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References.bib
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References.bib
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@article{Beaman2023,
author = {Beaman, Lori and Karlan, Dean and Thuysbaert, Bram and Udry, Christopher},
title = {Selection Into Credit Markets: Evidence From Agriculture in Mali},
journal = {Econometrica},
volume = {91},
number = {5},
pages = {1595-1627},
keywords = {Credit markets, agriculture, returns to capital},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA18916},
url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.3982/ECTA18916},
eprint = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.3982/ECTA18916},
abstract = {We use a two-stage experiment on agricultural lending in Mali to test whether selection into lending is predictive of heterogeneous returns to capital. Understanding this heterogeneity, and the selection process which reveals it, is critical for guiding modeling of credit markets in developing countries, as well as for policy. We find such heterogeneity: returns to capital are higher for farmers who borrow than for those who do not. In our first stage, we offer loans in some villages and not others. In the second stage, we provide cash grants to a random subset of all farmers in villages where no loans were offered, and to a random subset of the farmers who do not borrow in villages where loans were offered. We estimate seasonal returns to the grant of 130\% for would-be borrowers, whereas we find returns near zero for the sample representative of non-borrowers. We also provide evidence that there are some farmers—particularly those that are poor at baseline—that have high returns but do not receive a loan.},
year = {2023}
}
@article{KarlanZinman2009,
author = {Karlan, Dean and Zinman, Jonathan},
title = {Observing Unobservables: Identifying Information Asymmetries With a Consumer Credit Field Experiment},
journal = {Econometrica},
volume = {77},
number = {6},
pages = {1993-2008},
keywords = {Advanced selection, credit markets, development finance, information asymmetrics microfinance, moral hazard},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA5781},
url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.3982/ECTA5781},
eprint = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.3982/ECTA5781},
abstract = {Information asymmetries are important in theory but difficult to identify in practice. We estimate the presence and importance of hidden information and hidden action problems in a consumer credit market using a new field experiment methodology. We randomized 58,000 direct mail offers to former clients of a major South African lender along three dimensions: (i) an initial “offer interest rate” featured on a direct mail solicitation; (ii) a “contract interest rate” that was revealed only after a borrower agreed to the initial offer rate; and (ii) a dynamic repayment incentive that was also a surprise and extended preferential pricing on future loans to borrowers who remained in good standing. These three randomizations, combined with complete knowledge of the lender's information set, permit identification of specific types of private information problems. Our setup distinguishes hidden information effects from selection on the offer rate (via unobservable risk and anticipated effort), from hidden action effects (via moral hazard in effort) induced by actual contract terms. We find strong evidence of moral hazard and weaker evidence of hidden information problems. A rough estimate suggests that perhaps 13\% to 21\% of default is due to moral hazard. Asymmetric information thus may help explain the prevalence of credit constraints even in a market that specializes in financing high-risk borrowers.},
year = {2009}
}
@article{non_adherence,
author = {McDonald, Heather P. and Garg, Amit X. and Haynes, R. Brian},
title = "{Interventions to Enhance Patient Adherence to Medication PrescriptionsScientific Review}",
journal = {JAMA},
volume = {288},
number = {22},
pages = {2868-2879},
year = {2002},
month = {12},
abstract = "{ContextLow adherence with prescribed treatments is ubiquitous and undermines
treatment benefits.ObjectiveTo systematically review published randomized controlled trials (RCTs)
of interventions to assist patients' adherence to prescribed medications.Data SourcesA search of MEDLINE, CINAHL, PSYCHLIT, SOCIOFILE, IPA, EMBASE, The Cochrane
Library databases, and bibliographies was performed for records from 1967
through August 2001 to identify relevant articles of all RCTs of interventions
intended to improve adherence to self-administered medications.Study Selection and Data ExtractionStudies were included if they reported an unconfounded RCT of an intervention
to improve adherence with prescribed medications for a medical or psychiatric
disorder; both adherence and treatment outcome were measured; follow-up of
at least 80\\% of each study group was reported; and the duration of follow-up
for studies with positive initial findings was at least 6 months. Information
on study design features, interventions, controls, and findings (adherence
rates and patient outcomes) were extracted for each article.Data SynthesisStudies were too disparate to warrant meta-analysis. Forty-nine percent
of the interventions tested (19 of 39 in 33 studies) were associated with
statistically significant increases in medication adherence and only 17 reported
statistically significant improvements in treatment outcomes. Almost all the
interventions that were effective for long-term care were complex, including
combinations of more convenient care, information, counseling, reminders,
self-monitoring, reinforcement, family therapy, and other forms of additional
supervision or attention. Even the most effective interventions had modest
effects.ConclusionsCurrent methods of improving medication adherence for chronic health
problems are mostly complex, labor-intensive, and not predictably effective.
