chore(deps): update dependency vite to v4.5.3 [security] - autoclosed #1453

renovate · 2024-04-24T09:39:03Z

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Adoption	Passing	Confidence
vite (source)	`4.5.0` -> `4.5.3`

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2023-49293

Summary

When Vite's HTML transformation is invoked manually via server.transformIndexHtml, the original request URL is passed in unmodified, and the html being transformed contains inline module scripts (<script type="module">...</script>), it is possible to inject arbitrary HTML into the transformed output by supplying a malicious URL query string to server.transformIndexHtml.

Impact

Only apps using appType: 'custom' and using the default Vite HTML middleware are affected. The HTML entry must also contain an inline script. The attack requires a user to click on a malicious URL while running the dev server. Restricted files aren't exposed to the attacker.

Patches

Fixed in [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]

Details

Suppose index.html contains an inline module script:

<script type="module">
  // Inline script
</script>

This script is transformed into a proxy script like

<script type="module" src="/index.html?html-proxy&index=0.js"></script>

due to Vite's HTML plugin:

https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/7fd7c6cebfcad34ae7021ebee28f97b1f28ef3f3/packages/vite/src/node/plugins/html.ts#L429-L465

When appType: 'spa' | 'mpa', Vite serves HTML itself, and htmlFallbackMiddleware rewrites req.url to the canonical path of index.html,

https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/73ef074b80fa7252e0c46a37a2c94ba8cba46504/packages/vite/src/node/server/middlewares/htmlFallback.ts#L44-L47

so the url passed to server.transformIndexHtml is /index.html.

However, if appType: 'custom', HTML is served manually, and if server.transformIndexHtml is called with the unmodified request URL (as the SSR docs suggest), then the path of the transformed html-proxy script varies with the request URL. For example, a request with path / produces

<script type="module" src="/@&#8203;id/__x00__/index.html?html-proxy&index=0.js"></script>

It is possible to abuse this behavior by crafting a request URL to contain a malicious payload like

"></script><script>alert('boom')</script>

so a request to http://localhost:5173/?%22%3E%3C/script%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(%27boom%27)%3C/script%3E produces HTML output like

<script type="module" src="/@&#8203;id/__x00__/?"></script><script>alert("boom")</script>?html-proxy&index=0.js"></script>

which demonstrates XSS.

PoC

Example 1. Serving HTML from vite dev middleware with appType: 'custom'
- Go to https://stackblitz.com/edit/vitejs-vite-9xhma4?file=main.js&terminal=dev-html
- "Open in New Tab"
- Edit URL to set query string to ?%22%3E%3C/script%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(%27boom%27)%3C/script%3E and navigate
- Witness XSS:
Example 2. Serving HTML from SSR-style Express server (Vite dev server runs in middleware mode):
- Go to https://stackblitz.com/edit/vitejs-vite-9xhma4?file=main.js&terminal=server
- (Same steps as above)
Example 3. Plain vite dev (this shows that vanilla vite dev is not vulnerable, provided htmlFallbackMiddleware is used)
- Go to https://stackblitz.com/edit/vitejs-vite-9xhma4?file=main.js&terminal=dev
- (Same steps as above)
- You should not see the alert box in this case

Detailed Impact

This will probably predominantly affect development-mode SSR, where vite.transformHtml is called using the original req.url, per the docs:

https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/7fd7c6cebfcad34ae7021ebee28f97b1f28ef3f3/docs/guide/ssr.md?plain=1#L114-L126

However, since this vulnerability affects server.transformIndexHtml, the scope of impact may be higher to also include other ad-hoc calls to server.transformIndexHtml from outside of Vite's own codebase.

My best guess at bisecting which versions are vulnerable involves the following test script

import fs from 'node:fs/promises';
import * as vite from 'vite';

const html = `
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
  <head>
    <meta charset="UTF-8" />
  </head>
  <body>
    <script type="module">
      // Inline script
    </script>
  </body>
</html>
`;
const server = await vite.createServer({ appType: 'custom' });
const transformed = await server.transformIndexHtml('/?%22%3E%3C/script%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(%27boom%27)%3C/script%3E', html);
console.log(transformed);
await server.close();

and using it I was able to narrow down to #13581. If this is correct, then vulnerable Vite versions are 4.4.0-beta.2 and higher (which includes 4.4.0).

