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exfiltration_rds_snapshot_export.toml
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exfiltration_rds_snapshot_export.toml
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[metadata]
creation_date = "2021/06/06"
integration = ["aws"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2024/05/21"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic", "Austin Songer"]
description = "Identifies the export of an Amazon Relational Database Service (RDS) Aurora database snapshot."
false_positives = [
"""
Exporting snapshots may be done by a system or network administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent,
and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. Snapshot exports from unfamiliar users or hosts should
be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
""",
]
from = "now-60m"
index = ["filebeat-*", "logs-aws.cloudtrail-*"]
interval = "10m"
language = "kuery"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "AWS RDS Snapshot Export"
note = """## Setup
The AWS Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule."""
references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonRDS/latest/APIReference/API_StartExportTask.html"]
risk_score = 21
rule_id = "119c8877-8613-416d-a98a-96b6664ee73a"
severity = "low"
tags = [
"Domain: Cloud",
"Data Source: AWS",
"Data Source: Amazon Web Services",
"Use Case: Asset Visibility",
"Tactic: Exfiltration",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "query"
query = '''
event.dataset:aws.cloudtrail and event.provider:rds.amazonaws.com and event.action:StartExportTask and event.outcome:success
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0010"
name = "Exfiltration"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/"