From 8a53ab4cc21c25bd614fcaeb74cf0f721b22cc58 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: protectionsmachine
 <72879786+protectionsmachine@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2024 13:54:58 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 1/4] Update latest docs

---
 ...l-process-id-or-lock-file-created.asciidoc |  169 +++
 ...ess-of-stored-browser-credentials.asciidoc |  123 ++
 ...ess-to-a-sensitive-ldap-attribute.asciidoc |  132 ++
 ...-keychain-credentials-directories.asciidoc |  129 ++
 ...covery-command-via-system-account.asciidoc |  141 ++
 ...e-8-11-11-adfind-command-activity.asciidoc |  169 +++
 ...insdholder-sdprop-exclusion-added.asciidoc |  157 +++
 ...-8-11-11-adobe-hijack-persistence.asciidoc |  155 +++
 ...on-followed-by-network-connection.asciidoc |  119 ++
 ...ion-with-administrator-privileges.asciidoc |  108 ++
 ...tempt-to-clear-kernel-ring-buffer.asciidoc |  114 ++
 ...-11-attempt-to-disable-gatekeeper.asciidoc |  100 ++
 ...t-to-disable-iptables-or-firewall.asciidoc |  117 ++
 ...attempt-to-disable-syslog-service.asciidoc |  123 ++
 ...ttempt-to-enable-the-root-account.asciidoc |  103 ++
 ...tempt-to-install-root-certificate.asciidoc |  105 ++
 ...-mount-smb-share-via-command-line.asciidoc |  110 ++
 ...-remove-file-quarantine-attribute.asciidoc |  109 ++
 ...ndpoint-security-kernel-extension.asciidoc |  113 ++
 ...authorization-plugin-modification.asciidoc |  106 ++
 ...e-8-11-11-aws-route-table-created.asciidoc |   72 ++
 ...s-route-table-modified-or-deleted.asciidoc |   76 ++
 ...base32-encoding-decoding-activity.asciidoc |  123 ++
 ...uted-from-shared-memory-directory.asciidoc |  106 ++
 ...11-11-bpf-filter-applied-using-tc.asciidoc |  108 ++
 ...11-11-bypass-uac-via-event-viewer.asciidoc |  170 +++
 ...ule-8-11-11-chkconfig-service-add.asciidoc |  202 +++
 ...-clearing-windows-console-history.asciidoc |  149 +++
 ...11-11-clearing-windows-event-logs.asciidoc |  143 ++
 ...icy-modification-through-registry.asciidoc |  146 +++
 ...-execution-via-solarwinds-process.asciidoc |  110 ++
 ...command-prompt-network-connection.asciidoc |  152 +++
 ...ell-activity-started-via-rundll32.asciidoc |  113 ++
 ...-component-object-model-hijacking.asciidoc |  269 ++++
 ...wned-by-suspicious-parent-process.asciidoc |  170 +++
 ...ed-free-ssl-certificate-providers.asciidoc |   89 ++
 ...on-to-external-network-via-telnet.asciidoc |  123 ++
 ...on-to-internal-network-via-telnet.asciidoc |  123 ++
 ...el-process-with-unusual-arguments.asciidoc |   99 ++
 ...on-of-a-hidden-local-user-account.asciidoc |  130 ++
 ...s-and-directories-via-commandline.asciidoc |  128 ++
 ...-of-hidden-launch-agent-or-daemon.asciidoc |  123 ++
 ...idden-login-item-via-apple-script.asciidoc |  118 ++
 ...tion-of-hidden-shared-object-file.asciidoc |  125 ++
 ...new-gpo-scheduled-task-or-service.asciidoc |   98 ++
 ...f-domain-backup-dpapi-private-key.asciidoc |   99 ++
 ...-modification-of-root-certificate.asciidoc |  176 +++
 ...isition-via-registry-hive-dumping.asciidoc |  148 +++
 ...ged-by-previously-unknown-process.asciidoc |  226 ++++
 ...ting-backup-catalogs-with-wbadmin.asciidoc |  140 ++
 ...creation-on-a-sensitive-directory.asciidoc |   73 ++
 ...ecurity-logs-using-built-in-tools.asciidoc |  155 +++
 ...-windows-firewall-rules-via-netsh.asciidoc |  132 ++
 ...control-via-registry-modification.asciidoc |  182 +++
 ...-security-settings-via-powershell.asciidoc |  156 +++
 ...s-over-https-enabled-via-registry.asciidoc |   91 ++
 ...ount-hashes-via-built-in-commands.asciidoc |  100 ++
 ...hain-content-via-security-command.asciidoc |  102 ++
 ...-rule-8-11-11-dynamic-linker-copy.asciidoc |  192 +++
 ...-elastic-agent-service-terminated.asciidoc |   98 ++
 ...nd-rules-creation-or-modification.asciidoc |  104 ++
 ...-host-network-discovery-via-netsh.asciidoc |  130 ++
 ...executable-stored-in-the-registry.asciidoc |   69 +
 ...ncrypting-files-with-winrar-or-7z.asciidoc |  153 +++
 ...tion-command-spawned-via-wmiprvse.asciidoc |  137 ++
 ...eration-of-administrator-accounts.asciidoc |  162 +++
 ...-11-enumeration-of-kernel-modules.asciidoc |  104 ++
 ...rivileged-local-groups-membership.asciidoc |  198 +++
 ...s-or-groups-via-built-in-commands.asciidoc |  126 ++
 ...e-8-11-11-esxi-discovery-via-find.asciidoc |  104 ++
 ...e-8-11-11-esxi-discovery-via-grep.asciidoc |  106 ++
 ...-timestomping-using-touch-command.asciidoc |  109 ++
 ...nge-mailbox-export-via-powershell.asciidoc |  137 ++
 ...creation-with-multiple-extensions.asciidoc |   98 ++
 ...le-masquerading-as-kernel-process.asciidoc |  110 ++
 ...om-unusual-directory-command-line.asciidoc |  267 ++++
 ...ecution-of-com-object-via-xwizard.asciidoc |   92 ++
 ...n-or-modified-by-microsoft-office.asciidoc |  148 +++
 ...written-or-modified-by-pdf-reader.asciidoc |  151 +++
 ...-of-persistent-suspicious-program.asciidoc |   85 ++
 ...tron-child-process-node-js-module.asciidoc |  109 ++
 ...ution-via-local-sxs-shared-module.asciidoc |   90 ++
 ...ssql-xp-cmdshell-stored-procedure.asciidoc |  155 +++
 ...execution-via-tsclient-mountpoint.asciidoc |   84 ++
 ...xplicit-credentials-via-scripting.asciidoc |  118 ++
 ...g-exchange-mailbox-via-powershell.asciidoc |  160 +++
 ...-deletion-in-suspicious-directory.asciidoc |  109 ++
 ...-11-11-file-creation-time-changed.asciidoc |   84 ++
 ...e-8-11-11-file-deletion-via-shred.asciidoc |  104 ++
 ...-11-file-made-immutable-by-chattr.asciidoc |  127 ++
 ...odification-in-writable-directory.asciidoc |  114 ++
 ...r-listener-established-via-netcat.asciidoc |  192 +++
 ...ync-plugin-registered-and-enabled.asciidoc |  112 ++
 ...value-accessed-in-secrets-manager.asciidoc |  132 ++
 ...-first-time-seen-removable-device.asciidoc |   80 ++
 ...me-seen-account-performing-dcsync.asciidoc |  164 +++
 ...er-mode-dumps-enabled-system-wide.asciidoc |   86 ++
 ...licy-abuse-for-privilege-addition.asciidoc |  138 ++
 ...ry-via-microsoft-gpresult-utility.asciidoc |  112 ++
 ...ocess-arguments-in-an-rdp-session.asciidoc |   92 ++
 ...high-mean-of-rdp-session-duration.asciidoc |   92 ++
 ...ocess-and-or-service-terminations.asciidoc |  114 ++
 ...gh-number-of-process-terminations.asciidoc |  149 +++
 ...-variance-in-rdp-session-duration.asciidoc |   92 ++
 ...s-via-windows-subsystem-for-linux.asciidoc |   70 +
 ...-rule-8-11-11-hosts-file-modified.asciidoc |  149 +++
 ...le-8-11-11-hping-process-activity.asciidoc |  120 ++
 ...8-11-11-iis-http-logging-disabled.asciidoc |  134 ++
 ...-file-execution-options-injection.asciidoc |   90 ++
 ...windows-update-auto-update-client.asciidoc |  151 +++
 ...g-dcom-lateral-movement-via-mshta.asciidoc |   87 ++
 ...ng-dcom-lateral-movement-with-mmc.asciidoc |   87 ++
 ...hellbrowserwindow-or-shellwindows.asciidoc |   75 ++
 ...execution-via-powershell-remoting.asciidoc |   85 ++
 ...-execution-via-winrm-remote-shell.asciidoc |   70 +
 ...allation-of-custom-shim-databases.asciidoc |   73 ++
 ...tion-of-security-support-provider.asciidoc |   98 ++
 ...rocess-making-network-connections.asciidoc |   70 +
 ...ctive-logon-by-an-unusual-process.asciidoc |   98 ++
 ...ractive-terminal-spawned-via-perl.asciidoc |  116 ++
 ...ctive-terminal-spawned-via-python.asciidoc |  108 ++
 ...rberos-cached-credentials-dumping.asciidoc |  109 ++
 ...-authentication-disabled-for-user.asciidoc |  157 +++
 ...eros-traffic-from-unusual-process.asciidoc |  188 +++
 ...rnel-driver-load-by-non-root-user.asciidoc |  111 ++
 ...load-or-unload-via-kexec-detected.asciidoc |  132 ++
 ...-11-kernel-module-load-via-insmod.asciidoc |  196 +++
 ...ule-8-11-11-kernel-module-removal.asciidoc |  118 ++
 ...ssword-retrieval-via-command-line.asciidoc |  116 ++
 ...-rule-8-11-11-kirbi-file-creation.asciidoc |   65 +
 ...-11-11-krbtgt-delegation-backdoor.asciidoc |   96 ++
 ...teral-movement-via-startup-folder.asciidoc |  102 ++
 ...odification-and-immediate-loading.asciidoc |  106 ++
 ...odification-and-immediate-loading.asciidoc |  100 ++
 ...rule-8-11-11-linux-group-creation.asciidoc |  157 +++
 ...ux-init-pid-1-secret-dump-via-gdb.asciidoc |  106 ++
 ...-11-linux-process-hooking-via-gdb.asciidoc |   74 ++
 ...shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s.asciidoc |  245 ++++
 ...11-11-linux-user-account-creation.asciidoc |  156 +++
 ...ux-user-added-to-privileged-group.asciidoc |  174 +++
 ...count-tokenfilter-policy-disabled.asciidoc |   88 ++
 ...-11-local-scheduled-task-creation.asciidoc |   82 ++
 ...-11-11-lsass-memory-dump-creation.asciidoc |  172 +++
 ...1-lsass-memory-dump-handle-access.asciidoc |  192 +++
 ...uest-predicted-to-be-a-dga-domain.asciidoc |  132 ++
 ...with-a-high-dga-probability-score.asciidoc |  132 ++
 ...redicted-to-be-malicious-activity.asciidoc |  134 ++
 ...-high-malicious-probability-score.asciidoc |  135 ++
 ...using-a-known-sunburst-dns-domain.asciidoc |  132 ++
 ...ller-package-spawns-network-event.asciidoc |  119 ++
 ...masquerading-space-after-filename.asciidoc |   84 ++
 ...engine-started-an-unusual-process.asciidoc |   92 ++
 ...ngine-started-by-a-script-process.asciidoc |  103 ++
 ...ngine-started-by-a-system-process.asciidoc |   89 ++
 ...-started-by-an-office-application.asciidoc |  163 +++
 ...ld-engine-using-an-alternate-name.asciidoc |  158 +++
 ...-um-spawning-suspicious-processes.asciidoc |  103 ++
 ...erver-um-writing-suspicious-files.asciidoc |  119 ++
 ...ker-spawning-suspicious-processes.asciidoc |  102 ++
 ...iis-connection-strings-decryption.asciidoc |   83 ++
 ...s-service-account-password-dumped.asciidoc |   82 ++
 ...rosoft-windows-defender-tampering.asciidoc |  171 +++
 ...mimikatz-memssp-log-file-detected.asciidoc |  138 ++
 ...cation-of-amsienable-registry-key.asciidoc |  162 +++
 ...odification-of-boot-configuration.asciidoc |  139 ++
 ...amic-linker-preload-shared-object.asciidoc |  122 ++
 ...nvironment-variable-via-launchctl.asciidoc |  115 ++
 ...-modification-of-openssh-binaries.asciidoc |  227 ++++
 ...ari-settings-via-defaults-command.asciidoc |  112 ++
 ...on-of-the-mspkiaccountcredentials.asciidoc |   90 ++
 ...tion-of-wdigest-security-provider.asciidoc |  152 +++
 ...ng-hidden-or-webdav-remote-shares.asciidoc |  118 ++
 ...o-security-registry-modifications.asciidoc |  162 +++
 ...sbuild-making-network-connections.asciidoc |  140 ++
 ...-mshta-making-network-connections.asciidoc |   72 ++
 ...failure-followed-by-logon-success.asciidoc |  168 +++
 ...lure-from-the-same-source-address.asciidoc |  168 +++
 ...ltiple-vault-web-credentials-read.asciidoc |   97 ++
 ...ebuilt-rule-8-11-11-my-first-rule.asciidoc |   61 +
 ...espace-manipulation-using-unshare.asciidoc |  121 ++
 ...t-listener-established-via-rlwrap.asciidoc |  105 ++
 ...network-activity-detected-via-cat.asciidoc |  185 +++
 ...ork-activity-detected-via-kworker.asciidoc |  124 ++
 ...rom-binary-with-rwx-memory-region.asciidoc |  103 ++
 ...connection-via-compiled-html-file.asciidoc |  164 +++
 ...1-11-network-connection-via-msxsl.asciidoc |   71 +
 ...-via-recently-compiled-executable.asciidoc |  114 ++
 ...nnection-via-registration-utility.asciidoc |  158 +++
 ...work-connection-via-signed-binary.asciidoc |  142 ++
 ...on-provider-registry-modification.asciidoc |  161 +++
 ...oweddeviceid-added-via-powershell.asciidoc |   99 ++
 ...ted-by-previously-unknown-process.asciidoc |  220 ++++
 ...8-11-11-new-systemd-timer-created.asciidoc |  187 +++
 ...le-8-11-11-nping-process-activity.asciidoc |  120 ++
 ...-ntds-or-sam-database-file-copied.asciidoc |  168 +++
 ...sessionpipe-registry-modification.asciidoc |   83 ++
 ...uled-task-activity-via-powershell.asciidoc |   79 ++
 ...11-11-peripheral-device-discovery.asciidoc |  124 ++
 ...tence-via-bits-job-notify-cmdline.asciidoc |   89 ++
 ...ectoryservice-plugin-modification.asciidoc |   99 ++
 ...-via-docker-shortcut-modification.asciidoc |  100 ++
 ...sistence-via-folder-action-script.asciidoc |  111 ++
 ...tence-via-hidden-run-key-detected.asciidoc |  116 ++
 ...ript-or-desktop-file-modification.asciidoc |  214 +++
 ...sistence-via-login-or-logout-hook.asciidoc |  107 ++
 ...tence-via-microsoft-office-addins.asciidoc |   91 ++
 ...istence-via-microsoft-outlook-vba.asciidoc |   82 ++
 ...ersistence-via-powershell-profile.asciidoc |  155 +++
 ...stence-via-scheduled-job-creation.asciidoc |   96 ++
 ...ycontroller-scheduled-task-hijack.asciidoc |  112 ++
 ...pdate-orchestrator-service-hijack.asciidoc |  180 +++
 ...stence-via-wmi-event-subscription.asciidoc |   96 ++
 ...ia-wmi-standard-registry-provider.asciidoc |  201 +++
 ...-scripts-in-the-startup-directory.asciidoc |  173 +++
 ...-11-port-forwarding-rule-addition.asciidoc |  148 +++
 ...tial-admin-group-account-addition.asciidoc |  103 ++
 ...n-interface-bypass-via-powershell.asciidoc |  167 +++
 ...-application-shimming-via-sdbinst.asciidoc |   96 ++
 ...l-buffer-overflow-attack-detected.asciidoc |   86 ++
 ...chroot-container-escape-via-mount.asciidoc |  116 ++
 ...ial-code-execution-via-postgresql.asciidoc |  106 ++
 ...and-control-via-internet-explorer.asciidoc |   88 ++
 ...okies-theft-via-browser-debugging.asciidoc |   95 ++
 ...tial-credential-access-via-dcsync.asciidoc |  183 +++
 ...cess-via-duplicatehandle-in-lsass.asciidoc |   86 ++
 ...tial-access-via-lsass-memory-dump.asciidoc |  101 ++
 ...cess-via-renamed-com-services-dll.asciidoc |  174 +++
 ...ess-via-trusted-developer-utility.asciidoc |  158 +++
 ...tial-access-via-windows-utilities.asciidoc |  181 +++
 ...-curl-cve-2023-38545-exploitation.asciidoc |  120 ++
 ...ty-to-an-unusual-destination-port.asciidoc |   91 ++
 ...activity-to-an-unusual-ip-address.asciidoc |   91 ++
 ...n-activity-to-an-unusual-iso-code.asciidoc |   91 ++
 ...ion-activity-to-an-unusual-region.asciidoc |   91 ++
 ...tential-defense-evasion-via-proot.asciidoc |  101 ++
 ...le-8-11-11-potential-dga-activity.asciidoc |  122 ++
 ...1-potential-disabling-of-apparmor.asciidoc |  109 ++
 ...11-potential-disabling-of-selinux.asciidoc |  122 ++
 ...ft-antimalware-service-executable.asciidoc |   95 ++
 ...ng-via-trusted-microsoft-programs.asciidoc |   96 ++
 ...ential-evasion-via-filter-manager.asciidoc |  148 +++
 ...on-via-windows-filtering-platform.asciidoc |  134 ++
 ...al-linux-ssh-brute-force-detected.asciidoc |  158 +++
 ...idden-local-user-account-creation.asciidoc |  103 ++
 ...-hidden-process-via-mount-hidepid.asciidoc |  105 ++
 ...al-linux-ssh-brute-force-detected.asciidoc |  154 +++
 ...invoke-mimikatz-powershell-script.asciidoc |  163 +++
 ...ntial-kerberos-attack-via-bifrost.asciidoc |  116 ++
 ...ux-backdoor-user-account-creation.asciidoc |  168 +++
 ...ntial-dumping-via-proc-filesystem.asciidoc |  112 ++
 ...x-credential-dumping-via-unshadow.asciidoc |  105 ++
 ...otential-linux-hack-tool-launched.asciidoc |  114 ++
 ...ocal-account-brute-force-detected.asciidoc |  106 ++
 ...ransomware-note-creation-detected.asciidoc |  111 ++
 ...-tunneling-and-or-port-forwarding.asciidoc |  196 +++
 ...tential-local-ntlm-relay-via-http.asciidoc |   88 ++
 ...e-creation-via-psscapturesnapshot.asciidoc |   86 ++
 ...emory-dump-via-psscapturesnapshot.asciidoc |   81 ++
 ...al-macos-ssh-brute-force-detected.asciidoc |   98 ++
 ...tential-meterpreter-reverse-shell.asciidoc |  131 ++
 ...-microsoft-office-sandbox-evasion.asciidoc |  100 ++
 ...ication-of-accessibility-binaries.asciidoc |  194 +++
 ...l-network-scan-executed-from-host.asciidoc |  103 ++
 ...fa-bombing-via-push-notifications.asciidoc |  129 ++
 ...openssh-backdoor-logging-activity.asciidoc |  161 +++
 ...rsistence-through-init-d-detected.asciidoc |  189 +++
 ...rough-motd-file-creation-detected.asciidoc |  181 +++
 ...ence-through-run-control-detected.asciidoc |  184 +++
 ...via-atom-init-script-modification.asciidoc |  100 ++
 ...ential-persistence-via-login-hook.asciidoc |  118 ++
 ...al-persistence-via-periodic-tasks.asciidoc |  105 ++
 ...ce-via-time-provider-modification.asciidoc |  156 +++
 ...hacktool-script-by-function-names.asciidoc |  356 +++++
 ...-bypass-via-localhost-secure-copy.asciidoc |  111 ++
 ...rol-bypass-via-tccdb-modification.asciidoc |  106 ++
 ...on-through-writable-docker-socket.asciidoc |  104 ++
 ...on-via-container-misconfiguration.asciidoc |  115 ++
 ...lege-escalation-via-cve-2023-4911.asciidoc |  114 ++
 ...lege-escalation-via-enlightenment.asciidoc |  104 ++
 ...alation-via-installerfiletakeover.asciidoc |  164 +++
 ...alation-via-linux-dac-permissions.asciidoc |   99 ++
 ...rivilege-escalation-via-overlayfs.asciidoc |  104 ++
 ...l-privilege-escalation-via-pkexec.asciidoc |  114 ++
 ...-escalation-via-python-cap-setuid.asciidoc |  109 ++
 ...-via-recently-compiled-executable.asciidoc |  105 ++
 ...tion-via-uid-int-max-bug-detected.asciidoc |  103 ++
 ...ation-via-samaccountname-spoofing.asciidoc |  102 ++
 ...-process-injection-via-powershell.asciidoc |  177 +++
 ...tocol-tunneling-via-chisel-client.asciidoc |  184 +++
 ...tocol-tunneling-via-chisel-server.asciidoc |  184 +++
 ...-protocol-tunneling-via-earthworm.asciidoc |  199 +++
 ...-pspy-process-monitoring-detected.asciidoc |  103 ++
 ...ote-code-execution-via-web-server.asciidoc |  201 +++
 ...te-credential-access-via-registry.asciidoc |  146 +++
 ...remote-desktop-shadowing-activity.asciidoc |  100 ++
 ...remote-desktop-tunneling-detected.asciidoc |  145 +++
 ...verse-shell-activity-via-terminal.asciidoc |  135 ++
 ...erse-shell-via-background-process.asciidoc |  112 ++
 ...potential-reverse-shell-via-child.asciidoc |  119 ++
 ...-potential-reverse-shell-via-java.asciidoc |  127 ++
 ...verse-shell-via-suspicious-binary.asciidoc |  127 ++
 ...hell-via-suspicious-child-process.asciidoc |  135 ++
 ...1-potential-reverse-shell-via-udp.asciidoc |  139 ++
 ...e-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell.asciidoc |  117 ++
 ...file-deletion-via-sdelete-utility.asciidoc |  124 ++
 ...ow-credentials-added-to-ad-object.asciidoc |  144 +++
 ...e-read-via-command-line-utilities.asciidoc |  116 ++
 ...l-via-wildcard-injection-detected.asciidoc |  114 ++
 ...ential-ssh-it-ssh-worm-downloaded.asciidoc |  120 ++
 ...x-ftp-brute-force-attack-detected.asciidoc |  125 ++
 ...x-rdp-brute-force-attack-detected.asciidoc |  123 ++
 ...successful-ssh-brute-force-attack.asciidoc |  163 +++
 ...potential-sudo-hijacking-detected.asciidoc |  114 ++
 ...ege-escalation-via-cve-2019-14287.asciidoc |  105 ++
 ...anipulation-via-process-injection.asciidoc |  114 ++
 ...icious-debugfs-root-device-access.asciidoc |  106 ++
 ...s-via-wildcard-injection-detected.asciidoc |  117 ++
 ...-upgrade-of-non-interactive-shell.asciidoc |  106 ++
 ...l-veeam-credential-access-command.asciidoc |   88 ++
 ...indows-error-manager-masquerading.asciidoc |  139 ++
 ...rocess-started-via-tmux-or-screen.asciidoc |   65 +
 ...owershell-invoke-ninjacopy-script.asciidoc |  150 +++
 ...1-powershell-kerberos-ticket-dump.asciidoc |  174 +++
 ...owershell-kerberos-ticket-request.asciidoc |  163 +++
 ...1-11-powershell-keylogging-script.asciidoc |  172 +++
 ...ershell-mailbox-collection-script.asciidoc |  174 +++
 ...-11-11-powershell-minidump-script.asciidoc |  157 +++
 ...11-11-powershell-psreflect-script.asciidoc |  192 +++
 ...ell-script-block-logging-disabled.asciidoc |  135 ++
 ...ncryption-decryption-capabilities.asciidoc |  129 ++
 ...-token-impersonation-capabilities.asciidoc |  207 +++
 ...am-credential-access-capabilities.asciidoc |  110 ++
 ...webcam-video-capture-capabilities.asciidoc |  111 ++
 ...wershell-share-enumeration-script.asciidoc |  174 +++
 ...ery-related-windows-api-functions.asciidoc |  211 +++
 ...us-payload-encoded-and-compressed.asciidoc |  187 +++
 ...t-with-audio-capture-capabilities.asciidoc |  167 +++
 ...-clipboard-retrieval-capabilities.asciidoc |  178 +++
 ...ript-with-screenshot-capabilities.asciidoc |  156 +++
 ...cap-chown-cap-fowner-capabilities.asciidoc |  111 ++
 ...ia-cap-setuid-setgid-capabilities.asciidoc |  111 ++
 ...escalation-via-gdb-cap-sys-ptrace.asciidoc |  110 ++
 ...tion-via-named-pipe-impersonation.asciidoc |  149 +++
 ...ia-rogue-named-pipe-impersonation.asciidoc |   83 ++
 ...ia-root-crontab-file-modification.asciidoc |  104 ++
 ...n-via-windir-environment-variable.asciidoc |   77 ++
 ...11-privileged-account-brute-force.asciidoc |  153 +++
 ...s-activity-via-compiled-html-file.asciidoc |  168 +++
 ...11-process-capability-enumeration.asciidoc |  101 ++
 ...cess-creation-via-secondary-logon.asciidoc |   95 ++
 ...ecution-from-an-unusual-directory.asciidoc |  196 +++
 ...ion-by-the-microsoft-build-engine.asciidoc |   77 ++
 ...-started-from-process-id-pid-file.asciidoc |  124 ++
 ...gram-files-directory-masquerading.asciidoc |   92 ++
 ...pt-for-credentials-with-osascript.asciidoc |  104 ++
 ...rule-8-11-11-proxychains-activity.asciidoc |  146 +++
 ...8-11-11-psexec-network-connection.asciidoc |  142 ++
 ...re-smb-connection-to-the-internet.asciidoc |  100 ++
 ...-8-11-11-rdp-enabled-via-registry.asciidoc |  151 +++
 ...istry-persistence-via-appcert-dll.asciidoc |  100 ++
 ...istry-persistence-via-appinit-dll.asciidoc |  175 +++
 ...bled-in-windows-firewall-by-netsh.asciidoc |  136 ++
 ...emote-file-copy-to-a-hidden-share.asciidoc |   87 ++
 ...1-remote-file-copy-via-teamviewer.asciidoc |  154 +++
 ...oad-via-desktopimgdownldr-utility.asciidoc |  155 +++
 ...remote-file-download-via-mpcmdrun.asciidoc |  154 +++
 ...e-download-via-script-interpreter.asciidoc |  144 +++
 ...11-remote-scheduled-task-creation.asciidoc |  126 ++
 ...n-enabled-via-systemsetup-command.asciidoc |  107 ++
 ...remotely-started-services-via-rpc.asciidoc |  169 +++
 ...enamed-autoit-scripts-interpreter.asciidoc |  148 +++
 ...-executed-with-short-program-name.asciidoc |  132 ++
 ...connection-via-gdb-cap-sys-ptrace.asciidoc |  132 ++
 ...-task-created-by-a-windows-script.asciidoc |  101 ++
 ...d-task-execution-at-scale-via-gpo.asciidoc |  177 +++
 ...cheduled-tasks-at-command-enabled.asciidoc |  101 ++
 ...le-modified-by-unexpected-process.asciidoc |  140 ++
 ...or-saved-credentials-via-vaultcmd.asciidoc |   92 ++
 ...urity-software-discovery-via-grep.asciidoc |  172 +++
 ...e-enabled-by-a-suspicious-process.asciidoc |  108 ++
 ...11-11-sensitive-files-compression.asciidoc |  167 +++
 ...ationprivilege-assigned-to-a-user.asciidoc |  150 +++
 ...-service-command-lateral-movement.asciidoc |   91 ++
 ...tcap-setuid-setgid-capability-set.asciidoc |  181 +++
 ...ged-by-previously-unknown-process.asciidoc |  185 +++
 ...ell-execution-via-apple-scripting.asciidoc |  101 ++
 ...oxy-execution-via-ms-work-folders.asciidoc |  129 ++
 ...8-11-11-sip-provider-modification.asciidoc |   76 ++
 ...-rule-8-11-11-smtp-on-port-26-tcp.asciidoc |   67 +
 ...reupdate-preferences-modification.asciidoc |  104 ++
 ...s-disabling-services-via-registry.asciidoc |  113 ++
 ...to-an-external-device-via-airdrop.asciidoc |   90 ++
 ...-bytes-sent-to-an-external-device.asciidoc |   90 ++
 ...connections-made-from-a-source-ip.asciidoc |   92 ++
 ...nections-made-to-a-destination-ip.asciidoc |   92 ++
 ...er-of-processes-in-an-rdp-session.asciidoc |   92 ++
 ...11-spike-in-remote-file-transfers.asciidoc |   91 ++
 ...authorized-keys-file-modification.asciidoc |  103 ++
 ...ript-added-to-group-policy-object.asciidoc |  170 +++
 ...rsistence-by-a-suspicious-process.asciidoc |  178 +++
 ...ing-activity-with-high-confidence.asciidoc |   96 ++
 ...el-detected-c2-beaconing-activity.asciidoc |   97 ++
 ...r-application-script-modification.asciidoc |  111 ++
 ...sudo-command-enumeration-detected.asciidoc |   99 ++
 ...1-suid-sguid-enumeration-detected.asciidoc |  119 ++
 ...us-antimalware-scan-interface-dll.asciidoc |  142 ++
 ...ous-apt-package-manager-execution.asciidoc |  129 ++
 ...ackage-manager-network-connection.asciidoc |  118 ++
 ...ous-automator-workflows-execution.asciidoc |  100 ++
 ...-suspicious-browser-child-process.asciidoc |  126 ++
 ...icious-calendar-file-modification.asciidoc |  112 ++
 ...obe-acrobat-reader-update-service.asciidoc |  110 ++
 ...-suspicious-cmd-execution-via-wmi.asciidoc |   88 ++
 ...racted-or-decompressed-via-funzip.asciidoc |  120 ++
 ...-crontab-creation-or-modification.asciidoc |  104 ++
 ...ta-encryption-via-openssl-utility.asciidoc |  105 ++
 ...rsistence-or-privilege-escalation.asciidoc |  191 +++
 ...s-dynamic-linker-discovery-via-od.asciidoc |  108 ++
 ...11-suspicious-emond-child-process.asciidoc |  126 ++
 ...-endpoint-security-parent-process.asciidoc |  107 ++
 ...s-execution-from-a-mounted-device.asciidoc |  112 ++
 ...tion-via-microsoft-office-add-ins.asciidoc |  123 ++
 ...ious-execution-via-scheduled-task.asciidoc |  129 ++
 ...suspicious-explorer-child-process.asciidoc |  128 ++
 ...us-file-changes-activity-detected.asciidoc |  108 ++
 ...e-creation-in-etc-for-persistence.asciidoc |  245 ++++
 ...picious-file-creation-via-kworker.asciidoc |  192 +++
 ...s-hidden-child-process-of-launchd.asciidoc |  118 ++
 ...-11-suspicious-html-file-creation.asciidoc |  113 ++
 ...-load-taskschd-dll-from-ms-office.asciidoc |  182 +++
 ...icious-imagepath-service-creation.asciidoc |   81 ++
 ...-11-suspicious-java-child-process.asciidoc |  136 ++
 ...-suspicious-kworker-uid-elevation.asciidoc |  113 ++
 ...ious-lsass-access-via-malseclogon.asciidoc |   87 ++
 ...1-suspicious-lsass-process-access.asciidoc |  103 ++
 ...ous-macos-ms-office-child-process.asciidoc |  136 ++
 ...ious-managed-code-hosting-process.asciidoc |   72 ++
 ...soft-diagnostics-wizard-execution.asciidoc |   92 ++
 ...ous-mining-process-creation-event.asciidoc |  103 ++
 ...suspicious-module-loaded-by-lsass.asciidoc |  147 +++
 ...uspicious-ms-office-child-process.asciidoc |  192 +++
 ...spicious-ms-outlook-child-process.asciidoc |  179 +++
 ...1-suspicious-net-code-compilation.asciidoc |   97 ++
 ...ous-net-reflection-via-powershell.asciidoc |  201 +++
 ...-by-previously-unknown-executable.asciidoc |  241 ++++
 ...etwork-connection-via-sudo-binary.asciidoc |  112 ++
 ...us-network-connection-via-systemd.asciidoc |  122 ++
 ...spicious-passwd-file-event-action.asciidoc |  130 ++
 ...spicious-pdf-reader-child-process.asciidoc |  166 +++
 ...able-encoded-in-powershell-script.asciidoc |  177 +++
 ...cious-print-spooler-file-deletion.asciidoc |   83 ++
 ...print-spooler-point-and-print-dll.asciidoc |   80 ++
 ...us-print-spooler-spl-file-created.asciidoc |  169 +++
 ...-service-executable-file-creation.asciidoc |   94 ++
 ...11-suspicious-proc-maps-discovery.asciidoc |  102 ++
 ...ess-access-via-direct-system-call.asciidoc |  174 +++
 ...icious-process-creation-calltrace.asciidoc |  123 ++
 ...ion-via-renamed-psexec-executable.asciidoc |  142 ++
 ...rocess-spawned-from-motd-detected.asciidoc |  201 +++
 ...picious-rdp-activex-client-loaded.asciidoc |  105 ++
 ...stry-access-via-sebackupprivilege.asciidoc |  168 +++
 ...suspicious-renaming-of-esxi-files.asciidoc |  104 ++
 ...-renaming-of-esxi-index-html-file.asciidoc |  103 ++
 ...uspicious-script-object-execution.asciidoc |   87 ++
 ...spicious-solarwinds-child-process.asciidoc |  109 ++
 ...startup-shell-folder-modification.asciidoc |  165 +++
 ...-suspicious-symbolic-link-created.asciidoc |  129 ++
 ...-by-previously-unknown-executable.asciidoc |  110 ++
 ...cious-termination-of-esxi-process.asciidoc |  101 ++
 ...-utility-launched-via-proxychains.asciidoc |  187 +++
 ...suspicious-werfault-child-process.asciidoc |  115 ++
 ...1-11-suspicious-which-enumeration.asciidoc |   68 +
 ...process-cluster-spawned-by-a-host.asciidoc |  124 ++
 ...uster-spawned-by-a-parent-process.asciidoc |  126 ++
 ...process-cluster-spawned-by-a-user.asciidoc |  126 ++
 ...us-wmi-event-subscription-created.asciidoc |   68 +
 ...ous-wmi-image-load-from-ms-office.asciidoc |   83 ++
 ...picious-wmic-xsl-script-execution.asciidoc |   77 ++
 ...-11-suspicious-zoom-child-process.asciidoc |  144 +++
 ...rule-8-11-11-svchost-spawning-cmd.asciidoc |  143 ++
 ...bolic-link-to-shadow-copy-created.asciidoc |  172 +++
 ...-or-moved-to-suspicious-directory.asciidoc |  130 ++
 ...-8-11-11-system-log-file-deletion.asciidoc |  141 ++
 ...systemkey-access-via-command-line.asciidoc |  103 ++
 ...-11-11-tainted-kernel-module-load.asciidoc |  105 ++
 ...ing-of-shell-command-line-history.asciidoc |   94 ++
 ...-via-mounted-apfs-snapshot-access.asciidoc |  100 ++
 ...es-deleted-via-unexpected-process.asciidoc |  164 +++
 ...threat-intel-hash-indicator-match.asciidoc |  137 ++
 ...-intel-ip-address-indicator-match.asciidoc |  139 ++
 ...-threat-intel-url-indicator-match.asciidoc |  142 ++
 ...-windows-registry-indicator-match.asciidoc |  132 ++
 ...-timestomping-using-touch-command.asciidoc |   84 ++
 ...nternet-explorer-add-on-installer.asciidoc |  115 ++
 ...eged-ifileoperation-com-interface.asciidoc |  110 ++
 ...ia-windows-directory-masquerading.asciidoc |  174 +++
 ...ademanager-elevated-com-interface.asciidoc |  113 ++
 ...diskcleanup-scheduled-task-hijack.asciidoc |  112 ++
 ...icmluautil-elevated-com-interface.asciidoc |  111 ++
 ...a-windows-firewall-snap-in-hijack.asciidoc |  177 +++
 ...rom-previously-unknown-executable.asciidoc |  121 ++
 ...ommon-registry-persistence-change.asciidoc |  142 ++
 ...ocess-of-macos-screensaver-engine.asciidoc |  116 ++
 ...-of-binary-with-rwx-memory-region.asciidoc |   89 ++
 ...-loading-from-a-suspicious-folder.asciidoc |  167 +++
 ...ess-from-a-system-virtual-process.asciidoc |   80 ++
 ...-unusual-child-process-of-dns-exe.asciidoc |  136 ++
 ...usual-child-processes-of-rundll32.asciidoc |  144 +++
 ...tion-by-a-system-critical-process.asciidoc |  162 +++
 ...le-creation-alternate-data-stream.asciidoc |  212 +++
 ...sual-file-modification-by-dns-exe.asciidoc |  100 ++
 ...vity-from-a-windows-system-binary.asciidoc |  203 +++
 ...al-network-connection-via-dllhost.asciidoc |   73 ++
 ...l-network-connection-via-rundll32.asciidoc |  136 ++
 ...unusual-parent-child-relationship.asciidoc |  179 +++
 ...nusual-parent-process-for-cmd-exe.asciidoc |  104 ++
 ...persistence-via-services-registry.asciidoc |   96 ++
 ...usual-print-spooler-child-process.asciidoc |   93 ++
 ...cution-path-alternate-data-stream.asciidoc |   83 ++
 ...nusual-process-network-connection.asciidoc |  129 ++
 ...unusual-process-spawned-by-a-host.asciidoc |  126 ++
 ...ocess-spawned-by-a-parent-process.asciidoc |  126 ++
 ...unusual-process-spawned-by-a-user.asciidoc |  126 ++
 ...riting-data-to-an-external-device.asciidoc |   90 ++
 ...-11-unusual-remote-file-directory.asciidoc |   91 ++
 ...-11-unusual-remote-file-extension.asciidoc |   91 ++
 ...-8-11-11-unusual-remote-file-size.asciidoc |   91 ++
 ...t-child-process-childless-service.asciidoc |  120 ++
 ...al-time-or-day-for-an-rdp-session.asciidoc |   92 ++
 ...user-privilege-enumeration-via-id.asciidoc |   99 ++
 ...ule-8-11-11-user-account-creation.asciidoc |  135 ++
 ...-account-exposed-to-kerberoasting.asciidoc |  154 +++
 ...11-user-added-to-privileged-group.asciidoc |  131 ++
 ...library-loaded-by-unusual-process.asciidoc |   81 ++
 ...l-machine-fingerprinting-via-grep.asciidoc |   80 ++
 ...11-virtual-machine-fingerprinting.asciidoc |  121 ++
 ...rivate-network-connection-attempt.asciidoc |  105 ++
 ...y-deleted-or-resized-via-vssadmin.asciidoc |  154 +++
 ...adow-copy-deletion-via-powershell.asciidoc |  173 +++
 ...ume-shadow-copy-deletion-via-wmic.asciidoc |  163 +++
 ...ess-child-of-common-web-processes.asciidoc |  190 +++
 ...11-webproxy-settings-modification.asciidoc |  103 ++
 ...-11-webserver-access-logs-deleted.asciidoc |   84 ++
 ...e-8-11-11-whoami-process-activity.asciidoc |  152 +++
 ...erability-cve-2020-0601-curveball.asciidoc |   65 +
 ...isabled-via-registry-modification.asciidoc |  170 +++
 ...r-exclusions-added-via-powershell.asciidoc |  167 +++
 ...-firewall-disabled-via-powershell.asciidoc |  151 +++
 ...ndows-script-executing-powershell.asciidoc |  170 +++
 ...rpreter-executing-process-via-wmi.asciidoc |  113 ++
 ...e-installed-via-an-unusual-client.asciidoc |   95 ++
 ...-for-linux-distribution-installed.asciidoc |  126 ++
 ...-11-wmi-incoming-lateral-movement.asciidoc |   91 ++
 ...-11-zoom-meeting-with-no-passcode.asciidoc |   70 +
 .../prebuilt-rules-8-11-11-appendix.asciidoc  |  561 ++++++++
 .../prebuilt-rules-8-11-11-summary.asciidoc   | 1122 ++++++++++++++++
 ...ebuilt-rules-downloadable-updates.asciidoc |    5 +
 .../prebuilt-rules-reference.asciidoc         | 1148 +++++++++--------
 .../prebuilt-rules/rule-desc-index.asciidoc   |   10 +-
 ...l-process-id-or-lock-file-created.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...ess-of-stored-browser-credentials.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...ess-to-a-sensitive-ldap-attribute.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...-keychain-credentials-directories.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...covery-command-via-system-account.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...roup-discovery-via-built-in-tools.asciidoc |    2 +-
 .../account-password-reset-remotely.asciidoc  |    2 +-
 .../adfind-command-activity.asciidoc          |    6 +-
 ...insdholder-sdprop-exclusion-added.asciidoc |    6 +-
 .../adobe-hijack-persistence.asciidoc         |    8 +-
 ...on-followed-by-network-connection.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...ion-with-administrator-privileges.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...tempt-to-clear-kernel-ring-buffer.asciidoc |   10 +-
 .../attempt-to-disable-gatekeeper.asciidoc    |    6 +-
 ...t-to-disable-iptables-or-firewall.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...attempt-to-disable-syslog-service.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...ttempt-to-enable-the-root-account.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...tempt-to-install-root-certificate.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...-mount-smb-share-via-command-line.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...-remove-file-quarantine-attribute.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...ndpoint-security-kernel-extension.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...orce-a-microsoft-365-user-account.asciidoc |    2 +-
 ...authorization-plugin-modification.asciidoc |    6 +-
 .../aws-route-table-created.asciidoc          |    4 +-
 ...s-route-table-modified-or-deleted.asciidoc |    4 +-
 ...base32-encoding-decoding-activity.asciidoc |   10 +-
 ...uted-from-shared-memory-directory.asciidoc |    6 +-
 .../bpf-filter-applied-using-tc.asciidoc      |    4 +-
 .../bypass-uac-via-event-viewer.asciidoc      |    6 +-
 .../cap-sys-admin-assigned-to-binary.asciidoc |    9 +-
 .../chkconfig-service-add.asciidoc            |    6 +-
 .../clearing-windows-console-history.asciidoc |    6 +-
 .../clearing-windows-event-logs.asciidoc      |    6 +-
 ...icy-modification-through-registry.asciidoc |   11 +-
 ...-execution-via-solarwinds-process.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...command-prompt-network-connection.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...ell-activity-started-via-rundll32.asciidoc |    8 +-
 .../component-object-model-hijacking.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...wned-by-suspicious-parent-process.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...ed-free-ssl-certificate-providers.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...on-to-external-network-via-telnet.asciidoc |    4 +-
 ...on-to-internal-network-via-telnet.asciidoc |    4 +-
 ...el-process-with-unusual-arguments.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...on-of-a-hidden-local-user-account.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...s-and-directories-via-commandline.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...-of-hidden-launch-agent-or-daemon.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...idden-login-item-via-apple-script.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...tion-of-hidden-shared-object-file.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...new-gpo-scheduled-task-or-service.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...f-domain-backup-dpapi-private-key.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...-modification-of-root-certificate.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...isition-via-registry-hive-dumping.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...ged-by-previously-unknown-process.asciidoc |    4 +-
 ...ting-backup-catalogs-with-wbadmin.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...creation-on-a-sensitive-directory.asciidoc |   73 ++
 ...ecurity-logs-using-built-in-tools.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...-windows-firewall-rules-via-netsh.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...control-via-registry-modification.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...-security-settings-via-powershell.asciidoc |   14 +-
 .../discovery-of-domain-groups.asciidoc       |    4 +-
 ...s-over-https-enabled-via-registry.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...ount-hashes-via-built-in-commands.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...hain-content-via-security-command.asciidoc |    6 +-
 .../rule-details/dynamic-linker-copy.asciidoc |    6 +-
 .../elastic-agent-service-terminated.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...nd-rules-creation-or-modification.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...-host-network-discovery-via-netsh.asciidoc |    7 +-
 ...executable-stored-in-the-registry.asciidoc |    4 +-
 ...ncrypting-files-with-winrar-or-7z.asciidoc |   11 +-
 ...tion-command-spawned-via-wmiprvse.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...eration-of-administrator-accounts.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...ration-of-kernel-modules-via-proc.asciidoc |    3 +
 .../enumeration-of-kernel-modules.asciidoc    |    6 +-
 ...rivileged-local-groups-membership.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...s-or-groups-via-built-in-commands.asciidoc |    6 +-
 .../esxi-discovery-via-find.asciidoc          |    8 +-
 .../esxi-discovery-via-grep.asciidoc          |    8 +-
 ...-timestomping-using-touch-command.asciidoc |   10 +-
 ...nge-mailbox-export-via-powershell.asciidoc |    4 +-
 ...creation-with-multiple-extensions.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...le-masquerading-as-kernel-process.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...om-unusual-directory-command-line.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...ecution-of-com-object-via-xwizard.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...n-or-modified-by-microsoft-office.asciidoc |    4 +-
 ...written-or-modified-by-pdf-reader.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...-of-persistent-suspicious-program.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...tron-child-process-node-js-module.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...ution-via-local-sxs-shared-module.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...ssql-xp-cmdshell-stored-procedure.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...execution-via-tsclient-mountpoint.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...xplicit-credentials-via-scripting.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...g-exchange-mailbox-via-powershell.asciidoc |    7 +-
 ...ed-or-archived-into-common-format.asciidoc |    3 +-
 ...-deletion-in-suspicious-directory.asciidoc |    8 +-
 .../file-creation-time-changed.asciidoc       |    5 +-
 .../file-deletion-via-shred.asciidoc          |    6 +-
 .../file-made-immutable-by-chattr.asciidoc    |    6 +-
 ...odification-in-writable-directory.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...r-listener-established-via-netcat.asciidoc |    7 +-
 ...ync-plugin-registered-and-enabled.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...value-accessed-in-secrets-manager.asciidoc |   15 +-
 .../first-time-seen-removable-device.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...me-seen-account-performing-dcsync.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...er-mode-dumps-enabled-system-wide.asciidoc |   13 +-
 ...licy-abuse-for-privilege-addition.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...ry-via-microsoft-gpresult-utility.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...s-and-directories-via-hidden-flag.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...ocess-arguments-in-an-rdp-session.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...high-mean-of-rdp-session-duration.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...ocess-and-or-service-terminations.asciidoc |    3 +-
 ...gh-number-of-process-terminations.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...-variance-in-rdp-session-duration.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...s-via-windows-subsystem-for-linux.asciidoc |    5 +-
 .../rule-details/hosts-file-modified.asciidoc |    7 +-
 .../hping-process-activity.asciidoc           |    8 +-
 .../iis-http-logging-disabled.asciidoc        |    6 +-
 ...-file-execution-options-injection.asciidoc |    4 +-
 ...windows-update-auto-update-client.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...g-dcom-lateral-movement-via-mshta.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...ng-dcom-lateral-movement-with-mmc.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...hellbrowserwindow-or-shellwindows.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...execution-via-powershell-remoting.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...-execution-via-winrm-remote-shell.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...allation-of-custom-shim-databases.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...tion-of-security-support-provider.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...rocess-making-network-connections.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...ctive-logon-by-an-unusual-process.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...ractive-terminal-spawned-via-perl.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...ctive-terminal-spawned-via-python.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...rberos-cached-credentials-dumping.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...-authentication-disabled-for-user.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...eros-traffic-from-unusual-process.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...rnel-driver-load-by-non-root-user.asciidoc |    7 +-
 ...load-or-unload-via-kexec-detected.asciidoc |   15 +-
 .../kernel-module-load-via-insmod.asciidoc    |    4 +-
 .../kernel-module-removal.asciidoc            |    8 +-
 ...ssword-retrieval-via-command-line.asciidoc |    6 +-
 .../rule-details/kirbi-file-creation.asciidoc |    4 +-
 .../krbtgt-delegation-backdoor.asciidoc       |    5 +-
 ...teral-movement-via-startup-folder.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...odification-and-immediate-loading.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...odification-and-immediate-loading.asciidoc |    6 +-
 .../linux-group-creation.asciidoc             |    7 +-
 ...ux-init-pid-1-secret-dump-via-gdb.asciidoc |    8 +-
 .../linux-process-hooking-via-gdb.asciidoc    |    6 +-
 ...shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s.asciidoc |    7 +-
 ...inux-system-information-discovery.asciidoc |    2 +-
 .../linux-user-account-creation.asciidoc      |    7 +-
 ...ux-user-added-to-privileged-group.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...count-tokenfilter-policy-disabled.asciidoc |    5 +-
 .../local-scheduled-task-creation.asciidoc    |    7 +-
 .../lsass-memory-dump-creation.asciidoc       |    9 +-
 .../lsass-memory-dump-handle-access.asciidoc  |    6 +-
 ...uest-predicted-to-be-a-dga-domain.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...with-a-high-dga-probability-score.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...redicted-to-be-malicious-activity.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...-high-malicious-probability-score.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...using-a-known-sunburst-dns-domain.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...ller-package-spawns-network-event.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...masquerading-space-after-filename.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...change-anti-phish-policy-deletion.asciidoc |    2 +-
 ...ange-anti-phish-rule-modification.asciidoc |    2 +-
 ...im-signing-configuration-disabled.asciidoc |    2 +-
 ...t-365-exchange-dlp-policy-removed.asciidoc |    2 +-
 ...ge-malware-filter-policy-deletion.asciidoc |    2 +-
 ...-malware-filter-rule-modification.asciidoc |    2 +-
 ...-management-group-role-assignment.asciidoc |    2 +-
 ...nge-safe-attachment-rule-disabled.asciidoc |    2 +-
 ...xchange-safe-link-policy-disabled.asciidoc |    2 +-
 ...-exchange-transport-rule-creation.asciidoc |    2 +-
 ...hange-transport-rule-modification.asciidoc |    2 +-
 ...lobal-administrator-role-assigned.asciidoc |    2 +-
 ...365-inbox-forwarding-rule-created.asciidoc |    2 +-
 ...365-potential-ransomware-activity.asciidoc |    2 +-
 ...m-application-interaction-allowed.asciidoc |    2 +-
 ...365-teams-external-access-enabled.asciidoc |    2 +-
 ...ft-365-teams-guest-access-enabled.asciidoc |    2 +-
 ...5-unusual-volume-of-file-deletion.asciidoc |    2 +-
 ...ser-restricted-from-sending-email.asciidoc |    2 +-
 ...engine-started-an-unusual-process.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...ngine-started-by-a-script-process.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...ngine-started-by-a-system-process.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...-started-by-an-office-application.asciidoc |    7 +-
 ...ld-engine-using-an-alternate-name.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...-um-spawning-suspicious-processes.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...erver-um-writing-suspicious-files.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...ge-transport-agent-install-script.asciidoc |    7 +-
 ...ker-spawning-suspicious-processes.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...iis-connection-strings-decryption.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...s-service-account-password-dumped.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...rosoft-windows-defender-tampering.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...mimikatz-memssp-log-file-detected.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...cation-of-amsienable-registry-key.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...odification-of-boot-configuration.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...amic-linker-preload-shared-object.asciidoc |   10 +-
 ...nvironment-variable-via-launchctl.asciidoc |    6 +-
 .../modification-of-openssh-binaries.asciidoc |    4 +-
 ...ari-settings-via-defaults-command.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...on-of-the-mspkiaccountcredentials.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...tion-of-wdigest-security-provider.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...ng-hidden-or-webdav-remote-shares.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...o-security-registry-modifications.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...sbuild-making-network-connections.asciidoc |    5 +-
 .../mshta-making-network-connections.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...failure-followed-by-logon-success.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...lure-from-the-same-source-address.asciidoc |   10 +-
 ...ltiple-vault-web-credentials-read.asciidoc |    5 +-
 .../rule-details/my-first-rule.asciidoc       |   12 +-
 ...espace-manipulation-using-unshare.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...t-listener-established-via-rlwrap.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...network-activity-detected-via-cat.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...ork-activity-detected-via-kworker.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...rom-binary-with-rwx-memory-region.asciidoc |  103 ++
 .../network-connection-via-certutil.asciidoc  |    5 +-
 ...connection-via-compiled-html-file.asciidoc |    5 +-
 .../network-connection-via-msxsl.asciidoc     |    5 +-
 ...-via-recently-compiled-executable.asciidoc |   10 +-
 ...nnection-via-registration-utility.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...work-connection-via-signed-binary.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...on-provider-registry-modification.asciidoc |    4 +-
 ...k-traffic-capture-via-cap-net-raw.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...oweddeviceid-added-via-powershell.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...new-or-modified-federation-domain.asciidoc |    2 +-
 ...ted-by-previously-unknown-process.asciidoc |    6 +-
 .../new-systemd-timer-created.asciidoc        |    7 +-
 .../nping-process-activity.asciidoc           |    8 +-
 .../ntds-or-sam-database-file-copied.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...sessionpipe-registry-modification.asciidoc |    4 +-
 ...orted-by-user-as-malware-or-phish.asciidoc |    2 +-
 ...ssive-single-sign-on-logon-errors.asciidoc |    2 +-
 ...spicious-mailbox-right-delegation.asciidoc |    2 +-
 ...o365-mailbox-audit-logging-bypass.asciidoc |    2 +-
 .../onedrive-malware-file-upload.asciidoc     |    2 +-
 ...uled-task-activity-via-powershell.asciidoc |    9 +-
 .../peripheral-device-discovery.asciidoc      |    9 +-
 ...tence-via-bits-job-notify-cmdline.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...ectoryservice-plugin-modification.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...-via-docker-shortcut-modification.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...sistence-via-folder-action-script.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...tence-via-hidden-run-key-detected.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...ript-or-desktop-file-modification.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...sistence-via-login-or-logout-hook.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...tence-via-microsoft-office-addins.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...istence-via-microsoft-outlook-vba.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...ersistence-via-powershell-profile.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...stence-via-scheduled-job-creation.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...ycontroller-scheduled-task-hijack.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...pdate-orchestrator-service-hijack.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...stence-via-wmi-event-subscription.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...ia-wmi-standard-registry-provider.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...-scripts-in-the-startup-directory.asciidoc |   16 +-
 .../port-forwarding-rule-addition.asciidoc    |    8 +-
 ...-via-azure-registered-application.asciidoc |    2 +-
 ...tial-admin-group-account-addition.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...n-interface-bypass-via-powershell.asciidoc |    4 +-
 ...-application-shimming-via-sdbinst.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...l-buffer-overflow-attack-detected.asciidoc |    7 +-
 ...chroot-container-escape-via-mount.asciidoc |   11 +-
 ...ial-code-execution-via-postgresql.asciidoc |   10 +-
 ...and-control-via-internet-explorer.asciidoc |    4 +-
 ...okies-theft-via-browser-debugging.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...tial-credential-access-via-dcsync.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...cess-via-duplicatehandle-in-lsass.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...tial-access-via-lsass-memory-dump.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...cess-via-renamed-com-services-dll.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...ess-via-trusted-developer-utility.asciidoc |    7 +-
 ...tial-access-via-windows-utilities.asciidoc |   24 +-
 ...-curl-cve-2023-38545-exploitation.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...ty-to-an-unusual-destination-port.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...activity-to-an-unusual-ip-address.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...n-activity-to-an-unusual-iso-code.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...ion-activity-to-an-unusual-region.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...tential-defense-evasion-via-proot.asciidoc |    9 +-
 .../potential-dga-activity.asciidoc           |    6 +-
 .../potential-disabling-of-apparmor.asciidoc  |   10 +-
 .../potential-disabling-of-selinux.asciidoc   |   10 +-
 ...ft-antimalware-service-executable.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...ng-via-trusted-microsoft-programs.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...ential-evasion-via-filter-manager.asciidoc |    3 +-
 ...on-via-windows-filtering-platform.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...al-linux-ssh-brute-force-detected.asciidoc |    7 +-
 ...idden-local-user-account-creation.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...-hidden-process-via-mount-hidepid.asciidoc |   10 +-
 ...al-linux-ssh-brute-force-detected.asciidoc |    7 +-
 ...invoke-mimikatz-powershell-script.asciidoc |   10 +-
 ...ntial-kerberos-attack-via-bifrost.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...ux-backdoor-user-account-creation.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...ntial-dumping-via-proc-filesystem.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...x-credential-dumping-via-unshadow.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...otential-linux-hack-tool-launched.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...ocal-account-brute-force-detected.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...ransomware-note-creation-detected.asciidoc |    4 +-
 ...otential-linux-ssh-x11-forwarding.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...-tunneling-and-or-port-forwarding.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...tential-local-ntlm-relay-via-http.asciidoc |    3 +-
 ...e-creation-via-psscapturesnapshot.asciidoc |    7 +-
 ...emory-dump-via-psscapturesnapshot.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...al-macos-ssh-brute-force-detected.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...potential-memory-seeking-activity.asciidoc |    4 +-
 ...tential-meterpreter-reverse-shell.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...-microsoft-office-sandbox-evasion.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...ication-of-accessibility-binaries.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...l-network-scan-executed-from-host.asciidoc |    4 +-
 ...andard-port-http-https-connection.asciidoc |   11 +-
 ...fa-bombing-via-push-notifications.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...openssh-backdoor-logging-activity.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...ng-of-microsoft-365-user-accounts.asciidoc |    2 +-
 ...rsistence-through-init-d-detected.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...rough-motd-file-creation-detected.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...ence-through-run-control-detected.asciidoc |    7 +-
 ...via-atom-init-script-modification.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...ential-persistence-via-login-hook.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...al-persistence-via-periodic-tasks.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...ce-via-time-provider-modification.asciidoc |    4 +-
 ...hacktool-script-by-function-names.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...-bypass-via-localhost-secure-copy.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...rol-bypass-via-tccdb-modification.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...on-through-writable-docker-socket.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...on-via-container-misconfiguration.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...lege-escalation-via-cve-2023-4911.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...lege-escalation-via-enlightenment.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...alation-via-installerfiletakeover.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...alation-via-linux-dac-permissions.asciidoc |   15 +-
 ...rivilege-escalation-via-overlayfs.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...l-privilege-escalation-via-pkexec.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...-escalation-via-python-cap-setuid.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...-via-recently-compiled-executable.asciidoc |   10 +-
 ...tion-via-uid-int-max-bug-detected.asciidoc |   10 +-
 ...ation-via-samaccountname-spoofing.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...-process-injection-via-powershell.asciidoc |   10 +-
 ...tocol-tunneling-via-chisel-client.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...tocol-tunneling-via-chisel-server.asciidoc |   10 +-
 ...-protocol-tunneling-via-earthworm.asciidoc |    7 +-
 ...-pspy-process-monitoring-detected.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...ote-code-execution-via-web-server.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...te-credential-access-via-registry.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...remote-desktop-shadowing-activity.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...remote-desktop-tunneling-detected.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...verse-shell-activity-via-terminal.asciidoc |    7 +-
 ...erse-shell-via-background-process.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...potential-reverse-shell-via-child.asciidoc |    7 +-
 .../potential-reverse-shell-via-java.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...verse-shell-via-suspicious-binary.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...hell-via-suspicious-child-process.asciidoc |    6 +-
 .../potential-reverse-shell-via-udp.asciidoc  |   34 +-
 .../potential-reverse-shell.asciidoc          |    6 +-
 ...file-deletion-via-sdelete-utility.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...ow-credentials-added-to-ad-object.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...e-read-via-command-line-utilities.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...l-via-wildcard-injection-detected.asciidoc |   10 +-
 ...ential-ssh-it-ssh-worm-downloaded.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...x-ftp-brute-force-attack-detected.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...x-rdp-brute-force-attack-detected.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...successful-ssh-brute-force-attack.asciidoc |    7 +-
 ...potential-sudo-hijacking-detected.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...ege-escalation-via-cve-2019-14287.asciidoc |   15 +-
 ...anipulation-via-process-injection.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...cious-clipboard-activity-detected.asciidoc |   10 +-
 ...icious-debugfs-root-device-access.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...s-via-wildcard-injection-detected.asciidoc |   13 +-
 ...-upgrade-of-non-interactive-shell.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...l-veeam-credential-access-command.asciidoc |   88 ++
 ...indows-error-manager-masquerading.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...rocess-started-via-tmux-or-screen.asciidoc |    4 +-
 ...owershell-invoke-ninjacopy-script.asciidoc |    4 +-
 .../powershell-kerberos-ticket-dump.asciidoc  |    7 +-
 ...owershell-kerberos-ticket-request.asciidoc |   10 +-
 .../powershell-keylogging-script.asciidoc     |   10 +-
 ...ershell-mailbox-collection-script.asciidoc |   10 +-
 .../powershell-minidump-script.asciidoc       |   10 +-
 .../powershell-psreflect-script.asciidoc      |   10 +-
 ...ell-script-block-logging-disabled.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...-archive-compression-capabilities.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...cript-with-discovery-capabilities.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...ncryption-decryption-capabilities.asciidoc |    4 +-
 ...cript-with-log-clear-capabilities.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...ord-policy-discovery-capabilities.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...-execution-capabilities-via-winrm.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...-token-impersonation-capabilities.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...am-credential-access-capabilities.asciidoc |  110 ++
 ...webcam-video-capture-capabilities.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...wershell-share-enumeration-script.asciidoc |   10 +-
 ...ery-related-windows-api-functions.asciidoc |   10 +-
 ...us-payload-encoded-and-compressed.asciidoc |   10 +-
 ...t-with-audio-capture-capabilities.asciidoc |   10 +-
 ...-clipboard-retrieval-capabilities.asciidoc |   10 +-
 ...ript-with-screenshot-capabilities.asciidoc |   10 +-
 ...cap-chown-cap-fowner-capabilities.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...ia-cap-setuid-setgid-capabilities.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...escalation-via-gdb-cap-sys-ptrace.asciidoc |   11 +-
 ...tion-via-named-pipe-impersonation.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...ia-rogue-named-pipe-impersonation.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...ia-root-crontab-file-modification.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...n-via-windir-environment-variable.asciidoc |    6 +-
 .../privileged-account-brute-force.asciidoc   |   10 +-
 ...s-activity-via-compiled-html-file.asciidoc |    7 +-
 .../process-capability-enumeration.asciidoc   |    7 +-
 ...cess-creation-via-secondary-logon.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...scovery-via-built-in-applications.asciidoc |    2 +-
 ...ecution-from-an-unusual-directory.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...ion-by-the-microsoft-build-engine.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...-started-from-process-id-pid-file.asciidoc |    5 +-
 .../processes-with-trailing-spaces.asciidoc   |   10 +-
 ...gram-files-directory-masquerading.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...pt-for-credentials-with-osascript.asciidoc |    6 +-
 .../proxychains-activity.asciidoc             |    6 +-
 .../psexec-network-connection.asciidoc        |    5 +-
 ...script-execution-via-command-line.asciidoc |    3 +
 ...re-smb-connection-to-the-internet.asciidoc |    5 +-
 .../rdp-enabled-via-registry.asciidoc         |    9 +-
 ...istry-persistence-via-appcert-dll.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...istry-persistence-via-appinit-dll.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...bled-in-windows-firewall-by-netsh.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...emote-file-copy-to-a-hidden-share.asciidoc |    6 +-
 .../remote-file-copy-via-teamviewer.asciidoc  |    8 +-
 ...oad-via-desktopimgdownldr-utility.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...remote-file-download-via-mpcmdrun.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...e-download-via-script-interpreter.asciidoc |    5 +-
 .../remote-scheduled-task-creation.asciidoc   |    5 +-
 ...n-enabled-via-systemsetup-command.asciidoc |    6 +-
 .../remote-system-discovery-commands.asciidoc |    7 +-
 ...remotely-started-services-via-rpc.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...enamed-autoit-scripts-interpreter.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...-executed-with-short-program-name.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...connection-via-gdb-cap-sys-ptrace.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...-task-created-by-a-windows-script.asciidoc |    7 +-
 ...d-task-execution-at-scale-via-gpo.asciidoc |   10 +-
 ...cheduled-tasks-at-command-enabled.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...le-modified-by-unexpected-process.asciidoc |    7 +-
 ...or-saved-credentials-via-vaultcmd.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...ity-software-discovery-using-wmic.asciidoc |    7 +-
 ...urity-software-discovery-via-grep.asciidoc |    7 +-
 ...e-enabled-by-a-suspicious-process.asciidoc |    7 +-
 .../sensitive-files-compression.asciidoc      |    6 +-
 ...ationprivilege-assigned-to-a-user.asciidoc |    6 +-
 .../service-command-lateral-movement.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...tcap-setuid-setgid-capability-set.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...ged-by-previously-unknown-process.asciidoc |   14 +-
 .../sharepoint-malware-file-upload.asciidoc   |    2 +-
 ...ell-execution-via-apple-scripting.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...oxy-execution-via-ms-work-folders.asciidoc |    6 +-
 .../sip-provider-modification.asciidoc        |    4 +-
 .../rule-details/smtp-on-port-26-tcp.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...reupdate-preferences-modification.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...s-disabling-services-via-registry.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...to-an-external-device-via-airdrop.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...-bytes-sent-to-an-external-device.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...connections-made-from-a-source-ip.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...nections-made-to-a-destination-ip.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...er-of-processes-in-an-rdp-session.asciidoc |    6 +-
 .../spike-in-remote-file-transfers.asciidoc   |    6 +-
 ...authorized-keys-file-modification.asciidoc |    7 +-
 ...ript-added-to-group-policy-object.asciidoc |   10 +-
 ...rsistence-by-a-suspicious-process.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...ing-activity-with-high-confidence.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...el-detected-c2-beaconing-activity.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...r-application-script-modification.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...sudo-command-enumeration-detected.asciidoc |    4 +-
 .../suid-sguid-enumeration-detected.asciidoc  |    6 +-
 ...us-antimalware-scan-interface-dll.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...ous-apt-package-manager-execution.asciidoc |   11 +-
 ...ackage-manager-network-connection.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...ous-automator-workflows-execution.asciidoc |    6 +-
 .../suspicious-browser-child-process.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...icious-calendar-file-modification.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...obe-acrobat-reader-update-service.asciidoc |    6 +-
 .../suspicious-cmd-execution-via-wmi.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...racted-or-decompressed-via-funzip.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...-crontab-creation-or-modification.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...ta-encryption-via-openssl-utility.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...rsistence-or-privilege-escalation.asciidoc |   13 +-
 ...s-dynamic-linker-discovery-via-od.asciidoc |    9 +-
 .../suspicious-emond-child-process.asciidoc   |    6 +-
 ...-endpoint-security-parent-process.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...s-execution-from-a-mounted-device.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...tion-via-microsoft-office-add-ins.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...ious-execution-via-scheduled-task.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...suspicious-explorer-child-process.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...us-file-changes-activity-detected.asciidoc |    4 +-
 ...e-creation-in-etc-for-persistence.asciidoc |    4 +-
 ...picious-file-creation-via-kworker.asciidoc |    1 -
 ...s-hidden-child-process-of-launchd.asciidoc |    6 +-
 .../suspicious-html-file-creation.asciidoc    |    5 +-
 ...-load-taskschd-dll-from-ms-office.asciidoc |   10 +-
 ...icious-imagepath-service-creation.asciidoc |    4 +-
 .../suspicious-java-child-process.asciidoc    |   13 +-
 .../suspicious-kworker-uid-elevation.asciidoc |   12 +-
 ...ious-lsass-access-via-malseclogon.asciidoc |    9 +-
 .../suspicious-lsass-process-access.asciidoc  |   10 +-
 ...ous-macos-ms-office-child-process.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...ious-managed-code-hosting-process.asciidoc |    5 +-
 .../suspicious-memory-grep-activity.asciidoc  |    4 +-
 ...ft-365-mail-access-by-clientappid.asciidoc |    2 +-
 ...soft-diagnostics-wizard-execution.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...ous-mining-process-creation-event.asciidoc |    9 +-
 .../suspicious-modprobe-file-event.asciidoc   |    3 +
 ...suspicious-module-loaded-by-lsass.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...uspicious-ms-office-child-process.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...spicious-ms-outlook-child-process.asciidoc |    6 +-
 .../suspicious-net-code-compilation.asciidoc  |    6 +-
 ...ous-net-reflection-via-powershell.asciidoc |   10 +-
 ...-by-previously-unknown-executable.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...etwork-connection-via-sudo-binary.asciidoc |   13 +-
 ...us-network-connection-via-systemd.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...spicious-passwd-file-event-action.asciidoc |    7 +-
 ...spicious-pdf-reader-child-process.asciidoc |    7 +-
 ...able-encoded-in-powershell-script.asciidoc |   10 +-
 ...cious-print-spooler-file-deletion.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...print-spooler-point-and-print-dll.asciidoc |    4 +-
 ...us-print-spooler-spl-file-created.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...-service-executable-file-creation.asciidoc |    8 +-
 .../suspicious-proc-maps-discovery.asciidoc   |    9 +-
 ...oc-pseudo-file-system-enumeration.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...ess-access-via-direct-system-call.asciidoc |   10 +-
 ...icious-process-creation-calltrace.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...ion-via-renamed-psexec-executable.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...rocess-spawned-from-motd-detected.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...picious-rdp-activex-client-loaded.asciidoc |   10 +-
 ...stry-access-via-sebackupprivilege.asciidoc |   10 +-
 ...suspicious-renaming-of-esxi-files.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...-renaming-of-esxi-index-html-file.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...uspicious-script-object-execution.asciidoc |    3 +-
 ...spicious-solarwinds-child-process.asciidoc |    7 +-
 ...startup-shell-folder-modification.asciidoc |    6 +-
 .../suspicious-symbolic-link-created.asciidoc |   10 +-
 .../suspicious-sysctl-file-event.asciidoc     |    3 +
 ...-by-previously-unknown-executable.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...cious-termination-of-esxi-process.asciidoc |    4 +-
 ...-utility-launched-via-proxychains.asciidoc |   10 +-
 ...suspicious-werfault-child-process.asciidoc |    5 +-
 .../suspicious-which-enumeration.asciidoc     |    4 +-
 ...process-cluster-spawned-by-a-host.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...uster-spawned-by-a-parent-process.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...process-cluster-spawned-by-a-user.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...us-wmi-event-subscription-created.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...ous-wmi-image-load-from-ms-office.asciidoc |   10 +-
 ...picious-wmic-xsl-script-execution.asciidoc |    7 +-
 .../suspicious-zoom-child-process.asciidoc    |    3 +-
 .../svchost-spawning-cmd.asciidoc             |    6 +-
 ...bolic-link-to-shadow-copy-created.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...-or-moved-to-suspicious-directory.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...scovery-via-windows-command-shell.asciidoc |    7 +-
 .../system-log-file-deletion.asciidoc         |    6 +-
 ...tem-network-connections-discovery.asciidoc |    2 +-
 ...systemkey-access-via-command-line.asciidoc |    6 +-
 .../tainted-kernel-module-load.asciidoc       |    6 +-
 ...ing-of-shell-command-line-history.asciidoc |   94 ++
 ...-via-mounted-apfs-snapshot-access.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...es-deleted-via-unexpected-process.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...threat-intel-hash-indicator-match.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...-intel-ip-address-indicator-match.asciidoc |    6 +-
 .../threat-intel-url-indicator-match.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...-windows-registry-indicator-match.asciidoc |    6 +-
 .../timestomping-using-touch-command.asciidoc |    5 +-
 .../trap-signals-execution.asciidoc           |    2 +-
 ...nternet-explorer-add-on-installer.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...eged-ifileoperation-com-interface.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...ia-windows-directory-masquerading.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...ademanager-elevated-com-interface.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...diskcleanup-scheduled-task-hijack.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...icmluautil-elevated-com-interface.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...a-windows-firewall-snap-in-hijack.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...rom-previously-unknown-executable.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...ommon-registry-persistence-change.asciidoc |   10 +-
 ...ocess-of-macos-screensaver-engine.asciidoc |    7 +-
 .../unix-socket-connection.asciidoc           |    4 +-
 ...-of-binary-with-rwx-memory-region.asciidoc |   89 ++
 ...-loading-from-a-suspicious-folder.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...ess-from-a-system-virtual-process.asciidoc |    6 +-
 .../unusual-child-process-of-dns-exe.asciidoc |    7 +-
 ...usual-child-processes-of-rundll32.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...tion-by-a-system-critical-process.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...le-creation-alternate-data-stream.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...sual-file-modification-by-dns-exe.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...vity-from-a-windows-system-binary.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...al-network-connection-via-dllhost.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...l-network-connection-via-rundll32.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...unusual-parent-child-relationship.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...nusual-parent-process-for-cmd-exe.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...persistence-via-services-registry.asciidoc |    4 +-
 ...usual-print-spooler-child-process.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...cution-path-alternate-data-stream.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...nusual-process-network-connection.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...unusual-process-spawned-by-a-host.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...ocess-spawned-by-a-parent-process.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...unusual-process-spawned-by-a-user.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...riting-data-to-an-external-device.asciidoc |    6 +-
 .../unusual-remote-file-directory.asciidoc    |    6 +-
 .../unusual-remote-file-extension.asciidoc    |    6 +-
 .../unusual-remote-file-size.asciidoc         |    6 +-
 ...t-child-process-childless-service.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...al-time-or-day-for-an-rdp-session.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...user-privilege-enumeration-via-id.asciidoc |    8 +-
 .../user-account-creation.asciidoc            |    7 +-
 ...-account-exposed-to-kerberoasting.asciidoc |    6 +-
 .../user-added-to-privileged-group.asciidoc   |    6 +-
 ...library-loaded-by-unusual-process.asciidoc |   81 ++
 ...l-machine-fingerprinting-via-grep.asciidoc |    5 +-
 .../virtual-machine-fingerprinting.asciidoc   |    6 +-
 ...rivate-network-connection-attempt.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...y-deleted-or-resized-via-vssadmin.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...adow-copy-deletion-via-powershell.asciidoc |    5 +-
 ...ume-shadow-copy-deletion-via-wmic.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...ess-child-of-common-web-processes.asciidoc |    6 +-
 .../webproxy-settings-modification.asciidoc   |    6 +-
 .../webserver-access-logs-deleted.asciidoc    |    8 +-
 .../whoami-process-activity.asciidoc          |    6 +-
 ...erability-cve-2020-0601-curveball.asciidoc |    3 +-
 ...isabled-via-registry-modification.asciidoc |    8 +-
 ...r-exclusions-added-via-powershell.asciidoc |    6 +-
 ...-firewall-disabled-via-powershell.asciidoc |    8 +-
 .../windows-network-enumeration.asciidoc      |    7 +-
 ...ndows-script-executing-powershell.asciidoc |    9 +-
 ...rpreter-executing-process-via-wmi.asciidoc |    7 +-
 ...e-installed-via-an-unusual-client.asciidoc |    7 +-
 ...-for-linux-distribution-installed.asciidoc |    5 +-
 .../wmi-incoming-lateral-movement.asciidoc    |   24 +-
 ...access-on-active-directory-object.asciidoc |    6 +-
 .../zoom-meeting-with-no-passcode.asciidoc    |    5 +-
 docs/index.asciidoc                           |    2 +
 1179 files changed, 75836 insertions(+), 1932 deletions(-)
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 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-file-creation-alternate-data-stream.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-file-modification-by-dns-exe.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-network-activity-from-a-windows-system-binary.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-network-connection-via-dllhost.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-network-connection-via-rundll32.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-parent-child-relationship.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-parent-process-for-cmd-exe.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-persistence-via-services-registry.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-print-spooler-child-process.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-process-execution-path-alternate-data-stream.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-process-network-connection.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-process-spawned-by-a-host.asciidoc
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 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-process-spawned-by-a-user.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-process-writing-data-to-an-external-device.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-remote-file-directory.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-remote-file-extension.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-remote-file-size.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-service-host-child-process-childless-service.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-time-or-day-for-an-rdp-session.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-user-privilege-enumeration-via-id.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-user-account-creation.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-user-account-exposed-to-kerberoasting.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-user-added-to-privileged-group.asciidoc
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 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-virtual-machine-fingerprinting-via-grep.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-virtual-machine-fingerprinting.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-virtual-private-network-connection-attempt.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-volume-shadow-copy-deleted-or-resized-via-vssadmin.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-volume-shadow-copy-deletion-via-powershell.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-volume-shadow-copy-deletion-via-wmic.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-web-shell-detection-script-process-child-of-common-web-processes.asciidoc
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 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-webserver-access-logs-deleted.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-whoami-process-activity.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-cryptoapi-spoofing-vulnerability-cve-2020-0601-curveball.asciidoc
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 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-veeam-credential-access-command.asciidoc
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 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/tampering-of-shell-command-line-history.asciidoc
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 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/veeam-backup-library-loaded-by-unusual-process.asciidoc

diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-abnormal-process-id-or-lock-file-created.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-abnormal-process-id-or-lock-file-created.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9abf9a1a5a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-abnormal-process-id-or-lock-file-created.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-abnormal-process-id-or-lock-file-created]]
+=== Abnormal Process ID or Lock File Created
+
+Identifies the creation of a Process ID (PID), lock or reboot file created in temporary file storage paradigm (tmpfs) directory /var/run. On Linux, the PID files typically hold the process ID to track previous copies running and manage other tasks. Certain Linux malware use the /var/run directory for holding data, executables and other tasks, disguising itself or these files as legitimate PID files.
+
+*Rule type*: new_terms
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.sandflysecurity.com/blog/linux-file-masquerading-and-malicious-pids-sandfly-1-2-6-update/
+* https://twitter.com/GossiTheDog/status/1522964028284411907
+* https://exatrack.com/public/Tricephalic_Hellkeeper.pdf
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/a-peek-behind-the-bpfdoor
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Threat: BPFDoor
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+
+*Version*: 213
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Abnormal Process ID or Lock File Created*
+
+
+Linux applications may need to save their process identification number (PID) for various purposes: from signaling that a program is running to serving as a signal that a previous instance of an application didn't exit successfully. PID files contain its creator process PID in an integer value.
+
+Linux lock files are used to coordinate operations in files so that conflicts and race conditions are prevented.
+
+This rule identifies the creation of PID, lock, or reboot files in the /var/run/ directory. Attackers can masquerade malware, payloads, staged data for exfiltration, and more as legitimate PID files.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Retrieve the file and determine if it is malicious:
+    - Check the contents of the PID files. They should only contain integer strings.
+    - Check the file type of the lock and PID files to determine if they are executables. This is only observed in     malicious files.
+    - Check the size of the subject file. Legitimate PID files should be under 10 bytes.
+    - Check if the lock or PID file has high entropy. This typically indicates an encrypted payload.
+        - Analysts can use tools like `ent` to measure entropy.
+    - Examine the reputation of the SHA-256 hash in the PID file. Use a database like VirusTotal to identify additional pivots and artifacts for investigation.
+- Trace the file's creation to ensure it came from a legitimate or authorized process.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate any abnormal account behavior, such as command executions, file creations or modifications, and network connections.
+- Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process such as network connections, file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- False positives can appear if the PID file is legitimate and holding a process ID as intended. If the PID file is an executable or has a file size that's larger than 10 bytes, it should be ruled suspicious.
+- If this activity is expected and noisy in your environment, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of file name and process executable conditions.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+- Take actions to terminate processes and connections used by the attacker.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+host.os.type:linux and event.category:file and event.action:(creation or file_create_event) and
+user.id:0 and file.extension:(pid or lock or reboot) and file.path:(/var/run/* or /run/*) and (
+  (process.name : (
+    bash or dash or sh or tcsh or csh or zsh or ksh or fish or ash or touch or nano or vim or vi or editor or mv or cp)
+  ) or (
+  process.executable : (
+    ./* or /tmp/* or /var/tmp/* or /dev/shm/* or /var/run/* or /boot/* or /srv/* or /run/*
+  ))
+) and not process.name : (go or git or containerd* or snap-confine or cron or crond or sshd or unattended-upgrade or 
+vzctl or ifup or rpcbind or runc or gitlab-runner-helper or elastic-agent or metricbeat) and
+not file.name : (jem.*.pid)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Native API
+** ID: T1106
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-access-of-stored-browser-credentials.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-access-of-stored-browser-credentials.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7e4220d913
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-access-of-stored-browser-credentials.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-access-of-stored-browser-credentials]]
+=== Access of Stored Browser Credentials
+
+Identifies the execution of a process with arguments pointing to known browser files that store passwords and cookies. Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://securelist.com/calisto-trojan-for-macos/86543/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type in ("start", "process_started") and
+  process.args :
+    (
+      "/Users/*/Library/Application Support/Google/Chrome/Default/Login Data",
+      "/Users/*/Library/Application Support/Google/Chrome/Default/Cookies",
+      "/Users/*/Library/Application Support/Google/Chrome/Profile*/Cookies",
+      "/Users/*/Library/Cookies*",
+      "/Users/*/Library/Application Support/Firefox/Profiles/*.default/cookies.sqlite",
+      "/Users/*/Library/Application Support/Firefox/Profiles/*.default/key*.db",
+      "/Users/*/Library/Application Support/Firefox/Profiles/*.default/logins.json",
+      "Login Data",
+      "Cookies.binarycookies",
+      "key4.db",
+      "key3.db",
+      "logins.json",
+      "cookies.sqlite"
+    ) and 
+  not (process.name : "wordexp-helper" and process.parent.name : ("elastic-agent", "elastic-endpoint"))
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Steal Web Session Cookie
+** ID: T1539
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Credentials from Password Stores
+** ID: T1555
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Credentials from Web Browsers
+** ID: T1555.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-access-to-a-sensitive-ldap-attribute.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-access-to-a-sensitive-ldap-attribute.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..13f1449afb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-access-to-a-sensitive-ldap-attribute.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-access-to-a-sensitive-ldap-attribute]]
+=== Access to a Sensitive LDAP Attribute
+
+Identify access to sensitive Active Directory object attributes that contains credentials and decryption keys such as unixUserPassword, ms-PKI-AccountCredentials and msPKI-CredentialRoamingTokens.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-system.*
+* logs-windows.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt29-windows-credential-roaming
+* https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/11483.windows-credential-roaming.aspx
+* https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5136
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring
+* Data Source: Active Directory
+
+*Version*: 10
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The 'Audit Directory Service Access' logging policy must be configured for (Success, Failure).
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Policies >
+Windows Settings >
+Security Settings >
+Advanced Audit Policies Configuration >
+Audit Policies >
+DS Access >
+Audit Directory Service Access (Success,Failure)
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+any where event.action == "Directory Service Access" and event.code == "4662" and
+
+  not winlog.event_data.SubjectUserSid : "S-1-5-18" and
+
+  winlog.event_data.Properties : (
+   /* unixUserPassword */
+  "*612cb747-c0e8-4f92-9221-fdd5f15b550d*",
+
+  /* ms-PKI-AccountCredentials */
+  "*b8dfa744-31dc-4ef1-ac7c-84baf7ef9da7*",
+
+  /*  ms-PKI-DPAPIMasterKeys */
+  "*b3f93023-9239-4f7c-b99c-6745d87adbc2*",
+
+  /* msPKI-CredentialRoamingTokens */
+  "*b7ff5a38-0818-42b0-8110-d3d154c97f24*"
+  ) and
+
+  /*
+   Excluding noisy AccessMasks
+   0x0 undefined and 0x100 Control Access
+   https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4662
+   */
+  not winlog.event_data.AccessMask in ("0x0", "0x100")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Unsecured Credentials
+** ID: T1552
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Private Keys
+** ID: T1552.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Valid Accounts
+** ID: T1078
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Domain Accounts
+** ID: T1078.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-access-to-keychain-credentials-directories.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-access-to-keychain-credentials-directories.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e14497483c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-access-to-keychain-credentials-directories.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-access-to-keychain-credentials-directories]]
+=== Access to Keychain Credentials Directories
+
+Adversaries may collect the keychain storage data from a system to acquire credentials. Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features such as WiFi passwords, websites, secure notes and certificates.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html
+* https://securelist.com/calisto-trojan-for-macos/86543/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type in ("start", "process_started") and
+  process.args :
+    (
+      "/Users/*/Library/Keychains/*",
+      "/Library/Keychains/*",
+      "/Network/Library/Keychains/*",
+      "System.keychain",
+      "login.keychain-db",
+      "login.keychain"
+    ) and
+    not process.args : ("find-certificate",
+                      "add-trusted-cert",
+                      "set-keychain-settings",
+                      "delete-certificate",
+                      "/Users/*/Library/Keychains/openvpn.keychain-db",
+                      "show-keychain-info",
+                      "lock-keychain",
+                      "set-key-partition-list",
+                      "import",
+                      "find-identity") and
+    not process.parent.executable :
+      (
+        "/Applications/OpenVPN Connect/OpenVPN Connect.app/Contents/MacOS/OpenVPN Connect",
+        "/Applications/Microsoft Defender.app/Contents/MacOS/wdavdaemon_enterprise.app/Contents/MacOS/wdavdaemon_enterprise",
+        "/opt/jc/bin/jumpcloud-agent"
+      ) and
+    not process.executable : "/opt/jc/bin/jumpcloud-agent"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Credentials from Password Stores
+** ID: T1555
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Keychain
+** ID: T1555.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-account-discovery-command-via-system-account.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-account-discovery-command-via-system-account.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..92768de213
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-account-discovery-command-via-system-account.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-account-discovery-command-via-system-account]]
+=== Account Discovery Command via SYSTEM Account
+
+Identifies when the SYSTEM account uses an account discovery utility. This could be a sign of discovery activity after an adversary has achieved privilege escalation.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Discovery
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Account Discovery Command via SYSTEM Account*
+
+
+After successfully compromising an environment, attackers may try to gain situational awareness to plan their next steps. This can happen by running commands to enumerate network resources, users, connections, files, and installed security software.
+
+This rule looks for the execution of account discovery utilities using the SYSTEM account, which is commonly observed after attackers successfully perform privilege escalation or exploit web applications.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+  - If the process tree includes a web-application server process such as w3wp, httpd.exe, nginx.exe and alike, investigate any suspicious file creation or modification in the last 48 hours to assess the presence of any potential webshell backdoor.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Determine how the SYSTEM account is being used. For example, users with administrator privileges can spawn a system shell using Windows services, scheduled tasks or other third party utilities.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Discovery activities are not inherently malicious if they occur in isolation. As long as the analyst did not identify suspicious activity related to the user or host, such alerts can be dismissed.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection via the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+- Use the data collected through the analysis to investigate other machines affected in the environment.
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  (?process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name : "System" or
+  ?winlog.event_data.IntegrityLevel : "System") and
+  (
+    process.name : "whoami.exe" or
+    (
+      process.name : "net1.exe" and not process.parent.name : "net.exe" and not process.args : ("start", "stop", "/active:*")
+    )
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Discovery
+** ID: TA0007
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/
+* Technique:
+** Name: System Owner/User Discovery
+** ID: T1033
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Valid Accounts
+** ID: T1078
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Local Accounts
+** ID: T1078.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-adfind-command-activity.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-adfind-command-activity.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..262fa3e504
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-adfind-command-activity.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-adfind-command-activity]]
+=== AdFind Command Activity
+
+This rule detects the Active Directory query tool, AdFind.exe. AdFind has legitimate purposes, but it is frequently leveraged by threat actors to perform post-exploitation Active Directory reconnaissance. The AdFind tool has been observed in Trickbot, Ryuk, Maze, and FIN6 campaigns. For Winlogbeat, this rule requires Sysmon.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/
+* https://thedfirreport.com/2020/05/08/adfind-recon/
+* https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/05/tactics-techniques-procedures-associated-with-maze-ransomware-incidents.html
+* https://www.cybereason.com/blog/dropping-anchor-from-a-trickbot-infection-to-the-discovery-of-the-anchor-malware
+* https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html
+* https://usa.visa.com/dam/VCOM/global/support-legal/documents/fin6-cybercrime-group-expands-threat-To-ecommerce-merchants.pdf
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Discovery
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating AdFind Command Activity*
+
+
+http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/[AdFind] is a freely available command-line tool used to retrieve information from Active Directory (AD). Network discovery and enumeration tools like `AdFind` are useful to adversaries in the same ways they are effective for network administrators. This tool provides quick ability to scope AD person/computer objects and understand subnets and domain information. There are many https://thedfirreport.com/category/adfind/[examples] of this tool being adopted by ransomware and criminal groups and used in compromises.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Examine the command line to determine what information was retrieved by the tool.
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This rule has a high chance to produce false positives as it is a legitimate tool used by network administrators.
+- If this rule is noisy in your environment due to expected activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+- Malicious behavior with `AdFind` should be investigated as part of a step within an attack chain. It doesn't happen in isolation, so reviewing previous logs/activity from impacted machines can be very telling.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- Windows Network Enumeration - 7b8bfc26-81d2-435e-965c-d722ee397ef1
+- Enumeration of Administrator Accounts - 871ea072-1b71-4def-b016-6278b505138d
+- Enumeration Command Spawned via WMIPrvSE - 770e0c4d-b998-41e5-a62e-c7901fd7f470
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  (process.name : "AdFind.exe" or ?process.pe.original_file_name == "AdFind.exe") and
+  process.args : ("objectcategory=computer", "(objectcategory=computer)",
+                  "objectcategory=person", "(objectcategory=person)",
+                  "objectcategory=subnet", "(objectcategory=subnet)",
+                  "objectcategory=group", "(objectcategory=group)",
+                  "objectcategory=organizationalunit", "(objectcategory=organizationalunit)",
+                  "objectcategory=attributeschema", "(objectcategory=attributeschema)",
+                  "domainlist", "dcmodes", "adinfo", "dclist", "computers_pwnotreqd", "trustdmp")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Discovery
+** ID: TA0007
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote System Discovery
+** ID: T1018
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Permission Groups Discovery
+** ID: T1069
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Domain Groups
+** ID: T1069.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Account Discovery
+** ID: T1087
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Domain Account
+** ID: T1087.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Domain Trust Discovery
+** ID: T1482
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/
+* Technique:
+** Name: System Network Configuration Discovery
+** ID: T1016
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-adminsdholder-sdprop-exclusion-added.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-adminsdholder-sdprop-exclusion-added.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fc283f8c55
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-adminsdholder-sdprop-exclusion-added.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-adminsdholder-sdprop-exclusion-added]]
+=== AdminSDHolder SDProp Exclusion Added
+
+Identifies a modification on the dsHeuristics attribute on the bit that holds the configuration of groups excluded from the SDProp process. The SDProp compares the permissions on protected objects with those defined on the AdminSDHolder object. If the permissions on any of the protected accounts and groups do not match, the permissions on the protected accounts and groups are reset to match those of the domain's AdminSDHolder object, meaning that groups excluded will remain unchanged. Attackers can abuse this misconfiguration to maintain long-term access to privileged accounts in these groups.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-system.*
+* logs-windows.*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/guide-ad.html#dsheuristics_bad
+* https://petri.com/active-directory-security-understanding-adminsdholder-object
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Active Directory
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating AdminSDHolder SDProp Exclusion Added*
+
+
+The SDProp process compares the permissions on protected objects with those defined on the AdminSDHolder object. If the permissions on any of the protected accounts and groups do not match, it resets the permissions on the protected accounts and groups to match those defined in the domain AdminSDHolder object.
+
+The dSHeuristics is a Unicode string attribute, in which each character in the string represents a heuristic that is used to determine the behavior of Active Directory.
+
+Administrators can use the dSHeuristics attribute to exclude privilege groups from the SDProp process by setting the 16th bit (dwAdminSDExMask) of the string to a certain value, which represents the group(s):
+
+- For example, to exclude the Account Operators group, an administrator would modify the string, so the 16th character is set to 1 (i.e., 0000000001000001).
+
+The usage of this exclusion can leave the accounts unprotected and facilitate the misconfiguration of privileges for the excluded groups, enabling attackers to add accounts to these groups to maintain long-term persistence with high privileges.
+
+This rule matches changes of the dsHeuristics object where the 16th bit is set to a value other than zero.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Contact the account and system owners and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Check the value assigned to the 16th bit of the string on the `winlog.event_data.AttributeValue` field:
+    - Account Operators eq 1
+    - Server Operators eq 2
+    - Print Operators eq 4
+    - Backup Operators eq 8
+    The field value can range from 0 to f (15). If more than one group is specified, the values will be summed together; for example, Backup Operators and Print Operators will set the `c` value on the bit.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- While this modification can be done legitimately, it is not a best practice. Any potential benign true positive (B-TP) should be mapped and reviewed by the security team for alternatives as this weakens the security of the privileged group.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- The change can be reverted by setting the dwAdminSDExMask (16th bit) to 0 in dSHeuristics.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The 'Audit Directory Service Changes' logging policy must be configured for (Success).
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Policies >
+Windows Settings >
+Security Settings >
+Advanced Audit Policies Configuration >
+Audit Policies >
+DS Access >
+Audit Directory Service Changes (Success)
+```
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+any where event.action == "Directory Service Changes" and
+  event.code == "5136" and
+  winlog.event_data.AttributeLDAPDisplayName : "dSHeuristics" and
+  length(winlog.event_data.AttributeValue) > 15 and
+  winlog.event_data.AttributeValue regex~ "[0-9]{15}([1-9a-f]).*"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Valid Accounts
+** ID: T1078
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Domain Accounts
+** ID: T1078.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Account Manipulation
+** ID: T1098
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-adobe-hijack-persistence.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-adobe-hijack-persistence.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3fbca59474
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-adobe-hijack-persistence.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-adobe-hijack-persistence]]
+=== Adobe Hijack Persistence
+
+Detects writing executable files that will be automatically launched by Adobe on launch.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://twitter.com/pabraeken/status/997997818362155008
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Adobe Hijack Persistence*
+
+
+Attackers can replace the `RdrCEF.exe` executable with their own to maintain their access, which will be launched whenever Adobe Acrobat Reader is executed.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the file using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "creation" and
+  file.path : ("?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Adobe\\Acrobat Reader DC\\Reader\\AcroCEF\\RdrCEF.exe",
+               "?:\\Program Files\\Adobe\\Acrobat Reader DC\\Reader\\AcroCEF\\RdrCEF.exe") and
+  not process.name : "msiexec.exe"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Hijack Execution Flow
+** ID: T1574
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Services File Permissions Weakness
+** ID: T1574.010
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/010/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Compromise Client Software Binary
+** ID: T1554
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1554/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-apple-script-execution-followed-by-network-connection.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-apple-script-execution-followed-by-network-connection.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ca81411794
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-apple-script-execution-followed-by-network-connection.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-apple-script-execution-followed-by-network-connection]]
+=== Apple Script Execution followed by Network Connection
+
+Detects execution via the Apple script interpreter (osascript) followed by a network connection from the same process within a short time period. Adversaries may use malicious scripts for execution and command and control.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/LanguagesUtilities/Conceptual/MacAutomationScriptingGuide/index.html
+* https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv4-special-registry/iana-ipv4-special-registry.xhtml
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Command and Control
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id, process.entity_id with maxspan=30s
+ [process where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type == "start" and process.name == "osascript"]
+ [network where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type != "end" and process.name == "osascript" and destination.ip != "::1" and
+  not cidrmatch(destination.ip,
+    "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.0.0.0/24", "192.0.0.0/29", "192.0.0.8/32",
+    "192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.0.10/32", "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32", "192.0.2.0/24", "192.31.196.0/24",
+    "192.52.193.0/24", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "100.64.0.0/10", "192.175.48.0/24",
+    "198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "240.0.0.0/4", "::1", "FE80::/10", "FF00::/8")]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: AppleScript
+** ID: T1059.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Ingress Tool Transfer
+** ID: T1105
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-apple-scripting-execution-with-administrator-privileges.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-apple-scripting-execution-with-administrator-privileges.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..68205a9f53
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-apple-scripting-execution-with-administrator-privileges.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-apple-scripting-execution-with-administrator-privileges]]
+=== Apple Scripting Execution with Administrator Privileges
+
+Identifies execution of the Apple script interpreter (osascript) without a password prompt and with administrator privileges.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://discussions.apple.com/thread/2266150
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type in ("start", "process_started") and process.name : "osascript" and
+  process.command_line : "osascript*with administrator privileges"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Valid Accounts
+** ID: T1078
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-clear-kernel-ring-buffer.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-clear-kernel-ring-buffer.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..aabdd4b6f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-clear-kernel-ring-buffer.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-clear-kernel-ring-buffer]]
+=== Attempt to Clear Kernel Ring Buffer
+
+Monitors for the deletion of the kernel ring buffer events through dmesg. Attackers may clear kernel ring buffer events to evade detection after installing a Linux kernel module (LKM).
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
+
+*Version*: 4
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and process.name == "dmesg" and process.args == "-c"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Impair Defenses
+** ID: T1562
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Disable or Modify Tools
+** ID: T1562.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Indicator Removal
+** ID: T1070
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Clear Linux or Mac System Logs
+** ID: T1070.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-disable-gatekeeper.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-disable-gatekeeper.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7a924821ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-disable-gatekeeper.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-disable-gatekeeper]]
+=== Attempt to Disable Gatekeeper
+
+Detects attempts to disable Gatekeeper on macOS. Gatekeeper is a security feature that's designed to ensure that only trusted software is run. Adversaries may attempt to disable Gatekeeper before executing malicious code.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202491
+* https://community.carbonblack.com/t5/Threat-Advisories-Documents/TAU-TIN-Shlayer-OSX/ta-p/68397
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:macos and event.type:(start or process_started) and
+  process.args:(spctl and "--master-disable")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Subvert Trust Controls
+** ID: T1553
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-disable-iptables-or-firewall.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-disable-iptables-or-firewall.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..88d9f5eb69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-disable-iptables-or-firewall.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-disable-iptables-or-firewall]]
+=== Attempt to Disable IPTables or Firewall
+
+Adversaries may attempt to disable the iptables or firewall service in an attempt to affect how a host is allowed to receive or send network traffic.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+
+*Version*: 7
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and
+ (
+   /* disable FW */
+   (
+     (process.name == "ufw" and process.args == "disable") or
+     (process.name == "iptables" and process.args == "-F" and process.args_count == 2)
+   ) or
+
+   /* stop FW service */
+   (
+     ((process.name == "service" and process.args == "stop") or
+       (process.name == "chkconfig" and process.args == "off") or
+       (process.name == "systemctl" and process.args in ("disable", "stop", "kill"))) and
+    process.args in ("firewalld", "ip6tables", "iptables")
+    )
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Impair Defenses
+** ID: T1562
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Disable or Modify Tools
+** ID: T1562.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-disable-syslog-service.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-disable-syslog-service.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2d36116232
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-disable-syslog-service.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-disable-syslog-service]]
+=== Attempt to Disable Syslog Service
+
+Adversaries may attempt to disable the syslog service in an attempt to an attempt to disrupt event logging and evade detection by security controls.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
+- Elastic Defend
+- Auditbeat
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Auditbeat Setup*
+
+Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit the activities of users and processes on your systems. For example, you can use Auditbeat to collect and centralize audit events from the Linux Audit Framework. You can also use Auditbeat to detect changes to critical files, like binaries and configuration files, and identify potential security policy violations.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Auditbeat on a Linux System:*
+
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setup-repositories.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-docker.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html[helper guide].
+- For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and
+ ( (process.name == "service" and process.args == "stop") or
+   (process.name == "chkconfig" and process.args == "off") or
+   (process.name == "systemctl" and process.args in ("disable", "stop", "kill"))
+ ) and process.args in ("syslog", "rsyslog", "syslog-ng")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Impair Defenses
+** ID: T1562
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Disable or Modify Tools
+** ID: T1562.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-enable-the-root-account.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-enable-the-root-account.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e997d7ee16
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-enable-the-root-account.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-enable-the-root-account]]
+=== Attempt to Enable the Root Account
+
+Identifies attempts to enable the root account using the dsenableroot command. This command may be abused by adversaries for persistence, as the root account is disabled by default.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://ss64.com/osx/dsenableroot.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:macos and event.type:(start or process_started) and
+ process.name:dsenableroot and not process.args:"-d"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Valid Accounts
+** ID: T1078
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Local Accounts
+** ID: T1078.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-install-root-certificate.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-install-root-certificate.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bc469cff81
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-install-root-certificate.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-install-root-certificate]]
+=== Attempt to Install Root Certificate
+
+Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to their command and control servers. Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://ss64.com/osx/security-cert.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:macos and event.type:(start or process_started) and
+  process.name:security and process.args:"add-trusted-cert" and
+  not process.parent.executable:("/Library/Bitdefender/AVP/product/bin/BDCoreIssues" or "/Applications/Bitdefender/SecurityNetworkInstallerApp.app/Contents/MacOS/SecurityNetworkInstallerApp"
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Subvert Trust Controls
+** ID: T1553
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Install Root Certificate
+** ID: T1553.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-mount-smb-share-via-command-line.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-mount-smb-share-via-command-line.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bb7f870653
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-mount-smb-share-via-command-line.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-mount-smb-share-via-command-line]]
+=== Attempt to Mount SMB Share via Command Line
+
+Identifies the execution of macOS built-in commands to mount a Server Message Block (SMB) network share. Adversaries may use valid accounts to interact with a remote network share using SMB.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.freebsd.org/cgi/man.cgi?mount_smbfs
+* https://ss64.com/osx/mount.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type in ("start", "process_started") and
+  (
+    process.name : "mount_smbfs" or
+    (process.name : "open" and process.args : "smb://*") or
+    (process.name : "mount" and process.args : "smbfs") or
+    (process.name : "osascript" and process.command_line : "osascript*mount volume*smb://*")
+  ) and
+  not process.parent.executable : "/Applications/Google Drive.app/Contents/MacOS/Google Drive"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote Services
+** ID: T1021
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: SMB/Windows Admin Shares
+** ID: T1021.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-remove-file-quarantine-attribute.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-remove-file-quarantine-attribute.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bfeb8522aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-remove-file-quarantine-attribute.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-remove-file-quarantine-attribute]]
+=== Attempt to Remove File Quarantine Attribute
+
+Identifies a potential Gatekeeper bypass. In macOS, when applications or programs are downloaded from the internet, there is a quarantine flag set on the file. This attribute is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program at execution time. An adversary may disable this attribute to evade defenses.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/k/new-macos-backdoor-connected-to-oceanlotus-surfaces.html
+* https://ss64.com/osx/xattr.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type in ("start", "process_started") and
+  process.name : "xattr" and
+  (
+    (process.args : "com.apple.quarantine" and process.args : ("-d", "-w")) or
+    (process.args : "-c") or
+    (process.command_line : ("/bin/bash -c xattr -c *", "/bin/zsh -c xattr -c *", "/bin/sh -c xattr -c *"))
+  ) and not process.args_count > 12
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Impair Defenses
+** ID: T1562
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Disable or Modify Tools
+** ID: T1562.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-unload-elastic-endpoint-security-kernel-extension.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-unload-elastic-endpoint-security-kernel-extension.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..613ef31809
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-unload-elastic-endpoint-security-kernel-extension.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-unload-elastic-endpoint-security-kernel-extension]]
+=== Attempt to Unload Elastic Endpoint Security Kernel Extension
+
+Identifies attempts to unload the Elastic Endpoint Security kernel extension via the kextunload command.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:macos and event.type:(start or process_started) and
+ process.name:kextunload and process.args:("/System/Library/Extensions/EndpointSecurity.kext" or "EndpointSecurity.kext")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Impair Defenses
+** ID: T1562
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Disable or Modify Tools
+** ID: T1562.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
+** ID: T1547
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Kernel Modules and Extensions
+** ID: T1547.006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/006/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-authorization-plugin-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-authorization-plugin-modification.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fbe2017ee7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-authorization-plugin-modification.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-authorization-plugin-modification]]
+=== Authorization Plugin Modification
+
+Authorization plugins are used to extend the authorization services API and implement mechanisms that are not natively supported by the OS, such as multi-factor authentication with third party software. Adversaries may abuse this feature to persist and/or collect clear text credentials as they traverse the registered plugins during user logon.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/authorization_plug-ins
+* https://www.xorrior.com/persistent-credential-theft/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:file and host.os.type:macos and not event.type:deletion and
+  file.path:(/Library/Security/SecurityAgentPlugins/* and
+  not /Library/Security/SecurityAgentPlugins/TeamViewerAuthPlugin.bundle/*) and
+  not process.name:shove and process.code_signature.trusted:true
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
+** ID: T1547
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Authentication Package
+** ID: T1547.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-aws-route-table-created.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-aws-route-table-created.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0679aa4d45
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-aws-route-table-created.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-aws-route-table-created]]
+=== AWS Route Table Created
+
+Identifies when an AWS Route Table has been created.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* filebeat-*
+* logs-aws*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 10m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-60m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://docs.datadoghq.com/security_platform/default_rules/aws-ec2-route-table-modified/
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_CreateRoute.html
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_CreateRouteTable
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Cloud
+* Data Source: AWS
+* Data Source: Amazon Web Services
+* Use Case: Network Security Monitoring
+* Tactic: Persistence
+
+*Version*: 206
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+* Austin Songer
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+The AWS Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.dataset:aws.cloudtrail and event.provider:ec2.amazonaws.com and event.action:(CreateRoute or CreateRouteTable) and
+event.outcome:success
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-aws-route-table-modified-or-deleted.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-aws-route-table-modified-or-deleted.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7589185d90
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-aws-route-table-modified-or-deleted.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-aws-route-table-modified-or-deleted]]
+=== AWS Route Table Modified or Deleted
+
+Identifies when an AWS Route Table has been modified or deleted.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* filebeat-*
+* logs-aws*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 10m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-60m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/easttimor/aws-incident-response#network-routing
+* https://docs.datadoghq.com/security_platform/default_rules/aws-ec2-route-table-modified/
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_ReplaceRoute.html
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_ReplaceRouteTableAssociation
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteRouteTable.html
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteRoute.html
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_DisassociateRouteTable.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Cloud
+* Data Source: AWS
+* Data Source: Amazon Web Services
+* Use Case: Network Security Monitoring
+* Tactic: Persistence
+
+*Version*: 206
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+* Austin Songer
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+The AWS Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.dataset:aws.cloudtrail and event.provider:ec2.amazonaws.com and event.action:(ReplaceRoute or ReplaceRouteTableAssociation or
+DeleteRouteTable or DeleteRoute or DisassociateRouteTable) and event.outcome:success
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-base16-or-base32-encoding-decoding-activity.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-base16-or-base32-encoding-decoding-activity.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d426f69d2e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-base16-or-base32-encoding-decoding-activity.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-base16-or-base32-encoding-decoding-activity]]
+=== Base16 or Base32 Encoding/Decoding Activity
+
+Adversaries may encode/decode data in an attempt to evade detection by host- or network-based security controls.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
+- Elastic Defend
+- Auditbeat
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Auditbeat Setup*
+
+Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit the activities of users and processes on your systems. For example, you can use Auditbeat to collect and centralize audit events from the Linux Audit Framework. You can also use Auditbeat to detect changes to critical files, like binaries and configuration files, and identify potential security policy violations.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Auditbeat on a Linux System:*
+
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setup-repositories.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-docker.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html[helper guide].
+- For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and process.name in ("base16", "base32", "base32plain", "base32hex") and
+not process.args in ("--help", "--version")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Obfuscated Files or Information
+** ID: T1027
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
+** ID: T1140
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-binary-executed-from-shared-memory-directory.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-binary-executed-from-shared-memory-directory.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7d52cf6f8a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-binary-executed-from-shared-memory-directory.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-binary-executed-from-shared-memory-directory]]
+=== Binary Executed from Shared Memory Directory
+
+Identifies the execution of a binary by root in Linux shared memory directories: (/dev/shm/, /run/shm/, /var/run/, /var/lock/). This activity is to be considered highly abnormal and should be investigated. Threat actors have placed executables used for persistence on high-uptime servers in these directories as system backdoors.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://linuxsecurity.com/features/fileless-malware-on-linux
+* https://twitter.com/GossiTheDog/status/1522964028284411907
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/a-peek-behind-the-bpfdoor
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Threat: BPFDoor
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and
+user.id == "0" and process.executable : ("/dev/shm/*", "/run/shm/*", "/var/run/*", "/var/lock/*") and
+not process.executable : ("/var/run/docker/*", "/var/run/utsns/*", "/var/run/s6/*", "/var/run/cloudera-scm-agent/*", 
+"/var/run/argo/argoexec") and not process.parent.command_line : "/usr/bin/runc init"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-bpf-filter-applied-using-tc.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-bpf-filter-applied-using-tc.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cf5f3c27dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-bpf-filter-applied-using-tc.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-bpf-filter-applied-using-tc]]
+=== BPF filter applied using TC
+
+Detects when the tc (transmission control) binary is utilized to set a BPF (Berkeley Packet Filter) on a network interface. Tc is used to configure Traffic Control in the Linux kernel. It can shape, schedule, police and drop traffic. A threat actor can utilize tc to set a bpf filter on an interface for the purpose of manipulating the incoming traffic. This technique is not at all common and should indicate abnormal, suspicious or malicious activity.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/h3xduck/TripleCross/blob/master/src/helpers/deployer.sh
+* https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/tc.8.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Threat: TripleCross
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type != "end" and process.executable == "/usr/sbin/tc" and
+process.args == "filter" and process.args == "add" and process.args == "bpf" and
+not process.parent.executable == "/usr/sbin/libvirtd"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Unix Shell
+** ID: T1059.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-bypass-uac-via-event-viewer.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-bypass-uac-via-event-viewer.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fb0beeb54c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-bypass-uac-via-event-viewer.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-bypass-uac-via-event-viewer]]
+=== Bypass UAC via Event Viewer
+
+Identifies User Account Control (UAC) bypass via eventvwr.exe. Attackers bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 111
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Bypass UAC via Event Viewer*
+
+
+Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges (tracked as low to high integrity levels) to perform a task under administrator-level permissions, possibly by prompting the user for confirmation. UAC can deny an operation under high-integrity enforcement, or allow the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and enter an administrator password when prompted.
+
+For more information about the UAC and how it works, check the https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/how-user-account-control-works[official Microsoft docs page].
+
+During startup, `eventvwr.exe` checks the registry value of the `HKCU\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command` registry key for the location of `mmc.exe`, which is used to open the `eventvwr.msc` saved console file. If the location of another binary or script is added to this registry value, it will be executed as a high-integrity process without a UAC prompt being displayed to the user. This rule detects this UAC bypass by monitoring processes spawned by `eventvwr.exe` other than `mmc.exe` and `werfault.exe`.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Inspect the host for suspicious or abnormal behavior in the alert timeframe.
+- Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  process.parent.name : "eventvwr.exe" and
+  not process.executable :
+            ("?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\mmc.exe",
+             "?:\\Windows\\System32\\mmc.exe",
+             "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFault.exe",
+             "?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
+** ID: T1548
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Bypass User Account Control
+** ID: T1548.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
+** ID: T1548
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Bypass User Account Control
+** ID: T1548.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-chkconfig-service-add.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-chkconfig-service-add.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bf19d2a388
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-chkconfig-service-add.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-chkconfig-service-add]]
+=== Chkconfig Service Add
+
+Detects the use of the chkconfig binary to manually add a service for management by chkconfig. Threat actors may utilize this technique to maintain persistence on a system. When a new service is added, chkconfig ensures that the service has either a start or a kill entry in every runlevel and when the system is rebooted the service file added will run providing long-term persistence.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/lightning-framework-new-linux-threat/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Threat: Lightning Framework
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 111
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Chkconfig Service Add*
+
+Service files are configuration files in Linux systems used to define and manage system services. The `Chkconfig` binary can be used to manually add, delete or modify a service. 
+
+Malicious actors can leverage services to achieve persistence by creating or modifying service files to execute malicious commands or payloads during system startup. This allows them to maintain unauthorized access, execute additional malicious activities, or evade detection.
+
+This rule monitors the usage of the `chkconfig` binary to manually add a service for management by `chkconfig`, potentially indicating the creation of a persistence mechanism.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html[placeholder fields] to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+
+*Possible Investigation Steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the service that was created or modified.
+- Investigate the currently enabled system services through the following commands `sudo chkconfig --list | grep on` and `sudo systemctl list-unit-files`.
+- Investigate the status of potentially suspicious services through the `chkconfig --list service_name` command. 
+- Search for the `rc.d` or `init.d` service files that were created or modified, and analyze their contents.
+- Investigate whether any other files in any of the available `rc.d` or `init.d` directories have been altered through OSQuery.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve File Listing Information","query":"SELECT * FROM file WHERE (path LIKE '/etc/init.d/%' OR path LIKE '/etc/rc%.d/%')"}}
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Additional File Listing Information","query":"SELECT\n  f.path,\n  u.username AS file_owner,\n  g.groupname AS group_owner,\n  datetime(f.atime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_access_time,\n  datetime(f.mtime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_modified_time,\n  datetime(f.ctime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_status_change_time,\n  datetime(f.btime, 'unixepoch') AS file_created_time,\n  f.size AS size_bytes\nFROM\n  file f\n  LEFT JOIN users u ON f.uid = u.uid\n  LEFT JOIN groups g ON f.gid = g.gid\nWHERE (path LIKE '/etc/init.d/%' OR path LIKE '/etc/rc%.d/%')\n"}}
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User","query":"SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"}}
+- Investigate syslog through the `sudo cat /var/log/syslog | grep 'LSB'` command to find traces of the LSB header of the script (if present). If syslog is being ingested into Elasticsearch, the same can be accomplished through Kibana.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+- Investigate whether the altered scripts call other malicious scripts elsewhere on the file system. 
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+        - Cron jobs, services and other persistence mechanisms.
+            - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Crontab Information","query":"SELECT * FROM crontab"}}
+- Investigate abnormal behaviors by the subject process/user such as network connections, file modifications, and any other spawned child processes.
+  - Investigate listening ports and open sockets to look for potential command and control traffic or data exfiltration.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Listening Ports","query":"SELECT pid, address, port, socket, protocol, path FROM listening_ports"}}
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Open Sockets","query":"SELECT pid, family, remote_address, remote_port, socket, state FROM process_open_sockets"}}
+  - Identify the user account that performed the action, analyze it, and check whether it should perform this kind of action.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific User","query":"SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = {{user.name}}"}}
+- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Investigate the Account Authentication Status","query":"SELECT * FROM logged_in_users WHERE user = {{user.name}}"}}
+
+
+*False Positive Analysis*
+
+
+- If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+- If this activity is related to a system administrator who uses the `chkconfig` binary for administrative purposes, consider adding exceptions for this specific administrator user account. 
+- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
+
+
+*Related Rules*
+
+
+- Suspicious File Creation in /etc for Persistence - 1c84dd64-7e6c-4bad-ac73-a5014ee37042
+- Potential Persistence Through Run Control Detected - 0f4d35e4-925e-4959-ab24-911be207ee6f
+- Potential Persistence Through init.d Detected - 474fd20e-14cc-49c5-8160-d9ab4ba16c8b
+- New Systemd Timer Created - 7fb500fa-8e24-4bd1-9480-2a819352602c
+- New Systemd Service Created by Previously Unknown Process - 17b0a495-4d9f-414c-8ad0-92f018b8e001
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Delete the service/timer or restore its original configuration.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and
+( 
+  (process.executable : "/usr/sbin/chkconfig" and process.args : "--add") or
+  (process.args : "*chkconfig" and process.args : "--add")
+) and 
+not process.parent.name in ("rpm", "qualys-scan-util", "qualys-cloud-agent", "update-alternatives") and
+not process.parent.args : ("/var/tmp/rpm*", "/var/lib/waagent/*")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
+** ID: T1037
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: RC Scripts
+** ID: T1037.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-clearing-windows-console-history.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-clearing-windows-console-history.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bda276c113
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-clearing-windows-console-history.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-clearing-windows-console-history]]
+=== Clearing Windows Console History
+
+Identifies when a user attempts to clear console history. An adversary may clear the command history of a compromised account to conceal the actions undertaken during an intrusion.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://stefanos.cloud/kb/how-to-clear-the-powershell-command-history/
+* https://www.shellhacks.com/clear-history-powershell/
+* https://community.sophos.com/sophos-labs/b/blog/posts/powershell-command-history-forensics
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Austin Songer
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Clearing Windows Console History*
+
+
+PowerShell is one of the main tools system administrators use for automation, report routines, and other tasks. This makes it available for use in various environments, and creates an attractive way for attackers to execute code.
+
+Attackers can try to cover their tracks by clearing PowerShell console history. PowerShell has two different ways of logging commands: the built-in history and the command history managed by the PSReadLine module. This rule looks for the execution of commands that can clear the built-in PowerShell logs or delete the `ConsoleHost_history.txt` file.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+  - Verify if any other anti-forensics behaviors were observed.
+- Investigate the PowerShell logs on the SIEM to determine if there was suspicious behavior that an attacker may be trying to cover up.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+  - Ensure that PowerShell auditing policies and log collection are in place to grant future visibility.
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  (process.name : ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe") or ?process.pe.original_file_name == "PowerShell.EXE") and
+     (process.args : "*Clear-History*" or
+     (process.args : ("*Remove-Item*", "rm") and process.args : ("*ConsoleHost_history.txt*", "*(Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath*")) or
+     (process.args : "*Set-PSReadlineOption*" and process.args : "*SaveNothing*"))
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Indicator Removal
+** ID: T1070
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Clear Command History
+** ID: T1070.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/003/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-clearing-windows-event-logs.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-clearing-windows-event-logs.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..471805590c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-clearing-windows-event-logs.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-clearing-windows-event-logs]]
+=== Clearing Windows Event Logs
+
+Identifies attempts to clear or disable Windows event log stores using Windows wevetutil command. This is often done by attackers in an attempt to evade detection or destroy forensic evidence on a system.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 111
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Clearing Windows Event Logs*
+
+
+Windows event logs are a fundamental data source for security monitoring, forensics, and incident response. Adversaries can tamper, clear, and delete this data to break SIEM detections, cover their tracks, and slow down incident response.
+
+This rule looks for the execution of the `wevtutil.exe` utility or the `Clear-EventLog` cmdlet to clear event logs.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+  - Verify if any other anti-forensics behaviors were observed.
+- Investigate the event logs prior to the action for suspicious behaviors that an attacker may be trying to cover up.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This mechanism can be used legitimately. Analysts can dismiss the alert if the administrator is aware of the activity and there are justifications for this action.
+- Analyze whether the cleared event log is pertinent to security and general monitoring. Administrators can clear non-relevant event logs using this mechanism. If this activity is expected and noisy in your environment, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+  - This activity is potentially done after the adversary achieves its objectives on the host. Ensure that previous actions, if any, are investigated accordingly with their response playbooks.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+(
+  (
+    (process.name : "wevtutil.exe" or ?process.pe.original_file_name == "wevtutil.exe") and
+    process.args : ("/e:false", "cl", "clear-log")
+  ) or
+  (
+    process.name : ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe") and
+    process.args : "Clear-EventLog"
+  )
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Indicator Removal
+** ID: T1070
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Clear Windows Event Logs
+** ID: T1070.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/001/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Disable Windows Event Logging
+** ID: T1562.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-code-signing-policy-modification-through-registry.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-code-signing-policy-modification-through-registry.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2b4abd3f86
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-code-signing-policy-modification-through-registry.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-code-signing-policy-modification-through-registry]]
+=== Code Signing Policy Modification Through Registry
+
+Identifies attempts to disable the code signing policy through the registry. Code signing provides authenticity on a program, and grants the user with the ability to check whether the program has been tampered with. By allowing the execution of unsigned or self-signed code, threat actors can craft and execute malicious code.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 8
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Code Signing Policy Modification Through Registry*
+
+
+Microsoft created the Windows Driver Signature Enforcement (DSE) security feature to prevent drivers with invalid signatures from loading and executing into the kernel (ring 0). DSE aims to protect systems by blocking attackers from loading malicious drivers on targets. 
+
+This protection is essential for maintaining system security. However, attackers or administrators can disable DSE and load untrusted drivers, which can put the system at risk. Therefore, it's important to keep this feature enabled and only load drivers from trusted sources to ensure system integrity and security.
+
+This rule identifies registry modifications that can disable DSE.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Use Osquery and endpoint driver events (`event.category = "driver"`) to investigate if suspicious drivers were loaded into the system after the registry was modified.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Non-Microsoft Drivers with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, class, description, directory, image, issuer_name, manufacturer, service, signed, subject_name FROM drivers JOIN authenticode ON drivers.image = authenticode.path JOIN hash ON drivers.image = hash.path WHERE NOT (provider == \"Microsoft\" AND signed == \"1\")\n"}}
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Unsigned Drivers with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, class, description, directory, image, issuer_name, manufacturer, service, signed, subject_name FROM drivers JOIN authenticode ON drivers.image = authenticode.path JOIN hash ON drivers.image = hash.path WHERE signed == \"0\"\n"}}
+- Identify the driver's `Device Name` and `Service Name`.
+- Check for alerts from the rules specified in the `Related Rules` section.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity should not happen legitimately. The security team should address any potential benign true positive (B-TP), as this configuration can put the user and the domain at risk.
+
+
+*Related Rules*
+
+
+- First Time Seen Driver Loaded - df0fd41e-5590-4965-ad5e-cd079ec22fa9
+- Untrusted Driver Loaded - d8ab1ec1-feeb-48b9-89e7-c12e189448aa
+- Code Signing Policy Modification Through Built-in tools - b43570de-a908-4f7f-8bdb-b2df6ffd8c80
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Disable and uninstall all suspicious drivers found in the system. This can be done via Device Manager. (Note that this step may require you to boot the system into Safe Mode.)
+- Remove the related services and registry keys found in the system. Note that the service will probably not stop if the driver is still installed.
+  - This can be done via PowerShell `Remove-Service` cmdlet.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Ensure that the Driver Signature Enforcement is enabled on the system.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+registry where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type : ("creation", "change") and
+(
+  registry.path : (
+    "HKEY_USERS\\*\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\Driver Signing\\BehaviorOnFailedVerify",
+    "HKU\\*\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\Driver Signing\\BehaviorOnFailedVerify",
+    "\\REGISTRY\\USER\\*\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\Driver Signing\\BehaviorOnFailedVerify"
+  ) and
+  registry.value: "BehaviorOnFailedVerify" and
+  registry.data.strings : ("0", "0x00000000", "1", "0x00000001")
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Subvert Trust Controls
+** ID: T1553
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Code Signing Policy Modification
+** ID: T1553.006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Modify Registry
+** ID: T1112
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-command-execution-via-solarwinds-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-command-execution-via-solarwinds-process.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..029e064c3c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-command-execution-via-solarwinds-process.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-command-execution-via-solarwinds-process]]
+=== Command Execution via SolarWinds Process
+
+A suspicious SolarWinds child process (Cmd.exe or Powershell.exe) was detected.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html
+* https://github.com/mandiant/sunburst_countermeasures/blob/main/rules/SUNBURST/hxioc/SUNBURST%20SUSPICIOUS%20FILEWRITES%20(METHODOLOGY).ioc
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Tactic: Initial Access
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and process.name: ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe") and
+process.parent.name: (
+     "ConfigurationWizard*.exe",
+     "NetflowDatabaseMaintenance*.exe",
+     "NetFlowService*.exe",
+     "SolarWinds.Administration*.exe",
+     "SolarWinds.Collector.Service*.exe",
+     "SolarwindsDiagnostics*.exe"
+     )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Windows Command Shell
+** ID: T1059.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Initial Access
+** ID: TA0001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Supply Chain Compromise
+** ID: T1195
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Compromise Software Supply Chain
+** ID: T1195.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-command-prompt-network-connection.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-command-prompt-network-connection.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..76019e9ae8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-command-prompt-network-connection.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-command-prompt-network-connection]]
+=== Command Prompt Network Connection
+
+Identifies cmd.exe making a network connection. Adversaries could abuse cmd.exe to download or execute malware from a remote URL.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv4-special-registry/iana-ipv4-special-registry.xhtml
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Command Prompt Network Connection*
+
+
+Attackers commonly transfer tooling or malware from external systems into a compromised environment using a command and control channel. However, they can also abuse signed utilities to drop these files.
+
+This rule looks for a network connection to an external address from the `cmd.exe` utility, which can indicate the abuse of the utility to download malicious files and tools.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+  - Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+  - Investigate the file digital signature and process original filename, if suspicious, treat it as potential malware.
+- Investigate the target host that the signed binary is communicating with.
+  - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+  - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+- Examine if any file was downloaded and check if it is an executable or script.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the downloaded file using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- If this activity is expected and noisy in your environment, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of destination IP address and file name conditions.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by process.entity_id
+  [process where host.os.type == "windows" and process.name : "cmd.exe" and event.type == "start"]
+  [network where host.os.type == "windows" and process.name : "cmd.exe" and
+     not cidrmatch(destination.ip, "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.0.0.0/24",
+                                  "192.0.0.0/29", "192.0.0.8/32", "192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.0.10/32", "192.0.0.170/32",
+                                  "192.0.0.171/32", "192.0.2.0/24", "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24",
+                                  "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "100.64.0.0/10", "192.175.48.0/24",
+                                  "198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "240.0.0.0/4", "::1",
+                                  "FE80::/10", "FF00::/8") and
+    not dns.question.name : (
+          "wpad", "localhost", "ocsp.comodoca.com", "ocsp.digicert.com", "ocsp.sectigo.com", "crl.comodoca.com"
+    )]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Ingress Tool Transfer
+** ID: T1105
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-command-shell-activity-started-via-rundll32.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-command-shell-activity-started-via-rundll32.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4a5dd0c1fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-command-shell-activity-started-via-rundll32.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-command-shell-activity-started-via-rundll32]]
+=== Command Shell Activity Started via RunDLL32
+
+Identifies command shell activity started via RunDLL32, which is commonly abused by attackers to host malicious code.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+ process.name : ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe") and
+  process.parent.name : "rundll32.exe" and process.parent.command_line != null and
+  /* common FPs can be added here */
+  not process.parent.args : ("C:\\Windows\\System32\\SHELL32.dll,RunAsNewUser_RunDLL",
+                             "C:\\WINDOWS\\*.tmp,zzzzInvokeManagedCustomActionOutOfProc")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Windows Command Shell
+** ID: T1059.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Unsecured Credentials
+** ID: T1552
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: System Binary Proxy Execution
+** ID: T1218
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Rundll32
+** ID: T1218.011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-component-object-model-hijacking.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-component-object-model-hijacking.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..794220f681
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-component-object-model-hijacking.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,269 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-component-object-model-hijacking]]
+=== Component Object Model Hijacking
+
+Identifies Component Object Model (COM) hijacking via registry modification. Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to COM objects.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://bohops.com/2018/08/18/abusing-the-com-registry-structure-part-2-loading-techniques-for-evasion-and-persistence/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 111
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Component Object Model Hijacking*
+
+
+Adversaries can insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means of persistence.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
+- Retrieve the file referenced in the registry and determine if it is malicious:
+  - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+    - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+      - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - File and registry access, modification, and creation activities.
+      - Service creation and launch activities.
+      - Scheduled task creation.
+  - Use the PowerShell Get-FileHash cmdlet to get the files' SHA-256 hash values.
+    - Search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Some Microsoft executables will reference the LocalServer32 registry key value for the location of external COM objects.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+registry where host.os.type == "windows" and
+  /* not necessary but good for filtering privileged installations */
+  user.domain != "NT AUTHORITY" and
+  (
+    (
+      registry.path : "HK*\\InprocServer32\\" and
+      registry.data.strings: ("scrobj.dll", "?:\\*\\scrobj.dll") and
+      not registry.path : "*\\{06290BD*-48AA-11D2-8432-006008C3FBFC}\\*"
+    ) or
+
+    (
+      registry.path : "HKLM\\*\\InProcServer32\\*" and
+        registry.data.strings : ("*\\Users\\*", "*\\ProgramData\\*")
+    ) or
+
+    /* in general COM Registry changes on Users Hive is less noisy and worth alerting */
+    (
+      registry.path : (
+        "HKEY_USERS\\*\\InprocServer32\\",
+        "HKEY_USERS\\*\\LocalServer32\\",
+        "HKEY_USERS\\*\\DelegateExecute",
+        "HKEY_USERS\\*\\TreatAs\\",
+        "HKEY_USERS\\*\\ScriptletURL*"
+      ) and
+      not 
+      (
+        (
+          process.name : "svchost.exe" and
+            process.code_signature.trusted == true and process.code_signature.subject_name == "Microsoft Windows Publisher" and
+            registry.value : "DelegateExecute" and
+            registry.data.strings : (
+              /* https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/clsid_4ED3A719-CEA8-4BD9-910D-E252F997AFC2.html */
+              "{4ED3A719-CEA8-4BD9-910D-E252F997AFC2}",
+
+              /* https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/clsid_A56A841F-E974-45C1-8001-7E3F8A085917.html */
+              "{A56A841F-E974-45C1-8001-7E3F8A085917}",
+
+              /* https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/clsid_BFEC0C93-0B7D-4F2C-B09C-AFFFC4BDAE78.html */
+              "{BFEC0C93-0B7D-4F2C-B09C-AFFFC4BDAE78}",
+              "%SystemRoot%\\system32\\shdocvw.dll"
+            )
+        ) or
+        (
+          process.name : "veeam.backup.shell.exe" and
+            registry.path : "HKEY_USERS\\S-1-*_Classes\\CLSID\\*\\LocalServer32\\" and
+            process.code_signature.trusted == true and process.code_signature.subject_name == "Veeam Software Group GmbH"
+        ) or 
+        (
+          process.name : ("ADNotificationManager.exe", "Creative Cloud.exe") and
+            process.code_signature.trusted == true and process.code_signature.subject_name == "Adobe Inc." and
+            registry.data.strings : (
+              "\"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Adobe\\Acrobat Reader DC\\Reader\\ADNotificationManager.exe\" -ToastActivated",
+              "\"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Adobe\\Acrobat DC\\Acrobat\\ADNotificationManager.exe\" -ToastActivated",
+              "\"?:\\Program Files\\Adobe\\Acrobat DC\\Acrobat\\ADNotificationManager.exe\" -ToastActivated",
+              "\"?:\\Program Files\\Adobe\\Acrobat Reader DC\\Reader\\ADNotificationManager.exe\" -ToastActivated",
+              "\"?:\\Program Files\\Adobe\\Adobe Creative Cloud\\ACC\\Creative Cloud.exe\" -ToastActivated"
+            )
+        ) or 
+        (
+          process.name : ("IslandUpdateComRegisterShell64.exe", "IslandUpdate.exe", "GoogleUpdateComRegisterShell64.exe") and
+            process.code_signature.trusted == true and
+            process.code_signature.subject_name in ("Island Technology Inc.", "Google LLC") and
+            registry.data.strings : (
+              "*?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Island\\Update\\*",
+              "*?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Google\\Update\\*"
+            )
+        ) or 
+        (
+          process.name : ("SelfService.exe", "WfShell.exe") and
+            process.code_signature.trusted == true and process.code_signature.subject_name == "Citrix Systems, Inc." and
+            registry.data.strings : (
+              "\"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Citrix\\ICA Client\\SelfServicePlugin\\SelfService.exe\" -ToastActivated",
+              "%SystemRoot%\\system32\\shdocvw.dll",
+              "%SystemRoot%\\sysWOW64\\shdocvw.dll"
+            )
+        ) or 
+        (
+          process.name : ("msrdcw.exe") and
+            process.code_signature.trusted == true and process.code_signature.subject_name == "Microsoft Corporation" and
+            registry.data.strings : (
+              "\"?:\\Program Files\\Remote Desktop\\msrdcw.exe\" -ToastActivated",
+              "\"?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Apps\\Remote Desktop\\msrdcw.exe\" -ToastActivated"
+            )
+        ) or 
+        (
+          process.name : ("ssvagent.exe") and
+            process.code_signature.trusted == true and process.code_signature.subject_name == "Oracle America, Inc." and
+            registry.data.strings : (
+              "?:\\Program Files\\Java\\jre*\\bin\\jp2iexp.dll",
+              "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Java\\jre*\\bin\\jp2iexp.dll"
+            )
+        ) or 
+        (
+          process.name : ("hpnotifications.exe") and
+            process.code_signature.trusted == true and process.code_signature.subject_name == "HP Inc." and
+            registry.data.strings : (
+              "\"?:\\Windows\\System32\\DriverStore\\FileRepository\\hpsvcsscancomp.inf_amd64_*\\x64\\hpnotifications.exe\" -ToastActivated"
+            )
+        )
+      )
+    )
+  ) and
+
+  /* removes false-positives generated by OneDrive and Teams */
+  not
+  (
+    process.name: ("OneDrive.exe", "OneDriveSetup.exe", "FileSyncConfig.exe", "Teams.exe") and
+    process.code_signature.trusted == true and process.code_signature.subject_name in ("Microsoft Windows", "Microsoft Corporation")
+  ) and
+
+  /* Teams DLL loaded by regsvr */
+  not (process.name: "regsvr32.exe" and registry.data.strings : "*Microsoft.Teams.*.dll")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Event Triggered Execution
+** ID: T1546
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Component Object Model Hijacking
+** ID: T1546.015
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/015/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Event Triggered Execution
+** ID: T1546
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Component Object Model Hijacking
+** ID: T1546.015
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/015/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Modify Registry
+** ID: T1112
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-conhost-spawned-by-suspicious-parent-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-conhost-spawned-by-suspicious-parent-process.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1348495452
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-conhost-spawned-by-suspicious-parent-process.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-conhost-spawned-by-suspicious-parent-process]]
+=== Conhost Spawned By Suspicious Parent Process
+
+Detects when the Console Window Host (conhost.exe) process is spawned by a suspicious parent process, which could be indicative of code injection.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-one.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Conhost Spawned By Suspicious Parent Process*
+
+
+The Windows Console Host, or `conhost.exe`, is both the server application for all of the Windows Console APIs as well as the classic Windows user interface for working with command-line applications.
+
+Attackers often rely on custom shell implementations to avoid using built-in command interpreters like `cmd.exe` and `PowerShell.exe` and bypass application allowlisting and security features. Attackers commonly inject these implementations into legitimate system processes.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate abnormal behaviors observed by the subject process, such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Inspect the host for suspicious or abnormal behavior in the alert timeframe.
+- Retrieve the parent process executable and determine if it is malicious:
+  - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+    - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+      - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - File and registry access, modification, and creation activities.
+      - Service creation and launch activities.
+      - Scheduled task creation.
+  - Use the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet to get the files' SHA-256 hash values.
+    - Search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- Suspicious Process from Conhost - 28896382-7d4f-4d50-9b72-67091901fd26
+- Suspicious PowerShell Engine ImageLoad - 852c1f19-68e8-43a6-9dce-340771fe1be3
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  process.name : "conhost.exe" and
+  process.parent.name : ("lsass.exe", "services.exe", "smss.exe", "winlogon.exe", "explorer.exe", "dllhost.exe", "rundll32.exe",
+                         "regsvr32.exe", "userinit.exe", "wininit.exe", "spoolsv.exe", "ctfmon.exe") and
+  not (process.parent.name : "rundll32.exe" and
+       process.parent.args : ("?:\\Windows\\Installer\\MSI*.tmp,zzzzInvokeManagedCustomActionOutOfProc",
+                              "?:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\PcaSvc.dll,PcaPatchSdbTask",
+                              "?:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie"))
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Masquerading
+** ID: T1036
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Process Injection
+** ID: T1055
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-connection-to-commonly-abused-free-ssl-certificate-providers.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-connection-to-commonly-abused-free-ssl-certificate-providers.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3d0b151739
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-connection-to-commonly-abused-free-ssl-certificate-providers.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-connection-to-commonly-abused-free-ssl-certificate-providers]]
+=== Connection to Commonly Abused Free SSL Certificate Providers
+
+Identifies unusual processes connecting to domains using known free SSL certificates. Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Command and Control
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+network where host.os.type == "windows" and network.protocol == "dns" and
+  /* Add new free SSL certificate provider domains here */
+  dns.question.name : ("*letsencrypt.org", "*.sslforfree.com", "*.zerossl.com", "*.freessl.org") and
+
+  /* Native Windows process paths that are unlikely to have network connections to domains secured using free SSL certificates */
+  process.executable : ("C:\\Windows\\System32\\*.exe",
+                        "C:\\Windows\\System\\*.exe",
+	                  "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*.exe",
+		          "C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework*\\*.exe",
+		          "C:\\Windows\\explorer.exe",
+		          "C:\\Windows\\notepad.exe") and
+
+  /* Insert noisy false positives here */
+  not process.name : ("svchost.exe", "MicrosoftEdge*.exe", "msedge.exe")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Encrypted Channel
+** ID: T1573
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-connection-to-external-network-via-telnet.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-connection-to-external-network-via-telnet.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..56fb7f4c97
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-connection-to-external-network-via-telnet.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-connection-to-external-network-via-telnet]]
+=== Connection to External Network via Telnet
+
+Telnet provides a command line interface for communication with a remote device or server. This rule identifies Telnet network connections to publicly routable IP addresses.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv4-special-registry/iana-ipv4-special-registry.xhtml
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
+- Elastic Defend
+- Auditbeat
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Auditbeat Setup*
+
+Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit the activities of users and processes on your systems. For example, you can use Auditbeat to collect and centralize audit events from the Linux Audit Framework. You can also use Auditbeat to detect changes to critical files, like binaries and configuration files, and identify potential security policy violations.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Auditbeat on a Linux System:*
+
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setup-repositories.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-docker.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html[helper guide].
+- For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by process.entity_id
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and process.name == "telnet" and event.type == "start"]
+  [network where host.os.type == "linux" and process.name == "telnet" and not cidrmatch(
+     destination.ip, "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.0.0.0/24", "192.0.0.0/29",
+     "192.0.0.8/32", "192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.0.10/32", "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32", "192.0.2.0/24",
+     "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "100.64.0.0/10",
+     "192.175.48.0/24", "198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "240.0.0.0/4", "::1", "FE80::/10",
+     "FF00::/8"
+    )
+  ]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote Services
+** ID: T1021
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-connection-to-internal-network-via-telnet.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-connection-to-internal-network-via-telnet.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6da75eb674
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-connection-to-internal-network-via-telnet.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-connection-to-internal-network-via-telnet]]
+=== Connection to Internal Network via Telnet
+
+Telnet provides a command line interface for communication with a remote device or server. This rule identifies Telnet network connections to non-publicly routable IP addresses.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv4-special-registry/iana-ipv4-special-registry.xhtml
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
+- Elastic Defend
+- Auditbeat
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Auditbeat Setup*
+
+Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit the activities of users and processes on your systems. For example, you can use Auditbeat to collect and centralize audit events from the Linux Audit Framework. You can also use Auditbeat to detect changes to critical files, like binaries and configuration files, and identify potential security policy violations.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Auditbeat on a Linux System:*
+
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setup-repositories.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-docker.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html[helper guide].
+- For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by process.entity_id
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and process.name == "telnet" and event.type == "start"]
+  [network where host.os.type == "linux" and process.name == "telnet" and cidrmatch(
+     destination.ip, "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.0.0.0/24", "192.0.0.0/29",
+     "192.0.0.8/32", "192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.0.10/32", "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32", "192.0.2.0/24",
+     "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "100.64.0.0/10",
+     "192.175.48.0/24", "198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "240.0.0.0/4", "::1", "FE80::/10",
+     "FF00::/8"
+    )
+  ]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote Services
+** ID: T1021
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-control-panel-process-with-unusual-arguments.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-control-panel-process-with-unusual-arguments.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b472fc49b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-control-panel-process-with-unusual-arguments.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-control-panel-process-with-unusual-arguments]]
+=== Control Panel Process with Unusual Arguments
+
+Identifies unusual instances of Control Panel with suspicious keywords or paths in the process command line value. Adversaries may abuse control.exe to proxy execution of malicious code.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/476188/1/html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+ process.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\control.exe", "?:\\Windows\\System32\\control.exe") and
+ process.command_line :
+          ("*.jpg*",
+           "*.png*",
+           "*.gif*",
+           "*.bmp*",
+           "*.jpeg*",
+           "*.TIFF*",
+           "*.inf*",
+           "*.cpl:*/*",
+           "*../../..*",
+           "*/AppData/Local/*",
+           "*:\\Users\\Public\\*",
+           "*\\AppData\\Local\\*")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: System Binary Proxy Execution
+** ID: T1218
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Control Panel
+** ID: T1218.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-of-a-hidden-local-user-account.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-of-a-hidden-local-user-account.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d6526ddc7b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-of-a-hidden-local-user-account.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-of-a-hidden-local-user-account]]
+=== Creation of a Hidden Local User Account
+
+Identifies the creation of a hidden local user account by appending the dollar sign to the account name. This is sometimes done by attackers to increase access to a system and avoid appearing in the results of accounts listing using the net users command.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* http://web.archive.org/web/20230329153858/https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-6-hiding-in-plain-sights_8.html
+* https://github.com/CyberMonitor/APT_CyberCriminal_Campagin_Collections/tree/master/2020/2020.12.15.Lazarus_Campaign
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Creation of a Hidden Local User Account*
+
+
+Attackers can create accounts ending with a `$` symbol to make the account hidden to user enumeration utilities and bypass detections that identify computer accounts by this pattern to apply filters.
+
+This rule uses registry events to identify the creation of local hidden accounts.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positive (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Delete the hidden account.
+- Review the privileges assigned to the involved users to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+registry where host.os.type == "windows" and registry.path : (
+    "HKLM\\SAM\\SAM\\Domains\\Account\\Users\\Names\\*$\\",
+    "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SAM\\SAM\\Domains\\Account\\Users\\Names\\*$\\"
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Create Account
+** ID: T1136
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Local Account
+** ID: T1136.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-of-hidden-files-and-directories-via-commandline.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-of-hidden-files-and-directories-via-commandline.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..806955e86d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-of-hidden-files-and-directories-via-commandline.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-of-hidden-files-and-directories-via-commandline]]
+=== Creation of Hidden Files and Directories via CommandLine
+
+Users can mark specific files as hidden simply by putting a "." as the first character in the file or folder name. Adversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders on the system for persistence and defense evasion. This rule looks for hidden files or folders in common writable directories.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 33
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
+- Elastic Defend
+- Auditbeat
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Auditbeat Setup*
+
+Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit the activities of users and processes on your systems. For example, you can use Auditbeat to collect and centralize audit events from the Linux Audit Framework. You can also use Auditbeat to detect changes to critical files, like binaries and configuration files, and identify potential security policy violations.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Auditbeat on a Linux System:*
+
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setup-repositories.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-docker.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html[helper guide].
+- For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Custom Ingest Pipeline*
+
+For versions <8.2, you need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate `event.ingested` with @timestamp for non-elastic-agent indexes, like auditbeats/filebeat/winlogbeat etc. For more details to add a custom ingest pipeline refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html[guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
+process.working_directory in ("/tmp", "/var/tmp", "/dev/shm") and
+process.args regex~ """\.[a-z0-9_\-][a-z0-9_\-\.]{1,254}""" and
+not process.name in ("ls", "find", "grep", "git", "jq", "basename")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Hide Artifacts
+** ID: T1564
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Hidden Files and Directories
+** ID: T1564.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/001/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-of-hidden-launch-agent-or-daemon.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-of-hidden-launch-agent-or-daemon.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a8c9d1cf55
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-of-hidden-launch-agent-or-daemon.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-of-hidden-launch-agent-or-daemon]]
+=== Creation of Hidden Launch Agent or Daemon
+
+Identifies the creation of a hidden launch agent or daemon. An adversary may establish persistence by installing a new launch agent or daemon which executes at login.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type != "deletion" and
+  file.path :
+  (
+    "/System/Library/LaunchAgents/.*.plist",
+    "/Library/LaunchAgents/.*.plist",
+    "/Users/*/Library/LaunchAgents/.*.plist",
+    "/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/.*.plist",
+    "/Library/LaunchDaemons/.*.plist"
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Create or Modify System Process
+** ID: T1543
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Launch Agent
+** ID: T1543.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Hide Artifacts
+** ID: T1564
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Hidden Files and Directories
+** ID: T1564.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-of-hidden-login-item-via-apple-script.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-of-hidden-login-item-via-apple-script.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d42762d4b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-of-hidden-login-item-via-apple-script.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-of-hidden-login-item-via-apple-script]]
+=== Creation of Hidden Login Item via Apple Script
+
+Identifies the execution of osascript to create a hidden login item. This may indicate an attempt to persist a malicious program while concealing its presence.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type in ("start", "process_started") and process.name : "osascript" and
+ process.command_line : "osascript*login item*hidden:true*"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
+** ID: T1547
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: AppleScript
+** ID: T1059.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Plist File Modification
+** ID: T1647
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1647/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-of-hidden-shared-object-file.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-of-hidden-shared-object-file.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..52f1cea3c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-of-hidden-shared-object-file.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-of-hidden-shared-object-file]]
+=== Creation of Hidden Shared Object File
+
+Identifies the creation of a hidden shared object (.so) file. Users can mark specific files as hidden simply by putting a "." as the first character in the file or folder name. Adversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders on the system for persistence and defense evasion.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 33
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
+- Elastic Defend
+- Auditbeat
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Auditbeat Setup*
+
+Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit the activities of users and processes on your systems. For example, you can use Auditbeat to collect and centralize audit events from the Linux Audit Framework. You can also use Auditbeat to detect changes to critical files, like binaries and configuration files, and identify potential security policy violations.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Auditbeat on a Linux System:*
+
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setup-repositories.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-docker.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html[helper guide].
+- For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Custom Ingest Pipeline*
+
+For versions <8.2, you need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate `event.ingested` with @timestamp for non-elastic-agent indexes, like auditbeats/filebeat/winlogbeat etc. For more details to add a custom ingest pipeline refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html[guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "creation" and file.extension == "so" and file.name : ".*.so" and
+not process.name == "dockerd"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Hide Artifacts
+** ID: T1564
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Hidden Files and Directories
+** ID: T1564.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-or-modification-of-a-new-gpo-scheduled-task-or-service.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-or-modification-of-a-new-gpo-scheduled-task-or-service.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b4688e52ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-or-modification-of-a-new-gpo-scheduled-task-or-service.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-or-modification-of-a-new-gpo-scheduled-task-or-service]]
+=== Creation or Modification of a new GPO Scheduled Task or Service
+
+Detects the creation or modification of a new Group Policy based scheduled task or service. These methods are used for legitimate system administration, but can also be abused by an attacker with domain admin permissions to execute a malicious payload remotely on all or a subset of the domain joined machines.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type != "deletion" and
+  file.path : ("?:\\Windows\\SYSVOL\\domain\\Policies\\*\\MACHINE\\Preferences\\ScheduledTasks\\ScheduledTasks.xml",
+               "?:\\Windows\\SYSVOL\\domain\\Policies\\*\\MACHINE\\Preferences\\Services\\Services.xml") and
+  not process.name : "dfsrs.exe"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Domain Policy Modification
+** ID: T1484
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Group Policy Modification
+** ID: T1484.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task/Job
+** ID: T1053
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task
+** ID: T1053.005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-or-modification-of-domain-backup-dpapi-private-key.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-or-modification-of-domain-backup-dpapi-private-key.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4e3837e409
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-or-modification-of-domain-backup-dpapi-private-key.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-or-modification-of-domain-backup-dpapi-private-key]]
+=== Creation or Modification of Domain Backup DPAPI private key
+
+Identifies the creation or modification of Domain Backup private keys. Adversaries may extract the Data Protection API (DPAPI) domain backup key from a Domain Controller (DC) to be able to decrypt any domain user master key file.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.dsinternals.com/en/retrieving-dpapi-backup-keys-from-active-directory/
+* https://posts.specterops.io/operational-guidance-for-offensive-user-dpapi-abuse-1fb7fac8b107
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+Domain DPAPI Backup keys are stored on domain controllers and can be dumped remotely with tools such as Mimikatz. The resulting .pvk private key can be used to decrypt ANY domain user masterkeys, which then can be used to decrypt any secrets protected by those keys.
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type != "deletion" and file.name : ("ntds_capi_*.pfx", "ntds_capi_*.pvk")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Unsecured Credentials
+** ID: T1552
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Private Keys
+** ID: T1552.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Credentials from Password Stores
+** ID: T1555
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-or-modification-of-root-certificate.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-or-modification-of-root-certificate.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ee4f1d0400
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-or-modification-of-root-certificate.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-or-modification-of-root-certificate]]
+=== Creation or Modification of Root Certificate
+
+Identifies the creation or modification of a local trusted root certificate in Windows. The install of a malicious root certificate would allow an attacker the ability to masquerade malicious files as valid signed components from any entity (for example, Microsoft). It could also allow an attacker to decrypt SSL traffic.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec
+* https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/persistence/t1130-install-root-certificate
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Creation or Modification of Root Certificate*
+
+
+Root certificates are the primary level of certifications that tell a browser that the communication is trusted and legitimate. This verification is based upon the identification of a certification authority. Windows adds several trusted root certificates so browsers can use them to communicate with websites.
+
+https://www.thewindowsclub.com/what-are-root-certificates-windows[Check out this post] for more details on root certificates and the involved cryptography.
+
+This rule identifies the creation or modification of a root certificate by monitoring registry modifications. The installation of a malicious root certificate would allow an attacker the ability to masquerade malicious files as valid signed components from any entity (for example, Microsoft). It could also allow an attacker to decrypt SSL traffic.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate abnormal behaviors observed by the subject process such as network connections, other registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+- If one of the processes is suspicious, retrieve it and determine if it is malicious:
+  - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+    - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+      - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - File and registry access, modification, and creation activities.
+      - Service creation and launch activities.
+      - Scheduled task creation.
+  - Use the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet to get the files' SHA-256 hash values.
+    - Search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This detection may be triggered by certain applications that install root certificates for the purpose of inspecting SSL traffic. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove the malicious certificate from the root certificate store.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+registry where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type in ("creation", "change") and
+  registry.path :
+    (
+      "HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\SystemCertificates\\Root\\Certificates\\*\\Blob",
+      "HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\SystemCertificates\\AuthRoot\\Certificates\\*\\Blob",
+      "HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\SystemCertificates\\Root\\Certificates\\*\\Blob",
+      "HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\SystemCertificates\\AuthRoot\\Certificates\\*\\Blob",
+      "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\SystemCertificates\\Root\\Certificates\\*\\Blob",
+      "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\SystemCertificates\\AuthRoot\\Certificates\\*\\Blob",
+      "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\SystemCertificates\\Root\\Certificates\\*\\Blob",
+      "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\SystemCertificates\\AuthRoot\\Certificates\\*\\Blob"
+    ) and
+  not process.executable : (
+          "?:\\ProgramData\\Lenovo\\Vantage\\Addins\\LenovoHardwareScanAddin\\*\\LdeApi.Server.exe",
+          "?:\\ProgramData\\Logishrd\\LogiOptionsPlus\\Plugins\\64\\certmgr.exe",
+          "?:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Platform\\*\\MsMpEng.exe",
+          "?:\\ProgramData\\Quest\\KACE\\modules\\clientidentifier\\clientidentifier.exe",
+          "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe",
+          "?:\\Program Files\\*.exe",
+          "?:\\Windows\\CCM\\CcmExec.exe",
+          "?:\\Windows\\ccmsetup\\cache\\ccmsetup.exe",
+          "?:\\Windows\\Cluster\\clussvc.exe",
+          "?:\\Windows\\ImmersiveControlPanel\\SystemSettings.exe",
+          "?:\\Windows\\Lenovo\\ImController\\PluginHost86\\Lenovo.Modern.ImController.PluginHost.Device.exe",
+          "?:\\Windows\\Lenovo\\ImController\\Service\\Lenovo.Modern.ImController.exe",
+          "?:\\Windows\\Sysmon.exe",
+          "?:\\Windows\\Sysmon64.exe",
+          "?:\\Windows\\System32\\*.exe",
+          "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*.exe",
+          "?:\\Windows\\UUS\\amd64\\MoUsoCoreWorker.exe",
+          "?:\\Windows\\WinSxS\\*.exe"
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Subvert Trust Controls
+** ID: T1553
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Install Root Certificate
+** ID: T1553.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-credential-acquisition-via-registry-hive-dumping.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-credential-acquisition-via-registry-hive-dumping.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..12d4f2ecc4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-credential-acquisition-via-registry-hive-dumping.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-credential-acquisition-via-registry-hive-dumping]]
+=== Credential Acquisition via Registry Hive Dumping
+
+Identifies attempts to export a registry hive which may contain credentials using the Windows reg.exe tool.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-the-registry-7512674487f8
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/detect-credential-access
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Credential Acquisition via Registry Hive Dumping*
+
+
+Dumping registry hives is a common way to access credential information as some hives store credential material.
+
+For example, the SAM hive stores locally cached credentials (SAM Secrets), and the SECURITY hive stores domain cached credentials (LSA secrets).
+
+Dumping these hives in combination with the SYSTEM hive enables the attacker to decrypt these secrets.
+
+This rule identifies the usage of `reg.exe` to dump SECURITY and/or SAM hives, which potentially indicates the compromise of the credentials stored in the host.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate if the credential material was exfiltrated or processed locally by other tools.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (e.g., 4624) to the target host.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Administrators can export registry hives for backup purposes using command line tools like `reg.exe`. Check whether the user is legitamitely performing this kind of activity.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- Registry Hive File Creation via SMB - a4c7473a-5cb4-4bc1-9d06-e4a75adbc494
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Reimage the host operating system and restore compromised files to clean versions.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+ (?process.pe.original_file_name == "reg.exe" or process.name : "reg.exe") and
+ process.args : ("save", "export") and
+ process.args : ("hklm\\sam", "hklm\\security")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Security Account Manager
+** ID: T1003.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/002/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: LSA Secrets
+** ID: T1003.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-cron-job-created-or-changed-by-previously-unknown-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-cron-job-created-or-changed-by-previously-unknown-process.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a700547cfe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-cron-job-created-or-changed-by-previously-unknown-process.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,226 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-cron-job-created-or-changed-by-previously-unknown-process]]
+=== Cron Job Created or Changed by Previously Unknown Process
+
+Linux cron jobs are scheduled tasks that can be leveraged by malicious actors for persistence, privilege escalation and command execution. By creating or modifying cron job configurations, attackers can execute malicious commands or scripts at predefined intervals, ensuring their continued presence and enabling unauthorized activities.
+
+*Rule type*: new_terms
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://pberba.github.io/security/2022/01/30/linux-threat-hunting-for-persistence-systemd-timers-cron/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 9
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Cron Job Created or Changed by Previously Unknown Process*
+
+Linux cron jobs are scheduled tasks that run at specified intervals or times, managed by the cron daemon. 
+
+By creating or modifying cron job configurations, attackers can execute malicious commands or scripts at predefined intervals, ensuring their continued presence and enabling unauthorized activities.
+
+This rule monitors the creation of previously unknown cron jobs by monitoring for file creation events in the most common cron job task location directories.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html[placeholder fields] to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+
+*Possible Investigation Steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the cron job file that was created or modified.
+- Investigate whether any other files in any of the available cron job directories have been altered through OSQuery.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve File Listing Information","query":"SELECT * FROM file WHERE (\n  path LIKE '/etc/cron.allow.d/%' OR\n  path LIKE '/etc/cron.d/%' OR\n  path LIKE '/etc/cron.hourly/%' OR\n  path LIKE '/etc/cron.daily/%' OR\n  path LIKE '/etc/cron.weekly/%' OR\n  path LIKE '/etc/cron.monthly/%'\n)\n"}}
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve rc-local.service File Information","query":"SELECT * FROM file WHERE (\n  path = '/etc/cron.allow' OR\n  path = '/etc/cron.deny' OR\n  path = '/etc/crontab' OR\n  path = '/usr/sbin/cron' OR\n  path = '/usr/sbin/anacron'\n)\n"}}
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Additional File Listing Information","query":"SELECT\n  f.path,\n  u.username AS file_owner,\n  g.groupname AS group_owner,\n  datetime(f.atime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_access_time,\n  datetime(f.mtime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_modified_time,\n  datetime(f.ctime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_status_change_time,\n  datetime(f.btime, 'unixepoch') AS file_created_time,\n  f.size AS size_bytes\nFROM\n  file f\n  LEFT JOIN users u ON f.uid = u.uid\n  LEFT JOIN groups g ON f.gid = g.gid\nWHERE (\n  path LIKE '/etc/cron.allow.d/%' OR\n  path LIKE '/etc/cron.d/%' OR\n  path LIKE '/etc/cron.hourly/%' OR\n  path LIKE '/etc/cron.daily/%' OR\n  path LIKE '/etc/cron.weekly/%' OR\n  path LIKE '/etc/cron.monthly/%'\n)\n"}}
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User","query":"SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"}}
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+- Investigate whether the altered scripts call other malicious scripts elsewhere on the file system. 
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+- Investigate abnormal behaviors by the subject process/user such as network connections, file modifications, and any other spawned child processes.
+  - Investigate listening ports and open sockets to look for potential command and control traffic or data exfiltration.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Listening Ports","query":"SELECT pid, address, port, socket, protocol, path FROM listening_ports"}}
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Open Sockets","query":"SELECT pid, family, remote_address, remote_port, socket, state FROM process_open_sockets"}}
+  - Identify the user account that performed the action, analyze it, and check whether it should perform this kind of action.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific User","query":"SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = {{user.name}}"}}
+- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Investigate the Account Authentication Status","query":"SELECT * FROM logged_in_users WHERE user = {{user.name}}"}}
+
+
+*False Positive Analysis*
+
+
+- If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+- If this activity is related to a system administrator who uses cron jobs for administrative purposes, consider adding exceptions for this specific administrator user account. 
+- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
+
+
+*Related Rules*
+
+
+- Suspicious File Creation in /etc for Persistence - 1c84dd64-7e6c-4bad-ac73-a5014ee37042
+- Potential Persistence Through Run Control Detected - 0f4d35e4-925e-4959-ab24-911be207ee6f
+- Potential Persistence Through init.d Detected - 474fd20e-14cc-49c5-8160-d9ab4ba16c8b
+- New Systemd Timer Created - 7fb500fa-8e24-4bd1-9480-2a819352602c
+- New Systemd Service Created by Previously Unknown Process - 17b0a495-4d9f-414c-8ad0-92f018b8e001
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Delete the service/timer or restore its original configuration.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+host.os.type : "linux" and event.action : ("change" or "file_modify_event" or "creation" or "file_create_event") and 
+file.path : (/etc/cron.allow or /etc/cron.deny or /etc/cron.d/* or /etc/cron.hourly/* or /etc/cron.daily/* or 
+/etc/cron.weekly/* or /etc/cron.monthly/* or /etc/crontab or /usr/sbin/cron or /usr/sbin/anacron) 
+and not (
+  (process.name : ("dpkg" or "dockerd" or "rpm" or "snapd" or "yum" or "exe" or "dnf" or "podman" or 
+  "dnf-automatic" or puppet or autossl_check )) or 
+  (file.extension : ("swp" or "swpx")) or 
+  (process.name : "sed" and file.name : sed*) or 
+  (process.name : "perl" and file.name : e2scrub_all.tmp*) or
+  (process.executable : /var/lib/dpkg*)
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task/Job
+** ID: T1053
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Cron
+** ID: T1053.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task/Job
+** ID: T1053
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Cron
+** ID: T1053.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task/Job
+** ID: T1053
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Cron
+** ID: T1053.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-deleting-backup-catalogs-with-wbadmin.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-deleting-backup-catalogs-with-wbadmin.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..462273b1d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-deleting-backup-catalogs-with-wbadmin.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-deleting-backup-catalogs-with-wbadmin]]
+=== Deleting Backup Catalogs with Wbadmin
+
+Identifies use of the wbadmin.exe to delete the backup catalog. Ransomware and other malware may do this to prevent system recovery.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Impact
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Deleting Backup Catalogs with Wbadmin*
+
+
+Windows Server Backup stores the details about your backups (what volumes are backed up and where the backups are located) in a file called a backup catalog, which ransomware victims can use to recover corrupted backup files. Deleting these files is a common step in threat actor playbooks.
+
+This rule identifies the deletion of the backup catalog using the `wbadmin.exe` utility.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
+- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Administrators can use this command to delete corrupted catalogs, but overall the activity is unlikely to be legitimate.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- Third-party Backup Files Deleted via Unexpected Process - 11ea6bec-ebde-4d71-a8e9-784948f8e3e9
+- Volume Shadow Copy Deleted or Resized via VssAdmin - b5ea4bfe-a1b2-421f-9d47-22a75a6f2921
+- Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via PowerShell - d99a037b-c8e2-47a5-97b9-170d076827c4
+- Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via WMIC - dc9c1f74-dac3-48e3-b47f-eb79db358f57
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Consider isolating the involved host to prevent destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.
+- If any backups were affected:
+  - Perform data recovery locally or restore the backups from replicated copies (cloud, other servers, etc.).
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  (process.name : "wbadmin.exe" or ?process.pe.original_file_name == "WBADMIN.EXE") and
+  process.args : "catalog" and process.args : "delete"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Impact
+** ID: TA0040
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Inhibit System Recovery
+** ID: T1490
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Data Destruction
+** ID: T1485
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-deprecated-remote-file-creation-on-a-sensitive-directory.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-deprecated-remote-file-creation-on-a-sensitive-directory.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5bf1dd4350
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-deprecated-remote-file-creation-on-a-sensitive-directory.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-deprecated-remote-file-creation-on-a-sensitive-directory]]
+=== Deprecated - Remote File Creation on a Sensitive Directory
+
+Discovery of files created by a remote host on sensitive directories and folders. Remote file creation in these directories could indicate a malicious binary or script trying to compromise the system.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-10m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/es/blog/remote-desktop-protocol-connections-elastic-security
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* Use Case: Lateral Movement Detection
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 2
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where event.action in ("creation", "modification") and
+  not user.name:("SYSTEM", "root") and
+  process.name in ("System", "scp", "sshd", "smbd", "vsftpd", "sftp-server") and
+  (
+    file.path : (
+        "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Roaming*", "?:\\Program Files*",
+        "?:\\Windows\\*", "?:\\Windows\\System\\*",
+        "?:\\Windows\\System32\\*", "/etc/*", "/tmp*",
+        "/var/tmp*", "/home/*/.*", "/home/.*", "/usr/bin/*",
+        "/sbin/*", "/bin/*", "/usr/lib/*", "/usr/sbin/*",
+        "/usr/share/*", "/usr/local/*", "/var/lib/dpkg/*",
+        "/lib/systemd/*"
+    )
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation of Remote Services
+** ID: T1210
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-disable-windows-event-and-security-logs-using-built-in-tools.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-disable-windows-event-and-security-logs-using-built-in-tools.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2d1c121ca2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-disable-windows-event-and-security-logs-using-built-in-tools.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-disable-windows-event-and-security-logs-using-built-in-tools]]
+=== Disable Windows Event and Security Logs Using Built-in Tools
+
+Identifies attempts to disable EventLog via the logman Windows utility, PowerShell, or auditpol. This is often done by attackers in an attempt to evade detection on a system.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/logman
+* https://medium.com/palantir/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 111
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+* Ivan Ninichuck
+* Austin Songer
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Disable Windows Event and Security Logs Using Built-in Tools*
+
+
+Windows event logs are a fundamental data source for security monitoring, forensics, and incident response. Adversaries can tamper, clear, and delete this data to break SIEM detections, cover their tracks, and slow down incident response.
+
+This rule looks for the usage of different utilities to disable the EventLog service or specific event logs.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+  - Verify if any other anti-forensics behaviors were observed.
+- Investigate the event logs prior to the action for suspicious behaviors that an attacker may be trying to cover up.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Re-enable affected logging components, services, and security monitoring.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+(
+  ((process.name:"logman.exe" or ?process.pe.original_file_name == "Logman.exe") and
+      process.args : "EventLog-*" and process.args : ("stop", "delete")) or
+
+  ((process.name : ("pwsh.exe", "powershell.exe", "powershell_ise.exe") or ?process.pe.original_file_name in
+      ("pwsh.exe", "powershell.exe", "powershell_ise.exe")) and
+	process.args : "Set-Service" and process.args: "EventLog" and process.args : "Disabled")  or
+
+  ((process.name:"auditpol.exe" or ?process.pe.original_file_name == "AUDITPOL.EXE") and process.args : "/success:disable")
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Indicator Removal
+** ID: T1070
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Clear Windows Event Logs
+** ID: T1070.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Impair Defenses
+** ID: T1562
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Disable Windows Event Logging
+** ID: T1562.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/002/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Indicator Blocking
+** ID: T1562.006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-disable-windows-firewall-rules-via-netsh.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-disable-windows-firewall-rules-via-netsh.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4f9a2df596
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-disable-windows-firewall-rules-via-netsh.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-disable-windows-firewall-rules-via-netsh]]
+=== Disable Windows Firewall Rules via Netsh
+
+Identifies use of the netsh.exe to disable or weaken the local firewall. Attackers will use this command line tool to disable the firewall during troubleshooting or to enable network mobility.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Disable Windows Firewall Rules via Netsh*
+
+
+The Windows Defender Firewall is a native component which provides host-based, two-way network traffic filtering for a device, and blocks unauthorized network traffic flowing into or out of the local device.
+
+Attackers can disable the Windows firewall or its rules to enable lateral movement and command and control activity.
+
+This rule identifies patterns related to disabling the Windows firewall or its rules using the `netsh.exe` utility.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Contact the user to check if they are aware of the operation.
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This mechanism can be used legitimately. Check whether the user is an administrator and is legitimately performing troubleshooting.
+- In case of an allowed benign true positive (B-TP), assess adding rules to allow needed traffic and re-enable the firewall.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Review the privileges assigned to the involved users to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  process.name : "netsh.exe" and
+  (
+    (process.args : "disable" and process.args : "firewall" and process.args : "set") or
+    (process.args : "advfirewall" and process.args : "off" and process.args : "state")
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Impair Defenses
+** ID: T1562
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Disable or Modify System Firewall
+** ID: T1562.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-disabling-user-account-control-via-registry-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-disabling-user-account-control-via-registry-modification.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1919618ade
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-disabling-user-account-control-via-registry-modification.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-disabling-user-account-control-via-registry-modification]]
+=== Disabling User Account Control via Registry Modification
+
+User Account Control (UAC) can help mitigate the impact of malware on Windows hosts. With UAC, apps and tasks always run in the security context of a non-administrator account, unless an administrator specifically authorizes administrator-level access to the system. This rule identifies registry value changes to bypass User Access Control (UAC) protection.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.greyhathacker.net/?p=796
+* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-group-policy-and-registry-key-settings
+* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-overview
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Disabling User Account Control via Registry Modification*
+
+
+Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges (tracked as low to high integrity levels) to perform a task under administrator-level permissions, possibly by prompting the user for confirmation. UAC can deny an operation under high-integrity enforcement, or allow the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and enter an administrator password when prompted.
+
+For more information about the UAC and how it works, check the https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/how-user-account-control-works[official Microsoft docs page].
+
+Attackers may disable UAC to execute code directly in high integrity. This rule identifies registry value changes to bypass the UAC protection.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Inspect the host for suspicious or abnormal behaviors in the alert timeframe.
+- Investigate abnormal behaviors observed by the subject process such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+- Analyze non-system processes executed with high integrity after UAC was disabled for unknown or suspicious processes.
+- Retrieve the suspicious processes' executables and determine if they are malicious:
+  - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+    - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+      - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - File and registry access, modification, and creation activities.
+      - Service creation and launch activities.
+      - Scheduled tasks creation.
+  - Use the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet to get the files' SHA-256 hash values.
+    - Search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Restore UAC settings to the desired state.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+registry where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "change" and
+  registry.path :
+    (
+      "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\EnableLUA",
+      "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin",
+      "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\PromptOnSecureDesktop",
+      "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\EnableLUA",
+      "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin",
+      "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\PromptOnSecureDesktop"
+    ) and
+  registry.data.strings : ("0", "0x00000000")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
+** ID: T1548
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Bypass User Account Control
+** ID: T1548.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
+** ID: T1548
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Bypass User Account Control
+** ID: T1548.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Impair Defenses
+** ID: T1562
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Disable or Modify Tools
+** ID: T1562.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Modify Registry
+** ID: T1112
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-disabling-windows-defender-security-settings-via-powershell.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-disabling-windows-defender-security-settings-via-powershell.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5963b005cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-disabling-windows-defender-security-settings-via-powershell.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-disabling-windows-defender-security-settings-via-powershell]]
+=== Disabling Windows Defender Security Settings via PowerShell
+
+Identifies use of the Set-MpPreference PowerShell command to disable or weaken certain Windows Defender settings.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/defender/set-mppreference?view=windowsserver2019-ps
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Disabling Windows Defender Security Settings via PowerShell*
+
+
+Microsoft Windows Defender is an antivirus product built into Microsoft Windows, which makes it popular across multiple environments. Disabling it is a common step in threat actor playbooks.
+
+This rule monitors the execution of commands that can tamper the Windows Defender antivirus features.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Examine the command line to determine which action was executed. Based on that, examine exceptions, antivirus state, sample submission, etc.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This mechanism can be used legitimately. Analysts can dismiss the alert if the administrator is aware of the activity, the configuration is justified (for example, it is being used to deploy other security solutions or troubleshooting), and no other suspicious activity has been observed.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- Windows Defender Disabled via Registry Modification - 2ffa1f1e-b6db-47fa-994b-1512743847eb
+- Microsoft Windows Defender Tampering - fe794edd-487f-4a90-b285-3ee54f2af2d3
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Based on the command line, take actions to restore the appropriate Windows Defender antivirus configurations.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Review the privileges assigned to the user to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  (
+    process.name : ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe") or
+    ?process.pe.original_file_name in ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.dll", "powershell_ise.exe")
+  ) and
+  process.args : "Set-MpPreference" and process.args : ("-Disable*", "Disabled", "NeverSend", "-Exclusion*")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Impair Defenses
+** ID: T1562
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Disable or Modify Tools
+** ID: T1562.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-dns-over-https-enabled-via-registry.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-dns-over-https-enabled-via-registry.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6844a6d17d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-dns-over-https-enabled-via-registry.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-dns-over-https-enabled-via-registry]]
+=== DNS-over-HTTPS Enabled via Registry
+
+Identifies when a user enables DNS-over-HTTPS. This can be used to hide internet activity or the process of exfiltrating data. With this enabled, an organization will lose visibility into data such as query type, response, and originating IP, which are used to determine bad actors.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.tenforums.com/tutorials/151318-how-enable-disable-dns-over-https-doh-microsoft-edge.html
+* https://chromeenterprise.google/policies/?policy=DnsOverHttpsMode
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Austin Songer
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+registry where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type in ("creation", "change") and
+  (registry.path : "*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Edge\\BuiltInDnsClientEnabled" and
+  registry.data.strings : "1") or
+  (registry.path : "*\\SOFTWARE\\Google\\Chrome\\DnsOverHttpsMode" and
+  registry.data.strings : "secure") or
+  (registry.path : "*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\DNSOverHTTPS" and
+  registry.data.strings : "1")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Impair Defenses
+** ID: T1562
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Modify Registry
+** ID: T1112
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-dumping-account-hashes-via-built-in-commands.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-dumping-account-hashes-via-built-in-commands.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a0e05d8a58
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-dumping-account-hashes-via-built-in-commands.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-dumping-account-hashes-via-built-in-commands]]
+=== Dumping Account Hashes via Built-In Commands
+
+Identifies the execution of macOS built-in commands used to dump user account hashes. Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login information in the form of a hash. These hashes can be cracked or leveraged for lateral movement.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://apple.stackexchange.com/questions/186893/os-x-10-9-where-are-password-hashes-stored
+* https://www.unix.com/man-page/osx/8/mkpassdb/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:macos and event.type:start and
+ process.name:(defaults or mkpassdb) and process.args:(ShadowHashData or "-dump")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-dumping-of-keychain-content-via-security-command.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-dumping-of-keychain-content-via-security-command.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ba9c1273c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-dumping-of-keychain-content-via-security-command.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-dumping-of-keychain-content-via-security-command]]
+=== Dumping of Keychain Content via Security Command
+
+Adversaries may dump the content of the keychain storage data from a system to acquire credentials. Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features, including Wi-Fi and website passwords, secure notes, certificates, and Kerberos.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://ss64.com/osx/security.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type in ("start", "process_started") and process.args : "dump-keychain" and process.args : "-d"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Credentials from Password Stores
+** ID: T1555
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Keychain
+** ID: T1555.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-dynamic-linker-copy.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-dynamic-linker-copy.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c13659e35b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-dynamic-linker-copy.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-dynamic-linker-copy]]
+=== Dynamic Linker Copy
+
+Detects the copying of the Linux dynamic loader binary and subsequent file creation for the purpose of creating a backup copy. This technique was seen recently being utilized by Linux malware prior to patching the dynamic loader in order to inject and preload a malicious shared object file. This activity should never occur and if it does then it should be considered highly suspicious or malicious.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.intezer.com/blog/incident-response/orbit-new-undetected-linux-threat/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Threat: Orbit
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Dynamic Linker Copy*
+
+
+The Linux dynamic linker is responsible for loading shared libraries required by executables at runtime. It is a critical component of the Linux operating system and should not be tampered with. 
+
+Adversaries may attempt to copy the dynamic linker binary and create a backup copy before patching it to inject and preload malicious shared object files. This technique has been observed in recent Linux malware attacks and is considered highly suspicious or malicious.
+
+The detection rule 'Dynamic Linker Copy' is designed to identify such abuse by monitoring for processes with names "cp" or "rsync" that involve copying the dynamic linker binary ("/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2") and modifying the "/etc/ld.so.preload" file. Additionally, the rule checks for the creation of new files with the "so" extension on Linux systems. By detecting these activities within a short time span (1 minute), the rule aims to alert security analysts to potential malicious behavior.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html[placeholder fields] to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the dynamic linker that was copied or altered.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve File Listing Information","query":"SELECT * FROM file WHERE (\n  path = '/etc/ld.so.preload' OR\n  path = '/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2' OR\n  path = '/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2' OR\n  path = '/usr/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2' OR\n  path = '/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2'\n)\n"}}
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Additional File Listing Information","query":"SELECT\n  f.path,\n  u.username AS file_owner,\n  g.groupname AS group_owner,\n  datetime(f.atime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_access_time,\n  datetime(f.mtime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_modified_time,\n  datetime(f.ctime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_status_change_time,\n  datetime(f.btime, 'unixepoch') AS file_created_time,\n  f.size AS size_bytes\nFROM\n  file f\n  LEFT JOIN users u ON f.uid = u.uid\n  LEFT JOIN groups g ON f.gid = g.gid\nWHERE (\n  path = '/etc/ld.so.preload' OR\n  path = '/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2' OR\n  path = '/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2' OR\n  path = '/usr/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2' OR\n  path = '/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2'\n)\n"}}
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User","query":"SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"}}
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+- Investigate whether the altered scripts call other malicious scripts elsewhere on the file system. 
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+- Investigate abnormal behaviors by the subject process/user such as network connections, file modifications, and any other spawned child processes.
+  - Investigate listening ports and open sockets to look for potential command and control traffic or data exfiltration.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Listening Ports","query":"SELECT pid, address, port, socket, protocol, path FROM listening_ports"}}
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Open Sockets","query":"SELECT pid, family, remote_address, remote_port, socket, state FROM process_open_sockets"}}
+  - Identify the user account that performed the action, analyze it, and check whether it should perform this kind of action.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific User","query":"SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = {{user.name}}"}}
+- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Investigate the Account Authentication Status","query":"SELECT * FROM logged_in_users WHERE user = {{user.name}}"}}
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+- Any activity that triggered the alert and is not inherently malicious must be monitored by the security team.
+- The security team should address any potential benign true positive (B-TP), as this configuration can put the user and the domain at risk.
+- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
+
+
+*Related Rules*
+
+
+- Modification of Dynamic Linker Preload Shared Object Inside A Container - 342f834b-21a6-41bf-878c-87d116eba3ee
+- Modification of Dynamic Linker Preload Shared Object - 717f82c2-7741-4f9b-85b8-d06aeb853f4f
+- Shared Object Created or Changed by Previously Unknown Process - aebaa51f-2a91-4f6a-850b-b601db2293f4
+
+
+*Response and Remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by process.entity_id with maxspan=1m
+[process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and process.name in ("cp", "rsync") and
+   process.args in (
+     "/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2", "/etc/ld.so.preload", "/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2",
+     "/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2", "/usr/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2"
+    )]
+[file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "creation" and file.extension == "so"]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Hijack Execution Flow
+** ID: T1574
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Dynamic Linker Hijacking
+** ID: T1574.006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-elastic-agent-service-terminated.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-elastic-agent-service-terminated.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8a2ed591d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-elastic-agent-service-terminated.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-elastic-agent-service-terminated]]
+=== Elastic Agent Service Terminated
+
+Identifies the Elastic endpoint agent has stopped and is no longer running on the host. Adversaries may attempt to disable security monitoring tools in an attempt to evade detection or prevention capabilities during an intrusion. This may also indicate an issue with the agent itself and should be addressed to ensure defensive measures are back in a stable state.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* OS: Windows
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where
+/* net, sc or wmic stopping or deleting Elastic Agent on Windows */
+(event.type == "start" and
+  process.name : ("net.exe", "sc.exe", "wmic.exe","powershell.exe","taskkill.exe","PsKill.exe","ProcessHacker.exe") and
+  process.args : ("stopservice","uninstall", "stop", "disabled","Stop-Process","terminate","suspend") and
+  process.args : ("elasticendpoint", "Elastic Agent","elastic-agent","elastic-endpoint"))
+or
+/* service or systemctl used to stop Elastic Agent on Linux */
+(event.type == "end" and
+  (process.name : ("systemctl", "service") and
+    process.args : "elastic-agent" and
+    process.args : "stop")
+  or
+  /* pkill , killall used to stop Elastic Agent on Linux */
+  ( event.type == "end" and process.name : ("pkill", "killall") and process.args: "elastic-agent")
+  or
+  /* Unload Elastic Agent extension on MacOS */
+  (process.name : "kextunload" and
+    process.args : "com.apple.iokit.EndpointSecurity" and
+    event.action : "end"))
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Impair Defenses
+** ID: T1562
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Disable or Modify Tools
+** ID: T1562.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-emond-rules-creation-or-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-emond-rules-creation-or-modification.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..449ab7833f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-emond-rules-creation-or-modification.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-emond-rules-creation-or-modification]]
+=== Emond Rules Creation or Modification
+
+Identifies the creation or modification of the Event Monitor Daemon (emond) rules. Adversaries may abuse this service by writing a rule to execute commands when a defined event occurs, such as system start up or user authentication.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.xorrior.com/emond-persistence/
+* https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type != "deletion" and
+ file.path : ("/private/etc/emond.d/rules/*.plist", "/etc/emon.d/rules/*.plist", "/private/var/db/emondClients/*")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Event Triggered Execution
+** ID: T1546
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Emond
+** ID: T1546.014
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/014/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-enable-host-network-discovery-via-netsh.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-enable-host-network-discovery-via-netsh.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..779d70012f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-enable-host-network-discovery-via-netsh.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-enable-host-network-discovery-via-netsh]]
+=== Enable Host Network Discovery via Netsh
+
+Identifies use of the netsh.exe program to enable host discovery via the network. Attackers can use this command-line tool to weaken the host firewall settings.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Enable Host Network Discovery via Netsh*
+
+
+The Windows Defender Firewall is a native component that provides host-based, two-way network traffic filtering for a device and blocks unauthorized network traffic flowing into or out of the local device.
+
+Attackers can enable Network Discovery on the Windows firewall to find other systems present in the same network. Systems with this setting enabled will communicate with other systems using broadcast messages, which can be used to identify targets for lateral movement. This rule looks for the setup of this setting using the netsh utility.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Inspect the host for suspicious or abnormal behavior in the alert timeframe.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This mechanism can be used legitimately. Analysts can dismiss the alert if the Administrator is aware of the activity and there are justifications for this configuration.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Disable Network Discovery:
+    - Using netsh: `netsh advfirewall firewall set rule group="Network Discovery" new enable=No`
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Review the privileges assigned to the involved users to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+process.name : "netsh.exe" and
+process.args : ("firewall", "advfirewall") and process.args : "group=Network Discovery" and process.args : "enable=Yes"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Impair Defenses
+** ID: T1562
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Disable or Modify System Firewall
+** ID: T1562.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-encoded-executable-stored-in-the-registry.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-encoded-executable-stored-in-the-registry.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..efe7f1eef8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-encoded-executable-stored-in-the-registry.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-encoded-executable-stored-in-the-registry]]
+=== Encoded Executable Stored in the Registry
+
+Identifies registry write modifications to hide an encoded portable executable. This could be indicative of adversary defense evasion by avoiding the storing of malicious content directly on disk.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+registry where host.os.type == "windows" and
+/* update here with encoding combinations */
+ registry.data.strings : "TVqQAAMAAAAEAAAA*"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Modify Registry
+** ID: T1112
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
+** ID: T1140
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-encrypting-files-with-winrar-or-7z.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-encrypting-files-with-winrar-or-7z.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ff83954ad3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-encrypting-files-with-winrar-or-7z.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-encrypting-files-with-winrar-or-7z]]
+=== Encrypting Files with WinRar or 7z
+
+Identifies use of WinRar or 7z to create an encrypted files. Adversaries will often compress and encrypt data in preparation for exfiltration.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/12/02/turla-crutch-keeping-back-door-open/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Collection
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Encrypting Files with WinRar or 7z*
+
+
+Attackers may compress and/or encrypt data collected before exfiltration. Compressing the data can help obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less apparent upon inspection by a defender.
+
+These steps are usually done in preparation for exfiltration, meaning the attack may be in its final stages.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Retrieve the encrypted file.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Check if the password used in the encryption was included in the command line.
+- Decrypt the `.rar`/`.zip` and check if the information is sensitive.
+- If the password is not available, and the format is `.zip` or the option used in WinRAR is not the `-hp`, list the file names included in the encrypted file.
+- Investigate if the file was transferred to an attacker-controlled server.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Backup software can use these utilities. Check the `process.parent.executable` and `process.parent.command_line` fields to determine what triggered the encryption.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Prioritize cases that involve personally identifiable information (PII) or other classified data.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+(
+  (
+    (
+      process.name:"rar.exe" or ?process.code_signature.subject_name == "win.rar GmbH" or
+      ?process.pe.original_file_name == "Command line RAR"
+    ) and
+    process.args == "a" and process.args : ("-hp*", "-p*", "/hp*", "/p*")
+  ) or
+  (
+    ?process.pe.original_file_name in ("7z.exe", "7za.exe") and
+    process.args == "a" and process.args : "-p*"
+  )
+) and
+  not process.parent.executable : (
+        "C:\\Program Files\\*.exe",
+        "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe",
+        "?:\\ManageEngine\\*\\jre\\bin\\java.exe",
+        "?:\\Nox\\bin\\Nox.exe"
+      )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Collection
+** ID: TA0009
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Archive Collected Data
+** ID: T1560
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Archive via Utility
+** ID: T1560.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Data from Local System
+** ID: T1005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-enumeration-command-spawned-via-wmiprvse.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-enumeration-command-spawned-via-wmiprvse.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..efb8957ffc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-enumeration-command-spawned-via-wmiprvse.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-enumeration-command-spawned-via-wmiprvse]]
+=== Enumeration Command Spawned via WMIPrvSE
+
+Identifies native Windows host and network enumeration commands spawned by the Windows Management Instrumentation Provider Service (WMIPrvSE).
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and process.command_line != null and 
+  process.name:
+  (
+    "arp.exe",
+    "dsquery.exe",
+    "dsget.exe",
+    "gpresult.exe",
+    "hostname.exe",
+    "ipconfig.exe",
+    "nbtstat.exe",
+    "net.exe",
+    "net1.exe",
+    "netsh.exe",
+    "netstat.exe",
+    "nltest.exe",
+    "ping.exe",
+    "qprocess.exe",
+    "quser.exe",
+    "qwinsta.exe",
+    "reg.exe",
+    "sc.exe",
+    "systeminfo.exe",
+    "tasklist.exe",
+    "tracert.exe",
+    "whoami.exe"
+  ) and
+  process.parent.name:"wmiprvse.exe" and 
+  not (
+    process.name : "sc.exe" and process.args : "RemoteRegistry" and process.args : "start=" and 
+    process.args : ("demand", "disabled")
+  ) and
+  not process.args : "tenable_mw_scan"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Windows Management Instrumentation
+** ID: T1047
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Discovery
+** ID: TA0007
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote System Discovery
+** ID: T1018
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Account Discovery
+** ID: T1087
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Software Discovery
+** ID: T1518
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/
+* Technique:
+** Name: System Network Configuration Discovery
+** ID: T1016
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Internet Connection Discovery
+** ID: T1016.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016/001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Process Discovery
+** ID: T1057
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-enumeration-of-administrator-accounts.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-enumeration-of-administrator-accounts.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..20f7c71ca7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-enumeration-of-administrator-accounts.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-enumeration-of-administrator-accounts]]
+=== Enumeration of Administrator Accounts
+
+Identifies instances of lower privilege accounts enumerating Administrator accounts or groups using built-in Windows tools.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Discovery
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 111
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Enumeration of Administrator Accounts*
+
+
+After successfully compromising an environment, attackers may try to gain situational awareness to plan their next steps. This can happen by running commands to enumerate network resources, users, connections, files, and installed security software.
+
+This rule looks for the execution of the `net` and `wmic` utilities to enumerate administrator-related users or groups in the domain and local machine scope. Attackers can use this information to plan their next steps of the attack, such as mapping targets for credential compromise and other post-exploitation activities.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate any abnormal account behavior, such as command executions, file creations or modifications, and network connections.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Discovery activities are not inherently malicious if they occur in isolation. As long as the analyst did not identify suspicious activity related to the user or host, such alerts can be dismissed.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- AdFind Command Activity - eda499b8-a073-4e35-9733-22ec71f57f3a
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+(
+  (
+    (
+      (process.name : "net.exe" or ?process.pe.original_file_name == "net.exe") or
+      ((process.name : "net1.exe" or ?process.pe.original_file_name == "net1.exe") and not process.parent.name : "net.exe")
+    ) and
+    process.args : ("group", "user", "localgroup") and
+    process.args : ("*admin*", "Domain Admins", "Remote Desktop Users", "Enterprise Admins", "Organization Management")
+    and not process.args : ("/add", "/delete")
+  ) or
+  (
+    (process.name : "wmic.exe" or ?process.pe.original_file_name == "wmic.exe") and
+    process.args : ("group", "useraccount")
+  )
+) and not user.id : ("S-1-5-18", "S-1-5-19", "S-1-5-20")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Discovery
+** ID: TA0007
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Permission Groups Discovery
+** ID: T1069
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Local Groups
+** ID: T1069.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Domain Groups
+** ID: T1069.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Account Discovery
+** ID: T1087
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Local Account
+** ID: T1087.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Domain Account
+** ID: T1087.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-enumeration-of-kernel-modules.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-enumeration-of-kernel-modules.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e524c88754
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-enumeration-of-kernel-modules.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-enumeration-of-kernel-modules]]
+=== Enumeration of Kernel Modules
+
+Loadable Kernel Modules (or LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. This identifies attempts to enumerate information about a kernel module.
+
+*Rule type*: new_terms
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Discovery
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+
+*Version*: 209
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:linux and event.type:start and event.action:(exec or exec_event) and (
+ (process.name:(lsmod or modinfo)) or 
+ (process.name:kmod and process.args:list) or 
+ (process.name:depmod and process.args:(--all or -a))
+) and not process.parent.name:(mkinitramfs or cryptroot or framebuffer or dracut or jem or thin-provisioning-tools
+or readykernel or lvm2 or vz-start or iscsi or mdadm or ovalprobes or bcache or plymouth or dkms or overlayroot or 
+weak-modules or zfs)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Discovery
+** ID: TA0007
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/
+* Technique:
+** Name: System Information Discovery
+** ID: T1082
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-enumeration-of-privileged-local-groups-membership.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-enumeration-of-privileged-local-groups-membership.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b16769afac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-enumeration-of-privileged-local-groups-membership.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-enumeration-of-privileged-local-groups-membership]]
+=== Enumeration of Privileged Local Groups Membership
+
+Identifies instances of an unusual process enumerating built-in Windows privileged local groups membership like Administrators or Remote Desktop users.
+
+*Rule type*: new_terms
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-system.*
+* logs-windows.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Discovery
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+
+*Version*: 211
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Enumeration of Privileged Local Groups Membership*
+
+
+After successfully compromising an environment, attackers may try to gain situational awareness to plan their next steps. This can happen by running commands to enumerate network resources, users, connections, files, and installed security software.
+
+This rule looks for the enumeration of privileged local groups' membership by suspicious processes, and excludes known legitimate utilities and programs installed. Attackers can use this information to decide the next steps of the attack, such as mapping targets for credential compromise and other post-exploitation activities.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Identify the process, host and user involved on the event.
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate any abnormal account behavior, such as command executions, file creations or modifications, and network connections.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Discovery activities are not inherently malicious if they occur in isolation. As long as the analyst did not identify suspicious activity related to the user or host, such alerts can be dismissed.
+- If this rule is noisy in your environment due to expected activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The 'Audit Security Group Management' audit policy must be configured (Success).
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Policies >
+Windows Settings >
+Security Settings >
+Advanced Audit Policies Configuration >
+Audit Policies >
+Account Management >
+Audit Security Group Management (Success)
+```
+
+Microsoft introduced the https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4799[event used] in this detection rule on Windows 10 and Windows Server 2016 or later operating systems.
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+host.os.type:windows and event.category:iam and event.action:user-member-enumerated and 
+  (
+    group.name:(*Admin* or "RemoteDesktopUsers") or
+    winlog.event_data.TargetSid:("S-1-5-32-544" or "S-1-5-32-555")
+  ) and 
+  not (
+    winlog.event_data.SubjectUserName: *$ or
+    winlog.event_data.SubjectUserSid: ("S-1-5-19" or "S-1-5-20") or 
+    winlog.event_data.CallerProcessName:("-" or 
+                                       *\:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\VSSVC.exe or 
+                                       *\:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\SearchIndexer.exe or 
+                                       *\:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\CompatTelRunner.exe or 
+                                       *\:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\oobe\\\\msoobe.exe or
+                                       *\:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\net1.exe or 
+                                       *\:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\svchost.exe or 
+                                       *\:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\Netplwiz.exe or 
+                                       *\:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\msiexec.exe or
+                                       *\:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\CloudExperienceHostBroker.exe or
+                                       *\:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\RuntimeBroker.exe or
+                                       *\:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\wbem\\\\WmiPrvSE.exe or
+                                       *\:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\SrTasks.exe or
+                                       *\:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\diskshadow.exe or
+                                       *\:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\dfsrs.exe or
+                                       *\:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\vssadmin.exe or
+                                       *\:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\dllhost.exe or
+                                       *\:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\mmc.exe or
+                                       *\:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\SettingSyncHost.exe or
+                                       *\:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\inetsrv\\\\w3wp.exe or
+                                       *\:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\wsmprovhost.exe or
+                                       *\:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\spool\\\\drivers\\\\x64\\\\3\\\\x3jobt3?.exe or
+                                       *\:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\mstsc.exe or
+                                       *\:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\esentutl.exe or
+                                       *\:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\RecoveryDrive.exe or
+                                       *\:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\SystemPropertiesComputerName.exe or
+                                       *\:\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\msiexec.exe or
+                                       *\:\\\\Windows\\\\ImmersiveControlPanel\\\\SystemSettings.exe or
+                                       *\:\\\\Windows\\\\Temp\\\\rubrik_vmware???\\\\snaptool.exe or
+                                       *\:\\\\Windows\\\\VeeamVssSupport\\\\VeeamGuestHelper.exe or
+                                       ?\:\\\\WindowsAzure\\\\*WaAppAgent.exe or
+                                       ?\:\\\\Program?Files?\(x86\)\\\\*.exe or
+                                       ?\:\\\\Program?Files\\\\*.exe or
+                                       ?\:\\\\$WINDOWS.~BT\\\\Sources\\\\*.exe
+                                      )
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Discovery
+** ID: TA0007
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Permission Groups Discovery
+** ID: T1069
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Local Groups
+** ID: T1069.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-enumeration-of-users-or-groups-via-built-in-commands.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-enumeration-of-users-or-groups-via-built-in-commands.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b95532211f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-enumeration-of-users-or-groups-via-built-in-commands.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-enumeration-of-users-or-groups-via-built-in-commands]]
+=== Enumeration of Users or Groups via Built-in Commands
+
+Identifies the execution of macOS built-in commands related to account or group enumeration. Adversaries may use account and group information to orient themselves before deciding how to act.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Discovery
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type in ("start", "process_started") and
+  (
+    process.name : ("ldapsearch", "dsmemberutil") or
+    (process.name : "dscl" and
+      process.args : ("read", "-read", "list", "-list", "ls", "search", "-search") and
+      process.args : ("/Active Directory/*", "/Users*", "/Groups*"))
+	) and
+  not process.parent.executable : ("/Applications/NoMAD.app/Contents/MacOS/NoMAD",
+     "/Applications/ZoomPresence.app/Contents/MacOS/ZoomPresence",
+     "/Applications/Sourcetree.app/Contents/MacOS/Sourcetree",
+     "/Library/Application Support/JAMF/Jamf.app/Contents/MacOS/JamfDaemon.app/Contents/MacOS/JamfDaemon",
+     "/Applications/Jamf Connect.app/Contents/MacOS/Jamf Connect",
+     "/usr/local/jamf/bin/jamf",
+     "/Library/Application Support/AirWatch/hubd",
+     "/opt/jc/bin/jumpcloud-agent",
+     "/Applications/ESET Endpoint Antivirus.app/Contents/MacOS/esets_daemon",
+     "/Applications/ESET Endpoint Security.app/Contents/MacOS/esets_daemon",
+     "/Library/PrivilegedHelperTools/com.fortinet.forticlient.uninstall_helper"
+    )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Discovery
+** ID: TA0007
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Permission Groups Discovery
+** ID: T1069
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Local Groups
+** ID: T1069.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Account Discovery
+** ID: T1087
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Local Account
+** ID: T1087.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-esxi-discovery-via-find.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-esxi-discovery-via-find.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b35c0da463
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-esxi-discovery-via-find.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-esxi-discovery-via-find]]
+=== ESXI Discovery via Find
+
+Identifies instances where the 'find' command is started on a Linux system with arguments targeting specific VM-related paths, such as "/etc/vmware/", "/usr/lib/vmware/", or "/vmfs/*". These paths are associated with VMware virtualization software, and their presence in the find command arguments may indicate that a threat actor is attempting to search for, analyze, or manipulate VM-related files and configurations on the system.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/massive-esxiargs-ransomware-attack-targets-vmware-esxi-servers-worldwide/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Discovery
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
+
+*Version*: 6
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and process.name == "find" and process.args : ("/etc/vmware/*", "/usr/lib/vmware/*", "/vmfs/*")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Discovery
+** ID: TA0007
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Software Discovery
+** ID: T1518
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-esxi-discovery-via-grep.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-esxi-discovery-via-grep.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3637608afc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-esxi-discovery-via-grep.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-esxi-discovery-via-grep]]
+=== ESXI Discovery via Grep
+
+Identifies instances where a process named 'grep', 'egrep', or 'pgrep' is started on a Linux system with arguments related to virtual machine (VM) files, such as "vmdk", "vmx", "vmxf", "vmsd", "vmsn", "vswp", "vmss", "nvram", or "vmem". These file extensions are associated with VM-related file formats, and their presence in grep command arguments may indicate that a threat actor is attempting to search for, analyze, or manipulate VM files on the system.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/massive-esxiargs-ransomware-attack-targets-vmware-esxi-servers-worldwide/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Discovery
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
+
+*Version*: 6
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and process.name in ("grep", "egrep", "pgrep") and process.args in (
+  "vmdk", "vmx", "vmxf", "vmsd", "vmsn", "vswp", "vmss", "nvram", "vmem"
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Discovery
+** ID: TA0007
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Software Discovery
+** ID: T1518
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-esxi-timestomping-using-touch-command.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-esxi-timestomping-using-touch-command.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8a0e5ebd0d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-esxi-timestomping-using-touch-command.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-esxi-timestomping-using-touch-command]]
+=== ESXI Timestomping using Touch Command
+
+Identifies instances where the 'touch' command is executed on a Linux system with the "-r" flag, which is used to modify the timestamp of a file based on another file's timestamp. The rule targets specific VM-related paths, such as "/etc/vmware/", "/usr/lib/vmware/", or "/vmfs/*". These paths are associated with VMware virtualization software, and their presence in the touch command arguments may indicate that a threat actor is attempting to tamper with timestamps of VM-related files and configurations on the system.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/massive-esxiargs-ransomware-attack-targets-vmware-esxi-servers-worldwide/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
+
+*Version*: 8
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and process.name == "touch" and process.args == "-r" and
+process.args : ("/etc/vmware/*", "/usr/lib/vmware/*", "/vmfs/*")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Indicator Removal
+** ID: T1070
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Timestomp
+** ID: T1070.006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/006/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-exchange-mailbox-export-via-powershell.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-exchange-mailbox-export-via-powershell.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cddb4a338d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-exchange-mailbox-export-via-powershell.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-exchange-mailbox-export-via-powershell]]
+=== Exchange Mailbox Export via PowerShell
+
+Identifies the use of the Exchange PowerShell cmdlet, New-MailBoxExportRequest, to export the contents of a primary mailbox or archive to a .pst file. Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/
+* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/new-mailboxexportrequest?view=exchange-ps
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/siestagraph-new-implant-uncovered-in-asean-member-foreign-ministry
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Collection
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: PowerShell Logs
+
+*Version*: 8
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Exchange Mailbox Export via PowerShell*
+
+
+The `New-MailBoxExportRequest` cmdlet is used to begin the process of exporting contents of a primary mailbox or archive to a .pst file. Note that this is done on a per-mailbox basis and this cmdlet is available only in on-premises Exchange.
+Attackers can abuse this functionality in preparation for exfiltrating contents, which is likely to contain sensitive and strategic data.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate the export operation:
+  - Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+  - Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+  - Check if this operation was approved and performed according to the organization's change management policy.
+  - Retrieve the operation status and use the `Get-MailboxExportRequest` cmdlet to review previous requests.
+  - By default, no group in Exchange has the privilege to import or export mailboxes. Investigate administrators that assigned the "Mailbox Import Export" privilege for abnormal activity.
+- Investigate if there is a significant quantity of export requests in the alert timeframe. This operation is done on a per-mailbox basis and can be part of a mass export.
+- If the operation was completed successfully:
+  - Check if the file is on the path specified in the command.
+  - Investigate if the file was compressed, archived, or retrieved by the attacker for exfiltration.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This mechanism can be used legitimately. Analysts can dismiss the alert if the administrator is aware of the activity and it is done with proper approval.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- If the involved host is not the Exchange server, isolate the host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Use the `Remove-MailboxExportRequest` cmdlet to remove fully or partially completed export requests.
+- Prioritize cases that involve personally identifiable information (PII) or other classified data.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Review the privileges of users with the "Mailbox Import Export" privilege to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:windows and
+  powershell.file.script_block_text : "New-MailboxExportRequest" and
+  not (
+    file.path : (
+      ?\:\\\\Users\\\\*\\\\AppData\\\\Roaming\\\\Microsoft\\\\Exchange\\\\RemotePowerShell\\\\* or
+      ?\:\\\\Users\\\\*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Temp\\\\tmp_????????.???\\\\tmp_????????.???.ps?1* or
+      ?\:\\\\Windows\\\\TEMP\\\\tmp_????????.???\\\\tmp_????????.???.ps?1*
+    ) and file.name:(*.psd1 or *.psm1)
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Collection
+** ID: TA0009
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Data from Local System
+** ID: T1005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Email Collection
+** ID: T1114
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Local Email Collection
+** ID: T1114.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/001/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Remote Email Collection
+** ID: T1114.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-executable-file-creation-with-multiple-extensions.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-executable-file-creation-with-multiple-extensions.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..29c2bec6ce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-executable-file-creation-with-multiple-extensions.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-executable-file-creation-with-multiple-extensions]]
+=== Executable File Creation with Multiple Extensions
+
+Masquerading can allow an adversary to evade defenses and better blend in with the environment. One way it occurs is when the name or location of a file is manipulated as a means of tricking a user into executing what they think is a benign file type but is actually executable code.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "creation" and file.extension : "exe" and
+  file.name regex~ """.*\.(vbs|vbe|bat|js|cmd|wsh|ps1|pdf|docx?|xlsx?|pptx?|txt|rtf|gif|jpg|png|bmp|hta|txt|img|iso)\.exe""" and
+  not (process.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\msiexec.exe", "C:\\Users\\*\\QGIS_SCCM\\Files\\QGIS-OSGeo4W-*-Setup-x86_64.exe") and
+       file.path : "?:\\Program Files\\QGIS *\\apps\\grass\\*.exe") and
+  not process.executable : ("/bin/sh", "/usr/sbin/MailScanner", "/usr/bin/perl")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Masquerading
+** ID: T1036
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Double File Extension
+** ID: T1036.007
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/007/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: User Execution
+** ID: T1204
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Malicious File
+** ID: T1204.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-executable-masquerading-as-kernel-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-executable-masquerading-as-kernel-process.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c97d6c3b63
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-executable-masquerading-as-kernel-process.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-executable-masquerading-as-kernel-process]]
+=== Executable Masquerading as Kernel Process
+
+Monitors for kernel processes with associated process executable fields that are not empty. Unix kernel processes such as kthreadd and kworker typically do not have process.executable fields associated to them. Attackers may attempt to hide their malicious programs by masquerading as legitimate kernel processes.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://sandflysecurity.com/blog/linux-stealth-rootkit-malware-with-edr-evasion-analyzed/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+
+*Version*: 2
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and
+process.name : ("kworker*", "kthread*") and process.executable != null
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Hide Artifacts
+** ID: T1564
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Masquerading
+** ID: T1036
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Masquerade Task or Service
+** ID: T1036.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-from-unusual-directory-command-line.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-from-unusual-directory-command-line.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bceda9d377
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-from-unusual-directory-command-line.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,267 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-from-unusual-directory-command-line]]
+=== Execution from Unusual Directory - Command Line
+
+Identifies process execution from suspicious default Windows directories. This may be abused by adversaries to hide malware in trusted paths.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 111
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Execution from Unusual Directory - Command Line*
+
+
+This rule looks for the execution of scripts from unusual directories. Attackers can use system or application paths to hide malware and make the execution less suspicious.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Examine the command line to determine which commands or scripts were executed.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the script using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- If this activity is expected and noisy in your environment, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of parent process executable and command line conditions.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- Process Execution from an Unusual Directory - ebfe1448-7fac-4d59-acea-181bd89b1f7f
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  process.name : ("wscript.exe",
+                  "cscript.exe",
+                  "rundll32.exe",
+                  "regsvr32.exe",
+                  "cmstp.exe",
+                  "RegAsm.exe",
+                  "installutil.exe",
+                  "mshta.exe",
+                  "RegSvcs.exe",
+                  "powershell.exe",
+                  "pwsh.exe",
+                  "cmd.exe") and
+
+  /* add suspicious execution paths here */
+  process.args : ("C:\\PerfLogs\\*",
+                  "C:\\Users\\Public\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\Tasks\\*",
+                  "C:\\Intel\\*",
+                  "C:\\AMD\\Temp\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\AppReadiness\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\ServiceState\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\security\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\IdentityCRL\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\Branding\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\csc\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\DigitalLocker\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\en-US\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\wlansvc\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\Prefetch\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\Fonts\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\diagnostics\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\TAPI\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\INF\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\System32\\Speech\\*",
+                  "C:\\windows\\tracing\\*",
+                  "c:\\windows\\IME\\*",
+                  "c:\\Windows\\Performance\\*",
+                  "c:\\windows\\intel\\*",
+                  "c:\\windows\\ms\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\dot3svc\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\panther\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\RemotePackages\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\OCR\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\appcompat\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\apppatch\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\addins\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\Setup\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\Help\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\SKB\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\Vss\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\servicing\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\CbsTemp\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\Logs\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\WaaS\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\twain_32\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\ShellExperiences\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\ShellComponents\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\PLA\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\Migration\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\debug\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\Cursors\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\Containers\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\Boot\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\bcastdvr\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\TextInput\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\security\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\schemas\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\SchCache\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\Resources\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\rescache\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\Provisioning\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\PrintDialog\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\PolicyDefinitions\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\media\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\Globalization\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\L2Schemas\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\LiveKernelReports\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\ModemLogs\\*",
+                  "C:\\Windows\\ImmersiveControlPanel\\*",
+                  "C:\\$Recycle.Bin\\*") and
+
+  /* noisy FP patterns */
+
+  not process.parent.executable : ("C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\DriverStore\\FileRepository\\*\\igfxCUIService*.exe",
+                                   "C:\\Windows\\System32\\spacedeskService.exe",
+                                   "C:\\Program Files\\Dell\\SupportAssistAgent\\SRE\\SRE.exe") and
+  not (process.name : "rundll32.exe" and
+       process.args : ("uxtheme.dll,#64",
+                       "PRINTUI.DLL,PrintUIEntry",
+                       "?:\\Windows\\System32\\FirewallControlPanel.dll,ShowNotificationDialog",
+                       "?:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\Speech\\SpeechUX\\sapi.cpl",
+                       "?:\\Windows\\system32\\shell32.dll,OpenAs_RunDLL")) and
+
+  not (process.name : "cscript.exe" and process.args : "?:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\calluxxprovider.vbs") and
+
+  not (process.name : "cmd.exe" and process.args : "?:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\powercfg.exe" and process.args : "?:\\WINDOWS\\inf\\PowerPlan.log") and
+
+  not (process.name : "regsvr32.exe" and process.args : "?:\\Windows\\Help\\OEM\\scripts\\checkmui.dll") and
+
+  not (process.name : "cmd.exe" and
+       process.parent.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\oobe\\windeploy.exe",
+                                    "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\ossec-agent\\wazuh-agent.exe",
+                                    "?:\\Windows\\System32\\igfxCUIService.exe",
+                                    "?:\\Windows\\Temp\\IE*.tmp\\IE*-support\\ienrcore.exe"))
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Windows Command Shell
+** ID: T1059.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Masquerading
+** ID: T1036
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Match Legitimate Name or Location
+** ID: T1036.005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-of-com-object-via-xwizard.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-of-com-object-via-xwizard.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bfd477b968
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-of-com-object-via-xwizard.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-of-com-object-via-xwizard]]
+=== Execution of COM object via Xwizard
+
+Windows Component Object Model (COM) is an inter-process communication (IPC) component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects or executable code. Xwizard can be used to run a COM object created in registry to evade defensive counter measures.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Xwizard/
+* http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/07/31/the-wizard-of-x-oppa-plugx-style/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+ (process.name : "xwizard.exe" or ?process.pe.original_file_name : "xwizard.exe") and
+ (
+   (process.args : "RunWizard" and process.args : "{*}") or
+   (process.executable != null and
+     not process.executable : ("C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\xwizard.exe", "C:\\Windows\\System32\\xwizard.exe")
+   )
+ )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Inter-Process Communication
+** ID: T1559
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Component Object Model
+** ID: T1559.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-of-file-written-or-modified-by-microsoft-office.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-of-file-written-or-modified-by-microsoft-office.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bf93c79c7f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-of-file-written-or-modified-by-microsoft-office.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-of-file-written-or-modified-by-microsoft-office]]
+=== Execution of File Written or Modified by Microsoft Office
+
+Identifies an executable created by a Microsoft Office application and subsequently executed. These processes are often launched via scripts inside documents or during exploitation of Microsoft Office applications.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 60m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-120m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Execution of File Written or Modified by Microsoft Office*
+
+
+Microsoft Office, a widely used suite of productivity applications, is frequently targeted by attackers due to its popularity in corporate environments. Attackers exploit its extensive capabilities, like macro scripts in Word and Excel, to gain initial access to systems. They often use Office documents as delivery mechanisms for malware or phishing attempts, taking advantage of their trusted status in professional settings.
+
+This rule searches for executable files written by MS Office applications executed in sequence. This is most likely the result of the execution of malicious documents or exploitation for initial access or privilege escalation. This rule can also detect suspicious processes masquerading as the MS Office applications.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Retrieve MS Office documents received and opened by the user that could cause this behavior. Common locations include, but are not limited to, the Downloads and Document folders and the folder configured at the email client.
+- Determine if the collected files are malicious:
+  - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+    - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+      - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - File and registry access, modification, and creation activities.
+      - Service creation and launch activities.
+      - Scheduled task creation.
+  - Use the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet to get the files' SHA-256 hash values.
+    - Search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+  - If the malicious file was delivered via phishing:
+    - Block the email sender from sending future emails.
+    - Block the malicious web pages.
+    - Remove emails from the sender from mailboxes.
+    - Consider improvements to the security awareness program.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence with maxspan=2h
+  [file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type != "deletion" and file.extension : "exe" and
+     (process.name : "WINWORD.EXE" or
+      process.name : "EXCEL.EXE" or
+      process.name : "OUTLOOK.EXE" or
+      process.name : "POWERPNT.EXE" or
+      process.name : "eqnedt32.exe" or
+      process.name : "fltldr.exe" or
+      process.name : "MSPUB.EXE" or
+      process.name : "MSACCESS.EXE")
+  ] by host.id, file.path
+  [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and 
+   not (process.name : "NewOutlookInstaller.exe" and process.code_signature.subject_name : "Microsoft Corporation" and process.code_signature.trusted == true)
+  ] by host.id, process.executable
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Initial Access
+** ID: TA0001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Phishing
+** ID: T1566
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Spearphishing Attachment
+** ID: T1566.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Spearphishing Link
+** ID: T1566.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-of-file-written-or-modified-by-pdf-reader.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-of-file-written-or-modified-by-pdf-reader.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dd4b7639ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-of-file-written-or-modified-by-pdf-reader.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-of-file-written-or-modified-by-pdf-reader]]
+=== Execution of File Written or Modified by PDF Reader
+
+Identifies a suspicious file that was written by a PDF reader application and subsequently executed. These processes are often launched via exploitation of PDF applications.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 60m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-120m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Execution of File Written or Modified by PDF Reader*
+
+
+PDF is a common file type used in corporate environments and most machines have software to handle these files. This creates a vector where attackers can exploit the engines and technology behind this class of software for initial access or privilege escalation.
+
+This rule searches for executable files written by PDF reader software and executed in sequence. This is most likely the result of exploitation for privilege escalation or initial access. This rule can also detect suspicious processes masquerading as PDF readers.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Retrieve the PDF documents received and opened by the user that could cause this behavior. Common locations include, but are not limited to, the Downloads and Document folders and the folder configured at the email client.
+- Determine if the collected files are malicious:
+  - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+    - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+      - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - File and registry access, modification, and creation activities.
+      - Service creation and launch activities.
+      - Scheduled task creation.
+  - Use the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet to get the files' SHA-256 hash values.
+    - Search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+  - If the malicious file was delivered via phishing:
+    - Block the email sender from sending future emails.
+    - Block the malicious web pages.
+    - Remove emails from the sender from mailboxes.
+    - Consider improvements to the security awareness program.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence with maxspan=2h
+  [file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type != "deletion" and file.extension : "exe" and
+     (process.name : "AcroRd32.exe" or
+      process.name : "rdrcef.exe" or
+      process.name : "FoxitPhantomPDF.exe" or
+      process.name : "FoxitReader.exe") and
+     not (file.name : "FoxitPhantomPDF.exe" or
+          file.name : "FoxitPhantomPDFUpdater.exe" or
+          file.name : "FoxitReader.exe" or
+          file.name : "FoxitReaderUpdater.exe" or
+          file.name : "AcroRd32.exe" or
+          file.name : "rdrcef.exe")
+  ] by host.id, file.path
+  [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start"] by host.id, process.executable
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Initial Access
+** ID: TA0001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Phishing
+** ID: T1566
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Spearphishing Attachment
+** ID: T1566.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Spearphishing Link
+** ID: T1566.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-of-persistent-suspicious-program.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-of-persistent-suspicious-program.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..adcc8554e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-of-persistent-suspicious-program.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-of-persistent-suspicious-program]]
+=== Execution of Persistent Suspicious Program
+
+Identifies execution of suspicious persistent programs (scripts, rundll32, etc.) by looking at process lineage and command line usage.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+/* userinit followed by explorer followed by early child process of explorer (unlikely to be launched interactively) within 1m */
+sequence by host.id, user.name with maxspan=1m
+  [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and process.name : "userinit.exe" and process.parent.name : "winlogon.exe"]
+  [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and process.name : "explorer.exe"]
+  [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and process.parent.name : "explorer.exe" and
+   /* add suspicious programs here */
+   process.pe.original_file_name in ("cscript.exe",
+                                     "wscript.exe",
+                                     "PowerShell.EXE",
+                                     "MSHTA.EXE",
+                                     "RUNDLL32.EXE",
+                                     "REGSVR32.EXE",
+                                     "RegAsm.exe",
+                                     "MSBuild.exe",
+                                     "InstallUtil.exe") and
+    /* add potential suspicious paths here */
+    process.args : ("C:\\Users\\*", "C:\\ProgramData\\*", "C:\\Windows\\Temp\\*", "C:\\Windows\\Tasks\\*", "C:\\PerfLogs\\*", "C:\\Intel\\*")
+   ]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
+** ID: T1547
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
+** ID: T1547.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-via-electron-child-process-node-js-module.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-via-electron-child-process-node-js-module.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ee2e2c5ba5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-via-electron-child-process-node-js-module.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-via-electron-child-process-node-js-module]]
+=== Execution via Electron Child Process Node.js Module
+
+Identifies attempts to execute a child process from within the context of an Electron application using the child_process Node.js module. Adversaries may abuse this technique to inherit permissions from parent processes.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.matthewslipper.com/2019/09/22/everything-you-wanted-electron-child-process.html
+* https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/macos-injection-via-third-party-frameworks/
+* https://nodejs.org/api/child_process.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:macos and event.type:(start or process_started) and process.args:("-e" and const*require*child_process*)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
+** ID: T1548
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-via-local-sxs-shared-module.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-via-local-sxs-shared-module.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f3ef05846f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-via-local-sxs-shared-module.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-via-local-sxs-shared-module]]
+=== Execution via local SxS Shared Module
+
+Identifies the creation, change, or deletion of a DLL module within a Windows SxS local folder. Adversaries may abuse shared modules to execute malicious payloads by instructing the Windows module loader to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-redirection
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+The SxS DotLocal folder is a legitimate feature that can be abused to hijack standard modules loading order by forcing an executable on the same application.exe.local folder to load a malicious DLL module from the same directory.
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "windows" and file.extension : "dll" and file.path : "C:\\*\\*.exe.local\\*.dll"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Shared Modules
+** ID: T1129
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-via-mssql-xp-cmdshell-stored-procedure.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-via-mssql-xp-cmdshell-stored-procedure.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ad47732644
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-via-mssql-xp-cmdshell-stored-procedure.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-via-mssql-xp-cmdshell-stored-procedure]]
+=== Execution via MSSQL xp_cmdshell Stored Procedure
+
+Identifies execution via MSSQL xp_cmdshell stored procedure. Malicious users may attempt to elevate their privileges by using xp_cmdshell, which is disabled by default, thus, it's important to review the context of it's use.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://thedfirreport.com/2022/07/11/select-xmrig-from-sqlserver/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Execution via MSSQL xp_cmdshell Stored Procedure*
+
+
+Microsoft SQL Server (MSSQL) has procedures meant to extend its functionality, the Extended Stored Procedures. These procedures are external functions written in C/C++; some provide interfaces for external programs. This is the case for xp_cmdshell, which spawns a Windows command shell and passes in a string for execution. Attackers can use this to execute commands on the system running the SQL server, commonly to escalate their privileges and establish persistence.
+
+The xp_cmdshell procedure is disabled by default, but when used, it has the same security context as the MSSQL Server service account, which is often privileged.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate any abnormal account behavior, such as command executions, file creations or modifications, and network connections.
+- Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+- Examine the command line to determine if the command executed is potentially harmful or malicious.
+- Inspect the host for suspicious or abnormal behavior in the alert timeframe.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This mechanism can be used legitimately, but it brings inherent risk. The security team must monitor any activity of it. If recurrent tasks are being executed using this mechanism, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a full command line.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Ensure that SQL servers are not directly exposed to the internet. If there is a business justification for such, use an allowlist to allow only connections from known legitimate sources.
+- Disable the xp_cmdshell stored procedure.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and process.parent.name : "sqlservr.exe" and 
+  (
+   (process.name : "cmd.exe" and 
+    not process.args : ("\\\\*", "diskfree", "rmdir", "mkdir", "dir", "del", "rename", "bcp", "*XMLNAMESPACES*", 
+                        "?:\\MSSQL\\Backup\\Jobs\\sql_agent_backup_job.ps1", "K:\\MSSQL\\Backup\\msdb", "K:\\MSSQL\\Backup\\Logins")) or 
+                        
+   (process.name : "vpnbridge.exe" or ?process.pe.original_file_name : "vpnbridge.exe") or 
+
+   (process.name : "certutil.exe" or ?process.pe.original_file_name == "CertUtil.exe") or 
+
+   (process.name : "bitsadmin.exe" or ?process.pe.original_file_name == "bitsadmin.exe")
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Server Software Component
+** ID: T1505
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: SQL Stored Procedures
+** ID: T1505.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/001/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Windows Command Shell
+** ID: T1059.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-via-tsclient-mountpoint.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-via-tsclient-mountpoint.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d71a910e70
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-via-tsclient-mountpoint.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-via-tsclient-mountpoint]]
+=== Execution via TSClient Mountpoint
+
+Identifies execution from the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) shared mountpoint tsclient on the target host. This may indicate a lateral movement attempt.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://posts.specterops.io/revisiting-remote-desktop-lateral-movement-8fb905cb46c3
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and process.executable : "\\Device\\Mup\\tsclient\\*.exe"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote Services
+** ID: T1021
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Remote Desktop Protocol
+** ID: T1021.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-with-explicit-credentials-via-scripting.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-with-explicit-credentials-via-scripting.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d430e50595
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-with-explicit-credentials-via-scripting.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-with-explicit-credentials-via-scripting]]
+=== Execution with Explicit Credentials via Scripting
+
+Identifies execution of the security_authtrampoline process via a scripting interpreter. This occurs when programs use AuthorizationExecute-WithPrivileges from the Security.framework to run another program with root privileges. It should not be run by itself, as this is a sign of execution with explicit logon credentials.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://objectivebythesea.com/v2/talks/OBTS_v2_Thomas.pdf
+* https://www.manpagez.com/man/8/security_authtrampoline/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:macos and event.type:(start or process_started) and
+ process.name:"security_authtrampoline" and
+ process.parent.name:(osascript or com.apple.automator.runner or sh or bash or dash or zsh or python* or Python or perl* or php* or ruby or pwsh)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Valid Accounts
+** ID: T1078
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
+** ID: T1548
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Elevated Execution with Prompt
+** ID: T1548.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/004/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-exporting-exchange-mailbox-via-powershell.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-exporting-exchange-mailbox-via-powershell.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6ab5738e98
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-exporting-exchange-mailbox-via-powershell.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-exporting-exchange-mailbox-via-powershell]]
+=== Exporting Exchange Mailbox via PowerShell
+
+Identifies the use of the Exchange PowerShell cmdlet, New-MailBoxExportRequest, to export the contents of a primary mailbox or archive to a .pst file. Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/
+* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/new-mailboxexportrequest?view=exchange-ps
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Collection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Exporting Exchange Mailbox via PowerShell*
+
+
+Email mailboxes and their information can be valuable assets for attackers. Company mailboxes often contain sensitive information such as login credentials, intellectual property, financial data, and personal information, making them high-value targets for malicious actors.
+
+The `New-MailBoxExportRequest` cmdlet is used to begin the process of exporting contents of a primary mailbox or archive to a .pst file. Note that this is done on a per-mailbox basis and this cmdlet is available only in on-premises Exchange.
+
+Attackers can abuse this functionality in preparation for exfiltrating contents, which is likely to contain sensitive and strategic data.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate the export operation:
+  - Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+  - Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+  - Check if this operation was approved and performed according to the organization's change management policy.
+  - Retrieve the operation status and use the `Get-MailboxExportRequest` cmdlet to review previous requests.
+  - By default, no group in Exchange has the privilege to import or export mailboxes. Investigate administrators that assigned the "Mailbox Import Export" privilege for abnormal activity.
+- Investigate if there is a significant quantity of export requests in the alert timeframe. This operation is done on a per-mailbox basis and can be part of a mass export.
+- If the operation was completed successfully:
+  - Check if the file is on the path specified in the command.
+  - Investigate if the file was compressed, archived, or retrieved by the attacker for exfiltration.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This mechanism can be used legitimately. Analysts can dismiss the alert if the administrator is aware of the activity and it is done with proper approval.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- If the involved host is not the Exchange server, isolate the host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Use the `Remove-MailboxExportRequest` cmdlet to remove fully or partially completed export requests.
+- Prioritize cases that involve personally identifiable information (PII) or other classified data.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Review the privileges of users with the "Mailbox Import Export" privilege to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  process.name: ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe") and 
+  process.command_line : ("*MailboxExportRequest*", "*-Mailbox*-ContentFilter*")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Collection
+** ID: TA0009
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Data from Local System
+** ID: T1005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Email Collection
+** ID: T1114
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Remote Email Collection
+** ID: T1114.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-file-creation-execution-and-self-deletion-in-suspicious-directory.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-file-creation-execution-and-self-deletion-in-suspicious-directory.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..46d9dfa57d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-file-creation-execution-and-self-deletion-in-suspicious-directory.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-file-creation-execution-and-self-deletion-in-suspicious-directory]]
+=== File Creation, Execution and Self-Deletion in Suspicious Directory
+
+This rule monitors for the creation of a file, followed by its execution and self-deletion in a short timespan within a directory often used for malicious purposes by threat actors. This behavior is often used by malware to execute malicious code and delete itself to hide its tracks.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 4
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id, user.id with maxspan=1m
+  [file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "creation" and 
+   process.name in ("curl", "wget", "fetch", "ftp", "sftp", "scp", "rsync", "ld") and 
+   file.path : ("/dev/shm/*", "/run/shm/*", "/tmp/*", "/var/tmp/*",
+     "/run/*", "/var/run/*", "/var/www/*", "/proc/*/fd/*")] by file.name
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and 
+   process.parent.name in ("bash", "dash", "ash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish")] by process.name
+  [file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "deletion" and not process.name in ("rm", "ld") and 
+   file.path : ("/dev/shm/*", "/run/shm/*", "/tmp/*", "/var/tmp/*",
+     "/run/*", "/var/run/*", "/var/www/*", "/proc/*/fd/*")] by file.name
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Unix Shell
+** ID: T1059.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-file-creation-time-changed.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-file-creation-time-changed.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2c51901ab5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-file-creation-time-changed.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-file-creation-time-changed]]
+=== File Creation Time Changed
+
+Identifies modification of a file creation time. Adversaries may modify file time attributes to blend malicious content with existing files. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file often to mimic files that are in trusted directories.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 5
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.code : "2" and
+
+ /* Requires Sysmon EventID 2 - File creation time change */
+ event.action : "File creation time changed*" and 
+ 
+ not process.executable : 
+          ("?:\\Program Files\\*", 
+           "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*", 
+           "?:\\Windows\\system32\\cleanmgr.exe",
+           "?:\\Windows\\system32\\msiexec.exe", 
+           "?:\\Windows\\syswow64\\msiexec.exe", 
+           "?:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe", 
+           "?:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\backgroundTaskHost.exe",
+           "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome\\Application\\chrome.exe", 
+           "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox.exe",
+           "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\slack\\app-*\\slack.exe", 
+           "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\GitHubDesktop\\app-*\\GitHubDesktop.exe",
+           "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\Teams.exe", 
+           "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\OneDrive\\OneDrive.exe") and 
+ not file.extension : ("temp", "tmp", "~tmp", "xml", "newcfg") and not user.name : ("SYSTEM", "Local Service", "Network Service") and
+ not file.name : ("LOG", "temp-index", "license.rtf", "iconcache_*.db")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Indicator Removal
+** ID: T1070
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Timestomp
+** ID: T1070.006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/006/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-file-deletion-via-shred.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-file-deletion-via-shred.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e08c1172cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-file-deletion-via-shred.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-file-deletion-via-shred]]
+=== File Deletion via Shred
+
+Malware or other files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave traces behind as to what was done within a network and how. Adversaries may remove these files over the course of an intrusion to keep their footprint low or remove them at the end as part of the post-intrusion cleanup process.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and process.name == "shred" and process.args in (
+  "-u", "--remove", "-z", "--zero"
+) and not process.parent.name == "logrotate"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Indicator Removal
+** ID: T1070
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: File Deletion
+** ID: T1070.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-file-made-immutable-by-chattr.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-file-made-immutable-by-chattr.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cd7ffb51a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-file-made-immutable-by-chattr.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-file-made-immutable-by-chattr]]
+=== File made Immutable by Chattr
+
+Detects a file being made immutable using the chattr binary. Making a file immutable means it cannot be deleted or renamed, no link can be created to this file, most of the file's metadata can not be modified, and the file can not be opened in write mode. Threat actors will commonly utilize this to prevent tampering or modification of their malicious files or any system files they have modified for purposes of persistence (e.g .ssh, /etc/passwd, etc.).
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 33
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 111
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
+- Elastic Defend
+- Auditbeat
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Auditbeat Setup*
+
+Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit the activities of users and processes on your systems. For example, you can use Auditbeat to collect and centralize audit events from the Linux Audit Framework. You can also use Auditbeat to detect changes to critical files, like binaries and configuration files, and identify potential security policy violations.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Auditbeat on a Linux System:*
+
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setup-repositories.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-docker.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html[helper guide].
+- For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Custom Ingest Pipeline*
+
+For versions <8.2, you need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate `event.ingested` with @timestamp for non-elastic-agent indexes, like auditbeats/filebeat/winlogbeat etc. For more details to add a custom ingest pipeline refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html[guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and user.id == "0" and
+  process.executable : "/usr/bin/chattr" and process.args : ("-*i*", "+*i*") and
+  not process.parent.executable: ("/lib/systemd/systemd", "/usr/local/uems_agent/bin/*", "/usr/lib/systemd/systemd") and
+  not process.parent.name in ("systemd", "cf-agent", "ntpdate", "xargs", "px", "preinst", "auth")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: File and Directory Permissions Modification
+** ID: T1222
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification
+** ID: T1222.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-file-permission-modification-in-writable-directory.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-file-permission-modification-in-writable-directory.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a2e12121fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-file-permission-modification-in-writable-directory.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-file-permission-modification-in-writable-directory]]
+=== File Permission Modification in Writable Directory
+
+Identifies file permission modifications in common writable directories by a non-root user. Adversaries often drop files or payloads into a writable directory and change permissions prior to execution.
+
+*Rule type*: new_terms
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 210
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
+- Elastic Defend
+- Auditbeat
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Auditbeat Setup*
+
+Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit the activities of users and processes on your systems. For example, you can use Auditbeat to collect and centralize audit events from the Linux Audit Framework. You can also use Auditbeat to detect changes to critical files, like binaries and configuration files, and identify potential security policy violations.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Auditbeat on a Linux System:*
+
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setup-repositories.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-docker.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html[helper guide].
+- For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+host.os.type:linux and event.category:process and event.type:start and
+process.name:(chattr or chgrp or chmod or chown) and process.working_directory:(/dev/shm or /tmp or /var/tmp) and
+not process.parent.name:(apt-key or update-motd-updates-available)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: File and Directory Permissions Modification
+** ID: T1222
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-file-transfer-or-listener-established-via-netcat.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-file-transfer-or-listener-established-via-netcat.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1ef6c191ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-file-transfer-or-listener-established-via-netcat.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-file-transfer-or-listener-established-via-netcat]]
+=== File Transfer or Listener Established via Netcat
+
+A netcat process is engaging in network activity on a Linux host. Netcat is often used as a persistence mechanism by exporting a reverse shell or by serving a shell on a listening port. Netcat is also sometimes used for data exfiltration.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* http://pentestmonkey.net/cheat-sheet/shells/reverse-shell-cheat-sheet
+* https://www.sans.org/security-resources/sec560/netcat_cheat_sheet_v1.pdf
+* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Netcat
+* https://www.hackers-arise.com/hacking-fundamentals
+* https://null-byte.wonderhowto.com/how-to/hack-like-pro-use-netcat-swiss-army-knife-hacking-tools-0148657/
+* https://levelup.gitconnected.com/ethical-hacking-part-15-netcat-nc-and-netcat-f6a8f7df43fd
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Netcat Network Activity*
+
+
+Netcat is a dual-use command line tool that can be used for various purposes, such as port scanning, file transfers, and connection tests. Attackers can abuse its functionality for malicious purposes such creating bind shells or reverse shells to gain access to the target system.
+
+A reverse shell is a mechanism that's abused to connect back to an attacker-controlled system. It effectively redirects the system's input and output and delivers a fully functional remote shell to the attacker. Even private systems are vulnerable since the connection is outgoing.
+
+A bind shell is a type of backdoor that attackers set up on the target host and binds to a specific port to listen for an incoming connection from the attacker.
+
+This rule identifies potential reverse shell or bind shell activity using Netcat by checking for the execution of Netcat followed by a network connection.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Examine the command line to identify if the command is suspicious.
+- Extract and examine the target domain or IP address.
+  - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+  - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+  - Scope other potentially compromised hosts in your environment by mapping hosts that also communicated with the domain or IP address.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate any abnormal account behavior, such as command executions, file creations or modifications, and network connections.
+- Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process such as network connections, file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Netcat is a dual-use tool that can be used for benign or malicious activity. It is included in some Linux distributions, so its presence is not necessarily suspicious. Some normal use of this program, while uncommon, may originate from scripts, automation tools, and frameworks.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+- Take actions to terminate processes and connections used by the attacker.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
+- Elastic Defend
+- Auditbeat
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Auditbeat Setup*
+
+Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit the activities of users and processes on your systems. For example, you can use Auditbeat to collect and centralize audit events from the Linux Audit Framework. You can also use Auditbeat to detect changes to critical files, like binaries and configuration files, and identify potential security policy violations.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Auditbeat on a Linux System:*
+
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setup-repositories.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-docker.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html[helper guide].
+- For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by process.entity_id
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and
+      process.name:("nc","ncat","netcat","netcat.openbsd","netcat.traditional") and (
+          /* bind shell to echo for command execution */
+          (process.args:("-l","-p") and process.args:("-c","echo","$*"))
+          /* bind shell to specific port */
+          or process.args:("-l","-p","-lp")
+          /* reverse shell to command-line interpreter used for command execution */
+          or (process.args:("-e") and process.args:("/bin/bash","/bin/sh"))
+          /* file transfer via stdout */
+          or process.args:(">","<")
+          /* file transfer via pipe */
+          or (process.args:("|") and process.args:("nc","ncat"))
+      )]
+  [network where host.os.type == "linux" and (process.name == "nc" or process.name == "ncat" or process.name == "netcat" or
+                  process.name == "netcat.openbsd" or process.name == "netcat.traditional")]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Unix Shell
+** ID: T1059.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-finder-sync-plugin-registered-and-enabled.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-finder-sync-plugin-registered-and-enabled.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..03f9609c3a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-finder-sync-plugin-registered-and-enabled.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-finder-sync-plugin-registered-and-enabled]]
+=== Finder Sync Plugin Registered and Enabled
+
+Finder Sync plugins enable users to extend Finder’s functionality by modifying the user interface. Adversaries may abuse this feature by adding a rogue Finder Plugin to repeatedly execute malicious payloads for persistence.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/specterops/presentations/raw/master/Leo%20Pitt/Hey_Im_Still_in_Here_Modern_macOS_Persistence_SO-CON2020.pdf
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type in ("start", "process_started") and process.name : "pluginkit" and
+  process.args : "-e" and process.args : "use" and process.args : "-i" and
+  not process.args :
+  (
+    "com.google.GoogleDrive.FinderSyncAPIExtension",
+    "com.google.drivefs.findersync",
+    "com.boxcryptor.osx.Rednif",
+    "com.adobe.accmac.ACCFinderSync",
+    "com.microsoft.OneDrive.FinderSync",
+    "com.insynchq.Insync.Insync-Finder-Integration",
+    "com.box.desktop.findersyncext"
+  ) and
+  not process.parent.executable : (
+    "/Library/Application Support/IDriveforMac/IDriveHelperTools/FinderPluginApp.app/Contents/MacOS/FinderPluginApp"
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Create or Modify System Process
+** ID: T1543
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-first-time-seen-aws-secret-value-accessed-in-secrets-manager.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-first-time-seen-aws-secret-value-accessed-in-secrets-manager.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b61acd734e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-first-time-seen-aws-secret-value-accessed-in-secrets-manager.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-first-time-seen-aws-secret-value-accessed-in-secrets-manager]]
+=== First Time Seen AWS Secret Value Accessed in Secrets Manager
+
+An adversary with access to a compromised AWS service such as an EC2 instance, Lambda function, or other service may attempt to leverage the compromised service to access secrets in AWS Secrets Manager. This rule looks for the first time a specific user identity has programmatically retrieved a specific secret value from Secrets Manager using the `GetSecretValue` action.  This rule assumes that AWS services such as Lambda functions and EC2 instances are setup with IAM role's assigned that have the necessary permissions to access the secrets in Secrets Manager. An adversary with access to a compromised AWS service such as an EC2 instance, Lambda function, or other service would rely on the compromised service's IAM role to access the secrets in Secrets Manager.
+
+*Rule type*: new_terms
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* filebeat-*
+* logs-aws.cloudtrail*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 10m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-60m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/secretsmanager/latest/apireference/API_GetSecretValue.html
+* https://detectioninthe.cloud/ttps/credential_access/access_secret_in_secrets_manager/
+* https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-services/aws-secrets-manager-enum
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Cloud
+* Data Source: AWS
+* Data Source: Amazon Web Services
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+
+*Version*: 309
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Nick Jones
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating First Time Seen AWS Secret Value Accessed in Secrets Manager*
+
+
+AWS Secrets Manager is a service that enables the replacement of hardcoded credentials in code, including passwords, with an API call to Secrets Manager to retrieve the secret programmatically.
+
+This rule looks for the retrieval of credentials using `GetSecretValue` action in Secrets Manager programmatically. This is a https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/rules-ui-create.html#create-new-terms-rule[New Terms] rule indicating this is the first time a specific user identity has successfuly retrieved a specific secret value from Secrets Manager within the last 15 days.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Identify the account and its role in the environment, and inspect the related policy.
+- Identify the applications that should use this account.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user account during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate abnormal values in the `user_agent.original` field by comparing them with the intended and authorized usage and historical data. Suspicious user agent values include non-SDK, AWS CLI, custom user agents, etc.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences involving other users.
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Considering the source IP address and geolocation of the user who issued the command:
+    - Do they look normal for the calling user?
+    - If the source is an EC2 IP address, is it associated with an EC2 instance in one of your accounts or is the source IP from an EC2 instance that's not under your control?
+    - If it is an authorized EC2 instance, is the activity associated with normal behavior for the instance role or roles? Are there any other alerts or signs of suspicious activity involving this instance?
+- Review IAM permission policies for the user identity and specific secrets accessed.
+- Examine the request parameters. These might indicate the source of the program or the nature of its tasks.
+- If you suspect the account has been compromised, scope potentially compromised assets by tracking servers, services, and data accessed by the account in the last 24 hours.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- False positives may occur due to the intended usage of the service. Tuning is needed in order to have higher confidence. Consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user agent and IP address conditions.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Disable or limit the account during the investigation and response.
+- Identify the possible impact of the incident and prioritize accordingly; the following actions can help you gain context:
+    - Identify the account role in the cloud environment.
+    - Assess the criticality of affected services and servers.
+    - Work with your IT team to identify and minimize the impact on users.
+    - Identify if the attacker is moving laterally and compromising other accounts, servers, or services.
+    - Identify any regulatory or legal ramifications related to this activity.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Rotate secrets or delete API keys as needed to revoke the attacker's access to the environment. Work with your IT teams to minimize the impact on business operations during these actions.
+- Check if unauthorized new users were created, remove unauthorized new accounts, and request password resets for other IAM users.
+- Consider enabling multi-factor authentication for users.
+- Review the permissions assigned to the implicated user to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
+- Implement security best practices https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/security-best-practices/[outlined] by AWS.
+- Take the actions needed to return affected systems, data, or services to their normal operational levels.
+- Identify the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection via the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+The AWS Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.dataset:aws.cloudtrail and event.provider:secretsmanager.amazonaws.com and
+    event.action:GetSecretValue and event.outcome:success and aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.session_context.session_issuer.type: Role and
+    not user_agent.name: ("Chrome" or "Firefox" or "Safari" or "Edge" or "Brave" or "Opera")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Steal Application Access Token
+** ID: T1528
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-first-time-seen-removable-device.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-first-time-seen-removable-device.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..db3cb63be5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-first-time-seen-removable-device.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-first-time-seen-removable-device]]
+=== First Time Seen Removable Device
+
+Identifies newly seen removable devices by device friendly name using registry modification events. While this activity is not inherently malicious, analysts can use those events to aid monitoring for data exfiltration over those devices.
+
+*Rule type*: new_terms
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://winreg-kb.readthedocs.io/en/latest/sources/system-keys/USB-storage.html
+* https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/usbcon/usb-device-specific-registry-settings
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Initial Access
+* Tactic: Exfiltration
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:"registry" and host.os.type:"windows" and registry.value:"FriendlyName" and registry.path:*USBSTOR*
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Initial Access
+** ID: TA0001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Replication Through Removable Media
+** ID: T1091
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1091/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Exfiltration
+** ID: TA0010
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium
+** ID: T1052
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1052/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Exfiltration over USB
+** ID: T1052.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1052/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-firsttime-seen-account-performing-dcsync.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-firsttime-seen-account-performing-dcsync.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6b9d2e1983
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-firsttime-seen-account-performing-dcsync.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-firsttime-seen-account-performing-dcsync]]
+=== FirstTime Seen Account Performing DCSync
+
+This rule identifies when a User Account starts the Active Directory Replication Process for the first time. Attackers can use the DCSync technique to get credential information of individual accounts or the entire domain, thus compromising the entire domain.
+
+*Rule type*: new_terms
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-system.*
+* logs-windows.*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/06_credential_access/WIN-180815210510.html
+* https://threathunterplaybook.com/library/windows/active_directory_replication.html?highlight=dcsync#directory-replication-services-auditing
+* https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_ad_replication_non_machine_account.yml
+* https://github.com/atc-project/atomic-threat-coverage/blob/master/Atomic_Threat_Coverage/Logging_Policies/LP_0027_windows_audit_directory_service_access.md
+* https://attack.stealthbits.com/privilege-escalation-using-mimikatz-dcsync
+* https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/credentials/dumping/dcsync
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring
+* Data Source: Active Directory
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+
+*Version*: 10
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating FirstTime Seen Account Performing DCSync*
+
+
+Active Directory replication is the process by which the changes that originate on one domain controller are automatically transferred to other domain controllers that store the same data.
+
+Active Directory data consists of objects that have properties, or attributes. Each object is an instance of an object class, and object classes and their respective attributes are defined in the Active Directory schema. Objects are defined by the values of their attributes, and changes to attribute values must be transferred from the domain controller on which they occur to every other domain controller that stores a replica of an affected object.
+
+Adversaries can use the DCSync technique that uses Windows Domain Controller's API to simulate the replication process from a remote domain controller, compromising major credential material such as the Kerberos krbtgt keys that are used legitimately for creating tickets, but also for forging tickets by attackers. This attack requires some extended privileges to succeed (DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All), which are granted by default to members of the Administrators, Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, and Domain Controllers groups. Privileged accounts can be abused to grant controlled objects the right to DCsync/Replicate.
+
+More details can be found on https://threathunterplaybook.com/library/windows/active_directory_replication.html?highlight=dcsync#directory-replication-services-auditing[Threat Hunter Playbook] and https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/credentials/dumping/dcsync[The Hacker Recipes].
+
+This rule monitors for when a Windows Event ID 4662 (Operation was performed on an Active Directory object) with the access mask 0x100 (Control Access) and properties that contain at least one of the following or their equivalent Schema-Id-GUID (DS-Replication-Get-Changes, DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All, DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set) is seen in the environment for the first time in the last 15 days.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Contact the account and system owners and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Correlate security events 4662 and 4624 (Logon Type 3) by their Logon ID (`winlog.logon.id`) on the Domain Controller (DC) that received the replication request. This will tell you where the AD replication request came from, and if it came from another DC or not.
+- Scope which credentials were compromised (for example, whether all accounts were replicated or specific ones).
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Administrators may use custom accounts on Azure AD Connect; investigate if this is part of a new Azure AD account setup, and ensure it is properly secured. If the activity was expected and there is no other suspicious activity involving the host or user, the analyst can dismiss the alert.
+- Although replicating Active Directory (AD) data to non-Domain Controllers is not a common practice and is generally not recommended from a security perspective, some software vendors may require it for their products to function correctly. Investigate if this is part of a new product setup, and ensure it is properly secured. If the activity was expected and there is no other suspicious activity involving the host or user, the analyst can dismiss the alert.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- If the entire domain or the `krbtgt` user was compromised:
+  - Activate your incident response plan for total Active Directory compromise which should include, but not be limited to, a password reset (twice) of the `krbtgt` user.
+- Investigate how the attacker escalated privileges and identify systems they used to conduct lateral movement. Use this information to determine ways the attacker could regain access to the environment.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The 'Audit Directory Service Access' logging policy must be configured for (Success, Failure).
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Policies >
+Windows Settings >
+Security Settings >
+Advanced Audit Policies Configuration >
+Audit Policies >
+DS Access >
+Audit Directory Service Access (Success,Failure)
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.action:("Directory Service Access" or "object-operation-performed") and event.code:"4662" and
+ winlog.event_data.Properties:(*DS-Replication-Get-Changes* or *DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All* or
+                               *DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set* or *1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2* or
+                               *1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2* or *89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c*) and
+ not winlog.event_data.SubjectUserName:(*$ or MSOL_*)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: DCSync
+** ID: T1003.006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/006/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Valid Accounts
+** ID: T1078
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Domain Accounts
+** ID: T1078.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-full-user-mode-dumps-enabled-system-wide.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-full-user-mode-dumps-enabled-system-wide.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0f431d7e1a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-full-user-mode-dumps-enabled-system-wide.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-full-user-mode-dumps-enabled-system-wide]]
+=== Full User-Mode Dumps Enabled System-Wide
+
+Identifies the enable of the full user-mode dumps feature system-wide. This feature allows Windows Error Reporting (WER) to collect data after an application crashes. This setting is a requirement for the LSASS Shtinkering attack, which fakes the communication of a crash on LSASS, generating a dump of the process memory, which gives the attacker access to the credentials present on the system without having to bring malware to the system. This setting is not enabled by default, and applications must create their registry subkeys to hold settings that enable them to collect dumps.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wer/collecting-user-mode-dumps
+* https://github.com/deepinstinct/Lsass-Shtinkering
+* https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2030/DEF%20CON%2030%20presentations/Asaf%20Gilboa%20-%20LSASS%20Shtinkering%20Abusing%20Windows%20Error%20Reporting%20to%20Dump%20LSASS.pdf
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 6
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+registry where host.os.type == "windows" and
+    registry.path : (
+        "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Windows Error Reporting\\LocalDumps\\DumpType",
+        "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Windows Error Reporting\\LocalDumps\\DumpType"
+    ) and
+    registry.data.strings : ("2", "0x00000002") and
+    not (process.executable : "?:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe" and user.id : ("S-1-5-18", "S-1-5-19", "S-1-5-20"))
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: LSASS Memory
+** ID: T1003.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Modify Registry
+** ID: T1112
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-group-policy-abuse-for-privilege-addition.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-group-policy-abuse-for-privilege-addition.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b914a23fc0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-group-policy-abuse-for-privilege-addition.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-group-policy-abuse-for-privilege-addition]]
+=== Group Policy Abuse for Privilege Addition
+
+Detects the first occurrence of a modification to Group Policy Object Attributes to add privileges to user accounts or use them to add users as local admins.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-system.*
+* logs-windows.*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: None ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/atc-project/atc-data/blob/master/docs/Logging_Policies/LP_0025_windows_audit_directory_service_changes.md
+* https://labs.f-secure.com/tools/sharpgpoabuse
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: Active Directory
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Group Policy Abuse for Privilege Addition*
+
+
+Group Policy Objects (GPOs) can be used to add rights and/or modify Group Membership on GPOs by changing the contents of an INF file named GptTmpl.inf, which is responsible for storing every setting under the Security Settings container in the GPO. This file is unique for each GPO, and only exists if the GPO contains security settings. Example Path: "\\DC.com\SysVol\DC.com\Policies\{PolicyGUID}\Machine\Microsoft\Windows NT\SecEdit\GptTmpl.inf"
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- This attack abuses a legitimate mechanism of Active Directory, so it is important to determine whether the activity is legitimate and the administrator is authorized to perform this operation.
+- Retrieve the contents of the `GptTmpl.inf` file, and under the `Privilege Rights` section, look for potentially dangerous high privileges, for example: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege, SeEnableDelegationPrivilege, etc.
+- Inspect the user security identifiers (SIDs) associated with these privileges, and if they should have these privileges.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Inspect whether the user that has done the modifications should be allowed to. The user name can be found in the `winlog.event_data.SubjectUserName` field.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- Scheduled Task Execution at Scale via GPO - 15a8ba77-1c13-4274-88fe-6bd14133861e
+- Startup/Logon Script added to Group Policy Object - 16fac1a1-21ee-4ca6-b720-458e3855d046
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- The investigation and containment must be performed in every computer controlled by the GPO, where necessary.
+- Remove the script from the GPO.
+- Check if other GPOs have suspicious scripts attached.
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The 'Audit Directory Service Changes' audit policy must be configured (Success Failure).
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Policies >
+Windows Settings >
+Security Settings >
+Advanced Audit Policies Configuration >
+Audit Policies >
+DS Access >
+Audit Directory Service Changes (Success,Failure)
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.code: "5136" and
+  winlog.event_data.AttributeLDAPDisplayName:"gPCMachineExtensionNames" and
+  winlog.event_data.AttributeValue:(*827D319E-6EAC-11D2-A4EA-00C04F79F83A* and *803E14A0-B4FB-11D0-A0D0-00A0C90F574B*)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Domain Policy Modification
+** ID: T1484
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Group Policy Modification
+** ID: T1484.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-group-policy-discovery-via-microsoft-gpresult-utility.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-group-policy-discovery-via-microsoft-gpresult-utility.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b0dd23d8dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-group-policy-discovery-via-microsoft-gpresult-utility.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-group-policy-discovery-via-microsoft-gpresult-utility]]
+=== Group Policy Discovery via Microsoft GPResult Utility
+
+Detects the usage of gpresult.exe to query group policy objects. Attackers may query group policy objects during the reconnaissance phase after compromising a system to gain a better understanding of the active directory environment and possible methods to escalate privileges or move laterally.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Discovery
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 7
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Group Policy Discovery via Microsoft GPResult Utility*
+
+
+Group Policy is a Windows feature that allows administrators to manage and configure settings for users and computers in an Active Directory environment. The Microsoft GPResult utility (gpresult.exe) is a command-line tool used to query and display Group Policy Objects (GPOs) applied to a system. Attackers may abuse this utility to gain insights into the active directory environment and identify potential privilege escalation or lateral movement opportunities.
+
+The detection rule 'Group Policy Discovery via Microsoft GPResult Utility' is designed to identify the usage of gpresult.exe with specific arguments ("/z", "/v", "/r", "/x") that are commonly used by adversaries during the reconnaissance phase to perform group policy discovery.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Review the alert details to understand the context of the gpresult.exe usage, such as the user account, system, and time of execution.
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate any abnormal account behavior, such as command executions, file creations or modifications, and network connections.
+- Inspect the host for suspicious or abnormal behavior in the alert timeframe.
+- Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+- Investigate any abnormal behavior by the parent process, such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any other spawned child processes.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Discovery activities are not inherently malicious if they occur in isolation. As long as the analyst did not identify suspicious activity related to the user or host, such alerts can be dismissed.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Reimage the host operating system or restore the compromised files to clean versions.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection via the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+(process.name: "gpresult.exe" or ?process.pe.original_file_name == "gprslt.exe") and process.args: ("/z", "/v", "/r", "/x")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Discovery
+** ID: TA0007
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Group Policy Discovery
+** ID: T1615
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1615/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-high-mean-of-process-arguments-in-an-rdp-session.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-high-mean-of-process-arguments-in-an-rdp-session.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fe19e577a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-high-mean-of-process-arguments-in-an-rdp-session.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-high-mean-of-process-arguments-in-an-rdp-session]]
+=== High Mean of Process Arguments in an RDP Session
+
+A machine learning job has detected unusually high number of process arguments in an RDP session. Executing sophisticated attacks such as lateral movement can involve the use of complex commands, obfuscation mechanisms, redirection and piping, which in turn increases the number of arguments in a command.
+
+*Rule type*: machine_learning
+
+*Rule indices*: None
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 15m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-12h ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html
+* https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/lmd
+* https://www.elastic.co/blog/detecting-lateral-movement-activity-a-new-kibana-integration
+* https://www.elastic.co/blog/remote-desktop-protocol-connections-elastic-security
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Use Case: Lateral Movement Detection
+* Rule Type: ML
+* Rule Type: Machine Learning
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The rule requires the Lateral Movement Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as file and Windows RDP process events collected by the Elastic Defend integration.  
+
+
+*Lateral Movement Detection Setup*
+
+The Lateral Movement Detection integration detects lateral movement activity by identifying abnormalities in file and Windows RDP events. Anomalies are detected using Elastic's Anomaly Detection feature.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Lateral Movement Detection.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+- Windows RDP process events collected by the https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/endpoint[Elastic Defend] integration.
+- To install Elastic Defend, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed to install assets associated with the Lateral Movement Detection integration:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Lateral Movement Detection and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Under Settings, click Install Lateral Movement Detection assets and follow the prompts to install the assets.
+
+
+*Anomaly Detection Setup*
+
+Before you can enable rules for Lateral Movement Detection, you'll need to enable the corresponding Anomaly Detection jobs.
+- Before enabling the Anomaly Detection jobs, confirm that the Pivot Transform asset is installed and actively gathering data in the destination index `ml-rdp-lmd`.
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Analytics, click Machine Learning.
+- Under Anomaly Detection, click Jobs, and then click "Create job". Select the Data View containing your transformed RDP process data i.e.`ml-rdp-lmd`.
+- If the selected Data View contains events that match the query in https://github.com/elastic/integrations/blob/main/packages/lmd/kibana/ml_module/lmd-ml.json[this] configuration file, you will see a card for Lateral Movement Detection under "Use preconfigured jobs".
+- Keep the default settings and click "Create jobs" to start the anomaly detection jobs and datafeeds.
+
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation of Remote Services
+** ID: T1210
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-high-mean-of-rdp-session-duration.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-high-mean-of-rdp-session-duration.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..aa80dc1b10
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-high-mean-of-rdp-session-duration.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-high-mean-of-rdp-session-duration]]
+=== High Mean of RDP Session Duration
+
+A machine learning job has detected unusually high mean of RDP session duration. Long RDP sessions can be used to evade detection mechanisms via session persistence, and might be used to perform tasks such as lateral movement, that might require uninterrupted access to a compromised machine.
+
+*Rule type*: machine_learning
+
+*Rule indices*: None
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 15m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-12h ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html
+* https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/lmd
+* https://www.elastic.co/blog/detecting-lateral-movement-activity-a-new-kibana-integration
+* https://www.elastic.co/blog/remote-desktop-protocol-connections-elastic-security
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Use Case: Lateral Movement Detection
+* Rule Type: ML
+* Rule Type: Machine Learning
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The rule requires the Lateral Movement Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as file and Windows RDP process events collected by the Elastic Defend integration.  
+
+
+*Lateral Movement Detection Setup*
+
+The Lateral Movement Detection integration detects lateral movement activity by identifying abnormalities in file and Windows RDP events. Anomalies are detected using Elastic's Anomaly Detection feature.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Lateral Movement Detection.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+- Windows RDP process events collected by the https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/endpoint[Elastic Defend] integration.
+- To install Elastic Defend, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed to install assets associated with the Lateral Movement Detection integration:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Lateral Movement Detection and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Under Settings, click Install Lateral Movement Detection assets and follow the prompts to install the assets.
+
+
+*Anomaly Detection Setup*
+
+Before you can enable rules for Lateral Movement Detection, you'll need to enable the corresponding Anomaly Detection jobs.
+- Before enabling the Anomaly Detection jobs, confirm that the Pivot Transform asset is installed and actively gathering data in the destination index `ml-rdp-lmd`.
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Analytics, click Machine Learning.
+- Under Anomaly Detection, click Jobs, and then click "Create job". Select the Data View containing your transformed RDP process data i.e.`ml-rdp-lmd`.
+- If the selected Data View contains events that match the query in https://github.com/elastic/integrations/blob/main/packages/lmd/kibana/ml_module/lmd-ml.json[this] configuration file, you will see a card for Lateral Movement Detection under "Use preconfigured jobs".
+- Keep the default settings and click "Create jobs" to start the anomaly detection jobs and datafeeds.
+
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation of Remote Services
+** ID: T1210
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-high-number-of-process-and-or-service-terminations.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-high-number-of-process-and-or-service-terminations.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1ab3c9167d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-high-number-of-process-and-or-service-terminations.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-high-number-of-process-and-or-service-terminations]]
+=== High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations
+
+This rule identifies a high number (10) of process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.
+
+*Rule type*: threshold
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/luna-ransomware-attack-pattern
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Impact
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations*
+
+
+Attackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted, or stop security and backup solutions, etc.
+
+This rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.
+- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:windows and event.type:start and process.name:(net.exe or sc.exe or taskkill.exe) and
+ process.args:(stop or pause or delete or "/PID" or "/IM" or "/T" or "/F" or "/t" or "/f" or "/im" or "/pid") and
+ not process.parent.name:osquerybeat.exe
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Impact
+** ID: TA0040
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Service Stop
+** ID: T1489
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-high-number-of-process-terminations.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-high-number-of-process-terminations.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..942cd3701e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-high-number-of-process-terminations.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-high-number-of-process-terminations]]
+=== High Number of Process Terminations
+
+This rule identifies a high number (10) of process terminations via pkill from the same host within a short time period.
+
+*Rule type*: threshold
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Impact
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
+
+*Version*: 112
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating High Number of Process Terminations*
+
+
+Attackers can kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can kill process associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted,or stop security and backup solutions, etc.
+
+This rule identifies a high number (10) of process terminations via pkill from the same host within a short time period.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Examine the entry point to the host and user in action via the Analyse View.
+  - Identify the session entry leader and session user.
+- Examine the contents of session leading to the process termination(s) via the Session View.
+  - Examine the command execution pattern in the session, which may lead to suspricous activities.
+- Examine the process killed during the malicious execution
+  - Identify imment threat to the system from the process killed.
+  - Take necessary incident response actions to respawn necessary process.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.
+- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:linux and event.type:start and process.name:"pkill" and process.args:"-f"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Impact
+** ID: TA0040
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Service Stop
+** ID: T1489
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-high-variance-in-rdp-session-duration.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-high-variance-in-rdp-session-duration.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..688d5c9abc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-high-variance-in-rdp-session-duration.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-high-variance-in-rdp-session-duration]]
+=== High Variance in RDP Session Duration
+
+A machine learning job has detected unusually high variance of RDP session duration. Long RDP sessions can be used to evade detection mechanisms via session persistence, and might be used to perform tasks such as lateral movement, that might require uninterrupted access to a compromised machine.
+
+*Rule type*: machine_learning
+
+*Rule indices*: None
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 15m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-12h ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html
+* https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/lmd
+* https://www.elastic.co/blog/detecting-lateral-movement-activity-a-new-kibana-integration
+* https://www.elastic.co/blog/remote-desktop-protocol-connections-elastic-security
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Use Case: Lateral Movement Detection
+* Rule Type: ML
+* Rule Type: Machine Learning
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The rule requires the Lateral Movement Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as file and Windows RDP process events collected by the Elastic Defend integration.  
+
+
+*Lateral Movement Detection Setup*
+
+The Lateral Movement Detection integration detects lateral movement activity by identifying abnormalities in file and Windows RDP events. Anomalies are detected using Elastic's Anomaly Detection feature.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Lateral Movement Detection.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+- Windows RDP process events collected by the https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/endpoint[Elastic Defend] integration.
+- To install Elastic Defend, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed to install assets associated with the Lateral Movement Detection integration:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Lateral Movement Detection and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Under Settings, click Install Lateral Movement Detection assets and follow the prompts to install the assets.
+
+
+*Anomaly Detection Setup*
+
+Before you can enable rules for Lateral Movement Detection, you'll need to enable the corresponding Anomaly Detection jobs.
+- Before enabling the Anomaly Detection jobs, confirm that the Pivot Transform asset is installed and actively gathering data in the destination index `ml-rdp-lmd`.
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Analytics, click Machine Learning.
+- Under Anomaly Detection, click Jobs, and then click "Create job". Select the Data View containing your transformed RDP process data i.e.`ml-rdp-lmd`.
+- If the selected Data View contains events that match the query in https://github.com/elastic/integrations/blob/main/packages/lmd/kibana/ml_module/lmd-ml.json[this] configuration file, you will see a card for Lateral Movement Detection under "Use preconfigured jobs".
+- Keep the default settings and click "Create jobs" to start the anomaly detection jobs and datafeeds.
+
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation of Remote Services
+** ID: T1210
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-host-files-system-changes-via-windows-subsystem-for-linux.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-host-files-system-changes-via-windows-subsystem-for-linux.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fcb9d04648
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-host-files-system-changes-via-windows-subsystem-for-linux.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-host-files-system-changes-via-windows-subsystem-for-linux]]
+=== Host Files System Changes via Windows Subsystem for Linux
+
+Detects files creation and modification on the host system from the the Windows Subsystem for Linux. Adversaries may enable and use WSL for Linux to avoid detection.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/microsoft/WSL
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 6
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by process.entity_id with maxspan=5m
+ [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  process.name : "dllhost.exe" and 
+   /* Plan9FileSystem CLSID - WSL Host File System Worker */
+  process.command_line : "*{DFB65C4C-B34F-435D-AFE9-A86218684AA8}*"]
+ [file where host.os.type == "windows" and process.name : "dllhost.exe" and not file.path : "?:\\Users\\*\\Downloads\\*"]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Indirect Command Execution
+** ID: T1202
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1202/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-hosts-file-modified.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-hosts-file-modified.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..332f31d4ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-hosts-file-modified.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-hosts-file-modified]]
+=== Hosts File Modified
+
+The hosts file on endpoints is used to control manual IP address to hostname resolutions. The hosts file is the first point of lookup for DNS hostname resolution so if adversaries can modify the endpoint hosts file, they can route traffic to malicious infrastructure. This rule detects modifications to the hosts file on Microsoft Windows, Linux (Ubuntu or RHEL) and macOS systems.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* auditbeat-*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/auditbeat-reference-yml.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* OS: Windows
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Impact
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Hosts File Modified*
+
+
+Operating systems use the hosts file to map a connection between an IP address and domain names before going to domain name servers. Attackers can abuse this mechanism to route traffic to malicious infrastructure or disrupt security that depends on server communications. For example, Russian threat actors modified this file on a domain controller to redirect Duo MFA calls to localhost instead of the Duo server, which prevented the MFA service from contacting its server to validate MFA login. This effectively disabled MFA for active domain accounts because the default policy of Duo for Windows is to "Fail open" if the MFA server is unreachable. This can happen in any MFA implementation and is not exclusive to Duo. Find more details in this https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-074a[CISA Alert].
+
+This rule identifies modifications in the hosts file across multiple operating systems using process creation events for Linux and file events in Windows and macOS.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Identify the specifics of the involved assets, such as role, criticality, and associated users.
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Examine the changes to the hosts file by comparing it against file backups, volume shadow copies, and other restoration mechanisms.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This mechanism can be used legitimately. Analysts can dismiss the alert if the administrator is aware of the activity and the configuration was justified.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Consider isolating the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Review the privileges of the administrator account that performed the action.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+For Windows systems using Auditbeat, this rule requires adding `C:/Windows/System32/drivers/etc` as an additional path in the 'file_integrity' module of auditbeat.yml.
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+any where
+
+  /* file events for creation; file change events are not captured by some of the included sources for linux and so may
+     miss this, which is the purpose of the process + command line args logic below */
+  (
+   event.category == "file" and event.type in ("change", "creation") and
+     file.path : ("/private/etc/hosts", "/etc/hosts", "?:\\Windows\\System32\\drivers\\etc\\hosts") and 
+     not process.name in ("dockerd", "rootlesskit", "podman", "crio")
+  )
+  or
+
+  /* process events for change targeting linux only */
+  (
+   event.category == "process" and event.type in ("start") and
+     process.name in ("nano", "vim", "vi", "emacs", "echo", "sed") and
+     process.args : ("/etc/hosts") and 
+     not process.parent.name in ("dhclient-script", "google_set_hostname")
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Impact
+** ID: TA0040
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Data Manipulation
+** ID: T1565
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Stored Data Manipulation
+** ID: T1565.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-hping-process-activity.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-hping-process-activity.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..36f426e840
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-hping-process-activity.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-hping-process-activity]]
+=== Hping Process Activity
+
+Hping ran on a Linux host. Hping is a FOSS command-line packet analyzer and has the ability to construct network packets for a wide variety of network security testing applications, including scanning and firewall auditing.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hping
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Discovery
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
+- Elastic Defend
+- Auditbeat
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Auditbeat Setup*
+
+Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit the activities of users and processes on your systems. For example, you can use Auditbeat to collect and centralize audit events from the Linux Audit Framework. You can also use Auditbeat to detect changes to critical files, like binaries and configuration files, and identify potential security policy violations.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Auditbeat on a Linux System:*
+
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setup-repositories.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-docker.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html[helper guide].
+- For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and process.name in ("hping", "hping2", "hping3")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Discovery
+** ID: TA0007
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/
+* Technique:
+** Name: System Information Discovery
+** ID: T1082
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-iis-http-logging-disabled.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-iis-http-logging-disabled.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f37f48bdec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-iis-http-logging-disabled.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-iis-http-logging-disabled]]
+=== IIS HTTP Logging Disabled
+
+Identifies when Internet Information Services (IIS) HTTP Logging is disabled on a server. An attacker with IIS server access via a webshell or other mechanism can disable HTTP Logging as an effective anti-forensics measure.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 33
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating IIS HTTP Logging Disabled*
+
+
+IIS (Internet Information Services) is a Microsoft web server software used to host websites and web applications on Windows. It provides features for serving dynamic and static content, and can be managed through a graphical interface or command-line tools.
+
+IIS logging is a data source that can be used for security monitoring, forensics, and incident response. It contains mainly information related to requests done to the web server, and can be used to spot malicious activities like webshells. Adversaries can tamper, clear, and delete this data to evade detection, cover their tracks, and slow down incident response.
+
+This rule monitors commands that disable IIS logging.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+  - Verify if any other anti-forensics behaviors were observed.
+- Verify whether the logs stored in the `C:\inetpub\logs\logfiles\w3svc1` directory were deleted after this action.
+- Check if this operation is done under change management and approved according to the organization's policy.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Re-enable affected logging components, services, and security monitoring.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  (process.name : "appcmd.exe" or ?process.pe.original_file_name == "appcmd.exe") and
+  process.args : "/dontLog*:*True" and
+  not process.parent.name : "iissetup.exe"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Impair Defenses
+** ID: T1562
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Disable Windows Event Logging
+** ID: T1562.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-image-file-execution-options-injection.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-image-file-execution-options-injection.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9d73f1671f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-image-file-execution-options-injection.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-image-file-execution-options-injection]]
+=== Image File Execution Options Injection
+
+The Debugger and SilentProcessExit registry keys can allow an adversary to intercept the execution of files, causing a different process to be executed. This functionality can be abused by an adversary to establish persistence.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/10/persistence-using-globalflags-in-image-file-execution-options-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+registry where host.os.type == "windows" and length(registry.data.strings) > 0 and
+  registry.path : (
+    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\*.exe\\Debugger",
+    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\*\\Debugger",
+    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\SilentProcessExit\\*\\MonitorProcess",
+    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\SilentProcessExit\\*\\MonitorProcess",
+    "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\*.exe\\Debugger",
+    "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\*\\Debugger",
+    "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\SilentProcessExit\\*\\MonitorProcess",
+    "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\SilentProcessExit\\*\\MonitorProcess"
+  ) and
+    /* add FPs here */
+  not registry.data.strings regex~ ("""C:\\Program Files( \(x86\))?\\ThinKiosk\\thinkiosk\.exe""", """.*\\PSAppDeployToolkit\\.*""")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Event Triggered Execution
+** ID: T1546
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Image File Execution Options Injection
+** ID: T1546.012
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/012/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Modify Registry
+** ID: T1112
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-imageload-via-windows-update-auto-update-client.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-imageload-via-windows-update-auto-update-client.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5fabbb5f46
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-imageload-via-windows-update-auto-update-client.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-imageload-via-windows-update-auto-update-client]]
+=== ImageLoad via Windows Update Auto Update Client
+
+Identifies abuse of the Windows Update Auto Update Client (wuauclt.exe) to load an arbitrary DLL. This behavior is used as a defense evasion technique to blend-in malicious activity with legitimate Windows software.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://dtm.uk/wuauclt/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 111
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating ImageLoad via Windows Update Auto Update Client*
+
+
+The Windows Update Auto Update Client (wuauclt.exe) is the component responsible for managing system updates. However, adversaries may abuse this process to load a malicious DLL and execute malicious code while blending into a legitimate system mechanism. 
+
+This rule identifies potential abuse for code execution by monitoring for specific process arguments ("/RunHandlerComServer" and "/UpdateDeploymentProvider") and common writable paths where the target DLL can be placed (e.g., "C:\Users\*.dll", "C:\ProgramData\*.dll", etc.).
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process, such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+- Examine the command line and identify the DLL location.
+- Examine whether the DLL is signed.
+- Retrieve the DLL and determine if it is malicious:
+  - Analyze the file using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate the behavior of child processes, such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned processes.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Any activity that triggered the alert and is not inherently malicious must be monitored by the security team.
+
+
+*Response and Remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  (?process.pe.original_file_name == "wuauclt.exe" or process.name : "wuauclt.exe") and
+   /* necessary windows update client args to load a dll */
+   process.args : "/RunHandlerComServer" and process.args : "/UpdateDeploymentProvider" and
+   /* common paths writeable by a standard user where the target DLL can be placed */
+   process.args : ("C:\\Users\\*.dll", "C:\\ProgramData\\*.dll", "C:\\Windows\\Temp\\*.dll", "C:\\Windows\\Tasks\\*.dll")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: System Binary Proxy Execution
+** ID: T1218
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-incoming-dcom-lateral-movement-via-mshta.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-incoming-dcom-lateral-movement-via-mshta.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..071996285c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-incoming-dcom-lateral-movement-via-mshta.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-incoming-dcom-lateral-movement-via-mshta]]
+=== Incoming DCOM Lateral Movement via MSHTA
+
+Identifies the use of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) to execute commands from a remote host, which are launched via the HTA Application COM Object. This behavior may indicate an attacker abusing a DCOM application to move laterally while attempting to evade detection.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://codewhitesec.blogspot.com/2018/07/lethalhta.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence with maxspan=1m
+  [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+     process.name : "mshta.exe" and process.args : "-Embedding"
+  ] by host.id, process.entity_id
+  [network where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and process.name : "mshta.exe" and
+     network.direction : ("incoming", "ingress") and network.transport == "tcp" and
+     source.port > 49151 and destination.port > 49151 and source.ip != "127.0.0.1" and source.ip != "::1"
+  ] by host.id, process.entity_id
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote Services
+** ID: T1021
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Distributed Component Object Model
+** ID: T1021.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: System Binary Proxy Execution
+** ID: T1218
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Mshta
+** ID: T1218.005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-incoming-dcom-lateral-movement-with-mmc.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-incoming-dcom-lateral-movement-with-mmc.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d8ebe89315
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-incoming-dcom-lateral-movement-with-mmc.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-incoming-dcom-lateral-movement-with-mmc]]
+=== Incoming DCOM Lateral Movement with MMC
+
+Identifies the use of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) to run commands from a remote host, which are launched via the MMC20 Application COM Object. This behavior may indicate an attacker abusing a DCOM application to move laterally.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id with maxspan=1m
+ [network where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and process.name : "mmc.exe" and source.port >= 49152 and
+ destination.port >= 49152 and source.ip != "127.0.0.1" and source.ip != "::1" and
+  network.direction : ("incoming", "ingress") and network.transport == "tcp"
+ ] by process.entity_id
+ [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and process.parent.name : "mmc.exe"
+ ] by process.parent.entity_id
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote Services
+** ID: T1021
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Distributed Component Object Model
+** ID: T1021.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: System Binary Proxy Execution
+** ID: T1218
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: MMC
+** ID: T1218.014
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/014/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-incoming-dcom-lateral-movement-with-shellbrowserwindow-or-shellwindows.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-incoming-dcom-lateral-movement-with-shellbrowserwindow-or-shellwindows.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c95b420291
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-incoming-dcom-lateral-movement-with-shellbrowserwindow-or-shellwindows.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-incoming-dcom-lateral-movement-with-shellbrowserwindow-or-shellwindows]]
+=== Incoming DCOM Lateral Movement with ShellBrowserWindow or ShellWindows
+
+Identifies use of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) to run commands from a remote host, which are launched via the ShellBrowserWindow or ShellWindows Application COM Object. This behavior may indicate an attacker abusing a DCOM application to stealthily move laterally.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/23/lateral-movement-via-dcom-round-2/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id with maxspan=5s
+ [network where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and process.name : "explorer.exe" and
+  network.direction : ("incoming", "ingress") and network.transport == "tcp" and
+  source.port > 49151 and destination.port > 49151 and source.ip != "127.0.0.1" and source.ip != "::1"
+ ] by process.entity_id
+ [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  process.parent.name : "explorer.exe"
+ ] by process.parent.entity_id
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote Services
+** ID: T1021
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Distributed Component Object Model
+** ID: T1021.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-incoming-execution-via-powershell-remoting.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-incoming-execution-via-powershell-remoting.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..040d6831ce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-incoming-execution-via-powershell-remoting.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-incoming-execution-via-powershell-remoting]]
+=== Incoming Execution via PowerShell Remoting
+
+Identifies remote execution via Windows PowerShell remoting. Windows PowerShell remoting allows a user to run any Windows PowerShell command on one or more remote computers. This could be an indication of lateral movement.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/scripting/learn/remoting/running-remote-commands?view=powershell-7.1
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id with maxspan = 30s
+   [network where host.os.type == "windows" and network.direction : ("incoming", "ingress") and destination.port in (5985, 5986) and
+    network.protocol == "http" and source.ip != "127.0.0.1" and source.ip != "::1"]
+   [process where host.os.type == "windows" and 
+    event.type == "start" and process.parent.name : "wsmprovhost.exe" and not process.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\conhost.exe"]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote Services
+** ID: T1021
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Windows Remote Management
+** ID: T1021.006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-incoming-execution-via-winrm-remote-shell.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-incoming-execution-via-winrm-remote-shell.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c964db7a0a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-incoming-execution-via-winrm-remote-shell.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-incoming-execution-via-winrm-remote-shell]]
+=== Incoming Execution via WinRM Remote Shell
+
+Identifies remote execution via Windows Remote Management (WinRM) remote shell on a target host. This could be an indication of lateral movement.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id with maxspan=30s
+   [network where host.os.type == "windows" and process.pid == 4 and network.direction : ("incoming", "ingress") and
+    destination.port in (5985, 5986) and network.protocol == "http" and source.ip != "127.0.0.1" and source.ip != "::1"]
+   [process where host.os.type == "windows" and 
+    event.type == "start" and process.parent.name : "winrshost.exe" and not process.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\conhost.exe"]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote Services
+** ID: T1021
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Windows Remote Management
+** ID: T1021.006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-installation-of-custom-shim-databases.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-installation-of-custom-shim-databases.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..72ed0c923a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-installation-of-custom-shim-databases.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-installation-of-custom-shim-databases]]
+=== Installation of Custom Shim Databases
+
+Identifies the installation of custom Application Compatibility Shim databases. This Windows functionality has been abused by attackers to stealthily gain persistence and arbitrary code execution in legitimate Windows processes.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.registry*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+registry where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type in ("creation", "change") and
+    registry.path : "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\AppCompatFlags\\Custom\\*.sdb" and 
+    not process.executable : 
+                       ("?:\\Program Files (x86)\\DesktopCentral_Agent\\swrepository\\1\\swuploads\\SAP-SLC\\SAPSetupSLC02_14-80001954\\Setup\\NwSapSetup.exe", 
+                        "?:\\$WINDOWS.~BT\\Sources\\SetupPlatform.exe", 
+                         "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\SAP\\SAPsetup\\setup\\NwSapSetup.exe", 
+                         "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\SAP\\SapSetup\\OnRebootSvc\\NWSAPSetupOnRebootInstSvc.exe", 
+                         "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Kaspersky Lab\\Kaspersky Security for Windows Server\\kavfs.exe")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Event Triggered Execution
+** ID: T1546
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Application Shimming
+** ID: T1546.011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/011/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-installation-of-security-support-provider.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-installation-of-security-support-provider.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..849099b755
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-installation-of-security-support-provider.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-installation-of-security-support-provider]]
+=== Installation of Security Support Provider
+
+Identifies registry modifications related to the Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) configuration. Adversaries may abuse this to establish persistence in an environment.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+registry where host.os.type == "windows" and
+   registry.path : (
+      "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\\Control\\Lsa\\Security Packages*",
+      "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\\Control\\Lsa\\OSConfig\\Security Packages*",
+      "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\\Control\\Lsa\\Security Packages*",
+      "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\\Control\\Lsa\\OSConfig\\Security Packages*"
+   ) and
+   not process.executable : ("C:\\Windows\\System32\\msiexec.exe", "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\msiexec.exe")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
+** ID: T1547
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Security Support Provider
+** ID: T1547.005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/005/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Modify Registry
+** ID: T1112
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-installutil-process-making-network-connections.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-installutil-process-making-network-connections.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b056626c89
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-installutil-process-making-network-connections.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-installutil-process-making-network-connections]]
+=== InstallUtil Process Making Network Connections
+
+Identifies InstallUtil.exe making outbound network connections. This may indicate adversarial activity as InstallUtil is often leveraged by adversaries to execute code and evade detection.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+/* the benefit of doing this as an eql sequence vs kql is this will limit to alerting only on the first network connection */
+
+sequence by process.entity_id
+  [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and process.name : "installutil.exe"]
+  [network where host.os.type == "windows" and process.name : "installutil.exe" and network.direction : ("outgoing", "egress")]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: System Binary Proxy Execution
+** ID: T1218
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: InstallUtil
+** ID: T1218.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-interactive-logon-by-an-unusual-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-interactive-logon-by-an-unusual-process.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f9a7b5bdb8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-interactive-logon-by-an-unusual-process.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-interactive-logon-by-an-unusual-process]]
+=== Interactive Logon by an Unusual Process
+
+Identifies interactive logon attempt with alternate credentials and by an unusual process. Adversaries may create a new token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-system.*
+* logs-windows.*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+Audit event 4624 is needed to trigger this rule.
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+authentication where 
+ host.os.type : "windows" and winlog.event_data.LogonProcessName : "Advapi*" and 
+ winlog.logon.type == "Interactive" and winlog.event_data.SubjectUserSid : ("S-1-5-21*", "S-1-12-*") and 
+ winlog.event_data.TargetUserSid : ("S-1-5-21*", "S-1-12-*")  and process.executable : "C:\\*" and 
+ not startswith~(winlog.event_data.SubjectUserSid, winlog.event_data.TargetUserSid) and 
+ not process.executable : 
+            ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\winlogon.exe", 
+             "?:\\Windows\\System32\\wininit.exe", 
+             "?:\\Program Files\\*.exe", 
+             "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe", 
+             "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\inetsrv\\w3wp.exe", 
+             "?:\\Windows\\System32\\inetsrv\\w3wp.exe", 
+             "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\msiexec.exe")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Access Token Manipulation
+** ID: T1134
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Create Process with Token
+** ID: T1134.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Make and Impersonate Token
+** ID: T1134.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-interactive-terminal-spawned-via-perl.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-interactive-terminal-spawned-via-perl.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dea3cdc324
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-interactive-terminal-spawned-via-perl.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-interactive-terminal-spawned-via-perl]]
+=== Interactive Terminal Spawned via Perl
+
+Identifies when a terminal (tty) is spawned via Perl. Attackers may upgrade a simple reverse shell to a fully interactive tty after obtaining initial access to a host.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
+- Elastic Defend
+- Auditbeat
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Auditbeat Setup*
+
+Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit the activities of users and processes on your systems. For example, you can use Auditbeat to collect and centralize audit events from the Linux Audit Framework. You can also use Auditbeat to detect changes to critical files, like binaries and configuration files, and identify potential security policy violations.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Auditbeat on a Linux System:*
+
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setup-repositories.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-docker.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html[helper guide].
+- For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:linux and event.type:(start or process_started) and process.name:perl and
+  process.args:("exec \"/bin/sh\";" or "exec \"/bin/dash\";" or "exec \"/bin/bash\";")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-interactive-terminal-spawned-via-python.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-interactive-terminal-spawned-via-python.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..293c0c45cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-interactive-terminal-spawned-via-python.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-interactive-terminal-spawned-via-python]]
+=== Interactive Terminal Spawned via Python
+
+Identifies when a terminal (tty) is spawned via Python. Attackers may upgrade a simple reverse shell to a fully interactive tty after obtaining initial access to a host.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and
+(
+  (process.parent.name : "python*" and process.name in ("bash", "dash", "ash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh",
+   "fish") and process.parent.args_count >= 3 and process.parent.args : "*pty.spawn*" and process.parent.args : "-c") or
+  (process.parent.name : "python*" and process.name in ("bash", "dash", "ash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh",
+   "fish") and process.args : "*sh" and process.args_count == 1 and process.parent.args_count == 1)
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Python
+** ID: T1059.006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kerberos-cached-credentials-dumping.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kerberos-cached-credentials-dumping.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bc3d4c7542
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kerberos-cached-credentials-dumping.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kerberos-cached-credentials-dumping]]
+=== Kerberos Cached Credentials Dumping
+
+Identifies the use of the Kerberos credential cache (kcc) utility to dump locally cached Kerberos tickets. Adversaries may attempt to dump credential material in the form of tickets that can be leveraged for lateral movement.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/EmpireProject/EmPyre/blob/master/lib/modules/collection/osx/kerberosdump.py
+* https://opensource.apple.com/source/Heimdal/Heimdal-323.12/kuser/kcc-commands.in.auto.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:macos and event.type:(start or process_started) and
+  process.name:kcc and
+  process.args:copy_cred_cache
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
+** ID: T1558
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Kerberoasting
+** ID: T1558.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kerberos-pre-authentication-disabled-for-user.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kerberos-pre-authentication-disabled-for-user.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cf32aba27d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kerberos-pre-authentication-disabled-for-user.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kerberos-pre-authentication-disabled-for-user]]
+=== Kerberos Pre-authentication Disabled for User
+
+Identifies the modification of an account's Kerberos pre-authentication options. An adversary with GenericWrite/GenericAll rights over the account can maliciously modify these settings to perform offline password cracking attacks such as AS-REP roasting.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-system.*
+* logs-windows.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://harmj0y.medium.com/roasting-as-reps-e6179a65216b
+* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4738
+* https://github.com/atc-project/atomic-threat-coverage/blob/master/Atomic_Threat_Coverage/Logging_Policies/LP_0026_windows_audit_user_account_management.md
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring
+* Data Source: Active Directory
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Kerberos Pre-authentication Disabled for User*
+
+
+Kerberos pre-authentication is an account protection against offline password cracking. When enabled, a user requesting access to a resource initiates communication with the Domain Controller (DC) by sending an Authentication Server Request (AS-REQ) message with a timestamp that is encrypted with the hash of their password. If and only if the DC is able to successfully decrypt the timestamp with the hash of the user’s password, it will then send an Authentication Server Response (AS-REP) message that contains the Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) to the user. Part of the AS-REP message is signed with the user’s password. Microsoft's security monitoring https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4738[recommendations] state that `'Don't Require Preauth' – Enabled` should not be enabled for user accounts because it weakens security for the account’s Kerberos authentication.
+
+AS-REP roasting is an attack against Kerberos for user accounts that do not require pre-authentication, which means that if the target user has pre-authentication disabled, an attacker can request authentication data for it and get a TGT that can be brute-forced offline, similarly to Kerberoasting.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Determine if the target account is sensitive or privileged.
+- Inspect the account activities for suspicious or abnormal behaviors in the alert timeframe.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Disabling pre-authentication is a bad security practice and should not be allowed in the domain. The security team should map and monitor any potential benign true positives (B-TPs), especially if the target account is privileged.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Reset the target account's password if there is any risk of TGTs having been retrieved.
+- Re-enable the preauthentication option or disable the target account.
+- Review the privileges assigned to the involved users to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The 'Audit User Account Management' logging policy must be configured for (Success, Failure).
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Policies >
+Windows Settings >
+Security Settings >
+Advanced Audit Policies Configuration >
+Audit Policies >
+Account Management >
+Audit User Account Management (Success,Failure)
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.code:4738 and winlog.api:"wineventlog" and message:"'Don't Require Preauth' - Enabled"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
+** ID: T1558
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: AS-REP Roasting
+** ID: T1558.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/004/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Impair Defenses
+** ID: T1562
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Valid Accounts
+** ID: T1078
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Domain Accounts
+** ID: T1078.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kerberos-traffic-from-unusual-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kerberos-traffic-from-unusual-process.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..10b430ce16
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kerberos-traffic-from-unusual-process.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kerberos-traffic-from-unusual-process]]
+=== Kerberos Traffic from Unusual Process
+
+Identifies network connections to the standard Kerberos port from an unusual process. On Windows, the only process that normally performs Kerberos traffic from a domain joined host is lsass.exe.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Kerberos Traffic from Unusual Process*
+
+
+Kerberos is the default authentication protocol in Active Directory, designed to provide strong authentication for client/server applications by using secret-key cryptography.
+
+Domain-joined hosts usually perform Kerberos traffic using the `lsass.exe` process. This rule detects the occurrence of traffic on the Kerberos port (88) by processes other than `lsass.exe` to detect the unusual request and usage of Kerberos tickets.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Check if the Destination IP is related to a Domain Controller.
+- Review event ID 4769 for suspicious ticket requests.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This rule uses a Kerberos-related port but does not identify the protocol used on that port. HTTP traffic on a non-standard port or destination IP address unrelated to Domain controllers can create false positives.
+- Exceptions can be added for noisy/frequent connections.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+  - Ticket requests can be used to investigate potentially compromised accounts.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+network where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and network.direction == "egress" and
+  destination.port == 88 and source.port >= 49152 and process.pid != 4 and destination.address : "*" and
+  not 
+  (
+    process.executable : (
+        "\\device\\harddiskvolume?\\program files (x86)\\nmap\\nmap.exe",
+        "\\device\\harddiskvolume?\\program files (x86)\\nmap oem\\nmap.exe",
+        "\\device\\harddiskvolume?\\windows\\system32\\lsass.exe",
+        "?:\\Program Files\\Amazon Corretto\\jdk1*\\bin\\java.exe",
+        "?:\\Program Files\\BlackBerry\\UEM\\Proxy Server\\bin\\prunsrv.exe",
+        "?:\\Program Files\\BlackBerry\\UEM\\Core\\tomcat-core\\bin\\tomcat9.exe",
+        "?:\\Program Files\\DBeaver\\dbeaver.exe",
+        "?:\\Program Files\\Docker\\Docker\\resources\\com.docker.backend.exe",
+        "?:\\Program Files\\Docker\\Docker\\resources\\com.docker.vpnkit.exe",
+        "?:\\Program Files\\Docker\\Docker\\resources\\vpnkit.exe",
+        "?:\\Program Files\\Google\\Chrome\\Application\\chrome.exe",
+        "?:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore.exe",
+        "?:\\Program Files\\JetBrains\\PyCharm Community Edition*\\bin\\pycharm64.exe",
+        "?:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox.exe",
+        "?:\\Program Files\\Oracle\\VirtualBox\\VirtualBoxVM.exe",
+        "?:\\Program Files\\Puppet Labs\\Puppet\\puppet\\bin\\ruby.exe",
+        "?:\\Program Files\\rapid7\\nexpose\\nse\\.DLLCACHE\\nseserv.exe",
+        "?:\\Program Files\\Silverfort\\Silverfort AD Adapter\\SilverfortServer.exe",
+        "?:\\Program Files\\Tenable\\Nessus\\nessusd.exe",
+        "?:\\Program Files\\VMware\\VMware View\\Server\\bin\\ws_TomcatService.exe",
+        "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Advanced Port Scanner\\advanced_port_scanner.exe",
+        "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\DesktopCentral_Agent\\bin\\dcpatchscan.exe",
+        "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\GFI\\LanGuard 12 Agent\\lnsscomm.exe",
+        "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Google\\Chrome\\Application\\chrome.exe",
+        "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore.exe",
+        "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft\\Edge\\Application\\msedge.exe",
+        "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft\\EdgeUpdate\\MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe",
+        "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft Silverlight\\sllauncher.exe",
+        "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Nmap\\nmap.exe",
+        "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Nmap OEM\\nmap.exe",
+        "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\nwps\\NetScanTools Pro\\NSTPRO.exe",
+        "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\SAP BusinessObjects\\tomcat\\bin\\tomcat9.exe",
+        "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\SuperScan\\scanner.exe",
+        "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Zscaler\\ZSATunnel\\ZSATunnel.exe",
+        "?:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe",
+        "?:\\Windows\\System32\\MicrosoftEdgeCP.exe",
+        "?:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
+        "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\vmnat.exe",
+        "?:\\Windows\\SystemApps\\Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_*\\MicrosoftEdge.exe",
+        "System"
+    ) and process.code_signature.trusted == true
+  ) and
+ destination.address != "127.0.0.1" and destination.address != "::1"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
+** ID: T1558
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kernel-driver-load-by-non-root-user.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kernel-driver-load-by-non-root-user.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..745e0c55cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kernel-driver-load-by-non-root-user.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kernel-driver-load-by-non-root-user]]
+=== Kernel Driver Load by non-root User
+
+Detects the loading of a Linux kernel module by a non-root user through system calls. Threat actors may leverage Linux kernel modules to load a rootkit on a system providing them with complete control and the ability to hide from security products. As other rules monitor for the addition of Linux kernel modules through system utilities or .ko files, this rule covers the gap that evasive rootkits leverage by monitoring for kernel module additions on the lowest level through auditd_manager.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Auditd Manager.
+
+
+*Auditd Manager Integration Setup*
+
+The Auditd Manager Integration receives audit events from the Linux Audit Framework which is a part of the Linux kernel.
+Auditd Manager provides a user-friendly interface and automation capabilities for configuring and monitoring system auditing through the auditd daemon. With `auditd_manager`, administrators can easily define audit rules, track system events, and generate comprehensive audit reports, improving overall security and compliance in the system.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Agent System integration "auditd_manager" on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click “Add integrations”.
+- In the query bar, search for “Auditd Manager” and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click “Add Auditd Manager”.
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Review optional and advanced settings accordingly.
+- Add the newly installed “auditd manager” to an existing or a new agent policy, and deploy the agent on a Linux system from which auditd log files are desirable.
+- Click “Save and Continue”.
+- For more details on the integration refer to the https://docs.elastic.co/integrations/auditd_manager[helper guide].
+
+
+*Rule Specific Setup Note*
+
+Auditd Manager subscribes to the kernel and receives events as they occur without any additional configuration.
+However, if more advanced configuration is required to detect specific behavior, audit rules can be added to the integration in either the "audit rules" configuration box or the "auditd rule files" box by specifying a file to read the audit rules from.
+- For this detection rule the following additional audit rules are required to be added to the integration:
+  -- "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S finit_module -S init_module -S delete_module -F auid!=-1 -k modules"
+  -- "-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S finit_module -S init_module -S delete_module -F auid!=-1 -k modules"
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+driver where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "loaded-kernel-module" and
+auditd.data.syscall in ("init_module", "finit_module") and user.id != "0"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
+** ID: T1547
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Kernel Modules and Extensions
+** ID: T1547.006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/006/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Rootkit
+** ID: T1014
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kernel-load-or-unload-via-kexec-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kernel-load-or-unload-via-kexec-detected.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..94c421190a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kernel-load-or-unload-via-kexec-detected.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kernel-load-or-unload-via-kexec-detected]]
+=== Kernel Load or Unload via Kexec Detected
+
+This detection rule identifies the usage of kexec, helping to uncover unauthorized kernel replacements and potential compromise of the system's integrity. Kexec is a Linux feature that enables the loading and execution of a different kernel without going through the typical boot process. Malicious actors can abuse kexec to bypass security measures, escalate privileges, establish persistence or hide their activities by loading a malicious kernel, enabling them to tamper with the system's trusted state, allowing e.g. a VM Escape.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/venom-vulnerability-details/
+* https://www.makeuseof.com/what-is-venom-vulnerability/
+* https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
+
+*Version*: 6
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and process.name == "kexec" and process.args in ("--exec", "-e", "--load", "-l", "--unload", "-u")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Escape to Host
+** ID: T1611
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
+** ID: T1547
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Kernel Modules and Extensions
+** ID: T1547.006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/006/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Modify System Image
+** ID: T1601
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Patch System Image
+** ID: T1601.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kernel-module-load-via-insmod.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kernel-module-load-via-insmod.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ffc9cf2213
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kernel-module-load-via-insmod.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kernel-module-load-via-insmod]]
+=== Kernel Module Load via insmod
+
+Detects the use of the insmod binary to load a Linux kernel object file. Threat actors can use this binary, given they have root privileges, to load a rootkit on a system providing them with complete control and the ability to hide from security products. Manually loading a kernel module in this manner should not be at all common and can indicate suspcious or malicious behavior.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://decoded.avast.io/davidalvarez/linux-threat-hunting-syslogk-a-kernel-rootkit-found-under-development-in-the-wild/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Threat: Rootkit
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Kernel module load via insmod*
+
+
+The insmod binary is a Linux utility that allows users with root privileges to load kernel modules, which are object files that extend the functionality of the kernel. 
+
+Threat actors can abuse this utility to load rootkits, granting them full control over the system and the ability to evade security products.
+
+The detection rule 'Kernel module load via insmod' is designed to identify instances where the insmod binary is used to load a kernel object file (with a .ko extension) on a Linux system. This activity is uncommon and may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html[placeholder fields] to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the kernel object file that was loaded via insmod.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User","query":"SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"}}
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Listening Ports","query":"SELECT pid, address, port, socket, protocol, path FROM listening_ports"}}
+- Investigate the kernel ring buffer for any warnings or messages, such as tainted or out-of-tree kernel module loads through `dmesg`.
+- Investigate syslog for any unusual segfaults or other messages. Rootkits may be installed on targets with different architecture as expected, and could potentially cause segmentation faults. 
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+- Investigate whether the altered scripts call other malicious scripts elsewhere on the file system. 
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+- Investigate abnormal behaviors by the subject process/user such as network connections, file modifications, and any other spawned child processes.
+  - Investigate listening ports and open sockets to look for potential command and control traffic or data exfiltration.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Open Sockets","query":"SELECT pid, family, remote_address, remote_port, socket, state FROM process_open_sockets"}}
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific User","query":"SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = {{user.name}}"}}
+  - Identify the user account that performed the action, analyze it, and check whether it should perform this kind of action.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Investigate the Account Authentication Status","query":"SELECT * FROM logged_in_users WHERE user = {{user.name}}"}}
+- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
+    - $osquery_6
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+- If this activity is related to a system administrator who uses cron jobs for administrative purposes, consider adding exceptions for this specific administrator user account. 
+- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
+
+
+*Related Rules*
+
+
+- Kernel Driver Load - 3e12a439-d002-4944-bc42-171c0dcb9b96
+- Tainted Out-Of-Tree Kernel Module Load - 51a09737-80f7-4551-a3be-dac8ef5d181a
+- Tainted Kernel Module Load - 05cad2fb-200c-407f-b472-02ea8c9e5e4a
+- Attempt to Clear Kernel Ring Buffer - 2724808c-ba5d-48b2-86d2-0002103df753
+- Enumeration of Kernel Modules via Proc - 80084fa9-8677-4453-8680-b891d3c0c778
+- Suspicious Modprobe File Event - 40ddbcc8-6561-44d9-afc8-eefdbfe0cccd
+- Kernel Module Removal - cd66a5af-e34b-4bb0-8931-57d0a043f2ef
+- Enumeration of Kernel Modules - 2d8043ed-5bda-4caf-801c-c1feb7410504
+
+
+*Response and Remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and process.name == "insmod" and process.args : "*.ko"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
+** ID: T1547
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Kernel Modules and Extensions
+** ID: T1547.006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/006/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kernel-module-removal.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kernel-module-removal.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2cdc3e8441
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kernel-module-removal.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kernel-module-removal]]
+=== Kernel Module Removal
+
+Kernel modules are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. This rule identifies attempts to remove a kernel module.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/modprobe.8.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and
+process.name == "rmmod" or (process.name == "modprobe" and process.args in ("--remove", "-r")) and 
+process.parent.name in ("sudo", "bash", "dash", "ash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Impair Defenses
+** ID: T1562
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Disable or Modify Tools
+** ID: T1562.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
+** ID: T1547
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Kernel Modules and Extensions
+** ID: T1547.006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/006/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-keychain-password-retrieval-via-command-line.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-keychain-password-retrieval-via-command-line.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7773061645
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-keychain-password-retrieval-via-command-line.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-keychain-password-retrieval-via-command-line]]
+=== Keychain Password Retrieval via Command Line
+
+Adversaries may collect keychain storage data from a system to in order to acquire credentials. Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features, including Wi-Fi and website passwords, secure notes, certificates, and Kerberos.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.netmeister.org/blog/keychain-passwords.html
+* https://github.com/priyankchheda/chrome_password_grabber/blob/master/chrome.py
+* https://ss64.com/osx/security.html
+* https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/operation-electrorat-attacker-creates-fake-companies-to-drain-your-crypto-wallets/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type == "start" and
+ process.name : "security" and process.args : "-wa" and process.args : ("find-generic-password", "find-internet-password") and
+ process.args : ("Chrome*", "Chromium", "Opera", "Safari*", "Brave", "Microsoft Edge", "Edge", "Firefox*") and
+ not process.parent.executable : "/Applications/Keeper Password Manager.app/Contents/Frameworks/Keeper Password Manager Helper*/Contents/MacOS/Keeper Password Manager Helper*"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Credentials from Password Stores
+** ID: T1555
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Keychain
+** ID: T1555.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Credentials from Password Stores
+** ID: T1555
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Credentials from Web Browsers
+** ID: T1555.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kirbi-file-creation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kirbi-file-creation.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..75d17cf912
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kirbi-file-creation.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kirbi-file-creation]]
+=== Kirbi File Creation
+
+Identifies the creation of .kirbi files. The creation of this kind of file is an indicator of an attacker running Kerberos ticket dump utilities, such as Mimikatz, and precedes attacks such as Pass-The-Ticket (PTT), which allows the attacker to impersonate users using Kerberos tickets.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 60m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 4
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "creation" and file.extension : "kirbi"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
+** ID: T1558
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-krbtgt-delegation-backdoor.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-krbtgt-delegation-backdoor.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5fd5a14abb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-krbtgt-delegation-backdoor.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-krbtgt-delegation-backdoor]]
+=== KRBTGT Delegation Backdoor
+
+Identifies the modification of the msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo attribute to KRBTGT. Attackers can use this technique to maintain persistence to the domain by having the ability to request tickets for the KRBTGT service.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-system.*
+* logs-windows.*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://skyblue.team/posts/delegate-krbtgt
+* https://github.com/atc-project/atomic-threat-coverage/blob/master/Atomic_Threat_Coverage/Logging_Policies/LP_0026_windows_audit_user_account_management.md
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring
+* Data Source: Active Directory
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The 'Audit User Account Management' logging policy must be configured for (Success, Failure).
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Policies >
+Windows Settings >
+Security Settings >
+Advanced Audit Policies Configuration >
+Audit Policies >
+Account Management >
+Audit User Account Management (Success,Failure)
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.action:modified-user-account and event.code:4738 and
+  winlog.event_data.AllowedToDelegateTo:*krbtgt*
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Account Manipulation
+** ID: T1098
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
+** ID: T1558
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-lateral-movement-via-startup-folder.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-lateral-movement-via-startup-folder.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7f989aade1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-lateral-movement-via-startup-folder.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-lateral-movement-via-startup-folder]]
+=== Lateral Movement via Startup Folder
+
+Identifies suspicious file creations in the startup folder of a remote system. An adversary could abuse this to move laterally by dropping a malicious script or executable that will be executed after a reboot or user logon.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2017/06/rdpinception/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type in ("creation", "change") and
+
+ /* via RDP TSClient mounted share or SMB */
+  (process.name : "mstsc.exe" or process.pid == 4) and
+
+   file.path : ("?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\*",
+                "?:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\*")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote Services
+** ID: T1021
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Remote Desktop Protocol
+** ID: T1021.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
+** ID: T1547
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
+** ID: T1547.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-launch-agent-creation-or-modification-and-immediate-loading.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-launch-agent-creation-or-modification-and-immediate-loading.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b70d4a2e27
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-launch-agent-creation-or-modification-and-immediate-loading.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-launch-agent-creation-or-modification-and-immediate-loading]]
+=== Launch Agent Creation or Modification and Immediate Loading
+
+An adversary can establish persistence by installing a new launch agent that executes at login by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id with maxspan=1m
+ [file where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type != "deletion" and
+  file.path : ("/System/Library/LaunchAgents/*", "/Library/LaunchAgents/*", "/Users/*/Library/LaunchAgents/*")
+ ]
+ [process where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type in ("start", "process_started") and process.name == "launchctl" and process.args == "load"]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Create or Modify System Process
+** ID: T1543
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Launch Agent
+** ID: T1543.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-launchdaemon-creation-or-modification-and-immediate-loading.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-launchdaemon-creation-or-modification-and-immediate-loading.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c3cce20b02
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-launchdaemon-creation-or-modification-and-immediate-loading.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-launchdaemon-creation-or-modification-and-immediate-loading]]
+=== LaunchDaemon Creation or Modification and Immediate Loading
+
+Indicates the creation or modification of a launch daemon, which adversaries may use to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id with maxspan=1m
+ [file where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type != "deletion" and file.path : ("/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/*", "/Library/LaunchDaemons/*")]
+ [process where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type in ("start", "process_started") and process.name == "launchctl" and process.args == "load"]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Create or Modify System Process
+** ID: T1543
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-linux-group-creation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-linux-group-creation.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d656459f1a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-linux-group-creation.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-linux-group-creation]]
+=== Linux Group Creation
+
+Identifies attempts to create a new group. Attackers may create new groups to establish persistence on a system.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-system.auth-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+
+*Version*: 4
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Linux Group Creation*
+
+
+The `groupadd` and `addgroup` commands are used to create new user groups in Linux-based operating systems.
+
+Attackers may create new groups to maintain access to victim systems or escalate privileges by assigning a compromised account to a privileged group.
+
+This rule identifies the usages of `groupadd` and `addgroup` to create new groups.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html[placeholder fields] to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate whether the group was created succesfully.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific Group","query":"SELECT * FROM groups WHERE groupname = {{group.name}}"}}
+- Identify if a user account was added to this group after creation.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific User","query":"SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = {{user.name}}"}}
+- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Investigate the Account Authentication Status","query":"SELECT * FROM logged_in_users WHERE user = {{user.name}}"}}
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User","query":"SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"}}
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Group creation is a common administrative task, so there is a high chance of the activity being legitimate. Before investigating further, verify that this activity is not benign.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Review the privileges assigned to the involved users to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
+- Delete the created group and, in case an account was added to this group, delete the account.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Filebeat.
+
+
+*Filebeat Setup*
+
+Filebeat is a lightweight shipper for forwarding and centralizing log data. Installed as an agent on your servers, Filebeat monitors the log files or locations that you specify, collects log events, and forwards them either to Elasticsearch or Logstash for indexing.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Filebeat on a Linux System:*
+
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/setup-repositories.html[helper guide].
+- To run Filebeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/running-on-docker.html[helper guide].
+- To run Filebeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html[helper guide].
+- For quick start information for Filebeat refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/8.11/filebeat-installation-configuration.html[helper guide].
+- For complete “Setup and Run Filebeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Rule Specific Setup Note*
+
+- This rule requires the “Filebeat System Module” to be enabled.
+- The system module collects and parses logs created by the system logging service of common Unix/Linux based distributions.
+- To run the system module of Filebeat on Linux follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-system.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+iam where host.os.type == "linux" and (event.type == "group" and event.type == "creation") and
+process.name in ("groupadd", "addgroup") and group.name != null
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Create Account
+** ID: T1136
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Local Account
+** ID: T1136.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-linux-init-pid-1-secret-dump-via-gdb.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-linux-init-pid-1-secret-dump-via-gdb.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..25b5d87450
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-linux-init-pid-1-secret-dump-via-gdb.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-linux-init-pid-1-secret-dump-via-gdb]]
+=== Linux init (PID 1) Secret Dump via GDB
+
+This rule monitors for the potential memory dump of the init process (PID 1) through gdb. Attackers may leverage memory dumping techniques to attempt secret extraction from privileged processes. Tools that display this behavior include "truffleproc" and "bash-memory-dump". This behavior should not happen by default, and should be investigated thoroughly.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/controlplaneio/truffleproc
+* https://github.com/hajzer/bash-memory-dump
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+
+*Version*: 6
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and 
+process.name == "gdb" and process.args in ("--pid", "-p") and process.args == "1"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Proc Filesystem
+** ID: T1003.007
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/007/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-linux-process-hooking-via-gdb.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-linux-process-hooking-via-gdb.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..78f07e5b49
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-linux-process-hooking-via-gdb.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-linux-process-hooking-via-gdb]]
+=== Linux Process Hooking via GDB
+
+This rule monitors for potential memory dumping through gdb. Attackers may leverage memory dumping techniques to attempt secret extraction from privileged processes. Tools that display this behavior include "truffleproc" and "bash-memory-dump". This behavior should not happen by default, and should be investigated thoroughly.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/controlplaneio/truffleproc
+* https://github.com/hajzer/bash-memory-dump
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and process.name == "gdb" and process.args in ("--pid", "-p") and 
+/* Covered by d4ff2f53-c802-4d2e-9fb9-9ecc08356c3f */
+process.args != "1"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Proc Filesystem
+** ID: T1003.007
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/007/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..83c1d57479
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s]]
+=== Linux Restricted Shell Breakout via Linux Binary(s)
+
+Identifies the abuse of a Linux binary to break out of a restricted shell or environment by spawning an interactive system shell. The activity of spawning a shell from a binary is not common behavior for a user or system administrator, and may indicate an attempt to evade detection, increase capabilities or enhance the stability of an adversary.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/apt/
+* https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/apt-get/
+* https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/nawk/
+* https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/mawk/
+* https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/awk/
+* https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/gawk/
+* https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/busybox/
+* https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/c89/
+* https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/c99/
+* https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/cpulimit/
+* https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/crash/
+* https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/env/
+* https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/expect/
+* https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/find/
+* https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/flock/
+* https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/gcc/
+* https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/mysql/
+* https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/nice/
+* https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/ssh/
+* https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/vi/
+* https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/vim/
+* https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/capsh/
+* https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/byebug/
+* https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/git/
+* https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/ftp/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 112
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Shell Evasion via Linux Utilities*
+
+Detection alerts from this rule indicate that a Linux utility has been abused to breakout of restricted shells or
+environments by spawning an interactive system shell.
+Here are some possible avenues of investigation:
+- Examine the entry point to the host and user in action via the Analyse View.
+  - Identify the session entry leader and session user
+- Examine the contents of session leading to the abuse via the Session View.
+  - Examine the command execution pattern in the session, which may lead to suspricous activities
+- Examine the execution of commands in the spawned shell.
+  - Identify imment threat to the system from the executed commands
+  - Take necessary incident response actions to contain any malicious behviour caused via this execution.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- A malicious spawned shell can execute any of the possible MITTRE ATT&CK vectors mainly to impair defences.
+- Hence its adviced to enable defence evasion and privilige escalation rules accordingly in your environment
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+
+- If the triage releaved suspicious netwrok activity from the malicious spawned shell,
+  - Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware execution via the maliciously spawned shell,
+  - Search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- If the triage revelaed defence evasion for imparing defenses
+  - Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+  - Identified the disabled security guard components on the host and take necessary steps in renebaling the same.
+  - If any tools have been disbaled / uninstalled or config tampered work towards reenabling the same.
+- If the triage revelaed addition of persistence mechanism exploit like auto start scripts
+  - Isolate further login to the systems that can initae auto start scripts.
+  - Identify the auto start scripts and disable and remove the same from the systems
+- If the triage revealed data crawling or data export via remote copy
+  - Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised / used / decoded by the attacker during the data crawling
+  - Intiate compromised credential deactivation and credential rotation process for all exposed crednetials.
+  - Investiagte if any IPR data was accessed during the data crawling and take appropriate actions.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+Session View uses process data collected by the Elastic Defend integration, but this data is not always collected by default. Session View is available on enterprise subscription for versions 8.3 and above.
+
+*To confirm that Session View data is enabled:*
+
+- Go to “Manage → Policies”, and edit one or more of your Elastic Defend integration policies.
+- Select the” Policy settings” tab, then scroll down to the “Linux event collection” section near the bottom.
+- Check the box for “Process events”, and turn on the “Include session data” toggle.
+- If you want to include file and network alerts in Session View, check the boxes for “Network and File events”.
+- If you want to enable terminal output capture, turn on the “Capture terminal output” toggle.
+For more information about the additional fields collected when this setting is enabled and the usage of Session View for Analysis refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/session-view.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and
+(
+  /* launching shell from capsh */
+  (process.name == "capsh" and process.args == "--") or
+  
+  /* launching shells from unusual parents or parent+arg combos */
+  (process.name in ("bash", "dash", "ash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish") and (
+    (process.parent.name : "*awk" and process.parent.args : "BEGIN {system(*)}") or
+    (process.parent.name == "git" and process.parent.args : ("*PAGER*", "!*sh", "exec *sh") or 
+     process.args : ("*PAGER*", "!*sh", "exec *sh") and not process.name == "ssh" ) or
+    (process.parent.name : ("byebug", "ftp", "strace", "zip", "tar") and 
+    (
+      process.parent.args : "BEGIN {system(*)}" or
+      (process.parent.args : ("*PAGER*", "!*sh", "exec *sh") or process.args : ("*PAGER*", "!*sh", "exec *sh")) or
+      (
+        (process.parent.args : "exec=*sh" or (process.parent.args : "-I" and process.parent.args : "*sh")) or
+        (process.args : "exec=*sh" or (process.args : "-I" and process.args : "*sh"))
+        )
+      )
+    ) or
+    
+    /* shells specified in parent args */
+    /* nice rule is broken in 8.2 */
+    (process.parent.args : "*sh" and
+      (
+        (process.parent.name == "nice") or
+        (process.parent.name == "cpulimit" and process.parent.args == "-f") or
+        (process.parent.name == "find" and process.parent.args == "." and process.parent.args == "-exec" and 
+         process.parent.args == ";" and process.parent.args : "/bin/*sh") or
+        (process.parent.name == "flock" and process.parent.args == "-u" and process.parent.args == "/")
+      )
+    )
+  )) or
+
+  /* shells specified in args */
+  (process.args : "*sh" and (
+    (process.parent.name == "crash" and process.parent.args == "-h") or
+    (process.name == "sensible-pager" and process.parent.name in ("apt", "apt-get") and process.parent.args == "changelog")
+    /* scope to include more sensible-pager invoked shells with different parent process to reduce noise and remove false positives */
+    
+  )) or
+  (process.name == "busybox" and event.action == "exec" and process.args_count == 2 and process.args : "*sh" and not 
+   process.executable : "/var/lib/docker/overlay2/*/merged/bin/busybox" and not (process.parent.args == "init" and
+   process.parent.args == "runc") and not process.parent.args in ("ls-remote", "push", "fetch") and not process.parent.name == "mkinitramfs") or
+  (process.name == "env" and process.args_count == 2 and process.args : "*sh") or
+  (process.parent.name in ("vi", "vim") and process.parent.args == "-c" and process.parent.args : ":!*sh") or
+  (process.parent.name in ("c89", "c99", "gcc") and process.parent.args : "*sh,-s" and process.parent.args == "-wrapper") or
+  (process.parent.name == "expect" and process.parent.args == "-c" and process.parent.args : "spawn *sh;interact") or
+  (process.parent.name == "mysql" and process.parent.args == "-e" and process.parent.args : "\\!*sh") or
+  (process.parent.name == "ssh" and process.parent.args == "-o" and process.parent.args : "ProxyCommand=;*sh 0<&2 1>&2")
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Unix Shell
+** ID: T1059.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-linux-user-account-creation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-linux-user-account-creation.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..04fadfce99
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-linux-user-account-creation.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-linux-user-account-creation]]
+=== Linux User Account Creation
+
+Identifies attempts to create new users. Attackers may add new users to establish persistence on a system.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-system.auth-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+
+*Version*: 4
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Linux User Account Creation*
+
+
+The `useradd` and `adduser` commands are used to create new user accounts in Linux-based operating systems.
+
+Attackers may create new accounts (both local and domain) to maintain access to victim systems.
+
+This rule identifies the usage of `useradd` and `adduser` to create new accounts.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html[placeholder fields] to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate whether the user was created succesfully.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific User","query":"SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = {{user.name}}"}}
+- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Investigate the Account Authentication Status","query":"SELECT * FROM logged_in_users WHERE user = {{user.name}}"}}
+- Identify if the account was added to privileged groups or assigned special privileges after creation.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific Group","query":"SELECT * FROM groups WHERE groupname = {{group.name}}"}}
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User","query":"SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"}}
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Account creation is a common administrative task, so there is a high chance of the activity being legitimate. Before investigating further, verify that this activity is not benign.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Review the privileges assigned to the involved users to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
+- Delete the created account.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Filebeat.
+
+
+*Filebeat Setup*
+
+Filebeat is a lightweight shipper for forwarding and centralizing log data. Installed as an agent on your servers, Filebeat monitors the log files or locations that you specify, collects log events, and forwards them either to Elasticsearch or Logstash for indexing.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Filebeat on a Linux System:*
+
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/setup-repositories.html[helper guide].
+- To run Filebeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/running-on-docker.html[helper guide].
+- To run Filebeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html[helper guide].
+- For quick start information for Filebeat refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/8.11/filebeat-installation-configuration.html[helper guide].
+- For complete “Setup and Run Filebeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Rule Specific Setup Note*
+
+- This rule requires the “Filebeat System Module” to be enabled.
+- The system module collects and parses logs created by the system logging service of common Unix/Linux based distributions.
+- To run the system module of Filebeat on Linux follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-system.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+iam where host.os.type == "linux" and (event.type == "user" and event.type == "creation") and
+process.name in ("useradd", "adduser") and user.name != null
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Create Account
+** ID: T1136
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Local Account
+** ID: T1136.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-linux-user-added-to-privileged-group.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-linux-user-added-to-privileged-group.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6143fc911a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-linux-user-added-to-privileged-group.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-linux-user-added-to-privileged-group]]
+=== Linux User Added to Privileged Group
+
+Identifies attempts to add a user to a privileged group. Attackers may add users to a privileged group in order to establish persistence on a system.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
+
+*Version*: 6
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Linux User User Added to Privileged Group*
+
+
+The `usermod`, `adduser`, and `gpasswd` commands can be used to assign user accounts to new groups in Linux-based operating systems.
+
+Attackers may add users to a privileged group in order to escalate privileges or establish persistence on a system or domain.
+
+This rule identifies the usages of `usermod`, `adduser` and `gpasswd` to assign user accounts to a privileged group.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html[placeholder fields] to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate whether the user was succesfully added to the privileged group.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific User","query":"SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = {{user.name}}"}}
+- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Investigate the Account Authentication Status","query":"SELECT * FROM logged_in_users WHERE user = {{user.name}}"}}
+- Retrieve information about the privileged group to which the user was added.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific Group","query":"SELECT * FROM groups WHERE groupname = {{group.name}}"}}
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User","query":"SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"}}
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Adding accounts to a group is a common administrative task, so there is a high chance of the activity being legitimate. Before investigating further, verify that this activity is not benign.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Review the privileges assigned to the involved users to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
+- Delete the account that seems to be involved in malicious activity.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and process.args in (
+  "root", "admin", "wheel", "staff", "sudo","disk", "video", "shadow", "lxc", "lxd"
+) and
+(
+  process.name in ("usermod", "adduser") or
+  process.name == "gpasswd" and 
+  process.args in ("-a", "--add", "-M", "--members") 
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Create Account
+** ID: T1136
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Local Account
+** ID: T1136.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-local-account-tokenfilter-policy-disabled.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-local-account-tokenfilter-policy-disabled.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..42d01a8951
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-local-account-tokenfilter-policy-disabled.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-local-account-tokenfilter-policy-disabled]]
+=== Local Account TokenFilter Policy Disabled
+
+Identifies registry modification to the LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy policy. If this value exists (which doesn't by default) and is set to 1, then remote connections from all local members of Administrators are granted full high-integrity tokens during negotiation.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.stigviewer.com/stig/windows_server_2008_r2_member_server/2014-04-02/finding/V-36439
+* https://posts.specterops.io/pass-the-hash-is-dead-long-live-localaccounttokenfilterpolicy-506c25a7c167
+* https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/ESET_Turla_Mosquito.pdf
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 7
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+registry where host.os.type == "windows" and registry.path : (
+  "HKLM\\*\\LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy",
+  "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\*\\LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy") and
+  registry.data.strings : ("1", "0x00000001")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Modify Registry
+** ID: T1112
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Impair Defenses
+** ID: T1562
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Use Alternate Authentication Material
+** ID: T1550
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Pass the Hash
+** ID: T1550.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-local-scheduled-task-creation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-local-scheduled-task-creation.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..beff657b5f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-local-scheduled-task-creation.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-local-scheduled-task-creation]]
+=== Local Scheduled Task Creation
+
+Indicates the creation of a scheduled task. Adversaries can use these to establish persistence, move laterally, and/or escalate privileges.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security-part-1
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security-part-2
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence with maxspan=1m
+  [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type != "end" and
+    ((process.name : ("cmd.exe", "wscript.exe", "rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "wmic.exe", "mshta.exe",
+                      "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe", "WmiPrvSe.exe", "wsmprovhost.exe", "winrshost.exe") or
+    process.pe.original_file_name : ("cmd.exe", "wscript.exe", "rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "wmic.exe", "mshta.exe",
+                                     "powershell.exe", "pwsh.dll", "powershell_ise.exe", "WmiPrvSe.exe", "wsmprovhost.exe",
+                                     "winrshost.exe")) or
+    ?process.code_signature.trusted == false)] by process.entity_id
+  [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+    (process.name : "schtasks.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name == "schtasks.exe") and
+    process.args : ("/create", "-create") and process.args : ("/RU", "/SC", "/TN", "/TR", "/F", "/XML") and
+    /* exclude SYSTEM Integrity Level - look for task creations by non-SYSTEM user */
+    not (?process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name : "System" or ?winlog.event_data.IntegrityLevel : "System")
+  ] by process.parent.entity_id
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task/Job
+** ID: T1053
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task
+** ID: T1053.005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-lsass-memory-dump-creation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-lsass-memory-dump-creation.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..aa893d8892
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-lsass-memory-dump-creation.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-lsass-memory-dump-creation]]
+=== LSASS Memory Dump Creation
+
+Identifies the creation of a Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (lsass.exe) default memory dump. This may indicate a credential access attempt via trusted system utilities such as Task Manager (taskmgr.exe) and SQL Dumper (sqldumper.exe) or known pentesting tools such as Dumpert and AndrewSpecial.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/outflanknl/Dumpert
+* https://github.com/hoangprod/AndrewSpecial
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating LSASS Memory Dump Creation*
+
+
+Local Security Authority Server Service (LSASS) is a process in Microsoft Windows operating systems that is responsible for enforcing security policy on the system. It verifies users logging on to a Windows computer or server, handles password changes, and creates access tokens.
+
+This rule looks for the creation of memory dump files with file names compatible with credential dumping tools or that start with `lsass`.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Identify the process responsible for creating the dump file.
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Any activity that triggered the alert and is not inherently malicious must be monitored by the security team.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.action != "deletion" and
+  file.name : ("lsass*.dmp", "dumpert.dmp", "Andrew.dmp", "SQLDmpr*.mdmp", "Coredump.dmp") and
+
+  not (
+        process.executable : (
+          "?:\\Program Files\\Microsoft SQL Server\\*\\Shared\\SqlDumper.exe",
+          "?:\\Windows\\System32\\dllhost.exe"
+        ) and
+        file.path : (
+          "?:\\*\\Reporting Services\\Logfiles\\SQLDmpr*.mdmp",
+          "?:\\Program Files\\Microsoft SQL Server\\*\\Shared\\ErrorDumps\\SQLDmpr*.mdmp",
+          "?:\\Program Files\\Microsoft SQL Server\\*\\MSSQL\\LOG\\SQLDmpr*.mdmp"
+        )
+      ) and
+
+  not (
+        process.executable : "?:\\Windows\\system32\\WerFault.exe" and
+        file.path : (
+          "?:\\Windows\\System32\\config\\systemprofile\\AppData\\Local\\CrashDumps\\lsass.exe.*.dmp",
+          "?:\\Windows\\System32\\%LOCALAPPDATA%\\CrashDumps\\lsass.exe.*.dmp"
+        )
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: LSASS Memory
+** ID: T1003.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-lsass-memory-dump-handle-access.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-lsass-memory-dump-handle-access.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3633bf0cd5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-lsass-memory-dump-handle-access.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-lsass-memory-dump-handle-access]]
+=== LSASS Memory Dump Handle Access
+
+Identifies handle requests for the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) object access with specific access masks that many tools with a capability to dump memory to disk use (0x1fffff, 0x1010, 0x120089). This rule is tool agnostic as it has been validated against a host of various LSASS dump tools such as SharpDump, Procdump, Mimikatz, Comsvcs etc. It detects this behavior at a low level and does not depend on a specific tool or dump file name.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-system.*
+* logs-windows.*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4656
+* https://twitter.com/jsecurity101/status/1227987828534956033?s=20
+* https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/
+* https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/06_credential_access/WIN-170105221010.html
+* http://findingbad.blogspot.com/2017/
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/detect-credential-access
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating LSASS Memory Dump Handle Access*
+
+
+Local Security Authority Server Service (LSASS) is a process in Microsoft Windows operating systems that is responsible for enforcing security policy on the system. It verifies users logging on to a Windows computer or server, handles password changes, and creates access tokens.
+
+Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in LSASS process memory. After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. This is meant to facilitate single sign-on (SSO) ensuring a user isn’t prompted each time resource access is requested. These credential materials can be harvested by an adversary using administrative user or SYSTEM privileges to conduct lateral movement using https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/[alternate authentication material].
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- There should be very few or no false positives for this rule. If this activity is expected or noisy in your environment, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+- If the process is related to antivirus or endpoint detection and response solutions, validate that it is installed on the correct path and signed with the company's valid digital signature.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Scope compromised credentials and disable the accounts.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+Ensure advanced audit policies for Windows are enabled, specifically:
+Object Access policies https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4656[Event ID 4656] (Handle to an Object was Requested)
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Policies >
+Windows Settings >
+Security Settings >
+Advanced Audit Policies Configuration >
+System Audit Policies >
+Object Access >
+Audit File System (Success,Failure)
+Audit Handle Manipulation (Success,Failure)
+```
+
+Also, this event generates only if the object’s https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/access-control-lists[SACL] has the required access control entry (ACE) to handle the use of specific access rights.
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+any where event.action == "File System" and event.code == "4656" and
+
+    winlog.event_data.ObjectName : (
+        "?:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe",
+        "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume?\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe",
+        "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume??\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe") and
+
+    /* The right to perform an operation controlled by an extended access right. */
+
+    (winlog.event_data.AccessMask : ("0x1fffff" , "0x1010", "0x120089", "0x1F3FFF") or
+     winlog.event_data.AccessMaskDescription : ("READ_CONTROL", "Read from process memory"))
+
+     /* Common Noisy False Positives */
+
+    and not winlog.event_data.ProcessName : (
+        "?:\\Program Files\\*.exe",
+        "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe",
+        "?:\\Windows\\system32\\wbem\\WmiPrvSE.exe",
+        "?:\\Windows\\System32\\dllhost.exe",
+        "?:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
+        "?:\\Windows\\System32\\msiexec.exe",
+        "?:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\*.exe",
+        "?:\\Windows\\explorer.exe",
+        "?:\\Windows\\System32\\poqexec.exe")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: LSASS Memory
+** ID: T1003.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-predicted-to-be-a-dga-domain.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-predicted-to-be-a-dga-domain.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2a9567a2b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-predicted-to-be-a-dga-domain.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-predicted-to-be-a-dga-domain]]
+=== Machine Learning Detected a DNS Request Predicted to be a DGA Domain
+
+A supervised machine learning model has identified a DNS question name that is predicted to be the result of a Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA), which could indicate command and control network activity.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-network_traffic.*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-10m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html
+* https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/dga
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/detect-domain-generation-algorithm-activity-with-new-kibana-integration
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Network
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Use Case: Domain Generation Algorithm Detection
+* Rule Type: ML
+* Rule Type: Machine Learning
+* Tactic: Command and Control
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The rule requires the Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as DNS events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend, Network Packet Capture, or Packetbeat.  
+
+
+*DGA Detection Setup*
+
+The DGA Detection integration consists of an ML-based framework to detect DGA activity in DNS events.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for DGA Detection.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+- DNS events collected by the https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/endpoint[Elastic Defend], https://docs.elastic.co/integrations/network_traffic[Network Packet Capture] integration, or https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/packetbeat/current/packetbeat-overview.html[Packetbeat].
+- To install Elastic Defend, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[documentation].
+- To add the Network Packet Capture integration to an Elastic Agent policy, refer to https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/add-integration-to-policy.html[this] guide.
+- To set up and run Packetbeat, follow https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/packetbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[this] guide.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed to install assets associated with the DGA Detection integration:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Domain Generation Algorithm Detection and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Under Settings, click Install Domain Generation Algorithm Detection assets and follow the prompts to install the assets.
+
+
+*Ingest Pipeline Setup*
+
+Before you can enable this rule, you'll need to enrich DNS events with predictions from the Supervised DGA Detection model. This is done via the ingest pipeline named `<package_version>-ml_dga_ingest_pipeline` installed with the DGA Detection package.
+- If using an Elastic Beat such as Packetbeat, add the DGA ingest pipeline to it by adding a simple configuration https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/current/ingest.html#pipelines-for-beats[setting] to `packetbeat.yml`.
+- If adding the DGA ingest pipeline to an existing pipeline, use a https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/current/pipeline-processor.html[pipeline processor].
+
+
+*Adding Custom Mappings*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Stack Management.
+- Under Data click Index Management and navigate to the Component Templates tab.
+- Templates that can be edited to add custom components will be marked with a @custom suffix. Edit the @custom component template corresponding to the beat/integration you added the DGA ingest pipeline to, by pasting the following JSON blob in the "Load JSON" flyout:
+```
+{
+  "properties": {
+    "ml_is_dga": {
+      "properties": {
+        "malicious_prediction": {
+          "type": "long"
+        },
+        "malicious_probability": {
+          "type": "float"
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+ml_is_dga.malicious_prediction:1 and not dns.question.registered_domain:avsvmcloud.com
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Dynamic Resolution
+** ID: T1568
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Domain Generation Algorithms
+** ID: T1568.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-with-a-high-dga-probability-score.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-with-a-high-dga-probability-score.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ac089bb9c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-with-a-high-dga-probability-score.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-with-a-high-dga-probability-score]]
+=== Machine Learning Detected a DNS Request With a High DGA Probability Score
+
+A supervised machine learning model has identified a DNS question name with a high probability of sourcing from a Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA), which could indicate command and control network activity.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-network_traffic.*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-10m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html
+* https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/dga
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/detect-domain-generation-algorithm-activity-with-new-kibana-integration
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Network
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Use Case: Domain Generation Algorithm Detection
+* Rule Type: ML
+* Rule Type: Machine Learning
+* Tactic: Command and Control
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The rule requires the Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as DNS events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend, Network Packet Capture, or Packetbeat.  
+
+
+*DGA Detection Setup*
+
+The DGA Detection integration consists of an ML-based framework to detect DGA activity in DNS events.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for DGA Detection.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+- DNS events collected by the https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/endpoint[Elastic Defend], https://docs.elastic.co/integrations/network_traffic[Network Packet Capture] integration, or https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/packetbeat/current/packetbeat-overview.html[Packetbeat].
+- To install Elastic Defend, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[documentation].
+- To add the Network Packet Capture integration to an Elastic Agent policy, refer to https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/add-integration-to-policy.html[this] guide.
+- To set up and run Packetbeat, follow https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/packetbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[this] guide.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed to install assets associated with the DGA Detection integration:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Domain Generation Algorithm Detection and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Under Settings, click Install Domain Generation Algorithm Detection assets and follow the prompts to install the assets.
+
+
+*Ingest Pipeline Setup*
+
+Before you can enable this rule, you'll need to enrich DNS events with predictions from the Supervised DGA Detection model. This is done via the ingest pipeline named `<package_version>-ml_dga_ingest_pipeline` installed with the DGA Detection package.
+- If using an Elastic Beat such as Packetbeat, add the DGA ingest pipeline to it by adding a simple configuration https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/current/ingest.html#pipelines-for-beats[setting] to `packetbeat.yml`.
+- If adding the DGA ingest pipeline to an existing pipeline, use a https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/current/pipeline-processor.html[pipeline processor].
+
+
+*Adding Custom Mappings*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Stack Management.
+- Under Data click Index Management and navigate to the Component Templates tab.
+- Templates that can be edited to add custom components will be marked with a @custom suffix. Edit the @custom component template corresponding to the beat/integration you added the DGA ingest pipeline to, by pasting the following JSON blob in the "Load JSON" flyout:
+```
+{
+  "properties": {
+    "ml_is_dga": {
+      "properties": {
+        "malicious_prediction": {
+          "type": "long"
+        },
+        "malicious_probability": {
+          "type": "float"
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+ml_is_dga.malicious_probability > 0.98
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Dynamic Resolution
+** ID: T1568
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Domain Generation Algorithms
+** ID: T1568.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-predicted-to-be-malicious-activity.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-predicted-to-be-malicious-activity.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fd472bc109
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-predicted-to-be-malicious-activity.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-predicted-to-be-malicious-activity]]
+=== Machine Learning Detected a Suspicious Windows Event Predicted to be Malicious Activity
+
+A supervised machine learning model (ProblemChild) has identified a suspicious Windows process event with high probability of it being malicious activity. Alternatively, the model's blocklist identified the event as being malicious.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* endgame-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.process-*
+* winlogbeat-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-10m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html
+* https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/problemchild
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/detecting-living-off-the-land-attacks-with-new-elastic-integration
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* OS: Windows
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Use Case: Living off the Land Attack Detection
+* Rule Type: ML
+* Rule Type: Machine Learning
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The rule requires the Living off the Land (LotL) Attack Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as Windows process events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend or Winlogbeat.  
+
+
+*LotL Attack Detection Setup*
+
+The LotL Attack Detection integration detects living-off-the-land activity in Windows process events.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for LotL Attack Detection.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+- Windows process events collected by the https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/endpoint[Elastic Defend] integration or Winlogbeat(https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/winlogbeat/current/_winlogbeat_overview.html).
+- To install Elastic Defend, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[documentation].
+- To set up and run Winlogbeat, follow https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/winlogbeat/current/winlogbeat-installation-configuration.html[this] guide.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed to install assets associated with the LotL Attack Detection integration:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Living off the Land Attack Detection and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Under Settings, click Install Living off the Land Attack Detection assets and follow the prompts to install the assets.
+
+
+*Ingest Pipeline Setup*
+
+Before you can enable this rule, you'll need to enrich Windows process events with predictions from the Supervised LotL Attack Detection model. This is done via the ingest pipeline named `<package_version>-problem_child_ingest_pipeline` installed with the LotL Attack Detection package.
+- If using an Elastic Beat such as Winlogbeat, add the LotL ingest pipeline to it by adding a simple configuration https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/current/ingest.html#pipelines-for-beats[setting] to `winlogbeat.yml`.
+- If adding the LotL ingest pipeline to an existing pipeline, use a https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/current/pipeline-processor.html[pipeline processor].
+
+
+*Adding Custom Mappings*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Stack Management.
+- Under Data click Index Management and navigate to the Component Templates tab.
+- Templates that can be edited to add custom components will be marked with a @custom suffix. Edit the @custom component template corresponding to the beat/integration you added the LotL ingest pipeline to, by pasting the following JSON blob in the "Load JSON" flyout:
+```
+{
+  "properties": {
+    "problemchild": {
+      "properties": {
+        "prediction": {
+          "type": "long"
+        },
+        "prediction_probability": {
+          "type": "float"
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "blocklist_label": {
+      "type": "long"
+    }
+  }
+}
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where (problemchild.prediction == 1 or blocklist_label == 1) and not process.args : ("*C:\\WINDOWS\\temp\\nessus_*.txt*", "*C:\\WINDOWS\\temp\\nessus_*.tmp*")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Masquerading
+** ID: T1036
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Masquerade Task or Service
+** ID: T1036.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-with-a-high-malicious-probability-score.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-with-a-high-malicious-probability-score.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e9c751f883
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-with-a-high-malicious-probability-score.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-with-a-high-malicious-probability-score]]
+=== Machine Learning Detected a Suspicious Windows Event with a High Malicious Probability Score
+
+A supervised machine learning model (ProblemChild) has identified a suspicious Windows process event with high probability of it being malicious activity. Alternatively, the model's blocklist identified the event as being malicious.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* endgame-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.process-*
+* winlogbeat-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-10m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html
+* https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/problemchild
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/detecting-living-off-the-land-attacks-with-new-elastic-integration
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* OS: Windows
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Use Case: Living off the Land Attack Detection
+* Rule Type: ML
+* Rule Type: Machine Learning
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The rule requires the Living off the Land (LotL) Attack Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as Windows process events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend or Winlogbeat.  
+
+
+*LotL Attack Detection Setup*
+
+The LotL Attack Detection integration detects living-off-the-land activity in Windows process events.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for LotL Attack Detection.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+- Windows process events collected by the https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/endpoint[Elastic Defend] integration or Winlogbeat(https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/winlogbeat/current/_winlogbeat_overview.html).
+- To install Elastic Defend, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[documentation].
+- To set up and run Winlogbeat, follow https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/winlogbeat/current/winlogbeat-installation-configuration.html[this] guide.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed to install assets associated with the LotL Attack Detection integration:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Living off the Land Attack Detection and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Under Settings, click Install Living off the Land Attack Detection assets and follow the prompts to install the assets.
+
+
+*Ingest Pipeline Setup*
+
+Before you can enable this rule, you'll need to enrich Windows process events with predictions from the Supervised LotL Attack Detection model. This is done via the ingest pipeline named `<package_version>-problem_child_ingest_pipeline` installed with the LotL Attack Detection package.
+- If using an Elastic Beat such as Winlogbeat, add the LotL ingest pipeline to it by adding a simple configuration https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/current/ingest.html#pipelines-for-beats[setting] to `winlogbeat.yml`.
+- If adding the LotL ingest pipeline to an existing pipeline, use a https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/current/pipeline-processor.html[pipeline processor].
+
+
+*Adding Custom Mappings*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Stack Management.
+- Under Data click Index Management and navigate to the Component Templates tab.
+- Templates that can be edited to add custom components will be marked with a @custom suffix. Edit the @custom component template corresponding to the beat/integration you added the LotL ingest pipeline to, by pasting the following JSON blob in the "Load JSON" flyout:
+```
+{
+  "properties": {
+    "problemchild": {
+      "properties": {
+        "prediction": {
+          "type": "long"
+        },
+        "prediction_probability": {
+          "type": "float"
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "blocklist_label": {
+      "type": "long"
+    }
+  }
+}
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where ((problemchild.prediction == 1 and problemchild.prediction_probability > 0.98) or
+blocklist_label == 1) and not process.args : ("*C:\\WINDOWS\\temp\\nessus_*.txt*", "*C:\\WINDOWS\\temp\\nessus_*.tmp*")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Masquerading
+** ID: T1036
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Masquerade Task or Service
+** ID: T1036.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-machine-learning-detected-dga-activity-using-a-known-sunburst-dns-domain.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-machine-learning-detected-dga-activity-using-a-known-sunburst-dns-domain.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2145290cb4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-machine-learning-detected-dga-activity-using-a-known-sunburst-dns-domain.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-machine-learning-detected-dga-activity-using-a-known-sunburst-dns-domain]]
+=== Machine Learning Detected DGA activity using a known SUNBURST DNS domain
+
+A supervised machine learning model has identified a DNS question name that used by the SUNBURST malware and is predicted to be the result of a Domain Generation Algorithm.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-network_traffic.*
+
+*Severity*: critical
+
+*Risk score*: 99
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-10m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html
+* https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/dga
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/detect-domain-generation-algorithm-activity-with-new-kibana-integration
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Network
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Use Case: Domain Generation Algorithm Detection
+* Rule Type: ML
+* Rule Type: Machine Learning
+* Tactic: Command and Control
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The rule requires the Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as DNS events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend, Network Packet Capture, or Packetbeat.  
+
+
+*DGA Detection Setup*
+
+The DGA Detection integration consists of an ML-based framework to detect DGA activity in DNS events.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for DGA Detection.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+- DNS events collected by the https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/endpoint[Elastic Defend], https://docs.elastic.co/integrations/network_traffic[Network Packet Capture] integration, or https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/packetbeat/current/packetbeat-overview.html[Packetbeat].
+- To install Elastic Defend, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[documentation].
+- To add the Network Packet Capture integration to an Elastic Agent policy, refer to https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/add-integration-to-policy.html[this] guide.
+- To set up and run Packetbeat, follow https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/packetbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[this] guide.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed to install assets associated with the DGA Detection integration:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Domain Generation Algorithm Detection and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Under Settings, click Install Domain Generation Algorithm Detection assets and follow the prompts to install the assets.
+
+
+*Ingest Pipeline Setup*
+
+Before you can enable this rule, you'll need to enrich DNS events with predictions from the Supervised DGA Detection model. This is done via the ingest pipeline named `<package_version>-ml_dga_ingest_pipeline` installed with the DGA Detection package.
+- If using an Elastic Beat such as Packetbeat, add the DGA ingest pipeline to it by adding a simple configuration https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/current/ingest.html#pipelines-for-beats[setting] to `packetbeat.yml`.
+- If adding the DGA ingest pipeline to an existing pipeline, use a https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/current/pipeline-processor.html[pipeline processor].
+
+
+*Adding Custom Mappings*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Stack Management.
+- Under Data click Index Management and navigate to the Component Templates tab.
+- Templates that can be edited to add custom components will be marked with a @custom suffix. Edit the @custom component template corresponding to the beat/integration you added the DGA ingest pipeline to, by pasting the following JSON blob in the "Load JSON" flyout:
+```
+{
+  "properties": {
+    "ml_is_dga": {
+      "properties": {
+        "malicious_prediction": {
+          "type": "long"
+        },
+        "malicious_probability": {
+          "type": "float"
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}
+``` 
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+ml_is_dga.malicious_prediction:1 and dns.question.registered_domain:avsvmcloud.com
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Dynamic Resolution
+** ID: T1568
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Domain Generation Algorithms
+** ID: T1568.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-macos-installer-package-spawns-network-event.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-macos-installer-package-spawns-network-event.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8b661fe1b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-macos-installer-package-spawns-network-event.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-macos-installer-package-spawns-network-event]]
+=== MacOS Installer Package Spawns Network Event
+
+Detects the execution of a MacOS installer package with an abnormal child process (e.g bash) followed immediately by a network connection via a suspicious process (e.g curl). Threat actors will build and distribute malicious MacOS installer packages, which have a .pkg extension, many times imitating valid software in order to persuade and infect their victims often using the package files (e.g pre/post install scripts etc.) to download additional tools or malicious software. If this rule fires it should indicate the installation of a malicious or suspicious package.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings
+* https://posts.specterops.io/introducing-mystikal-4fbd2f7ae520
+* https://github.com/D00MFist/Mystikal
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Tactic: Command and Control
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id, user.id with maxspan=30s
+[process where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and process.parent.name : ("installer", "package_script_service") and process.name : ("bash", "sh", "zsh", "python", "osascript", "tclsh*")]
+[network where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type == "start" and process.name : ("curl", "osascript", "wget", "python")]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: JavaScript
+** ID: T1059.007
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Application Layer Protocol
+** ID: T1071
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Web Protocols
+** ID: T1071.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-masquerading-space-after-filename.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-masquerading-space-after-filename.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..650af720e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-masquerading-space-after-filename.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-masquerading-space-after-filename]]
+=== Masquerading Space After Filename
+
+This rules identifies a process created from an executable with a space appended to the end of the filename. This may indicate an attempt to masquerade a malicious file as benign to gain user execution. When a space is added to the end of certain files, the OS will execute the file according to it's true filetype instead of it's extension. Adversaries can hide a program's true filetype by changing the extension of the file. They can then add a space to the end of the name so that the OS automatically executes the file when it's double-clicked.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/blog/picus-10-critical-mitre-attck-techniques-t1036-masquerading
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 6
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type:("linux","macos") and
+  event.type == "start" and
+  (process.executable regex~ """/[a-z0-9\s_\-\\./]+\s""") and not
+  process.name in ("ls", "find", "grep", "xkbcomp")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Masquerading
+** ID: T1036
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Space after Filename
+** ID: T1036.006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/006/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-build-engine-started-an-unusual-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-build-engine-started-an-unusual-process.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8a3b87410b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-build-engine-started-an-unusual-process.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-build-engine-started-an-unusual-process]]
+=== Microsoft Build Engine Started an Unusual Process
+
+An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, started a PowerShell script or the Visual C# Command Line Compiler. This technique is sometimes used to deploy a malicious payload using the Build Engine.
+
+*Rule type*: new_terms
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/02/building-bypass-with-msbuild.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 210
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+host.os.type:windows and event.category:process and event.type:start and process.parent.name:("MSBuild.exe" or "msbuild.exe") and
+process.name:("csc.exe" or "iexplore.exe" or "powershell.exe")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Obfuscated Files or Information
+** ID: T1027
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Compile After Delivery
+** ID: T1027.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
+** ID: T1127
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: MSBuild
+** ID: T1127.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-build-engine-started-by-a-script-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-build-engine-started-by-a-script-process.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..37ccc8fc0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-build-engine-started-by-a-script-process.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-build-engine-started-by-a-script-process]]
+=== Microsoft Build Engine Started by a Script Process
+
+An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, was started by a script or the Windows command interpreter. This behavior is unusual and is sometimes used by malicious payloads.
+
+*Rule type*: new_terms
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 208
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+host.os.type:windows and event.category:process and event.type:start and (
+  process.name.caseless:"msbuild.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name:"MSBuild.exe") and 
+  process.parent.name:("cmd.exe" or "powershell.exe" or "pwsh.exe" or "powershell_ise.exe" or "cscript.exe" or
+    "wscript.exe" or "mshta.exe")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
+** ID: T1127
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: MSBuild
+** ID: T1127.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Windows Command Shell
+** ID: T1059.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Visual Basic
+** ID: T1059.005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-build-engine-started-by-a-system-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-build-engine-started-by-a-system-process.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..69a62bab1e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-build-engine-started-by-a-system-process.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-build-engine-started-by-a-system-process]]
+=== Microsoft Build Engine Started by a System Process
+
+An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, was started by Explorer or the WMI (Windows Management Instrumentation) subsystem. This behavior is unusual and is sometimes used by malicious payloads.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  process.name : "MSBuild.exe" and
+  process.parent.name : ("explorer.exe", "wmiprvse.exe")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
+** ID: T1127
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: MSBuild
+** ID: T1127.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-build-engine-started-by-an-office-application.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-build-engine-started-by-an-office-application.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b42e4a07ee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-build-engine-started-by-an-office-application.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-build-engine-started-by-an-office-application]]
+=== Microsoft Build Engine Started by an Office Application
+
+An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, was started by Excel or Word. This is unusual behavior for the Build Engine and could have been caused by an Excel or Word document executing a malicious script payload.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/02/building-bypass-with-msbuild.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Microsoft Build Engine Started by an Office Application*
+
+
+Microsoft Office (MS Office) is a suite of applications designed to help with productivity and completing common tasks on a computer. You can create and edit documents containing text and images, work with data in spreadsheets and databases, and create presentations and posters. As it is some of the most-used software across companies, MS Office is frequently targeted for initial access. It also has a wide variety of capabilities that attackers can take advantage of.
+
+The Microsoft Build Engine is a platform for building applications. This engine, also known as MSBuild, provides an XML schema for a project file that controls how the build platform processes and builds software, and can be abused to proxy execution of code.
+
+This rule looks for the `Msbuild.exe` utility spawned by MS Office programs. This is generally the result of the execution of malicious documents.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate abnormal behaviors observed by the subject process, such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Retrieve MS Office documents received and opened by the user that could cause this behavior. Common locations include, but are not limited to, the Downloads and Document folders and the folder configured at the email client.
+- Determine if the collected files are malicious:
+  - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+    - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+      - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - File and registry access, modification, and creation activities.
+      - Service creation and launch activities.
+      - Scheduled task creation.
+  - Use the PowerShell Get-FileHash cmdlet to get the files' SHA-256 hash values.
+    - Search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+  - If the malicious file was delivered via phishing:
+    - Block the email sender from sending future emails.
+    - Block the malicious web pages.
+    - Remove emails from the sender from mailboxes.
+    - Consider improvements to the security awareness program.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  process.name : "MSBuild.exe" and
+  process.parent.name : ("eqnedt32.exe",
+                         "excel.exe",
+                         "fltldr.exe",
+                         "msaccess.exe",
+                         "mspub.exe",
+                         "outlook.exe",
+                         "powerpnt.exe",
+                         "winword.exe" )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
+** ID: T1127
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: MSBuild
+** ID: T1127.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-build-engine-using-an-alternate-name.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-build-engine-using-an-alternate-name.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4e089eb9c3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-build-engine-using-an-alternate-name.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-build-engine-using-an-alternate-name]]
+=== Microsoft Build Engine Using an Alternate Name
+
+An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, was started after being renamed. This is uncommon behavior and may indicate an attempt to run unnoticed or undetected.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 111
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Microsoft Build Engine Using an Alternate Name*
+
+
+The OriginalFileName attribute of a PE (Portable Executable) file is a metadata field that contains the original name of the executable file when compiled or linked. By using this attribute, analysts can identify renamed instances that attackers can use with the intent of evading detections, application allowlists, and other security protections.
+
+The Microsoft Build Engine is a platform for building applications. This engine, also known as MSBuild, provides an XML schema for a project file that controls how the build platform processes and builds software, and can be abused to proxy execution of code.
+
+This rule checks for renamed instances of MSBuild, which can indicate an attempt of evading detections, application allowlists, and other security protections.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  process.pe.original_file_name == "MSBuild.exe" and
+  not process.name : "MSBuild.exe"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Masquerading
+** ID: T1036
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Rename System Utilities
+** ID: T1036.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
+** ID: T1127
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: MSBuild
+** ID: T1127.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-exchange-server-um-spawning-suspicious-processes.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-exchange-server-um-spawning-suspicious-processes.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5a14f355d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-exchange-server-um-spawning-suspicious-processes.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-exchange-server-um-spawning-suspicious-processes]]
+=== Microsoft Exchange Server UM Spawning Suspicious Processes
+
+Identifies suspicious processes being spawned by the Microsoft Exchange Server Unified Messaging (UM) service. This activity has been observed exploiting CVE-2021-26857.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers
+* https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Initial Access
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Use Case: Vulnerability
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+* Austin Songer
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  process.parent.name : ("UMService.exe", "UMWorkerProcess.exe") and
+    not process.executable :
+              ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\werfault.exe",
+               "?:\\Windows\\System32\\wermgr.exe",
+               "?:\\Program Files\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V??\\Bin\\UMWorkerProcess.exe",
+               "?:\\Program Files\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\Bin\\UMWorkerProcess.exe",
+               "D:\\Exchange 2016\\Bin\\UMWorkerProcess.exe",
+               "E:\\ExchangeServer\\Bin\\UMWorkerProcess.exe",
+               "D:\\Exchange\\Bin\\UMWorkerProcess.exe",
+               "D:\\Exchange Server\\Bin\\UMWorkerProcess.exe",
+               "E:\\Exchange Server\\V15\\Bin\\UMWorkerProcess.exe")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Initial Access
+** ID: TA0001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploit Public-Facing Application
+** ID: T1190
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation of Remote Services
+** ID: T1210
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-exchange-server-um-writing-suspicious-files.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-exchange-server-um-writing-suspicious-files.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..56200442af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-exchange-server-um-writing-suspicious-files.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-exchange-server-um-writing-suspicious-files]]
+=== Microsoft Exchange Server UM Writing Suspicious Files
+
+Identifies suspicious files being written by the Microsoft Exchange Server Unified Messaging (UM) service. This activity has been observed exploiting CVE-2021-26858.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers
+* https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Initial Access
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Use Case: Vulnerability
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+* Austin Songer
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+Positive hits can be checked against the established Microsoft https://github.com/microsoft/CSS-Exchange/tree/main/Security/Baselines[baselines].
+
+Microsoft highly recommends that the best course of action is patching, but this may not protect already compromised systems
+from existing intrusions. Other tools for detecting and mitigating can be found within their Exchange support
+https://github.com/microsoft/CSS-Exchange/tree/main/Security[repository]
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "creation" and
+  process.name : ("UMWorkerProcess.exe", "umservice.exe") and
+  file.extension : ("php", "jsp", "js", "aspx", "asmx", "asax", "cfm", "shtml") and
+  (
+    file.path : "?:\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\aspnet_client\\*" or
+
+    (file.path : "?:\\*\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server*\\FrontEnd\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth\\*" and
+       not (file.path : "?:\\*\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server*\\FrontEnd\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth\\version\\*" or
+            file.name : ("errorFE.aspx", "expiredpassword.aspx", "frowny.aspx", "GetIdToken.htm", "logoff.aspx",
+                        "logon.aspx", "OutlookCN.aspx", "RedirSuiteServiceProxy.aspx", "signout.aspx"))) or
+
+    (file.path : "?:\\*\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server*\\FrontEnd\\HttpProxy\\ecp\\auth\\*" and
+       not file.name : "TimeoutLogoff.aspx")
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Initial Access
+** ID: TA0001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploit Public-Facing Application
+** ID: T1190
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation of Remote Services
+** ID: T1210
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-exchange-worker-spawning-suspicious-processes.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-exchange-worker-spawning-suspicious-processes.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2051efef42
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-exchange-worker-spawning-suspicious-processes.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-exchange-worker-spawning-suspicious-processes]]
+=== Microsoft Exchange Worker Spawning Suspicious Processes
+
+Identifies suspicious processes being spawned by the Microsoft Exchange Server worker process (w3wp). This activity may indicate exploitation activity or access to an existing web shell backdoor.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers
+* https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities
+* https://discuss.elastic.co/t/detection-and-response-for-hafnium-activity/266289
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Initial Access
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  process.parent.name : "w3wp.exe" and process.parent.args : "MSExchange*AppPool" and
+  (process.name : ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe") or
+  ?process.pe.original_file_name in ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.dll", "powershell_ise.exe"))
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Initial Access
+** ID: TA0001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploit Public-Facing Application
+** ID: T1190
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Windows Command Shell
+** ID: T1059.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-iis-connection-strings-decryption.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-iis-connection-strings-decryption.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..90d7a09bb2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-iis-connection-strings-decryption.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-iis-connection-strings-decryption]]
+=== Microsoft IIS Connection Strings Decryption
+
+Identifies use of aspnet_regiis to decrypt Microsoft IIS connection strings. An attacker with Microsoft IIS web server access via a webshell or alike can decrypt and dump any hardcoded connection strings, such as the MSSQL service account password using aspnet_regiis command.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 33
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://blog.netspi.com/decrypting-iis-passwords-to-break-out-of-the-dmz-part-1/
+* https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/greenbug-espionage-telco-south-asia
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  (process.name : "aspnet_regiis.exe" or ?process.pe.original_file_name == "aspnet_regiis.exe") and
+  process.args : "connectionStrings" and process.args : "-pdf"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-iis-service-account-password-dumped.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-iis-service-account-password-dumped.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..586740ec6b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-iis-service-account-password-dumped.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-iis-service-account-password-dumped]]
+=== Microsoft IIS Service Account Password Dumped
+
+Identifies the Internet Information Services (IIS) command-line tool, AppCmd, being used to list passwords. An attacker with IIS web server access via a web shell can decrypt and dump the IIS AppPool service account password using AppCmd.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 33
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://blog.netspi.com/decrypting-iis-passwords-to-break-out-of-the-dmz-part-1/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+   (process.name : "appcmd.exe" or ?process.pe.original_file_name == "appcmd.exe") and
+   process.args : "/list" and process.args : "/text*password"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-windows-defender-tampering.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-windows-defender-tampering.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..aff7d087e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-windows-defender-tampering.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-windows-defender-tampering]]
+=== Microsoft Windows Defender Tampering
+
+Identifies when one or more features on Microsoft Defender are disabled. Adversaries may disable or tamper with Microsoft Defender features to evade detection and conceal malicious behavior.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
+* https://www.tenforums.com/tutorials/32236-enable-disable-microsoft-defender-pua-protection-windows-10-a.html
+* https://www.tenforums.com/tutorials/104025-turn-off-core-isolation-memory-integrity-windows-10-a.html
+* https://www.tenforums.com/tutorials/105533-enable-disable-windows-defender-exploit-protection-settings.html
+* https://www.tenforums.com/tutorials/123792-turn-off-tamper-protection-microsoft-defender-antivirus.html
+* https://www.tenforums.com/tutorials/51514-turn-off-microsoft-defender-periodic-scanning-windows-10-a.html
+* https://www.tenforums.com/tutorials/3569-turn-off-real-time-protection-microsoft-defender-antivirus.html
+* https://www.tenforums.com/tutorials/99576-how-schedule-scan-microsoft-defender-antivirus-windows-10-a.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Austin Songer
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Microsoft Windows Defender Tampering*
+
+
+Microsoft Windows Defender is an antivirus product built into Microsoft Windows, which makes it popular across multiple environments. Disabling it is a common step in threat actor playbooks.
+
+This rule monitors the registry for modifications that disable Windows Defender features.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Examine which features have been disabled, and check if this operation is done under change management and approved according to the organization's policy.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This mechanism can be used legitimately. Analysts can dismiss the alert if the administrator is aware of the activity, the configuration is justified (for example, it is being used to deploy other security solutions or troubleshooting), and no other suspicious activity has been observed.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- Windows Defender Disabled via Registry Modification - 2ffa1f1e-b6db-47fa-994b-1512743847eb
+- Disabling Windows Defender Security Settings via PowerShell - c8cccb06-faf2-4cd5-886e-2c9636cfcb87
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Take actions to restore the appropriate Windows Defender antivirus configurations.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Review the privileges assigned to the user to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+registry where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type in ("creation", "change") and
+  (registry.path : "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\PUAProtection" and
+  registry.data.strings : ("0", "0x00000000")) or
+  (registry.path : "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender Security Center\\App and Browser protection\\DisallowExploitProtectionOverride" and
+  registry.data.strings : ("0", "0x00000000")) or
+  (registry.path : "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\DisableAntiSpyware" and
+  registry.data.strings : ("1", "0x00000001")) or
+  (registry.path : "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Features\\TamperProtection" and
+  registry.data.strings : ("0", "0x00000000")) or
+  (registry.path : "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableRealtimeMonitoring" and
+  registry.data.strings : ("1", "0x00000001")) or
+  (registry.path : "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem" and
+  registry.data.strings : ("1", "0x00000001")) or
+  (registry.path : "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableScriptScanning" and
+  registry.data.strings : ("1", "0x00000001")) or
+  (registry.path : "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Windows Defender Exploit Guard\\Controlled Folder Access\\EnableControlledFolderAccess" and
+  registry.data.strings : ("0", "0x00000000")) or
+  (registry.path : "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableIOAVProtection" and
+  registry.data.strings : ("1", "0x00000001")) or
+  (registry.path : "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Reporting\\DisableEnhancedNotifications" and
+  registry.data.strings : ("1", "0x00000001")) or
+  (registry.path : "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\SpyNet\\DisableBlockAtFirstSeen" and
+  registry.data.strings : ("1", "0x00000001")) or
+  (registry.path : "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\SpyNet\\SpynetReporting" and
+  registry.data.strings : ("0", "0x00000000")) or
+  (registry.path : "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\SpyNet\\SubmitSamplesConsent" and
+  registry.data.strings : ("0", "0x00000000")) or
+  (registry.path : "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableBehaviorMonitoring" and
+  registry.data.strings : ("1", "0x00000001"))
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Impair Defenses
+** ID: T1562
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Modify Registry
+** ID: T1112
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-mimikatz-memssp-log-file-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-mimikatz-memssp-log-file-detected.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2a49b8e387
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-mimikatz-memssp-log-file-detected.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-mimikatz-memssp-log-file-detected]]
+=== Mimikatz Memssp Log File Detected
+
+Identifies the password log file from the default Mimikatz memssp module.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/detect-credential-access
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Mimikatz Memssp Log File Detected*
+
+
+https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz[Mimikatz] is an open-source tool used to collect, decrypt, and/or use cached credentials. This tool is commonly abused by adversaries during the post-compromise stage where adversaries have gained an initial foothold on an endpoint and are looking to elevate privileges and seek out additional authentication objects such as tokens/hashes/credentials that can then be used to laterally move and pivot across a network.
+
+This rule looks for the creation of a file named `mimilsa.log`, which is generated when using the Mimikatz misc::memssp module, which injects a malicious Windows SSP to collect locally authenticated credentials, which includes the computer account password, running service credentials, and any accounts that logon.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (e.g., 4624) to the target host.
+- Retrieve and inspect the log file contents.
+- Search for DLL files created in the same location as the log file, and retrieve unsigned DLLs.
+  - Use the PowerShell Get-FileHash cmdlet to get the SHA-256 hash value of these files.
+    - Search for the existence of these files in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+  - Identify the process that created the DLL using file creation events.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This file name `mimilsa.log` should not legitimately be created.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- Mimikatz Powershell Module Activity - ac96ceb8-4399-4191-af1d-4feeac1f1f46
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the host is a Domain Controller (DC):
+  - Activate your incident response plan for total Active Directory compromise.
+  - Review the privileges assigned to users that can access the DCs to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed and reduce the attack surface.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Reboot the host to remove the injected SSP from memory.
+- Reimage the host operating system or restore compromised files to clean versions.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "windows" and file.name : "mimilsa.log" and process.name : "lsass.exe"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-amsienable-registry-key.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-amsienable-registry-key.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..79e3b670e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-amsienable-registry-key.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-amsienable-registry-key]]
+=== Modification of AmsiEnable Registry Key
+
+Identifies modifications of the AmsiEnable registry key to 0, which disables the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI). An adversary can modify this key to disable AMSI protections.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://hackinparis.com/data/slides/2019/talks/HIP2019-Dominic_Chell-Cracking_The_Perimeter_With_Sharpshooter.pdf
+* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/amsi/antimalware-scan-interface-portal
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Modification of AmsiEnable Registry Key*
+
+
+The Windows Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) is a versatile interface standard that allows your applications and services to integrate with any antimalware product on a machine. AMSI integrates with multiple Windows components, ranging from User Account Control (UAC) to VBA macros and PowerShell.
+
+Since AMSI is widely used across security products for increased visibility, attackers can disable it to evade detections that rely on it.
+
+This rule monitors the modifications to the Software\Microsoft\Windows Script\Settings\AmsiEnable registry key.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate the execution of scripts and macros after the registry modification.
+- Retrieve scripts or Microsoft Office files and determine if they are malicious:
+  - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+    - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+      - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - File and registry access, modification, and creation activities.
+      - Service creation and launch activities.
+      - Scheduled task creation.
+  - Use the PowerShell Get-FileHash cmdlet to get the files' SHA-256 hash values.
+    - Search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Use process name, command line, and file hash to search for occurrences on other hosts.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This modification should not happen legitimately. Any potential benign true positive (B-TP) should be mapped and monitored by the security team as these modifications expose the host to malware infections.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- Microsoft Windows Defender Tampering - fe794edd-487f-4a90-b285-3ee54f2af2d3
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Delete or set the key to its default value.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+registry where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type in ("creation", "change") and
+  registry.path : (
+    "HKEY_USERS\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows Script\\Settings\\AmsiEnable",
+    "HKU\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows Script\\Settings\\AmsiEnable",
+    "\\REGISTRY\\USER\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows Script\\Settings\\AmsiEnable"
+  ) and
+  registry.data.strings: ("0", "0x00000000")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Impair Defenses
+** ID: T1562
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Disable or Modify Tools
+** ID: T1562.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Modify Registry
+** ID: T1112
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-boot-configuration.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-boot-configuration.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..da40099e30
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-boot-configuration.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-boot-configuration]]
+=== Modification of Boot Configuration
+
+Identifies use of bcdedit.exe to delete boot configuration data. This tactic is sometimes used as by malware or an attacker as a destructive technique.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Impact
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Modification of Boot Configuration*
+
+
+Boot entry parameters, or boot parameters, are optional, system-specific settings that represent configuration options. These are stored in a boot configuration data (BCD) store, and administrators can use utilities like `bcdedit.exe` to configure these.
+
+This rule identifies the usage of `bcdedit.exe` to:
+
+- Disable Windows Error Recovery (recoveryenabled).
+- Ignore errors if there is a failed boot, failed shutdown, or failed checkpoint (bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures).
+
+These are common steps in destructive attacks by adversaries leveraging ransomware.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
+- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- The usage of these options is not inherently malicious. Administrators can modify these configurations to force a machine to boot for troubleshooting or data recovery purposes.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- Deleting Backup Catalogs with Wbadmin - 581add16-df76-42bb-af8e-c979bfb39a59
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Consider isolating the involved host to prevent destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  (process.name : "bcdedit.exe" or ?process.pe.original_file_name == "bcdedit.exe") and
+    (
+      (process.args : "/set" and process.args : "bootstatuspolicy" and process.args : "ignoreallfailures") or
+      (process.args : "no" and process.args : "recoveryenabled")
+    )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Impact
+** ID: TA0040
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Inhibit System Recovery
+** ID: T1490
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-dynamic-linker-preload-shared-object.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-dynamic-linker-preload-shared-object.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0d9a3f460e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-dynamic-linker-preload-shared-object.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-dynamic-linker-preload-shared-object]]
+=== Modification of Dynamic Linker Preload Shared Object
+
+Identifies modification of the dynamic linker preload shared object (ld.so.preload). Adversaries may execute malicious payloads by hijacking the dynamic linker used to load libraries.
+
+*Rule type*: new_terms
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.anomali.com/blog/rocke-evolves-its-arsenal-with-a-new-malware-family-written-in-golang
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 209
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
+- Elastic Defend
+- Auditbeat
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Auditbeat Setup*
+
+Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit the activities of users and processes on your systems. For example, you can use Auditbeat to collect and centralize audit events from the Linux Audit Framework. You can also use Auditbeat to detect changes to critical files, like binaries and configuration files, and identify potential security policy violations.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Auditbeat on a Linux System:*
+
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setup-repositories.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-docker.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html[helper guide].
+- For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+host.os.type:linux and event.category:file and event.action:(updated or renamed or rename or file_rename_event) and 
+not event.type:deletion and file.path:/etc/ld.so.preload and not process.name:(wine or oneagentinstallaction)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Hijack Execution Flow
+** ID: T1574
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Dynamic Linker Hijacking
+** ID: T1574.006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-environment-variable-via-launchctl.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-environment-variable-via-launchctl.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..de917e34f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-environment-variable-via-launchctl.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-environment-variable-via-launchctl]]
+=== Modification of Environment Variable via Launchctl
+
+Identifies modifications to an environment variable using the built-in launchctl command. Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking certain environment variables to load arbitrary libraries or bypass certain restrictions.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master//modules/post/osx/escalate/tccbypass.rb
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:macos and event.type:start and 
+  process.name:launchctl and 
+  process.args:(setenv and not (ANT_HOME or 
+                                DBUS_LAUNCHD_SESSION_BUS_SOCKET or 
+                                EDEN_ENV or 
+                                LG_WEBOS_TV_SDK_HOME or 
+                                RUNTIME_JAVA_HOME or 
+                                WEBOS_CLI_TV or 
+                                JAVA*_HOME) and 
+                not *.vmoptions) and 
+  not process.parent.executable:("/Applications/IntelliJ IDEA CE.app/Contents/jbr/Contents/Home/lib/jspawnhelper" or 
+                                  /Applications/NoMachine.app/Contents/Frameworks/bin/nxserver.bin or 
+                                  /Applications/NoMachine.app/Contents/Frameworks/bin/nxserver.bin or 
+                                  /usr/local/bin/kr)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Hijack Execution Flow
+** ID: T1574
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable
+** ID: T1574.007
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/007/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-openssh-binaries.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-openssh-binaries.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8c2c5a21c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-openssh-binaries.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,227 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-openssh-binaries]]
+=== Modification of OpenSSH Binaries
+
+Adversaries may modify SSH related binaries for persistence or credential access by patching sensitive functions to enable unauthorized access or by logging SSH credentials for exfiltration.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://blog.angelalonso.es/2016/09/anatomy-of-real-linux-intrusion-part-ii.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Modification of OpenSSH Binaries*
+
+
+OpenSSH is a widely used suite of secure networking utilities based on the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol, which provides encrypted communication sessions over a computer network.
+
+Adversaries may exploit OpenSSH by modifying its binaries, such as `/usr/bin/scp`, `/usr/bin/sftp`, `/usr/bin/ssh`, `/usr/sbin/sshd`, or `libkeyutils.so`, to gain unauthorized access or exfiltrate SSH credentials.
+
+The detection rule 'Modification of OpenSSH Binaries' is designed to identify such abuse by monitoring file changes in the Linux environment. It triggers an alert when a process, modifies any of the specified OpenSSH binaries or libraries. This helps security analysts detect potential malicious activities and take appropriate action.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html[placeholder fields] to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User","query":"SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"}}
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+- Investigate whether the altered scripts call other malicious scripts elsewhere on the file system. 
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+        - Cron jobs, services and other persistence mechanisms.
+            - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Crontab Information","query":"SELECT * FROM crontab"}}
+- Investigate abnormal behaviors by the subject process/user such as network connections, file modifications, and any other spawned child processes.
+  - Investigate listening ports and open sockets to look for potential command and control traffic or data exfiltration.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Listening Ports","query":"SELECT pid, address, port, socket, protocol, path FROM listening_ports"}}
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Open Sockets","query":"SELECT pid, family, remote_address, remote_port, socket, state FROM process_open_sockets"}}
+  - Identify the user account that performed the action, analyze it, and check whether it should perform this kind of action.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific User","query":"SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = {{user.name}}"}}
+- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Investigate the Account Authentication Status","query":"SELECT * FROM logged_in_users WHERE user = {{user.name}}"}}
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Regular users should not need to modify OpenSSH binaries, which makes false positives unlikely. In the case of authorized benign true positives (B-TPs), exceptions can be added.
+- If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+- If this activity is related to a system administrator that performed these actions for administrative purposes, consider adding exceptions for this specific administrator user account. 
+- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
+
+
+*Response and Remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
+- Elastic Defend
+- Auditbeat
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Auditbeat Setup*
+
+Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit the activities of users and processes on your systems. For example, you can use Auditbeat to collect and centralize audit events from the Linux Audit Framework. You can also use Auditbeat to detect changes to critical files, like binaries and configuration files, and identify potential security policy violations.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Auditbeat on a Linux System:*
+
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setup-repositories.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-docker.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html[helper guide].
+- For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:file and host.os.type:linux and event.type:change and 
+  process.name:(* and not (dnf or dnf-automatic or dpkg or yum or rpm or yum-cron or anacron or platform-python)) and 
+  (file.path:(/usr/bin/scp or 
+                /usr/bin/sftp or 
+                /usr/bin/ssh or 
+                /usr/sbin/sshd) or 
+  file.name:libkeyutils.so) and
+  not process.executable:/usr/share/elasticsearch/*
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Create or Modify System Process
+** ID: T1543
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Modify Authentication Process
+** ID: T1556
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote Services
+** ID: T1021
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: SSH
+** ID: T1021.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote Service Session Hijacking
+** ID: T1563
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: SSH Hijacking
+** ID: T1563.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-safari-settings-via-defaults-command.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-safari-settings-via-defaults-command.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9c2128e419
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-safari-settings-via-defaults-command.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-safari-settings-via-defaults-command]]
+=== Modification of Safari Settings via Defaults Command
+
+Identifies changes to the Safari configuration using the built-in defaults command. Adversaries may attempt to enable or disable certain Safari settings, such as enabling JavaScript from Apple Events to ease in the hijacking of the users browser.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://objectivebythesea.com/v2/talks/OBTS_v2_Zohar.pdf
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:macos and event.type:start and
+  process.name:defaults and process.args:
+    (com.apple.Safari and write and not
+      (
+      UniversalSearchEnabled or
+      SuppressSearchSuggestions or
+      WebKitTabToLinksPreferenceKey or
+      ShowFullURLInSmartSearchField or
+      com.apple.Safari.ContentPageGroupIdentifier.WebKit2TabsToLinks
+      )
+    )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Impair Defenses
+** ID: T1562
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Disable or Modify Tools
+** ID: T1562.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-the-mspkiaccountcredentials.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-the-mspkiaccountcredentials.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f6b398e907
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-the-mspkiaccountcredentials.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-the-mspkiaccountcredentials]]
+=== Modification of the msPKIAccountCredentials
+
+Identify the modification of the msPKIAccountCredentials attribute in an Active Directory User Object. Attackers can abuse the credentials roaming feature to overwrite an arbitrary file for privilege escalation. ms-PKI-AccountCredentials contains binary large objects (BLOBs) of encrypted credential objects from the credential manager store, private keys, certificates, and certificate requests.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-system.*
+* logs-windows.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt29-windows-credential-roaming
+* https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/11483.windows-credential-roaming.aspx
+* https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5136
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Data Source: Active Directory
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring
+
+*Version*: 9
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The 'Audit Directory Service Changes' logging policy must be configured for (Success, Failure).
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Policies >
+Windows Settings >
+Security Settings >
+Advanced Audit Policies Configuration >
+Audit Policies >
+DS Access >
+Audit Directory Service Changes (Success,Failure)
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.action:"Directory Service Changes" and event.code:"5136" and
+  winlog.event_data.AttributeLDAPDisplayName:"msPKIAccountCredentials" and winlog.event_data.OperationType:"%%14674" and
+  not winlog.event_data.SubjectUserSid : "S-1-5-18"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
+** ID: T1068
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-wdigest-security-provider.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-wdigest-security-provider.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1f76038f40
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-wdigest-security-provider.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-wdigest-security-provider]]
+=== Modification of WDigest Security Provider
+
+Identifies attempts to modify the WDigest security provider in the registry to force the user's password to be stored in clear text in memory. This behavior can be indicative of an adversary attempting to weaken the security configuration of an endpoint. Once the UseLogonCredential value is modified, the adversary may attempt to dump clear text passwords from memory.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.csoonline.com/article/3438824/how-to-detect-and-halt-credential-theft-via-windows-wdigest.html
+* https://www.praetorian.com/blog/mitigating-mimikatz-wdigest-cleartext-credential-theft?edition=2019
+* https://frsecure.com/compromised-credentials-response-playbook
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/detect-credential-access
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Modification of WDigest Security Provider*
+
+
+In Windows XP, Microsoft added support for a protocol known as WDigest. The WDigest protocol allows clients to send cleartext credentials to Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Authentication Security Layer (SASL) applications based on RFC 2617 and 2831. Windows versions up to 8 and 2012 store logon credentials in memory in plaintext by default, which is no longer the case with newer Windows versions.
+
+Still, attackers can force WDigest to store the passwords insecurely on the memory by modifying the `HKLM\SYSTEM\*ControlSet*\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest\UseLogonCredential` registry key. This activity is commonly related to the execution of credential dumping tools.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- It is unlikely that the monitored registry key was modified legitimately in newer versions of Windows. Analysts should treat any activity triggered from this rule with high priority as it typically represents an active adversary.
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Determine if credential dumping tools were run on the host, and retrieve and analyze suspicious executables:
+  - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+    - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+      - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - File and registry access, modification, and creation activities.
+      - Service creation and launch activities.
+      - Scheduled task creation.
+  - Use the PowerShell Get-FileHash cmdlet to get the files' SHA-256 hash values.
+    - Search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Use process name, command line, and file hash to search for occurrences on other hosts.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This modification should not happen legitimately. Any potential benign true positive (B-TP) should be mapped and monitored by the security team, as these modifications expose the entire domain to credential compromises and consequently unauthorized access.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- Mimikatz Powershell Module Activity - ac96ceb8-4399-4191-af1d-4feeac1f1f46
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Reimage the host operating system and restore compromised files to clean versions.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+registry where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type : ("creation", "change") and
+    registry.path : (
+        "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\\Control\\SecurityProviders\\WDigest\\UseLogonCredential",
+        "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\\Control\\SecurityProviders\\WDigest\\UseLogonCredential"
+    ) and registry.data.strings : ("1", "0x00000001") and
+    not (process.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe" and user.id : "S-1-5-18")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: LSASS Memory
