not support hisilicon CortexA73 cpu #1
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shamiali2008
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"blob" resources don't have an associated pixman image: #0 pixman_image_get_stride (image=0x0) at ../pixman/pixman-image.c:921 #1 0x0000562327c25236 in virtio_gpu_save (f=0x56232bb13b00, opaque=0x56232b555a60, size=0, field=0x5623289ab6c8 <__compound_literal.3+104>, vmdesc=0x56232ab59fe0) at ../hw/display/virtio-gpu.c:1225 Related to: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2236353 Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <[email protected]> Acked-by: Peter Xu <[email protected]>
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If there is a pending DMA operation during ide_bus_reset(), the fact
that the IDEState is already reset before the operation is canceled
can be problematic. In particular, ide_dma_cb() might be called and
then use the reset IDEState which contains the signature after the
reset. When used to construct the IO operation this leads to
ide_get_sector() returning 0 and nsector being 1. This is particularly
bad, because a write command will thus destroy the first sector which
often contains a partition table or similar.
Traces showing the unsolicited write happening with IDEState
0x5595af6949d0 being used after reset:
> ahci_port_write ahci(0x5595af6923f0)[0]: port write [reg:PxSCTL] @ 0x2c: 0x00000300
> ahci_reset_port ahci(0x5595af6923f0)[0]: reset port
> ide_reset IDEstate 0x5595af6949d0
> ide_reset IDEstate 0x5595af694da8
> ide_bus_reset_aio aio_cancel
> dma_aio_cancel dbs=0x7f64600089a0
> dma_blk_cb dbs=0x7f64600089a0 ret=0
> dma_complete dbs=0x7f64600089a0 ret=0 cb=0x5595acd40b30
> ahci_populate_sglist ahci(0x5595af6923f0)[0]
> ahci_dma_prepare_buf ahci(0x5595af6923f0)[0]: prepare buf limit=512 prepared=512
> ide_dma_cb IDEState 0x5595af6949d0; sector_num=0 n=1 cmd=DMA WRITE
> dma_blk_io dbs=0x7f6420802010 bs=0x5595ae2c6c30 offset=0 to_dev=1
> dma_blk_cb dbs=0x7f6420802010 ret=0
> (gdb) p *qiov
> $11 = {iov = 0x7f647c76d840, niov = 1, {{nalloc = 1, local_iov = {iov_base = 0x0,
> iov_len = 512}}, {__pad = "\001\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000",
> size = 512}}}
> (gdb) bt
> #0 blk_aio_pwritev (blk=0x5595ae2c6c30, offset=0, qiov=0x7f6420802070, flags=0,
> cb=0x5595ace6f0b0 <dma_blk_cb>, opaque=0x7f6420802010)
> at ../block/block-backend.c:1682
> #1 0x00005595ace6f185 in dma_blk_cb (opaque=0x7f6420802010, ret=<optimized out>)
> at ../softmmu/dma-helpers.c:179
> #2 0x00005595ace6f778 in dma_blk_io (ctx=0x5595ae0609f0,
> sg=sg@entry=0x5595af694d00, offset=offset@entry=0, align=align@entry=512,
> io_func=io_func@entry=0x5595ace6ee30 <dma_blk_write_io_func>,
> io_func_opaque=io_func_opaque@entry=0x5595ae2c6c30,
> cb=0x5595acd40b30 <ide_dma_cb>, opaque=0x5595af6949d0,
> dir=DMA_DIRECTION_TO_DEVICE) at ../softmmu/dma-helpers.c:244
> #3 0x00005595ace6f90a in dma_blk_write (blk=0x5595ae2c6c30,
> sg=sg@entry=0x5595af694d00, offset=offset@entry=0, align=align@entry=512,
> cb=cb@entry=0x5595acd40b30 <ide_dma_cb>, opaque=opaque@entry=0x5595af6949d0)
> at ../softmmu/dma-helpers.c:280
> #4 0x00005595acd40e18 in ide_dma_cb (opaque=0x5595af6949d0, ret=<optimized out>)
> at ../hw/ide/core.c:953
> #5 0x00005595ace6f319 in dma_complete (ret=0, dbs=0x7f64600089a0)
> at ../softmmu/dma-helpers.c:107
> #6 dma_blk_cb (opaque=0x7f64600089a0, ret=0) at ../softmmu/dma-helpers.c:127
> #7 0x00005595ad12227d in blk_aio_complete (acb=0x7f6460005b10)
> at ../block/block-backend.c:1527
> #8 blk_aio_complete (acb=0x7f6460005b10) at ../block/block-backend.c:1524
> #9 blk_aio_write_entry (opaque=0x7f6460005b10) at ../block/block-backend.c:1594
> #10 0x00005595ad258cfb in coroutine_trampoline (i0=<optimized out>,
> i1=<optimized out>) at ../util/coroutine-ucontext.c:177
Signed-off-by: Fiona Ebner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]>
Tested-by: [email protected]
Message-ID: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]>
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On LoongArch host, we got an Aborted from tcg_out_mov(). qemu-x86_64 configure with '--enable-debug'. > (gdb) b /home1/gaosong/code/qemu/tcg/loongarch64/tcg-target.c.inc:312 > Breakpoint 1 at 0x2576f0: file /home1/gaosong/code/qemu/tcg/loongarch64/tcg-target.c.inc, line 312. > (gdb) run hello [...] > Thread 1 "qemu-x86_64" hit Breakpoint 1, tcg_out_mov (s=0xaaaae91760 <tcg_init_ctx>, type=TCG_TYPE_V128, ret=TCG_REG_V2, > arg=TCG_REG_V0) at /home1/gaosong/code/qemu/tcg/loongarch64/tcg-target.c.inc:312 > 312 g_assert_not_reached(); > (gdb) bt > #0 tcg_out_mov (s=0xaaaae91760 <tcg_init_ctx>, type=TCG_TYPE_V128, ret=TCG_REG_V2, arg=TCG_REG_V0) > at /home1/gaosong/code/qemu/tcg/loongarch64/tcg-target.c.inc:312 > #1 0x000000aaaad0fee0 in tcg_reg_alloc_mov (s=0xaaaae91760 <tcg_init_ctx>, op=0xaaaaf67c20) at ../tcg/tcg.c:4632 > #2 0x000000aaaad142f4 in tcg_gen_code (s=0xaaaae91760 <tcg_init_ctx>, tb=0xffe8030340 <code_gen_buffer+197328>, > pc_start=4346094) at ../tcg/tcg.c:6135 [...] > (gdb) c > Continuing. > ** > ERROR:/home1/gaosong/code/qemu/tcg/loongarch64/tcg-target.c.inc:312:tcg_out_mov: code should not be reached > Bail out! ERROR:/home1/gaosong/code/qemu/tcg/loongarch64/tcg-target.c.inc:312:tcg_out_mov: code should not be reached > > Thread 1 "qemu-x86_64" received signal SIGABRT, Aborted. > 0x000000fff7b1c390 in raise () from /lib64/libc.so.6 > (gdb) q Fixes: 16288de ("tcg/loongarch64: Lower basic tcg vec ops to LSX") Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Song Gao <[email protected]> Message-Id: <[email protected]>
