The purpose of the document is to create a secure and healthy PGP set of keys to manage GitHub identities and have the Verified status on there.
We want to end up with a set of 3 keys:
- Master Key used to certify other keys and to create and revoke subkeys.
- Signing SubKey this subkey will be used to sign our commits.
- Encryption SubKey not really used in this context, but this is created by default and it could come handy.
We will keep the private part of the Master Key offline to protect our identity against theft or loss. Read more about subkeys here.
This walkthrough refers to gpg (GnuPG) 2.1.18, please make sure to have the latest stable GnuPG2 installed for your distribution.
Even if you alredy have a GPG key-pair, it would be wise to have a Foundries-specific pair. If you still want to use your existing keypair, please make sure to understand how PGP subkeys work and skip to section 2.
Let's just generate a RSA 4096 key that never expires, so we are able to sign and encrypt. While the master key will never expire, the keys we will actually use on a daily basis will expire.
$ gpg2 --full-gen-keySelect options like in here:
gpg (GnuPG) 2.1.18; Copyright (C) 2017 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
Please select what kind of key you want:
(1) RSA and RSA (default)
(2) DSA and Elgamal
(3) DSA (sign only)
(4) RSA (sign only)
Your selection? 1
RSA keys may be between 1024 and 4096 bits long.
What keysize do you want? (2048) 4096
Requested keysize is 4096 bits
Please specify how long the key should be valid.
0 = key does not expire
<n> = key expires in n days
<n>w = key expires in n weeks
<n>m = key expires in n months
<n>y = key expires in n years
Key is valid for? (0) 0
Key does not expire at all
Is this correct? (y/N) y
GnuPG needs to construct a user ID to identify your key.
Real name: Tyler Baker
Email address: [email protected]
Comment: Tyler Baker Foundries Identity
You selected this USER-ID:
"Tyler Baker (Tyler Baker Foundries Identity) <[email protected]>"
Change (N)ame, (C)omment, (E)mail or (O)kay/(Q)uit? O
We need to generate a lot of random bytes. It is a good idea to perform
some other action (type on the keyboard, move the mouse, utilize the
disks) during the prime generation; this gives the random number
generator a better chance to gain enough entropy.
After this the key will be generated after the OS obtains some entropy.
We can check the newly created key with:
$ gpg2 -KExample output:
gpg: checking the trustdb
gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 0 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
/home/youruser/.gnupg/pubring.kbx
---------------------------------
sec rsa4096 2018-06-14 [SC]
B3DFA611285A0FF08D4151AE2E1920CC6D2B72DD
uid [ultimate] Tyler Baker (Tyler Baker Foundries Identity) <[email protected]>
ssb rsa4096 2018-06-14 [E]This means we have a secret master key of type RSA 4096 associated to the [email protected] identity. The master key can be used to sign and certify [SC].
There is also a secret subkey ssb, that can be used to encrypt data [E].
The ID of the key is B3DFA611285A0FF08D4151AE2E1920CC6D2B72DD.
For others to be able to have your identity handy, upload the newly created public key to a keyserver:
$ gpg2 --keyserver hkp://keys.gnupg.net --send-keys B3DFA611285A0FF08D4151AE2E1920CC6D2B72DD
We do not want to use our master key for everyday use, we want to have subkeys that expire to sign and encrypt instead.
$ gpg2 --edit-key B3DFA611285A0FF08D4151AE2E1920CC6D2B72DD
gpg (GnuPG) 2.1.18; Copyright (C) 2017 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
Secret key is available.
sec rsa4096/2E1920CC6D2B72DD
created: 2018-06-14 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: ultimate
ssb rsa4096/2FBE06F3FC085E04
created: 2018-06-14 expires: never usage: E
[ultimate] (1). Tyler Baker (Tyler Baker Foundries Identity) <[email protected]>
gpg>
Currently we have a master key and an encryption subkey, no expiration date is set for neither of them.
