A 5 "validate.*config" keep/providers/
Length of output: 56295
keep/providers/datadog_provider/datadog_provider.py (1)
72-80: LGTM! Good type safety improvement
The change from str to HttpsUrl type for the domain field enhances type safety and validation. The added validation metadata clearly specifies the HTTPS URL requirement.
keep/validation/fields.py (3)
9-14: Confirm the default port implementation in HttpsUrl
The get_default_parts method in the HttpsUrl class sets the default port to 443. This ensures that URLs without an explicitly defined port default to the standard HTTPS port, which aligns with expected behavior.
6-6: Verify the usage of UrlPort within the codebase
The UrlPort type is defined but not used within this file. Ensure that it is utilized where needed or consider removing it if it's unnecessary.
Run the following script to check for usages of UrlPort in the codebase:
✅ Verification successful
UrlPort is actively used across multiple provider modules
The type is properly utilized throughout the codebase:
- Imported and used in 8 different provider modules for port validation
- Used consistently for port-related fields in dataclass definitions
- Applied for various services including Postgres, SSH, Splunk, SMTP, VictoriaMetrics, OpenObserve, Kibana, and Clickhouse
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Find all usages of 'UrlPort' in the project.
# Test: Search for the 'UrlPort' type. Expect: Occurrences where it's used.
rg 'UrlPort'
Length of output: 1690
17-46: 🛠️ Refactor suggestion
Refactor scheme handling in NoSchemeUrl to avoid using placeholder schemes
Assigning "foo" as a placeholder scheme in validate_parts and then removing it in build may lead to confusion or unexpected behavior. Consider refactoring to handle URLs without a scheme more elegantly.
Apply this diff to adjust the scheme handling:
- scheme = parts["scheme"]
- parts["scheme"] = "foo" if scheme is None else scheme
+ if parts["scheme"] is None:
+ parts["scheme"] = ''In the build method, modify the URL construction to handle the absence of a scheme without relying on splitting the string:
- return url.split("://")[1]
+ if '://' in url:
+ return url.split('://', 1)[1]
+ else:
+ return urlThis approach preserves the integrity of the URL and avoids introducing arbitrary scheme values.
Likely invalid or redundant comment.
keep/providers/base/base_provider.py (4)
22-23: Approved: Updated imports are appropriate
The import of get_provider_by_name and is_linked_provider is necessary for the new methods is_installed and format_alert.
28-29: Approved: Importing parse_and_enrich_deleted_and_assignees
The import is required for enrichment functions and aligns with the new code.
714-721: Approved: Addition of is_installed property
The is_installed property correctly checks if the provider has been recorded in the database and enhances the provider's configurability.
722-731: Verify the necessity of importing Parser within is_provisioned property
Importing Parser inside the is_provisioned property may be a workaround for circular import issues. Confirm that this import placement is required and won't introduce performance overhead or maintainability concerns.
If the circular dependency can be resolved, consider moving the import to the top level. Otherwise, document the reason for the local import to aid future maintainers.
keep-ui/app/providers/provider-form.tsx (1)
110-115: Avoid using spread syntax in reducers for better performance.
Similar to the previous function, using spread syntax in getOptionalConfigs can lead to performance issues. Mutate the accumulator directly to enhance efficiency.
🧰 Tools
🪛 Biome
[error] 115-115: Avoid the use of spread (...) syntax on accumulators.
Spread syntax should be avoided on accumulators (like those in .reduce) because it causes a time complexity of O(n^2).
Consider methods such as .splice or .push instead.
(lint/performance/noAccumulatingSpread)
| size={ | ||
| window.innerWidth < 640 ? 100 : window.innerWidth < 1024 ? 80 : 40 | ||
| } |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Consider hydration safety and window resize handling
The direct access to window.innerWidth in the render method could cause hydration mismatches and won't respond to window resizes. Consider using a hook-based approach for better reliability.