The full benefits of medications cannot be realized at currently achievable
levels of adherence; therefore, more studies of innovative approaches to assist
patients to follow prescriptions for medications are needed.}",
issn = {0098-7484},
doi = {10.1001/jama.288.22.2868},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.288.22.2868},
eprint = {https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/articlepdf/195605/jsr20016.pdf},
}
@article{Sapolsky1995,
title = {Stress and cognitive function},
journal = {Current Opinion in Neurobiology},
volume = {5},
number = {2},
pages = {205-216},
year = {1995},
issn = {0959-4388},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/0959-4388(95)80028-X},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/095943889580028X},
author = {Bruce S McEwen and Robert M Sapolsky},
abstract = {Stress affects cognition in a number of ways, acting rapidly via catecholamines and more slowly via glucocorticoids. Catecholamine actions involve beta adrenergic receptors and also availability of glucose, whereas glucocorticoids biphasically modulate synaptic plasticity over hours and also produce longer-term changes in dendritic structure that last for weeks. Prolonged exposure to stress leads to loss of neurons, particularly in the hippocampus. Recent evidence suggests that the glucocorticoid- and stress-related cognitive impairments involving declarative memory are probably related to the changes they effect in the hippocampus, whereas the stress-induced catecholamine effects on emotionally laden memories are postulated to involve structures such as the amgydala.}
}
@article{StressReview,
title = {Decision making under stress: A selective review},
journal = {Neuroscience \& Biobehavioral Reviews},
volume = {36},
number = {4},
pages = {1228-1248},
year = {2012},
issn = {0149-7634},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2012.02.003},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0149763412000218},
author = {Katrin Starcke and Matthias Brand},
keywords = {Stress, Decision making, Cognition, Emotion, Stress hormones, Neuroimaging, Neuropsychology},
abstract = {Many decisions must be made under stress, and many decision situations elicit stress responses themselves. Thus, stress and decision making are intricately connected, not only on the behavioral level, but also on the neural level, i.e., the brain regions that underlie intact decision making are regions that are sensitive to stress-induced changes. The purpose of this review is to summarize the findings from studies that investigated the impact of stress on decision making. The review includes those studies that examined decision making under stress in humans and were published between 1985 and October 2011. The reviewed studies were found using PubMed and PsycInfo searches. The review focuses on studies that have examined the influence of acutely induced laboratory stress on decision making and that measured both decision-making performance and stress responses. Additionally, some studies that investigated decision making under naturally occurring stress levels and decision-making abilities in patients who suffer from stress-related disorders are described. The results from the studies that were included in the review support the assumption that stress affects decision making. If stress confers an advantage or disadvantage in terms of outcome depends on the specific task or situation. The results also emphasize the role of mediating and moderating variables. The results are discussed with respect to underlying psychological and neural mechanisms, implications for everyday decision making and future research directions.}
}
@article{Ariely,
author = {Dan Ariely and Klaus Wertenbroch},
title ={Procrastination, Deadlines, and Performance: Self-Control by Precommitment},
journal = {Psychological Science},
volume = {13},
number = {3},
pages = {219-224},
year = {2002},
doi = {10.1111/1467-9280.00441},
note ={PMID: 12009041},
abstract = { Procrastination is all too familiar to most people. People delay writing up their research (so we hear!), repeatedly declare they will start their diets tomorrow, or postpone until next week doing odd jobs around the house. Yet people also sometimes attempt to control their procrastination by setting deadlines for themselves. In this article, we pose three questions: (a) Are people willing to self-impose meaningful (i.e., costly) deadlines to overcome procrastination? (b) Are self-imposed deadlines effective in improving task performance? (c) When self-imposing deadlines, do people set them optimally, for maximum performance enhancement? A set of studies examined these issues experimentally, showing that the answer is “yes” to the first two questions, and “nO'’ to the third. People have self-control problems, they recognize them, and they try to control them by self-imposing costly deadlines. These deadlines help people control procrastination, but they are not as effective as some externally imposed deadlines in improving task performance. }
}
@article{mogstad2018using,
title={Using instrumental variables for inference about policy relevant treatment parameters},
author={Mogstad, Magne and Santos, Andres and Torgovitsky, Alexander},
journal={Econometrica},
volume={86},
number={5},
pages={1589--1619},
year={2018},
publisher={Wiley Online Library}
}
@article{mamadehussene2023reliability,
title={On the Reliability of the BDM Mechanism},
author={Mamadehussene, Samir and Sguera, Francesco},
journal={Management Science},
volume={69},
number={2},
pages={1166--1179},
year={2023},
publisher={INFORMS}
}
@article{bohm1997eliciting,
title={Eliciting reservation prices: Becker--DeGroot--Marschak mechanisms vs. markets},
author={Bohm, Peter and Lind{\'e}n, Johan and Sonneg{\aa}rd, Joakim},
journal={The Economic Journal},
volume={107},
number={443},
pages={1079--1089},
year={1997},
publisher={Oxford University Press Oxford, UK}
}
@article{banerji2014detection,
title={Detection, identification, and estimation of loss aversion: Evidence from an auction experiment},