At continuation we set an expiration date for the first subkey and we create a signing subkey.
gpg> key 1
sec rsa4096/2E1920CC6D2B72DD
created: 2018-06-14 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: ultimate
ssb* rsa4096/2FBE06F3FC085E04
created: 2018-06-14 expires: never usage: E
[ultimate] (1). Tyler Baker (Tyler Baker Foundries Identity) <[email protected]>
gpg> expire
Changing expiration time for a subkey.
Please specify how long the key should be valid.
0 = key does not expire
<n> = key expires in n days
<n>w = key expires in n weeks
<n>m = key expires in n months
<n>y = key expires in n years
Key is valid for? (0) 1y
Key expires at Fri 14 Jun 2019 11:37:16 AM UTC
Is this correct? (y/N) y
sec rsa4096/2E1920CC6D2B72DD
created: 2018-06-14 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: ultimate
ssb* rsa4096/2FBE06F3FC085E04
created: 2018-06-14 expires: 2019-06-14 usage: E
[ultimate] (1). Tyler Baker (Tyler Baker Foundries Identity) <[email protected]>
gpg> addkey
Please select what kind of key you want:
(3) DSA (sign only)
(4) RSA (sign only)
(5) Elgamal (encrypt only)
(6) RSA (encrypt only)
Your selection? 4
RSA keys may be between 1024 and 4096 bits long.
What keysize do you want? (2048) 4096
Requested keysize is 4096 bits
Please specify how long the key should be valid.
0 = key does not expire
<n> = key expires in n days
<n>w = key expires in n weeks
<n>m = key expires in n months
<n>y = key expires in n years
Key is valid for? (0) 1y
Key expires at Fri 14 Jun 2019 11:37:31 AM UTC
Is this correct? (y/N) y
Really create? (y/N) y
We need to generate a lot of random bytes. It is a good idea to perform
some other action (type on the keyboard, move the mouse, utilize the
disks) during the prime generation; this gives the random number
generator a better chance to gain enough entropy.
You should end up in a similar configuration:
gpg> list
sec rsa4096/2E1920CC6D2B72DD
created: 2018-06-14 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: ultimate
ssb* rsa4096/2FBE06F3FC085E04
created: 2018-06-14 expires: 2019-06-14 usage: E
ssb rsa4096/97A4AC4092576B55
created: 2018-06-14 expires: 2019-06-14 usage: S
[ultimate] (1). Tyler Baker (Tyler Baker Foundries Identity) <[email protected]>
gpg> save
Don't forget to save the changes by issuing a gpg> save to the prompt.
We will proceed by exporting Master Key's revocation certificate and secret portion. We will then proceed to delete the secret Master Key from our keyring. You should store this Master Key offline, separatly from your main device, a location which is both easy to remember and accessible. The Master Key's secret is essentially the certificate for your identity, and you do not want to compromise your entire identity if your device is stolen or lost. The Master Key's secret will be needed to:
- Generate new subkeys.
- Revoke subkeys.
- Revoke Master Key.
- Sign other people's Master Keys.
Let's generate a revocation certificate for the Master Key. This will be the only way to retract your Master Key in case you loose it.
$ gpg2 --output tyler.baker.foundries.gpg-revocation-certificate --gen-revoke [email protected]
Select these options:
sec rsa4096/2E1920CC6D2B72DD 2018-06-14 Tyler Baker (Tyler Baker Foundries Identity) <[email protected]>
Create a revocation certificate for this key? (y/N) y
Please select the reason for the revocation:
0 = No reason specified
1 = Key has been compromised
2 = Key is superseded
3 = Key is no longer used
Q = Cancel
(Probably you want to select 1 here)
Your decision? 0
Enter an optional description; end it with an empty line:
>
Reason for revocation: No reason specified
(No description given)
Is this okay? (y/N) y
ASCII armored output forced.
File 'tyler.baker.foundries.gpg-revocation-certificate' exists. Overwrite? (y/N) y
Revocation certificate created.
Please move it to a medium which you can hide away; if Mallory gets
access to this certificate he can use it to make your key unusable.
It is smart to print this certificate and store it away, just in case
your media become unreadable. But have some caution: The print system of
your machine might store the data and make it available to others!
Store the file offline and delete it from the device.