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…/qemu-hppa into staging target/hppa qemu v8.2 regression fixes There were some regressions introduced with Qemu v8.2 on the hppa/hppa64 target, e.g.: - 32-bit HP-UX crashes on B160L (32-bit) machine - NetBSD boot failure due to power button in page zero - NetBSD FPU detection failure - OpenBSD 7.4 boot failure This patch series fixes those known regressions and additionally: - allows usage of the max. 3840MB of memory (instead of 3GB), - adds support for the qemu --nodefaults option (to debug other devices) This patch set will not fix those known (non-regression) bugs: - HP-UX and NetBSD still fail to boot on the new 64-bit C3700 machine - Linux kernel will still fail to boot on C3700 as long as kernel modules are used. Changes v2->v3: - Added comment about Figures H-10 and H-11 in the parisc2.0 spec in patch which calculate PDC address translation if PSW.W=0 - Introduce and use hppa_set_ior_and_isr() - Use drive_get_max_bus(IF_SCSI), nd_table[] and serial_hd() to check if default devices should be created - Added Tested-by and Reviewed-by tags Changes v1->v2: - fix OpenBSD boot with SeaBIOS v15 instead of v14 - commit message enhancements suggested by BALATON Zoltan - use uint64_t for ram_max in patch #1 # -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- # # iHUEABYKAB0WIQS86RI+GtKfB8BJu973ErUQojoPXwUCZaImPQAKCRD3ErUQojoP # X2C5AP9fbIkCni45JU6KC6OmFsCbAReRQCPwLO+MzR8/us2ywgD+PsGxSBk8ASxM # nqtv3J9JC3i+XSnbtwLV+qChnO+IXwc= # =FAMY # -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- # gpg: Signature made Sat 13 Jan 2024 05:57:17 GMT # gpg: using EDDSA key BCE9123E1AD29F07C049BBDEF712B510A23A0F5F # gpg: Good signature from "Helge Deller <[email protected]>" [unknown] # gpg: aka "Helge Deller <[email protected]>" [unknown] # gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature! # gpg: There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner. # Primary key fingerprint: 4544 8228 2CD9 10DB EF3D 25F8 3E5F 3D04 A7A2 4603 # Subkey fingerprint: BCE9 123E 1AD2 9F07 C049 BBDE F712 B510 A23A 0F5F * tag 'hppa-fixes-8.2-pull-request' of https://github.com/hdeller/qemu-hppa: target/hppa: Update SeaBIOS-hppa to version 15 target/hppa: Fix IOR and ISR on error in probe target/hppa: Fix IOR and ISR on unaligned access trap target/hppa: Export function hppa_set_ior_and_isr() target/hppa: Avoid accessing %gr0 when raising exception hw/hppa: Move software power button address back into PDC target/hppa: Fix PDC address translation on PA2.0 with PSW.W=0 hw/pci-host/astro: Add missing astro & elroy registers for NetBSD hw/hppa/machine: Disable default devices with --nodefaults option hw/hppa/machine: Allow up to 3840 MB total memory Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <[email protected]>
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…ock_status Using fleecing backup like in [0] on a qcow2 image (with metadata preallocation) can lead to the following assertion failure: > bdrv_co_do_block_status: Assertion `!(ret & BDRV_BLOCK_ZERO)' failed. In the reproducer [0], it happens because the BDRV_BLOCK_RECURSE flag will be set by the qcow2 driver, so the caller will recursively check the file child. Then the BDRV_BLOCK_ZERO set too. Later up the call chain, in bdrv_co_do_block_status() for the snapshot-access driver, the assertion failure will happen, because both flags are set. To fix it, clear the recurse flag after the recursive check was done. In detail: > #0 qcow2_co_block_status Returns 0x45 = BDRV_BLOCK_RECURSE | BDRV_BLOCK_DATA | BDRV_BLOCK_OFFSET_VALID. > #1 bdrv_co_do_block_status Because of the data flag, bdrv_co_do_block_status() will now also set BDRV_BLOCK_ALLOCATED. Because of the recurse flag, bdrv_co_do_block_status() for the bdrv_file child will be called, which returns 0x16 = BDRV_BLOCK_ALLOCATED | BDRV_BLOCK_OFFSET_VALID | BDRV_BLOCK_ZERO. Now the return value inherits the zero flag. Returns 0x57 = BDRV_BLOCK_RECURSE | BDRV_BLOCK_DATA | BDRV_BLOCK_OFFSET_VALID | BDRV_BLOCK_ALLOCATED | BDRV_BLOCK_ZERO. > #2 bdrv_co_common_block_status_above > #3 bdrv_co_block_status_above > #4 bdrv_co_block_status > #5 cbw_co_snapshot_block_status > #6 bdrv_co_snapshot_block_status > #7 snapshot_access_co_block_status > #8 bdrv_co_do_block_status Return value is propagated all the way up to here, where the assertion failure happens, because BDRV_BLOCK_RECURSE and BDRV_BLOCK_ZERO are both set. > #9 bdrv_co_common_block_status_above > #10 bdrv_co_block_status_above > #11 block_copy_block_status > #12 block_copy_dirty_clusters > #13 block_copy_common > #14 block_copy_async_co_entry > #15 coroutine_trampoline [0]: > #!/bin/bash > rm /tmp/disk.qcow2 > ./qemu-img create /tmp/disk.qcow2 -o preallocation=metadata -f qcow2 1G > ./qemu-img create /tmp/fleecing.qcow2 -f qcow2 1G > ./qemu-img create /tmp/backup.qcow2 -f qcow2 1G > ./qemu-system-x86_64 --qmp stdio \ > --blockdev qcow2,node-name=node0,file.driver=file,file.filename=/tmp/disk.qcow2 \ > --blockdev qcow2,node-name=node1,file.driver=file,file.filename=/tmp/fleecing.qcow2 \ > --blockdev qcow2,node-name=node2,file.driver=file,file.filename=/tmp/backup.qcow2 \ > <<EOF > {"execute": "qmp_capabilities"} > {"execute": "blockdev-add", "arguments": { "driver": "copy-before-write", "file": "node0", "target": "node1", "node-name": "node3" } } > {"execute": "blockdev-add", "arguments": { "driver": "snapshot-access", "file": "node3", "node-name": "snap0" } } > {"execute": "blockdev-backup", "arguments": { "device": "snap0", "target": "node1", "sync": "full", "job-id": "backup0" } } > EOF Signed-off-by: Fiona Ebner <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <[email protected]> Message-id: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]>