Here's a suggested implementation:
+import { useEffect, useState } from "react";
+
+const usePanelSize = () => {
+ const [size, setSize] = useState(40);
+
+ useEffect(() => {
+ const updateSize = () => {
+ const width = window.innerWidth;
+ setSize(width < 640 ? 100 : width < 1024 ? 80 : 40);
+ };
+
+ updateSize();
+ window.addEventListener('resize', updateSize);
+ return () => window.removeEventListener('resize', updateSize);
+ }, []);
+
+ return size;
+};
const ProvidersTiles = ({ ... }) => {
+ const panelSize = usePanelSize();
return (
<SlidingPanel
type={"right"}
isOpen={openPanel}
- size={
- window.innerWidth < 640 ? 100 : window.innerWidth < 1024 ? 80 : 40
- }
+ size={panelSize}
backdropClicked={handleCloseModal}📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| size={ | |
| window.innerWidth < 640 ? 100 : window.innerWidth < 1024 ? 80 : 40 | |
| } | |
| import { useEffect, useState } from "react"; | |
| const usePanelSize = () => { | |
| const [size, setSize] = useState(40); | |
| useEffect(() => { | |
| const updateSize = () => { | |
| const width = window.innerWidth; | |
| setSize(width < 640 ? 100 : width < 1024 ? 80 : 40); | |
| }; | |
| updateSize(); | |
| window.addEventListener('resize', updateSize); | |
| return () => window.removeEventListener('resize', updateSize); | |
| }, []); | |
| return size; | |
| }; | |
| const ProvidersTiles = ({ ... }) => { | |
| const panelSize = usePanelSize(); | |
| return ( | |
| <SlidingPanel | |
| type={"right"} | |
| isOpen={openPanel} | |
| size={panelSize} | |
| backdropClicked={handleCloseModal} |
| host: pydantic.AnyUrl = dataclasses.field( | ||
| metadata={ | ||
| "required": True, | ||
| "description": "MySQL hostname", | ||
| "validation": "any_url", | ||
| } |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Consider using a more appropriate type for MySQL host validation
The change from str to pydantic.AnyUrl might be too restrictive for MySQL host configurations. MySQL connections commonly support various host formats including:
- Hostnames (e.g., "db.example.com")
- IP addresses (e.g., "192.168.1.1")
- Unix domain sockets (e.g., "/var/run/mysqld/mysqld.sock")
- Special values (e.g., "localhost")
The AnyUrl type will reject valid MySQL host values that don't conform to URL syntax.
Consider these alternatives:
- host: pydantic.AnyUrl = dataclasses.field(
+ host: str = dataclasses.field(
metadata={
"required": True,
"description": "MySQL hostname",
- "validation": "any_url",
+ "pattern": "^[a-zA-Z0-9-._]+$|^[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+$|^/[a-zA-Z0-9-._/]+$",
}
)Or create a custom type:
class MySQLHost(str):
@classmethod
def __get_validators__(cls):
yield cls.validate
@classmethod
def validate(cls, v):
if not isinstance(v, str):
raise TypeError('string required')
# Add validation for hostname, IP, socket path
return cls(v)
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Seems like the humans are having a chat. I'll hop back into my burrow for now. If you need me again, just tag @coderabbitai in a new comment, and I'll come hopping out!
| if self.is_installed or self.is_provisioned: | ||
| host = self.config.authentication["domain"] | ||
| host = "https://" + host if not host.startswith("https://") else host | ||
| self.config.authentication["domain"] = host |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
🛠️ Refactor suggestion
Consider removing redundant HTTPS scheme handling.
The manual HTTPS scheme prepending seems redundant since HttpsUrl type should already handle this validation. This could lead to double transformation of the URL.
Consider simplifying to:
- host = self.config.authentication["domain"]
- host = "https://" + host if not host.startswith("https://") else host
- self.config.authentication["domain"] = hostLet the HttpsUrl type handle the validation and transformation.
Committable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.
| domain: HttpsUrl = dataclasses.field( | ||
| metadata={ | ||
| "required": True, | ||
| "description": "Auth0 API Token", | ||
| "hint": "https://manage.auth0.com/dashboard/us/YOUR_ACCOUNT/apis/management/explorer", | ||
| "description": "Auth0 Domain", | ||
| "hint": "https://tenantname.us.auth0.com", | ||
| "validation": "https_url", | ||
| }, | ||
| ) | ||
| domain: str = dataclasses.field( | ||
|
|
||
| token: str = dataclasses.field( | ||
| default=None, | ||
| metadata={ | ||
| "required": True, | ||
| "description": "Auth0 Domain", | ||
| "hint": "tenantname.us.auth0.com", | ||
| "description": "Auth0 API Token", | ||
| "hint": "https://manage.auth0.com/dashboard/us/YOUR_ACCOUNT/apis/management/explorer", | ||
| }, |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
💡 Codebase verification
Based on the gathered information, I can now provide the final response:
Auth0 provider validation needs test coverage
The validation changes for Auth0 provider configuration lack test coverage:
- No unit tests for Auth0 provider validation
- No end-to-end tests for Auth0 provider field validation
- Other providers (Kibana, Teams, MongoDB, etc.) have validation tests, but Auth0 is missing
Please add:
- Unit tests for Auth0 provider field validation
- End-to-end test case in
test_provider_validationto verify:- Domain URL format validation
- Required token validation
- Error message display for invalid inputs
🔗 Analysis chain
Verify Auth0 provider configuration in end-to-end tests.
The validation changes look good, but let's ensure they're covered by tests.
Let me gather more information about Auth0 provider tests.
Let me check the content of the identified files to understand the test coverage.