CVE-2024-23331

Summary

Vite dev server option server.fs.deny can be bypassed on case-insensitive file systems using case-augmented versions of filenames. Notably this affects servers hosted on Windows.

This bypass is similar to https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-34092 -- with surface area reduced to hosts having case-insensitive filesystems.

Patches

Fixed in [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]

Details

Since picomatch defaults to case-sensitive glob matching, but the file server doesn't discriminate; a blacklist bypass is possible.

See picomatch usage, where nocase is defaulted to false: https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/v5.1.0-beta.1/packages/vite/src/node/server/index.ts#L632

By requesting raw filesystem paths using augmented casing, the matcher derived from config.server.fs.deny fails to block access to sensitive files.

PoC

Setup

Created vanilla Vite project using npm create vite@latest on a Standard Azure hosted Windows 10 instance.
- npm run dev -- --host 0.0.0.0
- Publicly accessible for the time being here: http://20.12.242.81:5173/
Created dummy secret files, e.g. custom.secret and production.pem
Populated vite.config.js with

export default { server: { fs: { deny: ['.env', '.env.*', '*.{crt,pem}', 'custom.secret'] } } }

Reproduction

curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@fs//
- Descriptive error page reveals absolute filesystem path to project root
curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@fs/C:/Users/darbonzo/Desktop/vite-project/vite.config.js
- Discoverable configuration file reveals locations of secrets
curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@fs/C:/Users/darbonzo/Desktop/vite-project/custom.sEcReT
- Secrets are directly accessible using case-augmented version of filename

Proof

Impact

Who

Users with exposed dev servers on environments with case-insensitive filesystems

What

Files protected by server.fs.deny are both discoverable, and accessible

CVE-2024-31207

Summary

Vite dev server option server.fs.deny did not deny requests for patterns with directories. An example of such a pattern is /foo/**/*.

Impact

Only apps setting a custom server.fs.deny that includes a pattern with directories, and explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.

Patches

Fixed in [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]

Details

server.fs.deny uses picomatch with the config of { matchBase: true }. matchBase only matches the basename of the file, not the path due to a bug (https://github.com/micromatch/picomatch/issues/89). The vite config docs read like you should be able to set fs.deny to glob with picomatch. Vite also does not set { dot: true } and that causes dotfiles not to be denied unless they are explicitly defined.

Reproduction

Set fs.deny to ['**/.git/**'] and then curl for /.git/config.

with matchBase: true, you can get any file under .git/ (config, HEAD, etc).
with matchBase: false, you cannot get any file under .git/ (config, HEAD, etc).

Release Notes

vitejs/vite (vite)

`v4.5.3`

Compare Source

`v4.5.2`

Compare Source

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

`v4.5.1`

Compare Source

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

Configuration

📅 Schedule: Branch creation - "" in timezone Europe/Madrid, Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined).

🚦 Automerge: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied.

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renovate bot requested a review from a team as a code owner April 24, 2024 09:39

renovate bot added the dependencies Pull requests that update a dependency file label Apr 24, 2024

renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-vite-vulnerability branch 13 times, most recently from a3c835b to fd319b7 Compare May 3, 2024 08:23

chore(deps): update dependency vite to v4.5.3 [security]

77b74fa

renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-vite-vulnerability branch from fd319b7 to 77b74fa Compare May 3, 2024 08:39

renovate bot changed the title ~~chore(deps): update dependency vite to v4.5.3 [security]~~ chore(deps): update dependency vite to v4.5.3 [security] - autoclosed May 6, 2024

renovate bot closed this May 6, 2024

renovate bot deleted the renovate/npm-vite-vulnerability branch May 6, 2024 11:05

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chore(deps): update dependency vite to v4.5.3 [security] - autoclosed #1453

chore(deps): update dependency vite to v4.5.3 [security] - autoclosed #1453

renovate bot commented Apr 24, 2024

chore(deps): update dependency vite to v4.5.3 [security] - autoclosed #1453

chore(deps): update dependency vite to v4.5.3 [security] - autoclosed #1453

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renovate bot commented Apr 24, 2024

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2023-49293

Summary

Impact

Patches

Details

PoC

Detailed Impact

CVE-2024-23331

Summary

Patches

Details

PoC

Impact

CVE-2024-31207

Summary

Impact

Patches

Details

Release Notes

v4.5.3

v4.5.2

v4.5.1

Configuration

`v4.5.3`

`v4.5.2`

`v4.5.1`