diff --git a/doc/Basic.md b/doc/Basic.md
index 3972487..9527310 100644
--- a/doc/Basic.md
+++ b/doc/Basic.md
@@ -2,24 +2,28 @@
 
 This is the Basic Halite API:
 
-  * Encryption
+* Encryption
     * Symmetric
-       * `Symmetric\Crypto::encrypt`(`HiddenString`, [`EncryptionKey`](Classes/Symmetric/EncryptionKey.md), `bool?`): `string`
-       * `Symmetric\Crypto::decrypt`(`string`, [`EncryptionKey`](Classes/Symmetric/EncryptionKey.md), `bool?`): `HiddenString`
+        * `Symmetric\Crypto::encrypt`([`HiddenString`](Classes/HiddenString.md), [`EncryptionKey`](Classes/Symmetric/EncryptionKey.md)): `string`
+        * `Symmetric\Crypto::encryptWithAD`([`HiddenString`](Classes/HiddenString.md), [`EncryptionKey`](Classes/Symmetric/EncryptionKey.md), `string`): `string`
+        * `Symmetric\Crypto::decrypt`(`string`, [`EncryptionKey`](Classes/Symmetric/EncryptionKey.md)): [`HiddenString`](Classes/HiddenString.md)
+        * `Symmetric\Crypto::decryptWithAD`(`string`, [`EncryptionKey`](Classes/Symmetric/EncryptionKey.md), `string`): [`HiddenString`](Classes/HiddenString.md)
     * Asymmetric
-       * Anonymous
-         * `Asymmetric\Crypto::seal`(`HiddenString`, [`EncryptionPublicKey`](Classes/Asymmetric/EncryptionPublicKey.md), `bool?`): `string`
-         * `Asymmetric\Crypto::unseal`(`string`, [`EncryptionSecretKey`](Classes/Asymmetric/EncryptionSecretKey.md), `bool?`): `HiddenString`
-       * Authenticated
-         * `Asymmetric\Crypto::encrypt`(`HiddenString`, [`EncryptionSecretKey`](Classes/Asymmetric/EncryptionSecretKey.md), [`EncryptionPublicKey`](Classes/Asymmetric/EncryptionPublicKey.md), `bool?`): `string`
-         * `Asymmetric\Crypto::decrypt`(`string`, [`EncryptionSecretKey`](Classes/Asymmetric/EncryptionSecretKey.md), [`EncryptionPublicKey`](Classes/Asymmetric/EncryptionPublicKey.md), `bool?`): `HiddenString`
-  * Authentication
+        * Anonymous
+            * `Asymmetric\Crypto::seal`([`HiddenString`](Classes/HiddenString.md), [`EncryptionPublicKey`](Classes/Asymmetric/EncryptionPublicKey.md)): `string`
+            * `Asymmetric\Crypto::unseal`(`string`, [`EncryptionSecretKey`](Classes/Asymmetric/EncryptionSecretKey.md)): [`HiddenString`](Classes/HiddenString.md)
+        * Authenticated
+            * `Asymmetric\Crypto::encrypt`([`HiddenString`](Classes/HiddenString.md), [`EncryptionSecretKey`](Classes/Asymmetric/EncryptionSecretKey.md), [`EncryptionPublicKey`](Classes/Asymmetric/EncryptionPublicKey.md)): `string`
+            * `Asymmetric\Crypto::encryptWithAD`([`HiddenString`](Classes/HiddenString.md), [`EncryptionSecretKey`](Classes/Asymmetric/EncryptionSecretKey.md), [`EncryptionPublicKey`](Classes/Asymmetric/EncryptionPublicKey.md), `string`): `string`
+            * `Asymmetric\Crypto::decrypt`(`string`, [`EncryptionSecretKey`](Classes/Asymmetric/EncryptionSecretKey.md), [`EncryptionPublicKey`](Classes/Asymmetric/EncryptionPublicKey.md)): [`HiddenString`](Classes/HiddenString.md)