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There is a bug in the blklogwrites driver pertaining to logging "write
zeroes" operations, causing log corruption. This can be easily observed
by setting detect-zeroes to something other than "off" for the driver.
The issue is caused by a concurrency bug pertaining to the fact that
"write zeroes" operations have to be logged in two parts: first the log
entry metadata, then the zeroed-out region. While the log entry
metadata is being written by bdrv_co_pwritev(), another operation may
begin in the meanwhile and modify the state of the blklogwrites driver.
This is as intended by the coroutine-driven I/O model in QEMU, of
course.
Unfortunately, this specific scenario is mishandled. A short example:
1. Initially, in the current operation (#1), the current log sector
number in the driver state is only incremented by the number of sectors
taken by the log entry metadata, after which the log entry metadata is
written. The current operation yields.
2. Another operation (#2) may start while the log entry metadata is
being written. It uses the current log position as the start offset for
its log entry. This is in the sector right after the operation #1 log
entry metadata, which is bad!
3. After bdrv_co_pwritev() returns (#1), the current log sector
number is reread from the driver state in order to find out the start
offset for bdrv_co_pwrite_zeroes(). This is an obvious blunder, as the
offset will be the sector right after the (misplaced) operation #2 log
entry, which means that the zeroed-out region begins at the wrong
offset.
4. As a result of the above, the log is corrupt.
Fix this by only reading the driver metadata once, computing the
offsets and sizes in one go (including the optional zeroed-out region)
and setting the log sector number to the appropriate value for the next
operation in line.
Signed-off-by: Ari Sundholm <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Message-ID: <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Wolf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <[email protected]>
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A memory page poisoned from the hypervisor level is no longer readable. The migration of a VM will crash Qemu when it tries to read the memory address space and stumbles on the poisoned page with a similar stack trace: Program terminated with signal SIGBUS, Bus error. #0 _mm256_loadu_si256 #1 buffer_zero_avx2 #2 select_accel_fn #3 buffer_is_zero #4 save_zero_page #5 ram_save_target_page_legacy #6 ram_save_host_page #7 ram_find_and_save_block #8 ram_save_iterate #9 qemu_savevm_state_iterate #10 migration_iteration_run #11 migration_thread #12 qemu_thread_start To avoid this VM crash during the migration, prevent the migration when a known hardware poison exists on the VM. Signed-off-by: William Roche <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <[email protected]>
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…ock_status Using fleecing backup like in [0] on a qcow2 image (with metadata preallocation) can lead to the following assertion failure: > bdrv_co_do_block_status: Assertion `!(ret & BDRV_BLOCK_ZERO)' failed. In the reproducer [0], it happens because the BDRV_BLOCK_RECURSE flag will be set by the qcow2 driver, so the caller will recursively check the file child. Then the BDRV_BLOCK_ZERO set too. Later up the call chain, in bdrv_co_do_block_status() for the snapshot-access driver, the assertion failure will happen, because both flags are set. To fix it, clear the recurse flag after the recursive check was done. In detail: > #0 qcow2_co_block_status Returns 0x45 = BDRV_BLOCK_RECURSE | BDRV_BLOCK_DATA | BDRV_BLOCK_OFFSET_VALID. > #1 bdrv_co_do_block_status Because of the data flag, bdrv_co_do_block_status() will now also set BDRV_BLOCK_ALLOCATED. Because of the recurse flag, bdrv_co_do_block_status() for the bdrv_file child will be called, which returns 0x16 = BDRV_BLOCK_ALLOCATED | BDRV_BLOCK_OFFSET_VALID | BDRV_BLOCK_ZERO. Now the return value inherits the zero flag. Returns 0x57 = BDRV_BLOCK_RECURSE | BDRV_BLOCK_DATA | BDRV_BLOCK_OFFSET_VALID | BDRV_BLOCK_ALLOCATED | BDRV_BLOCK_ZERO. > #2 bdrv_co_common_block_status_above > #3 bdrv_co_block_status_above > #4 bdrv_co_block_status > #5 cbw_co_snapshot_block_status > #6 bdrv_co_snapshot_block_status > #7 snapshot_access_co_block_status > #8 bdrv_co_do_block_status Return value is propagated all the way up to here, where the assertion failure happens, because BDRV_BLOCK_RECURSE and BDRV_BLOCK_ZERO are both set. > #9 bdrv_co_common_block_status_above > #10 bdrv_co_block_status_above > #11 block_copy_block_status > #12 block_copy_dirty_clusters > #13 block_copy_common > #14 block_copy_async_co_entry > #15 coroutine_trampoline [0]: > #!