From 2075afc09d0c27df4498ea68eddcfb33f3d2c30a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: dnartz Date: Sun, 12 Nov 2017 18:12:29 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] Fix typo. valdators -> validators --- papers/censorship_rejection/censorship_rejection.tex | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/papers/censorship_rejection/censorship_rejection.tex b/papers/censorship_rejection/censorship_rejection.tex index 162a04c9..09881332 100644 --- a/papers/censorship_rejection/censorship_rejection.tex +++ b/papers/censorship_rejection/censorship_rejection.tex @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ \section{Unforgiving Rejection} \section{Incentives in the Uncoordinated Majority Model} -There are two ways to analyze the incentives of automated censorship rejection. The first is to look at automated rejection \textit{between miners only}, and explore its game-theoretic properties in a model where all actors have minority hashpower. The second is to assume that the attacker has a great majority of all valdators (and we will assume that they are proof of stake validators, with some specific incentive rules), and try to prove that any harmful attack on the network will, in expectation, cost the attacker a substantial amount of money. +There are two ways to analyze the incentives of automated censorship rejection. The first is to look at automated rejection \textit{between miners only}, and explore its game-theoretic properties in a model where all actors have minority hashpower. The second is to assume that the attacker has a great majority of all validators (and we will assume that they are proof of stake validators, with some specific incentive rules), and try to prove that any harmful attack on the network will, in expectation, cost the attacker a substantial amount of money. Pure forgiving rejection can be viewed as a Nakamoto blockchain where some blocks are, from the point of view of some miners, explicitly prevented from being the head, but a block on top of such a block can always be created which allows that chain to be the head again.