Let's export the secret portion of our Master Key:
$ gpg2 --export-secret-keys --output tyler.baker.secret.gpg --armor B3DFA611285A0FF08D4151AE2E1920CC6D2B72DD
The exported key file is encrypted with the passphrase you chose during the key's creation.
Store the file in a safe, offline and easy-to-remember place and delete it from the device. Please note that the backup should be easily accessible from you at any time.
$ gpg2 --delete-secret-key B3DFA611285A0FF08D4151AE2E1920CC6D2B72DD
gpg2 will interactively prompt what secret keys you want to delete.
REMOVE THE MASTER KEY'S SECRET ONLY, LEAVING SUBKEYS ALONE.
Example output:
gpg (GnuPG) 2.1.18; Copyright (C) 2017 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
sec rsa4096/2E1920CC6D2B72DD 2018-06-14 Tyler Baker (Tyler Baker Foundries Identity) <[email protected]>
Delete this key from the keyring? (y/N) y
This is a secret key! - really delete? (y/N) y
gpg: deleting secret subkey failed: Operation cancelled
gpg: B3DFA611285A0FF08D4151AE2E1920CC6D2B72DD: delete key failed: Operation cancelled
To check that everything went according to plan issue:
$ gpg2 -K
You should have an output like this:
/home/youruser/.gnupg/pubring.kbx
---------------------------------
sec# rsa4096 2018-06-14 [SC]
B3DFA611285A0FF08D4151AE2E1920CC6D2B72DD
uid [ultimate] Tyler Baker (Tyler Baker Foundries Identity) <[email protected]>
ssb rsa4096 2018-06-14 [E] [expires: 2019-06-14]
ssb rsa4096 2018-06-14 [S] [expires: 2019-06-14]
The # next to the Master Key's means that the secret part of that key is not present in the keyring anymore, therefore it is not usable. This is what we wanted: generating two complete keypairs for everyday's use, while retaining only the public portion of the the Master Key on our device.
After the deleting the private part, the Master Key is not usable anymore to modifying or adding subkeys.
To verify your backup, retrieve it from your secure offline storage and issue:
$ gpg2 --import tyler.baker.secret.gpg
Example output:
gpg: key 2E1920CC6D2B72DD: "Tyler Baker (Tyler Baker Foundries Identity) <[email protected]>" 1 new signature
gpg: key 2E1920CC6D2B72DD: "Tyler Baker (Tyler Baker Foundries Identity) <[email protected]>" 1 new subkey
gpg: key 2E1920CC6D2B72DD: secret key imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: new subkeys: 1
gpg: new signatures: 1
gpg: secret keys read: 1
gpg: secret keys imported: 1
gpg: secret keys unchanged: 1
By listing the private keyring once again we can see that the # sign has disappeared, meaning the Master Key is once again usable.
$ gpg2 -K
/home/youruser/.gnupg/pubring.kbx
---------------------------------
sec rsa4096 2018-06-14 [SC]
B3DFA611285A0FF08D4151AE2E1920CC6D2B72DD
uid [ultimate] Tyler Baker (Tyler Baker Foundries Identity) <[email protected]>
ssb rsa4096 2018-06-14 [S] [expires: 2019-06-14]
ssb rsa4096 2018-06-14 [E] [expires: 2019-06-14]
Make sure the pcscd (On Linux) / CryptoTokenKit or pcsc-lite on Mac OSX SmartCard middleware is running on your host to interact with the smartcard.
Plug your Yubikey in!
Yubikey cards implement several modules and protocols for you to interact with the card. We will be interacting with the OpenPGP module of the card through the gpg cli.
$ gpg2 --card-edit
[BLURRED]
gpg/card>
Information of the card will be listed.
We will now proceed to change the PIN and the Admin PIN from the default values. The default Admin PIN on a brand new Yubikey 4 defaults to 12345678.
gpg/card> admin
Admin commands are allowed
gpg/card> passwd
gpg: OpenPGP card no. [BLURRED] detected
1 - change PIN
2 - unblock PIN
3 - change Admin PIN
4 - set the Reset Code
Q - quit
Your selection? 3
PIN changed.
1 - change PIN
2 - unblock PIN
3 - change Admin PIN
4 - set the Reset Code
Q - quit
Your selection? 2
PIN changed.
