login_duress
is a
BSD authentication
module providing duress functionality upon authentication.
The concept is modeled after the
pam_duress
module for PAM.
It essentially adds a per-user backdoor password which, when entered instead of the user's normal password, will also execute a particular command as that user.
Compile and install the module with make install
.
The module will be installed as /usr/libexec/auth/login_-duress
per
login.conf(5)
recommending local authentication styles starting with a dash.
Create a duress database at /etc/duress
in the format of:
user:encrypted_password:duress_command
The encrypted password hash can be generated with encrypt -b10 -p
.
The command in the duress file will be executed as the user logging in
(via sh -c
), so any functionality requiring elevated privileges should use
doas
or sudo
configured to allow the command without a password.
Once the duress database has been created, make sure its ownership is correct:
# chown root:wheel /etc/duress
# chmod 600 /etc/duress
duress
can now be activated as the default authentication type in
/etc/login.conf
by changing auth-defaults
(or by assigning a new auth
key
for the specific user class):
auth-defaults:auth=-duress:
This will allow duress
logins when authenticating via login(1)
, doas(8)
,
sudo(8)
, xenodm(1)
, ssh(1)
(if you allow password authentication, which
you shouldn't), and everything else that uses BSD authentication on the system.
Example /etc/duress
database:
jcs:$2b$10$PxqDTkwaNak6mUUi1aNWweUZYGIVwE90kYnPkt8HE1HrFWdt84Snm:/usr/bin/doas /sbin/halt -pnq
Example doas.conf
:
permit nopass jcs cmd /sbin/halt
Note: doas
uses the last matching entry, so if you also have the default
"permit persist keepenv :wheel
", the nopass
entry must be added after that
permit
line.
Now when the user jcs
logs in with the password that matches the hash in
/etc/duress
instead of the normal password database, the command
/usr/sbin/doas /sbin/halt -pnq
will be run, immediately powering off the
machine.
This is not a particularly subtle example, so perhaps a better one might be to
run a script that just deletes (via rm -P
) the user's sensitive files such
as SSH keys, e-mail archives, etc.
Perhaps an even more subtle example is to run just /usr/bin/true
upon duress
login.
This does nothing but allow one to login with an alternative password in the
scenario where some agency is requiring the user to reveal their password so
they can login and poke around, but that user's normal system password is also
used on other, more sensitive systems and cannot be revealed.