/bin/bash > rm /tmp/disk.qcow2 > ./qemu-img create /tmp/disk.qcow2 -o preallocation=metadata -f qcow2 1G > ./qemu-img create /tmp/fleecing.qcow2 -f qcow2 1G > ./qemu-img create /tmp/backup.qcow2 -f qcow2 1G > ./qemu-system-x86_64 --qmp stdio \ > --blockdev qcow2,node-name=node0,file.driver=file,file.filename=/tmp/disk.qcow2 \ > --blockdev qcow2,node-name=node1,file.driver=file,file.filename=/tmp/fleecing.qcow2 \ > --blockdev qcow2,node-name=node2,file.driver=file,file.filename=/tmp/backup.qcow2 \ > <<EOF > {"execute": "qmp_capabilities"} > {"execute": "blockdev-add", "arguments": { "driver": "copy-before-write", "file": "node0", "target": "node1", "node-name": "node3" } } > {"execute": "blockdev-add", "arguments": { "driver": "snapshot-access", "file": "node3", "node-name": "snap0" } } > {"execute": "blockdev-backup", "arguments": { "device": "snap0", "target": "node1", "sync": "full", "job-id": "backup0" } } > EOF Signed-off-by: Fiona Ebner <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <[email protected]> Message-id: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 8a9be79) Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <[email protected]>
shamiali2008
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There is a bug in the blklogwrites driver pertaining to logging "write
zeroes" operations, causing log corruption. This can be easily observed
by setting detect-zeroes to something other than "off" for the driver.
The issue is caused by a concurrency bug pertaining to the fact that
"write zeroes" operations have to be logged in two parts: first the log
entry metadata, then the zeroed-out region. While the log entry
metadata is being written by bdrv_co_pwritev(), another operation may
begin in the meanwhile and modify the state of the blklogwrites driver.
This is as intended by the coroutine-driven I/O model in QEMU, of
course.
Unfortunately, this specific scenario is mishandled. A short example:
1. Initially, in the current operation (#1), the current log sector
number in the driver state is only incremented by the number of sectors
taken by the log entry metadata, after which the log entry metadata is
written. The current operation yields.
2. Another operation (#2) may start while the log entry metadata is
being written. It uses the current log position as the start offset for
its log entry. This is in the sector right after the operation #1 log
entry metadata, which is bad!
3. After bdrv_co_pwritev() returns (#1), the current log sector
number is reread from the driver state in order to find out the start
offset for bdrv_co_pwrite_zeroes(). This is an obvious blunder, as the
offset will be the sector right after the (misplaced) operation #2 log
entry, which means that the zeroed-out region begins at the wrong
offset.
4. As a result of the above, the log is corrupt.
Fix this by only reading the driver metadata once, computing the
offsets and sizes in one go (including the optional zeroed-out region)
and setting the log sector number to the appropriate value for the next
operation in line.
Signed-off-by: Ari Sundholm <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Message-ID: <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Wolf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit a9c8ea9)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <[email protected]>
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…B changes
The old_bs variable in bdrv_next() is currently determined by looking
at the old block backend. However, if the block graph changes before
the next bdrv_next() call, it might be that the associated BDS is not
the same that was referenced previously. In that case, the wrong BDS
is unreferenced, leading to an assertion failure later:
> bdrv_unref: Assertion `bs->refcnt > 0' failed.
In particular, this can happen in the context of bdrv_flush_all(),
when polling for bdrv_co_flush() in the generated co-wrapper leads to
a graph change (for example with a stream block job [0]).
A racy reproducer:
> #!/bin/bash
> rm -f /tmp/backing.qcow2
> rm -f /tmp/top.qcow2
> ./qemu-img create /tmp/backing.qcow2 -f qcow2 64M
> ./qemu-io -c "write -P42 0x0 0x1" /tmp/backing.qcow2
> ./qemu-img create /tmp/top.qcow2 -f qcow2 64M -b /tmp/backing.qcow2 -F qcow2
> ./qemu-system-x86_64 --qmp stdio \
> --blockdev qcow2,node-name=node0,file.driver=file,file.filename=/tmp/top.qcow2 \
> <<EOF
> {"execute": "qmp_capabilities"}
> {"execute": "block-stream", "arguments": { "job-id": "stream0", "device": "node0" } }
> {"execute": "quit"}
> EOF
[0]:
> #0 bdrv_replace_child_tran (child=..., new_bs=..., tran=...)
> #1 bdrv_replace_node_noperm (from=..., to=..., auto_skip=..., tran=..., errp=...)
> #2 bdrv_replace_node_common (from=..., to=..., auto_skip=..., detach_subchain=..., errp=...)
> #3 bdrv_drop_filter (bs=..., errp=...)
> #4 bdrv_cor_filter_drop (cor_filter_bs=...)
> #5 stream_prepare (job=...)
> #6 job_prepare_locked (job=...)
> #7 job_txn_apply_locked (fn=..., job=...)
> #8 job_do_finalize_locked (job=...)
> #9 job_exit (opaque=...)
> #10 aio_bh_poll (ctx=...)
> #11 aio_poll (ctx=..., blocking=...)
> #12 bdrv_poll_co (s=...)
> #13 bdrv_flush (bs=...)
> #14 bdrv_flush_all ()
> #15 do_vm_stop (state=..., send_stop=...)
