adr-044-lite-client-with-weak-subjectivity.md

ADR 044: Lite Client with Weak Subjectivity

Changelog

• 13-07-2019: Initial draft
• 14-08-2019: Address cwgoes comments

Context

The concept of light clients was introduced in the Bitcoin white paper. It describes a watcher of distributed consensus process that only validates the consensus algorithm and not the state machine transactions within.

Tendermint light clients allow bandwidth & compute-constrained devices, such as smartphones, low-power embedded chips, or other blockchains to efficiently verify the consensus of a Tendermint blockchain. This forms the basis of safe and efficient state synchronization for new network nodes and inter-blockchain communication (where a light client of one Tendermint instance runs in another chain's state machine).

In a network that is expected to reliably punish validators for misbehavior by slashing bonded stake and where the validator set changes infrequently, clients can take advantage of this assumption to safely synchronize a lite client without downloading the intervening headers.

Light clients (and full nodes) operating in the Proof Of Stake context need a trusted block height from a trusted source that is no older than 1 unbonding window plus a configurable evidence submission synchrony bound. This is called “weak subjectivity”.

Weak subjectivity is required in Proof of Stake blockchains because it is costless for an attacker to buy up voting keys that are no longer bonded and fork the network at some point in its prior history. See Vitalik’s post at Proof of Stake: How I Learned to Love Weak Subjectivity.

Currently, Tendermint provides a lite client implementation in the lite package. This lite client implements a bisection algorithm that tries to use a binary search to find the minimum number of block headers where the validator set voting power changes are less than < 1/3rd. This interface does not support weak subjectivity at this time. The Cosmos SDK also does not support counterfactual slashing, nor does the lite client have any capacity to report evidence making these systems theoretically unsafe.

NOTE: Tendermint provides a somewhat different (stronger) light client model than Bitcoin under eclipse, since the eclipsing node(s) can only fool the light client if they have two-thirds of the private keys from the last root-of-trust.

Decision

The Weak Subjectivity Interface

Add the weak subjectivity interface for when a new light client connects to the network or when a light client that has been offline for longer than the unbonding period connects to the network. Specifically, the node needs to initialize the following structure before syncing from user input:

type TrustOptions struct {
    // Required: only trust commits up to this old.
    // Should be equal to the unbonding period minus some delta for evidence reporting.
    TrustPeriod time.Duration `json:"trust-period"`

    // Option 1: TrustHeight and TrustHash can both be provided
    // to force the trusting of a particular height and hash.
    // If the latest trusted height/hash is more recent, then this option is
    // ignored.
    TrustHeight int64  `json:"trust-height"`
    TrustHash   []byte `json:"trust-hash"`

    // Option 2: Callback can be set to implement a confirmation
    // step if the trust store is uninitialized, or expired.
    Callback func(height int64, hash []byte) error
}

The expectation is the user will get this information from a trusted source like a validator, a friend, or a secure website. A more user friendly solution with trust tradeoffs is that we establish an https based protocol with a default end point that populates this information. Also an on-chain registry of roots-of-trust (e.g. on the Cosmos Hub) seems likely in the future.

Linear Verification

The linear verification algorithm requires downloading all headers between the TrustHeight and the LatestHeight. The lite client downloads the full header for the provided TrustHeight and then proceeds to download N+1 headers and applies the Tendermint validation rules to each block.

Bisecting Verification

Bisecting Verification is a more bandwidth and compute intensive mechanism that in the most optimistic case requires a light client to only download two block headers to come into synchronization.

The bisection algorithm proceeds in the following fashion. The client downloads and verifies the full block header for TrustHeight and then fetches LatestHeight blocker header. The client then verifies the LatestHeight header. Finally the client attempts to verify the LatestHeight header with voting powers taken from NextValidatorSet in the TrustHeight header. This verification will succeed if the validators from TrustHeight still have > 2/3 +1 of voting power in the LatestHeight. If this succeeds, the client is fully synchronized. If this fails, then following Bisection Algorithm should be executed.

The Client tries to download the block at the mid-point block between LatestHeight and TrustHeight and attempts that same algorithm as above using MidPointHeight instead of LatestHeight and a different threshold - 1/3 +1 of voting power for non-adjacent headers. In the case the of failure, recursively perform the MidPoint verification until success then start over with an updated NextValidatorSet and TrustHeight.

If the client encounters a forged header, it should submit the header along with some other intermediate headers as the evidence of misbehavior to other full nodes. After that, it can retry the bisection using another full node. An optimal client will cache trusted headers from the previous run to minimize network usage.

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Check out the formal specification here.

Status

Accepted.

Consequences

Positive

• light client which is safe to use (it can go offline, but not for too long)

Negative

• complexity of bisection

Neutral

• social consensus can be prone to errors (for cases where a new light client joins a network or it has been offline for too long)