+** ID: T1003.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-mounting-hidden-or-webdav-remote-shares.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-mounting-hidden-or-webdav-remote-shares.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9de1b9d512
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-mounting-hidden-or-webdav-remote-shares.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-mounting-hidden-or-webdav-remote-shares]]
+=== Mounting Hidden or WebDav Remote Shares
+
+Identifies the use of net.exe to mount a WebDav or hidden remote share. This may indicate lateral movement or preparation for data exfiltration.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Initial Access
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+ ((process.name : "net.exe" or ?process.pe.original_file_name == "net.exe") or ((process.name : "net1.exe" or ?process.pe.original_file_name == "net1.exe") and
+ not process.parent.name : "net.exe")) and
+ process.args : "use" and
+ /* including hidden and webdav based online shares such as onedrive  */
+ process.args : ("\\\\*\\*$*", "\\\\*@SSL\\*", "http*") and
+ /* excluding shares deletion operation */
+ not process.args : "/d*"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote Services
+** ID: T1021
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: SMB/Windows Admin Shares
+** ID: T1021.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Initial Access
+** ID: TA0001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Valid Accounts
+** ID: T1078
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Local Accounts
+** ID: T1078.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Discovery
+** ID: TA0007
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Account Discovery
+** ID: T1087
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Local Account
+** ID: T1087.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Domain Account
+** ID: T1087.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-ms-office-macro-security-registry-modifications.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-ms-office-macro-security-registry-modifications.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a93a47fe80
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-ms-office-macro-security-registry-modifications.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-ms-office-macro-security-registry-modifications]]
+=== MS Office Macro Security Registry Modifications
+
+Microsoft Office Products offer options for users and developers to control the security settings for running and using Macros. Adversaries may abuse these security settings to modify the default behavior of the Office Application to trust future macros and/or disable security warnings, which could increase their chances of establishing persistence.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating MS Office Macro Security Registry Modifications*
+
+
+Macros are small programs that are used to automate repetitive tasks in Microsoft Office applications. Historically, macros have been used for a variety of reasons -- from automating part of a job, to building entire processes and data flows. Macros are written in Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) and are saved as part of Microsoft Office files.
+
+Macros are often created for legitimate reasons, but they can also be written by attackers to gain access, harm a system, or bypass other security controls such as application allow listing. In fact, exploitation from malicious macros is one of the top ways that organizations are compromised today. These attacks are often conducted through phishing or spear phishing campaigns.
+
+Attackers can convince victims to modify Microsoft Office security settings, so their macros are trusted by default and no warnings are displayed when they are executed. These settings include:
+
+- *Trust access to the VBA project object model* - When enabled, Microsoft Office will trust all macros and run any code without showing a security warning or requiring user permission.
+- *VbaWarnings* - When set to 1, Microsoft Office will trust all macros and run any code without showing a security warning or requiring user permission.
+
+This rule looks for registry changes affecting the conditions above.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Contact the user and check if the change was done manually.
+- Verify whether malicious macros were executed after the registry change.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Retrieve recently executed Office documents and determine if they are malicious:
+  - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+    - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+      - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - File and registry access, modification, and creation activities.
+      - Service creation and launch activities.
+      - Scheduled task creation.
+  - Use the PowerShell Get-FileHash cmdlet to get the files' SHA-256 hash values.
+    - Search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity should not happen legitimately. The security team should address any potential benign true positive (B-TP), as this configuration can put the user and the domain at risk.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Reset the registry key value.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Explore using GPOs to manage security settings for Microsoft Office macros.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+registry where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "change" and
+    registry.path : (
+        "HKU\\S-1-5-21-*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Office\\*\\Security\\AccessVBOM",
+        "HKU\\S-1-5-21-*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Office\\*\\Security\\VbaWarnings",
+        "HKU\\S-1-12-1-*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Office\\*\\Security\\AccessVBOM",
+        "HKU\\S-1-12-1-*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Office\\*\\Security\\VbaWarnings",
+        "\\REGISTRY\\USER\\S-1-5-21-*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Office\\*\\Security\\AccessVBOM",
+        "\\REGISTRY\\USER\\S-1-5-21-*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Office\\*\\Security\\VbaWarnings",
+        "\\REGISTRY\\USER\\S-1-12-1-*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Office\\*\\Security\\AccessVBOM",
+        "\\REGISTRY\\USER\\S-1-12-1-*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Office\\*\\Security\\VbaWarnings"
+        ) and
+    registry.data.strings : ("0x00000001", "1") and
+    process.name : ("cscript.exe", "wscript.exe", "mshta.exe", "mshta.exe", "winword.exe", "excel.exe")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Modify Registry
+** ID: T1112
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: User Execution
+** ID: T1204
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Malicious File
+** ID: T1204.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-msbuild-making-network-connections.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-msbuild-making-network-connections.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2a417486f6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-msbuild-making-network-connections.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-msbuild-making-network-connections]]
+=== MsBuild Making Network Connections
+
+Identifies MsBuild.exe making outbound network connections. This may indicate adversarial activity as MsBuild is often leveraged by adversaries to execute code and evade detection.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating MsBuild Making Network Connections*
+
+
+By examining the specific traits of Windows binaries (such as process trees, command lines, network connections, registry modifications, and so on) it's possible to establish a baseline of normal activity. Deviations from this baseline can indicate malicious activity, such as masquerading and deserve further investigation.
+
+The Microsoft Build Engine, also known as MSBuild, is a platform for building applications. This engine provides an XML schema for a project file that controls how the build platform processes and builds software, and can be abused to proxy code execution.
+
+This rule looks for the `Msbuild.exe` utility execution, followed by a network connection to an external address. Attackers can abuse MsBuild to execute malicious files or masquerade as those utilities in order to bypass detections and evade defenses.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+  - Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+  - Investigate the file digital signature and process original filename, if suspicious, treat it as potential malware.
+- Investigate the target host that the signed binary is communicating with.
+  - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+  - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- If this activity is expected and noisy in your environment, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of destination IP address and command line conditions.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by process.entity_id
+  [process where host.os.type == "windows" and process.name : "MSBuild.exe" and event.type == "start"]
+  [network where host.os.type == "windows" and process.name : "MSBuild.exe" and
+     not cidrmatch(destination.ip, "127.0.0.1", "::1") and
+     not dns.question.name : "localhost"]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
+** ID: T1127
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: MSBuild
+** ID: T1127.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-mshta-making-network-connections.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-mshta-making-network-connections.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..186b860b66
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-mshta-making-network-connections.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-mshta-making-network-connections]]
+=== Mshta Making Network Connections
+
+Identifies Mshta.exe making outbound network connections. This may indicate adversarial activity, as Mshta is often leveraged by adversaries to execute malicious scripts and evade detection.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-20m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by process.entity_id with maxspan=10m
+  [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and process.name : "mshta.exe" and
+     not process.parent.name : "Microsoft.ConfigurationManagement.exe" and
+     not (process.parent.executable : "C:\\Amazon\\Amazon Assistant\\amazonAssistantService.exe" or
+          process.parent.executable : "C:\\TeamViewer\\TeamViewer.exe") and
+     not process.args : "ADSelfService_Enroll.hta"]
+  [network where host.os.type == "windows" and process.name : "mshta.exe"]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: System Binary Proxy Execution
+** ID: T1218
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Mshta
+** ID: T1218.005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-multiple-logon-failure-followed-by-logon-success.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-multiple-logon-failure-followed-by-logon-success.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b3a7f76880
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-multiple-logon-failure-followed-by-logon-success.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-multiple-logon-failure-followed-by-logon-success]]
+=== Multiple Logon Failure Followed by Logon Success
+
+Identifies multiple logon failures followed by a successful one from the same source address. Adversaries will often brute force login attempts across multiple users with a common or known password, in an attempt to gain access to accounts.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-system.security*
+* logs-windows.forwarded*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4625
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+
+*Version*: 10
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Multiple Logon Failure Followed by Logon Success*
+
+
+Adversaries with no prior knowledge of legitimate credentials within the system or environment may guess passwords to attempt access to accounts. Without knowledge of the password for an account, an adversary may opt to guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism systematically. More details can be found https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001/[here].
+
+This rule identifies potential password guessing/brute force activity from a single address, followed by a successful logon, indicating that an attacker potentially successfully compromised the account.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the logon failure reason code and the targeted user name.
+  - Prioritize the investigation if the account is critical or has administrative privileges over the domain.
+- Investigate the source IP address of the failed Network Logon attempts.
+  - Identify whether these attempts are coming from the internet or are internal.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the involved users and source host during the past 48 hours.
+- Identify the source and the target computer and their roles in the IT environment.
+- Check whether the involved credentials are used in automation or scheduled tasks.
+- If this activity is suspicious, contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of it.
+- Examine the source host for derived artifacts that indicate compromise:
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in the alert source host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the host which is the source of this activity.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Authentication misconfiguration or obsolete credentials.
+- Service account password expired.
+- Domain trust relationship issues.
+- Infrastructure or availability issues.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- Multiple Logon Failure from the same Source Address - 48b6edfc-079d-4907-b43c-baffa243270d
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the source host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the asset is exposed to the internet with RDP or other remote services available, take the necessary measures to restrict access to the asset. If not possible, limit the access via the firewall to only the needed IP addresses. Also, ensure the system uses robust authentication mechanisms and is patched regularly.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by winlog.computer_name, source.ip with maxspan=5s
+  [authentication where event.action == "logon-failed" and
+    /* event 4625 need to be logged */
+    winlog.logon.type : "Network" and user.id != null and 
+    source.ip != null and source.ip != "127.0.0.1" and source.ip != "::1" and 
+    not winlog.event_data.TargetUserSid : "S-1-0-0" and not user.id : "S-1-0-0" and 
+    not user.name : ("ANONYMOUS LOGON", "-", "*$") and not user.domain == "NT AUTHORITY" and
+
+    /* noisy failure status codes often associated to authentication misconfiguration */
+    not winlog.event_data.Status : ("0xC000015B", "0XC000005E", "0XC0000133", "0XC0000192")] with runs=5
+  [authentication where event.action == "logged-in" and
+    /* event 4624 need to be logged */
+    winlog.logon.type : "Network" and
+    source.ip != null and source.ip != "127.0.0.1" and source.ip != "::1" and
+    not user.name : ("ANONYMOUS LOGON", "-", "*$") and not user.domain == "NT AUTHORITY"]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Brute Force
+** ID: T1110
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Password Guessing
+** ID: T1110.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Password Spraying
+** ID: T1110.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-multiple-logon-failure-from-the-same-source-address.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-multiple-logon-failure-from-the-same-source-address.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f8725cd235
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-multiple-logon-failure-from-the-same-source-address.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-multiple-logon-failure-from-the-same-source-address]]
+=== Multiple Logon Failure from the same Source Address
+
+Identifies multiple consecutive logon failures from the same source address and within a short time interval. Adversaries will often brute force login attempts across multiple users with a common or known password, in an attempt to gain access to accounts.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-system.security*
+* logs-windows.forwarded*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4625
+* https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventid=4624
+* https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/ie/en-US/c82ac4f3-a235-472c-9fd3-53aa646cfcfd/network-information-missing-in-event-id-4624?forum=winserversecurity
+* https://serverfault.com/questions/379092/remote-desktop-failed-logon-event-4625-not-logging-ip-address-on-2008-terminal-s/403638#403638
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+
+*Version*: 9
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Multiple Logon Failure from the same Source Address*
+
+
+Adversaries with no prior knowledge of legitimate credentials within the system or environment may guess passwords to attempt access to accounts. Without knowledge of the password for an account, an adversary may opt to guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism systematically. More details can be found https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001/[here].
+
+This rule identifies potential password guessing/brute force activity from a single address.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the logon failure reason code and the targeted user names.
+  - Prioritize the investigation if the account is critical or has administrative privileges over the domain.
+- Investigate the source IP address of the failed Network Logon attempts.
+  - Identify whether these attempts are coming from the internet or are internal.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the involved users and source host during the past 48 hours.
+- Identify the source and the target computer and their roles in the IT environment.
+- Check whether the involved credentials are used in automation or scheduled tasks.
+- If this activity is suspicious, contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of it.
+- Examine the source host for derived artifacts that indicate compromise:
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in the alert source host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the host which is the source of this activity
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Understand the context of the authentications by contacting the asset owners. This activity can be related to a new or existing automation or business process that is in a failing state.
+- Authentication misconfiguration or obsolete credentials.
+- Service account password expired.
+- Domain trust relationship issues.
+- Infrastructure or availability issues.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- Multiple Logon Failure Followed by Logon Success - 4e85dc8a-3e41-40d8-bc28-91af7ac6cf60
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the source host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the asset is exposed to the internet with RDP or other remote services available, take the necessary measures to restrict access to the asset. If not possible, limit the access via the firewall to only the needed IP addresses. Also, ensure the system uses robust authentication mechanisms and is patched regularly.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+- In some cases the source network address in Windows events 4625/4624 is not populated due to Microsoft logging limitations (examples in the references links). This edge case will break the rule condition and it won't trigger an alert.
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by winlog.computer_name, source.ip with maxspan=10s
+  [authentication where event.action == "logon-failed" and
+    /* event 4625 need to be logged */
+    winlog.logon.type : "Network" and
+    source.ip != null and source.ip != "127.0.0.1" and source.ip != "::1" and
+    not user.name : ("ANONYMOUS LOGON", "-", "*$") and not user.domain == "NT AUTHORITY" and
+
+    /*
+    noisy failure status codes often associated to authentication misconfiguration :
+     0xC000015B - The user has not been granted the requested logon type (also called the logon right) at this machine.
+     0XC000005E	- There are currently no logon servers available to service the logon request.
+     0XC0000133	- Clocks between DC and other computer too far out of sync.
+     0XC0000192	An attempt was made to logon, but the Netlogon service was not started.
+    */
+    not winlog.event_data.Status : ("0xC000015B", "0XC000005E", "0XC0000133", "0XC0000192")] with runs=10
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Brute Force
+** ID: T1110
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Password Guessing
+** ID: T1110.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Password Spraying
+** ID: T1110.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-multiple-vault-web-credentials-read.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-multiple-vault-web-credentials-read.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dff929c75c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-multiple-vault-web-credentials-read.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-multiple-vault-web-credentials-read]]
+=== Multiple Vault Web Credentials Read
+
+Windows Credential Manager allows you to create, view, or delete saved credentials for signing into websites, connected applications, and networks. An adversary may abuse this to list or dump credentials stored in the Credential Manager for saved usernames and passwords. This may also be performed in preparation of lateral movement.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-system.*
+* logs-windows.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventid=5382
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/detect-credential-access
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+
+*Version*: 10
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by winlog.computer_name, winlog.process.pid with maxspan=1s
+
+ /* 2 consecutive vault reads from same pid for web creds */
+
+ [any where event.code : "5382" and
+  (winlog.event_data.SchemaFriendlyName : "Windows Web Password Credential" and winlog.event_data.Resource : "http*") and
+  not winlog.event_data.SubjectLogonId : "0x3e7" and 
+  not winlog.event_data.Resource : "http://localhost/"]
+
+ [any where event.code : "5382" and
+  (winlog.event_data.SchemaFriendlyName : "Windows Web Password Credential" and winlog.event_data.Resource : "http*") and
+  not winlog.event_data.SubjectLogonId : "0x3e7" and 
+  not winlog.event_data.Resource : "http://localhost/"]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Credentials from Password Stores
+** ID: T1555
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Windows Credential Manager
+** ID: T1555.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-my-first-rule.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-my-first-rule.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7f413908c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-my-first-rule.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-my-first-rule]]
+=== My First Rule
+
+This rule helps you test and practice using alerts with Elastic Security as you get set up. It’s not a sign of threat activity.
+
+*Rule type*: threshold
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* auditbeat-*
+* filebeat-*
+* logs-*
+* winlogbeat-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 24h
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-30m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 1
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-rules.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Use Case: Guided Onboarding
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+This is a test alert.
+
+This alert does not show threat activity. Elastic created this alert to help you understand how alerts work.
+
+For normal rules, the Investigation Guide will help analysts investigate alerts.
+
+This alert will show once every 24 hours for each host. It is safe to disable this rule.
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.kind:event
+
+----------------------------------
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-namespace-manipulation-using-unshare.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-namespace-manipulation-using-unshare.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4cda74a1c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-namespace-manipulation-using-unshare.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-namespace-manipulation-using-unshare]]
+=== Namespace Manipulation Using Unshare
+
+Identifies suspicious usage of unshare to manipulate system namespaces. Unshare can be utilized to escalate privileges or escape container security boundaries. Threat actors have utilized this binary to allow themselves to escape to the host and access other resources or escalate privileges.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/unshare.1.html
+* https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/cve-2022-0185-kubernetes-container-escape-using-linux-kernel-exploit/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 9
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
+- Elastic Defend
+- Auditbeat
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Auditbeat Setup*
+
+Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit the activities of users and processes on your systems. For example, you can use Auditbeat to collect and centralize audit events from the Linux Audit Framework. You can also use Auditbeat to detect changes to critical files, like binaries and configuration files, and identify potential security policy violations.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Auditbeat on a Linux System:*
+
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setup-repositories.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-docker.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html[helper guide].
+- For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action : ("exec", "exec_event") and
+process.executable: "/usr/bin/unshare" and
+not process.parent.executable: ("/usr/bin/udevadm", "*/lib/systemd/systemd-udevd", "/usr/bin/unshare") and
+not process.args == "/usr/bin/snap" and not process.parent.name in ("zz-proxmox-boot", "java")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Create or Modify System Process
+** ID: T1543
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-netcat-listener-established-via-rlwrap.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-netcat-listener-established-via-rlwrap.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..be5f67b30a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-netcat-listener-established-via-rlwrap.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-netcat-listener-established-via-rlwrap]]
+=== Netcat Listener Established via rlwrap
+
+Monitors for the execution of a netcat listener via rlwrap. rlwrap is a 'readline wrapper', a small utility that uses the GNU Readline library to allow the editing of keyboard input for any command. This utility can be used in conjunction with netcat to gain a more stable reverse shell.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows
+the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest to select "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and 
+process.name == "rlwrap" and process.args in ("nc", "ncat", "netcat", "nc.openbsd", "socat") and
+process.args : "*l*" and process.args_count >= 4
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Unix Shell
+** ID: T1059.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-activity-detected-via-cat.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-activity-detected-via-cat.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7daa549263
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-activity-detected-via-cat.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-activity-detected-via-cat]]
+=== Network Activity Detected via cat
+
+This rule monitors for the execution of the cat command, followed by a connection attempt by the same process. Cat is capable of transfering data via tcp/udp channels by redirecting its read output to a /dev/tcp or /dev/udp channel. This activity is highly suspicious, and should be investigated. Attackers may leverage this capability to transfer tools or files to another host in the network or exfiltrate data while attempting to evade detection in the process.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Command and Control
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 6
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Network Activity Detected via cat*
+
+
+Attackers may leverage the `cat` utility in conjunction with a listener to read all bytes of a file, and output the content to a `/dev/tcp` or `/dev/udp` channel to transfer/exfiltrate file contents to a remote system. 
+
+This rule looks for a sequence of a `cat` execution event followed by a network connection attempt by the same `cat` process. 
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html[placeholder fields] to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Identify any signs of suspicious network activity or anomalies that may indicate command and control activity or data exfiltration. This could include unexpected traffic patterns or unusual network behavior.
+  - Investigate listening ports and open sockets to look for potential protocol tunneling, reverse shells, or data exfiltration.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Listening Ports","query":"SELECT pid, address, port, socket, protocol, path FROM listening_ports"}}
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Open Sockets","query":"SELECT pid, family, remote_address, remote_port, socket, state FROM process_open_sockets"}}
+- Identify the user account that performed the action, analyze it, and check whether it should perform this kind of action.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific User","query":"SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = {{user.name}}"}}
+- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Investigate the Account Authentication Status","query":"SELECT * FROM logged_in_users WHERE user = {{user.name}}"}}
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User","query":"SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"}}
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Process Info","query":"SELECT name, cmdline, parent, path, uid FROM processes"}}
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- Suspicious Network Activity to the Internet by Previously Unknown Executable - 53617418-17b4-4e9c-8a2c-8deb8086ca4b
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors, such as reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers, that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id, process.entity_id with maxspan=1s
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
+   process.name == "cat" and process.parent.name in ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish")]
+  [network where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("connection_attempted", "disconnect_received") and
+   process.name == "cat" and not (destination.ip == null or destination.ip == "0.0.0.0" or cidrmatch(
+     destination.ip, "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.0.0.0/24", "192.0.0.0/29",
+     "192.0.0.8/32", "192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.0.10/32", "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32", "192.0.2.0/24",
+     "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "100.64.0.0/10",
+     "192.175.48.0/24","198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "240.0.0.0/4", "::1", "FE80::/10",
+     "FF00::/8"
+     )
+   )]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Exfiltration
+** ID: TA0010
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-activity-detected-via-kworker.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-activity-detected-via-kworker.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..048784543b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-activity-detected-via-kworker.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-activity-detected-via-kworker]]
+=== Network Activity Detected via Kworker
+
+This rule monitors for network connections from a kworker process. kworker, or kernel worker, processes are part of the kernel's workqueue mechanism. They are responsible for executing work that has been scheduled to be done in kernel space, which might include tasks like handling interrupts, background activities, and other kernel-related tasks. Attackers may attempt to evade detection by masquerading as a kernel worker process.
+
+*Rule type*: new_terms
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-60m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Command and Control
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows
+the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest to select "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+host.os.type:linux and event.category:network and event.action:(connection_attempted or connection_accepted) and 
+process.name:kworker* and not destination.ip:(
+  10.0.0.0/8 or
+  127.0.0.0/8 or
+  169.254.0.0/16 or
+  172.16.0.0/12 or
+  192.168.0.0/16 or
+  224.0.0.0/4 or
+  "::1" or
+  "FE80::/10" or
+  "FF00::/8"
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Masquerading
+** ID: T1036
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Rootkit
+** ID: T1014
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Exfiltration
+** ID: TA0010
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
+** ID: T1041
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-connection-from-binary-with-rwx-memory-region.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-connection-from-binary-with-rwx-memory-region.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c30b34fcad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-connection-from-binary-with-rwx-memory-region.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-connection-from-binary-with-rwx-memory-region]]
+=== Network Connection from Binary with RWX Memory Region
+
+Monitors for the execution of a unix binary with read, write and execute memory region permissions, followed by a network connection. The mprotect() system call is used to change the access protections on a region of memory that has already been allocated. This syscall allows a process to modify the permissions of pages in its virtual address space, enabling or disabling permissions such as read, write, and execute for those pages. RWX permissions on memory is in many cases overly permissive, and should (especially in conjunction with an outbound network connection) be analyzed thoroughly.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/mprotect.2.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires the use of the `auditd_manager` integration. `Auditd_manager` is a tool designed to simplify and enhance the management of the audit subsystem in Linux systems. It provides a user-friendly interface and automation capabilities for configuring and monitoring system auditing through the auditd daemon. With `auditd_manager`, administrators can easily define audit rules, track system events, and generate comprehensive audit reports, improving overall security and compliance in the system. The following steps should be executed in order to install and deploy `auditd_manager` on a Linux system.
+```
+Kibana -->
+Management -->
+Integrations -->
+Auditd Manager -->
+Add Auditd Manager
+```
+`Auditd_manager` subscribes to the kernel and receives events as they occur without any additional configuration. However, if more advanced configuration is required to detect specific behavior, audit rules can be added to the integration in either the "audit rules" configuration box or the "auditd rule files" box by specifying a file to read the audit rules from.
+For this detection rule to trigger, the following additional audit rules are required to be added to the integration:
+```
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S mprotect
+```
+Add the newly installed `auditd manager` to an agent policy, and deploy the agent on a Linux system from which auditd log files are desirable.
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sample by host.id, process.pid, process.name
+  /* auditd.data.a2 == "7" translates to RWX memory region protection (PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC) */
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and auditd.data.syscall == "mprotect" and auditd.data.a2 == "7"]
+  [network where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "connection_attempted" and
+   not cidrmatch(destination.ip, "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "224.0.0.0/4", "::1")]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Unix Shell
+** ID: T1059.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Application Layer Protocol
+** ID: T1071
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-connection-via-compiled-html-file.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-connection-via-compiled-html-file.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1dfc5fbe10
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-connection-via-compiled-html-file.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-connection-via-compiled-html-file]]
+=== Network Connection via Compiled HTML File
+
+Compiled HTML files (.chm) are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. Adversaries may conceal malicious code in a CHM file and deliver it to a victim for execution. CHM content is loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe).
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv4-special-registry/iana-ipv4-special-registry.xhtml
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Network Connection via Compiled HTML File*
+
+
+CHM (Compiled HTML) files are a format for delivering online help files on Windows. CHM files are compressed compilations of various content, such as HTML documents, images, and scripting/web-related programming languages such as VBA, JScript, Java, and ActiveX.
+
+When users double-click CHM files, the HTML Help executable program (`hh.exe`) will execute them. `hh.exe` also can be used to execute code embedded in those files, PowerShell scripts, and executables. This makes it useful for attackers not only to proxy the execution of malicious payloads via a signed binary that could bypass security controls, but also to gain initial access to environments via social engineering methods.
+
+This rule identifies network connections done by `hh.exe`, which can potentially indicate abuse to download malicious files or tooling, or masquerading.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+  - Examine the command lines for suspicious activities.
+  - Retrieve `.chm`, `.ps1`, and other files that were involved for further examination.
+  - Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+  - Investigate the file digital signature and process original filename, if suspicious, treat it as potential malware.
+- Investigate the target host that the signed binary is communicating with.
+  - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+  - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the process executables, scripts and help files retrieved from the system using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- If this activity is expected and noisy in your environment, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- If the malicious file was delivered via phishing:
+  - Block the email sender from sending future emails.
+  - Block the malicious web pages.
+  - Remove emails from the sender from mailboxes.
+  - Consider improvements to the security awareness program.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by process.entity_id
+  [process where host.os.type == "windows" and process.name : "hh.exe" and event.type == "start"]
+  [network where host.os.type == "windows" and process.name : "hh.exe" and
+     not cidrmatch(destination.ip, "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.0.0.0/24",
+       "192.0.0.0/29", "192.0.0.8/32", "192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.0.10/32", "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32",
+       "192.0.2.0/24", "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4",
+       "100.64.0.0/10", "192.175.48.0/24","198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "240.0.0.0/4", "::1",
+       "FE80::/10", "FF00::/8") and
+     not dns.question.name : "localhost"]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: User Execution
+** ID: T1204
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Malicious File
+** ID: T1204.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: System Binary Proxy Execution
+** ID: T1218
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Compiled HTML File
+** ID: T1218.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-connection-via-msxsl.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-connection-via-msxsl.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..217f675ddf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-connection-via-msxsl.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-connection-via-msxsl]]
+=== Network Connection via MsXsl
+
+Identifies msxsl.exe making a network connection. This may indicate adversarial activity as msxsl.exe is often leveraged by adversaries to execute malicious scripts and evade detection.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv4-special-registry/iana-ipv4-special-registry.xhtml
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 105
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by process.entity_id
+  [process where host.os.type == "windows" and process.name : "msxsl.exe" and event.type == "start"]
+  [network where host.os.type == "windows" and process.name : "msxsl.exe" and
+     not cidrmatch(destination.ip, "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.0.0.0/24",
+       "192.0.0.0/29", "192.0.0.8/32", "192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.0.10/32", "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32",
+       "192.0.2.0/24", "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4",
+       "100.64.0.0/10", "192.175.48.0/24","198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "240.0.0.0/4", "::1",
+       "FE80::/10", "FF00::/8")]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: XSL Script Processing
+** ID: T1220
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1220/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-connection-via-recently-compiled-executable.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-connection-via-recently-compiled-executable.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..72f3d05db7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-connection-via-recently-compiled-executable.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-connection-via-recently-compiled-executable]]
+=== Network Connection via Recently Compiled Executable
+
+This rule monitors a sequence involving a program compilation event followed by its execution and a subsequent network connection event. This behavior can indicate the set up of a reverse tcp connection to a command-and-control server. Attackers may spawn reverse shells to establish persistence onto a target system.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 5
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id with maxspan=1m
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and 
+   process.name in ("gcc", "g++", "cc")] by process.args
+  [file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "creation" and process.name == "ld"] by file.name
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec"] by process.name
+  [network where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "connection_attempted" and destination.ip != null and 
+   not cidrmatch(destination.ip, "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "224.0.0.0/4", "::1")] by process.name
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Unix Shell
+** ID: T1059.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Application Layer Protocol
+** ID: T1071
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-connection-via-registration-utility.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-connection-via-registration-utility.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..15ab065566
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-connection-via-registration-utility.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-connection-via-registration-utility]]
+=== Network Connection via Registration Utility
+
+Identifies the native Windows tools regsvr32.exe, regsvr64.exe, RegSvcs.exe, or RegAsm.exe making a network connection. This may be indicative of an attacker bypassing allowlists or running arbitrary scripts via a signed Microsoft binary.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv4-special-registry/iana-ipv4-special-registry.xhtml
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Network Connection via Registration Utility*
+
+
+By examining the specific traits of Windows binaries -- such as process trees, command lines, network connections, registry modifications, and so on -- it's possible to establish a baseline of normal activity. Deviations from this baseline can indicate malicious activity such as masquerading, and deserve further investigation.
+
+This rule looks for the execution of `regsvr32.exe`, `RegAsm.exe`, or `RegSvcs.exe` utilities followed by a network connection to an external address. Attackers can abuse utilities to execute malicious files or masquerade as those utilities in order to bypass detections and evade defenses.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+  - Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+  - Investigate the file digital signature and process original filename, if suspicious, treat it as potential malware.
+- Investigate the target host that the signed binary is communicating with.
+  - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+  - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- If this activity is expected and noisy in your environment, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of destination IP address and command line conditions.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by process.entity_id
+  [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+   process.name : ("regsvr32.exe", "RegAsm.exe", "RegSvcs.exe") and
+   not (
+         (?process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name : "System" or ?winlog.event_data.IntegrityLevel : "System") and
+         (process.parent.name : "msiexec.exe" or process.parent.executable : ("C:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe", "C:\\Program Files\\*.exe"))
+       )
+   ]
+  [network where host.os.type == "windows" and process.name : ("regsvr32.exe", "RegAsm.exe", "RegSvcs.exe")  and
+   not cidrmatch(destination.ip, "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.0.0.0/24",
+       "192.0.0.0/29", "192.0.0.8/32", "192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.0.10/32", "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32",
+       "192.0.2.0/24", "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4",
+       "100.64.0.0/10", "192.175.48.0/24","198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "240.0.0.0/4", "::1",
+       "FE80::/10", "FF00::/8") and network.protocol != "dns"]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: System Binary Proxy Execution
+** ID: T1218
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Regsvcs/Regasm
+** ID: T1218.009
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Regsvr32
+** ID: T1218.010
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-connection-via-signed-binary.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-connection-via-signed-binary.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..39917f0cf8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-connection-via-signed-binary.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-connection-via-signed-binary]]
+=== Network Connection via Signed Binary
+
+Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates can execute on Windows systems protected by digital signature validation. Adversaries may use these binaries to 'live off the land' and execute malicious files that could bypass application allowlists and signature validation.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv4-special-registry/iana-ipv4-special-registry.xhtml
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Network Connection via Signed Binary*
+
+
+By examining the specific traits of Windows binaries (such as process trees, command lines, network connections, registry modifications, and so on) it's possible to establish a baseline of normal activity. Deviations from this baseline can indicate malicious activity, such as masquerading and deserve further investigation.
+
+This rule looks for the execution of `expand.exe`, `extrac32.exe`, `ieexec.exe`, or `makecab.exe` utilities, followed by a network connection to an external address. Attackers can abuse utilities to execute malicious files or masquerade as those utilities to bypass detections and evade defenses.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+  - Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+  - Investigate the file digital signature and process original filename, if suspicious, treat it as potential malware.
+- Investigate the target host that the signed binary is communicating with.
+  - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+  - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- If this activity is expected and noisy in your environment, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of destination IP address and command line conditions.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by process.entity_id
+  [process where host.os.type == "windows" and (process.name : "expand.exe" or process.name : "extrac32.exe" or
+                 process.name : "ieexec.exe" or process.name : "makecab.exe") and
+                 event.type == "start"]
+  [network where host.os.type == "windows" and (process.name : "expand.exe" or process.name : "extrac32.exe" or
+                 process.name : "ieexec.exe" or process.name : "makecab.exe") and
+    not cidrmatch(destination.ip,
+      "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.0.0.0/24", "192.0.0.0/29", "192.0.0.8/32",
+      "192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.0.10/32", "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32", "192.0.2.0/24", "192.31.196.0/24",
+      "192.52.193.0/24", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "100.64.0.0/10", "192.175.48.0/24",
+      "198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "240.0.0.0/4", "::1", "FE80::/10", "FF00::/8")]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: System Binary Proxy Execution
+** ID: T1218
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-logon-provider-registry-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-logon-provider-registry-modification.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..be6eadc00c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-logon-provider-registry-modification.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-logon-provider-registry-modification]]
+=== Network Logon Provider Registry Modification
+
+Identifies the modification of the network logon provider registry. Adversaries may register a rogue network logon provider module for persistence and/or credential access via intercepting the authentication credentials in clear text during user logon.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/PasswordStealing/NPPSpy
+* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/npapi/nf-npapi-nplogonnotify
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Network Logon Provider Registry Modification*
+
+
+Network logon providers are components in Windows responsible for handling the authentication process during a network logon.
+
+This rule identifies the modification of the network logon provider registry. Adversaries may register a rogue network logon provider module for persistence and/or credential access via intercepting the authentication credentials in plain text during user logon.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Examine the `registry.data.strings` field to identify the DLL registered.
+- Identify the process responsible for the registry operation and the file creation and investigate their process execution chains (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+  - Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+  - Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process, such as network connections, DLLs loaded, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+- Retrieve the file and examine if it is signed with valid digital signatures from vendors that are supposed to implement this kind of software and approved to use in the environment. Check for prevalence in the environment and whether they are located in expected locations.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the executables of the processes using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process's `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- False Positives can include legitimate software installations or updates that modify the network logon provider registry. These modifications may be necessary for the proper functioning of the software and are not indicative of malicious activity.
+
+
+*Response and Remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+  - If malicious activity is confirmed, perform a broader investigation to identify the scope of the compromise and determine the appropriate remediation steps.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Reimage the host operating system or restore the compromised files to clean versions.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+registry where host.os.type == "windows" and registry.data.strings : "?*" and
+  registry.path : (
+    "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\\Services\\*\\NetworkProvider\\ProviderPath",
+    "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\\Services\\*\\NetworkProvider\\ProviderPath"
+  ) and
+  /* Excluding default NetworkProviders RDPNP, LanmanWorkstation and webclient. */
+  not (
+    user.id : "S-1-5-18" and
+    registry.data.strings : (
+        "%SystemRoot%\\System32\\ntlanman.dll",
+        "%SystemRoot%\\System32\\drprov.dll",
+        "%SystemRoot%\\System32\\davclnt.dll",
+        "%SystemRoot%\\System32\\vmhgfs.dll",
+        "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Citrix\\ICA Client\\x64\\pnsson.dll",
+        "?:\\Program Files\\Dell\\SARemediation\\agent\\DellMgmtNP.dll",
+        "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\CheckPoint\\Endpoint Connect\\\\epcgina.dll"
+    )
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Modify Authentication Process
+** ID: T1556
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Create or Modify System Process
+** ID: T1543
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-new-activesyncalloweddeviceid-added-via-powershell.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-new-activesyncalloweddeviceid-added-via-powershell.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..81d5f7d3d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-new-activesyncalloweddeviceid-added-via-powershell.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-new-activesyncalloweddeviceid-added-via-powershell]]
+=== New ActiveSyncAllowedDeviceID Added via PowerShell
+
+Identifies the use of the Exchange PowerShell cmdlet, Set-CASMailbox, to add a new ActiveSync allowed device. Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/
+* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/set-casmailbox?view=exchange-ps
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  process.name: ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe") and process.args : "Set-CASMailbox*ActiveSyncAllowedDeviceIDs*"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Account Manipulation
+** ID: T1098
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Additional Email Delegate Permissions
+** ID: T1098.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-new-systemd-service-created-by-previously-unknown-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-new-systemd-service-created-by-previously-unknown-process.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6f1a00a58b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-new-systemd-service-created-by-previously-unknown-process.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-new-systemd-service-created-by-previously-unknown-process]]
+=== New Systemd Service Created by Previously Unknown Process
+
+Systemd service files are configuration files in Linux systems used to define and manage system services. Malicious actors can leverage systemd service files to achieve persistence by creating or modifying service files to execute malicious commands or payloads during system startup. This allows them to maintain unauthorized access, execute additional malicious activities, or evade detection.
+
+*Rule type*: new_terms
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://opensource.com/article/20/7/systemd-timers
+* https://pberba.github.io/security/2022/01/30/linux-threat-hunting-for-persistence-systemd-timers-cron/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 9
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating New Systemd Service Created by Previously Unknown Process*
+
+
+Systemd service files are configuration files in Linux systems used to define and manage system services.
+
+Malicious actors can leverage systemd service files to achieve persistence by creating or modifying service files to execute malicious commands or payloads during system startup. This allows them to maintain unauthorized access, execute additional malicious activities, or evade detection.
+
+This rule monitors the creation of new systemd service files, potentially indicating the creation of a persistence mechanism.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html[placeholder fields] to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+
+*Possible Investigation Steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the systemd service file that was created or modified.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve File Information","query":"SELECT * FROM file WHERE path = {{file.path}}"}}
+- Investigate the currently enabled systemd services through the following command `sudo systemctl list-unit-files`.
+- Investigate whether any other files in any of the available systemd directories have been altered through OSQuery.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve File Listing Information","query":"SELECT * FROM file WHERE (\npath LIKE '/etc/systemd/system/%' OR \npath LIKE '/usr/local/lib/systemd/system/%' OR \npath LIKE '/lib/systemd/system/%' OR\npath LIKE '/usr/lib/systemd/system/%' OR\npath LIKE '/home/user/.config/systemd/user/%'\n)\n"}}
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Additional File Listing Information","query":"SELECT\n  f.path,\n  u.username AS file_owner,\n  g.groupname AS group_owner,\n  datetime(f.atime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_access_time,\n  datetime(f.mtime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_modified_time,\n  datetime(f.ctime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_status_change_time,\n  datetime(f.btime, 'unixepoch') AS file_created_time,\n  f.size AS size_bytes\nFROM\n  file f\n  LEFT JOIN users u ON f.uid = u.uid\n  LEFT JOIN groups g ON f.gid = g.gid\nWHERE (\npath LIKE '/etc/systemd/system/%' OR \npath LIKE '/usr/local/lib/systemd/system/%' OR \npath LIKE '/lib/systemd/system/%' OR\npath LIKE '/usr/lib/systemd/system/%' OR\npath LIKE '/home/{{user.name}}/.config/systemd/user/%'\n)\n"}}
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User","query":"SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"}}
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+- Investigate whether the altered scripts call other malicious scripts elsewhere on the file system. 
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+        - Cron jobs, services and other persistence mechanisms.
+            - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Crontab Information","query":"SELECT * FROM crontab"}}
+- Investigate abnormal behaviors by the subject process/user such as network connections, file modifications, and any other spawned child processes.
+  - Investigate listening ports and open sockets to look for potential command and control traffic or data exfiltration.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Listening Ports","query":"SELECT pid, address, port, socket, protocol, path FROM listening_ports"}}
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Open Sockets","query":"SELECT pid, family, remote_address, remote_port, socket, state FROM process_open_sockets"}}
+  - Identify the user account that performed the action, analyze it, and check whether it should perform this kind of action.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific User","query":"SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = {{user.name}}"}}
+- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Investigate the Account Authentication Status","query":"SELECT * FROM logged_in_users WHERE user = {{user.name}}"}}
+
+
+*False Positive Analysis*
+
+
+- If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+- If this activity is related to a system administrator who uses systemd services for administrative purposes, consider adding exceptions for this specific administrator user account. 
+- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
+
+
+*Related Rules*
+
+
+- Potential Persistence Through Run Control Detected - 0f4d35e4-925e-4959-ab24-911be207ee6f
+- Potential Persistence Through init.d Detected - 474fd20e-14cc-49c5-8160-d9ab4ba16c8b
+- New Systemd Timer Created - 7fb500fa-8e24-4bd1-9480-2a819352602c
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Delete the service/timer or restore its original configuration.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+host.os.type:linux and event.category:file and event.action:("creation" or "file_create_event") and file.path:(
+  /etc/systemd/system/* or 
+  /usr/local/lib/systemd/system/* or 
+  /lib/systemd/system/* or 
+  /usr/lib/systemd/system/* or 
+  /home/*/.config/systemd/user/*
+) and 
+not (
+  process.name:(
+    "dpkg" or "dockerd" or "rpm" or "snapd" or "yum" or "exe" or "dnf" or "dnf-automatic" or python* or "puppetd" or
+    "elastic-agent" or "cinc-client" or "chef-client" or "pacman" or "puppet" or "cloudflared" or "packagekitd" or
+    "podman"
+  ) or 
+  file.extension:("swp" or "swpx")
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Create or Modify System Process
+** ID: T1543
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Systemd Service
+** ID: T1543.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Create or Modify System Process
+** ID: T1543
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Systemd Service
+** ID: T1543.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-new-systemd-timer-created.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-new-systemd-timer-created.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2f3944c797
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-new-systemd-timer-created.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-new-systemd-timer-created]]
+=== New Systemd Timer Created
+
+Detects the creation of a systemd timer within any of the default systemd timer directories. Systemd timers can be used by an attacker to gain persistence, by scheduling the execution of a command or script. Similarly to cron/at, systemd timers can be set up to execute on boot time, or on a specific point in time, which allows attackers to regain access in case the connection to the infected asset was lost.
+
+*Rule type*: new_terms
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://opensource.com/article/20/7/systemd-timers
+* https://pberba.github.io/security/2022/01/30/linux-threat-hunting-for-persistence-systemd-timers-cron/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 9
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating New Systemd Timer Created*
+
+
+Systemd timers are used for scheduling and automating recurring tasks or services on Linux systems. 
+
+Attackers can leverage systemd timers to run scripts, commands, or malicious software at system boot or on a set time interval by creating a systemd timer and a corresponding systemd service file. 
+
+This rule monitors the creation of new systemd timer files, potentially indicating the creation of a persistence mechanism.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html[placeholder fields] to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+
+*Possible Investigation Steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the timer file that was created or modified.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve File Information","query":"SELECT * FROM file WHERE path = {{file.path}}"}}
+- Investigate the currently enabled systemd timers through the following command `sudo systemctl list-timers`.
+- Search for the systemd service file named similarly to the timer that was created.
+- Investigate whether any other files in any of the available systemd directories have been altered through OSQuery.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve File Listing Information","query":"SELECT * FROM file WHERE (\npath LIKE '/etc/systemd/system/%' OR \npath LIKE '/usr/local/lib/systemd/system/%' OR \npath LIKE '/lib/systemd/system/%' OR\npath LIKE '/usr/lib/systemd/system/%' OR\npath LIKE '/home/user/.config/systemd/user/%'\n)\n"}}
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Additional File Listing Information","query":"SELECT\n  f.path,\n  u.username AS file_owner,\n  g.groupname AS group_owner,\n  datetime(f.atime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_access_time,\n  datetime(f.mtime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_modified_time,\n  datetime(f.ctime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_status_change_time,\n  datetime(f.btime, 'unixepoch') AS file_created_time,\n  f.size AS size_bytes\nFROM\n  file f\n  LEFT JOIN users u ON f.uid = u.uid\n  LEFT JOIN groups g ON f.gid = g.gid\nWHERE (\npath LIKE '/etc/systemd/system/%' OR \npath LIKE '/usr/local/lib/systemd/system/%' OR \npath LIKE '/lib/systemd/system/%' OR\npath LIKE '/usr/lib/systemd/system/%' OR\npath LIKE '/home/{{user.name}}/.config/systemd/user/%'\n)\n"}}
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User","query":"SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"}}
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+- Investigate whether the altered scripts call other malicious scripts elsewhere on the file system. 
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+        - Cron jobs, services and other persistence mechanisms.
+            - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Crontab Information","query":"SELECT * FROM crontab"}}
+
+
+*False Positive Analysis*
+
+
+- If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+- If this activity is related to a system administrator who uses systemd timers for administrative purposes, consider adding exceptions for this specific administrator user account. 
+- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Delete the service/timer or restore its original configuration.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+host.os.type : "linux" and event.action : ("creation" or "file_create_event") and file.extension : "timer" and
+file.path : (/etc/systemd/system/* or /usr/local/lib/systemd/system/* or /lib/systemd/system/* or 
+/usr/lib/systemd/system/* or /home/*/.config/systemd/user/*) and not (
+  (process.name : (
+    "docker" or "dockerd" or "dnf" or "yum" or "rpm" or "dpkg" or "executor" or "cloudflared" or "pacman" or "podman" or 
+    "pamac-daemon"
+  ))
+  or (file.name:apt-*.timer)
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task/Job
+** ID: T1053
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Systemd Timers
+** ID: T1053.006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/006/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-nping-process-activity.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-nping-process-activity.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..540e1d172e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-nping-process-activity.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-nping-process-activity]]
+=== Nping Process Activity
+
+Nping ran on a Linux host. Nping is part of the Nmap tool suite and has the ability to construct raw packets for a wide variety of security testing applications, including denial of service testing.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nmap
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Discovery
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
+- Elastic Defend
+- Auditbeat
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Auditbeat Setup*
+
+Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit the activities of users and processes on your systems. For example, you can use Auditbeat to collect and centralize audit events from the Linux Audit Framework. You can also use Auditbeat to detect changes to critical files, like binaries and configuration files, and identify potential security policy violations.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Auditbeat on a Linux System:*
+
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setup-repositories.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-docker.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html[helper guide].
+- For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and process.name == "nping"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Discovery
+** ID: TA0007
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Network Service Discovery
+** ID: T1046
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1046/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-ntds-or-sam-database-file-copied.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-ntds-or-sam-database-file-copied.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a2a4aa3ba4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-ntds-or-sam-database-file-copied.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-ntds-or-sam-database-file-copied]]
+=== NTDS or SAM Database File Copied
+
+Identifies a copy operation of the Active Directory Domain Database (ntds.dit) or Security Account Manager (SAM) files. Those files contain sensitive information including hashed domain and/or local credentials.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 33
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://thedfirreport.com/2020/11/23/pysa-mespinoza-ransomware/
+* https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-3---esentutlexe-sam-copy
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/detect-credential-access
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 111
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+* Austin Songer
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating NTDS or SAM Database File Copied*
+
+
+The Active Directory Domain Database (ntds.dit) and Security Account Manager (SAM) files are critical components in Windows environments, containing sensitive information such as hashed domain and local credentials.
+
+This rule identifies copy operations of these files using specific command-line tools, such as Cmd.Exe, PowerShell.EXE, XCOPY.EXE, and esentutl.exe. By monitoring for the presence of these tools and their associated arguments, the rule aims to detect potential credential access activities.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, command lines, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Check for any recent changes in user account privileges or group memberships that may have allowed the unauthorized access.
+- Determine whether the file was potentially exfiltrated from the subject host.
+- Scope compromised credentials and disable the accounts.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process's `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Look for the presence of relevant artifacts on other systems. Identify commonalities and differences between potentially compromised systems.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and Remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+  - If malicious activity is confirmed, perform a broader investigation to identify the scope of the compromise and determine the appropriate remediation steps.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Restore the affected system to its operational state by applying any necessary patches, updates, or configuration changes.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  (
+    ((?process.pe.original_file_name in ("Cmd.Exe", "PowerShell.EXE", "XCOPY.EXE") or process.name : ("Cmd.Exe", "PowerShell.EXE", "XCOPY.EXE")) and
+       process.args : ("copy", "xcopy", "Copy-Item", "move", "cp", "mv")
+    ) or
+    ((?process.pe.original_file_name : "esentutl.exe" or process.name : "esentutl.exe") and process.args : ("*/y*", "*/vss*", "*/d*"))
+  ) and
+  process.command_line : ("*\\ntds.dit*", "*\\config\\SAM*", "*\\*\\GLOBALROOT\\Device\\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy*\\*", "*/system32/config/SAM*", "*\\User Data\\*")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Security Account Manager
+** ID: T1003.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/002/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: NTDS
+** ID: T1003.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-nullsessionpipe-registry-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-nullsessionpipe-registry-modification.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c50919639f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-nullsessionpipe-registry-modification.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-nullsessionpipe-registry-modification]]
+=== NullSessionPipe Registry Modification
+
+Identifies NullSessionPipe registry modifications that specify which pipes can be accessed anonymously. This could be indicative of adversary lateral movement preparation by making the added pipe available to everyone.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/29/turla-powershell-usage/
+* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/network-access-restrict-anonymous-access-to-named-pipes-and-shares
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+registry where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type in ("creation", "change") and
+registry.path : (
+    "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\\services\\LanmanServer\\Parameters\\NullSessionPipes",
+    "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\\services\\LanmanServer\\Parameters\\NullSessionPipes"
+) and length(registry.data.strings) > 0
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote Services
+** ID: T1021
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: SMB/Windows Admin Shares
+** ID: T1021.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Modify Registry
+** ID: T1112
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-outbound-scheduled-task-activity-via-powershell.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-outbound-scheduled-task-activity-via-powershell.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ec478007ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-outbound-scheduled-task-activity-via-powershell.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-outbound-scheduled-task-activity-via-powershell]]
+=== Outbound Scheduled Task Activity via PowerShell
+
+Identifies the PowerShell process loading the Task Scheduler COM DLL followed by an outbound RPC network connection within a short time period. This may indicate lateral movement or remote discovery via scheduled tasks.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id, process.entity_id with maxspan = 5s
+ [any where host.os.type == "windows" and (event.category == "library" or (event.category == "process" and event.action : "Image loaded*")) and
+  (?dll.name : "taskschd.dll" or file.name : "taskschd.dll") and process.name : ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe")]
+ [network where host.os.type == "windows" and process.name : ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe") and destination.port == 135 and not destination.ip in ("127.0.0.1", "::1")]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task/Job
+** ID: T1053
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task
+** ID: T1053.005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-peripheral-device-discovery.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-peripheral-device-discovery.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3b4eb7082d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-peripheral-device-discovery.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-peripheral-device-discovery]]
+=== Peripheral Device Discovery
+
+Identifies use of the Windows file system utility (fsutil.exe) to gather information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Discovery
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Peripheral Device Discovery*
+
+
+After successfully compromising an environment, attackers may try to gain situational awareness to plan their next steps. This can happen by running commands to enumerate network resources, users, connections, files, and installed security software.
+
+This rule looks for the execution of the `fsutil` utility with the `fsinfo` subcommand to enumerate drives attached to the computer, which can be used to identify secondary drives used for backups, mapped network drives, and removable media. These devices can contain valuable information for attackers.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate any abnormal account behavior, such as command executions, file creations or modifications, and network connections.
+- Determine whether this activity was followed by suspicious file access/copy operations or uploads to file storage services.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Discovery activities are not inherently malicious if they occur in isolation. As long as the analyst did not identify suspicious activity related to the user or host, such alerts can be dismissed.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  (process.name : "fsutil.exe" or ?process.pe.original_file_name == "fsutil.exe") and
+  process.args : "fsinfo" and process.args : "drives"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Discovery
+** ID: TA0007
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Peripheral Device Discovery
+** ID: T1120
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1120/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-bits-job-notify-cmdline.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-bits-job-notify-cmdline.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..428bd805bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-bits-job-notify-cmdline.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-bits-job-notify-cmdline]]
+=== Persistence via BITS Job Notify Cmdline
+
+An adversary can use the Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) SetNotifyCmdLine method to execute a program that runs after a job finishes transferring data or after a job enters a specified state in order to persist on a system.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://pentestlab.blog/2019/10/30/persistence-bits-jobs/
+* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/bits1_5/nf-bits1_5-ibackgroundcopyjob2-setnotifycmdline
+* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/bitsadmin-setnotifycmdline
+* https://www.elastic.co/blog/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security-part-2
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  process.parent.name : "svchost.exe" and process.parent.args : "BITS" and
+  not process.executable :
+              ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFaultSecure.exe",
+               "?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe",
+               "?:\\Windows\\System32\\wermgr.exe",
+               "?:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\directxdatabaseupdater.exe")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: BITS Jobs
+** ID: T1197
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-directoryservice-plugin-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-directoryservice-plugin-modification.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9dcf9cd55d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-directoryservice-plugin-modification.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-directoryservice-plugin-modification]]
+=== Persistence via DirectoryService Plugin Modification
+
+Identifies the creation or modification of a DirectoryService PlugIns (dsplug) file. The DirectoryService daemon launches on each system boot and automatically reloads after crash. It scans and executes bundles that are located in the DirectoryServices PlugIns folder and can be abused by adversaries to maintain persistence.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://blog.chichou.me/2019/11/21/two-macos-persistence-tricks-abusing-plugins/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:file and host.os.type:macos and not event.type:deletion and
+  file.path:/Library/DirectoryServices/PlugIns/*.dsplug
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
+** ID: T1547
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-docker-shortcut-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-docker-shortcut-modification.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2de1ae185a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-docker-shortcut-modification.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-docker-shortcut-modification]]
+=== Persistence via Docker Shortcut Modification
+
+An adversary can establish persistence by modifying an existing macOS dock property list in order to execute a malicious application instead of the intended one when invoked.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/specterops/presentations/raw/master/Leo%20Pitt/Hey_Im_Still_in_Here_Modern_macOS_Persistence_SO-CON2020.pdf
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:file and host.os.type:macos and event.action:modification and
+ file.path:/Users/*/Library/Preferences/com.apple.dock.plist and
+ not process.name:(xpcproxy or cfprefsd or plutil or jamf or PlistBuddy or InstallerRemotePluginService)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Create or Modify System Process
+** ID: T1543
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-folder-action-script.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-folder-action-script.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bac51790a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-folder-action-script.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-folder-action-script]]
+=== Persistence via Folder Action Script
+
+Detects modification of a Folder Action script. A Folder Action script is executed when the folder to which it is attached has items added or removed, or when its window is opened, closed, moved, or resized. Adversaries may abuse this feature to establish persistence by utilizing a malicious script.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://posts.specterops.io/folder-actions-for-persistence-on-macos-8923f222343d
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id with maxspan=5s
+ [process where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type in ("start", "process_started", "info") and process.name == "com.apple.foundation.UserScriptService"] by process.pid
+ [process where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type in ("start", "process_started") and process.name in ("osascript", "python", "tcl", "node", "perl", "ruby", "php", "bash", "csh", "zsh", "sh") and
+  not process.args : "/Users/*/Library/Application Support/iTerm2/Scripts/AutoLaunch/*.scpt"
+ ] by process.parent.pid
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
+** ID: T1037
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-hidden-run-key-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-hidden-run-key-detected.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1947f76d87
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-hidden-run-key-detected.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-hidden-run-key-detected]]
+=== Persistence via Hidden Run Key Detected
+
+Identifies a persistence mechanism that utilizes the NtSetValueKey native API to create a hidden (null terminated) registry key. An adversary may use this method to hide from system utilities such as the Registry Editor (regedit).
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/outflanknl/SharpHide
+* https://github.com/ewhitehats/InvisiblePersistence/blob/master/InvisibleRegValues_Whitepaper.pdf
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+/* Registry Path ends with backslash */
+registry where host.os.type == "windows" and /* length(registry.data.strings) > 0 and */
+ registry.path : ("HKEY_USERS\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\",
+                  "HKU\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\",
+                  "HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\",
+                  "HKLM\\Software\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\",
+                  "HKEY_USERS\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run\\",
+                  "HKU\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run\\",
+                  "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run\\",
+                  "\\REGISTRY\\USER\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\",
+                  "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\",
+                  "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\Software\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\",
+                  "\\REGISTRY\\USER\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run\\",
+                  "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run\\")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
+** ID: T1547
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
+** ID: T1547.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Native API
+** ID: T1106
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Modify Registry
+** ID: T1112
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-kde-autostart-script-or-desktop-file-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-kde-autostart-script-or-desktop-file-modification.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2a9200cf31
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-kde-autostart-script-or-desktop-file-modification.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-kde-autostart-script-or-desktop-file-modification]]
+=== Persistence via KDE AutoStart Script or Desktop File Modification
+
+Identifies the creation or modification of a K Desktop Environment (KDE) AutoStart script or desktop file that will execute upon each user logon. Adversaries may abuse this method for persistence.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://userbase.kde.org/System_Settings/Autostart
+* https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2020/09/german-made-finspy-spyware-found-in-egypt-and-mac-and-linux-versions-revealed/
+* https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/operation-electrorat-attacker-creates-fake-companies-to-drain-your-crypto-wallets/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Persistence via KDE AutoStart Script or Desktop File Modification*
+
+
+K Desktop Environment (KDE) is a popular graphical desktop environment for Linux systems. It supports AutoStart scripts and desktop files that execute automatically upon user logon.
+
+Adversaries may exploit this feature to maintain persistence on a compromised system by creating or modifying these files.
+
+The detection rule 'Persistence via KDE AutoStart Script or Desktop File Modification' is designed to identify such activities by monitoring file events on Linux systems. It specifically targets the creation or modification of files with extensions ".sh" or ".desktop" in various AutoStart directories. By detecting these events, the rule helps security analysts identify potential abuse of KDE AutoStart functionality by malicious actors.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html[placeholder fields] to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the file that was created or modified.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve File Listing Information","query":"SELECT * FROM file WHERE (\n  path LIKE '/home/%/.config/autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE '/home/%/.config/autostart/%.desktop' OR\n  path LIKE '/root/.config/autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE '/root/.config/autostart/%.desktop' OR\n  path LIKE '/home/%/.kde/Autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE '/home/%/.kde/Autostart/%.desktop' OR\n  path LIKE '/root/.kde/Autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE '/root/.kde/Autostart/%.desktop' OR\n  path LIKE '/home/%/.kde4/Autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE '/home/%/.kde4/Autostart/%.desktop' OR\n  path LIKE '/root/.kde4/Autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE '/root/.kde4/Autostart/%.desktop' OR\n  path LIKE '/home/%/.kde/share/autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE '/home/%/.kde/share/autostart/%.desktop' OR\n  path LIKE '/root/.kde/share/autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE '/root/.kde/share/autostart/%.desktop' OR\n  path LIKE '/home/%/.kde4/share/autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE '/home/%/.kde4/share/autostart/%.desktop' OR\n  path LIKE '/root/.kde4/share/autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE '/root/.kde4/share/autostart/%.desktop' OR\n  path LIKE '/home/%/.local/share/autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE '/home/%/.local/share/autostart/%.desktop' OR\n  path LIKE '/root/.local/share/autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE '/root/.local/share/autostart/%.desktop' OR\n  path LIKE '/home/%/.config/autostart-scripts/%.sh' OR path LIKE '/home/%/.config/autostart-scripts/%.desktop' OR\n  path LIKE '/root/.config/autostart-scripts/%.sh' OR path LIKE '/root/.config/autostart-scripts/%.desktop' OR\n  path LIKE '/etc/xdg/autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE '/etc/xdg/autostart/%.desktop' OR\n  path LIKE '/usr/share/autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE '/usr/share/autostart/%.desktop'\n)\n"}}
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Additional File Listing Information","query":"SELECT\n  f.path,\n  u.username AS file_owner,\n  g.groupname AS group_owner,\n  datetime(f.atime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_access_time,\n  datetime(f.mtime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_modified_time,\n  datetime(f.ctime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_status_change_time,\n  datetime(f.btime, 'unixepoch') AS file_created_time,\n  f.size AS size_bytes\nFROM\n  file f\n  LEFT JOIN users u ON f.uid = u.uid\n  LEFT JOIN groups g ON f.gid = g.gid\nWHERE (\n  path LIKE '/home/%/.config/autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE '/home/%/.config/autostart/%.desktop' OR\n  path LIKE '/root/.config/autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE '/root/.config/autostart/%.desktop' OR\n  path LIKE '/home/%/.kde/Autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE '/home/%/.kde/Autostart/%.desktop' OR\n  path LIKE '/root/.kde/Autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE '/root/.kde/Autostart/%.desktop' OR\n  path LIKE '/home/%/.kde4/Autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE '/home/%/.kde4/Autostart/%.desktop' OR\n  path LIKE '/root/.kde4/Autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE '/root/.kde4/Autostart/%.desktop' OR\n  path LIKE '/home/%/.kde/share/autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE '/home/%/.kde/share/autostart/%.desktop' OR\n  path LIKE '/root/.kde/share/autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE '/root/.kde/share/autostart/%.desktop' OR\n  path LIKE '/home/%/.kde4/share/autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE '/home/%/.kde4/share/autostart/%.desktop' OR\n  path LIKE '/root/.kde4/share/autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE '/root/.kde4/share/autostart/%.desktop' OR\n  path LIKE '/home/%/.local/share/autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE '/home/%/.local/share/autostart/%.desktop' OR\n  path LIKE '/root/.local/share/autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE '/root/.local/share/autostart/%.desktop' OR\n  path LIKE '/home/%/.config/autostart-scripts/%.sh' OR path LIKE '/home/%/.config/autostart-scripts/%.desktop' OR\n  path LIKE '/root/.config/autostart-scripts/%.sh' OR path LIKE '/root/.config/autostart-scripts/%.desktop' OR\n  path LIKE '/etc/xdg/autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE '/etc/xdg/autostart/%.desktop' OR\n  path LIKE '/usr/share/autostart/%.sh' OR path LIKE '/usr/share/autostart/%.desktop'\n)\n"}}
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User","query":"SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"}}
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+- Investigate whether the altered scripts call other malicious scripts elsewhere on the file system. 
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+        - Cron jobs, services and other persistence mechanisms.
+            - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Crontab Information","query":"SELECT * FROM crontab"}}
+- Investigate abnormal behaviors by the subject process/user such as network connections, file modifications, and any other spawned child processes.
+  - Investigate listening ports and open sockets to look for potential command and control traffic or data exfiltration.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Listening Ports","query":"SELECT pid, address, port, socket, protocol, path FROM listening_ports"}}
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Open Sockets","query":"SELECT pid, family, remote_address, remote_port, socket, state FROM process_open_sockets"}}
+  - Identify the user account that performed the action, analyze it, and check whether it should perform this kind of action.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific User","query":"SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = {{user.name}}"}}
+- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Investigate the Account Authentication Status","query":"SELECT * FROM logged_in_users WHERE user = {{user.name}}"}}
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+- If this activity is related to a system administrator who uses cron jobs for administrative purposes, consider adding exceptions for this specific administrator user account. 
+- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
+
+
+*Response and Remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
+- Elastic Defend
+- Auditbeat
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Auditbeat Setup*
+
+Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit the activities of users and processes on your systems. For example, you can use Auditbeat to collect and centralize audit events from the Linux Audit Framework. You can also use Auditbeat to detect changes to critical files, like binaries and configuration files, and identify potential security policy violations.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Auditbeat on a Linux System:*
+
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setup-repositories.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-docker.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html[helper guide].
+- For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Custom Ingest Pipeline*
+
+For versions <8.2, you need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate `event.ingested` with @timestamp for non-elastic-agent indexes, like auditbeats/filebeat/winlogbeat etc. For more details to add a custom ingest pipeline refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html[guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type != "deletion" and
+  file.extension in ("sh", "desktop") and
+  file.path :
+    (
+      "/home/*/.config/autostart/*", "/root/.config/autostart/*",
+      "/home/*/.kde/Autostart/*", "/root/.kde/Autostart/*",
+      "/home/*/.kde4/Autostart/*", "/root/.kde4/Autostart/*",
+      "/home/*/.kde/share/autostart/*", "/root/.kde/share/autostart/*",
+      "/home/*/.kde4/share/autostart/*", "/root/.kde4/share/autostart/*",
+      "/home/*/.local/share/autostart/*", "/root/.local/share/autostart/*",
+      "/home/*/.config/autostart-scripts/*", "/root/.config/autostart-scripts/*",
+      "/etc/xdg/autostart/*", "/usr/share/autostart/*"
+    ) and
+    not process.name in ("yum", "dpkg", "install", "dnf", "teams", "yum-cron", "dnf-automatic", "docker", "dockerd", 
+    "rpm", "pacman", "podman", "nautilus", "remmina", "cinnamon-settings.py")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
+** ID: T1547
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-login-or-logout-hook.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-login-or-logout-hook.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9a052eb423
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-login-or-logout-hook.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-login-or-logout-hook]]
+=== Persistence via Login or Logout Hook
+
+Identifies use of the Defaults command to install a login or logoff hook in MacOS. An adversary may abuse this capability to establish persistence in an environment by inserting code to be executed at login or logout.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference_slides/2014/Wardle-VB2014.pdf
+* https://www.manpagez.com/man/1/defaults/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type == "start" and
+ process.name == "defaults" and process.args == "write" and process.args : ("LoginHook", "LogoutHook") and
+ not process.args :
+       (
+         "Support/JAMF/ManagementFrameworkScripts/logouthook.sh",
+         "Support/JAMF/ManagementFrameworkScripts/loginhook.sh",
+         "/Library/Application Support/JAMF/ManagementFrameworkScripts/logouthook.sh",
+         "/Library/Application Support/JAMF/ManagementFrameworkScripts/loginhook.sh"
+       )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
+** ID: T1037
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-microsoft-office-addins.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-microsoft-office-addins.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..47cc6906e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-microsoft-office-addins.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-microsoft-office-addins]]
+=== Persistence via Microsoft Office AddIns
+
+Detects attempts to establish persistence on an endpoint by abusing Microsoft Office add-ins.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/add-in-opportunities-for-office-persistence
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type != "deletion" and
+ file.extension : ("wll","xll","ppa","ppam","xla","xlam") and
+ file.path :
+    (
+    "C:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Word\\Startup\\*",
+    "C:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\AddIns\\*",
+    "C:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Excel\\XLSTART\\*"
+    )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Office Application Startup
+** ID: T1137
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Add-ins
+** ID: T1137.006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/006/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-microsoft-outlook-vba.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-microsoft-outlook-vba.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..45deb0f832
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-microsoft-outlook-vba.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-microsoft-outlook-vba]]
+=== Persistence via Microsoft Outlook VBA
+
+Detects attempts to establish persistence on an endpoint by installing a rogue Microsoft Outlook VBA Template.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/11/a-fresh-outlook-on-mail-based-persistence/
+* https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/outlook-backdoor-using-vba-samir-b-/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type != "deletion" and
+ file.path : "C:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Outlook\\VbaProject.OTM"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Office Application Startup
+** ID: T1137
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-powershell-profile.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-powershell-profile.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7102c15550
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-powershell-profile.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-powershell-profile]]
+=== Persistence via PowerShell profile
+
+Identifies the creation or modification of a PowerShell profile. PowerShell profile is a script that is executed when PowerShell starts to customize the user environment, which can be abused by attackers to persist in a environment where PowerShell is common.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_profiles
+* https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/29/turla-powershell-usage/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 8
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Persistence via PowerShell profile*
+
+
+PowerShell profiles are scripts executed when PowerShell starts, customizing the user environment. They are commonly used in Windows environments for legitimate purposes, such as setting variables or loading modules. However, adversaries can abuse PowerShell profiles to establish persistence by inserting malicious code that executes each time PowerShell is launched.
+
+This rule identifies the creation or modification of a PowerShell profile. It does this by monitoring file events on Windows systems, specifically targeting profile-related file paths and names, such as `profile.ps1` and `Microsoft.Powershell_profile.ps1`. By detecting these activities, security analysts can investigate potential abuse of PowerShell profiles for malicious persistence.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Retrive and inspect the PowerShell profile content; look for suspicious DLL imports, collection or persistence capabilities, suspicious functions, encoded or compressed data, suspicious commands, and other potentially malicious characteristics.
+- Identify the process responsible for the PowerShell profile creation/modification. Use the Elastic Defend events to examine all the activity of the subject process by filtering by the process's `process.entity_id`.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Evaluate whether the user needs to use PowerShell to complete tasks.
+- Check for additional PowerShell and command-line logs that indicate that any suspicious command or function were run.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process's `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This is a dual-use mechanism, meaning its usage is not inherently malicious. Analysts can dismiss the alert if the script doesn't contain malicious functions or potential for abuse, no other suspicious activity was identified, and the user has business justifications to use PowerShell.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+  - If malicious activity is confirmed, perform a broader investigation to identify the scope of the compromise and determine the appropriate remediation steps.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Reimage the host operating system or restore the compromised files to clean versions.
+- Restrict PowerShell usage outside of IT and engineering business units using GPOs, AppLocker, Intune, or similar software.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+  - Consider enabling and collecting PowerShell logs such as transcription, module, and script block logging, to improve visibility into PowerShell activities.
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type != "deletion" and
+  file.path : ("?:\\Users\\*\\Documents\\WindowsPowerShell\\*",
+               "?:\\Users\\*\\Documents\\PowerShell\\*",
+               "?:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\*") and
+  file.name : ("profile.ps1", "Microsoft.Powershell_profile.ps1")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Event Triggered Execution
+** ID: T1546
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell Profile
+** ID: T1546.013
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/013/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Event Triggered Execution
+** ID: T1546
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell Profile
+** ID: T1546.013
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/013/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-scheduled-job-creation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-scheduled-job-creation.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..72bfcbd685
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-scheduled-job-creation.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-scheduled-job-creation]]
+=== Persistence via Scheduled Job Creation
+
+A job can be used to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type != "deletion" and
+  file.path : "?:\\Windows\\Tasks\\*" and file.extension : "job" and
+  not (
+    (
+      process.executable : "?:\\Program Files\\CCleaner\\CCleaner64.exe" and
+      file.path : "?:\\Windows\\Tasks\\CCleanerCrashReporting.job"
+    ) or
+    (
+      process.executable : (
+        "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\ManageEngine\\UEMS_Agent\\bin\\dcagentregister.exe",
+        "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\DesktopCentral_Agent\\bin\\dcagentregister.exe"
+      ) and
+      file.path : "?:\\Windows\\Tasks\\DCAgentUpdater.job"
+    )
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task/Job
+** ID: T1053
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task
+** ID: T1053.005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-telemetrycontroller-scheduled-task-hijack.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-telemetrycontroller-scheduled-task-hijack.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f2100452de
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-telemetrycontroller-scheduled-task-hijack.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-telemetrycontroller-scheduled-task-hijack]]
+=== Persistence via TelemetryController Scheduled Task Hijack
+
+Detects the successful hijack of Microsoft Compatibility Appraiser scheduled task to establish persistence with an integrity level of system.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/abusing-windows-telemetry-for-persistence
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  process.parent.name : "CompatTelRunner.exe" and process.args : "-cv*" and
+  not process.name : ("conhost.exe",
+                      "DeviceCensus.exe",
+                      "CompatTelRunner.exe",
+                      "DismHost.exe",
+                      "rundll32.exe",
+                      "powershell.exe")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task/Job
+** ID: T1053
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task
+** ID: T1053.005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Hijack Execution Flow
+** ID: T1574
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task/Job
+** ID: T1053
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task
+** ID: T1053.005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Hijack Execution Flow
+** ID: T1574
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-update-orchestrator-service-hijack.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-update-orchestrator-service-hijack.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1a4ad795de
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-update-orchestrator-service-hijack.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-update-orchestrator-service-hijack]]
+=== Persistence via Update Orchestrator Service Hijack
+
+Identifies potential hijacking of the Microsoft Update Orchestrator Service to establish persistence with an integrity level of SYSTEM.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/irsl/CVE-2020-1313
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Use Case: Vulnerability
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Persistence via Update Orchestrator Service Hijack*
+
+
+Windows Update Orchestrator Service is a DCOM service used by other components to install Windows updates that are already downloaded. Windows Update Orchestrator Service was vulnerable to elevation of privileges (any user to local system) due to an improper authorization of the callers. The vulnerability affected the Windows 10 and Windows Server Core products. Fixed by Microsoft on Patch Tuesday June 2020.
+
+This rule will detect uncommon processes spawned by `svchost.exe` with `UsoSvc` as the command line parameters. Attackers can leverage this technique to elevate privileges or maintain persistence.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  process.parent.executable : "C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe" and
+  process.parent.args : "UsoSvc" and
+  not process.executable :
+          ("?:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows\\UUS\\Packages\\*\\amd64\\MoUsoCoreWorker.exe",
+          "?:\\Windows\\System32\\UsoClient.exe",
+          "?:\\Windows\\System32\\MusNotification.exe",
+          "?:\\Windows\\System32\\MusNotificationUx.exe",
+          "?:\\Windows\\System32\\MusNotifyIcon.exe",
+          "?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe",
+          "?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerMgr.exe",
+          "?:\\Windows\\UUS\\amd64\\MoUsoCoreWorker.exe",
+          "?:\\Windows\\System32\\MoUsoCoreWorker.exe",
+          "?:\\Windows\\UUS\\amd64\\UsoCoreWorker.exe",
+          "?:\\Windows\\System32\\UsoCoreWorker.exe",
+          "?:\\Program Files\\Common Files\\microsoft shared\\ClickToRun\\OfficeC2RClient.exe") and
+  not process.name : ("MoUsoCoreWorker.exe", "OfficeC2RClient.exe")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Create or Modify System Process
+** ID: T1543
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Windows Service
+** ID: T1543.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
+** ID: T1068
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Hijack Execution Flow
+** ID: T1574
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-wmi-event-subscription.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-wmi-event-subscription.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5d0074c4ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-wmi-event-subscription.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-wmi-event-subscription]]
+=== Persistence via WMI Event Subscription
+
+An adversary can use Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security-part-1
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  (process.name : "wmic.exe" or ?process.pe.original_file_name == "wmic.exe") and
+  process.args : "create" and
+  process.args : ("ActiveScriptEventConsumer", "CommandLineEventConsumer")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Event Triggered Execution
+** ID: T1546
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription
+** ID: T1546.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/003/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Windows Management Instrumentation
+** ID: T1047
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-wmi-standard-registry-provider.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-wmi-standard-registry-provider.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f9197c1ca1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-wmi-standard-registry-provider.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-wmi-standard-registry-provider]]
+=== Persistence via WMI Standard Registry Provider
+
+Identifies use of the Windows Management Instrumentation StdRegProv (registry provider) to modify commonly abused registry locations for persistence.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/desktop/regprov/stdregprov
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security-part-1
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Persistence via WMI Standard Registry Provider*
+
+
+The Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) StdRegProv is a registry provider that allows users to manage registry keys and values on Windows systems. Adversaries may abuse this functionality to modify registry locations commonly used for persistence, enabling them to maintain unauthorized access to a system.
+
+This rule identifies instances where the WMI StdRegProv is used to modify specific registry paths associated with persistence mechanisms.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Validate if the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
+- Identify which process triggered this behavior.
+- Verify whether the file specified in the run key is signed.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Examine the file specified in the run key using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and Remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+registry where host.os.type == "windows" and
+ registry.data.strings != null and process.name : "WmiPrvSe.exe" and
+ registry.path : (
+                  "HKEY_USERS\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Command Processor\\Autorun",
+                  "HKEY_USERS\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\*",
+                  "HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\*",
+                  "HKLM\\Software\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\*",
+                  "HKEY_USERS\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run\\*",
+                  "HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run\\*",
+                  "HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce\\*",
+                  "HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnceEx\\*",
+                  "HKEY_USERS\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce\\*",
+                  "HKEY_USERS\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnceEx\\*",
+                  "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\\Services\\*\\ServiceDLL",
+                  "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\\Services\\*\\ImagePath",
+                  "HKEY_USERS\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Shell\\*",
+                  "HKEY_USERS\\*\\Environment\\UserInitMprLogonScript",
+                  "HKEY_USERS\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows\\Load",
+                  "HKEY_USERS\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Shell",
+                  "HKEY_USERS\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\Shell",
+                  "HKEY_USERS\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\\Scripts\\Logoff\\Script",
+                  "HKEY_USERS\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\\Scripts\\Logon\\Script",
+                  "HKEY_USERS\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\\Scripts\\Shutdown\\Script",
+                  "HKEY_USERS\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\\Scripts\\Startup\\Script",
+                  "HKEY_USERS\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Ctf\\LangBarAddin\\*\\FilePath",
+                  "HKEY_USERS\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Extensions\\*\\Exec",
+                  "HKEY_USERS\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Extensions\\*\\Script",
+                  "\\REGISTRY\\USER\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Command Processor\\Autorun",
+                  "\\REGISTRY\\USER\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\*",
+                  "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\*",
+                  "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\Software\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\*",
+                  "\\REGISTRY\\USER\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run\\*",
+                  "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run\\*",
+                  "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce\\*",
+                  "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnceEx\\*",
+                  "\\REGISTRY\\USER\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce\\*",
+                  "\\REGISTRY\\USER\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnceEx\\*",
+                  "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\\Services\\*\\ServiceDLL",
+                  "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\\Services\\*\\ImagePath",
+                  "\\REGISTRY\\USER\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Shell\\*",
+                  "\\REGISTRY\\USER\\*\\Environment\\UserInitMprLogonScript",
+                  "\\REGISTRY\\USER\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows\\Load",
+                  "\\REGISTRY\\USER\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Shell",
+                  "\\REGISTRY\\USER\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\Shell",
+                  "\\REGISTRY\\USER\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\\Scripts\\Logoff\\Script",
+                  "\\REGISTRY\\USER\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\\Scripts\\Logon\\Script",
+                  "\\REGISTRY\\USER\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\\Scripts\\Shutdown\\Script",
+                  "\\REGISTRY\\USER\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\\Scripts\\Startup\\Script",
+                  "\\REGISTRY\\USER\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Ctf\\LangBarAddin\\*\\FilePath",
+                  "\\REGISTRY\\USER\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Extensions\\*\\Exec",
+                  "\\REGISTRY\\USER\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Extensions\\*\\Script"
+                  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Create or Modify System Process
+** ID: T1543
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Windows Service
+** ID: T1543.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
+** ID: T1547
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
+** ID: T1547.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Windows Management Instrumentation
+** ID: T1047
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistent-scripts-in-the-startup-directory.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistent-scripts-in-the-startup-directory.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..26a05d7bbe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistent-scripts-in-the-startup-directory.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistent-scripts-in-the-startup-directory]]
+=== Persistent Scripts in the Startup Directory
+
+Identifies script engines creating files in the Startup folder, or the creation of script files in the Startup folder. Adversaries may abuse this technique to maintain persistence in an environment.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.file*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Persistent Scripts in the Startup Directory*
+
+
+The Windows Startup folder is a special folder in Windows. Programs added to this folder are executed during account logon, without user interaction, providing an excellent way for attackers to maintain persistence.
+
+This rule looks for shortcuts created by wscript.exe or cscript.exe, or js/vbs scripts created by any process.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Validate if the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the file using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- Suspicious Startup Shell Folder Modification - c8b150f0-0164-475b-a75e-74b47800a9ff
+- Startup Folder Persistence via Unsigned Process - 2fba96c0-ade5-4bce-b92f-a5df2509da3f
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type != "deletion" and
+
+  file.extension : ("lnk", "vbs", "vbe", "wsh", "wsf", "js") and
+  not (startsWith(user.domain, "NT") or endsWith(user.domain, "NT")) and
+
+  /* detect shortcuts created by wscript.exe or cscript.exe */
+  (file.path : "C:\\*\\Programs\\Startup\\*.lnk" and
+     process.name : ("wscript.exe", "cscript.exe")) or
+
+  /* detect vbs or js files created by any process */
+  file.path : ("C:\\*\\Programs\\Startup\\*.vbs",
+               "C:\\*\\Programs\\Startup\\*.vbe",
+               "C:\\*\\Programs\\Startup\\*.wsh",
+               "C:\\*\\Programs\\Startup\\*.wsf",
+               "C:\\*\\Programs\\Startup\\*.js")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
+** ID: T1547
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
+** ID: T1547.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Shortcut Modification
+** ID: T1547.009
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/009/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-port-forwarding-rule-addition.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-port-forwarding-rule-addition.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9a189f2654
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-port-forwarding-rule-addition.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-port-forwarding-rule-addition]]
+=== Port Forwarding Rule Addition
+
+Identifies the creation of a new port forwarding rule. An adversary may abuse this technique to bypass network segmentation restrictions.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/bypassing-network-restrictions-through-rdp-tunneling.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Command and Control
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Port Forwarding Rule Addition*
+
+
+Network port forwarding is a mechanism to redirect incoming TCP connections (IPv4 or IPv6) from the local TCP port to any other port number, or even to a port on a remote computer.
+
+Attackers may configure port forwarding rules to bypass network segmentation restrictions, using the host as a jump box to access previously unreachable systems.
+
+This rule monitors the modifications to the `HKLM\SYSTEM\*ControlSet*\Services\PortProxy\v4tov4\` subkeys.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Contact the account and system owners and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
+- Identify the target host IP address, check the connections originating from the host where the modification occurred, and inspect the credentials used.
+  - Investigate suspicious login activity, such as unauthorized access and logins from outside working hours and unusual locations.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This mechanism can be used legitimately. Analysts can dismiss the alert if the Administrator is aware of the activity and there are justifications for this configuration.
+- If this rule is noisy in your environment due to expected activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Delete the port forwarding rule.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+registry where host.os.type == "windows" and registry.path : (
+  "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\\Services\\PortProxy\\v4tov4\\*",
+  "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\\Services\\PortProxy\\v4tov4\\*"
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Protocol Tunneling
+** ID: T1572
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Modify Registry
+** ID: T1112
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-admin-group-account-addition.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-admin-group-account-addition.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a70517fff6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-admin-group-account-addition.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-admin-group-account-addition]]
+=== Potential Admin Group Account Addition
+
+Identifies attempts to add an account to the admin group via the command line. This could be an indication of privilege escalation activity.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://managingosx.wordpress.com/2010/01/14/add-a-user-to-the-admin-group-via-command-line-3-0/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:macos and event.type:(start or process_started) and
+ process.name:(dscl or dseditgroup) and process.args:(("/Groups/admin" or admin) and ("-a" or "-append"))
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Valid Accounts
+** ID: T1078
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Local Accounts
+** ID: T1078.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-antimalware-scan-interface-bypass-via-powershell.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-antimalware-scan-interface-bypass-via-powershell.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f25762e061
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-antimalware-scan-interface-bypass-via-powershell.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-antimalware-scan-interface-bypass-via-powershell]]
+=== Potential Antimalware Scan Interface Bypass via PowerShell
+
+Identifies the execution of PowerShell script with keywords related to different Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) bypasses. An adversary may attempt first to disable AMSI before executing further malicious powershell scripts to evade detection.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/Amsi-Bypass-Powershell
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: PowerShell Logs
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+
+*Version*: 8
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Potential Antimalware Scan Interface Bypass via PowerShell*
+
+
+PowerShell is one of the main tools system administrators use for automation, report routines, and other tasks. This makes it available for use in various environments, and creates an attractive way for attackers to execute code.
+
+The Windows Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) is a versatile interface standard that allows your applications and services to integrate with any antimalware product on a machine. AMSI integrates with multiple Windows components, ranging from User Account Control (UAC) to VBA macros and PowerShell.
+
+This rule identifies scripts that contain methods and classes that can be abused to bypass AMSI.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Examine the script content that triggered the detection; look for suspicious DLL imports, collection or exfiltration capabilities, suspicious functions, encoded or compressed data, and other potentially malicious characteristics.
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Determine whether the script was executed and capture relevant information, such as arguments that reveal intent or are indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate commands and scripts executed after this activity was observed.
+- Inspect the host for suspicious or abnormal behavior in the alert timeframe:
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Restrict PowerShell usage outside of IT and engineering business units using GPOs, AppLocker, Intune, or similar software.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:"process" and host.os.type:windows and
+  (
+    powershell.file.script_block_text : (
+      "System.Management.Automation.AmsiUtils" or
+			amsiInitFailed or 
+			"Invoke-AmsiBypass" or 
+			"Bypass.AMSI" or 
+			"amsi.dll" or 
+			AntimalwareProvider  or 
+			amsiSession or 
+			amsiContext or
+			AmsiInitialize or 
+			unloadobfuscated or 
+			unloadsilent or 
+			AmsiX64 or 
+			AmsiX32 or 
+			FindAmsiFun
+    ) or
+    powershell.file.script_block_text:("[System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy" and "VirtualProtect") or
+    powershell.file.script_block_text:("[Ref].Assembly.GetType(('System.Management.Automation" and ".SetValue(")
+  ) and
+  not powershell.file.script_block_text : (
+    "sentinelbreakpoints" and "Set-PSBreakpoint"
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Impair Defenses
+** ID: T1562
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Disable or Modify Tools
+** ID: T1562.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-application-shimming-via-sdbinst.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-application-shimming-via-sdbinst.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..204c317a4e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-application-shimming-via-sdbinst.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-application-shimming-via-sdbinst]]
+=== Potential Application Shimming via Sdbinst
+
+The Application Shim was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating system codebase changes over time. This Windows functionality has been abused by attackers to stealthily gain persistence and arbitrary code execution in legitimate Windows processes.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and process.name : "sdbinst.exe" and
+  not (process.args : "-m" and process.args : "-bg") and
+  not process.args : "-mm"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Event Triggered Execution
+** ID: T1546
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Application Shimming
+** ID: T1546.011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/011/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Event Triggered Execution
+** ID: T1546
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Application Shimming
+** ID: T1546.011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/011/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-buffer-overflow-attack-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-buffer-overflow-attack-detected.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..75c66c9ac0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-buffer-overflow-attack-detected.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-buffer-overflow-attack-detected]]
+=== Potential Buffer Overflow Attack Detected
+
+Detects potential buffer overflow attacks by querying the "Segfault Detected" pre-built rule signal index, through a threshold rule, with a minimum number of 100 segfault alerts in a short timespan. A large amount of segfaults in a short time interval could indicate application exploitation attempts.
+
+*Rule type*: threshold
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* .alerts-security.*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Tactic: Initial Access
+* Use Case: Vulnerability
+* Rule Type: Higher-Order Rule
+
+*Version*: 2
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+
+This rule leverages alert data from other prebuilt detection rules to function correctly. 
+
+
+*Dependent Elastic Detection Rule Enablement*
+
+As a higher-order rule (based on other detections), this rule also requires the following prerequisite Elastic detection rule to be installed and enabled:
+- Segfault Detected (5c81fc9d-1eae-437f-ba07-268472967013)
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+kibana.alert.rule.rule_id:5c81fc9d-1eae-437f-ba07-268472967013 and event.kind:signal
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
+** ID: T1068
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Initial Access
+** ID: TA0001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploit Public-Facing Application
+** ID: T1190
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-chroot-container-escape-via-mount.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-chroot-container-escape-via-mount.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ec6a6f94a6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-chroot-container-escape-via-mount.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-chroot-container-escape-via-mount]]
+=== Potential Chroot Container Escape via Mount
+
+Monitors for the execution of a file system mount followed by a chroot execution. Given enough permissions, a user within a container is capable of mounting the root file system of the host, and leveraging chroot to escape its containarized environment. This behavior pattern is very uncommon and should be investigated.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://book.hacktricks.xyz/v/portugues-ht/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/escaping-from-limited-bash
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Domain: Container
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 2
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+Session View uses process data collected by the Elastic Defend integration, but this data is not always collected by default. Session View is available on enterprise subscription for versions 8.3 and above.
+
+*To confirm that Session View data is enabled:*
+
+- Go to “Manage → Policies”, and edit one or more of your Elastic Defend integration policies.
+- Select the” Policy settings” tab, then scroll down to the “Linux event collection” section near the bottom.
+- Check the box for “Process events”, and turn on the “Include session data” toggle.
+- If you want to include file and network alerts in Session View, check the boxes for “Network and File events”.
+- If you want to enable terminal output capture, turn on the “Capture terminal output” toggle.
+For more information about the additional fields collected when this setting is enabled and the usage of Session View for Analysis refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/session-view.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id, process.parent.entity_id with maxspan=5m
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
+   process.name == "mount" and process.args : "/dev/sd*" and process.args_count >= 3 and
+   process.parent.name in ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish")]
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
+   process.name == "chroot"]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Escape to Host
+** ID: T1611
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-code-execution-via-postgresql.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-code-execution-via-postgresql.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..91970dbd34
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-code-execution-via-postgresql.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-code-execution-via-postgresql]]
+=== Potential Code Execution via Postgresql
+
+This rule monitors for suspicious activities that may indicate an attacker attempting to execute arbitrary code within a PostgreSQL environment. Attackers can execute code via PostgreSQL as a result of gaining unauthorized access to a public facing PostgreSQL database or exploiting vulnerabilities, such as remote command execution and SQL injection attacks, which can result in unauthorized access and malicious actions, and facilitate post-exploitation activities for unauthorized access and malicious actions.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 6
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "fork", "fork_event") and 
+user.name == "postgres" and (
+  (process.parent.args : "*sh" and process.parent.args : "echo*") or 
+  (process.args : "*sh" and process.args : "echo*")
+) and not process.parent.name : "puppet"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Unix Shell
+** ID: T1059.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-command-and-control-via-internet-explorer.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-command-and-control-via-internet-explorer.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5003974901
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-command-and-control-via-internet-explorer.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-command-and-control-via-internet-explorer]]
+=== Potential Command and Control via Internet Explorer
+
+Identifies instances of Internet Explorer (iexplore.exe) being started via the Component Object Model (COM) making unusual network connections. Adversaries could abuse Internet Explorer via COM to avoid suspicious processes making network connections and bypass host-based firewall restrictions.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Command and Control
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 105
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id, user.name with maxspan = 5s
+  [library where host.os.type == "windows" and dll.name : "IEProxy.dll" and process.name : ("rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe")]
+  [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and process.parent.name : "iexplore.exe" and process.parent.args : "-Embedding"]
+  /* IE started via COM in normal conditions makes few connections, mainly to Microsoft and OCSP related domains, add FPs here */
+  [network where host.os.type == "windows" and network.protocol == "dns" and process.name : "iexplore.exe" and
+   not dns.question.name :
+   (
+    "*.microsoft.com",
+    "*.digicert.com",
+    "*.msocsp.com",
+    "*.windowsupdate.com",
+    "*.bing.com",
+    "*.identrust.com",
+    "*.sharepoint.com",
+    "*.office365.com",
+    "*.office.com"
+    )
+  ] /* with runs=5 */
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Application Layer Protocol
+** ID: T1071
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Inter-Process Communication
+** ID: T1559
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Component Object Model
+** ID: T1559.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-cookies-theft-via-browser-debugging.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-cookies-theft-via-browser-debugging.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9201e67eea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-cookies-theft-via-browser-debugging.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-cookies-theft-via-browser-debugging]]
+=== Potential Cookies Theft via Browser Debugging
+
+Identifies the execution of a Chromium based browser with the debugging process argument, which may indicate an attempt to steal authentication cookies. An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* auditbeat-*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 33
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/defaultnamehere/cookie_crimes
+* https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2020/cookie-crimes-on-mirosoft-edge/
+* https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/documentation/modules/post/multi/gather/chrome_cookies.md
+* https://posts.specterops.io/hands-in-the-cookie-jar-dumping-cookies-with-chromiums-remote-debugger-port-34c4f468844e
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* OS: Windows
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 105
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where event.type in ("start", "process_started", "info") and
+  process.name in (
+             "Microsoft Edge",
+             "chrome.exe",
+             "Google Chrome",
+             "google-chrome-stable",
+             "google-chrome-beta",
+             "google-chrome",
+             "msedge.exe") and
+   process.args : ("--remote-debugging-port=*",
+                   "--remote-debugging-targets=*",
+                   "--remote-debugging-pipe=*") and
+   process.args : "--user-data-dir=*" and not process.args:"--remote-debugging-port=0"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Steal Web Session Cookie
+** ID: T1539
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-credential-access-via-dcsync.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-credential-access-via-dcsync.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4b6c89df27
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-credential-access-via-dcsync.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-credential-access-via-dcsync]]
+=== Potential Credential Access via DCSync
+
+This rule identifies when a User Account starts the Active Directory Replication Process. Attackers can use the DCSync technique to get credential information of individual accounts or the entire domain, thus compromising the entire domain.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-system.*
+* logs-windows.*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/06_credential_access/WIN-180815210510.html
+* https://threathunterplaybook.com/library/windows/active_directory_replication.html?highlight=dcsync#directory-replication-services-auditing
+* https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_ad_replication_non_machine_account.yml
+* https://github.com/atc-project/atomic-threat-coverage/blob/master/Atomic_Threat_Coverage/Logging_Policies/LP_0027_windows_audit_directory_service_access.md
+* https://attack.stealthbits.com/privilege-escalation-using-mimikatz-dcsync
+* https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/credentials/dumping/dcsync
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: Active Directory
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring
+
+*Version*: 113
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Potential Credential Access via DCSync*
+
+
+Active Directory replication is the process by which the changes that originate on one domain controller are automatically transferred to other domain controllers that store the same data.
+
+Active Directory data consists of objects that have properties, or attributes. Each object is an instance of an object class, and object classes and their respective attributes are defined in the Active Directory schema. Objects are defined by the values of their attributes, and changes to attribute values must be transferred from the domain controller on which they occur to every other domain controller that stores a replica of an affected object.
+
+Adversaries can use the DCSync technique that uses Windows Domain Controller's API to simulate the replication process from a remote domain controller, compromising major credential material such as the Kerberos krbtgt keys used legitimately for tickets creation, but also tickets forging by attackers. This attack requires some extended privileges to succeed (DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All), which are granted by default to members of the Administrators, Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, and Domain Controllers groups. Privileged accounts can be abused to grant controlled objects the right to DCsync/Replicate.
+
+More details can be found on https://threathunterplaybook.com/library/windows/active_directory_replication.html?highlight=dcsync#directory-replication-services-auditing[Threat Hunter Playbook] and https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/credentials/dumping/dcsync[The Hacker Recipes].
+
+This rule monitors for Event ID 4662 (Operation was performed on an Active Directory object) and identifies events that use the access mask 0x100 (Control Access) and properties that contain at least one of the following or their equivalent Schema-Id-GUID (DS-Replication-Get-Changes, DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All, DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set). It also filters out events that use computer accounts and also Azure AD Connect MSOL accounts (more details https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-defender-for-identity/ad-connect-msol-user-suspected-dcsync-attack/m-p/788028[here]).
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Contact the account and system owners and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Correlate security events 4662 and 4624 (Logon Type 3) by their Logon ID (`winlog.logon.id`) on the Domain Controller (DC) that received the replication request. This will tell you where the AD replication request came from, and if it came from another DC or not.
+- Scope which credentials were compromised (for example, whether all accounts were replicated or specific ones).
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Administrators may use custom accounts on Azure AD Connect, investigate if it is the case, and if it is properly secured. If noisy in your environment due to expected activity, consider adding the corresponding account as a exception.
+- Although replicating Active Directory (AD) data to non-Domain Controllers is not a common practice and is generally not recommended from a security perspective, some software vendors may require it for their products to function correctly. If this rule is noisy in your environment due to expected activity, consider adding the corresponding account as a exception.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- If the entire domain or the `krbtgt` user was compromised:
+  - Activate your incident response plan for total Active Directory compromise which should include, but not be limited to, a password reset (twice) of the `krbtgt` user.
+- Investigate how the attacker escalated privileges and identify systems they used to conduct lateral movement. Use this information to determine ways the attacker could regain access to the environment.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The 'Audit Directory Service Access' logging policy must be configured for (Success, Failure).
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Policies >
+Windows Settings >
+Security Settings >
+Advanced Audit Policies Configuration >
+Audit Policies >
+DS Access >
+Audit Directory Service Access (Success,Failure)
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+any where event.action : ("Directory Service Access", "object-operation-performed") and
+  event.code == "4662" and winlog.event_data.Properties : (
+
+    /* Control Access Rights/Permissions Symbol */
+
+    "*DS-Replication-Get-Changes*",
+    "*DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All*",
+    "*DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set*",
+
+    /* Identifying GUID used in ACE */
+
+    "*1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2*",
+    "*1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2*",
+    "*89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c*")
+
+    /* The right to perform an operation controlled by an extended access right. */
+
+    and winlog.event_data.AccessMask : "0x100" and
+    not winlog.event_data.SubjectUserName : (
+          "*$", "MSOL_*", "OpenDNS_Connector", "adconnect", "SyncADConnect",
+          "SyncADConnectCM", "aadsync", "svcAzureADSync", "-"
+        )
+
+    /* The Umbrella AD Connector uses the OpenDNS_Connector account to perform replication */
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: DCSync
+** ID: T1003.006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/006/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Valid Accounts
+** ID: T1078
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Domain Accounts
+** ID: T1078.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-credential-access-via-duplicatehandle-in-lsass.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-credential-access-via-duplicatehandle-in-lsass.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8a4483a415
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-credential-access-via-duplicatehandle-in-lsass.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-credential-access-via-duplicatehandle-in-lsass]]
+=== Potential Credential Access via DuplicateHandle in LSASS
+
+Identifies suspicious access to an LSASS handle via DuplicateHandle from an unknown call trace module. This may indicate an attempt to bypass the NtOpenProcess API to evade detection and dump LSASS memory for credential access.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/CCob/MirrorDump
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 208
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.code == "10" and
+
+ /* LSASS requesting DuplicateHandle access right to another process */
+ process.name : "lsass.exe" and winlog.event_data.GrantedAccess == "0x40" and
+
+ /* call is coming from an unknown executable region */
+ winlog.event_data.CallTrace : "*UNKNOWN*"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: LSASS Memory
+** ID: T1003.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-credential-access-via-lsass-memory-dump.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-credential-access-via-lsass-memory-dump.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..25064a60f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-credential-access-via-lsass-memory-dump.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-credential-access-via-lsass-memory-dump]]
+=== Potential Credential Access via LSASS Memory Dump
+
+Identifies suspicious access to LSASS handle from a call trace pointing to DBGHelp.dll or DBGCore.dll, which both export the MiniDumpWriteDump method that can be used to dump LSASS memory content in preparation for credential access.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dump-credentials-from-lsass-process-without-mimikatz
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/detect-credential-access
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Tactic:Execution
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 209
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.code == "10" and
+  winlog.event_data.TargetImage : "?:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass.exe" and
+
+   /* DLLs exporting MiniDumpWriteDump API to create an lsass mdmp*/
+  winlog.event_data.CallTrace : ("*dbghelp*", "*dbgcore*") and
+
+   /* case of lsass crashing */
+  not process.executable : (
+        "?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe",
+        "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFault.exe",
+        "?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFaultSecure.exe"
+      )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: LSASS Memory
+** ID: T1003.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Native API
+** ID: T1106
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-credential-access-via-renamed-com-services-dll.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-credential-access-via-renamed-com-services-dll.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..721ff2f9c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-credential-access-via-renamed-com-services-dll.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-credential-access-via-renamed-com-services-dll]]
+=== Potential Credential Access via Renamed COM+ Services DLL
+
+Identifies suspicious renamed COMSVCS.DLL Image Load, which exports the MiniDump function that can be used to dump a process memory. This may indicate an attempt to dump LSASS memory while bypassing command-line based detection in preparation for credential access.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/08/30/minidumpwritedump-via-com-services-dll/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Potential Credential Access via Renamed COM+ Services DLL*
+
+
+COMSVCS.DLL is a Windows library that exports the MiniDump function, which can be used to dump a process memory. Adversaries may attempt to dump LSASS memory using a renamed COMSVCS.DLL to bypass command-line based detection and gain unauthorized access to credentials.
+
+This rule identifies suspicious instances of rundll32.exe loading a renamed COMSVCS.DLL image, which can indicate potential abuse of the MiniDump function for credential theft.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process, such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+- Identify the process that created the DLL using file creation events.
+   - Inspect the file for useful metadata, such as file size and creation or modification time.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the process executable and DLL using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process's `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
+- Look for the presence of relevant artifacts on other systems. Identify commonalities and differences between potentially compromised systems.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- False positives may include legitimate instances of rundll32.exe loading a renamed COMSVCS.DLL image for non-malicious purposes, such as during software development, testing, or troubleshooting.
+
+
+*Related Rules*
+
+
+- Potential Credential Access via LSASS Memory Dump - 9960432d-9b26-409f-972b-839a959e79e2
+- Suspicious Module Loaded by LSASS - 3a6001a0-0939-4bbe-86f4-47d8faeb7b97
+- Suspicious Lsass Process Access - 128468bf-cab1-4637-99ea-fdf3780a4609
+- LSASS Process Access via Windows API - ff4599cb-409f-4910-a239-52e4e6f532ff
+
+
+*Response and Remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+  - If malicious activity is confirmed, perform a broader investigation to identify the scope of the compromise and determine the appropriate remediation steps.
+- Implement Elastic Endpoint Security to detect and prevent further post exploitation activities in the environment.
+   - Contain the affected system by isolating it from the network to prevent further spread of the attack.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Restore the affected system to its operational state by applying any necessary patches, updates, or configuration changes.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+You will need to enable logging of ImageLoads in your Sysmon configuration to include COMSVCS.DLL by Imphash or Original
+File Name.
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by process.entity_id with maxspan=1m
+ [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.category == "process" and
+    process.name : "rundll32.exe"]
+ [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.category == "process" and event.dataset : "windows.sysmon_operational" and event.code == "7" and
+   (file.pe.original_file_name : "COMSVCS.DLL" or file.pe.imphash : "EADBCCBB324829ACB5F2BBE87E5549A8") and
+    /* renamed COMSVCS */
+    not file.name : "COMSVCS.DLL"]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: LSASS Memory
+** ID: T1003.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: System Binary Proxy Execution
+** ID: T1218
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Rundll32
+** ID: T1218.011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-credential-access-via-trusted-developer-utility.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-credential-access-via-trusted-developer-utility.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5c703a2200
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-credential-access-via-trusted-developer-utility.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-credential-access-via-trusted-developer-utility]]
+=== Potential Credential Access via Trusted Developer Utility
+
+An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, loaded DLLs (dynamically linked libraries) responsible for Windows credential management. This technique is sometimes used for credential dumping.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Potential Credential Access via Trusted Developer Utility*
+
+
+The Microsoft Build Engine is a platform for building applications. This engine, also known as MSBuild, provides an XML schema for a project file that controls how the build platform processes and builds software.
+
+Adversaries can abuse MSBuild to proxy the execution of malicious code. The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# or Visual Basic code to be inserted into an XML project file. MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. `MSBuild.exe` is a signed Microsoft binary, and the execution of code using it can bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow `MSBuild.exe` execution.
+
+This rule looks for the MSBuild process loading `vaultcli.dll` or `SAMLib.DLL`, which indicates the execution of credential access activities.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate abnormal behaviors observed by the subject process, such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Examine the command line to identify the `.csproj` file location.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the file using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by process.entity_id
+ [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and (process.name : "MSBuild.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name == "MSBuild.exe")]
+ [any where host.os.type == "windows" and (event.category == "library" or (event.category == "process" and event.action : "Image loaded*")) and
+  (?dll.name : ("vaultcli.dll", "SAMLib.DLL") or file.name : ("vaultcli.dll", "SAMLib.DLL"))]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Security Account Manager
+** ID: T1003.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Credentials from Password Stores
+** ID: T1555
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Windows Credential Manager
+** ID: T1555.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/004/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
+** ID: T1127
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: MSBuild
+** ID: T1127.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-credential-access-via-windows-utilities.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-credential-access-via-windows-utilities.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..81a4588fb0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-credential-access-via-windows-utilities.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-credential-access-via-windows-utilities]]
+=== Potential Credential Access via Windows Utilities
+
+Identifies the execution of known Windows utilities often abused to dump LSASS memory or the Active Directory database (NTDS.dit) in preparation for credential access.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://lolbas-project.github.io/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 111
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Potential Credential Access via Windows Utilities*
+
+
+Local Security Authority Server Service (LSASS) is a process in Microsoft Windows operating systems that is responsible for enforcing security policy on the system. It verifies users logging on to a Windows computer or server, handles password changes, and creates access tokens.
+
+The `Ntds.dit` file is a database that stores Active Directory data, including information about user objects, groups, and group membership.
+
+This rule looks for the execution of utilities that can extract credential data from the LSASS memory and Active Directory `Ntds.dit` file.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate abnormal behaviors observed by the subject process, such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Examine the command line to identify what information was targeted.
+- Identify the target computer and its role in the IT environment.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Any activity that triggered the alert and is not inherently malicious must be monitored by the security team.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- If the host is a domain controller (DC):
+  - Activate your incident response plan for total Active Directory compromise.
+  - Review the privileges assigned to users that can access the DCs, to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed and to reduce the attack surface.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+(
+  (
+    (?process.pe.original_file_name : "procdump" or process.name : "procdump.exe") and process.args : "-ma"
+  ) or
+  (
+    process.name : "ProcessDump.exe" and not process.parent.executable regex~ """C:\\Program Files( \(x86\))?\\Cisco Systems\\.*"""
+  ) or
+  (
+    (?process.pe.original_file_name : "WriteMiniDump.exe" or process.name : "WriteMiniDump.exe") and
+      not process.parent.executable regex~ """C:\\Program Files( \(x86\))?\\Steam\\.*"""
+  ) or
+  (
+    (?process.pe.original_file_name : "RUNDLL32.EXE" or process.name : "RUNDLL32.exe") and
+      (process.args : "MiniDump*" or process.command_line : "*comsvcs.dll*#24*")
+  ) or
+  (
+    (?process.pe.original_file_name : "RdrLeakDiag.exe" or process.name : "RdrLeakDiag.exe") and
+      process.args : "/fullmemdmp"
+  ) or
+  (
+    (?process.pe.original_file_name : "SqlDumper.exe" or process.name : "SqlDumper.exe") and
+      process.args : "0x01100*") or
+  (
+    (?process.pe.original_file_name : "TTTracer.exe" or process.name : "TTTracer.exe") and
+      process.args : "-dumpFull" and process.args : "-attach") or
+  (
+    (?process.pe.original_file_name : "ntdsutil.exe" or process.name : "ntdsutil.exe") and
+      process.args : "create*full*") or
+  (
+    (?process.pe.original_file_name : "diskshadow.exe" or process.name : "diskshadow.exe") and process.args : "/s")
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: LSASS Memory
+** ID: T1003.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: NTDS
+** ID: T1003.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/003/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: System Binary Proxy Execution
+** ID: T1218
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Rundll32
+** ID: T1218.011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-curl-cve-2023-38545-exploitation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-curl-cve-2023-38545-exploitation.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..272fee2508
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-curl-cve-2023-38545-exploitation.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-curl-cve-2023-38545-exploitation]]
+=== Potential curl CVE-2023-38545 Exploitation
+
+Detects potential exploitation of curl CVE-2023-38545 by monitoring for vulnerable command line arguments in conjunction with an unusual command line length. A flaw in curl version <= 8.3 makes curl vulnerable to a heap based buffer overflow during the SOCKS5 proxy handshake. Upgrade to curl version >= 8.4 to patch this vulnerability. This exploit can be executed with and without the use of environment variables. For increased visibility, enable the collection of http_proxy, HTTPS_PROXY and ALL_PROXY environment variables based on the instructions provided in the setup guide of this rule.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2023-38545.html
+* https://daniel.haxx.se/blog/2023/10/11/curl-8-4-0/
+* https://twitter.com/_JohnHammond/status/1711986412554531015
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Use Case: Vulnerability
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 5
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+Elastic Defend integration does not collect environment variable logging by default.
+In order to capture this behavior, this rule requires a specific configuration option set within the advanced settings of the Elastic Defend integration.
+ #### To set up environment variable capture for an Elastic Agent policy:
+- Go to “Security → Manage → Policies”.
+- Select an “Elastic Agent policy”.
+- Click “Show advanced settings”.
+- Scroll down or search for “linux.advanced.capture_env_vars”.
+- Enter the names of environment variables you want to capture, separated by commas.
+- For this rule the linux.advanced.capture_env_vars variable should be set to "http_proxy,HTTPS_PROXY,ALL_PROXY".
+- Click “Save”.
+After saving the integration change, the Elastic Agents running this policy will be updated and the rule will function properly.
+For more information on capturing environment variables refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/environment-variable-capture.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and process.name == "curl" 
+and (
+  process.args : ("--socks5-hostname", "--proxy", "--preproxy", "socks5*") or 
+  process.env_vars: ("http_proxy=socks5h://*", "HTTPS_PROXY=socks5h://*", "ALL_PROXY=socks5h://*")
+) and length(process.command_line) > 255 and 
+not process.parent.name in ("cf-agent", "agent-run", "agent-check", "rudder", "agent-inventory", "cf-execd") and
+not process.args == "/opt/rudder/bin/curl"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation for Client Execution
+** ID: T1203
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-destination-port.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-destination-port.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c39d7e51fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-destination-port.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-destination-port]]
+=== Potential Data Exfiltration Activity to an Unusual Destination Port
+
+A machine learning job has detected data exfiltration to a particular destination port. Data transfer patterns that are outside the normal traffic patterns of an organization could indicate exfiltration over command and control channels.
+
+*Rule type*: machine_learning
+
+*Rule indices*: None
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 15m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-6h ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html
+* https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/ded
+* https://www.elastic.co/blog/detect-data-exfiltration-activity-with-kibanas-new-integration
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Use Case: Data Exfiltration Detection
+* Rule Type: ML
+* Rule Type: Machine Learning
+* Tactic: Exfiltration
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The rule requires the Data Exfiltration Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as network and file events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend and Network Packet Capture (for network events only).  
+
+
+*Data Exfiltration Detection Setup*
+
+The Data Exfiltration Detection integration detects data exfiltration activity by identifying abnormalities in network and file events. Anomalies are detected using Elastic's Anomaly Detection feature. 
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Data Exfiltration Detection.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+- Network events collected by the https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/endpoint[Elastic Defend] or https://docs.elastic.co/integrations/network_traffic[Network Packet Capture] integration.
+- To install Elastic Defend, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[documentation].
+- To add the Network Packet Capture integration to an Elastic Agent policy, refer to https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/add-integration-to-policy.html[this] guide.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed to install assets associated with the Data Exfiltration Detection integration:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Data Exfiltration Detection and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Under Settings, click Install Data Exfiltration Detection assets and follow the prompts to install the assets.
+
+
+*Anomaly Detection Setup*
+
+Before you can enable rules for Data Exfiltration Detection, you'll need to enable the corresponding Anomaly Detection jobs. 
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Analytics, click Machine Learning.
+- Under Anomaly Detection, click Jobs, and then click "Create job". Select the Data View containing your network data. For example, this would be `logs-endpoint.events.*` if you used Elastic Defend to collect events, or `logs-network_traffic.*` if you used Network Packet Capture.
+- If the selected Data View contains events that match the query in https://github.com/elastic/integrations/blob/main/packages/ded/kibana/ml_module/ded-ml.json[this] configuration file, you will see a card for Data Exfiltration Detection under "Use preconfigured jobs".
+- Keep the default settings and click "Create jobs" to start the anomaly detection jobs and datafeeds.
+
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Exfiltration
+** ID: TA0010
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
+** ID: T1041
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-ip-address.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-ip-address.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..476fc908a6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-ip-address.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-ip-address]]
+=== Potential Data Exfiltration Activity to an Unusual IP Address
+
+A machine learning job has detected data exfiltration to a particular geo-location (by IP address). Data transfers to geo-locations that are outside the normal traffic patterns of an organization could indicate exfiltration over command and control channels.
+
+*Rule type*: machine_learning
+
+*Rule indices*: None
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 15m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-6h ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html
+* https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/ded
+* https://www.elastic.co/blog/detect-data-exfiltration-activity-with-kibanas-new-integration
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Use Case: Data Exfiltration Detection
+* Rule Type: ML
+* Rule Type: Machine Learning
+* Tactic: Exfiltration
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The rule requires the Data Exfiltration Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as network and file events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend and Network Packet Capture (for network events only).  
+
+
+*Data Exfiltration Detection Setup*
+
+The Data Exfiltration Detection integration detects data exfiltration activity by identifying abnormalities in network and file events. Anomalies are detected using Elastic's Anomaly Detection feature. 
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Data Exfiltration Detection.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+- Network events collected by the https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/endpoint[Elastic Defend] or https://docs.elastic.co/integrations/network_traffic[Network Packet Capture] integration.
+- To install Elastic Defend, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[documentation].
+- To add the Network Packet Capture integration to an Elastic Agent policy, refer to https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/add-integration-to-policy.html[this] guide.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed to install assets associated with the Data Exfiltration Detection integration:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Data Exfiltration Detection and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Under Settings, click Install Data Exfiltration Detection assets and follow the prompts to install the assets.
+
+
+*Anomaly Detection Setup*
+
+Before you can enable rules for Data Exfiltration Detection, you'll need to enable the corresponding Anomaly Detection jobs. 
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Analytics, click Machine Learning.
+- Under Anomaly Detection, click Jobs, and then click "Create job". Select the Data View containing your network data. For example, this would be `logs-endpoint.events.*` if you used Elastic Defend to collect events, or `logs-network_traffic.*` if you used Network Packet Capture.
+- If the selected Data View contains events that match the query in https://github.com/elastic/integrations/blob/main/packages/ded/kibana/ml_module/ded-ml.json[this] configuration file, you will see a card for Data Exfiltration Detection under "Use preconfigured jobs".
+- Keep the default settings and click "Create jobs" to start the anomaly detection jobs and datafeeds.
+
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Exfiltration
+** ID: TA0010
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
+** ID: T1041
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-iso-code.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-iso-code.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..95c47e2ad2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-iso-code.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-iso-code]]
+=== Potential Data Exfiltration Activity to an Unusual ISO Code
+
+A machine learning job has detected data exfiltration to a particular geo-location (by region name). Data transfers to geo-locations that are outside the normal traffic patterns of an organization could indicate exfiltration over command and control channels.
+
+*Rule type*: machine_learning
+
+*Rule indices*: None
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 15m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-6h ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html
+* https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/ded
+* https://www.elastic.co/blog/detect-data-exfiltration-activity-with-kibanas-new-integration
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Use Case: Data Exfiltration Detection
+* Rule Type: ML
+* Rule Type: Machine Learning
+* Tactic: Exfiltration
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The rule requires the Data Exfiltration Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as network and file events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend and Network Packet Capture (for network events only).  
+
+
+*Data Exfiltration Detection Setup*
+
+The Data Exfiltration Detection integration detects data exfiltration activity by identifying abnormalities in network and file events. Anomalies are detected using Elastic's Anomaly Detection feature. 
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Data Exfiltration Detection.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+- Network events collected by the https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/endpoint[Elastic Defend] or https://docs.elastic.co/integrations/network_traffic[Network Packet Capture] integration.
+- To install Elastic Defend, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[documentation].
+- To add the Network Packet Capture integration to an Elastic Agent policy, refer to https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/add-integration-to-policy.html[this] guide.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed to install assets associated with the Data Exfiltration Detection integration:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Data Exfiltration Detection and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Under Settings, click Install Data Exfiltration Detection assets and follow the prompts to install the assets.
+
+
+*Anomaly Detection Setup*
+
+Before you can enable rules for Data Exfiltration Detection, you'll need to enable the corresponding Anomaly Detection jobs. 
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Analytics, click Machine Learning.
+- Under Anomaly Detection, click Jobs, and then click "Create job". Select the Data View containing your network data. For example, this would be `logs-endpoint.events.*` if you used Elastic Defend to collect events, or `logs-network_traffic.*` if you used Network Packet Capture.
+- If the selected Data View contains events that match the query in https://github.com/elastic/integrations/blob/main/packages/ded/kibana/ml_module/ded-ml.json[this] configuration file, you will see a card for Data Exfiltration Detection under "Use preconfigured jobs".
+- Keep the default settings and click "Create jobs" to start the anomaly detection jobs and datafeeds.
+
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Exfiltration
+** ID: TA0010
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
+** ID: T1041
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-region.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-region.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0c6fc8c655
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-region.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-region]]
+=== Potential Data Exfiltration Activity to an Unusual Region
+
+A machine learning job has detected data exfiltration to a particular geo-location (by region name). Data transfers to geo-locations that are outside the normal traffic patterns of an organization could indicate exfiltration over command and control channels.
+
+*Rule type*: machine_learning
+
+*Rule indices*: None
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 15m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-6h ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html
+* https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/ded
+* https://www.elastic.co/blog/detect-data-exfiltration-activity-with-kibanas-new-integration
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Use Case: Data Exfiltration Detection
+* Rule Type: ML
+* Rule Type: Machine Learning
+* Tactic: Exfiltration
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The rule requires the Data Exfiltration Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as network and file events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend and Network Packet Capture (for network events only).  
+
+
+*Data Exfiltration Detection Setup*
+
+The Data Exfiltration Detection integration detects data exfiltration activity by identifying abnormalities in network and file events. Anomalies are detected using Elastic's Anomaly Detection feature. 
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Data Exfiltration Detection.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+- Network events collected by the https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/endpoint[Elastic Defend] or https://docs.elastic.co/integrations/network_traffic[Network Packet Capture] integration.
+- To install Elastic Defend, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[documentation].
+- To add the Network Packet Capture integration to an Elastic Agent policy, refer to https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/add-integration-to-policy.html[this] guide.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed to install assets associated with the Data Exfiltration Detection integration:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Data Exfiltration Detection and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Under Settings, click Install Data Exfiltration Detection assets and follow the prompts to install the assets.
+
+
+*Anomaly Detection Setup*
+
+Before you can enable rules for Data Exfiltration Detection, you'll need to enable the corresponding Anomaly Detection jobs. 
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Analytics, click Machine Learning.
+- Under Anomaly Detection, click Jobs, and then click "Create job". Select the Data View containing your network data. For example, this would be `logs-endpoint.events.*` if you used Elastic Defend to collect events, or `logs-network_traffic.*` if you used Network Packet Capture.
+- If the selected Data View contains events that match the query in https://github.com/elastic/integrations/blob/main/packages/ded/kibana/ml_module/ded-ml.json[this] configuration file, you will see a card for Data Exfiltration Detection under "Use preconfigured jobs".
+- Keep the default settings and click "Create jobs" to start the anomaly detection jobs and datafeeds.
+
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Exfiltration
+** ID: TA0010
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
+** ID: T1041
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-defense-evasion-via-proot.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-defense-evasion-via-proot.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8c5b86621b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-defense-evasion-via-proot.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-defense-evasion-via-proot]]
+=== Potential Defense Evasion via PRoot
+
+Identifies the execution of the PRoot utility, an open-source tool for user-space implementation of chroot, mount --bind, and binfmt_misc. Adversaries can leverage an open-source tool PRoot to expand the scope of their operations to multiple Linux distributions and simplify their necessary efforts. In a normal threat scenario, the scope of an attack is limited by the varying configurations of each Linux distribution. With PRoot, it provides an attacker with a consistent operational environment across different Linux distributions, such as Ubuntu, Fedora, and Alpine. PRoot also provides emulation capabilities that allow for malware built on other architectures, such as ARM, to be run.The post-exploitation technique called bring your own filesystem (BYOF), can be used by the threat actors to execute malicious payload or elevate privileges or perform network scans or orchestrate another attack on the environment. Although PRoot was originally not developed with malicious intent it can be easily tuned to work for one.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://proot-me.github.io/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+
+*Version*: 7
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and
+process.parent.name == "proot"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation for Defense Evasion
+** ID: T1211
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-dga-activity.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-dga-activity.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2a5936fbbe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-dga-activity.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-dga-activity]]
+=== Potential DGA Activity
+
+A population analysis machine learning job detected potential DGA (domain generation algorithm) activity. Such activity is often used by malware command and control (C2) channels. This machine learning job looks for a source IP address making DNS requests that have an aggregate high probability of being DGA activity.
+
+*Rule type*: machine_learning
+
+*Rule indices*: None
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 15m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-45m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html
+* https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/dga
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/detect-domain-generation-algorithm-activity-with-new-kibana-integration
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Use Case: Domain Generation Algorithm Detection
+* Rule Type: ML
+* Rule Type: Machine Learning
+* Tactic: Command and Control
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The rule requires the Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as DNS events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend, Network Packet Capture, or Packetbeat.  
+
+
+*DGA Detection Setup*
+
+The DGA Detection integration consists of an ML-based framework to detect DGA activity in DNS events.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for DGA Detection.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+- DNS events collected by the https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/endpoint[Elastic Defend], https://docs.elastic.co/integrations/network_traffic[Network Packet Capture] integration, or https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/packetbeat/current/packetbeat-overview.html[Packetbeat].
+- To install Elastic Defend, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[documentation].
+- To add the Network Packet Capture integration to an Elastic Agent policy, refer to https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/add-integration-to-policy.html[this] guide.
+- To set up and run Packetbeat, follow https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/packetbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[this] guide.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed to install assets associated with the DGA Detection integration:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Domain Generation Algorithm Detection and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Under Settings, click Install Domain Generation Algorithm Detection assets and follow the prompts to install the assets.
+
+
+*Ingest Pipeline Setup*
+
+Before you can enable this rule, you'll need to enrich DNS events with predictions from the Supervised DGA Detection model. This is done via the ingest pipeline named `<package_version>-ml_dga_ingest_pipeline` installed with the DGA Detection package.
+- If using an Elastic Beat such as Packetbeat, add the DGA ingest pipeline to it by adding a simple configuration https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/current/ingest.html#pipelines-for-beats[setting] to `packetbeat.yml`.
+- If adding the DGA ingest pipeline to an existing pipeline, use a https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/current/pipeline-processor.html[pipeline processor].
+
+
+*Adding Custom Mappings*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Stack Management.
+- Under Data click Index Management and navigate to the Component Templates tab.
+- Templates that can be edited to add custom components will be marked with a @custom suffix. Edit the @custom component template corresponding to the beat/integration you added the DGA ingest pipeline to, by pasting the following JSON blob in the "Load JSON" flyout:
+```
+{
+  "properties": {
+    "ml_is_dga": {
+      "properties": {
+        "malicious_prediction": {
+          "type": "long"
+        },
+        "malicious_probability": {
+          "type": "float"
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}
+```
+
+
+*Anomaly Detection Setup*
+
+Before you can enable this rule, you'll need to enable the corresponding Anomaly Detection job. 
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Analytics, click Machine Learning.
+- Under Anomaly Detection, click Jobs, and then click "Create job". Select the Data View containing your enriched DNS events. For example, this would be `logs-endpoint.events.*` if you used Elastic Defend to collect events, or `logs-network_traffic.*` if you used Network Packet Capture.
+- If the selected Data View contains events that match the query in https://github.com/elastic/integrations/blob/main/packages/dga/kibana/ml_module/dga-ml.json[this] configuration file, you will see a card for DGA under "Use preconfigured jobs".
+- Keep the default settings and click "Create jobs" to start the anomaly detection job and datafeed.
+
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Dynamic Resolution
+** ID: T1568
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-disabling-of-apparmor.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-disabling-of-apparmor.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6d50eb45dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-disabling-of-apparmor.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-disabling-of-apparmor]]
+=== Potential Disabling of AppArmor
+
+This rule monitors for potential attempts to disable AppArmor. AppArmor is a Linux security module that enforces fine-grained access control policies to restrict the actions and resources that specific applications and processes can access. Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
+
+*Version*: 6
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and (
+  (process.name == "systemctl" and process.args == "disable" and process.args == "apparmor") or
+  (process.name == "ln" and process.args : "/etc/apparmor.d/*" and process.args == "/etc/apparmor.d/disable/")
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Impair Defenses
+** ID: T1562
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Disable or Modify Tools
+** ID: T1562.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-disabling-of-selinux.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-disabling-of-selinux.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a4def85251
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-disabling-of-selinux.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-disabling-of-selinux]]
+=== Potential Disabling of SELinux
+
+Identifies potential attempts to disable Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux), which is a Linux kernel security feature to support access control policies. Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
+- Elastic Defend
+- Auditbeat
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Auditbeat Setup*
+
+Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit the activities of users and processes on your systems. For example, you can use Auditbeat to collect and centralize audit events from the Linux Audit Framework. You can also use Auditbeat to detect changes to critical files, like binaries and configuration files, and identify potential security policy violations.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Auditbeat on a Linux System:*
+
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setup-repositories.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-docker.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html[helper guide].
+- For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and process.name == "setenforce" and process.args == "0"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Impair Defenses
+** ID: T1562
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Disable or Modify Tools
+** ID: T1562.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-dll-side-loading-via-microsoft-antimalware-service-executable.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-dll-side-loading-via-microsoft-antimalware-service-executable.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c2984ea283
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-dll-side-loading-via-microsoft-antimalware-service-executable.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-dll-side-loading-via-microsoft-antimalware-service-executable]]
+=== Potential DLL Side-Loading via Microsoft Antimalware Service Executable
+
+Identifies a Windows trusted program that is known to be vulnerable to DLL Search Order Hijacking starting after being renamed or from a non-standard path. This is uncommon behavior and may indicate an attempt to evade defenses via side-loading a malicious DLL within the memory space of one of those processes.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/07/04/independence-day-revil-uses-supply-chain-exploit-to-attack-hundreds-of-businesses/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+* Dennis Perto
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+(
+  (process.pe.original_file_name == "MsMpEng.exe" and not process.name : "MsMpEng.exe") or
+  (process.name : "MsMpEng.exe" and not
+        process.executable : ("?:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\*.exe",
+                              "?:\\Program Files\\Windows Defender\\*.exe",
+                              "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Windows Defender\\*.exe",
+                              "?:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Security Client\\*.exe",
+                              "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft Security Client\\*.exe"))
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Hijack Execution Flow
+** ID: T1574
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: DLL Side-Loading
+** ID: T1574.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-dll-side-loading-via-trusted-microsoft-programs.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-dll-side-loading-via-trusted-microsoft-programs.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1bf1a04c8b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-dll-side-loading-via-trusted-microsoft-programs.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-dll-side-loading-via-trusted-microsoft-programs]]
+=== Potential DLL Side-Loading via Trusted Microsoft Programs
+
+Identifies an instance of a Windows trusted program that is known to be vulnerable to DLL Search Order Hijacking starting after being renamed or from a non-standard path. This is uncommon behavior and may indicate an attempt to evade defenses via side loading a malicious DLL within the memory space of one of those processes.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  process.pe.original_file_name in ("WinWord.exe", "EXPLORER.EXE", "w3wp.exe", "DISM.EXE") and
+  not (process.name : ("winword.exe", "explorer.exe", "w3wp.exe", "Dism.exe") or
+         process.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\explorer.exe",
+                               "?:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office*\\WINWORD.EXE",
+                               "?:\\Program Files?(x86)\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office*\\WINWORD.EXE",
+                               "?:\\Windows\\System32\\Dism.exe",
+                               "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\Dism.exe",
+                               "?:\\Windows\\System32\\inetsrv\\w3wp.exe")
+         )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Masquerading
+** ID: T1036
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Hijack Execution Flow
+** ID: T1574
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: DLL Side-Loading
+** ID: T1574.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-evasion-via-filter-manager.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-evasion-via-filter-manager.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bd81b5637c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-evasion-via-filter-manager.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-evasion-via-filter-manager]]
+=== Potential Evasion via Filter Manager
+
+The Filter Manager Control Program (fltMC.exe) binary may be abused by adversaries to unload a filter driver and evade defenses.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Potential Evasion via Filter Manager*
+
+
+A file system filter driver, or minifilter, is a specialized type of filter driver designed to intercept and modify I/O requests sent to a file system or another filter driver. Minifilters are used by a wide range of security software, including EDR, antivirus, backup agents, encryption products, etc.
+
+Attackers may try to unload minifilters to avoid protections such as malware detection, file system monitoring, and behavior-based detections.
+
+This rule identifies the attempt to unload a minifilter using the `fltmc.exe` command-line utility, a tool used to manage and query the filter drivers loaded on Windows systems.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Examine the command line event to identify the target driver.
+  - Identify the minifilter's role in the environment and if it is security-related. Microsoft provides a https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/ifs/allocated-altitudes[list] of allocated altitudes that may provide more context, such as the manufacturer.
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This mechanism can be used legitimately. Analysts can dismiss the alert if the administrator is aware of the activity and there are justifications for the action.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  process.name : "fltMC.exe" and process.args : "unload" and
+  not
+  (
+    (
+      process.executable : "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\ManageEngine\\UEMS_Agent\\bin\\DCFAService64.exe" and
+      process.args : ("DFMFilter", "DRMFilter")
+    ) or
+    (
+      process.executable : "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\msiexec.exe" and
+      process.args : ("BrFilter_*", "BrCow_*") and
+      user.id : "S-1-5-18"
+    )
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Impair Defenses
+** ID: T1562
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Disable or Modify Tools
+** ID: T1562.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-evasion-via-windows-filtering-platform.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-evasion-via-windows-filtering-platform.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..13c882853b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-evasion-via-windows-filtering-platform.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-evasion-via-windows-filtering-platform]]
+=== Potential Evasion via Windows Filtering Platform
+
+Identifies multiple Windows Filtering Platform block events and where the process name is related to an endpoint security software. Adversaries may add malicious WFP rules to prevent Endpoint security from sending telemetry.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.*
+* logs-system.security-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/dsnezhkov/shutter/tree/main
+* https://github.com/netero1010/EDRSilencer/tree/main
+* https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2023/09/nighthawk-0-2-6-three-wise-monkeys/
+* https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5157
+* https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5152
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 2
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The 'Filtering Platform Connection' logging policy must be configured for (Success, Failure).
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Policies >
+Windows Settings >
+Security Settings >
+Advanced Audit Policies Configuration >
+Audit Policies >
+Object Access >
+Filtering Platform Connection (Success,Failure)
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by winlog.computer_name with maxspan=1m
+ [network where host.os.type == "windows" and 
+  event.action : ("windows-firewall-packet-block", "windows-firewall-packet-drop") and 
+  process.name : (
+        "bdagent.exe", "bdreinit.exe", "pdscan.exe", "pdiface.exe", "BDSubWiz.exe", "ProductAgentService.exe",
+        "ProductAgentUI.exe", "WatchDog.exe", "CarbonBlackClientSetup.exe", "TrGUI.exe", "TracCAPI.exe", "cpmsi_tool.exe",
+        "trac.exe", "vna_install64.exe", "vna_utils.exe", "TracSrvWrapper.exe", "vsmon.exe", "p95tray.exe",
+        "CybereasonRansomFreeServiceHost.exe", "CrAmTray.exe", "minionhost.exe", "CybereasonSensor.exe", "CylanceUI.exe",
+        "CylanceProtectSetup.exe", "cylancesvc.exe", "cyupdate.exe", "elastic-agent.exe", "elastic-endpoint.exe",
+        "egui.exe", "minodlogin.exe", "emu-rep.exe", "emu_install.exe", "emu-cci.exe", "emu-gui.exe", "emu-uninstall.exe",
+        "ndep.exe", "spike.exe", "ecls.exe", "ecmd.exe", "ecomserver.exe", "eeclnt.exe", "eh64.exe", "EHttpSrv.exe",
+        "xagt.exe", "collectoragent.exe", "FSAEConfig.exe", "uninstalldcagent.exe", "rmon.exe", "fccomint.exe",
+        "fclanguageselector.exe", "fortifw.exe", "fcreg.exe", "fortitray.exe", "fcappdb.exe", "fcwizard.exe", "submitv.exe",
+        "av_task.exe", "fortiwf.exe", "fortiwadbd.exe", "fcauth.exe", "fcdblog.exe", "fcmgr.exe", "fortiwad.exe",
+        "fortiproxy.exe", "fortiscand.exe", "fortivpnst.exe", "ipsec.exe", "fcwscd7.exe", "fcasc.exe", "fchelper.exe",
+        "forticlient.exe","fcwsc.exe", "FortiClient.exe", "fmon.exe", "FSSOMA.exe", "FCVbltScan.exe", "FortiESNAC.exe",
+        "EPCUserAvatar.exe", "FortiAvatar.exe", "FortiClient_Diagnostic_Tool.exe", "FortiSSLVPNdaemon.exe", "avp.exe",
+        "FCConfig.exe", "avpsus.exe", "klnagent.exe", "klnsacwsrv.exe", "kl_platf.exe", "stpass.exe", "klnagwds.exe",
+        "mbae.exe", "mbae64.exe", "mbae-svc.exe", "mbae-uninstaller.exe", "mbaeLoader32.exe", "mbaeloader64.exe",
+        "mbam-dor.exe", "mbamgui.exe", "mbamservice.exe", "mbamtrayctrl.exe", "mbampt.exe", "mbamscheduler.exe",
+        "Coreinst.exe", "mbae-setup.exe", "mcupdate.exe", "ProtectedModuleHost.exe", "ESConfigTool.exe", "FWInstCheck.exe",
+        "FwWindowsFirewallHandler.exe", "mfeesp.exe", "mfefw.exe", "mfeProvisionModeUtility.exe", "mfetp.exe", "avpui.exe", 
+        "WscAVExe.exe", "mcshield.exe", "McChHost.exe", "mfewc.exe", "mfewch.exe", "mfewcui.exe", "fwinfo.exe",
+        "mfecanary.exe", "mfefire.exe", "mfehidin.exe", "mfemms.exe", "mfevtps.exe", "mmsinfo.exe", "vtpinfo.exe",
+        "MarSetup.exe", "mctray.exe", "masvc.exe", "macmnsvc.exe", "McAPExe.exe", "McPvTray.exe", "mcods.exe",
+        "mcuicnt.exe", "mcuihost.exe", "xtray.exe", "McpService.exe", "epefprtrainer.exe", "mfeffcoreservice.exe",
+        "MfeEpeSvc.exe", "qualysagent.exe", "QualysProxy.exe", "QualysAgentUI.exe", "SVRTgui.exe", "SVRTcli.exe",
+        "SVRTcli.exe", "SVRTgui.exe", "SCTCleanupService.exe", "SVRTservice.exe", "native.exe", "SCTBootTasks.exe",
+        "ALMon.exe", "SAA.exe", "SUMService.exe", "ssp.exe", "SCFService.exe", "SCFManager.exe", "spa.exe", "cabarc.exe",
+        "sargui.exe", "sntpservice.exe", "McsClient.exe", "McsAgent.exe", "McsHeartbeat.exe", "SAVAdminService.exe",
+        "sav32cli.exe", "ForceUpdateAlongSideSGN.exe", "SAVCleanupService.exe", "SavMain.exe", "SavProgress.exe", 
+        "SavProxy.exe", "SavService.exe", "swc_service.exe", "swi_di.exe", "swi_service.exe", "swi_filter.exe",
+        "ALUpdate.exe", "SophosUpdate.exe", "ALsvc.exe", "SophosAlert.exe", "osCheck.exe", "N360Downloader.exe",
+        "InstWrap.exe", "symbos.exe", "nss.exe", "symcorpui.exe", "isPwdSvc.exe", "ccsvchst.exe", "ntrmv.exe",
+        "pccntmon.exe", "AosUImanager.exe", "NTRTScan.exe", "TMAS_OL.exe", "TMAS_OLImp.exe", "TMAS_OLSentry.exe",
+        "ufnavi.exe", "Clnrbin.exe", "vizorhtmldialog.exe", "pwmConsole.exe", "PwmSvc.exe", "coreServiceShell.exe",
+        "ds_agent.exe", "SfCtlCom.exe", "MBAMHelper.exe", "cb.exe", "smc.exe", "tda.exe", "xagtnotif.exe", "ekrn.exe",
+        "dsa.exe", "Notifier.exe", "rphcp.exe", "lc_sensor.exe", "CSFalconService.exe", "CSFalconController.exe",
+        "SenseSampleUploader.exe", "windefend.exe", "MSASCui.exe", "MSASCuiL.exe", "msmpeng.exe", "msmpsvc.exe",
+        "MsSense.exe", "esensor.exe", "sentinelone.exe", "tmccsf.exe", "csfalconcontainer.exe", "sensecncproxy.exe",
+        "splunk.exe", "sysmon.exe", "sysmon64.exe", "taniumclient.exe"
+    )] with runs=5
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Impair Defenses
+** ID: T1562
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Disable or Modify System Firewall
+** ID: T1562.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-external-linux-ssh-brute-force-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-external-linux-ssh-brute-force-detected.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..582e683631
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-external-linux-ssh-brute-force-detected.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-external-linux-ssh-brute-force-detected]]
+=== Potential External Linux SSH Brute Force Detected
+
+Identifies multiple external consecutive login failures targeting a user account from the same source address within a short time interval. Adversaries will often brute force login attempts across multiple users with a common or known password, in an attempt to gain access to these accounts.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-system.auth-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 5
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+
+*Version*: 6
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Potential External Linux SSH Brute Force Detected*
+
+
+The rule identifies consecutive SSH login failures targeting a user account from the same source IP address to the same target host indicating brute force login attempts.
+
+This rule will generate a lot of noise for systems with a front-facing SSH service, as adversaries scan the internet for remotely accessible SSH services and try to brute force them to gain unauthorized access. 
+
+In case this rule generates too much noise and external brute forcing is of not much interest, consider turning this rule off and enabling "Potential Internal Linux SSH Brute Force Detected" to detect internal brute force attempts.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the login failure user name(s).
+- Investigate the source IP address of the failed ssh login attempt(s).
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Identify the source and the target computer and their roles in the IT environment.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Authentication misconfiguration or obsolete credentials.
+- Service account password expired.
+- Infrastructure or availability issue.
+
+
+*Related Rules*
+
+
+- Potential Internal Linux SSH Brute Force Detected - 1c27fa22-7727-4dd3-81c0-de6da5555feb
+- Potential SSH Password Guessing - 8cb84371-d053-4f4f-bce0-c74990e28f28
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Filebeat.
+
+
+*Filebeat Setup*
+
+Filebeat is a lightweight shipper for forwarding and centralizing log data. Installed as an agent on your servers, Filebeat monitors the log files or locations that you specify, collects log events, and forwards them either to Elasticsearch or Logstash for indexing.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Filebeat on a Linux System:*
+
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/setup-repositories.html[helper guide].
+- To run Filebeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/running-on-docker.html[helper guide].
+- To run Filebeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html[helper guide].
+- For quick start information for Filebeat refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/8.11/filebeat-installation-configuration.html[helper guide].
+- For complete “Setup and Run Filebeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Rule Specific Setup Note*
+
+- This rule requires the “Filebeat System Module” to be enabled.
+- The system module collects and parses logs created by the system logging service of common Unix/Linux based distributions.
+- To run the system module of Filebeat on Linux follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-system.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id, source.ip, user.name with maxspan=15s
+  [ authentication where host.os.type == "linux" and 
+   event.action in ("ssh_login", "user_login") and event.outcome == "failure" and
+   not cidrmatch(source.ip, "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.0.0.0/24",
+       "192.0.0.0/29", "192.0.0.8/32", "192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.0.10/32", "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32",
+       "192.0.2.0/24", "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4",
+       "100.64.0.0/10", "192.175.48.0/24","198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "240.0.0.0/4", 
+       "::1", "FE80::/10", "FF00::/8") ] with runs = 10
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Brute Force
+** ID: T1110
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Password Guessing
+** ID: T1110.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Password Spraying
+** ID: T1110.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-hidden-local-user-account-creation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-hidden-local-user-account-creation.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..da5db41471
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-hidden-local-user-account-creation.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-hidden-local-user-account-creation]]
+=== Potential Hidden Local User Account Creation
+
+Identifies attempts to create a local account that will be hidden from the macOS logon window. This may indicate an attempt to evade user attention while maintaining persistence using a separate local account.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT203998
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:macos and event.type:(start or process_started) and
+ process.name:dscl and process.args:(IsHidden and create and (true or 1 or yes))
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Valid Accounts
+** ID: T1078
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Local Accounts
+** ID: T1078.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-hidden-process-via-mount-hidepid.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-hidden-process-via-mount-hidepid.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5afd8e527a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-hidden-process-via-mount-hidepid.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-hidden-process-via-mount-hidepid]]
+=== Potential Hidden Process via Mount Hidepid
+
+Identifies the execution of mount process with hidepid parameter, which can make processes invisible to other users from the system. Adversaries using Linux kernel version 3.2+ (or RHEL/CentOS v6.5+ above) can hide the process from other users. When hidepid=2 option is executed to mount the /proc filesystem, only the root user can see all processes and the logged-in user can only see their own process. This provides a defense evasion mechanism for the adversaries to hide their process executions from all other commands such as ps, top, pgrep and more. With the Linux kernel hardening hidepid option all the user has to do is remount the /proc filesystem with the option, which can now be monitored and detected.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/linux-hide-processes-from-other-users/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
+
+*Version*: 8
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and process.name == "mount" and process.args == "/proc" and process.args == "-o" and
+process.args : "*hidepid=2*"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Hide Artifacts
+** ID: T1564
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-internal-linux-ssh-brute-force-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-internal-linux-ssh-brute-force-detected.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d8a30f3e91
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-internal-linux-ssh-brute-force-detected.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-internal-linux-ssh-brute-force-detected]]
+=== Potential Internal Linux SSH Brute Force Detected
+
+Identifies multiple internal consecutive login failures targeting a user account from the same source address within a short time interval. Adversaries will often brute force login attempts across multiple users with a common or known password, in an attempt to gain access to these accounts.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-system.auth-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 5
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+
+*Version*: 10
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Potential Internal Linux SSH Brute Force Detected*
+
+
+The rule identifies consecutive internal SSH login failures targeting a user account from the same source IP address to the same target host indicating brute force login attempts.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the login failure user name(s).
+- Investigate the source IP address of the failed ssh login attempt(s).
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Identify the source and the target computer and their roles in the IT environment.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Authentication misconfiguration or obsolete credentials.
+- Service account password expired.
+- Infrastructure or availability issue.
+
+
+*Related Rules*
+
+
+- Potential External Linux SSH Brute Force Detected - fa210b61-b627-4e5e-86f4-17e8270656ab
+- Potential SSH Password Guessing - 8cb84371-d053-4f4f-bce0-c74990e28f28
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Filebeat.
+
+
+*Filebeat Setup*
+
+Filebeat is a lightweight shipper for forwarding and centralizing log data. Installed as an agent on your servers, Filebeat monitors the log files or locations that you specify, collects log events, and forwards them either to Elasticsearch or Logstash for indexing.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Filebeat on a Linux System:*
+
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/setup-repositories.html[helper guide].
+- To run Filebeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/running-on-docker.html[helper guide].
+- To run Filebeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html[helper guide].
+- For quick start information for Filebeat refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/8.11/filebeat-installation-configuration.html[helper guide].
+- For complete “Setup and Run Filebeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Rule Specific Setup Note*
+
+- This rule requires the “Filebeat System Module” to be enabled.
+- The system module collects and parses logs created by the system logging service of common Unix/Linux based distributions.
+- To run the system module of Filebeat on Linux follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-system.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id, source.ip, user.name with maxspan=15s
+  [ authentication where host.os.type == "linux" and 
+   event.action in ("ssh_login", "user_login") and event.outcome == "failure" and
+   cidrmatch(source.ip, "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.0.0.0/24",
+       "192.0.0.0/29", "192.0.0.8/32", "192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.0.10/32", "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32",
+       "192.0.2.0/24", "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4",
+       "100.64.0.0/10", "192.175.48.0/24","198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "240.0.0.0/4", 
+       "::1", "FE80::/10", "FF00::/8") ] with runs = 10
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Brute Force
+** ID: T1110
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Password Guessing
+** ID: T1110.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Password Spraying
+** ID: T1110.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-invoke-mimikatz-powershell-script.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-invoke-mimikatz-powershell-script.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..06deb59dae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-invoke-mimikatz-powershell-script.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-invoke-mimikatz-powershell-script]]
+=== Potential Invoke-Mimikatz PowerShell Script
+
+Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords, along with many other features that make it useful for testing the security of networks. This rule detects Invoke-Mimikatz PowerShell script and alike.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002/
+* https://raw.githubusercontent.com/EmpireProject/Empire/master/data/module_source/credentials/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/detect-credential-access
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: PowerShell Logs
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Mimikatz PowerShell Activity*
+
+
+https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz[Mimikatz] is an open-source tool used to collect, decrypt, and/or use cached credentials. This tool is commonly abused by adversaries during the post-compromise stage where adversaries have gained an initial foothold on an endpoint and are looking to elevate privileges and seek out additional authentication objects such as tokens/hashes/credentials that can then be used to move laterally and pivot across a network.
+
+This rule looks for PowerShell scripts that load mimikatz in memory, like Invoke-Mimikataz, which are used to dump credentials from the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). Any activity triggered from this rule should be treated with high priority as it typically represents an active adversary.
+
+More information about Mimikatz components and how to detect/prevent them can be found on https://adsecurity.org/?page_id=1821[ADSecurity].
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Examine the script content that triggered the detection; look for suspicious DLL imports, collection or exfiltration capabilities, suspicious functions, encoded or compressed data, and other potentially malicious characteristics.
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Examine file or network events from the involved PowerShell process for suspicious behavior.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+  - Invoke-Mimitakz and alike scripts heavily use other capabilities covered by other detections described in the "Related Rules" section.
+- Evaluate whether the user needs to use PowerShell to complete tasks.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host.
+  - Examine network and security events in the environment to identify potential lateral movement using compromised credentials.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- PowerShell PSReflect Script - 56f2e9b5-4803-4e44-a0a4-a52dc79d57fe
+- Suspicious .NET Reflection via PowerShell - e26f042e-c590-4e82-8e05-41e81bd822ad
+- PowerShell Suspicious Payload Encoded and Compressed - 81fe9dc6-a2d7-4192-a2d8-eed98afc766a
+- Potential Process Injection via PowerShell - 2e29e96a-b67c-455a-afe4-de6183431d0d
+- Mimikatz Memssp Log File Detected - ebb200e8-adf0-43f8-a0bb-4ee5b5d852c6
+- Modification of WDigest Security Provider - d703a5af-d5b0-43bd-8ddb-7a5d500b7da5
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Restrict PowerShell usage outside of IT and engineering business units using GPOs, AppLocker, Intune, or similar software.
+- Validate that cleartext passwords are disabled in memory for use with `WDigest`.
+- Look into preventing access to `LSASS` using capabilities such as LSA protection or antivirus/EDR tools that provide this capability.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be configured (Enable).
+
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Administrative Templates >
+Windows PowerShell >
+Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging (Enable)
+```
+
+Steps to implement the logging policy via registry:
+
+```
+reg add "hklm\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging" /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 1
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:windows and
+powershell.file.script_block_text:(
+  (DumpCreds and
+  DumpCerts) or
+  "sekurlsa::logonpasswords" or
+  ("crypto::certificates" and
+  "CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_LOCAL_MACHINE")
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: LSASS Memory
+** ID: T1003.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-kerberos-attack-via-bifrost.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-kerberos-attack-via-bifrost.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f5123e98d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-kerberos-attack-via-bifrost.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-kerberos-attack-via-bifrost]]
+=== Potential Kerberos Attack via Bifrost
+
+Identifies use of Bifrost, a known macOS Kerberos pentesting tool, which can be used to dump cached Kerberos tickets or attempt unauthorized authentication techniques such as pass-the-ticket/hash and kerberoasting.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/its-a-feature/bifrost
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:macos and event.type:start and
+ process.args:("-action" and ("-kerberoast" or askhash or asktgs or asktgt or s4u or ("-ticket" and ptt) or (dump and (tickets or keytab))))
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Use Alternate Authentication Material
+** ID: T1550
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Pass the Ticket
+** ID: T1550.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
+** ID: T1558
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Kerberoasting
+** ID: T1558.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-backdoor-user-account-creation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-backdoor-user-account-creation.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e4e14b6eae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-backdoor-user-account-creation.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-backdoor-user-account-creation]]
+=== Potential Linux Backdoor User Account Creation
+
+Identifies the attempt to create a new backdoor user by setting the user's UID to 0. Attackers may alter a user's UID to 0 to establish persistence on a system.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
+
+*Version*: 6
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Potential Linux Backdoor User Account Creation*
+
+
+The `usermod` command is used to modify user account attributes and settings in Linux-based operating systems.
+
+Attackers may create new accounts with a UID of 0 to maintain root access to target systems without leveraging the root user account.
+
+This rule identifies the usage of the `usermod` command to set a user's UID to 0, indicating that the user becomes a root account. 
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html[placeholder fields] to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+- Investigate the user account that got assigned a uid of 0, and analyze its corresponding attributes.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve User Accounts with a UID of 0","query":"SELECT description, gid, gid_signed, shell, uid, uid_signed, username FROM users WHERE username != 'root' AND uid LIKE '0'"}}
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User","query":"SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"}}
+- Identify the user account that performed the action, analyze it, and check whether it should perform this kind of action.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific User","query":"SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = {{user.name}}"}}
+- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Investigate the Account Authentication Status","query":"SELECT * FROM logged_in_users WHERE user = {{user.name}}"}}
+- Identify if the account was added to privileged groups or assigned special privileges after creation.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific Group","query":"SELECT * FROM groups WHERE groupname = {{group.name}}"}}
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Any activity that triggered the alert and is not inherently malicious must be monitored by the security team.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Review the privileges assigned to the involved users to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
+- Delete the created account.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and process.name == "usermod" and process.args : "-u" and process.args : "0" and process.args : "-o"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Create Account
+** ID: T1136
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Local Account
+** ID: T1136.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-credential-dumping-via-proc-filesystem.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-credential-dumping-via-proc-filesystem.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d38bf7c057
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-credential-dumping-via-proc-filesystem.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-credential-dumping-via-proc-filesystem]]
+=== Potential Linux Credential Dumping via Proc Filesystem
+
+Identifies the execution of the mimipenguin exploit script which is linux adaptation of Windows tool mimikatz. Mimipenguin exploit script is used to dump clear text passwords from a currently logged-in user. The tool exploits a known vulnerability CVE-2018-20781. Malicious actors can exploit the cleartext credentials in memory by dumping the process and extracting lines that have a high probability of containing cleartext passwords.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/huntergregal/mimipenguin
+* https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-20781
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Use Case: Vulnerability
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 7
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id, process.parent.name with maxspan=1m
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and process.name == "ps" and event.action == "exec"
+   and process.args in ("-eo", "pid", "command")]
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and process.name == "strings" and event.action == "exec"
+   and process.args : "/tmp/*"]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Proc Filesystem
+** ID: T1003.007
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/007/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation for Credential Access
+** ID: T1212
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-credential-dumping-via-unshadow.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-credential-dumping-via-unshadow.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e5195a6215
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-credential-dumping-via-unshadow.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-credential-dumping-via-unshadow]]
+=== Potential Linux Credential Dumping via Unshadow
+
+Identifies the execution of the unshadow utility which is part of John the Ripper, a password-cracking tool on the host machine. Malicious actors can use the utility to retrieve the combined contents of the '/etc/shadow' and '/etc/password' files. Using the combined file generated from the utility, the malicious threat actors can use them as input for password-cracking utilities or prepare themselves for future operations by gathering credential information of the victim.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/unix-linux-password-cracking-john-the-ripper/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+
+*Version*: 8
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and
+process.name == "unshadow" and process.args_count >= 3
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow
+** ID: T1003.008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/008/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-hack-tool-launched.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-hack-tool-launched.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3b51762efc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-hack-tool-launched.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-hack-tool-launched]]
+=== Potential Linux Hack Tool Launched
+
+Monitors for the execution of different processes that might be used by attackers for malicious intent. An alert from this rule should be investigated further, as hack tools are commonly used by blue teamers and system administrators as well.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows
+the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest to select "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and process.name in (
+  // exploitation frameworks
+  "crackmapexec", "msfconsole", "msfvenom", "sliver-client", "sliver-server", "havoc",
+  // network scanners (nmap left out to reduce noise)
+  "zenmap", "nuclei", "netdiscover", "legion",
+  // web enumeration
+  "gobuster", "dirbuster", "dirb", "wfuzz", "ffuf", "whatweb", "eyewitness",
+  // web vulnerability scanning
+  "wpscan", "joomscan", "droopescan", "nikto", 
+  // exploitation tools
+  "sqlmap", "commix", "yersinia",
+  // cracking and brute forcing
+  "john", "hashcat", "hydra", "ncrack", "cewl", "fcrackzip", "rainbowcrack",
+  // host and network
+  "linenum.sh", "linpeas.sh", "pspy32", "pspy32s", "pspy64", "pspy64s", "binwalk", "evil-winrm"
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-local-account-brute-force-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-local-account-brute-force-detected.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dc8a480505
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-local-account-brute-force-detected.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-local-account-brute-force-detected]]
+=== Potential Linux Local Account Brute Force Detected
+
+Identifies multiple consecutive login attempts executed by one process targeting a local linux user account within a short time interval. Adversaries might brute force login attempts across different users with a default wordlist or a set of customly crafted passwords in an attempt to gain access to these accounts.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 6
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id, process.parent.executable, user.id with maxspan=1s
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and process.name == "su" and 
+   not process.parent.name in (
+     "bash", "dash", "ash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish", "clickhouse-server", "ma", "gitlab-runner",
+     "updatedb.findutils", "cron"
+   )
+  ] with runs=10
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Brute Force
+** ID: T1110
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Password Guessing
+** ID: T1110.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-ransomware-note-creation-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-ransomware-note-creation-detected.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..808510c2e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-ransomware-note-creation-detected.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-ransomware-note-creation-detected]]
+=== Potential Linux Ransomware Note Creation Detected
+
+This rule identifies a sequence of a mass file encryption event in conjunction with the creation of a .txt file with a file name containing ransomware keywords executed by the same process in a 1 second timespan. Ransomware is a type of malware that encrypts a victim's files or systems and demands payment (usually in cryptocurrency) in exchange for the decryption key. One important indicator of a ransomware attack is the mass encryption of the file system, after which a new file extension is added to the file.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Impact
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 8
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by process.entity_id, host.id with maxspan=1s 
+  [file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "change" and event.action == "rename" and file.extension : "?*" 
+   and process.executable : ("./*", "/tmp/*", "/var/tmp/*", "/dev/shm/*", "/var/run/*", "/boot/*", "/srv/*", "/run/*") and
+   file.path : (
+     "/home/*/Downloads/*", "/home/*/Documents/*", "/root/*", "/bin/*", "/usr/bin/*", "/var/log/*", "/var/lib/log/*",
+     "/var/backup/*", "/var/www/*") and
+   not process.name : (
+     "dpkg", "yum", "dnf", "rpm", "dockerd", "go", "java", "pip*", "python*", "node", "containerd", "php", "p4d",
+     "conda", "chrome", "imap", "cmake", "firefox", "semanage", "semodule", "ansible-galaxy", "fc-cache", "jammy", "git",
+     "systemsettings", "vmis-launcher", "bundle", "kudu-tserver", "suldownloader"
+    )
+  ] with runs=25
+  [file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "creation" and file.name : (
+     "*crypt*", "*restore*", "*lock*", "*recovery*", "*data*", "*read*", "*instruction*", "*how_to*", "*ransom*"
+    )
+  ]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Impact
+** ID: TA0040
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Data Encrypted for Impact
+** ID: T1486
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-tunneling-and-or-port-forwarding.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-tunneling-and-or-port-forwarding.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1537b6b527
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-tunneling-and-or-port-forwarding.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-tunneling-and-or-port-forwarding]]
+=== Potential Linux Tunneling and/or Port Forwarding
+
+This rule monitors for a set of Linux utilities that can be used for tunneling and port forwarding. Attackers can leverage tunneling and port forwarding techniques to bypass network defenses, establish hidden communication channels, and gain unauthorized access to internal resources, facilitating data exfiltration, lateral movement, and remote control.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://blog.bitsadmin.com/living-off-the-foreign-land-windows-as-offensive-platform
+* https://book.hacktricks.xyz/generic-methodologies-and-resources/tunneling-and-port-forwarding
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Command and Control
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+
+*Version*: 6
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Potential Linux Tunneling and/or Port Forwarding*
+
+
+Attackers can leverage many utilities to clandestinely tunnel network communications and evade security measures, potentially gaining unauthorized access to sensitive systems.
+
+This rule looks for several utilities that are capable of setting up tunnel network communications by analyzing process names or command line arguments. 
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html[placeholder fields] to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Identify any signs of suspicious network activity or anomalies that may indicate protocol tunneling. This could include unexpected traffic patterns or unusual network behavior.
+  - Investigate listening ports and open sockets to look for potential protocol tunneling, reverse shells, or data exfiltration.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Listening Ports","query":"SELECT pid, address, port, socket, protocol, path FROM listening_ports"}}
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Open Sockets","query":"SELECT pid, family, remote_address, remote_port, socket, state FROM process_open_sockets"}}
+- Identify the user account that performed the action, analyze it, and check whether it should perform this kind of action.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific User","query":"SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = {{user.name}}"}}
+- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Investigate the Account Authentication Status","query":"SELECT * FROM logged_in_users WHERE user = {{user.name}}"}}
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User","query":"SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"}}
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Process Info","query":"SELECT name, cmdline, parent, path, uid FROM processes"}}
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- Potential Protocol Tunneling via Chisel Client - 3f12325a-4cc6-410b-8d4c-9fbbeb744cfd
+- Potential Protocol Tunneling via Chisel Server - ac8805f6-1e08-406c-962e-3937057fa86f
+- Potential Protocol Tunneling via EarthWorm - 9f1c4ca3-44b5-481d-ba42-32dc215a2769
+- Suspicious Utility Launched via ProxyChains - 6ace94ba-f02c-4d55-9f53-87d99b6f9af4
+- ProxyChains Activity - 4b868f1f-15ff-4ba3-8c11-d5a7a6356d37
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+- If this activity is related to a system administrator or developer who uses port tunneling/forwarding for benign purposes, consider adding exceptions for specific user accounts or hosts. 
+- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors, such as reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers, that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and (
+  (
+    // gost & pivotnacci - spawned without process.parent.name
+    (process.name == "gost" and process.args : ("-L*", "-C*", "-R*")) or (process.name == "pivotnacci")) or (
+    // ssh
+    (process.name in ("ssh", "sshd") and (process.args in ("-R", "-L", "D", "-w") and process.args_count >= 4 and 
+     not process.args : "chmod")) or
+    // sshuttle
+    (process.name == "sshuttle" and process.args in ("-r", "--remote", "-l", "--listen") and process.args_count >= 4) or
+    // socat
+    (process.name == "socat" and process.args : ("TCP4-LISTEN:*", "SOCKS*") and process.args_count >= 3) or
+    // chisel
+    (process.name : "chisel*" and process.args in ("client", "server")) or
+    // iodine(d), dnscat, hans, ptunnel-ng, ssf, 3proxy & ngrok 
+    (process.name in ("iodine", "iodined", "dnscat", "hans", "hans-ubuntu", "ptunnel-ng", "ssf", "3proxy", "ngrok"))
+  ) and process.parent.name in ("bash", "dash", "ash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish")
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Protocol Tunneling
+** ID: T1572
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-local-ntlm-relay-via-http.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-local-ntlm-relay-via-http.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..944a187b92
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-local-ntlm-relay-via-http.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-local-ntlm-relay-via-http]]
+=== Potential Local NTLM Relay via HTTP
+
+Identifies attempt to coerce a local NTLM authentication via HTTP using the Windows Printer Spooler service as a target. An adversary may use this primitive in combination with other techniques to elevate privileges on a compromised system.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/med0x2e/NTLMRelay2Self
+* https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam
+* https://github.com/dirkjanm/krbrelayx/blob/master/printerbug.py
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  process.name : "rundll32.exe" and
+
+  /* Rundll32 WbeDav Client  */
+  process.args : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie", "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie") and
+
+  /* Access to named pipe via http */
+  process.args : ("http*/print/pipe/*", "http*/pipe/spoolss", "http*/pipe/srvsvc")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation for Credential Access
+** ID: T1212
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: System Binary Proxy Execution
+** ID: T1218
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Rundll32
+** ID: T1218.011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-lsass-clone-creation-via-psscapturesnapshot.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-lsass-clone-creation-via-psscapturesnapshot.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..74965095bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-lsass-clone-creation-via-psscapturesnapshot.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-lsass-clone-creation-via-psscapturesnapshot]]
+=== Potential LSASS Clone Creation via PssCaptureSnapShot
+
+Identifies the creation of an LSASS process clone via PssCaptureSnapShot where the parent process is the initial LSASS process instance. This may indicate an attempt to evade detection and dump LSASS memory for credential access.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-system.*
+* logs-windows.*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.matteomalvica.com/blog/2019/12/02/win-defender-atp-cred-bypass/
+* https://medium.com/@Achilles8284/the-birth-of-a-process-part-2-97c6fb9c42a2
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This is meant to run only on datasources using Windows security event 4688 that captures the process clone creation.
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.code:"4688" and
+  process.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe" and
+  process.parent.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: LSASS Memory
+** ID: T1003.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-lsass-memory-dump-via-psscapturesnapshot.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-lsass-memory-dump-via-psscapturesnapshot.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..303c563658
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-lsass-memory-dump-via-psscapturesnapshot.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-lsass-memory-dump-via-psscapturesnapshot]]
+=== Potential LSASS Memory Dump via PssCaptureSnapShot
+
+Identifies suspicious access to an LSASS handle via PssCaptureSnapShot where two successive process accesses are performed by the same process and target two different instances of LSASS. This may indicate an attempt to evade detection and dump LSASS memory for credential access.
+
+*Rule type*: threshold
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.matteomalvica.com/blog/2019/12/02/win-defender-atp-cred-bypass/
+* https://twitter.com/sbousseaden/status/1280619931516747777?lang=en
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 208
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This is meant to run only on datasources using Elastic Agent 7.14+ since versions prior to that will be missing the threshold
+rule cardinality feature.
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:windows and event.code:10 and
+ winlog.event_data.TargetImage:("C:\\Windows\\system32\\lsass.exe" or
+                                 "c:\\Windows\\system32\\lsass.exe" or
+                                 "c:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: LSASS Memory
+** ID: T1003.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-macos-ssh-brute-force-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-macos-ssh-brute-force-detected.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..416a136a97
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-macos-ssh-brute-force-detected.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-macos-ssh-brute-force-detected]]
+=== Potential macOS SSH Brute Force Detected
+
+Identifies a high number (20) of macOS SSH KeyGen process executions from the same host. An adversary may attempt a brute force attack to obtain unauthorized access to user accounts.
+
+*Rule type*: threshold
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://themittenmac.com/detecting-ssh-activity-via-process-monitoring/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:macos and event.type:start and process.name:"sshd-keygen-wrapper" and process.parent.name:launchd
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Brute Force
+** ID: T1110
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-meterpreter-reverse-shell.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-meterpreter-reverse-shell.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8524e2d5de
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-meterpreter-reverse-shell.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-meterpreter-reverse-shell]]
+=== Potential Meterpreter Reverse Shell
+
+This detection rule identifies a sample of suspicious Linux system file reads used for system fingerprinting, leveraged by the Metasploit Meterpreter shell to gather information about the target that it is executing its shell on. Detecting this pattern is indicative of a successful meterpreter shell connection.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+
+*Version*: 6
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
+- Auditbeat
+- Auditd Manager
+
+
+*Auditbeat Setup*
+
+Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit the activities of users and processes on your systems. For example, you can use Auditbeat to collect and centralize audit events from the Linux Audit Framework. You can also use Auditbeat to detect changes to critical files, like binaries and configuration files, and identify potential security policy violations.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Auditbeat on a Linux System:*
+
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setup-repositories.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-docker.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html[helper guide].
+- For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Auditd Manager Integration Setup*
+
+The Auditd Manager Integration receives audit events from the Linux Audit Framework which is a part of the Linux kernel.
+Auditd Manager provides a user-friendly interface and automation capabilities for configuring and monitoring system auditing through the auditd daemon. With `auditd_manager`, administrators can easily define audit rules, track system events, and generate comprehensive audit reports, improving overall security and compliance in the system.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Agent System integration "auditd_manager" on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click “Add integrations”.
+- In the query bar, search for “Auditd Manager” and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click “Add Auditd Manager”.
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Review optional and advanced settings accordingly.
+- Add the newly installed “auditd manager” to an existing or a new agent policy, and deploy the agent on a Linux system from which auditd log files are desirable.
+- Click “Save and Continue”.
+- For more details on the integration refer to the https://docs.elastic.co/integrations/auditd_manager[helper guide].
+
+
+*Rule Specific Setup Note*
+
+Auditd Manager subscribes to the kernel and receives events as they occur without any additional configuration.
+However, if more advanced configuration is required to detect specific behavior, audit rules can be added to the integration in either the "audit rules" configuration box or the "auditd rule files" box by specifying a file to read the audit rules from.
+- For this detection rule the following additional audit rules are required to be added to the integration:
+  -w /proc/net/ -p r -k audit_proc
+  -w /etc/machine-id -p wa -k machineid
+  -w /etc/passwd -p wa -k passwd
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sample by host.id, process.pid, user.id
+  [file where host.os.type == "linux" and auditd.data.syscall == "open" and auditd.data.a2 == "1b6" and file.path == "/etc/machine-id"]
+  [file where host.os.type == "linux" and auditd.data.syscall == "open" and auditd.data.a2 == "1b6" and file.path == "/etc/passwd"]
+  [file where host.os.type == "linux" and auditd.data.syscall == "open" and auditd.data.a2 == "1b6" and file.path == "/proc/net/route"]
+  [file where host.os.type == "linux" and auditd.data.syscall == "open" and auditd.data.a2 == "1b6" and file.path == "/proc/net/ipv6_route"]
+  [file where host.os.type == "linux" and auditd.data.syscall == "open" and auditd.data.a2 == "1b6" and file.path == "/proc/net/if_inet6"]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Unix Shell
+** ID: T1059.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Application Layer Protocol
+** ID: T1071
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-microsoft-office-sandbox-evasion.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-microsoft-office-sandbox-evasion.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bf8a188c3a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-microsoft-office-sandbox-evasion.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-microsoft-office-sandbox-evasion]]
+=== Potential Microsoft Office Sandbox Evasion
+
+Identifies the creation of a suspicious zip file prepended with special characters. Sandboxed Microsoft Office applications on macOS are allowed to write files that start with special characters, which can be combined with an AutoStart location to achieve sandbox evasion.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Wednesday/us-20-Wardle-Office-Drama-On-macOS.pdf
+* https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2018/08/escaping-the-sandbox-microsoft-office-on-macos/
+* https://desi-jarvis.medium.com/office365-macos-sandbox-escape-fcce4fa4123c
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:file and host.os.type:(macos and macos) and not event.type:deletion and file.name:~$*.zip
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
+** ID: T1497
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-modification-of-accessibility-binaries.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-modification-of-accessibility-binaries.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7a21dd9462
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-modification-of-accessibility-binaries.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-modification-of-accessibility-binaries]]
+=== Potential Modification of Accessibility Binaries
+
+Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in. An adversary can modify the way these programs are launched to get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/blog/practical-security-engineering-stateful-detection
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Potential Modification of Accessibility Binaries*
+
+
+Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by accessibility features. Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in (ex: when the user is on the Windows logon screen). An adversary can modify the way these programs are launched to get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system.
+
+More details can be found https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008/[here].
+
+This rule looks for the execution of supposed accessibility binaries that don't match any of the accessibility features binaries' original file names, which is likely a custom binary deployed by the attacker.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Contact the account and system owners and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the file using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity should not happen legitimately. The security team should address any potential benign true positive (B-TP), as this configuration can put the user and the domain at risk.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+ process.parent.name : ("Utilman.exe", "winlogon.exe") and user.name == "SYSTEM" and
+ process.pe.original_file_name : "?*" and
+ process.args :
+    (
+    "C:\\Windows\\System32\\osk.exe",
+    "C:\\Windows\\System32\\Magnify.exe",
+    "C:\\Windows\\System32\\Narrator.exe",
+    "C:\\Windows\\System32\\Sethc.exe",
+    "utilman.exe",
+    "ATBroker.exe",
+    "DisplaySwitch.exe",
+    "sethc.exe"
+    )
+ and not process.pe.original_file_name in
+    (
+    "osk.exe",
+    "sethc.exe",
+    "utilman2.exe",
+    "DisplaySwitch.exe",
+    "ATBroker.exe",
+    "ScreenMagnifier.exe",
+    "SR.exe",
+    "Narrator.exe",
+    "magnify.exe",
+    "MAGNIFY.EXE"
+    )
+
+/* uncomment once in winlogbeat to avoid bypass with rogue process with matching pe original file name */
+/* and process.code_signature.subject_name == "Microsoft Windows" and process.code_signature.status == "trusted" */
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Event Triggered Execution
+** ID: T1546
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Accessibility Features
+** ID: T1546.008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Event Triggered Execution
+** ID: T1546
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Accessibility Features
+** ID: T1546.008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-network-scan-executed-from-host.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-network-scan-executed-from-host.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6214b246a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-network-scan-executed-from-host.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-network-scan-executed-from-host]]
+=== Potential Network Scan Executed From Host
+
+This threshold rule monitors for the rapid execution of unix utilities that are capable of conducting network scans. Adversaries may leverage built-in tools such as ping, netcat or socat to execute ping sweeps across the network while attempting to evade detection or due to the lack of network mapping tools available on the compromised host.
+
+*Rule type*: threshold
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Discovery
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows
+the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest to select "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:linux and event.action:(exec or exec_event or executed or process_started) and
+event.type:start and process.name:(ping or nping or hping or hping2 or hping3 or nc or ncat or netcat or socat)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Discovery
+** ID: TA0007
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Network Service Discovery
+** ID: T1046
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1046/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-okta-mfa-bombing-via-push-notifications.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-okta-mfa-bombing-via-push-notifications.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0001bf1214
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-okta-mfa-bombing-via-push-notifications.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-okta-mfa-bombing-via-push-notifications]]
+=== Potential Okta MFA Bombing via Push Notifications
+
+Detects when an attacker abuses the Multi-Factor authentication mechanism by repeatedly issuing login requests until the user eventually accepts the Okta push notification. An adversary may attempt to bypass the Okta MFA policies configured for an organization to obtain unauthorized access.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* filebeat-*
+* logs-okta*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: None ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.mandiant.com/resources/russian-targeting-gov-business
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/testing-okta-visibility-and-detection-dorothy
+* https://sec.okta.com/articles/2023/08/cross-tenant-impersonation-prevention-and-detection
+* https://www.rezonate.io/blog/okta-logs-decoded-unveiling-identity-threats-through-threat-hunting/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Use Case: Identity and Access Audit
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Okta
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Potential Okta MFA Bombing via Push Notifications*
+
+
+Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) is an effective method to prevent unauthorized access. However, some adversaries may abuse the system by repeatedly sending MFA push notifications until the user unwittingly approves the access.
+
+This rule detects when a user denies MFA Okta Verify push notifications twice, followed by a successful authentication event within a 10-minute window. This sequence could indicate an adversary's attempt to bypass the Okta MFA policy.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps:*
+
+
+- Identify the user who received the MFA notifications by reviewing the `user.email` field.
+- Identify the time, source IP, and geographical location of the MFA requests and the subsequent successful login.
+- Review the `event.action` field to understand the nature of the events. It should include two `user.mfa.okta_verify.deny_push` actions and one `user.authentication.sso` action.
+- Ask the user if they remember receiving the MFA notifications and subsequently logging into their account.
+- Check if the MFA requests and the successful login occurred during the user's regular activity hours.
+- Look for any other suspicious activity on the account around the same time.
+- Identify whether the same pattern is repeated for other users in your organization. Multiple users receiving push notifications simultaneously might indicate a larger attack.
+
+
+*False positive analysis:*
+
+
+- Determine if the MFA push notifications were legitimate. Sometimes, users accidentally trigger MFA requests or deny them unintentionally and later approve them.
+- Check if there are known issues with the MFA system causing false denials.
+
+
+*Response and remediation:*
+
+
+- If unauthorized access is confirmed, initiate your incident response process.
+- Alert the user and your IT department immediately.
+- If possible, isolate the user's account until the issue is resolved.
+- Investigate the source of the unauthorized access.
+- If the account was accessed by an unauthorized party, determine the actions they took after logging in.
+- Consider enhancing your MFA policy to prevent such incidents in the future.
+- Encourage users to report any unexpected MFA notifications immediately.
+- Review and update your incident response plans and security policies based on the findings from the incident.
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The Okta Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by okta.actor.id with maxspan=10m
+  [authentication where event.dataset == "okta.system"
+    and okta.event_type == "user.mfa.okta_verify.deny_push"] with runs=5
+  until [authentication where event.dataset == "okta.system"
+    and (okta.event_type: (
+      "user.authentication.sso",
+      "user.authentication.auth_via_mfa",
+      "user.authentication.verify",
+      "user.session.start") and okta.outcome.result == "SUCCESS")]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
+** ID: T1621
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1621/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-openssh-backdoor-logging-activity.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-openssh-backdoor-logging-activity.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a5de48cc17
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-openssh-backdoor-logging-activity.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-openssh-backdoor-logging-activity]]
+=== Potential OpenSSH Backdoor Logging Activity
+
+Identifies a Secure Shell (SSH) client or server process creating or writing to a known SSH backdoor log file. Adversaries may modify SSH related binaries for persistence or credential access via patching sensitive functions to enable unauthorized access or to log SSH credentials for exfiltration.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/eset/malware-ioc/tree/master/sshdoor
+* https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/ESET_Kobalos.pdf
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
+- Elastic Defend
+- Auditbeat
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Auditbeat Setup*
+
+Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit the activities of users and processes on your systems. For example, you can use Auditbeat to collect and centralize audit events from the Linux Audit Framework. You can also use Auditbeat to detect changes to critical files, like binaries and configuration files, and identify potential security policy violations.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Auditbeat on a Linux System:*
+
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setup-repositories.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-docker.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html[helper guide].
+- For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Custom Ingest Pipeline*
+
+For versions <8.2, you need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate `event.ingested` with @timestamp for non-elastic-agent indexes, like auditbeats/filebeat/winlogbeat etc. For more details to add a custom ingest pipeline refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html[guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "change" and process.executable : ("/usr/sbin/sshd", "/usr/bin/ssh") and
+  (
+    (file.name : (".*", "~*", "*~") and not file.name : (".cache", ".viminfo", ".bash_history", ".google_authenticator",
+      ".jelenv", ".csvignore", ".rtreport")) or
+    file.extension : ("in", "out", "ini", "h", "gz", "so", "sock", "sync", "0", "1", "2", "3", "4", "5", "6", "7", "8", "9") or
+    file.path :
+    (
+      "/private/etc/*--",
+      "/usr/share/*",
+      "/usr/include/*",
+      "/usr/local/include/*",
+      "/private/tmp/*",
+      "/private/var/tmp/*",
+      "/usr/tmp/*",
+      "/usr/share/man/*",
+      "/usr/local/share/*",
+      "/usr/lib/*.so.*",
+      "/private/etc/ssh/.sshd_auth",
+      "/usr/bin/ssd",
+      "/private/var/opt/power",
+      "/private/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts",
+      "/private/var/html/lol",
+      "/private/var/log/utmp",
+      "/private/var/lib",
+      "/var/run/sshd/sshd.pid",
+      "/var/run/nscd/ns.pid",
+      "/var/run/udev/ud.pid",
+      "/var/run/udevd.pid"
+    )
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Modify Authentication Process
+** ID: T1556
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Compromise Client Software Binary
+** ID: T1554
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1554/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-persistence-through-init-d-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-persistence-through-init-d-detected.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..98bb6624b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-persistence-through-init-d-detected.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-persistence-through-init-d-detected]]
+=== Potential Persistence Through init.d Detected
+
+Files that are placed in the /etc/init.d/ directory in Unix can be used to start custom applications, services, scripts or commands during start-up. Init.d has been mostly replaced in favor of Systemd. However, the "systemd-sysv-generator" can convert init.d files to service unit files that run at boot. Adversaries may add or alter files located in the /etc/init.d/ directory to execute malicious code upon boot in order to gain persistence on the system.
+
+*Rule type*: new_terms
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.intezer.com/blog/malware-analysis/hiddenwasp-malware-targeting-linux-systems/
+* https://pberba.github.io/security/2022/02/06/linux-threat-hunting-for-persistence-initialization-scripts-and-shell-configuration/#8-boot-or-logon-initialization-scripts-rc-scripts
+* https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/how-to-enable-rc-local-shell-script-on-systemd-while-booting-linux-system/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 9
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Potential Persistence Through init.d Detected*
+
+
+The `/etc/init.d` directory is used in Linux systems to store the initialization scripts for various services and daemons that are executed during system startup and shutdown.
+
+Attackers can abuse files within the `/etc/init.d/` directory to run scripts, commands or malicious software every time a system is rebooted by converting an executable file into a service file through the `systemd-sysv-generator`. After conversion, a unit file is created within the `/run/systemd/generator.late/` directory.
+
+This rule looks for the creation of new files within the `/etc/init.d/` directory. Executable files in these directories will automatically run at boot with root privileges.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html[placeholder fields] to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+*Possible Investigation Steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the file that was created or modified.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve File Information","query":"SELECT * FROM file WHERE path = {{file.path}}"}}
+- Investigate whether any other files in the `/etc/init.d/` or `/run/systemd/generator.late/` directories have been altered.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve File Listing Information","query":"SELECT * FROM file WHERE (path LIKE '/etc/init.d/%' OR path LIKE '/run/systemd/generator.late/%')"}}
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Additional File Listing Information","query":"SELECT\n  f.path,\n  u.username AS file_owner,\n  g.groupname AS group_owner,\n  datetime(f.atime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_access_time,\n  datetime(f.mtime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_modified_time,\n  datetime(f.ctime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_status_change_time,\n  datetime(f.btime, 'unixepoch') AS file_created_time,\n  f.size AS size_bytes\nFROM\n  file f\n  LEFT JOIN users u ON f.uid = u.uid\n  LEFT JOIN groups g ON f.gid = g.gid\nWHERE (path LIKE '/etc/init.d/%' OR path LIKE '/run/systemd/generator.late/%')\n"}}
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User","query":"SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"}}
+- Investigate syslog through the `sudo cat /var/log/syslog | grep 'LSB'` command to find traces of the LSB header of the script (if present). If syslog is being ingested into Elasticsearch, the same can be accomplished through Kibana.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Validate whether this activity is related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+- Investigate whether the altered scripts call other malicious scripts elsewhere on the file system. 
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+        - Cron jobs, services and other persistence mechanisms.
+            - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Crontab Information","query":"SELECT * FROM crontab"}}
+
+
+*False Positive Analysis*
+
+
+- If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+- If this activity is related to a system administrator who uses init.d for administrative purposes, consider adding exceptions for this specific administrator user account. 
+- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
+
+
+*Related Rules*
+
+
+- Suspicious File Creation in /etc for Persistence - 1c84dd64-7e6c-4bad-ac73-a5014ee37042
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Delete the maliciously created service/init.d files or restore it to the original configuration.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+host.os.type :"linux" and event.action:("creation" or "file_create_event" or "rename" or "file_rename_event") and 
+file.path : /etc/init.d/* and not (
+  (process.name : ("dpkg" or "dockerd" or "rpm" or "dnf" or "chef-client" or "apk" or "yum" or "rpm" or
+  "vmis-launcher" or "exe" or "platform-python" or "executor" or "podman")) or
+  (file.extension : ("swp" or "swpx")) or
+  (process.name:mv and file.name:*.dpkg-remove) or
+  (process.name:sed and file.name:sed*) or
+  (process.name:systemd and file.name:*.dpkg-new)
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
+** ID: T1037
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-persistence-through-motd-file-creation-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-persistence-through-motd-file-creation-detected.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ff32905055
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-persistence-through-motd-file-creation-detected.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-persistence-through-motd-file-creation-detected]]
+=== Potential Persistence Through MOTD File Creation Detected
+
+Message of the day (MOTD) is the message that is presented to the user when a user connects to a Linux server via SSH or a serial connection. Linux systems contain several default MOTD files located in the "/etc/update-motd.d/" and "/usr/lib/update-notifier/" directories. These scripts run as the root user every time a user connects over SSH or a serial connection. Adversaries may create malicious MOTD files that grant them persistence onto the target every time a user connects to the system by executing a backdoor script or command. This rule detects the creation of potentially malicious files within the default MOTD file directories.
+
+*Rule type*: new_terms
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://pberba.github.io/security/2022/02/06/linux-threat-hunting-for-persistence-initialization-scripts-and-shell-configuration/#10-boot-or-logon-initialization-scripts-motd
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 9
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Potential Persistence Through MOTD File Creation Detected*
+
+
+The message-of-the-day (MOTD) is used to display a customizable system-wide message or information to users upon login in Linux.
+
+Attackers can abuse message-of-the-day (motd) files to run scripts, commands or malicious software every time a user connects to a system over SSH or a serial connection, by creating a new file within the `/etc/update-motd.d/` or `/usr/lib/update-notifier/` directory. Executable files in these directories automatically run with root privileges.
+
+This rule identifies the creation of new files within the `/etc/update-motd.d/` or `/usr/lib/update-notifier/` directories.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html[placeholder fields] to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+
+*Possible Investigation Steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the file that was created or modified.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve File Information","query":"SELECT * FROM file WHERE path = {{file.path}}"}}
+- Investigate whether any other files in the `/etc/update-motd.d/` or `/usr/lib/update-notifier/` directories have been altered.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve File Listing Information","query":"SELECT * FROM file WHERE (path LIKE '/etc/update-motd.d/%' OR path LIKE '/usr/lib/update-notifier/%')"}}
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Additional File Listing Information","query":"SELECT\n  f.path,\n  u.username AS file_owner,\n  g.groupname AS group_owner,\n  datetime(f.atime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_access_time,\n  datetime(f.mtime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_modified_time,\n  datetime(f.ctime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_status_change_time,\n  datetime(f.btime, 'unixepoch') AS file_created_time,\n  f.size AS size_bytes\nFROM\n  file f\n  LEFT JOIN users u ON f.uid = u.uid\n  LEFT JOIN groups g ON f.gid = g.gid\nWHERE (path LIKE '/etc/update-motd.d/%' OR path LIKE '/usr/lib/update-notifier/%')\n"}}
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User","query":"SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"}}
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate whether the modified scripts call other malicious scripts elsewhere on the file system.
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+        - Cron jobs, services and other persistence mechanisms.
+            - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Crontab Information","query":"SELECT * FROM crontab"}}
+
+
+*Related Rules*
+
+
+- Suspicious Process Spawned from MOTD Detected - 4ec47004-b34a-42e6-8003-376a123ea447
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Any activity that triggered the alert and is not inherently malicious must be monitored by the security team.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Delete the MOTD files or restore their original configuration.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+host.os.type :linux and event.action:(creation or file_create_event or rename or file_rename_event) and
+file.path : (/etc/update-motd.d/* or /usr/lib/update-notifier/*) and not process.name : (
+  dpkg or dockerd or rpm or executor or dnf or podman or ln or yum 
+) and not (
+  (process.name:mv and file.extension:dpkg-remove) or
+  (file.extension:(swp or swpx))
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
+** ID: T1037
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-persistence-through-run-control-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-persistence-through-run-control-detected.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..54145d0c6f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-persistence-through-run-control-detected.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-persistence-through-run-control-detected]]
+=== Potential Persistence Through Run Control Detected
+
+This rule monitors the creation/alteration of the rc.local file by a previously unknown process executable through the use of the new terms rule type. The /etc/rc.local file is used to start custom applications, services, scripts or commands during start-up. The rc.local file has mostly been replaced by Systemd. However, through the "systemd-rc-local-generator", rc.local files can be converted to services that run at boot. Adversaries may alter rc.local to execute malicious code at start-up, and gain persistence onto the system.
+
+*Rule type*: new_terms
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.intezer.com/blog/malware-analysis/hiddenwasp-malware-targeting-linux-systems/
+* https://pberba.github.io/security/2022/02/06/linux-threat-hunting-for-persistence-initialization-scripts-and-shell-configuration/#8-boot-or-logon-initialization-scripts-rc-scripts
+* https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/how-to-enable-rc-local-shell-script-on-systemd-while-booting-linux-system/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Potential Persistence Through Run Control Detected*
+
+
+The `rc.local` file executes custom commands or scripts during system startup on Linux systems. `rc.local` has been deprecated in favor of the use of `systemd services`, and more recent Unix distributions no longer leverage this method of on-boot script execution.
+
+There might still be users that use `rc.local` in a benign matter, so investigation to see whether the file is malicious is vital.
+
+Detection alerts from this rule indicate the creation of a new `/etc/rc.local` file.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html[placeholder fields] to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+
+*Possible Investigation Steps*
+
+
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Investigate the file that was created or modified.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve File Information","query":"SELECT * FROM file WHERE path = {{file.path}}"}}
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User","query":"SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"}}
+- Investigate whether the `/lib/systemd/system/rc-local.service` and `/run/systemd/generator/multi-user.target.wants/rc-local.service` files were created through the `systemd-rc-local-generator` located at `/usr/lib/systemd/system-generators/systemd-rc-local-generator`.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve rc-local.service File Information","query":"SELECT * FROM file WHERE (path = '/run/systemd/generator/multi-user.target.wants/rc-local.service' OR path = '/run/systemd/generator/multi-user.target.wants/rc-local.service')"}}
+  - In case the file is not present here, `sudo systemctl status rc-local` can be executed to find the location of the rc-local unit file.
+  - If `rc-local.service` is found, manual investigation is required to check for the rc script execution. Systemd will generate syslogs in case of the execution of the rc-local service. `sudo cat /var/log/syslog | grep "rc-local.service|/etc/rc.local Compatibility"` can be executed to check for the execution of the service.
+    - If logs are found, it's likely that the contents of the `rc.local` file have been executed. Analyze the logs. In case several syslog log files are available, use a wildcard to search through all of the available logs.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Validate whether this activity is related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+- Investigate whether the altered scripts call other malicious scripts elsewhere on the file system.
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+        - Cron jobs, services and other persistence mechanisms.
+            - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Crontab Information","query":"SELECT * FROM crontab"}}
+
+
+*False Positive Analysis*
+
+
+- If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+- If this activity is related to a system administrator who uses `rc.local` for administrative purposes, consider adding exceptions for this specific administrator user account.
+- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Delete the `service/rc.local` files or restore their original configuration.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+host.os.type : "linux" and event.category : "file" and
+event.type : ("change" or "file_modify_event" or "creation" or "file_create_event") and
+file.path : "/etc/rc.local" and not process.name : (
+  "dockerd" or "docker" or "dnf" or "dnf-automatic" or "yum" or "rpm" or "dpkg"
+) and not file.extension : ("swp" or "swpx")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
+** ID: T1037
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: RC Scripts
+** ID: T1037.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-persistence-via-atom-init-script-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-persistence-via-atom-init-script-modification.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..257845c3fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-persistence-via-atom-init-script-modification.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-persistence-via-atom-init-script-modification]]
+=== Potential Persistence via Atom Init Script Modification
+
+Identifies modifications to the Atom desktop text editor Init File. Adversaries may add malicious JavaScript code to the init.coffee file that will be executed upon the Atom application opening.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/D00MFist/PersistentJXA/blob/master/AtomPersist.js
+* https://flight-manual.atom.io/hacking-atom/sections/the-init-file/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:file and host.os.type:macos and not event.type:"deletion" and
+ file.path:/Users/*/.atom/init.coffee and not process.name:(Atom or xpcproxy) and not user.name:root
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
+** ID: T1037
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-persistence-via-login-hook.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-persistence-via-login-hook.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b52d9eeb95
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-persistence-via-login-hook.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-persistence-via-login-hook]]
+=== Potential Persistence via Login Hook
+
+Identifies the creation or modification of the login window property list (plist). Adversaries may modify plist files to run a program during system boot or user login for persistence.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/D00MFist/PersistentJXA/blob/master/LoginScript.js
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+Starting in Mac OS X 10.7 (Lion), users can specify certain applications to be re-opened when a user reboots their machine. This can be abused to establish or maintain persistence on a compromised system.
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:file and host.os.type:macos and not event.type:"deletion" and
+ file.name:"com.apple.loginwindow.plist" and
+ process.name:(* and not (systemmigrationd or DesktopServicesHelper or diskmanagementd or rsync or launchd or cfprefsd or xpcproxy or ManagedClient or MCXCompositor or backupd or "iMazing Profile Editor"
+))
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
+** ID: T1547
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Plist File Modification
+** ID: T1647
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1647/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-persistence-via-periodic-tasks.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-persistence-via-periodic-tasks.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..92effbd534
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-persistence-via-periodic-tasks.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-persistence-via-periodic-tasks]]
+=== Potential Persistence via Periodic Tasks
+
+Identifies the creation or modification of the default configuration for periodic tasks. Adversaries may abuse periodic tasks to execute malicious code or maintain persistence.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://opensource.apple.com/source/crontabs/crontabs-13/private/etc/defaults/periodic.conf.auto.html
+* https://www.oreilly.com/library/view/mac-os-x/0596003706/re328.html
+* https://github.com/D00MFist/PersistentJXA/blob/master/PeriodicPersist.js
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:file and host.os.type:macos and not event.type:"deletion" and
+ file.path:(/private/etc/periodic/* or /private/etc/defaults/periodic.conf or /private/etc/periodic.conf)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task/Job
+** ID: T1053
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Cron
+** ID: T1053.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-persistence-via-time-provider-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-persistence-via-time-provider-modification.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..807325f356
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-persistence-via-time-provider-modification.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-persistence-via-time-provider-modification]]
+=== Potential Persistence via Time Provider Modification
+
+Identifies modification of the Time Provider. Adversaries may establish persistence by registering and enabling a malicious DLL as a time provider. Windows uses the time provider architecture to obtain accurate time stamps from other network devices or clients in the network. Time providers are implemented in the form of a DLL file which resides in the System32 folder. The service W32Time initiates during the startup of Windows and loads w32time.dll.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://pentestlab.blog/2019/10/22/persistence-time-providers/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Potential Persistence via Time Provider Modification*
+
+
+The Time Provider architecture in Windows is responsible for obtaining accurate timestamps from network devices or clients. It is implemented as a DLL file in the System32 folder and is initiated by the W32Time service during Windows startup. Adversaries may exploit this by registering and enabling a malicious DLL as a time provider to establish persistence. 
+
+This rule identifies changes in the registry paths associated with Time Providers, specifically targeting the addition of new DLL files.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Examine whether the DLL is signed.
+- Retrieve the DLL and determine if it is malicious:
+  - Analyze the file using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and Remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Restore Time Provider settings to the desired state.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+registry where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type:"change" and
+  registry.path: (
+    "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\\Services\\W32Time\\TimeProviders\\*",
+    "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\\Services\\W32Time\\TimeProviders\\*"
+  ) and
+  registry.data.strings:"*.dll" and
+  not
+  (
+    process.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\msiexec.exe" and
+    registry.data.strings : "?:\\Program Files\\VMware\\VMware Tools\\vmwTimeProvider\\vmwTimeProvider.dll"
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
+** ID: T1547
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Time Providers
+** ID: T1547.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/003/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
+** ID: T1547
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Time Providers
+** ID: T1547.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-powershell-hacktool-script-by-function-names.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-powershell-hacktool-script-by-function-names.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d4a78ff415
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-powershell-hacktool-script-by-function-names.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,356 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-powershell-hacktool-script-by-function-names]]
+=== Potential PowerShell HackTool Script by Function Names
+
+Detects known PowerShell offensive tooling functions names in PowerShell scripts. Attackers commonly use out-of-the-box offensive tools without modifying the code. This rule aim is to take advantage of that.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/atc-project/atc-data/blob/master/docs/Logging_Policies/LP_0109_windows_powershell_script_block_log.md
+* https://github.com/BC-SECURITY/Empire
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: PowerShell Logs
+
+*Version*: 10
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Potential PowerShell HackTool Script by Function Names*
+
+
+PowerShell is one of the main tools system administrators use for automation, report routines, and other tasks. This makes it available for use in various environments, and creates an attractive way for attackers to execute code.
+
+Adversaries often exploit PowerShell's capabilities to execute malicious scripts and perform various attacks. This rule identifies known offensive tooling function names in PowerShell scripts, as attackers commonly use out-of-the-box tools without modifying the code. By monitoring these specific function names, the rule aims to detect and alert potential malicious PowerShell activity.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Examine the script content that triggered the detection; look for suspicious DLL imports, collection or exfiltration capabilities, suspicious functions, encoded or compressed data, and other potentially malicious characteristics.
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Examine the script's execution context, such as the user account, privileges, the role of the system on which it was executed, and any relevant timestamps.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Evaluate whether the user needs to use PowerShell to complete tasks.
+- Investigate the origin of the PowerShell script, including its source, download method, and any associated URLs or IP addresses.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the script using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process's `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This rule may generate false positives if legitimate scripts or tools used by administrators contain any of the listed function names. These function names are commonly associated with offensive tooling, but they may also be present in benign scripts or tools.
+- To handle these false positives consider adding exceptions - preferably with a combination of full file path and users.
+
+
+*Related Rules*
+
+
+- PowerShell Invoke-NinjaCopy script - b8386923-b02c-4b94-986a-d223d9b01f88
+- PowerShell Suspicious Discovery Related Windows API Functions - 61ac3638-40a3-44b2-855a-985636ca985e
+- Potential Process Injection via PowerShell - 2e29e96a-b67c-455a-afe4-de6183431d0d
+- PowerShell Keylogging Script - bd2c86a0-8b61-4457-ab38-96943984e889
+
+
+*Response and Remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+  - If malicious activity is confirmed, perform a broader investigation to identify the scope of the compromise and determine the appropriate remediation steps.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Reimage the host operating system or restore the compromised files to clean versions.
+- Restrict PowerShell usage outside of IT and engineering business units using GPOs, AppLocker, Intune, or similar software.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Administrative Templates >
+Windows PowerShell >
+Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging (Enable)
+```
+
+Steps to implement the logging policy via registry:
+
+```
+reg add "hklm\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging" /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 1
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:windows and
+  powershell.file.script_block_text : (
+    "Add-DomainGroupMember" or "Add-DomainObjectAcl" or
+    "Add-RemoteConnection" or "Add-ServiceDacl" or
+    "Add-Win32Type" or "Convert-ADName" or
+    "Convert-LDAPProperty" or "ConvertFrom-LDAPLogonHours" or
+    "ConvertFrom-UACValue" or "Copy-ArrayOfMemAddresses" or
+    "Create-NamedPipe" or "Create-ProcessWithToken" or
+    "Create-RemoteThread" or "Create-SuspendedWinLogon" or
+    "Create-WinLogonProcess" or "Emit-CallThreadStub" or
+    "Enable-SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege" or "Enable-SeDebugPrivilege" or
+    "Enum-AllTokens" or "Export-PowerViewCSV" or
+    "Find-AVSignature" or "Find-AppLockerLog" or
+    "Find-DomainLocalGroupMember" or "Find-DomainObjectPropertyOutlier" or
+    "Find-DomainProcess" or "Find-DomainShare" or
+    "Find-DomainUserEvent" or "Find-DomainUserLocation" or
+    "Find-InterestingDomainAcl" or "Find-InterestingDomainShareFile" or
+    "Find-InterestingFile" or "Find-LocalAdminAccess" or
+    "Find-PSScriptsInPSAppLog" or "Find-PathDLLHijack" or
+    "Find-ProcessDLLHijack" or "Find-RDPClientConnection" or
+    "Get-AllAttributesForClass" or "Get-CachedGPPPassword" or
+    "Get-DecryptedCpassword" or "Get-DecryptedSitelistPassword" or
+    "Get-DelegateType" or
+    "Get-DomainDFSShare" or "Get-DomainDFSShareV1" or
+    "Get-DomainDFSShareV2" or "Get-DomainDNSRecord" or
+    "Get-DomainDNSZone" or "Get-DomainFileServer" or
+    "Get-DomainForeignGroupMember" or "Get-DomainForeignUser" or
+    "Get-DomainGPO" or "Get-DomainGPOComputerLocalGroupMapping" or
+    "Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup" or "Get-DomainGPOUserLocalGroupMapping" or
+    "Get-DomainGUIDMap" or "Get-DomainGroup" or
+    "Get-DomainGroupMember" or "Get-DomainGroupMemberDeleted" or
+    "Get-DomainManagedSecurityGroup" or "Get-DomainOU" or
+    "Get-DomainObject" or "Get-DomainObjectAcl" or
+    "Get-DomainObjectAttributeHistory" or "Get-DomainObjectLinkedAttributeHistory" or
+    "Get-DomainPolicyData" or "Get-DomainSID" or
+    "Get-DomainSPNTicket" or "Get-DomainSearcher" or
+    "Get-DomainSite" or "Get-DomainSubnet" or
+    "Get-DomainTrust" or "Get-DomainTrustMapping" or
+    "Get-DomainUser" or "Get-DomainUserEvent" or
+    "Get-Forest" or "Get-ForestDomain" or
+    "Get-ForestGlobalCatalog" or "Get-ForestSchemaClass" or
+    "Get-ForestTrust" or "Get-GPODelegation" or
+    "Get-GPPAutologon" or "Get-GPPInnerField" or
+    "Get-GPPInnerFields" or "Get-GPPPassword" or
+    "Get-GptTmpl" or "Get-GroupsXML" or
+    "Get-HttpStatus" or "Get-ImageNtHeaders" or
+    "Get-Keystrokes" or
+    "Get-MemoryProcAddress" or "Get-MicrophoneAudio" or
+    "Get-ModifiablePath" or "Get-ModifiableRegistryAutoRun" or
+    "Get-ModifiableScheduledTaskFile" or "Get-ModifiableService" or
+    "Get-ModifiableServiceFile" or "Get-Name" or
+    "Get-NetComputerSiteName" or "Get-NetLocalGroup" or
+    "Get-NetLocalGroupMember" or "Get-NetLoggedon" or
+    "Get-NetRDPSession" or "Get-NetSession" or
+    "Get-NetShare" or "Get-PEArchitecture" or
+    "Get-PEBasicInfo" or "Get-PEDetailedInfo" or
+    "Get-PathAcl" or "Get-PrimaryToken" or
+    "Get-ProcAddress" or "Get-ProcessTokenGroup" or
+    "Get-ProcessTokenPrivilege" or "Get-ProcessTokenType" or
+    "Get-RegLoggedOn" or "Get-RegistryAlwaysInstallElevated" or
+    "Get-RegistryAutoLogon" or "Get-RemoteProcAddress" or
+    "Get-Screenshot" or "Get-ServiceDetail" or
+    "Get-SiteListPassword" or "Get-SitelistField" or
+    "Get-System" or "Get-SystemNamedPipe" or
+    "Get-SystemToken" or "Get-ThreadToken" or
+    "Get-TimedScreenshot" or "Get-TokenInformation" or
+    "Get-TopPort" or "Get-UnattendedInstallFile" or
+    "Get-UniqueTokens" or "Get-UnquotedService" or
+    "Get-VaultCredential" or "Get-VaultElementValue" or
+    "Get-VirtualProtectValue" or "Get-VolumeShadowCopy" or
+    "Get-WMIProcess" or "Get-WMIRegCachedRDPConnection" or
+    "Get-WMIRegLastLoggedOn" or "Get-WMIRegMountedDrive" or
+    "Get-WMIRegProxy" or "Get-WebConfig" or
+    "Get-Win32Constants" or "Get-Win32Functions" or
+    "Get-Win32Types" or "Import-DllImports" or
+    "Import-DllInRemoteProcess" or "Inject-LocalShellcode" or
+    "Inject-RemoteShellcode" or "Install-ServiceBinary" or
+    "Invoke-CompareAttributesForClass" or "Invoke-CreateRemoteThread" or
+    "Invoke-CredentialInjection" or "Invoke-DllInjection" or
+    "Invoke-EventVwrBypass" or "Invoke-ImpersonateUser" or
+    "Invoke-Kerberoast" or "Invoke-MemoryFreeLibrary" or
+    "Invoke-MemoryLoadLibrary" or
+    "Invoke-Mimikatz" or "Invoke-NinjaCopy" or
+    "Invoke-PatchDll" or "Invoke-Portscan" or
+    "Invoke-PrivescAudit" or "Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection" or
+    "Invoke-ReverseDnsLookup" or "Invoke-RevertToSelf" or
+    "Invoke-ServiceAbuse" or "Invoke-Shellcode" or
+    "Invoke-TokenManipulation" or "Invoke-UserImpersonation" or
+    "Invoke-WmiCommand" or "Mount-VolumeShadowCopy" or
+    "New-ADObjectAccessControlEntry" or "New-DomainGroup" or
+    "New-DomainUser" or "New-DynamicParameter" or
+    "New-InMemoryModule" or
+    "New-ThreadedFunction" or "New-VolumeShadowCopy" or
+    "Out-CompressedDll" or "Out-EncodedCommand" or
+    "Out-EncryptedScript" or "Out-Minidump" or
+    "PortScan-Alive" or "Portscan-Port" or
+    "Remove-DomainGroupMember" or "Remove-DomainObjectAcl" or
+    "Remove-RemoteConnection" or "Remove-VolumeShadowCopy" or
+    "Restore-ServiceBinary" or "Set-DesktopACLToAllowEveryone" or
+    "Set-DesktopACLs" or "Set-DomainObject" or
+    "Set-DomainObjectOwner" or "Set-DomainUserPassword" or
+    "Set-ServiceBinaryPath" or "Sub-SignedIntAsUnsigned" or
+    "Test-AdminAccess" or "Test-MemoryRangeValid" or
+    "Test-ServiceDaclPermission" or "Update-ExeFunctions" or
+    "Update-MemoryAddresses" or "Update-MemoryProtectionFlags" or
+    "Write-BytesToMemory" or "Write-HijackDll" or
+    "Write-PortscanOut" or "Write-ServiceBinary" or
+    "Write-UserAddMSI" or "Invoke-Privesc" or
+    "func_get_proc_address" or "Invoke-BloodHound" or
+    "Invoke-HostEnum" or "Get-BrowserInformation" or
+    "Get-DomainAccountPolicy" or "Get-DomainAdmins" or
+    "Get-AVProcesses" or "Get-AVInfo" or
+    "Get-RecycleBin" or "Invoke-BruteForce" or
+    "Get-PassHints" or "Invoke-SessionGopher" or
+    "Get-LSASecret" or "Get-PassHashes" or
+    "Invoke-WdigestDowngrade" or "Get-ChromeDump" or
+    "Invoke-DomainPasswordSpray" or "Get-FoxDump" or
+    "New-HoneyHash" or "Invoke-DCSync" or
+    "Invoke-PowerDump" or "Invoke-SSIDExfil" or
+    "Invoke-PowerShellTCP" or "Add-Exfiltration" or
+    "Do-Exfiltration" or "Invoke-DropboxUpload" or
+    "Invoke-ExfilDataToGitHub" or "Invoke-EgressCheck" or
+    "Invoke-PostExfil" or "Create-MultipleSessions" or
+    "Invoke-NetworkRelay" or "New-GPOImmediateTask" or
+    "Invoke-WMIDebugger" or "Invoke-SQLOSCMD" or
+    "Invoke-SMBExec" or "Invoke-PSRemoting" or
+    "Invoke-ExecuteMSBuild" or "Invoke-DCOM" or
+    "Invoke-InveighRelay" or "Invoke-PsExec" or
+    "Invoke-SSHCommand" or "Find-ActiveUsersWMI" or
+    "Get-SystemDrivesWMI" or "Get-ActiveNICSWMI" or
+    "Remove-Persistence" or "DNS_TXT_Pwnage" or
+    "Execute-OnTime" or "HTTP-Backdoor" or
+    "Add-ConstrainedDelegationBackdoor" or "Add-RegBackdoor" or
+    "Add-ScrnSaveBackdoor" or "Gupt-Backdoor" or
+    "Invoke-ADSBackdoor" or "Add-Persistence" or
+    "Invoke-ResolverBackdoor" or "Invoke-EventLogBackdoor" or
+    "Invoke-DeadUserBackdoor" or "Invoke-DisableMachineAcctChange" or
+    "Invoke-AccessBinary" or "Add-NetUser" or
+    "Invoke-Schtasks" or "Invoke-JSRatRegsvr" or
+    "Invoke-JSRatRundll" or "Invoke-PoshRatHttps" or
+    "Invoke-PsGcatAgent" or "Remove-PoshRat" or
+    "Install-SSP" or "Invoke-BackdoorLNK" or
+    "PowerBreach" or "InstallEXE-Persistence" or
+    "RemoveEXE-Persistence" or "Install-ServiceLevel-Persistence" or
+    "Remove-ServiceLevel-Persistence" or "Invoke-Prompt" or
+    "Invoke-PacketCapture" or "Start-WebcamRecorder" or
+    "Get-USBKeyStrokes" or "Invoke-KeeThief" or
+    "Get-Keystrokes" or "Invoke-NetRipper" or
+    "Get-EmailItems" or "Invoke-MailSearch" or
+    "Invoke-SearchGAL" or "Get-WebCredentials" or
+    "Start-CaptureServer" or "Invoke-PowerShellIcmp" or
+    "Invoke-PowerShellTcpOneLine" or "Invoke-PowerShellTcpOneLineBind" or
+    "Invoke-PowerShellUdp" or "Invoke-PowerShellUdpOneLine" or
+    "Run-EXEonRemote" or "Download-Execute-PS" or
+    "Out-RundllCommand" or "Set-RemoteWMI" or
+    "Set-DCShadowPermissions" or "Invoke-PowerShellWMI" or
+    "Invoke-Vnc" or "Invoke-LockWorkStation" or
+    "Invoke-EternalBlue" or "Invoke-ShellcodeMSIL" or
+    "Invoke-MetasploitPayload" or "Invoke-DowngradeAccount" or
+    "Invoke-RunAs" or "ExetoText" or
+    "Disable-SecuritySettings" or "Set-MacAttribute" or
+    "Invoke-MS16032" or "Invoke-BypassUACTokenManipulation" or
+    "Invoke-SDCLTBypass" or "Invoke-FodHelperBypass" or
+    "Invoke-EventVwrBypass" or "Invoke-EnvBypass" or
+    "Get-ServiceUnquoted" or "Get-ServiceFilePermission" or
+    "Get-ServicePermission" or
+    "Enable-DuplicateToken" or "Invoke-PsUaCme" or
+    "Invoke-Tater" or "Invoke-WScriptBypassUAC" or
+    "Invoke-AllChecks" or "Find-TrustedDocuments" or
+    "Invoke-Interceptor" or "Invoke-PoshRatHttp" or
+    "Invoke-ExecCommandWMI" or "Invoke-KillProcessWMI" or
+    "Invoke-CreateShareandExecute" or "Invoke-RemoteScriptWithOutput" or
+    "Invoke-SchedJobManipulation" or "Invoke-ServiceManipulation" or
+    "Invoke-PowerOptionsWMI" or "Invoke-DirectoryListing" or
+    "Invoke-FileTransferOverWMI" or "Invoke-WMImplant" or
+    "Invoke-WMIObfuscatedPSCommand" or "Invoke-WMIDuplicateClass" or
+    "Invoke-WMIUpload" or "Invoke-WMIRemoteExtract" or "Invoke-winPEAS"
+  ) and
+  not powershell.file.script_block_text : (
+    "sentinelbreakpoints" and "Set-PSBreakpoint"
+  ) and
+  not file.path : (
+    ?\:\\\\ProgramData\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows?Defender?Advanced?Threat?Protection\\\\DataCollection\\\\*
+  ) and
+  not user.id : ("S-1-5-18" or "S-1-5-19")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privacy-control-bypass-via-localhost-secure-copy.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privacy-control-bypass-via-localhost-secure-copy.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ecb01eafb7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privacy-control-bypass-via-localhost-secure-copy.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privacy-control-bypass-via-localhost-secure-copy]]
+=== Potential Privacy Control Bypass via Localhost Secure Copy
+
+Identifies use of the Secure Copy Protocol (SCP) to copy files locally by abusing the auto addition of the Secure Shell Daemon (sshd) to the authorized application list for Full Disk Access. This may indicate attempts to bypass macOS privacy controls to access sensitive files.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/h/xcsset-mac-malware--infects-xcode-projects--uses-0-days.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type in ("start", "process_started") and
+ process.name:"scp" and
+ process.args:"StrictHostKeyChecking=no" and
+ process.command_line:("scp *localhost:/*", "scp *127.0.0.1:/*") and
+ not process.args:"vagrant@*127.0.0.1*"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
+** ID: T1548
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
+** ID: T1548
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privacy-control-bypass-via-tccdb-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privacy-control-bypass-via-tccdb-modification.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c47c4633ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privacy-control-bypass-via-tccdb-modification.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privacy-control-bypass-via-tccdb-modification]]
+=== Potential Privacy Control Bypass via TCCDB Modification
+
+Identifies the use of sqlite3 to directly modify the Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC) SQLite database. This may indicate an attempt to bypass macOS privacy controls, including access to sensitive resources like the system camera, microphone, address book, and calendar.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://applehelpwriter.com/2016/08/29/discovering-how-dropbox-hacks-your-mac/
+* https://github.com/bp88/JSS-Scripts/blob/master/TCC.db%20Modifier.sh
+* https://medium.com/@mattshockl/cve-2020-9934-bypassing-the-os-x-transparency-consent-and-control-tcc-framework-for-4e14806f1de8
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type in ("start", "process_started") and process.name : "sqlite*" and
+ process.args : "/*/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db" and
+ not process.parent.executable : "/Library/Bitdefender/AVP/product/bin/*"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Impair Defenses
+** ID: T1562
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Disable or Modify Tools
+** ID: T1562.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-through-writable-docker-socket.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-through-writable-docker-socket.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8f227009a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-through-writable-docker-socket.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-through-writable-docker-socket]]
+=== Potential Privilege Escalation through Writable Docker Socket
+
+This rule monitors for the usage of Docker runtime sockets to escalate privileges on Linux systems. Docker sockets by default are only be writable by the root user and docker group. Attackers that have permissions to write to these sockets may be able to create and run a container that allows them to escalate privileges and gain further access onto the host file system.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://book.hacktricks.xyz/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/docker-security/docker-breakout-privilege-escalation#automatic-enumeration-and-escape
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Domain: Container
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 5
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and 
+(
+  (process.name == "docker" and process.args : "run" and process.args : "-it"  and 
+   process.args : ("unix://*/docker.sock", "unix://*/dockershim.sock")) or 
+  (process.name == "socat" and process.args : ("UNIX-CONNECT:*/docker.sock", "UNIX-CONNECT:*/dockershim.sock"))
+) and not user.Ext.real.id : "0" and not group.Ext.real.id : "0"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Escape to Host
+** ID: T1611
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-container-misconfiguration.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-container-misconfiguration.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5535f54c92
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-container-misconfiguration.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-container-misconfiguration]]
+=== Potential Privilege Escalation via Container Misconfiguration
+
+This rule monitors for the execution of processes that interact with Linux containers through an interactive shell without root permissions. Utilities such as runc and ctr are universal command-line utilities leveraged to interact with containers via root permissions. On systems where the access to these utilities are misconfigured, attackers might be able to create and run a container that mounts the root folder or spawn a privileged container vulnerable to a container escape attack, which might allow them to escalate privileges and gain further access onto the host file system.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://book.hacktricks.xyz/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/runc-privilege-escalation
+* https://book.hacktricks.xyz/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/containerd-ctr-privilege-escalation
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Domain: Container
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 5
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+Session View uses process data collected by the Elastic Defend integration, but this data is not always collected by default. Session View is available on enterprise subscription for versions 8.3 and above.
+
+*To confirm that Session View data is enabled:*
+
+- Go to “Manage → Policies”, and edit one or more of your Elastic Defend integration policies.
+- Select the” Policy settings” tab, then scroll down to the “Linux event collection” section near the bottom.
+- Check the box for “Process events”, and turn on the “Include session data” toggle.
+- If you want to include file and network alerts in Session View, check the boxes for “Network and File events”.
+- If you want to enable terminal output capture, turn on the “Capture terminal output” toggle.
+For more information about the additional fields collected when this setting is enabled and the usage of Session View for Analysis refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/session-view.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and (
+  (process.name == "runc" and process.args == "run") or
+  (process.name == "ctr" and process.args == "run" and process.args in ("--privileged", "--mount"))
+) and not user.Ext.real.id == "0" and not group.Ext.real.id == "0" and 
+process.interactive == true and process.parent.interactive == true
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Escape to Host
+** ID: T1611
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-cve-2023-4911.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-cve-2023-4911.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7f9339250d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-cve-2023-4911.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-cve-2023-4911]]
+=== Potential Privilege Escalation via CVE-2023-4911
+
+This rule detects potential privilege escalation attempts through Looney Tunables (CVE-2023-4911). Looney Tunables is a buffer overflow vulnerability in GNU C Library's dynamic loader's processing of the GLIBC_TUNABLES environment variable.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2023/10/03/cve-2023-4911-looney-tunables-local-privilege-escalation-in-the-glibcs-ld-so
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Use Case: Vulnerability
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 4
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+Elastic Defend integration does not collect environment variable logging by default.
+In order to capture this behavior, this rule requires a specific configuration option set within the advanced settings of the Elastic Defend integration.
+ #### To set up environment variable capture for an Elastic Agent policy:
+- Go to “Security → Manage → Policies”.
+- Select an “Elastic Agent policy”.
+- Click “Show advanced settings”.
+- Scroll down or search for “linux.advanced.capture_env_vars”.
+- Enter the names of environment variables you want to capture, separated by commas.
+- For this rule the linux.advanced.capture_env_vars variable should be set to "GLIBC_TUNABLES".
+- Click “Save”.
+After saving the integration change, the Elastic Agents running this policy will be updated and the rule will function properly.
+For more information on capturing environment variables refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/environment-variable-capture.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id, process.parent.entity_id, process.executable with maxspan=5s
+ [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and 
+  process.env_vars : "*GLIBC_TUNABLES=glibc.*=glibc.*=*"] with runs=5
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
+** ID: T1068
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-enlightenment.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-enlightenment.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f4fd1833c3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-enlightenment.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-enlightenment]]
+=== Potential Privilege Escalation via Enlightenment
+
+Identifies an attempt to exploit a local privilege escalation CVE-2022-37706 via a flaw in Linux window manager package Enlightenment. enlightenment_sys in Enlightenment before 0.25.4 allows local users to gain privileges because it is setuid root, and the system library function mishandles pathnames that begin with a /dev/.. substring.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2022-37706
+* https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/51180
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Use Case: Vulnerability
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 2
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id, process.parent.entity_id with maxspan=5s
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
+    process.name == "enlightenment_sys" and process.args in ("/bin/mount/", "-o","noexec","nosuid","nodev","uid=*") ]
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "uid_change" and event.type == "change" and user.id == "0"]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
+** ID: T1068
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-installerfiletakeover.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-installerfiletakeover.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c3512a9b35
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-installerfiletakeover.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-installerfiletakeover]]
+=== Potential Privilege Escalation via InstallerFileTakeOver
+
+Identifies a potential exploitation of InstallerTakeOver (CVE-2021-41379) default PoC execution. Successful exploitation allows an unprivileged user to escalate privileges to SYSTEM.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/klinix5/InstallerFileTakeOver
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Use Case: Vulnerability
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Potential Privilege Escalation via InstallerFileTakeOver*
+
+
+InstallerFileTakeOver is a weaponized escalation of privilege proof of concept (EoP PoC) to the CVE-2021-41379 vulnerability. Upon successful exploitation, an unprivileged user will escalate privileges to SYSTEM/NT AUTHORITY.
+
+This rule detects the default execution of the PoC, which overwrites the `elevation_service.exe` DACL and copies itself to the location to escalate privileges. An attacker is able to still take over any file that is not in use (locked), which is outside the scope of this rule.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Look for additional processes spawned by the process, command lines, and network communications.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the file using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Verify whether a digital signature exists in the executable, and if it is valid.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- Suspicious DLL Loaded for Persistence or Privilege Escalation - bfeaf89b-a2a7-48a3-817f-e41829dc61ee
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+    process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name : "System" and
+    (
+      (process.name : "elevation_service.exe" and
+       not process.pe.original_file_name == "elevation_service.exe") or
+      
+      (process.name : "elevation_service.exe" and
+       not process.code_signature.trusted == true) or
+
+      (process.parent.name : "elevation_service.exe" and
+       process.name : ("rundll32.exe", "cmd.exe", "powershell.exe"))
+    ) and
+    not
+    (
+      process.name : "elevation_service.exe" and process.code_signature.trusted == true and
+      process.pe.original_file_name == null
+    )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
+** ID: T1068
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-linux-dac-permissions.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-linux-dac-permissions.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..54103c32f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-linux-dac-permissions.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-linux-dac-permissions]]
+=== Potential Privilege Escalation via Linux DAC permissions
+
+Identifies potential privilege escalation exploitation of DAC (Discretionary access control) file permissions. The rule identifies exploitation of DAC checks on sensitive file paths via suspicious processes whose capabilities include CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE (where a process can bypass all read write and execution checks) or CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH (where a process can read any file or perform any executable permission on the directories).
+
+*Rule type*: new_terms
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 2
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:linux and event.type:start and event.action:exec and
+(process.thread.capabilities.permitted:CAP_DAC_* or process.thread.capabilities.effective: CAP_DAC_*) and
+process.command_line:(*sudoers* or *passwd* or *shadow* or */root/*) and not user.id:"0"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
+** ID: T1068
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-overlayfs.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-overlayfs.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..23ff539e6d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-overlayfs.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-overlayfs]]
+=== Potential Privilege Escalation via OverlayFS
+
+Identifies an attempt to exploit a local privilege escalation (CVE-2023-2640 and CVE-2023-32629) via a flaw in Ubuntu's modifications to OverlayFS. These flaws allow the creation of specialized executables, which, upon execution, grant the ability to escalate privileges to root on the affected machine.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.wiz.io/blog/ubuntu-overlayfs-vulnerability
+* https://twitter.com/liadeliyahu/status/1684841527959273472
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Use Case: Vulnerability
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 5
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by process.parent.entity_id, host.id with maxspan=5s
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and 
+    process.name == "unshare" and process.args : ("-r", "-rm", "m") and process.args : "*cap_setuid*"  and user.id != "0"]
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "uid_change" and event.type == "change" and 
+    user.id == "0"]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
+** ID: T1068
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-pkexec.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-pkexec.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0b277da7d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-pkexec.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-pkexec]]
+=== Potential Privilege Escalation via PKEXEC
+
+Identifies an attempt to exploit a local privilege escalation in polkit pkexec (CVE-2021-4034) via unsecure environment variable injection. Successful exploitation allows an unprivileged user to escalate to the root user.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://seclists.org/oss-sec/2022/q1/80
+* https://haxx.in/files/blasty-vs-pkexec.c
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Use Case: Vulnerability
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and file.path : "/*GCONV_PATH*"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
+** ID: T1068
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Hijack Execution Flow
+** ID: T1574
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable
+** ID: T1574.007
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/007/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-python-cap-setuid.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-python-cap-setuid.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a7f696647d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-python-cap-setuid.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-python-cap-setuid]]
+=== Potential Privilege Escalation via Python cap_setuid
+
+This detection rule monitors for the execution of a system command with setuid or setgid capabilities via Python, followed by a uid or gid change to the root user. This sequence of events may indicate successful privilege escalation. Setuid (Set User ID) and setgid (Set Group ID) are Unix-like OS features that enable processes to run with elevated privileges, based on the file owner or group. Threat actors can exploit these attributes to escalate privileges to the privileges that are set on the binary that is being executed.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows
+the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest to select "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id, process.entity_id with maxspan=1s
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and 
+   process.args : "import os;os.set?id(0);os.system(*)" and process.args : "*python*" and user.id != "0"]
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("uid_change", "gid_change") and event.type == "change" and 
+   (user.id == "0" or group.id == "0")]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
+** ID: T1068
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
+** ID: T1548
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Setuid and Setgid
+** ID: T1548.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-recently-compiled-executable.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-recently-compiled-executable.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ffe75dfc57
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-recently-compiled-executable.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-recently-compiled-executable]]
+=== Potential Privilege Escalation via Recently Compiled Executable
+
+This rule monitors a sequence involving a program compilation event followed by its execution and a subsequent alteration of UID permissions to root privileges. This behavior can potentially indicate the execution of a kernel or software privilege escalation exploit.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Use Case: Vulnerability
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 4
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id with maxspan=1m
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and 
+   process.name in ("gcc", "g++", "cc") and user.id != "0"] by process.args
+  [file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "creation" and event.type == "creation" and 
+   process.name == "ld" and user.id != "0"] by file.name
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and 
+   user.id != "0"] by process.name
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("uid_change", "guid_change") and event.type == "change" and 
+   user.id == "0"] by process.name
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
+** ID: T1068
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-uid-int-max-bug-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-uid-int-max-bug-detected.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1d3bf049c5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-uid-int-max-bug-detected.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-uid-int-max-bug-detected]]
+=== Potential Privilege Escalation via UID INT_MAX Bug Detected
+
+This rule monitors for the execution of the systemd-run command by a user with a UID that is larger than the maximum allowed UID size (INT_MAX). Some older Linux versions were affected by a bug which allows user accounts with a UID greater than INT_MAX to escalate privileges by spawning a shell through systemd-run.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://twitter.com/paragonsec/status/1071152249529884674
+* https://github.com/mirchr/security-research/blob/master/vulnerabilities/CVE-2018-19788.sh
+* https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/polkit/polkit/-/issues/74
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+
+*Version*: 5
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and 
+process.name == "systemd-run" and process.args == "-t" and process.args_count >= 3 and user.id >= "1000000000"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
+** ID: T1068
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privileged-escalation-via-samaccountname-spoofing.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privileged-escalation-via-samaccountname-spoofing.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..98237d4fd7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privileged-escalation-via-samaccountname-spoofing.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privileged-escalation-via-samaccountname-spoofing]]
+=== Potential Privileged Escalation via SamAccountName Spoofing
+
+Identifies a suspicious computer account name rename event, which may indicate an attempt to exploit CVE-2021-42278 to elevate privileges from a standard domain user to a user with domain admin privileges. CVE-2021-42278 is a security vulnerability that allows potential attackers to impersonate a domain controller via samAccountName attribute spoofing.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-system.*
+* logs-windows.*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5008102-active-directory-security-accounts-manager-hardening-changes-cve-2021-42278-5975b463-4c95-45e1-831a-d120004e258e
+* https://cloudbrothers.info/en/exploit-kerberos-samaccountname-spoofing/
+* https://github.com/cube0x0/noPac
+* https://twitter.com/exploitph/status/1469157138928914432
+* https://exploit.ph/cve-2021-42287-cve-2021-42278-weaponisation.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring
+* Data Source: Active Directory
+* Use Case: Vulnerability
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+iam where event.action == "renamed-user-account" and
+  /* machine account name renamed to user like account name */
+  winlog.event_data.OldTargetUserName : "*$" and not winlog.event_data.NewTargetUserName : "*$"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
+** ID: T1068
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Valid Accounts
+** ID: T1078
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Domain Accounts
+** ID: T1078.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Account Manipulation
+** ID: T1098
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-process-injection-via-powershell.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-process-injection-via-powershell.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7c79349de1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-process-injection-via-powershell.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-process-injection-via-powershell]]
+=== Potential Process Injection via PowerShell
+
+Detects the use of Windows API functions that are commonly abused by malware and security tools to load malicious code or inject it into remote processes.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/data/module_source/management/Invoke-PSInject.ps1
+* https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/data/module_source/management/Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection.ps1
+* https://github.com/BC-SECURITY/Empire/blob/master/empire/server/data/module_source/credentials/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/detect-credential-access
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: PowerShell Logs
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Potential Process Injection via PowerShell*
+
+
+PowerShell is one of the main tools system administrators use for automation, report routines, and other tasks. This makes it available for use in various environments, and creates an attractive way for attackers to execute code.
+
+PowerShell also has solid capabilities to make the interaction with the Win32 API in an uncomplicated and reliable way, like the execution of inline C# code, PSReflect, Get-ProcAddress, etc.
+
+Red Team tooling and malware developers take advantage of these capabilities to develop stagers and loaders that inject payloads directly into the memory without touching the disk to circumvent file-based security protections.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Examine the script content that triggered the detection; look for suspicious DLL imports, collection or exfiltration capabilities, suspicious functions, encoded or compressed data, and other potentially malicious characteristics.
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Examine file or network events from the involved PowerShell process for suspicious behavior.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Evaluate whether the user needs to use PowerShell to complete tasks.
+- Check if the imported function was executed and which process it targeted.
+- Check if the injected code can be retrieved (hardcoded in the script or on command line logs).
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- PowerShell PSReflect Script - 56f2e9b5-4803-4e44-a0a4-a52dc79d57fe
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Restrict PowerShell usage outside of IT and engineering business units using GPOs, AppLocker, Intune, or similar software.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Administrative Templates >
+Windows PowerShell >
+Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging (Enable)
+```
+
+Steps to implement the logging policy via registry:
+
+```
+reg add "hklm\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging" /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 1
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:windows and
+  powershell.file.script_block_text : (
+   (VirtualAlloc or VirtualAllocEx or VirtualProtect or LdrLoadDll or LoadLibrary or LoadLibraryA or
+      LoadLibraryEx or GetProcAddress or OpenProcess or OpenProcessToken or AdjustTokenPrivileges) and
+   (WriteProcessMemory or CreateRemoteThread or NtCreateThreadEx or CreateThread or QueueUserAPC or
+      SuspendThread or ResumeThread or GetDelegateForFunctionPointer)
+  ) and not 
+  (user.id:("S-1-5-18" or "S-1-5-19") and
+   file.directory: "C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection\\SenseCM")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Process Injection
+** ID: T1055
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Dynamic-link Library Injection
+** ID: T1055.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Portable Executable Injection
+** ID: T1055.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Native API
+** ID: T1106
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-protocol-tunneling-via-chisel-client.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-protocol-tunneling-via-chisel-client.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..416bf07b1c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-protocol-tunneling-via-chisel-client.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-protocol-tunneling-via-chisel-client]]
+=== Potential Protocol Tunneling via Chisel Client
+
+This rule monitors for common command line flags leveraged by the Chisel client utility followed by a connection attempt. Chisel is a command-line utility used for creating and managing TCP and UDP tunnels, enabling port forwarding and secure communication between machines. Attackers can abuse the Chisel utility to establish covert communication channels, bypass network restrictions, and carry out malicious activities by creating tunnels that allow unauthorized access to internal systems.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://blog.bitsadmin.com/living-off-the-foreign-land-windows-as-offensive-platform
+* https://book.hacktricks.xyz/generic-methodologies-and-resources/tunneling-and-port-forwarding
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Command and Control
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 5
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Potential Protocol Tunneling via Chisel Client*
+
+
+Attackers can leverage `chisel` to clandestinely tunnel network communications and evade security measures, potentially gaining unauthorized access to sensitive systems.
+
+This rule looks for a sequence of command line arguments that are consistent with `chisel` client tunneling behavior, followed by a network event by an uncommon process. 
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html[placeholder fields] to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Identify any signs of suspicious network activity or anomalies that may indicate protocol tunneling. This could include unexpected traffic patterns or unusual network behavior.
+  - Investigate listening ports and open sockets to look for potential protocol tunneling, reverse shells, or data exfiltration.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Listening Ports","query":"SELECT pid, address, port, socket, protocol, path FROM listening_ports"}}
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Open Sockets","query":"SELECT pid, family, remote_address, remote_port, socket, state FROM process_open_sockets"}}
+- Identify the user account that performed the action, analyze it, and check whether it should perform this kind of action.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific User","query":"SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = {{user.name}}"}}
+- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Investigate the Account Authentication Status","query":"SELECT * FROM logged_in_users WHERE user = {{user.name}}"}}
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User","query":"SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"}}
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Process Info","query":"SELECT name, cmdline, parent, path, uid FROM processes"}}
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- Potential Protocol Tunneling via Chisel Server - ac8805f6-1e08-406c-962e-3937057fa86f
+- Potential Linux Tunneling and/or Port Forwarding - 6ee947e9-de7e-4281-a55d-09289bdf947e
+- Potential Protocol Tunneling via EarthWorm - 9f1c4ca3-44b5-481d-ba42-32dc215a2769
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+- If this activity is related to a system administrator or developer who uses port tunneling for benign purposes, consider adding exceptions for specific user accounts or hosts. 
+- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors, such as reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers, that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id, process.entity_id with maxspan=1s
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and 
+   process.args == "client" and process.args : ("R*", "*:*", "*socks*", "*.*") and process.args_count >= 4 and 
+   process.parent.name in ("bash", "dash", "ash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish")]
+  [network where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "connection_attempted" and event.type == "start" and 
+   destination.ip != null and destination.ip != "127.0.0.1" and destination.ip != "::1" and 
+   not process.name : (
+     "python*", "php*", "perl", "ruby", "lua*", "openssl", "nc", "netcat", "ncat", "telnet", "awk", "java", "telnet",
+     "ftp", "socat", "curl", "wget", "dpkg", "docker", "dockerd", "yum", "apt", "rpm", "dnf", "ssh", "sshd")]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Protocol Tunneling
+** ID: T1572
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-protocol-tunneling-via-chisel-server.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-protocol-tunneling-via-chisel-server.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..407ceed318
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-protocol-tunneling-via-chisel-server.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-protocol-tunneling-via-chisel-server]]
+=== Potential Protocol Tunneling via Chisel Server
+
+This rule monitors for common command line flags leveraged by the Chisel server utility followed by a received connection within a timespan of 1 minute. Chisel is a command-line utility used for creating and managing TCP and UDP tunnels, enabling port forwarding and secure communication between machines. Attackers can abuse the Chisel utility to establish covert communication channels, bypass network restrictions, and carry out malicious activities by creating tunnels that allow unauthorized access to internal systems.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://blog.bitsadmin.com/living-off-the-foreign-land-windows-as-offensive-platform
+* https://book.hacktricks.xyz/generic-methodologies-and-resources/tunneling-and-port-forwarding
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Command and Control
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 6
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Potential Protocol Tunneling via Chisel Server*
+
+
+Attackers can leverage `chisel` to clandestinely tunnel network communications and evade security measures, potentially gaining unauthorized access to sensitive systems.
+
+This rule looks for a sequence of command line arguments that are consistent with `chisel` server tunneling behavior, followed by a network event by an uncommon process. 
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html[placeholder fields] to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Identify any signs of suspicious network activity or anomalies that may indicate protocol tunneling. This could include unexpected traffic patterns or unusual network behavior.
+  - Investigate listening ports and open sockets to look for potential protocol tunneling, reverse shells, or data exfiltration.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Listening Ports","query":"SELECT pid, address, port, socket, protocol, path FROM listening_ports"}}
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Open Sockets","query":"SELECT pid, family, remote_address, remote_port, socket, state FROM process_open_sockets"}}
+- Identify the user account that performed the action, analyze it, and check whether it should perform this kind of action.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific User","query":"SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = {{user.name}}"}}
+- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Investigate the Account Authentication Status","query":"SELECT * FROM logged_in_users WHERE user = {{user.name}}"}}
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User","query":"SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"}}
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Process Info","query":"SELECT name, cmdline, parent, path, uid FROM processes"}}
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- Potential Protocol Tunneling via Chisel Client - 3f12325a-4cc6-410b-8d4c-9fbbeb744cfd
+- Potential Linux Tunneling and/or Port Forwarding - 6ee947e9-de7e-4281-a55d-09289bdf947e
+- Potential Protocol Tunneling via EarthWorm - 9f1c4ca3-44b5-481d-ba42-32dc215a2769
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+- If this activity is related to a system administrator or developer who uses port tunneling for benign purposes, consider adding exceptions for specific user accounts or hosts. 
+- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors, such as reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers, that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id, process.entity_id with maxspan=1m
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and 
+   process.args == "server" and process.args in ("--port", "-p", "--reverse", "--backend", "--socks5") and 
+   process.args_count >= 3 and process.parent.name in ("bash", "dash", "ash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish")]
+  [network where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "connection_accepted" and 
+   destination.ip != null and destination.ip != "127.0.0.1" and destination.ip != "::1" and 
+   not process.name : (
+     "python*", "php*", "perl", "ruby", "lua*", "openssl", "nc", "netcat", "ncat", "telnet", "awk", "java", "telnet",
+     "ftp", "socat", "curl", "wget", "dpkg", "docker", "dockerd", "yum", "apt", "rpm", "dnf", "ssh", "sshd", "hugo")]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Protocol Tunneling
+** ID: T1572
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-protocol-tunneling-via-earthworm.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-protocol-tunneling-via-earthworm.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a23950bc18
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-protocol-tunneling-via-earthworm.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-protocol-tunneling-via-earthworm]]
+=== Potential Protocol Tunneling via EarthWorm
+
+Identifies the execution of the EarthWorm tunneler. Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection and network filtering, or to enable access to otherwise unreachable systems.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* http://rootkiter.com/EarthWorm/
+* https://decoded.avast.io/luigicamastra/apt-group-targeting-governmental-agencies-in-east-asia/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Command and Control
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Potential Protocol Tunneling via EarthWorm*
+
+
+Attackers can leverage `earthworm` to clandestinely tunnel network communications and evade security measures, potentially gaining unauthorized access to sensitive systems.
+
+This rule looks for several command line arguments that are consistent with `earthworm` tunneling behavior. 
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html[placeholder fields] to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Identify any signs of suspicious network activity or anomalies that may indicate protocol tunneling. This could include unexpected traffic patterns or unusual network behavior.
+  - Investigate listening ports and open sockets to look for potential protocol tunneling, reverse shells, or data exfiltration.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Listening Ports","query":"SELECT pid, address, port, socket, protocol, path FROM listening_ports"}}
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Open Sockets","query":"SELECT pid, family, remote_address, remote_port, socket, state FROM process_open_sockets"}}
+- Identify the user account that performed the action, analyze it, and check whether it should perform this kind of action.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific User","query":"SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = {{user.name}}"}}
+- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Investigate the Account Authentication Status","query":"SELECT * FROM logged_in_users WHERE user = {{user.name}}"}}
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User","query":"SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"}}
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Process Info","query":"SELECT name, cmdline, parent, path, uid FROM processes"}}
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- Potential Protocol Tunneling via Chisel Client - 3f12325a-4cc6-410b-8d4c-9fbbeb744cfd
+- Potential Protocol Tunneling via Chisel Server - ac8805f6-1e08-406c-962e-3937057fa86f
+- Potential Linux Tunneling and/or Port Forwarding - 6ee947e9-de7e-4281-a55d-09289bdf947e
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+- If this activity is related to a system administrator or developer who uses port tunneling for benign purposes, consider adding exceptions for specific user accounts or hosts. 
+- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors, such as reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers, that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in either from Elastic Defend, or Auditbeat integration.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Auditbeat Setup*
+
+Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit the activities of users and processes on your systems. For example, you can use Auditbeat to collect and centralize audit events from the Linux Audit Framework. You can also use Auditbeat to detect changes to critical files, like binaries and configuration files, and identify potential security policy violations.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Auditbeat on a Linux System:*
+
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setup-repositories.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-docker.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html[helper guide].
+- For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Custom Ingest Pipeline*
+
+For versions <8.2, you need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate `event.ingested` with @timestamp for non-elastic-agent indexes, like auditbeats/filebeat/winlogbeat etc. For more details to add a custom ingest pipeline refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html[guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and
+ process.args : "-s" and process.args : "-d" and process.args : "rssocks"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Protocol Tunneling
+** ID: T1572
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-pspy-process-monitoring-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-pspy-process-monitoring-detected.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2fe34499dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-pspy-process-monitoring-detected.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-pspy-process-monitoring-detected]]
+=== Potential Pspy Process Monitoring Detected
+
+This rule leverages auditd to monitor for processes scanning different processes within the /proc directory using the openat syscall. This is a strong indication for the usage of the pspy utility. Attackers may leverage the pspy process monitoring utility to monitor system processes without requiring root permissions, in order to find potential privilege escalation vectors.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/DominicBreuker/pspy
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Discovery
+
+*Version*: 7
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Auditd Manager.
+
+
+*Auditd Manager Integration Setup*
+
+The Auditd Manager Integration receives audit events from the Linux Audit Framework which is a part of the Linux kernel.
+Auditd Manager provides a user-friendly interface and automation capabilities for configuring and monitoring system auditing through the auditd daemon. With `auditd_manager`, administrators can easily define audit rules, track system events, and generate comprehensive audit reports, improving overall security and compliance in the system.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Agent System integration "auditd_manager" on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click “Add integrations”.
+- In the query bar, search for “Auditd Manager” and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click “Add Auditd Manager”.
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Review optional and advanced settings accordingly.
+- Add the newly installed “auditd manager” to an existing or a new agent policy, and deploy the agent on a Linux system from which auditd log files are desirable.
+- Click “Save and Continue”.
+- For more details on the integration refer to the https://docs.elastic.co/integrations/auditd_manager[helper guide].
+
+
+*Rule Specific Setup Note*
+
+Auditd Manager subscribes to the kernel and receives events as they occur without any additional configuration.
+However, if more advanced configuration is required to detect specific behavior, audit rules can be added to the integration in either the "audit rules" configuration box or the "auditd rule files" box by specifying a file to read the audit rules from.
+- For this detection rule the following additional audit rules are required to be added to the integration:
+  -- "-w /proc/ -p r -k audit_proc"
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by process.pid, host.id with maxspan=5s
+  [file where host.os.type == "linux" and auditd.data.syscall == "openat" and file.path == "/proc" and
+   auditd.data.a0 : ("ffffffffffffff9c", "ffffff9c") and auditd.data.a2 : ("80000", "88000") ] with runs=10
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Discovery
+** ID: TA0007
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Process Discovery
+** ID: T1057
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057/
+* Technique:
+** Name: System Information Discovery
+** ID: T1082
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-remote-code-execution-via-web-server.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-remote-code-execution-via-web-server.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..71cd72b004
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-remote-code-execution-via-web-server.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-remote-code-execution-via-web-server]]
+=== Potential Remote Code Execution via Web Server
+
+Identifies suspicious commands executed via a web server, which may suggest a vulnerability and remote shell access. Attackers may exploit a vulnerability in a web application to execute commands via a web server, or place a backdoor file that can be abused to gain code execution as a mechanism for persistence.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://pentestlab.blog/tag/web-shell/
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/elastic-response-to-the-the-spring4shell-vulnerability-cve-2022-22965
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Initial Access
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Use Case: Vulnerability
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 7
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Potential Remote Code Execution via Web Server*
+
+
+Adversaries may backdoor web servers with web shells to establish persistent access to systems. A web shell is a malicious script, often embedded into a compromised web server, that grants an attacker remote access and control over the server. This enables the execution of arbitrary commands, data exfiltration, and further exploitation of the target network.
+
+This rule detects a web server process spawning script and command line interface programs, potentially indicating attackers executing commands using the web shell.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html[placeholder fields] to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate abnormal behaviors by the subject process such as network connections, file modifications, and any other spawned child processes.
+  - Investigate listening ports and open sockets to look for potential reverse shells or data exfiltration.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Listening Ports","query":"SELECT pid, address, port, socket, protocol, path FROM listening_ports"}}
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Open Sockets","query":"SELECT pid, family, remote_address, remote_port, socket, state FROM process_open_sockets"}}
+  - Investigate the process information for malicious or uncommon processes/process trees.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Process Info","query":"SELECT name, cmdline, parent, path, uid FROM processes"}}
+  - Investigate the process tree spawned from the user that is used to run the web application service. A user that is running a web application should not spawn other child processes.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Process Info for Webapp User","query":"SELECT name, cmdline, parent, path, uid FROM processes WHERE uid = {{process.user.id}}"}}
+- Examine the command line to determine which commands or scripts were executed.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+  - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+    - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+      - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+        - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+        - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+      - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+      - Cron jobs, services and other persistence mechanisms.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Crontab Information","query":"SELECT * FROM crontab"}}
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Any activity that triggered the alert and is not inherently malicious must be monitored by the security team.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and
+event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and process.parent.executable : (
+  "/usr/sbin/nginx", "/usr/local/sbin/nginx",
+  "/usr/sbin/apache", "/usr/local/sbin/apache",
+  "/usr/sbin/apache2", "/usr/local/sbin/apache2",
+  "/usr/sbin/php*", "/usr/local/sbin/php*",
+  "/usr/sbin/lighttpd", "/usr/local/sbin/lighttpd",
+  "/usr/sbin/hiawatha", "/usr/local/sbin/hiawatha",
+  "/usr/local/bin/caddy", 
+  "/usr/local/lsws/bin/lswsctrl",
+  "*/bin/catalina.sh"
+) and
+process.name : (
+  "bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish", "python*", "php*", "perl", "ruby", "lua*", "openssl", "nc",
+  "netcat", "ncat", "telnet", "awk", "socat"
+  ) and process.args : (
+  "whoami", "id", "uname", "cat", "hostname", "ip", "curl", "wget", "pwd", "ls", "cd", "python*", "php*", "perl",
+  "ruby", "lua*", "openssl", "nc", "netcat", "ncat", "telnet", "awk", "socat"
+  ) and not process.name == "phpquery"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Server Software Component
+** ID: T1505
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Web Shell
+** ID: T1505.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Initial Access
+** ID: TA0001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploit Public-Facing Application
+** ID: T1190
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-remote-credential-access-via-registry.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-remote-credential-access-via-registry.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..31b9d7872a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-remote-credential-access-via-registry.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-remote-credential-access-via-registry]]
+=== Potential Remote Credential Access via Registry
+
+Identifies remote access to the registry to potentially dump credential data from the Security Account Manager (SAM) registry hive in preparation for credential access and privileges elevation.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/master/examples/secretsdump.py
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/detect-credential-access
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Potential Remote Credential Access via Registry*
+
+
+Dumping registry hives is a common way to access credential information. Some hives store credential material, such as the SAM hive, which stores locally cached credentials (SAM secrets), and the SECURITY hive, which stores domain cached credentials (LSA secrets). Dumping these hives in combination with the SYSTEM hive enables the attacker to decrypt these secrets.
+
+Attackers can use tools like secretsdump.py or CrackMapExec to dump the registry hives remotely, and use dumped credentials to access other systems in the domain.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Identify the specifics of the involved assets, such as their role, criticality, and associated users.
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Determine the privileges of the compromised accounts.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/source host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (e.g., 4624) to the target host.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Any activity that triggered the alert and is not inherently malicious must be monitored by the security team.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- Credential Acquisition via Registry Hive Dumping - a7e7bfa3-088e-4f13-b29e-3986e0e756b8
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Determine if other hosts were compromised.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Reimage the host operating system or restore the compromised files to clean versions.
+- Ensure that the machine has the latest security updates and is not running unsupported Windows versions.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule uses Elastic Endpoint file creation and system integration events for correlation. Both data should be collected from the host for this detection to work.
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "windows" and
+  event.action == "creation" and process.name : "svchost.exe" and
+  file.Ext.header_bytes : "72656766*" and user.id : ("S-1-5-21-*", "S-1-12-1-*") and file.size >= 30000 and
+  file.path : ("?:\\Windows\\system32\\*.tmp", "?:\\WINDOWS\\Temp\\*.tmp")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Security Account Manager
+** ID: T1003.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote Services
+** ID: T1021
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-remote-desktop-shadowing-activity.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-remote-desktop-shadowing-activity.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a47524fce6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-remote-desktop-shadowing-activity.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-remote-desktop-shadowing-activity]]
+=== Potential Remote Desktop Shadowing Activity
+
+Identifies the modification of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) Shadow registry or the execution of processes indicative of an active RDP shadowing session. An adversary may abuse the RDP Shadowing feature to spy on or control other users active RDP sessions.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://bitsadm.in/blog/spying-on-users-using-rdp-shadowing
+* https://swarm.ptsecurity.com/remote-desktop-services-shadowing/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+/* Identifies the modification of RDP Shadow registry or
+  the execution of processes indicative of active shadow RDP session */
+
+any where host.os.type == "windows" and
+(
+  (event.category == "registry" and
+     registry.path : (
+      "HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\Terminal Services\\Shadow",
+      "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\Terminal Services\\Shadow"
+    )
+  ) or
+  (event.category == "process" and event.type == "start" and
+     (process.name : ("RdpSaUacHelper.exe", "RdpSaProxy.exe") and process.parent.name : "svchost.exe") or
+     (process.pe.original_file_name : "mstsc.exe" and process.args : "/shadow:*")
+  )
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote Services
+** ID: T1021
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Remote Desktop Protocol
+** ID: T1021.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-remote-desktop-tunneling-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-remote-desktop-tunneling-detected.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7a163ac8b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-remote-desktop-tunneling-detected.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-remote-desktop-tunneling-detected]]
+=== Potential Remote Desktop Tunneling Detected
+
+Identifies potential use of an SSH utility to establish RDP over a reverse SSH Tunnel. This can be used by attackers to enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://blog.netspi.com/how-to-access-rdp-over-a-reverse-ssh-tunnel/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Command and Control
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Potential Remote Desktop Tunneling Detected*
+
+
+Protocol Tunneling is a mechanism that involves explicitly encapsulating a protocol within another for various use cases, ranging from providing an outer layer of encryption (similar to a VPN) to enabling traffic that network appliances would filter to reach their destination.
+
+Attackers may tunnel Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) traffic through other protocols like Secure Shell (SSH) to bypass network restrictions that block incoming RDP connections but may be more permissive to other protocols.
+
+This rule looks for command lines involving the `3389` port, which RDP uses by default and options commonly associated with tools that perform tunneling.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Contact the account and system owners and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
+- Examine network data to determine if the host communicated with external servers using the tunnel.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+- Investigate the command line for the execution of programs that are unrelated to tunneling, like Remote Desktop clients.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Take the necessary actions to disable the tunneling, which can be a process kill, service deletion, registry key modification, etc. Inspect the host to learn which method was used and to determine a response for the case.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  /* RDP port and usual SSH tunneling related switches in command line */
+  process.args : "*:3389" and
+  process.args : ("-L", "-P", "-R", "-pw", "-ssh")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Protocol Tunneling
+** ID: T1572
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote Services
+** ID: T1021
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: SSH
+** ID: T1021.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell-activity-via-terminal.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell-activity-via-terminal.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..793c36ce8c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell-activity-via-terminal.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell-activity-via-terminal]]
+=== Potential Reverse Shell Activity via Terminal
+
+Identifies the execution of a shell process with suspicious arguments which may be indicative of reverse shell activity.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Methodology%20and%20Resources/Reverse%20Shell%20Cheatsheet.md
+* https://github.com/WangYihang/Reverse-Shell-Manager
+* https://www.netsparker.com/blog/web-security/understanding-reverse-shells/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Potential Reverse Shell Activity via Terminal*
+
+
+A reverse shell is a mechanism that's abused to connect back to an attacker-controlled system. It effectively redirects the system's input and output and delivers a fully functional remote shell to the attacker. Even private systems are vulnerable since the connection is outgoing. This activity is typically the result of vulnerability exploitation, malware infection, or penetration testing.
+
+This rule identifies commands that are potentially related to reverse shell activities using shell applications.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Examine the command line and extract the target domain or IP address information.
+  - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+  - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+  - Scope other potentially compromised hosts in your environment by mapping hosts that also communicated with the domain or IP address.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate any abnormal account behavior, such as command executions, file creations or modifications, and network connections.
+- Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process such as network connections, file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Any activity that triggered the alert and is not inherently malicious must be monitored by the security team.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Take actions to terminate processes and connections used by the attacker.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and
+  process.name in ("sh", "bash", "zsh", "dash", "zmodload") and
+  process.args : ("*/dev/tcp/*", "*/dev/udp/*", "*zsh/net/tcp*", "*zsh/net/udp*") and
+
+  /* noisy FPs */
+  not (process.parent.name : "timeout" and process.executable : "/var/lib/docker/overlay*") and
+  not process.command_line : (
+    "*/dev/tcp/sirh_db/*", "*/dev/tcp/remoteiot.com/*", "*dev/tcp/elk.stag.one/*", "*dev/tcp/kafka/*",
+    "*/dev/tcp/$0/$1*", "*/dev/tcp/127.*", "*/dev/udp/127.*", "*/dev/tcp/localhost/*", "*/dev/tcp/itom-vault/*") and
+  not process.parent.command_line : "runc init"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell-via-background-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell-via-background-process.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2dd7aa9699
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell-via-background-process.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell-via-background-process]]
+=== Potential Reverse Shell via Background Process
+
+Monitors for the execution of background processes with process arguments capable of opening a socket in the /dev/tcp channel. This may indicate the creation of a backdoor reverse connection, and should be investigated further.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+
+*Version*: 4
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and 
+process.name in ("setsid", "nohup") and process.args : "*/dev/tcp/*0>&1*" and 
+process.parent.name in ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Unix Shell
+** ID: T1059.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Application Layer Protocol
+** ID: T1071
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell-via-child.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell-via-child.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8cd2eef23d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell-via-child.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell-via-child]]
+=== Potential Reverse Shell via Child
+
+This detection rule identifies suspicious network traffic patterns associated with TCP reverse shell activity. This activity consists of a network event that is followed by the creation of a shell process with suspicious command line arguments. An attacker may establish a Linux TCP reverse shell to gain remote access to a target system.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Methodology%20and%20Resources/Reverse%20Shell%20Cheatsheet.md
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 2
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows
+the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click Add integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Elastic Defend and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click Add Elastic Defend.
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either Traditional Endpoints or Cloud Workloads.
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest to select "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in New agent policy name. If other agent policies already exist, you can click the Existing hosts tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click Save and Continue.
+- To complete the integration, select Add Elastic Agent to your hosts and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id, process.entity_id with maxspan=5s
+  [network where event.type == "start" and event.action in ("connection_attempted", "connection_accepted") and 
+   process.name : ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish", "socat") and destination.ip != null and 
+   not cidrmatch(destination.ip, "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "224.0.0.0/4", "::1")]
+  [process where event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and 
+   process.name in ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish") and (
+     (process.args : ("-i", "-l")) or (process.parent.name == "socat" and process.parent.args : "*exec*")
+   )]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Unix Shell
+** ID: T1059.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Application Layer Protocol
+** ID: T1071
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell-via-java.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell-via-java.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8d9875ad6e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell-via-java.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell-via-java]]
+=== Potential Reverse Shell via Java
+
+This detection rule identifies the execution of a Linux shell process from a Java JAR application post an incoming network connection. This behavior may indicate reverse shell activity via a Java application.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Methodology%20and%20Resources/Reverse%20Shell%20Cheatsheet.md
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 8
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id with maxspan=5s
+  [network where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("connection_accepted", "connection_attempted") and 
+   process.executable : ("/usr/bin/java", "/bin/java", "/usr/lib/jvm/*", "/usr/java/*") and 
+   not (destination.ip == null or destination.ip == "0.0.0.0" or cidrmatch(
+     destination.ip, "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.0.0.0/24", "192.0.0.0/29",
+     "192.0.0.8/32", "192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.0.10/32", "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32", "192.0.2.0/24",
+     "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "100.64.0.0/10",
+     "192.175.48.0/24","198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "240.0.0.0/4", "::1", "FE80::/10",
+     "FF00::/8"
+    )
+  )] by process.entity_id
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "exec" and 
+   process.parent.executable : ("/usr/bin/java", "/bin/java", "/usr/lib/jvm/*", "/usr/java/*") and
+   process.parent.args : "-jar" and process.name in ("bash", "dash", "ash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish")
+   and not process.parent.args in (
+     "/usr/share/java/jenkins.war", "/etc/remote-iot/services/remoteiot.jar",
+     "/usr/lib64/NetExtender.jar", "/usr/lib/jenkins/jenkins.war"
+   )] by process.parent.entity_id
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Unix Shell
+** ID: T1059.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Application Layer Protocol
+** ID: T1071
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell-via-suspicious-binary.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell-via-suspicious-binary.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..45a0e4e0e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell-via-suspicious-binary.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell-via-suspicious-binary]]
+=== Potential Reverse Shell via Suspicious Binary
+
+This detection rule detects the creation of a shell through a chain consisting of the execution of a suspicious binary (located in a commonly abused location or executed manually) followed by a network event and ending with a shell being spawned. Stageless reverse tcp shells display this behaviour. Attackers may spawn reverse shells to establish persistence onto a target system.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Methodology%20and%20Resources/Reverse%20Shell%20Cheatsheet.md
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 7
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id, process.entity_id with maxspan=1s
+[ process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
+  process.executable : (
+  "./*", "/tmp/*", "/var/tmp/*", "/var/www/*", "/dev/shm/*", "/etc/init.d/*", "/etc/rc*.d/*",
+  "/etc/crontab", "/etc/cron.*", "/etc/update-motd.d/*", "/usr/lib/update-notifier/*",
+  "/boot/*", "/srv/*", "/run/*", "/root/*", "/etc/rc.local"
+   ) and
+  process.parent.name : ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish") and not
+  process.name : ("curl", "wget", "ping", "apt", "dpkg", "yum", "rpm", "dnf", "dockerd") ]
+[ network where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("connection_attempted", "connection_accepted") and
+  process.executable : (
+  "./*", "/tmp/*", "/var/tmp/*", "/var/www/*", "/dev/shm/*", "/etc/init.d/*", "/etc/rc*.d/*",
+  "/etc/crontab", "/etc/cron.*", "/etc/update-motd.d/*", "/usr/lib/update-notifier/*",
+  "/boot/*", "/srv/*", "/run/*", "/root/*", "/etc/rc.local"
+   ) and destination.ip != null and destination.ip != "127.0.0.1" and destination.ip != "::1" ]
+[ process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and 
+  process.name : ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish") and 
+  process.parent.name : ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish") ]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Unix Shell
+** ID: T1059.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Application Layer Protocol
+** ID: T1071
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell-via-suspicious-child-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell-via-suspicious-child-process.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..51dc1a4071
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell-via-suspicious-child-process.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell-via-suspicious-child-process]]
+=== Potential Reverse Shell via Suspicious Child Process
+
+This detection rule detects the creation of a shell through a suspicious process chain. Any reverse shells spawned by the specified utilities that are initialized from a single process followed by a network connection attempt will be captured through this rule. Attackers may spawn reverse shells to establish persistence onto a target system.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Methodology%20and%20Resources/Reverse%20Shell%20Cheatsheet.md
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 9
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id, process.entity_id with maxspan=1s
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "fork") and (
+    (process.name : "python*" and process.args : "-c" and process.args : (
+     "*import*pty*spawn*", "*import*subprocess*call*"
+    )) or
+    (process.name : "perl*" and process.args : "-e" and process.args : "*socket*" and process.args : (
+     "*exec*", "*system*"
+    )) or
+    (process.name : "ruby*" and process.args : ("-e", "-rsocket") and process.args : (
+     "*TCPSocket.new*", "*TCPSocket.open*"
+     )) or
+    (process.name : "lua*" and process.args : "-e" and process.args : "*socket.tcp*" and process.args : (
+     "*io.popen*", "*os.execute*"
+    )) or
+    (process.name : "php*" and process.args : "-r" and process.args : "*fsockopen*" and process.args : "*/bin/*sh*") or 
+    (process.name : ("awk", "gawk", "mawk", "nawk") and process.args : "*/inet/tcp/*") or
+    (process.name : "openssl" and process.args : "-connect") or
+    (process.name : ("nc", "ncat", "netcat") and process.args == "-e" and process.args_count >= 3 and 
+     not process.args == "-z") or
+    (process.name : "telnet" and process.args_count >= 3)
+  ) and process.parent.name : (
+    "bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish", "python*", "php*", "perl", "ruby", "lua*",
+    "openssl", "nc", "netcat", "ncat", "telnet", "awk")]
+  [network where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("connection_attempted", "connection_accepted") and 
+    process.name : ("python*", "php*", "perl", "ruby", "lua*", "openssl", "nc", "netcat", "ncat", "telnet", "awk") and 
+    destination.ip != null and not cidrmatch(destination.ip, "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "224.0.0.0/4", "::1")]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Unix Shell
+** ID: T1059.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Application Layer Protocol
+** ID: T1071
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell-via-udp.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell-via-udp.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0fbef078e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell-via-udp.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell-via-udp]]
+=== Potential Reverse Shell via UDP
+
+This detection rule identifies suspicious network traffic patterns associated with UDP reverse shell activity. This activity consists of a sample of an execve, socket and connect syscall executed by the same process, where the auditd.data.a0-1 indicate a UDP connection, ending with an egress connection event. An attacker may establish a Linux UDP reverse shell to bypass traditional firewall restrictions and gain remote access to a target system covertly.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Methodology%20and%20Resources/Reverse%20Shell%20Cheatsheet.md
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+
+*Version*: 6
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
+- Auditbeat
+- Auditd Manager
+
+
+*Auditbeat Setup*
+
+Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit the activities of users and processes on your systems. For example, you can use Auditbeat to collect and centralize audit events from the Linux Audit Framework. You can also use Auditbeat to detect changes to critical files, like binaries and configuration files, and identify potential security policy violations.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Auditbeat on a Linux System:*
+
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setup-repositories.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-docker.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html[helper guide].
+- For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Auditd Manager Integration Setup*
+
+The Auditd Manager Integration receives audit events from the Linux Audit Framework which is a part of the Linux kernel.
+Auditd Manager provides a user-friendly interface and automation capabilities for configuring and monitoring system auditing through the auditd daemon. With `auditd_manager`, administrators can easily define audit rules, track system events, and generate comprehensive audit reports, improving overall security and compliance in the system.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Agent System integration "auditd_manager" on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click “Add integrations”.
+- In the query bar, search for “Auditd Manager” and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click “Add Auditd Manager”.
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Review optional and advanced settings accordingly.
+- Add the newly installed “auditd manager” to an existing or a new agent policy, and deploy the agent on a Linux system from which auditd log files are desirable.
+- Click “Save and Continue”.
+- For more details on the integration refer to the https://docs.elastic.co/integrations/auditd_manager[helper guide].
+
+
+*Rule Specific Setup Note*
+
+Auditd Manager subscribes to the kernel and receives events as they occur without any additional configuration.
+However, if more advanced configuration is required to detect specific behavior, audit rules can be added to the integration in either the "audit rules" configuration box or the "auditd rule files" box by specifying a file to read the audit rules from.
+- For this detection rule no additional audit rules are required to be added to the integration.
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sample by host.id, process.pid, process.parent.pid
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "executed" and process.name : (
+    "bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish", "perl", "python*", "nc", "ncat", "netcat", "php*",
+    "ruby", "openssl", "awk", "telnet", "lua*", "socat"
+    )]
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and auditd.data.syscall == "socket" and process.name : (
+    "bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish", "perl", "python*", "nc", "ncat", "netcat", "php*",
+    "ruby", "openssl", "awk", "telnet", "lua*", "socat"
+    ) and auditd.data.a1 == "2"]
+  [network where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "connected-to" and
+   process.name : (
+    "bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish", "perl", "python*", "nc", "ncat", "netcat", "php*",
+    "ruby", "openssl", "awk", "telnet", "lua*", "socat"
+    ) and network.direction == "egress" and destination.ip != null and
+   not cidrmatch(destination.ip, "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "224.0.0.0/4", "::1")]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Unix Shell
+** ID: T1059.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Application Layer Protocol
+** ID: T1071
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f015de3795
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell]]
+=== Potential Reverse Shell
+
+This detection rule identifies suspicious network traffic patterns associated with TCP reverse shell activity. This activity consists of a parent-child relationship where a network event is followed by the creation of a shell process. An attacker may establish a Linux TCP reverse shell to gain remote access to a target system.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Methodology%20and%20Resources/Reverse%20Shell%20Cheatsheet.md
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 8
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id with maxspan=5s
+  [network where event.type == "start" and event.action in ("connection_attempted", "connection_accepted") and 
+   process.name : ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish", "socat") and destination.ip != null and 
+   not cidrmatch(destination.ip, "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "224.0.0.0/4", "::1")] by process.entity_id
+  [process where event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "fork") and 
+   process.name in ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish") and (
+     (process.args : ("-i", "-l")) or (process.parent.name == "socat" and process.parent.args : "*exec*")
+   )] by process.parent.entity_id
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Unix Shell
+** ID: T1059.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Application Layer Protocol
+** ID: T1071
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-secure-file-deletion-via-sdelete-utility.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-secure-file-deletion-via-sdelete-utility.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f1b38d912a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-secure-file-deletion-via-sdelete-utility.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-secure-file-deletion-via-sdelete-utility]]
+=== Potential Secure File Deletion via SDelete Utility
+
+Detects file name patterns generated by the use of Sysinternals SDelete utility to securely delete a file via multiple file overwrite and rename operations.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Tactic: Impact
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Potential Secure File Deletion via SDelete Utility*
+
+
+SDelete is a tool primarily used for securely deleting data from storage devices, making it unrecoverable. Microsoft develops it as part of the Sysinternals Suite. Although commonly used to delete data securely, attackers can abuse it to delete forensic indicators and remove files as a post-action to a destructive action such as ransomware or data theft to hinder recovery efforts.
+
+This rule identifies file name patterns generated by the use of SDelete utility to securely delete a file via multiple file overwrite and rename operations.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Examine the command line and identify the files deleted, their importance and whether they could be the target of antiforensics activity.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This is a dual-use tool, meaning its usage is not inherently malicious. Analysts can dismiss the alert if the administrator is aware of the activity, no other suspicious activity was identified, and there are justifications for the execution.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+  - Prioritize cases involving critical servers and users.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- If important data was encrypted, deleted, or modified, activate your data recovery plan.
+    - Perform data recovery locally or restore the backups from replicated copies (cloud, other servers, etc.).
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Review the privileges assigned to the user to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "change" and file.name : "*AAA.AAA"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Indicator Removal
+** ID: T1070
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: File Deletion
+** ID: T1070.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/004/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Impact
+** ID: TA0040
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Data Destruction
+** ID: T1485
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-shadow-credentials-added-to-ad-object.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-shadow-credentials-added-to-ad-object.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..762a14d558
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-shadow-credentials-added-to-ad-object.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-shadow-credentials-added-to-ad-object]]
+=== Potential Shadow Credentials added to AD Object
+
+Identify the modification of the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute in an Active Directory Computer or User Object. Attackers can abuse control over the object and create a key pair, append to raw public key in the attribute, and obtain persistent and stealthy access to the target user or computer object.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-system.*
+* logs-windows.*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://posts.specterops.io/shadow-credentials-abusing-key-trust-account-mapping-for-takeover-8ee1a53566ab
+* https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/kerberos/shadow-credentials
+* https://github.com/OTRF/Set-AuditRule
+* https://cyberstoph.org/posts/2022/03/detecting-shadow-credentials/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Active Directory
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Potential Shadow Credentials added to AD Object*
+
+
+The msDS-KeyCredentialLink is an Active Directory (AD) attribute that links cryptographic certificates to a user or computer for domain authentication.
+
+Attackers with write privileges on this attribute over an object can abuse it to gain access to the object or maintain persistence. This means they can authenticate and perform actions on behalf of the exploited identity, and they can use Shadow Credentials to request Ticket Granting Tickets (TGTs) on behalf of the identity.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Identify whether Windows Hello for Business (WHfB) and/or Azure AD is used in the environment.
+  - Review the event ID 4624 for logon events involving the subject identity (`winlog.event_data.SubjectUserName`).
+    - Check whether the `source.ip` is the server running Azure AD Connect.
+- Contact the account and system owners and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Review the event IDs 4768 and 4769 for suspicious ticket requests involving the modified identity (`winlog.event_data.ObjectDN`).
+  - Extract the source IP addresses from these events and use them as indicators of compromise (IoCs) to investigate whether the host is compromised and to scope the attacker's access to the environment.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Administrators might use custom accounts on Azure AD Connect. If this is the case, make sure the account is properly secured. You can also create an exception for the account if expected activity makes too much noise in your environment.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+  - Remove the Shadow Credentials from the object.
+- Investigate how the attacker escalated privileges and identify systems they used to conduct lateral movement. Use this information to determine ways the attacker could regain access to the environment.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The 'Audit Directory Service Changes' logging policy must be configured for (Success, Failure).
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Policies >
+Windows Settings >
+Security Settings >
+Advanced Audit Policies Configuration >
+Audit Policies >
+DS Access >
+Audit Directory Service Changes (Success,Failure)
+```
+
+The above policy does not cover User objects, so we need to set up an AuditRule using https://github.com/OTRF/Set-AuditRule.
+As this specifies the msDS-KeyCredentialLink Attribute GUID, it is expected to be low noise.
+
+```
+Set-AuditRule -AdObjectPath 'AD:\CN=Users,DC=Domain,DC=com' -WellKnownSidType WorldSid -Rights WriteProperty -InheritanceFlags Children -AttributeGUID 5b47d60f-6090-40b2-9f37-2a4de88f3063 -AuditFlags Success
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.action:"Directory Service Changes" and event.code:"5136" and
+ winlog.event_data.AttributeLDAPDisplayName:"msDS-KeyCredentialLink" and winlog.event_data.AttributeValue :B\:828* and
+ not winlog.event_data.SubjectUserName: MSOL_*
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Modify Authentication Process
+** ID: T1556
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-shadow-file-read-via-command-line-utilities.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-shadow-file-read-via-command-line-utilities.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..164dcff139
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-shadow-file-read-via-command-line-utilities.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-shadow-file-read-via-command-line-utilities]]
+=== Potential Shadow File Read via Command Line Utilities
+
+Identifies access to the /etc/shadow file via the commandline using standard system utilities. After elevating privileges to root, threat actors may attempt to read or dump this file in order to gain valid credentials. They may utilize these to move laterally undetected and access additional resources.
+
+*Rule type*: new_terms
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/unix-linux-password-cracking-john-the-ripper/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 208
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+host.os.type : "linux" and event.category : "process" and event.action : ("exec" or "exec_event") and
+(process.args : "/etc/shadow" or (process.working_directory: "/etc" and process.args: "shadow")) and not 
+(process.executable : ("/bin/chown" or "/usr/bin/chown") and process.args : "root:shadow") and not 
+(process.executable : ("/bin/chmod" or "/usr/bin/chmod") and process.args : "640")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
+** ID: T1068
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow
+** ID: T1003.008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/008/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-shell-via-wildcard-injection-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-shell-via-wildcard-injection-detected.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9a8dd1b6b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-shell-via-wildcard-injection-detected.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-shell-via-wildcard-injection-detected]]
+=== Potential Shell via Wildcard Injection Detected
+
+This rule monitors for the execution of a set of linux binaries, that are potentially vulnerable to wildcard injection, with suspicious command line flags followed by a shell spawn event. Linux wildcard injection is a type of security vulnerability where attackers manipulate commands or input containing wildcards (e.g., *, ?, []) to execute unintended operations or access sensitive data by tricking the system into interpreting the wildcard characters in unexpected ways.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.exploit-db.com/papers/33930
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 5
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id with maxspan=1s
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and (
+    (process.name == "tar" and process.args : "--checkpoint=*" and process.args : "--checkpoint-action=*") or
+    (process.name == "rsync" and process.args : "-e*") or
+    (process.name == "zip" and process.args == "--unzip-command") )]  by process.entity_id
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and 
+     process.parent.name : ("tar", "rsync", "zip") and 
+     process.name : ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish")] by process.parent.entity_id
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
+** ID: T1068
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-ssh-it-ssh-worm-downloaded.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-ssh-it-ssh-worm-downloaded.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e416d34253
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-ssh-it-ssh-worm-downloaded.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-ssh-it-ssh-worm-downloaded]]
+=== Potential SSH-IT SSH Worm Downloaded
+
+Identifies processes that are capable of downloading files with command line arguments containing URLs to SSH-IT's autonomous SSH worm. This worm intercepts outgoing SSH connections every time a user uses ssh.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.thc.org/ssh-it/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows
+the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest to select "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and process.name in ("curl", "wget") and process.args : (
+  "https://thc.org/ssh-it/x", "http://nossl.segfault.net/ssh-it-deploy.sh", "https://gsocket.io/x",
+  "https://thc.org/ssh-it/bs", "http://nossl.segfault.net/bs"
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote Services
+** ID: T1021
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: SSH
+** ID: T1021.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote Service Session Hijacking
+** ID: T1563
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: SSH Hijacking
+** ID: T1563.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-successful-linux-ftp-brute-force-attack-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-successful-linux-ftp-brute-force-attack-detected.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..98c8fe46a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-successful-linux-ftp-brute-force-attack-detected.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-successful-linux-ftp-brute-force-attack-detected]]
+=== Potential Successful Linux FTP Brute Force Attack Detected
+
+An FTP (file transfer protocol) brute force attack is a method where an attacker systematically tries different combinations of usernames and passwords to gain unauthorized access to an FTP server, and if successful, the impact can include unauthorized data access, manipulation, or theft, compromising the security and integrity of the server and potentially exposing sensitive information. This rule identifies multiple consecutive authentication failures targeting a specific user account from the same source address and within a short time interval, followed by a successful authentication.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+
+*Version*: 7
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
+- Auditbeat
+- Auditd Manager
+
+
+*Auditbeat Setup*
+
+Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit the activities of users and processes on your systems. For example, you can use Auditbeat to collect and centralize audit events from the Linux Audit Framework. You can also use Auditbeat to detect changes to critical files, like binaries and configuration files, and identify potential security policy violations.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Auditbeat on a Linux System:*
+
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setup-repositories.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-docker.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html[helper guide].
+- For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Auditd Manager Integration Setup*
+
+The Auditd Manager Integration receives audit events from the Linux Audit Framework which is a part of the Linux kernel.
+Auditd Manager provides a user-friendly interface and automation capabilities for configuring and monitoring system auditing through the auditd daemon. With `auditd_manager`, administrators can easily define audit rules, track system events, and generate comprehensive audit reports, improving overall security and compliance in the system.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Agent System integration "auditd_manager" on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click “Add integrations”.
+- In the query bar, search for “Auditd Manager” and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click “Add Auditd Manager”.
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Review optional and advanced settings accordingly.
+- Add the newly installed “auditd manager” to an existing or a new agent policy, and deploy the agent on a Linux system from which auditd log files are desirable.
+- Click “Save and Continue”.
+- For more details on the integration refer to the https://docs.elastic.co/integrations/auditd_manager[helper guide].
+
+
+*Rule Specific Setup Note*
+
+Auditd Manager subscribes to the kernel and receives events as they occur without any additional configuration.
+However, if more advanced configuration is required to detect specific behavior, audit rules can be added to the integration in either the "audit rules" configuration box or the "auditd rule files" box by specifying a file to read the audit rules from.
+- For this detection rule no additional audit rules are required to be added to the integration.
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id, auditd.data.addr, related.user with maxspan=5s
+  [authentication where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "authenticated" and
+   auditd.data.terminal == "ftp" and event.outcome == "failure" and auditd.data.addr != null and
+   auditd.data.addr != "0.0.0.0" and auditd.data.addr != "::"] with runs=10
+  [authentication where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action  == "authenticated" and
+   auditd.data.terminal == "ftp" and event.outcome == "success" and auditd.data.addr != null and
+   auditd.data.addr != "0.0.0.0" and auditd.data.addr != "::"] | tail 1
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Brute Force
+** ID: T1110
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Password Guessing
+** ID: T1110.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Password Spraying
+** ID: T1110.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-successful-linux-rdp-brute-force-attack-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-successful-linux-rdp-brute-force-attack-detected.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5adc23a703
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-successful-linux-rdp-brute-force-attack-detected.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-successful-linux-rdp-brute-force-attack-detected]]
+=== Potential Successful Linux RDP Brute Force Attack Detected
+
+An RDP (Remote Desktop Protocol) brute force attack involves an attacker repeatedly attempting various username and password combinations to gain unauthorized access to a remote computer via RDP, and if successful, the potential impact can include unauthorized control over the compromised system, data theft, or the ability to launch further attacks within the network, jeopardizing the security and confidentiality of the targeted system and potentially compromising the entire network infrastructure. This rule identifies multiple consecutive authentication failures targeting a specific user account within a short time interval, followed by a successful authentication.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+
+*Version*: 7
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
+- Auditbeat
+- Auditd Manager
+
+
+*Auditbeat Setup*
+
+Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit the activities of users and processes on your systems. For example, you can use Auditbeat to collect and centralize audit events from the Linux Audit Framework. You can also use Auditbeat to detect changes to critical files, like binaries and configuration files, and identify potential security policy violations.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Auditbeat on a Linux System:*
+
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setup-repositories.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-docker.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html[helper guide].
+- For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Auditd Manager Integration Setup*
+
+The Auditd Manager Integration receives audit events from the Linux Audit Framework which is a part of the Linux kernel.
+Auditd Manager provides a user-friendly interface and automation capabilities for configuring and monitoring system auditing through the auditd daemon. With `auditd_manager`, administrators can easily define audit rules, track system events, and generate comprehensive audit reports, improving overall security and compliance in the system.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Agent System integration "auditd_manager" on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click “Add integrations”.
+- In the query bar, search for “Auditd Manager” and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click “Add Auditd Manager”.
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Review optional and advanced settings accordingly.
+- Add the newly installed “auditd manager” to an existing or a new agent policy, and deploy the agent on a Linux system from which auditd log files are desirable.
+- Click “Save and Continue”.
+- For more details on the integration refer to the https://docs.elastic.co/integrations/auditd_manager[helper guide].
+
+
+*Rule Specific Setup Note*
+
+Auditd Manager subscribes to the kernel and receives events as they occur without any additional configuration.
+However, if more advanced configuration is required to detect specific behavior, audit rules can be added to the integration in either the "audit rules" configuration box or the "auditd rule files" box by specifying a file to read the audit rules from.
+- For this detection rule no additional audit rules are required to be added to the integration.
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id, related.user with maxspan=5s
+  [authentication where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "authenticated" and
+   auditd.data.terminal : "*rdp*" and event.outcome == "failure"] with runs=10
+  [authentication where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action  == "authenticated" and
+   auditd.data.terminal : "*rdp*" and event.outcome == "success"] | tail 1
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Brute Force
+** ID: T1110
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Password Guessing
+** ID: T1110.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Password Spraying
+** ID: T1110.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-successful-ssh-brute-force-attack.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-successful-ssh-brute-force-attack.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..74e26bf192
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-successful-ssh-brute-force-attack.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-successful-ssh-brute-force-attack]]
+=== Potential Successful SSH Brute Force Attack
+
+Identifies multiple SSH login failures followed by a successful one from the same source address. Adversaries can attempt to login into multiple users with a common or known password to gain access to accounts.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-system.auth-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+
+*Version*: 10
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Potential Successful SSH Brute Force Attack*
+
+
+The rule identifies consecutive SSH login failures followed by a successful login from the same source IP address to the same target host indicating a successful attempt of brute force password guessing.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the login failure user name(s).
+- Investigate the source IP address of the failed ssh login attempt(s).
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Identify the source and the target computer and their roles in the IT environment.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Authentication misconfiguration or obsolete credentials.
+- Service account password expired.
+- Infrastructure or availability issue.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Ensure active session(s) on the host(s) are terminated as the attacker could have gained initial access to the system(s).
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
+- Auditbeat
+- Filebeat
+
+
+*Auditbeat Setup*
+
+Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit the activities of users and processes on your systems. For example, you can use Auditbeat to collect and centralize audit events from the Linux Audit Framework. You can also use Auditbeat to detect changes to critical files, like binaries and configuration files, and identify potential security policy violations.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Auditbeat on a Linux System:*
+
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setup-repositories.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-docker.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html[helper guide].
+- For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Filebeat Setup*
+
+Filebeat is a lightweight shipper for forwarding and centralizing log data. Installed as an agent on your servers, Filebeat monitors the log files or locations that you specify, collects log events, and forwards them either to Elasticsearch or Logstash for indexing.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Filebeat on a Linux System:*
+
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/setup-repositories.html[helper guide].
+- To run Filebeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/running-on-docker.html[helper guide].
+- To run Filebeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html[helper guide].
+- For quick start information for Filebeat refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/8.11/filebeat-installation-configuration.html[helper guide].
+- For complete “Setup and Run Filebeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Rule Specific Setup Note*
+
+- This rule requires the “Filebeat System Module” to be enabled.
+- The system module collects and parses logs created by the system logging service of common Unix/Linux based distributions.
+- To run the system module of Filebeat on Linux follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-system.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id, source.ip, user.name with maxspan=15s
+  [authentication where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action  in ("ssh_login", "user_login") and
+   event.outcome == "failure" and source.ip != null and source.ip != "0.0.0.0" and source.ip != "::" ] with runs=10
+
+  [authentication where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action  in ("ssh_login", "user_login") and
+   event.outcome == "success" and source.ip != null and source.ip != "0.0.0.0" and source.ip != "::" ]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Brute Force
+** ID: T1110
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Password Guessing
+** ID: T1110.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Password Spraying
+** ID: T1110.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-sudo-hijacking-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-sudo-hijacking-detected.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0ff0d10057
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-sudo-hijacking-detected.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-sudo-hijacking-detected]]
+=== Potential Sudo Hijacking Detected
+
+Identifies the creation of a sudo binary located at /usr/bin/sudo. Attackers may hijack the default sudo binary and replace it with a custom binary or script that can read the user's password in clear text to escalate privileges or enable persistence onto the system every time the sudo binary is executed.
+
+*Rule type*: new_terms
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://eapolsniper.github.io/2020/08/17/Sudo-Hijacking/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 105
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+host.os.type:linux and event.category:file and event.type:("creation" or "file_create_event") and
+file.path:("/usr/bin/sudo" or "/bin/sudo") and not process.name:(docker or dockerd or pacman)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
+** ID: T1548
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Sudo and Sudo Caching
+** ID: T1548.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Hijack Execution Flow
+** ID: T1574
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-sudo-privilege-escalation-via-cve-2019-14287.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-sudo-privilege-escalation-via-cve-2019-14287.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..19859a138c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-sudo-privilege-escalation-via-cve-2019-14287.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-sudo-privilege-escalation-via-cve-2019-14287]]
+=== Potential Sudo Privilege Escalation via CVE-2019-14287
+
+This rule monitors for the execution of a suspicious sudo command that is leveraged in CVE-2019-14287 to escalate privileges to root. Sudo does not verify the presence of the designated user ID and proceeds to execute using a user ID that can be chosen arbitrarily. By using the sudo privileges, the command "sudo -u#-1" translates to an ID of 0, representing the root user. This exploit may work for sudo versions prior to v1.28.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/47502
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Use Case: Vulnerability
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
+
+*Version*: 4
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and process.name == "sudo" and process.args == "-u#-1"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
+** ID: T1068
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-sudo-token-manipulation-via-process-injection.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-sudo-token-manipulation-via-process-injection.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..115137a9a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-sudo-token-manipulation-via-process-injection.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-sudo-token-manipulation-via-process-injection]]
+=== Potential Sudo Token Manipulation via Process Injection
+
+This rule detects potential sudo token manipulation attacks through process injection by monitoring the use of a debugger (gdb) process followed by a successful uid change event during the execution of the sudo process. A sudo token manipulation attack is performed by injecting into a process that has a valid sudo token, which can then be used by attackers to activate their own sudo token. This attack requires ptrace to be enabled in conjunction with the existence of a living process that has a valid sudo token with the same uid as the current user.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/nongiach/sudo_inject
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 5
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id, process.session_leader.entity_id with maxspan=15s
+[ process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and 
+  process.name == "gdb" and process.user.id != "0" and process.group.id != "0" ]
+[ process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "uid_change" and event.type == "change" and 
+  process.name == "sudo" and process.user.id == "0" and process.group.id == "0" ]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Process Injection
+** ID: T1055
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Ptrace System Calls
+** ID: T1055.008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
+** ID: T1548
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Sudo and Sudo Caching
+** ID: T1548.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-suspicious-debugfs-root-device-access.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-suspicious-debugfs-root-device-access.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1f595dc812
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-suspicious-debugfs-root-device-access.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-suspicious-debugfs-root-device-access]]
+=== Potential Suspicious DebugFS Root Device Access
+
+This rule monitors for the usage of the built-in Linux DebugFS utility to access a disk device without root permissions. Linux users that are part of the "disk" group have sufficient privileges to access all data inside of the machine through DebugFS. Attackers may leverage DebugFS in conjunction with "disk" permissions to read sensitive files owned by root, such as the shadow file, root ssh private keys or other sensitive files that may allow them to further escalate privileges.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://book.hacktricks.xyz/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/interesting-groups-linux-pe#disk-group
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 5
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and 
+process.name == "debugfs" and process.args : "/dev/sd*" and not process.args == "-R" and 
+not user.Ext.real.id == "0" and not group.Ext.real.id == "0"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Valid Accounts
+** ID: T1078
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Local Accounts
+** ID: T1078.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-unauthorized-access-via-wildcard-injection-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-unauthorized-access-via-wildcard-injection-detected.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..684a44e7db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-unauthorized-access-via-wildcard-injection-detected.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-unauthorized-access-via-wildcard-injection-detected]]
+=== Potential Unauthorized Access via Wildcard Injection Detected
+
+This rule monitors for the execution of the "chown" and "chmod" commands with command line flags that could indicate a wildcard injection attack. Linux wildcard injection is a type of security vulnerability where attackers manipulate commands or input containing wildcards (e.g., *, ?, []) to execute unintended operations or access sensitive data by tricking the system into interpreting the wildcard characters in unexpected ways.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.exploit-db.com/papers/33930
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
+
+*Version*: 5
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and process.name in ("chown", "chmod") and process.args == "-R" and process.args : "--reference=*"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
+** ID: T1068
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow
+** ID: T1003.008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/008/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-upgrade-of-non-interactive-shell.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-upgrade-of-non-interactive-shell.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7a356d5f21
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-upgrade-of-non-interactive-shell.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-upgrade-of-non-interactive-shell]]
+=== Potential Upgrade of Non-interactive Shell
+
+Identifies when a non-interactive terminal (tty) is being upgraded to a fully interactive shell. Attackers may upgrade a simple reverse shell to a fully interactive tty after obtaining initial access to a host, in order to obtain a more stable connection.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and (
+  (process.name == "stty" and process.args == "raw" and process.args == "-echo" and process.args_count >= 3) or
+  (process.name == "script" and process.args in ("-qc", "-c") and process.args == "/dev/null" and 
+   process.args_count == 4)
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Unix Shell
+** ID: T1059.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-veeam-credential-access-command.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-veeam-credential-access-command.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a358f9e87f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-veeam-credential-access-command.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-veeam-credential-access-command]]
+=== Potential Veeam Credential Access Command
+
+Identifies commands that can access and decrypt Veeam credentials stored in MSSQL databases. Attackers can use Veeam Credentials to target backups as part of destructive operations such as Ransomware attacks.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.process-*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://thedfirreport.com/2021/12/13/diavol-ransomware/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  (
+    (process.name : "sqlcmd.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name : "sqlcmd.exe") or
+    process.args : ("Invoke-Sqlcmd", "Invoke-SqlExecute", "Invoke-DbaQuery", "Invoke-SqlQuery")
+  ) and
+  process.args : "*[VeeamBackup].[dbo].[Credentials]*"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Credentials from Password Stores
+** ID: T1555
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-windows-error-manager-masquerading.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-windows-error-manager-masquerading.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..51877650f6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-windows-error-manager-masquerading.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-windows-error-manager-masquerading]]
+=== Potential Windows Error Manager Masquerading
+
+Identifies suspicious instances of the Windows Error Reporting process (WerFault.exe or Wermgr.exe) with matching command-line and process executable values performing outgoing network connections. This may be indicative of a masquerading attempt to evade suspicious child process behavior detections.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1235533224337641473
+* https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2019/09/20/werfault-command-line-switches-v0-1/
+* https://app.any.run/tasks/26051d84-b68e-4afb-8a9a-76921a271b81/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Potential Windows Error Manager Masquerading*
+
+
+By examining the specific traits of Windows binaries -- such as process trees, command lines, network connections, registry modifications, and so on -- it's possible to establish a baseline of normal activity. Deviations from this baseline can indicate malicious activity, such as masquerading and deserve further investigation.
+
+This rule identifies a potential malicious process masquerading as `wermgr.exe` or `WerFault.exe`, by looking for a process creation with no arguments followed by a network connection.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id, process.entity_id with maxspan = 5s
+  [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type:"start" and process.name : ("wermgr.exe", "WerFault.exe") and process.args_count == 1]
+  [network where host.os.type == "windows" and process.name : ("wermgr.exe", "WerFault.exe") and network.protocol != "dns" and
+    network.direction : ("outgoing", "egress") and destination.ip !="::1" and destination.ip !="127.0.0.1"
+  ]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Masquerading
+** ID: T1036
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Match Legitimate Name or Location
+** ID: T1036.005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potentially-suspicious-process-started-via-tmux-or-screen.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potentially-suspicious-process-started-via-tmux-or-screen.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ce4db9f11a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potentially-suspicious-process-started-via-tmux-or-screen.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potentially-suspicious-process-started-via-tmux-or-screen]]
+=== Potentially Suspicious Process Started via tmux or screen
+
+This rule monitors for the execution of suspicious commands via screen and tmux. When launching a command and detaching directly, the commands will be executed in the background via its parent process. Attackers may leverage screen or tmux to execute commands while attempting to evade detection.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+
+*Version*: 4
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and 
+process.parent.name in ("screen", "tmux") and process.name : (
+  "nmap", "nc", "ncat", "netcat", "socat", "nc.openbsd", "ngrok", "ping", "java", "python*", "php*", "perl", "ruby",
+  "lua*", "openssl", "telnet", "awk", "wget", "curl", "id"
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: System Binary Proxy Execution
+** ID: T1218
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-invoke-ninjacopy-script.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-invoke-ninjacopy-script.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d3e8f30d79
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-invoke-ninjacopy-script.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-invoke-ninjacopy-script]]
+=== PowerShell Invoke-NinjaCopy script
+
+Detects PowerShell scripts that contain the default exported functions used on Invoke-NinjaCopy. Attackers can use Invoke-NinjaCopy to read SYSTEM files that are normally locked, such as the NTDS.dit file or registry hives.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/BC-SECURITY/Empire/blob/main/empire/server/data/module_source/collection/Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: PowerShell Logs
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+
+*Version*: 5
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating PowerShell Invoke-NinjaCopy script*
+
+
+PowerShell is one of the main tools system administrators use for automation, report routines, and other tasks, making it available for use in various environments, creating an attractive way for attackers to execute code.
+
+Invoke-NinjaCopy is a PowerShell script capable of reading SYSTEM files that were normally locked, such as `NTDS.dit` or sensitive registry locations. It does so by using the direct volume access technique, which enables attackers to bypass access control mechanisms and file system monitoring by reading the raw data directly from the disk and extracting the file by parsing the file system structures.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Examine the script content that triggered the detection; look for suspicious DLL imports, collection or exfiltration capabilities, suspicious functions, encoded or compressed data, and other potentially malicious characteristics.
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Examine file or network events from the involved PowerShell process for suspicious behavior.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Evaluate whether the user needs to use PowerShell to complete tasks.
+- Determine whether the script stores the captured data locally.
+- Check if the imported function was executed and which file it targeted.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Any activity that triggered the alert and is not inherently malicious must be monitored by the security team.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Restrict PowerShell usage outside of IT and engineering business units using GPOs, AppLocker, Intune, or similar software.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:windows and
+  powershell.file.script_block_text : (
+    "StealthReadFile" or
+    "StealthReadFileAddr" or
+    "StealthCloseFileDelegate" or
+    "StealthOpenFile" or
+    "StealthCloseFile" or
+    "StealthReadFile" or
+    "Invoke-NinjaCopy"
+   )
+  and not user.id : "S-1-5-18"
+  and not powershell.file.script_block_text : (
+    "sentinelbreakpoints" and "Set-PSBreakpoint" and "PowerSploitIndicators"
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Security Account Manager
+** ID: T1003.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/002/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: NTDS
+** ID: T1003.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/003/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Direct Volume Access
+** ID: T1006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1006/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-kerberos-ticket-dump.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-kerberos-ticket-dump.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..67706a8041
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-kerberos-ticket-dump.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-kerberos-ticket-dump]]
+=== PowerShell Kerberos Ticket Dump
+
+Detects PowerShell scripts that have the capability of dumping Kerberos tickets from LSA, which potentially indicates an attacker's attempt to acquire credentials for lateral movement.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/MzHmO/PowershellKerberos/blob/main/dumper.ps1
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: PowerShell Logs
+
+*Version*: 4
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating PowerShell Kerberos Ticket Dump*
+
+
+Kerberos is an authentication protocol that relies on tickets to grant access to network resources. Adversaries may abuse this protocol to acquire credentials for lateral movement within a network.
+
+This rule indicates the use of scripts that contain code capable of dumping Kerberos tickets, which can indicate potential PowerShell abuse for credential theft.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Examine the script content that triggered the detection; look for suspicious DLL imports, collection or exfiltration capabilities, suspicious functions, encoded or compressed data, and other potentially malicious characteristics.
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate if the script was executed, and if so, which account was targeted.
+- Identify the account involved and contact the owner to confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Check if the script has any other functionality that can be potentially malicious.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate other potentially compromised accounts and hosts. Review login events (like 4624) for suspicious events involving the subject and target accounts.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- If this activity is expected and noisy in your environment, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of file path and user ID conditions.
+
+
+*Related Rules*
+
+
+- PowerShell Kerberos Ticket Request - eb610e70-f9e6-4949-82b9-f1c5bcd37c39
+
+
+*Response and Remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+  - If malicious activity is confirmed, perform a broader investigation to identify the scope of the compromise and determine the appropriate remediation steps.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Disable or limit involved accounts during the investigation and response.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Reimage the host operating system or restore the compromised files to clean versions.
+- Restrict PowerShell usage outside of IT and engineering business units using GPOs, AppLocker, Intune, or similar software.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Administrative Templates >
+Windows PowerShell >
+Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging (Enable)
+```
+
+Steps to implement the logging policy via registry:
+
+```
+reg add "hklm\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging" /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 1
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:windows and
+  powershell.file.script_block_text : (
+    "LsaCallAuthenticationPackage" and
+    (
+      "KerbRetrieveEncodedTicketMessage" or
+      "KerbQueryTicketCacheMessage" or
+      "KerbQueryTicketCacheExMessage" or
+      "KerbQueryTicketCacheEx2Message" or
+      "KerbRetrieveTicketMessage" or
+      "KerbDecryptDataMessage"
+    )
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
+** ID: T1558
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-kerberos-ticket-request.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-kerberos-ticket-request.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6c6d22b838
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-kerberos-ticket-request.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-kerberos-ticket-request]]
+=== PowerShell Kerberos Ticket Request
+
+Detects PowerShell scripts that have the capability of requesting kerberos tickets, which is a common step in Kerberoasting toolkits to crack service accounts.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://cobalt.io/blog/kerberoast-attack-techniques
+* https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/data/module_source/credentials/Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: PowerShell Logs
+
+*Version*: 111
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating PowerShell Kerberos Ticket Request*
+
+
+PowerShell is one of the main tools system administrators use for automation, report routines, and other tasks, making it available for use in various environments, creating an attractive way for attackers to execute code.
+
+Accounts associated with a service principal name (SPN) are viable targets for Kerberoasting attacks, which use brute force to crack the user password, which is used to encrypt a Kerberos TGS ticket.
+
+Attackers can use PowerShell to request these Kerberos tickets, with the intent of extracting them from memory to perform Kerberoasting.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Examine the script content that triggered the detection; look for suspicious DLL imports, collection or exfiltration capabilities, suspicious functions, encoded or compressed data, and other potentially malicious characteristics.
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate if the script was executed, and if so, which account was targeted.
+- Validate if the account has an SPN associated with it.
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Check if the script has any other functionality that can be potentially malicious.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Review event ID https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4769[4769] related to this account and service name for additional information.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- A possible false positive can be identified if the script content is not malicious/harmful or does not request Kerberos tickets for user accounts, as computer accounts are not vulnerable to Kerberoasting due to complex password requirements and policy.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services. Prioritize privileged accounts.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Administrative Templates >
+Windows PowerShell >
+Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging (Enable)
+```
+
+Steps to implement the logging policy via registry:
+
+```
+reg add "hklm\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging" /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 1
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:windows and
+  powershell.file.script_block_text : (
+    KerberosRequestorSecurityToken
+  ) and not user.id : ("S-1-5-18" or "S-1-5-20") and
+  not powershell.file.script_block_text : (
+    ("sentinelbreakpoints" and ("Set-PSBreakpoint" or "Set-HookFunctionTabs")) or
+    ("function global" and "\\windows\\sentinel\\4")
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
+** ID: T1558
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Kerberoasting
+** ID: T1558.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-keylogging-script.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-keylogging-script.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ccc8f3d076
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-keylogging-script.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-keylogging-script]]
+=== PowerShell Keylogging Script
+
+Detects the use of Win32 API Functions that can be used to capture user keystrokes in PowerShell scripts. Attackers use this technique to capture user input, looking for credentials and/or other valuable data.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/data/module_source/collection/Get-Keystrokes.ps1
+* https://github.com/MojtabaTajik/FunnyKeylogger/blob/master/FunnyLogger.ps1
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Collection
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: PowerShell Logs
+
+*Version*: 112
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating PowerShell Keylogging Script*
+
+
+PowerShell is one of the main tools system administrators use for automation, report routines, and other tasks. This makes it available for use in various environments, and creates an attractive way for attackers to execute code.
+
+Attackers can abuse PowerShell capabilities to capture user keystrokes with the goal of stealing credentials and other valuable information as credit card data and confidential conversations.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Examine the script content that triggered the detection; look for suspicious DLL imports, collection or exfiltration capabilities, suspicious functions, encoded or compressed data, and other potentially malicious characteristics.
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Examine file or network events from the involved PowerShell process for suspicious behavior.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Evaluate whether the user needs to use PowerShell to complete tasks.
+- Determine whether the script stores the captured data locally.
+- Investigate whether the script contains exfiltration capabilities and identify the exfiltration server.
+- Assess network data to determine if the host communicated with the exfiltration server.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Regular users do not have a business justification for using scripting utilities to capture keystrokes, making false positives unlikely. In the case of authorized benign true positives (B-TPs), exceptions can be added.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- PowerShell PSReflect Script - 56f2e9b5-4803-4e44-a0a4-a52dc79d57fe
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Prioritize the response if this alert involves key executives or potentially valuable targets for espionage.
+- Restrict PowerShell usage outside of IT and engineering business units using GPOs, AppLocker, Intune, or similar software.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Administrative Templates >
+Windows PowerShell >
+Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging (Enable)
+```
+
+Steps to implement the logging policy via registry:
+
+```
+reg add "hklm\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging" /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 1
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:windows and
+  (
+   powershell.file.script_block_text : (GetAsyncKeyState or NtUserGetAsyncKeyState or GetKeyboardState or "Get-Keystrokes") or
+   powershell.file.script_block_text : (
+        (SetWindowsHookA or SetWindowsHookW or SetWindowsHookEx or SetWindowsHookExA or NtUserSetWindowsHookEx) and
+        (GetForegroundWindow or GetWindowTextA or GetWindowTextW or "WM_KEYBOARD_LL" or "WH_MOUSE_LL")
+   )
+   ) and not user.id : "S-1-5-18"
+  and not powershell.file.script_block_text : (
+    "sentinelbreakpoints" and "Set-PSBreakpoint"
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Collection
+** ID: TA0009
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Input Capture
+** ID: T1056
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Keylogging
+** ID: T1056.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Native API
+** ID: T1106
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-mailbox-collection-script.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-mailbox-collection-script.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1a6c42c5d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-mailbox-collection-script.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-mailbox-collection-script]]
+=== PowerShell Mailbox Collection Script
+
+Detects PowerShell scripts that can be used to collect data from mailboxes. Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/dafthack/MailSniper/blob/master/MailSniper.ps1
+* https://github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/adversary_emulation_library/blob/master/apt29/Archive/CALDERA_DIY/evals/payloads/stepSeventeen_email.ps1
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Collection
+* Data Source: PowerShell Logs
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+
+*Version*: 7
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating PowerShell Mailbox Collection Script*
+
+
+PowerShell is one of the main tools system administrators use for automation, report routines, and other tasks. This makes it available for use in various environments, and creates an attractive way for attackers to execute code.
+
+Email mailboxes and their information can be valuable assets for attackers. Company mailboxes often contain sensitive information such as login credentials, intellectual property, financial data, and personal information, making them high-value targets for malicious actors.
+
+This rule identifies scripts that contains methods and classes that can be abused to collect emails from local and remote mailboxes.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Examine the script content that triggered the detection; look for suspicious DLL imports, collection or exfiltration capabilities, suspicious functions, encoded or compressed data, and other potentially malicious characteristics.
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Determine whether the script was executed and capture relevant information, such as arguments that reveal intent or are indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Evaluate whether the user needs to use PowerShell to complete tasks.
+- Determine whether the script stores the captured data locally.
+- Investigate whether the script contains exfiltration capabilities and identify the exfiltration server.
+  - Assess network data to determine if the host communicated with the exfiltration server.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This mechanism can be used legitimately. Analysts can dismiss the alert if the administrator is aware of the activity and it is done with proper approval.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- Exporting Exchange Mailbox via PowerShell - 6aace640-e631-4870-ba8e-5fdda09325db
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- If the involved host is not the Exchange server, isolate the host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Prioritize cases that involve personally identifiable information (PII) or other classified data.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Administrative Templates >
+Windows PowerShell >
+Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging (Enable)
+```
+
+Steps to implement the logging policy via registry:
+
+```
+reg add "hklm\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging" /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 1
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:windows and
+  (
+   powershell.file.script_block_text : (
+      "Microsoft.Office.Interop.Outlook" or
+      "Interop.Outlook.olDefaultFolders" or
+      "::olFolderInBox"
+   ) or
+   powershell.file.script_block_text : (
+      "Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.Data.Folder" or
+      "Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.Data.FileAttachment"
+   )
+  ) and not user.id : "S-1-5-18"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Collection
+** ID: TA0009
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Email Collection
+** ID: T1114
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Local Email Collection
+** ID: T1114.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/001/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Remote Email Collection
+** ID: T1114.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-minidump-script.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-minidump-script.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..58d26dcd34
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-minidump-script.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-minidump-script]]
+=== PowerShell MiniDump Script
+
+This rule detects PowerShell scripts capable of dumping process memory using WindowsErrorReporting or Dbghelp.dll MiniDumpWriteDump. Attackers can use this tooling to dump LSASS and get access to credentials.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Out-Minidump.ps1
+* https://github.com/FuzzySecurity/PowerShell-Suite/blob/master/Get-ProcessMiniDump.ps1
+* https://github.com/atc-project/atc-data/blob/master/docs/Logging_Policies/LP_0109_windows_powershell_script_block_log.md
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: PowerShell Logs
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating PowerShell MiniDump Script*
+
+
+PowerShell is one of the main tools system administrators use for automation, report routines, and other tasks. This makes it available for use in various environments, and creates an attractive way for attackers to execute code.
+
+Attackers can abuse Process Memory Dump capabilities to extract credentials from LSASS or to obtain other privileged information stored in the process memory.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Examine the script content that triggered the detection; look for suspicious DLL imports, collection or exfiltration capabilities, suspicious functions, encoded or compressed data, and other potentially malicious characteristics.
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Examine file or network events from the involved PowerShell process for suspicious behavior.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Evaluate whether the user needs to use PowerShell to complete tasks.
+- Check if the imported function was executed and which process it targeted.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Regular users do not have a business justification for using scripting utilities to dump process memory, making false positives unlikely.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- PowerShell PSReflect Script - 56f2e9b5-4803-4e44-a0a4-a52dc79d57fe
+- Potential Process Injection via PowerShell - 2e29e96a-b67c-455a-afe4-de6183431d0d
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Restrict PowerShell usage outside of IT and engineering business units using GPOs, AppLocker, Intune, or similar software.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Administrative Templates >
+Windows PowerShell >
+Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging (Enable)
+```
+
+Steps to implement the logging policy via registry:
+
+```
+reg add "hklm\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging" /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 1
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:windows and powershell.file.script_block_text:(MiniDumpWriteDump or MiniDumpWithFullMemory or pmuDetirWpmuDiniM) and not user.id : "S-1-5-18"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: LSASS Memory
+** ID: T1003.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-psreflect-script.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-psreflect-script.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..83078a733e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-psreflect-script.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-psreflect-script]]
+=== PowerShell PSReflect Script
+
+Detects the use of PSReflect in PowerShell scripts. Attackers leverage PSReflect as a library that enables PowerShell to access win32 API functions.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/mattifestation/PSReflect/blob/master/PSReflect.psm1
+* https://github.com/atc-project/atc-data/blob/master/docs/Logging_Policies/LP_0109_windows_powershell_script_block_log.md
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: PowerShell Logs
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating PowerShell PSReflect Script*
+
+
+PowerShell is one of the main tools system administrators use for automation, report routines, and other tasks. This makes it available for use in various environments, and creates an attractive way for attackers to execute code.
+
+PSReflect is a library that enables PowerShell to access win32 API functions in an uncomplicated way. It also helps to create enums and structs easily—all without touching the disk.
+
+Although this is an interesting project for every developer and admin out there, it is mainly used in the red team and malware tooling for its capabilities.
+
+Detecting the core implementation of PSReflect means detecting most of the tooling that uses Windows API through PowerShell, enabling defenders to discover tools being dropped in the environment.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Examine the script content that triggered the detection; look for suspicious DLL imports, collection or exfiltration capabilities, suspicious functions, encoded or compressed data, and other potentially malicious characteristics. The script content that may be split into multiple script blocks (you can use the field `powershell.file.script_block_id` for filtering).
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Check for additional PowerShell and command-line logs that indicate that imported functions were run.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Evaluate whether the user needs to use PowerShell to complete tasks.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the script using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- PowerShell Suspicious Discovery Related Windows API Functions - 61ac3638-40a3-44b2-855a-985636ca985e
+- PowerShell Keylogging Script - bd2c86a0-8b61-4457-ab38-96943984e889
+- PowerShell Suspicious Script with Audio Capture Capabilities - 2f2f4939-0b34-40c2-a0a3-844eb7889f43
+- Potential Process Injection via PowerShell - 2e29e96a-b67c-455a-afe4-de6183431d0d
+- Suspicious .NET Reflection via PowerShell - e26f042e-c590-4e82-8e05-41e81bd822ad
+- PowerShell Suspicious Payload Encoded and Compressed - 81fe9dc6-a2d7-4192-a2d8-eed98afc766a
+- PowerShell Suspicious Script with Screenshot Capabilities - 959a7353-1129-4aa7-9084-30746b256a70
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Restrict PowerShell usage outside of IT and engineering business units using GPOs, AppLocker, Intune, or similar software.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be configured (Enable).
+
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Administrative Templates >
+Windows PowerShell >
+Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging (Enable)
+```
+
+Steps to implement the logging policy via registry:
+
+```
+reg add "hklm\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging" /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 1
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:windows and
+  powershell.file.script_block_text:(
+    "New-InMemoryModule" or
+    "Add-Win32Type" or
+    psenum or
+    DefineDynamicAssembly or
+    DefineDynamicModule or
+    "Reflection.TypeAttributes" or
+    "Reflection.Emit.OpCodes" or
+    "Reflection.Emit.CustomAttributeBuilder" or
+    "Runtime.InteropServices.DllImportAttribute"
+  ) and
+  not user.id : "S-1-5-18" and
+  not file.path : ?\:\\\\ProgramData\\\\MaaS360\\\\Cloud?Extender\\\\AR\\\\Scripts\\\\ASModuleCommon.ps1*
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Native API
+** ID: T1106
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-script-block-logging-disabled.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-script-block-logging-disabled.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7003588b56
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-script-block-logging-disabled.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-script-block-logging-disabled]]
+=== PowerShell Script Block Logging Disabled
+
+Identifies attempts to disable PowerShell Script Block Logging via registry modification. Attackers may disable this logging to conceal their activities in the host and evade detection.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://admx.help/?Category=Windows_10_2016&Policy=Microsoft.Policies.PowerShell::EnableScriptBlockLogging
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating PowerShell Script Block Logging Disabled*
+
+
+PowerShell is one of the main tools system administrators use for automation, report routines, and other tasks, making it available in various environments and creating an attractive way for attackers to execute code.
+
+PowerShell Script Block Logging is a feature of PowerShell that records the content of all script blocks that it processes, giving defenders visibility of PowerShell scripts and sequences of executed commands.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Check whether it makes sense for the user to use PowerShell to complete tasks.
+- Investigate if PowerShell scripts were run after logging was disabled.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- PowerShell Suspicious Discovery Related Windows API Functions - 61ac3638-40a3-44b2-855a-985636ca985e
+- PowerShell Keylogging Script - bd2c86a0-8b61-4457-ab38-96943984e889
+- PowerShell Suspicious Script with Audio Capture Capabilities - 2f2f4939-0b34-40c2-a0a3-844eb7889f43
+- Potential Process Injection via PowerShell - 2e29e96a-b67c-455a-afe4-de6183431d0d
+- Suspicious .NET Reflection via PowerShell - e26f042e-c590-4e82-8e05-41e81bd822ad
+- PowerShell Suspicious Payload Encoded and Compressed - 81fe9dc6-a2d7-4192-a2d8-eed98afc766a
+- PowerShell Suspicious Script with Screenshot Capabilities - 959a7353-1129-4aa7-9084-30746b256a70
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Review the privileges assigned to the involved users to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
+- Restrict PowerShell usage outside of IT and engineering business units using GPOs, AppLocker, Intune, or similar software.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+registry where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "change" and
