Adebisi Lives

README.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 # PrisonersDilemmaTournament
 
-This is my CS 269i class project.
+This is my CS 269i class project. Check out my webpage for context! https://htwins.net/prisoners-dilemma/
 
-Watch This Place's awesome videos about iterated Prisoner's Dilemma for context!
+Watch This Place's awesome videos about iterated Prisoner's Dilemma for more context!
 
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t9Lo2fgxWHw
 
@@ -44,3 +44,7 @@ Each pairing simulation runs for this many turns:
 200-40*np.log(random.random())
 ```
 This means each game is guaranteed to be at least 200 turns long. But then, for every turn after the 200th, there is an equal probability that the game ends. The probability is very low, so there should be no strategizing to defect on the very last turn consequence-free.
+
+---
+
+Please submit your strategies to this Google Form: https://forms.gle/wWwZY9mmSHF2X34P7 by May 26th, 2021 at 10 PM UTC. Your file can be named whatever you want your strategy to be called, like "superCleverDetective.py", but you must keep it a .py file. Also, do not rename the function header within the file - you must keep it as "def strategy(history, memory):". When I’ve got all your strategies collected in one place, I will combine them with that list of 9 example strategies already provided in the GitHub repo. With these (9 + n) strategies all appearing once in this giant "mosh pit", I will run the program "prisonersDilemma.py". Whoever’s single strategy takes the top spot will win $1,000!  Second place will win $300, and third place will win $100. (Note: There is a small chance one of the 9 default strategies win, but I hope that doesn't happen!)

code/exampleStrats/alwaysCooperate.py

@@ -1,2 +1,4 @@
+# Reminder: For the history array, "cooperate" = 1, "defect" = 0
+
 def strategy(history, memory):
-	return 1, None
+	return "cooperate", None

code/exampleStrats/alwaysDefect.py

@@ -1,2 +1,4 @@
+# Reminder: For the history array, "cooperate" = 1, "defect" = 0
+
 def strategy(history, memory):
-	return 0, None
+	return "defect", None

code/exampleStrats/detective.py

@@ -5,13 +5,15 @@
 # https://ncase.me/trust/
 #
 # DETECTIVE: First: I analyze you. I start:
-# Cooperate, Cheat, Cooperate, Cooperate.
-# If you cheat back, I'll act like [Tit for Tat].
-# If you never cheta back, I'll act like [alwaysDefect],
+# Cooperate, Defect, Cooperate, Cooperate.
+# If you defect back, I'll act like [Tit for Tat].
+# If you never defect back, I'll act like [alwaysDefect],
 # to exploit you. Elementary, my dear Watson.
 
+# Reminder: For the history array, "cooperate" = 1, "defect" = 0
+
 def strategy(history, memory):
-    testingSchedule = [1,0,1,1]
+    testingSchedule = ["cooperate","defect","cooperate","cooperate"]
     gameLength = history.shape[1]
     shallIExploit = memory
     choice = None
@@ -27,8 +29,8 @@ def strategy(history, memory):
 
     if gameLength >= 4:
         if shallIExploit:
-            choice = 0
+            choice = "defect"
         else:
             choice = history[1,-1] # Do Tit for Tat
 
-    return choice, shallIExploit
+    return choice, shallIExploit

code/exampleStrats/ftft.py

@@ -1,7 +1,10 @@
 # Forgiving Tit for Tat.
 # Choose to defect if and only if the opponent just defected TWICE in a row.
+
+# Reminder: For the history array, "cooperate" = 1, "defect" = 0
+
 def strategy(history, memory):
-    choice = 1
+    choice = "cooperate"
     if history.shape[1] >= 2 and history[1,-1] == 0 and history[1,-2] == 0: # We check the TWO most recent turns to see if BOTH were defections, and only then do we defect too.
-        choice = 0
-    return choice, None
+        choice = "defect"
+    return choice, None

code/exampleStrats/grimTrigger.py

@@ -4,7 +4,9 @@
 #
 # In this implementation, I used the memory variable to store Grim Trigger's state of mind.
 # memory is true if Grim Trigger has been wronged, and false if it hasn't.
-#
+
+# Reminder: For the history array, "cooperate" = 1, "defect" = 0
+
 def strategy(history, memory):
     wronged = False