> #16 vm_shutdown ()
Signed-off-by: Fiona Ebner <[email protected]>
Message-ID: <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Wolf <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit f6d38c9)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <[email protected]>
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When vhost-user or vhost-kernel is handling virtio net datapath, QEMU should not touch used ring. But with vhost-user socket reconnect scenario, in a very rare case (has pending kick event). VRING_USED_F_NO_NOTIFY is set by QEMU in following code path: #0 virtio_queue_split_set_notification (vq=0x7ff5f4c920a8, enable=0) at ../hw/virtio/virtio.c:511 #1 0x0000559d6dbf033b in virtio_queue_set_notification (vq=0x7ff5f4c920a8, enable=0) at ../hw/virtio/virtio.c:576 #2 0x0000559d6dbbbdbc in virtio_net_handle_tx_bh (vdev=0x559d703a6aa0, vq=0x7ff5f4c920a8) at ../hw/net/virtio-net.c:2801 #3 0x0000559d6dbf4791 in virtio_queue_notify_vq (vq=0x7ff5f4c920a8) at ../hw/virtio/virtio.c:2248 #4 0x0000559d6dbf79da in virtio_queue_host_notifier_read (n=0x7ff5f4c9211c) at ../hw/virtio/virtio.c:3525 #5 0x0000559d6d9a5814 in virtio_bus_cleanup_host_notifier (bus=0x559d703a6a20, n=1) at ../hw/virtio/virtio-bus.c:321 #6 0x0000559d6dbf83c9 in virtio_device_stop_ioeventfd_impl (vdev=0x559d703a6aa0) at ../hw/virtio/virtio.c:3774 #7 0x0000559d6d9a55c8 in virtio_bus_stop_ioeventfd (bus=0x559d703a6a20) at ../hw/virtio/virtio-bus.c:259 #8 0x0000559d6d9a53e8 in virtio_bus_grab_ioeventfd (bus=0x559d703a6a20) at ../hw/virtio/virtio-bus.c:199 #9 0x0000559d6dbf841c in virtio_device_grab_ioeventfd (vdev=0x559d703a6aa0) at ../hw/virtio/virtio.c:3783 #10 0x0000559d6d9bde18 in vhost_dev_enable_notifiers (hdev=0x559d707edd70, vdev=0x559d703a6aa0) at ../hw/virtio/vhost.c:1592 #11 0x0000559d6d89a0b8 in vhost_net_start_one (net=0x559d707edd70, dev=0x559d703a6aa0) at ../hw/net/vhost_net.c:266 #12 0x0000559d6d89a6df in vhost_net_start (dev=0x559d703a6aa0, ncs=0x559d7048d890, data_queue_pairs=31, cvq=0) at ../hw/net/vhost_net.c:412 #13 0x0000559d6dbb5b89 in virtio_net_vhost_status (n=0x559d703a6aa0, status=15 '\017') at ../hw/net/virtio-net.c:311 #14 0x0000559d6dbb5e34 in virtio_net_set_status (vdev=0x559d703a6aa0, status=15 '\017') at ../hw/net/virtio-net.c:392 #15 0x0000559d6dbb60d8 in virtio_net_set_link_status (nc=0x559d7048d890) at ../hw/net/virtio-net.c:455 #16 0x0000559d6da64863 in qmp_set_link (name=0x559d6f0b83d0 "hostnet1", up=true, errp=0x7ffdd76569f0) at ../net/net.c:1459 #17 0x0000559d6da7226e in net_vhost_user_event (opaque=0x559d6f0b83d0, event=CHR_EVENT_OPENED) at ../net/vhost-user.c:301 #18 0x0000559d6ddc7f63 in chr_be_event (s=0x559d6f2ffea0, event=CHR_EVENT_OPENED) at ../chardev/char.c:62 #19 0x0000559d6ddc7fdc in qemu_chr_be_event (s=0x559d6f2ffea0, event=CHR_EVENT_OPENED) at ../chardev/char.c:82 This issue causes guest kernel stop kicking device and traffic stop. Add vhost_started check in virtio_net_handle_tx_bh to fix this wrong VRING_USED_F_NO_NOTIFY set. Signed-off-by: Yajun Wu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]> Message-ID: <[email protected]> [PMD: Use unlikely()] Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 4c54f5b) Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <[email protected]>
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This modification ensures that in scenarios where the buffer size is
insufficient for a zone report, the function will now properly set an
error status and proceed to a cleanup label, instead of merely
returning.
The following ASAN log reveals it:
==1767400==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks
Direct leak of 312 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x64ac7b3280cd in malloc llvm/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:129:3
#1 0x735b02fb9738 in g_malloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5e738)
#2 0x64ac7d23be96 in virtqueue_split_pop hw/virtio/virtio.c:1612:12
#3 0x64ac7d23728a in virtqueue_pop hw/virtio/virtio.c:1783:16
#4 0x64ac7cfcaacd in virtio_blk_get_request hw/block/virtio-blk.c:228:27
#5 0x64ac7cfca7c7 in virtio_blk_handle_vq hw/block/virtio-blk.c:1123:23
#6 0x64ac7cfecb95 in virtio_blk_handle_output hw/block/virtio-blk.c:1157:5
Signed-off-by: Zheyu Ma <[email protected]>
Message-id: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit bbdf902)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <[email protected]>
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This patch improves error handling in virtio_snd_handle_tx_xfer()
and virtio_snd_handle_rx_xfer() in the VirtIO sound driver. Previously,
'goto' statements were used for error paths, leading to unnecessary
processing and potential null pointer dereferences. Now, 'continue' is
used to skip the rest of the current loop iteration for errors such as
message size discrepancies or null streams, reducing crash risks.