author={Banerji, Abhijit and Gupta, Neha},
journal={American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
volume={6},
number={1},
pages={91--133},
year={2014},
publisher={American Economic Association 2014 Broadway, Suite 305, Nashville, TN 37203-2425}
}
@article{aronow2013beyond,
title={Beyond LATE: Estimation of the average treatment effect with an instrumental variable},
author={Aronow, Peter M and Carnegie, Allison},
journal={Political Analysis},
volume={21},
number={4},
pages={492--506},
year={2013},
publisher={Cambridge University Press}
}
@inproceedings{angrist2013extrapolate,
title={ExtrapoLATE-ing: External Validity and Overidentification in the LATE Framework},
author={Angrist, Joshua D. and Fernandez-Val, Ivan},
booktitle={Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Tenth World Congress},
volume={3},
pages={401},
year={2013},
organization={Cambridge University Press}
}
@article{chernozhukov2005iv,
title={An IV model of quantile treatment effects},
author={Chernozhukov, Victor and Hansen, Christian},
journal={Econometrica},
volume={73},
number={1},
pages={245--261},
year={2005},
publisher={Wiley Online Library}
}
@article{cornelissen2018benefits,
title={Who benefits from universal child care? Estimating marginal returns to early child care attendance},
author={Cornelissen, Thomas and Dustmann, Christian and Raute, Anna and Sch{\"o}nberg, Uta},
journal={Journal of Political Economy},
volume={126},
number={6},
pages={2356--2409},
year={2018},
publisher={University of Chicago Press Chicago, IL}
}
@article{heckman2007econometric,
title={Econometric evaluation of social programs, part II: Using the marginal treatment effect to organize alternative econometric estimators to evaluate social programs, and to forecast their effects in new environments},
author={Heckman, James J and Vytlacil, Edward J},
journal={Handbook of econometrics},
volume={6},
pages={4875--5143},
year={2007},
publisher={Elsevier}
}
@Article{BinaryRegressor,
Title = {Identifying the Effect of a Mis-classified, Binary, Endogenous Regressor},
Author = {Francis J.\ DiTraglia and Camilo Garcia-Jimeno},
Journal = {Journal of Econometrics},
Volume = {209},
Number = {2},
Pages = {376-390},
Year = {2019}
}
@incollection{chamberlain2011bayesian,
author = {Chamberlain, Gary},
isbn = {9780199559084},
title = "{1011 Bayesian Aspects of Treatment Choice}",
booktitle = "{The Oxford Handbook of Bayesian Econometrics}",
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {2011},
month = {09},
abstract = "{This article discusses the Bayesian approach to decision theory. It focuses on the case of an individual deciding between treatments. It deals with the role of information that is available about other individuals through a propensity score. It also shows the reason for absence of propensity score in the likelihood function but its appearance in the prior. A prior distribution leads to a closed-form expression for the decision rule. The parametric model plays the role of a prior distribution that can be dominated by the data. The next section examines the role of the propensity score in a random effects model with normal distributions for the outcomes and the random effects. It takes up the extension to the case of treatment selection based on unobservables. The main aim of this article is to estimate an average treatment effect for a particular covariate cell.}",
doi = {10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199559084.013.0002},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199559084.013.0002},
eprint = {https://academic.oup.com/book/0/chapter/334661705/chapter-ag-pdf/44445461/book\_38595\_section\_334661705.ag.pdf},
}
@techreport{chernozhukov2018generic,
title={Generic machine learning inference on heterogeneous treatment effects in randomized experiments, with an application to immunization in India},
author={Chernozhukov, Victor and Demirer, Mert and Duflo, Esther and Fernandez-Val, Ivan},
year={2018},
institution={National Bureau of Economic Research}
}
@article{Meltzer,
author = {Brian T. Melzer},
journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
number = {1},
pages = {517--555},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
title = {The real costs of credit access: evidence from the payday lending market},
volume = {126},
year = {2011}
}
@article{fan2010sharp,
title={Sharp bounds on the distribution of treatment effects and their statistical inference},
author={Fan, Yanqin and Park, Sang Soo},
journal={Econometric Theory},
volume={26},
number={3},
pages={931--951},
year={2010},
publisher={Cambridge University Press}
}
@article{Bertrand,
author = {Marianne Bertrand and Adair Morse},
journal = {The Journal of Finance},
number = {6},
pages = {1865--1893},
publisher = {[American Finance Association, Wiley]},
title = {Information Disclosure, Cognitive Biases, and Payday Borrowing},
volume = {66},
year = {2011}
}
@article{Payday,
Author = {Stegman, Michael A.},
Title = {Payday Lending},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives},
Volume = {21},
Number = {1},
Year = {2007},
Month = {March},
Pages = {169-190},
DOI = {10.1257/jep.21.1.169},
URL = {https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.21.1.169}}
@article{John_theory,
author = {Anett John},
journal = {Revue économique},
number = {5},
pages = {909--924},
publisher = {Sciences Po University Press},
title = {Can Fixed Regular Deposits Overcome Savings Constraints?},
volume = {68},
year = {2017}
}
@article{Blumenstock,
Author = {Blumenstock, Joshua and Callen, Michael and Ghani, Tarek},
Title = {Why Do Defaults Affect Behavior? Experimental Evidence from Afghanistan},
Journal = {American Economic Review},
Volume = {108},
Number = {10},
Year = {2018},
Month = {October},
Pages = {2868-2901},
DOI = {10.1257/aer.20171676},
URL = {https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20171676}}
@article{Finanzia,
author = {Castellanos, Sara and Mahajan, Aprajit and Jimenez, Diego and Seira, Enrique},
title = {Expanding Financial Access Via Credit Cards:
Evidence from Mexico},
journal = {Working Paper},