+            * `Asymmetric\Crypto::decryptWithAD`(`string`, [`EncryptionSecretKey`](Classes/Asymmetric/EncryptionSecretKey.md), [`EncryptionPublicKey`](Classes/Asymmetric/EncryptionPublicKey.md), `string`): [`HiddenString`](Classes/HiddenString.md)
+* Authentication
     * Symmetric
-       * `Symmetric\Crypto::authenticate`(`string`, [`AuthenticationKey`](Classes/Symmetric/AuthenticationKey.md), `bool?`): `string`
-       * `Symmetric\Crypto::verify`(`string`, [`AuthenticationKey`](Classes/Symmetric/AuthenticationKey.md), `string`, `bool?`): `bool`
+        * `Symmetric\Crypto::authenticate`(`string`, [`AuthenticationKey`](Classes/Symmetric/AuthenticationKey.md)): `string`
+        * `Symmetric\Crypto::verify`(`string`, [`AuthenticationKey`](Classes/Symmetric/AuthenticationKey.md), `string`): `bool`
     * Asymmetric
-       * `Asymmetric\Crypto::sign`(`string`, [`SignatureSecretKey`](Classes/Asymmetric/SignatureSecretKey.md), `bool?`): `string`
-       * `Asymmetric\Crypto::verify`(`string`, [`SignaturePublicKey`](Classes/Asymmetric/SignaturePublicKey.md), `string`, `bool?`): `bool`
+        * `Asymmetric\Crypto::sign`(`string`, [`SignatureSecretKey`](Classes/Asymmetric/SignatureSecretKey.md)): `string`
+        * `Asymmetric\Crypto::verify`(`string`, [`SignaturePublicKey`](Classes/Asymmetric/SignaturePublicKey.md), `string`): `bool`
 
 Most of the other [Halite features](Features.md) build on top of these simple APIs.
 
@@ -67,7 +71,7 @@ Later, you can load it like so:
 $enc_key = KeyFactory::loadEncryptionKey('/path/to/encryption.key');
 ```
 
-Or if you want to store it in a string
+Or if you want to store it in a string, rather than on the filesystem:
 
 ```php
 $key_hex = KeyFactory::export($enc_key)->getString();
@@ -94,7 +98,7 @@ $ciphertext = \ParagonIE\Halite\Symmetric\Crypto::encrypt(
 );
 ```
 
-By default, `Crypto::encrypt()` will return a hexadecimal encoded string. If you
+By default, `Crypto::encrypt()` will return a base64url-encoded string. If you
 want raw binary, simply pass `true` as the third argument (similar to the API
 used by PHP's `hash()` function).
 
@@ -113,6 +117,57 @@ instance of `\ParagonIE\Halite\Symmetric\EncryptionKey`.
 If you're attempting to decrypt a raw binary string rather than a hex-encoded
 string, pass `true` to the third argument of `Crypto::decrypt`.
 
+#### Additional Associated Data
+
+Sometimes encrypting a message isn't sufficient protection, and you also want to
+bind an encrypted message to some context. Usually, this happens when you're concerned
+with Confused Deputy Attacks.
+
+The simplest way to accomplish this is to use Halite's `EncryptWithAD()` and `DecryptWithAD()`
+methods.
+
+**Note:** The Additional Associated Data is **NOT** stored in the encrypted message.
+You must manage these strings yourself to ensure successful decryption.
+
+```php
+use ParagonIE\HiddenString\HiddenString;
+
+$ad = 'Additional data that must be passed to both encrypt and decrypt calls';
+
+$ciphertext = \ParagonIE\Halite\Symmetric\Crypto::encryptWithAD(
+    new HiddenString(
+        "Your message here. Any string content will do just fine."