ASAN log illustrating the issue addressed:
ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x0000000000b4
#0 0x57cea39967b8 in qemu_mutex_lock_impl qemu/util/qemu-thread-posix.c:92:5
#1 0x57cea128c462 in qemu_mutex_lock qemu/include/qemu/thread.h:122:5
#2 0x57cea128d72f in qemu_lockable_lock qemu/include/qemu/lockable.h:95:5
#3 0x57cea128c294 in qemu_lockable_auto_lock qemu/include/qemu/lockable.h:105:5
#4 0x57cea1285eb2 in virtio_snd_handle_rx_xfer qemu/hw/audio/virtio-snd.c:1026:9
#5 0x57cea2caebbc in virtio_queue_notify_vq qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:2268:9
#6 0x57cea2cae412 in virtio_queue_host_notifier_read qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:3671:9
#7 0x57cea39822f1 in aio_dispatch_handler qemu/util/aio-posix.c:372:9
#8 0x57cea3979385 in aio_dispatch_handlers qemu/util/aio-posix.c:414:20
#9 0x57cea3978eb1 in aio_dispatch qemu/util/aio-posix.c:424:5
#10 0x57cea3a1eede in aio_ctx_dispatch qemu/util/async.c:360:5
Signed-off-by: Zheyu Ma <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Manos Pitsidianakis <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit a45f099)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <[email protected]>
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Replace qemu_bh_new_guarded() by virtio_bh_new_guarded()
so the bus and device use the same guard. Otherwise the
DMA-reentrancy protection can be bypassed:
$ cat << EOF | qemu-system-i386 -display none -nodefaults \
-machine q35,accel=qtest \
-m 512M \
-device virtio-gpu \
-qtest stdio
outl 0xcf8 0x80000820
outl 0xcfc 0xe0004000
outl 0xcf8 0x80000804
outw 0xcfc 0x06
write 0xe0004030 0x4 0x024000e0
write 0xe0004028 0x1 0xff
write 0xe0004020 0x4 0x00009300
write 0xe000401c 0x1 0x01
write 0x101 0x1 0x04
write 0x103 0x1 0x1c
write 0x9301c8 0x1 0x18
write 0x105 0x1 0x1c
write 0x107 0x1 0x1c
write 0x109 0x1 0x1c
write 0x10b 0x1 0x00
write 0x10d 0x1 0x00
write 0x10f 0x1 0x00
write 0x111 0x1 0x00
write 0x113 0x1 0x00
write 0x115 0x1 0x00
write 0x117 0x1 0x00
write 0x119 0x1 0x00
write 0x11b 0x1 0x00
write 0x11d 0x1 0x00
write 0x11f 0x1 0x00
write 0x121 0x1 0x00
write 0x123 0x1 0x00
write 0x125 0x1 0x00
write 0x127 0x1 0x00
write 0x129 0x1 0x00
write 0x12b 0x1 0x00
write 0x12d 0x1 0x00
write 0x12f 0x1 0x00
write 0x131 0x1 0x00
write 0x133 0x1 0x00
write 0x135 0x1 0x00
write 0x137 0x1 0x00
write 0x139 0x1 0x00
write 0xe0007003 0x1 0x00
EOF
...
=================================================================
==276099==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x60d000011178
at pc 0x562cc3b736c7 bp 0x7ffed49dee60 sp 0x7ffed49dee58
READ of size 8 at 0x60d000011178 thread T0
#0 0x562cc3b736c6 in virtio_gpu_ctrl_response hw/display/virtio-gpu.c:180:42
#1 0x562cc3b7c40b in virtio_gpu_ctrl_response_nodata hw/display/virtio-gpu.c:192:5
#2 0x562cc3b7c40b in virtio_gpu_simple_process_cmd hw/display/virtio-gpu.c:1015:13
#3 0x562cc3b82873 in virtio_gpu_process_cmdq hw/display/virtio-gpu.c:1050:9
#4 0x562cc4a85514 in aio_bh_call util/async.c:169:5
#5 0x562cc4a85c52 in aio_bh_poll util/async.c:216:13
#6 0x562cc4a1a79b in aio_dispatch util/aio-posix.c:423:5
#7 0x562cc4a8a2da in aio_ctx_dispatch util/async.c:358:5
#8 0x7f36840547a8 in g_main_context_dispatch (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x547a8)
#9 0x562cc4a8b753 in glib_pollfds_poll util/main-loop.c:290:9
#10 0x562cc4a8b753 in os_host_main_loop_wait util/main-loop.c:313:5
#11 0x562cc4a8b753 in main_loop_wait util/main-loop.c:592:11
#12 0x562cc3938186 in qemu_main_loop system/runstate.c:782:9
#13 0x562cc43b7af5 in qemu_default_main system/main.c:37:14
#14 0x7f3683a6c189 in __libc_start_call_main csu/../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58:16
#15 0x7f3683a6c244 in __libc_start_main csu/../csu/libc-start.c:381:3
#16 0x562cc2a58ac0 in _start (qemu-system-i386+0x231bac0)
0x60d000011178 is located 56 bytes inside of 136-byte region [0x60d000011140,0x60d0000111c8)
freed by thread T0 here:
#0 0x562cc2adb662 in __interceptor_free (qemu-system-i386+0x239e662)
#1 0x562cc3b86b21 in virtio_gpu_reset hw/display/virtio-gpu.c:1524:9
#2 0x562cc416e20e in virtio_reset hw/virtio/virtio.c:2145:9
#3 0x562cc37c5644 in virtio_pci_reset hw/virtio/virtio-pci.c:2249:5
#4 0x562cc4233758 in memory_region_write_accessor system/memory.c:497:5
#5 0x562cc4232eea in access_with_adjusted_size system/memory.c:573:18
previously allocated by thread T0 here:
#0 0x562cc2adb90e in malloc (qemu-system-i386+0x239e90e)
#1 0x7f368405a678 in g_malloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5a678)
#2 0x562cc4163ffc in virtqueue_split_pop hw/virtio/virtio.c:1612:12
#3 0x562cc4163ffc in virtqueue_pop hw/virtio/virtio.c:1783:16
#4 0x562cc3b91a95 in virtio_gpu_handle_ctrl hw/display/virtio-gpu.c:1112:15
#5 0x562cc4a85514 in aio_bh_call util/async.c:169:5
#6 0x562cc4a85c52 in aio_bh_poll util/async.c:216:13
#7 0x562cc4a1a79b in aio_dispatch util/aio-posix.c:423:5
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free hw/display/virtio-gpu.c:180:42 in virtio_gpu_ctrl_response
With this change, the same reproducer triggers:
qemu-system-i386: warning: Blocked re-entrant IO on MemoryRegion: virtio-pci-common-virtio-gpu at addr: 0x6
Fixes: CVE-2024-3446