     if memory is not None and memory: # Has memory that it was already wronged.
@@ -14,7 +16,7 @@ def strategy(history, memory):
             wronged = True
 
     if wronged:
-        return 0, True
+        return "defect", True
     else:
-        return 1, False
-
+        return "cooperate", False
+    

code/exampleStrats/joss.py

@@ -3,9 +3,11 @@
 # Variant of Tit For Tat that randomly defects to try to take advantage
 # of overly forgiving opponents.
 
+# Reminder: For the history array, "cooperate" = 1, "defect" = 0
+
 def strategy(history, memory):
-    choice = 1
+    choice = "cooperate"
     if random.random() < 0.10 or (history.shape[1] >= 1 and history[1,-1] == 0):
     # Choose to defect randomly by 10% chance, OR if and only if the opponent just defected.
-        choice = 0
-    return choice, None
+        choice = "defect"
+    return choice, None

code/exampleStrats/randomStrategy.py

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+import random
+
+# Reminder: For the history array, "cooperate" = 1, "defect" = 0
+
+def strategy(history, memory):
+    if random.randint(0,1) == 0:
+        return "cooperate", None
+    else:
+        return "defect", None

code/exampleStrats/simpleton.py

@@ -3,16 +3,18 @@
 #
 # SIMPLETON: Hi! I try to start by cooperating. If  you cooperate
 # back, I do the same thing as my last move, even if it was a mistake.
-# If you cheat back, I do the opposite thing as my last move, even
+# If you defect back, I do the opposite thing as my last move, even
 # if it was a mistake.
 
+# Reminder: For the history array, "cooperate" = 1, "defect" = 0
+
 def strategy(history, memory):
     choice = None
     if history.shape[1] == 0: # We're on the first turn!
-        choice = 1
+        choice = "cooperate"
     else:
-        choice = history[0,-1] # I will keep doing the same thing as last move!
+        choice = "cooperate" if history[0,-1] == 1 else "defect" # I will keep doing the same thing as last move!
         if history[1,-1] == 0: # If my opponent defected last turn, I'll just do the opposite thing as my last move:
-            choice = 1-choice
+            choice = "defect" if history[0,-1] == 1 else "cooperate" # I will keep doing the same thing as last move!
 
-    return choice, None
+    return choice, None

code/exampleStrats/titForTat.py

@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
+# Reminder: For the history array, "cooperate" = 1, "defect" = 0
+
 def strategy(history, memory):
-    choice = 1
+    choice = "cooperate"
     if history.shape[1] >= 1 and history[1,-1] == 0: # Choose to defect if and only if the opponent just defected.
-        choice = 0
-    return choice, None
+        choice = "defect"
+    return choice, None

code/prisonersDilemma.py

@@ -30,18 +30,19 @@ def getVisibleHistory(history, player, turn):
 
 def strategyMove(move):
     if type(move) is str:
-        defects = ["defect","confess the crime"]
+        defects = ["defect","tell truth"]
         return 0 if (move in defects) else 1
     else:
-        return move
+        # Coerce all moves to be 0 or 1 so strategies can safely assume 0/1's only
+        return int(bool(move))
 
 def runRound(pair):
     moduleA = importlib.import_module(STRATEGY_FOLDER+"."+pair[0])
     moduleB = importlib.import_module(STRATEGY_FOLDER+"."+pair[1])
     memoryA = None
     memoryB = None
 
-    LENGTH_OF_GAME = int(200-40*np.log(random.random())) # The games are a minimum of 50 turns long. The np.log here guarantees that every turn after the 50th has an equal (low) chance of being the final turn.
+    LENGTH_OF_GAME = int(200-40*np.log(1-random.random())) # The games are a minimum of 200 turns long. The np.log here guarantees that every turn after the 200th has an equal (low) chance of being the final turn.
     history = np.zeros((2,LENGTH_OF_GAME),dtype=int)
 
     for turn in range(LENGTH_OF_GAME):
@@ -117,4 +118,4 @@ def runFullPairingTournament(inFolder, outFile):
     print("Done with everything! Results file written to "+RESULTS_FILE)
 
 
-runFullPairingTournament(STRATEGY_FOLDER, RESULTS_FILE)
+runFullPairingTournament(STRATEGY_FOLDER, RESULTS_FILE)