+    ),
+    $enc_key,
+    $ad
+);
+```
+
+This string must also be provided in the other direction:
+
+```php
+$plaintext = \ParagonIE\Halite\Symmetric\Crypto::decryptWithAD(
+    $ciphertext,
+    $enc_key,
+    $ad
+);
+```
+
+This will not succeed:
+
+```php
+try {
+    \ParagonIE\Halite\Symmetric\Crypto::decryptWithAD(
+        $ciphertext,
+        $enc_key,
+        'Incorrect String'
+    );
+} catch (\ParagonIE\Halite\Alerts\HaliteAlert $ex) {
+    var_dump($ex->getMessage());
+    exit;
+}
+```
+
 ### Authenticated Asymmetric-Key Encryption (Encrypting)
 
 This API facilitates message encryption between to participants in a 
@@ -131,8 +186,6 @@ $send_to_bob = sodium_bin2hex($alice_public->getRawKeyMaterial());
 Alice will then load Bob's public key into the appropriate object like so:
 
 ```php
-use ParagonIE\HiddenString\HiddenString;
-
 $bob_public = new \ParagonIE\Halite\Asymmetric\EncryptionPublicKey(
     new HiddenString(
         sodium_hex2bin($recv_from_bob)
@@ -168,6 +221,34 @@ $message = \ParagonIE\Halite\Asymmetric\Crypto::decrypt(
 );
 ```
 
+#### Additional Associated Data with Asymmetric Encryption
+
+If you've read the section on Symmetric Encryption, this should be unsurprising.
+
+```php
+$ad = 'Additional Data that must be asserted on decrypt';
+
+$send_to_bob = \ParagonIE\Halite\Asymmetric\Crypto::encryptWithAD(
+    new HiddenString(
+        "Your message here. Any string content will do just fine."
+    ),
+    $alice_secret,
+    $bob_public,
+    $ad
+);
+```
+
+And decryption is similarly straightforward:
+
+```php
+$message = \ParagonIE\Halite\Asymmetric\Crypto::decryptWithAD(
+    $received_ciphertext,
+    $alice_secret,
+    $bob_public,
+    $ad
+);
+```
+
 ### Anonymous Asymmetric-Key Encryption (Sealing)
 
 A sealing interface is one where you encrypt a message with a public key, such
diff --git a/doc/Classes/Alerts/FileError.md b/doc/Classes/Alerts/FileError.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1068243
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/Classes/Alerts/FileError.md
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# FileError extends [HaliteAlert](HaliteAlert.md)
+
+**Namespace**: `\ParagonIE\Halite\Alerts`
+
+This indicates a filesystem error occurred.
diff --git a/doc/Classes/Alerts/FileModified.md b/doc/Classes/Alerts/FileModified.md
index 6f0263a..feccf3b 100644
--- a/doc/Classes/Alerts/FileModified.md
+++ b/doc/Classes/Alerts/FileModified.md
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# FileModified extends [HaliteAlert](HaliteAlert.md)
+# FileModified extends [FileError](FileError.md)
 
 **Namespace**: `\ParagonIE\Halite\Alerts`
 
diff --git a/doc/Classes/Alerts/HaliteAlertInterface.md b/doc/Classes/Alerts/HaliteAlertInterface.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f2a5cc5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/Classes/Alerts/HaliteAlertInterface.md
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# HaliteAlertInterface extends Throwable
+
+**Namespace**: `\ParagonIE\Halite\Alerts`
+
+This is just a common interface for all Halite Alerts.
diff --git a/doc/Classes/Asymmetric/Crypto.md b/doc/Classes/Asymmetric/Crypto.md
index 5398e84..63a74bb 100644
--- a/doc/Classes/Asymmetric/Crypto.md
+++ b/doc/Classes/Asymmetric/Crypto.md
@@ -6,11 +6,14 @@
 
 ### `getSharedSecret()`
 
-> `public` getSharedSecret([`EncryptionSecretKey`](EncryptionSecretKey.md) `$privateKey`, [`EncryptionPublicKey`](EncryptionPublicKey.md) `$publicKey`, `$get_as_object = false`) : [`EncryptionKey`](../Symmetric/EncryptionKey.md)
+> `public` getSharedSecret([`EncryptionSecretKey`](EncryptionSecretKey.md) `$privateKey`, [`EncryptionPublicKey`](EncryptionPublicKey.md) `$publicKey`, `$get_as_object = false`, [`?Config`](Config.md) `$config = null`) : [`EncryptionKey`](../Symmetric/EncryptionKey.md)
 
 This method calculates a shared [`EncryptionKey`](../Symmetric/EncryptionKey.md)
 using X25519 (Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman key agreement over Curve25519).