1 - change PIN
2 - unblock PIN
3 - change Admin PIN
4 - set the Reset Code
Q - quit
Your selection? q
Please beware that issuing the Admin PIN incorrectly for several times will lock the contents of the card, and factory reset will be necessary.
Let's make the key personal by adding your personal info:
gpg/card> name
Cardholder's surname: Baker
Cardholder's given name: Tyler
gpg/card> lang
Language preferences: en
gpg/card> sex
Sex ((M)ale, (F)emale or space): m
gpg/card> login
Login data (account name): andrea
gpg/card> quit
You can choose either of the following options:
- Yubikey with Sub Key inside (reccomended): Master Key's secret is on an generic backup storage. Subkey is carried around with the Yukibey, regardless of the device. Loosing the backup will lead to entire identity compromise.
- Yubikey with Master Key inside: well-identified object and often carried around. Subkeys on device, you will need to create / copy subkey per device you use. If you loose the Yubikey your entire identity is compromised.
Please, take a moment to understand the implications of this step: every time you will need to sign other's people identities, alter, revoke or generate subkeys for your identity you will have to recur to the offline Master Key backup you performed in section 3.2. Loosing your Yubikey won't lead to an identity compromise.
gpg2 --edit-key B3DFA611285A0FF08D4151AE2E1920CC6D2B72DD
gpg (GnuPG) 2.1.18; Copyright (C) 2017 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
Secret key is available.
pub rsa4096/2E1920CC6D2B72DD
created: 2018-06-14 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: ultimate
ssb rsa4096/97A4AC4092576B55
created: 2018-06-14 expires: 2019-06-14 usage: S
ssb rsa4096/2FBE06F3FC085E04
created: 2018-06-14 expires: 2019-06-14 usage: E
[ultimate] (1). Tyler Baker (Tyler Baker Foundries Identity) <[email protected]>
gpg> key 1
pub rsa4096/2E1920CC6D2B72DD
created: 2018-06-14 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: ultimate
ssb* rsa4096/97A4AC4092576B55
created: 2018-06-14 expires: 2019-06-14 usage: S
ssb rsa4096/2FBE06F3FC085E04
created: 2018-06-14 expires: 2019-06-14 usage: E
[ultimate] (1). Tyler Baker (Tyler Baker Foundries Identity) <[email protected]>
gpg> keytocard
Please select where to store the key:
(1) Signature key
(3) Authentication key
Your selection? 1
gpg> save
After this step you should end up in the followin situation:
$ gpg2 -K
/home/youruser/.gnupg/pubring.kbx
---------------------------------
sec# rsa4096 2018-06-14 [SC]
B3DFA611285A0FF08D4151AE2E1920CC6D2B72DD
uid [ultimate] Tyler Baker (Tyler Baker Foundries Identity) <[email protected]>
ssb> rsa4096 2018-06-14 [S] [expires: 2019-06-14]
ssb rsa4096 2018-06-14 [E] [expires: 2019-06-14]
The > symbol next to your Sub Key means that the secret is safely stored on the SmartCard. Notice that, by now, you should also have backed-up and removed the Master Key secret from the device as explained in section 3.3, hence the # symbol next to the Master Key.
Please, take a moment to understand the implications of this step: if your Yubikey is lost or stolen, you will have to assume the compromise of your entire identity.
gpg2 --edit-key B3DFA611285A0FF08D4151AE2E1920CC6D2B72DD
gpg (GnuPG) 2.1.18; Copyright (C) 2017 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
Secret key is available.