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Yongkang Jia <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Xiao Lei <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Yiming Tao <[email protected]>
Buglink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1888606
Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit ba28e0f)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <[email protected]>
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nand_command() and nand_getio() don't check @offset points into the block, nor the available data length (s->iolen) is not negative. In order to fix: - check the offset is in range in nand_blk_load_NAND_PAGE_SIZE(), - do not set @iolen if blk_load() failed. Reproducer: $ cat << EOF | qemu-system-arm -machine tosa \ -monitor none -serial none \ -display none -qtest stdio write 0x10000111 0x1 0xca write 0x10000104 0x1 0x47 write 0x1000ca04 0x1 0xd7 write 0x1000ca01 0x1 0xe0 write 0x1000ca04 0x1 0x71 write 0x1000ca00 0x1 0x50 write 0x1000ca04 0x1 0xd7 read 0x1000ca02 0x1 write 0x1000ca01 0x1 0x10 EOF ================================================================= ==15750==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x61f000000de0 at pc 0x560e61557210 bp 0x7ffcfc4a59f0 sp 0x7ffcfc4a59e8 READ of size 1 at 0x61f000000de0 thread T0 #0 0x560e6155720f in mem_and hw/block/nand.c:101:20 #1 0x560e6155ac9c in nand_blk_write_512 hw/block/nand.c:663:9 #2 0x560e61544200 in nand_command hw/block/nand.c:293:13 #3 0x560e6153cc83 in nand_setio hw/block/nand.c:520:13 #4 0x560e61a0a69e in tc6393xb_nand_writeb hw/display/tc6393xb.c:380:13 #5 0x560e619f9bf7 in tc6393xb_writeb hw/display/tc6393xb.c:524:9 #6 0x560e647c7d03 in memory_region_write_accessor softmmu/memory.c:492:5 #7 0x560e647c7641 in access_with_adjusted_size softmmu/memory.c:554:18 #8 0x560e647c5f66 in memory_region_dispatch_write softmmu/memory.c:1514:16 #9 0x560e6485409e in flatview_write_continue softmmu/physmem.c:2825:23 #10 0x560e648421eb in flatview_write softmmu/physmem.c:2867:12 #11 0x560e64841ca8 in address_space_write softmmu/physmem.c:2963:18 #12 0x560e61170162 in qemu_writeb tests/qtest/videzzo/videzzo_qemu.c:1080:5 #13 0x560e6116eef7 in dispatch_mmio_write tests/qtest/videzzo/videzzo_qemu.c:1227:28 0x61f000000de0 is located 0 bytes to the right of 3424-byte region [0x61f000000080,0x61f000000de0) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x560e611276cf in malloc /root/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:145:3 #1 0x7f7959a87e98 in g_malloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x57e98) #2 0x560e64b98871 in object_new qom/object.c:749:12 #3 0x560e64b5d1a1 in qdev_new hw/core/qdev.c:153:19 #4 0x560e61547ea5 in nand_init hw/block/nand.c:639:11 #5 0x560e619f8772 in tc6393xb_init hw/display/tc6393xb.c:558:16 #6 0x560e6390bad2 in tosa_init hw/arm/tosa.c:250:12 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow hw/block/nand.c:101:20 in mem_and ==15750==ABORTING Broken since introduction in commit 3e3d581 ("NAND Flash memory emulation and ECC calculation helpers for use by NAND controllers"). Cc: [email protected] Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/1445 Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/1446 Reported-by: Qiang Liu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Kevin Wolf <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]> Message-Id: <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit d39fdff) Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <[email protected]>
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When the MAC Interface Layer (MIL) transmit FIFO is full, truncate the packet, and raise the Transmitter Error (TXE) flag. Broken since model introduction in commit 2a42499 ("LAN9118 emulation"). When using the reproducer from https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2267 we get: hw/net/lan9118.c:798:17: runtime error: index 2048 out of bounds for type 'uint8_t[2048]' (aka 'unsigned char[2048]') #0 0x563ec9a057b1 in tx_fifo_push hw/net/lan9118.c:798:43 #1 0x563ec99fbb28 in lan9118_writel hw/net/lan9118.c:1042:9 #2 0x563ec99f2de2 in lan9118_16bit_mode_write hw/net/lan9118.c:1205:9 #3 0x563ecbf78013 in memory_region_write_accessor system/memory.c:497:5 #4 0x563ecbf776f5 in access_with_adjusted_size system/memory.c:573:18 #5 0x563ecbf75643 in memory_region_dispatch_write system/memory.c:1521:16 #6 0x563ecc01bade in flatview_write_continue_step system/physmem.c:2713:18 #7 0x563ecc01b374 in flatview_write_continue system/physmem.c:2743:19 #8 0x563ecbff1c9b in flatview_write system/physmem.c:2774:12 #9 0x563ecbff1768 in address_space_write system/physmem.c:2894:18 ... [*] LAN9118 DS00002266B.pdf, Table 5.3.3 "INTERRUPT STATUS REGISTER" Cc: [email protected] Reported-by: Will Lester Reported-by: Chuhong Yuan <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2267 Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> Message-Id: <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit ad766d6) Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <[email protected]>
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Per "SD Host Controller Standard Specification Version 3.00":
* 2.2.5 Transfer Mode Register (Offset 00Ch)
Writes to this register shall be ignored when the Command
Inhibit (DAT) in the Present State register is 1.