 
+In Halite v5+, this X25519 output is processed with HKDF-BLAKE2b to ensure a uniformly
+random bit string is returned, rather than merely a random group element.
+
 ### `encrypt()`
 
 > `public` encrypt(`HiddenString $source`, [`EncryptionSecretKey`](EncryptionSecretKey.md) `$ourPrivateKey`, [`EncryptionPublicKey`](EncryptionPublicKey.md) `$theirPublicKey`, `$encoding = Halite::ENCODE_BASE64URLSAFE`) : `string`
@@ -44,17 +47,23 @@ This method will:
    key (step 4).
 7. Return what should be the original plaintext.
 
-### `encryptWithAd()`
+### `encryptWithAD()`
+
+> `public` encryptWithAD(`HiddenString $plaintext`, [`EncryptionSecretKey`](EncryptionSecretKey.md) `$ourPrivateKey`, [`EncryptionPublicKey`](EncryptionPublicKey.md) `$theirPublicKey`, `string $additionalData = ''`, `$encoding = Halite::ENCODE_BASE64URLSAFE`): `string`
+
+This is similar to `encrypt()`, except the `$additionalData` string is covered by the Message Authentication Code (MAC).
 
-> `public` encryptWithAd(`HiddenString $plaintext`, [`EncryptionSecretKey`](EncryptionSecretKey.md) `$ourPrivateKey`, [`EncryptionPublicKey`](EncryptionPublicKey.md) `$theirPublicKey`, `string $additionalData = ''`, `$encoding = Halite::ENCODE_BASE64URLSAFE`): `string`
+Since Halite v5, this uses the [PAE](https://github.com/paseto-standard/paseto-spec/blob/master/docs/01-Protocol-Versions/Common.md#pae-definition)
+concept from PASETO.
 
-This is similar to `encrypt()`, except the `$additionalData` string is prepended to the ciphertext (after the nonce) when calculating the Message Authentication Code (MAC).
+### `decryptWithAD()`
 
-### `decryptWithAd()`
+> `public` decryptWithAD(`string $ciphertext`, [`EncryptionSecretKey`](EncryptionSecretKey.md) `$ourPrivateKey`, [`EncryptionPublicKey`](EncryptionPublicKey.md) `$theirPublicKey`, `string $additionalData = ''`, `$encoding = Halite::ENCODE_BASE64URLSAFE`): `HiddenString`
 
-> `public` decryptWithAd(`string $ciphertext`, [`EncryptionSecretKey`](EncryptionSecretKey.md) `$ourPrivateKey`, [`EncryptionPublicKey`](EncryptionPublicKey.md) `$theirPublicKey`, `string $additionalData = ''`, `$encoding = Halite::ENCODE_BASE64URLSAFE`): `HiddenString`
+This is similar to `decrypt()`, except the `$additionalData` string is covered by the Message Authentication Code (MAC).
 
-This is similar to `decrypt()`, except the `$additionalData` string is prepended to the ciphertext (after the nonce) when calculating the Message Authentication Code (MAC).
+Since Halite v5, this uses the [PAE](https://github.com/paseto-standard/paseto-spec/blob/master/docs/01-Protocol-Versions/Common.md#pae-definition)
+concept from PASETO.
 
 ### `seal()`
 
diff --git a/doc/Classes/File.md b/doc/Classes/File.md
index 88800e0..04b0bd9 100644
--- a/doc/Classes/File.md
+++ b/doc/Classes/File.md
@@ -36,6 +36,34 @@ Both `$input` and `$output` can be a string, a resource, or an object whose clas
 In the object case, `$input` must be an instance of [`ReadOnlyFile`](Stream/ReadOnlyFile.md) and `$output` must
 be an instance of [`MutableFile`](Stream/MutableFile.md).
