- Learning more about how protocol should handle MEV
- Although many DEXes market themselves as a decentralized exchange, they're mostly custodial at best. You can learn more about my notes here
- Flash Boys 1.0: PRI in Person 2015 - Day 2 - Keynote: Brad Katsuyama
- Flash Boys 2.0: Frontrunning, Transaction Reordering, and Consensus Instability in Decentralized Exchanges
- Unity is Strength: A Formalization of Cross-Domain Maximal Extractable Value
- MEV Dashboards by Flashbots
- On the Instability of Bitcoin Without the Block Reward
- MEV and Me - Charlie Noyes
- Ethereum is Dark Forest
- Escaping the Dark Forest
- Flashbots main Github Respository
This is a series of notes related to MEV from various resources from YouTube, Crypto Twitter, to blogs and various sources online. The goal is to do an in-dept research on the subject and build a Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) for MEV.
- It is problem for both PoS and PoW.
- Block proposer extractable value
- Inefficient market -> Arbitrage
- Frontrunning other people transactions
- Backrunning
- It is a challenge because UX -> User get less favorable price
- Existencial challenge -> there's economic of scale
- There's a benefit of centralization
- Economic of scale
- Have a lot of money - hire goo engineer
- Ecosystem's best reply
- Firewall the centralization
- One party create bundles / bundles of transactions (Searchers)
- Block proposer (miners/validators)
- Economic design philosophy, sometimes you can't get rid of centralization
- This is a problem an now being solved by the ecosystem.