year = {2020},
}
@article{Craig,
author = {Atkinson, Jesse and de Janvry, Alain and McIntosh, Craig and Sadoulet, Elisabeth},
title = {Prompting Microfinance Borrowers to Save: A Field Experiment from Guatemala},
journal = {Economic Development and Cultural Change},
volume = {62},
number = {1},
pages = {21-64},
year = {2013},
doi = {10.1086/671713},
}
@article{Sprenger,
author = {Sadoff, Sally and Samek, Anya and Sprenger, Charles},
title = "{Dynamic Inconsistency in Food Choice: Experimental Evidence from Two Food Deserts}",
journal = {The Review of Economic Studies},
volume = {87},
number = {4},
pages = {1954-1988},
year = {2019},
month = {05},
issn = {0034-6527},
doi = {10.1093/restud/rdz030},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdz030},
eprint = {https://academic.oup.com/restud/article-pdf/87/4/1954/33461605/rdz030.pdf},
}
@article{Royer,
Author = {Royer, Heather and Stehr, Mark and Sydnor, Justin},
Title = {Incentives, Commitments, and Habit Formation in Exercise: Evidence from a Field Experiment with Workers at a Fortune-500 Company},
Journal = {American Economic Journal: Applied Economics},
Volume = {7},
Number = {3},
Year = {2015},
Month = {July},
Pages = {51-84},
DOI = {10.1257/app.20130327},
URL = {https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/app.20130327}}
@article{Field,
Author = {Field, Erica and Pande, Rohini and Papp, John and Rigol, Natalia},
Title = {Does the Classic Microfinance Model Discourage Entrepreneurship among the Poor? Experimental Evidence from India},
Journal = {American Economic Review},
Volume = {103},
Number = {6},
Year = {2013},
Month = {October},
Pages = {2196-2226},
DOI = {10.1257/aer.103.6.2196},
URL = {https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.103.6.2196}}
@article{Levin,
Author = {Adams, William and Einav, Liran and Levin, Jonathan},
Title = {Liquidity Constraints and Imperfect Information in Subprime Lending},
Journal = {American Economic Review},
Volume = {99},
Number = {1},
Year = {2009},
Month = {March},
Pages = {49-84},
DOI = {10.1257/aer.99.1.49},
URL = {https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.99.1.49}}
@article{Aprajit,
Author = {Mahajan, Aprajit, and Michel, Christian and Tarozzi, Alessandro},
Title = {Identification of Time-Inconsistent Models: The Case of Insecticide Treated Nets},
Journal = {Working paper},
Year = {2020},
}
@article{Tlaxcala,
Author = {Corral, Carlina and Gine, Xavi and Mahajan, Aprajit, and Seira, Enrique},
Title = {Autonomy and Specificity in Agricultural Technology Adoption: Evidence from Mexico},
Journal = {Working paper},
Year = {2020},
}
@article{AprajitP&P,
Author = {Tarozzi, Alessandro and Mahajan, Aprajit and Yoong, Joanne and Blackburn, Brian},
Title = {Commitment Mechanisms and Compliance with Health-Protecting Behavior: Preliminary Evidence from Orissa, India},
Journal = {American Economic Review},
Volume = {99},
Number = {2},
Year = {2009},
Month = {May},
Pages = {231-35},
DOI = {10.1257/aer.99.2.231},
URL = {https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.99.2.231}}
@article{Gine,
Author = {Giné, Xavier and Karlan, Dean and Zinman, Jonathan},
Title = {Put Your Money Where Your Butt Is: A Commitment Contract for Smoking Cessation},
Journal = {American Economic Journal: Applied Economics},
Volume = {2},
Number = {4},
Year = {2010},
Month = {October},
Pages = {213-35},
DOI = {10.1257/app.2.4.213},
URL = {https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/app.2.4.213}}
@TechReport{Ghatak,
author={Greg Fischer and Maitreesh Ghatak},
title={{Repayment Frequency in Microfinance Contracts with Present-Biased Borrowers}},
year=2010,
month=Jul,
institution={Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE},
type={STICERD - Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers Series},
url={https://ideas.repec.org/p/cep/stieop/021.html},
number={021},
abstract={This paper analyzes the theoretical underpinnings of high-frequency repayment, afeature in nearly all microfinance contracts that has been largely overlooked bytheorists. The pervasive belief among practitioners that frequent repayment is criticalin achieving high repayment rates is puzzling. Classically rational individualsshould benefit from more flexible repayment schedules, and less frequent repaymentshould increase neither default nor delinquency. This paper proposes a simpleexplanation based on present bias. For such individuals, more frequent repaymentcan increase the maximum incentive compatible loan size. However, the welfareeffects are ambiguous. More frequent repayment can lead to over-borrowing,reducing welfare as it increases loan sizes.4},
keywords={Microfinance; Repayment Frequency; Present-Bias},
doi={},
}
@article{Casaburi,
Author = {Casaburi, Lorenzo and Macchiavello, Rocco},
Title = {Demand and Supply of Infrequent Payments as a Commitment Device: Evidence from Kenya},
Journal = {American Economic Review},
Volume = {109},
Number = {2},
Year = {2019},
Month = {February},
Pages = {523-55},
DOI = {10.1257/aer.20180281},
URL = {https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20180281}}
@article{Dalboetal:2010,
title={{Institutions And Behavior: Experimental Evidence On The Effects Of Democracy}},
author={Dal B{\'o}, Pedro and Foster, Andrew and Putterman, Louis},
journal={American Economic Review},
volume={100},
number={5},
pages={2205--29},
year={2010}
}
@article{Sjostrometal:2018,
title={{Free to Choose: Testing the Pure Motivation Effect of Autonomous Choice}},
author={Sj{\"o}str{\"o}m, Tomas and Ulku, Levent and Vadovic, Radovan},
journal={Available at SSRN 3291646},
year={2018}
}
@article{Laibson2015,
Author = {Laibson, David},
Title = {Why Don't Present-Biased Agents Make Commitments?},
Journal = {American Economic Review},
Volume = {105},
Number = {5},
Year = {2015},
Month = {May},
Pages = {267-72},
DOI = {10.1257/aer.p20151084},
URL = {http://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.p20151084}}
@article{Laibson2018,
Author = {Laibson, David},
Title = {Private Paternalism, the Commitment Puzzle, and Model-Free Equilibrium},