 
+### `asymmetricDecrypt()`
+
+> `public static` asymmetricDecrypt(`$input`, `$output`, [`EncryptionSecretKey`](Asymmetric/EncryptionSecretKey.md) `$recipientSK`, [`EncryptionPublicKey`](Asymmetric/EncryptionPublicKey.md) `$senderPK`, `string $aad = null`): `int`
+
+Decrypt the contents of `$input` (either a string containing the path to a file, or an open file
+handle), and store it in the file (handle?) at `$output`.
+
+Both `$input` and `$output` can be a string, a resource, or an object whose class implements `StreamInterface`.
+In the object case, `$input` must be an instance of [`ReadOnlyFile`](Stream/ReadOnlyFile.md) and `$output` must
+be an instance of [`MutableFile`](Stream/MutableFile.md).
+
+The difference between `asymmetricDecrypt()` and `deseal()` is that `asymmetricDecrypt()` authenticates the sender, 
+while `unseal()` does not. (You can think of `unseal()` as anonymous public-key decryption.)
+
+### `asymmetricEncrypt()`
+
+> `public static` asymmetricEncrypt(`$input`, `$output`, [`EncryptionPublicKey`](Asymmetric/EncryptionPublicKey.md) `$recipientPK`, [`EncryptionSecretKey`](Asymmetric/EncryptionSecretKey.md) `$senderSK`, `string $aad = null`): `int`
+
+Encrypt the contents of `$input` (either a string containing the path to a file, or an open file
+handle), and store it in the file (handle?) at `$output`.
+
+Both `$input` and `$output` can be a string, a resource, or an object whose class implements `StreamInterface`.
+In the object case, `$input` must be an instance of [`ReadOnlyFile`](Stream/ReadOnlyFile.md) and `$output` must
+be an instance of [`MutableFile`](Stream/MutableFile.md).
+
+The difference between `asymmetricEncrypt()` and `seal()` is that `asymmetricEncrypt()` authenticates the sender, while
+`seal()` does not. (You can think of `seal()` as anonymous public-key encryption.)
+
 ### `seal()`
 
 > `public static` seal(`$input`, `$output`, [`EncryptionPublicKey`](Asymmetric/EncryptionPublicKey.md) `$key`): `string`
@@ -68,7 +96,7 @@ Calculate a digital signature of a file.
 
 ### `verify()`
 
-> `public static` sign(`$input`, [`SignaturePublicKey`](Asymmetric/SignaturePublicKey.md) `$key`, `string $signature`, `boolean $raw_binary`): `bool`
+> `public static` verify(`$input`, [`SignaturePublicKey`](Asymmetric/SignaturePublicKey.md) `$key`, `string $signature`, `boolean $raw_binary`): `bool`
 
 Verifies a digital signature of a file.