+    registry.path : (
+        "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\ScriptBlockLogging\\EnableScriptBlockLogging",
+        "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\ScriptBlockLogging\\EnableScriptBlockLogging"
+    ) and registry.data.strings : ("0", "0x00000000")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Impair Defenses
+** ID: T1562
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Disable Windows Event Logging
+** ID: T1562.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Modify Registry
+** ID: T1112
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-script-with-encryption-decryption-capabilities.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-script-with-encryption-decryption-capabilities.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..07c93ca0ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-script-with-encryption-decryption-capabilities.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-script-with-encryption-decryption-capabilities]]
+=== PowerShell Script with Encryption/Decryption Capabilities
+
+Identifies the use of Cmdlets and methods related to encryption/decryption of files in PowerShell scripts, which malware and offensive security tools can abuse to encrypt data or decrypt payloads to bypass security solutions.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: PowerShell Logs
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+
+*Version*: 6
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating PowerShell Script with Encryption/Decryption Capabilities*
+
+
+PowerShell is one of the main tools system administrators use for automation, report routines, and other tasks, making it available for use in various environments, creating an attractive way for attackers to execute code.
+
+PowerShell offers encryption and decryption functionalities that attackers can abuse for various purposes, such as concealing payloads, C2 communications, and encrypting data as part of ransomware operations.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Examine the script content that triggered the detection; look for suspicious DLL imports, collection or exfiltration capabilities, suspicious functions, encoded or compressed data, and other potentially malicious characteristics.
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Examine file or network events from the involved PowerShell process for suspicious behavior.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Evaluate whether the user needs to use PowerShell to complete tasks.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This is a dual-use mechanism, meaning its usage is not inherently malicious. Analysts can dismiss the alert if the script doesn't contain malicious functions or potential for abuse, no other suspicious activity was identified, and there are justifications for the execution.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Restrict PowerShell usage outside of IT and engineering business units using GPOs, AppLocker, Intune, or similar software.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:windows and
+  powershell.file.script_block_text : (
+    (
+      "Cryptography.AESManaged" or
+      "Cryptography.RijndaelManaged" or
+      "Cryptography.SHA1Managed" or
+      "Cryptography.SHA256Managed" or
+      "Cryptography.SHA384Managed" or
+      "Cryptography.SHA512Managed" or
+      "Cryptography.SymmetricAlgorithm" or
+      "PasswordDeriveBytes" or
+      "Rfc2898DeriveBytes"
+    ) and
+    (
+      CipherMode and PaddingMode
+    ) and
+    (
+      ".CreateEncryptor" or
+      ".CreateDecryptor"
+    )
+  ) and not user.id : "S-1-5-18"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Obfuscated Files or Information
+** ID: T1027
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
+** ID: T1140
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-script-with-token-impersonation-capabilities.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-script-with-token-impersonation-capabilities.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e61873421d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-script-with-token-impersonation-capabilities.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-script-with-token-impersonation-capabilities]]
+=== PowerShell Script with Token Impersonation Capabilities
+
+Detects scripts that contain PowerShell functions, structures, or Windows API functions related to token impersonation/theft. Attackers may duplicate then impersonate another user's token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/decoder-it/psgetsystem
+* https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Privesc/Get-System.ps1
+* https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/data/module_source/privesc/Invoke-MS16032.ps1
+* https://github.com/atc-project/atc-data/blob/master/docs/Logging_Policies/LP_0109_windows_powershell_script_block_log.md
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: PowerShell Logs
+
+*Version*: 11
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating PowerShell Script with Token Impersonation Capabilities*
+
+
+PowerShell is one of the main tools system administrators use for automation, report routines, and other tasks. This makes it available for use in various environments, and creates an attractive way for attackers to execute code.
+
+Adversaries can abuse PowerShell to perform token impersonation, which involves duplicating and impersonating another user's token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. This rule identifies scripts containing PowerShell functions, structures, or Windows API functions related to token impersonation/theft.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Examine the script content that triggered the detection; look for suspicious DLL imports, collection or exfiltration capabilities, suspicious functions, encoded or compressed data, and other potentially malicious characteristics.
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Examine PowerShell process creation and script block logs to identify command line arguments or hardcoded information that can indicate which user was the target of the impersonation.
+- Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process (PowerShell), such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+- Evaluate whether the user needs to use PowerShell to complete tasks.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the script using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Regular users should not need to impersonate other users, which makes false positives unlikely. In the case of authorized benign true positives (B-TPs), exceptions can be added.
+
+
+*Related Rules*
+
+
+- PowerShell PSReflect Script - 56f2e9b5-4803-4e44-a0a4-a52dc79d57fe
+- Potential Process Injection via PowerShell - 2e29e96a-b67c-455a-afe4-de6183431d0d
+
+
+*Response and Remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Restrict PowerShell usage outside of IT and engineering business units using GPOs, AppLocker, Intune, or similar software.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be configured (Enable).
+
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Administrative Templates >
+Windows PowerShell >
+Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging (Enable)
+```
+
+Steps to implement the logging policy via registry:
+
+```
+reg add "hklm\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging" /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 1
+```
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:windows and
+  powershell.file.script_block_text:(
+    "Invoke-TokenManipulation" or
+    "ImpersonateNamedPipeClient" or
+    "NtImpersonateThread" or
+    (
+      "STARTUPINFOEX" and
+      "UpdateProcThreadAttribute"
+    ) or
+    (
+      "AdjustTokenPrivileges" and
+      "SeDebugPrivilege"
+    ) or
+    (
+      ("DuplicateToken" or
+      "DuplicateTokenEx") and
+      ("SetThreadToken" or
+      "ImpersonateLoggedOnUser" or
+      "CreateProcessWithTokenW" or
+      "CreatePRocessAsUserW" or
+      "CreateProcessAsUserA")
+    ) 
+  ) and
+  not (
+    user.id:("S-1-5-18" or "S-1-5-19" or "S-1-5-20") and
+    file.directory: "C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection\\Downloads"
+  ) and
+  not powershell.file.script_block_text : (
+    "sentinelbreakpoints" and "Set-PSBreakpoint" and "PowerSploitIndicators"
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Access Token Manipulation
+** ID: T1134
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Token Impersonation/Theft
+** ID: T1134.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Native API
+** ID: T1106
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-script-with-veeam-credential-access-capabilities.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-script-with-veeam-credential-access-capabilities.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..556e00f03a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-script-with-veeam-credential-access-capabilities.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-script-with-veeam-credential-access-capabilities]]
+=== PowerShell Script with Veeam Credential Access Capabilities
+
+Identifies PowerShell scripts that can access and decrypt Veeam credentials stored in MSSQL databases. Attackers can use Veeam Credentials to target backups as part of destructive operations such as Ransomware attacks.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://forums.veeam.com/veeam-backup-replication-f2/recover-esxi-password-in-veeam-t34630.html
+* https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/anatomy-of-alpha-spider-ransomware/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: PowerShell Logs
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Administrative Templates >
+Windows PowerShell >
+Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging (Enable)
+```
+
+Steps to implement the logging policy via registry:
+
+```
+reg add "hklm\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging" /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 1
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:windows and
+  powershell.file.script_block_text : (
+    (
+      "[dbo].[Credentials]" and
+      ("Veeam" or "VeeamBackup")
+    ) or
+    "ProtectedStorage]::GetLocalString"
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Credentials from Password Stores
+** ID: T1555
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-script-with-webcam-video-capture-capabilities.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-script-with-webcam-video-capture-capabilities.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..96e964cf92
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-script-with-webcam-video-capture-capabilities.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-script-with-webcam-video-capture-capabilities]]
+=== PowerShell Script with Webcam Video Capture Capabilities
+
+Detects PowerShell scripts that can be used to record webcam video. Attackers can capture this information to extort or spy on victims.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/lib/modules/powershell/collection/WebcamRecorder.py
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Collection
+* Data Source: PowerShell Logs
+
+*Version*: 4
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Administrative Templates >
+Windows PowerShell >
+Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging (Enable)
+```
+
+Steps to implement the logging policy via registry:
+
+```
+reg add "hklm\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging" /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 1
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:windows and
+  powershell.file.script_block_text : (
+    "NewFrameEventHandler" or
+    "VideoCaptureDevice" or
+    "DirectX.Capture.Filters" or
+    "VideoCompressors" or
+    "Start-WebcamRecorder" or
+    (
+      ("capCreateCaptureWindowA" or
+       "capCreateCaptureWindow" or
+       "capGetDriverDescription") and
+      ("avicap32.dll" or "avicap32")
+    )
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Collection
+** ID: TA0009
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Video Capture
+** ID: T1125
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1125/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-share-enumeration-script.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-share-enumeration-script.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8c8debffe7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-share-enumeration-script.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-share-enumeration-script]]
+=== PowerShell Share Enumeration Script
+
+Detects scripts that contain PowerShell functions, structures, or Windows API functions related to windows share enumeration activities. Attackers, mainly ransomware groups, commonly identify and inspect network shares, looking for critical information for encryption and/or exfiltration.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.advintel.io/post/hunting-for-corporate-insurance-policies-indicators-of-ransom-exfiltrations
+* https://thedfirreport.com/2022/04/04/stolen-images-campaign-ends-in-conti-ransomware/
+* https://github.com/atc-project/atc-data/blob/master/docs/Logging_Policies/LP_0109_windows_powershell_script_block_log.md
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Discovery
+* Tactic: Collection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: PowerShell Logs
+
+*Version*: 9
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating PowerShell Share Enumeration Script*
+
+
+PowerShell is one of the main tools system administrators use for automation, report routines, and other tasks. This makes it available for use in various environments, and creates an attractive way for attackers to execute code.
+
+Attackers can use PowerShell to enumerate shares to search for sensitive data like documents, scripts, and other kinds of valuable data for encryption, exfiltration, and lateral movement.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Examine the script content that triggered the detection; look for suspicious DLL imports, collection or exfiltration capabilities, suspicious functions, encoded or compressed data, and other potentially malicious characteristics.
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Evaluate whether the user needs to use PowerShell to complete tasks.
+- Check for additional PowerShell and command line logs that indicate that imported functions were run.
+  - Evaluate which information was potentially mapped and accessed by the attacker.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Restrict PowerShell usage outside of IT and engineering business units using GPOs, AppLocker, Intune, or similar software.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be configured (Enable).
+
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Administrative Templates >
+Windows PowerShell >
+Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging (Enable)
+```
+
+Steps to implement the logging policy via registry:
+
+```
+reg add "hklm\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging" /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 1
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:windows and
+  powershell.file.script_block_text:(
+    "Invoke-ShareFinder" or
+    "Invoke-ShareFinderThreaded" or
+    (
+      "shi1_netname" and
+      "shi1_remark"
+    ) or
+    (
+      "NetShareEnum" and
+      "NetApiBufferFree"
+    )
+  ) and not user.id : "S-1-5-18"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Discovery
+** ID: TA0007
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Network Share Discovery
+** ID: T1135
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1135/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Native API
+** ID: T1106
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Collection
+** ID: TA0009
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Data from Network Shared Drive
+** ID: T1039
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1039/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-suspicious-discovery-related-windows-api-functions.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-suspicious-discovery-related-windows-api-functions.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cc14786ee0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-suspicious-discovery-related-windows-api-functions.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-suspicious-discovery-related-windows-api-functions]]
+=== PowerShell Suspicious Discovery Related Windows API Functions
+
+This rule detects the use of discovery-related Windows API functions in PowerShell Scripts. Attackers can use these functions to perform various situational awareness related activities, like enumerating users, shares, sessions, domain trusts, groups, etc.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/BC-SECURITY/Empire/blob/9259e5106986847d2bb770c4289c0c0f1adf2344/data/module_source/situational_awareness/network/powerview.ps1#L21413
+* https://github.com/atc-project/atc-data/blob/master/docs/Logging_Policies/LP_0109_windows_powershell_script_block_log.md
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Discovery
+* Tactic: Collection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: PowerShell Logs
+
+*Version*: 113
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating PowerShell Suspicious Discovery Related Windows API Functions*
+
+
+PowerShell is one of the main tools system administrators use for automation, report routines, and other tasks. This makes it available for use in various environments, and creates an attractive way for attackers to execute code.
+
+Attackers can use PowerShell to interact with the Win32 API to bypass command line based detections, using libraries like PSReflect or Get-ProcAddress Cmdlet.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Examine the script content that triggered the detection; look for suspicious DLL imports, collection or exfiltration capabilities, suspicious functions, encoded or compressed data, and other potentially malicious characteristics.
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Examine file or network events from the involved PowerShell process for suspicious behavior.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Evaluate whether the user needs to use PowerShell to complete tasks.
+- Check for additional PowerShell and command-line logs that indicate that imported functions were run.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Discovery activities themselves are not inherently malicious if occurring in isolation, as long as the script does not contain other capabilities, and there are no other alerts related to the user or host; such alerts can be dismissed. However, analysts should keep in mind that this is not a common way of getting information, making it suspicious.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- PowerShell PSReflect Script - 56f2e9b5-4803-4e44-a0a4-a52dc79d57fe
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Restrict PowerShell usage outside of IT and engineering business units using GPOs, AppLocker, Intune, or similar software.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Administrative Templates >
+Windows PowerShell >
+Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging (Enable)
+```
+
+Steps to implement the logging policy via registry:
+
+```
+reg add "hklm\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging" /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 1
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:windows and
+  powershell.file.script_block_text : (
+    NetShareEnum or
+    NetWkstaUserEnum or
+    NetSessionEnum or
+    NetLocalGroupEnum or
+    NetLocalGroupGetMembers or
+    DsGetSiteName or
+    DsEnumerateDomainTrusts or
+    WTSEnumerateSessionsEx or
+    WTSQuerySessionInformation or
+    LsaGetLogonSessionData or
+    QueryServiceObjectSecurity or
+    GetComputerNameEx or
+    NetWkstaGetInfo or
+    GetUserNameEx or
+    NetUserEnum or
+    NetUserGetInfo or
+    NetGroupEnum or
+    NetGroupGetInfo or
+    NetGroupGetUsers or
+    NetWkstaTransportEnum or
+    NetServerGetInfo or
+    LsaEnumerateTrustedDomains  or
+    NetScheduleJobEnum or
+    NetUserModalsGet
+  )
+  and not file.path : ?\:\\\\ProgramData\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows?Defender?Advanced?Threat?Protection\\\\DataCollection\\\\*
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Discovery
+** ID: TA0007
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Permission Groups Discovery
+** ID: T1069
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Local Groups
+** ID: T1069.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Account Discovery
+** ID: T1087
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Local Account
+** ID: T1087.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Domain Trust Discovery
+** ID: T1482
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Network Share Discovery
+** ID: T1135
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1135/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Native API
+** ID: T1106
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Collection
+** ID: TA0009
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Data from Network Shared Drive
+** ID: T1039
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1039/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-suspicious-payload-encoded-and-compressed.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-suspicious-payload-encoded-and-compressed.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5d26013146
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-suspicious-payload-encoded-and-compressed.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-suspicious-payload-encoded-and-compressed]]
+=== PowerShell Suspicious Payload Encoded and Compressed
+
+Identifies the use of .NET functionality for decompression and base64 decoding combined in PowerShell scripts, which malware and security tools heavily use to deobfuscate payloads and load them directly in memory to bypass defenses.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: PowerShell Logs
+
+*Version*: 111
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating PowerShell Suspicious Payload Encoded and Compressed*
+
+
+PowerShell is one of the main tools system administrators use for automation, report routines, and other tasks. This makes it available for use in various environments, and creates an attractive way for attackers to execute code.
+
+Attackers can embed compressed and encoded payloads in scripts to load directly into the memory without touching the disk. This strategy can circumvent string and file-based security protections.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Examine the script content that triggered the detection; look for suspicious DLL imports, collection or exfiltration capabilities, suspicious functions, encoded or compressed data, and other potentially malicious characteristics.
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Examine file or network events from the involved PowerShell process for suspicious behavior.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Evaluate whether the user needs to use PowerShell to complete tasks.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the script using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately outside engineering or IT business units. As long as the analyst did not identify malware or suspicious activity related to the user or host, this alert can be dismissed.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- PowerShell PSReflect Script - 56f2e9b5-4803-4e44-a0a4-a52dc79d57fe
+- Potential Process Injection via PowerShell - 2e29e96a-b67c-455a-afe4-de6183431d0d
+- Suspicious .NET Reflection via PowerShell - e26f042e-c590-4e82-8e05-41e81bd822ad
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Restrict PowerShell usage outside of IT and engineering business units using GPOs, AppLocker, Intune, or similar software.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Administrative Templates >
+Windows PowerShell >
+Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging (Enable)
+```
+
+Steps to implement the logging policy via registry:
+
+```
+reg add "hklm\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging" /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 1
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:windows and
+  powershell.file.script_block_text : (
+    (
+      "System.IO.Compression.DeflateStream" or
+      "System.IO.Compression.GzipStream" or
+      "IO.Compression.DeflateStream" or
+      "IO.Compression.GzipStream"
+    ) and
+    FromBase64String
+  ) and
+  not file.path: ?\:\\\\ProgramData\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows?Defender?Advanced?Threat?Protection\\\\Downloads\\\\* and
+  not user.id : "S-1-5-18"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Obfuscated Files or Information
+** ID: T1027
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
+** ID: T1140
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-suspicious-script-with-audio-capture-capabilities.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-suspicious-script-with-audio-capture-capabilities.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..493be48809
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-suspicious-script-with-audio-capture-capabilities.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-suspicious-script-with-audio-capture-capabilities]]
+=== PowerShell Suspicious Script with Audio Capture Capabilities
+
+Detects PowerShell scripts that can record audio, a common feature in popular post-exploitation tooling.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Get-MicrophoneAudio.ps1
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Collection
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: PowerShell Logs
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating PowerShell Suspicious Script with Audio Capture Capabilities*
+
+
+PowerShell is one of the main tools system administrators use for automation, report routines, and other tasks. This makes it available for use in various environments, and creates an attractive way for attackers to execute code.
+
+Attackers can use PowerShell to interact with the Windows API with the intent of capturing audio from input devices connected to the victim's computer.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Examine the script content that triggered the detection; look for suspicious DLL imports, collection or exfiltration capabilities, suspicious functions, encoded or compressed data, and other potentially malicious characteristics.
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Examine file or network events from the involved PowerShell process for suspicious behavior.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Evaluate whether the user needs to use PowerShell to complete tasks.
+- Investigate if the script stores the recorded data locally and determine if anything was recorded.
+- Investigate whether the script contains exfiltration capabilities and identify the exfiltration server.
+- Assess network data to determine if the host communicated with the exfiltration server.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Regular users should not need scripts to capture audio, which makes false positives unlikely. In the case of authorized benign true positives (B-TPs), exceptions can be added.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- PowerShell PSReflect Script - 56f2e9b5-4803-4e44-a0a4-a52dc79d57fe
+- Potential Process Injection via PowerShell - 2e29e96a-b67c-455a-afe4-de6183431d0d
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Prioritize the response if this alert involves key executives or potentially valuable targets for espionage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Restrict PowerShell usage outside of IT and engineering business units using GPOs, AppLocker, Intune, or similar software.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Administrative Templates >
+Windows PowerShell >
+Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging (Enable)
+```
+
+Steps to implement the logging policy via registry:
+
+```
+reg add "hklm\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging" /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 1
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:windows and
+  powershell.file.script_block_text : (
+    "Get-MicrophoneAudio" or
+    "WindowsAudioDevice-Powershell-Cmdlet" or
+    (waveInGetNumDevs and mciSendStringA)
+  )
+  and not powershell.file.script_block_text : (
+    "sentinelbreakpoints" and "Set-PSBreakpoint" and "PowerSploitIndicators"
+  )
+  and not user.id : "S-1-5-18"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Collection
+** ID: TA0009
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Audio Capture
+** ID: T1123
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1123/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Native API
+** ID: T1106
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-suspicious-script-with-clipboard-retrieval-capabilities.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-suspicious-script-with-clipboard-retrieval-capabilities.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e174e64d53
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-suspicious-script-with-clipboard-retrieval-capabilities.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-suspicious-script-with-clipboard-retrieval-capabilities]]
+=== PowerShell Suspicious Script with Clipboard Retrieval Capabilities
+
+Detects PowerShell scripts that can get the contents of the clipboard, which attackers can abuse to retrieve sensitive information like credentials, messages, etc.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/get-clipboard
+* https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/data/module_source/collection/Get-ClipboardContents.ps1
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Collection
+* Data Source: PowerShell Logs
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+
+*Version*: 8
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating PowerShell Suspicious Script with Clipboard Retrieval Capabilities*
+
+
+PowerShell is one of the main tools system administrators use for automation, report routines, and other tasks. This makes it available for use in various environments, and creates an attractive way for attackers to execute code.
+
+Attackers can abuse PowerShell capabilities to get the contents of the clipboard with the goal of stealing credentials and other valuable information, such as credit card data and confidential conversations.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Examine the script content that triggered the detection; look for suspicious DLL imports, collection or exfiltration capabilities, suspicious functions, encoded or compressed data, and other potentially malicious characteristics.
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Examine file or network events from the involved PowerShell process for suspicious behavior.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Evaluate whether the user needs to use PowerShell to complete tasks.
+- Determine whether the script stores the captured data locally.
+- Investigate whether the script contains exfiltration capabilities and identify the exfiltration server.
+- Assess network data to determine if the host communicated with the exfiltration server.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Regular users are unlikely to use scripting utilities to capture contents of the clipboard, making false positives unlikely. In the case of authorized benign true positives (B-TPs), exceptions can be added.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- PowerShell Keylogging Script - bd2c86a0-8b61-4457-ab38-96943984e889
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Prioritize the response if this alert involves key executives or potentially valuable targets for espionage.
+- Restrict PowerShell usage outside of IT and engineering business units using GPOs, AppLocker, Intune, or similar software.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Administrative Templates >
+Windows PowerShell >
+Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging (Enable)
+```
+
+Steps to implement the logging policy via registry:
+
+```
+reg add "hklm\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging" /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 1
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:windows and
+  (powershell.file.script_block_text : (
+    "Windows.Clipboard" or
+    "Windows.Forms.Clipboard" or
+    "Windows.Forms.TextBox"
+   ) and
+   powershell.file.script_block_text : (
+    "]::GetText" or
+    ".Paste()"
+  )) or powershell.file.script_block_text : "Get-Clipboard" and
+  not powershell.file.script_block_text : (
+    "sentinelbreakpoints" and "Set-PSBreakpoint" and "PowerSploitIndicators"
+  ) and
+  not user.id : "S-1-5-18" and
+  not file.path : (
+        ?\:\\\\program?files\\\\powershell\\\\?\\\\Modules\\\\*.psd1 or
+        ?\:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\v1.0\\\\Modules\\\\*.psd1 or
+        ?\:\\\\WINDOWS\\\\system32\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\v1.0\\\\Modules\\\\*.psd1 or
+        ?\:\\\\Program?Files\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\Modules\\\\*.psd1 or
+        ?\:\\\\Program?Files\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\Modules\\\\*.psm1
+      ) and 
+  not (
+    file.path : ?\:\\\\Program?Files\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\*Modules*.ps1 and
+    file.name : ("Convert-ExcelRangeToImage.ps1" or "Read-Clipboard.ps1")
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Collection
+** ID: TA0009
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Clipboard Data
+** ID: T1115
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1115/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-suspicious-script-with-screenshot-capabilities.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-suspicious-script-with-screenshot-capabilities.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e12520c439
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-suspicious-script-with-screenshot-capabilities.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-suspicious-script-with-screenshot-capabilities]]
+=== PowerShell Suspicious Script with Screenshot Capabilities
+
+Detects PowerShell scripts that can take screenshots, which is a common feature in post-exploitation kits and remote access tools (RATs).
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.drawing.graphics.copyfromscreen
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Collection
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: PowerShell Logs
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating PowerShell Suspicious Script with Screenshot Capabilities*
+
+
+PowerShell is one of the main tools system administrators use for automation, report routines, and other tasks, which makes it available for use in various environments and creates an attractive way for attackers to execute code.
+
+Attackers can abuse PowerShell capabilities and take screen captures of desktops to gather information over the course of an operation.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Examine the script content that triggered the detection; look for suspicious DLL imports, collection or exfiltration capabilities, suspicious functions, encoded or compressed data, and other potentially malicious characteristics.
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Examine file or network events from the involved PowerShell process for suspicious behavior.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Evaluate whether the user needs to use PowerShell to complete tasks.
+- Determine whether the script stores the captured data locally.
+- Investigate whether the script contains exfiltration capabilities and identify the exfiltration server.
+- Assess network data to determine if the host communicated with the exfiltration server.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Regular users do not have a business justification for using scripting utilities to take screenshots, which makes false positives unlikely. In the case of authorized benign true positives (B-TPs), exceptions can be added.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- PowerShell Keylogging Script - bd2c86a0-8b61-4457-ab38-96943984e889
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Restrict PowerShell usage outside of IT and engineering business units using GPOs, AppLocker, Intune, or similar software.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Administrative Templates >
+Windows PowerShell >
+Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging (Enable)
+```
+
+Steps to implement the logging policy via registry:
+
+```
+reg add "hklm\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging" /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 1
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:windows and
+  powershell.file.script_block_text : (
+    CopyFromScreen and
+    ("System.Drawing.Bitmap" or "Drawing.Bitmap")
+  ) and not user.id : "S-1-5-18"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Collection
+** ID: TA0009
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Screen Capture
+** ID: T1113
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1113/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-cap-chown-cap-fowner-capabilities.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-cap-chown-cap-fowner-capabilities.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c554674d44
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-cap-chown-cap-fowner-capabilities.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-cap-chown-cap-fowner-capabilities]]
+=== Privilege Escalation via CAP_CHOWN/CAP_FOWNER Capabilities
+
+Identifies instances where a processes (granted CAP_CHOWN and/or CAP_FOWNER capabilities) is executed, after which the ownership of a suspicious file or binary is changed. In Linux, the CAP_CHOWN capability allows a process to change the owner of a file, while CAP_FOWNER permits it to bypass permission checks on operations that require file ownership (like reading, writing, and executing). Attackers may abuse these capabilities to obtain unauthorized access to files.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Auditd Manager.
+
+
+*Auditd Manager Integration Setup*
+
+The Auditd Manager Integration receives audit events from the Linux Audit Framework which is a part of the Linux kernel.
+Auditd Manager provides a user-friendly interface and automation capabilities for configuring and monitoring system auditing through the auditd daemon. With `auditd_manager`, administrators can easily define audit rules, track system events, and generate comprehensive audit reports, improving overall security and compliance in the system.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Agent System integration "auditd_manager" on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click “Add integrations”.
+- In the query bar, search for “Auditd Manager” and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click “Add Auditd Manager”.
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Review optional and advanced settings accordingly.
+- Add the newly installed “auditd manager” to an existing or a new agent policy, and deploy the agent on a Linux system from which auditd log files are desirable.
+- Click “Save and Continue”.
+- For more details on the integration refer to the https://docs.elastic.co/integrations/auditd_manager[helper guide].
+
+
+*Rule Specific Setup Note*
+
+Auditd Manager subscribes to the kernel and receives events as they occur without any additional configuration.
+However, if more advanced configuration is required to detect specific behavior, audit rules can be added to the integration in either the "audit rules" configuration box or the "auditd rule files" box by specifying a file to read the audit rules from.
+- For this detection rule the following additional audit rules are required to be added to the integration:
+  -- "-w /etc/ -p rwxa -k audit_recursive_etc"
+  -- "-w /root/ -p rwxa -k audit_root"
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id, process.pid with maxspan=1s
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
+   process.name != null and process.thread.capabilities.effective : ("CAP_CHOWN", "CAP_FOWNER") and
+   process.command_line : ("*sudoers*", "*passwd*", "*shadow*", "*/root/*") and user.id != "0"]
+  [file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "changed-file-ownership-of" and event.type == "change" and
+   event.outcome == "success" and file.path in (
+     "/etc/passwd",
+     "/etc/shadow",
+     "/etc/sudoers",
+     "/root/.ssh/*"
+   ) and user.id != "0"
+  ]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
+** ID: T1068
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-cap-setuid-setgid-capabilities.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-cap-setuid-setgid-capabilities.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9287aee835
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-cap-setuid-setgid-capabilities.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-cap-setuid-setgid-capabilities]]
+=== Privilege Escalation via CAP_SETUID/SETGID Capabilities
+
+Identifies instances where a process (granted CAP_SETUID and/or CAP_SETGID capabilities) is executed, after which the user's access is elevated to UID/GID 0 (root). In Linux, the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities allow a process to change its UID and GID, respectively, providing control over user and group identity management. Attackers may leverage a misconfiguration for exploitation in order to escalate their privileges to root.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 2
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id, process.entity_id with maxspan=1s
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and process.name != null and
+   (process.thread.capabilities.effective : "CAP_SET?ID" or process.thread.capabilities.permitted : "CAP_SET?ID") and 
+   user.id != "0"]
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "uid_change" and event.type == "change" and 
+   (process.thread.capabilities.effective : "CAP_SET?ID" or process.thread.capabilities.permitted : "CAP_SET?ID")
+   and user.id == "0"]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
+** ID: T1068
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
+** ID: T1548
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Setuid and Setgid
+** ID: T1548.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-gdb-cap-sys-ptrace.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-gdb-cap-sys-ptrace.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8fb8008b84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-gdb-cap-sys-ptrace.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-gdb-cap-sys-ptrace]]
+=== Privilege Escalation via GDB CAP_SYS_PTRACE
+
+Identifies instances where GDB (granted the CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability) is executed, after which the user's access is elevated to UID/GID 0 (root). In Linux, the CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability grants a process the ability to use the ptrace system call, which is typically used for debugging and allows the process to trace and control other processes. Attackers may leverage this capability to hook and inject into a process that is running with root permissions in order to escalate their privileges to root.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 2
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id, process.entry_leader.entity_id with maxspan=1m
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and process.name == "gdb" and
+   (process.thread.capabilities.effective : "CAP_SYS_PTRACE" or process.thread.capabilities.permitted : "CAP_SYS_PTRACE") and 
+   user.id != "0"]
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
+   process.name != null and user.id == "0"]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Process Injection
+** ID: T1055
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Ptrace System Calls
+** ID: T1055.008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
+** ID: T1068
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-named-pipe-impersonation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-named-pipe-impersonation.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..87d8132a9b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-named-pipe-impersonation.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-named-pipe-impersonation]]
+=== Privilege Escalation via Named Pipe Impersonation
+
+Identifies a privilege escalation attempt via named pipe impersonation. An adversary may abuse this technique by utilizing a framework such Metasploit's meterpreter getsystem command.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/privilege-escalation/windows-namedpipes-privilege-escalation
+* https://www.cobaltstrike.com/blog/what-happens-when-i-type-getsystem/
+* https://redcanary.com/blog/getsystem-offsec/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Privilege Escalation via Named Pipe Impersonation*
+
+
+A named pipe is a type of inter-process communication (IPC) mechanism used in operating systems like Windows, which allows two or more processes to communicate with each other by sending and receiving data through a well-known point.
+
+Attackers can abuse named pipes to elevate their privileges by impersonating the security context in which they execute code. Metasploit, for example, creates a service and a random pipe, and then uses the service to connect to the pipe and impersonate the service security context, which is SYSTEM.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Inspect the host for suspicious or abnormal behavior in the alert timeframe.
+- Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - If any suspicious processes were found, examine the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+ (process.name : ("Cmd.Exe", "PowerShell.EXE") or ?process.pe.original_file_name in ("Cmd.Exe", "PowerShell.EXE")) and
+ process.args : "echo" and process.args : ">" and process.args : "\\\\.\\pipe\\*"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Access Token Manipulation
+** ID: T1134
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-rogue-named-pipe-impersonation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-rogue-named-pipe-impersonation.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..24a09cdb96
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-rogue-named-pipe-impersonation.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-rogue-named-pipe-impersonation]]
+=== Privilege Escalation via Rogue Named Pipe Impersonation
+
+Identifies a privilege escalation attempt via rogue named pipe impersonation. An adversary may abuse this technique by masquerading as a known named pipe and manipulating a privileged process to connect to it.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://itm4n.github.io/printspoofer-abusing-impersonate-privileges/
+* https://github.com/zcgonvh/EfsPotato
+* https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1429530155291193354
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+Named Pipe Creation Events need to be enabled within the Sysmon configuration by including the following settings:
+`condition equal "contains" and keyword equal "pipe"`
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.action : "Pipe Created*" and
+ /* normal sysmon named pipe creation events truncate the pipe keyword */
+  file.name : "\\*\\Pipe\\*"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Access Token Manipulation
+** ID: T1134
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-root-crontab-file-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-root-crontab-file-modification.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..61bc7de602
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-root-crontab-file-modification.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-root-crontab-file-modification]]
+=== Privilege Escalation via Root Crontab File Modification
+
+Identifies modifications to the root crontab file. Adversaries may overwrite this file to gain code execution with root privileges by exploiting privileged file write or move related vulnerabilities.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://phoenhex.re/2017-06-09/pwn2own-diskarbitrationd-privesc
+* https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42146
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:file and host.os.type:macos and not event.type:deletion and
+ file.path:/private/var/at/tabs/root and not process.executable:/usr/bin/crontab
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task/Job
+** ID: T1053
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Cron
+** ID: T1053.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-windir-environment-variable.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-windir-environment-variable.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9afd0f447b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-windir-environment-variable.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-windir-environment-variable]]
+=== Privilege Escalation via Windir Environment Variable
+
+Identifies a privilege escalation attempt via a rogue Windows directory (Windir) environment variable. This is a known primitive that is often combined with other vulnerabilities to elevate privileges.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.tiraniddo.dev/2017/05/exploiting-environment-variables-in.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 105
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+registry where host.os.type == "windows" and registry.path : (
+    "HKEY_USERS\\*\\Environment\\windir",
+    "HKEY_USERS\\*\\Environment\\systemroot",
+    "HKU\\*\\Environment\\windir",
+    "HKU\\*\\Environment\\systemroot",
+    "\\REGISTRY\\USER\\*\\Environment\\windir",
+    "\\REGISTRY\\USER\\*\\Environment\\systemroot"
+    ) and
+ not registry.data.strings : ("C:\\windows", "%SystemRoot%")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Hijack Execution Flow
+** ID: T1574
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable
+** ID: T1574.007
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/007/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privileged-account-brute-force.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privileged-account-brute-force.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e17a32e172
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privileged-account-brute-force.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privileged-account-brute-force]]
+=== Privileged Account Brute Force
+
+Identifies multiple consecutive logon failures targeting an Admin account from the same source address and within a short time interval. Adversaries will often brute force login attempts across multiple users with a common or known password, in an attempt to gain access to accounts.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-system.security*
+* logs-windows.forwarded*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4625
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+
+*Version*: 9
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Privileged Account Brute Force*
+
+
+Adversaries with no prior knowledge of legitimate credentials within the system or environment may guess passwords to attempt access to accounts. Without knowledge of the password for an account, an adversary may opt to guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism systematically. More details can be found https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001/[here].
+
+This rule identifies potential password guessing/brute force activity from a single address against an account that contains the `admin` pattern on its name, which is likely a highly privileged account.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the logon failure reason code and the targeted user name.
+  - Prioritize the investigation if the account is critical or has administrative privileges over the domain.
+- Investigate the source IP address of the failed Network Logon attempts.
+  - Identify whether these attempts are coming from the internet or are internal.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the involved users and source host during the past 48 hours.
+- Identify the source and the target computer and their roles in the IT environment.
+- Check whether the involved credentials are used in automation or scheduled tasks.
+- If this activity is suspicious, contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of it.
+- Examine the source host for derived artifacts that indicate compromise:
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in the alert source host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the host which is the source of this activity.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Authentication misconfiguration or obsolete credentials.
+- Service account password expired.
+- Domain trust relationship issues.
+- Infrastructure or availability issues.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the source host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the asset is exposed to the internet with RDP or other remote services available, take the necessary measures to restrict access to the asset. If not possible, limit the access via the firewall to only the needed IP addresses. Also, ensure the system uses robust authentication mechanisms and is patched regularly.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by winlog.computer_name, source.ip with maxspan=10s
+  [authentication where event.action == "logon-failed" and winlog.logon.type : "Network" and
+    source.ip != null and source.ip != "127.0.0.1" and source.ip != "::1" and user.name : "*admin*" and
+
+    /* noisy failure status codes often associated to authentication misconfiguration */
+    not winlog.event_data.Status : ("0xC000015B", "0XC000005E", "0XC0000133", "0XC0000192")] with runs=5
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Brute Force
+** ID: T1110
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Password Guessing
+** ID: T1110.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Password Spraying
+** ID: T1110.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-process-activity-via-compiled-html-file.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-process-activity-via-compiled-html-file.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0f87f1563f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-process-activity-via-compiled-html-file.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-process-activity-via-compiled-html-file]]
+=== Process Activity via Compiled HTML File
+
+Compiled HTML files (.chm) are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. Adversaries may conceal malicious code in a CHM file and deliver it to a victim for execution. CHM content is loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe).
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Process Activity via Compiled HTML File*
+
+
+CHM (Compiled HTML) files are a format for delivering online help files on Windows. CHM files are compressed compilations of various content, such as HTML documents, images, and scripting/web-related programming languages such as VBA, JScript, Java, and ActiveX.
+
+When users double-click CHM files, the HTML Help executable program (`hh.exe`) will execute them. `hh.exe` also can be used to execute code embedded in those files, PowerShell scripts, and executables. This makes it useful for attackers not only to proxy the execution of malicious payloads via a signed binary that could bypass security controls, but also to gain initial access to environments via social engineering methods.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+- Investigate the parent process to gain understanding of what triggered this behavior.
+  - Retrieve `.chm`, `.ps1`, and other files that were involved to further examination.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the process executables, scripts and help files retrieved from the system using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- If the malicious file was delivered via phishing:
+  - Block the email sender from sending future emails.
+  - Block the malicious web pages.
+  - Remove emails from the sender from mailboxes.
+  - Consider improvements to the security awareness program.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+ process.parent.name : "hh.exe" and
+ process.name : ("mshta.exe", "cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe", "cscript.exe", "wscript.exe")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: User Execution
+** ID: T1204
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Malicious File
+** ID: T1204.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: System Binary Proxy Execution
+** ID: T1218
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Compiled HTML File
+** ID: T1218.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-process-capability-enumeration.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-process-capability-enumeration.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f22e90402e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-process-capability-enumeration.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-process-capability-enumeration]]
+=== Process Capability Enumeration
+
+Identifies recursive process capability enumeration of the entire filesystem through the getcap command. Malicious users may manipulate identified capabilities to gain root privileges.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Discovery
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+
+*Version*: 2
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and
+process.name == "getcap" and process.args == "-r" and process.args == "/" and process.args_count == 3 and
+user.id != "0"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Discovery
+** ID: TA0007
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Process Discovery
+** ID: T1057
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-process-creation-via-secondary-logon.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-process-creation-via-secondary-logon.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..273d51709b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-process-creation-via-secondary-logon.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-process-creation-via-secondary-logon]]
+=== Process Creation via Secondary Logon
+
+Identifies process creation with alternate credentials. Adversaries may create a new process with a different token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-system.*
+* logs-windows.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+
+*Version*: 9
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+Audit events 4624 and 4688 are needed to trigger this rule.
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by winlog.computer_name with maxspan=1m
+
+[authentication where event.action:"logged-in" and
+ event.outcome == "success" and user.id : ("S-1-5-21-*", "S-1-12-1-*") and
+
+ /* seclogon service */
+ process.name == "svchost.exe" and
+ winlog.event_data.LogonProcessName : "seclogo*" and source.ip == "::1" ] by winlog.event_data.TargetLogonId
+
+[process where event.type == "start"] by winlog.event_data.TargetLogonId
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Access Token Manipulation
+** ID: T1134
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Create Process with Token
+** ID: T1134.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Make and Impersonate Token
+** ID: T1134.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-process-execution-from-an-unusual-directory.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-process-execution-from-an-unusual-directory.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4752a80df2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-process-execution-from-an-unusual-directory.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-process-execution-from-an-unusual-directory]]
+=== Process Execution from an Unusual Directory
+
+Identifies process execution from suspicious default Windows directories. This is sometimes done by adversaries to hide malware in trusted paths.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Process Execution from an Unusual Directory*
+
+
+This rule identifies processes that are executed from suspicious default Windows directories. Adversaries may abuse this technique by planting malware in trusted paths, making it difficult for security analysts to discern if their activities are malicious or take advantage of exceptions that may apply to these paths.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes, examining their executable files for prevalence, location, and valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process, such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+- Examine arguments and working directory to determine the program's source or the nature of the tasks it is performing.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Inspect the host for suspicious or abnormal behavior in the alert timeframe.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- If this activity is expected and noisy in your environment, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of executable and signature conditions.
+
+
+*Related Rules*
+
+
+- Unusual Windows Path Activity - 445a342e-03fb-42d0-8656-0367eb2dead5
+- Execution from Unusual Directory - Command Line - cff92c41-2225-4763-b4ce-6f71e5bda5e6
+
+
+*Response and Remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  /* add suspicious execution paths here */
+  process.executable : (
+    "?:\\PerfLogs\\*.exe", "?:\\Users\\Public\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\Tasks\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\Intel\\*.exe", "?:\\AMD\\Temp\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\AppReadiness\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\Windows\\ServiceState\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\security\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\IdentityCRL\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\Windows\\Branding\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\csc\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\DigitalLocker\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\Windows\\en-US\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\wlansvc\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\Prefetch\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\Windows\\Fonts\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\diagnostics\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\TAPI\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\Windows\\INF\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\System32\\Speech\\*.exe", "?:\\windows\\tracing\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\windows\\IME\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\Performance\\*.exe", "?:\\windows\\intel\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\windows\\ms\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\dot3svc\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\panther\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\Windows\\RemotePackages\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\OCR\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\appcompat\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\Windows\\apppatch\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\addins\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\Setup\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\Windows\\Help\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\SKB\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\Vss\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\Windows\\Web\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\servicing\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\CbsTemp\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\Windows\\Logs\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\WaaS\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\ShellExperiences\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\Windows\\ShellComponents\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\PLA\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\Migration\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\Windows\\debug\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\Cursors\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\Containers\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\Windows\\Boot\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\bcastdvr\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\assembly\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\Windows\\TextInput\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\security\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\schemas\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\Windows\\SchCache\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\Resources\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\rescache\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\Windows\\Provisioning\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\PrintDialog\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\PolicyDefinitions\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\Windows\\media\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\Globalization\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\L2Schemas\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\Windows\\LiveKernelReports\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\ModemLogs\\*.exe",
+    "?:\\Windows\\ImmersiveControlPanel\\*.exe"
+  ) and
+  
+  not process.name : (
+    "SpeechUXWiz.exe", "SystemSettings.exe", "TrustedInstaller.exe",
+    "PrintDialog.exe", "MpSigStub.exe", "LMS.exe", "mpam-*.exe"
+  ) and
+  not process.executable :
+            ("?:\\Intel\\Wireless\\WUSetupLauncher.exe",
+             "?:\\Intel\\Wireless\\Setup.exe",
+             "?:\\Intel\\Move Mouse.exe",
+             "?:\\windows\\Panther\\DiagTrackRunner.exe",
+             "?:\\Windows\\servicing\\GC64\\tzupd.exe",
+             "?:\\Users\\Public\\res\\RemoteLite.exe",
+             "?:\\Users\\Public\\IBM\\ClientSolutions\\*.exe",
+             "?:\\Users\\Public\\Documents\\syspin.exe",
+             "?:\\Users\\Public\\res\\FileWatcher.exe")
+ /* uncomment once in winlogbeat */
+ /* and not (process.code_signature.subject_name == "Microsoft Corporation" and process.code_signature.trusted == true) */
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Masquerading
+** ID: T1036
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Match Legitimate Name or Location
+** ID: T1036.005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-process-injection-by-the-microsoft-build-engine.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-process-injection-by-the-microsoft-build-engine.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4f31d06272
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-process-injection-by-the-microsoft-build-engine.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-process-injection-by-the-microsoft-build-engine]]
+=== Process Injection by the Microsoft Build Engine
+
+An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, created a thread in another process. This technique is sometimes used to evade detection or elevate privileges.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: None ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process.name:MSBuild.exe and host.os.type:windows and event.action:"CreateRemoteThread detected (rule: CreateRemoteThread)"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Process Injection
+** ID: T1055
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
+** ID: T1127
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: MSBuild
+** ID: T1127.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Process Injection
+** ID: T1055
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-process-started-from-process-id-pid-file.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-process-started-from-process-id-pid-file.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9af4fef832
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-process-started-from-process-id-pid-file.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-process-started-from-process-id-pid-file]]
+=== Process Started from Process ID (PID) File
+
+Identifies a new process starting from a process ID (PID), lock or reboot file within the temporary file storage paradigm (tmpfs) directory /var/run directory. On Linux, the PID files typically hold the process ID to track previous copies running and manage other tasks. Certain Linux malware use the /var/run directory for holding data, executables and other tasks, disguising itself or these files as legitimate PID files.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.sandflysecurity.com/blog/linux-file-masquerading-and-malicious-pids-sandfly-1-2-6-update/
+* https://twitter.com/GossiTheDog/status/1522964028284411907
+* https://exatrack.com/public/Tricephalic_Hellkeeper.pdf
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/a-peek-behind-the-bpfdoor
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Threat: BPFDoor
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Process Started from Process ID (PID) File*
+
+Detection alerts from this rule indicate a process spawned from an executable masqueraded as a legitimate PID file which is very unusual and should not occur. Here are some possible avenues of investigation:
+- Examine parent and child process relationships of the new process to determine if other processes are running.
+- Examine the /var/run directory using Osquery to determine other potential PID files with unsually large file sizes, indicative of it being an executable: "SELECT f.size, f.uid, f.type, f.path from file f WHERE path like '/var/run/%%';"
+- Examine the reputation of the SHA256 hash from the PID file in a database like VirusTotal to identify additional pivots and artifacts for investigation.
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and user.id == "0" and
+  process.executable regex~ """/var/run/\w+\.(pid|lock|reboot)"""
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-program-files-directory-masquerading.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-program-files-directory-masquerading.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..47e84521da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-program-files-directory-masquerading.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-program-files-directory-masquerading]]
+=== Program Files Directory Masquerading
+
+Identifies execution from a directory masquerading as the Windows Program Files directories. These paths are trusted and usually host trusted third party programs. An adversary may leverage masquerading, along with low privileges to bypass detections allowlisting those folders.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  process.executable : "C:\\*Program*Files*\\*.exe" and
+  not process.executable : (
+        "?:\\Program Files\\*.exe",
+        "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe",
+        "?:\\Users\\*.exe",
+        "?:\\ProgramData\\*.exe",
+        "?:\\Windows\\Downloaded Program Files\\*.exe",
+        "?:\\Windows\\Temp\\.opera\\????????????\\CProgram?FilesOpera*\\*.exe",
+        "?:\\Windows\\Temp\\.opera\\????????????\\CProgram?Files?(x86)Opera*\\*.exe"
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Masquerading
+** ID: T1036
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Match Legitimate Name or Location
+** ID: T1036.005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-prompt-for-credentials-with-osascript.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-prompt-for-credentials-with-osascript.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..029711d66e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-prompt-for-credentials-with-osascript.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-prompt-for-credentials-with-osascript]]
+=== Prompt for Credentials with OSASCRIPT
+
+Identifies the use of osascript to execute scripts via standard input that may prompt a user with a rogue dialog for credentials.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/EmpireProject/EmPyre/blob/master/lib/modules/collection/osx/prompt.py
+* https://ss64.com/osx/osascript.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type in ("start", "process_started") and process.name : "osascript" and
+ process.command_line : "osascript*display dialog*password*"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Input Capture
+** ID: T1056
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: GUI Input Capture
+** ID: T1056.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-proxychains-activity.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-proxychains-activity.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c9fdfcdefd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-proxychains-activity.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-proxychains-activity]]
+=== ProxyChains Activity
+
+This rule monitors for the execution of the ProxyChains utility. ProxyChains is a command-line tool that enables the routing of network connections through intermediary proxies, enhancing anonymity and enabling access to restricted resources. Attackers can exploit the ProxyChains utility to hide their true source IP address, evade detection, and perform malicious activities through a chain of proxy servers, potentially masking their identity and intentions.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://blog.bitsadmin.com/living-off-the-foreign-land-windows-as-offensive-platform
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Command and Control
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
+
+*Version*: 4
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating ProxyChains Activity*
+
+
+Attackers can leverage `proxychains` to obfuscate their origin and bypass network defenses by routing their malicious traffic through multiple intermediary servers.
+
+This rule looks for processes spawned through `proxychains` by analyzing `proxychains` process execution.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html[placeholder fields] to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Identify any signs of suspicious network activity or anomalies that may indicate network obfuscation. This could include unexpected traffic patterns or unusual network behavior.
+  - Investigate listening ports and open sockets to look for potential protocol tunneling, reverse shells, or data exfiltration.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Listening Ports","query":"SELECT pid, address, port, socket, protocol, path FROM listening_ports"}}
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Open Sockets","query":"SELECT pid, family, remote_address, remote_port, socket, state FROM process_open_sockets"}}
+- Identify the user account that performed the action, analyze it, and check whether it should perform this kind of action.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific User","query":"SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = {{user.name}}"}}
+- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Investigate the Account Authentication Status","query":"SELECT * FROM logged_in_users WHERE user = {{user.name}}"}}
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User","query":"SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"}}
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Process Info","query":"SELECT name, cmdline, parent, path, uid FROM processes"}}
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- Suspicious Utility Launched via ProxyChains - 6ace94ba-f02c-4d55-9f53-87d99b6f9af4
+- Potential Protocol Tunneling via Chisel Client - 3f12325a-4cc6-410b-8d4c-9fbbeb744cfd
+- Potential Protocol Tunneling via Chisel Server - ac8805f6-1e08-406c-962e-3937057fa86f
+- Potential Linux Tunneling and/or Port Forwarding - 6ee947e9-de7e-4281-a55d-09289bdf947e
+- Potential Protocol Tunneling via EarthWorm - 9f1c4ca3-44b5-481d-ba42-32dc215a2769
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+- If this activity is related to a system administrator or developer who uses this utility for benign purposes, consider adding exceptions for specific user accounts or hosts. 
+- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors, such as reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers, that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and process.name == "proxychains"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Protocol Tunneling
+** ID: T1572
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-psexec-network-connection.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-psexec-network-connection.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cf5da14b5c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-psexec-network-connection.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-psexec-network-connection]]
+=== PsExec Network Connection
+
+Identifies use of the SysInternals tool PsExec.exe making a network connection. This could be an indication of lateral movement.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating PsExec Network Connection*
+
+
+PsExec is a remote administration tool that enables the execution of commands with both regular and SYSTEM privileges on Windows systems. Microsoft develops it as part of the Sysinternals Suite. Although commonly used by administrators, PsExec is frequently used by attackers to enable lateral movement and execute commands as SYSTEM to disable defenses and bypass security protections.
+
+This rule identifies PsExec execution by looking for the creation of `PsExec.exe`, the default name for the utility, followed by a network connection done by the process.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Check if the usage of this tool complies with the organization's administration policy.
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Identify the target computer and its role in the IT environment.
+- Investigate what commands were run, and assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This mechanism can be used legitimately. As long as the analyst did not identify suspicious activity related to the user or involved hosts, and the tool is allowed by the organization's policy, such alerts can be dismissed.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+  - Prioritize cases involving critical servers and users.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Review the privileges assigned to the user to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by process.entity_id
+  [process where host.os.type == "windows" and process.name : "PsExec.exe" and event.type == "start" and
+
+   /* This flag suppresses the display of the license dialog and may
+      indicate that psexec executed for the first time in the machine */
+   process.args : "-accepteula" and
+
+   not process.executable : ("?:\\ProgramData\\Docusnap\\Discovery\\discovery\\plugins\\17\\Bin\\psexec.exe",
+                             "?:\\Docusnap 11\\Bin\\psexec.exe",
+                             "?:\\Program Files\\Docusnap X\\Bin\\psexec.exe",
+                             "?:\\Program Files\\Docusnap X\\Tools\\dsDNS.exe") and
+   not process.parent.executable : "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Cynet\\Cynet Scanner\\CynetScanner.exe"]
+  [network where host.os.type == "windows" and process.name : "PsExec.exe"]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: System Services
+** ID: T1569
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Service Execution
+** ID: T1569.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote Services
+** ID: T1021
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: SMB/Windows Admin Shares
+** ID: T1021.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Lateral Tool Transfer
+** ID: T1570
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-rare-smb-connection-to-the-internet.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-rare-smb-connection-to-the-internet.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5ece5ab78a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-rare-smb-connection-to-the-internet.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-rare-smb-connection-to-the-internet]]
+=== Rare SMB Connection to the Internet
+
+This rule detects rare internet network connections via the SMB protocol. SMB is commonly used to leak NTLM credentials via rogue UNC path injection.
+
+*Rule type*: new_terms
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.securify.nl/en/blog/living-off-the-land-stealing-netntlm-hashes/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Exfiltration
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 2
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:network and host.os.type:windows and process.pid:4 and 
+  network.transport:tcp and destination.port:(139 or 445) and 
+  source.ip:(
+    10.0.0.0/8 or
+    172.16.0.0/12 or
+    192.168.0.0/16
+  ) and
+  not destination.ip:(
+    10.0.0.0/8 or
+    127.0.0.0/8 or
+    169.254.0.0/16 or
+    172.16.0.0/12 or
+    192.0.0.0/24 or
+    192.0.0.0/29 or
+    192.0.0.8/32 or
+    192.0.0.9/32 or
+    192.0.0.10/32 or
+    192.0.0.170/32 or
+    192.0.0.171/32 or
+    192.0.2.0/24 or
+    192.31.196.0/24 or
+    192.52.193.0/24 or
+    192.168.0.0/16 or
+    192.88.99.0/24 or
+    224.0.0.0/4 or
+    100.64.0.0/10 or
+    192.175.48.0/24 or
+    198.18.0.0/15 or
+    198.51.100.0/24 or
+    203.0.113.0/24 or
+    240.0.0.0/4 or
+    "::1" or
+    "FE80::/10" or
+    "FF00::/8"
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Exfiltration
+** ID: TA0010
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
+** ID: T1048
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-rdp-enabled-via-registry.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-rdp-enabled-via-registry.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..386376aa82
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-rdp-enabled-via-registry.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-rdp-enabled-via-registry]]
+=== RDP Enabled via Registry
+
+Identifies registry write modifications to enable Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) access. This could be indicative of adversary lateral movement preparation.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating RDP Enabled via Registry*
+
+
+Microsoft Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) is a proprietary Microsoft protocol that enables remote connections to other computers, typically over TCP port 3389.
+
+Attackers can use RDP to conduct their actions interactively. Ransomware operators frequently use RDP to access victim servers, often using privileged accounts.
+
+This rule detects modification of the fDenyTSConnections registry key to the value `0`, which specifies that remote desktop connections are enabled. Attackers can abuse remote registry, use psexec, etc., to enable RDP and move laterally.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Contact the user to check if they are aware of the operation.
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Check whether it makes sense to enable RDP to this host, given its role in the environment.
+- Check if the host is directly exposed to the internet.
+- Check whether privileged accounts accessed the host shortly after the modification.
+- Review network events within a short timespan of this alert for incoming RDP connection attempts.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This mechanism can be used legitimately. Check whether the user should be performing this kind of activity, whether they are aware of it, whether RDP should be open, and whether the action exposes the environment to unnecessary risks.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- If RDP is needed, make sure to secure it using firewall rules:
+  - Allowlist RDP traffic to specific trusted hosts.
+  - Restrict RDP logins to authorized non-administrator accounts, where possible.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Review the privileges assigned to the involved users to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+registry where host.os.type == "windows" and 
+ event.type in ("creation", "change") and
+  registry.path : "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\\Control\\Terminal Server\\fDenyTSConnections" and
+  registry.data.strings : ("0", "0x00000000") and
+  not process.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\SystemPropertiesRemote.exe", 
+                            "?:\\Windows\\System32\\SystemPropertiesComputerName.exe", 
+                            "?:\\Windows\\System32\\SystemPropertiesAdvanced.exe", 
+                            "?:\\Windows\\System32\\SystemSettingsAdminFlows.exe", 
+                            "?:\\Windows\\WinSxS\\*\\TiWorker.exe", 
+                            "?:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote Services
+** ID: T1021
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Remote Desktop Protocol
+** ID: T1021.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Modify Registry
+** ID: T1112
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-registry-persistence-via-appcert-dll.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-registry-persistence-via-appcert-dll.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8c70372a26
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-registry-persistence-via-appcert-dll.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-registry-persistence-via-appcert-dll]]
+=== Registry Persistence via AppCert DLL
+
+Detects attempts to maintain persistence by creating registry keys using AppCert DLLs. AppCert DLLs are loaded by every process using the common API functions to create processes.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+registry where host.os.type == "windows" and
+/* uncomment once stable length(bytes_written_string) > 0 and */
+  registry.path : (
+    "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\\Control\\Session Manager\\AppCertDLLs\\*",
+    "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\\Control\\Session Manager\\AppCertDLLs\\*"
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Event Triggered Execution
+** ID: T1546
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: AppCert DLLs
+** ID: T1546.009
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/009/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Event Triggered Execution
+** ID: T1546
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: AppCert DLLs
+** ID: T1546.009
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/009/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-registry-persistence-via-appinit-dll.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-registry-persistence-via-appinit-dll.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f19f8a3c0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-registry-persistence-via-appinit-dll.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-registry-persistence-via-appinit-dll]]
+=== Registry Persistence via AppInit DLL
+
+AppInit DLLs are dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are loaded into every process that creates a user interface (loads user32.dll) on Microsoft Windows operating systems. The AppInit DLL mechanism is used to load custom code into user-mode processes, allowing for the customization of the user interface and the behavior of Windows-based applications. Attackers who add those DLLs to the registry locations can execute code with elevated privileges, similar to process injection, and provide a solid and constant persistence on the machine.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Registry Persistence via AppInit DLL*
+
+
+AppInit DLLs are dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are loaded into every process that creates a user interface (loads `user32.dll`) on Microsoft Windows operating systems. The AppInit DLL mechanism is used to load custom code into user-mode processes, allowing for the customization of the user interface and the behavior of Windows-based applications.
+
+Attackers who add those DLLs to the registry locations can execute code with elevated privileges, similar to process injection, and provide a solid and constant persistence on the machine.
+
+This rule identifies modifications on the AppInit registry keys.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Review the source process and related DLL file tied to the Windows Registry entry.
+  - Check whether the DLL is signed, and tied to a authorized program used on your environment.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
+- Retrieve all DLLs under the AppInit registry keys:
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve AppInit Registry Value","query":"SELECT * FROM registry r where (r.key == 'HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows' or\nr.key == 'HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Wow6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows') and r.name ==\n'AppInit_DLLs'\n"}}
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the process executable and the DLLs using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+registry where host.os.type == "windows" and
+  registry.path : (
+     "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows\\AppInit_Dlls",
+     "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Wow6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows\\AppInit_Dlls",
+     "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows\\AppInit_Dlls",
+     "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Wow6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows\\AppInit_Dlls"
+  ) and
+  not process.executable : (
+     "?:\\Windows\\System32\\DriverStore\\FileRepository\\*\\Display.NvContainer\\NVDisplay.Container.exe",
+     "?:\\Windows\\System32\\msiexec.exe",
+     "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\msiexec.exe",
+     "?:\\Program Files\\Commvault\\Base\\cvd.exe",
+     "?:\\Program Files\\Commvault\\ContentStore*\\Base\\cvd.exe",
+     "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Commvault\\Base\\cvd.exe",
+     "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Commvault\\ContentStore*\\Base\\cvd.exe",
+     "?:\\Program Files\\NVIDIA Corporation\\Display.NvContainer\\NVDisplay.Container.exe"
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Event Triggered Execution
+** ID: T1546
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: AppInit DLLs
+** ID: T1546.010
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/010/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Modify Registry
+** ID: T1112
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-desktop-enabled-in-windows-firewall-by-netsh.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-desktop-enabled-in-windows-firewall-by-netsh.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fc4a3ece6a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-desktop-enabled-in-windows-firewall-by-netsh.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-desktop-enabled-in-windows-firewall-by-netsh]]
+=== Remote Desktop Enabled in Windows Firewall by Netsh
+
+Identifies use of the network shell utility (netsh.exe) to enable inbound Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) connections in the Windows Firewall.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Remote Desktop Enabled in Windows Firewall by Netsh*
+
+
+Microsoft Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) is a proprietary Microsoft protocol that enables remote connections to other computers, typically over TCP port 3389.
+
+Attackers can use RDP to conduct their actions interactively. Ransomware operators frequently use RDP to access victim servers, often using privileged accounts.
+
+This rule detects the creation of a Windows Firewall inbound rule that would allow inbound RDP traffic using the `netsh.exe` utility.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Contact the user to check if they are aware of the operation.
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Check whether it makes sense to enable RDP to this host, given its role in the environment.
+- Check if the host is directly exposed to the internet.
+- Check whether privileged accounts accessed the host shortly after the modification.
+- Review network events within a short timespan of this alert for incoming RDP connection attempts.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- The `netsh.exe` utility can be used legitimately. Check whether the user should be performing this kind of activity, whether the user is aware of it, whether RDP should be open, and whether the action exposes the environment to unnecessary risks.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- If RDP is needed, make sure to secure it:
+  - Allowlist RDP traffic to specific trusted hosts.
+  - Restrict RDP logins to authorized non-administrator accounts, where possible.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Review the privileges assigned to the involved users to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+ (process.name : "netsh.exe" or ?process.pe.original_file_name == "netsh.exe") and
+ process.args : ("localport=3389", "RemoteDesktop", "group=\"remote desktop\"") and
+ process.args : ("action=allow", "enable=Yes", "enable")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Impair Defenses
+** ID: T1562
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Disable or Modify System Firewall
+** ID: T1562.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-file-copy-to-a-hidden-share.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-file-copy-to-a-hidden-share.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7b0972242e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-file-copy-to-a-hidden-share.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-file-copy-to-a-hidden-share]]
+=== Remote File Copy to a Hidden Share
+
+Identifies a remote file copy attempt to a hidden network share. This may indicate lateral movement or data staging activity.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  (
+    process.name : ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "xcopy.exe") and
+    process.args : ("copy*", "move*", "cp", "mv") or
+    process.name : "robocopy.exe"
+  ) and process.args : "*\\\\*\\*$*"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote Services
+** ID: T1021
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: SMB/Windows Admin Shares
+** ID: T1021.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-file-copy-via-teamviewer.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-file-copy-via-teamviewer.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c380ec605b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-file-copy-via-teamviewer.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-file-copy-via-teamviewer]]
+=== Remote File Copy via TeamViewer
+
+Identifies an executable or script file remotely downloaded via a TeamViewer transfer session.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* http://web.archive.org/web/20230329160957/https://blog.menasec.net/2019/11/hunting-for-suspicious-use-of.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Command and Control
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Remote File Copy via TeamViewer*
+
+
+Attackers commonly transfer tooling or malware from external systems into a compromised environment using the command and control channel. However, they can also abuse legitimate utilities to drop these files.
+
+TeamViewer is a remote access and remote control tool used by helpdesks and system administrators to perform various support activities. It is also frequently used by attackers and scammers to deploy malware interactively and other malicious activities. This rule looks for the TeamViewer process creating files with suspicious extensions.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Contact the user to gather information about who and why was conducting the remote access.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Check whether the company uses TeamViewer for the support activities and if there is a support ticket related to this access.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the file using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This mechanism can be used legitimately. Analysts can dismiss the alert if the company relies on TeamViewer to conduct remote access and the triage has not identified suspicious or malicious files.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "creation" and process.name : "TeamViewer.exe" and
+  file.extension : ("exe", "dll", "scr", "com", "bat", "ps1", "vbs", "vbe", "js", "wsh", "hta") and
+  not 
+  (
+    file.path : (
+      "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\INetCache\\*.js",
+      "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\TeamViewer\\update.exe",
+      "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\?\\TeamViewer\\update.exe"
+    ) and process.code_signature.trusted == true
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Ingress Tool Transfer
+** ID: T1105
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote Access Software
+** ID: T1219
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-file-download-via-desktopimgdownldr-utility.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-file-download-via-desktopimgdownldr-utility.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..47d1985d60
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-file-download-via-desktopimgdownldr-utility.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-file-download-via-desktopimgdownldr-utility]]
+=== Remote File Download via Desktopimgdownldr Utility
+
+Identifies the desktopimgdownldr utility being used to download a remote file. An adversary may use desktopimgdownldr to download arbitrary files as an alternative to certutil.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://labs.sentinelone.com/living-off-windows-land-a-new-native-file-downldr/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Command and Control
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 111
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Remote File Download via Desktopimgdownldr Utility*
+
+
+Attackers commonly transfer tooling or malware from external systems into a compromised environment using the command and control channel. However, they can also abuse signed utilities to drop these files.
+
+The `Desktopimgdownldr.exe` utility is used to to configure lockscreen/desktop image, and can be abused with the `lockscreenurl` argument to download remote files and tools, this rule looks for this behavior.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/interactive-investigation-guides.html[Investigate Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.8.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+  - !{investigate{"label":"Alerts associated with the user in the last 48h","providers":[[{"excluded":false,"field":"event.kind","queryType":"phrase","value":"signal","valueType":"string"},{"excluded":false,"field":"user.id","queryType":"phrase","value":"{{user.id}}","valueType":"string"}]],"relativeFrom":"now-48h/h","relativeTo":"now"}}
+  - !{investigate{"label":"Alerts associated with the host in the last 48h","providers":[[{"excluded":false,"field":"event.kind","queryType":"phrase","value":"signal","valueType":"string"},{"excluded":false,"field":"host.name","queryType":"phrase","value":"{{host.name}}","valueType":"string"}]],"relativeFrom":"now-48h/h","relativeTo":"now"}}
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
+- Check the reputation of the domain or IP address used to host the downloaded file or if the user downloaded the file from an internal system.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the file using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+        - !{investigate{"label":"Investigate the Subject Process Network Events","providers":[[{"excluded":false,"field":"process.entity_id","queryType":"phrase","value":"{{process.entity_id}}","valueType":"string"},{"excluded":false,"field":"event.category","queryType":"phrase","value":"network","valueType":"string"}]]}}
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unusual but can be done by administrators. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+- Analysts can dismiss the alert if the downloaded file is a legitimate image.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  (process.name : "desktopimgdownldr.exe" or ?process.pe.original_file_name == "desktopimgdownldr.exe") and
+  process.args : "/lockscreenurl:http*"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Ingress Tool Transfer
+** ID: T1105
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-file-download-via-mpcmdrun.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-file-download-via-mpcmdrun.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..638de91e14
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-file-download-via-mpcmdrun.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-file-download-via-mpcmdrun]]
+=== Remote File Download via MpCmdRun
+
+Identifies the Windows Defender configuration utility (MpCmdRun.exe) being used to download a remote file.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://twitter.com/mohammadaskar2/status/1301263551638761477
+* https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/microsoft/microsoft-defender-can-ironically-be-used-to-download-malware/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Command and Control
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 111
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Remote File Download via MpCmdRun*
+
+
+Attackers commonly transfer tooling or malware from external systems into a compromised environment using the command and control channel. However, they can also abuse signed utilities to drop these files.
+
+The `MpCmdRun.exe` is a command-line tool part of Windows Defender and is used to manage various Microsoft Windows Defender Antivirus settings and perform certain tasks. It can also be abused by attackers to download remote files, including malware and offensive tooling. This rule looks for the patterns used to perform downloads using the utility.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/interactive-investigation-guides.html[Investigate Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.8.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+  - !{investigate{"label":"Alerts associated with the user in the last 48h","providers":[[{"excluded":false,"field":"event.kind","queryType":"phrase","value":"signal","valueType":"string"},{"excluded":false,"field":"user.id","queryType":"phrase","value":"{{user.id}}","valueType":"string"}]],"relativeFrom":"now-48h/h","relativeTo":"now"}}
+  - !{investigate{"label":"Alerts associated with the host in the last 48h","providers":[[{"excluded":false,"field":"event.kind","queryType":"phrase","value":"signal","valueType":"string"},{"excluded":false,"field":"host.name","queryType":"phrase","value":"{{host.name}}","valueType":"string"}]],"relativeFrom":"now-48h/h","relativeTo":"now"}}
+- Check the reputation of the domain or IP address used to host the downloaded file.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the file using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+        - !{investigate{"label":"Investigate the Subject Process Network Events","providers":[[{"excluded":false,"field":"process.entity_id","queryType":"phrase","value":"{{process.entity_id}}","valueType":"string"},{"excluded":false,"field":"event.category","queryType":"phrase","value":"network","valueType":"string"}]]}}
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  (process.name : "MpCmdRun.exe" or ?process.pe.original_file_name == "MpCmdRun.exe") and
+   process.args : "-DownloadFile" and process.args : "-url" and process.args : "-path"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Ingress Tool Transfer
+** ID: T1105
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-file-download-via-script-interpreter.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-file-download-via-script-interpreter.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b0ea098240
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-file-download-via-script-interpreter.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-file-download-via-script-interpreter]]
+=== Remote File Download via Script Interpreter
+
+Identifies built-in Windows script interpreters (cscript.exe or wscript.exe) being used to download an executable file from a remote destination.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Command and Control
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Remote File Download via Script Interpreter*
+
+
+The Windows Script Host (WSH) is a Windows automation technology, which is ideal for non-interactive scripting needs, such as logon scripting, administrative scripting, and machine automation.
+
+Attackers commonly use WSH scripts as their initial access method, acting like droppers for second stage payloads, but can also use them to download tools and utilities needed to accomplish their goals.
+
+This rule looks for DLLs and executables downloaded using `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe`.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze both the script and the executable involved using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- The usage of these script engines by regular users is unlikely. In the case of authorized benign true positives (B-TPs), exceptions can be added.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id, process.entity_id
+  [network where host.os.type == "windows" and process.name : ("wscript.exe", "cscript.exe") and network.protocol != "dns" and
+   network.direction : ("outgoing", "egress") and network.type == "ipv4" and destination.ip != "127.0.0.1"
+  ]
+  [file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "creation" and file.extension : ("exe", "dll")]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Ingress Tool Transfer
+** ID: T1105
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Visual Basic
+** ID: T1059.005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-scheduled-task-creation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-scheduled-task-creation.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cd55cdf756
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-scheduled-task-creation.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-scheduled-task-creation]]
+=== Remote Scheduled Task Creation
+
+Identifies remote scheduled task creations on a target host. This could be indicative of adversary lateral movement.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Remote Scheduled Task Creation*
+
+
+https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/taskschd/about-the-task-scheduler[Scheduled tasks] are a great mechanism for persistence and program execution. These features can be used remotely for a variety of legitimate reasons, but at the same time used by malware and adversaries. When investigating scheduled tasks that were set up remotely, one of the first steps should be to determine the original intent behind the configuration and to verify if the activity is tied to benign behavior such as software installation or any kind of network administrator work. One objective for these alerts is to understand the configured action within the scheduled task. This is captured within the registry event data for this rule and can be base64 decoded to view the value.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Review the base64 encoded tasks actions registry value to investigate the task configured action.
+- Validate if the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+- Further examination should include review of host-based artifacts and network logs from around when the scheduled task was created, on both the source and target machines.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- There is a high possibility of benign activity tied to the creation of remote scheduled tasks as it is a general feature within Windows and used for legitimate purposes for a wide range of activity. Any kind of context should be found to further understand the source of the activity and determine the intent based on the scheduled task's contents.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- Service Command Lateral Movement - d61cbcf8-1bc1-4cff-85ba-e7b21c5beedc
+- Remotely Started Services via RPC - aa9a274d-6b53-424d-ac5e-cb8ca4251650
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Remove scheduled task and any other related artifacts.
+- Review privileged account management and user account management settings. Consider implementing group policy object (GPO) policies to further restrict activity, or configuring settings that only allow administrators to create remote scheduled tasks.
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+/* Task Scheduler service incoming connection followed by TaskCache registry modification  */
+
+sequence by host.id, process.entity_id with maxspan = 1m
+   [network where host.os.type == "windows" and process.name : "svchost.exe" and
+   network.direction : ("incoming", "ingress") and source.port >= 49152 and destination.port >= 49152 and
+   source.ip != "127.0.0.1" and source.ip != "::1"
+   ]
+   [registry where host.os.type == "windows" and registry.path : "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Schedule\\TaskCache\\Tasks\\*\\Actions"]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote Services
+** ID: T1021
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task/Job
+** ID: T1053
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task
+** ID: T1053.005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-ssh-login-enabled-via-systemsetup-command.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-ssh-login-enabled-via-systemsetup-command.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b7260c8eb9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-ssh-login-enabled-via-systemsetup-command.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-ssh-login-enabled-via-systemsetup-command]]
+=== Remote SSH Login Enabled via systemsetup Command
+
+Detects use of the systemsetup command to enable remote SSH Login.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/pdf/XCSSET_Technical_Brief.pdf
+* https://ss64.com/osx/systemsetup.html
+* https://support.apple.com/guide/remote-desktop/about-systemsetup-apd95406b8d/mac
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:macos and event.type:(start or process_started) and
+ process.name:systemsetup and
+ process.args:("-setremotelogin" and on) and
+ not process.parent.executable : /usr/local/jamf/bin/jamf
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote Services
+** ID: T1021
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: SSH
+** ID: T1021.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remotely-started-services-via-rpc.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remotely-started-services-via-rpc.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7f4fd55622
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remotely-started-services-via-rpc.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remotely-started-services-via-rpc]]
+=== Remotely Started Services via RPC
+
+Identifies remote execution of Windows services over remote procedure call (RPC). This could be indicative of lateral movement, but will be noisy if commonly done by administrators."
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-scmr/705b624a-13de-43cc-b8a2-99573da3635f
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Remotely Started Services via RPC*
+
+
+The Service Control Manager Remote Protocol is a client/server protocol used for configuring and controlling service programs running on a remote computer. A remote service management session begins with the client initiating the connection request to the server. If the server grants the request, the connection is established. The client can then make multiple requests to modify, query the configuration, or start and stop services on the server by using the same session until the session is terminated.
+
+This rule detects the remote creation or start of a service by correlating a `services.exe` network connection and the spawn of a child process.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Review login events (e.g., 4624) in the alert timeframe to identify the account used to perform this action. Use the `source.address` field to help identify the source system.
+- Review network events from the source system using the source port identified on the alert and try to identify the program used to initiate the action.
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Validate if the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Remote management software like SCCM may trigger this rule. If noisy on your environment, consider adding exceptions.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence with maxspan=1s
+   [network where host.os.type == "windows" and process.name : "services.exe" and
+      network.direction : ("incoming", "ingress") and network.transport == "tcp" and
+      source.port >= 49152 and destination.port >= 49152 and source.ip != "127.0.0.1" and source.ip != "::1"
+   ] by host.id, process.entity_id
+   [process where host.os.type == "windows" and 
+       event.type == "start" and process.parent.name : "services.exe" and
+       not (process.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\msiexec.exe" and process.args : "/V") and
+       not process.executable : (
+                "?:\\Pella Corporation\\OSCToGPAutoService\\OSCToGPAutoSvc.exe",
+                "?:\\Pella Corporation\\Pella Order Management\\GPAutoSvc.exe",
+                "?:\\Pella Corporation\\Pella Order Management\\GPAutoSvc.exe",
+                "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe",
+                "?:\\Program Files\\*.exe",
+                "?:\\Windows\\ADCR_Agent\\adcrsvc.exe",
+                "?:\\Windows\\AdminArsenal\\PDQ*.exe",
+                "?:\\Windows\\CAInvokerService.exe",
+                "?:\\Windows\\ccmsetup\\ccmsetup.exe",
+                "?:\\Windows\\eset-remote-install-service.exe",
+                "?:\\Windows\\ProPatches\\Scheduler\\STSchedEx.exe",
+                "?:\\Windows\\PSEXESVC.EXE",
+                "?:\\Windows\\RemoteAuditService.exe",
+                "?:\\Windows\\servicing\\TrustedInstaller.exe",
+                "?:\\Windows\\System32\\certsrv.exe",
+                "?:\\Windows\\System32\\sppsvc.exe",
+                "?:\\Windows\\System32\\srmhost.exe",
+                "?:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
+                "?:\\Windows\\System32\\taskhostex.exe",
+                "?:\\Windows\\System32\\upfc.exe",
+                "?:\\Windows\\System32\\vds.exe",
+                "?:\\Windows\\System32\\VSSVC.exe",
+                "?:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\WmiApSrv.exe",
+                "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\NwxExeSvc\\NwxExeSvc.exe",
+                "?:\\Windows\\Veeam\\Backup\\VeeamDeploymentSvc.exe",
+                "?:\\Windows\\VeeamLogShipper\\VeeamLogShipper.exe",
+                "?:\\Windows\\VeeamVssSupport\\VeeamGuestHelper.exe"
+       )] by host.id, process.parent.entity_id
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote Services
+** ID: T1021
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-renamed-autoit-scripts-interpreter.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-renamed-autoit-scripts-interpreter.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1881afe31d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-renamed-autoit-scripts-interpreter.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-renamed-autoit-scripts-interpreter]]
+=== Renamed AutoIt Scripts Interpreter
+
+Identifies a suspicious AutoIt process execution. Malware written as an AutoIt script tends to rename the AutoIt executable to avoid detection.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Renamed AutoIt Scripts Interpreter*
+
+
+The OriginalFileName attribute of a PE (Portable Executable) file is a metadata field that contains the original name of the executable file when compiled or linked. By using this attribute, analysts can identify renamed instances that attackers can use with the intent of evading detections, application allowlists, and other security protections.
+
+AutoIt is a scripting language and tool for automating tasks on Microsoft Windows operating systems. Due to its capabilities, malicious threat actors can abuse it to create malicious scripts and distribute malware.
+
+This rule checks for renamed instances of AutoIt, which can indicate an attempt of evading detections, application allowlists, and other security protections.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  process.pe.original_file_name : "AutoIt*.exe" and not process.name : "AutoIt*.exe"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Masquerading
+** ID: T1036
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Rename System Utilities
+** ID: T1036.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-renamed-utility-executed-with-short-program-name.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-renamed-utility-executed-with-short-program-name.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..74b44d7fc4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-renamed-utility-executed-with-short-program-name.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-renamed-utility-executed-with-short-program-name]]
+=== Renamed Utility Executed with Short Program Name
+
+Identifies the execution of a process with a single character process name, differing from the original file name. This is often done by adversaries while staging, executing temporary utilities, or trying to bypass security detections based on the process name.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Renamed Utility Executed with Short Program Name*
+
+
+Identifies the execution of a process with a single character process name, differing from the original file name. This is often done by adversaries while staging, executing temporary utilities, or trying to bypass security detections based on the process name.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process such as network connections, registry or file modifications, command line and any spawned child processes.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
+
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and length(process.name) > 0 and
+ length(process.name) == 5 and length(process.pe.original_file_name) > 5
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Masquerading
+** ID: T1036
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Rename System Utilities
+** ID: T1036.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-root-network-connection-via-gdb-cap-sys-ptrace.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-root-network-connection-via-gdb-cap-sys-ptrace.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..63c80e5bbc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-root-network-connection-via-gdb-cap-sys-ptrace.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-root-network-connection-via-gdb-cap-sys-ptrace]]
+=== Root Network Connection via GDB CAP_SYS_PTRACE
+
+Identifies instances where GDB (granted the CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability) is executed, after which an outbound network connection is initiated by UID/GID 0 (root). In Linux, the CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability grants a process the ability to use the ptrace system call, which is typically used for debugging and allows the process to trace and control other processes. Attackers may leverage this capability to hook and inject into a process that is running with root permissions in order to execute shell code and gain a reverse shell with root privileges.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Tactic: Command and Control
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 2
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id, process.entry_leader.entity_id with maxspan=30s
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and process.name == "gdb" and
+   (process.thread.capabilities.effective : "CAP_SYS_PTRACE" or process.thread.capabilities.permitted : "CAP_SYS_PTRACE") and
+   user.id != "0"]
+  [network where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "connection_attempted" and event.type == "start" and
+   process.name != null and user.id == "0"]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Process Injection
+** ID: T1055
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Ptrace System Calls
+** ID: T1055.008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
+** ID: T1068
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Unix Shell
+** ID: T1059.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Application Layer Protocol
+** ID: T1071
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-scheduled-task-created-by-a-windows-script.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-scheduled-task-created-by-a-windows-script.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..85ee3ac5c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-scheduled-task-created-by-a-windows-script.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-scheduled-task-created-by-a-windows-script]]
+=== Scheduled Task Created by a Windows Script
+
+A scheduled task was created by a Windows script via cscript.exe, wscript.exe or powershell.exe. This can be abused by an adversary to establish persistence.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+Decode the base64 encoded Tasks Actions registry value to investigate the task's configured action.
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id with maxspan = 30s
+  [any where host.os.type == "windows" and 
+    (event.category : ("library", "driver") or (event.category == "process" and event.action : "Image loaded*")) and
+    (?dll.name : "taskschd.dll" or file.name : "taskschd.dll") and
+    process.name : ("cscript.exe", "wscript.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe")]
+  [registry where host.os.type == "windows" and registry.path : (
+    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Schedule\\TaskCache\\Tasks\\*\\Actions",
+    "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Schedule\\TaskCache\\Tasks\\*\\Actions")]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task/Job
+** ID: T1053
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task
+** ID: T1053.005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Visual Basic
+** ID: T1059.005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-scheduled-task-execution-at-scale-via-gpo.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-scheduled-task-execution-at-scale-via-gpo.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..236be68cd6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-scheduled-task-execution-at-scale-via-gpo.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-scheduled-task-execution-at-scale-via-gpo]]
+=== Scheduled Task Execution at Scale via GPO
+
+Detects the modification of Group Policy Object attributes to execute a scheduled task in the objects controlled by the GPO.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-system.*
+* logs-windows.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: None ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/atc-project/atc-data/blob/master/docs/Logging_Policies/LP_0025_windows_audit_directory_service_changes.md
+* https://github.com/atc-project/atc-data/blob/f2bbb51ecf68e2c9f488e3c70dcdd3df51d2a46b/docs/Logging_Policies/LP_0029_windows_audit_detailed_file_share.md
+* https://labs.f-secure.com/tools/sharpgpoabuse
+* https://twitter.com/menasec1/status/1106899890377052160
+* https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_gpo_scheduledtasks.yml
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+* Data Source: Active Directory
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Scheduled Task Execution at Scale via GPO*
+
+
+Group Policy Objects (GPOs) can be used by attackers to execute scheduled tasks at scale to compromise objects controlled by a given GPO. This is done by changing the contents of the `<GPOPath>\Machine\Preferences\ScheduledTasks\ScheduledTasks.xml` file.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- This attack abuses a legitimate mechanism of Active Directory, so it is important to determine whether the activity is legitimate and the administrator is authorized to perform this operation.
+- Retrieve the contents of the `ScheduledTasks.xml` file, and check the `<Command>` and `<Arguments>` XML tags for any potentially malicious commands or binaries.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Scope which objects may be compromised by retrieving information about which objects are controlled by the GPO.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Verify if the execution is allowed and done under change management, and if the execution is legitimate.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- Group Policy Abuse for Privilege Addition - b9554892-5e0e-424b-83a0-5aef95aa43bf
+- Startup/Logon Script added to Group Policy Object - 16fac1a1-21ee-4ca6-b720-458e3855d046
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- The investigation and containment must be performed in every computer controlled by the GPO, where necessary.
+- Remove the script from the GPO.
+- Check if other GPOs have suspicious scheduled tasks attached.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The 'Audit Detailed File Share' audit policy must be configured (Success Failure).
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Policies >
+Windows Settings >
+Security Settings >
+Advanced Audit Policies Configuration >
+Audit Policies >
+Object Access >
+Audit Detailed File Share (Success,Failure)
+```
+
+The 'Audit Directory Service Changes' audit policy must be configured (Success Failure).
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Policies >
+Windows Settings >
+Security Settings >
+Advanced Audit Policies Configuration >
+Audit Policies >
+DS Access >
+Audit Directory Service Changes (Success,Failure)
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+(event.code: "5136" and winlog.event_data.AttributeLDAPDisplayName:("gPCMachineExtensionNames" or "gPCUserExtensionNames") and
+   winlog.event_data.AttributeValue:(*CAB54552-DEEA-4691-817E-ED4A4D1AFC72* and *AADCED64-746C-4633-A97C-D61349046527*))
+or
+(event.code: "5145" and winlog.event_data.ShareName: "\\\\*\\SYSVOL" and winlog.event_data.RelativeTargetName: *ScheduledTasks.xml and
+  (message: WriteData or winlog.event_data.AccessList: *%%4417*))
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task/Job
+** ID: T1053
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task
+** ID: T1053.005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Domain Policy Modification
+** ID: T1484
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Group Policy Modification
+** ID: T1484.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Lateral Tool Transfer
+** ID: T1570
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-scheduled-tasks-at-command-enabled.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-scheduled-tasks-at-command-enabled.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..44fb84dd69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-scheduled-tasks-at-command-enabled.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-scheduled-tasks-at-command-enabled]]
+=== Scheduled Tasks AT Command Enabled
+
+Identifies attempts to enable the Windows scheduled tasks AT command via the registry. Attackers may use this method to move laterally or persist locally. The AT command has been deprecated since Windows 8 and Windows Server 2012, but still exists for backwards compatibility.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/cimwin32prov/win32-scheduledjob
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+registry where host.os.type == "windows" and
+  registry.path : (
+    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Schedule\\Configuration\\EnableAt",
+    "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Schedule\\Configuration\\EnableAt"
+  ) and registry.data.strings : ("1", "0x00000001")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Impair Defenses
+** ID: T1562
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Disable or Modify Tools
+** ID: T1562.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task/Job
+** ID: T1053
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: At
+** ID: T1053.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-screensaver-plist-file-modified-by-unexpected-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-screensaver-plist-file-modified-by-unexpected-process.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6ef63c44c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-screensaver-plist-file-modified-by-unexpected-process.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-screensaver-plist-file-modified-by-unexpected-process]]
+=== Screensaver Plist File Modified by Unexpected Process
+
+Identifies when a screensaver plist file is modified by an unexpected process. An adversary can maintain persistence on a macOS endpoint by creating a malicious screensaver (.saver) file and configuring the screensaver plist file to execute code each time the screensaver is activated.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://posts.specterops.io/saving-your-access-d562bf5bf90b
+* https://github.com/D00MFist/PersistentJXA
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+- Analyze the plist file modification event to identify whether the change was expected or not
+- Investigate the process that modified the plist file for malicious code or other suspicious behavior
+- Identify if any suspicious or known malicious screensaver (.saver) files were recently written to or modified on the host
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type != "deletion" and
+  file.name: "com.apple.screensaver.*.plist" and
+   file.path : (
+      "/Users/*/Library/Preferences/ByHost/*",
+      "/Library/Managed Preferences/*",
+      "/System/Library/Preferences/*"
+      ) and
+  (
+    process.code_signature.trusted == false or
+    process.code_signature.exists == false or
+
+    /* common script interpreters and abused native macOS bins */
+    process.name : (
+      "curl",
+      "mktemp",
+      "tail",
+      "funzip",
+      "python*",
+      "osascript",
+      "perl"
+      )
+   ) and
+
+  /* Filter OS processes modifying screensaver plist files */
+  not process.executable : (
+    "/usr/sbin/cfprefsd",
+    "/usr/libexec/xpcproxy",
+    "/System/Library/CoreServices/ManagedClient.app/Contents/Resources/MCXCompositor",
+    "/System/Library/CoreServices/ManagedClient.app/Contents/MacOS/ManagedClient"
+    )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Event Triggered Execution
+** ID: T1546
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-searching-for-saved-credentials-via-vaultcmd.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-searching-for-saved-credentials-via-vaultcmd.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b7a8758b54
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-searching-for-saved-credentials-via-vaultcmd.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-searching-for-saved-credentials-via-vaultcmd]]
+=== Searching for Saved Credentials via VaultCmd
+
+Windows Credential Manager allows you to create, view, or delete saved credentials for signing into websites, connected applications, and networks. An adversary may abuse this to list or dump credentials stored in the Credential Manager for saved usernames and passwords. This may also be performed in preparation of lateral movement.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16
+* https://web.archive.org/web/20201004080456/https://rastamouse.me/blog/rdp-jump-boxes/
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/detect-credential-access
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  (?process.pe.original_file_name:"vaultcmd.exe" or process.name:"vaultcmd.exe") and
+  process.args:"/list*"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Credentials from Password Stores
+** ID: T1555
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Windows Credential Manager
+** ID: T1555.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-security-software-discovery-via-grep.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-security-software-discovery-via-grep.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9c3cda8f79
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-security-software-discovery-via-grep.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-security-software-discovery-via-grep]]
+=== Security Software Discovery via Grep
+
+Identifies the use of the grep command to discover known third-party macOS and Linux security tools, such as Antivirus or Host Firewall details.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* auditbeat-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Discovery
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Security Software Discovery via Grep*
+
+
+After successfully compromising an environment, attackers may try to gain situational awareness to plan their next steps. This can happen by running commands to enumerate network resources, users, connections, files, and installed security software.
+
+This rule looks for the execution of the `grep` utility with arguments compatible to the enumeration of the security software installed on the host. Attackers can use this information to decide whether or not to infect a system, disable protections, use bypasses, etc.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate any abnormal account behavior, such as command executions, file creations or modifications, and network connections.
+- Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process such as network connections, file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+- Inspect the host for suspicious or abnormal behavior in the alert timeframe.
+- Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Discovery activities are not inherently malicious if they occur in isolation. As long as the analyst did not identify suspicious activity related to the user or host, such alerts can be dismissed.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection via the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where event.type == "start" and
+process.name : "grep" and user.id != "0" and
+ not process.parent.executable : ("/Library/Application Support/*", "/opt/McAfee/agent/scripts/ma") and
+   process.args :
+         ("Little Snitch*",
+          "Avast*",
+          "Avira*",
+          "ESET*",
+          "BlockBlock*",
+          "360Sec*",
+          "LuLu*",
+          "KnockKnock*",
+          "kav",
+          "KIS",
+          "RTProtectionDaemon*",
+          "Malware*",
+          "VShieldScanner*",
+          "WebProtection*",
+          "webinspectord*",
+          "McAfee*",
+          "isecespd*",
+          "macmnsvc*",
+          "masvc*",
+          "kesl*",
+          "avscan*",
+          "guard*",
+          "rtvscand*",
+          "symcfgd*",
+          "scmdaemon*",
+          "symantec*",
+          "sophos*",
+          "osquery*",
+          "elastic-endpoint*"
+          ) and
+   not (
+     (process.args : "Avast" and process.args : "Passwords") or
+     (process.parent.args : "/opt/McAfee/agent/scripts/ma" and process.parent.args : "checkhealth") or
+     (process.command_line : (
+       "grep ESET Command-line scanner, version %s -A2",
+       "grep -i McAfee Web Gateway Core version:",
+       "grep --color=auto ESET Command-line scanner, version %s -A2"
+       )
+     ) or
+     (process.parent.command_line : (
+       """sh -c printf "command_start_%s"*; perl -pe 's/[^ -~]/\n/g' < /opt/eset/esets/sbin/esets_scan | grep 'ESET Command-line scanner, version %s' -A2 | tail -1; printf "command_done_%s*""",
+       """bash -c perl -pe 's/[^ -~]/\n/g' < /opt/eset/esets/sbin/esets_scan | grep 'ESET Command-line scanner, version %s' -A2 | tail -1"""
+       )
+     )
+    )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Discovery
+** ID: TA0007
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Software Discovery
+** ID: T1518
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Security Software Discovery
+** ID: T1518.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-sedebugprivilege-enabled-by-a-suspicious-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-sedebugprivilege-enabled-by-a-suspicious-process.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3095336ac7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-sedebugprivilege-enabled-by-a-suspicious-process.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-sedebugprivilege-enabled-by-a-suspicious-process]]
+=== SeDebugPrivilege Enabled by a Suspicious Process
+
+Identifies the creation of a process running as SYSTEM and impersonating a Windows core binary privileges. Adversaries may create a new process with a different token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4703
+* https://blog.palantir.com/windows-privilege-abuse-auditing-detection-and-defense-3078a403d74e
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+
+*Version*: 7
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+Windows Event 4703 logs Token Privileges changes and need to be configured (Enable).
+
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Policies >
+Windows Settings >
+Security Settings >
+Advanced Audit Policies Configuration >
+Audit Policies >
+Detailed Tracking >
+Token Right Adjusted Events (Success)
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+any where host.os.type == "windows" and event.provider: "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing" and
+ event.action : "Token Right Adjusted Events" and
+
+ winlog.event_data.EnabledPrivilegeList : "SeDebugPrivilege" and
+
+ /* exclude processes with System Integrity  */
+ not winlog.event_data.SubjectUserSid : ("S-1-5-18", "S-1-5-19", "S-1-5-20") and
+
+ not winlog.event_data.ProcessName :
+         ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\msiexec.exe",
+          "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\msiexec.exe",
+          "?:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe",
+          "?:\\Windows\\WinSxS\\*",
+          "?:\\Program Files\\*",
+          "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*",
+          "?:\\Windows\\System32\\MRT.exe",
+          "?:\\Windows\\System32\\cleanmgr.exe",
+          "?:\\Windows\\System32\\taskhostw.exe",
+          "?:\\Windows\\System32\\mmc.exe",
+          "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*-*\\DismHost.exe",
+          "?:\\Windows\\System32\\auditpol.exe",
+          "?:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\WmiPrvSe.exe",
+          "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\wbem\\WmiPrvSe.exe")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Access Token Manipulation
+** ID: T1134
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-sensitive-files-compression.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-sensitive-files-compression.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7f95d064db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-sensitive-files-compression.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-sensitive-files-compression]]
+=== Sensitive Files Compression
+
+Identifies the use of a compression utility to collect known files containing sensitive information, such as credentials and system configurations.
+
+*Rule type*: new_terms
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.trendmicro.com/en_ca/research/20/l/teamtnt-now-deploying-ddos-capable-irc-bot-tntbotinger.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Collection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 208
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
+- Elastic Defend
+- Auditbeat
+
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows
+the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest to select "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Auditbeat Setup*
+
+Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit the activities of users and processes on your systems. For example, you can use Auditbeat to collect and centralize audit events from the Linux Audit Framework. You can also use Auditbeat to detect changes to critical files, like binaries and configuration files, and identify potential security policy violations.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Auditbeat on a Linux System:*
+
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setup-repositories.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-docker.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html[helper guide].
+- For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:linux and event.type:start and
+  process.name:(zip or tar or gzip or hdiutil or 7z) and
+  process.args:
+    (
+      /root/.ssh/id_rsa or
+      /root/.ssh/id_rsa.pub or
+      /root/.ssh/id_ed25519 or
+      /root/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub or
+      /root/.ssh/authorized_keys or
+      /root/.ssh/authorized_keys2 or
+      /root/.ssh/known_hosts or
+      /root/.bash_history or
+      /etc/hosts or
+      /home/*/.ssh/id_rsa or
+      /home/*/.ssh/id_rsa.pub or
+      /home/*/.ssh/id_ed25519 or
+      /home/*/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub or
+      /home/*/.ssh/authorized_keys or
+      /home/*/.ssh/authorized_keys2 or
+      /home/*/.ssh/known_hosts or
+      /home/*/.bash_history or
+      /root/.aws/credentials or
+      /root/.aws/config or
+      /home/*/.aws/credentials or
+      /home/*/.aws/config or
+      /root/.docker/config.json or
+      /home/*/.docker/config.json or
+      /etc/group or
+      /etc/passwd or
+      /etc/shadow or
+      /etc/gshadow
+    )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Unsecured Credentials
+** ID: T1552
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Credentials In Files
+** ID: T1552.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Collection
+** ID: TA0009
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Archive Collected Data
+** ID: T1560
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Archive via Utility
+** ID: T1560.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-sensitive-privilege-seenabledelegationprivilege-assigned-to-a-user.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-sensitive-privilege-seenabledelegationprivilege-assigned-to-a-user.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e13f75d122
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-sensitive-privilege-seenabledelegationprivilege-assigned-to-a-user.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-sensitive-privilege-seenabledelegationprivilege-assigned-to-a-user]]
+=== Sensitive Privilege SeEnableDelegationPrivilege assigned to a User
+
+Identifies the assignment of the SeEnableDelegationPrivilege sensitive "user right" to a user. The SeEnableDelegationPrivilege "user right" enables computer and user accounts to be trusted for delegation. Attackers can abuse this right to compromise Active Directory accounts and elevate their privileges.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-system.*
+* logs-windows.*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://blog.harmj0y.net/activedirectory/the-most-dangerous-user-right-you-probably-have-never-heard-of/
+* https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_alert_active_directory_user_control.yml
+* https://twitter.com/_nwodtuhs/status/1454049485080907776
+* https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/kerberos/delegations
+* https://github.com/atc-project/atomic-threat-coverage/blob/master/Atomic_Threat_Coverage/Logging_Policies/LP_0105_windows_audit_authorization_policy_change.md
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Active Directory
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Sensitive Privilege SeEnableDelegationPrivilege assigned to a User*
+
+
+Kerberos delegation is an Active Directory feature that allows user and computer accounts to impersonate other accounts, act on their behalf, and use their privileges. Delegation (constrained and unconstrained) can be configured for user and computer objects.
+
+Enabling unconstrained delegation for a computer causes the computer to store the ticket-granting ticket (TGT) in memory at any time an account connects to the computer, so it can be used by the computer for impersonation when needed. Risk is heightened if an attacker compromises computers with unconstrained delegation enabled, as they could extract TGTs from memory and then replay them to move laterally on the domain. If the attacker coerces a privileged user to connect to the server, or if the user does so routinely, the account will be compromised and the attacker will be able to pass-the-ticket to privileged assets.
+
+SeEnableDelegationPrivilege is a user right that is controlled within the Local Security Policy of a domain controller and is managed through Group Policy. This setting is named **Enable computer and user accounts to be trusted for delegation**.
+
+It is critical to control the assignment of this privilege. A user with this privilege and write access to a computer can control delegation settings, perform the attacks described above, and harvest TGTs from any user that connects to the system.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate how the privilege was assigned to the user and who assigned it.
+- Investigate other potentially malicious activity that was performed by the user that assigned the privileges using the `user.id` and `winlog.activity_id` fields as a filter during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the users/host during the past 48 hours.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- The SeEnableDelegationPrivilege privilege should not be assigned to users. If this rule is triggered in your environment legitimately, the security team should notify the administrators about the risks of using it.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- KRBTGT Delegation Backdoor - e052c845-48d0-4f46-8a13-7d0aba05df82
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Remove the privilege from the account.
+- Review the privileges of the administrator account that performed the action.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The 'Audit Authorization Policy Change' logging policy must be configured for (Success, Failure).
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Windows Settings >
+Security Settings >
+Advanced Audit Policy Configuration >
+Audit Policies >
+Policy Change >
+Audit Authorization Policy Change (Success,Failure)
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.action:"Authorization Policy Change" and event.code:4704 and
+  winlog.event_data.PrivilegeList:"SeEnableDelegationPrivilege"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
+** ID: T1558
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Account Manipulation
+** ID: T1098
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-service-command-lateral-movement.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-service-command-lateral-movement.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..22852536cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-service-command-lateral-movement.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-service-command-lateral-movement]]
+=== Service Command Lateral Movement
+
+Identifies use of sc.exe to create, modify, or start services on remote hosts. This could be indicative of adversary lateral movement but will be noisy if commonly done by admins.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by process.entity_id with maxspan = 1m
+  [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+     (process.name : "sc.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name : "sc.exe") and
+      process.args : "\\\\*" and process.args : ("binPath=*", "binpath=*") and
+      process.args : ("create", "config", "failure", "start")]
+  [network where host.os.type == "windows" and process.name : "sc.exe" and destination.ip != "127.0.0.1"]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote Services
+** ID: T1021
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Create or Modify System Process
+** ID: T1543
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Windows Service
+** ID: T1543.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: System Services
+** ID: T1569
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Service Execution
+** ID: T1569.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-setcap-setuid-setgid-capability-set.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-setcap-setuid-setgid-capability-set.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..30f8ec2a60
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-setcap-setuid-setgid-capability-set.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-setcap-setuid-setgid-capability-set]]
+=== Setcap setuid/setgid Capability Set
+
+This rule monitors for the addition of the cap_setuid+ep or cap_setgid+ep capabilities via setcap. Setuid (Set User ID) and setgid (Set Group ID) are Unix-like OS features that enable processes to run with elevated privileges, based on the file owner or group. Threat actors can exploit these attributes to achieve persistence by creating malicious binaries, allowing them to maintain control over a compromised system with elevated permissions.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+
+*Version*: 5
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Setcap setuid/setgid Capability Set*
+
+
+Setuid (Set User ID) and setgid (Set Group ID) are Unix-like OS features that enable processes to run with elevated privileges, based on the file owner or group.
+
+Threat actors can exploit these attributes to achieve persistence by creating malicious binaries, allowing them to maintain control over a compromised system with elevated permissions.
+
+This rule monitors for the addition of the cap_setuid+ep or cap_setgid+ep capabilities via setcap.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html[placeholder fields] to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+
+*Possible Investigation Steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the file that was targeted by the addition of the setuid/setgid capability through OSQuery.
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User","query":"SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"}}
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+- Investigate whether the altered scripts call other malicious scripts elsewhere on the file system. 
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+        - Cron jobs, services and other persistence mechanisms.
+            - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Crontab Information","query":"SELECT * FROM crontab"}}
+- Investigate abnormal behaviors by the subject process/user such as network connections, file modifications, and any other spawned child processes.
+  - Investigate listening ports and open sockets to look for potential command and control traffic or data exfiltration.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Listening Ports","query":"SELECT pid, address, port, socket, protocol, path FROM listening_ports"}}
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Open Sockets","query":"SELECT pid, family, remote_address, remote_port, socket, state FROM process_open_sockets"}}
+  - Identify the user account that performed the action, analyze it, and check whether it should perform this kind of action.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific User","query":"SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = {{user.name}}"}}
+- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Investigate the Account Authentication Status","query":"SELECT * FROM logged_in_users WHERE user = {{user.name}}"}}
+
+
+*False Positive Analysis*
+
+
+- If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+- If this activity is related to a system administrator that performed these actions for administrative purposes, consider adding exceptions for this specific administrator user account. 
+- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and 
+process.name == "setcap" and process.args : "cap_set?id+ep" and not process.parent.name in ("jem", "vzctl")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
+** ID: T1548
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Setuid and Setgid
+** ID: T1548.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-shared-object-created-or-changed-by-previously-unknown-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-shared-object-created-or-changed-by-previously-unknown-process.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b5838301f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-shared-object-created-or-changed-by-previously-unknown-process.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-shared-object-created-or-changed-by-previously-unknown-process]]
+=== Shared Object Created or Changed by Previously Unknown Process
+
+This rule monitors the creation of shared object files by previously unknown processes. The creation of a shared object file involves compiling code into a dynamically linked library that can be loaded by other programs at runtime. While this process is typically used for legitimate purposes, malicious actors can leverage shared object files to execute unauthorized code, inject malicious functionality into legitimate processes, or bypass security controls. This allows malware to persist on the system, evade detection, and potentially compromise the integrity and confidentiality of the affected system and its data.
+
+*Rule type*: new_terms
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://threatpost.com/sneaky-malware-backdoors-linux/180158/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 7
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Shared Object Created or Changed by Previously Unknown Process*
+
+
+A shared object file is a compiled library file (typically with a .so extension) that can be dynamically linked to executable programs at runtime, allowing for code reuse and efficient memory usage. The creation of a shared object file involves compiling code into a dynamically linked library that can be loaded by other programs at runtime.
+
+Malicious actors can leverage shared object files to execute unauthorized code, inject malicious functionality into legitimate processes, or bypass security controls. This allows malware to persist on the system, evade detection, and potentially compromise the integrity and confidentiality of the affected system and its data.
+
+This rule monitors the creation of shared object files by previously unknown processes through the usage of the new terms rule type.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html[placeholder fields] to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+
+*Possible Investigation Steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the shared object that was created or modified through OSQuery.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve File Listing Information","query":"SELECT * FROM file WHERE path = {{file.path}}\n"}}
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Additional File Listing Information","query":"SELECT\n  f.path,\n  u.username AS file_owner,\n  g.groupname AS group_owner,\n  datetime(f.atime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_access_time,\n  datetime(f.mtime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_modified_time,\n  datetime(f.ctime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_status_change_time,\n  datetime(f.btime, 'unixepoch') AS file_created_time,\n  f.size AS size_bytes\nFROM\n  file f\n  LEFT JOIN users u ON f.uid = u.uid\n  LEFT JOIN groups g ON f.gid = g.gid\nWHERE path = {{file.path}}\n"}}
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User","query":"SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"}}
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+- Investigate whether the altered scripts call other malicious scripts elsewhere on the file system. 
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+        - Cron jobs, services and other persistence mechanisms.
+            - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Crontab Information","query":"SELECT * FROM crontab"}}
+- Investigate abnormal behaviors by the subject process/user such as network connections, file modifications, and any other spawned child processes.
+  - Investigate listening ports and open sockets to look for potential command and control traffic or data exfiltration.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Listening Ports","query":"SELECT pid, address, port, socket, protocol, path FROM listening_ports"}}
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Open Sockets","query":"SELECT pid, family, remote_address, remote_port, socket, state FROM process_open_sockets"}}
+  - Identify the user account that performed the action, analyze it, and check whether it should perform this kind of action.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific User","query":"SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = {{user.name}}"}}
+- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Investigate the Account Authentication Status","query":"SELECT * FROM logged_in_users WHERE user = {{user.name}}"}}
+
+
+*False Positive Analysis*
+
+
+- If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+- If this activity is related to a system administrator that performed these actions for administrative purposes, consider adding exceptions for this specific administrator user account. 
+- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+host.os.type:linux and event.action:(creation or file_create_event or file_rename_event or rename) and 
+file.path:(/dev/shm/* or /usr/lib/*) and file.extension:so and process.name:* and not (
+  process.name:("dockerd" or "dpkg" or "rpm" or "snapd" or "yum" or "vmis-launcher" or "pacman" or
+  "apt-get" or "dnf" or "podman" or "platform-python") or 
+  (process.name:vmware-install.pl and file.path:/usr/lib/vmware-tools/*)
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Hijack Execution Flow
+** ID: T1574
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Dynamic Linker Hijacking
+** ID: T1574.006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-shell-execution-via-apple-scripting.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-shell-execution-via-apple-scripting.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2afa556920
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-shell-execution-via-apple-scripting.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-shell-execution-via-apple-scripting]]
+=== Shell Execution via Apple Scripting
+
+Identifies the execution of the shell process (sh) via scripting (JXA or AppleScript). Adversaries may use the doShellScript functionality in JXA or do shell script in AppleScript to execute system commands.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/technotes/tn2065/_index.html
+* https://objectivebythesea.com/v2/talks/OBTS_v2_Thomas.pdf
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id with maxspan=5s
+ [process where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type in ("start", "process_started", "info") and process.name == "osascript"] by process.pid
+ [process where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type in ("start", "process_started") and process.name == "sh" and process.args == "-c"] by process.parent.pid
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-signed-proxy-execution-via-ms-work-folders.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-signed-proxy-execution-via-ms-work-folders.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4a636f0382
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-signed-proxy-execution-via-ms-work-folders.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-signed-proxy-execution-via-ms-work-folders]]
+=== Signed Proxy Execution via MS Work Folders
+
+Identifies the use of Windows Work Folders to execute a potentially masqueraded control.exe file in the current working directory. Misuse of Windows Work Folders could indicate malicious activity.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/storage/work-folders/work-folders-overview
+* https://twitter.com/ElliotKillick/status/1449812843772227588
+* https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/WorkFolders/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+* Austin Songer
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Signed Proxy Execution via MS Work Folders*
+
+
+Work Folders is a role service for file servers running Windows Server that provides a consistent way for users to access their work files from their PCs and devices. This allows users to store work files and access them from anywhere. When called, Work Folders will automatically execute any Portable Executable (PE) named control.exe as an argument before accessing the synced share.
+
+Using Work Folders to execute a masqueraded control.exe could allow an adversary to bypass application controls and increase privileges.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+    - Examine the location of the WorkFolders.exe binary to determine if it was copied to the location of the control.exe binary. It resides in the System32 directory by default.
+- Trace the activity related to the control.exe binary to identify any continuing intrusion activity on the host.
+- Review the control.exe binary executed with Work Folders to determine maliciousness such as additional host activity or network traffic.
+- Determine if control.exe was synced to sync share, indicating potential lateral movement.
+- Review how control.exe was originally delivered on the host, such as emailed, downloaded from the web, or written to
+disk from a separate binary.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Windows Work Folders are used legitimately by end users and administrators for file sharing and syncing but not in the instance where a suspicious control.exe is passed as an argument.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Review the Work Folders synced share to determine if the control.exe was shared and if so remove it.
+- If no lateral movement was identified during investigation, take the affected host offline if possible and remove the control.exe binary as well as any additional artifacts identified during investigation.
+- Review integrating Windows Information Protection (WIP) to enforce data protection by encrypting the data on PCs using Work Folders.
+- Confirm with the user whether this was expected or not, and reset their password.
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start"
+    and process.name : "control.exe" and process.parent.name : "WorkFolders.exe"
+    and not process.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\control.exe", "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\control.exe")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: System Binary Proxy Execution
+** ID: T1218
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-sip-provider-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-sip-provider-modification.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..224a3e0c32
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-sip-provider-modification.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-sip-provider-modification]]
+=== SIP Provider Modification
+
+Identifies modifications to the registered Subject Interface Package (SIP) providers. SIP providers are used by the Windows cryptographic system to validate file signatures on the system. This may be an attempt to bypass signature validation checks or inject code into critical processes.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/mattifestation/PoCSubjectInterfacePackage
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+registry where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type:"change" and
+  registry.path: (
+    "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\OID\\EncodingType 0\\CryptSIPDllPutSignedDataMsg\\{*}\\Dll",
+    "*\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\OID\\EncodingType 0\\CryptSIPDllPutSignedDataMsg\\{*}\\Dll",
+    "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\Providers\\Trust\\FinalPolicy\\{*}\\$Dll",
+    "*\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\Providers\\Trust\\FinalPolicy\\{*}\\$Dll"
+    ) and
+  registry.data.strings:"*.dll"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Subvert Trust Controls
+** ID: T1553
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking
+** ID: T1553.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-smtp-on-port-26-tcp.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-smtp-on-port-26-tcp.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a3a80fabc3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-smtp-on-port-26-tcp.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-smtp-on-port-26-tcp]]
+=== SMTP on Port 26/TCP
+
+This rule detects events that may indicate use of SMTP on TCP port 26. This port is commonly used by several popular mail transfer agents to deconflict with the default SMTP port 25. This port has also been used by a malware family called BadPatch for command and control of Windows systems.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* packetbeat-*
+* auditbeat-*
+* filebeat-*
+* logs-network_traffic.*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-badpatch/
+* https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Next+up+whats+up+with+TCP+port+26/25564/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Tactic: Command and Control
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+
+*Version*: 104
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+(event.dataset: (network_traffic.flow or zeek.smtp) or event.category:(network or network_traffic)) and network.transport:tcp and destination.port:26
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Exfiltration
+** ID: TA0010
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
+** ID: T1048
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-softwareupdate-preferences-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-softwareupdate-preferences-modification.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..be2e91e752
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-softwareupdate-preferences-modification.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-softwareupdate-preferences-modification]]
+=== SoftwareUpdate Preferences Modification
+
+Identifies changes to the SoftwareUpdate preferences using the built-in defaults command. Adversaries may abuse this in an attempt to disable security updates.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://blog.checkpoint.com/2017/07/13/osxdok-refuses-go-away-money/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:macos and event.type:(start or process_started) and
+ process.name:defaults and
+ process.args:(write and "-bool" and (com.apple.SoftwareUpdate or /Library/Preferences/com.apple.SoftwareUpdate.plist) and not (TRUE or true))
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Impair Defenses
+** ID: T1562
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Disable or Modify Tools
+** ID: T1562.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-solarwinds-process-disabling-services-via-registry.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-solarwinds-process-disabling-services-via-registry.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d40f68c528
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-solarwinds-process-disabling-services-via-registry.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-solarwinds-process-disabling-services-via-registry]]
+=== SolarWinds Process Disabling Services via Registry
+
+Identifies a SolarWinds binary modifying the start type of a service to be disabled. An adversary may abuse this technique to manipulate relevant security services.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Tactic: Initial Access
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+registry where host.os.type == "windows" and registry.path : (
+    "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\\Services\\*\\Start",
+    "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\\Services\\*\\Start"
+  ) and
+  registry.data.strings : ("4", "0x00000004") and
+  process.name : (
+      "SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost*.exe",
+      "ConfigurationWizard*.exe",
+      "NetflowDatabaseMaintenance*.exe",
+      "NetFlowService*.exe",
+      "SolarWinds.Administration*.exe",
+      "SolarWinds.Collector.Service*.exe",
+      "SolarwindsDiagnostics*.exe")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Impair Defenses
+** ID: T1562
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Disable or Modify Tools
+** ID: T1562.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Modify Registry
+** ID: T1112
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Initial Access
+** ID: TA0001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Supply Chain Compromise
+** ID: T1195
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Compromise Software Supply Chain
+** ID: T1195.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-spike-in-bytes-sent-to-an-external-device-via-airdrop.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-spike-in-bytes-sent-to-an-external-device-via-airdrop.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fdb49d8b54
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-spike-in-bytes-sent-to-an-external-device-via-airdrop.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-spike-in-bytes-sent-to-an-external-device-via-airdrop]]
+=== Spike in Bytes Sent to an External Device via Airdrop
+
+A machine learning job has detected high bytes of data written to an external device via Airdrop. In a typical operational setting, there is usually a predictable pattern or a certain range of data that is written to external devices. An unusually large amount of data being written is anomalous and can signal illicit data copying or transfer activities.
+
+*Rule type*: machine_learning
+
+*Rule indices*: None
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 15m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-2h ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html
+* https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/ded
+* https://www.elastic.co/blog/detect-data-exfiltration-activity-with-kibanas-new-integration
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Use Case: Data Exfiltration Detection
+* Rule Type: ML
+* Rule Type: Machine Learning
+* Tactic: Exfiltration
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The rule requires the Data Exfiltration Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as network and file events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend and Network Packet Capture (for network events only).  
+
+
+*Data Exfiltration Detection Setup*
+
+The Data Exfiltration Detection integration detects data exfiltration activity by identifying abnormalities in network and file events. Anomalies are detected using Elastic's Anomaly Detection feature. 
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Data Exfiltration Detection.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+- File events collected by the Elastic Defend integration.
+- To install Elastic Defend, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed to install assets associated with the Data Exfiltration Detection integration:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Data Exfiltration Detection and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Under Settings, click Install Data Exfiltration Detection assets and follow the prompts to install the assets.
+
+
+*Anomaly Detection Setup*
+
+Before you can enable rules for Data Exfiltration Detection, you'll need to enable the corresponding Anomaly Detection jobs. 
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Analytics, click Machine Learning.
+- Under Anomaly Detection, click Jobs, and then click "Create job". Select the Data View containing your file events. For example, this would be `logs-endpoint.events.*` if you used Elastic Defend to collect events.
+- If the selected Data View contains events that match the query in https://github.com/elastic/integrations/blob/main/packages/ded/kibana/ml_module/ded-ml.json[this] configuration file, you will see a card for Data Exfiltration Detection under "Use preconfigured jobs".
+- Keep the default settings and click "Create jobs" to start the anomaly detection jobs and datafeeds.
+
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Exfiltration
+** ID: TA0010
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium
+** ID: T1011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1011/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-spike-in-bytes-sent-to-an-external-device.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-spike-in-bytes-sent-to-an-external-device.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5b56e4bede
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-spike-in-bytes-sent-to-an-external-device.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-spike-in-bytes-sent-to-an-external-device]]
+=== Spike in Bytes Sent to an External Device
+
+A machine learning job has detected high bytes of data written to an external device. In a typical operational setting, there is usually a predictable pattern or a certain range of data that is written to external devices. An unusually large amount of data being written is anomalous and can signal illicit data copying or transfer activities.
+
+*Rule type*: machine_learning
+
+*Rule indices*: None
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 15m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-2h ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html
+* https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/ded
+* https://www.elastic.co/blog/detect-data-exfiltration-activity-with-kibanas-new-integration
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Use Case: Data Exfiltration Detection
+* Rule Type: ML
+* Rule Type: Machine Learning
+* Tactic: Exfiltration
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The rule requires the Data Exfiltration Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as network and file events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend and Network Packet Capture (for network events only).  
+
+
+*Data Exfiltration Detection Setup*
+
+The Data Exfiltration Detection integration detects data exfiltration activity by identifying abnormalities in network and file events. Anomalies are detected using Elastic's Anomaly Detection feature. 
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Data Exfiltration Detection.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+- File events collected by the Elastic Defend integration.
+- To install Elastic Defend, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed to install assets associated with the Data Exfiltration Detection integration:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Data Exfiltration Detection and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Under Settings, click Install Data Exfiltration Detection assets and follow the prompts to install the assets.
+
+
+*Anomaly Detection Setup*
+
+Before you can enable rules for Data Exfiltration Detection, you'll need to enable the corresponding Anomaly Detection jobs. 
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Analytics, click Machine Learning.
+- Under Anomaly Detection, click Jobs, and then click "Create job". Select the Data View containing your file events. For example, this would be `logs-endpoint.events.*` if you used Elastic Defend to collect events.
+- If the selected Data View contains events that match the query in https://github.com/elastic/integrations/blob/main/packages/ded/kibana/ml_module/ded-ml.json[this] configuration file, you will see a card for Data Exfiltration Detection under "Use preconfigured jobs".
+- Keep the default settings and click "Create jobs" to start the anomaly detection jobs and datafeeds.
+
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Exfiltration
+** ID: TA0010
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium
+** ID: T1052
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1052/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-spike-in-number-of-connections-made-from-a-source-ip.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-spike-in-number-of-connections-made-from-a-source-ip.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..80c1ea7a72
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-spike-in-number-of-connections-made-from-a-source-ip.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-spike-in-number-of-connections-made-from-a-source-ip]]
+=== Spike in Number of Connections Made from a Source IP
+
+A machine learning job has detected a high count of destination IPs establishing an RDP connection with a single source IP. Once an attacker has gained access to one system, they might attempt to access more in the network in search of valuable assets, data, or further access points.
+
+*Rule type*: machine_learning
+
+*Rule indices*: None
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 15m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-12h ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html
+* https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/lmd
+* https://www.elastic.co/blog/detecting-lateral-movement-activity-a-new-kibana-integration
+* https://www.elastic.co/blog/remote-desktop-protocol-connections-elastic-security
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Use Case: Lateral Movement Detection
+* Rule Type: ML
+* Rule Type: Machine Learning
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The rule requires the Lateral Movement Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as file and Windows RDP process events collected by the Elastic Defend integration.  
+
+
+*Lateral Movement Detection Setup*
+
+The Lateral Movement Detection integration detects lateral movement activity by identifying abnormalities in file and Windows RDP events. Anomalies are detected using Elastic's Anomaly Detection feature.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Lateral Movement Detection.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+- Windows RDP process events collected by the https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/endpoint[Elastic Defend] integration.
+- To install Elastic Defend, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed to install assets associated with the Lateral Movement Detection integration:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Lateral Movement Detection and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Under Settings, click Install Lateral Movement Detection assets and follow the prompts to install the assets.
+
+
+*Anomaly Detection Setup*
+
+Before you can enable rules for Lateral Movement Detection, you'll need to enable the corresponding Anomaly Detection jobs.
+- Before enabling the Anomaly Detection jobs, confirm that the Pivot Transform asset is installed and actively gathering data in the destination index `ml-rdp-lmd`.
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Analytics, click Machine Learning.
+- Under Anomaly Detection, click Jobs, and then click "Create job". Select the Data View containing your transformed RDP process data i.e.`ml-rdp-lmd`.
+- If the selected Data View contains events that match the query in https://github.com/elastic/integrations/blob/main/packages/lmd/kibana/ml_module/lmd-ml.json[this] configuration file, you will see a card for Lateral Movement Detection under "Use preconfigured jobs".
+- Keep the default settings and click "Create jobs" to start the anomaly detection jobs and datafeeds.
+
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation of Remote Services
+** ID: T1210
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-spike-in-number-of-connections-made-to-a-destination-ip.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-spike-in-number-of-connections-made-to-a-destination-ip.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3db76ae7bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-spike-in-number-of-connections-made-to-a-destination-ip.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-spike-in-number-of-connections-made-to-a-destination-ip]]
+=== Spike in Number of Connections Made to a Destination IP
+
+A machine learning job has detected a high count of source IPs establishing an RDP connection with a single destination IP. Attackers might use multiple compromised systems to attack a target to ensure redundancy in case a source IP gets detected and blocked.
+
+*Rule type*: machine_learning
+
+*Rule indices*: None
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 15m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-12h ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html
+* https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/lmd
+* https://www.elastic.co/blog/detecting-lateral-movement-activity-a-new-kibana-integration
+* https://www.elastic.co/blog/remote-desktop-protocol-connections-elastic-security
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Use Case: Lateral Movement Detection
+* Rule Type: ML
+* Rule Type: Machine Learning
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The rule requires the Lateral Movement Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as file and Windows RDP process events collected by the Elastic Defend integration.  
+
+
+*Lateral Movement Detection Setup*
+
+The Lateral Movement Detection integration detects lateral movement activity by identifying abnormalities in file and Windows RDP events. Anomalies are detected using Elastic's Anomaly Detection feature.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Lateral Movement Detection.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+- Windows RDP process events collected by the https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/endpoint[Elastic Defend] integration.
+- To install Elastic Defend, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed to install assets associated with the Lateral Movement Detection integration:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Lateral Movement Detection and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Under Settings, click Install Lateral Movement Detection assets and follow the prompts to install the assets.
+
+
+*Anomaly Detection Setup*
+
+Before you can enable rules for Lateral Movement Detection, you'll need to enable the corresponding Anomaly Detection jobs.
+- Before enabling the Anomaly Detection jobs, confirm that the Pivot Transform asset is installed and actively gathering data in the destination index `ml-rdp-lmd`.
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Analytics, click Machine Learning.
+- Under Anomaly Detection, click Jobs, and then click "Create job". Select the Data View containing your transformed RDP process data i.e.`ml-rdp-lmd`.
+- If the selected Data View contains events that match the query in https://github.com/elastic/integrations/blob/main/packages/lmd/kibana/ml_module/lmd-ml.json[this] configuration file, you will see a card for Lateral Movement Detection under "Use preconfigured jobs".
+- Keep the default settings and click "Create jobs" to start the anomaly detection jobs and datafeeds.
+
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation of Remote Services
+** ID: T1210
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-spike-in-number-of-processes-in-an-rdp-session.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-spike-in-number-of-processes-in-an-rdp-session.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..28b828e226
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-spike-in-number-of-processes-in-an-rdp-session.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-spike-in-number-of-processes-in-an-rdp-session]]
+=== Spike in Number of Processes in an RDP Session
+
+A machine learning job has detected unusually high number of processes started in a single RDP session. Executing a large number of processes remotely on other machines can be an indicator of lateral movement activity.
+
+*Rule type*: machine_learning
+
+*Rule indices*: None
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 15m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-12h ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html
+* https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/lmd
+* https://www.elastic.co/blog/detecting-lateral-movement-activity-a-new-kibana-integration
+* https://www.elastic.co/blog/remote-desktop-protocol-connections-elastic-security
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Use Case: Lateral Movement Detection
+* Rule Type: ML
+* Rule Type: Machine Learning
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The rule requires the Lateral Movement Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as file and Windows RDP process events collected by the Elastic Defend integration.  
+
+
+*Lateral Movement Detection Setup*
+
+The Lateral Movement Detection integration detects lateral movement activity by identifying abnormalities in file and Windows RDP events. Anomalies are detected using Elastic's Anomaly Detection feature.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Lateral Movement Detection.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+- Windows RDP process events collected by the https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/endpoint[Elastic Defend] integration.
+- To install Elastic Defend, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed to install assets associated with the Lateral Movement Detection integration:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Lateral Movement Detection and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Under Settings, click Install Lateral Movement Detection assets and follow the prompts to install the assets.
+
+
+*Anomaly Detection Setup*
+
+Before you can enable rules for Lateral Movement Detection, you'll need to enable the corresponding Anomaly Detection jobs.
+- Before enabling the Anomaly Detection jobs, confirm that the Pivot Transform asset is installed and actively gathering data in the destination index `ml-rdp-lmd`.
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Analytics, click Machine Learning.
+- Under Anomaly Detection, click Jobs, and then click "Create job". Select the Data View containing your transformed RDP process data i.e.`ml-rdp-lmd`.
+- If the selected Data View contains events that match the query in https://github.com/elastic/integrations/blob/main/packages/lmd/kibana/ml_module/lmd-ml.json[this] configuration file, you will see a card for Lateral Movement Detection under "Use preconfigured jobs".
+- Keep the default settings and click "Create jobs" to start the anomaly detection jobs and datafeeds.
+
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation of Remote Services
+** ID: T1210
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-spike-in-remote-file-transfers.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-spike-in-remote-file-transfers.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..431bac1ffd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-spike-in-remote-file-transfers.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-spike-in-remote-file-transfers]]
+=== Spike in Remote File Transfers
+
+A machine learning job has detected an abnormal volume of remote files shared on the host indicating potential lateral movement activity. One of the primary goals of attackers after gaining access to a network is to locate and exfiltrate valuable information. Attackers might perform multiple small transfers to match normal egress activity in the network, to evade detection.
+
+*Rule type*: machine_learning
+
+*Rule indices*: None
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 15m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-90m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html
+* https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/lmd
+* https://www.elastic.co/blog/detecting-lateral-movement-activity-a-new-kibana-integration
+* https://www.elastic.co/blog/remote-desktop-protocol-connections-elastic-security
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Use Case: Lateral Movement Detection
+* Rule Type: ML
+* Rule Type: Machine Learning
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The rule requires the Lateral Movement Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as file and Windows RDP process events collected by the Elastic Defend integration.  
+
+
+*Lateral Movement Detection Setup*
+
+The Lateral Movement Detection integration detects lateral movement activity by identifying abnormalities in file and Windows RDP events. Anomalies are detected using Elastic's Anomaly Detection feature.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Lateral Movement Detection.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+- File events collected by the https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/endpoint[Elastic Defend] integration.
+- To install Elastic Defend, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed to install assets associated with the Lateral Movement Detection integration:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Lateral Movement Detection and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Under Settings, click Install Lateral Movement Detection assets and follow the prompts to install the assets.
+
+
+*Anomaly Detection Setup*
+
+Before you can enable rules for Lateral Movement Detection, you'll need to enable the corresponding Anomaly Detection jobs.
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Analytics, click Machine Learning.
+- Under Anomaly Detection, click Jobs, and then click "Create job". Select the Data View containing your file events. For example, this would be `logs-endpoint.events.*` if you used Elastic Defend to collect events.
+- If the selected Data View contains events that match the query in https://github.com/elastic/integrations/blob/main/packages/lmd/kibana/ml_module/lmd-ml.json[this] configuration file, you will see a card for Lateral Movement Detection under "Use preconfigured jobs".
+- Keep the default settings and click "Create jobs" to start the anomaly detection jobs and datafeeds.
+
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation of Remote Services
+** ID: T1210
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-ssh-authorized-keys-file-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-ssh-authorized-keys-file-modification.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..65720c3568
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-ssh-authorized-keys-file-modification.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-ssh-authorized-keys-file-modification]]
+=== SSH Authorized Keys File Modification
+
+The Secure Shell (SSH) authorized_keys file specifies which users are allowed to log into a server using public key authentication. Adversaries may modify it to maintain persistence on a victim host by adding their own public key(s).
+
+*Rule type*: new_terms
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 205
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:file and event.type:(change or creation) and
+ file.name:("authorized_keys" or "authorized_keys2" or "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" or "/root/.ssh") and
+ not process.executable:
+             (/Library/Developer/CommandLineTools/usr/bin/git or
+              /usr/local/Cellar/maven/*/libexec/bin/mvn or
+              /Library/Java/JavaVirtualMachines/jdk*.jdk/Contents/Home/bin/java or
+              /usr/bin/vim or
+              /usr/local/Cellar/coreutils/*/bin/gcat or
+              /usr/bin/bsdtar or
+              /usr/bin/nautilus or
+              /usr/bin/scp or
+              /usr/bin/touch or
+              /var/lib/docker/* or
+              /usr/bin/google_guest_agent or 
+              /opt/jc/bin/jumpcloud-agent or 
+              /opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/puppet or
+              /usr/bin/chef-client
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Account Manipulation
+** ID: T1098
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: SSH Authorized Keys
+** ID: T1098.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/004/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote Service Session Hijacking
+** ID: T1563
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: SSH Hijacking
+** ID: T1563.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote Services
+** ID: T1021
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: SSH
+** ID: T1021.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-startup-logon-script-added-to-group-policy-object.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-startup-logon-script-added-to-group-policy-object.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ad1ed5121e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-startup-logon-script-added-to-group-policy-object.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-startup-logon-script-added-to-group-policy-object]]
+=== Startup/Logon Script added to Group Policy Object
+
+Detects the modification of Group Policy Objects (GPO) to add a startup/logon script to users or computer objects.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-system.*
+* logs-windows.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: None ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/atc-project/atc-data/blob/master/docs/Logging_Policies/LP_0025_windows_audit_directory_service_changes.md
+* https://github.com/atc-project/atc-data/blob/f2bbb51ecf68e2c9f488e3c70dcdd3df51d2a46b/docs/Logging_Policies/LP_0029_windows_audit_detailed_file_share.md
+* https://labs.f-secure.com/tools/sharpgpoabuse
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: Active Directory
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Startup/Logon Script added to Group Policy Object*
+
+
+Group Policy Objects (GPOs) can be used by attackers to instruct arbitrarily large groups of clients to execute specified commands at startup, logon, shutdown, and logoff. This is done by creating or modifying the `scripts.ini` or `psscripts.ini` files. The scripts are stored in the following paths:
+  - `<GPOPath>\Machine\Scripts\`
+  - `<GPOPath>\User\Scripts\`
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- This attack abuses a legitimate mechanism of Active Directory, so it is important to determine whether the activity is legitimate and the administrator is authorized to perform this operation.
+- Retrieve the contents of the `ScheduledTasks.xml` file, and check the `<Command>` and `<Arguments>` XML tags for any potentially malicious commands or binaries.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Scope which objects may be compromised by retrieving information about which objects are controlled by the GPO.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Verify if the execution is legitimately authorized and executed under a change management process.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- Group Policy Abuse for Privilege Addition - b9554892-5e0e-424b-83a0-5aef95aa43bf
+- Scheduled Task Execution at Scale via GPO - 15a8ba77-1c13-4274-88fe-6bd14133861e
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- The investigation and containment must be performed in every computer controlled by the GPO, where necessary.
+- Remove the script from the GPO.
+- Check if other GPOs have suspicious scripts attached.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The 'Audit Detailed File Share' audit policy must be configured (Success Failure).
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Policies >
+Windows Settings >
+Security Settings >
+Advanced Audit Policies Configuration >
+Audit Policies >
+Object Access >
+Audit Detailed File Share (Success,Failure)
+```
+
+The 'Audit Directory Service Changes' audit policy must be configured (Success Failure).
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Policies >
+Windows Settings >
+Security Settings >
+Advanced Audit Policies Configuration >
+Audit Policies >
+DS Access >
+Audit Directory Service Changes (Success,Failure)
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+(
+ event.code:5136 and winlog.event_data.AttributeLDAPDisplayName:(gPCMachineExtensionNames or gPCUserExtensionNames) and
+   winlog.event_data.AttributeValue:(*42B5FAAE-6536-11D2-AE5A-0000F87571E3* and
+                                      (*40B66650-4972-11D1-A7CA-0000F87571E3* or *40B6664F-4972-11D1-A7CA-0000F87571E3*))
+)
+or
+(
+ event.code:5145 and winlog.event_data.ShareName:\\\\*\\SYSVOL and
+   winlog.event_data.RelativeTargetName:(*\\scripts.ini or *\\psscripts.ini) and
+   (message:WriteData or winlog.event_data.AccessList:*%%4417*)
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Domain Policy Modification
+** ID: T1484
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Group Policy Modification
+** ID: T1484.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
+** ID: T1547
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-startup-persistence-by-a-suspicious-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-startup-persistence-by-a-suspicious-process.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fe3246393b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-startup-persistence-by-a-suspicious-process.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-startup-persistence-by-a-suspicious-process]]
+=== Startup Persistence by a Suspicious Process
+
+Identifies files written to or modified in the startup folder by commonly abused processes. Adversaries may use this technique to maintain persistence.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security-part-1
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Startup Persistence by a Suspicious Process*
+
+
+The Windows Startup folder is a special folder in Windows. Programs added to this folder are executed during account logon, without user interaction, providing an excellent way for attackers to maintain persistence.
+
+This rule monitors for commonly abused processes writing to the Startup folder locations.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Validate if the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the file using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Administrators may add programs to this mechanism via command-line shells. Before the further investigation, verify that this activity is not benign.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- Suspicious Startup Shell Folder Modification - c8b150f0-0164-475b-a75e-74b47800a9ff
+- Persistent Scripts in the Startup Directory - f7c4dc5a-a58d-491d-9f14-9b66507121c0
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type != "deletion" and
+  user.domain != "NT AUTHORITY" and
+  file.path : ("C:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\*",
+               "C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\StartUp\\*") and
+  process.name : ("cmd.exe",
+                  "powershell.exe",
+                  "wmic.exe",
+                  "mshta.exe",
+                  "pwsh.exe",
+                  "cscript.exe",
+                  "wscript.exe",
+                  "regsvr32.exe",
+                  "RegAsm.exe",
+                  "rundll32.exe",
+                  "EQNEDT32.EXE",
+                  "WINWORD.EXE",
+                  "EXCEL.EXE",
+                  "POWERPNT.EXE",
+                  "MSPUB.EXE",
+                  "MSACCESS.EXE",
+                  "iexplore.exe",
+                  "InstallUtil.exe")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
+** ID: T1547
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
+** ID: T1547.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-statistical-model-detected-c2-beaconing-activity-with-high-confidence.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-statistical-model-detected-c2-beaconing-activity-with-high-confidence.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f26dcce628
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-statistical-model-detected-c2-beaconing-activity-with-high-confidence.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-statistical-model-detected-c2-beaconing-activity-with-high-confidence]]
+=== Statistical Model Detected C2 Beaconing Activity with High Confidence
+
+A statistical model has identified command-and-control (C2) beaconing activity with high confidence. Beaconing can help attackers maintain stealthy communication with their C2 servers, receive instructions and payloads, exfiltrate data and maintain persistence in a network.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* ml_beaconing.all
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-1h ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html
+* https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/beaconing
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/identifying-beaconing-malware-using-elastic
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Network
+* Use Case: C2 Beaconing Detection
+* Tactic: Command and Control
+
+*Version*: 4
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The rule requires the Network Beaconing Identification integration assets to be installed, as well as network logs collected by the Elastic Defend or Network Packet Capture integrations.
+
+
+*Network Beaconing Identification Setup*
+
+The Network Beaconing Identification integration consists of a statistical framework to identify C2 beaconing activity in network logs.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Network Beaconing Identification.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+- Network events collected by the https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/endpoint[Elastic Defend] or https://docs.elastic.co/integrations/network_traffic[Network Packet Capture] integration.
+- To install Elastic Defend, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[documentation].
+- To add the Network Packet Capture integration to an Elastic Agent policy, refer to https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/add-integration-to-policy.html[this] guide.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed to install assets associated with the Network Beaconing Identification integration:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Network Beaconing Identification and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Under Settings, click "Install Network Beaconing Identification assets" and follow the prompts to install the assets.
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+beacon_stats.beaconing_score: 3
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Web Service
+** ID: T1102
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Bidirectional Communication
+** ID: T1102.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-statistical-model-detected-c2-beaconing-activity.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-statistical-model-detected-c2-beaconing-activity.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e863bf1800
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-statistical-model-detected-c2-beaconing-activity.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-statistical-model-detected-c2-beaconing-activity]]
+=== Statistical Model Detected C2 Beaconing Activity
+
+A statistical model has identified command-and-control (C2) beaconing activity. Beaconing can help attackers maintain stealthy communication with their C2 servers, receive instructions and payloads, exfiltrate data and maintain persistence in a network.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* ml_beaconing.all
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-1h ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html
+* https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/beaconing
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/identifying-beaconing-malware-using-elastic
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Network
+* Use Case: C2 Beaconing Detection
+* Tactic: Command and Control
+
+*Version*: 4
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The rule requires the Network Beaconing Identification integration assets to be installed, as well as network logs collected by the Elastic Defend or Network Packet Capture integrations.
+
+
+*Network Beaconing Identification Setup*
+
+The Network Beaconing Identification integration consists of a statistical framework to identify C2 beaconing activity in network logs.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Network Beaconing Identification.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+- Network events collected by the https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/endpoint[Elastic Defend] or https://docs.elastic.co/integrations/network_traffic[Network Packet Capture] integration.
+- To install Elastic Defend, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[documentation].
+- To add the Network Packet Capture integration to an Elastic Agent policy, refer to https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/add-integration-to-policy.html[this] guide.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed to install assets associated with the Network Beaconing Identification integration:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Network Beaconing Identification and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Under Settings, click "Install Network Beaconing Identification assets" and follow the prompts to install the assets.
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+beacon_stats.is_beaconing: true and
+not process.name: ("WaAppAgent.exe" or "metricbeat.exe" or "packetbeat.exe" or "WindowsAzureGuestAgent.exe" or "HealthService.exe" or "Widgets.exe" or "lsass.exe" or "msedgewebview2.exe" or "MsMpEng.exe" or "OUTLOOK.EXE" or "msteams.exe" or "FileSyncHelper.exe" or "SearchProtocolHost.exe" or "Creative Cloud.exe" or "ms-teams.exe" or "ms-teamsupdate.exe" or "curl.exe" or "rundll32.exe" or "MsSense.exe" or "wermgr.exe" or "java" or "olk.exe" or "iexplore.exe" or "NetworkManager" or "packetbeat" or "Ssms.exe" or "NisSrv.exe" or "gamingservices.exe" or "appidcertstorecheck.exe" or "POWERPNT.EXE" or "miiserver.exe" or "Grammarly.Desktop.exe" or "SnagitEditor.exe" or "CRWindowsClientService.exe")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Web Service
+** ID: T1102
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Bidirectional Communication
+** ID: T1102.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-sublime-plugin-or-application-script-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-sublime-plugin-or-application-script-modification.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5ebe2e02d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-sublime-plugin-or-application-script-modification.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-sublime-plugin-or-application-script-modification]]
+=== Sublime Plugin or Application Script Modification
+
+Adversaries may create or modify the Sublime application plugins or scripts to execute a malicious payload each time the Sublime application is started.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://posts.specterops.io/persistent-jxa-66e1c3cd1cf5
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type in ("change", "creation") and file.extension : "py" and
+  file.path :
+    (
+      "/Users/*/Library/Application Support/Sublime Text*/Packages/*.py",
+      "/Applications/Sublime Text.app/Contents/MacOS/sublime.py"
+    ) and
+  not process.executable :
+    (
+      "/Applications/Sublime Text*.app/Contents/*",
+      "/usr/local/Cellar/git/*/bin/git",
+      "/Library/Developer/CommandLineTools/usr/bin/git",
+      "/usr/libexec/xpcproxy",
+      "/System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/DesktopServicesPriv.framework/Versions/A/Resources/DesktopServicesHelper"
+    )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Compromise Client Software Binary
+** ID: T1554
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1554/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-sudo-command-enumeration-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-sudo-command-enumeration-detected.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..25229b4aac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-sudo-command-enumeration-detected.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-sudo-command-enumeration-detected]]
+=== Sudo Command Enumeration Detected
+
+This rule monitors for the usage of the sudo -l command, which is used to list the allowed and forbidden commands for the invoking user. Attackers may execute this command to enumerate commands allowed to be executed with sudo permissions, potentially allowing to escalate privileges to root.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Discovery
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 5
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and 
+process.name == "sudo" and process.args == "-l" and process.args_count == 2 and
+process.parent.name in ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish") and 
+not group.Ext.real.id : "0" and not user.Ext.real.id : "0" and not process.args == "dpkg"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Discovery
+** ID: TA0007
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/
+* Technique:
+** Name: System Owner/User Discovery
+** ID: T1033
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suid-sguid-enumeration-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suid-sguid-enumeration-detected.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cfc9d7aa9f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suid-sguid-enumeration-detected.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suid-sguid-enumeration-detected]]
+=== SUID/SGUID Enumeration Detected
+
+This rule monitors for the usage of the "find" command in conjunction with SUID and SGUID permission arguments. SUID (Set User ID) and SGID (Set Group ID) are special permissions in Linux that allow a program to execute with the privileges of the file owner or group, respectively, rather than the privileges of the user running the program. In case an attacker is able to enumerate and find a binary that is misconfigured, they might be able to leverage this misconfiguration to escalate privileges by exploiting vulnerabilities or built-in features in the privileged program.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Discovery
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 5
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and 
+process.name == "find" and process.args : "-perm" and process.args : (
+  "/6000", "-6000", "/4000", "-4000", "/2000", "-2000", "/u=s", "-u=s", "/g=s", "-g=s", "/u=s,g=s", "/g=s,u=s"
+) and not (
+  user.Ext.real.id == "0" or group.Ext.real.id == "0" or process.args_count >= 12 or 
+  (process.args : "/usr/bin/pkexec" and process.args : "-xdev" and process.args_count == 7)
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Discovery
+** ID: TA0007
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/
+* Technique:
+** Name: File and Directory Discovery
+** ID: T1083
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
+** ID: T1548
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Setuid and Setgid
+** ID: T1548.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/001/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-antimalware-scan-interface-dll.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-antimalware-scan-interface-dll.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..522eb2442e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-antimalware-scan-interface-dll.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-antimalware-scan-interface-dll]]
+=== Suspicious Antimalware Scan Interface DLL
+
+Identifies the creation of the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) DLL in an unusual location. This may indicate an attempt to bypass AMSI by loading a rogue AMSI module instead of the legit one.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/Amsi-Bypass-Powershell
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 8
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Suspicious Antimalware Scan Interface DLL*
+
+
+The Windows Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) is a versatile interface standard that allows your applications and services to integrate with any antimalware product on a machine. AMSI integrates with multiple Windows components, ranging from User Account Control (UAC) to VBA macros and PowerShell.
+
+Attackers might copy a rogue AMSI DLL to an unusual location to prevent the process from loading the legitimate module, achieving a bypass to execute malicious code.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Identify the process that created the DLL and which account was used.
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate the execution of scripts and macros after the registry modification.
+- Investigate other processes launched from the directory that the DLL was created.
+- Inspect the host for suspicious or abnormal behavior in the alert timeframe:
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This modification should not happen legitimately. Any potential benign true positive (B-TP) should be mapped and monitored by the security team as these modifications expose the host to malware infections.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type != "deletion" and file.path != null and
+ file.name : ("amsi.dll", "amsi") and not file.path : ("?:\\Windows\\system32\\amsi.dll", "?:\\Windows\\Syswow64\\amsi.dll", "?:\\$WINDOWS.~BT\\NewOS\\Windows\\WinSXS\\*", "?:\\$WINDOWS.~BT\\NewOS\\Windows\\servicing\\LCU\\*", "?:\\$WINDOWS.~BT\\Work\\*\\*", "?:\\Windows\\SoftwareDistribution\\Download\\*")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Impair Defenses
+** ID: T1562
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Disable or Modify Tools
+** ID: T1562.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Hijack Execution Flow
+** ID: T1574
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: DLL Search Order Hijacking
+** ID: T1574.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-apt-package-manager-execution.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-apt-package-manager-execution.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a24f8a36b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-apt-package-manager-execution.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-apt-package-manager-execution]]
+=== Suspicious APT Package Manager Execution
+
+Detects suspicious process events executed by the APT package manager, potentially indicating persistence through an APT backdoor. In Linux, APT (Advanced Package Tool) is a command-line utility used for handling packages on Debian-based systems, providing functions for installing, updating, upgrading, and removing software along with managing package repositories. Attackers can backdoor APT to gain persistence by injecting malicious code into scripts that APT runs, thereby ensuring continued unauthorized access or control each time APT is used for package management.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 2
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id with maxspan=5s
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
+   process.parent.name == "apt" and process.args == "-c" and process.name in (
+     "bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish"
+   )
+  ] by process.entity_id
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and process.name : (
+     "bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish", "python*", "php*",
+     "perl", "ruby", "lua*", "openssl", "nc", "netcat", "ncat", "telnet", "awk"
+   )
+  ] by process.parent.entity_id
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Create or Modify System Process
+** ID: T1543
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Hijack Execution Flow
+** ID: T1574
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Unix Shell
+** ID: T1059.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-apt-package-manager-network-connection.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-apt-package-manager-network-connection.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d2a2b8b3a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-apt-package-manager-network-connection.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-apt-package-manager-network-connection]]
+=== Suspicious APT Package Manager Network Connection
+
+Detects suspicious network events executed by the APT package manager, potentially indicating persistence through an APT backdoor. In Linux, APT (Advanced Package Tool) is a command-line utility used for handling packages on Debian-based systems, providing functions for installing, updating, upgrading, and removing software along with managing package repositories. Attackers can backdoor APT to gain persistence by injecting malicious code into scripts that APT runs, thereby ensuring continued unauthorized access or control each time APT is used for package management.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Command and Control
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 2
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id with maxspan=5s
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
+   process.parent.name == "apt" and process.args == "-c" and process.name in (
+     "bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish"
+    )
+  ] by process.entity_id
+  [network where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "connection_attempted" and event.type == "start"
+  ] by process.parent.entity_id
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Create or Modify System Process
+** ID: T1543
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Hijack Execution Flow
+** ID: T1574
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-automator-workflows-execution.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-automator-workflows-execution.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..407579578b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-automator-workflows-execution.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-automator-workflows-execution]]
+=== Suspicious Automator Workflows Execution
+
+Identifies the execution of the Automator Workflows process followed by a network connection from it's XPC service. Adversaries may drop a custom workflow template that hosts malicious JavaScript for Automation (JXA) code as an alternative to using osascript.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://posts.specterops.io/persistent-jxa-66e1c3cd1cf5
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id with maxspan=30s
+ [process where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type in ("start", "process_started") and process.name == "automator"]
+ [network where host.os.type == "macos" and process.name:"com.apple.automator.runner"]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-browser-child-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-browser-child-process.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d50caee309
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-browser-child-process.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-browser-child-process]]
+=== Suspicious Browser Child Process
+
+Identifies the execution of a suspicious browser child process. Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x43.html
+* https://fr.slideshare.net/codeblue_jp/cb19-recent-apt-attack-on-crypto-exchange-employees-by-heungsoo-kang
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Initial Access
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type in ("start", "process_started") and
+  process.parent.name : ("Google Chrome", "Google Chrome Helper*", "firefox", "Opera", "Safari", "com.apple.WebKit.WebContent", "Microsoft Edge") and
+  process.name : ("sh", "bash", "dash", "ksh", "tcsh", "zsh", "curl", "wget", "python*", "perl*", "php*", "osascript", "pwsh") and
+  process.command_line != null and
+  not process.command_line : "*/Library/Application Support/Microsoft/MAU*/Microsoft AutoUpdate.app/Contents/MacOS/msupdate*" and
+  not process.args :
+    (
+      "hw.model",
+      "IOPlatformExpertDevice",
+      "/Volumes/Google Chrome/Google Chrome.app/Contents/Frameworks/*/Resources/install.sh",
+      "--defaults-torrc",
+      "*Chrome.app",
+      "Framework.framework/Versions/*/Resources/keystone_promote_preflight.sh",
+      "/Users/*/Library/Application Support/Google/Chrome/recovery/*/ChromeRecovery",
+      "$DISPLAY",
+      "*GIO_LAUNCHED_DESKTOP_FILE_PID=$$*",
+      "/opt/homebrew/*",
+      "/usr/local/*brew*"
+    )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation for Client Execution
+** ID: T1203
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Initial Access
+** ID: TA0001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Drive-by Compromise
+** ID: T1189
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-calendar-file-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-calendar-file-modification.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2709d6b99c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-calendar-file-modification.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-calendar-file-modification]]
+=== Suspicious Calendar File Modification
+
+Identifies suspicious modifications of the calendar file by an unusual process. Adversaries may create a custom calendar notification procedure to execute a malicious program at a recurring interval to establish persistence.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://labs.f-secure.com/blog/operationalising-calendar-alerts-persistence-on-macos
+* https://github.com/FSecureLABS/CalendarPersist
+* https://github.com/D00MFist/PersistentJXA/blob/master/CalendarPersist.js
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:file and host.os.type:macos and event.action:modification and
+  file.path:/Users/*/Library/Calendars/*.calendar/Events/*.ics and
+  process.executable:
+  (* and not
+    (
+      /System/Library/* or
+      /System/Applications/Calendar.app/Contents/MacOS/* or
+      /System/Applications/Mail.app/Contents/MacOS/Mail or
+      /usr/libexec/xpcproxy or
+      /sbin/launchd or
+      /Applications/*
+    )
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Event Triggered Execution
+** ID: T1546
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-child-process-of-adobe-acrobat-reader-update-service.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-child-process-of-adobe-acrobat-reader-update-service.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4f429afa0d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-child-process-of-adobe-acrobat-reader-update-service.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-child-process-of-adobe-acrobat-reader-update-service]]
+=== Suspicious Child Process of Adobe Acrobat Reader Update Service
+
+Detects attempts to exploit privilege escalation vulnerabilities related to the Adobe Acrobat Reader PrivilegedHelperTool responsible for installing updates. For more information, refer to CVE-2020-9615, CVE-2020-9614 and CVE-2020-9613 and verify that the impacted system is patched.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://rekken.github.io/2020/05/14/Security-Flaws-in-Adobe-Acrobat-Reader-Allow-Malicious-Program-to-Gain-Root-on-macOS-Silently/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Use Case: Vulnerability
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:macos and event.type:(start or process_started) and
+  process.parent.name:com.adobe.ARMDC.SMJobBlessHelper and
+  user.name:root and
+  not process.executable: (/Library/PrivilegedHelperTools/com.adobe.ARMDC.SMJobBlessHelper or
+                           /usr/bin/codesign or
+                           /private/var/folders/zz/*/T/download/ARMDCHammer or
+                           /usr/sbin/pkgutil or
+                           /usr/bin/shasum or
+                           /usr/bin/perl* or
+                           /usr/sbin/spctl or
+                           /usr/sbin/installer or
+                           /usr/bin/csrutil)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
+** ID: T1068
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-cmd-execution-via-wmi.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-cmd-execution-via-wmi.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f7580b8712
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-cmd-execution-via-wmi.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-cmd-execution-via-wmi]]
+=== Suspicious Cmd Execution via WMI
+
+Identifies suspicious command execution (cmd) via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) on a remote host. This could be indicative of adversary lateral movement.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+ process.parent.name : "WmiPrvSE.exe" and process.name : "cmd.exe" and
+ process.args : "\\\\127.0.0.1\\*" and process.args : ("2>&1", "1>")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Windows Management Instrumentation
+** ID: T1047
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Windows Command Shell
+** ID: T1059.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-content-extracted-or-decompressed-via-funzip.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-content-extracted-or-decompressed-via-funzip.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1b042ef7fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-content-extracted-or-decompressed-via-funzip.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-content-extracted-or-decompressed-via-funzip]]
+=== Suspicious Content Extracted or Decompressed via Funzip
+
+Identifies when suspicious content is extracted from a file and subsequently decompressed using the funzip utility. Malware may execute the tail utility using the "-c" option to read a sequence of bytes from the end of a file. The output from tail can be piped to funzip in order to decompress malicious code before it is executed. This behavior is consistent with malware families such as Bundlore.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0482/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 5
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and
+((process.args == "tail" and process.args == "-c" and process.args == "funzip")) and
+not process.args : "/var/log/messages" and 
+not process.parent.executable : ("/usr/bin/dracut", "/sbin/dracut", "/usr/bin/xargs") and
+not (process.parent.name in ("sh", "sudo") and process.parent.command_line : "*nessus_su*")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Unix Shell
+** ID: T1059.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Obfuscated Files or Information
+** ID: T1027
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
+** ID: T1140
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-crontab-creation-or-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-crontab-creation-or-modification.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3a8cda0a78
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-crontab-creation-or-modification.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-crontab-creation-or-modification]]
+=== Suspicious CronTab Creation or Modification
+
+Identifies attempts to create or modify a crontab via a process that is not crontab (i.e python, osascript, etc.). This activity should not be highly prevalent and could indicate the use of cron as a persistence mechanism by a threat actor.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://taomm.org/PDFs/vol1/CH%200x02%20Persistence.pdf
+* https://theevilbit.github.io/beyond/beyond_0004/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type != "deletion" and process.name != null and
+  file.path : "/private/var/at/tabs/*" and not process.executable == "/usr/bin/crontab"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task/Job
+** ID: T1053
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Cron
+** ID: T1053.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-data-encryption-via-openssl-utility.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-data-encryption-via-openssl-utility.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bd76905a38
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-data-encryption-via-openssl-utility.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-data-encryption-via-openssl-utility]]
+=== Suspicious Data Encryption via OpenSSL Utility
+
+Identifies when the openssl command-line utility is used to encrypt multiple files on a host within a short time window. Adversaries may encrypt data on a single or multiple systems in order to disrupt the availability of their target's data and may attempt to hold the organization's data to ransom for the purposes of extortion.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/06/30/telebots-back-supply-chain-attacks-against-ukraine/
+* https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/f/bash-ransomware-darkradiation-targets-red-hat--and-debian-based-linux-distributions.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Impact
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 6
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id, user.name, process.parent.entity_id with maxspan=5s
+  [ process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "exec" and 
+    process.name == "openssl" and process.parent.name : ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish", "perl*", "php*", "python*", "xargs") and
+    process.args == "-in" and process.args == "-out" and
+    process.args in ("-k", "-K", "-kfile", "-pass", "-iv", "-md") and
+    /* excluding base64 encoding options and including encryption password or key params */
+    not process.args in ("-d", "-a", "-A", "-base64", "-none", "-nosalt") ] with runs=10
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Impact
+** ID: TA0040
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Data Encrypted for Impact
+** ID: T1486
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-dll-loaded-for-persistence-or-privilege-escalation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-dll-loaded-for-persistence-or-privilege-escalation.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e19d5a0ac3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-dll-loaded-for-persistence-or-privilege-escalation.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-dll-loaded-for-persistence-or-privilege-escalation]]
+=== Suspicious DLL Loaded for Persistence or Privilege Escalation
+
+Identifies the loading of a non Microsoft signed DLL that is missing on a default Windows install (phantom DLL) or one that can be loaded from a different location by a native Windows process. This may be abused to persist or elevate privileges via privileged file write vulnerabilities.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://itm4n.github.io/windows-dll-hijacking-clarified/
+* http://remoteawesomethoughts.blogspot.com/2019/05/windows-10-task-schedulerservice.html
+* https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/04/windows-exploitation-tricks-exploiting.html
+* https://shellz.club/2020/10/16/edgegdi-dll-for-persistence-and-lateral-movement.html
+* https://windows-internals.com/faxing-your-way-to-system/
+* http://waleedassar.blogspot.com/2013/01/wow64logdll.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Suspicious DLL Loaded for Persistence or Privilege Escalation*
+
+
+Attackers can execute malicious code by abusing missing modules that processes try to load, enabling them to escalate privileges or gain persistence. This rule identifies the loading of a non-Microsoft-signed DLL that is missing on a default Windows installation or one that can be loaded from a different location by a native Windows process.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Examine the DLL signature and identify the process that created it.
+  - Investigate any abnormal behaviors by the process such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Retrieve the DLL and determine if it is malicious:
+  - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+    - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+      - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - File and registry access, modification, and creation activities.
+      - Service creation and launch activities.
+      - Scheduled task creation.
+  - Use the PowerShell Get-FileHash cmdlet to get the files' SHA-256 hash values.
+    - Search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Any activity that triggered the alert and is not inherently malicious must be monitored by the security team.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+any where host.os.type == "windows" and
+ (event.category : ("driver", "library") or (event.category == "process" and event.action : "Image loaded*")) and
+ (
+  /* compatible with Elastic Endpoint Library Events */
+  (?dll.name : ("wlbsctrl.dll", "wbemcomn.dll", "WptsExtensions.dll", "Tsmsisrv.dll", "TSVIPSrv.dll", "Msfte.dll",
+               "wow64log.dll", "WindowsCoreDeviceInfo.dll", "Ualapi.dll", "wlanhlp.dll", "phoneinfo.dll", "EdgeGdi.dll",
+               "cdpsgshims.dll", "windowsperformancerecordercontrol.dll", "diagtrack_win.dll", "oci.dll", "TPPCOIPW32.dll", 
+               "tpgenlic.dll", "thinmon.dll", "fxsst.dll", "msTracer.dll")
+   and (?dll.code_signature.trusted != true or ?dll.code_signature.exists != true)) or
+
+  /* compatible with Sysmon EventID 7 - Image Load */
+  (file.name : ("wlbsctrl.dll", "wbemcomn.dll", "WptsExtensions.dll", "Tsmsisrv.dll", "TSVIPSrv.dll", "Msfte.dll",
+               "wow64log.dll", "WindowsCoreDeviceInfo.dll", "Ualapi.dll", "wlanhlp.dll", "phoneinfo.dll", "EdgeGdi.dll",
+               "cdpsgshims.dll", "windowsperformancerecordercontrol.dll", "diagtrack_win.dll", "oci.dll", "TPPCOIPW32.dll", 
+               "tpgenlic.dll", "thinmon.dll", "fxsst.dll", "msTracer.dll") and 
+   not file.path : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\wbemcomn.dll", "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\wbemcomn.dll") and 
+   not file.hash.sha256 : 
+            ("6e837794fc282446906c36d681958f2f6212043fc117c716936920be166a700f", 
+             "b14e4954e8cca060ffeb57f2458b6a3a39c7d2f27e94391cbcea5387652f21a4", 
+             "c258d90acd006fa109dc6b748008edbb196d6168bc75ace0de0de54a4db46662") and 
+   not file.code_signature.status == "Valid")
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Hijack Execution Flow
+** ID: T1574
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: DLL Side-Loading
+** ID: T1574.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Hijack Execution Flow
+** ID: T1574
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: DLL Search Order Hijacking
+** ID: T1574.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Masquerading
+** ID: T1036
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Invalid Code Signature
+** ID: T1036.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-dynamic-linker-discovery-via-od.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-dynamic-linker-discovery-via-od.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8af44176ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-dynamic-linker-discovery-via-od.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-dynamic-linker-discovery-via-od]]
+=== Suspicious Dynamic Linker Discovery via od
+
+Monitors for dynamic linker discovery via the od utility. od (octal dump) is a command-line utility in Unix operating systems used for displaying data in various formats, including octal, hexadecimal, decimal, and ASCII, primarily used for examining and debugging binary files or data streams. Attackers can leverage od to analyze the dynamic linker by identifying injection points and craft exploits based on the observed behaviors and structures within these files.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/arget13/DDexec
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Discovery
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
+
+*Version*: 2
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and process.name == "od" and process.args in (
+  "/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2", "/etc/ld.so.preload", "/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2",
+  "/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2", "/usr/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2"
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Discovery
+** ID: TA0007
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Process Discovery
+** ID: T1057
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-emond-child-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-emond-child-process.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..60c483b366
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-emond-child-process.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-emond-child-process]]
+=== Suspicious Emond Child Process
+
+Identifies the execution of a suspicious child process of the Event Monitor Daemon (emond). Adversaries may abuse this service by writing a rule to execute commands when a defined event occurs, such as system start up or user authentication.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.xorrior.com/emond-persistence/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type in ("start", "process_started") and
+ process.parent.name : "emond" and
+ process.name : (
+   "bash",
+   "dash",
+   "sh",
+   "tcsh",
+   "csh",
+   "zsh",
+   "ksh",
+   "fish",
+   "Python",
+   "python*",
+   "perl*",
+   "php*",
+   "osascript",
+   "pwsh",
+   "curl",
+   "wget",
+   "cp",
+   "mv",
+   "touch",
+   "echo",
+   "base64",
+   "launchctl")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Event Triggered Execution
+** ID: T1546
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Emond
+** ID: T1546.014
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/014/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-endpoint-security-parent-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-endpoint-security-parent-process.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b3a28c1993
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-endpoint-security-parent-process.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-endpoint-security-parent-process]]
+=== Suspicious Endpoint Security Parent Process
+
+A suspicious Endpoint Security parent process was detected. This may indicate a process hollowing or other form of code injection.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  process.name : ("esensor.exe", "elastic-endpoint.exe") and
+  process.parent.executable != null and
+  /* add FPs here */
+  not process.parent.executable : (
+        "?:\\Program Files\\Elastic\\*",
+        "?:\\Windows\\System32\\services.exe",
+        "?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault*.exe",
+        "?:\\Windows\\System32\\wermgr.exe",
+        "?:\\Windows\\explorer.exe"
+  ) and
+  not (
+    process.parent.executable : (
+        "?:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe",
+        "?:\\Windows\\System32\\SecurityHealthHost.exe",
+        "?:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe"
+    ) and
+    process.args : (
+        "test", "version",
+        "top", "run",
+        "*help", "status",
+        "upgrade", "/launch",
+        "/enable"
+    )
+  )
+  
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Masquerading
+** ID: T1036
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Match Legitimate Name or Location
+** ID: T1036.005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-execution-from-a-mounted-device.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-execution-from-a-mounted-device.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7fad9155cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-execution-from-a-mounted-device.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-execution-from-a-mounted-device]]
+=== Suspicious Execution from a Mounted Device
+
+Identifies when a script interpreter or signed binary is launched via a non-standard working directory. An attacker may use this technique to evade defenses.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/27/new-sophisticated-email-based-attack-from-nobelium/
+* https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/05/27/suspected-apt29-operation-launches-election-fraud-themed-phishing-campaigns/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and process.executable : "C:\\*" and
+  (process.working_directory : "?:\\" and not process.working_directory: "C:\\") and
+  process.parent.name : "explorer.exe" and
+  process.name : ("rundll32.exe", "mshta.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "cmd.exe", "regsvr32.exe",
+                  "cscript.exe", "wscript.exe")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: System Binary Proxy Execution
+** ID: T1218
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Mshta
+** ID: T1218.005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Regsvr32
+** ID: T1218.010
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Rundll32
+** ID: T1218.011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Windows Command Shell
+** ID: T1059.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-execution-via-microsoft-office-add-ins.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-execution-via-microsoft-office-add-ins.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d7151230cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-execution-via-microsoft-office-add-ins.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-execution-via-microsoft-office-add-ins]]
+=== Suspicious Execution via Microsoft Office Add-Ins
+
+Identifies execution of common Microsoft Office applications to launch an Office Add-In from a suspicious path or with an unusual parent process. This may indicate an attempt to get initial access via a malicious phishing MS Office Add-In.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/Octoberfest7/XLL_Phishing
+* https://labs.f-secure.com/archive/add-in-opportunities-for-office-persistence/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Initial Access
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 4
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where 
+    
+    host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and  
+    
+    process.name : ("WINWORD.EXE", "EXCEL.EXE", "POWERPNT.EXE", "MSACCESS.EXE", "VSTOInstaller.exe") and 
+    
+    process.args regex~ """.+\.(wll|xll|ppa|ppam|xla|xlam|vsto)""" and 
+    
+    /* Office Add-In from suspicious paths */
+    (process.args :
+             ("?:\\Users\\*\\Temp\\7z*",
+              "?:\\Users\\*\\Temp\\Rar$*",
+              "?:\\Users\\*\\Temp\\Temp?_*",
+              "?:\\Users\\*\\Temp\\BNZ.*",
+              "?:\\Users\\*\\Downloads\\*",
+              "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Roaming\\*",
+              "?:\\Users\\Public\\*",
+              "?:\\ProgramData\\*",
+              "?:\\Windows\\Temp\\*",
+              "\\Device\\*",
+              "http*") or
+	      
+    process.parent.name : ("explorer.exe", "OpenWith.exe") or 
+    
+    /* Office Add-In from suspicious parent */
+    process.parent.name : ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe")) and
+	  
+    /* False Positives */
+    not (process.args : "*.vsto" and
+         process.parent.executable :
+                   ("?:\\Program Files\\Logitech\\LogiOptions\\PlugInInstallerUtility*.exe",
+                    "?:\\ProgramData\\Logishrd\\LogiOptions\\Plugins\\VSTO\\*\\VSTOInstaller.exe",
+                    "?:\\Program Files\\Logitech\\LogiOptions\\PlugInInstallerUtility.exe",
+                    "?:\\Program Files\\LogiOptionsPlus\\PlugInInstallerUtility*.exe",
+                    "?:\\ProgramData\\Logishrd\\LogiOptionsPlus\\Plugins\\VSTO\\*\\VSTOInstaller.exe",
+                    "?:\\Program Files\\Common Files\\microsoft shared\\VSTO\\*\\VSTOInstaller.exe")) and
+    not (process.args : "/Uninstall" and process.name : "VSTOInstaller.exe") and
+    not (process.parent.name : "rundll32.exe" and
+         process.parent.args : "?:\\WINDOWS\\Installer\\MSI*.tmp,zzzzInvokeManagedCustomActionOutOfProc") and
+    not (process.name : "VSTOInstaller.exe" and process.args : "https://dl.getsidekick.com/outlook/vsto/Sidekick.vsto")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Initial Access
+** ID: TA0001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Phishing
+** ID: T1566
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Spearphishing Attachment
+** ID: T1566.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Office Application Startup
+** ID: T1137
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Add-ins
+** ID: T1137.006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/006/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-execution-via-scheduled-task.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-execution-via-scheduled-task.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dd59cabe17
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-execution-via-scheduled-task.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-execution-via-scheduled-task]]
+=== Suspicious Execution via Scheduled Task
+
+Identifies execution of a suspicious program via scheduled tasks by looking at process lineage and command line usage.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+    /* Schedule service cmdline on Win10+ */
+    process.parent.name : "svchost.exe" and process.parent.args : "Schedule" and
+    /* add suspicious programs here */
+    process.pe.original_file_name in
+                                (
+                                  "cscript.exe",
+                                  "wscript.exe",
+                                  "PowerShell.EXE",
+                                  "Cmd.Exe",
+                                  "MSHTA.EXE",
+                                  "RUNDLL32.EXE",
+                                  "REGSVR32.EXE",
+                                  "MSBuild.exe",
+                                  "InstallUtil.exe",
+                                  "RegAsm.exe",
+                                  "RegSvcs.exe",
+                                  "msxsl.exe",
+                                  "CONTROL.EXE",
+                                  "EXPLORER.EXE",
+                                  "Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe",
+                                  "msiexec.exe"
+                                  ) and
+    /* add suspicious paths here */
+    process.args : (
+       "C:\\Users\\*",
+       "C:\\ProgramData\\*",
+       "C:\\Windows\\Temp\\*",
+       "C:\\Windows\\Tasks\\*",
+       "C:\\PerfLogs\\*",
+       "C:\\Intel\\*",
+       "C:\\Windows\\Debug\\*",
+       "C:\\HP\\*") and
+
+     not (process.name : "cmd.exe" and process.args : "?:\\*.bat" and process.working_directory : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\") and
+     not (process.name : "cscript.exe" and process.args : "?:\\Windows\\system32\\calluxxprovider.vbs") and
+     not (process.name : "powershell.exe" and process.args : ("-File", "-PSConsoleFile") and user.id : "S-1-5-18") and
+     not (process.name : "msiexec.exe" and user.id : "S-1-5-18")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task/Job
+** ID: T1053
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task
+** ID: T1053.005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task/Job
+** ID: T1053
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task
+** ID: T1053.005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-explorer-child-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-explorer-child-process.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6e4245affb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-explorer-child-process.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-explorer-child-process]]
+=== Suspicious Explorer Child Process
+
+Identifies a suspicious Windows explorer child process. Explorer.exe can be abused to launch malicious scripts or executables from a trusted parent process.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Initial Access
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  (
+   process.name : ("cscript.exe", "wscript.exe", "powershell.exe", "rundll32.exe", "cmd.exe", "mshta.exe", "regsvr32.exe") or
+   process.pe.original_file_name in ("cscript.exe", "wscript.exe", "PowerShell.EXE", "RUNDLL32.EXE", "Cmd.Exe", "MSHTA.EXE", "REGSVR32.EXE")
+  ) and
+  /* Explorer started via DCOM */
+  process.parent.name : "explorer.exe" and process.parent.args : "-Embedding" and
+  not process.parent.args:
+          (
+            /* Noisy CLSID_SeparateSingleProcessExplorerHost Explorer COM Class IDs   */
+            "/factory,{5BD95610-9434-43C2-886C-57852CC8A120}",
+            "/factory,{ceff45ee-c862-41de-aee2-a022c81eda92}"
+          )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Initial Access
+** ID: TA0001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Phishing
+** ID: T1566
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Spearphishing Attachment
+** ID: T1566.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Spearphishing Link
+** ID: T1566.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Windows Command Shell
+** ID: T1059.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Visual Basic
+** ID: T1059.005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: System Binary Proxy Execution
+** ID: T1218
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-file-changes-activity-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-file-changes-activity-detected.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ba18ca9e40
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-file-changes-activity-detected.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-file-changes-activity-detected]]
+=== Suspicious File Changes Activity Detected
+
+This rule identifies a sequence of 100 file extension rename events within a set of common file paths by the same process in a timespan of 1 second. Ransomware is a type of malware that encrypts a victim's files or systems and demands payment (usually in cryptocurrency) in exchange for the decryption key. One important indicator of a ransomware attack is the mass encryption of the file system, after which a new file extension is added to the file.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Impact
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 8
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by process.entity_id, host.id with maxspan=1s
+  [file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "change" and event.action == "rename" and file.extension : "?*" 
+   and process.executable : ("./*", "/tmp/*", "/var/tmp/*", "/dev/shm/*", "/var/run/*", "/boot/*", "/srv/*", "/run/*") and
+   file.path : (
+     "/home/*/Downloads/*", "/home/*/Documents/*", "/root/*", "/bin/*", "/usr/bin/*", "/var/log/*", "/var/lib/log/*",
+     "/var/backup/*", "/var/www/*"
+   ) and
+   not process.name : (
+     "dpkg", "yum", "dnf", "rpm", "dockerd", "go", "java", "pip*", "python*", "node", "containerd", "php", "p4d",
+     "conda", "chrome", "imap", "cmake", "firefox", "semanage", "semodule", "ansible-galaxy", "fc-cache", "jammy", "git",
+     "systemsettings", "vmis-launcher", "bundle", "kudu-tserver", "suldownloader"
+    )
+   ] with runs=25
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Impact
+** ID: TA0040
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Data Encrypted for Impact
+** ID: T1486
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-file-creation-in-etc-for-persistence.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-file-creation-in-etc-for-persistence.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..815a30a27a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-file-creation-in-etc-for-persistence.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-file-creation-in-etc-for-persistence]]
+=== Suspicious File Creation in /etc for Persistence
+
+Detects the manual creation of files in specific etc directories, via user root, used by Linux malware to persist and elevate privileges on compromised systems. File creation in these directories should not be entirely common and could indicate a malicious binary or script installing persistence mechanisms for long term access.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.intezer.com/blog/incident-response/orbit-new-undetected-linux-threat/
+* https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/lightning-framework-new-linux-threat/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Threat: Orbit
+* Threat: Lightning Framework
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 113
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Suspicious File Creation in /etc for Persistence*
+
+
+The /etc/ directory in Linux is used to store system-wide configuration files and scripts.
+
+By creating or modifying specific system-wide configuration files, attackers can leverage system services to execute malicious commands or scripts at predefined intervals, ensuring their continued presence and enabling unauthorized activities.
+
+This rule monitors for the creation of the most common system-wide configuration files and scripts abused by attackers for persistence. 
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html[placeholder fields] to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+
+*Possible Investigation Steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the file that was created or modified.
+- Investigate whether any other files in any of the commonly abused directories have been altered through OSQuery.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve File Listing Information","query":"SELECT * FROM file WHERE (\n  path LIKE '/etc/ld.so.conf.d/%' OR\n  path LIKE '/etc/cron.d/%' OR\n  path LIKE '/etc/sudoers.d/%' OR\n  path LIKE '/etc/rc%.d/%' OR\n  path LIKE '/etc/init.d/%' OR\n  path LIKE '/etc/systemd/system/%' OR\n  path LIKE '/usr/lib/systemd/system/%'\n)\n"}}
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Additional File Listing Information","query":"SELECT\n  f.path,\n  u.username AS file_owner,\n  g.groupname AS group_owner,\n  datetime(f.atime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_access_time,\n  datetime(f.mtime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_modified_time,\n  datetime(f.ctime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_status_change_time,\n  datetime(f.btime, 'unixepoch') AS file_created_time,\n  f.size AS size_bytes\nFROM\n  file f\n  LEFT JOIN users u ON f.uid = u.uid\n  LEFT JOIN groups g ON f.gid = g.gid\nWHERE (\n  path LIKE '/etc/ld.so.conf.d/%' OR\n  path LIKE '/etc/cron.d/%' OR\n  path LIKE '/etc/sudoers.d/%' OR\n  path LIKE '/etc/rc%.d/%' OR\n  path LIKE '/etc/init.d/%' OR\n  path LIKE '/etc/systemd/system/%' OR\n  path LIKE '/usr/lib/systemd/system/%'\n)\n"}}
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User","query":"SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"}}
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+- Investigate whether the altered scripts call other malicious scripts elsewhere on the file system. 
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+        - Cron jobs, services and other persistence mechanisms.
+            - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Crontab Information","query":"SELECT * FROM crontab"}}
+- Investigate abnormal behaviors by the subject process/user such as network connections, file modifications, and any other spawned child processes.
+  - Investigate listening ports and open sockets to look for potential command and control traffic or data exfiltration.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Listening Ports","query":"SELECT pid, address, port, socket, protocol, path FROM listening_ports"}}
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Open Sockets","query":"SELECT pid, family, remote_address, remote_port, socket, state FROM process_open_sockets"}}
+  - Identify the user account that performed the action, analyze it, and check whether it should perform this kind of action.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific User","query":"SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = {{user.name}}"}}
+- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Investigate the Account Authentication Status","query":"SELECT * FROM logged_in_users WHERE user = {{user.name}}"}}
+
+
+*False Positive Analysis*
+
+
+- If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+- If this activity is related to a system administrator that performed these actions for administrative purposes, consider adding exceptions for this specific administrator user account. 
+- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
+
+
+*Related Rules*
+
+
+- Cron Job Created or Changed by Previously Unknown Process - ff10d4d8-fea7-422d-afb1-e5a2702369a9
+- Potential Persistence Through Run Control Detected - 0f4d35e4-925e-4959-ab24-911be207ee6f
+- Potential Persistence Through init.d Detected - 474fd20e-14cc-49c5-8160-d9ab4ba16c8b
+- New Systemd Timer Created - 7fb500fa-8e24-4bd1-9480-2a819352602c
+- New Systemd Service Created by Previously Unknown Process - 17b0a495-4d9f-414c-8ad0-92f018b8e001
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Delete the service/timer or restore its original configuration.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type in ("creation", "file_create_event") and user.id == "0" and
+file.path : ("/etc/ld.so.conf.d/*", "/etc/cron.d/*", "/etc/sudoers.d/*", "/etc/rc.d/init.d/*", "/etc/systemd/system/*",
+"/usr/lib/systemd/system/*") and not (
+  (process.name : (
+    "chef-client", "ruby", "pacman", "packagekitd", "python*", "platform-python", "dpkg", "yum", "apt", "dnf", "rpm",
+    "systemd", "snapd", "dnf-automatic", "yum-cron", "elastic-agent", "dnfdaemon-system", "dockerd", "executor",
+    "rhn_check"
+    )
+  ) or 
+  (file.extension in ("swp", "swpx", "tmp"))
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
+** ID: T1037
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: RC Scripts
+** ID: T1037.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Hijack Execution Flow
+** ID: T1574
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Dynamic Linker Hijacking
+** ID: T1574.006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Create or Modify System Process
+** ID: T1543
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Systemd Service
+** ID: T1543.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task/Job
+** ID: T1053
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Cron
+** ID: T1053.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
+** ID: T1548
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Sudo and Sudo Caching
+** ID: T1548.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-file-creation-via-kworker.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-file-creation-via-kworker.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..657f0f7416
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-file-creation-via-kworker.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-file-creation-via-kworker]]
+=== Suspicious File Creation via Kworker
+
+This rule monitors for a file creation event originating from a kworker parent process. kworker, or kernel worker, processes are part of the kernel's workqueue mechanism. They are responsible for executing work that has been scheduled to be done in kernel space, which might include tasks like handling interrupts, background activities, and other kernel-related tasks. Attackers may attempt to evade detection by masquerading as a kernel worker process.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Suspicious File Creation via Kworker*
+
+
+Kworker, or kernel worker, processes are part of the kernel's workqueue mechanism. They are responsible for executing work that has been scheduled to be done in kernel space, which might include tasks like handling interrupts, background activities, and other kernel-related tasks.
+
+Attackers may attempt to evade detection by masquerading as a kernel worker process.
+
+This rule monitors for suspicious file creation events through the kworker process. This is not common, and could indicate malicious behaviour.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html[placeholder fields] to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+
+*Possible Investigation Steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the file that was created or modified through OSQuery.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve File Listing Information","query":"SELECT * FROM file WHERE path = {{file.path}}\n"}}
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Additional File Listing Information","query":"SELECT\n  f.path,\n  u.username AS file_owner,\n  g.groupname AS group_owner,\n  datetime(f.atime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_access_time,\n  datetime(f.mtime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_modified_time,\n  datetime(f.ctime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_status_change_time,\n  datetime(f.btime, 'unixepoch') AS file_created_time,\n  f.size AS size_bytes\nFROM\n  file f\n  LEFT JOIN users u ON f.uid = u.uid\n  LEFT JOIN groups g ON f.gid = g.gid\nWHERE path = {{file.path}}\n"}}
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User","query":"SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"}}
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+- Investigate whether the altered scripts call other malicious scripts elsewhere on the file system. 
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+        - Cron jobs, services and other persistence mechanisms.
+            - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Crontab Information","query":"SELECT * FROM crontab"}}
+- Investigate abnormal behaviors by the subject process/user such as network connections, file modifications, and any other spawned child processes.
+  - Investigate listening ports and open sockets to look for potential command and control traffic or data exfiltration.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Listening Ports","query":"SELECT pid, address, port, socket, protocol, path FROM listening_ports"}}
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Open Sockets","query":"SELECT pid, family, remote_address, remote_port, socket, state FROM process_open_sockets"}}
+  - Identify the user account that performed the action, analyze it, and check whether it should perform this kind of action.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific User","query":"SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = {{user.name}}"}}
+- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Investigate the Account Authentication Status","query":"SELECT * FROM logged_in_users WHERE user = {{user.name}}"}}
+
+
+*False Positive Analysis*
+
+
+- If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+- If this activity is related to a system administrator that performed these actions for administrative purposes, consider adding exceptions for this specific administrator user account. 
+- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
+
+
+*Related Rules*
+
+
+- Suspicious Kworker UID Elevation - 7dfaaa17-425c-4fe7-bd36-83705fde7c2b
+- Network Activity Detected via Kworker - 25d917c4-aa3c-4111-974c-286c0312ff95
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows
+the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click Add integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Elastic Defend and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click Add Elastic Defend.
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either Traditional Endpoints or Cloud Workloads.
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest to select "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in New agent policy name. If other agent policies already exist, you can click the Existing hosts tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click Save and Continue.
+- To complete the integration, select Add Elastic Agent to your hosts and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where event.action in ("creation", "file_create_event") and process.name : "kworker*" and not (
+  (process.name : "kworker*kcryptd*") or 
+  (file.path : ("/var/log/*", "/var/crash/*", "/var/run/*", "/var/lib/systemd/coredump/*", "/var/spool/*"))
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
+** ID: T1547
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Rootkit
+** ID: T1014
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-hidden-child-process-of-launchd.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-hidden-child-process-of-launchd.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f1217e205e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-hidden-child-process-of-launchd.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-hidden-child-process-of-launchd]]
+=== Suspicious Hidden Child Process of Launchd
+
+Identifies the execution of a launchd child process with a hidden file. An adversary can establish persistence by installing a new logon item, launch agent, or daemon that executes upon login.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x61.html
+* https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/operation-electrorat-attacker-creates-fake-companies-to-drain-your-crypto-wallets/
+* https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:macos and event.type:(start or process_started) and
+ process.name:.* and process.parent.executable:/sbin/launchd
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Create or Modify System Process
+** ID: T1543
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Launch Agent
+** ID: T1543.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Hide Artifacts
+** ID: T1564
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Hidden Files and Directories
+** ID: T1564.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-html-file-creation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-html-file-creation.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0775f0a05b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-html-file-creation.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-html-file-creation]]
+=== Suspicious HTML File Creation
+
+Identifies the execution of a browser process to open an HTML file with high entropy and size. Adversaries may smuggle data and files past content filters by hiding malicious payloads inside of seemingly benign HTML files.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Initial Access
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by user.id with maxspan=5m
+ [file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.action in ("creation", "rename") and
+  file.extension : ("htm", "html") and
+   file.path : ("?:\\Users\\*\\Downloads\\*",
+                "?:\\Users\\*\\Content.Outlook\\*",
+                "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\Temp?_*",
+                "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\7z*",
+                "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\Rar$*") and
+   ((file.Ext.entropy >= 5 and file.size >= 150000) or file.size >= 1000000)]
+ [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.action == "start" and
+  (
+   (process.name in ("chrome.exe", "msedge.exe", "brave.exe", "whale.exe", "browser.exe", "dragon.exe", "vivaldi.exe", "opera.exe")
+    and process.args == "--single-argument") or
+   (process.name == "iexplore.exe" and process.args_count == 2) or
+   (process.name in ("firefox.exe", "waterfox.exe") and process.args == "-url")
+  )
+  and process.args : ("?:\\Users\\*\\Downloads\\*.htm*",
+                      "?:\\Users\\*\\Content.Outlook\\*.htm*",
+                      "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\Temp?_*.htm*",
+                      "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\7z*.htm*",
+                      "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\Rar$*.htm*")]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Initial Access
+** ID: TA0001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Phishing
+** ID: T1566
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Spearphishing Attachment
+** ID: T1566.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Spearphishing Link
+** ID: T1566.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Obfuscated Files or Information
+** ID: T1027
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: HTML Smuggling
+** ID: T1027.006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/006/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-image-load-taskschd-dll-from-ms-office.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-image-load-taskschd-dll-from-ms-office.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..be218cb5a6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-image-load-taskschd-dll-from-ms-office.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-image-load-taskschd-dll-from-ms-office]]
+=== Suspicious Image Load (taskschd.dll) from MS Office
+
+Identifies a suspicious image load (taskschd.dll) from Microsoft Office processes. This behavior may indicate adversarial activity where a scheduled task is configured via Windows Component Object Model (COM). This technique can be used to configure persistence and evade monitoring by avoiding the usage of the traditional Windows binary (schtasks.exe) used to manage scheduled tasks.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16
+* https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Operation-Quicksand.pdf
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Suspicious Image Load (taskschd.dll) from MS Office*
+
+
+Microsoft Office, a widely used suite of productivity applications, is frequently targeted by attackers due to its popularity in corporate environments. These attackers exploit its extensive capabilities, like macro scripts in Word and Excel, to gain initial access to systems. They often use Office documents as delivery mechanisms for malware or phishing attempts, taking advantage of their trusted status in professional settings.
+
+`taskschd.dll` provides Command Object Model (COM) interfaces for the Windows Task Scheduler service, allowing developers to programmatically manage scheduled tasks.
+
+This rule looks for an MS Office process loading `taskschd.dll`, which may indicate an adversary abusing COM to configure a scheduled task. This can happen as part of a phishing attack, when a malicious office document registers the scheduled task to download the malware "stage 2" or to establish persistent access.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Analyze the host's scheduled tasks and explore the related Windows events to determine if tasks were created or deleted (Event IDs 4698 and 4699).
+- Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process, such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and spawned child processes.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Inspect the host for suspicious or abnormal behavior in the alert timeframe.
+- Examine the files downloaded during the past 24 hours.
+  - Identify files that are related or can be executed in MS Office.
+  - Identify and analyze macros that these documents contain.
+    - Identify suspicious traits in the office macros, such as encoded or encrypted sections.
+- Retrieve the suspicious files identified in the previous step and determine if they are malicious:
+  - Analyze the file using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Any activity that triggered the alert and is not inherently malicious must be monitored by the security team.
+
+
+*Related Rules*
+
+
+- Suspicious WMI Image Load from MS Office - 891cb88e-441a-4c3e-be2d-120d99fe7b0d
+
+
+*Response and Remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+  - If the malicious file was delivered via phishing:
+    - Block the email sender from sending future emails.
+    - Block the malicious web pages.
+    - Remove emails from the sender from mailboxes.
+    - Consider improvements to the security awareness program.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+any where host.os.type == "windows" and
+ (event.category : ("library", "driver") or (event.category == "process" and event.action : "Image loaded*")) and
+  process.name : ("WINWORD.EXE", "EXCEL.EXE", "POWERPNT.EXE", "MSPUB.EXE", "MSACCESS.EXE") and
+  (?dll.name : "taskschd.dll" or file.name : "taskschd.dll")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task/Job
+** ID: T1053
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task
+** ID: T1053.005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task/Job
+** ID: T1053
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task
+** ID: T1053.005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-imagepath-service-creation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-imagepath-service-creation.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..19eede6831
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-imagepath-service-creation.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-imagepath-service-creation]]
+=== Suspicious ImagePath Service Creation
+
+Identifies the creation of a suspicious ImagePath value. This could be an indication of an adversary attempting to stealthily persist or escalate privileges through abnormal service creation.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+registry where host.os.type == "windows" and registry.path : (
+    "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet*\\Services\\*\\ImagePath",
+    "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet*\\Services\\*\\ImagePath"
+    ) and
+ /* add suspicious registry ImagePath values here */
+    registry.data.strings : ("%COMSPEC%*", "*\\.\\pipe\\*")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Create or Modify System Process
+** ID: T1543
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Windows Service
+** ID: T1543.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Modify Registry
+** ID: T1112
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-java-child-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-java-child-process.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a2b645208a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-java-child-process.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-java-child-process]]
+=== Suspicious JAVA Child Process
+
+Identifies suspicious child processes of the Java interpreter process. This may indicate an attempt to execute a malicious JAR file or an exploitation attempt via a JAVA specific vulnerability.
+
+*Rule type*: new_terms
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/
+* https://github.com/christophetd/log4shell-vulnerable-app
+* https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Munoz-A-Journey-From-JNDI-LDAP-Manipulation-To-RCE.pdf
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/detecting-log4j2-with-elastic-security
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/analysis-of-log4shell-cve-2021-45046
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Use Case: Vulnerability
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 208
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Suspicious Java Child Process*
+
+
+This rule identifies a suspicious child process of the Java interpreter process. It may indicate an attempt to execute a malicious JAR file or an exploitation attempt via a Java specific vulnerability.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate any abnormal account behavior, such as command executions, file creations or modifications, and network connections.
+- Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process such as network connections, file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+- Examine the command line to determine if the command executed is potentially harmful or malicious.
+- Inspect the host for suspicious or abnormal behavior in the alert timeframe.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- If this activity is expected and noisy in your environment, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of process and command line conditions.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and event.type:("start" or "process_started") and process.parent.name:"java" and process.name:(
+  bash or dash or sh or tcsh or csh or zsh or ksh or fish or python* or php* or perl or ruby or lua* or openssl or
+  nc or netcat or ncat or telnet or awk or socat or wget or curl
+) and process.args :(
+  whoami or id or uname or cat or hostname or ip or curl or wget or pwd or ls or cd or python* or php* or perl or
+  ruby or lua* or openssl or nc or netcat or ncat or telnet or awk or socat
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: JavaScript
+** ID: T1059.007
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-kworker-uid-elevation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-kworker-uid-elevation.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..051c6e3eab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-kworker-uid-elevation.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-kworker-uid-elevation]]
+=== Suspicious Kworker UID Elevation
+
+Monitors for the elevation of regular user permissions to root permissions through the kworker process. kworker, or kernel worker, processes are part of the kernel's workqueue mechanism. They are responsible for executing work that has been scheduled to be done in kernel space, which might include tasks like handling interrupts, background activities, and other kernel-related tasks. Attackers may attempt to evade detection by masquerading as a kernel worker process, and hijack the execution flow by hooking certain functions/syscalls through a rootkit in order to provide easy access to root via a special modified command.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+
+*Version*: 2
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows
+the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click Add integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Elastic Defend and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click Add Elastic Defend.
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either Traditional Endpoints or Cloud Workloads.
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest to select "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in New agent policy name. If other agent policies already exist, you can click the Existing hosts tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click Save and Continue.
+- To complete the integration, select Add Elastic Agent to your hosts and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "session_id_change" and process.name : "kworker*" and
+user.id == "0"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Hijack Execution Flow
+** ID: T1574
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: KernelCallbackTable
+** ID: T1574.013
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/013/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Rootkit
+** ID: T1014
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-lsass-access-via-malseclogon.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-lsass-access-via-malseclogon.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..33623a4061
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-lsass-access-via-malseclogon.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-lsass-access-via-malseclogon]]
+=== Suspicious LSASS Access via MalSecLogon
+
+Identifies suspicious access to LSASS handle from a call trace pointing to seclogon.dll and with a suspicious access rights value. This may indicate an attempt to leak an LSASS handle via abusing the Secondary Logon service in preparation for credential access.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://splintercod3.blogspot.com/p/the-hidden-side-of-seclogon-part-3.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 208
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.code == "10" and
+  winlog.event_data.TargetImage : "?:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass.exe" and
+
+   /* seclogon service accessing lsass */
+  winlog.event_data.CallTrace : "*seclogon.dll*" and process.name : "svchost.exe" and
+
+   /* PROCESS_CREATE_PROCESS & PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE & PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION */
+  winlog.event_data.GrantedAccess == "0x14c0"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: LSASS Memory
+** ID: T1003.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-lsass-process-access.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-lsass-process-access.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..421bb32b21
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-lsass-process-access.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-lsass-process-access]]
+=== Suspicious Lsass Process Access
+
+Identifies access attempts to LSASS handle, this may indicate an attempt to dump credentials from Lsass memory.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.code == "10" and
+  winlog.event_data.TargetImage : "?:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass.exe" and
+  not winlog.event_data.GrantedAccess :
+                ("0x1000", "0x1400", "0x101400", "0x101000", "0x101001", "0x100000", "0x100040", "0x3200", "0x40", "0x3200") and
+  not process.name : ("procexp64.exe", "procmon.exe", "procexp.exe", "Microsoft.Identity.AadConnect.Health.AadSync.Host.ex") and
+  not process.executable : (
+        "?:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\platform\\*",
+        "?:\\ProgramData\\WebEx\\webex\\*",
+        "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*",
+        "?:\\Program Files\\*",
+        "?:\\Windows\\CCM\\CcmExec.exe",
+        "?:\\Windows\\LTSvc\\LTSVC.exe",
+        "?:\\Windows\\Sysmon.exe",
+        "?:\\Windows\\Sysmon64.exe",
+        "?:\\Windows\\system32\\csrss.exe",
+        "?:\\Windows\\System32\\lsm.exe",
+        "?:\\Windows\\system32\\MRT.exe",
+        "?:\\Windows\\System32\\msiexec.exe",
+        "?:\\Windows\\system32\\wbem\\wmiprvse.exe",
+        "?:\\Windows\\system32\\wininit.exe",
+        "?:\\Windows\\SystemTemp\\GUM*.tmp\\GoogleUpdate.exe",
+        "?:\\Windows\\sysWOW64\\wbem\\wmiprvse.exe"
+  ) and
+  not winlog.event_data.CallTrace : ("*mpengine.dll*", "*appresolver.dll*", "*sysmain.dll*")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: LSASS Memory
+** ID: T1003.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-macos-ms-office-child-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-macos-ms-office-child-process.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..623c208038
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-macos-ms-office-child-process.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-macos-ms-office-child-process]]
+=== Suspicious macOS MS Office Child Process
+
+Identifies suspicious child processes of frequently targeted Microsoft Office applications (Word, PowerPoint, and Excel). These child processes are often launched during exploitation of Office applications or by documents with malicious macros.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2017/02/microsoft-office-macro-malware-targets-macs/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Initial Access
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type in ("start", "process_started") and
+ process.parent.name:("Microsoft Word", "Microsoft PowerPoint", "Microsoft Excel") and
+ process.name:
+ (
+   "bash",
+   "dash",
+   "sh",
+   "tcsh",
+   "csh",
+   "zsh",
+   "ksh",
+   "fish",
+   "python*",
+   "perl*",
+   "php*",
+   "osascript",
+   "pwsh",
+   "curl",
+   "wget",
+   "cp",
+   "mv",
+   "base64",
+   "launchctl"
+  ) and
+  /* noisy false positives related to product version discovery and office errors reporting */
+  not process.args:
+    (
+      "ProductVersion",
+      "hw.model",
+      "ioreg",
+      "ProductName",
+      "ProductUserVisibleVersion",
+      "ProductBuildVersion",
+      "/Library/Application Support/Microsoft/MERP*/Microsoft Error Reporting.app/Contents/MacOS/Microsoft Error Reporting"
+    )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Initial Access
+** ID: TA0001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Phishing
+** ID: T1566
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Spearphishing Attachment
+** ID: T1566.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-managed-code-hosting-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-managed-code-hosting-process.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7b75373787
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-managed-code-hosting-process.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-managed-code-hosting-process]]
+=== Suspicious Managed Code Hosting Process
+
+Identifies a suspicious managed code hosting process which could indicate code injection or other form of suspicious code execution.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.file-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* http://web.archive.org/web/20230329154538/https://blog.menasec.net/2019/07/interesting-difr-traces-of-net-clr.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type != "deletion" and
+  file.name : ("wscript.exe.log",
+               "cscript.exe.log",
+               "mshta.exe.log",
+               "wmic.exe.log",
+               "svchost.exe.log",
+               "dllhost.exe.log",
+               "cmstp.exe.log",
+               "regsvr32.exe.log")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Process Injection
+** ID: T1055
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-microsoft-diagnostics-wizard-execution.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-microsoft-diagnostics-wizard-execution.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..18c64e8270
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-microsoft-diagnostics-wizard-execution.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-microsoft-diagnostics-wizard-execution]]
+=== Suspicious Microsoft Diagnostics Wizard Execution
+
+Identifies potential abuse of the Microsoft Diagnostics Troubleshooting Wizard (MSDT) to proxy malicious command or binary execution via malicious process arguments.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://twitter.com/nao_sec/status/1530196847679401984
+* https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msdt/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+   (process.pe.original_file_name == "msdt.exe" or process.name : "msdt.exe") and
+   (
+    process.args : ("IT_RebrowseForFile=*", "ms-msdt:/id", "ms-msdt:-id", "*FromBase64*") or
+
+    (process.args : "-af" and process.args : "/skip" and
+     process.parent.name : ("explorer.exe", "cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "cscript.exe", "wscript.exe", "mshta.exe", "rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe") and
+     process.args : ("?:\\WINDOWS\\diagnostics\\index\\PCWDiagnostic.xml", "PCWDiagnostic.xml", "?:\\Users\\Public\\*", "?:\\Windows\\Temp\\*")) or
+
+    (process.pe.original_file_name == "msdt.exe" and not process.name : "msdt.exe" and process.name != null) or
+
+    (process.pe.original_file_name == "msdt.exe" and not process.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\system32\\msdt.exe", "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\msdt.exe"))
+    )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: System Binary Proxy Execution
+** ID: T1218
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-mining-process-creation-event.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-mining-process-creation-event.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..135f30db73
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-mining-process-creation-event.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-mining-process-creation-event]]
+=== Suspicious Mining Process Creation Event
+
+Identifies service creation events of common mining services, possibly indicating the infection of a system with a cryptominer.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 6
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "creation" and event.action : ("creation", "file_create_event") and 
+file.name : ("aliyun.service", "moneroocean_miner.service", "c3pool_miner.service", "pnsd.service", "apache4.service", "pastebin.service", "xvf.service")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Unix Shell
+** ID: T1059.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-module-loaded-by-lsass.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-module-loaded-by-lsass.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..28cc55345c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-module-loaded-by-lsass.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-module-loaded-by-lsass]]
+=== Suspicious Module Loaded by LSASS
+
+Identifies LSASS loading an unsigned or untrusted DLL. Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into LSSAS process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://blog.xpnsec.com/exploring-mimikatz-part-2/
+* https://github.com/jas502n/mimikat_ssp
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 7
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+library where host.os.type == "windows" and process.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe" and
+  not (dll.code_signature.subject_name :
+               ("Microsoft Windows",
+                "Microsoft Corporation",
+                "Microsoft Windows Publisher",
+                "Microsoft Windows Software Compatibility Publisher",
+                "Microsoft Windows Hardware Compatibility Publisher",
+                "McAfee, Inc.",
+                "SecMaker AB",
+                "HID Global Corporation",
+                "HID Global",
+                "Apple Inc.",
+                "Citrix Systems, Inc.",
+                "Dell Inc",
+                "Hewlett-Packard Company",
+                "Symantec Corporation",
+                "National Instruments Corporation",
+                "DigitalPersona, Inc.",
+                "Novell, Inc.",
+                "gemalto",
+                "EasyAntiCheat Oy",
+                "Entrust Datacard Corporation",
+                "AuriStor, Inc.",
+                "LogMeIn, Inc.",
+                "VMware, Inc.",
+                "Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato S.p.A.",
+                "Nubeva Technologies Ltd",
+                "Micro Focus (US), Inc.",
+                "Yubico AB",
+                "GEMALTO SA",
+                "Secure Endpoints, Inc.",
+                "Sophos Ltd",
+                "Morphisec Information Security 2014 Ltd",
+                "Entrust, Inc.",
+                "Nubeva Technologies Ltd",
+                "Micro Focus (US), Inc.",
+                "F5 Networks Inc",
+                "Bit4id",
+                "Thales DIS CPL USA, Inc.",
+                "Micro Focus International plc",
+                "HYPR Corp",
+                "Intel(R) Software Development Products",
+                "PGP Corporation",
+                "Parallels International GmbH",
+                "FrontRange Solutions Deutschland GmbH",
+                "SecureLink, Inc.",
+                "Tidexa OU",
+                "Amazon Web Services, Inc.",
+                "SentryBay Limited",
+                "Audinate Pty Ltd",
+                "CyberArk Software Ltd.",
+                "McAfeeSysPrep",
+                "NVIDIA Corporation PE Sign v2016",
+                "Trend Micro, Inc.",
+                "Fortinet Technologies (Canada) Inc.",
+                "Carbon Black, Inc.") and
+       dll.code_signature.status : ("trusted", "errorExpired", "errorCode_endpoint*", "errorChaining")) and
+
+     not dll.hash.sha256 :
+                ("811a03a5d7c03802676d2613d741be690b3461022ea925eb6b2651a5be740a4c",
+                 "1181542d9cfd63fb00c76242567446513e6773ea37db6211545629ba2ecf26a1",
+                 "ed6e735aa6233ed262f50f67585949712f1622751035db256811b4088c214ce3",
+                 "26be2e4383728eebe191c0ab19706188f0e9592add2e0bf86b37442083ae5e12",
+                 "9367e78b84ef30cf38ab27776605f2645e52e3f6e93369c674972b668a444faa",
+                 "d46cc934765c5ecd53867070f540e8d6f7701e834831c51c2b0552aba871921b",
+                 "0f77a3826d7a5cd0533990be0269d951a88a5c277bc47cff94553330b715ec61",
+                 "4aca034d3d85a9e9127b5d7a10882c2ef4c3e0daa3329ae2ac1d0797398695fb",
+                 "86031e69914d9d33c34c2f4ac4ae523cef855254d411f88ac26684265c981d95")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: LSASS Memory
+** ID: T1003.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-ms-office-child-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-ms-office-child-process.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f3ce6f941d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-ms-office-child-process.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-ms-office-child-process]]
+=== Suspicious MS Office Child Process
+
+Identifies suspicious child processes of frequently targeted Microsoft Office applications (Word, PowerPoint, Excel). These child processes are often launched during exploitation of Office applications or from documents with malicious macros.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/blog/vulnerability-summary-follina
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Initial Access
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 111
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Suspicious MS Office Child Process*
+
+
+Microsoft Office (MS Office) is a suite of applications designed to help with productivity and completing common tasks on a computer. You can create and edit documents containing text and images, work with data in spreadsheets and databases, and create presentations and posters. As it is some of the most-used software across companies, MS Office is frequently targeted for initial access. It also has a wide variety of capabilities that attackers can take advantage of.
+
+This rule looks for suspicious processes spawned by MS Office programs. This is generally the result of the execution of malicious documents.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Retrieve MS Office documents received and opened by the user that could cause this behavior. Common locations include, but are not limited to, the Downloads and Document folders and the folder configured at the email client.
+- Determine if the collected files are malicious:
+  - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+    - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+      - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - File and registry access, modification, and creation activities.
+      - Service creation and launch activities.
+      - Scheduled task creation.
+  - Use the PowerShell Get-FileHash cmdlet to get the files' SHA-256 hash values.
+    - Search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+  - If the malicious file was delivered via phishing:
+    - Block the email sender from sending future emails.
+    - Block the malicious web pages.
+    - Remove emails from the sender from mailboxes.
+    - Consider improvements to the security awareness program.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  process.parent.name : (
+      "eqnedt32.exe", "excel.exe", "fltldr.exe", "msaccess.exe",
+      "mspub.exe", "powerpnt.exe", "winword.exe", "outlook.exe"
+  ) and
+  process.name : (
+      "Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe", "arp.exe", "atbroker.exe", "bginfo.exe", "bitsadmin.exe", "cdb.exe",
+      "certutil.exe", "cmd.exe", "cmstp.exe", "control.exe", "cscript.exe", "csi.exe", "dnx.exe", "dsget.exe",
+      "dsquery.exe", "forfiles.exe", "fsi.exe", "ftp.exe", "gpresult.exe", "hostname.exe", "ieexec.exe", "iexpress.exe",
+      "installutil.exe", "ipconfig.exe", "mshta.exe", "msxsl.exe", "nbtstat.exe", "net.exe", "net1.exe", "netsh.exe",
+      "netstat.exe", "nltest.exe", "odbcconf.exe", "ping.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "qprocess.exe",
+      "quser.exe", "qwinsta.exe", "rcsi.exe", "reg.exe", "regasm.exe", "regsvcs.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "sc.exe",
+      "schtasks.exe", "systeminfo.exe", "tasklist.exe", "tracert.exe", "whoami.exe", "wmic.exe", "wscript.exe",
+      "xwizard.exe", "explorer.exe", "rundll32.exe", "hh.exe", "msdt.exe"
+  ) and
+  not (
+    process.parent.name : "outlook.exe" and
+    process.name : "rundll32.exe" and
+    process.args : "shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL" and
+    process.args : "srchadmin.dll"
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Initial Access
+** ID: TA0001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Phishing
+** ID: T1566
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Spearphishing Attachment
+** ID: T1566.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Windows Command Shell
+** ID: T1059.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: System Binary Proxy Execution
+** ID: T1218
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-ms-outlook-child-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-ms-outlook-child-process.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b521378b35
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-ms-outlook-child-process.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-ms-outlook-child-process]]
+=== Suspicious MS Outlook Child Process
+
+Identifies suspicious child processes of Microsoft Outlook. These child processes are often associated with spear phishing activity.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Initial Access
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Suspicious MS Outlook Child Process*
+
+
+Microsoft Outlook is an email client that provides contact, email calendar, and task management features. Outlook is widely used, either standalone or as part of the Office suite.
+
+This rule looks for suspicious processes spawned by MS Outlook, which can be the result of the execution of malicious documents and/or exploitation for initial access.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Retrieve recently opened files received via email and opened by the user that could cause this behavior. Common locations include but are not limited to, the Downloads and Document folders and the folder configured at the email client.
+- Determine if the collected files are malicious:
+  - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+    - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+      - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - File and registry access, modification, and creation activities.
+      - Service creation and launch activities.
+      - Scheduled task creation.
+  - Use the PowerShell Get-FileHash cmdlet to get the files' SHA-256 hash values.
+    - Search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+  - If the malicious file was delivered via phishing:
+    - Block the email sender from sending future emails.
+    - Block the malicious web pages.
+    - Remove emails from the sender from mailboxes.
+    - Consider improvements to the security awareness program.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  process.parent.name : "outlook.exe" and
+  process.name : ("Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe", "arp.exe", "atbroker.exe", "bginfo.exe", "bitsadmin.exe",
+                  "cdb.exe", "certutil.exe", "cmd.exe", "cmstp.exe", "cscript.exe", "csi.exe", "dnx.exe", "dsget.exe",
+                  "dsquery.exe", "forfiles.exe", "fsi.exe", "ftp.exe", "gpresult.exe", "hostname.exe", "ieexec.exe",
+                  "iexpress.exe", "installutil.exe", "ipconfig.exe", "mshta.exe", "msxsl.exe", "nbtstat.exe", "net.exe",
+                  "net1.exe", "netsh.exe", "netstat.exe", "nltest.exe", "odbcconf.exe", "ping.exe", "powershell.exe",
+                  "pwsh.exe", "qprocess.exe", "quser.exe", "qwinsta.exe", "rcsi.exe", "reg.exe", "regasm.exe",
+                  "regsvcs.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "sc.exe", "schtasks.exe", "systeminfo.exe", "tasklist.exe",
+                  "tracert.exe", "whoami.exe", "wmic.exe", "wscript.exe", "xwizard.exe")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Initial Access
+** ID: TA0001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Phishing
+** ID: T1566
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Spearphishing Attachment
+** ID: T1566.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Windows Command Shell
+** ID: T1059.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: System Binary Proxy Execution
+** ID: T1218
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-net-code-compilation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-net-code-compilation.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..03db36e71f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-net-code-compilation.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-net-code-compilation]]
+=== Suspicious .NET Code Compilation
+
+Identifies executions of .NET compilers with suspicious parent processes, which can indicate an attacker's attempt to compile code after delivery in order to bypass security mechanisms.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  process.name : ("csc.exe", "vbc.exe") and
+  process.parent.name : ("wscript.exe", "mshta.exe", "cscript.exe", "wmic.exe", "svchost.exe", "rundll32.exe", "cmstp.exe", "regsvr32.exe")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Obfuscated Files or Information
+** ID: T1027
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Compile After Delivery
+** ID: T1027.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/004/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Visual Basic
+** ID: T1059.005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-net-reflection-via-powershell.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-net-reflection-via-powershell.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..742e90d1f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-net-reflection-via-powershell.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-net-reflection-via-powershell]]
+=== Suspicious .NET Reflection via PowerShell
+
+Detects the use of Reflection.Assembly to load PEs and DLLs in memory in PowerShell scripts. Attackers use this method to load executables and DLLs without writing to the disk, bypassing security solutions.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.reflection.assembly.load
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: PowerShell Logs
+
+*Version*: 112
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Suspicious .NET Reflection via PowerShell*
+
+
+PowerShell is one of the main tools system administrators use for automation, report routines, and other tasks. This makes it available for use in various environments, and creates an attractive way for attackers to execute code.
+
+Attackers can use .NET reflection to load PEs and DLLs in memory. These payloads are commonly embedded in the script, which can circumvent file-based security protections.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Examine the script content that triggered the detection; look for suspicious DLL imports, collection or exfiltration capabilities, suspicious functions, encoded or compressed data, and other potentially malicious characteristics.
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Examine file or network events from the involved PowerShell process for suspicious behavior.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Evaluate whether the user needs to use PowerShell to complete tasks.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the script using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately outside engineering or IT business units. As long as the analyst did not identify malware or suspicious activity related to the user or host, this alert can be dismissed.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- PowerShell PSReflect Script - 56f2e9b5-4803-4e44-a0a4-a52dc79d57fe
+- Potential Process Injection via PowerShell - 2e29e96a-b67c-455a-afe4-de6183431d0d
+- PowerShell Suspicious Payload Encoded and Compressed - 81fe9dc6-a2d7-4192-a2d8-eed98afc766a
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Restrict PowerShell usage outside of IT and engineering business units using GPOs, AppLocker, Intune, or similar software.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Administrative Templates >
+Windows PowerShell >
+Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging (Enable)
+```
+
+Steps to implement the logging policy via registry:
+
+```
+reg add "hklm\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging" /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 1
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:windows and
+  powershell.file.script_block_text : (
+    "[System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load" or
+    "[Reflection.Assembly]::Load"
+  ) and
+  not powershell.file.script_block_text : (
+        ("CommonWorkflowParameters" or "RelatedLinksHelpInfo") and
+        "HelpDisplayStrings"
+  ) and
+  not (powershell.file.script_block_text :
+        ("Get-SolutionFiles" or "Get-VisualStudio" or "Select-MSBuildPath") and
+        file.name : "PathFunctions.ps1"
+  ) and
+  not file.path : C\:\\\\Program?Files\\\\Microsoft?Monitoring?Agent\\\\Agent\\\\Health?Service?State\\\\Monitoring?Host?Temporary?Files*\\\\AvailabilityGroupMonitoring.ps1 and
+  not user.id : "S-1-5-18"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Reflective Code Loading
+** ID: T1620
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Process Injection
+** ID: T1055
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Dynamic-link Library Injection
+** ID: T1055.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Portable Executable Injection
+** ID: T1055.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-network-activity-to-the-internet-by-previously-unknown-executable.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-network-activity-to-the-internet-by-previously-unknown-executable.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..41fbadb327
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-network-activity-to-the-internet-by-previously-unknown-executable.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-network-activity-to-the-internet-by-previously-unknown-executable]]
+=== Suspicious Network Activity to the Internet by Previously Unknown Executable
+
+This rule monitors for network connectivity to the internet from a previously unknown executable located in a suspicious directory to a previously unknown destination ip. An alert from this rule can indicate the presence of potentially malicious activity, such as the execution of unauthorized or suspicious processes attempting to establish connections to unknown or suspicious destinations such as a command and control server. Detecting and investigating such behavior can help identify and mitigate potential security threats, protecting the system and its data from potential compromise.
+
+*Rule type*: new_terms
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* auditbeat-*
+* filebeat-*
+* packetbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-59m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Command and Control
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 8
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Suspicious Network Activity to the Internet by Previously Unknown Executable*
+
+
+After being installed, malware will often call out to its command and control server to receive further instructions by its operators.
+
+This rule leverages the new terms rule type to detect previously unknown processes, initiating network connections to external IP-addresses. 
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html[placeholder fields] to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Identify any signs of suspicious network activity or anomalies that may indicate malicious behavior. This could include unexpected traffic patterns or unusual network behavior.
+  - Investigate listening ports and open sockets to look for potential malicious processes, reverse shells or data exfiltration.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Listening Ports","query":"SELECT pid, address, port, socket, protocol, path FROM listening_ports"}}
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Open Sockets","query":"SELECT pid, family, remote_address, remote_port, socket, state FROM process_open_sockets"}}
+- Identify the user account that performed the action, analyze it, and check whether it should perform this kind of action.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific User","query":"SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = {{user.name}}"}}
+- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Investigate the Account Authentication Status","query":"SELECT * FROM logged_in_users WHERE user = {{user.name}}"}}
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User","query":"SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"}}
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Process Info","query":"SELECT name, cmdline, parent, path, uid FROM processes"}}
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- Network Activity Detected via cat - afd04601-12fc-4149-9b78-9c3f8fe45d39
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors, such as reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers, that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
+- Elastic Defend
+- Auditbeat
+- Filebeat
+- Packetbeat
+
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows
+the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest to select "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Auditbeat Setup*
+
+Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit the activities of users and processes on your systems. For example, you can use Auditbeat to collect and centralize audit events from the Linux Audit Framework. You can also use Auditbeat to detect changes to critical files, like binaries and configuration files, and identify potential security policy violations.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Auditbeat on a Linux System:*
+
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setup-repositories.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-docker.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html[helper guide].
+- For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Filebeat Setup*
+
+Filebeat is a lightweight shipper for forwarding and centralizing log data. Installed as an agent on your servers, Filebeat monitors the log files or locations that you specify, collects log events, and forwards them either to Elasticsearch or Logstash for indexing.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Filebeat on a Linux System:*
+
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/setup-repositories.html[helper guide].
+- To run Filebeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/running-on-docker.html[helper guide].
+- To run Filebeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html[helper guide].
+- For quick start information for Filebeat refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/8.11/filebeat-installation-configuration.html[helper guide].
+- For complete “Setup and Run Filebeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Packetbeat Setup*
+
+Packetbeat is a real-time network packet analyzer that you can use for application monitoring, performance analytics, and threat detection. Packetbeat works by capturing the network traffic between your application servers, decoding the application layer protocols (HTTP, MySQL, Redis, and so on), correlating the requests with the responses, and recording the interesting fields for each transaction.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Packetbeat on a  Linux System:*
+
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/packetbeat/current/setup-repositories.html[helper guide].
+- To run Packetbeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/packetbeat/current/running-on-docker.html[helper guide].
+- For quick start information for Packetbeat refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/packetbeat/current/packetbeat-installation-configuration.html[helper guide].
+- For complete “Setup and Run Packetbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/packetbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+host.os.type:linux and event.category:network and event.action:(connection_attempted or ipv4_connection_attempt_event) and 
+process.executable:(
+  (/etc/crontab or /etc/rc.local or ./* or /boot/* or /dev/shm/* or /etc/cron.*/* or /etc/init.d/* or /etc/rc*.d/* or 
+   /etc/update-motd.d/* or /home/*/.* or /run/* or /srv/* or /tmp/* or /usr/lib/update-notifier/* or /var/tmp/*
+  ) and not (/tmp/newroot/* or /tmp/snap.rootfs*)
+ ) and 
+source.ip:(10.0.0.0/8 or 127.0.0.0/8 or 172.16.0.0/12 or 192.168.0.0/16) and 
+not process.name:(
+ apt or chrome or curl or dnf or dockerd or dpkg or firefox-bin or java or kite-update or kited or node or rpm or
+ saml2aws or wget or yum or ansible* or aws* or php* or pip* or python* or steam* or terraform*
+) and 
+not destination.ip:(
+   10.0.0.0/8 or 100.64.0.0/10 or 127.0.0.0/8 or 169.254.0.0/16 or 172.16.0.0/12 or 192.0.0.0/24 or 192.0.0.0/29 or 
+   192.0.0.10/32 or 192.0.0.170/32 or 192.0.0.171/32 or 192.0.0.8/32 or 192.0.0.9/32 or 192.0.2.0/24 or 
+   192.168.0.0/16 or 192.175.48.0/24 or 192.31.196.0/24 or 192.52.193.0/24 or 192.88.99.0/24 or 198.18.0.0/15 or 
+   198.51.100.0/24 or 203.0.113.0/24 or 224.0.0.0/4 or 240.0.0.0/4 or "::1" or "FE80::/10" or "FF00::/8" or 0.0.0.0
+) and
+not destination.port:(22 or 80 or 443)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Application Layer Protocol
+** ID: T1071
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-network-connection-via-sudo-binary.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-network-connection-via-sudo-binary.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b5fb7335b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-network-connection-via-sudo-binary.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-network-connection-via-sudo-binary]]
+=== Suspicious Network Connection via Sudo Binary
+
+Detects network connections initiated by the "sudo" binary. This behavior is uncommon and may occur in instances where reverse shell shellcode is injected into a process run with elevated permissions via "sudo". Attackers may attempt to inject shellcode into processes running as root, to escalate privileges.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+
+*Version*: 2
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+network where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and
+event.action in ("connection_attempted", "ipv4_connection_attempt_event") and process.name == "sudo"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Process Injection
+** ID: T1055
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Ptrace System Calls
+** ID: T1055.008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
+** ID: T1548
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Sudo and Sudo Caching
+** ID: T1548.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-network-connection-via-systemd.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-network-connection-via-systemd.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ded571d236
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-network-connection-via-systemd.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-network-connection-via-systemd]]
+=== Suspicious Network Connection via systemd
+
+Detects suspicious network events executed by systemd, potentially indicating persistence through a systemd backdoor. Systemd is a system and service manager for Linux operating systems, used to initialize and manage system processes. Attackers can backdoor systemd for persistence by creating or modifying systemd unit files to execute malicious scripts or commands, or by replacing legitimate systemd binaries with compromised ones, ensuring that their malicious code is automatically executed at system startup or during certain system events.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Command and Control
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 2
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id with maxspan=5s
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
+   process.parent.name == "systemd" and process.name in (
+     "python*", "php*", "perl", "ruby", "lua*", "openssl", "nc", "netcat", "ncat", "telnet", "awk"
+   )
+  ] by process.entity_id
+  [network where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "connection_attempted" and event.type == "start"
+  ] by process.parent.entity_id
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Create or Modify System Process
+** ID: T1543
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Systemd Service
+** ID: T1543.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Hijack Execution Flow
+** ID: T1574
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-passwd-file-event-action.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-passwd-file-event-action.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..41a1130031
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-passwd-file-event-action.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-passwd-file-event-action]]
+=== Suspicious Passwd File Event Action
+
+Monitors for the generation of a passwd password entry via openssl, followed by a file write activity on the "/etc/passwd" file. The "/etc/passwd" file in Linux stores user account information, including usernames, user IDs, group IDs, home directories, and default shell paths. Attackers may exploit a misconfiguration in the "/etc/passwd" file permissions or other privileges to add a new entry to the "/etc/passwd" file with root permissions, and leverage this new user account to login as root.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend and Auditd Manager.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows
+the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest to select "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Auditd Manager Integration Setup*
+
+The Auditd Manager Integration receives audit events from the Linux Audit Framework which is a part of the Linux kernel.
+Auditd Manager provides a user-friendly interface and automation capabilities for configuring and monitoring system auditing through the auditd daemon. With `auditd_manager`, administrators can easily define audit rules, track system events, and generate comprehensive audit reports, improving overall security and compliance in the system.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Agent System integration "auditd_manager" on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click “Add integrations”.
+- In the query bar, search for “Auditd Manager” and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click “Add Auditd Manager”.
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Review optional and advanced settings accordingly.
+- Add the newly installed “auditd manager” to an existing or a new agent policy, and deploy the agent on a Linux system from which auditd log files are desirable.
+- Click “Save and Continue”.
+- For more details on the integration refer to the https://docs.elastic.co/integrations/auditd_manager[helper guide].
+
+
+*Rule Specific Setup Note*
+
+Auditd Manager subscribes to the kernel and receives events as they occur without any additional configuration.
+However, if more advanced configuration is required to detect specific behavior, audit rules can be added to the integration in either the "audit rules" configuration box or the "auditd rule files" box by specifying a file to read the audit rules from.
+- For this detection rule the following additional audit rules are required to be added to the integration:
+  -- "-w /etc/passwd -p wa -k etcpasswd"
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id, process.parent.pid with maxspan=1m
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
+   process.name == "openssl" and process.args == "passwd" and user.id != "0"]
+  [file where host.os.type == "linux" and file.path == "/etc/passwd" and process.parent.pid != 1 and
+   not auditd.data.a2 == "80000" and event.outcome == "success" and user.id != "0"]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
+** ID: T1068
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-pdf-reader-child-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-pdf-reader-child-process.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e5972aade7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-pdf-reader-child-process.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-pdf-reader-child-process]]
+=== Suspicious PDF Reader Child Process
+
+Identifies suspicious child processes of PDF reader applications. These child processes are often launched via exploitation of PDF applications or social engineering.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Tactic: Initial Access
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Suspicious PDF Reader Child Process*
+
+
+PDF is a common file type used in corporate environments and most machines have software to handle these files. This creates a vector where attackers can exploit the engines and technology behind this class of software for initial access or privilege escalation.
+
+This rule looks for commonly abused built-in utilities spawned by a PDF reader process, which is likely a malicious behavior.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Retrieve PDF documents received and opened by the user that could cause this behavior. Common locations include, but are not limited to, the Downloads and Document folders and the folder configured at the email client.
+- Determine if the collected files are malicious:
+  - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+    - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+      - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - File and registry access, modification, and creation activities.
+      - Service creation and launch activities.
+      - Scheduled task creation.
+  - Use the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet to get the files' SHA-256 hash values.
+    - Search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+  - If the malicious file was delivered via phishing:
+    - Block the email sender from sending future emails.
+    - Block the malicious web pages.
+    - Remove emails from the sender from mailboxes.
+    - Consider improvements to the security awareness program.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  process.parent.name : ("AcroRd32.exe",
+                         "Acrobat.exe",
+                         "FoxitPhantomPDF.exe",
+                         "FoxitReader.exe") and
+  process.name : ("arp.exe", "dsquery.exe", "dsget.exe", "gpresult.exe", "hostname.exe", "ipconfig.exe", "nbtstat.exe",
+                  "net.exe", "net1.exe", "netsh.exe", "netstat.exe", "nltest.exe", "ping.exe", "qprocess.exe",
+                  "quser.exe", "qwinsta.exe", "reg.exe", "sc.exe", "systeminfo.exe", "tasklist.exe", "tracert.exe",
+                  "whoami.exe", "bginfo.exe", "cdb.exe", "cmstp.exe", "csi.exe", "dnx.exe", "fsi.exe", "ieexec.exe",
+                  "iexpress.exe", "installutil.exe", "Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe", "msbuild.exe", "mshta.exe",
+                  "msxsl.exe", "odbcconf.exe", "rcsi.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "xwizard.exe", "atbroker.exe",
+                  "forfiles.exe", "schtasks.exe", "regasm.exe", "regsvcs.exe", "cmd.exe", "cscript.exe",
+                  "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "wmic.exe", "wscript.exe", "bitsadmin.exe", "certutil.exe", "ftp.exe")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation for Client Execution
+** ID: T1203
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Initial Access
+** ID: TA0001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Phishing
+** ID: T1566
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Spearphishing Attachment
+** ID: T1566.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-portable-executable-encoded-in-powershell-script.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-portable-executable-encoded-in-powershell-script.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7a15b52a69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-portable-executable-encoded-in-powershell-script.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-portable-executable-encoded-in-powershell-script]]
+=== Suspicious Portable Executable Encoded in Powershell Script
+
+Detects the presence of a portable executable (PE) in a PowerShell script by looking for its encoded header. Attackers embed PEs into PowerShell scripts to inject them into memory, avoiding defences by not writing to disk.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/atc-project/atc-data/blob/master/docs/Logging_Policies/LP_0109_windows_powershell_script_block_log.md
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: PowerShell Logs
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Suspicious Portable Executable Encoded in Powershell Script*
+
+
+PowerShell is one of the main tools system administrators use for automation, report routines, and other tasks. This makes it available for use in various environments, and creates an attractive way for attackers to execute code.
+
+Attackers can abuse PowerShell in-memory capabilities to inject executables into memory without touching the disk, bypassing file-based security protections. These executables are generally base64 encoded.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Examine the script content that triggered the detection; look for suspicious DLL imports, collection or exfiltration capabilities, suspicious functions, encoded or compressed data, and other potentially malicious characteristics.
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Evaluate whether the user needs to use PowerShell to complete tasks.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the script using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- Suspicious .NET Reflection via PowerShell - e26f042e-c590-4e82-8e05-41e81bd822ad
+- PowerShell Suspicious Payload Encoded and Compressed - 81fe9dc6-a2d7-4192-a2d8-eed98afc766a
+- PowerShell PSReflect Script - 56f2e9b5-4803-4e44-a0a4-a52dc79d57fe
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Reimage the host operating system or restore the compromised files to clean versions.
+- Restrict PowerShell usage outside of IT and engineering business units using GPOs, AppLocker, Intune, or similar software.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Administrative Templates >
+Windows PowerShell >
+Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging (Enable)
+```
+
+Steps to implement the logging policy via registry:
+
+```
+reg add "hklm\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging" /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 1
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:windows and
+  powershell.file.script_block_text : (
+    TVqQAAMAAAAEAAAA
+  ) and not user.id : "S-1-5-18"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Process Injection
+** ID: T1055
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-print-spooler-file-deletion.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-print-spooler-file-deletion.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..773908dc16
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-print-spooler-file-deletion.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-print-spooler-file-deletion]]
+=== Suspicious Print Spooler File Deletion
+
+Detects deletion of print driver files by an unusual process. This may indicate a clean up attempt post successful privilege escalation via Print Spooler service related vulnerabilities.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34527
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Use Case: Vulnerability
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type : "deletion" and
+ not process.name : ("spoolsv.exe", "dllhost.exe", "explorer.exe") and
+ file.path : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\3\\*.dll"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
+** ID: T1068
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-print-spooler-point-and-print-dll.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-print-spooler-point-and-print-dll.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f401dc4a25
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-print-spooler-point-and-print-dll.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-print-spooler-point-and-print-dll]]
+=== Suspicious Print Spooler Point and Print DLL
+
+Detects attempts to exploit a privilege escalation vulnerability (CVE-2020-1030) related to the print spooler service. Exploitation involves chaining multiple primitives to load an arbitrary DLL into the print spooler process running as SYSTEM.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.accenture.com/us-en/blogs/cyber-defense/discovering-exploiting-shutting-down-dangerous-windows-print-spooler-vulnerability
+* https://github.com/sbousseaden/EVTX-ATTACK-SAMPLES/blob/master/Privilege%20Escalation/privesc_sysmon_cve_20201030_spooler.evtx
+* https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2020-1030
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Use Case: Vulnerability
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 105
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id with maxspan=30s
+[registry where host.os.type == "windows" and
+ registry.path : (
+    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Print\\Printers\\*\\SpoolDirectory",
+    "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Print\\Printers\\*\\SpoolDirectory"
+    ) and
+ registry.data.strings : "C:\\Windows\\System32\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\4"]
+[registry where host.os.type == "windows" and
+ registry.path : (
+    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Print\\Printers\\*\\CopyFiles\\Payload\\Module",
+    "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Print\\Printers\\*\\CopyFiles\\Payload\\Module"
+    ) and
+ registry.data.strings : "C:\\Windows\\System32\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\4\\*"]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
+** ID: T1068
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-print-spooler-spl-file-created.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-print-spooler-spl-file-created.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..98e30f65d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-print-spooler-spl-file-created.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-print-spooler-spl-file-created]]
+=== Suspicious Print Spooler SPL File Created
+
+Detects attempts to exploit privilege escalation vulnerabilities related to the Print Spooler service including CVE-2020-1048 and CVE-2020-1337.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://safebreach.com/Post/How-we-bypassed-CVE-2020-1048-Patch-and-got-CVE-2020-1337
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Use Case: Vulnerability
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Suspicious Print Spooler SPL File Created*
+
+
+Print Spooler is a Windows service enabled by default in all Windows clients and servers. The service manages print jobs by loading printer drivers, receiving files to be printed, queuing them, scheduling, etc.
+
+The Print Spooler service has some known vulnerabilities that attackers can abuse to escalate privileges to SYSTEM, like CVE-2020-1048 and CVE-2020-1337. This rule looks for unusual processes writing SPL files to the location `?:\Windows\System32\spool\PRINTERS\`, which is an essential step in exploiting these vulnerabilities.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Inspect the host for suspicious or abnormal behavior in the alert timeframe.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- If this activity is expected and noisy in your environment, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of process executable and file conditions.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Ensure that the machine has the latest security updates and is not running legacy Windows versions.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type != "deletion" and
+  file.extension : "spl" and
+  file.path : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\spool\\PRINTERS\\*" and
+  not process.name : ("spoolsv.exe",
+                      "printfilterpipelinesvc.exe",
+                      "PrintIsolationHost.exe",
+                      "splwow64.exe",
+                      "msiexec.exe",
+                      "poqexec.exe",
+                      "System") and
+  not user.id : "S-1-5-18" and
+  not process.executable :
+            ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\mmc.exe",
+             "\\Device\\Mup\\*.exe",
+             "?:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
+             "?:\\Windows\\System32\\mmc.exe",
+             "?:\\Windows\\System32\\printui.exe",
+             "?:\\Windows\\System32\\mstsc.exe",
+             "?:\\Windows\\System32\\spool\\*.exe",
+             "?:\\Program Files\\*.exe",
+             "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe",
+             "?:\\PROGRA~1\\*.exe",
+             "?:\\PROGRA~2\\*.exe",
+             "?:\\Windows\\System32\\rundll32.exe")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
+** ID: T1068
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-printspooler-service-executable-file-creation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-printspooler-service-executable-file-creation.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4c90367055
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-printspooler-service-executable-file-creation.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-printspooler-service-executable-file-creation]]
+=== Suspicious PrintSpooler Service Executable File Creation
+
+Detects attempts to exploit privilege escalation vulnerabilities related to the Print Spooler service. For more information refer to the following CVE's - CVE-2020-1048, CVE-2020-1337 and CVE-2020-1300 and verify that the impacted system is patched.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://voidsec.com/cve-2020-1337-printdemon-is-dead-long-live-printdemon/
+* https://www.thezdi.com/blog/2020/7/8/cve-2020-1300-remote-code-execution-through-microsoft-windows-cab-files
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Use Case: Vulnerability
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "creation" and
+  process.name : "spoolsv.exe" and file.extension : "dll" and
+  file.path : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\*", "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*") and
+  not file.path : (
+    "?:\\WINDOWS\\SysWOW64\\PrintConfig.dll",
+    "?:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\x5lrs.dll",
+    "?:\\WINDOWS\\sysWOW64\\x5lrs.dll",
+    "?:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\PrintConfig.dll",
+    "?:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\spool\\DRIVERS\\x64\\*.dll",
+    "?:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\spool\\DRIVERS\\W32X86\\*.dll",
+    "?:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\spool\\PRTPROCS\\x64\\*.dll",
+    "?:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\spool\\{????????-????-????-????-????????????}\\*.dll"
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
+** ID: T1068
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-proc-maps-discovery.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-proc-maps-discovery.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f1b5c12266
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-proc-maps-discovery.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-proc-maps-discovery]]
+=== Suspicious /proc/maps Discovery
+
+Monitors for /proc/*/maps file reads. The /proc/*/maps file in Linux provides a memory map for a specific process, detailing the memory segments, permissions, and what files are mapped to these segments. Attackers may read a process's memory map to identify memory addresses for code injection or process hijacking.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/arget13/DDexec
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Discovery
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 2
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
+process.name in ("cat", "grep") and process.args : "/proc/*/maps" and process.entry_leader.name in (
+  "bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish"
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Discovery
+** ID: TA0007
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Process Discovery
+** ID: T1057
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-process-access-via-direct-system-call.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-process-access-via-direct-system-call.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8158f51f79
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-process-access-via-direct-system-call.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-process-access-via-direct-system-call]]
+=== Suspicious Process Access via Direct System Call
+
+Identifies suspicious process access events from an unknown memory region. Endpoint security solutions usually hook userland Windows APIs in order to decide if the code that is being executed is malicious or not. It's possible to bypass hooked functions by writing malicious functions that call syscalls directly.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1278013896440324096
+* https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/defense-evasion/using-syscalls-directly-from-visual-studio-to-bypass-avs-edrs
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 211
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Suspicious Process Access via Direct System Call*
+
+
+Endpoint security solutions usually hook userland Windows APIs in order to decide if the code that is being executed is malicious or not. It's possible to bypass hooked functions by writing malicious functions that call syscalls directly.
+
+More context and technical details can be found in this https://outflank.nl/blog/2019/06/19/red-team-tactics-combining-direct-system-calls-and-srdi-to-bypass-av-edr/[research blog].
+
+This rule identifies suspicious process access events from an unknown memory region. Attackers can use direct system calls to bypass security solutions that rely on hooks.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This detection may be triggered by certain applications that install root certificates for the purpose of inspecting SSL traffic. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove the malicious certificate from the root certificate store.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.code == "10" and
+ length(winlog.event_data.CallTrace) > 0 and
+
+ /* Sysmon CallTrace starting with unknown memory module instead of ntdll which host Windows NT Syscalls */
+ not winlog.event_data.CallTrace :
+            ("?:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll*",
+             "?:\\WINDOWS\\SysWOW64\\ntdll.dll*",
+             "?:\\Windows\\System32\\wow64cpu.dll*",
+             "?:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\wow64win.dll*",
+             "?:\\Windows\\System32\\win32u.dll*") and
+
+ not winlog.event_data.TargetImage :
+            ("?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Malwarebytes Anti-Exploit\\mbae-svc.exe",
+             "?:\\Program Files\\Cisco\\AMP\\*\\sfc.exe",
+             "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft\\EdgeWebView\\Application\\*\\msedgewebview2.exe",
+             "?:\\Program Files\\Adobe\\Acrobat DC\\Acrobat\\*\\AcroCEF.exe") and
+
+ not (process.executable : ("?:\\Program Files\\Adobe\\Acrobat DC\\Acrobat\\Acrobat.exe",
+                            "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\World of Warcraft\\_classic_\\WowClassic.exe") and
+      not winlog.event_data.TargetImage : "?:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass.exe")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Process Injection
+** ID: T1055
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Native API
+** ID: T1106
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-process-creation-calltrace.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-process-creation-calltrace.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bc79fd32cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-process-creation-calltrace.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-process-creation-calltrace]]
+=== Suspicious Process Creation CallTrace
+
+Identifies when a process is created and immediately accessed from an unknown memory code region and by the same parent process. This may indicate a code injection attempt.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 208
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Suspicious Process Creation CallTrace*
+
+
+Attackers may inject code into child processes' memory to hide their actual activity, evade detection mechanisms, and decrease discoverability during forensics. This rule looks for a spawned process by Microsoft Office, scripting, and command line applications, followed by a process access event for an unknown memory region by the parent process, which can indicate a code injection attempt.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Inspect the host for suspicious or abnormal behavior in the alert timeframe.
+- Create a memory dump of the child process for analysis.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id with maxspan=1m
+  [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.code == "1" and
+   /* sysmon process creation */
+   process.parent.name : ("winword.exe", "excel.exe", "outlook.exe", "powerpnt.exe", "eqnedt32.exe", "fltldr.exe",
+                          "mspub.exe", "msaccess.exe","cscript.exe", "wscript.exe", "rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe",
+                          "mshta.exe", "wmic.exe", "cmstp.exe", "msxsl.exe") and
+
+   /* noisy FP patterns */
+   not (process.parent.name : "EXCEL.EXE" and process.executable : "?:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office*\\ADDINS\\*.exe") and
+   not (process.executable : "?:\\Windows\\splwow64.exe" and process.args in ("8192", "12288") and process.parent.name : ("winword.exe", "excel.exe", "outlook.exe", "powerpnt.exe")) and
+   not (process.parent.name : "rundll32.exe" and process.parent.args : ("?:\\WINDOWS\\Installer\\MSI*.tmp,zzzzInvokeManagedCustomActionOutOfProc", "--no-sandbox")) and
+   not (process.executable :
+            ("?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft\\EdgeWebView\\Application\\*\\msedgewebview2.exe",
+             "?:\\Program Files\\Adobe\\Acrobat DC\\Acrobat\\Acrobat.exe",
+             "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\DWWIN.EXE") and
+        process.parent.name : ("winword.exe", "excel.exe", "outlook.exe", "powerpnt.exe")) and
+   not (process.parent.name : "regsvr32.exe" and process.parent.args : ("?:\\Program Files\\*", "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*"))
+   ] by process.parent.entity_id, process.entity_id
+  [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.code == "10" and
+   /* Sysmon process access event from unknown module */
+   winlog.event_data.CallTrace : "*UNKNOWN*"] by process.entity_id, winlog.event_data.TargetProcessGUID
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Process Injection
+** ID: T1055
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-process-execution-via-renamed-psexec-executable.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-process-execution-via-renamed-psexec-executable.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a4840cc576
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-process-execution-via-renamed-psexec-executable.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-process-execution-via-renamed-psexec-executable]]
+=== Suspicious Process Execution via Renamed PsExec Executable
+
+Identifies suspicious psexec activity which is executing from the psexec service that has been renamed, possibly to evade detection.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Suspicious Process Execution via Renamed PsExec Executable*
+
+
+PsExec is a remote administration tool that enables the execution of commands with both regular and SYSTEM privileges on Windows systems. It operates by executing a service component `Psexecsvc` on a remote system, which then runs a specified process and returns the results to the local system. Microsoft develops PsExec as part of the Sysinternals Suite. Although commonly used by administrators, PsExec is frequently used by attackers to enable lateral movement and execute commands as SYSTEM to disable defenses and bypass security protections.
+
+This rule identifies instances where the PsExec service component is executed using a custom name. This behavior can indicate an attempt to bypass security controls or detections that look for the default PsExec service component name.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Check if the usage of this tool complies with the organization's administration policy.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Identify the target computer and its role in the IT environment.
+- Investigate what commands were run, and assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This mechanism can be used legitimately. As long as the analyst did not identify suspicious activity related to the user or involved hosts, and the tool is allowed by the organization's policy, such alerts can be dismissed.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+  - Prioritize cases involving critical servers and users.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Review the privileges assigned to the user to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  process.pe.original_file_name : "psexesvc.exe" and not process.name : "PSEXESVC.exe"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: System Services
+** ID: T1569
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Service Execution
+** ID: T1569.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Masquerading
+** ID: T1036
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Rename System Utilities
+** ID: T1036.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-process-spawned-from-motd-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-process-spawned-from-motd-detected.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..58d9d647a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-process-spawned-from-motd-detected.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-process-spawned-from-motd-detected]]
+=== Suspicious Process Spawned from MOTD Detected
+
+Message of the day (MOTD) is the message that is presented to the user when a user connects to a Linux server via SSH or a serial connection. Linux systems contain several default MOTD files located in the "/etc/update-motd.d/" and "/usr/lib/update-notifier/" directories. These scripts run as the root user every time a user connects over SSH or a serial connection. Adversaries may create malicious MOTD files that grant them persistence onto the target every time a user connects to the system by executing a backdoor script or command. This rule detects the execution of potentially malicious processes through the MOTD utility.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://pberba.github.io/security/2022/02/06/linux-threat-hunting-for-persistence-initialization-scripts-and-shell-configuration/#10-boot-or-logon-initialization-scripts-motd
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 8
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Suspicious Process Spawned from MOTD Detected*
+
+
+The message-of-the-day (MOTD) is used to display a customizable system-wide message or information to users upon login in Linux.
+
+Attackers can abuse message-of-the-day (motd) files to run scripts, commands or malicious software every time a user connects to a system over SSH or a serial connection, by creating a new file within the `/etc/update-motd.d/` or `/usr/lib/update-notifier/` directory. Files in these directories will automatically run with root privileges when they are made executable.
+
+This rule identifies the execution of potentially malicious processes from a MOTD script, which is not likely to occur as default benign behavior. 
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html[placeholder fields] to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+
+*Possible Investigation Steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the file that was created or modified from which the suspicious process was executed.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve File Information","query":"SELECT * FROM file WHERE path = {{file.path}}"}}
+- Investigate whether any other files in the `/etc/update-motd.d/` or `/usr/lib/update-notifier/` directories have been altered.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve File Listing Information","query":"SELECT * FROM file WHERE (path LIKE '/etc/update-motd.d/%' OR path LIKE '/usr/lib/update-notifier/%')"}}
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Additional File Listing Information","query":"SELECT\n  f.path,\n  u.username AS file_owner,\n  g.groupname AS group_owner,\n  datetime(f.atime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_access_time,\n  datetime(f.mtime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_modified_time,\n  datetime(f.ctime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_status_change_time,\n  datetime(f.btime, 'unixepoch') AS file_created_time,\n  f.size AS size_bytes\nFROM\n  file f\n  LEFT JOIN users u ON f.uid = u.uid\n  LEFT JOIN groups g ON f.gid = g.gid\nWHERE (path LIKE '/etc/update-motd.d/%' OR path LIKE '/usr/lib/update-notifier/%')\n"}}
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User","query":"SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"}}
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate whether the altered scripts call other malicious scripts elsewhere on the file system. 
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+        - Cron jobs, services, and other persistence mechanisms.
+            - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Crontab Information","query":"SELECT * FROM crontab"}}
+
+
+*Related Rules*
+
+
+- Potential Persistence Through MOTD File Creation Detected - 96d11d31-9a79-480f-8401-da28b194608f
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Any activity that triggered the alert and is not inherently malicious must be monitored by the security team.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Delete the MOTD files or restore them to the original configuration.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where event.type == "start" and event.action : ("exec", "exec_event") and
+process.parent.executable : ("/etc/update-motd.d/*", "/usr/lib/update-notifier/*") and (
+  (process.name in ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish") and (
+    (process.args : ("-i", "-l")) or (process.parent.name == "socat" and process.parent.args : "*exec*"))) or
+  (process.name : ("nc", "ncat", "netcat", "nc.openbsd") and process.args_count >= 3 and 
+    not process.args : ("-*z*", "-*l*")) or
+  (process.name : "python*" and process.args : "-c" and process.args : (
+     "*import*pty*spawn*", "*import*subprocess*call*"
+  )) or
+  (process.name : "perl*" and process.args : "-e" and process.args : "*socket*" and process.args : (
+     "*exec*", "*system*"
+  )) or
+  (process.name : "ruby*" and process.args : ("-e", "-rsocket") and process.args : (
+     "*TCPSocket.new*", "*TCPSocket.open*"
+  )) or
+  (process.name : "lua*" and process.args : "-e" and process.args : "*socket.tcp*" and process.args : (
+     "*io.popen*", "*os.execute*"
+  )) or
+  (process.name : "php*" and process.args : "-r" and process.args : "*fsockopen*" and process.args : "*/bin/*sh*") or 
+  (process.name : ("awk", "gawk", "mawk", "nawk") and process.args : "*/inet/tcp/*") or 
+  (process.name in ("openssl", "telnet"))
+) and 
+not (
+  (process.parent.args : "--force") or
+  (process.args : ("/usr/games/lolcat", "/usr/bin/screenfetch")) or
+  (process.parent.name == "system-crash-notification")
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
+** ID: T1037
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-rdp-activex-client-loaded.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-rdp-activex-client-loaded.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a7feba035c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-rdp-activex-client-loaded.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-rdp-activex-client-loaded]]
+=== Suspicious RDP ActiveX Client Loaded
+
+Identifies suspicious Image Loading of the Remote Desktop Services ActiveX Client (mstscax), this may indicate the presence of RDP lateral movement capability.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://posts.specterops.io/revisiting-remote-desktop-lateral-movement-8fb905cb46c3
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+any where host.os.type == "windows" and
+ (event.category : ("library", "driver") or (event.category == "process" and event.action : "Image loaded*")) and
+ (?dll.name : "mstscax.dll" or file.name : "mstscax.dll") and
+   /* depending on noise in your env add here extra paths  */
+  process.executable : (
+    "C:\\Windows\\*",
+    "C:\\Users\\Public\\*",
+    "C:\\Users\\Default\\*",
+    "C:\\Intel\\*",
+    "C:\\PerfLogs\\*",
+    "C:\\ProgramData\\*",
+    "\\Device\\Mup\\*",
+    "\\\\*"
+  ) and
+  /* add here FPs */
+  not process.executable : (
+    "?:\\Windows\\System32\\mstsc.exe",
+    "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\mstsc.exe",
+    "?:\\Windows\\System32\\vmconnect.exe",
+    "?:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsSandboxClient.exe",
+    "?:\\Windows\\System32\\hvsirdpclient.exe"
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote Services
+** ID: T1021
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Remote Desktop Protocol
+** ID: T1021.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-remote-registry-access-via-sebackupprivilege.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-remote-registry-access-via-sebackupprivilege.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..20cfd3b9c5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-remote-registry-access-via-sebackupprivilege.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-remote-registry-access-via-sebackupprivilege]]
+=== Suspicious Remote Registry Access via SeBackupPrivilege
+
+Identifies remote access to the registry using an account with Backup Operators group membership. This may indicate an attempt to exfiltrate credentials by dumping the Security Account Manager (SAM) registry hive in preparation for credential access and privileges elevation.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-system.*
+* logs-windows.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/mpgn/BackupOperatorToDA
+* https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Wh04m1001/Random/main/BackupOperators.cpp
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/detect-credential-access
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring
+* Data Source: Active Directory
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Suspicious Remote Registry Access via SeBackupPrivilege*
+
+
+SeBackupPrivilege is a privilege that allows file content retrieval, designed to enable users to create backup copies of the system. Since it is impossible to make a backup of something you cannot read, this privilege comes at the cost of providing the user with full read access to the file system. This privilege must bypass any access control list (ACL) placed in the system.
+
+This rule identifies remote access to the registry using an account with Backup Operators group membership. This may indicate an attempt to exfiltrate credentials by dumping the Security Account Manager (SAM) registry hive in preparation for credential access and privileges elevation.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Investigate the activities done by the subject user the login session. The field `winlog.event_data.SubjectLogonId` can be used to get this data.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Investigate abnormal behaviors observed by the subject user such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and processes created.
+- Investigate if the registry file was retrieved or exfiltrated.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- If this activity is expected and noisy in your environment, benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Limit or disable the involved user account to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The 'Audit Detailed File Share' audit policy is required be configured (Success) on Domain Controllers and Sensitive Windows Servers.
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Policies >
+Windows Settings >
+Security Settings >
+Advanced Audit Policies Configuration >
+Audit Policies >
+Object Access >
+Audit Detailed File Share (Success)
+```
+
+The 'Special Logon' audit policy must be configured (Success).
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Policies >
+Windows Settings >
+Security Settings >
+Advanced Audit Policies Configuration >
+Audit Policies >
+Logon/Logoff >
+Special Logon (Success)
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by winlog.computer_name, winlog.event_data.SubjectLogonId with maxspan=1m
+ [iam where event.action == "logged-in-special"  and
+  winlog.event_data.PrivilegeList : "SeBackupPrivilege" and
+
+  /* excluding accounts with existing privileged access */
+  not winlog.event_data.PrivilegeList : "SeDebugPrivilege"]
+ [any where event.action == "Detailed File Share" and winlog.event_data.RelativeTargetName : "winreg"]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Security Account Manager
+** ID: T1003.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/002/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: LSA Secrets
+** ID: T1003.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/004/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote Services
+** ID: T1021
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-renaming-of-esxi-files.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-renaming-of-esxi-files.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c601602d75
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-renaming-of-esxi-files.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-renaming-of-esxi-files]]
+=== Suspicious Renaming of ESXI Files
+
+Identifies instances where VMware-related files, such as those with extensions like ".vmdk", ".vmx", ".vmxf", ".vmsd", ".vmsn", ".vswp", ".vmss", ".nvram", and ".vmem", are renamed on a Linux system. The rule monitors for the "rename" event action associated with these file types, which could indicate malicious activity.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/massive-esxiargs-ransomware-attack-targets-vmware-esxi-servers-worldwide/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 6
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "rename" and
+file.Ext.original.name : ("*.vmdk", "*.vmx", "*.vmxf", "*.vmsd", "*.vmsn", "*.vswp", "*.vmss", "*.nvram", "*.vmem")
+and not file.name : ("*.vmdk", "*.vmx", "*.vmxf", "*.vmsd", "*.vmsn", "*.vswp", "*.vmss", "*.nvram", "*.vmem")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Masquerading
+** ID: T1036
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Rename System Utilities
+** ID: T1036.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-renaming-of-esxi-index-html-file.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-renaming-of-esxi-index-html-file.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ca273b09e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-renaming-of-esxi-index-html-file.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-renaming-of-esxi-index-html-file]]
+=== Suspicious Renaming of ESXI index.html File
+
+Identifies instances where the "index.html" file within the "/usr/lib/vmware/*" directory is renamed on a Linux system. The rule monitors for the "rename" event action associated with this specific file and path, which could indicate malicious activity.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/massive-esxiargs-ransomware-attack-targets-vmware-esxi-servers-worldwide/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 6
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "rename" and file.name : "index.html" and
+file.Ext.original.path : "/usr/lib/vmware/*"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Masquerading
+** ID: T1036
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Rename System Utilities
+** ID: T1036.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-script-object-execution.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-script-object-execution.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c092f5fb67
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-script-object-execution.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-script-object-execution]]
+=== Suspicious Script Object Execution
+
+Identifies scrobj.dll loaded into unusual Microsoft processes. This usually means a malicious scriptlet is being executed in the target process.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.library-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+any where host.os.type == "windows" and 
+ (event.category == "library" or (event.category == "process" and event.action : "Image loaded*")) and 
+ (?dll.name : "scrobj.dll" or ?file.name : "scrobj.dll") and 
+ process.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*.exe") and 
+ not process.executable : (
+       "?:\\Windows\\System32\\cscript.exe",
+       "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\cscript.exe",
+       "?:\\Windows\\system32\\msiexec.exe",
+       "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\msiexec.exe",
+       "?:\\Windows\\System32\\smartscreen.exe",
+       "?:\\Windows\\system32\\taskhostw.exe",
+       "?:\\windows\\system32\\inetsrv\\w3wp.exe",
+       "?:\\windows\\SysWOW64\\inetsrv\\w3wp.exe",
+       "?:\\Windows\\system32\\wscript.exe",
+       "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\wscript.exe",
+       "?:\\Windows\\System32\\mshta.exe",
+       "?:\\Windows\\system32\\mobsync.exe",
+       "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\mobsync.exe",
+       "?:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe",
+       "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\cmd.exe", 
+       "?:\\Windows\\System32\\OpenWith.exe",
+       "?:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\WMIADAP.exe",
+       "?:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: System Binary Proxy Execution
+** ID: T1218
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Regsvr32
+** ID: T1218.010
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-solarwinds-child-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-solarwinds-child-process.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..707ae5a2c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-solarwinds-child-process.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-solarwinds-child-process]]
+=== Suspicious SolarWinds Child Process
+
+A suspicious SolarWinds child process was detected, which may indicate an attempt to execute malicious programs.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html
+* https://github.com/mandiant/sunburst_countermeasures/blob/main/rules/SUNBURST/hxioc/SUNBURST%20SUSPICIOUS%20CHILD%20PROCESSES%20(METHODOLOGY).ioc
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+ process.parent.name: ("SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost.exe", "SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHostx64.exe") and
+ not (
+    process.name : (
+        "APMServiceControl*.exe",
+        "ExportToPDFCmd*.Exe",
+        "SolarWinds.Credentials.Orion.WebApi*.exe",
+        "SolarWinds.Orion.Topology.Calculator*.exe",
+        "Database-Maint.exe",
+        "SolarWinds.Orion.ApiPoller.Service.exe",
+        "WerFault.exe",
+        "WerMgr.exe",
+        "SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost.exe",
+        "SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHostx64.exe",
+        "SolarWinds.Topology.Calculator.exe",
+        "SolarWinds.Topology.Calculatorx64.exe",
+        "SolarWinds.APM.RealTimeProcessPoller.exe") and
+    process.code_signature.trusted == true
+ ) and
+ not process.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\ARP.EXE", "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\lodctr.exe", "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\unlodctr.exe")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Native API
+** ID: T1106
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Initial Access
+** ID: TA0001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Supply Chain Compromise
+** ID: T1195
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Compromise Software Supply Chain
+** ID: T1195.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-startup-shell-folder-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-startup-shell-folder-modification.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..13c3f34575
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-startup-shell-folder-modification.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-startup-shell-folder-modification]]
+=== Suspicious Startup Shell Folder Modification
+
+Identifies suspicious startup shell folder modifications to change the default Startup directory in order to bypass detections monitoring file creation in the Windows Startup folder.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Suspicious Startup Shell Folder Modification*
+
+
+Techniques used within malware and by adversaries often leverage the Windows registry to store malicious programs for persistence. Startup shell folders are often targeted as they are not as prevalent as normal Startup folder paths so this behavior may evade existing AV/EDR solutions. These programs may also run with higher privileges which can be ideal for an attacker.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Review the source process and related file tied to the Windows Registry entry.
+- Validate if the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the file using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- There is a high possibility of benign legitimate programs being added to shell folders. This activity could be based on new software installations, patches, or other network administrator activity. Before undertaking further investigation, it should be verified that this activity is not benign.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- Startup or Run Key Registry Modification - 97fc44d3-8dae-4019-ae83-298c3015600f
+- Persistent Scripts in the Startup Directory - f7c4dc5a-a58d-491d-9f14-9b66507121c0
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- If the malicious file was delivered via phishing:
+  - Block the email sender from sending future emails.
+  - Block the malicious web pages.
+  - Remove emails from the sender from mailboxes.
+  - Consider improvements to the security awareness program.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+registry where host.os.type == "windows" and
+ registry.path : (
+     "HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders\\Common Startup",
+     "HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\Common Startup",
+     "HKEY_USERS\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders\\Startup",
+     "HKEY_USERS\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\Startup",
+     "HKU\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders\\Startup",
+     "HKU\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\Startup",
+     "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders\\Common Startup",
+     "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\Common Startup",
+     "\\REGISTRY\\USER\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders\\Startup",
+     "\\REGISTRY\\USER\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\Startup"
+     ) and
+  registry.data.strings != null and
+  /* Normal Startup Folder Paths */
+  not registry.data.strings : (
+           "C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup",
+           "%ProgramData%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup",
+           "%USERPROFILE%\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup",
+           "C:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup"
+           )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
+** ID: T1547
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
+** ID: T1547.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Modify Registry
+** ID: T1112
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-symbolic-link-created.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-symbolic-link-created.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d992bf0b1d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-symbolic-link-created.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-symbolic-link-created]]
+=== Suspicious Symbolic Link Created
+
+Identifies the creation of a symbolic link to a suspicious file or location. A symbolic link is a reference to a file or directory that acts as a pointer or shortcut, allowing users to access the target file or directory from a different location in the file system. An attacker can potentially leverage symbolic links for privilege escalation by tricking a privileged process into following the symbolic link to a sensitive file, giving the attacker access to data or capabilities they would not normally have.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 5
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and
+process.name == "ln" and process.args in ("-s", "-sf") and 
+  (
+    /* suspicious files */
+    (process.args in ("/etc/shadow", "/etc/shadow-", "/etc/shadow~", "/etc/gshadow", "/etc/gshadow-") or 
+    (process.working_directory == "/etc" and process.args in ("shadow", "shadow-", "shadow~", "gshadow", "gshadow-"))) or 
+    
+    /* suspicious bins */
+    (process.args in ("/bin/bash", "/bin/dash", "/bin/sh", "/bin/tcsh", "/bin/csh", "/bin/zsh", "/bin/ksh", "/bin/fish") or 
+    (process.working_directory == "/bin" and process.args : ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish"))) or 
+    (process.args in ("/usr/bin/bash", "/usr/bin/dash", "/usr/bin/sh", "/usr/bin/tcsh", "/usr/bin/csh", "/usr/bin/zsh", "/usr/bin/ksh", "/usr/bin/fish") or 
+    (process.working_directory == "/usr/bin" and process.args in ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish"))) or
+    
+    /* suspicious locations */
+    (process.args : ("/etc/cron.d/*", "/etc/cron.daily/*", "/etc/cron.hourly/*", "/etc/cron.weekly/*", "/etc/cron.monthly/*")) or
+    (process.args : ("/home/*/.ssh/*", "/root/.ssh/*","/etc/sudoers.d/*", "/dev/shm/*"))
+  ) and 
+  process.parent.name in ("bash", "dash", "ash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish") and 
+  not user.Ext.real.id == "0" and not group.Ext.real.id == "0"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
+** ID: T1548
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow
+** ID: T1003.008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/008/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-system-commands-executed-by-previously-unknown-executable.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-system-commands-executed-by-previously-unknown-executable.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f3737b86e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-system-commands-executed-by-previously-unknown-executable.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-system-commands-executed-by-previously-unknown-executable]]
+=== Suspicious System Commands Executed by Previously Unknown Executable
+
+This rule monitors for the execution of several commonly used system commands executed by a previously unknown executable located in commonly abused directories. An alert from this rule can indicate the presence of potentially malicious activity, such as the execution of unauthorized or suspicious processes attempting to run malicious code. Detecting and investigating such behavior can help identify and mitigate potential security threats, protecting the system and its data from potential compromise.
+
+*Rule type*: new_terms
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 105
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+host.os.type:linux and event.category:process and event.action:(exec or exec_event or fork or fork_event) and 
+process.executable:(
+  /bin/* or /usr/bin/* or /usr/share/* or /tmp/* or /var/tmp/* or /dev/shm/* or
+  /etc/init.d/* or /etc/rc*.d/* or /etc/crontab or /etc/cron.*/* or /etc/update-motd.d/* or 
+  /usr/lib/update-notifier/* or /home/*/.* or /boot/* or /srv/* or /run/*) 
+  and process.args:(whoami or id or hostname or uptime or top or ifconfig or netstat or route or ps or pwd or ls) and 
+  not process.name:(sudo or which or whoami or id or hostname or uptime or top or netstat or ps or pwd or ls or apt or 
+  dpkg or yum or rpm or dnf or dockerd or docker or snapd or snap) and
+  not process.parent.executable:(/bin/* or /usr/bin/* or /run/k3s/* or /etc/network/* or /opt/Elastic/*)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Unix Shell
+** ID: T1059.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-termination-of-esxi-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-termination-of-esxi-process.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1e37a9a6c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-termination-of-esxi-process.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-termination-of-esxi-process]]
+=== Suspicious Termination of ESXI Process
+
+Identifies instances where VMware processes, such as "vmware-vmx" or "vmx," are terminated on a Linux system by a "kill" command. The rule monitors for the "end" event type, which signifies the termination of a process. The presence of a "kill" command as the parent process for terminating VMware processes may indicate that a threat actor is attempting to interfere with the virtualized environment on the targeted system.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/massive-esxiargs-ransomware-attack-targets-vmware-esxi-servers-worldwide/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Impact
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+
+*Version*: 6
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "end" and process.name in ("vmware-vmx", "vmx")
+and process.parent.name == "kill"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Impact
+** ID: TA0040
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Service Stop
+** ID: T1489
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-utility-launched-via-proxychains.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-utility-launched-via-proxychains.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f0f5e5565a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-utility-launched-via-proxychains.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-utility-launched-via-proxychains]]
+=== Suspicious Utility Launched via ProxyChains
+
+This rule monitors for the execution of suspicious linux tools through ProxyChains. ProxyChains is a command-line tool that enables the routing of network connections through intermediary proxies, enhancing anonymity and enabling access to restricted resources. Attackers can exploit the ProxyChains utility to hide their true source IP address, evade detection, and perform malicious activities through a chain of proxy servers, potentially masking their identity and intentions.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://blog.bitsadmin.com/living-off-the-foreign-land-windows-as-offensive-platform
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Command and Control
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
+
+*Version*: 7
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Suspicious Utility Launched via ProxyChains*
+
+
+Attackers can leverage `proxychains` to obfuscate their origin and bypass network defenses by routing their malicious traffic through multiple intermediary servers.
+
+This rule looks for a list of suspicious processes spawned through `proxychains` by analyzing process command line arguments. 
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html[placeholder fields] to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Identify any signs of suspicious network activity or anomalies that may indicate network obfuscation. This could include unexpected traffic patterns or unusual network behavior.
+  - Investigate listening ports and open sockets to look for potential protocol tunneling, reverse shells, or data exfiltration.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Listening Ports","query":"SELECT pid, address, port, socket, protocol, path FROM listening_ports"}}
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Open Sockets","query":"SELECT pid, family, remote_address, remote_port, socket, state FROM process_open_sockets"}}
+- Identify the user account that performed the action, analyze it, and check whether it should perform this kind of action.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific User","query":"SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = {{user.name}}"}}
+- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Investigate the Account Authentication Status","query":"SELECT * FROM logged_in_users WHERE user = {{user.name}}"}}
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User","query":"SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"}}
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Process Info","query":"SELECT name, cmdline, parent, path, uid FROM processes"}}
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- ProxyChains Activity - 4b868f1f-15ff-4ba3-8c11-d5a7a6356d37
+- Potential Protocol Tunneling via Chisel Client - 3f12325a-4cc6-410b-8d4c-9fbbeb744cfd
+- Potential Protocol Tunneling via Chisel Server - ac8805f6-1e08-406c-962e-3937057fa86f
+- Potential Linux Tunneling and/or Port Forwarding - 6ee947e9-de7e-4281-a55d-09289bdf947e
+- Potential Protocol Tunneling via EarthWorm - 9f1c4ca3-44b5-481d-ba42-32dc215a2769
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+- If this activity is related to a system administrator or developer who uses this utility for benign purposes, consider adding exceptions for specific user accounts or hosts. 
+- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors, such as reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers, that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and process.name == "proxychains" and process.args : (
+  "ssh", "sshd", "sshuttle", "socat", "iodine", "iodined", "dnscat", "hans", "hans-ubuntu", "ptunnel-ng",
+  "ssf", "3proxy", "ngrok", "gost", "pivotnacci", "chisel*", "nmap", "ping", "python*", "php*", "perl", "ruby",
+  "lua*", "openssl", "nc", "netcat", "ncat", "telnet", "awk", "java", "telnet", "ftp", "curl", "wget"
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Protocol Tunneling
+** ID: T1572
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-werfault-child-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-werfault-child-process.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..544569ccf7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-werfault-child-process.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-werfault-child-process]]
+=== Suspicious WerFault Child Process
+
+A suspicious WerFault child process was detected, which may indicate an attempt to run via the SilentProcessExit registry key manipulation. Verify process details such as command line, network connections and file writes.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2019/09/19/silentprocessexit-quick-look-under-the-hood/
+* https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2019/09/20/werfault-command-line-switches-v0-1/
+* https://github.com/sbousseaden/EVTX-ATTACK-SAMPLES/blob/master/Persistence/persistence_SilentProcessExit_ImageHijack_sysmon_13_1.evtx
+* http://web.archive.org/web/20230530011556/https://blog.menasec.net/2021/01/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 111
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+
+  process.parent.name : "WerFault.exe" and 
+  
+  /* args -s and -t used to execute a process via SilentProcessExit mechanism */
+  (process.parent.args : "-s" and process.parent.args : "-t" and process.parent.args : "-c") and 
+  
+  not process.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\Initcrypt.exe", "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Heimdal\\Heimdal.Guard.exe")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Masquerading
+** ID: T1036
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Event Triggered Execution
+** ID: T1546
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Image File Execution Options Injection
+** ID: T1546.012
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/012/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Event Triggered Execution
+** ID: T1546
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Image File Execution Options Injection
+** ID: T1546.012
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/012/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-which-enumeration.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-which-enumeration.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a207442e4b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-which-enumeration.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-which-enumeration]]
+=== Suspicious which Enumeration
+
+This rule monitors for the usage of the which command with an unusual amount of process arguments. Attackers may leverage the which command to enumerate the system for useful installed utilities that may be used after compromising a system to escalate privileges or move latteraly across the network.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Discovery
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+
+*Version*: 5
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and 
+process.name == "which" and process.args_count >= 10 and not process.parent.name == "jem" and 
+not process.args == "--tty-only"
+
+/* potential tuning if rule would turn out to be noisy
+and process.args in ("nmap", "nc", "ncat", "netcat", nc.traditional", "gcc", "g++", "socat") and 
+process.parent.name in ("bash", "dash", "ash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish")
+*/ 
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Discovery
+** ID: TA0007
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/
+* Technique:
+** Name: System Information Discovery
+** ID: T1082
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-windows-process-cluster-spawned-by-a-host.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-windows-process-cluster-spawned-by-a-host.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1819008f90
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-windows-process-cluster-spawned-by-a-host.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-windows-process-cluster-spawned-by-a-host]]
+=== Suspicious Windows Process Cluster Spawned by a Host
+
+A machine learning job combination has detected a set of one or more suspicious Windows processes with unusually high scores for malicious probability. These process(es) have been classified as malicious in several ways. The process(es) were predicted to be malicious by the ProblemChild supervised ML model. If the anomaly contains a cluster of suspicious processes, each process has the same host name, and the aggregate score of the event cluster was calculated to be unusually high by an unsupervised ML model. Such a cluster often contains suspicious or malicious activity, possibly involving LOLbins, that may be resistant to detection using conventional search rules.
+
+*Rule type*: machine_learning
+
+*Rule indices*: None
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 15m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-45m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html
+* https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/problemchild
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/detecting-living-off-the-land-attacks-with-new-elastic-integration
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Use Case: Living off the Land Attack Detection
+* Rule Type: ML
+* Rule Type: Machine Learning
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The rule requires the Living off the Land (LotL) Attack Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as Windows process events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend or Winlogbeat.  
+
+
+*LotL Attack Detection Setup*
+
+The LotL Attack Detection integration detects living-off-the-land activity in Windows process events.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for LotL Attack Detection.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+- Windows process events collected by the https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/endpoint[Elastic Defend] integration or Winlogbeat(https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/winlogbeat/current/_winlogbeat_overview.html).
+- To install Elastic Defend, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[documentation].
+- To set up and run Winlogbeat, follow https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/winlogbeat/current/winlogbeat-installation-configuration.html[this] guide.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed to install assets associated with the LotL Attack Detection integration:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Living off the Land Attack Detection and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Under Settings, click Install Living off the Land Attack Detection assets and follow the prompts to install the assets.
+
+
+*Ingest Pipeline Setup*
+
+Before you can enable this rule, you'll need to enrich Windows process events with predictions from the Supervised LotL Attack Detection model. This is done via the ingest pipeline named `<package_version>-problem_child_ingest_pipeline` installed with the LotL Attack Detection package.
+- If using an Elastic Beat such as Winlogbeat, add the LotL ingest pipeline to it by adding a simple configuration https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/current/ingest.html#pipelines-for-beats[setting] to `winlogbeat.yml`.
+- If adding the LotL ingest pipeline to an existing pipeline, use a https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/current/pipeline-processor.html[pipeline processor].
+
+
+*Adding Custom Mappings*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Stack Management.
+- Under Data click Index Management and navigate to the Component Templates tab.
+- Templates that can be edited to add custom components will be marked with a @custom suffix. Edit the @custom component template corresponding to the beat/integration you added the LotL ingest pipeline to, by pasting the following JSON blob in the "Load JSON" flyout:
+```
+{
+  "properties": {
+    "problemchild": {
+      "properties": {
+        "prediction": {
+          "type": "long"
+        },
+        "prediction_probability": {
+          "type": "float"
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "blocklist_label": {
+      "type": "long"
+    }
+  }
+}
+```
+
+
+*Anomaly Detection Setup*
+
+Before you can enable this rule, you'll need to enable the corresponding Anomaly Detection job. 
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Analytics, click Machine Learning.
+- Under Anomaly Detection, click Jobs, and then click "Create job". Select the Data View containing your enriched Windows process events. For example, this would be `logs-endpoint.events.*` if you used Elastic Defend to collect events, or `winlogbeat-*` if you used Winlogbeat.
+- If the selected Data View contains events that match the query in https://github.com/elastic/integrations/blob/main/packages/problemchild/kibana/ml_module/problemchild-ml.json[this] configuration file, you will see a card for "Living off the Land Attack Detection" under "Use preconfigured jobs".
+- Keep the default settings and click "Create jobs" to start the anomaly detection job and datafeed.
+
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Masquerading
+** ID: T1036
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-windows-process-cluster-spawned-by-a-parent-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-windows-process-cluster-spawned-by-a-parent-process.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..96ac915a0d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-windows-process-cluster-spawned-by-a-parent-process.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-windows-process-cluster-spawned-by-a-parent-process]]
+=== Suspicious Windows Process Cluster Spawned by a Parent Process
+
+A machine learning job combination has detected a set of one or more suspicious Windows processes with unusually high scores for malicious probability. These process(es) have been classified as malicious in several ways. The process(es) were predicted to be malicious by the ProblemChild supervised ML model. If the anomaly contains a cluster of suspicious processes, each process has the same parent process name, and the aggregate score of the event cluster was calculated to be unusually high by an unsupervised ML model. Such a cluster often contains suspicious or malicious activity, possibly involving LOLbins, that may be resistant to detection using conventional search rules.
+
+*Rule type*: machine_learning
+
+*Rule indices*: None
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 15m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-45m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html
+* https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/problemchild
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/detecting-living-off-the-land-attacks-with-new-elastic-integration
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Living off the Land Attack Detection
+* Rule Type: ML
+* Rule Type: Machine Learning
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The rule requires the Living off the Land (LotL) Attack Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as Windows process events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend or Winlogbeat.  
+
+
+*LotL Attack Detection Setup*
+
+The LotL Attack Detection integration detects living-off-the-land activity in Windows process events.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for LotL Attack Detection.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+- Windows process events collected by the https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/endpoint[Elastic Defend] integration or Winlogbeat(https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/winlogbeat/current/_winlogbeat_overview.html).
+- To install Elastic Defend, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[documentation].
+- To set up and run Winlogbeat, follow https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/winlogbeat/current/winlogbeat-installation-configuration.html[this] guide.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed to install assets associated with the LotL Attack Detection integration:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Living off the Land Attack Detection and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Under Settings, click Install Living off the Land Attack Detection assets and follow the prompts to install the assets.
+
+
+*Ingest Pipeline Setup*
+
+Before you can enable this rule, you'll need to enrich Windows process events with predictions from the Supervised LotL Attack Detection model. This is done via the ingest pipeline named `<package_version>-problem_child_ingest_pipeline` installed with the LotL Attack Detection package.
+- If using an Elastic Beat such as Winlogbeat, add the LotL ingest pipeline to it by adding a simple configuration https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/current/ingest.html#pipelines-for-beats[setting] to `winlogbeat.yml`.
+- If adding the LotL ingest pipeline to an existing pipeline, use a https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/current/pipeline-processor.html[pipeline processor].
+
+
+*Adding Custom Mappings*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Stack Management.
+- Under Data click Index Management and navigate to the Component Templates tab.
+- Templates that can be edited to add custom components will be marked with a @custom suffix. Edit the @custom component template corresponding to the beat/integration you added the LotL ingest pipeline to, by pasting the following JSON blob in the "Load JSON" flyout:
+```
+{
+  "properties": {
+    "problemchild": {
+      "properties": {
+        "prediction": {
+          "type": "long"
+        },
+        "prediction_probability": {
+          "type": "float"
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "blocklist_label": {
+      "type": "long"
+    }
+  }
+}
+```
+
+
+*Anomaly Detection Setup*
+
+Before you can enable this rule, you'll need to enable the corresponding Anomaly Detection job. 
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Analytics, click Machine Learning.
+- Under Anomaly Detection, click Jobs, and then click "Create job". Select the Data View containing your enriched Windows process events. For example, this would be `logs-endpoint.events.*` if you used Elastic Defend to collect events, or `winlogbeat-*` if you used Winlogbeat.
+- If the selected Data View contains events that match the query in https://github.com/elastic/integrations/blob/main/packages/problemchild/kibana/ml_module/problemchild-ml.json[this] configuration file, you will see a card for "Living off the Land Attack Detection" under "Use preconfigured jobs".
+- Keep the default settings and click "Create jobs" to start the anomaly detection job and datafeed.
+
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Masquerading
+** ID: T1036
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-windows-process-cluster-spawned-by-a-user.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-windows-process-cluster-spawned-by-a-user.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b685a652a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-windows-process-cluster-spawned-by-a-user.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-windows-process-cluster-spawned-by-a-user]]
+=== Suspicious Windows Process Cluster Spawned by a User
+
+A machine learning job combination has detected a set of one or more suspicious Windows processes with unusually high scores for malicious probability. These process(es) have been classified as malicious in several ways. The process(es) were predicted to be malicious by the ProblemChild supervised ML model. If the anomaly contains a cluster of suspicious processes, each process has the same user name, and the aggregate score of the event cluster was calculated to be unusually high by an unsupervised ML model. Such a cluster often contains suspicious or malicious activity, possibly involving LOLbins, that may be resistant to detection using conventional search rules.
+
+*Rule type*: machine_learning
+
+*Rule indices*: None
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 15m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-45m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html
+* https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/problemchild
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/detecting-living-off-the-land-attacks-with-new-elastic-integration
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Living off the Land Attack Detection
+* Rule Type: ML
+* Rule Type: Machine Learning
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The rule requires the Living off the Land (LotL) Attack Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as Windows process events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend or Winlogbeat.  
+
+
+*LotL Attack Detection Setup*
+
+The LotL Attack Detection integration detects living-off-the-land activity in Windows process events.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for LotL Attack Detection.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+- Windows process events collected by the https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/endpoint[Elastic Defend] integration or Winlogbeat(https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/winlogbeat/current/_winlogbeat_overview.html).
+- To install Elastic Defend, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[documentation].
+- To set up and run Winlogbeat, follow https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/winlogbeat/current/winlogbeat-installation-configuration.html[this] guide.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed to install assets associated with the LotL Attack Detection integration:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Living off the Land Attack Detection and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Under Settings, click Install Living off the Land Attack Detection assets and follow the prompts to install the assets.
+
+
+*Ingest Pipeline Setup*
+
+Before you can enable this rule, you'll need to enrich Windows process events with predictions from the Supervised LotL Attack Detection model. This is done via the ingest pipeline named `<package_version>-problem_child_ingest_pipeline` installed with the LotL Attack Detection package.
+- If using an Elastic Beat such as Winlogbeat, add the LotL ingest pipeline to it by adding a simple configuration https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/current/ingest.html#pipelines-for-beats[setting] to `winlogbeat.yml`.
+- If adding the LotL ingest pipeline to an existing pipeline, use a https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/current/pipeline-processor.html[pipeline processor].
+
+
+*Adding Custom Mappings*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Stack Management.
+- Under Data click Index Management and navigate to the Component Templates tab.
+- Templates that can be edited to add custom components will be marked with a @custom suffix. Edit the @custom component template corresponding to the beat/integration you added the LotL ingest pipeline to, by pasting the following JSON blob in the "Load JSON" flyout:
+```
+{
+  "properties": {
+    "problemchild": {
+      "properties": {
+        "prediction": {
+          "type": "long"
+        },
+        "prediction_probability": {
+          "type": "float"
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "blocklist_label": {
+      "type": "long"
+    }
+  }
+}
+```
+
+
+*Anomaly Detection Setup*
+
+Before you can enable this rule, you'll need to enable the corresponding Anomaly Detection job. 
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Analytics, click Machine Learning.
+- Under Anomaly Detection, click Jobs, and then click "Create job". Select the Data View containing your enriched Windows process events. For example, this would be `logs-endpoint.events.*` if you used Elastic Defend to collect events, or `winlogbeat-*` if you used Winlogbeat.
+- If the selected Data View contains events that match the query in https://github.com/elastic/integrations/blob/main/packages/problemchild/kibana/ml_module/problemchild-ml.json[this] configuration file, you will see a card for "Living off the Land Attack Detection" under "Use preconfigured jobs".
+- Keep the default settings and click "Create jobs" to start the anomaly detection job and datafeed.
+
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Masquerading
+** ID: T1036
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-wmi-event-subscription-created.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-wmi-event-subscription-created.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6dac691b1a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-wmi-event-subscription-created.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-wmi-event-subscription-created]]
+=== Suspicious WMI Event Subscription Created
+
+Detects the creation of a WMI Event Subscription. Attackers can abuse this mechanism for persistence or to elevate to SYSTEM privileges.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf
+* https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-removing-wmi-persistence-60ccbb7dff96
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+any where event.dataset == "windows.sysmon_operational" and event.code == "21" and
+    winlog.event_data.Operation : "Created" and winlog.event_data.Consumer : ("*subscription:CommandLineEventConsumer*", "*subscription:ActiveScriptEventConsumer*")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Event Triggered Execution
+** ID: T1546
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription
+** ID: T1546.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-wmi-image-load-from-ms-office.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-wmi-image-load-from-ms-office.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bc548bad08
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-wmi-image-load-from-ms-office.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-wmi-image-load-from-ms-office]]
+=== Suspicious WMI Image Load from MS Office
+
+Identifies a suspicious image load (wmiutils.dll) from Microsoft Office processes. This behavior may indicate adversarial activity where child processes are spawned via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). This technique can be used to execute code and evade traditional parent/child processes spawned from Microsoft Office products.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+any where host.os.type == "windows" and
+ (event.category : ("library", "driver") or (event.category == "process" and event.action : "Image loaded*")) and
+  process.name : ("WINWORD.EXE", "EXCEL.EXE", "POWERPNT.EXE", "MSPUB.EXE", "MSACCESS.EXE") and
+  (?dll.name : "wmiutils.dll" or file.name : "wmiutils.dll")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Windows Management Instrumentation
+** ID: T1047
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-wmic-xsl-script-execution.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-wmic-xsl-script-execution.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5c2079d7df
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-wmic-xsl-script-execution.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-wmic-xsl-script-execution]]
+=== Suspicious WMIC XSL Script Execution
+
+Identifies WMIC allowlist bypass techniques by alerting on suspicious execution of scripts. When WMIC loads scripting libraries it may be indicative of an allowlist bypass.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by process.entity_id with maxspan = 2m
+[process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+   (process.name : "WMIC.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name : "wmic.exe") and
+   process.args : ("format*:*", "/format*:*", "*-format*:*") and
+   not process.command_line : ("* /format:table *", "* /format:table")]
+[any where host.os.type == "windows" and (event.category == "library" or (event.category == "process" and event.action : "Image loaded*")) and
+ (?dll.name : ("jscript.dll", "vbscript.dll") or file.name : ("jscript.dll", "vbscript.dll"))]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: XSL Script Processing
+** ID: T1220
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1220/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Windows Management Instrumentation
+** ID: T1047
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-zoom-child-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-zoom-child-process.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6cac311c2e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-zoom-child-process.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-zoom-child-process]]
+=== Suspicious Zoom Child Process
+
+A suspicious Zoom child process was detected, which may indicate an attempt to run unnoticed. Verify process details such as command line, network connections, file writes and associated file signature details as well.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Suspicious Zoom Child Process*
+
+
+By examining the specific traits of Windows binaries -- such as process trees, command lines, network connections, registry modifications, and so on -- it's possible to establish a baseline of normal activity. Deviations from this baseline can indicate malicious activity, such as masquerading, and deserve further investigation.
+
+This rule identifies a potential malicious process masquerading as `Zoom.exe` or exploiting a vulnerability in the application causing it to execute code.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+- Examine the command line of the child process to determine which commands or scripts were executed.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
+
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+ process.parent.name : "Zoom.exe" and process.name : ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Masquerading
+** ID: T1036
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Process Injection
+** ID: T1055
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation for Client Execution
+** ID: T1203
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-svchost-spawning-cmd.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-svchost-spawning-cmd.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6f041b656d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-svchost-spawning-cmd.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-svchost-spawning-cmd]]
+=== Svchost spawning Cmd
+
+Identifies a suspicious parent child process relationship with cmd.exe descending from svchost.exe
+
+*Rule type*: new_terms
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://nasbench.medium.com/demystifying-the-svchost-exe-process-and-its-command-line-options-508e9114e747
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 210
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Svchost spawning Cmd*
+
+
+The Service Host process (SvcHost) is a system process that can host one, or multiple, Windows services in the Windows NT family of operating systems. Note that `Svchost.exe` is reserved for use by the operating system and should not be used by non-Windows services.
+
+This rule looks for the creation of the `cmd.exe` process with `svchost.exe` as its parent process. This is an unusual behavior that can indicate the masquerading of a malicious process as `svchost.exe` or exploitation for privilege escalation.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+host.os.type:windows and event.category:process and event.type:start and process.parent.name:"svchost.exe" and process.name:("cmd.exe" or "Cmd.exe" or "CMD.EXE")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-symbolic-link-to-shadow-copy-created.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-symbolic-link-to-shadow-copy-created.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bf61c34af4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-symbolic-link-to-shadow-copy-created.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-symbolic-link-to-shadow-copy-created]]
+=== Symbolic Link to Shadow Copy Created
+
+Identifies the creation of symbolic links to a shadow copy. Symbolic links can be used to access files in the shadow copy, including sensitive files such as ntds.dit, System Boot Key and browser offline credentials.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/mklink
+* https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
+* https://blog.netwrix.com/2021/11/30/extracting-password-hashes-from-the-ntds-dit-file/
+* https://www.hackingarticles.in/credential-dumping-ntds-dit/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+* Austin Songer
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Symbolic Link to Shadow Copy Created*
+
+
+Shadow copies are backups or snapshots of an endpoint's files or volumes while they are in use. Adversaries may attempt to discover and create symbolic links to these shadow copies in order to copy sensitive information offline. If Active Directory (AD) is in use, often the ntds.dit file is a target as it contains password hashes, but an offline copy is needed to extract these hashes and potentially conduct lateral movement.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Determine if a volume shadow copy was recently created on this endpoint.
+- Review privileges of the end user as this requires administrative access.
+- Verify if the ntds.dit file was successfully copied and determine its copy destination.
+- Investigate for registry SYSTEM file copies made recently or saved via Reg.exe.
+- Investigate recent deletions of volume shadow copies.
+- Identify other files potentially copied from volume shadow copy paths directly.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This rule should cause very few false positives. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- NTDS or SAM Database File Copied - 3bc6deaa-fbd4-433a-ae21-3e892f95624f
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- If the entire domain or the `krbtgt` user was compromised:
+  - Activate your incident response plan for total Active Directory compromise which should include, but not be limited to, a password reset (twice) of the `krbtgt` user.
+- Locate and remove static files copied from volume shadow copies.
+- Command-Line tool mklink should require administrative access by default unless in developer mode.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+Ensure advanced audit policies for Windows are enabled, specifically:
+Object Access policies https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4656[Event ID 4656] (Handle to an Object was Requested)
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Policies >
+Windows Settings >
+Security Settings >
+Advanced Audit Policies Configuration >
+System Audit Policies >
+Object Access >
+Audit File System (Success,Failure)
+Audit Handle Manipulation (Success,Failure)
+```
+
+This event will only trigger if symbolic links are created from a new process spawning cmd.exe or powershell.exe with the correct arguments.
+Direct access to a shell and calling symbolic link creation tools will not generate an event matching this rule.
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+ (
+    (?process.pe.original_file_name in ("Cmd.Exe","PowerShell.EXE")) or
+    (process.name : ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe"))
+ ) and
+
+ /* Create Symbolic Link to Shadow Copies */
+ process.args : ("*mklink*", "*SymbolicLink*") and process.command_line : ("*HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy*")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Security Account Manager
+** ID: T1003.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/002/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: NTDS
+** ID: T1003.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-system-binary-copied-and-or-moved-to-suspicious-directory.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-system-binary-copied-and-or-moved-to-suspicious-directory.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..db1bdfd10e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-system-binary-copied-and-or-moved-to-suspicious-directory.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-system-binary-copied-and-or-moved-to-suspicious-directory]]
+=== System Binary Copied and/or Moved to Suspicious Directory
+
+This rule monitors for the copying or moving of a system binary to a suspicious directory. Adversaries may copy/move and rename system binaries to evade detection. Copying a system binary to a different location should not occur often, so if it does, the activity should be investigated.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 7
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id, process.entity_id with maxspan=1s
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and 
+   process.name in ("cp", "mv") and process.args : (
+   // Shells
+   "/bin/*sh", "/usr/bin/*sh", 
+
+   // Interpreters
+   "/bin/python*", "/usr/bin/python*", "/bin/php*", "/usr/bin/php*", "/bin/ruby*", "/usr/bin/ruby*", "/bin/perl*",
+   "/usr/bin/perl*", "/bin/lua*", "/usr/bin/lua*", "/bin/java*", "/usr/bin/java*", 
+
+   // Compilers
+   "/bin/gcc*", "/usr/bin/gcc*", "/bin/g++*", "/usr/bin/g++*", "/bin/cc", "/usr/bin/cc",
+
+   // Suspicious utilities
+   "/bin/nc", "/usr/bin/nc", "/bin/ncat", "/usr/bin/ncat", "/bin/netcat", "/usr/bin/netcat", "/bin/nc.openbsd",
+   "/usr/bin/nc.openbsd", "/bin/*awk", "/usr/bin/*awk", "/bin/socat", "/usr/bin/socat", "/bin/openssl",
+   "/usr/bin/openssl", "/bin/telnet", "/usr/bin/telnet", "/bin/mkfifo", "/usr/bin/mkfifo", "/bin/mknod",
+   "/usr/bin/mknod", "/bin/ping*", "/usr/bin/ping*", "/bin/nmap", "/usr/bin/nmap",
+
+   // System utilities
+   "/bin/ls", "/usr/bin/ls", "/bin/cat", "/usr/bin/cat", "/bin/sudo", "/usr/bin/sudo", "/bin/curl", "/usr/bin/curl",
+   "/bin/wget", "/usr/bin/wget", "/bin/tmux", "/usr/bin/tmux", "/bin/screen", "/usr/bin/screen", "/bin/ssh",
+   "/usr/bin/ssh", "/bin/ftp", "/usr/bin/ftp"
+  ) and not process.parent.name in ("dracut-install", "apticron", "generate-from-dir", "platform-python")]
+  [file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "creation" and file.path : (
+    "/dev/shm/*", "/run/shm/*", "/tmp/*", "/var/tmp/*", "/run/*", "/var/run/*", "/var/www/*", "/proc/*/fd/*"
+  ) and not file.path : ("/tmp/rear*", "/var/tmp/rear*", "/var/tmp/dracut*", "/var/tmp/mkinitramfs*")]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Hide Artifacts
+** ID: T1564
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Masquerading
+** ID: T1036
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Rename System Utilities
+** ID: T1036.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-system-log-file-deletion.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-system-log-file-deletion.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e57ca358b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-system-log-file-deletion.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-system-log-file-deletion]]
+=== System Log File Deletion
+
+Identifies the deletion of sensitive Linux system logs. This may indicate an attempt to evade detection or destroy forensic evidence on a system.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/11/live-off-the-land-an-overview-of-unc1945.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
+- Elastic Defend
+- Auditbeat
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Auditbeat Setup*
+
+Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit the activities of users and processes on your systems. For example, you can use Auditbeat to collect and centralize audit events from the Linux Audit Framework. You can also use Auditbeat to detect changes to critical files, like binaries and configuration files, and identify potential security policy violations.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Auditbeat on a Linux System:*
+
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setup-repositories.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-docker.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html[helper guide].
+- For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Custom Ingest Pipeline*
+
+For versions <8.2, you need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate `event.ingested` with @timestamp for non-elastic-agent indexes, like auditbeats/filebeat/winlogbeat etc. For more details to add a custom ingest pipeline refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html[guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "deletion" and
+  file.path :
+    (
+    "/var/run/utmp",
+    "/var/log/wtmp",
+    "/var/log/btmp",
+    "/var/log/lastlog",
+    "/var/log/faillog",
+    "/var/log/syslog",
+    "/var/log/messages",
+    "/var/log/secure",
+    "/var/log/auth.log",
+    "/var/log/boot.log",
+    "/var/log/kern.log"
+    ) and
+    not process.name in ("gzip", "executor", "dockerd")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Indicator Removal
+** ID: T1070
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Clear Linux or Mac System Logs
+** ID: T1070.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-systemkey-access-via-command-line.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-systemkey-access-via-command-line.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7d3415b2e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-systemkey-access-via-command-line.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-systemkey-access-via-command-line]]
+=== SystemKey Access via Command Line
+
+Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features, including Wi-Fi and website passwords, secure notes, certificates, and Kerberos. Adversaries may collect the keychain storage data from a system to acquire credentials.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne/blob/master/Mac/lazagne/softwares/system/chainbreaker.py
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:macos and event.type:(start or process_started) and
+  process.args:("/private/var/db/SystemKey" or "/var/db/SystemKey")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Credentials from Password Stores
+** ID: T1555
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Keychain
+** ID: T1555.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-tainted-kernel-module-load.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-tainted-kernel-module-load.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5e7b466142
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-tainted-kernel-module-load.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-tainted-kernel-module-load]]
+=== Tainted Kernel Module Load
+
+This rule monitors the syslog log file for messages related to instances of a tainted kernel module load. Rootkits often leverage kernel modules as their main defense evasion technique. Detecting tainted kernel module loads is crucial for ensuring system security and integrity, as malicious or unauthorized modules can compromise the kernel and lead to system vulnerabilities or unauthorized access.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-system.syslog-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+
+*Version*: 4
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
+- Filebeat
+
+
+*Filebeat Setup*
+
+Filebeat is a lightweight shipper for forwarding and centralizing log data. Installed as an agent on your servers, Filebeat monitors the log files or locations that you specify, collects log events, and forwards them either to Elasticsearch or Logstash for indexing.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Filebeat for the Linux System:*
+
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/setup-repositories.html[helper guide].
+- To run Filebeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/running-on-docker.html[helper guide].
+- To run Filebeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html[helper guide].
+- For quick start information for Filebeat refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/8.11/filebeat-installation-configuration.html[helper guide].
+- For complete Setup and Run Filebeat information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Rule Specific Setup Note*
+
+- This rule requires the Filebeat System Module to be enabled.
+- The system module collects and parses logs created by the system logging service of common Unix/Linux based distributions.
+- To run the system module of Filebeat on Linux follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-system.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+host.os.type:linux and event.dataset:"system.syslog" and process.name:kernel and 
+message:"module verification failed: signature and/or required key missing - tainting kernel"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
+** ID: T1547
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Kernel Modules and Extensions
+** ID: T1547.006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/006/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Rootkit
+** ID: T1014
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-tampering-of-shell-command-line-history.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-tampering-of-shell-command-line-history.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a4c2ecb53a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-tampering-of-shell-command-line-history.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-tampering-of-shell-command-line-history]]
+=== Tampering of Shell Command-Line History
+
+Adversaries may attempt to clear or disable the Bash command-line history in an attempt to evade detection or forensic investigations.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
+
+*Version*: 105
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started") and event.type == "start" and
+ (
+  ((process.args : ("rm", "echo") or
+    (process.args : "ln" and process.args : "-sf" and process.args : "/dev/null") or
+    (process.args : "truncate" and process.args : "-s0"))
+    and process.args : (".bash_history", "/root/.bash_history", "/home/*/.bash_history","/Users/.bash_history", "/Users/*/.bash_history",
+                        ".zsh_history", "/root/.zsh_history", "/home/*/.zsh_history", "/Users/.zsh_history", "/Users/*/.zsh_history")) or
+  (process.name : "history" and process.args : "-c") or
+  (process.args : "export" and process.args : ("HISTFILE=/dev/null", "HISTFILESIZE=0")) or
+  (process.args : "unset" and process.args : "HISTFILE") or
+  (process.args : "set" and process.args : "history" and process.args : "+o")
+ )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Indicator Removal
+** ID: T1070
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Clear Command History
+** ID: T1070.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-tcc-bypass-via-mounted-apfs-snapshot-access.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-tcc-bypass-via-mounted-apfs-snapshot-access.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0e6a86a427
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-tcc-bypass-via-mounted-apfs-snapshot-access.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-tcc-bypass-via-mounted-apfs-snapshot-access]]
+=== TCC Bypass via Mounted APFS Snapshot Access
+
+Identifies the use of the mount_apfs command to mount the entire file system through Apple File System (APFS) snapshots as read-only and with the noowners flag set. This action enables the adversary to access almost any file in the file system, including all user data and files protected by Apple’s privacy framework (TCC).
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://theevilbit.github.io/posts/cve_2020_9771/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Use Case: Vulnerability
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:macos and event.type:(start or process_started) and process.name:mount_apfs and
+  process.args:(/System/Volumes/Data and noowners)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Direct Volume Access
+** ID: T1006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1006/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-third-party-backup-files-deleted-via-unexpected-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-third-party-backup-files-deleted-via-unexpected-process.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0f5601e504
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-third-party-backup-files-deleted-via-unexpected-process.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-third-party-backup-files-deleted-via-unexpected-process]]
+=== Third-party Backup Files Deleted via Unexpected Process
+
+Identifies the deletion of backup files, saved using third-party software, by a process outside of the backup suite. Adversaries may delete Backup files to ensure that recovery from a ransomware attack is less likely.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.advintel.io/post/backup-removal-solutions-from-conti-ransomware-with-love
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Impact
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 111
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Third-party Backup Files Deleted via Unexpected Process*
+
+
+Backups are a significant obstacle for any ransomware operation. They allow the victim to resume business by performing data recovery, making them a valuable target.
+
+Attackers can delete backups from the host and gain access to backup servers to remove centralized backups for the environment, ensuring that victims have no alternatives to paying the ransom.
+
+This rule identifies file deletions performed by a process that does not belong to the backup suite and aims to delete Veritas or Veeam backups.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This rule can be triggered by the manual removal of backup files and by removal using other third-party tools that are not from the backup suite. Exceptions can be added for specific accounts and executables, preferably tied together.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- Deleting Backup Catalogs with Wbadmin - 581add16-df76-42bb-af8e-c979bfb39a59
+- Volume Shadow Copy Deleted or Resized via VssAdmin - b5ea4bfe-a1b2-421f-9d47-22a75a6f2921
+- Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via PowerShell - d99a037b-c8e2-47a5-97b9-170d076827c4
+- Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via WMIC - dc9c1f74-dac3-48e3-b47f-eb79db358f57
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Consider isolating the involved host to prevent destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.
+- Perform data recovery locally or restore the backups from replicated copies (Cloud, other servers, etc.).
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "deletion" and
+  (
+    /* Veeam Related Backup Files */
+    (
+      file.extension : ("VBK", "VIB", "VBM") and
+      not (
+        process.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\*", "?:\\Program Files\\*", "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*") and
+        (process.code_signature.trusted == true and process.code_signature.subject_name : ("Veeam Software Group GmbH", "Veeam Software AG"))
+      )
+    ) or
+    /* Veritas Backup Exec Related Backup File */
+    (
+      file.extension : "BKF" and
+        not process.executable : (
+          "?:\\Program Files\\Veritas\\Backup Exec\\*",
+          "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Veritas\\Backup Exec\\*"
+        )
+    )
+  ) and
+  not (
+    process.name : ("MSExchangeMailboxAssistants.exe", "Microsoft.PowerBI.EnterpriseGateway.exe") and
+      (process.code_signature.subject_name : "Microsoft Corporation" and process.code_signature.trusted == true)
+  ) and
+  not file.path : (
+    "?:\\ProgramData\\Trend Micro\\*",
+    "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Trend Micro\\*",
+    "?:\\$RECYCLE.BIN\\*"
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Impact
+** ID: TA0040
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Inhibit System Recovery
+** ID: T1490
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Data Destruction
+** ID: T1485
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-threat-intel-hash-indicator-match.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-threat-intel-hash-indicator-match.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7ed4ba9a74
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-threat-intel-hash-indicator-match.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-threat-intel-hash-indicator-match]]
+=== Threat Intel Hash Indicator Match
+
+This rule is triggered when a hash indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or integrations has a match against an event that contains file hashes, such as antivirus alerts, process creation, library load, and file operation events.
+
+*Rule type*: threat_match
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* auditbeat-*
+* endgame-*
+* filebeat-*
+* logs-*
+* winlogbeat-*
+
+*Severity*: critical
+
+*Risk score*: 99
+
+*Runs every*: 1h
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-65m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-threatintel.html
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/es-threat-intel-integrations.html
+* https://www.elastic.co/security/tip
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* OS: Windows
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Rule Type: Indicator Match
+
+*Version*: 7
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and Analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Threat Intel Hash Indicator Match*
+
+
+Threat Intel indicator match rules allow matching from a local observation, such as an endpoint event that records a file hash with an entry of a file hash stored within the Threat Intel integrations index.
+
+Matches are based on threat intelligence data that's been ingested during the last 30 days. Some integrations don't place expiration dates on their threat indicators, so we strongly recommend validating ingested threat indicators and reviewing match results. When reviewing match results, check associated activity to determine whether the event requires additional investigation.
+
+This rule is triggered when a hash indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or an indicator ingested from a threat intelligence integration matches against an event that contains file hashes, such as antivirus alerts, file operation events, etc.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Gain context about the field that matched the local observation. This information can be found in the `threat.indicator.matched.field` field.
+- Investigate the hash , which can be found in the `threat.indicator.matched.atomic` field:
+  - Search for the existence and reputation of the hash in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+  - Scope other potentially compromised hosts in your environment by mapping hosts with file operations involving the same hash.
+- Identify the process that created the file.
+  - Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+  - Enrich the information that you have right now by determining how the file was dropped, where it was downloaded from, etc. This can help you determine if the event is part of an ongoing campaign against the organization.
+- Retrieve the involved file and examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+- Using the data collected through the analysis, scope users targeted and other machines infected in the environment.
+
+
+*False Positive Analysis*
+
+
+- Adversaries often use legitimate tools as network administrators, such as `PsExec` or `AdFind`. These tools are often included in indicator lists, which creates the potential for false positives.
+
+
+*Response and Remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule needs threat intelligence indicators to work.
+Threat intelligence indicators can be collected using an https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#agent-ti-integration[Elastic Agent integration],
+the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#ti-mod-integration[Threat Intel module],
+or a https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#custom-ti-integration[custom integration].
+
+More information can be found https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html[here].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file.hash.*:* or process.hash.*:* or dll.hash.*:*
+
+----------------------------------
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-threat-intel-ip-address-indicator-match.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-threat-intel-ip-address-indicator-match.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4500cb7dbd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-threat-intel-ip-address-indicator-match.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-threat-intel-ip-address-indicator-match]]
+=== Threat Intel IP Address Indicator Match
+
+This rule is triggered when an IP address indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or integrations has a match against a network event.
+
+*Rule type*: threat_match
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* auditbeat-*
+* endgame-*
+* filebeat-*
+* logs-*
+* packetbeat-*
+* winlogbeat-*
+
+*Severity*: critical
+
+*Risk score*: 99
+
+*Runs every*: 1h
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-65m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-threatintel.html
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/es-threat-intel-integrations.html
+* https://www.elastic.co/security/tip
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* OS: Windows
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Rule Type: Indicator Match
+
+*Version*: 6
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and Analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Threat Intel IP Address Indicator Match*
+
+
+Threat Intel indicator match rules allow matching from a local observation, such as an endpoint event that records a file hash with an entry of a file hash stored within the Threat Intel integrations index.
+
+Matches are based on threat intelligence data that's been ingested during the last 30 days. Some integrations don't place expiration dates on their threat indicators, so we strongly recommend validating ingested threat indicators and reviewing match results. When reviewing match results, check associated activity to determine whether the event requires additional investigation.
+
+This rule is triggered when an IP address indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or a threat intelligence integration matches against a network event.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Gain context about the field that matched the local observation so you can understand the nature of the connection. This information can be found in the `threat.indicator.matched.field` field.
+- Investigate the IP address, which can be found in the `threat.indicator.matched.atomic` field:
+  - Check the reputation of the IP address in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+  - Execute a reverse DNS lookup to retrieve hostnames associated with the given IP address.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
+- Identify the process responsible for the connection, and investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Retrieve the involved process executable and examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+- Using the data collected through the analysis, scope users targeted and other machines infected in the environment.
+
+
+*False Positive Analysis*
+
+
+- When a match is found, it's important to consider the indicator's initial release date. Threat intelligence is useful for augmenting existing security processes but can quickly become outdated. In other words, some threat intelligence only represents a specific set of activity observed at a specific time. For example, an IP address may have hosted malware observed in a Dridex campaign months ago, but it's possible that IP has been remediated and no longer represents any threat.
+- False positives might occur after large and publicly written campaigns if curious employees interact with attacker infrastructure.
+- Some feeds may include internal or known benign addresses by mistake (e.g., 8.8.8.8, google.com, 127.0.0.1, etc.). Make sure you understand how blocking a specific domain or address might impact the organization or normal system functioning.
+
+
+*Response and Remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule needs threat intelligence indicators to work.
+Threat intelligence indicators can be collected using an https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#agent-ti-integration[Elastic Agent integration],
+the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#ti-mod-integration[Threat Intel module],
+or a https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#custom-ti-integration[custom integration].
+
+More information can be found https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html[here].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+source.ip:* or destination.ip:*
+
+----------------------------------
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-threat-intel-url-indicator-match.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-threat-intel-url-indicator-match.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6e7818eb4a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-threat-intel-url-indicator-match.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-threat-intel-url-indicator-match]]
+=== Threat Intel URL Indicator Match
+
+This rule is triggered when a URL indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or integrations has a match against an event that contains URL data, like DNS events, network logs, etc.
+
+*Rule type*: threat_match
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* auditbeat-*
+* endgame-*
+* filebeat-*
+* logs-*
+* packetbeat-*
+* winlogbeat-*
+
+*Severity*: critical
+
+*Risk score*: 99
+
+*Runs every*: 1h
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-65m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-threatintel.html
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/es-threat-intel-integrations.html
+* https://www.elastic.co/security/tip
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* OS: Windows
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Rule Type: Indicator Match
+
+*Version*: 6
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and Analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Threat Intel URL Indicator Match*
+
+
+Threat Intel indicator match rules allow matching from a local observation, such as an endpoint event that records a file hash with an entry of a file hash stored within the Threat Intel integrations index.
+
+Matches are based on threat intelligence data that's been ingested during the last 30 days. Some integrations don't place expiration dates on their threat indicators, so we strongly recommend validating ingested threat indicators and reviewing match results. When reviewing match results, check associated activity to determine whether the event requires additional investigation.
+
+This rule is triggered when a URL indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or a threat intelligence integration matches against an event that contains URL data, like DNS events, network logs, etc.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the URL, which can be found in the `threat.indicator.matched.atomic` field:
+  - Identify the type of malicious activity related to the URL (phishing, malware, etc.).
+  - Check the reputation of the IP address in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+  - Execute a WHOIS lookup to retrieve information about the domain registration and contacts to report abuse.
+  - If dealing with a phishing incident:
+    - Contact the user to gain more information around the delivery method, information sent, etc.
+    - Analyze whether the URL is trying to impersonate a legitimate address. Look for typosquatting, extra or unusual subdomains, or other anomalies that could lure the user.
+    - Investigate the phishing page to identify which information may have been sent to the attacker by the user.
+- Identify the process responsible for the connection, and investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Retrieve the involved process executable and examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+- Using the data collected through the analysis, scope users targeted and other machines infected in the environment.
+
+
+*False Positive Analysis*
+
+
+- False positives might occur after large and publicly written campaigns if curious employees interact with attacker infrastructure.
+- Some feeds may include internal or known benign addresses by mistake (e.g., 8.8.8.8, google.com, 127.0.0.1, etc.). Make sure you understand how blocking a specific domain or address might impact the organization or normal system functioning.
+
+
+*Response and Remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Consider reporting the address for abuse using the provided contact information.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule needs threat intelligence indicators to work.
+Threat intelligence indicators can be collected using an https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#agent-ti-integration[Elastic Agent integration],
+the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#ti-mod-integration[Threat Intel module],
+or a https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#custom-ti-integration[custom integration].
+
+More information can be found https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html[here].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+url.full:*
+
+----------------------------------
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-threat-intel-windows-registry-indicator-match.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-threat-intel-windows-registry-indicator-match.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f574970674
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-threat-intel-windows-registry-indicator-match.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-threat-intel-windows-registry-indicator-match]]
+=== Threat Intel Windows Registry Indicator Match
+
+This rule is triggered when a Windows registry indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or integrations has a match against an event that contains registry data.
+
+*Rule type*: threat_match
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* auditbeat-*
+* endgame-*
+* filebeat-*
+* logs-*
+* winlogbeat-*
+
+*Severity*: critical
+
+*Risk score*: 99
+
+*Runs every*: 1h
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-65m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-threatintel.html
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/es-threat-intel-integrations.html
+* https://www.elastic.co/security/tip
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* OS: Windows
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Rule Type: Indicator Match
+
+*Version*: 6
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and Analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Threat Intel Windows Registry Indicator Match*
+
+
+Threat Intel indicator match rules allow matching from a local observation, such as an endpoint event that records a file hash with an entry of a file hash stored within the Threat Intel integrations index.
+
+Matches are based on threat intelligence data that's been ingested during the last 30 days. Some integrations don't place expiration dates on their threat indicators, so we strongly recommend validating ingested threat indicators and reviewing match results. When reviewing match results, check associated activity to determine whether the event requires additional investigation.
+
+This rule is triggered when a Windows registry indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or a threat intelligence integration matches against an event that contains registry data.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Check related threat reports to gain context about the registry indicator of compromise (IoC) and to understand if it's a system-native mechanism abused for persistence, to store data, to disable security mechanisms, etc. Use this information to define the appropriate triage and respond steps.
+- Identify the process responsible for the registry operation and investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Retrieve the involved process executable and examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+- Using the data collected through the analysis, scope users targeted and other machines infected in the environment.
+
+
+*False Positive Analysis*
+
+
+- Adversaries can leverage dual-use registry mechanisms that are commonly used by normal applications. These registry keys can be added into indicator lists creating the potential for false positives.
+
+
