From f369e82e315bee17625d7fe05286276c4bbe14cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?=C3=9Fingen?= Date: Tue, 5 Dec 2023 16:54:01 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Update README --- README.md | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 9405914e0..d11888710 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -1739,6 +1739,8 @@ In case of a redemption, the “last” trove affected by the transaction may en An attacker trying to DoS redemptions could be bypassed by redeeming an amount that exactly corresponds to the debt of the affected trove(s). +The attack can be aggravated if a big trove is placed first in the queue, so that any incoming redemption is smaller than its debt, as no LUSD would be redeemed if the hint for that trove fails. But that attack would be very expensive and quite risky (risk of being redeemed if the strategy fails and of being liquidated as it may have a low CR). + Finally, this DoS could be avoided if the initial transaction avoids the public gas auction entirely and is sent direct-to-miner, via (for example) Flashbots.