Journal = {AEA Papers and Proceedings},
Volume = {108},
Year = {2018},
Month = {May},
Pages = {1-21},
DOI = {10.1257/pandp.20181124},
URL = {http://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pandp.20181124}}
@article{john,
author = {John, Anett},
title = {When Commitment Fails: Evidence from a Field Experiment},
journal = {Management Science},
volume = {66},
number = {2},
pages = {503-529},
year = {2020},
doi = {10.1287/mnsc.2018.3236},
URL = {
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3236
},
eprint = {
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3236
}
,
abstract = { Commitment products can remedy self-control problems. However, imperfect knowledge about their preferences may (discontinuously) lead individuals to select into incentive-incompatible commitments, which reduce their welfare. I conducted a field experiment in which low-income individuals were randomly offered a new installment-savings commitment account. Individuals chose a personalized savings plan and a default penalty themselves. A majority appears to choose a harmful contract: While the average effect on bank savings is large, 55\% of clients default and incur monetary losses. A possible explanation is that the chosen penalties were too low (the commitment was too weak) to overcome clients’ self-control problems. Measures of sophisticated hyperbolic discounting correlate negatively with take-up and default, and positively with penalty choices. This finding is consistent with theoretical predictions that partial sophisticates adopt weak commitments and then default, whereas full sophisticates are more cautious about committing, but better able to choose incentive-compatible contracts.This paper was accepted by John List, behavioral economics. }
}
@article{Alcohol,
Author = {Schilbach, Frank},
Title = {Alcohol and Self-Control: A Field Experiment in India},
Journal = {American Economic Review},
Volume = {109},
Number = {4},
Year = {2019},
Month = {April},
Pages = {1290-1322},
DOI = {10.1257/aer.20170458},
URL = {http://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20170458}
}
@article{Ted,
Author = {Bai, Liang and Handel, Benjamin and Miguel, Edward and Rao, Gautam},
Title = {Self-Control and Demand for Preventive Health: Evidence from Hypertension in India},
Journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics, Forthcoming},
year={2020},
}
@article{Rabin2018,
author = {Augenblick, Ned and Rabin, Matthew},
title = "{An Experiment on Time Preference and Misprediction in Unpleasant Tasks}",
journal = {The Review of Economic Studies},
volume = {86},
number = {3},
pages = {941-975},
year = {2018},
month = {05},
abstract = "{We experimentally investigate the time-inconsistent taste for immediate gratification and future-preference misprediction. Across 7 weeks, 100 participants choose the number of unpleasant transcription tasks given various wages to complete immediately and at different future dates. Participants preferred 10–12\\% fewer tasks in the present compared to any future date, leading to an estimated \\$\\beta \\$ of \\$0.83\\$. Comparing predictions with actual immediate-work choices provides evidence against substantial sophistication, with estimates implying that participants understand no more than 24\\% of their present bias. Finally, we find evidence of “projection bias”: participants wished to complete 4–12\\% fewer tasks when decisions were elicited right after completing tasks rather than before.}",
issn = {0034-6527},
doi = {10.1093/restud/rdy019},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdy019},
eprint = {http://oup.prod.sis.lan/restud/article-pdf/86/3/941/28529283/rdy019.pdf},
}
@article{Kremer,
author = {Kaur, Supreet and Kremer, Michael and Mullainathan, Sendhil},
title = {Self-Control at Work},
journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
volume = {123},
number = {6},
pages = {1227-1277},
year = {2015},
}
@techreport{Pedroza:2010,
author = {Pedroza, Paola},
institution = {Interamerican Development Bank Report},
file = {:home/amahajan/Dropbox/233/Articles/2010/Pedroza{\_}2010{\_}Microfinanzas en Am{\'{e}}rica Latina y el Caribe El sector en cifras.pdf:pdf},
pages = {20},
title = {{Microfinanzas en Am{\'{e}}rica Latina y el Caribe: El sector en Cifras}},
url = {www.iadb.org/micamericas{\%}5Cnhttp://www.portalmicrofinanzas.org/gm/document-1.9.60029/7ee95769-36ab-43df-b33f-f6bbfb4535e0.pdf},
year = {2010}
}
@article{PawnShops,
author = {Gregg, Samuel},
title = {How Medieval Monks Changed the Face of Banking},
journal = {American Banker},
year = {2016},
volume = {1},
number ={88}
}
@article{sunkcost,
author = {MCAFEE, R. PRESTON and MIALON, HUGO M. and MIALON, SUE H.},
title = {DO SUNK COSTS MATTER?},
journal = {Economic Inquiry},
volume = {48},
number = {2},
pages = {323-336},
doi = {10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00184.x},
url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00184.x},
eprint = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00184.x},
abstract = {That sunk costs are not relevant to rational decision making is often presented as one of the basic principles of economics. When people are influenced by sunk costs in their decision making, they are said to be committing the “sunk cost fallacy.” Contrary to conventional wisdom, we argue that in a broad range of situations, it is rational for people to condition behavior on sunk costs because of informational content, reputational concerns, or financial and time constraints. Once all the elements of the decision-making environment are taken into account, reacting to sunk costs can often be understood as rational behavior. (JEL D0, D01, D8, D81, D83, D9, D90)},
year = {2010}
}
@article{PromisesPartnerships,
author = {Charness, Gary and Dufwenberg, Martin},
title = {Promises and Partnership},
journal = {Econometrica},
volume = {74},
number = {6},
pages = {1579-1601},
keywords = {Promises, partnership, guilt aversion, psychological game theory, beliefs, trust, lies, social preferences, behavioral economics, hidden action},
doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00719.x},