 
diff --git a/doc/Classes/README.md b/doc/Classes/README.md
index 653dc05..c968f7b 100644
--- a/doc/Classes/README.md
+++ b/doc/Classes/README.md
@@ -6,8 +6,10 @@
     * [`\ParagonIE\Halite\Alerts\CannotSerializeKey`](Alerts/CannotSerializeKey.md)
     * [`\ParagonIE\Halite\Alerts\ConfigDirectiveNotFound`](Alerts/ConfigDirectiveNotFound.md)
     * [`\ParagonIE\Halite\Alerts\FileAccessDenied`](Alerts/FileAccessDenied.md)
+    * [`\ParagonIE\Halite\Alerts\FileError`](Alerts/FileError.md)
     * [`\ParagonIE\Halite\Alerts\FileModified`](Alerts/FileModified.md)
     * [`\ParagonIE\Halite\Alerts\HaliteAlert`](Alerts/HaliteAlert.md) (Base Exception for all Alerts)
+    * [`\ParagonIE\Halite\Alerts\HaliteAlertInterface`](Alerts/HaliteAlertInterface.md) (Common Interface)
     * [`\ParagonIE\Halite\Alerts\InvalidDigestLength`](Alerts/InvalidDigestLength.md)
     * [`\ParagonIE\Halite\Alerts\InvalidFlags`](Alerts/InvalidFlags.md)
     * [`\ParagonIE\Halite\Alerts\InvalidKey`](Alerts/InvalidKey.md)
diff --git a/doc/Classes/Symmetric/Crypto.md b/doc/Classes/Symmetric/Crypto.md
index 9b7d560..b9b5ec9 100644
--- a/doc/Classes/Symmetric/Crypto.md
+++ b/doc/Classes/Symmetric/Crypto.md
@@ -45,13 +45,19 @@ Verify-then-decrypt a message. This method will:
 
 > `public` encryptWithAd(`HiddenString $plaintext`, [`EncryptionKey`](EncryptionKey.md) `$secretKey`, `string $additionalData = ''`, `$encoding = Halite::ENCODE_BASE64URLSAFE`): `string`
 
-This is similar to `encrypt()`, except the `$additionalData` string is prepended to the ciphertext (after the nonce) when calculating the Message Authentication Code (MAC).
+This is similar to `encrypt()`, except the `$additionalData` string is covered by the Message Authentication Code (MAC).
 
-### `decryptWithAd()`
+Since Halite v5, this uses the [PAE](https://github.com/paseto-standard/paseto-spec/blob/master/docs/01-Protocol-Versions/Common.md#pae-definition)
+concept from PASETO.
 
-> `public` decryptWithAd(`string $ciphertext`, [`EncryptionKey`](EncryptionKey.md) `$secretKey`, `string $additionalData = ''`, `$encoding = Halite::ENCODE_BASE64URLSAFE`): `HiddenString`
+### `decryptWithAD()`
 
-This is similar to `decrypt()`, except the `$additionalData` string is prepended to the ciphertext (after the nonce) when calculating the Message Authentication Code (MAC).
+> `public` decryptWithAD(`string $ciphertext`, [`EncryptionKey`](EncryptionKey.md) `$secretKey`, `string $additionalData = ''`, `$encoding = Halite::ENCODE_BASE64URLSAFE`): `HiddenString`
+
+This is similar to `decrypt()`, except the `$additionalData` string is covered by the Message Authentication Code (MAC).
+
+Since Halite v5, this uses the [PAE](https://github.com/paseto-standard/paseto-spec/blob/master/docs/01-Protocol-Versions/Common.md#pae-definition)
+concept from PASETO.
 
 ### `verify()`
 
diff --git a/doc/Classes/Util.md b/doc/Classes/Util.md
index 0aa7647..aabac89 100644
--- a/doc/Classes/Util.md
+++ b/doc/Classes/Util.md
@@ -51,6 +51,16 @@ Returns a copy of a string without triggering PHP's optimizations. The
 string returned by this method can safely be used with `sodium_memzero()`
 without corrupting other copies of the same string.
 
+### `splitKeys()`
+
+Splits a single key into two distinct keys (one for encryption, one for authentication).
+
+Since Halite v5, the HKDF salt parameter is not used. Instead, this randomness is appended
+to the HKDF info parameter, in order to meet the [standard security definition for HKDF](https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/264).
+
+Additionally, this allows us to reuse the PRK (the value affected by the HKDF salt) value
+for both derived keys, which results in a nice performance gain.