sec rsa4096/2E1920CC6D2B72DD
created: 2018-06-14 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: ultimate
ssb rsa4096/97A4AC4092576B55
created: 2018-06-14 expires: 2019-06-14 usage: S
ssb rsa4096/2FBE06F3FC085E04
created: 2018-06-14 expires: 2019-06-14 usage: E
[ultimate] (1). Tyler Baker (Tyler Baker Foundries Identity) <[email protected]>
gpg> keytocard
Really move the primary key? (y/N) y
Please select where to store the key:
(1) Signature key
(3) Authentication key
Your selection? 1
gpg> save
After this step you should end up in the followin situation:
$ gpg2 -K
/home/youruser/.gnupg/pubring.kbx
---------------------------------
sec> rsa4096 2018-06-14 [SC]
B3DFA611285A0FF08D4151AE2E1920CC6D2B72DD
uid [ultimate] Tyler Baker (Tyler Baker Foundries Identity) <[email protected]>
ssb rsa4096 2018-06-14 [S] [expires: 2019-06-14]
ssb rsa4096 2018-06-14 [E] [expires: 2019-06-14]
The > symbol next to your Master Key means that the secret is safely stored on the SmartCard.
Export your Master Key's public part:
$ gpg2 --export --armor B3DFA611285A0FF08D4151AE2E1920CC6D2B72DD
Copy and paste the output as a GPG key under your GitHub profile.
We now want to configure git to make use of the signing GPG subkey, corresponding to the Master Key we uploaded to GitHub. Since we deleted the private portion of the Master Key, a valid signing subkey will be used instead.
$ gpg2 -K
Output:
/home/youruser/.gnupg/pubring.kbx
---------------------------------
sec> rsa4096 2018-06-14 [SC]
B3DFA611285A0FF08D4151AE2E1920CC6D2B72DD
uid [ultimate] Tyler Baker (Tyler Baker Foundries Identity) <[email protected]>
ssb rsa4096 2018-06-14 [E] [expires: 2019-06-14]
ssb rsa4096 2018-06-14 [S] [expires: 2019-06-14]
Copy the ID corresponding to the key, B3DFA611285A0FF08D4151AE2E1920CC6D2B72DD in this case.
Get into your `` repo folder and let's alter the local git configuration.
$ git config user.email [email protected]
$ git config user.name 'Tyler Baker'
$ git config user.signingkey B3DFA611285A0FF08D4151AE2E1920CC6D2B72DD
$ git config commit.gpgSign true
From now on, every commit you issue from this device will be signed with the configured PGP key. Since you uploaded the public part to GitHub, they will be marked as Verified.
In order to sign commits with MacOS you'll need a few additional items
-
brew install gpg# at the time this was written, version: gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.7 -
add no-tty to ~/.gnupg/gpg.conf
echo "no-tty" >> ~/.gnupg/gpg.conf
brew install pinentry-mac- add pinentry-mac to ~/.gnupg/gpg-agent.conf
echo "pinentry-program /usr/local/bin/pinentry-mac" >> ~/.gnupg/gpg-agent.conf
If you followed all the above, your signing subkey will expire 1 year after creation. When the expiration date approaches you can either extend the current key or create a new subkey starting from the same Master Key. Please note that you will need to use the Master Key's private you safely stored offline to perform these actions. Since the renewed or new key originates from the same Master Key, the world will recognise the new signatures as belonging to the same Master Key's public part, therefore same identity.
Realeses on GitHub are performed manually from the web interface. As long as a release points to a Verified commit, the release will also be consiered Kosher.
If binary files are attached as part of the release, it is good practice to generate a detached armored-ASCII signature corresponding to the user issuing the release.
$ gpg2 --detach-sign --armor lmp-gateway-image-raspberrypi3-64.img.gz [email protected]
This will generate a lmp-gateway-image-raspberrypi3-64.img.gz.asc signature file for my [email protected] identity to be included in the release.
As part of the text of the release, you should also provide MD5 and SHA256 checksums of the supplied binary files.
$ md5sum lmp-gateway-image-raspberrypi3-64.img.gz
$ sha256sum lmp-gateway-image-raspberrypi3-64.img.gz
Import the key
To sign other keys, you must have the master key in your keyring. Otherwise, you will recieve a message like "gpg: signing failed: No secret key" if you don't have a master key in your keyring.
gpg2 --keyserver pgp.mit.edu --recv-key <key id you want to sign>
Sign the key
gpg2 --sign-key --default-key 562C3B2B19600D79160B451EE3950BF5AE4B84A <key id you want to sign email address>
Upload the key
gpg2 --keyserver pgp.mit.edu --send-key <key id you signed>