Let me check the end-to-end test implementation for provider validation.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Look for Auth0 provider tests
rg -l "Auth0Provider.*test"
# Check for validation testing patterns
rg "domain.*invalid|incorrect" -A 5 -g "*test*.py"
Length of output: 3217
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Look for Auth0 provider test files
fd "test.*auth.*py|auth.*test.*py"
# Check for Auth0 provider validation tests in the entire codebase
rg -l "Auth0Provider" tests/
rg "def test.*auth0" tests/
# Look for any Auth0-related test configuration
rg -l "auth0.*domain|auth0.*token" tests/
Length of output: 183
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Check Auth0 provider test content
cat tests/test_auth.py
# Check Auth0-related test fixtures
cat tests/fixtures/client.py
# Look for any provider validation tests
rg "provider.*validation|validate.*provider" tests/ -A 5
Length of output: 14946
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Check the e2e test implementation for provider validation
cat tests/e2e_tests/test_end_to_end.py
# Look for any Auth0-specific provider tests in the e2e tests
rg "auth0" tests/e2e_tests/ -A 5
Length of output: 10783
| results = clickhouse_provider.query( | ||
| query="SELECT * FROM logs_table ORDER BY timestamp DESC LIMIT 1" | ||
| ) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Add missing required port in test configuration
The test configuration in the main block is missing the required port field, which is now mandatory with the new UrlPort type.
Apply this diff to fix the configuration:
config = ProviderConfig(
authentication={
"username": os.environ.get("CLICKHOUSE_USER"),
"password": os.environ.get("CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD"),
"host": os.environ.get("CLICKHOUSE_HOST"),
"database": os.environ.get("CLICKHOUSE_DATABASE"),
+ "port": os.environ.get("CLICKHOUSE_PORT"),
}
)Committable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.
| if cls.user_required and user is None: | ||
| raise errors.UrlUserInfoError() |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Define user_required in NoSchemeUrl to prevent AttributeError
The validate_parts method checks for cls.user_required, but user_required is not defined in the NoSchemeUrl class. This could result in an AttributeError.
Add the user_required attribute to the NoSchemeUrl class:
class NoSchemeUrl(AnyUrl):
"""Override to allow url without a scheme."""
+ user_required = FalseAlternatively, if user information is not needed for URLs without a scheme, you may remove the user validation check altogether.
Committable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.
| raise ProviderException(f"Error getting host status from Centreon: {e}") | ||
|
|
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Raise exceptions with from e to maintain exception context
When re-raising exceptions, using raise ... from e preserves the original exception's traceback, which is helpful for debugging. It provides a clear chain of exceptions, showing how the error was propagated.
Apply this diff to modify your exception handling:
raise ProviderException(f"Error getting host status from Centreon: {e}")
+ from e raise ProviderException(f"Error getting service status from Centreon: {e}")
+ from eAlso applies to: 184-185
🧰 Tools
🪛 Ruff
151-151: Within an except clause, raise exceptions with raise ... from err or raise ... from None to distinguish them from errors in exception handling
(B904)
| const [formValues, setFormValues] = useState<ProviderFormData>(() => | ||
| getInitialFormValues(provider) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Check for undefined 'accessToken' to prevent potential runtime errors.
The accessToken obtained from session?.accessToken could be undefined if the user is not authenticated. Ensure that you verify its existence before using it in API calls to prevent runtime exceptions.
Refactor the code to handle undefined accessToken:
const { data: session } = useSession();
+const accessToken = session?.accessToken;
+
+if (!accessToken) {
+ toast.error("Please log in to continue.");
+ return;
+}
const callInstallWebhook = async () => {
+ if (!accessToken) {
+ toast.error("You need to be logged in to install the webhook.");
+ return;
+ }
await installWebhook(provider, accessToken, apiUrl);
};
async function handleConnectClick() {
+ if (!accessToken) {
+ toast.error("Authentication required to connect the provider.");
+ onConnectChange?.(false, false);
+ return;
+ }
if (!validate()) return;Also applies to: 212-214, 433-434
| return Object.entries(config) | ||
| .filter(([_, config]) => config.required && !config.config_main_group) | ||
| .reduce((acc, [key, value]) => ({ ...acc, [key]: value }), {}); |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
🛠️ Refactor suggestion
Avoid using spread syntax in reducers for better performance.
Using spread syntax ({ ...acc, [key]: value }) inside a reduce function leads to O(n²) time complexity due to object copying on each iteration. To improve performance, consider mutating the accumulator directly.