+*Response and Remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule needs threat intelligence indicators to work.
+Threat intelligence indicators can be collected using an https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#agent-ti-integration[Elastic Agent integration],
+the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#ti-mod-integration[Threat Intel module],
+or a https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#custom-ti-integration[custom integration].
+
+More information can be found https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html[here].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+registry.path:*
+
+----------------------------------
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-timestomping-using-touch-command.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-timestomping-using-touch-command.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6b732f9c0d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-timestomping-using-touch-command.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-timestomping-using-touch-command]]
+=== Timestomping using Touch Command
+
+Timestomping is an anti-forensics technique which is used to modify the timestamps of a file, often to mimic files that are in the same folder.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 33
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where event.type == "start" and
+ process.name : "touch" and user.id != "0" and
+ process.args : ("-r", "-t", "-a*","-m*") and
+ not process.args : (
+   "/usr/lib/go-*/bin/go", "/usr/lib/dracut/dracut-functions.sh", "/tmp/KSInstallAction.*/m/.patch/*"
+) and not process.parent.name in ("pmlogger_daily", "pmlogger_janitor", "systemd")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Indicator Removal
+** ID: T1070
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Timestomp
+** ID: T1070.006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/006/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uac-bypass-attempt-via-elevated-com-internet-explorer-add-on-installer.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uac-bypass-attempt-via-elevated-com-internet-explorer-add-on-installer.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3e4c8154e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uac-bypass-attempt-via-elevated-com-internet-explorer-add-on-installer.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uac-bypass-attempt-via-elevated-com-internet-explorer-add-on-installer]]
+=== UAC Bypass Attempt via Elevated COM Internet Explorer Add-On Installer
+
+Identifies User Account Control (UAC) bypass attempts by abusing an elevated COM Interface to launch a malicious program. Attackers may attempt to bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://swapcontext.blogspot.com/2020/11/uac-bypasses-from-comautoapprovallist.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+ process.executable : "C:\\*\\AppData\\*\\Temp\\IDC*.tmp\\*.exe" and
+ process.parent.name : "ieinstal.exe" and process.parent.args : "-Embedding"
+
+ /* uncomment once in winlogbeat */
+ /* and not (process.code_signature.subject_name == "Microsoft Corporation" and process.code_signature.trusted == true) */
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
+** ID: T1548
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Bypass User Account Control
+** ID: T1548.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
+** ID: T1548
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Bypass User Account Control
+** ID: T1548.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Inter-Process Communication
+** ID: T1559
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Component Object Model
+** ID: T1559.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uac-bypass-attempt-via-privileged-ifileoperation-com-interface.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uac-bypass-attempt-via-privileged-ifileoperation-com-interface.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..44307623f6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uac-bypass-attempt-via-privileged-ifileoperation-com-interface.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uac-bypass-attempt-via-privileged-ifileoperation-com-interface]]
+=== UAC Bypass Attempt via Privileged IFileOperation COM Interface
+
+Identifies attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) via DLL side-loading. Attackers may attempt to bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/exploring-windows-uac-bypasses-techniques-and-detection-strategies
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type : "change" and process.name : "dllhost.exe" and
+  /* Known modules names side loaded into process running with high or system integrity level for UAC Bypass, update here for new modules */
+  file.name : ("wow64log.dll", "comctl32.dll", "DismCore.dll", "OskSupport.dll", "duser.dll", "Accessibility.ni.dll") and
+  /* has no impact on rule logic just to avoid OS install related FPs */
+  not file.path : ("C:\\Windows\\SoftwareDistribution\\*", "C:\\Windows\\WinSxS\\*")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
+** ID: T1548
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Bypass User Account Control
+** ID: T1548.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
+** ID: T1548
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Bypass User Account Control
+** ID: T1548.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Hijack Execution Flow
+** ID: T1574
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: DLL Side-Loading
+** ID: T1574.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uac-bypass-attempt-via-windows-directory-masquerading.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uac-bypass-attempt-via-windows-directory-masquerading.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..939772ebd9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uac-bypass-attempt-via-windows-directory-masquerading.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uac-bypass-attempt-via-windows-directory-masquerading]]
+=== UAC Bypass Attempt via Windows Directory Masquerading
+
+Identifies an attempt to bypass User Account Control (UAC) by masquerading as a Microsoft trusted Windows directory. Attackers may bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://medium.com/tenable-techblog/uac-bypass-by-mocking-trusted-directories-24a96675f6e
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 111
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating UAC Bypass Attempt via Windows Directory Masquerading*
+
+
+Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges (tracked as low to high integrity levels) to perform a task under administrator-level permissions, possibly by prompting the user for confirmation. UAC can deny an operation under high-integrity enforcement, or allow the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and enter an administrator password when prompted.
+
+For more information about the UAC and how it works, check the https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/how-user-account-control-works[official Microsoft docs page].
+
+This rule identifies an attempt to bypass User Account Control (UAC) by masquerading as a Microsoft trusted Windows directory. Attackers may bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Inspect the host for suspicious or abnormal behavior in the alert timeframe.
+- Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze any suspicious spawned processes using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  process.args : ("C:\\Windows \\system32\\*.exe", "C:\\Windows \\SysWOW64\\*.exe")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
+** ID: T1548
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Bypass User Account Control
+** ID: T1548.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
+** ID: T1548
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Bypass User Account Control
+** ID: T1548.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Masquerading
+** ID: T1036
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Match Legitimate Name or Location
+** ID: T1036.005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uac-bypass-attempt-with-ieditionupgrademanager-elevated-com-interface.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uac-bypass-attempt-with-ieditionupgrademanager-elevated-com-interface.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f83a055031
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uac-bypass-attempt-with-ieditionupgrademanager-elevated-com-interface.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uac-bypass-attempt-with-ieditionupgrademanager-elevated-com-interface]]
+=== UAC Bypass Attempt with IEditionUpgradeManager Elevated COM Interface
+
+Identifies attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) by abusing an elevated COM Interface to launch a rogue Windows ClipUp program. Attackers may attempt to bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and process.name : "Clipup.exe" and
+  not process.executable : "C:\\Windows\\System32\\ClipUp.exe" and process.parent.name : "dllhost.exe" and
+  /* CLSID of the Elevated COM Interface IEditionUpgradeManager */
+  process.parent.args : "/Processid:{BD54C901-076B-434E-B6C7-17C531F4AB41}"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
+** ID: T1548
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Bypass User Account Control
+** ID: T1548.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
+** ID: T1548
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Bypass User Account Control
+** ID: T1548.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Inter-Process Communication
+** ID: T1559
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Component Object Model
+** ID: T1559.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uac-bypass-via-diskcleanup-scheduled-task-hijack.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uac-bypass-via-diskcleanup-scheduled-task-hijack.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..09dbbc3430
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uac-bypass-via-diskcleanup-scheduled-task-hijack.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uac-bypass-via-diskcleanup-scheduled-task-hijack]]
+=== UAC Bypass via DiskCleanup Scheduled Task Hijack
+
+Identifies User Account Control (UAC) bypass via hijacking DiskCleanup Scheduled Task. Attackers bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+ process.args : "/autoclean" and process.args : "/d" and process.executable != null and 
+ not process.executable : ("C:\\Windows\\System32\\cleanmgr.exe",
+                           "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\cleanmgr.exe",
+                           "C:\\Windows\\System32\\taskhostw.exe")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
+** ID: T1548
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Bypass User Account Control
+** ID: T1548.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
+** ID: T1548
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Bypass User Account Control
+** ID: T1548.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task/Job
+** ID: T1053
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task
+** ID: T1053.005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uac-bypass-via-icmluautil-elevated-com-interface.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uac-bypass-via-icmluautil-elevated-com-interface.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0e11f0ce74
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uac-bypass-via-icmluautil-elevated-com-interface.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uac-bypass-via-icmluautil-elevated-com-interface]]
+=== UAC Bypass via ICMLuaUtil Elevated COM Interface
+
+Identifies User Account Control (UAC) bypass attempts via the ICMLuaUtil Elevated COM interface. Attackers may attempt to bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+ process.parent.name == "dllhost.exe" and
+ process.parent.args in ("/Processid:{3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7}", "/Processid:{D2E7041B-2927-42FB-8E9F-7CE93B6DC937}") and
+ process.pe.original_file_name != "WerFault.exe"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
+** ID: T1548
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Bypass User Account Control
+** ID: T1548.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
+** ID: T1548
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Bypass User Account Control
+** ID: T1548.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Inter-Process Communication
+** ID: T1559
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Component Object Model
+** ID: T1559.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uac-bypass-via-windows-firewall-snap-in-hijack.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uac-bypass-via-windows-firewall-snap-in-hijack.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c41bf31851
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uac-bypass-via-windows-firewall-snap-in-hijack.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uac-bypass-via-windows-firewall-snap-in-hijack]]
+=== UAC Bypass via Windows Firewall Snap-In Hijack
+
+Identifies attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) by hijacking the Microsoft Management Console (MMC) Windows Firewall snap-in. Attackers bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/AzAgarampur/byeintegrity-uac
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating UAC Bypass via Windows Firewall Snap-In Hijack*
+
+
+Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges (tracked as low to high integrity levels) to perform a task under administrator-level permissions, possibly by prompting the user for confirmation. UAC can deny an operation under high-integrity enforcement, or allow the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and enter an administrator password when prompted.
+
+For more information about the UAC and how it works, check the https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/how-user-account-control-works[official Microsoft docs page].
+
+This rule identifies attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) by hijacking the Microsoft Management Console (MMC) Windows Firewall snap-in. Attackers bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Inspect the host for suspicious or abnormal behavior in the alert timeframe.
+- Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze any suspicious spawned processes using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+ process.parent.name == "mmc.exe" and
+ /* process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name == "high" can be added in future for tuning */
+ /* args of the Windows Firewall SnapIn */
+  process.parent.args == "WF.msc" and process.name != "WerFault.exe"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
+** ID: T1548
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Bypass User Account Control
+** ID: T1548.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
+** ID: T1548
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Bypass User Account Control
+** ID: T1548.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: System Binary Proxy Execution
+** ID: T1218
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: MMC
+** ID: T1218.014
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/014/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uid-elevation-from-previously-unknown-executable.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uid-elevation-from-previously-unknown-executable.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5aafcec7a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uid-elevation-from-previously-unknown-executable.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uid-elevation-from-previously-unknown-executable]]
+=== UID Elevation from Previously Unknown Executable
+
+Monitors for the elevation of regular user permissions to root permissions through a previously unknown executable. Attackers may attempt to evade detection by hijacking the execution flow and hooking certain functions/syscalls through a rootkit in order to provide easy access to root via a special modified command.
+
+*Rule type*: new_terms
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 2
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows
+the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click Add integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Elastic Defend and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click Add Elastic Defend.
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either Traditional Endpoints or Cloud Workloads.
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest to select "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in New agent policy name. If other agent policies already exist, you can click the Existing hosts tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click Save and Continue.
+- To complete the integration, select Add Elastic Agent to your hosts and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+host.os.type:"linux" and event.category:"process" and event.action:"uid_change" and event.type:"change" and user.id:"0"
+and process.parent.name:("bash" or "dash" or "sh" or "tcsh" or "csh" or "zsh" or "ksh" or "fish") and not (
+  process.executable:(
+    /bin/* or /usr/bin/* or /sbin/* or /usr/sbin/* or /snap/* or /tmp/newroot/* or /var/lib/docker/* or /usr/local/*
+  ) or
+  process.name:(
+    "bash" or "dash" or "sh" or "tcsh" or "csh" or "zsh" or "ksh" or "fish" or "sudo" or "su" or "apt" or "apt-get" or
+    "aptitude" or "squid" or "snap" or "fusermount" or "pkexec" or "umount" or "master" or "omsbaseline" or "dzdo" or
+    "sandfly" or "logrotate"
+  ) or
+  process.args:/usr/bin/python*
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Hijack Execution Flow
+** ID: T1574
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: KernelCallbackTable
+** ID: T1574.013
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/013/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Rootkit
+** ID: T1014
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uncommon-registry-persistence-change.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uncommon-registry-persistence-change.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cea60486c5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uncommon-registry-persistence-change.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uncommon-registry-persistence-change]]
+=== Uncommon Registry Persistence Change
+
+Detects changes to registry persistence keys that are not commonly used or modified by legitimate programs. This could be an indication of an adversary's attempt to persist in a stealthy manner.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.registry*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/articles/article.aspx?p=2762082&seqNum=2
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+registry where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type in ("creation", "change") and
+ length(registry.data.strings) > 0 and
+ registry.path : (
+      "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Terminal Server\\Install\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\*",
+      "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Terminal Server\\Install\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Runonce\\*",
+      "HKEY_USERS\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows\\Load",
+      "HKEY_USERS\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows\\Run",
+      "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows\\IconServiceLib",
+      "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Shell",
+      "HKEY_USERS\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Shell",
+      "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\AppSetup",
+      "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Taskman",
+      "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Userinit",
+      "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\VmApplet",
+      "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run\\*",
+      "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\Shell",
+      "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\\Scripts\\Logoff\\Script",
+      "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\\Scripts\\Logon\\Script",
+      "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\\Scripts\\Shutdown\\Script",
+      "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\\Scripts\\Startup\\Script",
+      "HKEY_USERS\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run\\*",
+      "HKEY_USERS\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\Shell",
+      "HKEY_USERS\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\\Scripts\\Logoff\\Script",
+      "HKEY_USERS\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\\Scripts\\Logon\\Script",
+      "HKEY_USERS\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\\Scripts\\Shutdown\\Script",
+      "HKEY_USERS\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\\Scripts\\Startup\\Script",
+      "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Active Setup\\Installed Components\\*\\ShellComponent",
+      "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows CE Services\\AutoStartOnConnect\\MicrosoftActiveSync",
+      "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows CE Services\\AutoStartOnDisconnect\\MicrosoftActiveSync",
+      "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Ctf\\LangBarAddin\\*\\FilePath",
+      "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Extensions\\*\\Exec",
+      "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Extensions\\*\\Script",
+      "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Command Processor\\Autorun",
+      "HKEY_USERS\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Ctf\\LangBarAddin\\*\\FilePath",
+      "HKEY_USERS\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Extensions\\*\\Exec",
+      "HKEY_USERS\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Extensions\\*\\Script",
+      "HKEY_USERS\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Command Processor\\Autorun",
+      "HKEY_USERS\\*\\Control Panel\\Desktop\\scrnsave.exe",
+      "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\*\\VerifierDlls",
+      "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\GpExtensions\\*\\DllName",
+      "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet*\\Control\\SafeBoot\\AlternateShell",
+      "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet*\\Control\\Terminal Server\\Wds\\rdpwd\\StartupPrograms",
+      "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet*\\Control\\Terminal Server\\WinStations\\RDP-Tcp\\InitialProgram",
+      "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet*\\Control\\Session Manager\\BootExecute",
+      "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet*\\Control\\Session Manager\\SetupExecute",
+      "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet*\\Control\\Session Manager\\Execute",
+      "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet*\\Control\\Session Manager\\S0InitialCommand",
+      "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet*\\Control\\ServiceControlManagerExtension",
+      "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet*\\Control\\BootVerificationProgram\\ImagePath",
+      "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\Setup\\CmdLine",
+      "HKEY_USERS\\*\\Environment\\UserInitMprLogonScript") and
+
+ not registry.data.strings : ("C:\\Windows\\system32\\userinit.exe", "cmd.exe", "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe",
+                              "C:\\Program Files\\*.exe") and
+ not (process.name : "rundll32.exe" and registry.path : "*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Extensions\\*\\Script") and
+ not process.executable : ("C:\\Windows\\System32\\msiexec.exe",
+                           "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\msiexec.exe",
+                           "C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Platform\\*\\MsMpEng.exe",
+                           "C:\\Program Files\\*.exe",
+                           "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
+** ID: T1547
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
+** ID: T1547.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Event Triggered Execution
+** ID: T1546
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Screensaver
+** ID: T1546.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Modify Registry
+** ID: T1112
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unexpected-child-process-of-macos-screensaver-engine.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unexpected-child-process-of-macos-screensaver-engine.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4a4a95e225
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unexpected-child-process-of-macos-screensaver-engine.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unexpected-child-process-of-macos-screensaver-engine]]
+=== Unexpected Child Process of macOS Screensaver Engine
+
+Identifies when a child process is spawned by the screensaver engine process, which is consistent with an attacker's malicious payload being executed after the screensaver activated on the endpoint. An adversary can maintain persistence on a macOS endpoint by creating a malicious screensaver (.saver) file and configuring the screensaver plist file to execute code each time the screensaver is activated.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://posts.specterops.io/saving-your-access-d562bf5bf90b
+* https://github.com/D00MFist/PersistentJXA
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+- Analyze the descendant processes of the ScreenSaverEngine process for malicious code and suspicious behavior such
+as a download of a payload from a server.
+- Review the installed and activated screensaver on the host. Triage the screensaver (.saver) file that was triggered to
+identify whether the file is malicious or not.
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type == "start" and process.parent.name == "ScreenSaverEngine"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Event Triggered Execution
+** ID: T1546
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Screensaver
+** ID: T1546.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unknown-execution-of-binary-with-rwx-memory-region.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unknown-execution-of-binary-with-rwx-memory-region.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..80191985b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unknown-execution-of-binary-with-rwx-memory-region.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unknown-execution-of-binary-with-rwx-memory-region]]
+=== Unknown Execution of Binary with RWX Memory Region
+
+Monitors for the execution of a previously unknown unix binary with read, write and execute memory region permissions. The mprotect() system call is used to change the access protections on a region of memory that has already been allocated. This syscall allows a process to modify the permissions of pages in its virtual address space, enabling or disabling permissions such as read, write, and execute for those pages. RWX permissions on memory is in many cases overly permissive, and should be analyzed thoroughly.
+
+*Rule type*: new_terms
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/mprotect.2.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires the use of the `auditd_manager` integration. `Auditd_manager` is a tool designed to simplify and enhance the management of the audit subsystem in Linux systems. It provides a user-friendly interface and automation capabilities for configuring and monitoring system auditing through the auditd daemon. With `auditd_manager`, administrators can easily define audit rules, track system events, and generate comprehensive audit reports, improving overall security and compliance in the system. The following steps should be executed in order to install and deploy `auditd_manager` on a Linux system.
+```
+Kibana -->
+Management -->
+Integrations -->
+Auditd Manager -->
+Add Auditd Manager
+```
+`Auditd_manager` subscribes to the kernel and receives events as they occur without any additional configuration. However, if more advanced configuration is required to detect specific behavior, audit rules can be added to the integration in either the "audit rules" configuration box or the "auditd rule files" box by specifying a file to read the audit rules from.
+For this detection rule to trigger, the following additional audit rules are required to be added to the integration:
+```
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S mprotect
+```
+Add the newly installed `auditd manager` to an agent policy, and deploy the agent on a Linux system from which auditd log files are desirable.
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:linux and auditd.data.syscall:mprotect and auditd.data.a2:7
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Unix Shell
+** ID: T1059.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unsigned-dll-side-loading-from-a-suspicious-folder.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unsigned-dll-side-loading-from-a-suspicious-folder.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..411eaaa7e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unsigned-dll-side-loading-from-a-suspicious-folder.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unsigned-dll-side-loading-from-a-suspicious-folder]]
+=== Unsigned DLL Side-Loading from a Suspicious Folder
+
+Identifies a Windows trusted program running from locations often abused by adversaries to masquerade as a trusted program and loading a recently dropped DLL. This behavior may indicate an attempt to evade defenses via side-loading a malicious DLL within the memory space of a signed processes.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 7
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+library where host.os.type == "windows" and
+
+ process.code_signature.trusted == true and 
+ 
+ (dll.Ext.relative_file_creation_time <= 500 or dll.Ext.relative_file_name_modify_time <= 500) and 
+ 
+  not dll.code_signature.status : ("trusted", "errorExpired", "errorCode_endpoint*", "errorChaining") and 
+  
+      /* Suspicious Paths */
+      dll.path : ("?:\\PerfLogs\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Users\\*\\Pictures\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Users\\*\\Music\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Users\\Public\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Users\\*\\Documents\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\Tasks\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\System32\\Tasks\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Intel\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\AMD\\Temp\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\AppReadiness\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\ServiceState\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\security\\*.dll",
+		  "?:\\Windows\\System\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\IdentityCRL\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\Branding\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\csc\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\DigitalLocker\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\en-US\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\wlansvc\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\Prefetch\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\Fonts\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\diagnostics\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\TAPI\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\INF\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\windows\\tracing\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\windows\\IME\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\Performance\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\windows\\intel\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\windows\\ms\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\dot3svc\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\ServiceProfiles\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\panther\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\RemotePackages\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\OCR\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\appcompat\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\apppatch\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\addins\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\Setup\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\Help\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\SKB\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\Vss\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\Web\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\servicing\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\CbsTemp\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\Logs\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\WaaS\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\twain_32\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\ShellExperiences\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\ShellComponents\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\PLA\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\Migration\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\debug\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\Cursors\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\Containers\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\Boot\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\bcastdvr\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\TextInput\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\schemas\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\SchCache\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\Resources\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\rescache\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\Provisioning\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\PrintDialog\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\PolicyDefinitions\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\media\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\Globalization\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\L2Schemas\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\LiveKernelReports\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\ModemLogs\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\Windows\\ImmersiveControlPanel\\*.dll",
+                  "?:\\$Recycle.Bin\\*.dll") and 
+	 
+	 /* DLL loaded from the process.executable current directory */
+	 endswith~(substring(dll.path, 0, length(dll.path) - (length(dll.name) + 1)), substring(process.executable, 0, length(process.executable) - (length(process.name) + 1)))
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Masquerading
+** ID: T1036
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Invalid Code Signature
+** ID: T1036.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Hijack Execution Flow
+** ID: T1574
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: DLL Side-Loading
+** ID: T1574.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-child-process-from-a-system-virtual-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-child-process-from-a-system-virtual-process.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7625fd0cd2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-child-process-from-a-system-virtual-process.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-child-process-from-a-system-virtual-process]]
+=== Unusual Child Process from a System Virtual Process
+
+Identifies a suspicious child process of the Windows virtual system process, which could indicate code injection.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  process.parent.pid == 4 and process.executable : "?*" and
+  not process.executable : ("Registry", "MemCompression", "?:\\Windows\\System32\\smss.exe")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Process Injection
+** ID: T1055
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-child-process-of-dns-exe.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-child-process-of-dns-exe.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..60b7956bca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-child-process-of-dns-exe.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-child-process-of-dns-exe]]
+=== Unusual Child Process of dns.exe
+
+Identifies an unexpected process spawning from dns.exe, the process responsible for Windows DNS server services, which may indicate activity related to remote code execution or other forms of exploitation.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/
+* https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/07/14/july-2020-security-update-cve-2020-1350-vulnerability-in-windows-domain-name-system-dns-server/
+* https://github.com/maxpl0it/CVE-2020-1350-DoS
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/detection-rules-for-sigred-vulnerability
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Use Case: Vulnerability
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Unusual Child Process of dns.exe*
+
+
+SIGRed (CVE-2020-1350) is a wormable, critical vulnerability in the Windows DNS server that affects Windows Server versions 2003 to 2019 and can be triggered by a malicious DNS response. Because the service is running in elevated privileges (SYSTEM), an attacker that successfully exploits it is granted Domain Administrator rights. This can effectively compromise the entire corporate infrastructure.
+
+This rule looks for unusual children of the `dns.exe` process, which can indicate the exploitation of the SIGRed or a similar remote code execution vulnerability in the DNS server.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes.
+  - Any suspicious or abnormal child process spawned from dns.exe should be carefully reviewed and investigated. It's impossible to predict what an adversary may deploy as the follow-on process after the exploit, but built-in discovery/enumeration utilities should be top of mind (`whoami.exe`, `netstat.exe`, `systeminfo.exe`, `tasklist.exe`).
+  - Built-in Windows programs that contain capabilities used to download and execute additional payloads should also be considered. This is not an exhaustive list, but ideal candidates to start out would be: `mshta.exe`, `powershell.exe`, `regsvr32.exe`, `rundll32.exe`, `wscript.exe`, `wmic.exe`.
+  - If a denial-of-service (DoS) exploit is successful and DNS Server service crashes, be mindful of potential child processes related to `werfault.exe` occurring.
+- Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the host during the past 48 hours.
+- Check whether the server is vulnerable to CVE-2020-1350.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Reimage the host operating system or restore the compromised server to a clean state.
+- Install the latest patches on systems that run Microsoft DNS Server.
+- Consider the implementation of a patch management system, such as the Windows Server Update Services (WSUS).
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Review the privileges assigned to the user to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and process.parent.name : "dns.exe" and
+  not process.name : "conhost.exe"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation of Remote Services
+** ID: T1210
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-child-processes-of-rundll32.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-child-processes-of-rundll32.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9e3c7db10d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-child-processes-of-rundll32.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-child-processes-of-rundll32]]
+=== Unusual Child Processes of RunDLL32
+
+Identifies child processes of unusual instances of RunDLL32 where the command line parameters were suspicious. Misuse of RunDLL32 could indicate malicious activity.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 30m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-60m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Unusual Child Processes of RunDLL32*
+
+
+By examining the specific traits of Windows binaries -- such as process trees, command lines, network connections, registry modifications, and so on -- it's possible to establish a baseline of normal activity. Deviations from this baseline can indicate malicious activity, such as masquerading and deserve further investigation.
+
+RunDLL32 is a legitimate Windows utility used to load and execute functions within dynamic-link libraries (DLLs). However, adversaries may abuse RunDLL32 to execute malicious code, bypassing security measures and evading detection. This rule identifies potential abuse by looking for an unusual process creation with no arguments followed by the creation of a child process.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process, such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+- Investigate the behavior of child processes, such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned processes.
+- Inspect the host for suspicious or abnormal behavior in the alert timeframe.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Related Rules*
+
+
+- Unusual Network Connection via RunDLL32 - 52aaab7b-b51c-441a-89ce-4387b3aea886
+
+
+*Response and Remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence with maxspan=1h
+  [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+     (process.name : "rundll32.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name == "RUNDLL32.EXE") and
+      process.args_count == 1
+  ] by process.entity_id
+  [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and process.parent.name : "rundll32.exe"
+  ] by process.parent.entity_id
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: System Binary Proxy Execution
+** ID: T1218
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Rundll32
+** ID: T1218.011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-executable-file-creation-by-a-system-critical-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-executable-file-creation-by-a-system-critical-process.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..692c3e544f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-executable-file-creation-by-a-system-critical-process.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-executable-file-creation-by-a-system-critical-process]]
+=== Unusual Executable File Creation by a System Critical Process
+
+Identifies an unexpected executable file being created or modified by a Windows system critical process, which may indicate activity related to remote code execution or other forms of exploitation.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Unusual Executable File Creation by a System Critical Process*
+
+
+Windows internal/system processes have some characteristics that can be used to spot suspicious activities. One of these characteristics is file operations.
+
+This rule looks for the creation of executable files done by system-critical processes. This can indicate the exploitation of a vulnerability or a malicious process masquerading as a system-critical process.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type != "deletion" and
+  file.extension : ("exe", "dll") and
+  process.name : ("smss.exe",
+                  "autochk.exe",
+                  "csrss.exe",
+                  "wininit.exe",
+                  "services.exe",
+                  "lsass.exe",
+                  "winlogon.exe",
+                  "userinit.exe",
+                  "LogonUI.exe")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation for Defense Evasion
+** ID: T1211
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation for Client Execution
+** ID: T1203
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-file-creation-alternate-data-stream.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-file-creation-alternate-data-stream.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dbdcd723cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-file-creation-alternate-data-stream.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-file-creation-alternate-data-stream]]
+=== Unusual File Creation - Alternate Data Stream
+
+Identifies suspicious creation of Alternate Data Streams on highly targeted files. This is uncommon for legitimate files and sometimes done by adversaries to hide malware.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 113
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Unusual File Creation - Alternate Data Stream*
+
+
+Alternate Data Streams (ADS) are file attributes only found on the NTFS file system. In this file system, files are built up from a couple of attributes; one of them is $Data, also known as the data attribute.
+
+The regular data stream, also referred to as the unnamed data stream since the name string of this attribute is empty, contains the data inside the file. So any data stream that has a name is considered an alternate data stream.
+
+Attackers can abuse these alternate data streams to hide malicious files, string payloads, etc. This rule detects the creation of alternate data streams on highly targeted file types.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Retrieve the contents of the alternate data stream, and analyze it for potential maliciousness. Analysts can use the following PowerShell cmdlet to accomplish this:
+  - `Get-Content C:\Path\To\file.exe -stream SampleAlternateDataStreamName`
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- If this activity is expected and noisy in your environment, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of process executable and file conditions.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "creation" and
+
+  file.path : "C:\\*:*" and
+  not file.path : 
+          ("C:\\*:zone.identifier*",
+           "C:\\users\\*\\appdata\\roaming\\microsoft\\teams\\old_weblogs_*:$DATA") and
+
+  not process.executable :
+          ("?:\\windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
+           "?:\\Windows\\System32\\inetsrv\\w3wp.exe",
+           "?:\\Windows\\explorer.exe",
+           "?:\\Windows\\System32\\sihost.exe",
+           "?:\\Windows\\System32\\PickerHost.exe",
+           "?:\\Windows\\System32\\SearchProtocolHost.exe",
+           "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Dropbox\\Client\\Dropbox.exe",
+           "?:\\Program Files\\Rivet Networks\\SmartByte\\SmartByteNetworkService.exe",
+           "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft\\Edge\\Application\\msedge.exe",
+           "?:\\Program Files\\ExpressConnect\\ExpressConnectNetworkService.exe",
+           "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Google\\Chrome\\Application\\chrome.exe",
+           "?:\\Program Files\\Google\\Chrome\\Application\\chrome.exe",
+           "?:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox.exe",
+           "?:\\Program Files(x86)\\Microsoft Office\\root\\*\\EXCEL.EXE",
+           "?:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\*\\EXCEL.EXE",
+           "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft Office\\root\\*\\OUTLOOK.EXE",
+           "?:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\*\\OUTLOOK.EXE",
+           "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft Office\\root\\*\\POWERPNT.EXE",
+           "?:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\*\\POWERPNT.EXE",
+           "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft Office\\root\\*\\WINWORD.EXE",
+           "?:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\*\\WINWORD.EXE") and
+
+  file.extension :
+    (
+      "pdf",
+      "dll",
+      "png",
+      "exe",
+      "dat",
+      "com",
+      "bat",
+      "cmd",
+      "sys",
+      "vbs",
+      "ps1",
+      "hta",
+      "txt",
+      "vbe",
+      "js",
+      "wsh",
+      "docx",
+      "doc",
+      "xlsx",
+      "xls",
+      "pptx",
+      "ppt",
+      "rtf",
+      "gif",
+      "jpg",
+      "png",
+      "bmp",
+      "img",
+      "iso"
+    )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Hide Artifacts
+** ID: T1564
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: NTFS File Attributes
+** ID: T1564.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-file-modification-by-dns-exe.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-file-modification-by-dns-exe.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d2cd460bb5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-file-modification-by-dns-exe.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-file-modification-by-dns-exe]]
+=== Unusual File Modification by dns.exe
+
+Identifies an unexpected file being modified by dns.exe, the process responsible for Windows DNS Server services, which may indicate activity related to remote code execution or other forms of exploitation.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/
+* https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/07/14/july-2020-security-update-cve-2020-1350-vulnerability-in-windows-domain-name-system-dns-server/
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/detection-rules-for-sigred-vulnerability
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Use Case: Vulnerability
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Unusual File Write*
+
+Detection alerts from this rule indicate potential unusual/abnormal file writes from the DNS Server service process (`dns.exe`) after exploitation from CVE-2020-1350 (SigRed) has occurred. Here are some possible avenues of investigation:
+- Post-exploitation, adversaries may write additional files or payloads to the system as additional discovery/exploitation/persistence mechanisms.
+- Any suspicious or abnormal files written from `dns.exe` should be reviewed and investigated with care.
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "windows" and process.name : "dns.exe" and event.type in ("creation", "deletion", "change") and
+  not file.name : "dns.log" and not
+  (file.extension : ("old", "temp", "bak", "dns", "arpa") and file.path : "C:\\Windows\\System32\\dns\\*")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation of Remote Services
+** ID: T1210
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-network-activity-from-a-windows-system-binary.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-network-activity-from-a-windows-system-binary.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4a7b48569d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-network-activity-from-a-windows-system-binary.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-network-activity-from-a-windows-system-binary]]
+=== Unusual Network Activity from a Windows System Binary
+
+Identifies network activity from unexpected system applications. This may indicate adversarial activity as these applications are often leveraged by adversaries to execute code and evade detection.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Unusual Network Activity from a Windows System Binary*
+
+
+Attackers can abuse certain trusted developer utilities to proxy the execution of malicious payloads. Since these utilities are usually signed, they can bypass the security controls that were put in place to prevent or detect direct execution.
+
+This rule identifies network connections established by trusted developer utilities, which can indicate abuse to execute payloads or process masquerading.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate abnormal behaviors observed by the subject process, such as registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- As trusted developer utilities have dual-use purposes, alerts derived from this rule are not essentially malicious. If these utilities are contacting internal or known trusted domains, review their security and consider creating exceptions if the domain is safe.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+  - If the malicious file was delivered via phishing:
+    - Block the email sender from sending future emails.
+    - Block the malicious web pages.
+    - Remove emails from the sender from mailboxes.
+    - Consider improvements to the security awareness program.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by process.entity_id with maxspan=5m
+  [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+
+     /* known applocker bypasses */
+     (process.name : "bginfo.exe" or
+      process.name : "cdb.exe" or
+      process.name : "control.exe" or
+      process.name : "cmstp.exe" or
+      process.name : "csi.exe" or
+      process.name : "dnx.exe" or
+      process.name : "fsi.exe" or
+      process.name : "ieexec.exe" or
+      process.name : "iexpress.exe" or
+      process.name : "installutil.exe" or
+      process.name : "Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe" or
+      process.name : "MSBuild.exe" or
+      process.name : "msdt.exe" or
+      process.name : "mshta.exe" or
+      process.name : "msiexec.exe" or
+      process.name : "msxsl.exe" or
+      process.name : "odbcconf.exe" or
+      process.name : "rcsi.exe" or
+      process.name : "regsvr32.exe" or
+      process.name : "xwizard.exe")]
+  [network where
+     (process.name : "bginfo.exe" or
+      process.name : "cdb.exe" or
+      process.name : "control.exe" or
+      process.name : "cmstp.exe" or
+      process.name : "csi.exe" or
+      process.name : "dnx.exe" or
+      process.name : "fsi.exe" or
+      process.name : "ieexec.exe" or
+      process.name : "iexpress.exe" or
+      process.name : "installutil.exe" or
+      process.name : "Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe" or
+      (
+        process.name : "msbuild.exe" and
+          destination.ip != "127.0.0.1"
+      ) or
+      process.name : "msdt.exe" or
+      process.name : "mshta.exe" or
+      (
+        process.name : "msiexec.exe" and not
+        dns.question.name : (
+           "ocsp.digicert.com", "ocsp.verisign.com", "ocsp.comodoca.com", "ocsp.entrust.net", "ocsp.usertrust.com",
+           "ocsp.godaddy.com", "ocsp.camerfirma.com", "ocsp.globalsign.com", "ocsp.sectigo.com", "*.local"
+        ) and
+        /* Localhost, DigiCert and Comodo CA IP addresses */
+        not cidrmatch(destination.ip, "127.0.0.1", "192.229.211.108/32", "192.229.221.95/32",
+                      "152.195.38.76/32", "104.18.14.101/32")
+      ) or
+      process.name : "msxsl.exe" or
+      process.name : "odbcconf.exe" or
+      process.name : "rcsi.exe" or
+      process.name : "regsvr32.exe" or
+      process.name : "xwizard.exe")]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
+** ID: T1127
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: MSBuild
+** ID: T1127.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Mshta
+** ID: T1218.005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Masquerading
+** ID: T1036
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Match Legitimate Name or Location
+** ID: T1036.005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-network-connection-via-dllhost.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-network-connection-via-dllhost.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ad29a56c0a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-network-connection-via-dllhost.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-network-connection-via-dllhost]]
+=== Unusual Network Connection via DllHost
+
+Identifies unusual instances of dllhost.exe making outbound network connections. This may indicate adversarial Command and Control activity.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/27/new-sophisticated-email-based-attack-from-nobelium/
+* https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/05/27/suspected-apt29-operation-launches-election-fraud-themed-phishing-campaigns/
+* https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv4-special-registry/iana-ipv4-special-registry.xhtml
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id, process.entity_id with maxspan=1m
+  [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and process.name : "dllhost.exe" and process.args_count == 1]
+  [network where host.os.type == "windows" and process.name : "dllhost.exe" and
+   not cidrmatch(destination.ip, "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.0.0.0/24",
+    "192.0.0.0/29", "192.0.0.8/32", "192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.0.10/32", "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32", "192.0.2.0/24",
+    "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "100.64.0.0/10",
+    "192.175.48.0/24", "198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "240.0.0.0/4", "::1", "FE80::/10",
+    "FF00::/8")]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: System Binary Proxy Execution
+** ID: T1218
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-network-connection-via-rundll32.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-network-connection-via-rundll32.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3af3764143
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-network-connection-via-rundll32.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-network-connection-via-rundll32]]
+=== Unusual Network Connection via RunDLL32
+
+Identifies unusual instances of rundll32.exe making outbound network connections. This may indicate adversarial Command and Control activity.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv4-special-registry/iana-ipv4-special-registry.xhtml
+* https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/rundll32/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Tactic: Command and Control
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Unusual Network Connection via RunDLL32*
+
+
+RunDLL32 is a built-in Windows utility and also a vital component used by the operating system itself. The functionality provided by RunDLL32 to execute Dynamic Link Libraries (DLLs) is widely abused by attackers, because it makes it hard to differentiate malicious activity from normal operations.
+
+This rule looks for external network connections established using RunDLL32 when the utility is being executed with no arguments, which can potentially indicate command and control activity.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate the target host that RunDLL32 is communicating with.
+  - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+  - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+- Identify the target computer and its role in the IT environment.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Review the privileges assigned to the user to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id, process.entity_id with maxspan=1m
+  [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and process.name : "rundll32.exe" and process.args_count == 1]
+  [network where host.os.type == "windows" and process.name : "rundll32.exe" and
+   not cidrmatch(destination.ip, "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.0.0.0/24",
+       "192.0.0.0/29", "192.0.0.8/32", "192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.0.10/32", "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32",
+       "192.0.2.0/24", "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4",
+       "100.64.0.0/10", "192.175.48.0/24","198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "240.0.0.0/4", "::1",
+       "FE80::/10", "FF00::/8")]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: System Binary Proxy Execution
+** ID: T1218
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Rundll32
+** ID: T1218.011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Application Layer Protocol
+** ID: T1071
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Web Protocols
+** ID: T1071.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-parent-child-relationship.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-parent-child-relationship.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..54e1e8a310
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-parent-child-relationship.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-parent-child-relationship]]
+=== Unusual Parent-Child Relationship
+
+Identifies Windows programs run from unexpected parent processes. This could indicate masquerading or other strange activity on a system.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/sbousseaden/Slides/blob/master/Hunting%20MindMaps/PNG/Windows%20Processes%20TH.map.png
+* https://www.andreafortuna.org/2017/06/15/standard-windows-processes-a-brief-reference/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Unusual Parent-Child Relationship*
+
+
+Windows internal/system processes have some characteristics that can be used to spot suspicious activities. One of these characteristics is parent-child relationships. These relationships can be used to baseline the typical behavior of the system and then alert on occurrences that don't comply with the baseline.
+
+This rule uses this information to spot suspicious parent and child processes.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+process.parent.name != null and
+ (
+   /* suspicious parent processes */
+   (process.name:"autochk.exe" and not process.parent.name:"smss.exe") or
+   (process.name:("fontdrvhost.exe", "dwm.exe") and not process.parent.name:("wininit.exe", "winlogon.exe")) or
+   (process.name:("consent.exe", "RuntimeBroker.exe", "TiWorker.exe") and not process.parent.name:"svchost.exe") or
+   (process.name:"SearchIndexer.exe" and not process.parent.name:"services.exe") or
+   (process.name:"SearchProtocolHost.exe" and not process.parent.name:("SearchIndexer.exe", "dllhost.exe")) or
+   (process.name:"dllhost.exe" and not process.parent.name:("services.exe", "svchost.exe")) or
+   (process.name:"smss.exe" and not process.parent.name:("System", "smss.exe")) or
+   (process.name:"csrss.exe" and not process.parent.name:("smss.exe", "svchost.exe")) or
+   (process.name:"wininit.exe" and not process.parent.name:"smss.exe") or
+   (process.name:"winlogon.exe" and not process.parent.name:"smss.exe") or
+   (process.name:("lsass.exe", "LsaIso.exe") and not process.parent.name:"wininit.exe") or
+   (process.name:"LogonUI.exe" and not process.parent.name:("wininit.exe", "winlogon.exe")) or
+   (process.name:"services.exe" and not process.parent.name:"wininit.exe") or
+   (process.name:"svchost.exe" and not process.parent.name:("MsMpEng.exe", "services.exe", "svchost.exe")) or
+   (process.name:"spoolsv.exe" and not process.parent.name:"services.exe") or
+   (process.name:"taskhost.exe" and not process.parent.name:("services.exe", "svchost.exe", "ngentask.exe")) or
+   (process.name:"taskhostw.exe" and not process.parent.name:("services.exe", "svchost.exe")) or
+   (process.name:"userinit.exe" and not process.parent.name:("dwm.exe", "winlogon.exe")) or
+   (process.name:("wmiprvse.exe", "wsmprovhost.exe", "winrshost.exe") and not process.parent.name:"svchost.exe") or
+   /* suspicious child processes */
+   (process.parent.name:("SearchProtocolHost.exe", "taskhost.exe", "csrss.exe") and not process.name:("werfault.exe", "wermgr.exe", "WerFaultSecure.exe", "conhost.exe")) or
+   (process.parent.name:"autochk.exe" and not process.name:("chkdsk.exe", "doskey.exe", "WerFault.exe")) or
+   (process.parent.name:"smss.exe" and not process.name:("autochk.exe", "smss.exe", "csrss.exe", "wininit.exe", "winlogon.exe", "setupcl.exe", "WerFault.exe")) or
+   (process.parent.name:"wermgr.exe" and not process.name:("WerFaultSecure.exe", "wermgr.exe", "WerFault.exe")) or
+   (process.parent.name:"conhost.exe" and not process.name:("mscorsvw.exe", "wermgr.exe", "WerFault.exe", "WerFaultSecure.exe"))
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Process Injection
+** ID: T1055
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Process Hollowing
+** ID: T1055.012
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-parent-process-for-cmd-exe.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-parent-process-for-cmd-exe.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0ef2e309d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-parent-process-for-cmd-exe.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-parent-process-for-cmd-exe]]
+=== Unusual Parent Process for cmd.exe
+
+Identifies a suspicious parent child process relationship with cmd.exe descending from an unusual process.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  process.name : "cmd.exe" and
+  process.parent.name : ("lsass.exe",
+                         "csrss.exe",
+                         "epad.exe",
+                         "regsvr32.exe",
+                         "dllhost.exe",
+                         "LogonUI.exe",
+                         "wermgr.exe",
+                         "spoolsv.exe",
+                         "jucheck.exe",
+                         "jusched.exe",
+                         "ctfmon.exe",
+                         "taskhostw.exe",
+                         "GoogleUpdate.exe",
+                         "sppsvc.exe",
+                         "sihost.exe",
+                         "slui.exe",
+                         "SIHClient.exe",
+                         "SearchIndexer.exe",
+                         "SearchProtocolHost.exe",
+                         "FlashPlayerUpdateService.exe",
+                         "WerFault.exe",
+                         "WUDFHost.exe",
+                         "unsecapp.exe",
+                         "wlanext.exe" ) and
+  not (process.parent.name : "dllhost.exe" and process.parent.args : "/Processid:{CA8C87C1-929D-45BA-94DB-EF8E6CB346AD}")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-persistence-via-services-registry.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-persistence-via-services-registry.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e5ae61408f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-persistence-via-services-registry.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-persistence-via-services-registry]]
+=== Unusual Persistence via Services Registry
+
+Identifies processes modifying the services registry key directly, instead of through the expected Windows APIs. This could be an indication of an adversary attempting to stealthily persist through abnormal service creation or modification of an existing service.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+registry where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "change" and
+  registry.path : (
+      "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet*\\Services\\*\\ServiceDLL",
+      "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet*\\Services\\*\\ImagePath",
+      "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet*\\Services\\*\\ServiceDLL",
+      "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet*\\Services\\*\\ImagePath"
+  ) and not registry.data.strings : (
+      "?:\\windows\\system32\\Drivers\\*.sys",
+      "\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\*.sys",
+      "\\??\\?:\\Windows\\system32\\Drivers\\*.SYS",
+      "system32\\DRIVERS\\USBSTOR") and
+  not (process.name : "procexp??.exe" and registry.data.strings : "?:\\*\\procexp*.sys") and
+  not process.executable : (
+      "?:\\Program Files\\*.exe",
+      "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe",
+      "?:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
+      "?:\\Windows\\winsxs\\*\\TiWorker.exe",
+      "?:\\Windows\\System32\\drvinst.exe",
+      "?:\\Windows\\System32\\services.exe",
+      "?:\\Windows\\System32\\msiexec.exe",
+      "?:\\Windows\\System32\\regsvr32.exe")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Create or Modify System Process
+** ID: T1543
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Windows Service
+** ID: T1543.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Modify Registry
+** ID: T1112
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-print-spooler-child-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-print-spooler-child-process.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..610e1a69da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-print-spooler-child-process.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-print-spooler-child-process]]
+=== Unusual Print Spooler Child Process
+
+Detects unusual Print Spooler service (spoolsv.exe) child processes. This may indicate an attempt to exploit privilege escalation vulnerabilities related to the Printing Service on Windows.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34527
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Use Case: Vulnerability
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+ process.parent.name : "spoolsv.exe" and process.command_line != null and 
+ (?process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name : "System" or ?winlog.event_data.IntegrityLevel : "System") and
+
+ /* exclusions for FP control below */
+ not process.name : ("splwow64.exe", "PDFCreator.exe", "acrodist.exe", "spoolsv.exe", "msiexec.exe", "route.exe", "WerFault.exe") and
+ not process.command_line : "*\\WINDOWS\\system32\\spool\\DRIVERS*" and
+ not (process.name : "net.exe" and process.command_line : ("*stop*", "*start*")) and
+ not (process.name : ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe") and process.command_line : ("*.spl*", "*\\program files*", "*route add*")) and
+ not (process.name : "netsh.exe" and process.command_line : ("*add portopening*", "*rule name*")) and
+ not (process.name : "regsvr32.exe" and process.command_line : "*PrintConfig.dll*") and
+ not process.executable : (
+    "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\CutePDF Writer\\CPWriter2.exe",
+    "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\GPLGS\\gswin32c.exe"
+ )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
+** ID: T1068
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-process-execution-path-alternate-data-stream.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-process-execution-path-alternate-data-stream.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..095424a885
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-process-execution-path-alternate-data-stream.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-process-execution-path-alternate-data-stream]]
+=== Unusual Process Execution Path - Alternate Data Stream
+
+Identifies processes running from an Alternate Data Stream. This is uncommon for legitimate processes and sometimes done by adversaries to hide malware.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  process.args : "?:\\*:*" and process.args_count == 1
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Hide Artifacts
+** ID: T1564
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: NTFS File Attributes
+** ID: T1564.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-process-network-connection.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-process-network-connection.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..43ee8de89d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-process-network-connection.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-process-network-connection]]
+=== Unusual Process Network Connection
+
+Identifies network activity from unexpected system applications. This may indicate adversarial activity as these applications are often leveraged by adversaries to execute code and evade detection.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Unusual Process Network Connection*
+
+
+This rule identifies network activity from unexpected system utilities and applications. These applications are commonly abused by attackers to execute code, evade detections, and bypass security protections.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate the target host that the process is communicating with.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Review the privileges assigned to the user to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by process.entity_id
+  [process where host.os.type == "windows" and (process.name : "Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe" or
+                  process.name : "bginfo.exe" or
+                  process.name : "cdb.exe" or
+                  process.name : "cmstp.exe" or
+                  process.name : "csi.exe" or
+                  process.name : "dnx.exe" or
+                  process.name : "fsi.exe" or
+                  process.name : "ieexec.exe" or
+                  process.name : "iexpress.exe" or
+                  process.name : "odbcconf.exe" or
+                  process.name : "rcsi.exe" or
+                  process.name : "xwizard.exe") and
+     event.type == "start"]
+  [network where host.os.type == "windows" and (process.name : "Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe" or
+                  process.name : "bginfo.exe" or
+                  process.name : "cdb.exe" or
+                  process.name : "cmstp.exe" or
+                  process.name : "csi.exe" or
+                  process.name : "dnx.exe" or
+                  process.name : "fsi.exe" or
+                  process.name : "ieexec.exe" or
+                  process.name : "iexpress.exe" or
+                  process.name : "odbcconf.exe" or
+                  process.name : "rcsi.exe" or
+                  process.name : "xwizard.exe")]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
+** ID: T1127
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-process-spawned-by-a-host.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-process-spawned-by-a-host.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b8b1c8cd16
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-process-spawned-by-a-host.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-process-spawned-by-a-host]]
+=== Unusual Process Spawned by a Host
+
+A machine learning job has detected a suspicious Windows process. This process has been classified as suspicious in two ways. It was predicted to be suspicious by the ProblemChild supervised ML model, and it was found to be an unusual process, on a host that does not commonly manifest malicious activity. Such a process may be an instance of suspicious or malicious activity, possibly involving LOLbins, that may be resistant to detection using conventional search rules.
+
+*Rule type*: machine_learning
+
+*Rule indices*: None
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 15m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-45m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html
+* https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/problemchild
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/detecting-living-off-the-land-attacks-with-new-elastic-integration
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Living off the Land Attack Detection
+* Rule Type: ML
+* Rule Type: Machine Learning
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The rule requires the Living off the Land (LotL) Attack Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as Windows process events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend or Winlogbeat.  
+
+
+*LotL Attack Detection Setup*
+
+The LotL Attack Detection integration detects living-off-the-land activity in Windows process events.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for LotL Attack Detection.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+- Windows process events collected by the https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/endpoint[Elastic Defend] integration or Winlogbeat(https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/winlogbeat/current/_winlogbeat_overview.html).
+- To install Elastic Defend, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[documentation].
+- To set up and run Winlogbeat, follow https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/winlogbeat/current/winlogbeat-installation-configuration.html[this] guide.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed to install assets associated with the LotL Attack Detection integration:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Living off the Land Attack Detection and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Under Settings, click Install Living off the Land Attack Detection assets and follow the prompts to install the assets.
+
+
+*Ingest Pipeline Setup*
+
+Before you can enable this rule, you'll need to enrich Windows process events with predictions from the Supervised LotL Attack Detection model. This is done via the ingest pipeline named `<package_version>-problem_child_ingest_pipeline` installed with the LotL Attack Detection package.
+- If using an Elastic Beat such as Winlogbeat, add the LotL ingest pipeline to it by adding a simple configuration https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/current/ingest.html#pipelines-for-beats[setting] to `winlogbeat.yml`.
+- If adding the LotL ingest pipeline to an existing pipeline, use a https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/current/pipeline-processor.html[pipeline processor].
+
+
+*Adding Custom Mappings*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Stack Management.
+- Under Data click Index Management and navigate to the Component Templates tab.
+- Templates that can be edited to add custom components will be marked with a @custom suffix. Edit the @custom component template corresponding to the beat/integration you added the LotL ingest pipeline to, by pasting the following JSON blob in the "Load JSON" flyout:
+```
+{
+  "properties": {
+    "problemchild": {
+      "properties": {
+        "prediction": {
+          "type": "long"
+        },
+        "prediction_probability": {
+          "type": "float"
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "blocklist_label": {
+      "type": "long"
+    }
+  }
+}
+```
+
+
+*Anomaly Detection Setup*
+
+Before you can enable this rule, you'll need to enable the corresponding Anomaly Detection job. 
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Analytics, click Machine Learning.
+- Under Anomaly Detection, click Jobs, and then click "Create job". Select the Data View containing your enriched Windows process events. For example, this would be `logs-endpoint.events.*` if you used Elastic Defend to collect events, or `winlogbeat-*` if you used Winlogbeat.
+- If the selected Data View contains events that match the query in https://github.com/elastic/integrations/blob/main/packages/problemchild/kibana/ml_module/problemchild-ml.json[this] configuration file, you will see a card for "Living off the Land Attack Detection" under "Use preconfigured jobs".
+- Keep the default settings and click "Create jobs" to start the anomaly detection job and datafeed.
+
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: System Binary Proxy Execution
+** ID: T1218
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-process-spawned-by-a-parent-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-process-spawned-by-a-parent-process.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5d5a86abba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-process-spawned-by-a-parent-process.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-process-spawned-by-a-parent-process]]
+=== Unusual Process Spawned by a Parent Process
+
+A machine learning job has detected a suspicious Windows process. This process has been classified as malicious in two ways. It was predicted to be malicious by the ProblemChild supervised ML model, and it was found to be an unusual child process name, for the parent process, by an unsupervised ML model. Such a process may be an instance of suspicious or malicious activity, possibly involving LOLbins, that may be resistant to detection using conventional search rules.
+
+*Rule type*: machine_learning
+
+*Rule indices*: None
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 15m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-45m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html
+* https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/problemchild
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/detecting-living-off-the-land-attacks-with-new-elastic-integration
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Living off the Land Attack Detection
+* Rule Type: ML
+* Rule Type: Machine Learning
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The rule requires the Living off the Land (LotL) Attack Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as Windows process events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend or Winlogbeat.  
+
+
+*LotL Attack Detection Setup*
+
+The LotL Attack Detection integration detects living-off-the-land activity in Windows process events.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for LotL Attack Detection.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+- Windows process events collected by the https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/endpoint[Elastic Defend] integration or Winlogbeat(https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/winlogbeat/current/_winlogbeat_overview.html).
+- To install Elastic Defend, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[documentation].
+- To set up and run Winlogbeat, follow https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/winlogbeat/current/winlogbeat-installation-configuration.html[this] guide.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed to install assets associated with the LotL Attack Detection integration:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Living off the Land Attack Detection and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Under Settings, click Install Living off the Land Attack Detection assets and follow the prompts to install the assets.
+
+
+*Ingest Pipeline Setup*
+
+Before you can enable this rule, you'll need to enrich Windows process events with predictions from the Supervised LotL Attack Detection model. This is done via the ingest pipeline named `<package_version>-problem_child_ingest_pipeline` installed with the LotL Attack Detection package.
+- If using an Elastic Beat such as Winlogbeat, add the LotL ingest pipeline to it by adding a simple configuration https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/current/ingest.html#pipelines-for-beats[setting] to `winlogbeat.yml`.
+- If adding the LotL ingest pipeline to an existing pipeline, use a https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/current/pipeline-processor.html[pipeline processor].
+
+
+*Adding Custom Mappings*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Stack Management.
+- Under Data click Index Management and navigate to the Component Templates tab.
+- Templates that can be edited to add custom components will be marked with a @custom suffix. Edit the @custom component template corresponding to the beat/integration you added the LotL ingest pipeline to, by pasting the following JSON blob in the "Load JSON" flyout:
+```
+{
+  "properties": {
+    "problemchild": {
+      "properties": {
+        "prediction": {
+          "type": "long"
+        },
+        "prediction_probability": {
+          "type": "float"
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "blocklist_label": {
+      "type": "long"
+    }
+  }
+}
+```
+
+
+*Anomaly Detection Setup*
+
+Before you can enable this rule, you'll need to enable the corresponding Anomaly Detection job. 
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Analytics, click Machine Learning.
+- Under Anomaly Detection, click Jobs, and then click "Create job". Select the Data View containing your enriched Windows process events. For example, this would be `logs-endpoint.events.*` if you used Elastic Defend to collect events, or `winlogbeat-*` if you used Winlogbeat.
+- If the selected Data View contains events that match the query in https://github.com/elastic/integrations/blob/main/packages/problemchild/kibana/ml_module/problemchild-ml.json[this] configuration file, you will see a card for "Living off the Land Attack Detection" under "Use preconfigured jobs".
+- Keep the default settings and click "Create jobs" to start the anomaly detection job and datafeed.
+
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Masquerading
+** ID: T1036
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-process-spawned-by-a-user.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-process-spawned-by-a-user.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ed1e0109ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-process-spawned-by-a-user.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-process-spawned-by-a-user]]
+=== Unusual Process Spawned by a User
+
+A machine learning job has detected a suspicious Windows process. This process has been classified as malicious in two ways. It was predicted to be malicious by the ProblemChild supervised ML model, and it was found to be suspicious given that its user context is unusual and does not commonly manifest malicious activity,by an unsupervised ML model. Such a process may be an instance of suspicious or malicious activity, possibly involving LOLbins, that may be resistant to detection using conventional search rules.
+
+*Rule type*: machine_learning
+
+*Rule indices*: None
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 15m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-45m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html
+* https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/problemchild
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/detecting-living-off-the-land-attacks-with-new-elastic-integration
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Living off the Land Attack Detection
+* Rule Type: ML
+* Rule Type: Machine Learning
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The rule requires the Living off the Land (LotL) Attack Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as Windows process events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend or Winlogbeat.  
+
+
+*LotL Attack Detection Setup*
+
+The LotL Attack Detection integration detects living-off-the-land activity in Windows process events.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for LotL Attack Detection.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+- Windows process events collected by the https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/endpoint[Elastic Defend] integration or Winlogbeat(https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/winlogbeat/current/_winlogbeat_overview.html).
+- To install Elastic Defend, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[documentation].
+- To set up and run Winlogbeat, follow https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/winlogbeat/current/winlogbeat-installation-configuration.html[this] guide.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed to install assets associated with the LotL Attack Detection integration:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Living off the Land Attack Detection and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Under Settings, click Install Living off the Land Attack Detection assets and follow the prompts to install the assets.
+
+
+*Ingest Pipeline Setup*
+
+Before you can enable this rule, you'll need to enrich Windows process events with predictions from the Supervised LotL Attack Detection model. This is done via the ingest pipeline named `<package_version>-problem_child_ingest_pipeline` installed with the LotL Attack Detection package.
+- If using an Elastic Beat such as Winlogbeat, add the LotL ingest pipeline to it by adding a simple configuration https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/current/ingest.html#pipelines-for-beats[setting] to `winlogbeat.yml`.
+- If adding the LotL ingest pipeline to an existing pipeline, use a https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/current/pipeline-processor.html[pipeline processor].
+
+
+*Adding Custom Mappings*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Stack Management.
+- Under Data click Index Management and navigate to the Component Templates tab.
+- Templates that can be edited to add custom components will be marked with a @custom suffix. Edit the @custom component template corresponding to the beat/integration you added the LotL ingest pipeline to, by pasting the following JSON blob in the "Load JSON" flyout:
+```
+{
+  "properties": {
+    "problemchild": {
+      "properties": {
+        "prediction": {
+          "type": "long"
+        },
+        "prediction_probability": {
+          "type": "float"
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "blocklist_label": {
+      "type": "long"
+    }
+  }
+}
+```
+
+
+*Anomaly Detection Setup*
+
+Before you can enable this rule, you'll need to enable the corresponding Anomaly Detection job. 
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Analytics, click Machine Learning.
+- Under Anomaly Detection, click Jobs, and then click "Create job". Select the Data View containing your enriched Windows process events. For example, this would be `logs-endpoint.events.*` if you used Elastic Defend to collect events, or `winlogbeat-*` if you used Winlogbeat.
+- If the selected Data View contains events that match the query in https://github.com/elastic/integrations/blob/main/packages/problemchild/kibana/ml_module/problemchild-ml.json[this] configuration file, you will see a card for "Living off the Land Attack Detection" under "Use preconfigured jobs".
+- Keep the default settings and click "Create jobs" to start the anomaly detection job and datafeed.
+
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Masquerading
+** ID: T1036
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-process-writing-data-to-an-external-device.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-process-writing-data-to-an-external-device.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fd226500d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-process-writing-data-to-an-external-device.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-process-writing-data-to-an-external-device]]
+=== Unusual Process Writing Data to an External Device
+
+A machine learning job has detected a rare process writing data to an external device. Malicious actors often use benign-looking processes to mask their data exfiltration activities. The discovery of such a process that has no legitimate reason to write data to external devices can indicate exfiltration.
+
+*Rule type*: machine_learning
+
+*Rule indices*: None
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 15m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-2h ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html
+* https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/ded
+* https://www.elastic.co/blog/detect-data-exfiltration-activity-with-kibanas-new-integration
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Use Case: Data Exfiltration Detection
+* Rule Type: ML
+* Rule Type: Machine Learning
+* Tactic: Exfiltration
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The rule requires the Data Exfiltration Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as network and file events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend and Network Packet Capture (for network events only).  
+
+
+*Data Exfiltration Detection Setup*
+
+The Data Exfiltration Detection integration detects data exfiltration activity by identifying abnormalities in network and file events. Anomalies are detected using Elastic's Anomaly Detection feature. 
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Data Exfiltration Detection.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+- File events collected by the Elastic Defend integration.
+- To install Elastic Defend, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed to install assets associated with the Data Exfiltration Detection integration:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Data Exfiltration Detection and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Under Settings, click Install Data Exfiltration Detection assets and follow the prompts to install the assets.
+
+
+*Anomaly Detection Setup*
+
+Before you can enable rules for Data Exfiltration Detection, you'll need to enable the corresponding Anomaly Detection jobs. 
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Analytics, click Machine Learning.
+- Under Anomaly Detection, click Jobs, and then click "Create job". Select the Data View containing your file events. For example, this would be `logs-endpoint.events.*` if you used Elastic Defend to collect events.
+- If the selected Data View contains events that match the query in https://github.com/elastic/integrations/blob/main/packages/ded/kibana/ml_module/ded-ml.json[this] configuration file, you will see a card for Data Exfiltration Detection under "Use preconfigured jobs".
+- Keep the default settings and click "Create jobs" to start the anomaly detection jobs and datafeeds.
+
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Exfiltration
+** ID: TA0010
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium
+** ID: T1052
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1052/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-remote-file-directory.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-remote-file-directory.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5e432c1478
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-remote-file-directory.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-remote-file-directory]]
+=== Unusual Remote File Directory
+
+An anomaly detection job has detected a remote file transfer on an unusual directory indicating a potential lateral movement activity on the host. Many Security solutions monitor well-known directories for suspicious activities, so attackers might use less common directories to bypass monitoring.
+
+*Rule type*: machine_learning
+
+*Rule indices*: None
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 15m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-90m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html
+* https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/lmd
+* https://www.elastic.co/blog/detecting-lateral-movement-activity-a-new-kibana-integration
+* https://www.elastic.co/blog/remote-desktop-protocol-connections-elastic-security
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Use Case: Lateral Movement Detection
+* Rule Type: ML
+* Rule Type: Machine Learning
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The rule requires the Lateral Movement Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as file and Windows RDP process events collected by the Elastic Defend integration.  
+
+
+*Lateral Movement Detection Setup*
+
+The Lateral Movement Detection integration detects lateral movement activity by identifying abnormalities in file and Windows RDP events. Anomalies are detected using Elastic's Anomaly Detection feature.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Lateral Movement Detection.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+- File events collected by the https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/endpoint[Elastic Defend] integration.
+- To install Elastic Defend, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed to install assets associated with the Lateral Movement Detection integration:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Lateral Movement Detection and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Under Settings, click Install Lateral Movement Detection assets and follow the prompts to install the assets.
+
+
+*Anomaly Detection Setup*
+
+Before you can enable rules for Lateral Movement Detection, you'll need to enable the corresponding Anomaly Detection jobs.
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Analytics, click Machine Learning.
+- Under Anomaly Detection, click Jobs, and then click "Create job". Select the Data View containing your file events. For example, this would be `logs-endpoint.events.*` if you used Elastic Defend to collect events.
+- If the selected Data View contains events that match the query in https://github.com/elastic/integrations/blob/main/packages/lmd/kibana/ml_module/lmd-ml.json[this] configuration file, you will see a card for Lateral Movement Detection under "Use preconfigured jobs".
+- Keep the default settings and click "Create jobs" to start the anomaly detection jobs and datafeeds.
+
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation of Remote Services
+** ID: T1210
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-remote-file-extension.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-remote-file-extension.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b66d06979a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-remote-file-extension.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-remote-file-extension]]
+=== Unusual Remote File Extension
+
+An anomaly detection job has detected a remote file transfer with a rare extension, which could indicate potential lateral movement activity on the host.
+
+*Rule type*: machine_learning
+
+*Rule indices*: None
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 15m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-90m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html
+* https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/lmd
+* https://www.elastic.co/blog/detecting-lateral-movement-activity-a-new-kibana-integration
+* https://www.elastic.co/blog/remote-desktop-protocol-connections-elastic-security
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Use Case: Lateral Movement Detection
+* Rule Type: ML
+* Rule Type: Machine Learning
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The rule requires the Lateral Movement Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as file and Windows RDP process events collected by the Elastic Defend integration.  
+
+
+*Lateral Movement Detection Setup*
+
+The Lateral Movement Detection integration detects lateral movement activity by identifying abnormalities in file and Windows RDP events. Anomalies are detected using Elastic's Anomaly Detection feature.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Lateral Movement Detection.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+- File events collected by the https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/endpoint[Elastic Defend] integration.
+- To install Elastic Defend, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed to install assets associated with the Lateral Movement Detection integration:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Lateral Movement Detection and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Under Settings, click Install Lateral Movement Detection assets and follow the prompts to install the assets.
+
+
+*Anomaly Detection Setup*
+
+Before you can enable rules for Lateral Movement Detection, you'll need to enable the corresponding Anomaly Detection jobs.
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Analytics, click Machine Learning.
+- Under Anomaly Detection, click Jobs, and then click "Create job". Select the Data View containing your file events. For example, this would be `logs-endpoint.events.*` if you used Elastic Defend to collect events.
+- If the selected Data View contains events that match the query in https://github.com/elastic/integrations/blob/main/packages/lmd/kibana/ml_module/lmd-ml.json[this] configuration file, you will see a card for Lateral Movement Detection under "Use preconfigured jobs".
+- Keep the default settings and click "Create jobs" to start the anomaly detection jobs and datafeeds.
+
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation of Remote Services
+** ID: T1210
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-remote-file-size.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-remote-file-size.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f403146e40
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-remote-file-size.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-remote-file-size]]
+=== Unusual Remote File Size
+
+A machine learning job has detected an unusually high file size shared by a remote host indicating potential lateral movement activity. One of the primary goals of attackers after gaining access to a network is to locate and exfiltrate valuable information. Instead of multiple small transfers that can raise alarms, attackers might choose to bundle data into a single large file transfer.
+
+*Rule type*: machine_learning
+
+*Rule indices*: None
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 15m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-90m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html
+* https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/lmd
+* https://www.elastic.co/blog/detecting-lateral-movement-activity-a-new-kibana-integration
+* https://www.elastic.co/blog/remote-desktop-protocol-connections-elastic-security
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Use Case: Lateral Movement Detection
+* Rule Type: ML
+* Rule Type: Machine Learning
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The rule requires the Lateral Movement Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as file and Windows RDP process events collected by the Elastic Defend integration.  
+
+
+*Lateral Movement Detection Setup*
+
+The Lateral Movement Detection integration detects lateral movement activity by identifying abnormalities in file and Windows RDP events. Anomalies are detected using Elastic's Anomaly Detection feature.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Lateral Movement Detection.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+- File events collected by the https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/endpoint[Elastic Defend] integration.
+- To install Elastic Defend, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed to install assets associated with the Lateral Movement Detection integration:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Lateral Movement Detection and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Under Settings, click Install Lateral Movement Detection assets and follow the prompts to install the assets.
+
+
+*Anomaly Detection Setup*
+
+Before you can enable rules for Lateral Movement Detection, you'll need to enable the corresponding Anomaly Detection jobs.
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Analytics, click Machine Learning.
+- Under Anomaly Detection, click Jobs, and then click "Create job". Select the Data View containing your file events. For example, this would be `logs-endpoint.events.*` if you used Elastic Defend to collect events.
+- If the selected Data View contains events that match the query in https://github.com/elastic/integrations/blob/main/packages/lmd/kibana/ml_module/lmd-ml.json[this] configuration file, you will see a card for Lateral Movement Detection under "Use preconfigured jobs".
+- Keep the default settings and click "Create jobs" to start the anomaly detection jobs and datafeeds.
+
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation of Remote Services
+** ID: T1210
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-service-host-child-process-childless-service.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-service-host-child-process-childless-service.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..93a53ecdc3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-service-host-child-process-childless-service.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-service-host-child-process-childless-service]]
+=== Unusual Service Host Child Process - Childless Service
+
+Identifies unusual child processes of Service Host (svchost.exe) that traditionally do not spawn any child processes. This may indicate a code injection or an equivalent form of exploitation.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  process.parent.name : "svchost.exe" and
+
+  /* based on svchost service arguments -s svcname where the service is known to be childless */
+  process.parent.args : (
+    "WdiSystemHost", "LicenseManager", "StorSvc", "CDPSvc", "cdbhsvc", "BthAvctpSvc", "SstpSvc", "WdiServiceHost",
+    "imgsvc", "TrkWks", "WpnService", "IKEEXT", "PolicyAgent", "CryptSvc", "netprofm", "ProfSvc", "StateRepository",
+    "camsvc", "LanmanWorkstation", "NlaSvc", "EventLog", "hidserv", "DisplayEnhancementService", "ShellHWDetection",
+    "AppHostSvc", "fhsvc", "CscService", "PushToInstall"
+  ) and
+
+  /* unknown FPs can be added here */
+  not process.name : ("WerFault.exe", "WerFaultSecure.exe", "wermgr.exe") and
+  not (process.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\RelPost.exe" and process.parent.args : "WdiSystemHost") and
+  not (
+    process.name : "rundll32.exe" and
+    process.args : "?:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\winethc.dll,ForceProxyDetectionOnNextRun" and
+    process.parent.args : "WdiServiceHost"
+  ) and
+  not (
+    process.executable : (
+      "?:\\Program Files\\*",
+      "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*",
+      "?:\\Windows\\System32\\Kodak\\kds_?????\\lib\\lexexe.exe"
+    ) and process.parent.args : "imgsvc"
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Process Injection
+** ID: T1055
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Process Hollowing
+** ID: T1055.012
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Process Injection
+** ID: T1055
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Process Hollowing
+** ID: T1055.012
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-time-or-day-for-an-rdp-session.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-time-or-day-for-an-rdp-session.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..936a56b088
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-time-or-day-for-an-rdp-session.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-time-or-day-for-an-rdp-session]]
+=== Unusual Time or Day for an RDP Session
+
+A machine learning job has detected an RDP session started at an usual time or weekday. An RDP session at an unusual time could be followed by other suspicious activities, so catching this is a good first step in detecting a larger attack.
+
+*Rule type*: machine_learning
+
+*Rule indices*: None
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 15m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-12h ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html
+* https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/lmd
+* https://www.elastic.co/blog/detecting-lateral-movement-activity-a-new-kibana-integration
+* https://www.elastic.co/blog/remote-desktop-protocol-connections-elastic-security
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Use Case: Lateral Movement Detection
+* Rule Type: ML
+* Rule Type: Machine Learning
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+
+*Version*: 3
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The rule requires the Lateral Movement Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as file and Windows RDP process events collected by the Elastic Defend integration.  
+
+
+*Lateral Movement Detection Setup*
+
+The Lateral Movement Detection integration detects lateral movement activity by identifying abnormalities in file and Windows RDP events. Anomalies are detected using Elastic's Anomaly Detection feature.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Lateral Movement Detection.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+- Windows RDP process events collected by the https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/endpoint[Elastic Defend] integration.
+- To install Elastic Defend, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed to install assets associated with the Lateral Movement Detection integration:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Lateral Movement Detection and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Under Settings, click Install Lateral Movement Detection assets and follow the prompts to install the assets.
+
+
+*Anomaly Detection Setup*
+
+Before you can enable rules for Lateral Movement Detection, you'll need to enable the corresponding Anomaly Detection jobs.
+- Before enabling the Anomaly Detection jobs, confirm that the Pivot Transform asset is installed and actively gathering data in the destination index `ml-rdp-lmd`.
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Analytics, click Machine Learning.
+- Under Anomaly Detection, click Jobs, and then click "Create job". Select the Data View containing your transformed RDP process data i.e.`ml-rdp-lmd`.
+- If the selected Data View contains events that match the query in https://github.com/elastic/integrations/blob/main/packages/lmd/kibana/ml_module/lmd-ml.json[this] configuration file, you will see a card for Lateral Movement Detection under "Use preconfigured jobs".
+- Keep the default settings and click "Create jobs" to start the anomaly detection jobs and datafeeds.
+
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation of Remote Services
+** ID: T1210
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-user-privilege-enumeration-via-id.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-user-privilege-enumeration-via-id.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f34cdd6ab1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-user-privilege-enumeration-via-id.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-user-privilege-enumeration-via-id]]
+=== Unusual User Privilege Enumeration via id
+
+This rule monitors for a sequence of 20 "id" command executions within 1 second by the same parent process. This behavior is unusual, and may be indicative of the execution of an enumeration script such as LinPEAS or LinEnum. These scripts leverage the "id" command to enumerate the privileges of all users present on the system.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Discovery
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 4
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id, process.parent.entity_id with maxspan=1s
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and 
+   process.name == "id" and process.args_count == 2 and 
+   not (process.parent.name == "rpm" or process.parent.args : "/var/tmp/rpm-tmp*")] with runs=20
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Discovery
+** ID: TA0007
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/
+* Technique:
+** Name: System Owner/User Discovery
+** ID: T1033
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-user-account-creation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-user-account-creation.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b0c0a77362
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-user-account-creation.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-user-account-creation]]
+=== User Account Creation
+
+Identifies attempts to create new users. This is sometimes done by attackers to increase access or establish persistence on a system or domain.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating User Account Creation*
+
+
+Attackers may create new accounts (both local and domain) to maintain access to victim systems.
+
+This rule identifies the usage of `net.exe` to create new accounts.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Identify if the account was added to privileged groups or assigned special privileges after creation.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Account creation is a common administrative task, so there is a high chance of the activity being legitimate. Before investigating further, verify that this activity is not benign.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- Creation of a Hidden Local User Account - 2edc8076-291e-41e9-81e4-e3fcbc97ae5e
+- Windows User Account Creation - 38e17753-f581-4644-84da-0d60a8318694
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Delete the created account.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  process.name : ("net.exe", "net1.exe") and
+  not process.parent.name : "net.exe" and
+  (process.args : "user" and process.args : ("/ad", "/add"))
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Create Account
+** ID: T1136
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Local Account
+** ID: T1136.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-user-account-exposed-to-kerberoasting.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-user-account-exposed-to-kerberoasting.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..aef24bfead
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-user-account-exposed-to-kerberoasting.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-user-account-exposed-to-kerberoasting]]
+=== User account exposed to Kerberoasting
+
+Detects when a user account has the servicePrincipalName attribute modified. Attackers can abuse write privileges over a user to configure Service Principle Names (SPNs) so that they can perform Kerberoasting. Administrators can also configure this for legitimate purposes, exposing the account to Kerberoasting.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-system.*
+* logs-windows.*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/access-controls/targeted-kerberoasting
+* https://www.qomplx.com/qomplx-knowledge-kerberoasting-attacks-explained/
+* https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/kerberos/kerberoast
+* https://attack.stealthbits.com/cracking-kerberos-tgs-tickets-using-kerberoasting
+* https://adsecurity.org/?p=280
+* https://github.com/OTRF/Set-AuditRule
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Active Directory
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating User account exposed to Kerberoasting*
+
+
+Service Principal Names (SPNs) are names by which Kerberos clients uniquely identify service instances for Kerberos target computers.
+
+By default, only computer accounts have SPNs, which creates no significant risk, since machine accounts have a default domain policy that rotates their passwords every 30 days, and the password is composed of 120 random characters, making them invulnerable to Kerberoasting.
+
+A user account with an SPN assigned is considered a service account, and is accessible to the entire domain. If any user in the directory requests a ticket-granting service (TGS), the domain controller will encrypt it with the secret key of the account executing the service. An attacker can potentially perform a Kerberoasting attack with this information, as the human-defined password is likely to be less complex.
+
+For scenarios where SPNs cannot be avoided on user accounts, Microsoft provides the Group Managed Service Accounts (gMSA) feature, which ensures that account passwords are robust and changed regularly and automatically. More information can be found https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/security/group-managed-service-accounts/group-managed-service-accounts-overview[here].
+
+Attackers can also perform "Targeted Kerberoasting", which consists of adding fake SPNs to user accounts that they have write privileges to, making them potentially vulnerable to Kerberoasting.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Investigate if the target account is a member of privileged groups (Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, etc.).
+- Investigate if tickets have been requested for the target account.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- The use of user accounts as service accounts is a bad security practice and should not be allowed in the domain. The security team should map and monitor any potential benign true positive (B-TP), especially if the account is privileged. Domain Administrators that define this kind of setting can put the domain at risk as user accounts don't have the same security standards as computer accounts (which have long, complex, random passwords that change frequently), exposing them to credential cracking attacks (Kerberoasting, brute force, etc.).
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services. Prioritize privileged accounts.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The 'Audit Directory Service Changes' logging policy must be configured for (Success, Failure).
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Policies >
+Windows Settings >
+Security Settings >
+Advanced Audit Policies Configuration >
+Audit Policies >
+DS Access >
+Audit Directory Service Changes (Success,Failure)
+```
+
+The above policy does not cover User objects, so set up an AuditRule using https://github.com/OTRF/Set-AuditRule.
+As this specifies the servicePrincipalName Attribute GUID, it is expected to be low noise.
+
+```
+Set-AuditRule -AdObjectPath 'AD:\CN=Users,DC=Domain,DC=com' -WellKnownSidType WorldSid -Rights WriteProperty -InheritanceFlags Children -AttributeGUID f3a64788-5306-11d1-a9c5-0000f80367c1 -AuditFlags Success
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.action:"Directory Service Changes" and event.code:5136 and
+  winlog.event_data.OperationType:"%%14674" and
+  winlog.event_data.ObjectClass:"user" and
+  winlog.event_data.AttributeLDAPDisplayName:"servicePrincipalName"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
+** ID: T1558
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Kerberoasting
+** ID: T1558.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-user-added-to-privileged-group.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-user-added-to-privileged-group.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4d7ff98742
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-user-added-to-privileged-group.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-user-added-to-privileged-group]]
+=== User Added to Privileged Group
+
+Identifies a user being added to a privileged group in Active Directory. Privileged accounts and groups in Active Directory are those to which powerful rights, privileges, and permissions are granted that allow them to perform nearly any action in Active Directory and on domain-joined systems.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-system.*
+* logs-windows.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/appendix-b--privileged-accounts-and-groups-in-active-directory
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring
+* Data Source: Active Directory
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+* Skoetting
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating User Added to Privileged Group in Active Directory*
+
+
+Privileged accounts and groups in Active Directory are those to which powerful rights, privileges, and permissions are granted that allow them to perform nearly any action in Active Directory and on domain-joined systems.
+
+Attackers can add users to privileged groups to maintain a level of access if their other privileged accounts are uncovered by the security team. This allows them to keep operating after the security team discovers abused accounts.
+
+This rule monitors events related to a user being added to a privileged group.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should manage members of this group.
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This attack abuses a legitimate Active Directory mechanism, so it is important to determine whether the activity is legitimate, if the administrator is authorized to perform this operation, and if there is a need to grant the account this level of privilege.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- If the admin is not aware of the operation, activate your Active Directory incident response plan.
+- If the user does not need the administrator privileges, remove the account from the privileged group.
+- Review the privileges of the administrator account that performed the action.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+iam where winlog.api:"wineventlog" and event.action == "added-member-to-group" and
+  group.name : ("Admin*",
+                "Local Administrators",
+                "Domain Admins",
+                "Enterprise Admins",
+                "Backup Admins",
+                "Schema Admins",
+                "DnsAdmins",
+                "Exchange Organization Administrators")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Account Manipulation
+** ID: T1098
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-veeam-backup-library-loaded-by-unusual-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-veeam-backup-library-loaded-by-unusual-process.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9ae439eeac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-veeam-backup-library-loaded-by-unusual-process.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-veeam-backup-library-loaded-by-unusual-process]]
+=== Veeam Backup Library Loaded by Unusual Process
+
+Identifies potential credential decrypt operations by PowerShell or unsigned processes using the Veeam.Backup.Common.dll library. Attackers can use Veeam Credentials to target backups as part of destructive operations such as Ransomware attacks.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.library*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+library where host.os.type == "windows" and event.action == "load" and
+  (dll.name : "Veeam.Backup.Common.dll" or dll.pe.original_file_name : "Veeam.Backup.Common.dll") and
+  (
+    process.code_signature.trusted == false or
+    process.code_signature.exists == false or
+    process.name : ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe")
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Credentials from Password Stores
+** ID: T1555
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-virtual-machine-fingerprinting-via-grep.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-virtual-machine-fingerprinting-via-grep.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bf465d53a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-virtual-machine-fingerprinting-via-grep.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-virtual-machine-fingerprinting-via-grep]]
+=== Virtual Machine Fingerprinting via Grep
+
+An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware. This rule identifies common locations used to discover virtual machine hardware by a non-root user. This technique has been used by the Pupy RAT and other malware.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x4F.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Discovery
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 105
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where event.type == "start" and
+ process.name in ("grep", "egrep") and user.id != "0" and
+ process.args : ("parallels*", "vmware*", "virtualbox*") and process.args : "Manufacturer*" and
+ not process.parent.executable in ("/Applications/Docker.app/Contents/MacOS/Docker", "/usr/libexec/kcare/virt-what")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Discovery
+** ID: TA0007
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/
+* Technique:
+** Name: System Information Discovery
+** ID: T1082
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-virtual-machine-fingerprinting.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-virtual-machine-fingerprinting.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5485348b39
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-virtual-machine-fingerprinting.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-virtual-machine-fingerprinting]]
+=== Virtual Machine Fingerprinting
+
+An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware. This rule identifies common locations used to discover virtual machine hardware by a non-root user. This technique has been used by the Pupy RAT and other malware.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Discovery
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
+- Elastic Defend
+- Auditbeat
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Auditbeat Setup*
+
+Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit the activities of users and processes on your systems. For example, you can use Auditbeat to collect and centralize audit events from the Linux Audit Framework. You can also use Auditbeat to detect changes to critical files, like binaries and configuration files, and identify potential security policy violations.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Auditbeat on a Linux System:*
+
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setup-repositories.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-docker.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html[helper guide].
+- For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:linux and event.type:(start or process_started) and
+  process.args:("/sys/class/dmi/id/bios_version" or
+                "/sys/class/dmi/id/product_name" or
+                "/sys/class/dmi/id/chassis_vendor" or
+                "/proc/scsi/scsi" or
+                "/proc/ide/hd0/model") and
+  not user.name:root
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Discovery
+** ID: TA0007
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/
+* Technique:
+** Name: System Information Discovery
+** ID: T1082
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-virtual-private-network-connection-attempt.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-virtual-private-network-connection-attempt.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..77dc9b7cc8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-virtual-private-network-connection-attempt.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-virtual-private-network-connection-attempt]]
+=== Virtual Private Network Connection Attempt
+
+Identifies the execution of macOS built-in commands to connect to an existing Virtual Private Network (VPN). Adversaries may use VPN connections to laterally move and control remote systems on a network.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/modules/post/osx/manage/vpn.rb
+* https://www.unix.com/man-page/osx/8/networksetup/
+* https://superuser.com/questions/358513/start-configured-vpn-from-command-line-osx
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 107
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type in ("start", "process_started") and
+  (
+    (process.name : "networksetup" and process.args : "-connectpppoeservice") or
+    (process.name : "scutil" and process.args : "--nc" and process.args : "start") or
+    (process.name : "osascript" and process.command_line : "osascript*set VPN to service*")
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote Services
+** ID: T1021
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-volume-shadow-copy-deleted-or-resized-via-vssadmin.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-volume-shadow-copy-deleted-or-resized-via-vssadmin.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f00f573daf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-volume-shadow-copy-deleted-or-resized-via-vssadmin.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-volume-shadow-copy-deleted-or-resized-via-vssadmin]]
+=== Volume Shadow Copy Deleted or Resized via VssAdmin
+
+Identifies use of vssadmin.exe for shadow copy deletion or resizing on endpoints. This commonly occurs in tandem with ransomware or other destructive attacks.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Impact
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Volume Shadow Copy Deleted or Resized via VssAdmin*
+
+
+The Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS) is a Windows feature that enables system administrators to take snapshots of volumes that can later be restored or mounted to recover specific files or folders.
+
+A typical step in the playbook of an attacker attempting to deploy ransomware is to delete Volume Shadow Copies to ensure that victims have no alternative to paying the ransom, making any action that deletes shadow copies worth monitoring.
+
+This rule monitors the execution of Vssadmin.exe to either delete or resize shadow copies.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- In the case of a resize operation, check if the resize value is equal to suspicious values, like 401MB.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- If unsigned files are found on the process tree, retrieve them and determine if they are malicious:
+  - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+    - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+      - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - File and registry access, modification, and creation activities.
+      - Service creation and launch activities.
+      - Scheduled task creation.
+  - Use the PowerShell Get-FileHash cmdlet to get the files' SHA-256 hash values.
+    - Search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Use process name, command line, and file hash to search for occurrences in other hosts.
+- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.
+
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This rule may produce benign true positives (B-TPs). If this activity is expected and noisy in your environment, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- Volume Shadow Copy Deleted or Resized via VssAdmin - b5ea4bfe-a1b2-421f-9d47-22a75a6f2921
+- Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via PowerShell - d99a037b-c8e2-47a5-97b9-170d076827c4
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Consider isolating the involved host to prevent destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.
+- Priority should be given due to the advanced stage of this activity on the attack.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- If data was encrypted, deleted, or modified, activate your data recovery plan.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Perform data recovery locally or restore the backups from replicated copies (cloud, other servers, etc.).
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start"
+  and (process.name : "vssadmin.exe" or ?process.pe.original_file_name == "VSSADMIN.EXE") and
+  process.args in ("delete", "resize") and process.args : "shadows*"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Impact
+** ID: TA0040
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Inhibit System Recovery
+** ID: T1490
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-volume-shadow-copy-deletion-via-powershell.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-volume-shadow-copy-deletion-via-powershell.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..970fac095d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-volume-shadow-copy-deletion-via-powershell.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-volume-shadow-copy-deletion-via-powershell]]
+=== Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via PowerShell
+
+Identifies the use of the Win32_ShadowCopy class and related cmdlets to achieve shadow copy deletion. This commonly occurs in tandem with ransomware or other destructive attacks.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/desktop/vsswmi/win32-shadowcopy
+* https://powershell.one/wmi/root/cimv2/win32_shadowcopy
+* https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/stomping-shadow-copies-a-second-look-into-deletion-methods
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Impact
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+* Austin Songer
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via PowerShell*
+
+
+The Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS) is a Windows feature that enables system administrators to take snapshots of volumes that can later be restored or mounted to recover specific files or folders.
+
+A typical step in the playbook of an attacker attempting to deploy ransomware is to delete Volume Shadow Copies to ensure that victims have no alternative to paying the ransom, making any action that deletes shadow copies worth monitoring.
+
+This rule monitors the execution of PowerShell cmdlets to interact with the Win32_ShadowCopy WMI class, retrieve shadow copy objects, and delete them.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the program execution chain (parent process tree).
+- Check whether the account is authorized to perform this operation.
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- If unsigned files are found on the process tree, retrieve them and determine if they are malicious:
+  - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+    - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+      - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - File and registry access, modification, and creation activities.
+      - Service creation and launch activities.
+      - Scheduled task creation.
+  - Use the PowerShell Get-FileHash cmdlet to get the files' SHA-256 hash values.
+    - Search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Use process name, command line, and file hash to search for occurrences in other hosts.
+- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.
+
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This rule has chances of producing benign true positives (B-TPs). If this activity is expected and noisy in your environment, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- Volume Shadow Copy Deleted or Resized via VssAdmin - b5ea4bfe-a1b2-421f-9d47-22a75a6f2921
+- Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via PowerShell - d99a037b-c8e2-47a5-97b9-170d076827c4
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Consider isolating the involved host to prevent destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.
+- Priority should be given due to the advanced stage of this activity on the attack.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- If data was encrypted, deleted, or modified, activate your data recovery plan.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Perform data recovery locally or restore the backups from replicated copies (cloud, other servers, etc.).
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  process.name : ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe") and
+  process.args : ("*Get-WmiObject*", "*gwmi*", "*Get-CimInstance*", "*gcim*") and
+  process.args : ("*Win32_ShadowCopy*") and
+  process.args : ("*.Delete()*", "*Remove-WmiObject*", "*rwmi*", "*Remove-CimInstance*", "*rcim*")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Impact
+** ID: TA0040
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Inhibit System Recovery
+** ID: T1490
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-volume-shadow-copy-deletion-via-wmic.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-volume-shadow-copy-deletion-via-wmic.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fd6838c66f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-volume-shadow-copy-deletion-via-wmic.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-volume-shadow-copy-deletion-via-wmic]]
+=== Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via WMIC
+
+Identifies use of wmic.exe for shadow copy deletion on endpoints. This commonly occurs in tandem with ransomware or other destructive attacks.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Impact
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via WMIC*
+
+
+The Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS) is a Windows feature that enables system administrators to take snapshots of volumes that can later be restored or mounted to recover specific files or folders.
+
+A typical step in the playbook of an attacker attempting to deploy ransomware is to delete Volume Shadow Copies to ensure that victims have no alternative to paying the ransom, making any action that deletes shadow copies worth monitoring.
+
+This rule monitors the execution of `wmic.exe` to interact with VSS via the `shadowcopy` alias and delete parameter.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the program execution chain (parent process tree).
+- Check whether the account is authorized to perform this operation.
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- In the case of a resize operation, check if the resize value is equal to suspicious values, like 401MB.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- If unsigned files are found on the process tree, retrieve them and determine if they are malicious:
+  - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+    - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+      - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - File and registry access, modification, and creation activities.
+      - Service creation and launch activities.
+      - Scheduled task creation.
+  - Use the PowerShell Get-FileHash cmdlet to get the files' SHA-256 hash values.
+    - Search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Use process name, command line, and file hash to search for occurrences in other hosts.
+- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.
+
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This rule has chances of producing benign true positives (B-TPs). If this activity is expected and noisy in your environment, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- Volume Shadow Copy Deleted or Resized via VssAdmin - b5ea4bfe-a1b2-421f-9d47-22a75a6f2921
+- Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via PowerShell - d99a037b-c8e2-47a5-97b9-170d076827c4
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Priority should be given due to the advanced stage of this activity on the attack.
+- Consider isolating the involved host to prevent destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- If data was encrypted, deleted, or modified, activate your data recovery plan.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Perform data recovery locally or restore the backups from replicated copies (cloud, other servers, etc.).
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  (process.name : "WMIC.exe" or ?process.pe.original_file_name == "wmic.exe") and
+  process.args : "delete" and process.args : "shadowcopy"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Impact
+** ID: TA0040
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Inhibit System Recovery
+** ID: T1490
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Windows Management Instrumentation
+** ID: T1047
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-web-shell-detection-script-process-child-of-common-web-processes.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-web-shell-detection-script-process-child-of-common-web-processes.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..57b2ac6396
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-web-shell-detection-script-process-child-of-common-web-processes.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-web-shell-detection-script-process-child-of-common-web-processes]]
+=== Web Shell Detection: Script Process Child of Common Web Processes
+
+Identifies suspicious commands executed via a web server, which may suggest a vulnerability and remote shell access.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/02/04/ghost-in-the-shell-investigating-web-shell-attacks/
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/elastic-response-to-the-the-spring4shell-vulnerability-cve-2022-22965
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security-part-1
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Initial Access
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Web Shell Detection: Script Process Child of Common Web Processes*
+
+
+Adversaries may backdoor web servers with web shells to establish persistent access to systems. A web shell is a web script that is placed on an openly accessible web server to allow an adversary to use the web server as a gateway into a network. A web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the web server.
+
+This rule detects a web server process spawning script and command-line interface programs, potentially indicating attackers executing commands using the web shell.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate abnormal behaviors observed by the subject process such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any other spawned child processes.
+- Examine the command line to determine which commands or scripts were executed.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
+- If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+  - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+    - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+      - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - File and registry access, modification, and creation activities.
+      - Service creation and launch activities.
+      - Scheduled task creation.
+  - Use the PowerShell Get-FileHash cmdlet to get the files' SHA-256 hash values.
+    - Search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Any activity that triggered the alert and is not inherently malicious must be monitored by the security team.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  process.parent.name : ("w3wp.exe", "httpd.exe", "nginx.exe", "php.exe", "php-cgi.exe", "tomcat.exe") and
+  process.name : ("cmd.exe", "cscript.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe", "wmic.exe", "wscript.exe") and
+  not 
+  (
+    process.parent.name : ("php.exe", "httpd.exe") and process.name : "cmd.exe" and
+    process.command_line : (
+      "cmd.exe /c mode CON",
+      "cmd.exe /s /c \"mode CON\"",
+      "cmd.exe /c \"mode\"",
+      "cmd.exe /s /c \"tput colors 2>&1\""
+    )
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Server Software Component
+** ID: T1505
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Web Shell
+** ID: T1505.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Initial Access
+** ID: TA0001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploit Public-Facing Application
+** ID: T1190
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Windows Command Shell
+** ID: T1059.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Visual Basic
+** ID: T1059.005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Windows Management Instrumentation
+** ID: T1047
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-webproxy-settings-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-webproxy-settings-modification.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8247419416
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-webproxy-settings-modification.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-webproxy-settings-modification]]
+=== WebProxy Settings Modification
+
+Identifies the use of the built-in networksetup command to configure webproxy settings. This may indicate an attempt to hijack web browser traffic for credential access via traffic sniffing or redirection.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/
+* https://objectivebythesea.com/v2/talks/OBTS_v2_Zohar.pdf
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:macos and event.type:start and
+ process.name : networksetup and process.args : (("-setwebproxy" or "-setsecurewebproxy" or "-setautoproxyurl") and not (Bluetooth or off)) and
+ not process.parent.executable : ("/Library/PrivilegedHelperTools/com.80pct.FreedomHelper" or
+                                  "/Applications/Fiddler Everywhere.app/Contents/Resources/app/out/WebServer/Fiddler.WebUi" or
+                                  "/usr/libexec/xpcproxy")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Steal Web Session Cookie
+** ID: T1539
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-webserver-access-logs-deleted.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-webserver-access-logs-deleted.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0d874cca92
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-webserver-access-logs-deleted.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-webserver-access-logs-deleted]]
+=== WebServer Access Logs Deleted
+
+Identifies the deletion of WebServer access logs. This may indicate an attempt to evade detection or destroy forensic evidence on a system.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* auditbeat-*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* OS: Windows
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 105
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where event.type == "deletion" and
+  file.path : ("C:\\inetpub\\logs\\LogFiles\\*.log",
+               "/var/log/apache*/access.log",
+               "/etc/httpd/logs/access_log",
+               "/var/log/httpd/access_log",
+               "/var/www/*/logs/access.log")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Indicator Removal
+** ID: T1070
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-whoami-process-activity.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-whoami-process-activity.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c3f712eb0d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-whoami-process-activity.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-whoami-process-activity]]
+=== Whoami Process Activity
+
+Identifies suspicious use of whoami.exe which displays user, group, and privileges information for the user who is currently logged on to the local system.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* logs-system.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Discovery
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Whoami Process Activity*
+
+
+After successfully compromising an environment, attackers may try to gain situational awareness to plan their next steps. This can happen by running commands to enumerate network resources, users, connections, files, and installed security software.
+
+This rule looks for the execution of the `whoami` utility. Attackers commonly use this utility to measure their current privileges, discover the current user, determine if a privilege escalation was successful, etc.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate any abnormal account behavior, such as command executions, file creations or modifications, and network connections.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Discovery activities are not inherently malicious if they occur in isolation. As long as the analyst did not identify suspicious activity related to the user or host, such alerts can be dismissed.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- Account Discovery Command via SYSTEM Account - 2856446a-34e6-435b-9fb5-f8f040bfa7ed
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and process.name : "whoami.exe" and
+(
+  (
+    /* scoped for whoami execution under system privileges */
+    (
+      user.domain : ("NT *", "* NT", "IIS APPPOOL") and
+      user.id : ("S-1-5-18", "S-1-5-19", "S-1-5-20", "S-1-5-82-*") and
+      not ?winlog.event_data.SubjectUserName : "*$"
+    ) and
+    not (
+      process.parent.name : "cmd.exe" and
+      process.parent.args : (
+          "chcp 437>nul 2>&1 & C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\whoami.exe  /groups",
+          "chcp 437>nul 2>&1 & %systemroot%\\system32\\whoami /user",
+          "C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\whoami.exe /groups",
+          "*WINDOWS\\system32\\config\\systemprofile*"
+      )
+    ) and
+    not (process.parent.executable : "C:\\Windows\\system32\\inetsrv\\appcmd.exe" and process.parent.args : "LIST") and
+    not process.parent.executable : (
+        "C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Monitoring Agent\\Agent\\MonitoringHost.exe",
+        "C:\\Program Files\\Cohesity\\cohesity_windows_agent_service.exe"
+    )
+  ) or
+  process.parent.name : ("wsmprovhost.exe", "w3wp.exe", "wmiprvse.exe", "rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe")
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Discovery
+** ID: TA0007
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/
+* Technique:
+** Name: System Owner/User Discovery
+** ID: T1033
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-cryptoapi-spoofing-vulnerability-cve-2020-0601-curveball.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-cryptoapi-spoofing-vulnerability-cve-2020-0601-curveball.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4c84cf1611
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-cryptoapi-spoofing-vulnerability-cve-2020-0601-curveball.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-cryptoapi-spoofing-vulnerability-cve-2020-0601-curveball]]
+=== Windows CryptoAPI Spoofing Vulnerability (CVE-2020-0601 - CurveBall)
+
+A spoofing vulnerability exists in the way Windows CryptoAPI (Crypt32.dll) validates Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) certificates. An attacker could exploit the vulnerability by using a spoofed code-signing certificate to sign a malicious executable, making it appear the file was from a trusted, legitimate source.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: None ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Use Case: Vulnerability
+
+*Version*: 104
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.provider:"Microsoft-Windows-Audit-CVE" and message:"[CVE-2020-0601]" and host.os.type:windows
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Subvert Trust Controls
+** ID: T1553
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Code Signing
+** ID: T1553.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-defender-disabled-via-registry-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-defender-disabled-via-registry-modification.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3a14967e8a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-defender-disabled-via-registry-modification.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-defender-disabled-via-registry-modification]]
+=== Windows Defender Disabled via Registry Modification
+
+Identifies modifications to the Windows Defender registry settings to disable the service or set the service to be started manually.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://thedfirreport.com/2020/12/13/defender-control/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Windows Defender Disabled via Registry Modification*
+
+
+Microsoft Windows Defender is an antivirus product built into Microsoft Windows, which makes it popular across multiple environments. Disabling it is a common step in threat actor playbooks.
+
+This rule monitors the registry for configurations that disable Windows Defender or the start of its service.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Check if this operation was approved and performed according to the organization's change management policy.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This mechanism can be used legitimately. Analysts can dismiss the alert if the administrator is aware of the activity, the configuration is justified (for example, it is being used to deploy other security solutions or troubleshooting), and no other suspicious activity has been observed.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- Disabling Windows Defender Security Settings via PowerShell - c8cccb06-faf2-4cd5-886e-2c9636cfcb87
+- Microsoft Windows Defender Tampering - fe794edd-487f-4a90-b285-3ee54f2af2d3
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Re-enable Windows Defender and restore the service configurations to automatic start.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Review the privileges assigned to the user to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+registry where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type in ("creation", "change") and
+  (
+    (
+      registry.path: (
+        "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\DisableAntiSpyware",
+        "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\DisableAntiSpyware"
+      ) and
+      registry.data.strings: ("1", "0x00000001")
+   ) or
+   (
+      registry.path: (
+        "HKLM\\System\\*ControlSet*\\Services\\WinDefend\\Start",
+        "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\System\\*ControlSet*\\Services\\WinDefend\\Start"
+      ) and
+      registry.data.strings in ("3", "4", "0x00000003", "0x00000004")
+   )
+  ) and
+
+  not
+    (
+      process.executable : (
+          "?:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\services.exe",
+          "?:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
+          "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Trend Micro\\Security Agent\\NTRmv.exe"
+      ) and user.id : "S-1-5-18"
+    )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Impair Defenses
+** ID: T1562
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Disable or Modify Tools
+** ID: T1562.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Indicator Blocking
+** ID: T1562.006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Modify Registry
+** ID: T1112
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-defender-exclusions-added-via-powershell.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-defender-exclusions-added-via-powershell.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..25f63faf68
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-defender-exclusions-added-via-powershell.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-defender-exclusions-added-via-powershell]]
+=== Windows Defender Exclusions Added via PowerShell
+
+Identifies modifications to the Windows Defender configuration settings using PowerShell to add exclusions at the folder directory or process level.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.bitdefender.com/files/News/CaseStudies/study/400/Bitdefender-PR-Whitepaper-MosaicLoader-creat5540-en-EN.pdf
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Windows Defender Exclusions Added via PowerShell*
+
+
+Microsoft Windows Defender is an antivirus product built into Microsoft Windows. Since this software product is used to prevent and stop malware, it's important to monitor what specific exclusions are made to the product's configuration settings. These can often be signs of an adversary or malware trying to bypass Windows Defender's capabilities. One of the more notable https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/latest-trickbot-variant-has-new-tricks-up-its-sleeve/[examples] was observed in 2018 where Trickbot incorporated mechanisms to disable Windows Defender to avoid detection.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Examine the exclusion in order to determine the intent behind it.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
+- If the exclusion specifies a suspicious file or path, retrieve the file(s) and determine if malicious:
+  - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+    - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+      - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - File and registry access, modification, and creation activities.
+      - Service creation and launch activities.
+      - Scheduled task creation.
+  - Use the PowerShell Get-FileHash cmdlet to get the files' SHA-256 hash values.
+    - Search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This rule has a high chance to produce false positives due to how often network administrators legitimately configure exclusions. In order to validate the activity further, review the specific exclusion and its intent. There are many legitimate reasons for exclusions, so it's important to gain context.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- Windows Defender Disabled via Registry Modification - 2ffa1f1e-b6db-47fa-994b-1512743847eb
+- Disabling Windows Defender Security Settings via PowerShell - c8cccb06-faf2-4cd5-886e-2c9636cfcb87
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Exclusion lists for antimalware capabilities should always be routinely monitored for review.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+ (process.name : ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe") or ?process.pe.original_file_name in ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.dll", "powershell_ise.exe")) and
+  process.args : ("*Add-MpPreference*", "*Set-MpPreference*") and
+  process.args : ("*-Exclusion*")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Impair Defenses
+** ID: T1562
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Disable or Modify Tools
+** ID: T1562.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Indicator Blocking
+** ID: T1562.006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-firewall-disabled-via-powershell.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-firewall-disabled-via-powershell.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3ebacfe828
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-firewall-disabled-via-powershell.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-firewall-disabled-via-powershell]]
+=== Windows Firewall Disabled via PowerShell
+
+Identifies when the Windows Firewall is disabled using PowerShell cmdlets, which can help attackers evade network constraints, like internet and network lateral communication restrictions.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/netsecurity/set-netfirewallprofile?view=windowsserver2019-ps
+* https://www.tutorialspoint.com/how-to-get-windows-firewall-profile-settings-using-powershell
+* http://powershellhelp.space/commands/set-netfirewallrule-psv5.php
+* http://woshub.com/manage-windows-firewall-powershell/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Austin Songer
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Windows Firewall Disabled via PowerShell*
+
+
+Windows Defender Firewall is a native component that provides host-based, two-way network traffic filtering for a device and blocks unauthorized network traffic flowing into or out of the local device.
+
+Attackers can disable the Windows firewall or its rules to enable lateral movement and command and control activity.
+
+This rule identifies patterns related to disabling the Windows firewall or its rules using the `Set-NetFirewallProfile` PowerShell cmdlet.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Inspect the host for suspicious or abnormal behavior in the alert timeframe.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This mechanism can be used legitimately. Check whether the user is an administrator and is legitimately performing troubleshooting.
+- In case of an allowed benign true positive (B-TP), assess adding rules to allow needed traffic and re-enable the firewall.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Re-enable the firewall with its desired configurations.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Review the privileges assigned to the involved users to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.action == "start" and
+  (process.name : ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe") or ?process.pe.original_file_name == "PowerShell.EXE") and
+   process.args : "*Set-NetFirewallProfile*" and
+  (process.args : "*-Enabled*" and process.args : "*False*") and
+  (process.args : "*-All*" or process.args : ("*Public*", "*Domain*", "*Private*"))
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Impair Defenses
+** ID: T1562
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Disable or Modify System Firewall
+** ID: T1562.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/004/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-script-executing-powershell.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-script-executing-powershell.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5c2c3be883
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-script-executing-powershell.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-script-executing-powershell]]
+=== Windows Script Executing PowerShell
+
+Identifies a PowerShell process launched by either cscript.exe or wscript.exe. Observing Windows scripting processes executing a PowerShell script, may be indicative of malicious activity.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Initial Access
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Windows Script Executing PowerShell*
+
+
+The Windows Script Host (WSH) is an Windows automation technology, which is ideal for non-interactive scripting needs, such as logon scripting, administrative scripting, and machine automation.
+
+Attackers commonly use WSH scripts as their initial access method, acting like droppers for second stage payloads, but can also use them to download tools and utilities needed to accomplish their goals.
+
+This rule looks for the spawn of the `powershell.exe` process with `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` as its parent process.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Investigate commands executed by the spawned PowerShell process.
+- If unsigned files are found on the process tree, retrieve them and determine if they are malicious:
+  - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+    - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+      - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - File and registry access, modification, and creation activities.
+      - Service creation and launch activities.
+      - Scheduled task creation.
+  - Use the PowerShell Get-FileHash cmdlet to get the files' SHA-256 hash values.
+    - Search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Determine how the script file was delivered (email attachment, dropped by other processes, etc.).
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- The usage of these script engines by regular users is unlikely. In the case of authorized benign true positives (B-TPs), exceptions can be added.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- If the malicious file was delivered via phishing:
+  - Block the email sender from sending future emails.
+  - Block the malicious web pages.
+  - Remove emails from the sender from mailboxes.
+  - Consider improvements to the security awareness program.
+- Reimage the host operating system and restore compromised files to clean versions.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  process.parent.name : ("cscript.exe", "wscript.exe") and process.name : "powershell.exe" and
+  not (
+    process.parent.name : "wscript.exe" and
+    process.parent.args : "?:\\ProgramData\\intune-drive-mapping-generator\\IntuneDriveMapping-VBSHelper.vbs" and
+    process.parent.args : "?:\\ProgramData\\intune-drive-mapping-generator\\DriveMapping.ps1"
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Initial Access
+** ID: TA0001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Phishing
+** ID: T1566
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Spearphishing Attachment
+** ID: T1566.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Visual Basic
+** ID: T1059.005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-script-interpreter-executing-process-via-wmi.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-script-interpreter-executing-process-via-wmi.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1473b95488
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-script-interpreter-executing-process-via-wmi.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-script-interpreter-executing-process-via-wmi]]
+=== Windows Script Interpreter Executing Process via WMI
+
+Identifies use of the built-in Windows script interpreters (cscript.exe or wscript.exe) being used to execute a process via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). This may be indicative of malicious activity.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Initial Access
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id with maxspan = 5s
+    [any where host.os.type == "windows" and 
+     (event.category : ("library", "driver") or (event.category == "process" and event.action : "Image loaded*")) and
+     (?dll.name : "wmiutils.dll" or file.name : "wmiutils.dll") and process.name : ("wscript.exe", "cscript.exe")]
+    [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+     process.parent.name : "wmiprvse.exe" and
+     user.domain != "NT AUTHORITY" and
+     (process.pe.original_file_name :
+        (
+          "cscript.exe",
+          "wscript.exe",
+          "PowerShell.EXE",
+          "Cmd.Exe",
+          "MSHTA.EXE",
+          "RUNDLL32.EXE",
+          "REGSVR32.EXE",
+          "MSBuild.exe",
+          "InstallUtil.exe",
+          "RegAsm.exe",
+          "RegSvcs.exe",
+          "msxsl.exe",
+          "CONTROL.EXE",
+          "EXPLORER.EXE",
+          "Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe",
+          "msiexec.exe"
+        ) or
+      process.executable : ("C:\\Users\\*.exe", "C:\\ProgramData\\*.exe")
+     )
+    ]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Initial Access
+** ID: TA0001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Phishing
+** ID: T1566
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Spearphishing Attachment
+** ID: T1566.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Visual Basic
+** ID: T1059.005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Windows Management Instrumentation
+** ID: T1047
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-service-installed-via-an-unusual-client.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-service-installed-via-an-unusual-client.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3486a8500e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-service-installed-via-an-unusual-client.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-service-installed-via-an-unusual-client]]
+=== Windows Service Installed via an Unusual Client
+
+Identifies the creation of a Windows service by an unusual client process. Services may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to SYSTEM.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-system.*
+* logs-windows.*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.x86matthew.com/view_post?id=create_svc_rpc
+* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4697
+* https://github.com/atc-project/atomic-threat-coverage/blob/master/Atomic_Threat_Coverage/Logging_Policies/LP_0100_windows_audit_security_system_extension.md
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The 'Audit Security System Extension' logging policy must be configured for (Success)
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Policies >
+Windows Settings >
+Security Settings >
+Advanced Audit Policies Configuration >
+Audit Policies >
+System >
+Audit Security System Extension (Success)
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.action:"service-installed" and
+  (winlog.event_data.ClientProcessId:"0" or winlog.event_data.ParentProcessId:"0") and
+  not winlog.event_data.ServiceFileName : (
+    "C:\\Windows\\VeeamVssSupport\\VeeamGuestHelper.exe" or
+    "%SystemRoot%\\system32\\Drivers\\Crowdstrike\\17706-CsInstallerService.exe"
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Create or Modify System Process
+** ID: T1543
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Windows Service
+** ID: T1543.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-subsystem-for-linux-distribution-installed.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-subsystem-for-linux-distribution-installed.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1c5bb3ee6c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-subsystem-for-linux-distribution-installed.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-subsystem-for-linux-distribution-installed]]
+=== Windows Subsystem for Linux Distribution Installed
+
+Detects changes to the registry that indicates the install of a new Windows Subsystem for Linux distribution by name. Adversaries may enable and use WSL for Linux to avoid detection.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/wsl/wsl-config
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 6
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Windows Subsystem for Linux Distribution Installed*
+
+
+The Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL) lets developers install a Linux distribution (such as Ubuntu, OpenSUSE, Kali, Debian, Arch Linux, etc) and use Linux applications, utilities, and Bash command-line tools directly on Windows, unmodified, without the overhead of a traditional virtual machine or dualboot setup. Attackers may abuse WSL to avoid security protections on a Windows host and perform a wide range of attacks.
+
+This rule identifies the installation of a new Windows Subsystem for Linux distribution via registry events.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Examine which distribution was installed. Some distributions such as Kali Linux can facilitate the compromise of the environment.
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Validate that the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This is a dual-use tool, meaning its usage is not inherently malicious. Analysts can dismiss the alert if the administrator is aware of the activity, no other suspicious activity was identified, and the WSL distribution is homologated and approved in the environment.
+
+
+*Related Rules*
+
+
+- Host Files System Changes via Windows Subsystem for Linux - e88d1fe9-b2f4-48d4-bace-a026dc745d4b
+- Execution via Windows Subsystem for Linux - db7dbad5-08d2-4d25-b9b1-d3a1e4a15efd
+- Suspicious Execution via Windows Subsystem for Linux - 3e0eeb75-16e8-4f2f-9826-62461ca128b7
+- Windows Subsystem for Linux Enabled via Dism Utility - e2e0537d-7d8f-4910-a11d-559bcf61295a
+
+
+*Response and Remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+registry where host.os.type == "windows" and
+ registry.path : 
+       ("HK*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Lxss\\*\\PackageFamilyName",
+        "\\REGISTRY\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Lxss\\*\\PackageFamilyName")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Modify Registry
+** ID: T1112
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Indirect Command Execution
+** ID: T1202
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1202/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-wmi-incoming-lateral-movement.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-wmi-incoming-lateral-movement.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6a1aa86799
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-wmi-incoming-lateral-movement.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-wmi-incoming-lateral-movement]]
+=== WMI Incoming Lateral Movement
+
+Identifies processes executed via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) on a remote host. This could be indicative of adversary lateral movement, but could be noisy if administrators use WMI to remotely manage hosts.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 109
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id with maxspan = 2s
+
+ /* Accepted Incoming RPC connection by Winmgmt service */
+
+  [network where host.os.type == "windows" and process.name : "svchost.exe" and network.direction : ("incoming", "ingress") and
+   source.ip != "127.0.0.1" and source.ip != "::1" and source.port >= 49152 and destination.port >= 49152
+  ]
+
+  /* Excluding Common FPs Nessus and SCCM */
+
+  [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and process.parent.name : "WmiPrvSE.exe" and
+   not (?process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name : "System" or ?winlog.event_data.IntegrityLevel : "System") and
+   not user.id : ("S-1-5-18", "S-1-5-19", "S-1-5-20") and
+   not process.executable :
+               ("?:\\Program Files\\HPWBEM\\Tools\\hpsum_swdiscovery.exe",
+                "?:\\Windows\\CCM\\Ccm32BitLauncher.exe",
+                "?:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\mofcomp.exe",
+                "?:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework*\\csc.exe",
+                "?:\\Windows\\System32\\powercfg.exe") and
+   not (process.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\msiexec.exe" and process.args : "REBOOT=ReallySuppress") and
+   not (process.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\inetsrv\\appcmd.exe" and process.args : "uninstall")
+   ]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote Services
+** ID: T1021
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Windows Management Instrumentation
+** ID: T1047
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-zoom-meeting-with-no-passcode.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-zoom-meeting-with-no-passcode.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3567a43a5d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-zoom-meeting-with-no-passcode.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-zoom-meeting-with-no-passcode]]
+=== Zoom Meeting with no Passcode
+
+This rule identifies Zoom meetings that are created without a passcode. Meetings without a passcode are susceptible to Zoombombing. Zoombombing is carried out by taking advantage of Zoom sessions that are not protected with a passcode. Zoombombing refers to the unwanted, disruptive intrusion, generally by Internet trolls and hackers, into a video conference call. In a typical Zoombombing incident, a teleconferencing session is hijacked by the insertion of material that is lewd, obscene, racist, or antisemitic in nature, typically resulting of the shutdown of the session.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* filebeat-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: None ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://blog.zoom.us/a-message-to-our-users/
+* https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices/boston/news/press-releases/fbi-warns-of-teleconferencing-and-online-classroom-hijacking-during-covid-19-pandemic
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Data Source: Zoom
+* Use Case: Configuration Audit
+* Tactic: Initial Access
+
+*Version*: 103
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The Zoom Filebeat module or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.type:creation and event.module:zoom and event.dataset:zoom.webhook and
+  event.action:meeting.created and not zoom.meeting.password:*
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Initial Access
+** ID: TA0001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploit Public-Facing Application
+** ID: T1190
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rules-8-11-11-appendix.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rules-8-11-11-appendix.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..016353d2a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rules-8-11-11-appendix.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,561 @@
+["appendix",role="exclude",id="prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-prebuilt-rules-8-11-11-appendix"]
+= Downloadable rule update v8.11.11
+
+This section lists all updates associated with version 8.11.11 of the Fleet integration *Prebuilt Security Detection Rules*.
+
+
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-connection-from-binary-with-rwx-memory-region.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unknown-execution-of-binary-with-rwx-memory-region.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-script-with-veeam-credential-access-capabilities.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-veeam-backup-library-loaded-by-unusual-process.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-veeam-credential-access-command.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-cookies-theft-via-browser-debugging.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-webserver-access-logs-deleted.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-tampering-of-shell-command-line-history.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-elastic-agent-service-terminated.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-masquerading-space-after-filename.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-timestomping-using-touch-command.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-security-software-discovery-via-grep.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-virtual-machine-fingerprinting-via-grep.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell-activity-via-terminal.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-java-child-process.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-my-first-rule.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-hosts-file-modified.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-zoom-meeting-with-no-passcode.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-deprecated-remote-file-creation-on-a-sensitive-directory.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-ssh-authorized-keys-file-modification.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-threat-intel-ip-address-indicator-match.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-threat-intel-hash-indicator-match.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-threat-intel-windows-registry-indicator-match.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-threat-intel-url-indicator-match.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-first-time-seen-aws-secret-value-accessed-in-secrets-manager.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-aws-route-table-created.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-aws-route-table-modified-or-deleted.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-statistical-model-detected-c2-beaconing-activity.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-statistical-model-detected-c2-beaconing-activity-with-high-confidence.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-iso-code.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-ip-address.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-destination-port.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-region.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-spike-in-bytes-sent-to-an-external-device.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-spike-in-bytes-sent-to-an-external-device-via-airdrop.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-process-writing-data-to-an-external-device.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-machine-learning-detected-dga-activity-using-a-known-sunburst-dns-domain.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-dga-activity.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-with-a-high-dga-probability-score.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-predicted-to-be-a-dga-domain.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-high-mean-of-process-arguments-in-an-rdp-session.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-high-mean-of-rdp-session-duration.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-remote-file-size.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-high-variance-in-rdp-session-duration.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-remote-file-directory.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-remote-file-extension.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-spike-in-number-of-connections-made-from-a-source-ip.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-spike-in-number-of-connections-made-to-a-destination-ip.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-spike-in-number-of-processes-in-an-rdp-session.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-spike-in-remote-file-transfers.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-time-or-day-for-an-rdp-session.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-okta-mfa-bombing-via-push-notifications.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-process-spawned-by-a-host.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-process-spawned-by-a-parent-process.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-process-spawned-by-a-user.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-predicted-to-be-malicious-activity.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-with-a-high-malicious-probability-score.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-windows-process-cluster-spawned-by-a-host.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-windows-process-cluster-spawned-by-a-parent-process.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-windows-process-cluster-spawned-by-a-user.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-activity-detected-via-cat.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-protocol-tunneling-via-chisel-client.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-protocol-tunneling-via-chisel-server.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-activity-detected-via-kworker.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-proxychains-activity.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-utility-launched-via-proxychains.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-tunneling-and-or-port-forwarding.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-network-activity-to-the-internet-by-previously-unknown-executable.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-protocol-tunneling-via-earthworm.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-sensitive-files-compression.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-credential-dumping-via-unshadow.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-linux-init-pid-1-secret-dump-via-gdb.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-linux-process-hooking-via-gdb.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-local-account-brute-force-detected.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-external-linux-ssh-brute-force-detected.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-internal-linux-ssh-brute-force-detected.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-successful-linux-ftp-brute-force-attack-detected.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-successful-linux-rdp-brute-force-attack-detected.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-successful-ssh-brute-force-attack.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-credential-dumping-via-proc-filesystem.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-openssh-backdoor-logging-activity.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-disable-iptables-or-firewall.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-disable-syslog-service.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-base16-or-base32-encoding-decoding-activity.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-system-binary-copied-and-or-moved-to-suspicious-directory.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-file-made-immutable-by-chattr.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-clear-kernel-ring-buffer.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-disabling-of-apparmor.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-disabling-of-selinux.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-esxi-timestomping-using-touch-command.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-file-deletion-via-shred.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-file-permission-modification-in-writable-directory.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-of-hidden-files-and-directories-via-commandline.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-of-hidden-shared-object-file.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kernel-module-removal.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-executable-masquerading-as-kernel-process.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-system-log-file-deletion.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-hidden-process-via-mount-hidepid.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-defense-evasion-via-proot.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-renaming-of-esxi-files.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-renaming-of-esxi-index-html-file.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potentially-suspicious-process-started-via-tmux-or-screen.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-dynamic-linker-discovery-via-od.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-esxi-discovery-via-find.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-esxi-discovery-via-grep.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-enumeration-of-kernel-modules.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-hping-process-activity.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-nping-process-activity.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-network-scan-executed-from-host.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-proc-maps-discovery.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-process-capability-enumeration.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-pspy-process-monitoring-detected.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-sudo-command-enumeration-detected.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suid-sguid-enumeration-detected.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-which-enumeration.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-user-privilege-enumeration-via-id.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-virtual-machine-fingerprinting.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-abnormal-process-id-or-lock-file-created.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-curl-cve-2023-38545-exploitation.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-file-creation-execution-and-self-deletion-in-suspicious-directory.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-file-transfer-or-listener-established-via-netcat.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-upgrade-of-non-interactive-shell.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-netcat-listener-established-via-rlwrap.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-connection-via-recently-compiled-executable.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-interactive-terminal-spawned-via-perl.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-hack-tool-launched.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-process-started-from-process-id-pid-file.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-binary-executed-from-shared-memory-directory.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-interactive-terminal-spawned-via-python.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-code-execution-via-postgresql.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell-via-background-process.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell-via-child.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell-via-java.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell-via-suspicious-child-process.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-meterpreter-reverse-shell.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell-via-suspicious-binary.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell-via-udp.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-content-extracted-or-decompressed-via-funzip.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-system-commands-executed-by-previously-unknown-executable.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-mining-process-creation-event.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-bpf-filter-applied-using-tc.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-data-encryption-via-openssl-utility.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-termination-of-esxi-process.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-file-changes-activity-detected.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-ransomware-note-creation-detected.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-high-number-of-process-terminations.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-ssh-it-ssh-worm-downloaded.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-connection-to-external-network-via-telnet.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-connection-to-internal-network-via-telnet.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-apt-package-manager-execution.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-apt-package-manager-network-connection.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-chkconfig-service-add.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-openssh-binaries.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-cron-job-created-or-changed-by-previously-unknown-process.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-dynamic-linker-copy.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-file-creation-in-etc-for-persistence.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-persistence-through-init-d-detected.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kernel-module-load-via-insmod.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-kde-autostart-script-or-desktop-file-modification.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kernel-driver-load-by-non-root-user.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-file-creation-via-kworker.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-backdoor-user-account-creation.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-linux-group-creation.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-remote-code-execution-via-web-server.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-linux-user-account-creation.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-linux-user-added-to-privileged-group.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-persistence-through-motd-file-creation-detected.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-process-spawned-from-motd-detected.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-persistence-through-run-control-detected.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-setcap-setuid-setgid-capability-set.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-shared-object-created-or-changed-by-previously-unknown-process.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-network-connection-via-systemd.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-new-systemd-timer-created.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-new-systemd-service-created-by-previously-unknown-process.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-tainted-kernel-module-load.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-unauthorized-access-via-wildcard-injection-detected.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-container-misconfiguration.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-linux-dac-permissions.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-chroot-container-escape-via-mount.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-enlightenment.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-gdb-cap-sys-ptrace.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-root-network-connection-via-gdb-cap-sys-ptrace.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-kworker-uid-elevation.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-dynamic-linker-preload-shared-object.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-symbolic-link-created.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-uid-int-max-bug-detected.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kernel-load-or-unload-via-kexec-detected.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-cve-2023-4911.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-network-connection-via-sudo-binary.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-overlayfs.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-pkexec.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-buffer-overflow-attack-detected.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-shell-via-wildcard-injection-detected.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-suspicious-debugfs-root-device-access.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-shadow-file-read-via-command-line-utilities.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-sudo-privilege-escalation-via-cve-2019-14287.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-sudo-hijacking-detected.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-sudo-token-manipulation-via-process-injection.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-python-cap-setuid.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-cap-chown-cap-fowner-capabilities.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-passwd-file-event-action.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-cap-setuid-setgid-capabilities.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-recently-compiled-executable.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uid-elevation-from-previously-unknown-executable.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-namespace-manipulation-using-unshare.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-through-writable-docker-socket.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-access-of-stored-browser-credentials.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-access-to-keychain-credentials-directories.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-dumping-account-hashes-via-built-in-commands.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-dumping-of-keychain-content-via-security-command.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kerberos-cached-credentials-dumping.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-keychain-password-retrieval-via-command-line.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-webproxy-settings-modification.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-macos-ssh-brute-force-detected.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-prompt-for-credentials-with-osascript.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-systemkey-access-via-command-line.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-softwareupdate-preferences-modification.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-remove-file-quarantine-attribute.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-disable-gatekeeper.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-install-root-certificate.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-environment-variable-via-launchctl.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privacy-control-bypass-via-tccdb-modification.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privacy-control-bypass-via-localhost-secure-copy.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-safari-settings-via-defaults-command.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-microsoft-office-sandbox-evasion.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-tcc-bypass-via-mounted-apfs-snapshot-access.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-unload-elastic-endpoint-security-kernel-extension.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-enumeration-of-users-or-groups-via-built-in-commands.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-via-electron-child-process-node-js-module.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-browser-child-process.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-macos-installer-package-spawns-network-event.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-automator-workflows-execution.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-apple-script-execution-followed-by-network-connection.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-shell-execution-via-apple-scripting.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-macos-ms-office-child-process.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-kerberos-attack-via-bifrost.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-mount-smb-share-via-command-line.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-ssh-login-enabled-via-systemsetup-command.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-virtual-private-network-connection-attempt.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-hidden-local-user-account-creation.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-launch-agent-creation-or-modification-and-immediate-loading.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-of-hidden-login-item-via-apple-script.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-launchdaemon-creation-or-modification-and-immediate-loading.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-authorization-plugin-modification.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-crontab-creation-or-modification.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-hidden-child-process-of-launchd.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-directoryservice-plugin-modification.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-docker-shortcut-modification.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-emond-rules-creation-or-modification.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-emond-child-process.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-enable-the-root-account.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-of-hidden-launch-agent-or-daemon.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-finder-sync-plugin-registered-and-enabled.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-folder-action-script.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-login-or-logout-hook.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-persistence-via-login-hook.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-sublime-plugin-or-application-script-modification.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-persistence-via-periodic-tasks.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unexpected-child-process-of-macos-screensaver-engine.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-screensaver-plist-file-modified-by-unexpected-process.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-calendar-file-modification.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-persistence-via-atom-init-script-modification.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-apple-scripting-execution-with-administrator-privileges.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-with-explicit-credentials-via-scripting.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-child-process-of-adobe-acrobat-reader-update-service.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-admin-group-account-addition.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-root-crontab-file-modification.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-smtp-on-port-26-tcp.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-exporting-exchange-mailbox-via-powershell.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-exchange-mailbox-export-via-powershell.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-suspicious-script-with-audio-capture-capabilities.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-suspicious-script-with-clipboard-retrieval-capabilities.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-keylogging-script.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-mailbox-collection-script.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-suspicious-script-with-screenshot-capabilities.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-script-with-webcam-video-capture-capabilities.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-encrypting-files-with-winrar-or-7z.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-connection-to-commonly-abused-free-ssl-certificate-providers.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-command-and-control-via-internet-explorer.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-port-forwarding-rule-addition.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-remote-desktop-tunneling-detected.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-file-download-via-desktopimgdownldr-utility.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-file-download-via-mpcmdrun.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-file-download-via-script-interpreter.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-file-copy-via-teamviewer.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privileged-account-brute-force.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-multiple-logon-failure-followed-by-logon-success.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-multiple-logon-failure-from-the-same-source-address.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-credential-access-via-windows-utilities.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-ntds-or-sam-database-file-copied.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-credential-access-via-trusted-developer-utility.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-firsttime-seen-account-performing-dcsync.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-credential-access-via-dcsync.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kerberos-pre-authentication-disabled-for-user.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-or-modification-of-domain-backup-dpapi-private-key.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-credential-acquisition-via-registry-hive-dumping.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-full-user-mode-dumps-enabled-system-wide.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-iis-service-account-password-dumped.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-iis-connection-strings-decryption.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kerberos-traffic-from-unusual-process.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kirbi-file-creation.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-access-to-a-sensitive-ldap-attribute.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-lsass-access-via-malseclogon.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-module-loaded-by-lsass.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-lsass-memory-dump-creation.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-lsass-memory-dump-handle-access.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-mimikatz-memssp-log-file-detected.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-invoke-mimikatz-powershell-script.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-wdigest-security-provider.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-logon-provider-registry-modification.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-invoke-ninjacopy-script.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-kerberos-ticket-dump.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-minidump-script.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-kerberos-ticket-request.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-credential-access-via-duplicatehandle-in-lsass.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-local-ntlm-relay-via-http.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-remote-credential-access-via-registry.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-multiple-vault-web-credentials-read.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-searching-for-saved-credentials-via-vaultcmd.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-sensitive-privilege-seenabledelegationprivilege-assigned-to-a-user.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-shadow-credentials-added-to-ad-object.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-user-account-exposed-to-kerberoasting.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-credential-access-via-renamed-com-services-dll.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-lsass-process-access.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-credential-access-via-lsass-memory-dump.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-lsass-memory-dump-via-psscapturesnapshot.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-remote-registry-access-via-sebackupprivilege.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-symbolic-link-to-shadow-copy-created.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-lsass-clone-creation-via-psscapturesnapshot.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-antimalware-scan-interface-dll.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-antimalware-scan-interface-bypass-via-powershell.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-amsienable-registry-key.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-clearing-windows-console-history.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-clearing-windows-event-logs.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-code-signing-policy-modification-through-registry.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-or-modification-of-root-certificate.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-cryptoapi-spoofing-vulnerability-cve-2020-0601-curveball.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-defender-disabled-via-registry-modification.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-defender-exclusions-added-via-powershell.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-script-block-logging-disabled.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-disable-windows-firewall-rules-via-netsh.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-disabling-windows-defender-security-settings-via-powershell.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-disable-windows-event-and-security-logs-using-built-in-tools.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-dns-over-https-enabled-via-registry.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-net-code-compilation.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-desktop-enabled-in-windows-firewall-by-netsh.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-enable-host-network-discovery-via-netsh.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-control-panel-process-with-unusual-arguments.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-imageload-via-windows-update-auto-update-client.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-build-engine-started-by-an-office-application.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-build-engine-started-by-a-script-process.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-build-engine-started-by-a-system-process.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-build-engine-using-an-alternate-name.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-build-engine-started-an-unusual-process.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-dll-side-loading-via-trusted-microsoft-programs.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-dll-side-loading-via-microsoft-antimalware-service-executable.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-executable-file-creation-with-multiple-extensions.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-process-execution-from-an-unusual-directory.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-encoded-executable-stored-in-the-registry.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-iis-http-logging-disabled.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-process-injection-by-the-microsoft-build-engine.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-installutil-process-making-network-connections.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-endpoint-security-parent-process.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-renamed-autoit-scripts-interpreter.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-werfault-child-process.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-program-files-directory-masquerading.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-windows-error-manager-masquerading.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-windows-defender-tampering.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-connection-via-signed-binary.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-ms-office-macro-security-registry-modifications.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-msbuild-making-network-connections.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-mshta-making-network-connections.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-connection-via-msxsl.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-network-activity-from-a-windows-system-binary.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-local-account-tokenfilter-policy-disabled.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-net-reflection-via-powershell.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-suspicious-payload-encoded-and-compressed.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-script-with-encryption-decryption-capabilities.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-process-injection-via-powershell.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-firewall-disabled-via-powershell.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-microsoft-diagnostics-wizard-execution.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-child-processes-of-rundll32.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-scheduled-tasks-at-command-enabled.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-secure-file-deletion-via-sdelete-utility.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-sip-provider-modification.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-solarwinds-process-disabling-services-via-registry.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-execution-from-a-mounted-device.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-managed-code-hosting-process.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-process-access-via-direct-system-call.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-process-creation-calltrace.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-script-object-execution.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-renamed-utility-executed-with-short-program-name.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-wmic-xsl-script-execution.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-zoom-child-process.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-executable-file-creation-by-a-system-critical-process.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-file-creation-time-changed.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unsigned-dll-side-loading-from-a-suspicious-folder.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-file-creation-alternate-data-stream.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-process-execution-path-alternate-data-stream.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-network-connection-via-dllhost.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-network-connection-via-rundll32.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-process-network-connection.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-child-process-from-a-system-virtual-process.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-evasion-via-filter-manager.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-evasion-via-windows-filtering-platform.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-signed-proxy-execution-via-ms-work-folders.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-host-files-system-changes-via-windows-subsystem-for-linux.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-subsystem-for-linux-distribution-installed.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-adfind-command-activity.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-enumeration-of-administrator-accounts.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-account-discovery-command-via-system-account.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-group-policy-discovery-via-microsoft-gpresult-utility.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-peripheral-device-discovery.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-share-enumeration-script.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-suspicious-discovery-related-windows-api-functions.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-enumeration-of-privileged-local-groups-membership.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-whoami-process-activity.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-command-execution-via-solarwinds-process.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-solarwinds-child-process.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-of-com-object-via-xwizard.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-command-prompt-network-connection.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-svchost-spawning-cmd.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-parent-process-for-cmd-exe.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-command-shell-activity-started-via-rundll32.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-enumeration-command-spawned-via-wmiprvse.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-from-unusual-directory-command-line.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-connection-via-compiled-html-file.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-of-file-written-or-modified-by-microsoft-office.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-of-file-written-or-modified-by-pdf-reader.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-powershell-hacktool-script-by-function-names.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-portable-executable-encoded-in-powershell-script.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-psreflect-script.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-psexec-network-connection.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-connection-via-registration-utility.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-outbound-scheduled-task-activity-via-powershell.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-via-local-sxs-shared-module.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-cmd-execution-via-wmi.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-wmi-image-load-from-ms-office.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-pdf-reader-child-process.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-process-execution-via-renamed-psexec-executable.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-process-activity-via-compiled-html-file.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-conhost-spawned-by-suspicious-parent-process.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-rare-smb-connection-to-the-internet.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-third-party-backup-files-deleted-via-unexpected-process.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-deleting-backup-catalogs-with-wbadmin.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-boot-configuration.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-high-number-of-process-and-or-service-terminations.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-volume-shadow-copy-deleted-or-resized-via-vssadmin.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-volume-shadow-copy-deletion-via-powershell.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-volume-shadow-copy-deletion-via-wmic.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-html-file-creation.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-execution-via-microsoft-office-add-ins.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-first-time-seen-removable-device.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-script-executing-powershell.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-script-interpreter-executing-process-via-wmi.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-exchange-server-um-writing-suspicious-files.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-exchange-server-um-spawning-suspicious-processes.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-exchange-worker-spawning-suspicious-processes.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-ms-office-child-process.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-ms-outlook-child-process.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-explorer-child-process.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-service-command-lateral-movement.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-incoming-dcom-lateral-movement-via-mshta.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-incoming-dcom-lateral-movement-with-mmc.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-incoming-dcom-lateral-movement-with-shellbrowserwindow-or-shellwindows.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-nullsessionpipe-registry-modification.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-remote-desktop-shadowing-activity.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-via-tsclient-mountpoint.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-incoming-execution-via-winrm-remote-shell.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-wmi-incoming-lateral-movement.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-mounting-hidden-or-webdav-remote-shares.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-incoming-execution-via-powershell-remoting.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-rdp-enabled-via-registry.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-file-copy-to-a-hidden-share.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remotely-started-services-via-rpc.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-scheduled-task-creation.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-rdp-activex-client-loaded.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-child-process-of-dns-exe.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-file-modification-by-dns-exe.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-lateral-movement-via-startup-folder.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-adobe-hijack-persistence.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-installation-of-custom-shim-databases.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-registry-persistence-via-appcert-dll.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-registry-persistence-via-appinit-dll.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-of-a-hidden-local-user-account.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-image-file-execution-options-injection.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-startup-shell-folder-modification.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-scheduled-job-creation.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-local-scheduled-task-creation.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-scheduled-task-created-by-a-windows-script.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-microsoft-office-addins.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-microsoft-outlook-vba.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-krbtgt-delegation-backdoor.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-new-activesyncalloweddeviceid-added-via-powershell.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-powershell-profile.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-modification-of-accessibility-binaries.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uncommon-registry-persistence-change.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-of-persistent-suspicious-program.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-adminsdholder-sdprop-exclusion-added.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-persistence-via-services-registry.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-startup-persistence-by-a-suspicious-process.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistent-scripts-in-the-startup-directory.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-component-object-model-hijacking.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-image-load-taskschd-dll-from-ms-office.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-execution-via-scheduled-task.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-imagepath-service-creation.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-wmi-event-subscription-created.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-persistence-via-time-provider-modification.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-user-added-to-privileged-group.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-user-account-creation.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-application-shimming-via-sdbinst.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-bits-job-notify-cmdline.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-hidden-run-key-detected.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-installation-of-security-support-provider.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-telemetrycontroller-scheduled-task-hijack.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-update-orchestrator-service-hijack.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-wmi-event-subscription.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-wmi-standard-registry-provider.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-via-mssql-xp-cmdshell-stored-procedure.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-web-shell-detection-script-process-child-of-common-web-processes.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-process-creation-via-secondary-logon.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-the-mspkiaccountcredentials.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-disabling-user-account-control-via-registry-modification.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-or-modification-of-a-new-gpo-scheduled-task-or-service.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-startup-logon-script-added-to-group-policy-object.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-group-policy-abuse-for-privilege-addition.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-scheduled-task-execution-at-scale-via-gpo.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-installerfiletakeover.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-interactive-logon-by-an-unusual-process.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-named-pipe-impersonation.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-dll-loaded-for-persistence-or-privilege-escalation.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-script-with-token-impersonation-capabilities.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-print-spooler-point-and-print-dll.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-printspooler-service-executable-file-creation.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-print-spooler-file-deletion.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-print-spooler-spl-file-created.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-windir-environment-variable.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privileged-escalation-via-samaccountname-spoofing.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-sedebugprivilege-enabled-by-a-suspicious-process.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uac-bypass-attempt-with-ieditionupgrademanager-elevated-com-interface.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uac-bypass-attempt-via-elevated-com-internet-explorer-add-on-installer.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uac-bypass-via-icmluautil-elevated-com-interface.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uac-bypass-via-diskcleanup-scheduled-task-hijack.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uac-bypass-attempt-via-privileged-ifileoperation-com-interface.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-bypass-uac-via-event-viewer.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uac-bypass-attempt-via-windows-directory-masquerading.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uac-bypass-via-windows-firewall-snap-in-hijack.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-parent-child-relationship.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-print-spooler-child-process.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-service-host-child-process-childless-service.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-rogue-named-pipe-impersonation.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-service-installed-via-an-unusual-client.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-reverse-connection-through-port-knocking.asciidoc[]
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rules-8-11-11-summary.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rules-8-11-11-summary.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..40aa6486e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rules-8-11-11-summary.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,1122 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-prebuilt-rules-8-11-11-summary]]
+[role="xpack"]
+== Update v8.11.11
+
+This section lists all updates associated with version 8.11.11 of the Fleet integration *Prebuilt Security Detection Rules*.
+
+
+[width="100%",options="header"]
+|==============================================
+|Rule |Description |Status |Version
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-connection-from-binary-with-rwx-memory-region, Network Connection from Binary with RWX Memory Region>> | Monitors for the execution of a unix binary with read, write and execute memory region permissions, followed by a network connection. The mprotect() system call is used to change the access protections on a region of memory that has already been allocated. This syscall allows a process to modify the permissions of pages in its virtual address space, enabling or disabling permissions such as read, write, and execute for those pages. RWX permissions on memory is in many cases overly permissive, and should (especially in conjunction with an outbound network connection) be analyzed thoroughly. | new | 1 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unknown-execution-of-binary-with-rwx-memory-region, Unknown Execution of Binary with RWX Memory Region>> | Monitors for the execution of a previously unknown unix binary with read, write and execute memory region permissions. The mprotect() system call is used to change the access protections on a region of memory that has already been allocated. This syscall allows a process to modify the permissions of pages in its virtual address space, enabling or disabling permissions such as read, write, and execute for those pages. RWX permissions on memory is in many cases overly permissive, and should be analyzed thoroughly. | new | 1 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-script-with-veeam-credential-access-capabilities, PowerShell Script with Veeam Credential Access Capabilities>> | Identifies PowerShell scripts that can access and decrypt Veeam credentials stored in MSSQL databases. Attackers can use Veeam Credentials to target backups as part of destructive operations such as Ransomware attacks. | new | 1 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-veeam-backup-library-loaded-by-unusual-process, Veeam Backup Library Loaded by Unusual Process>> | Identifies potential credential decrypt operations by PowerShell or unsigned processes using the Veeam.Backup.Common.dll library. Attackers can use Veeam Credentials to target backups as part of destructive operations such as Ransomware attacks. | new | 1 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-veeam-credential-access-command, Potential Veeam Credential Access Command>> | Identifies commands that can access and decrypt Veeam credentials stored in MSSQL databases. Attackers can use Veeam Credentials to target backups as part of destructive operations such as Ransomware attacks. | new | 1 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-cookies-theft-via-browser-debugging, Potential Cookies Theft via Browser Debugging>> | Identifies the execution of a Chromium based browser with the debugging process argument, which may indicate an attempt to steal authentication cookies. An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials. | update | 105 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-webserver-access-logs-deleted, WebServer Access Logs Deleted>> | Identifies the deletion of WebServer access logs. This may indicate an attempt to evade detection or destroy forensic evidence on a system. | update | 105 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-tampering-of-shell-command-line-history, Tampering of Shell Command-Line History>> | Adversaries may attempt to clear or disable the Bash command-line history in an attempt to evade detection or forensic investigations. | update | 105 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-elastic-agent-service-terminated, Elastic Agent Service Terminated>> | Identifies the Elastic endpoint agent has stopped and is no longer running on the host. Adversaries may attempt to disable security monitoring tools in an attempt to evade detection or prevention capabilities during an intrusion. This may also indicate an issue with the agent itself and should be addressed to ensure defensive measures are back in a stable state. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-masquerading-space-after-filename, Masquerading Space After Filename>> | This rules identifies a process created from an executable with a space appended to the end of the filename. This may indicate an attempt to masquerade a malicious file as benign to gain user execution. When a space is added to the end of certain files, the OS will execute the file according to it's true filetype instead of it's extension. Adversaries can hide a program's true filetype by changing the extension of the file. They can then add a space to the end of the name so that the OS automatically executes the file when it's double-clicked. | update | 6 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-timestomping-using-touch-command, Timestomping using Touch Command>> | Timestomping is an anti-forensics technique which is used to modify the timestamps of a file, often to mimic files that are in the same folder. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-security-software-discovery-via-grep, Security Software Discovery via Grep>> | Identifies the use of the grep command to discover known third-party macOS and Linux security tools, such as Antivirus or Host Firewall details. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-virtual-machine-fingerprinting-via-grep, Virtual Machine Fingerprinting via Grep>> | An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware. This rule identifies common locations used to discover virtual machine hardware by a non-root user. This technique has been used by the Pupy RAT and other malware. | update | 105 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell-activity-via-terminal, Potential Reverse Shell Activity via Terminal>> | Identifies the execution of a shell process with suspicious arguments which may be indicative of reverse shell activity. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-java-child-process, Suspicious JAVA Child Process>> | Identifies suspicious child processes of the Java interpreter process. This may indicate an attempt to execute a malicious JAR file or an exploitation attempt via a JAVA specific vulnerability. | update | 208 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-my-first-rule, My First Rule>> | This rule helps you test and practice using alerts with Elastic Security as you get set up. It’s not a sign of threat activity. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-hosts-file-modified, Hosts File Modified>> | The hosts file on endpoints is used to control manual IP address to hostname resolutions. The hosts file is the first point of lookup for DNS hostname resolution so if adversaries can modify the endpoint hosts file, they can route traffic to malicious infrastructure. This rule detects modifications to the hosts file on Microsoft Windows, Linux (Ubuntu or RHEL) and macOS systems. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-zoom-meeting-with-no-passcode, Zoom Meeting with no Passcode>> | This rule identifies Zoom meetings that are created without a passcode. Meetings without a passcode are susceptible to Zoombombing. Zoombombing is carried out by taking advantage of Zoom sessions that are not protected with a passcode. Zoombombing refers to the unwanted, disruptive intrusion, generally by Internet trolls and hackers, into a video conference call. In a typical Zoombombing incident, a teleconferencing session is hijacked by the insertion of material that is lewd, obscene, racist, or antisemitic in nature, typically resulting of the shutdown of the session. | update | 103 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-deprecated-remote-file-creation-on-a-sensitive-directory, Deprecated - Remote File Creation on a Sensitive Directory>> | Discovery of files created by a remote host on sensitive directories and folders. Remote file creation in these directories could indicate a malicious binary or script trying to compromise the system. | update | 2 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-ssh-authorized-keys-file-modification, SSH Authorized Keys File Modification>> | The Secure Shell (SSH) authorized_keys file specifies which users are allowed to log into a server using public key authentication. Adversaries may modify it to maintain persistence on a victim host by adding their own public key(s). | update | 205 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-threat-intel-ip-address-indicator-match, Threat Intel IP Address Indicator Match>> | This rule is triggered when an IP address indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or integrations has a match against a network event. | update | 6 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-threat-intel-hash-indicator-match, Threat Intel Hash Indicator Match>> | This rule is triggered when a hash indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or integrations has a match against an event that contains file hashes, such as antivirus alerts, process creation, library load, and file operation events. | update | 7 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-threat-intel-windows-registry-indicator-match, Threat Intel Windows Registry Indicator Match>> | This rule is triggered when a Windows registry indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or integrations has a match against an event that contains registry data. | update | 6 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-threat-intel-url-indicator-match, Threat Intel URL Indicator Match>> | This rule is triggered when a URL indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or integrations has a match against an event that contains URL data, like DNS events, network logs, etc. | update | 6 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-first-time-seen-aws-secret-value-accessed-in-secrets-manager, First Time Seen AWS Secret Value Accessed in Secrets Manager>> | An adversary with access to a compromised AWS service such as an EC2 instance, Lambda function, or other service may attempt to leverage the compromised service to access secrets in AWS Secrets Manager. This rule looks for the first time a specific user identity has programmatically retrieved a specific secret value from Secrets Manager using the `GetSecretValue` action.  This rule assumes that AWS services such as Lambda functions and EC2 instances are setup with IAM role's assigned that have the necessary permissions to access the secrets in Secrets Manager. An adversary with access to a compromised AWS service such as an EC2 instance, Lambda function, or other service would rely on the compromised service's IAM role to access the secrets in Secrets Manager. | update | 309 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-aws-route-table-created, AWS Route Table Created>> | Identifies when an AWS Route Table has been created. | update | 206 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-aws-route-table-modified-or-deleted, AWS Route Table Modified or Deleted>> | Identifies when an AWS Route Table has been modified or deleted. | update | 206 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-statistical-model-detected-c2-beaconing-activity, Statistical Model Detected C2 Beaconing Activity>> | A statistical model has identified command-and-control (C2) beaconing activity. Beaconing can help attackers maintain stealthy communication with their C2 servers, receive instructions and payloads, exfiltrate data and maintain persistence in a network. | update | 4 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-statistical-model-detected-c2-beaconing-activity-with-high-confidence, Statistical Model Detected C2 Beaconing Activity with High Confidence>> | A statistical model has identified command-and-control (C2) beaconing activity with high confidence. Beaconing can help attackers maintain stealthy communication with their C2 servers, receive instructions and payloads, exfiltrate data and maintain persistence in a network. | update | 4 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-iso-code, Potential Data Exfiltration Activity to an Unusual ISO Code>> | A machine learning job has detected data exfiltration to a particular geo-location (by region name). Data transfers to geo-locations that are outside the normal traffic patterns of an organization could indicate exfiltration over command and control channels. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-ip-address, Potential Data Exfiltration Activity to an Unusual IP Address>> | A machine learning job has detected data exfiltration to a particular geo-location (by IP address). Data transfers to geo-locations that are outside the normal traffic patterns of an organization could indicate exfiltration over command and control channels. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-destination-port, Potential Data Exfiltration Activity to an Unusual Destination Port>> | A machine learning job has detected data exfiltration to a particular destination port. Data transfer patterns that are outside the normal traffic patterns of an organization could indicate exfiltration over command and control channels. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-region, Potential Data Exfiltration Activity to an Unusual Region>> | A machine learning job has detected data exfiltration to a particular geo-location (by region name). Data transfers to geo-locations that are outside the normal traffic patterns of an organization could indicate exfiltration over command and control channels. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-spike-in-bytes-sent-to-an-external-device, Spike in Bytes Sent to an External Device>> | A machine learning job has detected high bytes of data written to an external device. In a typical operational setting, there is usually a predictable pattern or a certain range of data that is written to external devices. An unusually large amount of data being written is anomalous and can signal illicit data copying or transfer activities. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-spike-in-bytes-sent-to-an-external-device-via-airdrop, Spike in Bytes Sent to an External Device via Airdrop>> | A machine learning job has detected high bytes of data written to an external device via Airdrop. In a typical operational setting, there is usually a predictable pattern or a certain range of data that is written to external devices. An unusually large amount of data being written is anomalous and can signal illicit data copying or transfer activities. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-process-writing-data-to-an-external-device, Unusual Process Writing Data to an External Device>> | A machine learning job has detected a rare process writing data to an external device. Malicious actors often use benign-looking processes to mask their data exfiltration activities. The discovery of such a process that has no legitimate reason to write data to external devices can indicate exfiltration. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-machine-learning-detected-dga-activity-using-a-known-sunburst-dns-domain, Machine Learning Detected DGA activity using a known SUNBURST DNS domain>> | A supervised machine learning model has identified a DNS question name that used by the SUNBURST malware and is predicted to be the result of a Domain Generation Algorithm. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-dga-activity, Potential DGA Activity>> | A population analysis machine learning job detected potential DGA (domain generation algorithm) activity. Such activity is often used by malware command and control (C2) channels. This machine learning job looks for a source IP address making DNS requests that have an aggregate high probability of being DGA activity. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-with-a-high-dga-probability-score, Machine Learning Detected a DNS Request With a High DGA Probability Score>> | A supervised machine learning model has identified a DNS question name with a high probability of sourcing from a Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA), which could indicate command and control network activity. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-predicted-to-be-a-dga-domain, Machine Learning Detected a DNS Request Predicted to be a DGA Domain>> | A supervised machine learning model has identified a DNS question name that is predicted to be the result of a Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA), which could indicate command and control network activity. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-high-mean-of-process-arguments-in-an-rdp-session, High Mean of Process Arguments in an RDP Session>> | A machine learning job has detected unusually high number of process arguments in an RDP session. Executing sophisticated attacks such as lateral movement can involve the use of complex commands, obfuscation mechanisms, redirection and piping, which in turn increases the number of arguments in a command. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-high-mean-of-rdp-session-duration, High Mean of RDP Session Duration>> | A machine learning job has detected unusually high mean of RDP session duration. Long RDP sessions can be used to evade detection mechanisms via session persistence, and might be used to perform tasks such as lateral movement, that might require uninterrupted access to a compromised machine. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-remote-file-size, Unusual Remote File Size>> | A machine learning job has detected an unusually high file size shared by a remote host indicating potential lateral movement activity. One of the primary goals of attackers after gaining access to a network is to locate and exfiltrate valuable information. Instead of multiple small transfers that can raise alarms, attackers might choose to bundle data into a single large file transfer. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-high-variance-in-rdp-session-duration, High Variance in RDP Session Duration>> | A machine learning job has detected unusually high variance of RDP session duration. Long RDP sessions can be used to evade detection mechanisms via session persistence, and might be used to perform tasks such as lateral movement, that might require uninterrupted access to a compromised machine. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-remote-file-directory, Unusual Remote File Directory>> | An anomaly detection job has detected a remote file transfer on an unusual directory indicating a potential lateral movement activity on the host. Many Security solutions monitor well-known directories for suspicious activities, so attackers might use less common directories to bypass monitoring. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-remote-file-extension, Unusual Remote File Extension>> | An anomaly detection job has detected a remote file transfer with a rare extension, which could indicate potential lateral movement activity on the host. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-spike-in-number-of-connections-made-from-a-source-ip, Spike in Number of Connections Made from a Source IP>> | A machine learning job has detected a high count of destination IPs establishing an RDP connection with a single source IP. Once an attacker has gained access to one system, they might attempt to access more in the network in search of valuable assets, data, or further access points. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-spike-in-number-of-connections-made-to-a-destination-ip, Spike in Number of Connections Made to a Destination IP>> | A machine learning job has detected a high count of source IPs establishing an RDP connection with a single destination IP. Attackers might use multiple compromised systems to attack a target to ensure redundancy in case a source IP gets detected and blocked. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-spike-in-number-of-processes-in-an-rdp-session, Spike in Number of Processes in an RDP Session>> | A machine learning job has detected unusually high number of processes started in a single RDP session. Executing a large number of processes remotely on other machines can be an indicator of lateral movement activity. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-spike-in-remote-file-transfers, Spike in Remote File Transfers>> | A machine learning job has detected an abnormal volume of remote files shared on the host indicating potential lateral movement activity. One of the primary goals of attackers after gaining access to a network is to locate and exfiltrate valuable information. Attackers might perform multiple small transfers to match normal egress activity in the network, to evade detection. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-time-or-day-for-an-rdp-session, Unusual Time or Day for an RDP Session>> | A machine learning job has detected an RDP session started at an usual time or weekday. An RDP session at an unusual time could be followed by other suspicious activities, so catching this is a good first step in detecting a larger attack. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-okta-mfa-bombing-via-push-notifications, Potential Okta MFA Bombing via Push Notifications>> | Detects when an attacker abuses the Multi-Factor authentication mechanism by repeatedly issuing login requests until the user eventually accepts the Okta push notification. An adversary may attempt to bypass the Okta MFA policies configured for an organization to obtain unauthorized access. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-process-spawned-by-a-host, Unusual Process Spawned by a Host>> | A machine learning job has detected a suspicious Windows process. This process has been classified as suspicious in two ways. It was predicted to be suspicious by the ProblemChild supervised ML model, and it was found to be an unusual process, on a host that does not commonly manifest malicious activity. Such a process may be an instance of suspicious or malicious activity, possibly involving LOLbins, that may be resistant to detection using conventional search rules. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-process-spawned-by-a-parent-process, Unusual Process Spawned by a Parent Process>> | A machine learning job has detected a suspicious Windows process. This process has been classified as malicious in two ways. It was predicted to be malicious by the ProblemChild supervised ML model, and it was found to be an unusual child process name, for the parent process, by an unsupervised ML model. Such a process may be an instance of suspicious or malicious activity, possibly involving LOLbins, that may be resistant to detection using conventional search rules. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-process-spawned-by-a-user, Unusual Process Spawned by a User>> | A machine learning job has detected a suspicious Windows process. This process has been classified as malicious in two ways. It was predicted to be malicious by the ProblemChild supervised ML model, and it was found to be suspicious given that its user context is unusual and does not commonly manifest malicious activity,by an unsupervised ML model. Such a process may be an instance of suspicious or malicious activity, possibly involving LOLbins, that may be resistant to detection using conventional search rules. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-predicted-to-be-malicious-activity, Machine Learning Detected a Suspicious Windows Event Predicted to be Malicious Activity>> | A supervised machine learning model (ProblemChild) has identified a suspicious Windows process event with high probability of it being malicious activity. Alternatively, the model's blocklist identified the event as being malicious. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-with-a-high-malicious-probability-score, Machine Learning Detected a Suspicious Windows Event with a High Malicious Probability Score>> | A supervised machine learning model (ProblemChild) has identified a suspicious Windows process event with high probability of it being malicious activity. Alternatively, the model's blocklist identified the event as being malicious. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-windows-process-cluster-spawned-by-a-host, Suspicious Windows Process Cluster Spawned by a Host>> | A machine learning job combination has detected a set of one or more suspicious Windows processes with unusually high scores for malicious probability. These process(es) have been classified as malicious in several ways. The process(es) were predicted to be malicious by the ProblemChild supervised ML model. If the anomaly contains a cluster of suspicious processes, each process has the same host name, and the aggregate score of the event cluster was calculated to be unusually high by an unsupervised ML model. Such a cluster often contains suspicious or malicious activity, possibly involving LOLbins, that may be resistant to detection using conventional search rules. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-windows-process-cluster-spawned-by-a-parent-process, Suspicious Windows Process Cluster Spawned by a Parent Process>> | A machine learning job combination has detected a set of one or more suspicious Windows processes with unusually high scores for malicious probability. These process(es) have been classified as malicious in several ways. The process(es) were predicted to be malicious by the ProblemChild supervised ML model. If the anomaly contains a cluster of suspicious processes, each process has the same parent process name, and the aggregate score of the event cluster was calculated to be unusually high by an unsupervised ML model. Such a cluster often contains suspicious or malicious activity, possibly involving LOLbins, that may be resistant to detection using conventional search rules. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-windows-process-cluster-spawned-by-a-user, Suspicious Windows Process Cluster Spawned by a User>> | A machine learning job combination has detected a set of one or more suspicious Windows processes with unusually high scores for malicious probability. These process(es) have been classified as malicious in several ways. The process(es) were predicted to be malicious by the ProblemChild supervised ML model. If the anomaly contains a cluster of suspicious processes, each process has the same user name, and the aggregate score of the event cluster was calculated to be unusually high by an unsupervised ML model. Such a cluster often contains suspicious or malicious activity, possibly involving LOLbins, that may be resistant to detection using conventional search rules. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-activity-detected-via-cat, Network Activity Detected via cat>> | This rule monitors for the execution of the cat command, followed by a connection attempt by the same process. Cat is capable of transfering data via tcp/udp channels by redirecting its read output to a /dev/tcp or /dev/udp channel. This activity is highly suspicious, and should be investigated. Attackers may leverage this capability to transfer tools or files to another host in the network or exfiltrate data while attempting to evade detection in the process. | update | 6 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-protocol-tunneling-via-chisel-client, Potential Protocol Tunneling via Chisel Client>> | This rule monitors for common command line flags leveraged by the Chisel client utility followed by a connection attempt. Chisel is a command-line utility used for creating and managing TCP and UDP tunnels, enabling port forwarding and secure communication between machines. Attackers can abuse the Chisel utility to establish covert communication channels, bypass network restrictions, and carry out malicious activities by creating tunnels that allow unauthorized access to internal systems. | update | 5 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-protocol-tunneling-via-chisel-server, Potential Protocol Tunneling via Chisel Server>> | This rule monitors for common command line flags leveraged by the Chisel server utility followed by a received connection within a timespan of 1 minute. Chisel is a command-line utility used for creating and managing TCP and UDP tunnels, enabling port forwarding and secure communication between machines. Attackers can abuse the Chisel utility to establish covert communication channels, bypass network restrictions, and carry out malicious activities by creating tunnels that allow unauthorized access to internal systems. | update | 6 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-activity-detected-via-kworker, Network Activity Detected via Kworker>> | This rule monitors for network connections from a kworker process. kworker, or kernel worker, processes are part of the kernel's workqueue mechanism. They are responsible for executing work that has been scheduled to be done in kernel space, which might include tasks like handling interrupts, background activities, and other kernel-related tasks. Attackers may attempt to evade detection by masquerading as a kernel worker process. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-proxychains-activity, ProxyChains Activity>> | This rule monitors for the execution of the ProxyChains utility. ProxyChains is a command-line tool that enables the routing of network connections through intermediary proxies, enhancing anonymity and enabling access to restricted resources. Attackers can exploit the ProxyChains utility to hide their true source IP address, evade detection, and perform malicious activities through a chain of proxy servers, potentially masking their identity and intentions. | update | 4 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-utility-launched-via-proxychains, Suspicious Utility Launched via ProxyChains>> | This rule monitors for the execution of suspicious linux tools through ProxyChains. ProxyChains is a command-line tool that enables the routing of network connections through intermediary proxies, enhancing anonymity and enabling access to restricted resources. Attackers can exploit the ProxyChains utility to hide their true source IP address, evade detection, and perform malicious activities through a chain of proxy servers, potentially masking their identity and intentions. | update | 7 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-tunneling-and-or-port-forwarding, Potential Linux Tunneling and/or Port Forwarding>> | This rule monitors for a set of Linux utilities that can be used for tunneling and port forwarding. Attackers can leverage tunneling and port forwarding techniques to bypass network defenses, establish hidden communication channels, and gain unauthorized access to internal resources, facilitating data exfiltration, lateral movement, and remote control. | update | 6 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-network-activity-to-the-internet-by-previously-unknown-executable, Suspicious Network Activity to the Internet by Previously Unknown Executable>> | This rule monitors for network connectivity to the internet from a previously unknown executable located in a suspicious directory to a previously unknown destination ip. An alert from this rule can indicate the presence of potentially malicious activity, such as the execution of unauthorized or suspicious processes attempting to establish connections to unknown or suspicious destinations such as a command and control server. Detecting and investigating such behavior can help identify and mitigate potential security threats, protecting the system and its data from potential compromise. | update | 8 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-protocol-tunneling-via-earthworm, Potential Protocol Tunneling via EarthWorm>> | Identifies the execution of the EarthWorm tunneler. Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection and network filtering, or to enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-sensitive-files-compression, Sensitive Files Compression>> | Identifies the use of a compression utility to collect known files containing sensitive information, such as credentials and system configurations. | update | 208 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-credential-dumping-via-unshadow, Potential Linux Credential Dumping via Unshadow>> | Identifies the execution of the unshadow utility which is part of John the Ripper, a password-cracking tool on the host machine. Malicious actors can use the utility to retrieve the combined contents of the '/etc/shadow' and '/etc/password' files. Using the combined file generated from the utility, the malicious threat actors can use them as input for password-cracking utilities or prepare themselves for future operations by gathering credential information of the victim. | update | 8 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-linux-init-pid-1-secret-dump-via-gdb, Linux init (PID 1) Secret Dump via GDB>> | This rule monitors for the potential memory dump of the init process (PID 1) through gdb. Attackers may leverage memory dumping techniques to attempt secret extraction from privileged processes. Tools that display this behavior include "truffleproc" and "bash-memory-dump". This behavior should not happen by default, and should be investigated thoroughly. | update | 6 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-linux-process-hooking-via-gdb, Linux Process Hooking via GDB>> | This rule monitors for potential memory dumping through gdb. Attackers may leverage memory dumping techniques to attempt secret extraction from privileged processes. Tools that display this behavior include "truffleproc" and "bash-memory-dump". This behavior should not happen by default, and should be investigated thoroughly. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-local-account-brute-force-detected, Potential Linux Local Account Brute Force Detected>> | Identifies multiple consecutive login attempts executed by one process targeting a local linux user account within a short time interval. Adversaries might brute force login attempts across different users with a default wordlist or a set of customly crafted passwords in an attempt to gain access to these accounts. | update | 6 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-external-linux-ssh-brute-force-detected, Potential External Linux SSH Brute Force Detected>> | Identifies multiple external consecutive login failures targeting a user account from the same source address within a short time interval. Adversaries will often brute force login attempts across multiple users with a common or known password, in an attempt to gain access to these accounts. | update | 6 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-internal-linux-ssh-brute-force-detected, Potential Internal Linux SSH Brute Force Detected>> | Identifies multiple internal consecutive login failures targeting a user account from the same source address within a short time interval. Adversaries will often brute force login attempts across multiple users with a common or known password, in an attempt to gain access to these accounts. | update | 10 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-successful-linux-ftp-brute-force-attack-detected, Potential Successful Linux FTP Brute Force Attack Detected>> | An FTP (file transfer protocol) brute force attack is a method where an attacker systematically tries different combinations of usernames and passwords to gain unauthorized access to an FTP server, and if successful, the impact can include unauthorized data access, manipulation, or theft, compromising the security and integrity of the server and potentially exposing sensitive information. This rule identifies multiple consecutive authentication failures targeting a specific user account from the same source address and within a short time interval, followed by a successful authentication. | update | 7 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-successful-linux-rdp-brute-force-attack-detected, Potential Successful Linux RDP Brute Force Attack Detected>> | An RDP (Remote Desktop Protocol) brute force attack involves an attacker repeatedly attempting various username and password combinations to gain unauthorized access to a remote computer via RDP, and if successful, the potential impact can include unauthorized control over the compromised system, data theft, or the ability to launch further attacks within the network, jeopardizing the security and confidentiality of the targeted system and potentially compromising the entire network infrastructure. This rule identifies multiple consecutive authentication failures targeting a specific user account within a short time interval, followed by a successful authentication. | update | 7 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-successful-ssh-brute-force-attack, Potential Successful SSH Brute Force Attack>> | Identifies multiple SSH login failures followed by a successful one from the same source address. Adversaries can attempt to login into multiple users with a common or known password to gain access to accounts. | update | 10 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-credential-dumping-via-proc-filesystem, Potential Linux Credential Dumping via Proc Filesystem>> | Identifies the execution of the mimipenguin exploit script which is linux adaptation of Windows tool mimikatz. Mimipenguin exploit script is used to dump clear text passwords from a currently logged-in user. The tool exploits a known vulnerability CVE-2018-20781. Malicious actors can exploit the cleartext credentials in memory by dumping the process and extracting lines that have a high probability of containing cleartext passwords. | update | 7 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-openssh-backdoor-logging-activity, Potential OpenSSH Backdoor Logging Activity>> | Identifies a Secure Shell (SSH) client or server process creating or writing to a known SSH backdoor log file. Adversaries may modify SSH related binaries for persistence or credential access via patching sensitive functions to enable unauthorized access or to log SSH credentials for exfiltration. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-disable-iptables-or-firewall, Attempt to Disable IPTables or Firewall>> | Adversaries may attempt to disable the iptables or firewall service in an attempt to affect how a host is allowed to receive or send network traffic. | update | 7 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-disable-syslog-service, Attempt to Disable Syslog Service>> | Adversaries may attempt to disable the syslog service in an attempt to an attempt to disrupt event logging and evade detection by security controls. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-base16-or-base32-encoding-decoding-activity, Base16 or Base32 Encoding/Decoding Activity>> | Adversaries may encode/decode data in an attempt to evade detection by host- or network-based security controls. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-system-binary-copied-and-or-moved-to-suspicious-directory, System Binary Copied and/or Moved to Suspicious Directory>> | This rule monitors for the copying or moving of a system binary to a suspicious directory. Adversaries may copy/move and rename system binaries to evade detection. Copying a system binary to a different location should not occur often, so if it does, the activity should be investigated. | update | 7 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-file-made-immutable-by-chattr, File made Immutable by Chattr>> | Detects a file being made immutable using the chattr binary. Making a file immutable means it cannot be deleted or renamed, no link can be created to this file, most of the file's metadata can not be modified, and the file can not be opened in write mode. Threat actors will commonly utilize this to prevent tampering or modification of their malicious files or any system files they have modified for purposes of persistence (e.g .ssh, /etc/passwd, etc.). | update | 111 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-clear-kernel-ring-buffer, Attempt to Clear Kernel Ring Buffer>> | Monitors for the deletion of the kernel ring buffer events through dmesg. Attackers may clear kernel ring buffer events to evade detection after installing a Linux kernel module (LKM). | update | 4 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-disabling-of-apparmor, Potential Disabling of AppArmor>> | This rule monitors for potential attempts to disable AppArmor. AppArmor is a Linux security module that enforces fine-grained access control policies to restrict the actions and resources that specific applications and processes can access. Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. | update | 6 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-disabling-of-selinux, Potential Disabling of SELinux>> | Identifies potential attempts to disable Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux), which is a Linux kernel security feature to support access control policies. Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-esxi-timestomping-using-touch-command, ESXI Timestomping using Touch Command>> | Identifies instances where the 'touch' command is executed on a Linux system with the "-r" flag, which is used to modify the timestamp of a file based on another file's timestamp. The rule targets specific VM-related paths, such as "/etc/vmware/", "/usr/lib/vmware/", or "/vmfs/*". These paths are associated with VMware virtualization software, and their presence in the touch command arguments may indicate that a threat actor is attempting to tamper with timestamps of VM-related files and configurations on the system. | update | 8 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-file-deletion-via-shred, File Deletion via Shred>> | Malware or other files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave traces behind as to what was done within a network and how. Adversaries may remove these files over the course of an intrusion to keep their footprint low or remove them at the end as part of the post-intrusion cleanup process. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-file-permission-modification-in-writable-directory, File Permission Modification in Writable Directory>> | Identifies file permission modifications in common writable directories by a non-root user. Adversaries often drop files or payloads into a writable directory and change permissions prior to execution. | update | 210 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-of-hidden-files-and-directories-via-commandline, Creation of Hidden Files and Directories via CommandLine>> | Users can mark specific files as hidden simply by putting a "." as the first character in the file or folder name. Adversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders on the system for persistence and defense evasion. This rule looks for hidden files or folders in common writable directories. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-of-hidden-shared-object-file, Creation of Hidden Shared Object File>> | Identifies the creation of a hidden shared object (.so) file. Users can mark specific files as hidden simply by putting a "." as the first character in the file or folder name. Adversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders on the system for persistence and defense evasion. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kernel-module-removal, Kernel Module Removal>> | Kernel modules are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. This rule identifies attempts to remove a kernel module. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-executable-masquerading-as-kernel-process, Executable Masquerading as Kernel Process>> | Monitors for kernel processes with associated process executable fields that are not empty. Unix kernel processes such as kthreadd and kworker typically do not have process.executable fields associated to them. Attackers may attempt to hide their malicious programs by masquerading as legitimate kernel processes. | update | 2 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-system-log-file-deletion, System Log File Deletion>> | Identifies the deletion of sensitive Linux system logs. This may indicate an attempt to evade detection or destroy forensic evidence on a system. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-hidden-process-via-mount-hidepid, Potential Hidden Process via Mount Hidepid>> | Identifies the execution of mount process with hidepid parameter, which can make processes invisible to other users from the system. Adversaries using Linux kernel version 3.2+ (or RHEL/CentOS v6.5+ above) can hide the process from other users. When hidepid=2 option is executed to mount the /proc filesystem, only the root user can see all processes and the logged-in user can only see their own process. This provides a defense evasion mechanism for the adversaries to hide their process executions from all other commands such as ps, top, pgrep and more. With the Linux kernel hardening hidepid option all the user has to do is remount the /proc filesystem with the option, which can now be monitored and detected. | update | 8 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-defense-evasion-via-proot, Potential Defense Evasion via PRoot>> | Identifies the execution of the PRoot utility, an open-source tool for user-space implementation of chroot, mount --bind, and binfmt_misc. Adversaries can leverage an open-source tool PRoot to expand the scope of their operations to multiple Linux distributions and simplify their necessary efforts. In a normal threat scenario, the scope of an attack is limited by the varying configurations of each Linux distribution. With PRoot, it provides an attacker with a consistent operational environment across different Linux distributions, such as Ubuntu, Fedora, and Alpine. PRoot also provides emulation capabilities that allow for malware built on other architectures, such as ARM, to be run.The post-exploitation technique called bring your own filesystem (BYOF), can be used by the threat actors to execute malicious payload or elevate privileges or perform network scans or orchestrate another attack on the environment. Although PRoot was originally not developed with malicious intent it can be easily tuned to work for one. | update | 7 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-renaming-of-esxi-files, Suspicious Renaming of ESXI Files>> | Identifies instances where VMware-related files, such as those with extensions like ".vmdk", ".vmx", ".vmxf", ".vmsd", ".vmsn", ".vswp", ".vmss", ".nvram", and ".vmem", are renamed on a Linux system. The rule monitors for the "rename" event action associated with these file types, which could indicate malicious activity. | update | 6 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-renaming-of-esxi-index-html-file, Suspicious Renaming of ESXI index.html File>> | Identifies instances where the "index.html" file within the "/usr/lib/vmware/*" directory is renamed on a Linux system. The rule monitors for the "rename" event action associated with this specific file and path, which could indicate malicious activity. | update | 6 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potentially-suspicious-process-started-via-tmux-or-screen, Potentially Suspicious Process Started via tmux or screen>> | This rule monitors for the execution of suspicious commands via screen and tmux. When launching a command and detaching directly, the commands will be executed in the background via its parent process. Attackers may leverage screen or tmux to execute commands while attempting to evade detection. | update | 4 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-dynamic-linker-discovery-via-od, Suspicious Dynamic Linker Discovery via od>> | Monitors for dynamic linker discovery via the od utility. od (octal dump) is a command-line utility in Unix operating systems used for displaying data in various formats, including octal, hexadecimal, decimal, and ASCII, primarily used for examining and debugging binary files or data streams. Attackers can leverage od to analyze the dynamic linker by identifying injection points and craft exploits based on the observed behaviors and structures within these files. | update | 2 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-esxi-discovery-via-find, ESXI Discovery via Find>> | Identifies instances where the 'find' command is started on a Linux system with arguments targeting specific VM-related paths, such as "/etc/vmware/", "/usr/lib/vmware/", or "/vmfs/*". These paths are associated with VMware virtualization software, and their presence in the find command arguments may indicate that a threat actor is attempting to search for, analyze, or manipulate VM-related files and configurations on the system. | update | 6 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-esxi-discovery-via-grep, ESXI Discovery via Grep>> | Identifies instances where a process named 'grep', 'egrep', or 'pgrep' is started on a Linux system with arguments related to virtual machine (VM) files, such as "vmdk", "vmx", "vmxf", "vmsd", "vmsn", "vswp", "vmss", "nvram", or "vmem". These file extensions are associated with VM-related file formats, and their presence in grep command arguments may indicate that a threat actor is attempting to search for, analyze, or manipulate VM files on the system. | update | 6 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-enumeration-of-kernel-modules, Enumeration of Kernel Modules>> | Loadable Kernel Modules (or LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. This identifies attempts to enumerate information about a kernel module. | update | 209 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-hping-process-activity, Hping Process Activity>> | Hping ran on a Linux host. Hping is a FOSS command-line packet analyzer and has the ability to construct network packets for a wide variety of network security testing applications, including scanning and firewall auditing. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-nping-process-activity, Nping Process Activity>> | Nping ran on a Linux host. Nping is part of the Nmap tool suite and has the ability to construct raw packets for a wide variety of security testing applications, including denial of service testing. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-network-scan-executed-from-host, Potential Network Scan Executed From Host>> | This threshold rule monitors for the rapid execution of unix utilities that are capable of conducting network scans. Adversaries may leverage built-in tools such as ping, netcat or socat to execute ping sweeps across the network while attempting to evade detection or due to the lack of network mapping tools available on the compromised host. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-proc-maps-discovery, Suspicious /proc/maps Discovery>> | Monitors for /proc/*/maps file reads. The /proc/*/maps file in Linux provides a memory map for a specific process, detailing the memory segments, permissions, and what files are mapped to these segments. Attackers may read a process's memory map to identify memory addresses for code injection or process hijacking. | update | 2 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-process-capability-enumeration, Process Capability Enumeration>> | Identifies recursive process capability enumeration of the entire filesystem through the getcap command. Malicious users may manipulate identified capabilities to gain root privileges. | update | 2 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-pspy-process-monitoring-detected, Potential Pspy Process Monitoring Detected>> | This rule leverages auditd to monitor for processes scanning different processes within the /proc directory using the openat syscall. This is a strong indication for the usage of the pspy utility. Attackers may leverage the pspy process monitoring utility to monitor system processes without requiring root permissions, in order to find potential privilege escalation vectors. | update | 7 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-sudo-command-enumeration-detected, Sudo Command Enumeration Detected>> | This rule monitors for the usage of the sudo -l command, which is used to list the allowed and forbidden commands for the invoking user. Attackers may execute this command to enumerate commands allowed to be executed with sudo permissions, potentially allowing to escalate privileges to root. | update | 5 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suid-sguid-enumeration-detected, SUID/SGUID Enumeration Detected>> | This rule monitors for the usage of the "find" command in conjunction with SUID and SGUID permission arguments. SUID (Set User ID) and SGID (Set Group ID) are special permissions in Linux that allow a program to execute with the privileges of the file owner or group, respectively, rather than the privileges of the user running the program. In case an attacker is able to enumerate and find a binary that is misconfigured, they might be able to leverage this misconfiguration to escalate privileges by exploiting vulnerabilities or built-in features in the privileged program. | update | 5 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-which-enumeration, Suspicious which Enumeration>> | This rule monitors for the usage of the which command with an unusual amount of process arguments. Attackers may leverage the which command to enumerate the system for useful installed utilities that may be used after compromising a system to escalate privileges or move latteraly across the network. | update | 5 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-user-privilege-enumeration-via-id, Unusual User Privilege Enumeration via id>> | This rule monitors for a sequence of 20 "id" command executions within 1 second by the same parent process. This behavior is unusual, and may be indicative of the execution of an enumeration script such as LinPEAS or LinEnum. These scripts leverage the "id" command to enumerate the privileges of all users present on the system. | update | 4 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-virtual-machine-fingerprinting, Virtual Machine Fingerprinting>> | An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware. This rule identifies common locations used to discover virtual machine hardware by a non-root user. This technique has been used by the Pupy RAT and other malware. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-abnormal-process-id-or-lock-file-created, Abnormal Process ID or Lock File Created>> | Identifies the creation of a Process ID (PID), lock or reboot file created in temporary file storage paradigm (tmpfs) directory /var/run. On Linux, the PID files typically hold the process ID to track previous copies running and manage other tasks. Certain Linux malware use the /var/run directory for holding data, executables and other tasks, disguising itself or these files as legitimate PID files. | update | 213 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-curl-cve-2023-38545-exploitation, Potential curl CVE-2023-38545 Exploitation>> | Detects potential exploitation of curl CVE-2023-38545 by monitoring for vulnerable command line arguments in conjunction with an unusual command line length. A flaw in curl version <= 8.3 makes curl vulnerable to a heap based buffer overflow during the SOCKS5 proxy handshake. Upgrade to curl version >= 8.4 to patch this vulnerability. This exploit can be executed with and without the use of environment variables. For increased visibility, enable the collection of http_proxy, HTTPS_PROXY and ALL_PROXY environment variables based on the instructions provided in the setup guide of this rule. | update | 5 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-file-creation-execution-and-self-deletion-in-suspicious-directory, File Creation, Execution and Self-Deletion in Suspicious Directory>> | This rule monitors for the creation of a file, followed by its execution and self-deletion in a short timespan within a directory often used for malicious purposes by threat actors. This behavior is often used by malware to execute malicious code and delete itself to hide its tracks. | update | 4 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-file-transfer-or-listener-established-via-netcat, File Transfer or Listener Established via Netcat>> | A netcat process is engaging in network activity on a Linux host. Netcat is often used as a persistence mechanism by exporting a reverse shell or by serving a shell on a listening port. Netcat is also sometimes used for data exfiltration. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-upgrade-of-non-interactive-shell, Potential Upgrade of Non-interactive Shell>> | Identifies when a non-interactive terminal (tty) is being upgraded to a fully interactive shell. Attackers may upgrade a simple reverse shell to a fully interactive tty after obtaining initial access to a host, in order to obtain a more stable connection. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-netcat-listener-established-via-rlwrap, Netcat Listener Established via rlwrap>> | Monitors for the execution of a netcat listener via rlwrap. rlwrap is a 'readline wrapper', a small utility that uses the GNU Readline library to allow the editing of keyboard input for any command. This utility can be used in conjunction with netcat to gain a more stable reverse shell. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-connection-via-recently-compiled-executable, Network Connection via Recently Compiled Executable>> | This rule monitors a sequence involving a program compilation event followed by its execution and a subsequent network connection event. This behavior can indicate the set up of a reverse tcp connection to a command-and-control server. Attackers may spawn reverse shells to establish persistence onto a target system. | update | 5 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-interactive-terminal-spawned-via-perl, Interactive Terminal Spawned via Perl>> | Identifies when a terminal (tty) is spawned via Perl. Attackers may upgrade a simple reverse shell to a fully interactive tty after obtaining initial access to a host. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-hack-tool-launched, Potential Linux Hack Tool Launched>> | Monitors for the execution of different processes that might be used by attackers for malicious intent. An alert from this rule should be investigated further, as hack tools are commonly used by blue teamers and system administrators as well. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-process-started-from-process-id-pid-file, Process Started from Process ID (PID) File>> | Identifies a new process starting from a process ID (PID), lock or reboot file within the temporary file storage paradigm (tmpfs) directory /var/run directory. On Linux, the PID files typically hold the process ID to track previous copies running and manage other tasks. Certain Linux malware use the /var/run directory for holding data, executables and other tasks, disguising itself or these files as legitimate PID files. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-binary-executed-from-shared-memory-directory, Binary Executed from Shared Memory Directory>> | Identifies the execution of a binary by root in Linux shared memory directories: (/dev/shm/, /run/shm/, /var/run/, /var/lock/). This activity is to be considered highly abnormal and should be investigated. Threat actors have placed executables used for persistence on high-uptime servers in these directories as system backdoors. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-interactive-terminal-spawned-via-python, Interactive Terminal Spawned via Python>> | Identifies when a terminal (tty) is spawned via Python. Attackers may upgrade a simple reverse shell to a fully interactive tty after obtaining initial access to a host. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-code-execution-via-postgresql, Potential Code Execution via Postgresql>> | This rule monitors for suspicious activities that may indicate an attacker attempting to execute arbitrary code within a PostgreSQL environment. Attackers can execute code via PostgreSQL as a result of gaining unauthorized access to a public facing PostgreSQL database or exploiting vulnerabilities, such as remote command execution and SQL injection attacks, which can result in unauthorized access and malicious actions, and facilitate post-exploitation activities for unauthorized access and malicious actions. | update | 6 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s, Linux Restricted Shell Breakout via Linux Binary(s)>> | Identifies the abuse of a Linux binary to break out of a restricted shell or environment by spawning an interactive system shell. The activity of spawning a shell from a binary is not common behavior for a user or system administrator, and may indicate an attempt to evade detection, increase capabilities or enhance the stability of an adversary. | update | 112 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell-via-background-process, Potential Reverse Shell via Background Process>> | Monitors for the execution of background processes with process arguments capable of opening a socket in the /dev/tcp channel. This may indicate the creation of a backdoor reverse connection, and should be investigated further. | update | 4 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell-via-child, Potential Reverse Shell via Child>> | This detection rule identifies suspicious network traffic patterns associated with TCP reverse shell activity. This activity consists of a network event that is followed by the creation of a shell process with suspicious command line arguments. An attacker may establish a Linux TCP reverse shell to gain remote access to a target system. | update | 2 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell-via-java, Potential Reverse Shell via Java>> | This detection rule identifies the execution of a Linux shell process from a Java JAR application post an incoming network connection. This behavior may indicate reverse shell activity via a Java application. | update | 8 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell-via-suspicious-child-process, Potential Reverse Shell via Suspicious Child Process>> | This detection rule detects the creation of a shell through a suspicious process chain. Any reverse shells spawned by the specified utilities that are initialized from a single process followed by a network connection attempt will be captured through this rule. Attackers may spawn reverse shells to establish persistence onto a target system. | update | 9 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-meterpreter-reverse-shell, Potential Meterpreter Reverse Shell>> | This detection rule identifies a sample of suspicious Linux system file reads used for system fingerprinting, leveraged by the Metasploit Meterpreter shell to gather information about the target that it is executing its shell on. Detecting this pattern is indicative of a successful meterpreter shell connection. | update | 6 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell-via-suspicious-binary, Potential Reverse Shell via Suspicious Binary>> | This detection rule detects the creation of a shell through a chain consisting of the execution of a suspicious binary (located in a commonly abused location or executed manually) followed by a network event and ending with a shell being spawned. Stageless reverse tcp shells display this behaviour. Attackers may spawn reverse shells to establish persistence onto a target system. | update | 7 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell, Potential Reverse Shell>> | This detection rule identifies suspicious network traffic patterns associated with TCP reverse shell activity. This activity consists of a parent-child relationship where a network event is followed by the creation of a shell process. An attacker may establish a Linux TCP reverse shell to gain remote access to a target system. | update | 8 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-reverse-shell-via-udp, Potential Reverse Shell via UDP>> | This detection rule identifies suspicious network traffic patterns associated with UDP reverse shell activity. This activity consists of a sample of an execve, socket and connect syscall executed by the same process, where the auditd.data.a0-1 indicate a UDP connection, ending with an egress connection event. An attacker may establish a Linux UDP reverse shell to bypass traditional firewall restrictions and gain remote access to a target system covertly. | update | 6 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-content-extracted-or-decompressed-via-funzip, Suspicious Content Extracted or Decompressed via Funzip>> | Identifies when suspicious content is extracted from a file and subsequently decompressed using the funzip utility. Malware may execute the tail utility using the "-c" option to read a sequence of bytes from the end of a file. The output from tail can be piped to funzip in order to decompress malicious code before it is executed. This behavior is consistent with malware families such as Bundlore. | update | 5 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-system-commands-executed-by-previously-unknown-executable, Suspicious System Commands Executed by Previously Unknown Executable>> | This rule monitors for the execution of several commonly used system commands executed by a previously unknown executable located in commonly abused directories. An alert from this rule can indicate the presence of potentially malicious activity, such as the execution of unauthorized or suspicious processes attempting to run malicious code. Detecting and investigating such behavior can help identify and mitigate potential security threats, protecting the system and its data from potential compromise. | update | 105 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-mining-process-creation-event, Suspicious Mining Process Creation Event>> | Identifies service creation events of common mining services, possibly indicating the infection of a system with a cryptominer. | update | 6 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-bpf-filter-applied-using-tc, BPF filter applied using TC>> | Detects when the tc (transmission control) binary is utilized to set a BPF (Berkeley Packet Filter) on a network interface. Tc is used to configure Traffic Control in the Linux kernel. It can shape, schedule, police and drop traffic. A threat actor can utilize tc to set a bpf filter on an interface for the purpose of manipulating the incoming traffic. This technique is not at all common and should indicate abnormal, suspicious or malicious activity. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-data-encryption-via-openssl-utility, Suspicious Data Encryption via OpenSSL Utility>> | Identifies when the openssl command-line utility is used to encrypt multiple files on a host within a short time window. Adversaries may encrypt data on a single or multiple systems in order to disrupt the availability of their target's data and may attempt to hold the organization's data to ransom for the purposes of extortion. | update | 6 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-termination-of-esxi-process, Suspicious Termination of ESXI Process>> | Identifies instances where VMware processes, such as "vmware-vmx" or "vmx," are terminated on a Linux system by a "kill" command. The rule monitors for the "end" event type, which signifies the termination of a process. The presence of a "kill" command as the parent process for terminating VMware processes may indicate that a threat actor is attempting to interfere with the virtualized environment on the targeted system. | update | 6 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-file-changes-activity-detected, Suspicious File Changes Activity Detected>> | This rule identifies a sequence of 100 file extension rename events within a set of common file paths by the same process in a timespan of 1 second. Ransomware is a type of malware that encrypts a victim's files or systems and demands payment (usually in cryptocurrency) in exchange for the decryption key. One important indicator of a ransomware attack is the mass encryption of the file system, after which a new file extension is added to the file. | update | 8 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-ransomware-note-creation-detected, Potential Linux Ransomware Note Creation Detected>> | This rule identifies a sequence of a mass file encryption event in conjunction with the creation of a .txt file with a file name containing ransomware keywords executed by the same process in a 1 second timespan. Ransomware is a type of malware that encrypts a victim's files or systems and demands payment (usually in cryptocurrency) in exchange for the decryption key. One important indicator of a ransomware attack is the mass encryption of the file system, after which a new file extension is added to the file. | update | 8 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-high-number-of-process-terminations, High Number of Process Terminations>> | This rule identifies a high number (10) of process terminations via pkill from the same host within a short time period. | update | 112 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-ssh-it-ssh-worm-downloaded, Potential SSH-IT SSH Worm Downloaded>> | Identifies processes that are capable of downloading files with command line arguments containing URLs to SSH-IT's autonomous SSH worm. This worm intercepts outgoing SSH connections every time a user uses ssh. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-connection-to-external-network-via-telnet, Connection to External Network via Telnet>> | Telnet provides a command line interface for communication with a remote device or server. This rule identifies Telnet network connections to publicly routable IP addresses. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-connection-to-internal-network-via-telnet, Connection to Internal Network via Telnet>> | Telnet provides a command line interface for communication with a remote device or server. This rule identifies Telnet network connections to non-publicly routable IP addresses. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-apt-package-manager-execution, Suspicious APT Package Manager Execution>> | Detects suspicious process events executed by the APT package manager, potentially indicating persistence through an APT backdoor. In Linux, APT (Advanced Package Tool) is a command-line utility used for handling packages on Debian-based systems, providing functions for installing, updating, upgrading, and removing software along with managing package repositories. Attackers can backdoor APT to gain persistence by injecting malicious code into scripts that APT runs, thereby ensuring continued unauthorized access or control each time APT is used for package management. | update | 2 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-apt-package-manager-network-connection, Suspicious APT Package Manager Network Connection>> | Detects suspicious network events executed by the APT package manager, potentially indicating persistence through an APT backdoor. In Linux, APT (Advanced Package Tool) is a command-line utility used for handling packages on Debian-based systems, providing functions for installing, updating, upgrading, and removing software along with managing package repositories. Attackers can backdoor APT to gain persistence by injecting malicious code into scripts that APT runs, thereby ensuring continued unauthorized access or control each time APT is used for package management. | update | 2 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-chkconfig-service-add, Chkconfig Service Add>> | Detects the use of the chkconfig binary to manually add a service for management by chkconfig. Threat actors may utilize this technique to maintain persistence on a system. When a new service is added, chkconfig ensures that the service has either a start or a kill entry in every runlevel and when the system is rebooted the service file added will run providing long-term persistence. | update | 111 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-openssh-binaries, Modification of OpenSSH Binaries>> | Adversaries may modify SSH related binaries for persistence or credential access by patching sensitive functions to enable unauthorized access or by logging SSH credentials for exfiltration. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-cron-job-created-or-changed-by-previously-unknown-process, Cron Job Created or Changed by Previously Unknown Process>> | Linux cron jobs are scheduled tasks that can be leveraged by malicious actors for persistence, privilege escalation and command execution. By creating or modifying cron job configurations, attackers can execute malicious commands or scripts at predefined intervals, ensuring their continued presence and enabling unauthorized activities. | update | 9 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-dynamic-linker-copy, Dynamic Linker Copy>> | Detects the copying of the Linux dynamic loader binary and subsequent file creation for the purpose of creating a backup copy. This technique was seen recently being utilized by Linux malware prior to patching the dynamic loader in order to inject and preload a malicious shared object file. This activity should never occur and if it does then it should be considered highly suspicious or malicious. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-file-creation-in-etc-for-persistence, Suspicious File Creation in /etc for Persistence>> | Detects the manual creation of files in specific etc directories, via user root, used by Linux malware to persist and elevate privileges on compromised systems. File creation in these directories should not be entirely common and could indicate a malicious binary or script installing persistence mechanisms for long term access. | update | 113 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-persistence-through-init-d-detected, Potential Persistence Through init.d Detected>> | Files that are placed in the /etc/init.d/ directory in Unix can be used to start custom applications, services, scripts or commands during start-up. Init.d has been mostly replaced in favor of Systemd. However, the "systemd-sysv-generator" can convert init.d files to service unit files that run at boot. Adversaries may add or alter files located in the /etc/init.d/ directory to execute malicious code upon boot in order to gain persistence on the system. | update | 9 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kernel-module-load-via-insmod, Kernel Module Load via insmod>> | Detects the use of the insmod binary to load a Linux kernel object file. Threat actors can use this binary, given they have root privileges, to load a rootkit on a system providing them with complete control and the ability to hide from security products. Manually loading a kernel module in this manner should not be at all common and can indicate suspcious or malicious behavior. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-kde-autostart-script-or-desktop-file-modification, Persistence via KDE AutoStart Script or Desktop File Modification>> | Identifies the creation or modification of a K Desktop Environment (KDE) AutoStart script or desktop file that will execute upon each user logon. Adversaries may abuse this method for persistence. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kernel-driver-load-by-non-root-user, Kernel Driver Load by non-root User>> | Detects the loading of a Linux kernel module by a non-root user through system calls. Threat actors may leverage Linux kernel modules to load a rootkit on a system providing them with complete control and the ability to hide from security products. As other rules monitor for the addition of Linux kernel modules through system utilities or .ko files, this rule covers the gap that evasive rootkits leverage by monitoring for kernel module additions on the lowest level through auditd_manager. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-file-creation-via-kworker, Suspicious File Creation via Kworker>> | This rule monitors for a file creation event originating from a kworker parent process. kworker, or kernel worker, processes are part of the kernel's workqueue mechanism. They are responsible for executing work that has been scheduled to be done in kernel space, which might include tasks like handling interrupts, background activities, and other kernel-related tasks. Attackers may attempt to evade detection by masquerading as a kernel worker process. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-backdoor-user-account-creation, Potential Linux Backdoor User Account Creation>> | Identifies the attempt to create a new backdoor user by setting the user's UID to 0. Attackers may alter a user's UID to 0 to establish persistence on a system. | update | 6 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-linux-group-creation, Linux Group Creation>> | Identifies attempts to create a new group. Attackers may create new groups to establish persistence on a system. | update | 4 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-remote-code-execution-via-web-server, Potential Remote Code Execution via Web Server>> | Identifies suspicious commands executed via a web server, which may suggest a vulnerability and remote shell access. Attackers may exploit a vulnerability in a web application to execute commands via a web server, or place a backdoor file that can be abused to gain code execution as a mechanism for persistence. | update | 7 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-linux-user-account-creation, Linux User Account Creation>> | Identifies attempts to create new users. Attackers may add new users to establish persistence on a system. | update | 4 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-linux-user-added-to-privileged-group, Linux User Added to Privileged Group>> | Identifies attempts to add a user to a privileged group. Attackers may add users to a privileged group in order to establish persistence on a system. | update | 6 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-persistence-through-motd-file-creation-detected, Potential Persistence Through MOTD File Creation Detected>> | Message of the day (MOTD) is the message that is presented to the user when a user connects to a Linux server via SSH or a serial connection. Linux systems contain several default MOTD files located in the "/etc/update-motd.d/" and "/usr/lib/update-notifier/" directories. These scripts run as the root user every time a user connects over SSH or a serial connection. Adversaries may create malicious MOTD files that grant them persistence onto the target every time a user connects to the system by executing a backdoor script or command. This rule detects the creation of potentially malicious files within the default MOTD file directories. | update | 9 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-process-spawned-from-motd-detected, Suspicious Process Spawned from MOTD Detected>> | Message of the day (MOTD) is the message that is presented to the user when a user connects to a Linux server via SSH or a serial connection. Linux systems contain several default MOTD files located in the "/etc/update-motd.d/" and "/usr/lib/update-notifier/" directories. These scripts run as the root user every time a user connects over SSH or a serial connection. Adversaries may create malicious MOTD files that grant them persistence onto the target every time a user connects to the system by executing a backdoor script or command. This rule detects the execution of potentially malicious processes through the MOTD utility. | update | 8 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-persistence-through-run-control-detected, Potential Persistence Through Run Control Detected>> | This rule monitors the creation/alteration of the rc.local file by a previously unknown process executable through the use of the new terms rule type. The /etc/rc.local file is used to start custom applications, services, scripts or commands during start-up. The rc.local file has mostly been replaced by Systemd. However, through the "systemd-rc-local-generator", rc.local files can be converted to services that run at boot. Adversaries may alter rc.local to execute malicious code at start-up, and gain persistence onto the system. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-setcap-setuid-setgid-capability-set, Setcap setuid/setgid Capability Set>> | This rule monitors for the addition of the cap_setuid+ep or cap_setgid+ep capabilities via setcap. Setuid (Set User ID) and setgid (Set Group ID) are Unix-like OS features that enable processes to run with elevated privileges, based on the file owner or group. Threat actors can exploit these attributes to achieve persistence by creating malicious binaries, allowing them to maintain control over a compromised system with elevated permissions. | update | 5 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-shared-object-created-or-changed-by-previously-unknown-process, Shared Object Created or Changed by Previously Unknown Process>> | This rule monitors the creation of shared object files by previously unknown processes. The creation of a shared object file involves compiling code into a dynamically linked library that can be loaded by other programs at runtime. While this process is typically used for legitimate purposes, malicious actors can leverage shared object files to execute unauthorized code, inject malicious functionality into legitimate processes, or bypass security controls. This allows malware to persist on the system, evade detection, and potentially compromise the integrity and confidentiality of the affected system and its data. | update | 7 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-network-connection-via-systemd, Suspicious Network Connection via systemd>> | Detects suspicious network events executed by systemd, potentially indicating persistence through a systemd backdoor. Systemd is a system and service manager for Linux operating systems, used to initialize and manage system processes. Attackers can backdoor systemd for persistence by creating or modifying systemd unit files to execute malicious scripts or commands, or by replacing legitimate systemd binaries with compromised ones, ensuring that their malicious code is automatically executed at system startup or during certain system events. | update | 2 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-new-systemd-timer-created, New Systemd Timer Created>> | Detects the creation of a systemd timer within any of the default systemd timer directories. Systemd timers can be used by an attacker to gain persistence, by scheduling the execution of a command or script. Similarly to cron/at, systemd timers can be set up to execute on boot time, or on a specific point in time, which allows attackers to regain access in case the connection to the infected asset was lost. | update | 9 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-new-systemd-service-created-by-previously-unknown-process, New Systemd Service Created by Previously Unknown Process>> | Systemd service files are configuration files in Linux systems used to define and manage system services. Malicious actors can leverage systemd service files to achieve persistence by creating or modifying service files to execute malicious commands or payloads during system startup. This allows them to maintain unauthorized access, execute additional malicious activities, or evade detection. | update | 9 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-tainted-kernel-module-load, Tainted Kernel Module Load>> | This rule monitors the syslog log file for messages related to instances of a tainted kernel module load. Rootkits often leverage kernel modules as their main defense evasion technique. Detecting tainted kernel module loads is crucial for ensuring system security and integrity, as malicious or unauthorized modules can compromise the kernel and lead to system vulnerabilities or unauthorized access. | update | 4 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-unauthorized-access-via-wildcard-injection-detected, Potential Unauthorized Access via Wildcard Injection Detected>> | This rule monitors for the execution of the "chown" and "chmod" commands with command line flags that could indicate a wildcard injection attack. Linux wildcard injection is a type of security vulnerability where attackers manipulate commands or input containing wildcards (e.g., *, ?, []) to execute unintended operations or access sensitive data by tricking the system into interpreting the wildcard characters in unexpected ways. | update | 5 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-container-misconfiguration, Potential Privilege Escalation via Container Misconfiguration>> | This rule monitors for the execution of processes that interact with Linux containers through an interactive shell without root permissions. Utilities such as runc and ctr are universal command-line utilities leveraged to interact with containers via root permissions. On systems where the access to these utilities are misconfigured, attackers might be able to create and run a container that mounts the root folder or spawn a privileged container vulnerable to a container escape attack, which might allow them to escalate privileges and gain further access onto the host file system. | update | 5 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-linux-dac-permissions, Potential Privilege Escalation via Linux DAC permissions>> | Identifies potential privilege escalation exploitation of DAC (Discretionary access control) file permissions. The rule identifies exploitation of DAC checks on sensitive file paths via suspicious processes whose capabilities include CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE (where a process can bypass all read write and execution checks) or CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH (where a process can read any file or perform any executable permission on the directories). | update | 2 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-chroot-container-escape-via-mount, Potential Chroot Container Escape via Mount>> | Monitors for the execution of a file system mount followed by a chroot execution. Given enough permissions, a user within a container is capable of mounting the root file system of the host, and leveraging chroot to escape its containarized environment. This behavior pattern is very uncommon and should be investigated. | update | 2 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-enlightenment, Potential Privilege Escalation via Enlightenment>> | Identifies an attempt to exploit a local privilege escalation CVE-2022-37706 via a flaw in Linux window manager package Enlightenment. enlightenment_sys in Enlightenment before 0.25.4 allows local users to gain privileges because it is setuid root, and the system library function mishandles pathnames that begin with a /dev/.. substring. | update | 2 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-gdb-cap-sys-ptrace, Privilege Escalation via GDB CAP_SYS_PTRACE>> | Identifies instances where GDB (granted the CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability) is executed, after which the user's access is elevated to UID/GID 0 (root). In Linux, the CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability grants a process the ability to use the ptrace system call, which is typically used for debugging and allows the process to trace and control other processes. Attackers may leverage this capability to hook and inject into a process that is running with root permissions in order to escalate their privileges to root. | update | 2 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-root-network-connection-via-gdb-cap-sys-ptrace, Root Network Connection via GDB CAP_SYS_PTRACE>> | Identifies instances where GDB (granted the CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability) is executed, after which an outbound network connection is initiated by UID/GID 0 (root). In Linux, the CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability grants a process the ability to use the ptrace system call, which is typically used for debugging and allows the process to trace and control other processes. Attackers may leverage this capability to hook and inject into a process that is running with root permissions in order to execute shell code and gain a reverse shell with root privileges. | update | 2 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-kworker-uid-elevation, Suspicious Kworker UID Elevation>> | Monitors for the elevation of regular user permissions to root permissions through the kworker process. kworker, or kernel worker, processes are part of the kernel's workqueue mechanism. They are responsible for executing work that has been scheduled to be done in kernel space, which might include tasks like handling interrupts, background activities, and other kernel-related tasks. Attackers may attempt to evade detection by masquerading as a kernel worker process, and hijack the execution flow by hooking certain functions/syscalls through a rootkit in order to provide easy access to root via a special modified command. | update | 2 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-dynamic-linker-preload-shared-object, Modification of Dynamic Linker Preload Shared Object>> | Identifies modification of the dynamic linker preload shared object (ld.so.preload). Adversaries may execute malicious payloads by hijacking the dynamic linker used to load libraries. | update | 209 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-symbolic-link-created, Suspicious Symbolic Link Created>> | Identifies the creation of a symbolic link to a suspicious file or location. A symbolic link is a reference to a file or directory that acts as a pointer or shortcut, allowing users to access the target file or directory from a different location in the file system. An attacker can potentially leverage symbolic links for privilege escalation by tricking a privileged process into following the symbolic link to a sensitive file, giving the attacker access to data or capabilities they would not normally have. | update | 5 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-uid-int-max-bug-detected, Potential Privilege Escalation via UID INT_MAX Bug Detected>> | This rule monitors for the execution of the systemd-run command by a user with a UID that is larger than the maximum allowed UID size (INT_MAX). Some older Linux versions were affected by a bug which allows user accounts with a UID greater than INT_MAX to escalate privileges by spawning a shell through systemd-run. | update | 5 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kernel-load-or-unload-via-kexec-detected, Kernel Load or Unload via Kexec Detected>> | This detection rule identifies the usage of kexec, helping to uncover unauthorized kernel replacements and potential compromise of the system's integrity. Kexec is a Linux feature that enables the loading and execution of a different kernel without going through the typical boot process. Malicious actors can abuse kexec to bypass security measures, escalate privileges, establish persistence or hide their activities by loading a malicious kernel, enabling them to tamper with the system's trusted state, allowing e.g. a VM Escape. | update | 6 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-cve-2023-4911, Potential Privilege Escalation via CVE-2023-4911>> | This rule detects potential privilege escalation attempts through Looney Tunables (CVE-2023-4911). Looney Tunables is a buffer overflow vulnerability in GNU C Library's dynamic loader's processing of the GLIBC_TUNABLES environment variable. | update | 4 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-network-connection-via-sudo-binary, Suspicious Network Connection via Sudo Binary>> | Detects network connections initiated by the "sudo" binary. This behavior is uncommon and may occur in instances where reverse shell shellcode is injected into a process run with elevated permissions via "sudo". Attackers may attempt to inject shellcode into processes running as root, to escalate privileges. | update | 2 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-overlayfs, Potential Privilege Escalation via OverlayFS>> | Identifies an attempt to exploit a local privilege escalation (CVE-2023-2640 and CVE-2023-32629) via a flaw in Ubuntu's modifications to OverlayFS. These flaws allow the creation of specialized executables, which, upon execution, grant the ability to escalate privileges to root on the affected machine. | update | 5 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-pkexec, Potential Privilege Escalation via PKEXEC>> | Identifies an attempt to exploit a local privilege escalation in polkit pkexec (CVE-2021-4034) via unsecure environment variable injection. Successful exploitation allows an unprivileged user to escalate to the root user. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-buffer-overflow-attack-detected, Potential Buffer Overflow Attack Detected>> | Detects potential buffer overflow attacks by querying the "Segfault Detected" pre-built rule signal index, through a threshold rule, with a minimum number of 100 segfault alerts in a short timespan. A large amount of segfaults in a short time interval could indicate application exploitation attempts. | update | 2 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-shell-via-wildcard-injection-detected, Potential Shell via Wildcard Injection Detected>> | This rule monitors for the execution of a set of linux binaries, that are potentially vulnerable to wildcard injection, with suspicious command line flags followed by a shell spawn event. Linux wildcard injection is a type of security vulnerability where attackers manipulate commands or input containing wildcards (e.g., *, ?, []) to execute unintended operations or access sensitive data by tricking the system into interpreting the wildcard characters in unexpected ways. | update | 5 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-suspicious-debugfs-root-device-access, Potential Suspicious DebugFS Root Device Access>> | This rule monitors for the usage of the built-in Linux DebugFS utility to access a disk device without root permissions. Linux users that are part of the "disk" group have sufficient privileges to access all data inside of the machine through DebugFS. Attackers may leverage DebugFS in conjunction with "disk" permissions to read sensitive files owned by root, such as the shadow file, root ssh private keys or other sensitive files that may allow them to further escalate privileges. | update | 5 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-shadow-file-read-via-command-line-utilities, Potential Shadow File Read via Command Line Utilities>> | Identifies access to the /etc/shadow file via the commandline using standard system utilities. After elevating privileges to root, threat actors may attempt to read or dump this file in order to gain valid credentials. They may utilize these to move laterally undetected and access additional resources. | update | 208 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-sudo-privilege-escalation-via-cve-2019-14287, Potential Sudo Privilege Escalation via CVE-2019-14287>> | This rule monitors for the execution of a suspicious sudo command that is leveraged in CVE-2019-14287 to escalate privileges to root. Sudo does not verify the presence of the designated user ID and proceeds to execute using a user ID that can be chosen arbitrarily. By using the sudo privileges, the command "sudo -u#-1" translates to an ID of 0, representing the root user. This exploit may work for sudo versions prior to v1.28. | update | 4 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-sudo-hijacking-detected, Potential Sudo Hijacking Detected>> | Identifies the creation of a sudo binary located at /usr/bin/sudo. Attackers may hijack the default sudo binary and replace it with a custom binary or script that can read the user's password in clear text to escalate privileges or enable persistence onto the system every time the sudo binary is executed. | update | 105 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-sudo-token-manipulation-via-process-injection, Potential Sudo Token Manipulation via Process Injection>> | This rule detects potential sudo token manipulation attacks through process injection by monitoring the use of a debugger (gdb) process followed by a successful uid change event during the execution of the sudo process. A sudo token manipulation attack is performed by injecting into a process that has a valid sudo token, which can then be used by attackers to activate their own sudo token. This attack requires ptrace to be enabled in conjunction with the existence of a living process that has a valid sudo token with the same uid as the current user. | update | 5 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-python-cap-setuid, Potential Privilege Escalation via Python cap_setuid>> | This detection rule monitors for the execution of a system command with setuid or setgid capabilities via Python, followed by a uid or gid change to the root user. This sequence of events may indicate successful privilege escalation. Setuid (Set User ID) and setgid (Set Group ID) are Unix-like OS features that enable processes to run with elevated privileges, based on the file owner or group. Threat actors can exploit these attributes to escalate privileges to the privileges that are set on the binary that is being executed. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-cap-chown-cap-fowner-capabilities, Privilege Escalation via CAP_CHOWN/CAP_FOWNER Capabilities>> | Identifies instances where a processes (granted CAP_CHOWN and/or CAP_FOWNER capabilities) is executed, after which the ownership of a suspicious file or binary is changed. In Linux, the CAP_CHOWN capability allows a process to change the owner of a file, while CAP_FOWNER permits it to bypass permission checks on operations that require file ownership (like reading, writing, and executing). Attackers may abuse these capabilities to obtain unauthorized access to files. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-passwd-file-event-action, Suspicious Passwd File Event Action>> | Monitors for the generation of a passwd password entry via openssl, followed by a file write activity on the "/etc/passwd" file. The "/etc/passwd" file in Linux stores user account information, including usernames, user IDs, group IDs, home directories, and default shell paths. Attackers may exploit a misconfiguration in the "/etc/passwd" file permissions or other privileges to add a new entry to the "/etc/passwd" file with root permissions, and leverage this new user account to login as root. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-cap-setuid-setgid-capabilities, Privilege Escalation via CAP_SETUID/SETGID Capabilities>> | Identifies instances where a process (granted CAP_SETUID and/or CAP_SETGID capabilities) is executed, after which the user's access is elevated to UID/GID 0 (root). In Linux, the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities allow a process to change its UID and GID, respectively, providing control over user and group identity management. Attackers may leverage a misconfiguration for exploitation in order to escalate their privileges to root. | update | 2 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-recently-compiled-executable, Potential Privilege Escalation via Recently Compiled Executable>> | This rule monitors a sequence involving a program compilation event followed by its execution and a subsequent alteration of UID permissions to root privileges. This behavior can potentially indicate the execution of a kernel or software privilege escalation exploit. | update | 4 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uid-elevation-from-previously-unknown-executable, UID Elevation from Previously Unknown Executable>> | Monitors for the elevation of regular user permissions to root permissions through a previously unknown executable. Attackers may attempt to evade detection by hijacking the execution flow and hooking certain functions/syscalls through a rootkit in order to provide easy access to root via a special modified command. | update | 2 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-namespace-manipulation-using-unshare, Namespace Manipulation Using Unshare>> | Identifies suspicious usage of unshare to manipulate system namespaces. Unshare can be utilized to escalate privileges or escape container security boundaries. Threat actors have utilized this binary to allow themselves to escape to the host and access other resources or escalate privileges. | update | 9 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-through-writable-docker-socket, Potential Privilege Escalation through Writable Docker Socket>> | This rule monitors for the usage of Docker runtime sockets to escalate privileges on Linux systems. Docker sockets by default are only be writable by the root user and docker group. Attackers that have permissions to write to these sockets may be able to create and run a container that allows them to escalate privileges and gain further access onto the host file system. | update | 5 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-access-of-stored-browser-credentials, Access of Stored Browser Credentials>> | Identifies the execution of a process with arguments pointing to known browser files that store passwords and cookies. Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-access-to-keychain-credentials-directories, Access to Keychain Credentials Directories>> | Adversaries may collect the keychain storage data from a system to acquire credentials. Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features such as WiFi passwords, websites, secure notes and certificates. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-dumping-account-hashes-via-built-in-commands, Dumping Account Hashes via Built-In Commands>> | Identifies the execution of macOS built-in commands used to dump user account hashes. Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login information in the form of a hash. These hashes can be cracked or leveraged for lateral movement. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-dumping-of-keychain-content-via-security-command, Dumping of Keychain Content via Security Command>> | Adversaries may dump the content of the keychain storage data from a system to acquire credentials. Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features, including Wi-Fi and website passwords, secure notes, certificates, and Kerberos. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kerberos-cached-credentials-dumping, Kerberos Cached Credentials Dumping>> | Identifies the use of the Kerberos credential cache (kcc) utility to dump locally cached Kerberos tickets. Adversaries may attempt to dump credential material in the form of tickets that can be leveraged for lateral movement. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-keychain-password-retrieval-via-command-line, Keychain Password Retrieval via Command Line>> | Adversaries may collect keychain storage data from a system to in order to acquire credentials. Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features, including Wi-Fi and website passwords, secure notes, certificates, and Kerberos. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-webproxy-settings-modification, WebProxy Settings Modification>> | Identifies the use of the built-in networksetup command to configure webproxy settings. This may indicate an attempt to hijack web browser traffic for credential access via traffic sniffing or redirection. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-macos-ssh-brute-force-detected, Potential macOS SSH Brute Force Detected>> | Identifies a high number (20) of macOS SSH KeyGen process executions from the same host. An adversary may attempt a brute force attack to obtain unauthorized access to user accounts. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-prompt-for-credentials-with-osascript, Prompt for Credentials with OSASCRIPT>> | Identifies the use of osascript to execute scripts via standard input that may prompt a user with a rogue dialog for credentials. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-systemkey-access-via-command-line, SystemKey Access via Command Line>> | Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features, including Wi-Fi and website passwords, secure notes, certificates, and Kerberos. Adversaries may collect the keychain storage data from a system to acquire credentials. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-softwareupdate-preferences-modification, SoftwareUpdate Preferences Modification>> | Identifies changes to the SoftwareUpdate preferences using the built-in defaults command. Adversaries may abuse this in an attempt to disable security updates. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-remove-file-quarantine-attribute, Attempt to Remove File Quarantine Attribute>> | Identifies a potential Gatekeeper bypass. In macOS, when applications or programs are downloaded from the internet, there is a quarantine flag set on the file. This attribute is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program at execution time. An adversary may disable this attribute to evade defenses. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-disable-gatekeeper, Attempt to Disable Gatekeeper>> | Detects attempts to disable Gatekeeper on macOS. Gatekeeper is a security feature that's designed to ensure that only trusted software is run. Adversaries may attempt to disable Gatekeeper before executing malicious code. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-install-root-certificate, Attempt to Install Root Certificate>> | Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to their command and control servers. Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-environment-variable-via-launchctl, Modification of Environment Variable via Launchctl>> | Identifies modifications to an environment variable using the built-in launchctl command. Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking certain environment variables to load arbitrary libraries or bypass certain restrictions. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privacy-control-bypass-via-tccdb-modification, Potential Privacy Control Bypass via TCCDB Modification>> | Identifies the use of sqlite3 to directly modify the Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC) SQLite database. This may indicate an attempt to bypass macOS privacy controls, including access to sensitive resources like the system camera, microphone, address book, and calendar. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privacy-control-bypass-via-localhost-secure-copy, Potential Privacy Control Bypass via Localhost Secure Copy>> | Identifies use of the Secure Copy Protocol (SCP) to copy files locally by abusing the auto addition of the Secure Shell Daemon (sshd) to the authorized application list for Full Disk Access. This may indicate attempts to bypass macOS privacy controls to access sensitive files. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-safari-settings-via-defaults-command, Modification of Safari Settings via Defaults Command>> | Identifies changes to the Safari configuration using the built-in defaults command. Adversaries may attempt to enable or disable certain Safari settings, such as enabling JavaScript from Apple Events to ease in the hijacking of the users browser. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-microsoft-office-sandbox-evasion, Potential Microsoft Office Sandbox Evasion>> | Identifies the creation of a suspicious zip file prepended with special characters. Sandboxed Microsoft Office applications on macOS are allowed to write files that start with special characters, which can be combined with an AutoStart location to achieve sandbox evasion. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-tcc-bypass-via-mounted-apfs-snapshot-access, TCC Bypass via Mounted APFS Snapshot Access>> | Identifies the use of the mount_apfs command to mount the entire file system through Apple File System (APFS) snapshots as read-only and with the noowners flag set. This action enables the adversary to access almost any file in the file system, including all user data and files protected by Apple’s privacy framework (TCC). | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-unload-elastic-endpoint-security-kernel-extension, Attempt to Unload Elastic Endpoint Security Kernel Extension>> | Identifies attempts to unload the Elastic Endpoint Security kernel extension via the kextunload command. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-enumeration-of-users-or-groups-via-built-in-commands, Enumeration of Users or Groups via Built-in Commands>> | Identifies the execution of macOS built-in commands related to account or group enumeration. Adversaries may use account and group information to orient themselves before deciding how to act. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-via-electron-child-process-node-js-module, Execution via Electron Child Process Node.js Module>> | Identifies attempts to execute a child process from within the context of an Electron application using the child_process Node.js module. Adversaries may abuse this technique to inherit permissions from parent processes. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-browser-child-process, Suspicious Browser Child Process>> | Identifies the execution of a suspicious browser child process. Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-macos-installer-package-spawns-network-event, MacOS Installer Package Spawns Network Event>> | Detects the execution of a MacOS installer package with an abnormal child process (e.g bash) followed immediately by a network connection via a suspicious process (e.g curl). Threat actors will build and distribute malicious MacOS installer packages, which have a .pkg extension, many times imitating valid software in order to persuade and infect their victims often using the package files (e.g pre/post install scripts etc.) to download additional tools or malicious software. If this rule fires it should indicate the installation of a malicious or suspicious package. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-automator-workflows-execution, Suspicious Automator Workflows Execution>> | Identifies the execution of the Automator Workflows process followed by a network connection from it's XPC service. Adversaries may drop a custom workflow template that hosts malicious JavaScript for Automation (JXA) code as an alternative to using osascript. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-apple-script-execution-followed-by-network-connection, Apple Script Execution followed by Network Connection>> | Detects execution via the Apple script interpreter (osascript) followed by a network connection from the same process within a short time period. Adversaries may use malicious scripts for execution and command and control. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-shell-execution-via-apple-scripting, Shell Execution via Apple Scripting>> | Identifies the execution of the shell process (sh) via scripting (JXA or AppleScript). Adversaries may use the doShellScript functionality in JXA or do shell script in AppleScript to execute system commands. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-macos-ms-office-child-process, Suspicious macOS MS Office Child Process>> | Identifies suspicious child processes of frequently targeted Microsoft Office applications (Word, PowerPoint, and Excel). These child processes are often launched during exploitation of Office applications or by documents with malicious macros. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-kerberos-attack-via-bifrost, Potential Kerberos Attack via Bifrost>> | Identifies use of Bifrost, a known macOS Kerberos pentesting tool, which can be used to dump cached Kerberos tickets or attempt unauthorized authentication techniques such as pass-the-ticket/hash and kerberoasting. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-mount-smb-share-via-command-line, Attempt to Mount SMB Share via Command Line>> | Identifies the execution of macOS built-in commands to mount a Server Message Block (SMB) network share. Adversaries may use valid accounts to interact with a remote network share using SMB. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-ssh-login-enabled-via-systemsetup-command, Remote SSH Login Enabled via systemsetup Command>> | Detects use of the systemsetup command to enable remote SSH Login. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-virtual-private-network-connection-attempt, Virtual Private Network Connection Attempt>> | Identifies the execution of macOS built-in commands to connect to an existing Virtual Private Network (VPN). Adversaries may use VPN connections to laterally move and control remote systems on a network. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-hidden-local-user-account-creation, Potential Hidden Local User Account Creation>> | Identifies attempts to create a local account that will be hidden from the macOS logon window. This may indicate an attempt to evade user attention while maintaining persistence using a separate local account. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-launch-agent-creation-or-modification-and-immediate-loading, Launch Agent Creation or Modification and Immediate Loading>> | An adversary can establish persistence by installing a new launch agent that executes at login by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-of-hidden-login-item-via-apple-script, Creation of Hidden Login Item via Apple Script>> | Identifies the execution of osascript to create a hidden login item. This may indicate an attempt to persist a malicious program while concealing its presence. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-launchdaemon-creation-or-modification-and-immediate-loading, LaunchDaemon Creation or Modification and Immediate Loading>> | Indicates the creation or modification of a launch daemon, which adversaries may use to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-authorization-plugin-modification, Authorization Plugin Modification>> | Authorization plugins are used to extend the authorization services API and implement mechanisms that are not natively supported by the OS, such as multi-factor authentication with third party software. Adversaries may abuse this feature to persist and/or collect clear text credentials as they traverse the registered plugins during user logon. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-crontab-creation-or-modification, Suspicious CronTab Creation or Modification>> | Identifies attempts to create or modify a crontab via a process that is not crontab (i.e python, osascript, etc.). This activity should not be highly prevalent and could indicate the use of cron as a persistence mechanism by a threat actor. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-hidden-child-process-of-launchd, Suspicious Hidden Child Process of Launchd>> | Identifies the execution of a launchd child process with a hidden file. An adversary can establish persistence by installing a new logon item, launch agent, or daemon that executes upon login. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-directoryservice-plugin-modification, Persistence via DirectoryService Plugin Modification>> | Identifies the creation or modification of a DirectoryService PlugIns (dsplug) file. The DirectoryService daemon launches on each system boot and automatically reloads after crash. It scans and executes bundles that are located in the DirectoryServices PlugIns folder and can be abused by adversaries to maintain persistence. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-docker-shortcut-modification, Persistence via Docker Shortcut Modification>> | An adversary can establish persistence by modifying an existing macOS dock property list in order to execute a malicious application instead of the intended one when invoked. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-emond-rules-creation-or-modification, Emond Rules Creation or Modification>> | Identifies the creation or modification of the Event Monitor Daemon (emond) rules. Adversaries may abuse this service by writing a rule to execute commands when a defined event occurs, such as system start up or user authentication. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-emond-child-process, Suspicious Emond Child Process>> | Identifies the execution of a suspicious child process of the Event Monitor Daemon (emond). Adversaries may abuse this service by writing a rule to execute commands when a defined event occurs, such as system start up or user authentication. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-attempt-to-enable-the-root-account, Attempt to Enable the Root Account>> | Identifies attempts to enable the root account using the dsenableroot command. This command may be abused by adversaries for persistence, as the root account is disabled by default. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-of-hidden-launch-agent-or-daemon, Creation of Hidden Launch Agent or Daemon>> | Identifies the creation of a hidden launch agent or daemon. An adversary may establish persistence by installing a new launch agent or daemon which executes at login. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-finder-sync-plugin-registered-and-enabled, Finder Sync Plugin Registered and Enabled>> | Finder Sync plugins enable users to extend Finder’s functionality by modifying the user interface. Adversaries may abuse this feature by adding a rogue Finder Plugin to repeatedly execute malicious payloads for persistence. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-folder-action-script, Persistence via Folder Action Script>> | Detects modification of a Folder Action script. A Folder Action script is executed when the folder to which it is attached has items added or removed, or when its window is opened, closed, moved, or resized. Adversaries may abuse this feature to establish persistence by utilizing a malicious script. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-login-or-logout-hook, Persistence via Login or Logout Hook>> | Identifies use of the Defaults command to install a login or logoff hook in MacOS. An adversary may abuse this capability to establish persistence in an environment by inserting code to be executed at login or logout. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-persistence-via-login-hook, Potential Persistence via Login Hook>> | Identifies the creation or modification of the login window property list (plist). Adversaries may modify plist files to run a program during system boot or user login for persistence. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-sublime-plugin-or-application-script-modification, Sublime Plugin or Application Script Modification>> | Adversaries may create or modify the Sublime application plugins or scripts to execute a malicious payload each time the Sublime application is started. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-persistence-via-periodic-tasks, Potential Persistence via Periodic Tasks>> | Identifies the creation or modification of the default configuration for periodic tasks. Adversaries may abuse periodic tasks to execute malicious code or maintain persistence. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unexpected-child-process-of-macos-screensaver-engine, Unexpected Child Process of macOS Screensaver Engine>> | Identifies when a child process is spawned by the screensaver engine process, which is consistent with an attacker's malicious payload being executed after the screensaver activated on the endpoint. An adversary can maintain persistence on a macOS endpoint by creating a malicious screensaver (.saver) file and configuring the screensaver plist file to execute code each time the screensaver is activated. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-screensaver-plist-file-modified-by-unexpected-process, Screensaver Plist File Modified by Unexpected Process>> | Identifies when a screensaver plist file is modified by an unexpected process. An adversary can maintain persistence on a macOS endpoint by creating a malicious screensaver (.saver) file and configuring the screensaver plist file to execute code each time the screensaver is activated. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-calendar-file-modification, Suspicious Calendar File Modification>> | Identifies suspicious modifications of the calendar file by an unusual process. Adversaries may create a custom calendar notification procedure to execute a malicious program at a recurring interval to establish persistence. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-persistence-via-atom-init-script-modification, Potential Persistence via Atom Init Script Modification>> | Identifies modifications to the Atom desktop text editor Init File. Adversaries may add malicious JavaScript code to the init.coffee file that will be executed upon the Atom application opening. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-apple-scripting-execution-with-administrator-privileges, Apple Scripting Execution with Administrator Privileges>> | Identifies execution of the Apple script interpreter (osascript) without a password prompt and with administrator privileges. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-with-explicit-credentials-via-scripting, Execution with Explicit Credentials via Scripting>> | Identifies execution of the security_authtrampoline process via a scripting interpreter. This occurs when programs use AuthorizationExecute-WithPrivileges from the Security.framework to run another program with root privileges. It should not be run by itself, as this is a sign of execution with explicit logon credentials. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-child-process-of-adobe-acrobat-reader-update-service, Suspicious Child Process of Adobe Acrobat Reader Update Service>> | Detects attempts to exploit privilege escalation vulnerabilities related to the Adobe Acrobat Reader PrivilegedHelperTool responsible for installing updates. For more information, refer to CVE-2020-9615, CVE-2020-9614 and CVE-2020-9613 and verify that the impacted system is patched. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-admin-group-account-addition, Potential Admin Group Account Addition>> | Identifies attempts to add an account to the admin group via the command line. This could be an indication of privilege escalation activity. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-root-crontab-file-modification, Privilege Escalation via Root Crontab File Modification>> | Identifies modifications to the root crontab file. Adversaries may overwrite this file to gain code execution with root privileges by exploiting privileged file write or move related vulnerabilities. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-smtp-on-port-26-tcp, SMTP on Port 26/TCP>> | This rule detects events that may indicate use of SMTP on TCP port 26. This port is commonly used by several popular mail transfer agents to deconflict with the default SMTP port 25. This port has also been used by a malware family called BadPatch for command and control of Windows systems. | update | 104 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-exporting-exchange-mailbox-via-powershell, Exporting Exchange Mailbox via PowerShell>> | Identifies the use of the Exchange PowerShell cmdlet, New-MailBoxExportRequest, to export the contents of a primary mailbox or archive to a .pst file. Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-exchange-mailbox-export-via-powershell, Exchange Mailbox Export via PowerShell>> | Identifies the use of the Exchange PowerShell cmdlet, New-MailBoxExportRequest, to export the contents of a primary mailbox or archive to a .pst file. Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. | update | 8 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-suspicious-script-with-audio-capture-capabilities, PowerShell Suspicious Script with Audio Capture Capabilities>> | Detects PowerShell scripts that can record audio, a common feature in popular post-exploitation tooling. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-suspicious-script-with-clipboard-retrieval-capabilities, PowerShell Suspicious Script with Clipboard Retrieval Capabilities>> | Detects PowerShell scripts that can get the contents of the clipboard, which attackers can abuse to retrieve sensitive information like credentials, messages, etc. | update | 8 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-keylogging-script, PowerShell Keylogging Script>> | Detects the use of Win32 API Functions that can be used to capture user keystrokes in PowerShell scripts. Attackers use this technique to capture user input, looking for credentials and/or other valuable data. | update | 112 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-mailbox-collection-script, PowerShell Mailbox Collection Script>> | Detects PowerShell scripts that can be used to collect data from mailboxes. Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. | update | 7 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-suspicious-script-with-screenshot-capabilities, PowerShell Suspicious Script with Screenshot Capabilities>> | Detects PowerShell scripts that can take screenshots, which is a common feature in post-exploitation kits and remote access tools (RATs). | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-script-with-webcam-video-capture-capabilities, PowerShell Script with Webcam Video Capture Capabilities>> | Detects PowerShell scripts that can be used to record webcam video. Attackers can capture this information to extort or spy on victims. | update | 4 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-encrypting-files-with-winrar-or-7z, Encrypting Files with WinRar or 7z>> | Identifies use of WinRar or 7z to create an encrypted files. Adversaries will often compress and encrypt data in preparation for exfiltration. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-connection-to-commonly-abused-free-ssl-certificate-providers, Connection to Commonly Abused Free SSL Certificate Providers>> | Identifies unusual processes connecting to domains using known free SSL certificates. Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-command-and-control-via-internet-explorer, Potential Command and Control via Internet Explorer>> | Identifies instances of Internet Explorer (iexplore.exe) being started via the Component Object Model (COM) making unusual network connections. Adversaries could abuse Internet Explorer via COM to avoid suspicious processes making network connections and bypass host-based firewall restrictions. | update | 105 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-port-forwarding-rule-addition, Port Forwarding Rule Addition>> | Identifies the creation of a new port forwarding rule. An adversary may abuse this technique to bypass network segmentation restrictions. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-remote-desktop-tunneling-detected, Potential Remote Desktop Tunneling Detected>> | Identifies potential use of an SSH utility to establish RDP over a reverse SSH Tunnel. This can be used by attackers to enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-file-download-via-desktopimgdownldr-utility, Remote File Download via Desktopimgdownldr Utility>> | Identifies the desktopimgdownldr utility being used to download a remote file. An adversary may use desktopimgdownldr to download arbitrary files as an alternative to certutil. | update | 111 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-file-download-via-mpcmdrun, Remote File Download via MpCmdRun>> | Identifies the Windows Defender configuration utility (MpCmdRun.exe) being used to download a remote file. | update | 111 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-file-download-via-script-interpreter, Remote File Download via Script Interpreter>> | Identifies built-in Windows script interpreters (cscript.exe or wscript.exe) being used to download an executable file from a remote destination. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-file-copy-via-teamviewer, Remote File Copy via TeamViewer>> | Identifies an executable or script file remotely downloaded via a TeamViewer transfer session. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privileged-account-brute-force, Privileged Account Brute Force>> | Identifies multiple consecutive logon failures targeting an Admin account from the same source address and within a short time interval. Adversaries will often brute force login attempts across multiple users with a common or known password, in an attempt to gain access to accounts. | update | 9 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-multiple-logon-failure-followed-by-logon-success, Multiple Logon Failure Followed by Logon Success>> | Identifies multiple logon failures followed by a successful one from the same source address. Adversaries will often brute force login attempts across multiple users with a common or known password, in an attempt to gain access to accounts. | update | 10 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-multiple-logon-failure-from-the-same-source-address, Multiple Logon Failure from the same Source Address>> | Identifies multiple consecutive logon failures from the same source address and within a short time interval. Adversaries will often brute force login attempts across multiple users with a common or known password, in an attempt to gain access to accounts. | update | 9 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-credential-access-via-windows-utilities, Potential Credential Access via Windows Utilities>> | Identifies the execution of known Windows utilities often abused to dump LSASS memory or the Active Directory database (NTDS.dit) in preparation for credential access. | update | 111 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-ntds-or-sam-database-file-copied, NTDS or SAM Database File Copied>> | Identifies a copy operation of the Active Directory Domain Database (ntds.dit) or Security Account Manager (SAM) files. Those files contain sensitive information including hashed domain and/or local credentials. | update | 111 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-credential-access-via-trusted-developer-utility, Potential Credential Access via Trusted Developer Utility>> | An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, loaded DLLs (dynamically linked libraries) responsible for Windows credential management. This technique is sometimes used for credential dumping. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-firsttime-seen-account-performing-dcsync, FirstTime Seen Account Performing DCSync>> | This rule identifies when a User Account starts the Active Directory Replication Process for the first time. Attackers can use the DCSync technique to get credential information of individual accounts or the entire domain, thus compromising the entire domain. | update | 10 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-credential-access-via-dcsync, Potential Credential Access via DCSync>> | This rule identifies when a User Account starts the Active Directory Replication Process. Attackers can use the DCSync technique to get credential information of individual accounts or the entire domain, thus compromising the entire domain. | update | 113 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kerberos-pre-authentication-disabled-for-user, Kerberos Pre-authentication Disabled for User>> | Identifies the modification of an account's Kerberos pre-authentication options. An adversary with GenericWrite/GenericAll rights over the account can maliciously modify these settings to perform offline password cracking attacks such as AS-REP roasting. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-or-modification-of-domain-backup-dpapi-private-key, Creation or Modification of Domain Backup DPAPI private key>> | Identifies the creation or modification of Domain Backup private keys. Adversaries may extract the Data Protection API (DPAPI) domain backup key from a Domain Controller (DC) to be able to decrypt any domain user master key file. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-credential-acquisition-via-registry-hive-dumping, Credential Acquisition via Registry Hive Dumping>> | Identifies attempts to export a registry hive which may contain credentials using the Windows reg.exe tool. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-full-user-mode-dumps-enabled-system-wide, Full User-Mode Dumps Enabled System-Wide>> | Identifies the enable of the full user-mode dumps feature system-wide. This feature allows Windows Error Reporting (WER) to collect data after an application crashes. This setting is a requirement for the LSASS Shtinkering attack, which fakes the communication of a crash on LSASS, generating a dump of the process memory, which gives the attacker access to the credentials present on the system without having to bring malware to the system. This setting is not enabled by default, and applications must create their registry subkeys to hold settings that enable them to collect dumps. | update | 6 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-iis-service-account-password-dumped, Microsoft IIS Service Account Password Dumped>> | Identifies the Internet Information Services (IIS) command-line tool, AppCmd, being used to list passwords. An attacker with IIS web server access via a web shell can decrypt and dump the IIS AppPool service account password using AppCmd. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-iis-connection-strings-decryption, Microsoft IIS Connection Strings Decryption>> | Identifies use of aspnet_regiis to decrypt Microsoft IIS connection strings. An attacker with Microsoft IIS web server access via a webshell or alike can decrypt and dump any hardcoded connection strings, such as the MSSQL service account password using aspnet_regiis command. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kerberos-traffic-from-unusual-process, Kerberos Traffic from Unusual Process>> | Identifies network connections to the standard Kerberos port from an unusual process. On Windows, the only process that normally performs Kerberos traffic from a domain joined host is lsass.exe. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-kirbi-file-creation, Kirbi File Creation>> | Identifies the creation of .kirbi files. The creation of this kind of file is an indicator of an attacker running Kerberos ticket dump utilities, such as Mimikatz, and precedes attacks such as Pass-The-Ticket (PTT), which allows the attacker to impersonate users using Kerberos tickets. | update | 4 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-access-to-a-sensitive-ldap-attribute, Access to a Sensitive LDAP Attribute>> | Identify access to sensitive Active Directory object attributes that contains credentials and decryption keys such as unixUserPassword, ms-PKI-AccountCredentials and msPKI-CredentialRoamingTokens. | update | 10 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-lsass-access-via-malseclogon, Suspicious LSASS Access via MalSecLogon>> | Identifies suspicious access to LSASS handle from a call trace pointing to seclogon.dll and with a suspicious access rights value. This may indicate an attempt to leak an LSASS handle via abusing the Secondary Logon service in preparation for credential access. | update | 208 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-module-loaded-by-lsass, Suspicious Module Loaded by LSASS>> | Identifies LSASS loading an unsigned or untrusted DLL. Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into LSSAS process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. | update | 7 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-lsass-memory-dump-creation, LSASS Memory Dump Creation>> | Identifies the creation of a Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (lsass.exe) default memory dump. This may indicate a credential access attempt via trusted system utilities such as Task Manager (taskmgr.exe) and SQL Dumper (sqldumper.exe) or known pentesting tools such as Dumpert and AndrewSpecial. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-lsass-memory-dump-handle-access, LSASS Memory Dump Handle Access>> | Identifies handle requests for the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) object access with specific access masks that many tools with a capability to dump memory to disk use (0x1fffff, 0x1010, 0x120089). This rule is tool agnostic as it has been validated against a host of various LSASS dump tools such as SharpDump, Procdump, Mimikatz, Comsvcs etc. It detects this behavior at a low level and does not depend on a specific tool or dump file name. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-mimikatz-memssp-log-file-detected, Mimikatz Memssp Log File Detected>> | Identifies the password log file from the default Mimikatz memssp module. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-invoke-mimikatz-powershell-script, Potential Invoke-Mimikatz PowerShell Script>> | Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords, along with many other features that make it useful for testing the security of networks. This rule detects Invoke-Mimikatz PowerShell script and alike. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-wdigest-security-provider, Modification of WDigest Security Provider>> | Identifies attempts to modify the WDigest security provider in the registry to force the user's password to be stored in clear text in memory. This behavior can be indicative of an adversary attempting to weaken the security configuration of an endpoint. Once the UseLogonCredential value is modified, the adversary may attempt to dump clear text passwords from memory. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-logon-provider-registry-modification, Network Logon Provider Registry Modification>> | Identifies the modification of the network logon provider registry. Adversaries may register a rogue network logon provider module for persistence and/or credential access via intercepting the authentication credentials in clear text during user logon. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-invoke-ninjacopy-script, PowerShell Invoke-NinjaCopy script>> | Detects PowerShell scripts that contain the default exported functions used on Invoke-NinjaCopy. Attackers can use Invoke-NinjaCopy to read SYSTEM files that are normally locked, such as the NTDS.dit file or registry hives. | update | 5 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-kerberos-ticket-dump, PowerShell Kerberos Ticket Dump>> | Detects PowerShell scripts that have the capability of dumping Kerberos tickets from LSA, which potentially indicates an attacker's attempt to acquire credentials for lateral movement. | update | 4 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-minidump-script, PowerShell MiniDump Script>> | This rule detects PowerShell scripts capable of dumping process memory using WindowsErrorReporting or Dbghelp.dll MiniDumpWriteDump. Attackers can use this tooling to dump LSASS and get access to credentials. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-kerberos-ticket-request, PowerShell Kerberos Ticket Request>> | Detects PowerShell scripts that have the capability of requesting kerberos tickets, which is a common step in Kerberoasting toolkits to crack service accounts. | update | 111 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-credential-access-via-duplicatehandle-in-lsass, Potential Credential Access via DuplicateHandle in LSASS>> | Identifies suspicious access to an LSASS handle via DuplicateHandle from an unknown call trace module. This may indicate an attempt to bypass the NtOpenProcess API to evade detection and dump LSASS memory for credential access. | update | 208 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-local-ntlm-relay-via-http, Potential Local NTLM Relay via HTTP>> | Identifies attempt to coerce a local NTLM authentication via HTTP using the Windows Printer Spooler service as a target. An adversary may use this primitive in combination with other techniques to elevate privileges on a compromised system. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-remote-credential-access-via-registry, Potential Remote Credential Access via Registry>> | Identifies remote access to the registry to potentially dump credential data from the Security Account Manager (SAM) registry hive in preparation for credential access and privileges elevation. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-multiple-vault-web-credentials-read, Multiple Vault Web Credentials Read>> | Windows Credential Manager allows you to create, view, or delete saved credentials for signing into websites, connected applications, and networks. An adversary may abuse this to list or dump credentials stored in the Credential Manager for saved usernames and passwords. This may also be performed in preparation of lateral movement. | update | 10 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-searching-for-saved-credentials-via-vaultcmd, Searching for Saved Credentials via VaultCmd>> | Windows Credential Manager allows you to create, view, or delete saved credentials for signing into websites, connected applications, and networks. An adversary may abuse this to list or dump credentials stored in the Credential Manager for saved usernames and passwords. This may also be performed in preparation of lateral movement. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-sensitive-privilege-seenabledelegationprivilege-assigned-to-a-user, Sensitive Privilege SeEnableDelegationPrivilege assigned to a User>> | Identifies the assignment of the SeEnableDelegationPrivilege sensitive "user right" to a user. The SeEnableDelegationPrivilege "user right" enables computer and user accounts to be trusted for delegation. Attackers can abuse this right to compromise Active Directory accounts and elevate their privileges. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-shadow-credentials-added-to-ad-object, Potential Shadow Credentials added to AD Object>> | Identify the modification of the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute in an Active Directory Computer or User Object. Attackers can abuse control over the object and create a key pair, append to raw public key in the attribute, and obtain persistent and stealthy access to the target user or computer object. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-user-account-exposed-to-kerberoasting, User account exposed to Kerberoasting>> | Detects when a user account has the servicePrincipalName attribute modified. Attackers can abuse write privileges over a user to configure Service Principle Names (SPNs) so that they can perform Kerberoasting. Administrators can also configure this for legitimate purposes, exposing the account to Kerberoasting. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-credential-access-via-renamed-com-services-dll, Potential Credential Access via Renamed COM+ Services DLL>> | Identifies suspicious renamed COMSVCS.DLL Image Load, which exports the MiniDump function that can be used to dump a process memory. This may indicate an attempt to dump LSASS memory while bypassing command-line based detection in preparation for credential access. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-lsass-process-access, Suspicious Lsass Process Access>> | Identifies access attempts to LSASS handle, this may indicate an attempt to dump credentials from Lsass memory. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-credential-access-via-lsass-memory-dump, Potential Credential Access via LSASS Memory Dump>> | Identifies suspicious access to LSASS handle from a call trace pointing to DBGHelp.dll or DBGCore.dll, which both export the MiniDumpWriteDump method that can be used to dump LSASS memory content in preparation for credential access. | update | 209 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-lsass-memory-dump-via-psscapturesnapshot, Potential LSASS Memory Dump via PssCaptureSnapShot>> | Identifies suspicious access to an LSASS handle via PssCaptureSnapShot where two successive process accesses are performed by the same process and target two different instances of LSASS. This may indicate an attempt to evade detection and dump LSASS memory for credential access. | update | 208 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-remote-registry-access-via-sebackupprivilege, Suspicious Remote Registry Access via SeBackupPrivilege>> | Identifies remote access to the registry using an account with Backup Operators group membership. This may indicate an attempt to exfiltrate credentials by dumping the Security Account Manager (SAM) registry hive in preparation for credential access and privileges elevation. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-symbolic-link-to-shadow-copy-created, Symbolic Link to Shadow Copy Created>> | Identifies the creation of symbolic links to a shadow copy. Symbolic links can be used to access files in the shadow copy, including sensitive files such as ntds.dit, System Boot Key and browser offline credentials. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-lsass-clone-creation-via-psscapturesnapshot, Potential LSASS Clone Creation via PssCaptureSnapShot>> | Identifies the creation of an LSASS process clone via PssCaptureSnapShot where the parent process is the initial LSASS process instance. This may indicate an attempt to evade detection and dump LSASS memory for credential access. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-antimalware-scan-interface-dll, Suspicious Antimalware Scan Interface DLL>> | Identifies the creation of the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) DLL in an unusual location. This may indicate an attempt to bypass AMSI by loading a rogue AMSI module instead of the legit one. | update | 8 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-antimalware-scan-interface-bypass-via-powershell, Potential Antimalware Scan Interface Bypass via PowerShell>> | Identifies the execution of PowerShell script with keywords related to different Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) bypasses. An adversary may attempt first to disable AMSI before executing further malicious powershell scripts to evade detection. | update | 8 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-amsienable-registry-key, Modification of AmsiEnable Registry Key>> | Identifies modifications of the AmsiEnable registry key to 0, which disables the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI). An adversary can modify this key to disable AMSI protections. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-clearing-windows-console-history, Clearing Windows Console History>> | Identifies when a user attempts to clear console history. An adversary may clear the command history of a compromised account to conceal the actions undertaken during an intrusion. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-clearing-windows-event-logs, Clearing Windows Event Logs>> | Identifies attempts to clear or disable Windows event log stores using Windows wevetutil command. This is often done by attackers in an attempt to evade detection or destroy forensic evidence on a system. | update | 111 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-code-signing-policy-modification-through-registry, Code Signing Policy Modification Through Registry>> | Identifies attempts to disable the code signing policy through the registry. Code signing provides authenticity on a program, and grants the user with the ability to check whether the program has been tampered with. By allowing the execution of unsigned or self-signed code, threat actors can craft and execute malicious code. | update | 8 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-or-modification-of-root-certificate, Creation or Modification of Root Certificate>> | Identifies the creation or modification of a local trusted root certificate in Windows. The install of a malicious root certificate would allow an attacker the ability to masquerade malicious files as valid signed components from any entity (for example, Microsoft). It could also allow an attacker to decrypt SSL traffic. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-cryptoapi-spoofing-vulnerability-cve-2020-0601-curveball, Windows CryptoAPI Spoofing Vulnerability (CVE-2020-0601 - CurveBall)>> | A spoofing vulnerability exists in the way Windows CryptoAPI (Crypt32.dll) validates Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) certificates. An attacker could exploit the vulnerability by using a spoofed code-signing certificate to sign a malicious executable, making it appear the file was from a trusted, legitimate source. | update | 104 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-defender-disabled-via-registry-modification, Windows Defender Disabled via Registry Modification>> | Identifies modifications to the Windows Defender registry settings to disable the service or set the service to be started manually. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-defender-exclusions-added-via-powershell, Windows Defender Exclusions Added via PowerShell>> | Identifies modifications to the Windows Defender configuration settings using PowerShell to add exclusions at the folder directory or process level. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-script-block-logging-disabled, PowerShell Script Block Logging Disabled>> | Identifies attempts to disable PowerShell Script Block Logging via registry modification. Attackers may disable this logging to conceal their activities in the host and evade detection. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-disable-windows-firewall-rules-via-netsh, Disable Windows Firewall Rules via Netsh>> | Identifies use of the netsh.exe to disable or weaken the local firewall. Attackers will use this command line tool to disable the firewall during troubleshooting or to enable network mobility. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-disabling-windows-defender-security-settings-via-powershell, Disabling Windows Defender Security Settings via PowerShell>> | Identifies use of the Set-MpPreference PowerShell command to disable or weaken certain Windows Defender settings. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-disable-windows-event-and-security-logs-using-built-in-tools, Disable Windows Event and Security Logs Using Built-in Tools>> | Identifies attempts to disable EventLog via the logman Windows utility, PowerShell, or auditpol. This is often done by attackers in an attempt to evade detection on a system. | update | 111 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-dns-over-https-enabled-via-registry, DNS-over-HTTPS Enabled via Registry>> | Identifies when a user enables DNS-over-HTTPS. This can be used to hide internet activity or the process of exfiltrating data. With this enabled, an organization will lose visibility into data such as query type, response, and originating IP, which are used to determine bad actors. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-net-code-compilation, Suspicious .NET Code Compilation>> | Identifies executions of .NET compilers with suspicious parent processes, which can indicate an attacker's attempt to compile code after delivery in order to bypass security mechanisms. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-desktop-enabled-in-windows-firewall-by-netsh, Remote Desktop Enabled in Windows Firewall by Netsh>> | Identifies use of the network shell utility (netsh.exe) to enable inbound Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) connections in the Windows Firewall. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-enable-host-network-discovery-via-netsh, Enable Host Network Discovery via Netsh>> | Identifies use of the netsh.exe program to enable host discovery via the network. Attackers can use this command-line tool to weaken the host firewall settings. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-control-panel-process-with-unusual-arguments, Control Panel Process with Unusual Arguments>> | Identifies unusual instances of Control Panel with suspicious keywords or paths in the process command line value. Adversaries may abuse control.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-imageload-via-windows-update-auto-update-client, ImageLoad via Windows Update Auto Update Client>> | Identifies abuse of the Windows Update Auto Update Client (wuauclt.exe) to load an arbitrary DLL. This behavior is used as a defense evasion technique to blend-in malicious activity with legitimate Windows software. | update | 111 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-build-engine-started-by-an-office-application, Microsoft Build Engine Started by an Office Application>> | An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, was started by Excel or Word. This is unusual behavior for the Build Engine and could have been caused by an Excel or Word document executing a malicious script payload. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-build-engine-started-by-a-script-process, Microsoft Build Engine Started by a Script Process>> | An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, was started by a script or the Windows command interpreter. This behavior is unusual and is sometimes used by malicious payloads. | update | 208 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-build-engine-started-by-a-system-process, Microsoft Build Engine Started by a System Process>> | An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, was started by Explorer or the WMI (Windows Management Instrumentation) subsystem. This behavior is unusual and is sometimes used by malicious payloads. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-build-engine-using-an-alternate-name, Microsoft Build Engine Using an Alternate Name>> | An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, was started after being renamed. This is uncommon behavior and may indicate an attempt to run unnoticed or undetected. | update | 111 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-build-engine-started-an-unusual-process, Microsoft Build Engine Started an Unusual Process>> | An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, started a PowerShell script or the Visual C# Command Line Compiler. This technique is sometimes used to deploy a malicious payload using the Build Engine. | update | 210 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-dll-side-loading-via-trusted-microsoft-programs, Potential DLL Side-Loading via Trusted Microsoft Programs>> | Identifies an instance of a Windows trusted program that is known to be vulnerable to DLL Search Order Hijacking starting after being renamed or from a non-standard path. This is uncommon behavior and may indicate an attempt to evade defenses via side loading a malicious DLL within the memory space of one of those processes. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-dll-side-loading-via-microsoft-antimalware-service-executable, Potential DLL Side-Loading via Microsoft Antimalware Service Executable>> | Identifies a Windows trusted program that is known to be vulnerable to DLL Search Order Hijacking starting after being renamed or from a non-standard path. This is uncommon behavior and may indicate an attempt to evade defenses via side-loading a malicious DLL within the memory space of one of those processes. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-executable-file-creation-with-multiple-extensions, Executable File Creation with Multiple Extensions>> | Masquerading can allow an adversary to evade defenses and better blend in with the environment. One way it occurs is when the name or location of a file is manipulated as a means of tricking a user into executing what they think is a benign file type but is actually executable code. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-process-execution-from-an-unusual-directory, Process Execution from an Unusual Directory>> | Identifies process execution from suspicious default Windows directories. This is sometimes done by adversaries to hide malware in trusted paths. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-encoded-executable-stored-in-the-registry, Encoded Executable Stored in the Registry>> | Identifies registry write modifications to hide an encoded portable executable. This could be indicative of adversary defense evasion by avoiding the storing of malicious content directly on disk. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-iis-http-logging-disabled, IIS HTTP Logging Disabled>> | Identifies when Internet Information Services (IIS) HTTP Logging is disabled on a server. An attacker with IIS server access via a webshell or other mechanism can disable HTTP Logging as an effective anti-forensics measure. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-process-injection-by-the-microsoft-build-engine, Process Injection by the Microsoft Build Engine>> | An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, created a thread in another process. This technique is sometimes used to evade detection or elevate privileges. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-installutil-process-making-network-connections, InstallUtil Process Making Network Connections>> | Identifies InstallUtil.exe making outbound network connections. This may indicate adversarial activity as InstallUtil is often leveraged by adversaries to execute code and evade detection. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-endpoint-security-parent-process, Suspicious Endpoint Security Parent Process>> | A suspicious Endpoint Security parent process was detected. This may indicate a process hollowing or other form of code injection. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-renamed-autoit-scripts-interpreter, Renamed AutoIt Scripts Interpreter>> | Identifies a suspicious AutoIt process execution. Malware written as an AutoIt script tends to rename the AutoIt executable to avoid detection. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-werfault-child-process, Suspicious WerFault Child Process>> | A suspicious WerFault child process was detected, which may indicate an attempt to run via the SilentProcessExit registry key manipulation. Verify process details such as command line, network connections and file writes. | update | 111 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-program-files-directory-masquerading, Program Files Directory Masquerading>> | Identifies execution from a directory masquerading as the Windows Program Files directories. These paths are trusted and usually host trusted third party programs. An adversary may leverage masquerading, along with low privileges to bypass detections allowlisting those folders. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-windows-error-manager-masquerading, Potential Windows Error Manager Masquerading>> | Identifies suspicious instances of the Windows Error Reporting process (WerFault.exe or Wermgr.exe) with matching command-line and process executable values performing outgoing network connections. This may be indicative of a masquerading attempt to evade suspicious child process behavior detections. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-windows-defender-tampering, Microsoft Windows Defender Tampering>> | Identifies when one or more features on Microsoft Defender are disabled. Adversaries may disable or tamper with Microsoft Defender features to evade detection and conceal malicious behavior. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-connection-via-signed-binary, Network Connection via Signed Binary>> | Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates can execute on Windows systems protected by digital signature validation. Adversaries may use these binaries to 'live off the land' and execute malicious files that could bypass application allowlists and signature validation. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-ms-office-macro-security-registry-modifications, MS Office Macro Security Registry Modifications>> | Microsoft Office Products offer options for users and developers to control the security settings for running and using Macros. Adversaries may abuse these security settings to modify the default behavior of the Office Application to trust future macros and/or disable security warnings, which could increase their chances of establishing persistence. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-msbuild-making-network-connections, MsBuild Making Network Connections>> | Identifies MsBuild.exe making outbound network connections. This may indicate adversarial activity as MsBuild is often leveraged by adversaries to execute code and evade detection. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-mshta-making-network-connections, Mshta Making Network Connections>> | Identifies Mshta.exe making outbound network connections. This may indicate adversarial activity, as Mshta is often leveraged by adversaries to execute malicious scripts and evade detection. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-connection-via-msxsl, Network Connection via MsXsl>> | Identifies msxsl.exe making a network connection. This may indicate adversarial activity as msxsl.exe is often leveraged by adversaries to execute malicious scripts and evade detection. | update | 105 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-network-activity-from-a-windows-system-binary, Unusual Network Activity from a Windows System Binary>> | Identifies network activity from unexpected system applications. This may indicate adversarial activity as these applications are often leveraged by adversaries to execute code and evade detection. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-local-account-tokenfilter-policy-disabled, Local Account TokenFilter Policy Disabled>> | Identifies registry modification to the LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy policy. If this value exists (which doesn't by default) and is set to 1, then remote connections from all local members of Administrators are granted full high-integrity tokens during negotiation. | update | 7 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-net-reflection-via-powershell, Suspicious .NET Reflection via PowerShell>> | Detects the use of Reflection.Assembly to load PEs and DLLs in memory in PowerShell scripts. Attackers use this method to load executables and DLLs without writing to the disk, bypassing security solutions. | update | 112 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-suspicious-payload-encoded-and-compressed, PowerShell Suspicious Payload Encoded and Compressed>> | Identifies the use of .NET functionality for decompression and base64 decoding combined in PowerShell scripts, which malware and security tools heavily use to deobfuscate payloads and load them directly in memory to bypass defenses. | update | 111 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-script-with-encryption-decryption-capabilities, PowerShell Script with Encryption/Decryption Capabilities>> | Identifies the use of Cmdlets and methods related to encryption/decryption of files in PowerShell scripts, which malware and offensive security tools can abuse to encrypt data or decrypt payloads to bypass security solutions. | update | 6 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-process-injection-via-powershell, Potential Process Injection via PowerShell>> | Detects the use of Windows API functions that are commonly abused by malware and security tools to load malicious code or inject it into remote processes. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-firewall-disabled-via-powershell, Windows Firewall Disabled via PowerShell>> | Identifies when the Windows Firewall is disabled using PowerShell cmdlets, which can help attackers evade network constraints, like internet and network lateral communication restrictions. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-microsoft-diagnostics-wizard-execution, Suspicious Microsoft Diagnostics Wizard Execution>> | Identifies potential abuse of the Microsoft Diagnostics Troubleshooting Wizard (MSDT) to proxy malicious command or binary execution via malicious process arguments. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-child-processes-of-rundll32, Unusual Child Processes of RunDLL32>> | Identifies child processes of unusual instances of RunDLL32 where the command line parameters were suspicious. Misuse of RunDLL32 could indicate malicious activity. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-scheduled-tasks-at-command-enabled, Scheduled Tasks AT Command Enabled>> | Identifies attempts to enable the Windows scheduled tasks AT command via the registry. Attackers may use this method to move laterally or persist locally. The AT command has been deprecated since Windows 8 and Windows Server 2012, but still exists for backwards compatibility. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-secure-file-deletion-via-sdelete-utility, Potential Secure File Deletion via SDelete Utility>> | Detects file name patterns generated by the use of Sysinternals SDelete utility to securely delete a file via multiple file overwrite and rename operations. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-sip-provider-modification, SIP Provider Modification>> | Identifies modifications to the registered Subject Interface Package (SIP) providers. SIP providers are used by the Windows cryptographic system to validate file signatures on the system. This may be an attempt to bypass signature validation checks or inject code into critical processes. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-solarwinds-process-disabling-services-via-registry, SolarWinds Process Disabling Services via Registry>> | Identifies a SolarWinds binary modifying the start type of a service to be disabled. An adversary may abuse this technique to manipulate relevant security services. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-execution-from-a-mounted-device, Suspicious Execution from a Mounted Device>> | Identifies when a script interpreter or signed binary is launched via a non-standard working directory. An attacker may use this technique to evade defenses. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-managed-code-hosting-process, Suspicious Managed Code Hosting Process>> | Identifies a suspicious managed code hosting process which could indicate code injection or other form of suspicious code execution. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-process-access-via-direct-system-call, Suspicious Process Access via Direct System Call>> | Identifies suspicious process access events from an unknown memory region. Endpoint security solutions usually hook userland Windows APIs in order to decide if the code that is being executed is malicious or not. It's possible to bypass hooked functions by writing malicious functions that call syscalls directly. | update | 211 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-process-creation-calltrace, Suspicious Process Creation CallTrace>> | Identifies when a process is created and immediately accessed from an unknown memory code region and by the same parent process. This may indicate a code injection attempt. | update | 208 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-script-object-execution, Suspicious Script Object Execution>> | Identifies scrobj.dll loaded into unusual Microsoft processes. This usually means a malicious scriptlet is being executed in the target process. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-renamed-utility-executed-with-short-program-name, Renamed Utility Executed with Short Program Name>> | Identifies the execution of a process with a single character process name, differing from the original file name. This is often done by adversaries while staging, executing temporary utilities, or trying to bypass security detections based on the process name. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-wmic-xsl-script-execution, Suspicious WMIC XSL Script Execution>> | Identifies WMIC allowlist bypass techniques by alerting on suspicious execution of scripts. When WMIC loads scripting libraries it may be indicative of an allowlist bypass. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-zoom-child-process, Suspicious Zoom Child Process>> | A suspicious Zoom child process was detected, which may indicate an attempt to run unnoticed. Verify process details such as command line, network connections, file writes and associated file signature details as well. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-executable-file-creation-by-a-system-critical-process, Unusual Executable File Creation by a System Critical Process>> | Identifies an unexpected executable file being created or modified by a Windows system critical process, which may indicate activity related to remote code execution or other forms of exploitation. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-file-creation-time-changed, File Creation Time Changed>> | Identifies modification of a file creation time. Adversaries may modify file time attributes to blend malicious content with existing files. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file often to mimic files that are in trusted directories. | update | 5 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unsigned-dll-side-loading-from-a-suspicious-folder, Unsigned DLL Side-Loading from a Suspicious Folder>> | Identifies a Windows trusted program running from locations often abused by adversaries to masquerade as a trusted program and loading a recently dropped DLL. This behavior may indicate an attempt to evade defenses via side-loading a malicious DLL within the memory space of a signed processes. | update | 7 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-file-creation-alternate-data-stream, Unusual File Creation - Alternate Data Stream>> | Identifies suspicious creation of Alternate Data Streams on highly targeted files. This is uncommon for legitimate files and sometimes done by adversaries to hide malware. | update | 113 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-process-execution-path-alternate-data-stream, Unusual Process Execution Path - Alternate Data Stream>> | Identifies processes running from an Alternate Data Stream. This is uncommon for legitimate processes and sometimes done by adversaries to hide malware. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-network-connection-via-dllhost, Unusual Network Connection via DllHost>> | Identifies unusual instances of dllhost.exe making outbound network connections. This may indicate adversarial Command and Control activity. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-network-connection-via-rundll32, Unusual Network Connection via RunDLL32>> | Identifies unusual instances of rundll32.exe making outbound network connections. This may indicate adversarial Command and Control activity. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-process-network-connection, Unusual Process Network Connection>> | Identifies network activity from unexpected system applications. This may indicate adversarial activity as these applications are often leveraged by adversaries to execute code and evade detection. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-child-process-from-a-system-virtual-process, Unusual Child Process from a System Virtual Process>> | Identifies a suspicious child process of the Windows virtual system process, which could indicate code injection. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-evasion-via-filter-manager, Potential Evasion via Filter Manager>> | The Filter Manager Control Program (fltMC.exe) binary may be abused by adversaries to unload a filter driver and evade defenses. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-evasion-via-windows-filtering-platform, Potential Evasion via Windows Filtering Platform>> | Identifies multiple Windows Filtering Platform block events and where the process name is related to an endpoint security software. Adversaries may add malicious WFP rules to prevent Endpoint security from sending telemetry. | update | 2 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-signed-proxy-execution-via-ms-work-folders, Signed Proxy Execution via MS Work Folders>> | Identifies the use of Windows Work Folders to execute a potentially masqueraded control.exe file in the current working directory. Misuse of Windows Work Folders could indicate malicious activity. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-host-files-system-changes-via-windows-subsystem-for-linux, Host Files System Changes via Windows Subsystem for Linux>> | Detects files creation and modification on the host system from the the Windows Subsystem for Linux. Adversaries may enable and use WSL for Linux to avoid detection. | update | 6 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-subsystem-for-linux-distribution-installed, Windows Subsystem for Linux Distribution Installed>> | Detects changes to the registry that indicates the install of a new Windows Subsystem for Linux distribution by name. Adversaries may enable and use WSL for Linux to avoid detection. | update | 6 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-adfind-command-activity, AdFind Command Activity>> | This rule detects the Active Directory query tool, AdFind.exe. AdFind has legitimate purposes, but it is frequently leveraged by threat actors to perform post-exploitation Active Directory reconnaissance. The AdFind tool has been observed in Trickbot, Ryuk, Maze, and FIN6 campaigns. For Winlogbeat, this rule requires Sysmon. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-enumeration-of-administrator-accounts, Enumeration of Administrator Accounts>> | Identifies instances of lower privilege accounts enumerating Administrator accounts or groups using built-in Windows tools. | update | 111 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-account-discovery-command-via-system-account, Account Discovery Command via SYSTEM Account>> | Identifies when the SYSTEM account uses an account discovery utility. This could be a sign of discovery activity after an adversary has achieved privilege escalation. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-group-policy-discovery-via-microsoft-gpresult-utility, Group Policy Discovery via Microsoft GPResult Utility>> | Detects the usage of gpresult.exe to query group policy objects. Attackers may query group policy objects during the reconnaissance phase after compromising a system to gain a better understanding of the active directory environment and possible methods to escalate privileges or move laterally. | update | 7 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-peripheral-device-discovery, Peripheral Device Discovery>> | Identifies use of the Windows file system utility (fsutil.exe) to gather information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-share-enumeration-script, PowerShell Share Enumeration Script>> | Detects scripts that contain PowerShell functions, structures, or Windows API functions related to windows share enumeration activities. Attackers, mainly ransomware groups, commonly identify and inspect network shares, looking for critical information for encryption and/or exfiltration. | update | 9 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-suspicious-discovery-related-windows-api-functions, PowerShell Suspicious Discovery Related Windows API Functions>> | This rule detects the use of discovery-related Windows API functions in PowerShell Scripts. Attackers can use these functions to perform various situational awareness related activities, like enumerating users, shares, sessions, domain trusts, groups, etc. | update | 113 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-enumeration-of-privileged-local-groups-membership, Enumeration of Privileged Local Groups Membership>> | Identifies instances of an unusual process enumerating built-in Windows privileged local groups membership like Administrators or Remote Desktop users. | update | 211 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-whoami-process-activity, Whoami Process Activity>> | Identifies suspicious use of whoami.exe which displays user, group, and privileges information for the user who is currently logged on to the local system. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-command-execution-via-solarwinds-process, Command Execution via SolarWinds Process>> | A suspicious SolarWinds child process (Cmd.exe or Powershell.exe) was detected. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-solarwinds-child-process, Suspicious SolarWinds Child Process>> | A suspicious SolarWinds child process was detected, which may indicate an attempt to execute malicious programs. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-of-com-object-via-xwizard, Execution of COM object via Xwizard>> | Windows Component Object Model (COM) is an inter-process communication (IPC) component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects or executable code. Xwizard can be used to run a COM object created in registry to evade defensive counter measures. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-command-prompt-network-connection, Command Prompt Network Connection>> | Identifies cmd.exe making a network connection. Adversaries could abuse cmd.exe to download or execute malware from a remote URL. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-svchost-spawning-cmd, Svchost spawning Cmd>> | Identifies a suspicious parent child process relationship with cmd.exe descending from svchost.exe | update | 210 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-parent-process-for-cmd-exe, Unusual Parent Process for cmd.exe>> | Identifies a suspicious parent child process relationship with cmd.exe descending from an unusual process. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-command-shell-activity-started-via-rundll32, Command Shell Activity Started via RunDLL32>> | Identifies command shell activity started via RunDLL32, which is commonly abused by attackers to host malicious code. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-enumeration-command-spawned-via-wmiprvse, Enumeration Command Spawned via WMIPrvSE>> | Identifies native Windows host and network enumeration commands spawned by the Windows Management Instrumentation Provider Service (WMIPrvSE). | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-from-unusual-directory-command-line, Execution from Unusual Directory - Command Line>> | Identifies process execution from suspicious default Windows directories. This may be abused by adversaries to hide malware in trusted paths. | update | 111 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-connection-via-compiled-html-file, Network Connection via Compiled HTML File>> | Compiled HTML files (.chm) are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. Adversaries may conceal malicious code in a CHM file and deliver it to a victim for execution. CHM content is loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe). | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-of-file-written-or-modified-by-microsoft-office, Execution of File Written or Modified by Microsoft Office>> | Identifies an executable created by a Microsoft Office application and subsequently executed. These processes are often launched via scripts inside documents or during exploitation of Microsoft Office applications. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-of-file-written-or-modified-by-pdf-reader, Execution of File Written or Modified by PDF Reader>> | Identifies a suspicious file that was written by a PDF reader application and subsequently executed. These processes are often launched via exploitation of PDF applications. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-powershell-hacktool-script-by-function-names, Potential PowerShell HackTool Script by Function Names>> | Detects known PowerShell offensive tooling functions names in PowerShell scripts. Attackers commonly use out-of-the-box offensive tools without modifying the code. This rule aim is to take advantage of that. | update | 10 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-portable-executable-encoded-in-powershell-script, Suspicious Portable Executable Encoded in Powershell Script>> | Detects the presence of a portable executable (PE) in a PowerShell script by looking for its encoded header. Attackers embed PEs into PowerShell scripts to inject them into memory, avoiding defences by not writing to disk. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-psreflect-script, PowerShell PSReflect Script>> | Detects the use of PSReflect in PowerShell scripts. Attackers leverage PSReflect as a library that enables PowerShell to access win32 API functions. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-psexec-network-connection, PsExec Network Connection>> | Identifies use of the SysInternals tool PsExec.exe making a network connection. This could be an indication of lateral movement. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-network-connection-via-registration-utility, Network Connection via Registration Utility>> | Identifies the native Windows tools regsvr32.exe, regsvr64.exe, RegSvcs.exe, or RegAsm.exe making a network connection. This may be indicative of an attacker bypassing allowlists or running arbitrary scripts via a signed Microsoft binary. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-outbound-scheduled-task-activity-via-powershell, Outbound Scheduled Task Activity via PowerShell>> | Identifies the PowerShell process loading the Task Scheduler COM DLL followed by an outbound RPC network connection within a short time period. This may indicate lateral movement or remote discovery via scheduled tasks. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-via-local-sxs-shared-module, Execution via local SxS Shared Module>> | Identifies the creation, change, or deletion of a DLL module within a Windows SxS local folder. Adversaries may abuse shared modules to execute malicious payloads by instructing the Windows module loader to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-cmd-execution-via-wmi, Suspicious Cmd Execution via WMI>> | Identifies suspicious command execution (cmd) via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) on a remote host. This could be indicative of adversary lateral movement. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-wmi-image-load-from-ms-office, Suspicious WMI Image Load from MS Office>> | Identifies a suspicious image load (wmiutils.dll) from Microsoft Office processes. This behavior may indicate adversarial activity where child processes are spawned via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). This technique can be used to execute code and evade traditional parent/child processes spawned from Microsoft Office products. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-pdf-reader-child-process, Suspicious PDF Reader Child Process>> | Identifies suspicious child processes of PDF reader applications. These child processes are often launched via exploitation of PDF applications or social engineering. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-process-execution-via-renamed-psexec-executable, Suspicious Process Execution via Renamed PsExec Executable>> | Identifies suspicious psexec activity which is executing from the psexec service that has been renamed, possibly to evade detection. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-process-activity-via-compiled-html-file, Process Activity via Compiled HTML File>> | Compiled HTML files (.chm) are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. Adversaries may conceal malicious code in a CHM file and deliver it to a victim for execution. CHM content is loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe). | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-conhost-spawned-by-suspicious-parent-process, Conhost Spawned By Suspicious Parent Process>> | Detects when the Console Window Host (conhost.exe) process is spawned by a suspicious parent process, which could be indicative of code injection. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-rare-smb-connection-to-the-internet, Rare SMB Connection to the Internet>> | This rule detects rare internet network connections via the SMB protocol. SMB is commonly used to leak NTLM credentials via rogue UNC path injection. | update | 2 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-third-party-backup-files-deleted-via-unexpected-process, Third-party Backup Files Deleted via Unexpected Process>> | Identifies the deletion of backup files, saved using third-party software, by a process outside of the backup suite. Adversaries may delete Backup files to ensure that recovery from a ransomware attack is less likely. | update | 111 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-deleting-backup-catalogs-with-wbadmin, Deleting Backup Catalogs with Wbadmin>> | Identifies use of the wbadmin.exe to delete the backup catalog. Ransomware and other malware may do this to prevent system recovery. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-boot-configuration, Modification of Boot Configuration>> | Identifies use of bcdedit.exe to delete boot configuration data. This tactic is sometimes used as by malware or an attacker as a destructive technique. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-high-number-of-process-and-or-service-terminations, High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations>> | This rule identifies a high number (10) of process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-volume-shadow-copy-deleted-or-resized-via-vssadmin, Volume Shadow Copy Deleted or Resized via VssAdmin>> | Identifies use of vssadmin.exe for shadow copy deletion or resizing on endpoints. This commonly occurs in tandem with ransomware or other destructive attacks. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-volume-shadow-copy-deletion-via-powershell, Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via PowerShell>> | Identifies the use of the Win32_ShadowCopy class and related cmdlets to achieve shadow copy deletion. This commonly occurs in tandem with ransomware or other destructive attacks. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-volume-shadow-copy-deletion-via-wmic, Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via WMIC>> | Identifies use of wmic.exe for shadow copy deletion on endpoints. This commonly occurs in tandem with ransomware or other destructive attacks. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-html-file-creation, Suspicious HTML File Creation>> | Identifies the execution of a browser process to open an HTML file with high entropy and size. Adversaries may smuggle data and files past content filters by hiding malicious payloads inside of seemingly benign HTML files. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-execution-via-microsoft-office-add-ins, Suspicious Execution via Microsoft Office Add-Ins>> | Identifies execution of common Microsoft Office applications to launch an Office Add-In from a suspicious path or with an unusual parent process. This may indicate an attempt to get initial access via a malicious phishing MS Office Add-In. | update | 4 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-first-time-seen-removable-device, First Time Seen Removable Device>> | Identifies newly seen removable devices by device friendly name using registry modification events. While this activity is not inherently malicious, analysts can use those events to aid monitoring for data exfiltration over those devices. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-script-executing-powershell, Windows Script Executing PowerShell>> | Identifies a PowerShell process launched by either cscript.exe or wscript.exe. Observing Windows scripting processes executing a PowerShell script, may be indicative of malicious activity. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-script-interpreter-executing-process-via-wmi, Windows Script Interpreter Executing Process via WMI>> | Identifies use of the built-in Windows script interpreters (cscript.exe or wscript.exe) being used to execute a process via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). This may be indicative of malicious activity. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-exchange-server-um-writing-suspicious-files, Microsoft Exchange Server UM Writing Suspicious Files>> | Identifies suspicious files being written by the Microsoft Exchange Server Unified Messaging (UM) service. This activity has been observed exploiting CVE-2021-26858. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-exchange-server-um-spawning-suspicious-processes, Microsoft Exchange Server UM Spawning Suspicious Processes>> | Identifies suspicious processes being spawned by the Microsoft Exchange Server Unified Messaging (UM) service. This activity has been observed exploiting CVE-2021-26857. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-microsoft-exchange-worker-spawning-suspicious-processes, Microsoft Exchange Worker Spawning Suspicious Processes>> | Identifies suspicious processes being spawned by the Microsoft Exchange Server worker process (w3wp). This activity may indicate exploitation activity or access to an existing web shell backdoor. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-ms-office-child-process, Suspicious MS Office Child Process>> | Identifies suspicious child processes of frequently targeted Microsoft Office applications (Word, PowerPoint, Excel). These child processes are often launched during exploitation of Office applications or from documents with malicious macros. | update | 111 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-ms-outlook-child-process, Suspicious MS Outlook Child Process>> | Identifies suspicious child processes of Microsoft Outlook. These child processes are often associated with spear phishing activity. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-explorer-child-process, Suspicious Explorer Child Process>> | Identifies a suspicious Windows explorer child process. Explorer.exe can be abused to launch malicious scripts or executables from a trusted parent process. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-service-command-lateral-movement, Service Command Lateral Movement>> | Identifies use of sc.exe to create, modify, or start services on remote hosts. This could be indicative of adversary lateral movement but will be noisy if commonly done by admins. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-incoming-dcom-lateral-movement-via-mshta, Incoming DCOM Lateral Movement via MSHTA>> | Identifies the use of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) to execute commands from a remote host, which are launched via the HTA Application COM Object. This behavior may indicate an attacker abusing a DCOM application to move laterally while attempting to evade detection. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-incoming-dcom-lateral-movement-with-mmc, Incoming DCOM Lateral Movement with MMC>> | Identifies the use of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) to run commands from a remote host, which are launched via the MMC20 Application COM Object. This behavior may indicate an attacker abusing a DCOM application to move laterally. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-incoming-dcom-lateral-movement-with-shellbrowserwindow-or-shellwindows, Incoming DCOM Lateral Movement with ShellBrowserWindow or ShellWindows>> | Identifies use of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) to run commands from a remote host, which are launched via the ShellBrowserWindow or ShellWindows Application COM Object. This behavior may indicate an attacker abusing a DCOM application to stealthily move laterally. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-nullsessionpipe-registry-modification, NullSessionPipe Registry Modification>> | Identifies NullSessionPipe registry modifications that specify which pipes can be accessed anonymously. This could be indicative of adversary lateral movement preparation by making the added pipe available to everyone. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-remote-desktop-shadowing-activity, Potential Remote Desktop Shadowing Activity>> | Identifies the modification of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) Shadow registry or the execution of processes indicative of an active RDP shadowing session. An adversary may abuse the RDP Shadowing feature to spy on or control other users active RDP sessions. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-via-tsclient-mountpoint, Execution via TSClient Mountpoint>> | Identifies execution from the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) shared mountpoint tsclient on the target host. This may indicate a lateral movement attempt. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-incoming-execution-via-winrm-remote-shell, Incoming Execution via WinRM Remote Shell>> | Identifies remote execution via Windows Remote Management (WinRM) remote shell on a target host. This could be an indication of lateral movement. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-wmi-incoming-lateral-movement, WMI Incoming Lateral Movement>> | Identifies processes executed via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) on a remote host. This could be indicative of adversary lateral movement, but could be noisy if administrators use WMI to remotely manage hosts. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-mounting-hidden-or-webdav-remote-shares, Mounting Hidden or WebDav Remote Shares>> | Identifies the use of net.exe to mount a WebDav or hidden remote share. This may indicate lateral movement or preparation for data exfiltration. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-incoming-execution-via-powershell-remoting, Incoming Execution via PowerShell Remoting>> | Identifies remote execution via Windows PowerShell remoting. Windows PowerShell remoting allows a user to run any Windows PowerShell command on one or more remote computers. This could be an indication of lateral movement. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-rdp-enabled-via-registry, RDP Enabled via Registry>> | Identifies registry write modifications to enable Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) access. This could be indicative of adversary lateral movement preparation. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-file-copy-to-a-hidden-share, Remote File Copy to a Hidden Share>> | Identifies a remote file copy attempt to a hidden network share. This may indicate lateral movement or data staging activity. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remotely-started-services-via-rpc, Remotely Started Services via RPC>> | Identifies remote execution of Windows services over remote procedure call (RPC). This could be indicative of lateral movement, but will be noisy if commonly done by administrators." | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-remote-scheduled-task-creation, Remote Scheduled Task Creation>> | Identifies remote scheduled task creations on a target host. This could be indicative of adversary lateral movement. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-rdp-activex-client-loaded, Suspicious RDP ActiveX Client Loaded>> | Identifies suspicious Image Loading of the Remote Desktop Services ActiveX Client (mstscax), this may indicate the presence of RDP lateral movement capability. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-child-process-of-dns-exe, Unusual Child Process of dns.exe>> | Identifies an unexpected process spawning from dns.exe, the process responsible for Windows DNS server services, which may indicate activity related to remote code execution or other forms of exploitation. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-file-modification-by-dns-exe, Unusual File Modification by dns.exe>> | Identifies an unexpected file being modified by dns.exe, the process responsible for Windows DNS Server services, which may indicate activity related to remote code execution or other forms of exploitation. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-lateral-movement-via-startup-folder, Lateral Movement via Startup Folder>> | Identifies suspicious file creations in the startup folder of a remote system. An adversary could abuse this to move laterally by dropping a malicious script or executable that will be executed after a reboot or user logon. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-adobe-hijack-persistence, Adobe Hijack Persistence>> | Detects writing executable files that will be automatically launched by Adobe on launch. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-installation-of-custom-shim-databases, Installation of Custom Shim Databases>> | Identifies the installation of custom Application Compatibility Shim databases. This Windows functionality has been abused by attackers to stealthily gain persistence and arbitrary code execution in legitimate Windows processes. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-registry-persistence-via-appcert-dll, Registry Persistence via AppCert DLL>> | Detects attempts to maintain persistence by creating registry keys using AppCert DLLs. AppCert DLLs are loaded by every process using the common API functions to create processes. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-registry-persistence-via-appinit-dll, Registry Persistence via AppInit DLL>> | AppInit DLLs are dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are loaded into every process that creates a user interface (loads user32.dll) on Microsoft Windows operating systems. The AppInit DLL mechanism is used to load custom code into user-mode processes, allowing for the customization of the user interface and the behavior of Windows-based applications. Attackers who add those DLLs to the registry locations can execute code with elevated privileges, similar to process injection, and provide a solid and constant persistence on the machine. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-of-a-hidden-local-user-account, Creation of a Hidden Local User Account>> | Identifies the creation of a hidden local user account by appending the dollar sign to the account name. This is sometimes done by attackers to increase access to a system and avoid appearing in the results of accounts listing using the net users command. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-image-file-execution-options-injection, Image File Execution Options Injection>> | The Debugger and SilentProcessExit registry keys can allow an adversary to intercept the execution of files, causing a different process to be executed. This functionality can be abused by an adversary to establish persistence. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-startup-shell-folder-modification, Suspicious Startup Shell Folder Modification>> | Identifies suspicious startup shell folder modifications to change the default Startup directory in order to bypass detections monitoring file creation in the Windows Startup folder. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-scheduled-job-creation, Persistence via Scheduled Job Creation>> | A job can be used to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-local-scheduled-task-creation, Local Scheduled Task Creation>> | Indicates the creation of a scheduled task. Adversaries can use these to establish persistence, move laterally, and/or escalate privileges. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-scheduled-task-created-by-a-windows-script, Scheduled Task Created by a Windows Script>> | A scheduled task was created by a Windows script via cscript.exe, wscript.exe or powershell.exe. This can be abused by an adversary to establish persistence. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-microsoft-office-addins, Persistence via Microsoft Office AddIns>> | Detects attempts to establish persistence on an endpoint by abusing Microsoft Office add-ins. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-microsoft-outlook-vba, Persistence via Microsoft Outlook VBA>> | Detects attempts to establish persistence on an endpoint by installing a rogue Microsoft Outlook VBA Template. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-krbtgt-delegation-backdoor, KRBTGT Delegation Backdoor>> | Identifies the modification of the msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo attribute to KRBTGT. Attackers can use this technique to maintain persistence to the domain by having the ability to request tickets for the KRBTGT service. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-new-activesyncalloweddeviceid-added-via-powershell, New ActiveSyncAllowedDeviceID Added via PowerShell>> | Identifies the use of the Exchange PowerShell cmdlet, Set-CASMailbox, to add a new ActiveSync allowed device. Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-powershell-profile, Persistence via PowerShell profile>> | Identifies the creation or modification of a PowerShell profile. PowerShell profile is a script that is executed when PowerShell starts to customize the user environment, which can be abused by attackers to persist in a environment where PowerShell is common. | update | 8 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-modification-of-accessibility-binaries, Potential Modification of Accessibility Binaries>> | Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in. An adversary can modify the way these programs are launched to get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uncommon-registry-persistence-change, Uncommon Registry Persistence Change>> | Detects changes to registry persistence keys that are not commonly used or modified by legitimate programs. This could be an indication of an adversary's attempt to persist in a stealthy manner. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-of-persistent-suspicious-program, Execution of Persistent Suspicious Program>> | Identifies execution of suspicious persistent programs (scripts, rundll32, etc.) by looking at process lineage and command line usage. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-adminsdholder-sdprop-exclusion-added, AdminSDHolder SDProp Exclusion Added>> | Identifies a modification on the dsHeuristics attribute on the bit that holds the configuration of groups excluded from the SDProp process. The SDProp compares the permissions on protected objects with those defined on the AdminSDHolder object. If the permissions on any of the protected accounts and groups do not match, the permissions on the protected accounts and groups are reset to match those of the domain's AdminSDHolder object, meaning that groups excluded will remain unchanged. Attackers can abuse this misconfiguration to maintain long-term access to privileged accounts in these groups. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-persistence-via-services-registry, Unusual Persistence via Services Registry>> | Identifies processes modifying the services registry key directly, instead of through the expected Windows APIs. This could be an indication of an adversary attempting to stealthily persist through abnormal service creation or modification of an existing service. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-startup-persistence-by-a-suspicious-process, Startup Persistence by a Suspicious Process>> | Identifies files written to or modified in the startup folder by commonly abused processes. Adversaries may use this technique to maintain persistence. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistent-scripts-in-the-startup-directory, Persistent Scripts in the Startup Directory>> | Identifies script engines creating files in the Startup folder, or the creation of script files in the Startup folder. Adversaries may abuse this technique to maintain persistence in an environment. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-component-object-model-hijacking, Component Object Model Hijacking>> | Identifies Component Object Model (COM) hijacking via registry modification. Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to COM objects. | update | 111 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-image-load-taskschd-dll-from-ms-office, Suspicious Image Load (taskschd.dll) from MS Office>> | Identifies a suspicious image load (taskschd.dll) from Microsoft Office processes. This behavior may indicate adversarial activity where a scheduled task is configured via Windows Component Object Model (COM). This technique can be used to configure persistence and evade monitoring by avoiding the usage of the traditional Windows binary (schtasks.exe) used to manage scheduled tasks. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-execution-via-scheduled-task, Suspicious Execution via Scheduled Task>> | Identifies execution of a suspicious program via scheduled tasks by looking at process lineage and command line usage. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-imagepath-service-creation, Suspicious ImagePath Service Creation>> | Identifies the creation of a suspicious ImagePath value. This could be an indication of an adversary attempting to stealthily persist or escalate privileges through abnormal service creation. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-wmi-event-subscription-created, Suspicious WMI Event Subscription Created>> | Detects the creation of a WMI Event Subscription. Attackers can abuse this mechanism for persistence or to elevate to SYSTEM privileges. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-persistence-via-time-provider-modification, Potential Persistence via Time Provider Modification>> | Identifies modification of the Time Provider. Adversaries may establish persistence by registering and enabling a malicious DLL as a time provider. Windows uses the time provider architecture to obtain accurate time stamps from other network devices or clients in the network. Time providers are implemented in the form of a DLL file which resides in the System32 folder. The service W32Time initiates during the startup of Windows and loads w32time.dll. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-user-added-to-privileged-group, User Added to Privileged Group>> | Identifies a user being added to a privileged group in Active Directory. Privileged accounts and groups in Active Directory are those to which powerful rights, privileges, and permissions are granted that allow them to perform nearly any action in Active Directory and on domain-joined systems. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-user-account-creation, User Account Creation>> | Identifies attempts to create new users. This is sometimes done by attackers to increase access or establish persistence on a system or domain. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-application-shimming-via-sdbinst, Potential Application Shimming via Sdbinst>> | The Application Shim was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating system codebase changes over time. This Windows functionality has been abused by attackers to stealthily gain persistence and arbitrary code execution in legitimate Windows processes. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-bits-job-notify-cmdline, Persistence via BITS Job Notify Cmdline>> | An adversary can use the Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) SetNotifyCmdLine method to execute a program that runs after a job finishes transferring data or after a job enters a specified state in order to persist on a system. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-hidden-run-key-detected, Persistence via Hidden Run Key Detected>> | Identifies a persistence mechanism that utilizes the NtSetValueKey native API to create a hidden (null terminated) registry key. An adversary may use this method to hide from system utilities such as the Registry Editor (regedit). | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-installation-of-security-support-provider, Installation of Security Support Provider>> | Identifies registry modifications related to the Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) configuration. Adversaries may abuse this to establish persistence in an environment. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-telemetrycontroller-scheduled-task-hijack, Persistence via TelemetryController Scheduled Task Hijack>> | Detects the successful hijack of Microsoft Compatibility Appraiser scheduled task to establish persistence with an integrity level of system. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-update-orchestrator-service-hijack, Persistence via Update Orchestrator Service Hijack>> | Identifies potential hijacking of the Microsoft Update Orchestrator Service to establish persistence with an integrity level of SYSTEM. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-wmi-event-subscription, Persistence via WMI Event Subscription>> | An adversary can use Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-persistence-via-wmi-standard-registry-provider, Persistence via WMI Standard Registry Provider>> | Identifies use of the Windows Management Instrumentation StdRegProv (registry provider) to modify commonly abused registry locations for persistence. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-execution-via-mssql-xp-cmdshell-stored-procedure, Execution via MSSQL xp_cmdshell Stored Procedure>> | Identifies execution via MSSQL xp_cmdshell stored procedure. Malicious users may attempt to elevate their privileges by using xp_cmdshell, which is disabled by default, thus, it's important to review the context of it's use. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-web-shell-detection-script-process-child-of-common-web-processes, Web Shell Detection: Script Process Child of Common Web Processes>> | Identifies suspicious commands executed via a web server, which may suggest a vulnerability and remote shell access. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-process-creation-via-secondary-logon, Process Creation via Secondary Logon>> | Identifies process creation with alternate credentials. Adversaries may create a new process with a different token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. | update | 9 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-modification-of-the-mspkiaccountcredentials, Modification of the msPKIAccountCredentials>> | Identify the modification of the msPKIAccountCredentials attribute in an Active Directory User Object. Attackers can abuse the credentials roaming feature to overwrite an arbitrary file for privilege escalation. ms-PKI-AccountCredentials contains binary large objects (BLOBs) of encrypted credential objects from the credential manager store, private keys, certificates, and certificate requests. | update | 9 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-disabling-user-account-control-via-registry-modification, Disabling User Account Control via Registry Modification>> | User Account Control (UAC) can help mitigate the impact of malware on Windows hosts. With UAC, apps and tasks always run in the security context of a non-administrator account, unless an administrator specifically authorizes administrator-level access to the system. This rule identifies registry value changes to bypass User Access Control (UAC) protection. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-creation-or-modification-of-a-new-gpo-scheduled-task-or-service, Creation or Modification of a new GPO Scheduled Task or Service>> | Detects the creation or modification of a new Group Policy based scheduled task or service. These methods are used for legitimate system administration, but can also be abused by an attacker with domain admin permissions to execute a malicious payload remotely on all or a subset of the domain joined machines. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-startup-logon-script-added-to-group-policy-object, Startup/Logon Script added to Group Policy Object>> | Detects the modification of Group Policy Objects (GPO) to add a startup/logon script to users or computer objects. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-group-policy-abuse-for-privilege-addition, Group Policy Abuse for Privilege Addition>> | Detects the first occurrence of a modification to Group Policy Object Attributes to add privileges to user accounts or use them to add users as local admins. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-scheduled-task-execution-at-scale-via-gpo, Scheduled Task Execution at Scale via GPO>> | Detects the modification of Group Policy Object attributes to execute a scheduled task in the objects controlled by the GPO. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privilege-escalation-via-installerfiletakeover, Potential Privilege Escalation via InstallerFileTakeOver>> | Identifies a potential exploitation of InstallerTakeOver (CVE-2021-41379) default PoC execution. Successful exploitation allows an unprivileged user to escalate privileges to SYSTEM. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-interactive-logon-by-an-unusual-process, Interactive Logon by an Unusual Process>> | Identifies interactive logon attempt with alternate credentials and by an unusual process. Adversaries may create a new token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. | update | 3 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-named-pipe-impersonation, Privilege Escalation via Named Pipe Impersonation>> | Identifies a privilege escalation attempt via named pipe impersonation. An adversary may abuse this technique by utilizing a framework such Metasploit's meterpreter getsystem command. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-dll-loaded-for-persistence-or-privilege-escalation, Suspicious DLL Loaded for Persistence or Privilege Escalation>> | Identifies the loading of a non Microsoft signed DLL that is missing on a default Windows install (phantom DLL) or one that can be loaded from a different location by a native Windows process. This may be abused to persist or elevate privileges via privileged file write vulnerabilities. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-powershell-script-with-token-impersonation-capabilities, PowerShell Script with Token Impersonation Capabilities>> | Detects scripts that contain PowerShell functions, structures, or Windows API functions related to token impersonation/theft. Attackers may duplicate then impersonate another user's token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. | update | 11 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-print-spooler-point-and-print-dll, Suspicious Print Spooler Point and Print DLL>> | Detects attempts to exploit a privilege escalation vulnerability (CVE-2020-1030) related to the print spooler service. Exploitation involves chaining multiple primitives to load an arbitrary DLL into the print spooler process running as SYSTEM. | update | 105 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-printspooler-service-executable-file-creation, Suspicious PrintSpooler Service Executable File Creation>> | Detects attempts to exploit privilege escalation vulnerabilities related to the Print Spooler service. For more information refer to the following CVE's - CVE-2020-1048, CVE-2020-1337 and CVE-2020-1300 and verify that the impacted system is patched. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-print-spooler-file-deletion, Suspicious Print Spooler File Deletion>> | Detects deletion of print driver files by an unusual process. This may indicate a clean up attempt post successful privilege escalation via Print Spooler service related vulnerabilities. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-suspicious-print-spooler-spl-file-created, Suspicious Print Spooler SPL File Created>> | Detects attempts to exploit privilege escalation vulnerabilities related to the Print Spooler service including CVE-2020-1048 and CVE-2020-1337. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-windir-environment-variable, Privilege Escalation via Windir Environment Variable>> | Identifies a privilege escalation attempt via a rogue Windows directory (Windir) environment variable. This is a known primitive that is often combined with other vulnerabilities to elevate privileges. | update | 105 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-privileged-escalation-via-samaccountname-spoofing, Potential Privileged Escalation via SamAccountName Spoofing>> | Identifies a suspicious computer account name rename event, which may indicate an attempt to exploit CVE-2021-42278 to elevate privileges from a standard domain user to a user with domain admin privileges. CVE-2021-42278 is a security vulnerability that allows potential attackers to impersonate a domain controller via samAccountName attribute spoofing. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-sedebugprivilege-enabled-by-a-suspicious-process, SeDebugPrivilege Enabled by a Suspicious Process>> | Identifies the creation of a process running as SYSTEM and impersonating a Windows core binary privileges. Adversaries may create a new process with a different token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. | update | 7 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uac-bypass-attempt-with-ieditionupgrademanager-elevated-com-interface, UAC Bypass Attempt with IEditionUpgradeManager Elevated COM Interface>> | Identifies attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) by abusing an elevated COM Interface to launch a rogue Windows ClipUp program. Attackers may attempt to bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uac-bypass-attempt-via-elevated-com-internet-explorer-add-on-installer, UAC Bypass Attempt via Elevated COM Internet Explorer Add-On Installer>> | Identifies User Account Control (UAC) bypass attempts by abusing an elevated COM Interface to launch a malicious program. Attackers may attempt to bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uac-bypass-via-icmluautil-elevated-com-interface, UAC Bypass via ICMLuaUtil Elevated COM Interface>> | Identifies User Account Control (UAC) bypass attempts via the ICMLuaUtil Elevated COM interface. Attackers may attempt to bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uac-bypass-via-diskcleanup-scheduled-task-hijack, UAC Bypass via DiskCleanup Scheduled Task Hijack>> | Identifies User Account Control (UAC) bypass via hijacking DiskCleanup Scheduled Task. Attackers bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uac-bypass-attempt-via-privileged-ifileoperation-com-interface, UAC Bypass Attempt via Privileged IFileOperation COM Interface>> | Identifies attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) via DLL side-loading. Attackers may attempt to bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-bypass-uac-via-event-viewer, Bypass UAC via Event Viewer>> | Identifies User Account Control (UAC) bypass via eventvwr.exe. Attackers bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions. | update | 111 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uac-bypass-attempt-via-windows-directory-masquerading, UAC Bypass Attempt via Windows Directory Masquerading>> | Identifies an attempt to bypass User Account Control (UAC) by masquerading as a Microsoft trusted Windows directory. Attackers may bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions. | update | 111 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-uac-bypass-via-windows-firewall-snap-in-hijack, UAC Bypass via Windows Firewall Snap-In Hijack>> | Identifies attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) by hijacking the Microsoft Management Console (MMC) Windows Firewall snap-in. Attackers bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-parent-child-relationship, Unusual Parent-Child Relationship>> | Identifies Windows programs run from unexpected parent processes. This could indicate masquerading or other strange activity on a system. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-print-spooler-child-process, Unusual Print Spooler Child Process>> | Detects unusual Print Spooler service (spoolsv.exe) child processes. This may indicate an attempt to exploit privilege escalation vulnerabilities related to the Printing Service on Windows. | update | 107 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-service-host-child-process-childless-service, Unusual Service Host Child Process - Childless Service>> | Identifies unusual child processes of Service Host (svchost.exe) that traditionally do not spawn any child processes. This may indicate a code injection or an equivalent form of exploitation. | update | 109 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-rogue-named-pipe-impersonation, Privilege Escalation via Rogue Named Pipe Impersonation>> | Identifies a privilege escalation attempt via rogue named pipe impersonation. An adversary may abuse this technique by masquerading as a known named pipe and manipulating a privileged process to connect to it. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-service-installed-via-an-unusual-client, Windows Service Installed via an Unusual Client>> | Identifies the creation of a Windows service by an unusual client process. Services may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to SYSTEM. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-reverse-connection-through-port-knocking, Potential Linux Reverse Connection through Port Knocking>> | Monitors for a sequence of network activity on atypical ports, prior to receiving a single packet on such a non-standard port, which potentially indicates signal port knocking activity. Port knocking is a covert method of externally opening ports by sending a sequence of packets to previously closed ports, which adversaries may leverage to discreetly gain access without directly alerting traditional monitoring systems. | deprecated | 2 
+
+|==============================================
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/prebuilt-rules-downloadable-updates.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/prebuilt-rules-downloadable-updates.asciidoc
index bac12f37a1..b72698b065 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/prebuilt-rules-downloadable-updates.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/prebuilt-rules-downloadable-updates.asciidoc
@@ -13,6 +13,10 @@ For previous rule updates, please navigate to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/e
 |Update version |Date | New rules | Updated rules | Notes
 