url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00719.x},
eprint = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00719.x},
abstract = {We examine experimentally the impact of communication on trust and cooperation. Our design admits observation of promises, lies, and beliefs. The evidence is consistent with people striving to live up to others' expectations so as to avoid guilt, as can be modeled using psychological game theory. When players exhibit such guilt aversion, communication may influence motivation and behavior by influencing beliefs about beliefs. Promises may enhance trustworthy behavior, which is what we observe. We argue that guilt aversion may be relevant for understanding strategic interaction in a variety of settings, and that it may shed light on the role of language, discussions, agreements, and social norms in these contexts.},
year = {2006}
}
@Article{WhyDoPromises,
author="Ismayilov, Huseyn
and Potters, Jan",
title="Why do promises affect trustworthiness, or do they?",
journal="Experimental Economics",
year="2016",
month="Jun",
day="01",
volume="19",
number="2",
pages="382--393",
abstract="We set out to test whether the effect of promises on trustworthiness derives from the fact that they are made (internal consistency) or that they are received (social obligation). The results of an experimental trust game appeared at first to support the former mechanism. Even when trustee messages are not delivered to trustors, trustees who make a promise are more likely to act trustworthy than those who do not make a promise. However, we subsequently ran a control treatment with restricted (non-promise) communication to examine whether the correlation between promises and trustworthiness is causal. The results show that the absence of promises does not decrease average cooperation rates. This indicates that promises do not induce trustworthiness, they are just more likely to be sent by cooperators than by non-cooperators.",
issn="1573-6938",
doi="10.1007/s10683-015-9444-1",
url="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-015-9444-1"
}
@Article{FurtherPromises,
author="Schwartz, Steven
and Spires, Eric
and Young, Rick",
title="Why do people keep their promises? A further investigation",
journal="Experimental Economics",
year="2019",
month="Jun",
day="01",
volume="22",
number="2",
pages="530--551",
abstract="Two rationales have emerged for why individuals keep their promises: (a) an emotional commitment to keep actions and words consistent, a commitment rationale and (b) avoidance of guilt due to not meeting the expectations of the promisee, an expectations rationale. We propose a new dichotomy with clearer distinctions between rationales: (1) an internal consistency rationale, which is the desire to keep actions and words consistent regardless of others' awareness of the promise and (2) a communication rationale, which captures all aspects of promise keeping that are associated with the promisee having learned of the promise, including but not limited to promisee expectations. Using an experiment that manipulates whether promises are delivered, we find no support for the internal consistency rationale; only delivered promises are relevant. In a second experiment designed to better understand what aspect of promise delivery influences promisor behavior, we manipulate whether the promise is delivered before or after the promisee is able to take a trusting action. We find late-arriving promises are relevant though not as relevant as promises delivered before the promisee chooses whether to take the trusting action. We conclude that implicit contracting does not fully explain promise keeping, because had it done so, late-arriving promises would also be irrelevant.",
issn="1573-6938",
doi="10.1007/s10683-018-9567-2",
url="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-018-9567-2"
}
@article{Vanberg,
author = {Vanberg, Christoph},
title = {Why Do People Keep Their Promises? An Experimental Test of Two Explanations},
journal = {Econometrica},
volume = {76},
number = {6},
pages = {1467-1480},
keywords = {Promises, contracts, obligations, guilt aversion, beliefs, behavioral economics, experimental economics},
doi = {10.3982/ECTA7673},
url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.3982/ECTA7673},
eprint = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.3982/ECTA7673},
abstract = {Numerous psychological and economic experiments have shown that the exchange of promises greatly enhances cooperative behavior in experimental games. This paper seeks to test two theories to explain this effect. The first posits that individuals have a preference for keeping their word. The second assumes that people dislike letting down others' payoff expectations. According to the latter account, promises affect behavior only indirectly, because they lead to changes in the payoff expectations attributed to others. I conduct an experiment designed to distinguish between and test these alternative explanations. The results demonstrate that the effects of promises cannot be accounted for by changes in payoff expectations. This suggests that people have a preference for promise keeping per se.},
year = {2008}
}
@article{Ismayilov2017,
title = "Elicited vs. voluntary promises",
journal = "Journal of Economic Psychology",
volume = "62",
pages = "295 - 312",
year = "2017",
issn = "0167-4870",
author = "Huseyn Ismayilov and Jan Potters",
keywords = "Promises, Communication, Cooperation, Guilt aversion, Cost-of-lying, Experiment",
abstract = "We set up an experiment with pre-play communication to study the impact of promise elicitation by trustors from trustees on trust and trustworthiness. When given the opportunity a majority of trustors solicits a promise from the trustee. This drives up the promise making rate by trustees to almost 100%. We find that elicited promises are more likely to be trusted than volunteered promises, but trustees who make an elicited promise are not more likely to be trustworthy than trustees who make a voluntary promise."
