exfiltration_gcp_logging_sink_modification.toml

[metadata]
creation_date = "2020/09/22"
integration = ["gcp"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2024/05/21"

[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies a modification to a Logging sink in Google Cloud Platform (GCP). Logging compares the log entry to the sinks
in that resource. Each sink whose filter matches the log entry writes a copy of the log entry to the sink's export
destination. An adversary may update a Logging sink to exfiltrate logs to a different export destination.
"""
false_positives = [
    """
    Logging sink modifications may be done by a system or network administrator. Verify whether the user email, resource
    name, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. Sink modifications from unfamiliar users or
    hosts should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
    """,
]
index = ["filebeat-*", "logs-gcp*"]
language = "kuery"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "GCP Logging Sink Modification"
note = """## Setup

The GCP Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule."""
references = ["https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/export#how_sinks_work"]
risk_score = 21
rule_id = "184dfe52-2999-42d9-b9d1-d1ca54495a61"
severity = "low"
tags = [
    "Domain: Cloud",
    "Data Source: GCP",
    "Data Source: Google Cloud Platform",
    "Use Case: Log Auditing",
    "Tactic: Exfiltration",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "query"

query = '''
event.dataset:gcp.audit and event.action:google.logging.v*.ConfigServiceV*.UpdateSink and event.outcome:success
'''


[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1537"
name = "Transfer Data to Cloud Account"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537/"


[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0010"
name = "Exfiltration"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/"