 
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-prebuilt-rules-8-11-11-summary, 8.11.11>> | 25 Mar 2024 | 5 | 549 | 
+Adding Release Notes to 8.11.11
+
+
 |<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-10-prebuilt-rules-8-11-10-summary, 8.11.10>> | 07 Mar 2024 | 9 | 7 | 
  This release includes significant rule tuning for Linux rules for better rule efficacy and performance.
 
@@ -88,3 +92,4 @@ include::downloadable-packages/8-11-7/prebuilt-rules-8-11-7-summary.asciidoc[lev
 include::downloadable-packages/8-11-8/prebuilt-rules-8-11-8-summary.asciidoc[leveloffset=+1]
 include::downloadable-packages/8-11-9/prebuilt-rules-8-11-9-summary.asciidoc[leveloffset=+1]
 include::downloadable-packages/8-11-10/prebuilt-rules-8-11-10-summary.asciidoc[leveloffset=+1]
+include::downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rules-8-11-11-summary.asciidoc[leveloffset=+1]
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/prebuilt-rules-reference.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/prebuilt-rules-reference.asciidoc
index 22dadedd1f..f92e4edbaf 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/prebuilt-rules-reference.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/prebuilt-rules-reference.asciidoc
@@ -106,9 +106,9 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<aws-route-53-domain-transferred-to-another-account, AWS Route 53 Domain Transferred to Another Account>> |Identifies when a request has been made to transfer a Route 53 domain to another AWS account. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Asset Visibility], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.9.0 |205
 