+
 ### `xorStrings()`
 
 > `public static` xorStrings(`string $left`, `string $right`): `string`
diff --git a/doc/Primitives.md b/doc/Primitives.md
index bec1e7c..0fabd1d 100644
--- a/doc/Primitives.md
+++ b/doc/Primitives.md
@@ -1,16 +1,17 @@
 # Cryptography Primitives used in Halite
 
 * Symmetric-key encryption: (note: only [authenticated encryption](https://tonyarcieri.com/all-the-crypto-code-youve-ever-written-is-probably-broken) is available through Halite)
-  * [**XChaCha20**](https://libsodium.gitbook.io/doc/advanced/stream_ciphers/xchacha20) 
-  * Previously, [**XSalsa20**](https://paragonie.com/book/pecl-libsodium/read/08-advanced.md#crypto-stream)
+  * [**XChaCha20**](https://libsodium.gitbook.io/doc/advanced/stream_ciphers/xchacha20) then BLAKE2b-MAC
+  * Previously, [**XSalsa20**](https://paragonie.com/book/pecl-libsodium/read/08-advanced.md#crypto-stream) then BLAKE2b-MAC
 * Symmetric-key authentication: **[BLAKE2b](https://download.libsodium.org/doc/hashing/generic_hashing.html#singlepart-example-with-a-key)** (keyed)
-* Asymmetric-key encryption: [**X25519**](https://paragonie.com/book/pecl-libsodium/read/08-advanced.md#crypto-scalarmult) followed by symmetric-key authenticated encryption
+* Asymmetric-key encryption: [**X25519**](https://paragonie.com/book/pecl-libsodium/read/08-advanced.md#crypto-scalarmult)
+  then [**HKDF-BLAKE2b**](Classes/Util.md#raw_keyed_hash), followed by symmetric-key authenticated encryption
 * Asymmetric-key digital signatures: [**Ed25519**](https://paragonie.com/book/pecl-libsodium/read/05-publickey-crypto.md#crypto-sign)
 * Checksums: [**BLAKE2b**](https://paragonie.com/book/pecl-libsodium/read/06-hashing.md#crypto-generichash)
-* Key splitting: [**HKDF-BLAKE2b**](Classes/Util.md)
+* Key splitting: [**HKDF-BLAKE2b**](Classes/Util.md#splitkeys)
 * Password-Based Key Derivation: [**Argon2**](https://paragonie.com/book/pecl-libsodium/read/07-password-hashing.md#crypto-pwhash-str)
 
-In all cases, we follow an Encrypt then MAC construction, thus avoiding the [cryptographic doom principle](https://moxie.org/2011/12/13/the-cryptographic-doom-principle.html).
+In all cases, we follow an Encrypt-then-MAC construction, thus avoiding the [cryptographic doom principle](https://moxie.org/2011/12/13/the-cryptographic-doom-principle.html).
 
 As a consequence of our use of a keyed BLAKE2b hash as a MAC, instead of GCM/Poly1305,
 Halite ciphertexts are [**message committing**](https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1456) which makes ciphertexts random key robust.  
diff --git a/doc/README.md b/doc/README.md
index 0d6ef7f..d97456f 100644
--- a/doc/README.md
+++ b/doc/README.md
@@ -13,8 +13,10 @@
   * [`\ParagonIE\Halite\Alerts\CannotSerializeKey`](Classes/Alerts/CannotSerializeKey.md)
   * [`\ParagonIE\Halite\Alerts\ConfigDirectiveNotFound`](Classes/Alerts/ConfigDirectiveNotFound.md)
   * [`\ParagonIE\Halite\Alerts\FileAccessDenied`](Classes/Alerts/FileAccessDenied.md)
+  * [`\ParagonIE\Halite\Alerts\FileError`](Classes/Alerts/FileError.md)
   * [`\ParagonIE\Halite\Alerts\FileModified`](Classes/Alerts/FileModified.md)
   * [`\ParagonIE\Halite\Alerts\HaliteAlert`](Classes/Alerts/HaliteAlert.md) (Base Exception for all Alerts)
+  * [`\ParagonIE\Halite\Alerts\HaliteAlertInterface`](Classes/Alerts/HaliteAlertInterface.md) (Common Interface)
   * [`\ParagonIE\Halite\Alerts\InvalidDigestLength`](Classes/Alerts/InvalidDigestLength.md)
   * [`\ParagonIE\Halite\Alerts\InvalidFlags`](Classes/Alerts/InvalidFlags.md)
   * [`\ParagonIE\Halite\Alerts\InvalidKey`](Classes/Alerts/InvalidKey.md)