}
@article{Belot2010,
title = "Promises and cooperation: Evidence from a TV game show",
journal = "Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization",
volume = "73",
number = "3",
pages = "396 - 405",
year = "2010",
issn = "0167-2681",
doi = "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2010.01.001",
url = "http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268110000041",
author = "Michèle Belot and V. Bhaskar and Jeroen van de Ven",
keywords = "Cheap talk, Communication, Promises, Cooperation",
abstract = "We study the role of communication in a high stakes prisoner’s dilemma, using data from a television game show. 40 Percent of the players voluntarily promise to cooperate, and these players are 50 percentage points more likely to cooperate than players who do not volunteer a promise. However, promises that arise in response to an explicit question by the presenter of the show are uninformative about behavior. These results augment and qualify recent experimental findings on communication—people do not want to volunteer lies but may have no compunction in lying if they feel compelled to do so."
}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
@article{Pascaline,
Author = {Dupas, Pascaline and Robinson, Jonathan},
Title = {Why Don't the Poor Save More? Evidence from Health Savings Experiments},
Journal = {American Economic Review},
Volume = {103},
Number = {4},
Year = {2013},
Month = {June},
Pages = {1138-71},
DOI = {10.1257/aer.103.4.1138},
URL = {http://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.103.4.1138}}
@article{Craig2,
ISSN = {00346535, 15309142},
URL = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/40043121},
abstract = {This paper demonstrates a method for estimating treatment effects in spatial tests, utilizing a second control group to measure unexplained spatial phenomena. The technique is implemented on two innovations in Ugandan microfinance, and we measure the ways in which concurrent shocks such as an Ebola outbreak and a contentious presidential election altered outcomes differentially across regions. By correcting for this spatial heterogeneity, we measure the impact of the policies; a program that increased borrowers' control over the terms of their loans improved outcomes, while the results of a program that bundled health insurance into the lending contract were more mixed.},
author = {Craig McIntosh},
journal = {The Review of Economics and Statistics},
number = {1},
pages = {15--28},
publisher = {The MIT Press},
title = {Estimating Treatment Effects from Spatial Policy Experiments: An Application to Ugandan Microfinance},
volume = {90},
year = {2008}
}
@article{LittleAtAtime,
title = "A little at a time: the use of regularly scheduled repayments in microfinance programs",
journal = "Journal of Development Economics",
volume = "72",
number = "1",
pages = "253 - 279",
year = "2003",
issn = "0304-3878",
doi = "https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3878(03)00076-2",
url = "http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387803000762",
author = "Sanjay Jain and Ghazala Mansuri",
keywords = "Microfinance institutions, Microcredit, Installment repayments, Informal lenders, Moral hazard",
abstract = "Informal lenders appear to be thriving even in regions where microfinance institutions (MFIs), such as the Grameen Bank, have established lending programs. We suggest that an explanation for this well-documented observation lies in the ubiquitous use of regularly scheduled repayments by MFIs. Borrowers are typically required to repay their loans in tightly structured installments, beginning soon after loan disbursement. This little-remarked aspect of the repayment schedule is usually explained as inculcating ‘fiscal discipline’ among borrowers. We argue that an alternative rationale for this loan repayment structure lies in the difficulty of monitoring borrowers' actions. The potential for moral hazard leads MFIs to use innovative mechanisms, such as regularly scheduled repayments, which indirectly coopt the better-informed informal lenders. Conversely, this installment repayment structure allows informal lenders to survive. Further, we show that this linkage can not only expand the volume of informal lending, but may also raise the interest rate in the informal sector."