-|<<aws-route-table-created, AWS Route Table Created>> |Identifies when an AWS Route Table has been created. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Network Security Monitoring], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.9.0 |205
+|<<aws-route-table-created, AWS Route Table Created>> |Identifies when an AWS Route Table has been created. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Network Security Monitoring], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.9.0 |206
 
-|<<aws-route-table-modified-or-deleted, AWS Route Table Modified or Deleted>> |Identifies when an AWS Route Table has been modified or deleted. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Network Security Monitoring], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.9.0 |205
+|<<aws-route-table-modified-or-deleted, AWS Route Table Modified or Deleted>> |Identifies when an AWS Route Table has been modified or deleted. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Network Security Monitoring], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.9.0 |206
 
 |<<aws-route53-private-hosted-zone-associated-with-a-vpc, AWS Route53 private hosted zone associated with a VPC>> |Identifies when a Route53 private hosted zone has been associated with VPC. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Asset Visibility], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.9.0 |205
 
@@ -134,35 +134,35 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<accepted-default-telnet-port-connection, Accepted Default Telnet Port Connection>> |This rule detects network events that may indicate the use of Telnet traffic. Telnet is commonly used by system administrators to remotely control older or embedded systems using the command line shell. It should almost never be directly exposed to the Internet, as it is frequently targeted and exploited by threat actors as an initial access or backdoor vector. As a plain-text protocol, it may also expose usernames and passwords to anyone capable of observing the traffic. |[Domain: Endpoint], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Tactic: Initial Access] |8.3.0 |104
 
-|<<access-of-stored-browser-credentials, Access of Stored Browser Credentials>> |Identifies the execution of a process with arguments pointing to known browser files that store passwords and cookies. Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<access-of-stored-browser-credentials, Access of Stored Browser Credentials>> |Identifies the execution of a process with arguments pointing to known browser files that store passwords and cookies. Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<access-to-keychain-credentials-directories, Access to Keychain Credentials Directories>> |Adversaries may collect the keychain storage data from a system to acquire credentials. Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features such as WiFi passwords, websites, secure notes and certificates. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<access-to-keychain-credentials-directories, Access to Keychain Credentials Directories>> |Adversaries may collect the keychain storage data from a system to acquire credentials. Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features such as WiFi passwords, websites, secure notes and certificates. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<access-to-a-sensitive-ldap-attribute, Access to a Sensitive LDAP Attribute>> |Identify access to sensitive Active Directory object attributes that contains credentials and decryption keys such as unixUserPassword, ms-PKI-AccountCredentials and msPKI-CredentialRoamingTokens. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring], [Data Source: Active Directory] |8.3.0 |9
+|<<access-to-a-sensitive-ldap-attribute, Access to a Sensitive LDAP Attribute>> |Identify access to sensitive Active Directory object attributes that contains credentials and decryption keys such as unixUserPassword, ms-PKI-AccountCredentials and msPKI-CredentialRoamingTokens. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring], [Data Source: Active Directory] |8.3.0 |10
 
 |<<accessing-outlook-data-files, Accessing Outlook Data Files>> |Identifies commands containing references to Outlook data files extensions, which can potentially indicate the search, access, or modification of these files. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Collection], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |1
 
 |<<account-configured-with-never-expiring-password, Account Configured with Never-Expiring Password>> |Detects the creation and modification of an account with the "Don't Expire Password" option Enabled. Attackers can abuse this misconfiguration to persist in the domain and maintain long-term access using compromised accounts with this property. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Active Directory], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<account-discovery-command-via-system-account, Account Discovery Command via SYSTEM Account>> |Identifies when the SYSTEM account uses an account discovery utility. This could be a sign of discovery activity after an adversary has achieved privilege escalation. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<account-discovery-command-via-system-account, Account Discovery Command via SYSTEM Account>> |Identifies when the SYSTEM account uses an account discovery utility. This could be a sign of discovery activity after an adversary has achieved privilege escalation. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |110
 
-|<<account-password-reset-remotely, Account Password Reset Remotely>> |Identifies an attempt to reset a potentially privileged account password remotely. Adversaries may manipulate account passwords to maintain access or evade password duration policies and preserve compromised credentials. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Impact] |8.3.0 |110
+|<<account-password-reset-remotely, Account Password Reset Remotely>> |Identifies an attempt to reset a potentially privileged account password remotely. Adversaries may manipulate account passwords to maintain access or evade password duration policies and preserve compromised credentials. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Impact] |8.3.0 |112
 
 |<<account-or-group-discovery-via-built-in-tools, Account or Group Discovery via Built-In Tools>> |Adversaries may use built-in applications to get a listing of local system or domain accounts and groups. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.3.0 |3
 
-|<<adfind-command-activity, AdFind Command Activity>> |This rule detects the Active Directory query tool, AdFind.exe. AdFind has legitimate purposes, but it is frequently leveraged by threat actors to perform post-exploitation Active Directory reconnaissance. The AdFind tool has been observed in Trickbot, Ryuk, Maze, and FIN6 campaigns. For Winlogbeat, this rule requires Sysmon. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<adfind-command-activity, AdFind Command Activity>> |This rule detects the Active Directory query tool, AdFind.exe. AdFind has legitimate purposes, but it is frequently leveraged by threat actors to perform post-exploitation Active Directory reconnaissance. The AdFind tool has been observed in Trickbot, Ryuk, Maze, and FIN6 campaigns. For Winlogbeat, this rule requires Sysmon. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
 
 |<<adding-hidden-file-attribute-via-attrib, Adding Hidden File Attribute via Attrib>> |Adversaries can add the 'hidden' attribute to files to hide them from the user in an attempt to evade detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
 
 |<<adminsdholder-backdoor, AdminSDHolder Backdoor>> |Detects modifications in the AdminSDHolder object. Attackers can abuse the SDProp process to implement a persistent backdoor in Active Directory. SDProp compares the permissions on protected objects with those defined on the AdminSDHolder object. If the permissions on any of the protected accounts and groups do not match, the permissions on the protected accounts and groups are reset to match those of the domain's AdminSDHolder object, regaining their Administrative Privileges. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring], [Data Source: Active Directory] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<adminsdholder-sdprop-exclusion-added, AdminSDHolder SDProp Exclusion Added>> |Identifies a modification on the dsHeuristics attribute on the bit that holds the configuration of groups excluded from the SDProp process. The SDProp compares the permissions on protected objects with those defined on the AdminSDHolder object. If the permissions on any of the protected accounts and groups do not match, the permissions on the protected accounts and groups are reset to match those of the domain's AdminSDHolder object, meaning that groups excluded will remain unchanged. Attackers can abuse this misconfiguration to maintain long-term access to privileged accounts in these groups. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Active Directory], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<adminsdholder-sdprop-exclusion-added, AdminSDHolder SDProp Exclusion Added>> |Identifies a modification on the dsHeuristics attribute on the bit that holds the configuration of groups excluded from the SDProp process. The SDProp compares the permissions on protected objects with those defined on the AdminSDHolder object. If the permissions on any of the protected accounts and groups do not match, the permissions on the protected accounts and groups are reset to match those of the domain's AdminSDHolder object, meaning that groups excluded will remain unchanged. Attackers can abuse this misconfiguration to maintain long-term access to privileged accounts in these groups. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Active Directory], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring] |8.3.0 |110
 
 |<<administrator-privileges-assigned-to-an-okta-group, Administrator Privileges Assigned to an Okta Group>> |Detects when an administrator role is assigned to an Okta group. An adversary may attempt to assign administrator privileges to an Okta group in order to assign additional permissions to compromised user accounts and maintain access to their target organization. |[Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Data Source: Okta], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.10.0 |205
 
 |<<administrator-role-assigned-to-an-okta-user, Administrator Role Assigned to an Okta User>> |Identifies when an administrator role is assigned to an Okta user. An adversary may attempt to assign an administrator role to an Okta user in order to assign additional permissions to a user account and maintain access to their target's environment. |[Data Source: Okta], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.10.0 |205
 
-|<<adobe-hijack-persistence, Adobe Hijack Persistence>> |Detects writing executable files that will be automatically launched by Adobe on launch. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<adobe-hijack-persistence, Adobe Hijack Persistence>> |Detects writing executable files that will be automatically launched by Adobe on launch. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |110
 
 |<<adversary-behavior-detected-elastic-endgame, Adversary Behavior - Detected - Elastic Endgame>> |Elastic Endgame detected an Adversary Behavior. Click the Elastic Endgame icon in the event.module column or the link in the rule.reference column for additional information. |[Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |8.3.0 |103
 
@@ -178,9 +178,9 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<anomalous-windows-process-creation, Anomalous Windows Process Creation>> |Identifies unusual parent-child process relationships that can indicate malware execution or persistence mechanisms. Malicious scripts often call on other applications and processes as part of their exploit payload. For example, when a malicious Office document runs scripts as part of an exploit payload, Excel or Word may start a script interpreter process, which, in turn, runs a script that downloads and executes malware. Another common scenario is Outlook running an unusual process when malware is downloaded in an email. Monitoring and identifying anomalous process relationships is a method of detecting new and emerging malware that is not yet recognized by anti-virus scanners. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Persistence], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.3.0 |105
 
-|<<apple-script-execution-followed-by-network-connection, Apple Script Execution followed by Network Connection>> |Detects execution via the Apple script interpreter (osascript) followed by a network connection from the same process within a short time period. Adversaries may use malicious scripts for execution and command and control. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<apple-script-execution-followed-by-network-connection, Apple Script Execution followed by Network Connection>> |Detects execution via the Apple script interpreter (osascript) followed by a network connection from the same process within a short time period. Adversaries may use malicious scripts for execution and command and control. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<apple-scripting-execution-with-administrator-privileges, Apple Scripting Execution with Administrator Privileges>> |Identifies execution of the Apple script interpreter (osascript) without a password prompt and with administrator privileges. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<apple-scripting-execution-with-administrator-privileges, Apple Scripting Execution with Administrator Privileges>> |Identifies execution of the Apple script interpreter (osascript) without a password prompt and with administrator privileges. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
 
 |<<application-added-to-google-workspace-domain, Application Added to Google Workspace Domain>> |Detects when a Google marketplace application is added to the Google Workspace domain. An adversary may add a malicious application to an organization’s Google Workspace domain in order to maintain a presence in their target’s organization and steal data. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Google Workspace], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Persistence], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.4.0 |205
 
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<at-exe-command-lateral-movement, At.exe Command Lateral Movement>> |Identifies use of at.exe to interact with the task scheduler on remote hosts. Remote task creations, modifications or execution could be indicative of adversary lateral movement. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |2
 
-|<<attempt-to-clear-kernel-ring-buffer, Attempt to Clear Kernel Ring Buffer>> |Monitors for the deletion of the kernel ring buffer events through dmesg. Attackers may clear kernel ring buffer events to evade detection after installing a Linux kernel module (LKM). |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.3.0 |3
+|<<attempt-to-clear-kernel-ring-buffer, Attempt to Clear Kernel Ring Buffer>> |Monitors for the deletion of the kernel ring buffer events through dmesg. Attackers may clear kernel ring buffer events to evade detection after installing a Linux kernel module (LKM). |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.3.0 |4
 
 |<<attempt-to-create-okta-api-token, Attempt to Create Okta API Token>> |Detects attempts to create an Okta API token. An adversary may create an Okta API token to maintain access to an organization's network while they work to achieve their objectives. An attacker may abuse an API token to execute techniques such as creating user accounts or disabling security rules or policies. |[Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Data Source: Okta], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.10.0 |205
 
@@ -210,17 +210,17 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<attempt-to-delete-an-okta-policy-rule, Attempt to Delete an Okta Policy Rule>> |Detects attempts to delete a rule within an Okta policy. An adversary may attempt to delete an Okta policy rule in order to weaken an organization's security controls. |[Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Data Source: Okta], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.10.0 |206
 
-|<<attempt-to-disable-gatekeeper, Attempt to Disable Gatekeeper>> |Detects attempts to disable Gatekeeper on macOS. Gatekeeper is a security feature that's designed to ensure that only trusted software is run. Adversaries may attempt to disable Gatekeeper before executing malicious code. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<attempt-to-disable-gatekeeper, Attempt to Disable Gatekeeper>> |Detects attempts to disable Gatekeeper on macOS. Gatekeeper is a security feature that's designed to ensure that only trusted software is run. Adversaries may attempt to disable Gatekeeper before executing malicious code. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<attempt-to-disable-iptables-or-firewall, Attempt to Disable IPTables or Firewall>> |Adversaries may attempt to disable the iptables or firewall service in an attempt to affect how a host is allowed to receive or send network traffic. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |8.3.0 |6
+|<<attempt-to-disable-iptables-or-firewall, Attempt to Disable IPTables or Firewall>> |Adversaries may attempt to disable the iptables or firewall service in an attempt to affect how a host is allowed to receive or send network traffic. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |8.3.0 |7
 
-|<<attempt-to-disable-syslog-service, Attempt to Disable Syslog Service>> |Adversaries may attempt to disable the syslog service in an attempt to an attempt to disrupt event logging and evade detection by security controls. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<attempt-to-disable-syslog-service, Attempt to Disable Syslog Service>> |Adversaries may attempt to disable the syslog service in an attempt to an attempt to disrupt event logging and evade detection by security controls. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
 
-|<<attempt-to-enable-the-root-account, Attempt to Enable the Root Account>> |Identifies attempts to enable the root account using the dsenableroot command. This command may be abused by adversaries for persistence, as the root account is disabled by default. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<attempt-to-enable-the-root-account, Attempt to Enable the Root Account>> |Identifies attempts to enable the root account using the dsenableroot command. This command may be abused by adversaries for persistence, as the root account is disabled by default. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
 |<<attempt-to-install-kali-linux-via-wsl, Attempt to Install Kali Linux via WSL>> |Detects attempts to install or use Kali Linux via Windows Subsystem for Linux. Adversaries may enable and use WSL for Linux to avoid detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |6
 
-|<<attempt-to-install-root-certificate, Attempt to Install Root Certificate>> |Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to their command and control servers. Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<attempt-to-install-root-certificate, Attempt to Install Root Certificate>> |Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to their command and control servers. Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
 |<<attempt-to-modify-an-okta-application, Attempt to Modify an Okta Application>> |Detects attempts to modify an Okta application. An adversary may attempt to modify, deactivate, or delete an Okta application in order to weaken an organization's security controls or disrupt their business operations. |[Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Data Source: Okta], [Tactic: Impact] |8.10.0 |205
 
@@ -230,25 +230,25 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<attempt-to-modify-an-okta-policy-rule, Attempt to Modify an Okta Policy Rule>> |Detects attempts to modify a rule within an Okta policy. An adversary may attempt to modify an Okta policy rule in order to weaken an organization's security controls. |[Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Okta] |8.10.0 |207
 
-|<<attempt-to-mount-smb-share-via-command-line, Attempt to Mount SMB Share via Command Line>> |Identifies the execution of macOS built-in commands to mount a Server Message Block (SMB) network share. Adversaries may use valid accounts to interact with a remote network share using SMB. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<attempt-to-mount-smb-share-via-command-line, Attempt to Mount SMB Share via Command Line>> |Identifies the execution of macOS built-in commands to mount a Server Message Block (SMB) network share. Adversaries may use valid accounts to interact with a remote network share using SMB. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<attempt-to-remove-file-quarantine-attribute, Attempt to Remove File Quarantine Attribute>> |Identifies a potential Gatekeeper bypass. In macOS, when applications or programs are downloaded from the internet, there is a quarantine flag set on the file. This attribute is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program at execution time. An adversary may disable this attribute to evade defenses. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<attempt-to-remove-file-quarantine-attribute, Attempt to Remove File Quarantine Attribute>> |Identifies a potential Gatekeeper bypass. In macOS, when applications or programs are downloaded from the internet, there is a quarantine flag set on the file. This attribute is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program at execution time. An adversary may disable this attribute to evade defenses. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
 
 |<<attempt-to-reset-mfa-factors-for-an-okta-user-account, Attempt to Reset MFA Factors for an Okta User Account>> |Detects attempts to reset an Okta user's enrolled multi-factor authentication (MFA) factors. An adversary may attempt to reset the MFA factors for an Okta user's account in order to register new MFA factors and abuse the account to blend in with normal activity in the victim's environment. |[Tactic: Persistence], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Data Source: Okta] |8.10.0 |206
 
 |<<attempt-to-revoke-okta-api-token, Attempt to Revoke Okta API Token>> |Identifies attempts to revoke an Okta API token. An adversary may attempt to revoke or delete an Okta API token to disrupt an organization's business operations. |[Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Data Source: Okta], [Tactic: Impact] |8.10.0 |206
 
-|<<attempt-to-unload-elastic-endpoint-security-kernel-extension, Attempt to Unload Elastic Endpoint Security Kernel Extension>> |Identifies attempts to unload the Elastic Endpoint Security kernel extension via the kextunload command. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<attempt-to-unload-elastic-endpoint-security-kernel-extension, Attempt to Unload Elastic Endpoint Security Kernel Extension>> |Identifies attempts to unload the Elastic Endpoint Security kernel extension via the kextunload command. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
 |<<attempted-bypass-of-okta-mfa, Attempted Bypass of Okta MFA>> |Detects attempts to bypass Okta multi-factor authentication (MFA). An adversary may attempt to bypass the Okta MFA policies configured for an organization in order to obtain unauthorized access to an application. |[Data Source: Okta], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Credential Access] |8.10.0 |207
 
 |<<attempted-private-key-access, Attempted Private Key Access>> |Attackers may try to access private keys, e.g. ssh, in order to gain further authenticated access to the environment. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |2
 
-|<<attempts-to-brute-force-a-microsoft-365-user-account, Attempts to Brute Force a Microsoft 365 User Account>> |Identifies attempts to brute force a Microsoft 365 user account. An adversary may attempt a brute force attack to obtain unauthorized access to user accounts. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Credential Access] |8.3.0 |104
+|<<attempts-to-brute-force-a-microsoft-365-user-account, Attempts to Brute Force a Microsoft 365 User Account>> |Identifies attempts to brute force a Microsoft 365 user account. An adversary may attempt a brute force attack to obtain unauthorized access to user accounts. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Credential Access] |8.3.0 |106
 
 |<<attempts-to-brute-force-an-okta-user-account, Attempts to Brute Force an Okta User Account>> |Identifies when an Okta user account is locked out 3 times within a 3 hour window. An adversary may attempt a brute force or password spraying attack to obtain unauthorized access to user accounts. The default Okta authentication policy ensures that a user account is locked out after 10 failed authentication attempts. |[Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Okta] |8.10.0 |208
 
-|<<authorization-plugin-modification, Authorization Plugin Modification>> |Authorization plugins are used to extend the authorization services API and implement mechanisms that are not natively supported by the OS, such as multi-factor authentication with third party software. Adversaries may abuse this feature to persist and/or collect clear text credentials as they traverse the registered plugins during user logon. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<authorization-plugin-modification, Authorization Plugin Modification>> |Authorization plugins are used to extend the authorization services API and implement mechanisms that are not natively supported by the OS, such as multi-factor authentication with third party software. Adversaries may abuse this feature to persist and/or collect clear text credentials as they traverse the registered plugins during user logon. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
 |<<azure-ad-global-administrator-role-assigned, Azure AD Global Administrator Role Assigned>> |In Azure Active Directory (Azure AD), permissions to manage resources are assigned using roles. The Global Administrator is a role that enables users to have access to all administrative features in Azure AD and services that use Azure AD identities like the Microsoft 365 Defender portal, the Microsoft 365 compliance center, Exchange, SharePoint Online, and Skype for Business Online. Attackers can add users as Global Administrators to maintain access and manage all subscriptions and their settings and resources. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Azure], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.3.0 |102
 
@@ -318,47 +318,47 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<bpf-filter-applied-using-tc, BPF filter applied using TC>> |Detects when the tc (transmission control) binary is utilized to set a BPF (Berkeley Packet Filter) on a network interface. Tc is used to configure Traffic Control in the Linux kernel. It can shape, schedule, police and drop traffic. A threat actor can utilize tc to set a bpf filter on an interface for the purpose of manipulating the incoming traffic. This technique is not at all common and should indicate abnormal, suspicious or malicious activity. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Threat: TripleCross], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<base16-or-base32-encoding-decoding-activity, Base16 or Base32 Encoding/Decoding Activity>> |Adversaries may encode/decode data in an attempt to evade detection by host- or network-based security controls. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<base16-or-base32-encoding-decoding-activity, Base16 or Base32 Encoding/Decoding Activity>> |Adversaries may encode/decode data in an attempt to evade detection by host- or network-based security controls. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.3.0 |110
 
 |<<bash-shell-profile-modification, Bash Shell Profile Modification>> |Both ~/.bash_profile and ~/.bashrc are files containing shell commands that are run when Bash is invoked. These files are executed in a user's context, either interactively or non-interactively, when a user logs in so that their environment is set correctly. Adversaries may abuse this to establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by a user’s shell. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |104
 
 |<<binary-content-copy-via-cmd-exe, Binary Content Copy via Cmd.exe>> |Attackers may abuse cmd.exe commands to reassemble binary fragments into a malicious payload. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |2
 
-|<<binary-executed-from-shared-memory-directory, Binary Executed from Shared Memory Directory>> |Identifies the execution of a binary by root in Linux shared memory directories: (/dev/shm/, /run/shm/, /var/run/, /var/lock/). This activity is to be considered highly abnormal and should be investigated. Threat actors have placed executables used for persistence on high-uptime servers in these directories as system backdoors. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Threat: BPFDoor], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<binary-executed-from-shared-memory-directory, Binary Executed from Shared Memory Directory>> |Identifies the execution of a binary by root in Linux shared memory directories: (/dev/shm/, /run/shm/, /var/run/, /var/lock/). This activity is to be considered highly abnormal and should be investigated. Threat actors have placed executables used for persistence on high-uptime servers in these directories as system backdoors. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Threat: BPFDoor], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
 
 |<<bitsadmin-activity, Bitsadmin Activity>> |Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism. Adversaries may abuse BITS to persist, download, execute, and even clean up after running malicious code. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |1
 
 |<<browser-extension-install, Browser Extension Install>> |Identifies the install of browser extensions. Malicious browser extensions can be installed via app store downloads masquerading as legitimate extensions, social engineering, or by an adversary that has already compromised a system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |1
 
-|<<bypass-uac-via-event-viewer, Bypass UAC via Event Viewer>> |Identifies User Account Control (UAC) bypass via eventvwr.exe. Attackers bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
+|<<bypass-uac-via-event-viewer, Bypass UAC via Event Viewer>> |Identifies User Account Control (UAC) bypass via eventvwr.exe. Attackers bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |111
 
-|<<cap-sys-admin-assigned-to-binary, CAP_SYS_ADMIN Assigned to Binary>> |Identifies instances where a binary is granted the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability. In Linux, the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability is a powerful and broad capability that allows a process to perform a range of system administration operations, such as mounting and unmounting filesystems, configuring network interfaces, and accessing hardware devices. Attackers may leverage a misconfiguration for exploitation in order to escalate their privileges to root. The rule identifies previously unknown processes executing with CAP_SYS_ADMIN capabilities through the use of the new terms rule type. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.11.0 |1
+|<<cap-sys-admin-assigned-to-binary, CAP_SYS_ADMIN Assigned to Binary>> |Identifies instances where a binary is granted the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability. In Linux, the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability is a powerful and broad capability that allows a process to perform a range of system administration operations, such as mounting and unmounting filesystems, configuring network interfaces, and accessing hardware devices. Attackers may leverage a misconfiguration for exploitation in order to escalate their privileges to root. The rule identifies previously unknown processes executing with CAP_SYS_ADMIN capabilities through the use of the new terms rule type. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.11.0 |2
 
-|<<chkconfig-service-add, Chkconfig Service Add>> |Detects the use of the chkconfig binary to manually add a service for management by chkconfig. Threat actors may utilize this technique to maintain persistence on a system. When a new service is added, chkconfig ensures that the service has either a start or a kill entry in every runlevel and when the system is rebooted the service file added will run providing long-term persistence. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Threat: Lightning Framework], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
+|<<chkconfig-service-add, Chkconfig Service Add>> |Detects the use of the chkconfig binary to manually add a service for management by chkconfig. Threat actors may utilize this technique to maintain persistence on a system. When a new service is added, chkconfig ensures that the service has either a start or a kill entry in every runlevel and when the system is rebooted the service file added will run providing long-term persistence. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Threat: Lightning Framework], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |111
 
-|<<clearing-windows-console-history, Clearing Windows Console History>> |Identifies when a user attempts to clear console history. An adversary may clear the command history of a compromised account to conceal the actions undertaken during an intrusion. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<clearing-windows-console-history, Clearing Windows Console History>> |Identifies when a user attempts to clear console history. An adversary may clear the command history of a compromised account to conceal the actions undertaken during an intrusion. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
 
-|<<clearing-windows-event-logs, Clearing Windows Event Logs>> |Identifies attempts to clear or disable Windows event log stores using Windows wevetutil command. This is often done by attackers in an attempt to evade detection or destroy forensic evidence on a system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
+|<<clearing-windows-event-logs, Clearing Windows Event Logs>> |Identifies attempts to clear or disable Windows event log stores using Windows wevetutil command. This is often done by attackers in an attempt to evade detection or destroy forensic evidence on a system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |111
 
 |<<cobalt-strike-command-and-control-beacon, Cobalt Strike Command and Control Beacon>> |Cobalt Strike is a threat emulation platform commonly modified and used by adversaries to conduct network attack and exploitation campaigns. This rule detects a network activity algorithm leveraged by Cobalt Strike implant beacons for command and control. |[Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Domain: Endpoint] |8.3.0 |105
 
 |<<code-signing-policy-modification-through-built-in-tools, Code Signing Policy Modification Through Built-in tools>> |Identifies attempts to disable/modify the code signing policy through system native utilities. Code signing provides authenticity on a program, and grants the user with the ability to check whether the program has been tampered with. By allowing the execution of unsigned or self-signed code, threat actors can craft and execute malicious code. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |6
 
-|<<code-signing-policy-modification-through-registry, Code Signing Policy Modification Through Registry>> |Identifies attempts to disable the code signing policy through the registry. Code signing provides authenticity on a program, and grants the user with the ability to check whether the program has been tampered with. By allowing the execution of unsigned or self-signed code, threat actors can craft and execute malicious code. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |7
+|<<code-signing-policy-modification-through-registry, Code Signing Policy Modification Through Registry>> |Identifies attempts to disable the code signing policy through the registry. Code signing provides authenticity on a program, and grants the user with the ability to check whether the program has been tampered with. By allowing the execution of unsigned or self-signed code, threat actors can craft and execute malicious code. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |8
 
-|<<command-execution-via-solarwinds-process, Command Execution via SolarWinds Process>> |A suspicious SolarWinds child process (Cmd.exe or Powershell.exe) was detected. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<command-execution-via-solarwinds-process, Command Execution via SolarWinds Process>> |A suspicious SolarWinds child process (Cmd.exe or Powershell.exe) was detected. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
 
-|<<command-prompt-network-connection, Command Prompt Network Connection>> |Identifies cmd.exe making a network connection. Adversaries could abuse cmd.exe to download or execute malware from a remote URL. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<command-prompt-network-connection, Command Prompt Network Connection>> |Identifies cmd.exe making a network connection. Adversaries could abuse cmd.exe to download or execute malware from a remote URL. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<command-shell-activity-started-via-rundll32, Command Shell Activity Started via RunDLL32>> |Identifies command shell activity started via RunDLL32, which is commonly abused by attackers to host malicious code. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<command-shell-activity-started-via-rundll32, Command Shell Activity Started via RunDLL32>> |Identifies command shell activity started via RunDLL32, which is commonly abused by attackers to host malicious code. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |109
 
-|<<component-object-model-hijacking, Component Object Model Hijacking>> |Identifies Component Object Model (COM) hijacking via registry modification. Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to COM objects. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
+|<<component-object-model-hijacking, Component Object Model Hijacking>> |Identifies Component Object Model (COM) hijacking via registry modification. Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to COM objects. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |111
 
 |<<compression-dll-loaded-by-unusual-process, Compression DLL Loaded by Unusual Process>> |Identifies the image load of a compression DLL. Adversaries will often compress and encrypt data in preparation for exfiltration. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Collection], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |2
 
-|<<conhost-spawned-by-suspicious-parent-process, Conhost Spawned By Suspicious Parent Process>> |Detects when the Console Window Host (conhost.exe) process is spawned by a suspicious parent process, which could be indicative of code injection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<conhost-spawned-by-suspicious-parent-process, Conhost Spawned By Suspicious Parent Process>> |Detects when the Console Window Host (conhost.exe) process is spawned by a suspicious parent process, which could be indicative of code injection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |109
 
-|<<connection-to-commonly-abused-free-ssl-certificate-providers, Connection to Commonly Abused Free SSL Certificate Providers>> |Identifies unusual processes connecting to domains using known free SSL certificates. Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<connection-to-commonly-abused-free-ssl-certificate-providers, Connection to Commonly Abused Free SSL Certificate Providers>> |Identifies unusual processes connecting to domains using known free SSL certificates. Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |106
 
 |<<connection-to-commonly-abused-web-services, Connection to Commonly Abused Web Services>> |Adversaries may implement command and control (C2) communications that use common web services to hide their activity. This attack technique is typically targeted at an organization and uses web services common to the victim network, which allows the adversary to blend into legitimate traffic activity. These popular services are typically targeted since they have most likely been used before compromise, which helps malicious traffic blend in. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
 
@@ -370,29 +370,29 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<container-workload-protection, Container Workload Protection>> |Generates a detection alert each time a 'Container Workload Protection' alert is received. Enabling this rule allows you to immediately begin triaging and investigating these alerts. |[Data Source: Elastic Defend for Containers], [Domain: Container] |8.8.0 |3
 
-|<<control-panel-process-with-unusual-arguments, Control Panel Process with Unusual Arguments>> |Identifies unusual instances of Control Panel with suspicious keywords or paths in the process command line value. Adversaries may abuse control.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<control-panel-process-with-unusual-arguments, Control Panel Process with Unusual Arguments>> |Identifies unusual instances of Control Panel with suspicious keywords or paths in the process command line value. Adversaries may abuse control.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
 
-|<<creation-of-hidden-files-and-directories-via-commandline, Creation of Hidden Files and Directories via CommandLine>> |Users can mark specific files as hidden simply by putting a "." as the first character in the file or folder name. Adversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders on the system for persistence and defense evasion. This rule looks for hidden files or folders in common writable directories. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<creation-of-hidden-files-and-directories-via-commandline, Creation of Hidden Files and Directories via CommandLine>> |Users can mark specific files as hidden simply by putting a "." as the first character in the file or folder name. Adversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders on the system for persistence and defense evasion. This rule looks for hidden files or folders in common writable directories. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
 
-|<<creation-of-hidden-launch-agent-or-daemon, Creation of Hidden Launch Agent or Daemon>> |Identifies the creation of a hidden launch agent or daemon. An adversary may establish persistence by installing a new launch agent or daemon which executes at login. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<creation-of-hidden-launch-agent-or-daemon, Creation of Hidden Launch Agent or Daemon>> |Identifies the creation of a hidden launch agent or daemon. An adversary may establish persistence by installing a new launch agent or daemon which executes at login. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<creation-of-hidden-login-item-via-apple-script, Creation of Hidden Login Item via Apple Script>> |Identifies the execution of osascript to create a hidden login item. This may indicate an attempt to persist a malicious program while concealing its presence. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<creation-of-hidden-login-item-via-apple-script, Creation of Hidden Login Item via Apple Script>> |Identifies the execution of osascript to create a hidden login item. This may indicate an attempt to persist a malicious program while concealing its presence. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<creation-of-hidden-shared-object-file, Creation of Hidden Shared Object File>> |Identifies the creation of a hidden shared object (.so) file. Users can mark specific files as hidden simply by putting a "." as the first character in the file or folder name. Adversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders on the system for persistence and defense evasion. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<creation-of-hidden-shared-object-file, Creation of Hidden Shared Object File>> |Identifies the creation of a hidden shared object (.so) file. Users can mark specific files as hidden simply by putting a "." as the first character in the file or folder name. Adversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders on the system for persistence and defense evasion. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
 
 |<<creation-of-kernel-module, Creation of Kernel Module>> |Identifies activity related to loading kernel modules on Linux via creation of new ko files in the LKM directory. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |8.3.0 |3
 
 |<<creation-of-settingcontent-ms-files, Creation of SettingContent-ms Files>> |Identifies the suspicious creation of SettingContents-ms files, which have been used in attacks to achieve code execution while evading defenses. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |2
 
-|<<creation-of-a-hidden-local-user-account, Creation of a Hidden Local User Account>> |Identifies the creation of a hidden local user account by appending the dollar sign to the account name. This is sometimes done by attackers to increase access to a system and avoid appearing in the results of accounts listing using the net users command. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<creation-of-a-hidden-local-user-account, Creation of a Hidden Local User Account>> |Identifies the creation of a hidden local user account by appending the dollar sign to the account name. This is sometimes done by attackers to increase access to a system and avoid appearing in the results of accounts listing using the net users command. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |109
 
-|<<creation-or-modification-of-domain-backup-dpapi-private-key, Creation or Modification of Domain Backup DPAPI private key>> |Identifies the creation or modification of Domain Backup private keys. Adversaries may extract the Data Protection API (DPAPI) domain backup key from a Domain Controller (DC) to be able to decrypt any domain user master key file. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<creation-or-modification-of-domain-backup-dpapi-private-key, Creation or Modification of Domain Backup DPAPI private key>> |Identifies the creation or modification of Domain Backup private keys. Adversaries may extract the Data Protection API (DPAPI) domain backup key from a Domain Controller (DC) to be able to decrypt any domain user master key file. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<creation-or-modification-of-root-certificate, Creation or Modification of Root Certificate>> |Identifies the creation or modification of a local trusted root certificate in Windows. The install of a malicious root certificate would allow an attacker the ability to masquerade malicious files as valid signed components from any entity (for example, Microsoft). It could also allow an attacker to decrypt SSL traffic. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<creation-or-modification-of-root-certificate, Creation or Modification of Root Certificate>> |Identifies the creation or modification of a local trusted root certificate in Windows. The install of a malicious root certificate would allow an attacker the ability to masquerade malicious files as valid signed components from any entity (for example, Microsoft). It could also allow an attacker to decrypt SSL traffic. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |109
 
-|<<creation-or-modification-of-a-new-gpo-scheduled-task-or-service, Creation or Modification of a new GPO Scheduled Task or Service>> |Detects the creation or modification of a new Group Policy based scheduled task or service. These methods are used for legitimate system administration, but can also be abused by an attacker with domain admin permissions to execute a malicious payload remotely on all or a subset of the domain joined machines. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<creation-or-modification-of-a-new-gpo-scheduled-task-or-service, Creation or Modification of a new GPO Scheduled Task or Service>> |Detects the creation or modification of a new Group Policy based scheduled task or service. These methods are used for legitimate system administration, but can also be abused by an attacker with domain admin permissions to execute a malicious payload remotely on all or a subset of the domain joined machines. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<credential-acquisition-via-registry-hive-dumping, Credential Acquisition via Registry Hive Dumping>> |Identifies attempts to export a registry hive which may contain credentials using the Windows reg.exe tool. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<credential-acquisition-via-registry-hive-dumping, Credential Acquisition via Registry Hive Dumping>> |Identifies attempts to export a registry hive which may contain credentials using the Windows reg.exe tool. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
 
 |<<credential-dumping-detected-elastic-endgame, Credential Dumping - Detected - Elastic Endgame>> |Elastic Endgame detected Credential Dumping. Click the Elastic Endgame icon in the event.module column or the link in the rule.reference column for additional information. |[Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access] |8.3.0 |102
 
@@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<dns-tunneling, DNS Tunneling>> |A machine learning job detected unusually large numbers of DNS queries for a single top-level DNS domain, which is often used for DNS tunneling. DNS tunneling can be used for command-and-control, persistence, or data exfiltration activity. For example, dnscat tends to generate many DNS questions for a top-level domain as it uses the DNS protocol to tunnel data. |[Use Case: Threat Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Command and Control] |8.3.0 |103
 
-|<<dns-over-https-enabled-via-registry, DNS-over-HTTPS Enabled via Registry>> |Identifies when a user enables DNS-over-HTTPS. This can be used to hide internet activity or the process of exfiltrating data. With this enabled, an organization will lose visibility into data such as query type, response, and originating IP, which are used to determine bad actors. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<dns-over-https-enabled-via-registry, DNS-over-HTTPS Enabled via Registry>> |Identifies when a user enables DNS-over-HTTPS. This can be used to hide internet activity or the process of exfiltrating data. With this enabled, an organization will lose visibility into data such as query type, response, and originating IP, which are used to determine bad actors. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |108
 
 |<<default-cobalt-strike-team-server-certificate, Default Cobalt Strike Team Server Certificate>> |This rule detects the use of the default Cobalt Strike Team Server TLS certificate. Cobalt Strike is software for Adversary Simulations and Red Team Operations which are security assessments that replicate the tactics and techniques of an advanced adversary in a network. Modifications to the Packetbeat configuration can be made to include MD5 and SHA256 hashing algorithms (the default is SHA1). See the References section for additional information on module configuration. |[Tactic: Command and Control], [Threat: Cobalt Strike], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Domain: Endpoint] |8.3.0 |104
 
@@ -418,17 +418,19 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<delete-volume-usn-journal-with-fsutil, Delete Volume USN Journal with Fsutil>> |Identifies use of the fsutil.exe to delete the volume USNJRNL. This technique is used by attackers to eliminate evidence of files created during post-exploitation activities. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<deleting-backup-catalogs-with-wbadmin, Deleting Backup Catalogs with Wbadmin>> |Identifies use of the wbadmin.exe to delete the backup catalog. Ransomware and other malware may do this to prevent system recovery. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Impact], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<deleting-backup-catalogs-with-wbadmin, Deleting Backup Catalogs with Wbadmin>> |Identifies use of the wbadmin.exe to delete the backup catalog. Ransomware and other malware may do this to prevent system recovery. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Impact], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
+
+|<<deprecated-remote-file-creation-on-a-sensitive-directory, Deprecated - Remote File Creation on a Sensitive Directory>> |Discovery of files created by a remote host on sensitive directories and folders. Remote file creation in these directories could indicate a malicious binary or script trying to compromise the system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [Use Case: Lateral Movement Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.9.0 |2
 
 |<<direct-outbound-smb-connection, Direct Outbound SMB Connection>> |Identifies unexpected processes making network connections over port 445. Windows File Sharing is typically implemented over Server Message Block (SMB), which communicates between hosts using port 445. When legitimate, these network connections are established by the kernel. Processes making 445/tcp connections may be port scanners, exploits, or suspicious user-level processes moving laterally. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
 
-|<<disable-windows-event-and-security-logs-using-built-in-tools, Disable Windows Event and Security Logs Using Built-in Tools>> |Identifies attempts to disable EventLog via the logman Windows utility, PowerShell, or auditpol. This is often done by attackers in an attempt to evade detection on a system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
+|<<disable-windows-event-and-security-logs-using-built-in-tools, Disable Windows Event and Security Logs Using Built-in Tools>> |Identifies attempts to disable EventLog via the logman Windows utility, PowerShell, or auditpol. This is often done by attackers in an attempt to evade detection on a system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |111
 
-|<<disable-windows-firewall-rules-via-netsh, Disable Windows Firewall Rules via Netsh>> |Identifies use of the netsh.exe to disable or weaken the local firewall. Attackers will use this command line tool to disable the firewall during troubleshooting or to enable network mobility. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<disable-windows-firewall-rules-via-netsh, Disable Windows Firewall Rules via Netsh>> |Identifies use of the netsh.exe to disable or weaken the local firewall. Attackers will use this command line tool to disable the firewall during troubleshooting or to enable network mobility. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
 
-|<<disabling-user-account-control-via-registry-modification, Disabling User Account Control via Registry Modification>> |User Account Control (UAC) can help mitigate the impact of malware on Windows hosts. With UAC, apps and tasks always run in the security context of a non-administrator account, unless an administrator specifically authorizes administrator-level access to the system. This rule identifies registry value changes to bypass User Access Control (UAC) protection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<disabling-user-account-control-via-registry-modification, Disabling User Account Control via Registry Modification>> |User Account Control (UAC) can help mitigate the impact of malware on Windows hosts. With UAC, apps and tasks always run in the security context of a non-administrator account, unless an administrator specifically authorizes administrator-level access to the system. This rule identifies registry value changes to bypass User Access Control (UAC) protection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |109
 
-|<<disabling-windows-defender-security-settings-via-powershell, Disabling Windows Defender Security Settings via PowerShell>> |Identifies use of the Set-MpPreference PowerShell command to disable or weaken certain Windows Defender settings. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<disabling-windows-defender-security-settings-via-powershell, Disabling Windows Defender Security Settings via PowerShell>> |Identifies use of the Set-MpPreference PowerShell command to disable or weaken certain Windows Defender settings. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
 
 |<<discovery-of-domain-groups, Discovery of Domain Groups>> |Identifies the execution of Linux built-in commands related to account or group enumeration. Adversaries may use account and group information to orient themselves before deciding how to act. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.3.0 |2
 
@@ -440,29 +442,29 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<downloaded-url-files, Downloaded URL Files>> |Identifies .url shortcut files downloaded from outside the local network. These shortcut files are commonly used in phishing campaigns. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |1
 
-|<<dumping-account-hashes-via-built-in-commands, Dumping Account Hashes via Built-In Commands>> |Identifies the execution of macOS built-in commands used to dump user account hashes. Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login information in the form of a hash. These hashes can be cracked or leveraged for lateral movement. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<dumping-account-hashes-via-built-in-commands, Dumping Account Hashes via Built-In Commands>> |Identifies the execution of macOS built-in commands used to dump user account hashes. Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login information in the form of a hash. These hashes can be cracked or leveraged for lateral movement. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<dumping-of-keychain-content-via-security-command, Dumping of Keychain Content via Security Command>> |Adversaries may dump the content of the keychain storage data from a system to acquire credentials. Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features, including Wi-Fi and website passwords, secure notes, certificates, and Kerberos. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<dumping-of-keychain-content-via-security-command, Dumping of Keychain Content via Security Command>> |Adversaries may dump the content of the keychain storage data from a system to acquire credentials. Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features, including Wi-Fi and website passwords, secure notes, certificates, and Kerberos. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<dynamic-linker-copy, Dynamic Linker Copy>> |Detects the copying of the Linux dynamic loader binary and subsequent file creation for the purpose of creating a backup copy. This technique was seen recently being utilized by Linux malware prior to patching the dynamic loader in order to inject and preload a malicious shared object file. This activity should never occur and if it does then it should be considered highly suspicious or malicious. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Threat: Orbit], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<dynamic-linker-copy, Dynamic Linker Copy>> |Detects the copying of the Linux dynamic loader binary and subsequent file creation for the purpose of creating a backup copy. This technique was seen recently being utilized by Linux malware prior to patching the dynamic loader in order to inject and preload a malicious shared object file. This activity should never occur and if it does then it should be considered highly suspicious or malicious. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Threat: Orbit], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
 
 |<<esxi-discovery-via-find, ESXI Discovery via Find>> |Identifies instances where the 'find' command is started on a Linux system with arguments targeting specific VM-related paths, such as "/etc/vmware/", "/usr/lib/vmware/", or "/vmfs/*". These paths are associated with VMware virtualization software, and their presence in the find command arguments may indicate that a threat actor is attempting to search for, analyze, or manipulate VM-related files and configurations on the system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.5.0 |6
 
 |<<esxi-discovery-via-grep, ESXI Discovery via Grep>> |Identifies instances where a process named 'grep', 'egrep', or 'pgrep' is started on a Linux system with arguments related to virtual machine (VM) files, such as "vmdk", "vmx", "vmxf", "vmsd", "vmsn", "vswp", "vmss", "nvram", or "vmem". These file extensions are associated with VM-related file formats, and their presence in grep command arguments may indicate that a threat actor is attempting to search for, analyze, or manipulate VM files on the system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.5.0 |6
 
-|<<esxi-timestomping-using-touch-command, ESXI Timestomping using Touch Command>> |Identifies instances where the 'touch' command is executed on a Linux system with the "-r" flag, which is used to modify the timestamp of a file based on another file's timestamp. The rule targets specific VM-related paths, such as "/etc/vmware/", "/usr/lib/vmware/", or "/vmfs/*". These paths are associated with VMware virtualization software, and their presence in the touch command arguments may indicate that a threat actor is attempting to tamper with timestamps of VM-related files and configurations on the system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.5.0 |7
+|<<esxi-timestomping-using-touch-command, ESXI Timestomping using Touch Command>> |Identifies instances where the 'touch' command is executed on a Linux system with the "-r" flag, which is used to modify the timestamp of a file based on another file's timestamp. The rule targets specific VM-related paths, such as "/etc/vmware/", "/usr/lib/vmware/", or "/vmfs/*". These paths are associated with VMware virtualization software, and their presence in the touch command arguments may indicate that a threat actor is attempting to tamper with timestamps of VM-related files and configurations on the system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.5.0 |8
 
 |<<eggshell-backdoor-execution, EggShell Backdoor Execution>> |Identifies the execution of and EggShell Backdoor. EggShell is a known post exploitation tool for macOS and Linux. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |103
 
-|<<elastic-agent-service-terminated, Elastic Agent Service Terminated>> |Identifies the Elastic endpoint agent has stopped and is no longer running on the host. Adversaries may attempt to disable security monitoring tools in an attempt to evade detection or prevention capabilities during an intrusion. This may also indicate an issue with the agent itself and should be addressed to ensure defensive measures are back in a stable state. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [OS: Windows], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<elastic-agent-service-terminated, Elastic Agent Service Terminated>> |Identifies the Elastic endpoint agent has stopped and is no longer running on the host. Adversaries may attempt to disable security monitoring tools in an attempt to evade detection or prevention capabilities during an intrusion. This may also indicate an issue with the agent itself and should be addressed to ensure defensive measures are back in a stable state. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [OS: Windows], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<emond-rules-creation-or-modification, Emond Rules Creation or Modification>> |Identifies the creation or modification of the Event Monitor Daemon (emond) rules. Adversaries may abuse this service by writing a rule to execute commands when a defined event occurs, such as system start up or user authentication. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<emond-rules-creation-or-modification, Emond Rules Creation or Modification>> |Identifies the creation or modification of the Event Monitor Daemon (emond) rules. Adversaries may abuse this service by writing a rule to execute commands when a defined event occurs, such as system start up or user authentication. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<enable-host-network-discovery-via-netsh, Enable Host Network Discovery via Netsh>> |Identifies use of the netsh.exe program to enable host discovery via the network. Attackers can use this command-line tool to weaken the host firewall settings. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<enable-host-network-discovery-via-netsh, Enable Host Network Discovery via Netsh>> |Identifies use of the netsh.exe program to enable host discovery via the network. Attackers can use this command-line tool to weaken the host firewall settings. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<encoded-executable-stored-in-the-registry, Encoded Executable Stored in the Registry>> |Identifies registry write modifications to hide an encoded portable executable. This could be indicative of adversary defense evasion by avoiding the storing of malicious content directly on disk. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<encoded-executable-stored-in-the-registry, Encoded Executable Stored in the Registry>> |Identifies registry write modifications to hide an encoded portable executable. This could be indicative of adversary defense evasion by avoiding the storing of malicious content directly on disk. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<encrypting-files-with-winrar-or-7z, Encrypting Files with WinRar or 7z>> |Identifies use of WinRar or 7z to create an encrypted files. Adversaries will often compress and encrypt data in preparation for exfiltration. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Collection], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<encrypting-files-with-winrar-or-7z, Encrypting Files with WinRar or 7z>> |Identifies use of WinRar or 7z to create an encrypted files. Adversaries will often compress and encrypt data in preparation for exfiltration. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Collection], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
 
 |<<endpoint-security, Endpoint Security>> |Generates a detection alert each time an Elastic Endpoint Security alert is received. Enabling this rule allows you to immediately begin investigating your Endpoint alerts. |[Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |102
 
@@ -470,55 +472,55 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<enumerating-domain-trusts-via-nltest-exe, Enumerating Domain Trusts via NLTEST.EXE>> |Identifies the use of nltest.exe for domain trust discovery purposes. Adversaries may use this command-line utility to enumerate domain trusts and gain insight into trust relationships, as well as the state of Domain Controller (DC) replication in a Microsoft Windows NT Domain. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
 
-|<<enumeration-command-spawned-via-wmiprvse, Enumeration Command Spawned via WMIPrvSE>> |Identifies native Windows host and network enumeration commands spawned by the Windows Management Instrumentation Provider Service (WMIPrvSE). |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<enumeration-command-spawned-via-wmiprvse, Enumeration Command Spawned via WMIPrvSE>> |Identifies native Windows host and network enumeration commands spawned by the Windows Management Instrumentation Provider Service (WMIPrvSE). |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
 
-|<<enumeration-of-administrator-accounts, Enumeration of Administrator Accounts>> |Identifies instances of lower privilege accounts enumerating Administrator accounts or groups using built-in Windows tools. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
+|<<enumeration-of-administrator-accounts, Enumeration of Administrator Accounts>> |Identifies instances of lower privilege accounts enumerating Administrator accounts or groups using built-in Windows tools. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |111
 
 |<<enumeration-of-kernel-modules, Enumeration of Kernel Modules>> |Loadable Kernel Modules (or LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. This identifies attempts to enumerate information about a kernel module. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |8.6.0 |209
 
 |<<enumeration-of-kernel-modules-via-proc, Enumeration of Kernel Modules via Proc>> |Loadable Kernel Modules (or LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. This identifies attempts to enumerate information about a kernel module using the /proc/modules filesystem. This filesystem is used by utilities such as lsmod and kmod to list the available kernel modules. |[Data Source: Auditd Manager], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.6.0 |106
 
-|<<enumeration-of-privileged-local-groups-membership, Enumeration of Privileged Local Groups Membership>> |Identifies instances of an unusual process enumerating built-in Windows privileged local groups membership like Administrators or Remote Desktop users. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.6.0 |210
+|<<enumeration-of-privileged-local-groups-membership, Enumeration of Privileged Local Groups Membership>> |Identifies instances of an unusual process enumerating built-in Windows privileged local groups membership like Administrators or Remote Desktop users. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.6.0 |211
 
-|<<enumeration-of-users-or-groups-via-built-in-commands, Enumeration of Users or Groups via Built-in Commands>> |Identifies the execution of macOS built-in commands related to account or group enumeration. Adversaries may use account and group information to orient themselves before deciding how to act. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<enumeration-of-users-or-groups-via-built-in-commands, Enumeration of Users or Groups via Built-in Commands>> |Identifies the execution of macOS built-in commands related to account or group enumeration. Adversaries may use account and group information to orient themselves before deciding how to act. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<exchange-mailbox-export-via-powershell, Exchange Mailbox Export via PowerShell>> |Identifies the use of the Exchange PowerShell cmdlet, New-MailBoxExportRequest, to export the contents of a primary mailbox or archive to a .pst file. Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Collection], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs] |8.3.0 |7
+|<<exchange-mailbox-export-via-powershell, Exchange Mailbox Export via PowerShell>> |Identifies the use of the Exchange PowerShell cmdlet, New-MailBoxExportRequest, to export the contents of a primary mailbox or archive to a .pst file. Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Collection], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs] |8.3.0 |8
 
-|<<executable-file-creation-with-multiple-extensions, Executable File Creation with Multiple Extensions>> |Masquerading can allow an adversary to evade defenses and better blend in with the environment. One way it occurs is when the name or location of a file is manipulated as a means of tricking a user into executing what they think is a benign file type but is actually executable code. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<executable-file-creation-with-multiple-extensions, Executable File Creation with Multiple Extensions>> |Masquerading can allow an adversary to evade defenses and better blend in with the environment. One way it occurs is when the name or location of a file is manipulated as a means of tricking a user into executing what they think is a benign file type but is actually executable code. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |107
 
 |<<executable-file-with-unusual-extension, Executable File with Unusual Extension>> |Identifies the creation or modification of an executable file with an unexpected file extension. Attackers may attempt to evade detection by masquerading files using the file extension values used by image, audio, or document file types. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |1
 
-|<<executable-masquerading-as-kernel-process, Executable Masquerading as Kernel Process>> |Monitors for kernel processes with associated process executable fields that are not empty. Unix kernel processes such as kthreadd and kworker typically do not have process.executable fields associated to them. Attackers may attempt to hide their malicious programs by masquerading as legitimate kernel processes. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |8.3.0 |1
+|<<executable-masquerading-as-kernel-process, Executable Masquerading as Kernel Process>> |Monitors for kernel processes with associated process executable fields that are not empty. Unix kernel processes such as kthreadd and kworker typically do not have process.executable fields associated to them. Attackers may attempt to hide their malicious programs by masquerading as legitimate kernel processes. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |8.3.0 |2
 
-|<<execution-from-unusual-directory-command-line, Execution from Unusual Directory - Command Line>> |Identifies process execution from suspicious default Windows directories. This may be abused by adversaries to hide malware in trusted paths. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
+|<<execution-from-unusual-directory-command-line, Execution from Unusual Directory - Command Line>> |Identifies process execution from suspicious default Windows directories. This may be abused by adversaries to hide malware in trusted paths. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |111
 
 |<<execution-from-a-removable-media-with-network-connection, Execution from a Removable Media with Network Connection>> |Identifies process execution from a removable media and by an unusual process. Adversaries may move onto systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into a system and executes. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |2
 
-|<<execution-of-com-object-via-xwizard, Execution of COM object via Xwizard>> |Windows Component Object Model (COM) is an inter-process communication (IPC) component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects or executable code. Xwizard can be used to run a COM object created in registry to evade defensive counter measures. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<execution-of-com-object-via-xwizard, Execution of COM object via Xwizard>> |Windows Component Object Model (COM) is an inter-process communication (IPC) component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects or executable code. Xwizard can be used to run a COM object created in registry to evade defensive counter measures. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<execution-of-file-written-or-modified-by-microsoft-office, Execution of File Written or Modified by Microsoft Office>> |Identifies an executable created by a Microsoft Office application and subsequently executed. These processes are often launched via scripts inside documents or during exploitation of Microsoft Office applications. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<execution-of-file-written-or-modified-by-microsoft-office, Execution of File Written or Modified by Microsoft Office>> |Identifies an executable created by a Microsoft Office application and subsequently executed. These processes are often launched via scripts inside documents or during exploitation of Microsoft Office applications. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
 
-|<<execution-of-file-written-or-modified-by-pdf-reader, Execution of File Written or Modified by PDF Reader>> |Identifies a suspicious file that was written by a PDF reader application and subsequently executed. These processes are often launched via exploitation of PDF applications. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<execution-of-file-written-or-modified-by-pdf-reader, Execution of File Written or Modified by PDF Reader>> |Identifies a suspicious file that was written by a PDF reader application and subsequently executed. These processes are often launched via exploitation of PDF applications. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<execution-of-persistent-suspicious-program, Execution of Persistent Suspicious Program>> |Identifies execution of suspicious persistent programs (scripts, rundll32, etc.) by looking at process lineage and command line usage. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<execution-of-persistent-suspicious-program, Execution of Persistent Suspicious Program>> |Identifies execution of suspicious persistent programs (scripts, rundll32, etc.) by looking at process lineage and command line usage. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |106
 
 |<<execution-of-an-unsigned-service, Execution of an Unsigned Service>> |This rule identifies the execution of unsigned executables via service control manager (SCM). Adversaries may abuse SCM to execute malware or escalate privileges. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |104
 
-|<<execution-via-electron-child-process-node-js-module, Execution via Electron Child Process Node.js Module>> |Identifies attempts to execute a child process from within the context of an Electron application using the child_process Node.js module. Adversaries may abuse this technique to inherit permissions from parent processes. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<execution-via-electron-child-process-node-js-module, Execution via Electron Child Process Node.js Module>> |Identifies attempts to execute a child process from within the context of an Electron application using the child_process Node.js module. Adversaries may abuse this technique to inherit permissions from parent processes. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
 |<<execution-via-ms-visualstudio-pre-post-build-events, Execution via MS VisualStudio Pre/Post Build Events>> |Identifies the execution of a command via Microsoft Visual Studio Pre or Post build events. Adversaries may backdoor a trusted visual studio project to execute a malicious command during the project build process. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |1
 
-|<<execution-via-mssql-xp-cmdshell-stored-procedure, Execution via MSSQL xp_cmdshell Stored Procedure>> |Identifies execution via MSSQL xp_cmdshell stored procedure. Malicious users may attempt to elevate their privileges by using xp_cmdshell, which is disabled by default, thus, it's important to review the context of it's use. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<execution-via-mssql-xp-cmdshell-stored-procedure, Execution via MSSQL xp_cmdshell Stored Procedure>> |Identifies execution via MSSQL xp_cmdshell stored procedure. Malicious users may attempt to elevate their privileges by using xp_cmdshell, which is disabled by default, thus, it's important to review the context of it's use. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
 
 |<<execution-via-microsoft-dotnet-clickonce-host, Execution via Microsoft DotNet ClickOnce Host>> |Identifies the execution of DotNet ClickOnce installer via Dfsvc.exe trampoline. Adversaries may take advantage of ClickOnce to proxy execution of malicious payloads via trusted Microsoft processes. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |1
 
-|<<execution-via-tsclient-mountpoint, Execution via TSClient Mountpoint>> |Identifies execution from the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) shared mountpoint tsclient on the target host. This may indicate a lateral movement attempt. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<execution-via-tsclient-mountpoint, Execution via TSClient Mountpoint>> |Identifies execution from the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) shared mountpoint tsclient on the target host. This may indicate a lateral movement attempt. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
 
 |<<execution-via-windows-subsystem-for-linux, Execution via Windows Subsystem for Linux>> |Detects attempts to execute a program on the host from the Windows Subsystem for Linux. Adversaries may enable and use WSL for Linux to avoid detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |5
 
-|<<execution-via-local-sxs-shared-module, Execution via local SxS Shared Module>> |Identifies the creation, change, or deletion of a DLL module within a Windows SxS local folder. Adversaries may abuse shared modules to execute malicious payloads by instructing the Windows module loader to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<execution-via-local-sxs-shared-module, Execution via local SxS Shared Module>> |Identifies the creation, change, or deletion of a DLL module within a Windows SxS local folder. Adversaries may abuse shared modules to execute malicious payloads by instructing the Windows module loader to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<execution-with-explicit-credentials-via-scripting, Execution with Explicit Credentials via Scripting>> |Identifies execution of the security_authtrampoline process via a scripting interpreter. This occurs when programs use AuthorizationExecute-WithPrivileges from the Security.framework to run another program with root privileges. It should not be run by itself, as this is a sign of execution with explicit logon credentials. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<execution-with-explicit-credentials-via-scripting, Execution with Explicit Credentials via Scripting>> |Identifies execution of the security_authtrampoline process via a scripting interpreter. This occurs when programs use AuthorizationExecute-WithPrivileges from the Security.framework to run another program with root privileges. It should not be run by itself, as this is a sign of execution with explicit logon credentials. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
 |<<expired-or-revoked-driver-loaded, Expired or Revoked Driver Loaded>> |Identifies an attempt to load a revoked or expired driver. Adversaries may bring outdated drivers with vulnerabilities to gain code execution in kernel mode or abuse revoked certificates to sign their drivers. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |4
 
@@ -526,7 +528,7 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<exploit-prevented-elastic-endgame, Exploit - Prevented - Elastic Endgame>> |Elastic Endgame prevented an Exploit. Click the Elastic Endgame icon in the event.module column or the link in the rule.reference column for additional information. |[Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation] |8.3.0 |102
 
-|<<exporting-exchange-mailbox-via-powershell, Exporting Exchange Mailbox via PowerShell>> |Identifies the use of the Exchange PowerShell cmdlet, New-MailBoxExportRequest, to export the contents of a primary mailbox or archive to a .pst file. Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Collection], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<exporting-exchange-mailbox-via-powershell, Exporting Exchange Mailbox via PowerShell>> |Identifies the use of the Exchange PowerShell cmdlet, New-MailBoxExportRequest, to export the contents of a primary mailbox or archive to a .pst file. Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Collection], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
 
 |<<external-alerts, External Alerts>> |Generates a detection alert for each external alert written to the configured indices. Enabling this rule allows you to immediately begin investigating external alerts in the app. |[OS: Windows], [Data Source: APM], [OS: macOS], [OS: Linux] |8.3.0 |102
 
@@ -534,33 +536,33 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<external-user-added-to-google-workspace-group, External User Added to Google Workspace Group>> |Detects an external Google Workspace user account being added to an existing group. Adversaries may add external user accounts as a means to intercept shared files or emails with that specific group. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Google Workspace], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.4.0 |2
 
-|<<file-compressed-or-archived-into-common-format, File Compressed or Archived into Common Format>> |Detects files being compressed or archived into common formats. This is a common technique used to obfuscate files to evade detection or to staging data for exfiltration. |[Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [OS: macOS], [OS: Windows], [Tactic: Collection], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |2
+|<<file-compressed-or-archived-into-common-format, File Compressed or Archived into Common Format>> |Detects files being compressed or archived into common formats. This is a common technique used to obfuscate files to evade detection or to staging data for exfiltration. |[Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [OS: Windows], [Tactic: Collection], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |3
 
-|<<file-creation-time-changed, File Creation Time Changed>> |Identifies modification of a file creation time. Adversaries may modify file time attributes to blend malicious content with existing files. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file often to mimic files that are in trusted directories. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.3.0 |4
+|<<file-creation-time-changed, File Creation Time Changed>> |Identifies modification of a file creation time. Adversaries may modify file time attributes to blend malicious content with existing files. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file often to mimic files that are in trusted directories. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |5
 
-|<<file-creation-execution-and-self-deletion-in-suspicious-directory, File Creation, Execution and Self-Deletion in Suspicious Directory>> |This rule monitors for the creation of a file, followed by its execution and self-deletion in a short timespan within a directory often used for malicious purposes by threat actors. This behavior is often used by malware to execute malicious code and delete itself to hide its tracks. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |3
+|<<file-creation-execution-and-self-deletion-in-suspicious-directory, File Creation, Execution and Self-Deletion in Suspicious Directory>> |This rule monitors for the creation of a file, followed by its execution and self-deletion in a short timespan within a directory often used for malicious purposes by threat actors. This behavior is often used by malware to execute malicious code and delete itself to hide its tracks. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |4
 
-|<<file-deletion-via-shred, File Deletion via Shred>> |Malware or other files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave traces behind as to what was done within a network and how. Adversaries may remove these files over the course of an intrusion to keep their footprint low or remove them at the end as part of the post-intrusion cleanup process. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<file-deletion-via-shred, File Deletion via Shred>> |Malware or other files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave traces behind as to what was done within a network and how. Adversaries may remove these files over the course of an intrusion to keep their footprint low or remove them at the end as part of the post-intrusion cleanup process. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |8.3.0 |109
 
 |<<file-made-executable-via-chmod-inside-a-container, File Made Executable via Chmod Inside A Container>> |This rule detects when chmod is used to add the execute permission to a file inside a container. Modifying file permissions to make a file executable could indicate malicious activity, as an attacker may attempt to run unauthorized or malicious code inside the container. |[Data Source: Elastic Defend for Containers], [Domain: Container], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.8.0 |2
 
-|<<file-permission-modification-in-writable-directory, File Permission Modification in Writable Directory>> |Identifies file permission modifications in common writable directories by a non-root user. Adversaries often drop files or payloads into a writable directory and change permissions prior to execution. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |209
+|<<file-permission-modification-in-writable-directory, File Permission Modification in Writable Directory>> |Identifies file permission modifications in common writable directories by a non-root user. Adversaries often drop files or payloads into a writable directory and change permissions prior to execution. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |210
 
 |<<file-staged-in-root-folder-of-recycle-bin, File Staged in Root Folder of Recycle Bin>> |Identifies files written to the root of the Recycle Bin folder instead of subdirectories. Adversaries may place files in the root of the Recycle Bin in preparation for exfiltration or to evade defenses. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Collection], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |2
 
 |<<file-system-debugger-launched-inside-a-privileged-container, File System Debugger Launched Inside a Privileged Container>> |This rule detects the use of the built-in Linux DebugFS utility from inside a privileged container. DebugFS is a special file system debugging utility which supports reading and writing directly from a hard drive device. When launched inside a privileged container, a container deployed with all the capabilities of the host machine, an attacker can access sensitive host level files which could be used for further privilege escalation and container escapes to the host machine. |[Data Source: Elastic Defend for Containers], [Domain: Container], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation] |8.10.0 |1
 
-|<<file-transfer-or-listener-established-via-netcat, File Transfer or Listener Established via Netcat>> |A netcat process is engaging in network activity on a Linux host. Netcat is often used as a persistence mechanism by exporting a reverse shell or by serving a shell on a listening port. Netcat is also sometimes used for data exfiltration. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<file-transfer-or-listener-established-via-netcat, File Transfer or Listener Established via Netcat>> |A netcat process is engaging in network activity on a Linux host. Netcat is often used as a persistence mechanism by exporting a reverse shell or by serving a shell on a listening port. Netcat is also sometimes used for data exfiltration. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
 
 |<<file-and-directory-permissions-modification, File and Directory Permissions Modification>> |Identifies the change of permissions/ownership of files/folders through built-in Windows utilities. Threat actors may require permission modification of files/folders to change, modify or delete them. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |1
 
-|<<file-made-immutable-by-chattr, File made Immutable by Chattr>> |Detects a file being made immutable using the chattr binary. Making a file immutable means it cannot be deleted or renamed, no link can be created to this file, most of the file's metadata can not be modified, and the file can not be opened in write mode. Threat actors will commonly utilize this to prevent tampering or modification of their malicious files or any system files they have modified for purposes of persistence (e.g .ssh, /etc/passwd, etc.). |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
+|<<file-made-immutable-by-chattr, File made Immutable by Chattr>> |Detects a file being made immutable using the chattr binary. Making a file immutable means it cannot be deleted or renamed, no link can be created to this file, most of the file's metadata can not be modified, and the file can not be opened in write mode. Threat actors will commonly utilize this to prevent tampering or modification of their malicious files or any system files they have modified for purposes of persistence (e.g .ssh, /etc/passwd, etc.). |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |111
 
 |<<file-or-directory-deletion-command, File or Directory Deletion Command>> |This rule identifies the execution of commands that can be used to delete files and directories. Adversaries may delete files and directories on a host system, such as logs, browser history, or malware. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |2
 
 |<<file-with-suspicious-extension-downloaded, File with Suspicious Extension Downloaded>> |Identifies unusual files downloaded from outside the local network that have the potential to be abused for code execution. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |2
 
-|<<finder-sync-plugin-registered-and-enabled, Finder Sync Plugin Registered and Enabled>> |Finder Sync plugins enable users to extend Finder’s functionality by modifying the user interface. Adversaries may abuse this feature by adding a rogue Finder Plugin to repeatedly execute malicious payloads for persistence. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<finder-sync-plugin-registered-and-enabled, Finder Sync Plugin Registered and Enabled>> |Finder Sync plugins enable users to extend Finder’s functionality by modifying the user interface. Adversaries may abuse this feature by adding a rogue Finder Plugin to repeatedly execute malicious payloads for persistence. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
 |<<first-occurrence-github-event-for-a-personal-access-token-pat, First Occurrence GitHub Event for a Personal Access Token (PAT)>> |Detects a first occurrence event for a personal access token (PAT) not seen in the last 14 days. |[Domain: Cloud], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Use Case: UEBA], [Tactic: Execution], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Github] |8.8.0 |1
 
@@ -582,7 +584,7 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<first-occurrence-of-user-agent-for-a-github-user, First Occurrence of User-Agent For a GitHub User>> |Detects a new user agent used for a GitHub user not previously seen in the last 14 days. |[Domain: Cloud], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Use Case: UEBA], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Github] |8.8.0 |1
 
-|<<first-time-seen-aws-secret-value-accessed-in-secrets-manager, First Time Seen AWS Secret Value Accessed in Secrets Manager>> |An adversary equipped with compromised credentials may attempt to access the secrets in secrets manager to steal certificates, credentials, or other sensitive material. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.9.0 |308
+|<<first-time-seen-aws-secret-value-accessed-in-secrets-manager, First Time Seen AWS Secret Value Accessed in Secrets Manager>> |An adversary with access to a compromised AWS service such as an EC2 instance, Lambda function, or other service may attempt to leverage the compromised service to access secrets in AWS Secrets Manager. This rule looks for the first time a specific user identity has programmatically retrieved a specific secret value from Secrets Manager using the `GetSecretValue` action.  This rule assumes that AWS services such as Lambda functions and EC2 instances are setup with IAM role's assigned that have the necessary permissions to access the secrets in Secrets Manager. An adversary with access to a compromised AWS service such as an EC2 instance, Lambda function, or other service would rely on the compromised service's IAM role to access the secrets in Secrets Manager. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.9.0 |309
 
 |<<first-time-seen-commonly-abused-remote-access-tool-execution, First Time Seen Commonly Abused Remote Access Tool Execution>> |Adversaries may install legitimate remote access tools (RAT) to compromised endpoints for further command-and-control (C2). Adversaries can rely on installed RATs for persistence, execution of native commands and more. This rule detects when a process is started whose name or code signature resembles commonly abused RATs. This is a New Terms rule type indicating the host has not seen this RAT process started before within the last 30 days. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.4.0 |4
 
@@ -592,13 +594,13 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<first-time-seen-newcredentials-logon-process, First Time Seen NewCredentials Logon Process>> |Identifies a new credentials logon type performed by an unusual process. This may indicate the existence of an access token forging capability that are often abused to bypass access control restrictions. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation] |8.4.0 |2
 
-|<<first-time-seen-removable-device, First Time Seen Removable Device>> |Identifies newly seen removable devices by device friendly name using registry modification events. While this activity is not inherently malicious, analysts can use those events to aid monitoring for data exfiltration over those devices. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Tactic: Exfiltration], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.4.0 |2
+|<<first-time-seen-removable-device, First Time Seen Removable Device>> |Identifies newly seen removable devices by device friendly name using registry modification events. While this activity is not inherently malicious, analysts can use those events to aid monitoring for data exfiltration over those devices. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Tactic: Exfiltration], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.4.0 |3
 
-|<<firsttime-seen-account-performing-dcsync, FirstTime Seen Account Performing DCSync>> |This rule identifies when a User Account starts the Active Directory Replication Process for the first time. Attackers can use the DCSync technique to get credential information of individual accounts or the entire domain, thus compromising the entire domain. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring], [Data Source: Active Directory], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.4.0 |9
+|<<firsttime-seen-account-performing-dcsync, FirstTime Seen Account Performing DCSync>> |This rule identifies when a User Account starts the Active Directory Replication Process for the first time. Attackers can use the DCSync technique to get credential information of individual accounts or the entire domain, thus compromising the entire domain. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring], [Data Source: Active Directory], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.4.0 |10
 
 |<<forwarded-google-workspace-security-alert, Forwarded Google Workspace Security Alert>> |Identifies the occurrence of a security alert from the Google Workspace alerts center. Google Workspace's security alert center provides an overview of actionable alerts that may be affecting an organization's domain. An alert is a warning of a potential security issue that Google has detected. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Google Workspace], [Use Case: Log Auditing], [Use Case: Threat Detection] |8.4.0 |2
 
-|<<full-user-mode-dumps-enabled-system-wide, Full User-Mode Dumps Enabled System-Wide>> |Identifies the enable of the full user-mode dumps feature system-wide. This feature allows Windows Error Reporting (WER) to collect data after an application crashes. This setting is a requirement for the LSASS Shtinkering attack, which fakes the communication of a crash on LSASS, generating a dump of the process memory, which gives the attacker access to the credentials present on the system without having to bring malware to the system. This setting is not enabled by default, and applications must create their registry subkeys to hold settings that enable them to collect dumps. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |5
+|<<full-user-mode-dumps-enabled-system-wide, Full User-Mode Dumps Enabled System-Wide>> |Identifies the enable of the full user-mode dumps feature system-wide. This feature allows Windows Error Reporting (WER) to collect data after an application crashes. This setting is a requirement for the LSASS Shtinkering attack, which fakes the communication of a crash on LSASS, generating a dump of the process memory, which gives the attacker access to the credentials present on the system without having to bring malware to the system. This setting is not enabled by default, and applications must create their registry subkeys to hold settings that enable them to collect dumps. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |6
 
 |<<gcp-firewall-rule-creation, GCP Firewall Rule Creation>> |Identifies when a firewall rule is created in Google Cloud Platform (GCP) for Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) or App Engine. These firewall rules can be configured to allow or deny connections to or from virtual machine (VM) instances or specific applications. An adversary may create a new firewall rule in order to weaken their target's security controls and allow more permissive ingress or egress traffic flows for their benefit. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: GCP], [Data Source: Google Cloud Platform], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.3.0 |104
 
@@ -694,17 +696,17 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<google-workspace-user-organizational-unit-changed, Google Workspace User Organizational Unit Changed>> |Users in Google Workspace are typically assigned a specific organizational unit that grants them permissions to certain services and roles that are inherited from this organizational unit. Adversaries may compromise a valid account and change which organizational account the user belongs to which then could allow them to inherit permissions to applications and resources inaccessible prior to. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Google Workspace], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Persistence], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.4.0 |106
 
-|<<group-policy-abuse-for-privilege-addition, Group Policy Abuse for Privilege Addition>> |Detects the first occurrence of a modification to Group Policy Object Attributes to add privileges to user accounts or use them to add users as local admins. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Active Directory], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<group-policy-abuse-for-privilege-addition, Group Policy Abuse for Privilege Addition>> |Detects the first occurrence of a modification to Group Policy Object Attributes to add privileges to user accounts or use them to add users as local admins. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Active Directory], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring] |8.3.0 |109
 
-|<<group-policy-discovery-via-microsoft-gpresult-utility, Group Policy Discovery via Microsoft GPResult Utility>> |Detects the usage of gpresult.exe to query group policy objects. Attackers may query group policy objects during the reconnaissance phase after compromising a system to gain a better understanding of the active directory environment and possible methods to escalate privileges or move laterally. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |6
+|<<group-policy-discovery-via-microsoft-gpresult-utility, Group Policy Discovery via Microsoft GPResult Utility>> |Detects the usage of gpresult.exe to query group policy objects. Attackers may query group policy objects during the reconnaissance phase after compromising a system to gain a better understanding of the active directory environment and possible methods to escalate privileges or move laterally. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |7
 
 |<<halfbaked-command-and-control-beacon, Halfbaked Command and Control Beacon>> |Halfbaked is a malware family used to establish persistence in a contested network. This rule detects a network activity algorithm leveraged by Halfbaked implant beacons for command and control. |[Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Domain: Endpoint] |8.3.0 |104
 
-|<<hidden-files-and-directories-via-hidden-flag, Hidden Files and Directories via Hidden Flag>> |Identify activity related where adversaries can add the 'hidden' flag to files to hide them from the user in an attempt to evade detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |1
+|<<hidden-files-and-directories-via-hidden-flag, Hidden Files and Directories via Hidden Flag>> |Identify activity related where adversaries can add the 'hidden' flag to files to hide them from the user in an attempt to evade detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.3.0 |2
 
-|<<high-mean-of-process-arguments-in-an-rdp-session, High Mean of Process Arguments in an RDP Session>> |A machine learning job has detected unusually high number of process arguments in an RDP session. Executing sophisticated attacks such as lateral movement can involve the use of complex commands, obfuscation mechanisms, redirection and piping, which in turn increases the number of arguments in a command. |[Use Case: Lateral Movement Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Lateral Movement] |8.9.0 |2
+|<<high-mean-of-process-arguments-in-an-rdp-session, High Mean of Process Arguments in an RDP Session>> |A machine learning job has detected unusually high number of process arguments in an RDP session. Executing sophisticated attacks such as lateral movement can involve the use of complex commands, obfuscation mechanisms, redirection and piping, which in turn increases the number of arguments in a command. |[Use Case: Lateral Movement Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Lateral Movement] |8.9.0 |3
 
-|<<high-mean-of-rdp-session-duration, High Mean of RDP Session Duration>> |A machine learning job has detected unusually high mean of RDP session duration. Long RDP sessions can be used to evade detection mechanisms via session persistence, and might be used to perform tasks such as lateral movement, that might require uninterrupted access to a compromised machine. |[Use Case: Lateral Movement Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Lateral Movement] |8.9.0 |2
+|<<high-mean-of-rdp-session-duration, High Mean of RDP Session Duration>> |A machine learning job has detected unusually high mean of RDP session duration. Long RDP sessions can be used to evade detection mechanisms via session persistence, and might be used to perform tasks such as lateral movement, that might require uninterrupted access to a compromised machine. |[Use Case: Lateral Movement Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Lateral Movement] |8.9.0 |3
 
 |<<high-number-of-cloned-github-repos-from-pat, High Number of Cloned GitHub Repos From PAT>> |Detects a high number of unique private repo clone events originating from a single personal access token within a short time period. |[Domain: Cloud], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Use Case: UEBA], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Github] |8.8.0 |1
 
@@ -712,37 +714,37 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<high-number-of-process-terminations, High Number of Process Terminations>> |This rule identifies a high number (10) of process terminations via pkill from the same host within a short time period. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Impact], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.3.0 |112
 
-|<<high-number-of-process-and-or-service-terminations, High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations>> |This rule identifies a high number (10) of process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Impact], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<high-number-of-process-and-or-service-terminations, High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations>> |This rule identifies a high number (10) of process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a short time period. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Impact], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<high-variance-in-rdp-session-duration, High Variance in RDP Session Duration>> |A machine learning job has detected unusually high variance of RDP session duration. Long RDP sessions can be used to evade detection mechanisms via session persistence, and might be used to perform tasks such as lateral movement, that might require uninterrupted access to a compromised machine. |[Use Case: Lateral Movement Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Lateral Movement] |8.9.0 |2
+|<<high-variance-in-rdp-session-duration, High Variance in RDP Session Duration>> |A machine learning job has detected unusually high variance of RDP session duration. Long RDP sessions can be used to evade detection mechanisms via session persistence, and might be used to perform tasks such as lateral movement, that might require uninterrupted access to a compromised machine. |[Use Case: Lateral Movement Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Lateral Movement] |8.9.0 |3
 
-|<<host-files-system-changes-via-windows-subsystem-for-linux, Host Files System Changes via Windows Subsystem for Linux>> |Detects files creation and modification on the host system from the the Windows Subsystem for Linux. Adversaries may enable and use WSL for Linux to avoid detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |5
+|<<host-files-system-changes-via-windows-subsystem-for-linux, Host Files System Changes via Windows Subsystem for Linux>> |Detects files creation and modification on the host system from the the Windows Subsystem for Linux. Adversaries may enable and use WSL for Linux to avoid detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |6
 
-|<<hosts-file-modified, Hosts File Modified>> |The hosts file on endpoints is used to control manual IP address to hostname resolutions. The hosts file is the first point of lookup for DNS hostname resolution so if adversaries can modify the endpoint hosts file, they can route traffic to malicious infrastructure. This rule detects modifications to the hosts file on Microsoft Windows, Linux (Ubuntu or RHEL) and macOS systems. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [OS: Windows], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Impact], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<hosts-file-modified, Hosts File Modified>> |The hosts file on endpoints is used to control manual IP address to hostname resolutions. The hosts file is the first point of lookup for DNS hostname resolution so if adversaries can modify the endpoint hosts file, they can route traffic to malicious infrastructure. This rule detects modifications to the hosts file on Microsoft Windows, Linux (Ubuntu or RHEL) and macOS systems. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [OS: Windows], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Impact], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
 
 |<<hping-process-activity, Hping Process Activity>> |Hping ran on a Linux host. Hping is a FOSS command-line packet analyzer and has the ability to construct network packets for a wide variety of network security testing applications, including scanning and firewall auditing. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<iis-http-logging-disabled, IIS HTTP Logging Disabled>> |Identifies when Internet Information Services (IIS) HTTP Logging is disabled on a server. An attacker with IIS server access via a webshell or other mechanism can disable HTTP Logging as an effective anti-forensics measure. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<iis-http-logging-disabled, IIS HTTP Logging Disabled>> |Identifies when Internet Information Services (IIS) HTTP Logging is disabled on a server. An attacker with IIS server access via a webshell or other mechanism can disable HTTP Logging as an effective anti-forensics measure. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
 
 |<<ipsec-nat-traversal-port-activity, IPSEC NAT Traversal Port Activity>> |This rule detects events that could be describing IPSEC NAT Traversal traffic. IPSEC is a VPN technology that allows one system to talk to another using encrypted tunnels. NAT Traversal enables these tunnels to communicate over the Internet where one of the sides is behind a NAT router gateway. This may be common on your network, but this technique is also used by threat actors to avoid detection. |[Tactic: Command and Control], [Domain: Endpoint], [Use Case: Threat Detection] |8.3.0 |104
 
-|<<image-file-execution-options-injection, Image File Execution Options Injection>> |The Debugger and SilentProcessExit registry keys can allow an adversary to intercept the execution of files, causing a different process to be executed. This functionality can be abused by an adversary to establish persistence. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<image-file-execution-options-injection, Image File Execution Options Injection>> |The Debugger and SilentProcessExit registry keys can allow an adversary to intercept the execution of files, causing a different process to be executed. This functionality can be abused by an adversary to establish persistence. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |106
 
 |<<image-loaded-with-invalid-signature, Image Loaded with Invalid Signature>> |Identifies binaries that are loaded and with an invalid code signature. This may indicate an attempt to masquerade as a signed binary. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |1
 