Do not update the TRNMOD register when Command Inhibit (DAT)
bit is set to avoid the present-status register going out of
sync, leading to malicious guest using DMA mode and overflowing
the FIFO buffer:
$ cat << EOF | qemu-system-i386 \
-display none -nographic -nodefaults \
-machine accel=qtest -m 512M \
-device sdhci-pci,sd-spec-version=3 \
-device sd-card,drive=mydrive \
-drive if=none,index=0,file=null-co://,format=raw,id=mydrive \
-qtest stdio
outl 0xcf8 0x80001013
outl 0xcfc 0x91
outl 0xcf8 0x80001001
outl 0xcfc 0x06000000
write 0x9100002c 0x1 0x05
write 0x91000058 0x1 0x16
write 0x91000005 0x1 0x04
write 0x91000028 0x1 0x08
write 0x16 0x1 0x21
write 0x19 0x1 0x20
write 0x9100000c 0x1 0x01
write 0x9100000e 0x1 0x20
write 0x9100000f 0x1 0x00
write 0x9100000c 0x1 0x00
write 0x91000020 0x1 0x00
EOF
Stack trace (part):
=================================================================
==89993==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address
0x615000029900 at pc 0x55d5f885700d bp 0x7ffc1e1e9470 sp 0x7ffc1e1e9468
WRITE of size 1 at 0x615000029900 thread T0
#0 0x55d5f885700c in sdhci_write_dataport hw/sd/sdhci.c:564:39
#1 0x55d5f8849150 in sdhci_write hw/sd/sdhci.c:1223:13
#2 0x55d5fa01db63 in memory_region_write_accessor system/memory.c:497:5
#3 0x55d5fa01d245 in access_with_adjusted_size system/memory.c:573:18
#4 0x55d5fa01b1a9 in memory_region_dispatch_write system/memory.c:1521:16
#5 0x55d5fa09f5c9 in flatview_write_continue system/physmem.c:2711:23
#6 0x55d5fa08f78b in flatview_write system/physmem.c:2753:12
#7 0x55d5fa08f258 in address_space_write system/physmem.c:2860:18
...
0x615000029900 is located 0 bytes to the right of 512-byte region
[0x615000029700,0x615000029900) allocated by thread T0 here:
#0 0x55d5f7237b27 in __interceptor_calloc
#1 0x7f9e36dd4c50 in g_malloc0
#2 0x55d5f88672f7 in sdhci_pci_realize hw/sd/sdhci-pci.c:36:5
#3 0x55d5f844b582 in pci_qdev_realize hw/pci/pci.c:2092:9
#4 0x55d5fa2ee74b in device_set_realized hw/core/qdev.c:510:13
#5 0x55d5fa325bfb in property_set_bool qom/object.c:2358:5
#6 0x55d5fa31ea45 in object_property_set qom/object.c:1472:5
#7 0x55d5fa332509 in object_property_set_qobject om/qom-qobject.c:28:10
#8 0x55d5fa31f6ed in object_property_set_bool qom/object.c:1541:15
#9 0x55d5fa2e2948 in qdev_realize hw/core/qdev.c:292:12
#10 0x55d5f8eed3f1 in qdev_device_add_from_qdict system/qdev-monitor.c:719:10
#11 0x55d5f8eef7ff in qdev_device_add system/qdev-monitor.c:738:11
#12 0x55d5f8f211f0 in device_init_func system/vl.c:1200:11
#13 0x55d5fad0877d in qemu_opts_foreach util/qemu-option.c:1135:14
#14 0x55d5f8f0df9c in qemu_create_cli_devices system/vl.c:2638:5
#15 0x55d5f8f0db24 in qmp_x_exit_preconfig system/vl.c:2706:5
#16 0x55d5f8f14dc0 in qemu_init system/vl.c:3737:9
...
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow hw/sd/sdhci.c:564:39
in sdhci_write_dataport
Add assertions to ensure the fifo_buffer[] is not overflowed by
malicious accesses to the Buffer Data Port register.
Fixes: CVE-2024-3447
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: d7dfca0 ("hw/sdhci: introduce standard SD host controller")
Buglink: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=58813
Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Chuhong Yuan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <CAFEAcA9iLiv1XGTGKeopgMa8Y9+8kvptvsb8z2OBeuy+5=NUfg@mail.gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 9e4b27c)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <[email protected]>
shamiali2008
pushed a commit
that referenced
this issue
Aug 28, 2024
If a fragmented packet size is too short, do not try to
calculate its checksum.
Reproduced using:
$ cat << EOF | qemu-system-i386 -display none -nodefaults \
-machine q35,accel=qtest -m 32M \
-device igb,netdev=net0 \
-netdev user,id=net0 \
-qtest stdio
outl 0xcf8 0x80000810
outl 0xcfc 0xe0000000
outl 0xcf8 0x80000804
outw 0xcfc 0x06
write 0xe0000403 0x1 0x02
writel 0xe0003808 0xffffffff
write 0xe000381a 0x1 0x5b
write 0xe000381b 0x1 0x00
EOF
Assertion failed: (offset == 0), function iov_from_buf_full, file util/iov.c, line 39.
#1 0x5575e81e952a in iov_from_buf_full qemu/util/iov.c:39:5
#2 0x5575e6500768 in net_tx_pkt_update_sctp_checksum qemu/hw/net/net_tx_pkt.c:144:9
#3 0x5575e659f3e1 in igb_setup_tx_offloads qemu/hw/net/igb_core.c:478:11
#4 0x5575e659f3e1 in igb_tx_pkt_send qemu/hw/net/igb_core.c:552:10
#5 0x5575e659f3e1 in igb_process_tx_desc qemu/hw/net/igb_core.c:671:17
#6 0x5575e659f3e1 in igb_start_xmit qemu/hw/net/igb_core.c:903:9
#7 0x5575e659f3e1 in igb_set_tdt qemu/hw/net/igb_core.c:2812:5
#8 0x5575e657d6a4 in igb_core_write qemu/hw/net/igb_core.c:4248:9
Fixes: CVE-2024-3567
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Zheyu Ma <[email protected]>
Fixes: f199b13 ("igb: Implement Tx SCTP CSO")
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2273
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Akihiko Odaki <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 83ddb3d)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <[email protected]>
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./configure --target-list=arm-softmmu,aarch64-softmmu,aarch64-linux-user --disable-werror --disable-docs
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