}
@article{Pande,
ISSN = {15424766, 15424774},
URL = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/40282659},
abstract = {In stark contrast to bank debt contracts, most micro- finance contracts require that repayments start nearly immediately after loan disbursement and occur weekly thereafter. Even though economic theory suggests that a more flexible repayment schedule would benefit clients and potentially improve their repayment capacity, micro-finance practitioners argue that the fiscal discipline imposed by frequent repayment is critical to preventing loan default. In this paper we use data from a field experiment which randomized client assignment to a weekly or monthly repayment schedule and find no significant effect of type of repayment schedule on client delinquency or default. Our findings suggest that, among micro-finance clients who are willing to borrow at either weekly or monthly repayment schedules, a more flexible schedule can significantly lower transaction costs without increasing client default.},
author = {Erica Field and Rohini Pande},
journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association},
number = {2/3},
pages = {501--509},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
title = {Repayment Frequency and Default in Microfinance: Evidence from India},
volume = {6},
year = {2008}
}
@article{Ashraf,
author = {Ashraf, Nava and Karlan, Dean and Yin, Wesley},
title = "{Tying Odysseus to the Mast: Evidence From a Commitment Savings Product in the Philippines*}",
journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
volume = {121},
number = {2},
pages = {635-672},
year = {2006},
month = {05},
abstract = "{We designed a commitment savings product for a Philippine bank and implemented it using a randomized control methodology. The savings product was intended for individuals who want to commit now to restrict access to their savings, and who were sophisticated enough to engage in such a mechanism. We conducted a baseline survey on 1777 existing or former clients of a bank. One month later, we offered the commitment product to a randomly chosen subset of 710 clients; 202 (28.4 percent) accepted the offer and opened the account. In the baseline survey, we asked hypothetical time discounting questions. Women who exhibited a lower discount rate for future relative to current trade-offs, and hence potentially have a preference for commitment, were indeed significantly more likely to open the commitment savings account. Mter twelve months, average savings balances increased by 81 percentage points for those clients assigned to the treatment group relative to those assigned to the control group. We conclude that the savings response represents a lasting change in savings, and not merely a short-term response to a new product.}",
issn = {0033-5533},
doi = {10.1162/qjec.2006.121.2.635},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2006.121.2.635},
eprint = {http://oup.prod.sis.lan/qje/article-pdf/121/2/635/5324429/121-2-635.pdf},
}
@article{Walters,
author = {Walters, Christopher R.},
title = {The Demand for Effective Charter Schools},
journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
volume = {126},
number = {6},
pages = {2179-2223},
year = {2018},
doi = {10.1086/699980},
URL = {
https://doi.org/10.1086/699980
},
eprint = {
https://doi.org/10.1086/699980
}
,
abstract = { This paper models decisions to apply to and attend charter schools in Boston using a generalized Roy selection framework linking preferences to the achievement gains generated by charter attendance. The model is estimated with instruments based on randomized admission lotteries and distance to charter schools. Charter schools generate larger gains for disadvantaged students, but demand for charters is stronger among more advantaged students. Similarly, gains are inversely related to unobserved preferences for charters. As a result, counterfactual simulations indicate that charter expansion is likely to be most effective when accompanied by efforts to target students who are unlikely to apply. }
}
@article{atheygrf,
author = "Athey, Susan and Tibshirani, Julie and Wager, Stefan",
doi = "10.1214/18-AOS1709",
fjournal = "The Annals of Statistics",
journal = "Ann. Statist.",
month = "04",
number = "2",
pages = "1148--1178",
publisher = "The Institute of Mathematical Statistics",
title = "Generalized random forests",
url = "https://doi.org/10.1214/18-AOS1709",
volume = "47",
year = "2019"
}
@article{smote,
author = {Chawla, Nitesh V. and Bowyer, Kevin W. and Hall, Lawrence O. and Kegelmeyer, W. Philip},
title = {SMOTE: Synthetic Minority over-Sampling Technique},
year = {2002},
issue_date = {January 2002},
publisher = {AI Access Foundation},
address = {El Segundo, CA, USA},
volume = {16},
number = {1},
issn = {1076-9757},
journal = {J. Artif. Int. Res.},
month = jun,
pages = {321–357},
numpages = {37}
}
@article{lognormal_dominance,
ISSN = {00206598, 14682354},
URL = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2525973},
author = {Haim Levy},
journal = {International Economic Review},
number = {3},
pages = {601--614},
publisher = {[Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania, Wiley, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University]},
title = {Stochastic Dominance among Log-Normal Prospects},
volume = {14},
year = {1973}
}
@book{collins2009portfolios,
title={Portfolios of the Poor},
author={Collins, Daryl and Morduch, Jonathan and Rutherford, Stuart and Ruthven, Orlanda},
year={2009},
publisher={Princeton University Press}
}
@article{callen2019headwaters,
title={What are the headwaters of formal savings? Experimental evidence from Sri Lanka},
author={Callen, Michael and De Mel, Suresh and McIntosh, Craig and Woodruff, Christopher},
journal={The Review of Economic Studies},
volume={86},
number={6},
pages={2491--2529},
year={2019},
publisher={Oxford University Press}
}
@article{thaler2004save,
title={Save more tomorrow™: Using behavioral economics to increase employee saving},
author={Thaler, Richard H and Benartzi, Shlomo},
journal={Journal of political Economy},
volume={112},
number={S1},
pages={S164--S187},
year={2004},
publisher={The University of Chicago Press}
}
@article{brune2016facilitating,
title={Facilitating savings for agriculture: Field experimental evidence from Malawi},
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