Apply this diff to optimize the code:
function getRequiredConfigs(config: Provider["config"]): Provider["config"] {
- return Object.entries(config)
- .filter(([_, config]) => config.required && !config.config_main_group)
- .reduce((acc, [key, value]) => ({ ...acc, [key]: value }), {});
+ const requiredConfigs: Provider["config"] = {};
+ Object.entries(config)
+ .filter(([_, config]) => config.required && !config.config_main_group)
+ .forEach(([key, value]) => {
+ requiredConfigs[key] = value;
+ });
+ return requiredConfigs;
}📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| return Object.entries(config) | |
| .filter(([_, config]) => config.required && !config.config_main_group) | |
| .reduce((acc, [key, value]) => ({ ...acc, [key]: value }), {}); | |
| const requiredConfigs: Provider["config"] = {}; | |
| Object.entries(config) | |
| .filter(([_, config]) => config.required && !config.config_main_group) | |
| .forEach(([key, value]) => { | |
| requiredConfigs[key] = value; | |
| }); | |
| return requiredConfigs; |
🧰 Tools
🪛 Biome
[error] 106-106: Avoid the use of spread (...) syntax on accumulators.
Spread syntax should be avoided on accumulators (like those in .reduce) because it causes a time complexity of O(n^2).
Consider methods such as .splice or .push instead.
(lint/performance/noAccumulatingSpread)
| if (config.type === "file") { | ||
| const baseSchema = z | ||
| .instanceof(File, { message: "Please upload a file here." }) | ||
| .or(z.string()) | ||
| .refine( | ||
| (file) => { | ||
| if (config.file_type == undefined) return true; | ||
| if (config.file_type.length <= 1) return true; | ||
| if (typeof file === "string" && installed) return true; | ||
| return ( | ||
| typeof file !== "string" && config.file_type.includes(file.type) | ||
| ); | ||
| }, | ||
| { | ||
| message: | ||
| config.file_type && config.file_type?.split(",").length > 1 | ||
| ? `File type should be one of ${config.file_type}.` | ||
| : `File should be of type ${config.file_type}.`, | ||
| } | ||
| ); |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Inconsistent handling of config.file_type as both string and array
The config.file_type is inconsistently treated as an array in some places and a string in others. This may lead to errors during file type validation.
Apply this diff to consistently treat config.file_type as an array:
.refine(
(file) => {
if (config.file_type == undefined) return true;
- if (config.file_type.length <= 1) return true;
+ if (config.file_type.length === 0) return true;
if (typeof file === "string" && installed) return true;
return (
typeof file !== "string" && config.file_type.includes(file.type)
);
},
{
message:
- config.file_type && config.file_type?.split(",").length > 1
- ? `File type should be one of ${config.file_type}.`
- : `File should be of type ${config.file_type}.`,
+ config.file_type.length > 1
+ ? `File type should be one of ${config.file_type.join(", ")}.`
+ : `File should be of type ${config.file_type[0]}.`,
}
);Ensure that config.file_type is consistently defined and used as an array throughout the code.
📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| if (config.type === "file") { | |
| const baseSchema = z | |
| .instanceof(File, { message: "Please upload a file here." }) | |
| .or(z.string()) | |
| .refine( | |
| (file) => { | |
| if (config.file_type == undefined) return true; | |
| if (config.file_type.length <= 1) return true; | |
| if (typeof file === "string" && installed) return true; | |
| return ( | |
| typeof file !== "string" && config.file_type.includes(file.type) | |
| ); | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| message: | |
| config.file_type && config.file_type?.split(",").length > 1 | |
| ? `File type should be one of ${config.file_type}.` | |
| : `File should be of type ${config.file_type}.`, | |
| } | |
| ); | |
| if (config.type === "file") { | |
| const baseSchema = z | |
| .instanceof(File, { message: "Please upload a file here." }) | |
| .or(z.string()) | |
| .refine( | |
| (file) => { | |
| if (config.file_type == undefined) return true; | |
| if (config.file_type.length === 0) return true; | |
| if (typeof file === "string" && installed) return true; | |
| return ( | |
| typeof file !== "string" && config.file_type.includes(file.type) | |
| ); | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| message: | |
| config.file_type.length > 1 | |
| ? `File type should be one of ${config.file_type.join(", ")}.` | |
| : `File should be of type ${config.file_type[0]}.`, | |
| } | |
| ); |
|
@theedigerati hey! thank you for the contribution! I'll pick it up from Matvey and review the changes. In the meantime, could you please check the coderabbit comments? Feel free to resolve not important ones, but I also pretty important ones — I tagged you. |
|
@Kiryous Alright. Thank you very much. I'll get on it. |
Closes #1327
📑 Description
Validation for provider inputs using zod schema on the frontend and pydantic on the backend
✅ Checks
ℹ Additional Information
https://www.loom.com/share/b08c408f192b4a29aef1d8f83c7c4638?sid=f21b2bb5-4390-4e3b-bd40-e966148597ed
Summary by CodeRabbit
Release Notes
New Features
zod, enhancing URL input validation across various components.Bug Fixes
Documentation
Refactor
Chores