-|<<imageload-via-windows-update-auto-update-client, ImageLoad via Windows Update Auto Update Client>> |Identifies abuse of the Windows Update Auto Update Client (wuauclt.exe) to load an arbitrary DLL. This behavior is used as a defense evasion technique to blend-in malicious activity with legitimate Windows software. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
+|<<imageload-via-windows-update-auto-update-client, ImageLoad via Windows Update Auto Update Client>> |Identifies abuse of the Windows Update Auto Update Client (wuauclt.exe) to load an arbitrary DLL. This behavior is used as a defense evasion technique to blend-in malicious activity with legitimate Windows software. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |111
 
 |<<inbound-connection-to-an-unsecure-elasticsearch-node, Inbound Connection to an Unsecure Elasticsearch Node>> |Identifies Elasticsearch nodes that do not have Transport Layer Security (TLS), and/or lack authentication, and are accepting inbound network connections over the default Elasticsearch port. |[Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Domain: Endpoint] |8.3.0 |104
 
-|<<incoming-dcom-lateral-movement-via-mshta, Incoming DCOM Lateral Movement via MSHTA>> |Identifies the use of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) to execute commands from a remote host, which are launched via the HTA Application COM Object. This behavior may indicate an attacker abusing a DCOM application to move laterally while attempting to evade detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<incoming-dcom-lateral-movement-via-mshta, Incoming DCOM Lateral Movement via MSHTA>> |Identifies the use of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) to execute commands from a remote host, which are launched via the HTA Application COM Object. This behavior may indicate an attacker abusing a DCOM application to move laterally while attempting to evade detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<incoming-dcom-lateral-movement-with-mmc, Incoming DCOM Lateral Movement with MMC>> |Identifies the use of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) to run commands from a remote host, which are launched via the MMC20 Application COM Object. This behavior may indicate an attacker abusing a DCOM application to move laterally. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<incoming-dcom-lateral-movement-with-mmc, Incoming DCOM Lateral Movement with MMC>> |Identifies the use of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) to run commands from a remote host, which are launched via the MMC20 Application COM Object. This behavior may indicate an attacker abusing a DCOM application to move laterally. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<incoming-dcom-lateral-movement-with-shellbrowserwindow-or-shellwindows, Incoming DCOM Lateral Movement with ShellBrowserWindow or ShellWindows>> |Identifies use of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) to run commands from a remote host, which are launched via the ShellBrowserWindow or ShellWindows Application COM Object. This behavior may indicate an attacker abusing a DCOM application to stealthily move laterally. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<incoming-dcom-lateral-movement-with-shellbrowserwindow-or-shellwindows, Incoming DCOM Lateral Movement with ShellBrowserWindow or ShellWindows>> |Identifies use of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) to run commands from a remote host, which are launched via the ShellBrowserWindow or ShellWindows Application COM Object. This behavior may indicate an attacker abusing a DCOM application to stealthily move laterally. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<incoming-execution-via-powershell-remoting, Incoming Execution via PowerShell Remoting>> |Identifies remote execution via Windows PowerShell remoting. Windows PowerShell remoting allows a user to run any Windows PowerShell command on one or more remote computers. This could be an indication of lateral movement. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<incoming-execution-via-powershell-remoting, Incoming Execution via PowerShell Remoting>> |Identifies remote execution via Windows PowerShell remoting. Windows PowerShell remoting allows a user to run any Windows PowerShell command on one or more remote computers. This could be an indication of lateral movement. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<incoming-execution-via-winrm-remote-shell, Incoming Execution via WinRM Remote Shell>> |Identifies remote execution via Windows Remote Management (WinRM) remote shell on a target host. This could be an indication of lateral movement. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<incoming-execution-via-winrm-remote-shell, Incoming Execution via WinRM Remote Shell>> |Identifies remote execution via Windows Remote Management (WinRM) remote shell on a target host. This could be an indication of lateral movement. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |107
 
 |<<indirect-command-execution-via-forfiles-pcalua, Indirect Command Execution via Forfiles/Pcalua>> |Identifies indirect command execution via Program Compatibility Assistant (pcalua.exe) or forfiles.exe. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |1
 
@@ -750,41 +752,41 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<installutil-activity, InstallUtil Activity>> |InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy the execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |1
 
-|<<installutil-process-making-network-connections, InstallUtil Process Making Network Connections>> |Identifies InstallUtil.exe making outbound network connections. This may indicate adversarial activity as InstallUtil is often leveraged by adversaries to execute code and evade detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<installutil-process-making-network-connections, InstallUtil Process Making Network Connections>> |Identifies InstallUtil.exe making outbound network connections. This may indicate adversarial activity as InstallUtil is often leveraged by adversaries to execute code and evade detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<installation-of-custom-shim-databases, Installation of Custom Shim Databases>> |Identifies the installation of custom Application Compatibility Shim databases. This Windows functionality has been abused by attackers to stealthily gain persistence and arbitrary code execution in legitimate Windows processes. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<installation-of-custom-shim-databases, Installation of Custom Shim Databases>> |Identifies the installation of custom Application Compatibility Shim databases. This Windows functionality has been abused by attackers to stealthily gain persistence and arbitrary code execution in legitimate Windows processes. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<installation-of-security-support-provider, Installation of Security Support Provider>> |Identifies registry modifications related to the Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) configuration. Adversaries may abuse this to establish persistence in an environment. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<installation-of-security-support-provider, Installation of Security Support Provider>> |Identifies registry modifications related to the Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) configuration. Adversaries may abuse this to establish persistence in an environment. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |107
 
 |<<interactive-exec-command-launched-against-a-running-container, Interactive Exec Command Launched Against A Running Container>> |This rule detects interactive 'exec' events launched against a container using the 'exec' command. Using the 'exec' command in a pod allows a user to establish a temporary shell session and execute any process/command inside the container. This rule specifically targets higher-risk interactive commands that allow real-time interaction with a container's shell. A malicious actor could use this level of access to further compromise the container environment or attempt a container breakout. |[Data Source: Elastic Defend for Containers], [Domain: Container], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution] |8.8.0 |2
 
-|<<interactive-logon-by-an-unusual-process, Interactive Logon by an Unusual Process>> |Identifies interactive logon attempt with alternate credentials and by an unusual process. Adversaries may create a new token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation] |8.3.0 |2
+|<<interactive-logon-by-an-unusual-process, Interactive Logon by an Unusual Process>> |Identifies interactive logon attempt with alternate credentials and by an unusual process. Adversaries may create a new token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation] |8.3.0 |3
 
-|<<interactive-terminal-spawned-via-perl, Interactive Terminal Spawned via Perl>> |Identifies when a terminal (tty) is spawned via Perl. Attackers may upgrade a simple reverse shell to a fully interactive tty after obtaining initial access to a host. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<interactive-terminal-spawned-via-perl, Interactive Terminal Spawned via Perl>> |Identifies when a terminal (tty) is spawned via Perl. Attackers may upgrade a simple reverse shell to a fully interactive tty after obtaining initial access to a host. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
 
 |<<interactive-terminal-spawned-via-python, Interactive Terminal Spawned via Python>> |Identifies when a terminal (tty) is spawned via Python. Attackers may upgrade a simple reverse shell to a fully interactive tty after obtaining initial access to a host. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
 
-|<<krbtgt-delegation-backdoor, KRBTGT Delegation Backdoor>> |Identifies the modification of the msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo attribute to KRBTGT. Attackers can use this technique to maintain persistence to the domain by having the ability to request tickets for the KRBTGT service. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring], [Data Source: Active Directory] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<krbtgt-delegation-backdoor, KRBTGT Delegation Backdoor>> |Identifies the modification of the msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo attribute to KRBTGT. Attackers can use this technique to maintain persistence to the domain by having the ability to request tickets for the KRBTGT service. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring], [Data Source: Active Directory] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<kerberos-cached-credentials-dumping, Kerberos Cached Credentials Dumping>> |Identifies the use of the Kerberos credential cache (kcc) utility to dump locally cached Kerberos tickets. Adversaries may attempt to dump credential material in the form of tickets that can be leveraged for lateral movement. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<kerberos-cached-credentials-dumping, Kerberos Cached Credentials Dumping>> |Identifies the use of the Kerberos credential cache (kcc) utility to dump locally cached Kerberos tickets. Adversaries may attempt to dump credential material in the form of tickets that can be leveraged for lateral movement. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<kerberos-pre-authentication-disabled-for-user, Kerberos Pre-authentication Disabled for User>> |Identifies the modification of an account's Kerberos pre-authentication options. An adversary with GenericWrite/GenericAll rights over the account can maliciously modify these settings to perform offline password cracking attacks such as AS-REP roasting. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring], [Data Source: Active Directory] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<kerberos-pre-authentication-disabled-for-user, Kerberos Pre-authentication Disabled for User>> |Identifies the modification of an account's Kerberos pre-authentication options. An adversary with GenericWrite/GenericAll rights over the account can maliciously modify these settings to perform offline password cracking attacks such as AS-REP roasting. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring], [Data Source: Active Directory] |8.3.0 |110
 
-|<<kerberos-traffic-from-unusual-process, Kerberos Traffic from Unusual Process>> |Identifies network connections to the standard Kerberos port from an unusual process. On Windows, the only process that normally performs Kerberos traffic from a domain joined host is lsass.exe. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<kerberos-traffic-from-unusual-process, Kerberos Traffic from Unusual Process>> |Identifies network connections to the standard Kerberos port from an unusual process. On Windows, the only process that normally performs Kerberos traffic from a domain joined host is lsass.exe. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
 
 |<<kernel-driver-load, Kernel Driver Load>> |Detects the loading of a Linux kernel module through system calls. Threat actors may leverage Linux kernel modules to load a rootkit on a system providing them with complete control and the ability to hide from security products. As other rules monitor for the addition of Linux kernel modules through system utilities or .ko files, this rule covers the gap that evasive rootkits leverage by monitoring for kernel module additions on the lowest level through auditd_manager. |[Data Source: Auditd Manager], [Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.3.0 |4
 
-|<<kernel-driver-load-by-non-root-user, Kernel Driver Load by non-root User>> |Detects the loading of a Linux kernel module by a non-root user through system calls. Threat actors may leverage Linux kernel modules to load a rootkit on a system providing them with complete control and the ability to hide from security products. As other rules monitor for the addition of Linux kernel modules through system utilities or .ko files, this rule covers the gap that evasive rootkits leverage by monitoring for kernel module additions on the lowest level through auditd_manager. |[Data Source: Auditd Manager], [Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.3.0 |2
+|<<kernel-driver-load-by-non-root-user, Kernel Driver Load by non-root User>> |Detects the loading of a Linux kernel module by a non-root user through system calls. Threat actors may leverage Linux kernel modules to load a rootkit on a system providing them with complete control and the ability to hide from security products. As other rules monitor for the addition of Linux kernel modules through system utilities or .ko files, this rule covers the gap that evasive rootkits leverage by monitoring for kernel module additions on the lowest level through auditd_manager. |[Data Source: Auditd Manager], [Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.3.0 |3
 
-|<<kernel-load-or-unload-via-kexec-detected, Kernel Load or Unload via Kexec Detected>> |This detection rule identifies the usage of kexec, helping to uncover unauthorized kernel replacements and potential compromise of the system's integrity. Kexec is a Linux feature that enables the loading and execution of a different kernel without going through the typical boot process. Malicious actors can abuse kexec to bypass security measures, escalate privileges, establish persistence or hide their activities by loading a malicious kernel, enabling them to tamper with the system's trusted state, allowing e.g. a VM Escape. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |5
+|<<kernel-load-or-unload-via-kexec-detected, Kernel Load or Unload via Kexec Detected>> |This detection rule identifies the usage of kexec, helping to uncover unauthorized kernel replacements and potential compromise of the system's integrity. Kexec is a Linux feature that enables the loading and execution of a different kernel without going through the typical boot process. Malicious actors can abuse kexec to bypass security measures, escalate privileges, establish persistence or hide their activities by loading a malicious kernel, enabling them to tamper with the system's trusted state, allowing e.g. a VM Escape. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.3.0 |6
 
 |<<kernel-module-load-via-insmod, Kernel Module Load via insmod>> |Detects the use of the insmod binary to load a Linux kernel object file. Threat actors can use this binary, given they have root privileges, to load a rootkit on a system providing them with complete control and the ability to hide from security products. Manually loading a kernel module in this manner should not be at all common and can indicate suspcious or malicious behavior. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Threat: Rootkit], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.3.0 |109
 
-|<<kernel-module-removal, Kernel Module Removal>> |Kernel modules are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. This rule identifies attempts to remove a kernel module. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<kernel-module-removal, Kernel Module Removal>> |Kernel modules are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. This rule identifies attempts to remove a kernel module. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
 
-|<<keychain-password-retrieval-via-command-line, Keychain Password Retrieval via Command Line>> |Adversaries may collect keychain storage data from a system to in order to acquire credentials. Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features, including Wi-Fi and website passwords, secure notes, certificates, and Kerberos. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<keychain-password-retrieval-via-command-line, Keychain Password Retrieval via Command Line>> |Adversaries may collect keychain storage data from a system to in order to acquire credentials. Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features, including Wi-Fi and website passwords, secure notes, certificates, and Kerberos. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<kirbi-file-creation, Kirbi File Creation>> |Identifies the creation of .kirbi files. The creation of this kind of file is an indicator of an attacker running Kerberos ticket dump utilities, such as Mimikatz, and precedes attacks such as Pass-The-Ticket (PTT), which allows the attacker to impersonate users using Kerberos tickets. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |3
+|<<kirbi-file-creation, Kirbi File Creation>> |Identifies the creation of .kirbi files. The creation of this kind of file is an indicator of an attacker running Kerberos ticket dump utilities, such as Mimikatz, and precedes attacks such as Pass-The-Ticket (PTT), which allows the attacker to impersonate users using Kerberos tickets. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |4
 
 |<<kubernetes-anonymous-request-authorized, Kubernetes Anonymous Request Authorized>> |This rule detects when an unauthenticated user request is authorized within the cluster. Attackers may attempt to use anonymous accounts to gain initial access to the cluster or to avoid attribution of their activities within the cluster. This rule excludes the /healthz, /livez and /readyz endpoints which are commonly accessed anonymously. |[Data Source: Kubernetes], [Tactic: Execution], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.4.0 |6
 
@@ -810,151 +812,151 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<kubernetes-user-exec-into-pod, Kubernetes User Exec into Pod>> |This rule detects a user attempt to establish a shell session into a pod using the 'exec' command. Using the 'exec' command in a pod allows a user to establish a temporary shell session and execute any process/commands in the pod. An adversary may call bash to gain a persistent interactive shell which will allow access to any data the pod has permissions to, including secrets. |[Data Source: Kubernetes], [Tactic: Execution] |8.4.0 |203
 
-|<<lsass-memory-dump-creation, LSASS Memory Dump Creation>> |Identifies the creation of a Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (lsass.exe) default memory dump. This may indicate a credential access attempt via trusted system utilities such as Task Manager (taskmgr.exe) and SQL Dumper (sqldumper.exe) or known pentesting tools such as Dumpert and AndrewSpecial. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<lsass-memory-dump-creation, LSASS Memory Dump Creation>> |Identifies the creation of a Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (lsass.exe) default memory dump. This may indicate a credential access attempt via trusted system utilities such as Task Manager (taskmgr.exe) and SQL Dumper (sqldumper.exe) or known pentesting tools such as Dumpert and AndrewSpecial. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<lsass-memory-dump-handle-access, LSASS Memory Dump Handle Access>> |Identifies handle requests for the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) object access with specific access masks that many tools with a capability to dump memory to disk use (0x1fffff, 0x1010, 0x120089). This rule is tool agnostic as it has been validated against a host of various LSASS dump tools such as SharpDump, Procdump, Mimikatz, Comsvcs etc. It detects this behavior at a low level and does not depend on a specific tool or dump file name. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<lsass-memory-dump-handle-access, LSASS Memory Dump Handle Access>> |Identifies handle requests for the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) object access with specific access masks that many tools with a capability to dump memory to disk use (0x1fffff, 0x1010, 0x120089). This rule is tool agnostic as it has been validated against a host of various LSASS dump tools such as SharpDump, Procdump, Mimikatz, Comsvcs etc. It detects this behavior at a low level and does not depend on a specific tool or dump file name. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.3.0 |110
 
 |<<lsass-process-access-via-windows-api, LSASS Process Access via Windows API>> |Identifies access attempts to the LSASS handle, which may indicate an attempt to dump credentials from LSASS memory. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.7.0 |6
 
-|<<lateral-movement-via-startup-folder, Lateral Movement via Startup Folder>> |Identifies suspicious file creations in the startup folder of a remote system. An adversary could abuse this to move laterally by dropping a malicious script or executable that will be executed after a reboot or user logon. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<lateral-movement-via-startup-folder, Lateral Movement via Startup Folder>> |Identifies suspicious file creations in the startup folder of a remote system. An adversary could abuse this to move laterally by dropping a malicious script or executable that will be executed after a reboot or user logon. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<launch-agent-creation-or-modification-and-immediate-loading, Launch Agent Creation or Modification and Immediate Loading>> |An adversary can establish persistence by installing a new launch agent that executes at login by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<launch-agent-creation-or-modification-and-immediate-loading, Launch Agent Creation or Modification and Immediate Loading>> |An adversary can establish persistence by installing a new launch agent that executes at login by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<launchdaemon-creation-or-modification-and-immediate-loading, LaunchDaemon Creation or Modification and Immediate Loading>> |Indicates the creation or modification of a launch daemon, which adversaries may use to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<launchdaemon-creation-or-modification-and-immediate-loading, LaunchDaemon Creation or Modification and Immediate Loading>> |Indicates the creation or modification of a launch daemon, which adversaries may use to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<linux-group-creation, Linux Group Creation>> |Identifies attempts to create a new group. Attackers may create new groups to establish persistence on a system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.3.0 |3
+|<<linux-group-creation, Linux Group Creation>> |Identifies attempts to create a new group. Attackers may create new groups to establish persistence on a system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.3.0 |4
 
-|<<linux-process-hooking-via-gdb, Linux Process Hooking via GDB>> |This rule monitors for potential memory dumping through gdb. Attackers may leverage memory dumping techniques to attempt secret extraction from privileged processes. Tools that display this behavior include "truffleproc" and "bash-memory-dump". This behavior should not happen by default, and should be investigated thoroughly. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.3.0 |2
+|<<linux-process-hooking-via-gdb, Linux Process Hooking via GDB>> |This rule monitors for potential memory dumping through gdb. Attackers may leverage memory dumping techniques to attempt secret extraction from privileged processes. Tools that display this behavior include "truffleproc" and "bash-memory-dump". This behavior should not happen by default, and should be investigated thoroughly. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.3.0 |3
 
-|<<linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s, Linux Restricted Shell Breakout via Linux Binary(s)>> |Identifies the abuse of a Linux binary to break out of a restricted shell or environment by spawning an interactive system shell. The activity of spawning a shell from a binary is not common behavior for a user or system administrator, and may indicate an attempt to evade detection, increase capabilities or enhance the stability of an adversary. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |111
+|<<linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s, Linux Restricted Shell Breakout via Linux Binary(s)>> |Identifies the abuse of a Linux binary to break out of a restricted shell or environment by spawning an interactive system shell. The activity of spawning a shell from a binary is not common behavior for a user or system administrator, and may indicate an attempt to evade detection, increase capabilities or enhance the stability of an adversary. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |112
 
 |<<linux-system-information-discovery, Linux System Information Discovery>> |Enrich process events with uname and other command lines that imply Linux system information discovery. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.3.0 |3
 
-|<<linux-user-account-creation, Linux User Account Creation>> |Identifies attempts to create new users. Attackers may add new users to establish persistence on a system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.3.0 |3
+|<<linux-user-account-creation, Linux User Account Creation>> |Identifies attempts to create new users. Attackers may add new users to establish persistence on a system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.3.0 |4
 
 |<<linux-user-added-to-privileged-group, Linux User Added to Privileged Group>> |Identifies attempts to add a user to a privileged group. Attackers may add users to a privileged group in order to establish persistence on a system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.3.0 |6
 
-|<<linux-init-pid-1-secret-dump-via-gdb, Linux init (PID 1) Secret Dump via GDB>> |This rule monitors for the potential memory dump of the init process (PID 1) through gdb. Attackers may leverage memory dumping techniques to attempt secret extraction from privileged processes. Tools that display this behavior include "truffleproc" and "bash-memory-dump". This behavior should not happen by default, and should be investigated thoroughly. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |8.3.0 |5
+|<<linux-init-pid-1-secret-dump-via-gdb, Linux init (PID 1) Secret Dump via GDB>> |This rule monitors for the potential memory dump of the init process (PID 1) through gdb. Attackers may leverage memory dumping techniques to attempt secret extraction from privileged processes. Tools that display this behavior include "truffleproc" and "bash-memory-dump". This behavior should not happen by default, and should be investigated thoroughly. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |8.3.0 |6
 
-|<<local-account-tokenfilter-policy-disabled, Local Account TokenFilter Policy Disabled>> |Identifies registry modification to the LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy policy. If this value exists (which doesn't by default) and is set to 1, then remote connections from all local members of Administrators are granted full high-integrity tokens during negotiation. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |6
+|<<local-account-tokenfilter-policy-disabled, Local Account TokenFilter Policy Disabled>> |Identifies registry modification to the LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy policy. If this value exists (which doesn't by default) and is set to 1, then remote connections from all local members of Administrators are granted full high-integrity tokens during negotiation. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |7
 
-|<<local-scheduled-task-creation, Local Scheduled Task Creation>> |Indicates the creation of a scheduled task. Adversaries can use these to establish persistence, move laterally, and/or escalate privileges. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<local-scheduled-task-creation, Local Scheduled Task Creation>> |Indicates the creation of a scheduled task. Adversaries can use these to establish persistence, move laterally, and/or escalate privileges. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |106
 
 |<<mfa-deactivation-with-no-re-activation-for-okta-user-account, MFA Deactivation with no Re-Activation for Okta User Account>> |Detects multi-factor authentication (MFA) deactivation with no subsequent re-activation for an Okta user account. An adversary may deactivate MFA for an Okta user account in order to weaken the authentication requirements for the account. |[Tactic: Persistence], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Data Source: Okta], [Domain: Cloud] |8.10.0 |207
 
 |<<mfa-disabled-for-google-workspace-organization, MFA Disabled for Google Workspace Organization>> |Detects when multi-factor authentication (MFA) is disabled for a Google Workspace organization. An adversary may attempt to modify a password policy in order to weaken an organization’s security controls. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Google Workspace], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Persistence], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.4.0 |205
 
-|<<ms-office-macro-security-registry-modifications, MS Office Macro Security Registry Modifications>> |Microsoft Office Products offer options for users and developers to control the security settings for running and using Macros. Adversaries may abuse these security settings to modify the default behavior of the Office Application to trust future macros and/or disable security warnings, which could increase their chances of establishing persistence. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<ms-office-macro-security-registry-modifications, MS Office Macro Security Registry Modifications>> |Microsoft Office Products offer options for users and developers to control the security settings for running and using Macros. Adversaries may abuse these security settings to modify the default behavior of the Office Application to trust future macros and/or disable security warnings, which could increase their chances of establishing persistence. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<macos-installer-package-spawns-network-event, MacOS Installer Package Spawns Network Event>> |Detects the execution of a MacOS installer package with an abnormal child process (e.g bash) followed immediately by a network connection via a suspicious process (e.g curl). Threat actors will build and distribute malicious MacOS installer packages, which have a .pkg extension, many times imitating valid software in order to persuade and infect their victims often using the package files (e.g pre/post install scripts etc.) to download additional tools or malicious software. If this rule fires it should indicate the installation of a malicious or suspicious package. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<macos-installer-package-spawns-network-event, MacOS Installer Package Spawns Network Event>> |Detects the execution of a MacOS installer package with an abnormal child process (e.g bash) followed immediately by a network connection via a suspicious process (e.g curl). Threat actors will build and distribute malicious MacOS installer packages, which have a .pkg extension, many times imitating valid software in order to persuade and infect their victims often using the package files (e.g pre/post install scripts etc.) to download additional tools or malicious software. If this rule fires it should indicate the installation of a malicious or suspicious package. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<machine-learning-detected-dga-activity-using-a-known-sunburst-dns-domain, Machine Learning Detected DGA activity using a known SUNBURST DNS domain>> |A supervised machine learning model has identified a DNS question name that used by the SUNBURST malware and is predicted to be the result of a Domain Generation Algorithm. |[Domain: Network], [Domain: Endpoint], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Use Case: Domain Generation Algorithm Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Command and Control] |8.9.0 |2
+|<<machine-learning-detected-dga-activity-using-a-known-sunburst-dns-domain, Machine Learning Detected DGA activity using a known SUNBURST DNS domain>> |A supervised machine learning model has identified a DNS question name that used by the SUNBURST malware and is predicted to be the result of a Domain Generation Algorithm. |[Domain: Network], [Domain: Endpoint], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Use Case: Domain Generation Algorithm Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Command and Control] |8.9.0 |3
 
-|<<machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-predicted-to-be-a-dga-domain, Machine Learning Detected a DNS Request Predicted to be a DGA Domain>> |A supervised machine learning model has identified a DNS question name that is predicted to be the result of a Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA), which could indicate command and control network activity. |[Domain: Network], [Domain: Endpoint], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Use Case: Domain Generation Algorithm Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Command and Control] |8.9.0 |2
+|<<machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-predicted-to-be-a-dga-domain, Machine Learning Detected a DNS Request Predicted to be a DGA Domain>> |A supervised machine learning model has identified a DNS question name that is predicted to be the result of a Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA), which could indicate command and control network activity. |[Domain: Network], [Domain: Endpoint], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Use Case: Domain Generation Algorithm Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Command and Control] |8.9.0 |3
 
-|<<machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-with-a-high-dga-probability-score, Machine Learning Detected a DNS Request With a High DGA Probability Score>> |A supervised machine learning model has identified a DNS question name with a high probability of sourcing from a Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA), which could indicate command and control network activity. |[Domain: Network], [Domain: Endpoint], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Use Case: Domain Generation Algorithm Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Command and Control] |8.9.0 |2
+|<<machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-with-a-high-dga-probability-score, Machine Learning Detected a DNS Request With a High DGA Probability Score>> |A supervised machine learning model has identified a DNS question name with a high probability of sourcing from a Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA), which could indicate command and control network activity. |[Domain: Network], [Domain: Endpoint], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Use Case: Domain Generation Algorithm Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Command and Control] |8.9.0 |3
 
-|<<machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-predicted-to-be-malicious-activity, Machine Learning Detected a Suspicious Windows Event Predicted to be Malicious Activity>> |A supervised machine learning model (ProblemChild) has identified a suspicious Windows process event with high probability of it being malicious activity. Alternatively, the model's blocklist identified the event as being malicious. |[OS: Windows], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Use Case: Living off the Land Attack Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.9.0 |2
+|<<machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-predicted-to-be-malicious-activity, Machine Learning Detected a Suspicious Windows Event Predicted to be Malicious Activity>> |A supervised machine learning model (ProblemChild) has identified a suspicious Windows process event with high probability of it being malicious activity. Alternatively, the model's blocklist identified the event as being malicious. |[OS: Windows], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Use Case: Living off the Land Attack Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.9.0 |3
 
-|<<machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-with-a-high-malicious-probability-score, Machine Learning Detected a Suspicious Windows Event with a High Malicious Probability Score>> |A supervised machine learning model (ProblemChild) has identified a suspicious Windows process event with high probability of it being malicious activity. Alternatively, the model's blocklist identified the event as being malicious. |[OS: Windows], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Use Case: Living off the Land Attack Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.9.0 |2
+|<<machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-with-a-high-malicious-probability-score, Machine Learning Detected a Suspicious Windows Event with a High Malicious Probability Score>> |A supervised machine learning model (ProblemChild) has identified a suspicious Windows process event with high probability of it being malicious activity. Alternatively, the model's blocklist identified the event as being malicious. |[OS: Windows], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Use Case: Living off the Land Attack Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.9.0 |3
 
 |<<malware-detected-elastic-endgame, Malware - Detected - Elastic Endgame>> |Elastic Endgame detected Malware. Click the Elastic Endgame icon in the event.module column or the link in the rule.reference column for additional information. |[Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |8.3.0 |102
 
 |<<malware-prevented-elastic-endgame, Malware - Prevented - Elastic Endgame>> |Elastic Endgame prevented Malware. Click the Elastic Endgame icon in the event.module column or the link in the rule.reference column for additional information. |[Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |8.3.0 |102
 
-|<<masquerading-space-after-filename, Masquerading Space After Filename>> |This rules identifies a process created from an executable with a space appended to the end of the filename. This may indicate an attempt to masquerade a malicious file as benign to gain user execution. When a space is added to the end of certain files, the OS will execute the file according to it's true filetype instead of it's extension. Adversaries can hide a program's true filetype by changing the extension of the file. They can then add a space to the end of the name so that the OS automatically executes the file when it's double-clicked. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |5
+|<<masquerading-space-after-filename, Masquerading Space After Filename>> |This rules identifies a process created from an executable with a space appended to the end of the filename. This may indicate an attempt to masquerade a malicious file as benign to gain user execution. When a space is added to the end of certain files, the OS will execute the file according to it's true filetype instead of it's extension. Adversaries can hide a program's true filetype by changing the extension of the file. They can then add a space to the end of the name so that the OS automatically executes the file when it's double-clicked. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |6
 
 |<<member-removed-from-github-organization, Member Removed From GitHub Organization>> |A member was removed or their invitation to join was removed from a GitHub Organization. |[Domain: Cloud], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Use Case: UEBA], [Tactic: Impact], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Github] |8.3.0 |1
 
 |<<memory-dump-file-with-unusual-extension, Memory Dump File with Unusual Extension>> |Identifies the creation of a memory dump file with an unusual extension, which can indicate an attempt to disguise a memory dump as another file type to bypass security defenses. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |1
 
-|<<microsoft-365-exchange-anti-phish-policy-deletion, Microsoft 365 Exchange Anti-Phish Policy Deletion>> |Identifies the deletion of an anti-phishing policy in Microsoft 365. By default, Microsoft 365 includes built-in features that help protect users from phishing attacks. Anti-phishing polices increase this protection by refining settings to better detect and prevent attacks. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Initial Access] |8.3.0 |103
+|<<microsoft-365-exchange-anti-phish-policy-deletion, Microsoft 365 Exchange Anti-Phish Policy Deletion>> |Identifies the deletion of an anti-phishing policy in Microsoft 365. By default, Microsoft 365 includes built-in features that help protect users from phishing attacks. Anti-phishing polices increase this protection by refining settings to better detect and prevent attacks. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Initial Access] |8.3.0 |105
 
-|<<microsoft-365-exchange-anti-phish-rule-modification, Microsoft 365 Exchange Anti-Phish Rule Modification>> |Identifies the modification of an anti-phishing rule in Microsoft 365. By default, Microsoft 365 includes built-in features that help protect users from phishing attacks. Anti-phishing rules increase this protection by refining settings to better detect and prevent attacks. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Initial Access] |8.3.0 |103
+|<<microsoft-365-exchange-anti-phish-rule-modification, Microsoft 365 Exchange Anti-Phish Rule Modification>> |Identifies the modification of an anti-phishing rule in Microsoft 365. By default, Microsoft 365 includes built-in features that help protect users from phishing attacks. Anti-phishing rules increase this protection by refining settings to better detect and prevent attacks. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Initial Access] |8.3.0 |105
 
-|<<microsoft-365-exchange-dkim-signing-configuration-disabled, Microsoft 365 Exchange DKIM Signing Configuration Disabled>> |Identifies when a DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) signing configuration is disabled in Microsoft 365. With DKIM in Microsoft 365, messages that are sent from Exchange Online will be cryptographically signed. This will allow the receiving email system to validate that the messages were generated by a server that the organization authorized and were not spoofed. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.3.0 |103
+|<<microsoft-365-exchange-dkim-signing-configuration-disabled, Microsoft 365 Exchange DKIM Signing Configuration Disabled>> |Identifies when a DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) signing configuration is disabled in Microsoft 365. With DKIM in Microsoft 365, messages that are sent from Exchange Online will be cryptographically signed. This will allow the receiving email system to validate that the messages were generated by a server that the organization authorized and were not spoofed. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.3.0 |105
 
-|<<microsoft-365-exchange-dlp-policy-removed, Microsoft 365 Exchange DLP Policy Removed>> |Identifies when a Data Loss Prevention (DLP) policy is removed in Microsoft 365. An adversary may remove a DLP policy to evade existing DLP monitoring. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.3.0 |103
+|<<microsoft-365-exchange-dlp-policy-removed, Microsoft 365 Exchange DLP Policy Removed>> |Identifies when a Data Loss Prevention (DLP) policy is removed in Microsoft 365. An adversary may remove a DLP policy to evade existing DLP monitoring. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.3.0 |105
 
-|<<microsoft-365-exchange-malware-filter-policy-deletion, Microsoft 365 Exchange Malware Filter Policy Deletion>> |Identifies when a malware filter policy has been deleted in Microsoft 365. A malware filter policy is used to alert administrators that an internal user sent a message that contained malware. This may indicate an account or machine compromise that would need to be investigated. Deletion of a malware filter policy may be done to evade detection. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.3.0 |103
+|<<microsoft-365-exchange-malware-filter-policy-deletion, Microsoft 365 Exchange Malware Filter Policy Deletion>> |Identifies when a malware filter policy has been deleted in Microsoft 365. A malware filter policy is used to alert administrators that an internal user sent a message that contained malware. This may indicate an account or machine compromise that would need to be investigated. Deletion of a malware filter policy may be done to evade detection. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.3.0 |105
 
-|<<microsoft-365-exchange-malware-filter-rule-modification, Microsoft 365 Exchange Malware Filter Rule Modification>> |Identifies when a malware filter rule has been deleted or disabled in Microsoft 365. An adversary or insider threat may want to modify a malware filter rule to evade detection. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.3.0 |103
+|<<microsoft-365-exchange-malware-filter-rule-modification, Microsoft 365 Exchange Malware Filter Rule Modification>> |Identifies when a malware filter rule has been deleted or disabled in Microsoft 365. An adversary or insider threat may want to modify a malware filter rule to evade detection. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.3.0 |105
 
-|<<microsoft-365-exchange-management-group-role-assignment, Microsoft 365 Exchange Management Group Role Assignment>> |Identifies when a new role is assigned to a management group in Microsoft 365. An adversary may attempt to add a role in order to maintain persistence in an environment. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.3.0 |103
+|<<microsoft-365-exchange-management-group-role-assignment, Microsoft 365 Exchange Management Group Role Assignment>> |Identifies when a new role is assigned to a management group in Microsoft 365. An adversary may attempt to add a role in order to maintain persistence in an environment. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.3.0 |105
 
-|<<microsoft-365-exchange-safe-attachment-rule-disabled, Microsoft 365 Exchange Safe Attachment Rule Disabled>> |Identifies when a safe attachment rule is disabled in Microsoft 365. Safe attachment rules can extend malware protections to include routing all messages and attachments without a known malware signature to a special hypervisor environment. An adversary or insider threat may disable a safe attachment rule to exfiltrate data or evade defenses. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.3.0 |103
+|<<microsoft-365-exchange-safe-attachment-rule-disabled, Microsoft 365 Exchange Safe Attachment Rule Disabled>> |Identifies when a safe attachment rule is disabled in Microsoft 365. Safe attachment rules can extend malware protections to include routing all messages and attachments without a known malware signature to a special hypervisor environment. An adversary or insider threat may disable a safe attachment rule to exfiltrate data or evade defenses. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.3.0 |105
 
-|<<microsoft-365-exchange-safe-link-policy-disabled, Microsoft 365 Exchange Safe Link Policy Disabled>> |Identifies when a Safe Link policy is disabled in Microsoft 365. Safe Link policies for Office applications extend phishing protection to documents that contain hyperlinks, even after they have been delivered to a user. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Initial Access] |8.3.0 |103
+|<<microsoft-365-exchange-safe-link-policy-disabled, Microsoft 365 Exchange Safe Link Policy Disabled>> |Identifies when a Safe Link policy is disabled in Microsoft 365. Safe Link policies for Office applications extend phishing protection to documents that contain hyperlinks, even after they have been delivered to a user. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Initial Access] |8.3.0 |105
 
-|<<microsoft-365-exchange-transport-rule-creation, Microsoft 365 Exchange Transport Rule Creation>> |Identifies a transport rule creation in Microsoft 365. As a best practice, Exchange Online mail transport rules should not be set to forward email to domains outside of your organization. An adversary may create transport rules to exfiltrate data. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Exfiltration] |8.3.0 |103
+|<<microsoft-365-exchange-transport-rule-creation, Microsoft 365 Exchange Transport Rule Creation>> |Identifies a transport rule creation in Microsoft 365. As a best practice, Exchange Online mail transport rules should not be set to forward email to domains outside of your organization. An adversary may create transport rules to exfiltrate data. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Exfiltration] |8.3.0 |105
 
-|<<microsoft-365-exchange-transport-rule-modification, Microsoft 365 Exchange Transport Rule Modification>> |Identifies when a transport rule has been disabled or deleted in Microsoft 365. Mail flow rules (also known as transport rules) are used to identify and take action on messages that flow through your organization. An adversary or insider threat may modify a transport rule to exfiltrate data or evade defenses. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Exfiltration] |8.3.0 |103
+|<<microsoft-365-exchange-transport-rule-modification, Microsoft 365 Exchange Transport Rule Modification>> |Identifies when a transport rule has been disabled or deleted in Microsoft 365. Mail flow rules (also known as transport rules) are used to identify and take action on messages that flow through your organization. An adversary or insider threat may modify a transport rule to exfiltrate data or evade defenses. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Exfiltration] |8.3.0 |105
 
-|<<microsoft-365-global-administrator-role-assigned, Microsoft 365 Global Administrator Role Assigned>> |In Azure Active Directory (Azure AD), permissions to manage resources are assigned using roles. The Global Administrator is a role that enables users to have access to all administrative features in Azure AD and services that use Azure AD identities like the Microsoft 365 Defender portal, the Microsoft 365 compliance center, Exchange, SharePoint Online, and Skype for Business Online. Attackers can add users as Global Administrators to maintain access and manage all subscriptions and their settings and resources. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.3.0 |103
+|<<microsoft-365-global-administrator-role-assigned, Microsoft 365 Global Administrator Role Assigned>> |In Azure Active Directory (Azure AD), permissions to manage resources are assigned using roles. The Global Administrator is a role that enables users to have access to all administrative features in Azure AD and services that use Azure AD identities like the Microsoft 365 Defender portal, the Microsoft 365 compliance center, Exchange, SharePoint Online, and Skype for Business Online. Attackers can add users as Global Administrators to maintain access and manage all subscriptions and their settings and resources. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.3.0 |105
 
 |<<microsoft-365-impossible-travel-activity, Microsoft 365 Impossible travel activity>> |Identifies when a Microsoft Cloud App Security reported a risky sign-in attempt due to a login associated with an impossible travel. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Initial Access] |None |1
 
-|<<microsoft-365-inbox-forwarding-rule-created, Microsoft 365 Inbox Forwarding Rule Created>> |Identifies when a new Inbox forwarding rule is created in Microsoft 365. Inbox rules process messages in the Inbox based on conditions and take actions. In this case, the rules will forward the emails to a defined address. Attackers can abuse Inbox Rules to intercept and exfiltrate email data without making organization-wide configuration changes or having the corresponding privileges. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Collection] |8.3.0 |103
+|<<microsoft-365-inbox-forwarding-rule-created, Microsoft 365 Inbox Forwarding Rule Created>> |Identifies when a new Inbox forwarding rule is created in Microsoft 365. Inbox rules process messages in the Inbox based on conditions and take actions. In this case, the rules will forward the emails to a defined address. Attackers can abuse Inbox Rules to intercept and exfiltrate email data without making organization-wide configuration changes or having the corresponding privileges. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Collection] |8.3.0 |105
 
 |<<microsoft-365-mass-download-by-a-single-user, Microsoft 365 Mass download by a single user>> |Identifies when Microsoft Cloud App Security reports that a single user performs more than 50 downloads within 1 minute. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Exfiltration] |None |1
 
-|<<microsoft-365-potential-ransomware-activity, Microsoft 365 Potential ransomware activity>> |Identifies when Microsoft Cloud App Security reports that a user has uploaded files to the cloud that might be infected with ransomware. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Impact] |8.3.0 |103
+|<<microsoft-365-potential-ransomware-activity, Microsoft 365 Potential ransomware activity>> |Identifies when Microsoft Cloud App Security reports that a user has uploaded files to the cloud that might be infected with ransomware. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Impact] |8.3.0 |105
 
-|<<microsoft-365-teams-custom-application-interaction-allowed, Microsoft 365 Teams Custom Application Interaction Allowed>> |Identifies when custom applications are allowed in Microsoft Teams. If an organization requires applications other than those available in the Teams app store, custom applications can be developed as packages and uploaded. An adversary may abuse this behavior to establish persistence in an environment. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.3.0 |104
+|<<microsoft-365-teams-custom-application-interaction-allowed, Microsoft 365 Teams Custom Application Interaction Allowed>> |Identifies when custom applications are allowed in Microsoft Teams. If an organization requires applications other than those available in the Teams app store, custom applications can be developed as packages and uploaded. An adversary may abuse this behavior to establish persistence in an environment. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<microsoft-365-teams-external-access-enabled, Microsoft 365 Teams External Access Enabled>> |Identifies when external access is enabled in Microsoft Teams. External access lets Teams and Skype for Business users communicate with other users that are outside their organization. An adversary may enable external access or add an allowed domain to exfiltrate data or maintain persistence in an environment. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.3.0 |103
+|<<microsoft-365-teams-external-access-enabled, Microsoft 365 Teams External Access Enabled>> |Identifies when external access is enabled in Microsoft Teams. External access lets Teams and Skype for Business users communicate with other users that are outside their organization. An adversary may enable external access or add an allowed domain to exfiltrate data or maintain persistence in an environment. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.3.0 |105
 
-|<<microsoft-365-teams-guest-access-enabled, Microsoft 365 Teams Guest Access Enabled>> |Identifies when guest access is enabled in Microsoft Teams. Guest access in Teams allows people outside the organization to access teams and channels. An adversary may enable guest access to maintain persistence in an environment. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.3.0 |103
+|<<microsoft-365-teams-guest-access-enabled, Microsoft 365 Teams Guest Access Enabled>> |Identifies when guest access is enabled in Microsoft Teams. Guest access in Teams allows people outside the organization to access teams and channels. An adversary may enable guest access to maintain persistence in an environment. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.3.0 |105
 
-|<<microsoft-365-unusual-volume-of-file-deletion, Microsoft 365 Unusual Volume of File Deletion>> |Identifies that a user has deleted an unusually large volume of files as reported by Microsoft Cloud App Security. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Impact] |8.3.0 |103
+|<<microsoft-365-unusual-volume-of-file-deletion, Microsoft 365 Unusual Volume of File Deletion>> |Identifies that a user has deleted an unusually large volume of files as reported by Microsoft Cloud App Security. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Impact] |8.3.0 |105
 
-|<<microsoft-365-user-restricted-from-sending-email, Microsoft 365 User Restricted from Sending Email>> |Identifies when a user has been restricted from sending email due to exceeding sending limits of the service policies per the Security Compliance Center. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Initial Access] |8.3.0 |103
+|<<microsoft-365-user-restricted-from-sending-email, Microsoft 365 User Restricted from Sending Email>> |Identifies when a user has been restricted from sending email due to exceeding sending limits of the service policies per the Security Compliance Center. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Initial Access] |8.3.0 |105
 
-|<<microsoft-build-engine-started-an-unusual-process, Microsoft Build Engine Started an Unusual Process>> |An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, started a PowerShell script or the Visual C# Command Line Compiler. This technique is sometimes used to deploy a malicious payload using the Build Engine. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |209
+|<<microsoft-build-engine-started-an-unusual-process, Microsoft Build Engine Started an Unusual Process>> |An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, started a PowerShell script or the Visual C# Command Line Compiler. This technique is sometimes used to deploy a malicious payload using the Build Engine. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |210
 
-|<<microsoft-build-engine-started-by-a-script-process, Microsoft Build Engine Started by a Script Process>> |An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, was started by a script or the Windows command interpreter. This behavior is unusual and is sometimes used by malicious payloads. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |207
+|<<microsoft-build-engine-started-by-a-script-process, Microsoft Build Engine Started by a Script Process>> |An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, was started by a script or the Windows command interpreter. This behavior is unusual and is sometimes used by malicious payloads. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |208
 
-|<<microsoft-build-engine-started-by-a-system-process, Microsoft Build Engine Started by a System Process>> |An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, was started by Explorer or the WMI (Windows Management Instrumentation) subsystem. This behavior is unusual and is sometimes used by malicious payloads. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<microsoft-build-engine-started-by-a-system-process, Microsoft Build Engine Started by a System Process>> |An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, was started by Explorer or the WMI (Windows Management Instrumentation) subsystem. This behavior is unusual and is sometimes used by malicious payloads. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
 
-|<<microsoft-build-engine-started-by-an-office-application, Microsoft Build Engine Started by an Office Application>> |An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, was started by Excel or Word. This is unusual behavior for the Build Engine and could have been caused by an Excel or Word document executing a malicious script payload. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<microsoft-build-engine-started-by-an-office-application, Microsoft Build Engine Started by an Office Application>> |An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, was started by Excel or Word. This is unusual behavior for the Build Engine and could have been caused by an Excel or Word document executing a malicious script payload. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
 
-|<<microsoft-build-engine-using-an-alternate-name, Microsoft Build Engine Using an Alternate Name>> |An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, was started after being renamed. This is uncommon behavior and may indicate an attempt to run unnoticed or undetected. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
+|<<microsoft-build-engine-using-an-alternate-name, Microsoft Build Engine Using an Alternate Name>> |An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, was started after being renamed. This is uncommon behavior and may indicate an attempt to run unnoticed or undetected. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |111
 
-|<<microsoft-exchange-server-um-spawning-suspicious-processes, Microsoft Exchange Server UM Spawning Suspicious Processes>> |Identifies suspicious processes being spawned by the Microsoft Exchange Server Unified Messaging (UM) service. This activity has been observed exploiting CVE-2021-26857. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<microsoft-exchange-server-um-spawning-suspicious-processes, Microsoft Exchange Server UM Spawning Suspicious Processes>> |Identifies suspicious processes being spawned by the Microsoft Exchange Server Unified Messaging (UM) service. This activity has been observed exploiting CVE-2021-26857. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<microsoft-exchange-server-um-writing-suspicious-files, Microsoft Exchange Server UM Writing Suspicious Files>> |Identifies suspicious files being written by the Microsoft Exchange Server Unified Messaging (UM) service. This activity has been observed exploiting CVE-2021-26858. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<microsoft-exchange-server-um-writing-suspicious-files, Microsoft Exchange Server UM Writing Suspicious Files>> |Identifies suspicious files being written by the Microsoft Exchange Server Unified Messaging (UM) service. This activity has been observed exploiting CVE-2021-26858. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<microsoft-exchange-transport-agent-install-script, Microsoft Exchange Transport Agent Install Script>> |Identifies the use of Cmdlets and methods related to Microsoft Exchange Transport Agents install. Adversaries may leverage malicious Microsoft Exchange Transport Agents to execute tasks in response to adversary-defined criteria, establishing persistence. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |3
+|<<microsoft-exchange-transport-agent-install-script, Microsoft Exchange Transport Agent Install Script>> |Identifies the use of Cmdlets and methods related to Microsoft Exchange Transport Agents install. Adversaries may leverage malicious Microsoft Exchange Transport Agents to execute tasks in response to adversary-defined criteria, establishing persistence. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |4
 
-|<<microsoft-exchange-worker-spawning-suspicious-processes, Microsoft Exchange Worker Spawning Suspicious Processes>> |Identifies suspicious processes being spawned by the Microsoft Exchange Server worker process (w3wp). This activity may indicate exploitation activity or access to an existing web shell backdoor. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<microsoft-exchange-worker-spawning-suspicious-processes, Microsoft Exchange Worker Spawning Suspicious Processes>> |Identifies suspicious processes being spawned by the Microsoft Exchange Server worker process (w3wp). This activity may indicate exploitation activity or access to an existing web shell backdoor. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<microsoft-iis-connection-strings-decryption, Microsoft IIS Connection Strings Decryption>> |Identifies use of aspnet_regiis to decrypt Microsoft IIS connection strings. An attacker with Microsoft IIS web server access via a webshell or alike can decrypt and dump any hardcoded connection strings, such as the MSSQL service account password using aspnet_regiis command. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<microsoft-iis-connection-strings-decryption, Microsoft IIS Connection Strings Decryption>> |Identifies use of aspnet_regiis to decrypt Microsoft IIS connection strings. An attacker with Microsoft IIS web server access via a webshell or alike can decrypt and dump any hardcoded connection strings, such as the MSSQL service account password using aspnet_regiis command. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
 
-|<<microsoft-iis-service-account-password-dumped, Microsoft IIS Service Account Password Dumped>> |Identifies the Internet Information Services (IIS) command-line tool, AppCmd, being used to list passwords. An attacker with IIS web server access via a web shell can decrypt and dump the IIS AppPool service account password using AppCmd. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<microsoft-iis-service-account-password-dumped, Microsoft IIS Service Account Password Dumped>> |Identifies the Internet Information Services (IIS) command-line tool, AppCmd, being used to list passwords. An attacker with IIS web server access via a web shell can decrypt and dump the IIS AppPool service account password using AppCmd. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
 
-|<<microsoft-windows-defender-tampering, Microsoft Windows Defender Tampering>> |Identifies when one or more features on Microsoft Defender are disabled. Adversaries may disable or tamper with Microsoft Defender features to evade detection and conceal malicious behavior. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<microsoft-windows-defender-tampering, Microsoft Windows Defender Tampering>> |Identifies when one or more features on Microsoft Defender are disabled. Adversaries may disable or tamper with Microsoft Defender features to evade detection and conceal malicious behavior. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |109
 
-|<<mimikatz-memssp-log-file-detected, Mimikatz Memssp Log File Detected>> |Identifies the password log file from the default Mimikatz memssp module. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<mimikatz-memssp-log-file-detected, Mimikatz Memssp Log File Detected>> |Identifies the password log file from the default Mimikatz memssp module. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<modification-of-amsienable-registry-key, Modification of AmsiEnable Registry Key>> |Identifies modifications of the AmsiEnable registry key to 0, which disables the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI). An adversary can modify this key to disable AMSI protections. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<modification-of-amsienable-registry-key, Modification of AmsiEnable Registry Key>> |Identifies modifications of the AmsiEnable registry key to 0, which disables the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI). An adversary can modify this key to disable AMSI protections. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |109
 
-|<<modification-of-boot-configuration, Modification of Boot Configuration>> |Identifies use of bcdedit.exe to delete boot configuration data. This tactic is sometimes used as by malware or an attacker as a destructive technique. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Impact], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<modification-of-boot-configuration, Modification of Boot Configuration>> |Identifies use of bcdedit.exe to delete boot configuration data. This tactic is sometimes used as by malware or an attacker as a destructive technique. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Impact], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<modification-of-dynamic-linker-preload-shared-object, Modification of Dynamic Linker Preload Shared Object>> |Identifies modification of the dynamic linker preload shared object (ld.so.preload). Adversaries may execute malicious payloads by hijacking the dynamic linker used to load libraries. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |208
+|<<modification-of-dynamic-linker-preload-shared-object, Modification of Dynamic Linker Preload Shared Object>> |Identifies modification of the dynamic linker preload shared object (ld.so.preload). Adversaries may execute malicious payloads by hijacking the dynamic linker used to load libraries. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |209
 
 |<<modification-of-dynamic-linker-preload-shared-object-inside-a-container, Modification of Dynamic Linker Preload Shared Object Inside A Container>> |This rule detects the creation or modification of the dynamic linker preload shared object (ld.so.preload) inside a container. The Linux dynamic linker is used to load libraries needed by a program at runtime. Adversaries may hijack the dynamic linker by modifying the /etc/ld.so.preload file to point to malicious libraries. This behavior can be used to grant unauthorized access to system resources and has been used to evade detection of malicious processes in container environments. |[Data Source: Elastic Defend for Containers], [Domain: Container], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.8.0 |1
 
-|<<modification-of-environment-variable-via-launchctl, Modification of Environment Variable via Launchctl>> |Identifies modifications to an environment variable using the built-in launchctl command. Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking certain environment variables to load arbitrary libraries or bypass certain restrictions. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<modification-of-environment-variable-via-launchctl, Modification of Environment Variable via Launchctl>> |Identifies modifications to an environment variable using the built-in launchctl command. Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking certain environment variables to load arbitrary libraries or bypass certain restrictions. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
 |<<modification-of-openssh-binaries, Modification of OpenSSH Binaries>> |Adversaries may modify SSH related binaries for persistence or credential access by patching sensitive functions to enable unauthorized access or by logging SSH credentials for exfiltration. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
 
-|<<modification-of-safari-settings-via-defaults-command, Modification of Safari Settings via Defaults Command>> |Identifies changes to the Safari configuration using the built-in defaults command. Adversaries may attempt to enable or disable certain Safari settings, such as enabling JavaScript from Apple Events to ease in the hijacking of the users browser. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<modification-of-safari-settings-via-defaults-command, Modification of Safari Settings via Defaults Command>> |Identifies changes to the Safari configuration using the built-in defaults command. Adversaries may attempt to enable or disable certain Safari settings, such as enabling JavaScript from Apple Events to ease in the hijacking of the users browser. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
 |<<modification-of-standard-authentication-module-or-configuration, Modification of Standard Authentication Module or Configuration>> |Adversaries may modify the standard authentication module for persistence via patching the normal authorization process or modifying the login configuration to allow unauthorized access or elevate privileges. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |204
 
-|<<modification-of-wdigest-security-provider, Modification of WDigest Security Provider>> |Identifies attempts to modify the WDigest security provider in the registry to force the user's password to be stored in clear text in memory. This behavior can be indicative of an adversary attempting to weaken the security configuration of an endpoint. Once the UseLogonCredential value is modified, the adversary may attempt to dump clear text passwords from memory. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<modification-of-wdigest-security-provider, Modification of WDigest Security Provider>> |Identifies attempts to modify the WDigest security provider in the registry to force the user's password to be stored in clear text in memory. This behavior can be indicative of an adversary attempting to weaken the security configuration of an endpoint. Once the UseLogonCredential value is modified, the adversary may attempt to dump clear text passwords from memory. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<modification-of-the-mspkiaccountcredentials, Modification of the msPKIAccountCredentials>> |Identify the modification of the msPKIAccountCredentials attribute in an Active Directory User Object. Attackers can abuse the credentials roaming feature to overwrite an arbitrary file for privilege escalation. ms-PKI-AccountCredentials contains binary large objects (BLOBs) of encrypted credential objects from the credential manager store, private keys, certificates, and certificate requests. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Data Source: Active Directory], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring] |8.3.0 |8
+|<<modification-of-the-mspkiaccountcredentials, Modification of the msPKIAccountCredentials>> |Identify the modification of the msPKIAccountCredentials attribute in an Active Directory User Object. Attackers can abuse the credentials roaming feature to overwrite an arbitrary file for privilege escalation. ms-PKI-AccountCredentials contains binary large objects (BLOBs) of encrypted credential objects from the credential manager store, private keys, certificates, and certificate requests. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Data Source: Active Directory], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring] |8.3.0 |9
 
 |<<modification-or-removal-of-an-okta-application-sign-on-policy, Modification or Removal of an Okta Application Sign-On Policy>> |Detects attempts to modify or delete a sign on policy for an Okta application. An adversary may attempt to modify or delete the sign on policy for an Okta application in order to remove or weaken an organization's security controls. |[Tactic: Persistence], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Data Source: Okta] |8.10.0 |206
 
@@ -962,11 +964,11 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<mount-launched-inside-a-privileged-container, Mount Launched Inside a Privileged Container>> |This rule detects the use of the mount utility from inside a privileged container. The mount command is used to make a device or file system accessible to the system, and then to connect its root directory to a specified mount point on the local file system. When launched inside a privileged container--a container deployed with all the capabilities of the host machine-- an attacker can access sensitive host level files which could be used for further privilege escalation and container escapes to the host machine. Any usage of mount inside a running privileged container should be further investigated. |[Data Source: Elastic Defend for Containers], [Domain: Container], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation] |8.10.0 |1
 
-|<<mounting-hidden-or-webdav-remote-shares, Mounting Hidden or WebDav Remote Shares>> |Identifies the use of net.exe to mount a WebDav or hidden remote share. This may indicate lateral movement or preparation for data exfiltration. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<mounting-hidden-or-webdav-remote-shares, Mounting Hidden or WebDav Remote Shares>> |Identifies the use of net.exe to mount a WebDav or hidden remote share. This may indicate lateral movement or preparation for data exfiltration. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<msbuild-making-network-connections, MsBuild Making Network Connections>> |Identifies MsBuild.exe making outbound network connections. This may indicate adversarial activity as MsBuild is often leveraged by adversaries to execute code and evade detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<msbuild-making-network-connections, MsBuild Making Network Connections>> |Identifies MsBuild.exe making outbound network connections. This may indicate adversarial activity as MsBuild is often leveraged by adversaries to execute code and evade detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<mshta-making-network-connections, Mshta Making Network Connections>> |Identifies Mshta.exe making outbound network connections. This may indicate adversarial activity, as Mshta is often leveraged by adversaries to execute malicious scripts and evade detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<mshta-making-network-connections, Mshta Making Network Connections>> |Identifies Mshta.exe making outbound network connections. This may indicate adversarial activity, as Mshta is often leveraged by adversaries to execute malicious scripts and evade detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |106
 
 |<<multi-factor-authentication-disabled-for-an-azure-user, Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled for an Azure User>> |Identifies when multi-factor authentication (MFA) is disabled for an Azure user account. An adversary may disable MFA for a user account in order to weaken the authentication requirements for the account. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Azure], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.3.0 |105
 
@@ -974,9 +976,9 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<multiple-alerts-in-different-att-ck-tactics-on-a-single-host, Multiple Alerts in Different ATT&CK Tactics on a Single Host>> |This rule uses alert data to determine when multiple alerts in different phases of an attack involving the same host are triggered. Analysts can use this to prioritize triage and response, as these hosts are more likely to be compromised. |[Use Case: Threat Detection], [Rule Type: Higher-Order Rule] |8.3.0 |4
 
-|<<multiple-logon-failure-followed-by-logon-success, Multiple Logon Failure Followed by Logon Success>> |Identifies multiple logon failures followed by a successful one from the same source address. Adversaries will often brute force login attempts across multiple users with a common or known password, in an attempt to gain access to accounts. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.3.0 |9
+|<<multiple-logon-failure-followed-by-logon-success, Multiple Logon Failure Followed by Logon Success>> |Identifies multiple logon failures followed by a successful one from the same source address. Adversaries will often brute force login attempts across multiple users with a common or known password, in an attempt to gain access to accounts. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.3.0 |10
 
-|<<multiple-logon-failure-from-the-same-source-address, Multiple Logon Failure from the same Source Address>> |Identifies multiple consecutive logon failures from the same source address and within a short time interval. Adversaries will often brute force login attempts across multiple users with a common or known password, in an attempt to gain access to accounts. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.3.0 |8
+|<<multiple-logon-failure-from-the-same-source-address, Multiple Logon Failure from the same Source Address>> |Identifies multiple consecutive logon failures from the same source address and within a short time interval. Adversaries will often brute force login attempts across multiple users with a common or known password, in an attempt to gain access to accounts. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.3.0 |9
 
 |<<multiple-okta-client-addresses-for-a-single-user-session, Multiple Okta Client Addresses for a Single User Session>> |Detects when a user has started multiple Okta sessions with the same user account and different session IDs. This may indicate an attacker has compromised a user's Okta account and is using it to access the organization's resources. |[Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Data Source: Okta], [Tactic: Initial Access] |8.10.0 |2
 
@@ -984,13 +986,13 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<multiple-okta-user-auth-events-with-same-device-token-hash-behind-a-proxy, Multiple Okta User Auth Events with Same Device Token Hash Behind a Proxy>> |Detects when Okta user authentication events are reported for multiple users with the same device token hash behind a proxy. |[Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Data Source: Okta], [Tactic: Credential Access] |8.10.0 |2
 
-|<<multiple-vault-web-credentials-read, Multiple Vault Web Credentials Read>> |Windows Credential Manager allows you to create, view, or delete saved credentials for signing into websites, connected applications, and networks. An adversary may abuse this to list or dump credentials stored in the Credential Manager for saved usernames and passwords. This may also be performed in preparation of lateral movement. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access] |8.3.0 |9
+|<<multiple-vault-web-credentials-read, Multiple Vault Web Credentials Read>> |Windows Credential Manager allows you to create, view, or delete saved credentials for signing into websites, connected applications, and networks. An adversary may abuse this to list or dump credentials stored in the Credential Manager for saved usernames and passwords. This may also be performed in preparation of lateral movement. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access] |8.3.0 |10
 
-|<<my-first-rule, My First Rule>> |This rule helps you test and practice using alerts with Elastic Security as you get set up. It’s not a sign of threat activity. |[Use Case: Guided Onboarding], [Data Source: APM], [OS: Windows], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |8.7.0 |2
+|<<my-first-rule, My First Rule>> |This rule helps you test and practice using alerts with Elastic Security as you get set up. It’s not a sign of threat activity. |[Use Case: Guided Onboarding] |8.7.0 |3
 
-|<<ntds-or-sam-database-file-copied, NTDS or SAM Database File Copied>> |Identifies a copy operation of the Active Directory Domain Database (ntds.dit) or Security Account Manager (SAM) files. Those files contain sensitive information including hashed domain and/or local credentials. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
+|<<ntds-or-sam-database-file-copied, NTDS or SAM Database File Copied>> |Identifies a copy operation of the Active Directory Domain Database (ntds.dit) or Security Account Manager (SAM) files. Those files contain sensitive information including hashed domain and/or local credentials. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |111
 
-|<<namespace-manipulation-using-unshare, Namespace Manipulation Using Unshare>> |Identifies suspicious usage of unshare to manipulate system namespaces. Unshare can be utilized to escalate privileges or escape container security boundaries. Threat actors have utilized this binary to allow themselves to escape to the host and access other resources or escalate privileges. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |8
+|<<namespace-manipulation-using-unshare, Namespace Manipulation Using Unshare>> |Identifies suspicious usage of unshare to manipulate system namespaces. Unshare can be utilized to escalate privileges or escape container security boundaries. Threat actors have utilized this binary to allow themselves to escape to the host and access other resources or escalate privileges. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |9
 
 |<<netcat-listener-established-inside-a-container, Netcat Listener Established Inside A Container>> |This rule detects an established netcat listener running inside a container. Netcat is a utility used for reading and writing data across network connections, and it can be used for malicious purposes such as establishing a backdoor for persistence or exfiltrating data. |[Data Source: Elastic Defend for Containers], [Domain: Container], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution] |8.8.0 |2
 
@@ -998,31 +1000,33 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<netsh-helper-dll, Netsh Helper DLL>> |Identifies the addition of a Netsh Helper DLL, netsh.exe supports the addition of these DLLs to extend its functionality. Attackers may abuse this mechanism to execute malicious payloads every time the utility is executed, which can be done by administrators or a scheduled task. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |1
 
-|<<network-activity-detected-via-kworker, Network Activity Detected via Kworker>> |This rule monitors for network connections from a kworker process. kworker, or kernel worker, processes are part of the kernel's workqueue mechanism. They are responsible for executing work that has been scheduled to be done in kernel space, which might include tasks like handling interrupts, background activities, and other kernel-related tasks. Attackers may attempt to evade detection by masquerading as a kernel worker process. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |2
+|<<network-activity-detected-via-kworker, Network Activity Detected via Kworker>> |This rule monitors for network connections from a kworker process. kworker, or kernel worker, processes are part of the kernel's workqueue mechanism. They are responsible for executing work that has been scheduled to be done in kernel space, which might include tasks like handling interrupts, background activities, and other kernel-related tasks. Attackers may attempt to evade detection by masquerading as a kernel worker process. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |3
+
+|<<network-activity-detected-via-cat, Network Activity Detected via cat>> |This rule monitors for the execution of the cat command, followed by a connection attempt by the same process. Cat is capable of transfering data via tcp/udp channels by redirecting its read output to a /dev/tcp or /dev/udp channel. This activity is highly suspicious, and should be investigated. Attackers may leverage this capability to transfer tools or files to another host in the network or exfiltrate data while attempting to evade detection in the process. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |6
 
-|<<network-activity-detected-via-cat, Network Activity Detected via cat>> |This rule monitors for the execution of the cat command, followed by a connection attempt by the same process. Cat is capable of transfering data via tcp/udp channels by redirecting its read output to a /dev/tcp or /dev/udp channel. This activity is highly suspicious, and should be investigated. Attackers may leverage this capability to transfer tools or files to another host in the network or exfiltrate data while attempting to evade detection in the process. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |5
+|<<network-connection-from-binary-with-rwx-memory-region, Network Connection from Binary with RWX Memory Region>> |Monitors for the execution of a unix binary with read, write and execute memory region permissions, followed by a network connection. The mprotect() system call is used to change the access protections on a region of memory that has already been allocated. This syscall allows a process to modify the permissions of pages in its virtual address space, enabling or disabling permissions such as read, write, and execute for those pages. RWX permissions on memory is in many cases overly permissive, and should (especially in conjunction with an outbound network connection) be analyzed thoroughly. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.6.0 |1
 
-|<<network-connection-via-certutil, Network Connection via Certutil>> |Identifies certutil.exe making a network connection. Adversaries could abuse certutil.exe to download a certificate, or malware, from a remote URL. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<network-connection-via-certutil, Network Connection via Certutil>> |Identifies certutil.exe making a network connection. Adversaries could abuse certutil.exe to download a certificate, or malware, from a remote URL. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |110
 
-|<<network-connection-via-compiled-html-file, Network Connection via Compiled HTML File>> |Compiled HTML files (.chm) are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. Adversaries may conceal malicious code in a CHM file and deliver it to a victim for execution. CHM content is loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe). |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<network-connection-via-compiled-html-file, Network Connection via Compiled HTML File>> |Compiled HTML files (.chm) are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. Adversaries may conceal malicious code in a CHM file and deliver it to a victim for execution. CHM content is loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe). |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<network-connection-via-msxsl, Network Connection via MsXsl>> |Identifies msxsl.exe making a network connection. This may indicate adversarial activity as msxsl.exe is often leveraged by adversaries to execute malicious scripts and evade detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |104
+|<<network-connection-via-msxsl, Network Connection via MsXsl>> |Identifies msxsl.exe making a network connection. This may indicate adversarial activity as msxsl.exe is often leveraged by adversaries to execute malicious scripts and evade detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |105
 
-|<<network-connection-via-recently-compiled-executable, Network Connection via Recently Compiled Executable>> |This rule monitors a sequence involving a program compilation event followed by its execution and a subsequent network connection event. This behavior can indicate the set up of a reverse tcp connection to a command-and-control server. Attackers may spawn reverse shells to establish persistence onto a target system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |4
+|<<network-connection-via-recently-compiled-executable, Network Connection via Recently Compiled Executable>> |This rule monitors a sequence involving a program compilation event followed by its execution and a subsequent network connection event. This behavior can indicate the set up of a reverse tcp connection to a command-and-control server. Attackers may spawn reverse shells to establish persistence onto a target system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |5
 
-|<<network-connection-via-registration-utility, Network Connection via Registration Utility>> |Identifies the native Windows tools regsvr32.exe, regsvr64.exe, RegSvcs.exe, or RegAsm.exe making a network connection. This may be indicative of an attacker bypassing allowlists or running arbitrary scripts via a signed Microsoft binary. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<network-connection-via-registration-utility, Network Connection via Registration Utility>> |Identifies the native Windows tools regsvr32.exe, regsvr64.exe, RegSvcs.exe, or RegAsm.exe making a network connection. This may be indicative of an attacker bypassing allowlists or running arbitrary scripts via a signed Microsoft binary. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<network-connection-via-signed-binary, Network Connection via Signed Binary>> |Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates can execute on Windows systems protected by digital signature validation. Adversaries may use these binaries to 'live off the land' and execute malicious files that could bypass application allowlists and signature validation. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<network-connection-via-signed-binary, Network Connection via Signed Binary>> |Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates can execute on Windows systems protected by digital signature validation. Adversaries may use these binaries to 'live off the land' and execute malicious files that could bypass application allowlists and signature validation. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<network-logon-provider-registry-modification, Network Logon Provider Registry Modification>> |Identifies the modification of the network logon provider registry. Adversaries may register a rogue network logon provider module for persistence and/or credential access via intercepting the authentication credentials in clear text during user logon. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<network-logon-provider-registry-modification, Network Logon Provider Registry Modification>> |Identifies the modification of the network logon provider registry. Adversaries may register a rogue network logon provider module for persistence and/or credential access via intercepting the authentication credentials in clear text during user logon. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<network-traffic-capture-via-cap-net-raw, Network Traffic Capture via CAP_NET_RAW>> |Identifies the ability of a process to be able to create RAW and PACKET socket types for the available network namespaces by a non-root user. A malicious process with this capability may exploit routing between hosts, bypass network access controls, and otherwise tamper with host networking if a firewall is not in place to limit the packet types and contents. The CAP_NET_RAW capability allows the process to bind to any address within the available namespaces, which allows network traffic sniffing by a non root user. The rule identifies previously unknown processes executing with CAP_NET_RAW capabilities through the use of the new terms rule type. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.11.0 |1
+|<<network-traffic-capture-via-cap-net-raw, Network Traffic Capture via CAP_NET_RAW>> |Identifies the ability of a process to be able to create RAW and PACKET socket types for the available network namespaces by a non-root user. A malicious process with this capability may exploit routing between hosts, bypass network access controls, and otherwise tamper with host networking if a firewall is not in place to limit the packet types and contents. The CAP_NET_RAW capability allows the process to bind to any address within the available namespaces, which allows network traffic sniffing by a non root user. The rule identifies previously unknown processes executing with CAP_NET_RAW capabilities through the use of the new terms rule type. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.11.0 |2
 
 |<<network-traffic-to-rare-destination-country, Network Traffic to Rare Destination Country>> |A machine learning job detected a rare destination country name in the network logs. This can be due to initial access, persistence, command-and-control, or exfiltration activity. For example, when a user clicks on a link in a phishing email or opens a malicious document, a request may be sent to download and run a payload from a server in a country which does not normally appear in network traffic or business work-flows. Malware instances and persistence mechanisms may communicate with command-and-control (C2) infrastructure in their country of origin, which may be an unusual destination country for the source network. |[Use Case: Threat Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning] |8.3.0 |103
 
 |<<network-level-authentication-nla-disabled, Network-Level Authentication (NLA) Disabled>> |Identifies the attempt to disable Network-Level Authentication (NLA) via registry modification. Network Level Authentication (NLA) is a feature on Windows that provides an extra layer of security for Remote Desktop (RDP) connections, as it requires users to authenticate before allowing a full RDP session. Attackers can disable NLA to enable persistence methods that require access to the Windows sign-in screen without authenticating, such as Accessibility Features persistence methods, like Sticky Keys. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |2
 
-|<<new-activesyncalloweddeviceid-added-via-powershell, New ActiveSyncAllowedDeviceID Added via PowerShell>> |Identifies the use of the Exchange PowerShell cmdlet, Set-CASMailbox, to add a new ActiveSync allowed device. Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<new-activesyncalloweddeviceid-added-via-powershell, New ActiveSyncAllowedDeviceID Added via PowerShell>> |Identifies the use of the Exchange PowerShell cmdlet, Set-CASMailbox, to add a new ActiveSync allowed device. Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
 
 |<<new-github-app-installed, New GitHub App Installed>> |This rule detects when a new GitHub App has been installed in your organization account. GitHub Apps extend GitHub's functionality both within and outside of GitHub. When an app is installed it is granted permissions to read or modify your repository and organization data. Only trusted apps should be installed and any newly installed apps should be investigated to verify their legitimacy. Unauthorized app installation could lower your organization's security posture and leave you exposed for future attacks. |[Domain: Cloud], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Github] |8.3.0 |1
 
@@ -1032,25 +1036,25 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<new-okta-identity-provider-idp-added-by-admin, New Okta Identity Provider (IdP) Added by Admin>> |Detects the creation of a new Identity Provider (IdP) by a Super Administrator or Organization Administrator within Okta. |[Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Okta] |8.10.0 |1
 
-|<<new-systemd-service-created-by-previously-unknown-process, New Systemd Service Created by Previously Unknown Process>> |Systemd service files are configuration files in Linux systems used to define and manage system services. Malicious actors can leverage systemd service files to achieve persistence by creating or modifying service files to execute malicious commands or payloads during system startup. This allows them to maintain unauthorized access, execute additional malicious activities, or evade detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |8
+|<<new-systemd-service-created-by-previously-unknown-process, New Systemd Service Created by Previously Unknown Process>> |Systemd service files are configuration files in Linux systems used to define and manage system services. Malicious actors can leverage systemd service files to achieve persistence by creating or modifying service files to execute malicious commands or payloads during system startup. This allows them to maintain unauthorized access, execute additional malicious activities, or evade detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |9
 
-|<<new-systemd-timer-created, New Systemd Timer Created>> |Detects the creation of a systemd timer within any of the default systemd timer directories. Systemd timers can be used by an attacker to gain persistence, by scheduling the execution of a command or script. Similarly to cron/at, systemd timers can be set up to execute on boot time, or on a specific point in time, which allows attackers to regain access in case the connection to the infected asset was lost. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |8
+|<<new-systemd-timer-created, New Systemd Timer Created>> |Detects the creation of a systemd timer within any of the default systemd timer directories. Systemd timers can be used by an attacker to gain persistence, by scheduling the execution of a command or script. Similarly to cron/at, systemd timers can be set up to execute on boot time, or on a specific point in time, which allows attackers to regain access in case the connection to the infected asset was lost. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |9
 
 |<<new-user-added-to-github-organization, New User Added To GitHub Organization>> |A new user was added to a GitHub organization. |[Domain: Cloud], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Use Case: UEBA], [Tactic: Persistence], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Github] |8.3.0 |1
 
-|<<new-or-modified-federation-domain, New or Modified Federation Domain>> |Identifies a new or modified federation domain, which can be used to create a trust between O365 and an external identity provider. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation] |8.3.0 |103
+|<<new-or-modified-federation-domain, New or Modified Federation Domain>> |Identifies a new or modified federation domain, which can be used to create a trust between O365 and an external identity provider. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation] |8.3.0 |105
 
 |<<nping-process-activity, Nping Process Activity>> |Nping ran on a Linux host. Nping is part of the Nmap tool suite and has the ability to construct raw packets for a wide variety of security testing applications, including denial of service testing. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<nullsessionpipe-registry-modification, NullSessionPipe Registry Modification>> |Identifies NullSessionPipe registry modifications that specify which pipes can be accessed anonymously. This could be indicative of adversary lateral movement preparation by making the added pipe available to everyone. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<nullsessionpipe-registry-modification, NullSessionPipe Registry Modification>> |Identifies NullSessionPipe registry modifications that specify which pipes can be accessed anonymously. This could be indicative of adversary lateral movement preparation by making the added pipe available to everyone. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<o365-email-reported-by-user-as-malware-or-phish, O365 Email Reported by User as Malware or Phish>> |Detects the occurrence of emails reported as Phishing or Malware by Users. Security Awareness training is essential to stay ahead of scammers and threat actors, as security products can be bypassed, and the user can still receive a malicious message. Educating users to report suspicious messages can help identify gaps in security controls and prevent malware infections and Business Email Compromise attacks. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Tactic: Initial Access] |8.3.0 |103
+|<<o365-email-reported-by-user-as-malware-or-phish, O365 Email Reported by User as Malware or Phish>> |Detects the occurrence of emails reported as Phishing or Malware by Users. Security Awareness training is essential to stay ahead of scammers and threat actors, as security products can be bypassed, and the user can still receive a malicious message. Educating users to report suspicious messages can help identify gaps in security controls and prevent malware infections and Business Email Compromise attacks. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Tactic: Initial Access] |8.3.0 |105
 
-|<<o365-excessive-single-sign-on-logon-errors, O365 Excessive Single Sign-On Logon Errors>> |Identifies accounts with a high number of single sign-on (SSO) logon errors. Excessive logon errors may indicate an attempt to brute force a password or SSO token. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Credential Access] |8.3.0 |104
+|<<o365-excessive-single-sign-on-logon-errors, O365 Excessive Single Sign-On Logon Errors>> |Identifies accounts with a high number of single sign-on (SSO) logon errors. Excessive logon errors may indicate an attempt to brute force a password or SSO token. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Credential Access] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<o365-exchange-suspicious-mailbox-right-delegation, O365 Exchange Suspicious Mailbox Right Delegation>> |Identifies the assignment of rights to access content from another mailbox. An adversary may use the compromised account to send messages to other accounts in the network of the target organization while creating inbox rules, so messages can evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.3.0 |103
+|<<o365-exchange-suspicious-mailbox-right-delegation, O365 Exchange Suspicious Mailbox Right Delegation>> |Identifies the assignment of rights to access content from another mailbox. An adversary may use the compromised account to send messages to other accounts in the network of the target organization while creating inbox rules, so messages can evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.3.0 |105
 
-|<<o365-mailbox-audit-logging-bypass, O365 Mailbox Audit Logging Bypass>> |Detects the occurrence of mailbox audit bypass associations. The mailbox audit is responsible for logging specified mailbox events (like accessing a folder or a message or permanently deleting a message). However, actions taken by some authorized accounts, such as accounts used by third-party tools or accounts used for lawful monitoring, can create a large number of mailbox audit log entries and may not be of interest to your organization. Because of this, administrators can create bypass associations, allowing certain accounts to perform their tasks without being logged. Attackers can abuse this allowlist mechanism to conceal actions taken, as the mailbox audit will log no activity done by the account. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.3.0 |103
+|<<o365-mailbox-audit-logging-bypass, O365 Mailbox Audit Logging Bypass>> |Detects the occurrence of mailbox audit bypass associations. The mailbox audit is responsible for logging specified mailbox events (like accessing a folder or a message or permanently deleting a message). However, actions taken by some authorized accounts, such as accounts used by third-party tools or accounts used for lawful monitoring, can create a large number of mailbox audit log entries and may not be of interest to your organization. Because of this, administrators can create bypass associations, allowing certain accounts to perform their tasks without being logged. Attackers can abuse this allowlist mechanism to conceal actions taken, as the mailbox audit will log no activity done by the account. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.3.0 |105
 
 |<<office-test-registry-persistence, Office Test Registry Persistence>> |Identifies the modification of the Microsoft Office "Office Test" Registry key, a registry location that can be used to specify a DLL which will be executed every time an MS Office application is started. Attackers can abuse this to gain persistence on a compromised host. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |2
 
@@ -1066,169 +1070,167 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<okta-user-sessions-started-from-different-geolocations, Okta User Sessions Started from Different Geolocations>> |Detects when a specific Okta actor has multiple sessions started from different geolocations. |[Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Data Source: Okta], [Tactic: Initial Access] |8.10.0 |1
 
-|<<onedrive-malware-file-upload, OneDrive Malware File Upload>> |Identifies the occurence of files uploaded to OneDrive being detected as Malware by the file scanning engine. Attackers can use File Sharing and Organization Repositories to spread laterally within the company and amplify their access. Users can inadvertently share these files without knowing their maliciousness, giving adversaries opportunity to gain initial access to other endpoints in the environment. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Tactic: Lateral Movement] |8.3.0 |103
+|<<onedrive-malware-file-upload, OneDrive Malware File Upload>> |Identifies the occurence of files uploaded to OneDrive being detected as Malware by the file scanning engine. Attackers can use File Sharing and Organization Repositories to spread laterally within the company and amplify their access. Users can inadvertently share these files without knowing their maliciousness, giving adversaries opportunity to gain initial access to other endpoints in the environment. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Tactic: Lateral Movement] |8.3.0 |105
 
-|<<outbound-scheduled-task-activity-via-powershell, Outbound Scheduled Task Activity via PowerShell>> |Identifies the PowerShell process loading the Task Scheduler COM DLL followed by an outbound RPC network connection within a short time period. This may indicate lateral movement or remote discovery via scheduled tasks. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<outbound-scheduled-task-activity-via-powershell, Outbound Scheduled Task Activity via PowerShell>> |Identifies the PowerShell process loading the Task Scheduler COM DLL followed by an outbound RPC network connection within a short time period. This may indicate lateral movement or remote discovery via scheduled tasks. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |106
 
 |<<parent-process-pid-spoofing, Parent Process PID Spoofing>> |Identifies parent process spoofing used to thwart detection. Adversaries may spoof the parent process identifier (PPID) of a new process to evade process-monitoring defenses or to elevate privileges. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
 
-|<<peripheral-device-discovery, Peripheral Device Discovery>> |Identifies use of the Windows file system utility (fsutil.exe) to gather information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<peripheral-device-discovery, Peripheral Device Discovery>> |Identifies use of the Windows file system utility (fsutil.exe) to gather information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
 
 |<<permission-theft-detected-elastic-endgame, Permission Theft - Detected - Elastic Endgame>> |Elastic Endgame detected Permission Theft. Click the Elastic Endgame icon in the event.module column or the link in the rule.reference column for additional information. |[Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation] |8.3.0 |102
 
 |<<permission-theft-prevented-elastic-endgame, Permission Theft - Prevented - Elastic Endgame>> |Elastic Endgame prevented Permission Theft. Click the Elastic Endgame icon in the event.module column or the link in the rule.reference column for additional information. |[Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation] |8.3.0 |102
 
-|<<persistence-via-bits-job-notify-cmdline, Persistence via BITS Job Notify Cmdline>> |An adversary can use the Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) SetNotifyCmdLine method to execute a program that runs after a job finishes transferring data or after a job enters a specified state in order to persist on a system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<persistence-via-bits-job-notify-cmdline, Persistence via BITS Job Notify Cmdline>> |An adversary can use the Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) SetNotifyCmdLine method to execute a program that runs after a job finishes transferring data or after a job enters a specified state in order to persist on a system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<persistence-via-directoryservice-plugin-modification, Persistence via DirectoryService Plugin Modification>> |Identifies the creation or modification of a DirectoryService PlugIns (dsplug) file. The DirectoryService daemon launches on each system boot and automatically reloads after crash. It scans and executes bundles that are located in the DirectoryServices PlugIns folder and can be abused by adversaries to maintain persistence. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<persistence-via-directoryservice-plugin-modification, Persistence via DirectoryService Plugin Modification>> |Identifies the creation or modification of a DirectoryService PlugIns (dsplug) file. The DirectoryService daemon launches on each system boot and automatically reloads after crash. It scans and executes bundles that are located in the DirectoryServices PlugIns folder and can be abused by adversaries to maintain persistence. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<persistence-via-docker-shortcut-modification, Persistence via Docker Shortcut Modification>> |An adversary can establish persistence by modifying an existing macOS dock property list in order to execute a malicious application instead of the intended one when invoked. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<persistence-via-docker-shortcut-modification, Persistence via Docker Shortcut Modification>> |An adversary can establish persistence by modifying an existing macOS dock property list in order to execute a malicious application instead of the intended one when invoked. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<persistence-via-folder-action-script, Persistence via Folder Action Script>> |Detects modification of a Folder Action script. A Folder Action script is executed when the folder to which it is attached has items added or removed, or when its window is opened, closed, moved, or resized. Adversaries may abuse this feature to establish persistence by utilizing a malicious script. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<persistence-via-folder-action-script, Persistence via Folder Action Script>> |Detects modification of a Folder Action script. A Folder Action script is executed when the folder to which it is attached has items added or removed, or when its window is opened, closed, moved, or resized. Adversaries may abuse this feature to establish persistence by utilizing a malicious script. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<persistence-via-hidden-run-key-detected, Persistence via Hidden Run Key Detected>> |Identifies a persistence mechanism that utilizes the NtSetValueKey native API to create a hidden (null terminated) registry key. An adversary may use this method to hide from system utilities such as the Registry Editor (regedit). |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<persistence-via-hidden-run-key-detected, Persistence via Hidden Run Key Detected>> |Identifies a persistence mechanism that utilizes the NtSetValueKey native API to create a hidden (null terminated) registry key. An adversary may use this method to hide from system utilities such as the Registry Editor (regedit). |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<persistence-via-kde-autostart-script-or-desktop-file-modification, Persistence via KDE AutoStart Script or Desktop File Modification>> |Identifies the creation or modification of a K Desktop Environment (KDE) AutoStart script or desktop file that will execute upon each user logon. Adversaries may abuse this method for persistence. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<persistence-via-kde-autostart-script-or-desktop-file-modification, Persistence via KDE AutoStart Script or Desktop File Modification>> |Identifies the creation or modification of a K Desktop Environment (KDE) AutoStart script or desktop file that will execute upon each user logon. Adversaries may abuse this method for persistence. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
 
-|<<persistence-via-login-or-logout-hook, Persistence via Login or Logout Hook>> |Identifies use of the Defaults command to install a login or logoff hook in MacOS. An adversary may abuse this capability to establish persistence in an environment by inserting code to be executed at login or logout. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<persistence-via-login-or-logout-hook, Persistence via Login or Logout Hook>> |Identifies use of the Defaults command to install a login or logoff hook in MacOS. An adversary may abuse this capability to establish persistence in an environment by inserting code to be executed at login or logout. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<persistence-via-microsoft-office-addins, Persistence via Microsoft Office AddIns>> |Detects attempts to establish persistence on an endpoint by abusing Microsoft Office add-ins. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<persistence-via-microsoft-office-addins, Persistence via Microsoft Office AddIns>> |Detects attempts to establish persistence on an endpoint by abusing Microsoft Office add-ins. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<persistence-via-microsoft-outlook-vba, Persistence via Microsoft Outlook VBA>> |Detects attempts to establish persistence on an endpoint by installing a rogue Microsoft Outlook VBA Template. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<persistence-via-microsoft-outlook-vba, Persistence via Microsoft Outlook VBA>> |Detects attempts to establish persistence on an endpoint by installing a rogue Microsoft Outlook VBA Template. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<persistence-via-powershell-profile, Persistence via PowerShell profile>> |Identifies the creation or modification of a PowerShell profile. PowerShell profile is a script that is executed when PowerShell starts to customize the user environment, which can be abused by attackers to persist in a environment where PowerShell is common. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |7
+|<<persistence-via-powershell-profile, Persistence via PowerShell profile>> |Identifies the creation or modification of a PowerShell profile. PowerShell profile is a script that is executed when PowerShell starts to customize the user environment, which can be abused by attackers to persist in a environment where PowerShell is common. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |8
 
-|<<persistence-via-scheduled-job-creation, Persistence via Scheduled Job Creation>> |A job can be used to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<persistence-via-scheduled-job-creation, Persistence via Scheduled Job Creation>> |A job can be used to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<persistence-via-telemetrycontroller-scheduled-task-hijack, Persistence via TelemetryController Scheduled Task Hijack>> |Detects the successful hijack of Microsoft Compatibility Appraiser scheduled task to establish persistence with an integrity level of system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<persistence-via-telemetrycontroller-scheduled-task-hijack, Persistence via TelemetryController Scheduled Task Hijack>> |Detects the successful hijack of Microsoft Compatibility Appraiser scheduled task to establish persistence with an integrity level of system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
 
-|<<persistence-via-update-orchestrator-service-hijack, Persistence via Update Orchestrator Service Hijack>> |Identifies potential hijacking of the Microsoft Update Orchestrator Service to establish persistence with an integrity level of SYSTEM. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<persistence-via-update-orchestrator-service-hijack, Persistence via Update Orchestrator Service Hijack>> |Identifies potential hijacking of the Microsoft Update Orchestrator Service to establish persistence with an integrity level of SYSTEM. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
 
-|<<persistence-via-wmi-event-subscription, Persistence via WMI Event Subscription>> |An adversary can use Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<persistence-via-wmi-event-subscription, Persistence via WMI Event Subscription>> |An adversary can use Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
 
-|<<persistence-via-wmi-standard-registry-provider, Persistence via WMI Standard Registry Provider>> |Identifies use of the Windows Management Instrumentation StdRegProv (registry provider) to modify commonly abused registry locations for persistence. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<persistence-via-wmi-standard-registry-provider, Persistence via WMI Standard Registry Provider>> |Identifies use of the Windows Management Instrumentation StdRegProv (registry provider) to modify commonly abused registry locations for persistence. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<persistent-scripts-in-the-startup-directory, Persistent Scripts in the Startup Directory>> |Identifies script engines creating files in the Startup folder, or the creation of script files in the Startup folder. Adversaries may abuse this technique to maintain persistence in an environment. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<persistent-scripts-in-the-startup-directory, Persistent Scripts in the Startup Directory>> |Identifies script engines creating files in the Startup folder, or the creation of script files in the Startup folder. Adversaries may abuse this technique to maintain persistence in an environment. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |110
 
-|<<port-forwarding-rule-addition, Port Forwarding Rule Addition>> |Identifies the creation of a new port forwarding rule. An adversary may abuse this technique to bypass network segmentation restrictions. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<port-forwarding-rule-addition, Port Forwarding Rule Addition>> |Identifies the creation of a new port forwarding rule. An adversary may abuse this technique to bypass network segmentation restrictions. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |109
 
-|<<possible-consent-grant-attack-via-azure-registered-application, Possible Consent Grant Attack via Azure-Registered Application>> |Detects when a user grants permissions to an Azure-registered application or when an administrator grants tenant-wide permissions to an application. An adversary may create an Azure-registered application that requests access to data such as contact information, email, or documents. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Azure], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Tactic: Initial Access] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<possible-consent-grant-attack-via-azure-registered-application, Possible Consent Grant Attack via Azure-Registered Application>> |Detects when a user grants permissions to an Azure-registered application or when an administrator grants tenant-wide permissions to an application. An adversary may create an Azure-registered application that requests access to data such as contact information, email, or documents. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Azure], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Tactic: Initial Access] |8.3.0 |109
 
 |<<possible-fin7-dga-command-and-control-behavior, Possible FIN7 DGA Command and Control Behavior>> |This rule detects a known command and control pattern in network events. The FIN7 threat group is known to use this command and control technique, while maintaining persistence in their target's network. |[Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Domain: Endpoint] |8.3.0 |105
 
 |<<possible-okta-dos-attack, Possible Okta DoS Attack>> |Detects possible Denial of Service (DoS) attacks against an Okta organization. An adversary may attempt to disrupt an organization's business operations by performing a DoS attack against its Okta service. |[Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Data Source: Okta], [Tactic: Impact] |8.10.0 |205
 
-|<<potential-admin-group-account-addition, Potential Admin Group Account Addition>> |Identifies attempts to add an account to the admin group via the command line. This could be an indication of privilege escalation activity. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<potential-admin-group-account-addition, Potential Admin Group Account Addition>> |Identifies attempts to add an account to the admin group via the command line. This could be an indication of privilege escalation activity. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<potential-antimalware-scan-interface-bypass-via-powershell, Potential Antimalware Scan Interface Bypass via PowerShell>> |Identifies the execution of PowerShell script with keywords related to different Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) bypasses. An adversary may attempt first to disable AMSI before executing further malicious powershell scripts to evade detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.3.0 |7
+|<<potential-antimalware-scan-interface-bypass-via-powershell, Potential Antimalware Scan Interface Bypass via PowerShell>> |Identifies the execution of PowerShell script with keywords related to different Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) bypasses. An adversary may attempt first to disable AMSI before executing further malicious powershell scripts to evade detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.3.0 |8
 
-|<<potential-application-shimming-via-sdbinst, Potential Application Shimming via Sdbinst>> |The Application Shim was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating system codebase changes over time. This Windows functionality has been abused by attackers to stealthily gain persistence and arbitrary code execution in legitimate Windows processes. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<potential-application-shimming-via-sdbinst, Potential Application Shimming via Sdbinst>> |The Application Shim was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating system codebase changes over time. This Windows functionality has been abused by attackers to stealthily gain persistence and arbitrary code execution in legitimate Windows processes. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
 
-|<<potential-buffer-overflow-attack-detected, Potential Buffer Overflow Attack Detected>> |Detects potential buffer overflow attacks by querying the "Segfault Detected" pre-built rule signal index, through a threshold rule, with a minimum number of 100 segfault alerts in a short timespan. A large amount of segfaults in a short time interval could indicate application exploitation attempts. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Rule Type: Higher-Order Rule] |8.3.0 |1
+|<<potential-buffer-overflow-attack-detected, Potential Buffer Overflow Attack Detected>> |Detects potential buffer overflow attacks by querying the "Segfault Detected" pre-built rule signal index, through a threshold rule, with a minimum number of 100 segfault alerts in a short timespan. A large amount of segfaults in a short time interval could indicate application exploitation attempts. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Rule Type: Higher-Order Rule] |8.3.0 |2
 
-|<<potential-chroot-container-escape-via-mount, Potential Chroot Container Escape via Mount>> |Monitors for the execution of a file system mount followed by a chroot execution. Given enough permissions, a user within a container is capable of mounting the root file system of the host, and leveraging chroot to escape its containarized environment. This behavior pattern is very uncommon and should be investigated. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Domain: Container], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |1
+|<<potential-chroot-container-escape-via-mount, Potential Chroot Container Escape via Mount>> |Monitors for the execution of a file system mount followed by a chroot execution. Given enough permissions, a user within a container is capable of mounting the root file system of the host, and leveraging chroot to escape its containarized environment. This behavior pattern is very uncommon and should be investigated. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Domain: Container], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |2
 
-|<<potential-code-execution-via-postgresql, Potential Code Execution via Postgresql>> |This rule monitors for suspicious activities that may indicate an attacker attempting to execute arbitrary code within a PostgreSQL environment. Attackers can execute code via PostgreSQL as a result of gaining unauthorized access to a public facing PostgreSQL database or exploiting vulnerabilities, such as remote command execution and SQL injection attacks, which can result in unauthorized access and malicious actions, and facilitate post-exploitation activities for unauthorized access and malicious actions. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |5
+|<<potential-code-execution-via-postgresql, Potential Code Execution via Postgresql>> |This rule monitors for suspicious activities that may indicate an attacker attempting to execute arbitrary code within a PostgreSQL environment. Attackers can execute code via PostgreSQL as a result of gaining unauthorized access to a public facing PostgreSQL database or exploiting vulnerabilities, such as remote command execution and SQL injection attacks, which can result in unauthorized access and malicious actions, and facilitate post-exploitation activities for unauthorized access and malicious actions. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |6
 
-|<<potential-command-and-control-via-internet-explorer, Potential Command and Control via Internet Explorer>> |Identifies instances of Internet Explorer (iexplore.exe) being started via the Component Object Model (COM) making unusual network connections. Adversaries could abuse Internet Explorer via COM to avoid suspicious processes making network connections and bypass host-based firewall restrictions. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |104
+|<<potential-command-and-control-via-internet-explorer, Potential Command and Control via Internet Explorer>> |Identifies instances of Internet Explorer (iexplore.exe) being started via the Component Object Model (COM) making unusual network connections. Adversaries could abuse Internet Explorer via COM to avoid suspicious processes making network connections and bypass host-based firewall restrictions. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
 
 |<<potential-container-escape-via-modified-notify-on-release-file, Potential Container Escape via Modified notify_on_release File>> |This rule detects modification of the cgroup notify_on_release file from inside a container. When the notify_on_release flag is enabled (1) in a cgroup, then whenever the last task in the cgroup exits or attaches to another cgroup, the command specified in the release_agent file is run and invoked from the host. A privileged container with SYS_ADMIN capabilities, enables a threat actor to mount a cgroup directory and modify the notify_on_release flag in order to take advantage of this feature, which could be used for further privilege escalation and container escapes to the host machine. |[Data Source: Elastic Defend for Containers], [Domain: Container], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation] |8.8.0 |1
 
 |<<potential-container-escape-via-modified-release-agent-file, Potential Container Escape via Modified release_agent File>> |This rule detects modification of the CGroup release_agent file from inside a privileged container. The release_agent is a script that is executed at the termination of any process on that CGroup and is invoked from the host. A privileged container with SYS_ADMIN capabilities, enables a threat actor to mount a CGroup directory and modify the release_agent which could be used for further privilege escalation and container escapes to the host machine. |[Data Source: Elastic Defend for Containers], [Domain: Container], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation] |8.8.0 |1
 
-|<<potential-cookies-theft-via-browser-debugging, Potential Cookies Theft via Browser Debugging>> |Identifies the execution of a Chromium based browser with the debugging process argument, which may indicate an attempt to steal authentication cookies. An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [OS: Windows], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |104
+|<<potential-cookies-theft-via-browser-debugging, Potential Cookies Theft via Browser Debugging>> |Identifies the execution of a Chromium based browser with the debugging process argument, which may indicate an attempt to steal authentication cookies. An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [OS: Windows], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
 
-|<<potential-credential-access-via-dcsync, Potential Credential Access via DCSync>> |This rule identifies when a User Account starts the Active Directory Replication Process. Attackers can use the DCSync technique to get credential information of individual accounts or the entire domain, thus compromising the entire domain. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Active Directory], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring] |8.3.0 |112
+|<<potential-credential-access-via-dcsync, Potential Credential Access via DCSync>> |This rule identifies when a User Account starts the Active Directory Replication Process. Attackers can use the DCSync technique to get credential information of individual accounts or the entire domain, thus compromising the entire domain. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Active Directory], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring] |8.3.0 |113
 
-|<<potential-credential-access-via-duplicatehandle-in-lsass, Potential Credential Access via DuplicateHandle in LSASS>> |Identifies suspicious access to an LSASS handle via DuplicateHandle from an unknown call trace module. This may indicate an attempt to bypass the NtOpenProcess API to evade detection and dump LSASS memory for credential access. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Sysmon Only] |8.8.0 |207
+|<<potential-credential-access-via-duplicatehandle-in-lsass, Potential Credential Access via DuplicateHandle in LSASS>> |Identifies suspicious access to an LSASS handle via DuplicateHandle from an unknown call trace module. This may indicate an attempt to bypass the NtOpenProcess API to evade detection and dump LSASS memory for credential access. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.8.0 |208
 
-|<<potential-credential-access-via-lsass-memory-dump, Potential Credential Access via LSASS Memory Dump>> |Identifies suspicious access to LSASS handle from a call trace pointing to DBGHelp.dll or DBGCore.dll, which both export the MiniDumpWriteDump method that can be used to dump LSASS memory content in preparation for credential access. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Tactic:Execution], [Data Source: Sysmon Only] |8.8.0 |208
+|<<potential-credential-access-via-lsass-memory-dump, Potential Credential Access via LSASS Memory Dump>> |Identifies suspicious access to LSASS handle from a call trace pointing to DBGHelp.dll or DBGCore.dll, which both export the MiniDumpWriteDump method that can be used to dump LSASS memory content in preparation for credential access. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Tactic:Execution], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.8.0 |209
 
 |<<potential-credential-access-via-memory-dump-file-creation, Potential Credential Access via Memory Dump File Creation>> |Identifies the creation or modification of a medium size memory dump file which can indicate an attempt to access credentials from a process memory. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |2
 
-|<<potential-credential-access-via-renamed-com-services-dll, Potential Credential Access via Renamed COM+ Services DLL>> |Identifies suspicious renamed COMSVCS.DLL Image Load, which exports the MiniDump function that can be used to dump a process memory. This may indicate an attempt to dump LSASS memory while bypassing command-line based detection in preparation for credential access. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Sysmon Only] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<potential-credential-access-via-renamed-com-services-dll, Potential Credential Access via Renamed COM+ Services DLL>> |Identifies suspicious renamed COMSVCS.DLL Image Load, which exports the MiniDump function that can be used to dump a process memory. This may indicate an attempt to dump LSASS memory while bypassing command-line based detection in preparation for credential access. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<potential-credential-access-via-trusted-developer-utility, Potential Credential Access via Trusted Developer Utility>> |An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, loaded DLLs (dynamically linked libraries) responsible for Windows credential management. This technique is sometimes used for credential dumping. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<potential-credential-access-via-trusted-developer-utility, Potential Credential Access via Trusted Developer Utility>> |An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, loaded DLLs (dynamically linked libraries) responsible for Windows credential management. This technique is sometimes used for credential dumping. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |109
 
-|<<potential-credential-access-via-windows-utilities, Potential Credential Access via Windows Utilities>> |Identifies the execution of known Windows utilities often abused to dump LSASS memory or the Active Directory database (NTDS.dit) in preparation for credential access. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
+|<<potential-credential-access-via-windows-utilities, Potential Credential Access via Windows Utilities>> |Identifies the execution of known Windows utilities often abused to dump LSASS memory or the Active Directory database (NTDS.dit) in preparation for credential access. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |111
 
 |<<potential-cross-site-scripting-xss, Potential Cross Site Scripting (XSS)>> |Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) is a type of attack in which malicious scripts are injected into trusted websites. In XSS attacks, an attacker uses a benign web application to send malicious code, generally in the form of a browser-side script. This detection rule identifies the potential malicious executions of such browser-side scripts. |[Data Source: APM], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Initial Access] |8.3.0 |1
 
-|<<potential-dga-activity, Potential DGA Activity>> |A population analysis machine learning job detected potential DGA (domain generation algorithm) activity. Such activity is often used by malware command and control (C2) channels. This machine learning job looks for a source IP address making DNS requests that have an aggregate high probability of being DGA activity. |[Use Case: Domain Generation Algorithm Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Command and Control] |8.9.0 |2
+|<<potential-dga-activity, Potential DGA Activity>> |A population analysis machine learning job detected potential DGA (domain generation algorithm) activity. Such activity is often used by malware command and control (C2) channels. This machine learning job looks for a source IP address making DNS requests that have an aggregate high probability of being DGA activity. |[Use Case: Domain Generation Algorithm Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Command and Control] |8.9.0 |3
 
-|<<potential-dll-side-loading-via-microsoft-antimalware-service-executable, Potential DLL Side-Loading via Microsoft Antimalware Service Executable>> |Identifies a Windows trusted program that is known to be vulnerable to DLL Search Order Hijacking starting after being renamed or from a non-standard path. This is uncommon behavior and may indicate an attempt to evade defenses via side-loading a malicious DLL within the memory space of one of those processes. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<potential-dll-side-loading-via-microsoft-antimalware-service-executable, Potential DLL Side-Loading via Microsoft Antimalware Service Executable>> |Identifies a Windows trusted program that is known to be vulnerable to DLL Search Order Hijacking starting after being renamed or from a non-standard path. This is uncommon behavior and may indicate an attempt to evade defenses via side-loading a malicious DLL within the memory space of one of those processes. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |109
 
-|<<potential-dll-side-loading-via-trusted-microsoft-programs, Potential DLL Side-Loading via Trusted Microsoft Programs>> |Identifies an instance of a Windows trusted program that is known to be vulnerable to DLL Search Order Hijacking starting after being renamed or from a non-standard path. This is uncommon behavior and may indicate an attempt to evade defenses via side loading a malicious DLL within the memory space of one of those processes. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<potential-dll-side-loading-via-trusted-microsoft-programs, Potential DLL Side-Loading via Trusted Microsoft Programs>> |Identifies an instance of a Windows trusted program that is known to be vulnerable to DLL Search Order Hijacking starting after being renamed or from a non-standard path. This is uncommon behavior and may indicate an attempt to evade defenses via side loading a malicious DLL within the memory space of one of those processes. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |109
 
 |<<potential-dns-tunneling-via-nslookup, Potential DNS Tunneling via NsLookup>> |This rule identifies a large number (15) of nslookup.exe executions with an explicit query type from the same host. This may indicate command and control activity utilizing the DNS protocol. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
 
-|<<potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-destination-port, Potential Data Exfiltration Activity to an Unusual Destination Port>> |A machine learning job has detected data exfiltration to a particular destination port. Data transfer patterns that are outside the normal traffic patterns of an organization could indicate exfiltration over command and control channels. |[Use Case: Data Exfiltration Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Exfiltration] |8.9.0 |2
+|<<potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-destination-port, Potential Data Exfiltration Activity to an Unusual Destination Port>> |A machine learning job has detected data exfiltration to a particular destination port. Data transfer patterns that are outside the normal traffic patterns of an organization could indicate exfiltration over command and control channels. |[Use Case: Data Exfiltration Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Exfiltration] |8.9.0 |3
 
-|<<potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-ip-address, Potential Data Exfiltration Activity to an Unusual IP Address>> |A machine learning job has detected data exfiltration to a particular geo-location (by IP address). Data transfers to geo-locations that are outside the normal traffic patterns of an organization could indicate exfiltration over command and control channels. |[Use Case: Data Exfiltration Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Exfiltration] |8.9.0 |2
+|<<potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-ip-address, Potential Data Exfiltration Activity to an Unusual IP Address>> |A machine learning job has detected data exfiltration to a particular geo-location (by IP address). Data transfers to geo-locations that are outside the normal traffic patterns of an organization could indicate exfiltration over command and control channels. |[Use Case: Data Exfiltration Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Exfiltration] |8.9.0 |3
 
-|<<potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-iso-code, Potential Data Exfiltration Activity to an Unusual ISO Code>> |A machine learning job has detected data exfiltration to a particular geo-location (by region name). Data transfers to geo-locations that are outside the normal traffic patterns of an organization could indicate exfiltration over command and control channels. |[Use Case: Data Exfiltration Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Exfiltration] |8.9.0 |2
+|<<potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-iso-code, Potential Data Exfiltration Activity to an Unusual ISO Code>> |A machine learning job has detected data exfiltration to a particular geo-location (by region name). Data transfers to geo-locations that are outside the normal traffic patterns of an organization could indicate exfiltration over command and control channels. |[Use Case: Data Exfiltration Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Exfiltration] |8.9.0 |3
 
-|<<potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-region, Potential Data Exfiltration Activity to an Unusual Region>> |A machine learning job has detected data exfiltration to a particular geo-location (by region name). Data transfers to geo-locations that are outside the normal traffic patterns of an organization could indicate exfiltration over command and control channels. |[Use Case: Data Exfiltration Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Exfiltration] |8.9.0 |2
+|<<potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-region, Potential Data Exfiltration Activity to an Unusual Region>> |A machine learning job has detected data exfiltration to a particular geo-location (by region name). Data transfers to geo-locations that are outside the normal traffic patterns of an organization could indicate exfiltration over command and control channels. |[Use Case: Data Exfiltration Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Exfiltration] |8.9.0 |3
 
 |<<potential-defense-evasion-via-cmstp-exe, Potential Defense Evasion via CMSTP.exe>> |The Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CMSTP.exe) is a command-line program to install Connection Manager service profiles, which accept installation information file (INF) files. Adversaries may abuse CMSTP to proxy the execution of malicious code by supplying INF files that contain malicious commands. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |1
 
-|<<potential-defense-evasion-via-proot, Potential Defense Evasion via PRoot>> |Identifies the execution of the PRoot utility, an open-source tool for user-space implementation of chroot, mount --bind, and binfmt_misc. Adversaries can leverage an open-source tool PRoot to expand the scope of their operations to multiple Linux distributions and simplify their necessary efforts. In a normal threat scenario, the scope of an attack is limited by the varying configurations of each Linux distribution. With PRoot, it provides an attacker with a consistent operational environment across different Linux distributions, such as Ubuntu, Fedora, and Alpine. PRoot also provides emulation capabilities that allow for malware built on other architectures, such as ARM, to be run.The post-exploitation technique called bring your own filesystem (BYOF), can be used by the threat actors to execute malicious payload or elevate privileges or perform network scans or orchestrate another attack on the environment. Although PRoot was originally not developed with malicious intent it can be easily tuned to work for one. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |8.3.0 |6
+|<<potential-defense-evasion-via-proot, Potential Defense Evasion via PRoot>> |Identifies the execution of the PRoot utility, an open-source tool for user-space implementation of chroot, mount --bind, and binfmt_misc. Adversaries can leverage an open-source tool PRoot to expand the scope of their operations to multiple Linux distributions and simplify their necessary efforts. In a normal threat scenario, the scope of an attack is limited by the varying configurations of each Linux distribution. With PRoot, it provides an attacker with a consistent operational environment across different Linux distributions, such as Ubuntu, Fedora, and Alpine. PRoot also provides emulation capabilities that allow for malware built on other architectures, such as ARM, to be run.The post-exploitation technique called bring your own filesystem (BYOF), can be used by the threat actors to execute malicious payload or elevate privileges or perform network scans or orchestrate another attack on the environment. Although PRoot was originally not developed with malicious intent it can be easily tuned to work for one. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |8.3.0 |7
 
-|<<potential-disabling-of-apparmor, Potential Disabling of AppArmor>> |This rule monitors for potential attempts to disable AppArmor. AppArmor is a Linux security module that enforces fine-grained access control policies to restrict the actions and resources that specific applications and processes can access. Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.3.0 |5
+|<<potential-disabling-of-apparmor, Potential Disabling of AppArmor>> |This rule monitors for potential attempts to disable AppArmor. AppArmor is a Linux security module that enforces fine-grained access control policies to restrict the actions and resources that specific applications and processes can access. Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.3.0 |6
 
-|<<potential-disabling-of-selinux, Potential Disabling of SELinux>> |Identifies potential attempts to disable Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux), which is a Linux kernel security feature to support access control policies. Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<potential-disabling-of-selinux, Potential Disabling of SELinux>> |Identifies potential attempts to disable Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux), which is a Linux kernel security feature to support access control policies. Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.3.0 |110
 
 |<<potential-enumeration-via-active-directory-web-service, Potential Enumeration via Active Directory Web Service>> |Identifies processes loading Active Directory related modules followed by a network connection to the ADWS dedicated TCP port. Adversaries may abuse the ADWS Windows service that allows Active Directory to be queried via this web service. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |1
 
-|<<potential-evasion-via-filter-manager, Potential Evasion via Filter Manager>> |The Filter Manager Control Program (fltMC.exe) binary may be abused by adversaries to unload a filter driver and evade defenses. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<potential-evasion-via-filter-manager, Potential Evasion via Filter Manager>> |The Filter Manager Control Program (fltMC.exe) binary may be abused by adversaries to unload a filter driver and evade defenses. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
 
-|<<potential-evasion-via-windows-filtering-platform, Potential Evasion via Windows Filtering Platform>> |Identifies multiple Windows Filtering Platform block events and where the process name is related to an endpoint security software. Adversaries may add malicious WFP rules to prevent Endpoint security from sending telemetry. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |1
+|<<potential-evasion-via-windows-filtering-platform, Potential Evasion via Windows Filtering Platform>> |Identifies multiple Windows Filtering Platform block events and where the process name is related to an endpoint security software. Adversaries may add malicious WFP rules to prevent Endpoint security from sending telemetry. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |2
 
 |<<potential-exploitation-of-an-unquoted-service-path-vulnerability, Potential Exploitation of an Unquoted Service Path Vulnerability>> |Adversaries may leverage unquoted service path vulnerabilities to escalate privileges. By placing an executable in a higher-level directory within the path of an unquoted service executable, Windows will natively launch this executable from its defined path variable instead of the benign one in a deeper directory, thus leading to code execution. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |2
 
-|<<potential-external-linux-ssh-brute-force-detected, Potential External Linux SSH Brute Force Detected>> |Identifies multiple external consecutive login failures targeting a user account from the same source address within a short time interval. Adversaries will often brute force login attempts across multiple users with a common or known password, in an attempt to gain access to these accounts. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access] |8.3.0 |5
+|<<potential-external-linux-ssh-brute-force-detected, Potential External Linux SSH Brute Force Detected>> |Identifies multiple external consecutive login failures targeting a user account from the same source address within a short time interval. Adversaries will often brute force login attempts across multiple users with a common or known password, in an attempt to gain access to these accounts. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access] |8.3.0 |6
 
 |<<potential-file-transfer-via-certreq, Potential File Transfer via Certreq>> |Identifies Certreq making an HTTP Post request. Adversaries could abuse Certreq to download files or upload data to a remote URL. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Tactic: Exfiltration], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |7
 
-|<<potential-hidden-local-user-account-creation, Potential Hidden Local User Account Creation>> |Identifies attempts to create a local account that will be hidden from the macOS logon window. This may indicate an attempt to evade user attention while maintaining persistence using a separate local account. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<potential-hidden-local-user-account-creation, Potential Hidden Local User Account Creation>> |Identifies attempts to create a local account that will be hidden from the macOS logon window. This may indicate an attempt to evade user attention while maintaining persistence using a separate local account. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<potential-hidden-process-via-mount-hidepid, Potential Hidden Process via Mount Hidepid>> |Identifies the execution of mount process with hidepid parameter, which can make processes invisible to other users from the system. Adversaries using Linux kernel version 3.2+ (or RHEL/CentOS v6.5+ above) can hide the process from other users. When hidepid=2 option is executed to mount the /proc filesystem, only the root user can see all processes and the logged-in user can only see their own process. This provides a defense evasion mechanism for the adversaries to hide their process executions from all other commands such as ps, top, pgrep and more. With the Linux kernel hardening hidepid option all the user has to do is remount the /proc filesystem with the option, which can now be monitored and detected. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.3.0 |7
+|<<potential-hidden-process-via-mount-hidepid, Potential Hidden Process via Mount Hidepid>> |Identifies the execution of mount process with hidepid parameter, which can make processes invisible to other users from the system. Adversaries using Linux kernel version 3.2+ (or RHEL/CentOS v6.5+ above) can hide the process from other users. When hidepid=2 option is executed to mount the /proc filesystem, only the root user can see all processes and the logged-in user can only see their own process. This provides a defense evasion mechanism for the adversaries to hide their process executions from all other commands such as ps, top, pgrep and more. With the Linux kernel hardening hidepid option all the user has to do is remount the /proc filesystem with the option, which can now be monitored and detected. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.3.0 |8
 
-|<<potential-internal-linux-ssh-brute-force-detected, Potential Internal Linux SSH Brute Force Detected>> |Identifies multiple internal consecutive login failures targeting a user account from the same source address within a short time interval. Adversaries will often brute force login attempts across multiple users with a common or known password, in an attempt to gain access to these accounts. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access] |8.3.0 |9
+|<<potential-internal-linux-ssh-brute-force-detected, Potential Internal Linux SSH Brute Force Detected>> |Identifies multiple internal consecutive login failures targeting a user account from the same source address within a short time interval. Adversaries will often brute force login attempts across multiple users with a common or known password, in an attempt to gain access to these accounts. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access] |8.3.0 |10
 
-|<<potential-invoke-mimikatz-powershell-script, Potential Invoke-Mimikatz PowerShell Script>> |Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords, along with many other features that make it useful for testing the security of networks. This rule detects Invoke-Mimikatz PowerShell script and alike. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<potential-invoke-mimikatz-powershell-script, Potential Invoke-Mimikatz PowerShell Script>> |Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords, along with many other features that make it useful for testing the security of networks. This rule detects Invoke-Mimikatz PowerShell script and alike. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs] |8.3.0 |108
 
 |<<potential-java-jndi-exploitation-attempt, Potential JAVA/JNDI Exploitation Attempt>> |Identifies an outbound network connection by JAVA to LDAP, RMI or DNS standard ports followed by a suspicious JAVA child processes. This may indicate an attempt to exploit a JAVA/NDI (Java Naming and Directory Interface) injection vulnerability. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |104
 
-|<<potential-kerberos-attack-via-bifrost, Potential Kerberos Attack via Bifrost>> |Identifies use of Bifrost, a known macOS Kerberos pentesting tool, which can be used to dump cached Kerberos tickets or attempt unauthorized authentication techniques such as pass-the-ticket/hash and kerberoasting. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<potential-kerberos-attack-via-bifrost, Potential Kerberos Attack via Bifrost>> |Identifies use of Bifrost, a known macOS Kerberos pentesting tool, which can be used to dump cached Kerberos tickets or attempt unauthorized authentication techniques such as pass-the-ticket/hash and kerberoasting. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
 |<<potential-lsa-authentication-package-abuse, Potential LSA Authentication Package Abuse>> |Adversaries can use the autostart mechanism provided by the Local Security Authority (LSA) authentication packages for privilege escalation or persistence by placing a reference to a binary in the Windows registry. The binary will then be executed by SYSTEM when the authentication packages are loaded. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |104
 
-|<<potential-lsass-clone-creation-via-psscapturesnapshot, Potential LSASS Clone Creation via PssCaptureSnapShot>> |Identifies the creation of an LSASS process clone via PssCaptureSnapShot where the parent process is the initial LSASS process instance. This may indicate an attempt to evade detection and dump LSASS memory for credential access. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Sysmon Only] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<potential-lsass-clone-creation-via-psscapturesnapshot, Potential LSASS Clone Creation via PssCaptureSnapShot>> |Identifies the creation of an LSASS process clone via PssCaptureSnapShot where the parent process is the initial LSASS process instance. This may indicate an attempt to evade detection and dump LSASS memory for credential access. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<potential-lsass-memory-dump-via-psscapturesnapshot, Potential LSASS Memory Dump via PssCaptureSnapShot>> |Identifies suspicious access to an LSASS handle via PssCaptureSnapShot where two successive process accesses are performed by the same process and target two different instances of LSASS. This may indicate an attempt to evade detection and dump LSASS memory for credential access. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Sysmon Only] |8.8.0 |207
+|<<potential-lsass-memory-dump-via-psscapturesnapshot, Potential LSASS Memory Dump via PssCaptureSnapShot>> |Identifies suspicious access to an LSASS handle via PssCaptureSnapShot where two successive process accesses are performed by the same process and target two different instances of LSASS. This may indicate an attempt to evade detection and dump LSASS memory for credential access. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.8.0 |208
 
 |<<potential-lateral-tool-transfer-via-smb-share, Potential Lateral Tool Transfer via SMB Share>> |Identifies the creation or change of a Windows executable file over network shares. Adversaries may transfer tools or other files between systems in a compromised environment. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
 
 |<<potential-linux-backdoor-user-account-creation, Potential Linux Backdoor User Account Creation>> |Identifies the attempt to create a new backdoor user by setting the user's UID to 0. Attackers may alter a user's UID to 0 to establish persistence on a system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.3.0 |6
 
-|<<potential-linux-credential-dumping-via-proc-filesystem, Potential Linux Credential Dumping via Proc Filesystem>> |Identifies the execution of the mimipenguin exploit script which is linux adaptation of Windows tool mimikatz. Mimipenguin exploit script is used to dump clear text passwords from a currently logged-in user. The tool exploits a known vulnerability CVE-2018-20781. Malicious actors can exploit the cleartext credentials in memory by dumping the process and extracting lines that have a high probability of containing cleartext passwords. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |6
+|<<potential-linux-credential-dumping-via-proc-filesystem, Potential Linux Credential Dumping via Proc Filesystem>> |Identifies the execution of the mimipenguin exploit script which is linux adaptation of Windows tool mimikatz. Mimipenguin exploit script is used to dump clear text passwords from a currently logged-in user. The tool exploits a known vulnerability CVE-2018-20781. Malicious actors can exploit the cleartext credentials in memory by dumping the process and extracting lines that have a high probability of containing cleartext passwords. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |7
 
-|<<potential-linux-credential-dumping-via-unshadow, Potential Linux Credential Dumping via Unshadow>> |Identifies the execution of the unshadow utility which is part of John the Ripper, a password-cracking tool on the host machine. Malicious actors can use the utility to retrieve the combined contents of the '/etc/shadow' and '/etc/password' files. Using the combined file generated from the utility, the malicious threat actors can use them as input for password-cracking utilities or prepare themselves for future operations by gathering credential information of the victim. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |8.3.0 |7
+|<<potential-linux-credential-dumping-via-unshadow, Potential Linux Credential Dumping via Unshadow>> |Identifies the execution of the unshadow utility which is part of John the Ripper, a password-cracking tool on the host machine. Malicious actors can use the utility to retrieve the combined contents of the '/etc/shadow' and '/etc/password' files. Using the combined file generated from the utility, the malicious threat actors can use them as input for password-cracking utilities or prepare themselves for future operations by gathering credential information of the victim. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |8.3.0 |8
 
 |<<potential-linux-hack-tool-launched, Potential Linux Hack Tool Launched>> |Monitors for the execution of different processes that might be used by attackers for malicious intent. An alert from this rule should be investigated further, as hack tools are commonly used by blue teamers and system administrators as well. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.3.0 |3
 
-|<<potential-linux-local-account-brute-force-detected, Potential Linux Local Account Brute Force Detected>> |Identifies multiple consecutive login attempts executed by one process targeting a local linux user account within a short time interval. Adversaries might brute force login attempts across different users with a default wordlist or a set of customly crafted passwords in an attempt to gain access to these accounts. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |5
+|<<potential-linux-local-account-brute-force-detected, Potential Linux Local Account Brute Force Detected>> |Identifies multiple consecutive login attempts executed by one process targeting a local linux user account within a short time interval. Adversaries might brute force login attempts across different users with a default wordlist or a set of customly crafted passwords in an attempt to gain access to these accounts. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |6
 
 |<<potential-linux-ransomware-note-creation-detected, Potential Linux Ransomware Note Creation Detected>> |This rule identifies a sequence of a mass file encryption event in conjunction with the creation of a .txt file with a file name containing ransomware keywords executed by the same process in a 1 second timespan. Ransomware is a type of malware that encrypts a victim's files or systems and demands payment (usually in cryptocurrency) in exchange for the decryption key. One important indicator of a ransomware attack is the mass encryption of the file system, after which a new file extension is added to the file. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Impact], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |8
 
-|<<potential-linux-reverse-connection-through-port-knocking, Potential Linux Reverse Connection through Port Knocking>> |Monitors for a sequence of network activity on atypical ports, prior to receiving a single packet on such a non-standard port, which potentially indicates signal port knocking activity. Port knocking is a covert method of externally opening ports by sending a sequence of packets to previously closed ports, which adversaries may leverage to discreetly gain access without directly alerting traditional monitoring systems. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |1
+|<<potential-linux-ssh-x11-forwarding, Potential Linux SSH X11 Forwarding>> |This rule monitors for X11 forwarding via SSH. X11 forwarding is a feature that allows users to run graphical applications on a remote server and display the application's graphical user interface on their local machine. Attackers can abuse X11 forwarding for tunneling their GUI-based tools, pivot through compromised systems, and create covert communication channels, enabling lateral movement and facilitating remote control of systems within a network. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |3
 
-|<<potential-linux-ssh-x11-forwarding, Potential Linux SSH X11 Forwarding>> |This rule monitors for X11 forwarding via SSH. X11 forwarding is a feature that allows users to run graphical applications on a remote server and display the application's graphical user interface on their local machine. Attackers can abuse X11 forwarding for tunneling their GUI-based tools, pivot through compromised systems, and create covert communication channels, enabling lateral movement and facilitating remote control of systems within a network. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |2
+|<<potential-linux-tunneling-and-or-port-forwarding, Potential Linux Tunneling and/or Port Forwarding>> |This rule monitors for a set of Linux utilities that can be used for tunneling and port forwarding. Attackers can leverage tunneling and port forwarding techniques to bypass network defenses, establish hidden communication channels, and gain unauthorized access to internal resources, facilitating data exfiltration, lateral movement, and remote control. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |8.3.0 |6
 
-|<<potential-linux-tunneling-and-or-port-forwarding, Potential Linux Tunneling and/or Port Forwarding>> |This rule monitors for a set of Linux utilities that can be used for tunneling and port forwarding. Attackers can leverage tunneling and port forwarding techniques to bypass network defenses, establish hidden communication channels, and gain unauthorized access to internal resources, facilitating data exfiltration, lateral movement, and remote control. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |8.3.0 |5
-
-|<<potential-local-ntlm-relay-via-http, Potential Local NTLM Relay via HTTP>> |Identifies attempt to coerce a local NTLM authentication via HTTP using the Windows Printer Spooler service as a target. An adversary may use this primitive in combination with other techniques to elevate privileges on a compromised system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<potential-local-ntlm-relay-via-http, Potential Local NTLM Relay via HTTP>> |Identifies attempt to coerce a local NTLM authentication via HTTP using the Windows Printer Spooler service as a target. An adversary may use this primitive in combination with other techniques to elevate privileges on a compromised system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
 
 |<<potential-masquerading-as-browser-process, Potential Masquerading as Browser Process>> |Identifies suspicious instances of browser processes, such as unsigned or signed with unusual certificates, that can indicate an attempt to conceal malicious activity, bypass security features such as allowlists, or trick users into executing malware. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Persistence], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |3
 
@@ -1242,13 +1244,13 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<potential-masquerading-as-vlc-dll, Potential Masquerading as VLC DLL>> |Identifies instances of VLC-related DLLs which are not signed by the original developer. Attackers may name their payload as legitimate applications to blend into the environment, or embedding its malicious code within legitimate applications to deceive machine learning algorithms by incorporating authentic and benign code. |[Domain: Endpoint], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Persistence], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |2
 
-|<<potential-memory-seeking-activity, Potential Memory Seeking Activity>> |Monitors for the execution of Unix utilities that may be leveraged as memory address seekers. Attackers may leverage built-in utilities to seek specific memory addresses, allowing for potential future manipulation/exploitation. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |8.3.0 |1
+|<<potential-memory-seeking-activity, Potential Memory Seeking Activity>> |Monitors for the execution of Unix utilities that may be leveraged as memory address seekers. Attackers may leverage built-in utilities to seek specific memory addresses, allowing for potential future manipulation/exploitation. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |8.3.0 |2
 
-|<<potential-meterpreter-reverse-shell, Potential Meterpreter Reverse Shell>> |This detection rule identifies a sample of suspicious Linux system file reads used for system fingerprinting, leveraged by the Metasploit Meterpreter shell to gather information about the target that it is executing its shell on. Detecting this pattern is indicative of a successful meterpreter shell connection. |[Data Source: Auditd Manager], [Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution] |8.6.0 |5
+|<<potential-meterpreter-reverse-shell, Potential Meterpreter Reverse Shell>> |This detection rule identifies a sample of suspicious Linux system file reads used for system fingerprinting, leveraged by the Metasploit Meterpreter shell to gather information about the target that it is executing its shell on. Detecting this pattern is indicative of a successful meterpreter shell connection. |[Data Source: Auditd Manager], [Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution] |8.6.0 |6
 
-|<<potential-microsoft-office-sandbox-evasion, Potential Microsoft Office Sandbox Evasion>> |Identifies the creation of a suspicious zip file prepended with special characters. Sandboxed Microsoft Office applications on macOS are allowed to write files that start with special characters, which can be combined with an AutoStart location to achieve sandbox evasion. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<potential-microsoft-office-sandbox-evasion, Potential Microsoft Office Sandbox Evasion>> |Identifies the creation of a suspicious zip file prepended with special characters. Sandboxed Microsoft Office applications on macOS are allowed to write files that start with special characters, which can be combined with an AutoStart location to achieve sandbox evasion. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<potential-modification-of-accessibility-binaries, Potential Modification of Accessibility Binaries>> |Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in. An adversary can modify the way these programs are launched to get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<potential-modification-of-accessibility-binaries, Potential Modification of Accessibility Binaries>> |Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in. An adversary can modify the way these programs are launched to get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |110
 
 |<<potential-network-scan-detected, Potential Network Scan Detected>> |This rule identifies a potential port scan. A port scan is a method utilized by attackers to systematically scan a target system or network for open ports, allowing them to identify available services and potential vulnerabilities. By mapping out the open ports, attackers can gather critical information to plan and execute targeted attacks, gaining unauthorized access, compromising security, and potentially leading to data breaches, unauthorized control, or further exploitation of the targeted system or network. This rule proposes threshold logic to check for connection attempts from one source host to 20 or more destination ports. |[Domain: Network], [Tactic: Discovery], [Tactic: Reconnaissance], [Use Case: Network Security Monitoring] |8.3.0 |5
 
@@ -1258,217 +1260,221 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<potential-network-sweep-detected, Potential Network Sweep Detected>> |This rule identifies a potential network sweep.  A network sweep is a method used by attackers to scan a target network, identifying active hosts, open ports, and available services to gather information on vulnerabilities and weaknesses. This reconnaissance helps them plan subsequent attacks and exploit potential entry points for unauthorized access, data theft, or other malicious activities. This rule proposes threshold logic to check for connection attempts from one source host to 10 or more destination hosts on commonly used network services. |[Domain: Network], [Tactic: Discovery], [Tactic: Reconnaissance], [Use Case: Network Security Monitoring] |8.3.0 |5
 
-|<<potential-non-standard-port-http-https-connection, Potential Non-Standard Port HTTP/HTTPS connection>> |Identifies potentially malicious processes communicating via a port paring typically not associated with HTTP/HTTPS. For example, HTTP over port 8443 or port 440 as opposed to the traditional port 80 , 443. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port a protocol uses to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing of network data. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |3
+|<<potential-non-standard-port-http-https-connection, Potential Non-Standard Port HTTP/HTTPS connection>> |Identifies potentially malicious processes communicating via a port paring typically not associated with HTTP/HTTPS. For example, HTTP over port 8443 or port 440 as opposed to the traditional port 80 , 443. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port a protocol uses to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing of network data. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |8.3.0 |4
 
 |<<potential-non-standard-port-ssh-connection, Potential Non-Standard Port SSH connection>> |Identifies potentially malicious processes communicating via a port paring typically not associated with SSH. For example, SSH over port 2200 or port 2222 as opposed to the traditional port 22. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port a protocol uses to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing of network data. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [OS: macOS], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |5
 
-|<<potential-okta-mfa-bombing-via-push-notifications, Potential Okta MFA Bombing via Push Notifications>> |Detects when an attacker abuses the Multi-Factor authentication mechanism by repeatedly issuing login requests until the user eventually accepts the Okta push notification. An adversary may attempt to bypass the Okta MFA policies configured for an organization to obtain unauthorized access. |[Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Okta] |8.10.0 |2
+|<<potential-okta-mfa-bombing-via-push-notifications, Potential Okta MFA Bombing via Push Notifications>> |Detects when an attacker abuses the Multi-Factor authentication mechanism by repeatedly issuing login requests until the user eventually accepts the Okta push notification. An adversary may attempt to bypass the Okta MFA policies configured for an organization to obtain unauthorized access. |[Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Okta] |8.10.0 |3
 
-|<<potential-openssh-backdoor-logging-activity, Potential OpenSSH Backdoor Logging Activity>> |Identifies a Secure Shell (SSH) client or server process creating or writing to a known SSH backdoor log file. Adversaries may modify SSH related binaries for persistence or credential access via patching sensitive functions to enable unauthorized access or to log SSH credentials for exfiltration. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<potential-openssh-backdoor-logging-activity, Potential OpenSSH Backdoor Logging Activity>> |Identifies a Secure Shell (SSH) client or server process creating or writing to a known SSH backdoor log file. Adversaries may modify SSH related binaries for persistence or credential access via patching sensitive functions to enable unauthorized access or to log SSH credentials for exfiltration. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
 
 |<<potential-outgoing-rdp-connection-by-unusual-process, Potential Outgoing RDP Connection by Unusual Process>> |Adversaries may attempt to connect to a remote system over Windows Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) to achieve lateral movement. Adversaries may avoid using the Microsoft Terminal Services Client (mstsc.exe) binary to establish an RDP connection to evade detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |2
 
 |<<potential-pass-the-hash-pth-attempt, Potential Pass-the-Hash (PtH) Attempt>> |Adversaries may pass the hash using stolen password hashes to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user's cleartext password. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement] |8.4.0 |3
 
-|<<potential-password-spraying-of-microsoft-365-user-accounts, Potential Password Spraying of Microsoft 365 User Accounts>> |Identifies a high number (25) of failed Microsoft 365 user authentication attempts from a single IP address within 30 minutes, which could be indicative of a password spraying attack. An adversary may attempt a password spraying attack to obtain unauthorized access to user accounts. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Credential Access] |8.3.0 |104
+|<<potential-password-spraying-of-microsoft-365-user-accounts, Potential Password Spraying of Microsoft 365 User Accounts>> |Identifies a high number (25) of failed Microsoft 365 user authentication attempts from a single IP address within 30 minutes, which could be indicative of a password spraying attack. An adversary may attempt a password spraying attack to obtain unauthorized access to user accounts. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Credential Access] |8.3.0 |106
 
 |<<potential-persistence-through-motd-file-creation-detected, Potential Persistence Through MOTD File Creation Detected>> |Message of the day (MOTD) is the message that is presented to the user when a user connects to a Linux server via SSH or a serial connection. Linux systems contain several default MOTD files located in the "/etc/update-motd.d/" and "/usr/lib/update-notifier/" directories. These scripts run as the root user every time a user connects over SSH or a serial connection. Adversaries may create malicious MOTD files that grant them persistence onto the target every time a user connects to the system by executing a backdoor script or command. This rule detects the creation of potentially malicious files within the default MOTD file directories. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |9
 
-|<<potential-persistence-through-run-control-detected, Potential Persistence Through Run Control Detected>> |This rule monitors the creation/alteration of the rc.local file by a previously unknown process executable through the use of the new terms rule type. The /etc/rc.local file is used to start custom applications, services, scripts or commands during start-up. The rc.local file has mostly been replaced by Systemd. However, through the "systemd-rc-local-generator", rc.local files can be converted to services that run at boot. Adversaries may alter rc.local to execute malicious code at start-up, and gain persistence onto the system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |109
+|<<potential-persistence-through-run-control-detected, Potential Persistence Through Run Control Detected>> |This rule monitors the creation/alteration of the rc.local file by a previously unknown process executable through the use of the new terms rule type. The /etc/rc.local file is used to start custom applications, services, scripts or commands during start-up. The rc.local file has mostly been replaced by Systemd. However, through the "systemd-rc-local-generator", rc.local files can be converted to services that run at boot. Adversaries may alter rc.local to execute malicious code at start-up, and gain persistence onto the system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |110
 
 |<<potential-persistence-through-systemd-udevd, Potential Persistence Through Systemd-udevd>> |Monitors for the creation of rule files that are used by systemd-udevd to manage device nodes and handle kernel device events in the Linux operating system. Systemd-udevd can be exploited for persistence by adversaries by creating malicious udev rules that trigger on specific events, executing arbitrary commands or payloads whenever a certain device is plugged in or recognized by the system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |3
 
 |<<potential-persistence-through-init-d-detected, Potential Persistence Through init.d Detected>> |Files that are placed in the /etc/init.d/ directory in Unix can be used to start custom applications, services, scripts or commands during start-up. Init.d has been mostly replaced in favor of Systemd. However, the "systemd-sysv-generator" can convert init.d files to service unit files that run at boot. Adversaries may add or alter files located in the /etc/init.d/ directory to execute malicious code upon boot in order to gain persistence on the system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |9
 
-|<<potential-persistence-via-atom-init-script-modification, Potential Persistence via Atom Init Script Modification>> |Identifies modifications to the Atom desktop text editor Init File. Adversaries may add malicious JavaScript code to the init.coffee file that will be executed upon the Atom application opening. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<potential-persistence-via-atom-init-script-modification, Potential Persistence via Atom Init Script Modification>> |Identifies modifications to the Atom desktop text editor Init File. Adversaries may add malicious JavaScript code to the init.coffee file that will be executed upon the Atom application opening. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<potential-persistence-via-login-hook, Potential Persistence via Login Hook>> |Identifies the creation or modification of the login window property list (plist). Adversaries may modify plist files to run a program during system boot or user login for persistence. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<potential-persistence-via-login-hook, Potential Persistence via Login Hook>> |Identifies the creation or modification of the login window property list (plist). Adversaries may modify plist files to run a program during system boot or user login for persistence. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<potential-persistence-via-periodic-tasks, Potential Persistence via Periodic Tasks>> |Identifies the creation or modification of the default configuration for periodic tasks. Adversaries may abuse periodic tasks to execute malicious code or maintain persistence. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<potential-persistence-via-periodic-tasks, Potential Persistence via Periodic Tasks>> |Identifies the creation or modification of the default configuration for periodic tasks. Adversaries may abuse periodic tasks to execute malicious code or maintain persistence. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<potential-persistence-via-time-provider-modification, Potential Persistence via Time Provider Modification>> |Identifies modification of the Time Provider. Adversaries may establish persistence by registering and enabling a malicious DLL as a time provider. Windows uses the time provider architecture to obtain accurate time stamps from other network devices or clients in the network. Time providers are implemented in the form of a DLL file which resides in the System32 folder. The service W32Time initiates during the startup of Windows and loads w32time.dll. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<potential-persistence-via-time-provider-modification, Potential Persistence via Time Provider Modification>> |Identifies modification of the Time Provider. Adversaries may establish persistence by registering and enabling a malicious DLL as a time provider. Windows uses the time provider architecture to obtain accurate time stamps from other network devices or clients in the network. Time providers are implemented in the form of a DLL file which resides in the System32 folder. The service W32Time initiates during the startup of Windows and loads w32time.dll. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |108
 
 |<<potential-port-monitor-or-print-processor-registration-abuse, Potential Port Monitor or Print Processor Registration Abuse>> |Identifies port monitor and print processor registry modifications. Adversaries may abuse port monitor and print processors to run malicious DLLs during system boot that will be executed as SYSTEM for privilege escalation and/or persistence, if permissions allow writing a fully-qualified pathname for that DLL. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
 
-|<<potential-powershell-hacktool-script-by-function-names, Potential PowerShell HackTool Script by Function Names>> |Detects known PowerShell offensive tooling functions names in PowerShell scripts. Attackers commonly use out-of-the-box offensive tools without modifying the code. This rule aim is to take advantage of that. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs] |8.3.0 |9
+|<<potential-powershell-hacktool-script-by-function-names, Potential PowerShell HackTool Script by Function Names>> |Detects known PowerShell offensive tooling functions names in PowerShell scripts. Attackers commonly use out-of-the-box offensive tools without modifying the code. This rule aim is to take advantage of that. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs] |8.3.0 |10
 
-|<<potential-privacy-control-bypass-via-localhost-secure-copy, Potential Privacy Control Bypass via Localhost Secure Copy>> |Identifies use of the Secure Copy Protocol (SCP) to copy files locally by abusing the auto addition of the Secure Shell Daemon (sshd) to the authorized application list for Full Disk Access. This may indicate attempts to bypass macOS privacy controls to access sensitive files. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<potential-privacy-control-bypass-via-localhost-secure-copy, Potential Privacy Control Bypass via Localhost Secure Copy>> |Identifies use of the Secure Copy Protocol (SCP) to copy files locally by abusing the auto addition of the Secure Shell Daemon (sshd) to the authorized application list for Full Disk Access. This may indicate attempts to bypass macOS privacy controls to access sensitive files. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<potential-privacy-control-bypass-via-tccdb-modification, Potential Privacy Control Bypass via TCCDB Modification>> |Identifies the use of sqlite3 to directly modify the Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC) SQLite database. This may indicate an attempt to bypass macOS privacy controls, including access to sensitive resources like the system camera, microphone, address book, and calendar. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<potential-privacy-control-bypass-via-tccdb-modification, Potential Privacy Control Bypass via TCCDB Modification>> |Identifies the use of sqlite3 to directly modify the Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC) SQLite database. This may indicate an attempt to bypass macOS privacy controls, including access to sensitive resources like the system camera, microphone, address book, and calendar. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<potential-privilege-escalation-through-writable-docker-socket, Potential Privilege Escalation through Writable Docker Socket>> |This rule monitors for the usage of Docker runtime sockets to escalate privileges on Linux systems. Docker sockets by default are only be writable by the root user and docker group. Attackers that have permissions to write to these sockets may be able to create and run a container that allows them to escalate privileges and gain further access onto the host file system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Domain: Container], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |4
+|<<potential-privilege-escalation-through-writable-docker-socket, Potential Privilege Escalation through Writable Docker Socket>> |This rule monitors for the usage of Docker runtime sockets to escalate privileges on Linux systems. Docker sockets by default are only be writable by the root user and docker group. Attackers that have permissions to write to these sockets may be able to create and run a container that allows them to escalate privileges and gain further access onto the host file system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Domain: Container], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |5
 
-|<<potential-privilege-escalation-via-cve-2023-4911, Potential Privilege Escalation via CVE-2023-4911>> |This rule detects potential privilege escalation attempts through Looney Tunables (CVE-2023-4911). Looney Tunables is a buffer overflow vulnerability in GNU C Library's dynamic loader's processing of the GLIBC_TUNABLES environment variable. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |3
+|<<potential-privilege-escalation-via-cve-2023-4911, Potential Privilege Escalation via CVE-2023-4911>> |This rule detects potential privilege escalation attempts through Looney Tunables (CVE-2023-4911). Looney Tunables is a buffer overflow vulnerability in GNU C Library's dynamic loader's processing of the GLIBC_TUNABLES environment variable. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |4
 
-|<<potential-privilege-escalation-via-container-misconfiguration, Potential Privilege Escalation via Container Misconfiguration>> |This rule monitors for the execution of processes that interact with Linux containers through an interactive shell without root permissions. Utilities such as runc and ctr are universal command-line utilities leveraged to interact with containers via root permissions. On systems where the access to these utilities are misconfigured, attackers might be able to create and run a container that mounts the root folder or spawn a privileged container vulnerable to a container escape attack, which might allow them to escalate privileges and gain further access onto the host file system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Domain: Container], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |4
+|<<potential-privilege-escalation-via-container-misconfiguration, Potential Privilege Escalation via Container Misconfiguration>> |This rule monitors for the execution of processes that interact with Linux containers through an interactive shell without root permissions. Utilities such as runc and ctr are universal command-line utilities leveraged to interact with containers via root permissions. On systems where the access to these utilities are misconfigured, attackers might be able to create and run a container that mounts the root folder or spawn a privileged container vulnerable to a container escape attack, which might allow them to escalate privileges and gain further access onto the host file system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Domain: Container], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |5
 
-|<<potential-privilege-escalation-via-enlightenment, Potential Privilege Escalation via Enlightenment>> |Identifies an attempt to exploit a local privilege escalation CVE-2022-37706 via a flaw in Linux window manager package Enlightenment. enlightenment_sys in Enlightenment before 0.25.4 allows local users to gain privileges because it is setuid root, and the system library function mishandles pathnames that begin with a /dev/.. substring. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.11.0 |1
+|<<potential-privilege-escalation-via-enlightenment, Potential Privilege Escalation via Enlightenment>> |Identifies an attempt to exploit a local privilege escalation CVE-2022-37706 via a flaw in Linux window manager package Enlightenment. enlightenment_sys in Enlightenment before 0.25.4 allows local users to gain privileges because it is setuid root, and the system library function mishandles pathnames that begin with a /dev/.. substring. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.11.0 |2
 
-|<<potential-privilege-escalation-via-installerfiletakeover, Potential Privilege Escalation via InstallerFileTakeOver>> |Identifies a potential exploitation of InstallerTakeOver (CVE-2021-41379) default PoC execution. Successful exploitation allows an unprivileged user to escalate privileges to SYSTEM. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<potential-privilege-escalation-via-installerfiletakeover, Potential Privilege Escalation via InstallerFileTakeOver>> |Identifies a potential exploitation of InstallerTakeOver (CVE-2021-41379) default PoC execution. Successful exploitation allows an unprivileged user to escalate privileges to SYSTEM. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
 
-|<<potential-privilege-escalation-via-linux-dac-permissions, Potential Privilege Escalation via Linux DAC permissions>> |Identifies potential privilege escalation exploitation of DAC (Discretionary access control) file permissions. The rule identifies exploitation of DAC checks on sensitive file paths via suspicious processes whose capabilities include CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE (where a process can bypass all read write and execution checks) or CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH (where a process can read any file or perform any executable permission on the directories). |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.11.0 |1
+|<<potential-privilege-escalation-via-linux-dac-permissions, Potential Privilege Escalation via Linux DAC permissions>> |Identifies potential privilege escalation exploitation of DAC (Discretionary access control) file permissions. The rule identifies exploitation of DAC checks on sensitive file paths via suspicious processes whose capabilities include CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE (where a process can bypass all read write and execution checks) or CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH (where a process can read any file or perform any executable permission on the directories). |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.11.0 |2
 
-|<<potential-privilege-escalation-via-overlayfs, Potential Privilege Escalation via OverlayFS>> |Identifies an attempt to exploit a local privilege escalation (CVE-2023-2640 and CVE-2023-32629) via a flaw in Ubuntu's modifications to OverlayFS. These flaws allow the creation of specialized executables, which, upon execution, grant the ability to escalate privileges to root on the affected machine. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |4
+|<<potential-privilege-escalation-via-overlayfs, Potential Privilege Escalation via OverlayFS>> |Identifies an attempt to exploit a local privilege escalation (CVE-2023-2640 and CVE-2023-32629) via a flaw in Ubuntu's modifications to OverlayFS. These flaws allow the creation of specialized executables, which, upon execution, grant the ability to escalate privileges to root on the affected machine. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |5
 
-|<<potential-privilege-escalation-via-pkexec, Potential Privilege Escalation via PKEXEC>> |Identifies an attempt to exploit a local privilege escalation in polkit pkexec (CVE-2021-4034) via unsecure environment variable injection. Successful exploitation allows an unprivileged user to escalate to the root user. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<potential-privilege-escalation-via-pkexec, Potential Privilege Escalation via PKEXEC>> |Identifies an attempt to exploit a local privilege escalation in polkit pkexec (CVE-2021-4034) via unsecure environment variable injection. Successful exploitation allows an unprivileged user to escalate to the root user. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<potential-privilege-escalation-via-python-cap-setuid, Potential Privilege Escalation via Python cap_setuid>> |This detection rule monitors for the execution of a system command with setuid or setgid capabilities via Python, followed by a uid or gid change to the root user. This sequence of events may indicate successful privilege escalation. Setuid (Set User ID) and setgid (Set Group ID) are Unix-like OS features that enable processes to run with elevated privileges, based on the file owner or group. Threat actors can exploit these attributes to escalate privileges to the privileges that are set on the binary that is being executed. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |2
+|<<potential-privilege-escalation-via-python-cap-setuid, Potential Privilege Escalation via Python cap_setuid>> |This detection rule monitors for the execution of a system command with setuid or setgid capabilities via Python, followed by a uid or gid change to the root user. This sequence of events may indicate successful privilege escalation. Setuid (Set User ID) and setgid (Set Group ID) are Unix-like OS features that enable processes to run with elevated privileges, based on the file owner or group. Threat actors can exploit these attributes to escalate privileges to the privileges that are set on the binary that is being executed. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |3
 
-|<<potential-privilege-escalation-via-recently-compiled-executable, Potential Privilege Escalation via Recently Compiled Executable>> |This rule monitors a sequence involving a program compilation event followed by its execution and a subsequent alteration of UID permissions to root privileges. This behavior can potentially indicate the execution of a kernel or software privilege escalation exploit. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |3
+|<<potential-privilege-escalation-via-recently-compiled-executable, Potential Privilege Escalation via Recently Compiled Executable>> |This rule monitors a sequence involving a program compilation event followed by its execution and a subsequent alteration of UID permissions to root privileges. This behavior can potentially indicate the execution of a kernel or software privilege escalation exploit. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |4
 
 |<<potential-privilege-escalation-via-sudoers-file-modification, Potential Privilege Escalation via Sudoers File Modification>> |A sudoers file specifies the commands users or groups can run and from which terminals. Adversaries can take advantage of these configurations to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |103
 
-|<<potential-privilege-escalation-via-uid-int-max-bug-detected, Potential Privilege Escalation via UID INT_MAX Bug Detected>> |This rule monitors for the execution of the systemd-run command by a user with a UID that is larger than the maximum allowed UID size (INT_MAX). Some older Linux versions were affected by a bug which allows user accounts with a UID greater than INT_MAX to escalate privileges by spawning a shell through systemd-run. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |4
+|<<potential-privilege-escalation-via-uid-int-max-bug-detected, Potential Privilege Escalation via UID INT_MAX Bug Detected>> |This rule monitors for the execution of the systemd-run command by a user with a UID that is larger than the maximum allowed UID size (INT_MAX). Some older Linux versions were affected by a bug which allows user accounts with a UID greater than INT_MAX to escalate privileges by spawning a shell through systemd-run. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |8.3.0 |5
 
-|<<potential-privileged-escalation-via-samaccountname-spoofing, Potential Privileged Escalation via SamAccountName Spoofing>> |Identifies a suspicious computer account name rename event, which may indicate an attempt to exploit CVE-2021-42278 to elevate privileges from a standard domain user to a user with domain admin privileges. CVE-2021-42278 is a security vulnerability that allows potential attackers to impersonate a domain controller via samAccountName attribute spoofing. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring], [Data Source: Active Directory], [Use Case: Vulnerability] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<potential-privileged-escalation-via-samaccountname-spoofing, Potential Privileged Escalation via SamAccountName Spoofing>> |Identifies a suspicious computer account name rename event, which may indicate an attempt to exploit CVE-2021-42278 to elevate privileges from a standard domain user to a user with domain admin privileges. CVE-2021-42278 is a security vulnerability that allows potential attackers to impersonate a domain controller via samAccountName attribute spoofing. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring], [Data Source: Active Directory], [Use Case: Vulnerability] |8.3.0 |108
 
 |<<potential-process-injection-from-malicious-document, Potential Process Injection from Malicious Document>> |Identifies child processes of frequently targeted Microsoft Office applications (Word, PowerPoint, Excel) with unusual process arguments and path. This behavior is often observed during exploitation of Office applications or from documents with malicious macros. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |1
 
-|<<potential-process-injection-via-powershell, Potential Process Injection via PowerShell>> |Detects the use of Windows API functions that are commonly abused by malware and security tools to load malicious code or inject it into remote processes. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<potential-process-injection-via-powershell, Potential Process Injection via PowerShell>> |Detects the use of Windows API functions that are commonly abused by malware and security tools to load malicious code or inject it into remote processes. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs] |8.3.0 |110
 
-|<<potential-protocol-tunneling-via-chisel-client, Potential Protocol Tunneling via Chisel Client>> |This rule monitors for common command line flags leveraged by the Chisel client utility followed by a connection attempt. Chisel is a command-line utility used for creating and managing TCP and UDP tunnels, enabling port forwarding and secure communication between machines. Attackers can abuse the Chisel utility to establish covert communication channels, bypass network restrictions, and carry out malicious activities by creating tunnels that allow unauthorized access to internal systems. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |4
+|<<potential-protocol-tunneling-via-chisel-client, Potential Protocol Tunneling via Chisel Client>> |This rule monitors for common command line flags leveraged by the Chisel client utility followed by a connection attempt. Chisel is a command-line utility used for creating and managing TCP and UDP tunnels, enabling port forwarding and secure communication between machines. Attackers can abuse the Chisel utility to establish covert communication channels, bypass network restrictions, and carry out malicious activities by creating tunnels that allow unauthorized access to internal systems. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |5
 
-|<<potential-protocol-tunneling-via-chisel-server, Potential Protocol Tunneling via Chisel Server>> |This rule monitors for common command line flags leveraged by the Chisel server utility followed by a received connection within a timespan of 1 minute. Chisel is a command-line utility used for creating and managing TCP and UDP tunnels, enabling port forwarding and secure communication between machines. Attackers can abuse the Chisel utility to establish covert communication channels, bypass network restrictions, and carry out malicious activities by creating tunnels that allow unauthorized access to internal systems. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |5
+|<<potential-protocol-tunneling-via-chisel-server, Potential Protocol Tunneling via Chisel Server>> |This rule monitors for common command line flags leveraged by the Chisel server utility followed by a received connection within a timespan of 1 minute. Chisel is a command-line utility used for creating and managing TCP and UDP tunnels, enabling port forwarding and secure communication between machines. Attackers can abuse the Chisel utility to establish covert communication channels, bypass network restrictions, and carry out malicious activities by creating tunnels that allow unauthorized access to internal systems. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |6
 
-|<<potential-protocol-tunneling-via-earthworm, Potential Protocol Tunneling via EarthWorm>> |Identifies the execution of the EarthWorm tunneler. Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection and network filtering, or to enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<potential-protocol-tunneling-via-earthworm, Potential Protocol Tunneling via EarthWorm>> |Identifies the execution of the EarthWorm tunneler. Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection and network filtering, or to enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
 
-|<<potential-pspy-process-monitoring-detected, Potential Pspy Process Monitoring Detected>> |This rule leverages auditd to monitor for processes scanning different processes within the /proc directory using the openat syscall. This is a strong indication for the usage of the pspy utility. Attackers may leverage the pspy process monitoring utility to monitor system processes without requiring root permissions, in order to find potential privilege escalation vectors. |[Data Source: Auditd Manager], [Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery] |8.3.0 |6
+|<<potential-pspy-process-monitoring-detected, Potential Pspy Process Monitoring Detected>> |This rule leverages auditd to monitor for processes scanning different processes within the /proc directory using the openat syscall. This is a strong indication for the usage of the pspy utility. Attackers may leverage the pspy process monitoring utility to monitor system processes without requiring root permissions, in order to find potential privilege escalation vectors. |[Data Source: Auditd Manager], [Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery] |8.3.0 |7
 
 |<<potential-remote-code-execution-via-web-server, Potential Remote Code Execution via Web Server>> |Identifies suspicious commands executed via a web server, which may suggest a vulnerability and remote shell access. Attackers may exploit a vulnerability in a web application to execute commands via a web server, or place a backdoor file that can be abused to gain code execution as a mechanism for persistence. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |7
 
-|<<potential-remote-credential-access-via-registry, Potential Remote Credential Access via Registry>> |Identifies remote access to the registry to potentially dump credential data from the Security Account Manager (SAM) registry hive in preparation for credential access and privileges elevation. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<potential-remote-credential-access-via-registry, Potential Remote Credential Access via Registry>> |Identifies remote access to the registry to potentially dump credential data from the Security Account Manager (SAM) registry hive in preparation for credential access and privileges elevation. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
 
-|<<potential-remote-desktop-shadowing-activity, Potential Remote Desktop Shadowing Activity>> |Identifies the modification of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) Shadow registry or the execution of processes indicative of an active RDP shadowing session. An adversary may abuse the RDP Shadowing feature to spy on or control other users active RDP sessions. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<potential-remote-desktop-shadowing-activity, Potential Remote Desktop Shadowing Activity>> |Identifies the modification of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) Shadow registry or the execution of processes indicative of an active RDP shadowing session. An adversary may abuse the RDP Shadowing feature to spy on or control other users active RDP sessions. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<potential-remote-desktop-tunneling-detected, Potential Remote Desktop Tunneling Detected>> |Identifies potential use of an SSH utility to establish RDP over a reverse SSH Tunnel. This can be used by attackers to enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<potential-remote-desktop-tunneling-detected, Potential Remote Desktop Tunneling Detected>> |Identifies potential use of an SSH utility to establish RDP over a reverse SSH Tunnel. This can be used by attackers to enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
 
 |<<potential-remote-file-execution-via-msiexec, Potential Remote File Execution via MSIEXEC>> |Identifies the execution of the built-in Windows Installer, msiexec.exe, to install a remote package. Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to launch local or network accessible MSI files. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |2
 
-|<<potential-reverse-shell, Potential Reverse Shell>> |This detection rule identifies suspicious network traffic patterns associated with TCP reverse shell activity. This activity consists of a parent-child relationship where a network event is followed by the creation of a shell process. An attacker may establish a Linux TCP reverse shell to gain remote access to a target system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |7
+|<<potential-reverse-shell, Potential Reverse Shell>> |This detection rule identifies suspicious network traffic patterns associated with TCP reverse shell activity. This activity consists of a parent-child relationship where a network event is followed by the creation of a shell process. An attacker may establish a Linux TCP reverse shell to gain remote access to a target system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |8
 
-|<<potential-reverse-shell-activity-via-terminal, Potential Reverse Shell Activity via Terminal>> |Identifies the execution of a shell process with suspicious arguments which may be indicative of reverse shell activity. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<potential-reverse-shell-activity-via-terminal, Potential Reverse Shell Activity via Terminal>> |Identifies the execution of a shell process with suspicious arguments which may be indicative of reverse shell activity. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
 
 |<<potential-reverse-shell-via-background-process, Potential Reverse Shell via Background Process>> |Monitors for the execution of background processes with process arguments capable of opening a socket in the /dev/tcp channel. This may indicate the creation of a backdoor reverse connection, and should be investigated further. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |8.3.0 |4
 
-|<<potential-reverse-shell-via-child, Potential Reverse Shell via Child>> |This detection rule identifies suspicious network traffic patterns associated with TCP reverse shell activity. This activity consists of a network event that is followed by the creation of a shell process with suspicious command line arguments. An attacker may establish a Linux TCP reverse shell to gain remote access to a target system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |1
+|<<potential-reverse-shell-via-child, Potential Reverse Shell via Child>> |This detection rule identifies suspicious network traffic patterns associated with TCP reverse shell activity. This activity consists of a network event that is followed by the creation of a shell process with suspicious command line arguments. An attacker may establish a Linux TCP reverse shell to gain remote access to a target system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |2
 
-|<<potential-reverse-shell-via-java, Potential Reverse Shell via Java>> |This detection rule identifies the execution of a Linux shell process from a Java JAR application post an incoming network connection. This behavior may indicate reverse shell activity via a Java application. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |7
+|<<potential-reverse-shell-via-java, Potential Reverse Shell via Java>> |This detection rule identifies the execution of a Linux shell process from a Java JAR application post an incoming network connection. This behavior may indicate reverse shell activity via a Java application. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |8
 
-|<<potential-reverse-shell-via-suspicious-binary, Potential Reverse Shell via Suspicious Binary>> |This detection rule detects the creation of a shell through a chain consisting of the execution of a suspicious binary (located in a commonly abused location or executed manually) followed by a network event and ending with a shell being spawned. Stageless reverse tcp shells display this behaviour. Attackers may spawn reverse shells to establish persistence onto a target system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |6
+|<<potential-reverse-shell-via-suspicious-binary, Potential Reverse Shell via Suspicious Binary>> |This detection rule detects the creation of a shell through a chain consisting of the execution of a suspicious binary (located in a commonly abused location or executed manually) followed by a network event and ending with a shell being spawned. Stageless reverse tcp shells display this behaviour. Attackers may spawn reverse shells to establish persistence onto a target system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |7
 
-|<<potential-reverse-shell-via-suspicious-child-process, Potential Reverse Shell via Suspicious Child Process>> |This detection rule detects the creation of a shell through a suspicious process chain. Any reverse shells spawned by the specified utilities that are initialized from a single process followed by a network connection attempt will be captured through this rule. Attackers may spawn reverse shells to establish persistence onto a target system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |8
+|<<potential-reverse-shell-via-suspicious-child-process, Potential Reverse Shell via Suspicious Child Process>> |This detection rule detects the creation of a shell through a suspicious process chain. Any reverse shells spawned by the specified utilities that are initialized from a single process followed by a network connection attempt will be captured through this rule. Attackers may spawn reverse shells to establish persistence onto a target system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |9
 
-|<<potential-reverse-shell-via-udp, Potential Reverse Shell via UDP>> |This detection rule identifies suspicious network traffic patterns associated with UDP reverse shell activity. This activity consists of a sample of an execve, socket and connect syscall executed by the same process, where the auditd.data.a0-1 indicate a UDP connection, ending with an egress connection event. An attacker may establish a Linux UDP reverse shell to bypass traditional firewall restrictions and gain remote access to a target system covertly. |[Data Source: Auditd Manager], [Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution] |8.6.0 |5
+|<<potential-reverse-shell-via-udp, Potential Reverse Shell via UDP>> |This detection rule identifies suspicious network traffic patterns associated with UDP reverse shell activity. This activity consists of a sample of an execve, socket and connect syscall executed by the same process, where the auditd.data.a0-1 indicate a UDP connection, ending with an egress connection event. An attacker may establish a Linux UDP reverse shell to bypass traditional firewall restrictions and gain remote access to a target system covertly. |[Data Source: Auditd Manager], [Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution] |8.6.0 |6
 
 |<<potential-ssh-it-ssh-worm-downloaded, Potential SSH-IT SSH Worm Downloaded>> |Identifies processes that are capable of downloading files with command line arguments containing URLs to SSH-IT's autonomous SSH worm. This worm intercepts outgoing SSH connections every time a user uses ssh. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.3.0 |3
 
 |<<potential-syn-based-network-scan-detected, Potential SYN-Based Network Scan Detected>> |This rule identifies a potential SYN-Based port scan. A SYN port scan is a technique employed by attackers to scan a target network for open ports by sending SYN packets to multiple ports and observing the response. Attackers use this method to identify potential entry points or services that may be vulnerable to exploitation, allowing them to launch targeted attacks or gain unauthorized access to the system or network, compromising its security and potentially leading to data breaches or further malicious activities. This rule proposes threshold logic to check for connection attempts from one source host to 10 or more destination ports using 2 or less packets per port. |[Domain: Network], [Tactic: Discovery], [Tactic: Reconnaissance], [Use Case: Network Security Monitoring] |8.3.0 |5
 
-|<<potential-secure-file-deletion-via-sdelete-utility, Potential Secure File Deletion via SDelete Utility>> |Detects file name patterns generated by the use of Sysinternals SDelete utility to securely delete a file via multiple file overwrite and rename operations. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Impact], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<potential-secure-file-deletion-via-sdelete-utility, Potential Secure File Deletion via SDelete Utility>> |Detects file name patterns generated by the use of Sysinternals SDelete utility to securely delete a file via multiple file overwrite and rename operations. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Impact], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<potential-shadow-credentials-added-to-ad-object, Potential Shadow Credentials added to AD Object>> |Identify the modification of the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute in an Active Directory Computer or User Object. Attackers can abuse control over the object and create a key pair, append to raw public key in the attribute, and obtain persistent and stealthy access to the target user or computer object. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Active Directory], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<potential-shadow-credentials-added-to-ad-object, Potential Shadow Credentials added to AD Object>> |Identify the modification of the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute in an Active Directory Computer or User Object. Attackers can abuse control over the object and create a key pair, append to raw public key in the attribute, and obtain persistent and stealthy access to the target user or computer object. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Active Directory], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<potential-shadow-file-read-via-command-line-utilities, Potential Shadow File Read via Command Line Utilities>> |Identifies access to the /etc/shadow file via the commandline using standard system utilities. After elevating privileges to root, threat actors may attempt to read or dump this file in order to gain valid credentials. They may utilize these to move laterally undetected and access additional resources. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.4.0 |108
+|<<potential-shadow-file-read-via-command-line-utilities, Potential Shadow File Read via Command Line Utilities>> |Identifies access to the /etc/shadow file via the commandline using standard system utilities. After elevating privileges to root, threat actors may attempt to read or dump this file in order to gain valid credentials. They may utilize these to move laterally undetected and access additional resources. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |208
 
 |<<potential-sharprdp-behavior, Potential SharpRDP Behavior>> |Identifies potential behavior of SharpRDP, which is a tool that can be used to perform authenticated command execution against a remote target via Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) for the purposes of lateral movement. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
 
-|<<potential-shell-via-wildcard-injection-detected, Potential Shell via Wildcard Injection Detected>> |This rule monitors for the execution of a set of linux binaries, that are potentially vulnerable to wildcard injection, with suspicious command line flags followed by a shell spawn event. Linux wildcard injection is a type of security vulnerability where attackers manipulate commands or input containing wildcards (e.g., *, ?, []) to execute unintended operations or access sensitive data by tricking the system into interpreting the wildcard characters in unexpected ways. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |4
+|<<potential-shell-via-wildcard-injection-detected, Potential Shell via Wildcard Injection Detected>> |This rule monitors for the execution of a set of linux binaries, that are potentially vulnerable to wildcard injection, with suspicious command line flags followed by a shell spawn event. Linux wildcard injection is a type of security vulnerability where attackers manipulate commands or input containing wildcards (e.g., *, ?, []) to execute unintended operations or access sensitive data by tricking the system into interpreting the wildcard characters in unexpected ways. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |5
 
-|<<potential-successful-linux-ftp-brute-force-attack-detected, Potential Successful Linux FTP Brute Force Attack Detected>> |An FTP (file transfer protocol) brute force attack is a method where an attacker systematically tries different combinations of usernames and passwords to gain unauthorized access to an FTP server, and if successful, the impact can include unauthorized data access, manipulation, or theft, compromising the security and integrity of the server and potentially exposing sensitive information. This rule identifies multiple consecutive authentication failures targeting a specific user account from the same source address and within a short time interval, followed by a successful authentication. |[Data Source: Auditd Manager], [Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access] |8.3.0 |6
+|<<potential-successful-linux-ftp-brute-force-attack-detected, Potential Successful Linux FTP Brute Force Attack Detected>> |An FTP (file transfer protocol) brute force attack is a method where an attacker systematically tries different combinations of usernames and passwords to gain unauthorized access to an FTP server, and if successful, the impact can include unauthorized data access, manipulation, or theft, compromising the security and integrity of the server and potentially exposing sensitive information. This rule identifies multiple consecutive authentication failures targeting a specific user account from the same source address and within a short time interval, followed by a successful authentication. |[Data Source: Auditd Manager], [Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access] |8.3.0 |7
 
-|<<potential-successful-linux-rdp-brute-force-attack-detected, Potential Successful Linux RDP Brute Force Attack Detected>> |An RDP (Remote Desktop Protocol) brute force attack involves an attacker repeatedly attempting various username and password combinations to gain unauthorized access to a remote computer via RDP, and if successful, the potential impact can include unauthorized control over the compromised system, data theft, or the ability to launch further attacks within the network, jeopardizing the security and confidentiality of the targeted system and potentially compromising the entire network infrastructure. This rule identifies multiple consecutive authentication failures targeting a specific user account within a short time interval, followed by a successful authentication. |[Data Source: Auditd Manager], [Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access] |8.3.0 |6
+|<<potential-successful-linux-rdp-brute-force-attack-detected, Potential Successful Linux RDP Brute Force Attack Detected>> |An RDP (Remote Desktop Protocol) brute force attack involves an attacker repeatedly attempting various username and password combinations to gain unauthorized access to a remote computer via RDP, and if successful, the potential impact can include unauthorized control over the compromised system, data theft, or the ability to launch further attacks within the network, jeopardizing the security and confidentiality of the targeted system and potentially compromising the entire network infrastructure. This rule identifies multiple consecutive authentication failures targeting a specific user account within a short time interval, followed by a successful authentication. |[Data Source: Auditd Manager], [Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access] |8.3.0 |7
 
-|<<potential-successful-ssh-brute-force-attack, Potential Successful SSH Brute Force Attack>> |Identifies multiple SSH login failures followed by a successful one from the same source address. Adversaries can attempt to login into multiple users with a common or known password to gain access to accounts. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access] |8.3.0 |9
+|<<potential-successful-ssh-brute-force-attack, Potential Successful SSH Brute Force Attack>> |Identifies multiple SSH login failures followed by a successful one from the same source address. Adversaries can attempt to login into multiple users with a common or known password to gain access to accounts. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access] |8.3.0 |10
 
-|<<potential-sudo-hijacking-detected, Potential Sudo Hijacking Detected>> |Identifies the creation of a sudo binary located at /usr/bin/sudo. Attackers may hijack the default sudo binary and replace it with a custom binary or script that can read the user's password in clear text to escalate privileges or enable persistence onto the system every time the sudo binary is executed. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |104
+|<<potential-sudo-hijacking-detected, Potential Sudo Hijacking Detected>> |Identifies the creation of a sudo binary located at /usr/bin/sudo. Attackers may hijack the default sudo binary and replace it with a custom binary or script that can read the user's password in clear text to escalate privileges or enable persistence onto the system every time the sudo binary is executed. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |105
 
-|<<potential-sudo-privilege-escalation-via-cve-2019-14287, Potential Sudo Privilege Escalation via CVE-2019-14287>> |This rule monitors for the execution of a suspicious sudo command that is leveraged in CVE-2019-14287 to escalate privileges to root. Sudo does not verify the presence of the designated user ID and proceeds to execute using a user ID that can be chosen arbitrarily. By using the sudo privileges, the command "sudo -u#-1" translates to an ID of 0, representing the root user. This exploit may work for sudo versions prior to v1.28. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Use Case: Vulnerability] |8.3.0 |3
+|<<potential-sudo-privilege-escalation-via-cve-2019-14287, Potential Sudo Privilege Escalation via CVE-2019-14287>> |This rule monitors for the execution of a suspicious sudo command that is leveraged in CVE-2019-14287 to escalate privileges to root. Sudo does not verify the presence of the designated user ID and proceeds to execute using a user ID that can be chosen arbitrarily. By using the sudo privileges, the command "sudo -u#-1" translates to an ID of 0, representing the root user. This exploit may work for sudo versions prior to v1.28. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.3.0 |4
 
-|<<potential-sudo-token-manipulation-via-process-injection, Potential Sudo Token Manipulation via Process Injection>> |This rule detects potential sudo token manipulation attacks through process injection by monitoring the use of a debugger (gdb) process followed by a successful uid change event during the execution of the sudo process. A sudo token manipulation attack is performed by injecting into a process that has a valid sudo token, which can then be used by attackers to activate their own sudo token. This attack requires ptrace to be enabled in conjunction with the existence of a living process that has a valid sudo token with the same uid as the current user. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |4
+|<<potential-sudo-token-manipulation-via-process-injection, Potential Sudo Token Manipulation via Process Injection>> |This rule detects potential sudo token manipulation attacks through process injection by monitoring the use of a debugger (gdb) process followed by a successful uid change event during the execution of the sudo process. A sudo token manipulation attack is performed by injecting into a process that has a valid sudo token, which can then be used by attackers to activate their own sudo token. This attack requires ptrace to be enabled in conjunction with the existence of a living process that has a valid sudo token with the same uid as the current user. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |5
 
-|<<potential-suspicious-clipboard-activity-detected, Potential Suspicious Clipboard Activity Detected>> |This rule monitors for the usage of the most common clipboard utilities on unix systems by an uncommon process group leader. Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Collection], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |3
+|<<potential-suspicious-clipboard-activity-detected, Potential Suspicious Clipboard Activity Detected>> |This rule monitors for the usage of the most common clipboard utilities on unix systems by an uncommon process group leader. Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Collection], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.6.0 |4
 
-|<<potential-suspicious-debugfs-root-device-access, Potential Suspicious DebugFS Root Device Access>> |This rule monitors for the usage of the built-in Linux DebugFS utility to access a disk device without root permissions. Linux users that are part of the "disk" group have sufficient privileges to access all data inside of the machine through DebugFS. Attackers may leverage DebugFS in conjunction with "disk" permissions to read sensitive files owned by root, such as the shadow file, root ssh private keys or other sensitive files that may allow them to further escalate privileges. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |4
+|<<potential-suspicious-debugfs-root-device-access, Potential Suspicious DebugFS Root Device Access>> |This rule monitors for the usage of the built-in Linux DebugFS utility to access a disk device without root permissions. Linux users that are part of the "disk" group have sufficient privileges to access all data inside of the machine through DebugFS. Attackers may leverage DebugFS in conjunction with "disk" permissions to read sensitive files owned by root, such as the shadow file, root ssh private keys or other sensitive files that may allow them to further escalate privileges. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |5
 
 |<<potential-suspicious-file-edit, Potential Suspicious File Edit>> |This rule monitors for the potential edit of a suspicious file. In Linux, when editing a file through an editor, a temporary .swp file is created. By monitoring for the creation of this .swp file, we can detect potential file edits of suspicious files. The execution of this rule is not a clear sign of the file being edited, as just opening the file through an editor will trigger this event. Attackers may alter any of the files added in this rule to establish persistence, escalate privileges or perform reconnaisance on the system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |4
 
-|<<potential-unauthorized-access-via-wildcard-injection-detected, Potential Unauthorized Access via Wildcard Injection Detected>> |This rule monitors for the execution of the "chown" and "chmod" commands with command line flags that could indicate a wildcard injection attack. Linux wildcard injection is a type of security vulnerability where attackers manipulate commands or input containing wildcards (e.g., *, ?, []) to execute unintended operations or access sensitive data by tricking the system into interpreting the wildcard characters in unexpected ways. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |4
+|<<potential-unauthorized-access-via-wildcard-injection-detected, Potential Unauthorized Access via Wildcard Injection Detected>> |This rule monitors for the execution of the "chown" and "chmod" commands with command line flags that could indicate a wildcard injection attack. Linux wildcard injection is a type of security vulnerability where attackers manipulate commands or input containing wildcards (e.g., *, ?, []) to execute unintended operations or access sensitive data by tricking the system into interpreting the wildcard characters in unexpected ways. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.3.0 |5
+
+|<<potential-upgrade-of-non-interactive-shell, Potential Upgrade of Non-interactive Shell>> |Identifies when a non-interactive terminal (tty) is being upgraded to a fully interactive shell. Attackers may upgrade a simple reverse shell to a fully interactive tty after obtaining initial access to a host, in order to obtain a more stable connection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |3
 
-|<<potential-upgrade-of-non-interactive-shell, Potential Upgrade of Non-interactive Shell>> |Identifies when a non-interactive terminal (tty) is being upgraded to a fully interactive shell. Attackers may upgrade a simple reverse shell to a fully interactive tty after obtaining initial access to a host, in order to obtain a more stable connection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |2
+|<<potential-veeam-credential-access-command, Potential Veeam Credential Access Command>> |Identifies commands that can access and decrypt Veeam credentials stored in MSSQL databases. Attackers can use Veeam Credentials to target backups as part of destructive operations such as Ransomware attacks. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |1
 
-|<<potential-windows-error-manager-masquerading, Potential Windows Error Manager Masquerading>> |Identifies suspicious instances of the Windows Error Reporting process (WerFault.exe or Wermgr.exe) with matching command-line and process executable values performing outgoing network connections. This may be indicative of a masquerading attempt to evade suspicious child process behavior detections. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<potential-windows-error-manager-masquerading, Potential Windows Error Manager Masquerading>> |Identifies suspicious instances of the Windows Error Reporting process (WerFault.exe or Wermgr.exe) with matching command-line and process executable values performing outgoing network connections. This may be indicative of a masquerading attempt to evade suspicious child process behavior detections. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |107
 
 |<<potential-curl-cve-2023-38545-exploitation, Potential curl CVE-2023-38545 Exploitation>> |Detects potential exploitation of curl CVE-2023-38545 by monitoring for vulnerable command line arguments in conjunction with an unusual command line length. A flaw in curl version <= 8.3 makes curl vulnerable to a heap based buffer overflow during the SOCKS5 proxy handshake. Upgrade to curl version >= 8.4 to patch this vulnerability. This exploit can be executed with and without the use of environment variables. For increased visibility, enable the collection of http_proxy, HTTPS_PROXY and ALL_PROXY environment variables based on the instructions provided in the setup guide of this rule. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |5
 
-|<<potential-macos-ssh-brute-force-detected, Potential macOS SSH Brute Force Detected>> |Identifies a high number (20) of macOS SSH KeyGen process executions from the same host. An adversary may attempt a brute force attack to obtain unauthorized access to user accounts. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<potential-macos-ssh-brute-force-detected, Potential macOS SSH Brute Force Detected>> |Identifies a high number (20) of macOS SSH KeyGen process executions from the same host. An adversary may attempt a brute force attack to obtain unauthorized access to user accounts. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
 
 |<<potentially-successful-mfa-bombing-via-push-notifications, Potentially Successful MFA Bombing via Push Notifications>> |Detects when an attacker abuses the Multi-Factor authentication mechanism by repeatedly issuing login requests until the user eventually accepts the Okta push notification. An adversary may attempt to bypass the Okta MFA policies configured for an organization to obtain unauthorized access. |[Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Okta] |8.10.0 |209
 
-|<<potentially-suspicious-process-started-via-tmux-or-screen, Potentially Suspicious Process Started via tmux or screen>> |This rule monitors for the execution of suspicious commands via screen and tmux. When launching a command and detaching directly, the commands will be executed in the background via its parent process. Attackers may leverage screen or tmux to execute commands while attempting to evade detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |8.3.0 |3
+|<<potentially-suspicious-process-started-via-tmux-or-screen, Potentially Suspicious Process Started via tmux or screen>> |This rule monitors for the execution of suspicious commands via screen and tmux. When launching a command and detaching directly, the commands will be executed in the background via its parent process. Attackers may leverage screen or tmux to execute commands while attempting to evade detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |8.3.0 |4
 
-|<<powershell-invoke-ninjacopy-script, PowerShell Invoke-NinjaCopy script>> |Detects PowerShell scripts that contain the default exported functions used on Invoke-NinjaCopy. Attackers can use Invoke-NinjaCopy to read SYSTEM files that are normally locked, such as the NTDS.dit file or registry hives. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.3.0 |4
+|<<powershell-invoke-ninjacopy-script, PowerShell Invoke-NinjaCopy script>> |Detects PowerShell scripts that contain the default exported functions used on Invoke-NinjaCopy. Attackers can use Invoke-NinjaCopy to read SYSTEM files that are normally locked, such as the NTDS.dit file or registry hives. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.3.0 |5
 
-|<<powershell-kerberos-ticket-dump, PowerShell Kerberos Ticket Dump>> |Detects PowerShell scripts that have the capability of dumping Kerberos tickets from LSA, which potentially indicates an attacker's attempt to acquire credentials for lateral movement. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs] |8.3.0 |3
+|<<powershell-kerberos-ticket-dump, PowerShell Kerberos Ticket Dump>> |Detects PowerShell scripts that have the capability of dumping Kerberos tickets from LSA, which potentially indicates an attacker's attempt to acquire credentials for lateral movement. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs] |8.3.0 |4
 
-|<<powershell-kerberos-ticket-request, PowerShell Kerberos Ticket Request>> |Detects PowerShell scripts that have the capability of requesting kerberos tickets, which is a common step in Kerberoasting toolkits to crack service accounts. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs] |8.3.0 |110
+|<<powershell-kerberos-ticket-request, PowerShell Kerberos Ticket Request>> |Detects PowerShell scripts that have the capability of requesting kerberos tickets, which is a common step in Kerberoasting toolkits to crack service accounts. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs] |8.3.0 |111
 
-|<<powershell-keylogging-script, PowerShell Keylogging Script>> |Detects the use of Win32 API Functions that can be used to capture user keystrokes in PowerShell scripts. Attackers use this technique to capture user input, looking for credentials and/or other valuable data. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Collection], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs] |8.3.0 |111
+|<<powershell-keylogging-script, PowerShell Keylogging Script>> |Detects the use of Win32 API Functions that can be used to capture user keystrokes in PowerShell scripts. Attackers use this technique to capture user input, looking for credentials and/or other valuable data. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Collection], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs] |8.3.0 |112
 
-|<<powershell-mailbox-collection-script, PowerShell Mailbox Collection Script>> |Detects PowerShell scripts that can be used to collect data from mailboxes. Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Collection], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.3.0 |6
+|<<powershell-mailbox-collection-script, PowerShell Mailbox Collection Script>> |Detects PowerShell scripts that can be used to collect data from mailboxes. Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Collection], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.3.0 |7
 
-|<<powershell-minidump-script, PowerShell MiniDump Script>> |This rule detects PowerShell scripts capable of dumping process memory using WindowsErrorReporting or Dbghelp.dll MiniDumpWriteDump. Attackers can use this tooling to dump LSASS and get access to credentials. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<powershell-minidump-script, PowerShell MiniDump Script>> |This rule detects PowerShell scripts capable of dumping process memory using WindowsErrorReporting or Dbghelp.dll MiniDumpWriteDump. Attackers can use this tooling to dump LSASS and get access to credentials. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<powershell-psreflect-script, PowerShell PSReflect Script>> |Detects the use of PSReflect in PowerShell scripts. Attackers leverage PSReflect as a library that enables PowerShell to access win32 API functions. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<powershell-psreflect-script, PowerShell PSReflect Script>> |Detects the use of PSReflect in PowerShell scripts. Attackers leverage PSReflect as a library that enables PowerShell to access win32 API functions. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs] |8.3.0 |110
 
-|<<powershell-script-block-logging-disabled, PowerShell Script Block Logging Disabled>> |Identifies attempts to disable PowerShell Script Block Logging via registry modification. Attackers may disable this logging to conceal their activities in the host and evade detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<powershell-script-block-logging-disabled, PowerShell Script Block Logging Disabled>> |Identifies attempts to disable PowerShell Script Block Logging via registry modification. Attackers may disable this logging to conceal their activities in the host and evade detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<powershell-script-with-archive-compression-capabilities, PowerShell Script with Archive Compression Capabilities>> |Identifies the use of Cmdlets and methods related to archive compression activities. Adversaries will often compress and encrypt data in preparation for exfiltration. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Collection], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |4
+|<<powershell-script-with-archive-compression-capabilities, PowerShell Script with Archive Compression Capabilities>> |Identifies the use of Cmdlets and methods related to archive compression activities. Adversaries will often compress and encrypt data in preparation for exfiltration. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Collection], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |5
 
-|<<powershell-script-with-discovery-capabilities, PowerShell Script with Discovery Capabilities>> |Identifies the use of Cmdlets and methods related to discovery activities. Attackers can use these to perform various situational awareness related activities, like enumerating users, shares, sessions, domain trusts, groups, etc. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Collection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |5
+|<<powershell-script-with-discovery-capabilities, PowerShell Script with Discovery Capabilities>> |Identifies the use of Cmdlets and methods related to discovery activities. Attackers can use these to perform various situational awareness related activities, like enumerating users, shares, sessions, domain trusts, groups, etc. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Collection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |6
 
-|<<powershell-script-with-encryption-decryption-capabilities, PowerShell Script with Encryption/Decryption Capabilities>> |Identifies the use of Cmdlets and methods related to encryption/decryption of files in PowerShell scripts, which malware and offensive security tools can abuse to encrypt data or decrypt payloads to bypass security solutions. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.3.0 |5
+|<<powershell-script-with-encryption-decryption-capabilities, PowerShell Script with Encryption/Decryption Capabilities>> |Identifies the use of Cmdlets and methods related to encryption/decryption of files in PowerShell scripts, which malware and offensive security tools can abuse to encrypt data or decrypt payloads to bypass security solutions. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.3.0 |6
 
-|<<powershell-script-with-log-clear-capabilities, PowerShell Script with Log Clear Capabilities>> |Identifies the use of Cmdlets and methods related to Windows event log deletion activities. This is often done by attackers in an attempt to evade detection or destroy forensic evidence on a system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |4
+|<<powershell-script-with-log-clear-capabilities, PowerShell Script with Log Clear Capabilities>> |Identifies the use of Cmdlets and methods related to Windows event log deletion activities. This is often done by attackers in an attempt to evade detection or destroy forensic evidence on a system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |5
 
-|<<powershell-script-with-password-policy-discovery-capabilities, PowerShell Script with Password Policy Discovery Capabilities>> |Identifies the use of Cmdlets and methods related to remote execution activities using WinRM. Attackers can abuse WinRM to perform lateral movement using built-in tools. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |4
+|<<powershell-script-with-password-policy-discovery-capabilities, PowerShell Script with Password Policy Discovery Capabilities>> |Identifies the use of Cmdlets and methods related to remote execution activities using WinRM. Attackers can abuse WinRM to perform lateral movement using built-in tools. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |5
 
-|<<powershell-script-with-remote-execution-capabilities-via-winrm, PowerShell Script with Remote Execution Capabilities via WinRM>> |Identifies the use of Cmdlets and methods related to remote execution activities using WinRM. Attackers can abuse WinRM to perform lateral movement using built-in tools. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |5
+|<<powershell-script-with-remote-execution-capabilities-via-winrm, PowerShell Script with Remote Execution Capabilities via WinRM>> |Identifies the use of Cmdlets and methods related to remote execution activities using WinRM. Attackers can abuse WinRM to perform lateral movement using built-in tools. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |6
 
-|<<powershell-script-with-token-impersonation-capabilities, PowerShell Script with Token Impersonation Capabilities>> |Detects scripts that contain PowerShell functions, structures, or Windows API functions related to token impersonation/theft. Attackers may duplicate then impersonate another user's token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs] |8.3.0 |10
+|<<powershell-script-with-token-impersonation-capabilities, PowerShell Script with Token Impersonation Capabilities>> |Detects scripts that contain PowerShell functions, structures, or Windows API functions related to token impersonation/theft. Attackers may duplicate then impersonate another user's token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs] |8.3.0 |11
 
-|<<powershell-script-with-webcam-video-capture-capabilities, PowerShell Script with Webcam Video Capture Capabilities>> |Detects PowerShell scripts that can be used to record webcam video. Attackers can capture this information to extort or spy on victims. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Collection], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs] |8.3.0 |3
+|<<powershell-script-with-veeam-credential-access-capabilities, PowerShell Script with Veeam Credential Access Capabilities>> |Identifies PowerShell scripts that can access and decrypt Veeam credentials stored in MSSQL databases. Attackers can use Veeam Credentials to target backups as part of destructive operations such as Ransomware attacks. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs] |8.3.0 |1
 
-|<<powershell-share-enumeration-script, PowerShell Share Enumeration Script>> |Detects scripts that contain PowerShell functions, structures, or Windows API functions related to windows share enumeration activities. Attackers, mainly ransomware groups, commonly identify and inspect network shares, looking for critical information for encryption and/or exfiltration. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Tactic: Collection], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs] |8.3.0 |8
+|<<powershell-script-with-webcam-video-capture-capabilities, PowerShell Script with Webcam Video Capture Capabilities>> |Detects PowerShell scripts that can be used to record webcam video. Attackers can capture this information to extort or spy on victims. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Collection], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs] |8.3.0 |4
 
-|<<powershell-suspicious-discovery-related-windows-api-functions, PowerShell Suspicious Discovery Related Windows API Functions>> |This rule detects the use of discovery-related Windows API functions in PowerShell Scripts. Attackers can use these functions to perform various situational awareness related activities, like enumerating users, shares, sessions, domain trusts, groups, etc. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Tactic: Collection], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs] |8.3.0 |112
+|<<powershell-share-enumeration-script, PowerShell Share Enumeration Script>> |Detects scripts that contain PowerShell functions, structures, or Windows API functions related to windows share enumeration activities. Attackers, mainly ransomware groups, commonly identify and inspect network shares, looking for critical information for encryption and/or exfiltration. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Tactic: Collection], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs] |8.3.0 |9
 
-|<<powershell-suspicious-payload-encoded-and-compressed, PowerShell Suspicious Payload Encoded and Compressed>> |Identifies the use of .NET functionality for decompression and base64 decoding combined in PowerShell scripts, which malware and security tools heavily use to deobfuscate payloads and load them directly in memory to bypass defenses. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs] |8.3.0 |110
+|<<powershell-suspicious-discovery-related-windows-api-functions, PowerShell Suspicious Discovery Related Windows API Functions>> |This rule detects the use of discovery-related Windows API functions in PowerShell Scripts. Attackers can use these functions to perform various situational awareness related activities, like enumerating users, shares, sessions, domain trusts, groups, etc. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Tactic: Collection], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs] |8.3.0 |113
 
-|<<powershell-suspicious-script-with-audio-capture-capabilities, PowerShell Suspicious Script with Audio Capture Capabilities>> |Detects PowerShell scripts that can record audio, a common feature in popular post-exploitation tooling. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Collection], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<powershell-suspicious-payload-encoded-and-compressed, PowerShell Suspicious Payload Encoded and Compressed>> |Identifies the use of .NET functionality for decompression and base64 decoding combined in PowerShell scripts, which malware and security tools heavily use to deobfuscate payloads and load them directly in memory to bypass defenses. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs] |8.3.0 |111
 
-|<<powershell-suspicious-script-with-clipboard-retrieval-capabilities, PowerShell Suspicious Script with Clipboard Retrieval Capabilities>> |Detects PowerShell scripts that can get the contents of the clipboard, which attackers can abuse to retrieve sensitive information like credentials, messages, etc. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Collection], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.3.0 |7
+|<<powershell-suspicious-script-with-audio-capture-capabilities, PowerShell Suspicious Script with Audio Capture Capabilities>> |Detects PowerShell scripts that can record audio, a common feature in popular post-exploitation tooling. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Collection], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs] |8.3.0 |110
 
-|<<powershell-suspicious-script-with-screenshot-capabilities, PowerShell Suspicious Script with Screenshot Capabilities>> |Detects PowerShell scripts that can take screenshots, which is a common feature in post-exploitation kits and remote access tools (RATs). |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Collection], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<powershell-suspicious-script-with-clipboard-retrieval-capabilities, PowerShell Suspicious Script with Clipboard Retrieval Capabilities>> |Detects PowerShell scripts that can get the contents of the clipboard, which attackers can abuse to retrieve sensitive information like credentials, messages, etc. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Collection], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.3.0 |8
 
-|<<privilege-escalation-via-cap-chown-cap-fowner-capabilities, Privilege Escalation via CAP_CHOWN/CAP_FOWNER Capabilities>> |Identifies instances where a processes (granted CAP_CHOWN and/or CAP_FOWNER capabilities) is executed, after which the ownership of a suspicious file or binary is changed. In Linux, the CAP_CHOWN capability allows a process to change the owner of a file, while CAP_FOWNER permits it to bypass permission checks on operations that require file ownership (like reading, writing, and executing). Attackers may abuse these capabilities to obtain unauthorized access to files. |[Data Source: Auditd Manager], [Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.11.0 |2
+|<<powershell-suspicious-script-with-screenshot-capabilities, PowerShell Suspicious Script with Screenshot Capabilities>> |Detects PowerShell scripts that can take screenshots, which is a common feature in post-exploitation kits and remote access tools (RATs). |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Collection], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<privilege-escalation-via-cap-setuid-setgid-capabilities, Privilege Escalation via CAP_SETUID/SETGID Capabilities>> |Identifies instances where a process (granted CAP_SETUID and/or CAP_SETGID capabilities) is executed, after which the user's access is elevated to UID/GID 0 (root). In Linux, the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities allow a process to change its UID and GID, respectively, providing control over user and group identity management. Attackers may leverage a misconfiguration for exploitation in order to escalate their privileges to root. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.11.0 |1
+|<<privilege-escalation-via-cap-chown-cap-fowner-capabilities, Privilege Escalation via CAP_CHOWN/CAP_FOWNER Capabilities>> |Identifies instances where a processes (granted CAP_CHOWN and/or CAP_FOWNER capabilities) is executed, after which the ownership of a suspicious file or binary is changed. In Linux, the CAP_CHOWN capability allows a process to change the owner of a file, while CAP_FOWNER permits it to bypass permission checks on operations that require file ownership (like reading, writing, and executing). Attackers may abuse these capabilities to obtain unauthorized access to files. |[Data Source: Auditd Manager], [Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.11.0 |3
 
-|<<privilege-escalation-via-gdb-cap-sys-ptrace, Privilege Escalation via GDB CAP_SYS_PTRACE>> |Identifies instances where GDB (granted the CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability) is executed, after which the user's access is elevated to UID/GID 0 (root). In Linux, the CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability grants a process the ability to use the ptrace system call, which is typically used for debugging and allows the process to trace and control other processes. Attackers may leverage this capability to hook and inject into a process that is running with root permissions in order to escalate their privileges to root. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.11.0 |1
+|<<privilege-escalation-via-cap-setuid-setgid-capabilities, Privilege Escalation via CAP_SETUID/SETGID Capabilities>> |Identifies instances where a process (granted CAP_SETUID and/or CAP_SETGID capabilities) is executed, after which the user's access is elevated to UID/GID 0 (root). In Linux, the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities allow a process to change its UID and GID, respectively, providing control over user and group identity management. Attackers may leverage a misconfiguration for exploitation in order to escalate their privileges to root. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.11.0 |2
 
-|<<privilege-escalation-via-named-pipe-impersonation, Privilege Escalation via Named Pipe Impersonation>> |Identifies a privilege escalation attempt via named pipe impersonation. An adversary may abuse this technique by utilizing a framework such Metasploit's meterpreter getsystem command. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<privilege-escalation-via-gdb-cap-sys-ptrace, Privilege Escalation via GDB CAP_SYS_PTRACE>> |Identifies instances where GDB (granted the CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability) is executed, after which the user's access is elevated to UID/GID 0 (root). In Linux, the CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability grants a process the ability to use the ptrace system call, which is typically used for debugging and allows the process to trace and control other processes. Attackers may leverage this capability to hook and inject into a process that is running with root permissions in order to escalate their privileges to root. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.11.0 |2
 
-|<<privilege-escalation-via-rogue-named-pipe-impersonation, Privilege Escalation via Rogue Named Pipe Impersonation>> |Identifies a privilege escalation attempt via rogue named pipe impersonation. An adversary may abuse this technique by masquerading as a known named pipe and manipulating a privileged process to connect to it. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Sysmon Only] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<privilege-escalation-via-named-pipe-impersonation, Privilege Escalation via Named Pipe Impersonation>> |Identifies a privilege escalation attempt via named pipe impersonation. An adversary may abuse this technique by utilizing a framework such Metasploit's meterpreter getsystem command. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
 
-|<<privilege-escalation-via-root-crontab-file-modification, Privilege Escalation via Root Crontab File Modification>> |Identifies modifications to the root crontab file. Adversaries may overwrite this file to gain code execution with root privileges by exploiting privileged file write or move related vulnerabilities. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<privilege-escalation-via-rogue-named-pipe-impersonation, Privilege Escalation via Rogue Named Pipe Impersonation>> |Identifies a privilege escalation attempt via rogue named pipe impersonation. An adversary may abuse this technique by masquerading as a known named pipe and manipulating a privileged process to connect to it. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<privilege-escalation-via-windir-environment-variable, Privilege Escalation via Windir Environment Variable>> |Identifies a privilege escalation attempt via a rogue Windows directory (Windir) environment variable. This is a known primitive that is often combined with other vulnerabilities to elevate privileges. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |104
+|<<privilege-escalation-via-root-crontab-file-modification, Privilege Escalation via Root Crontab File Modification>> |Identifies modifications to the root crontab file. Adversaries may overwrite this file to gain code execution with root privileges by exploiting privileged file write or move related vulnerabilities. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<privileged-account-brute-force, Privileged Account Brute Force>> |Identifies multiple consecutive logon failures targeting an Admin account from the same source address and within a short time interval. Adversaries will often brute force login attempts across multiple users with a common or known password, in an attempt to gain access to accounts. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.3.0 |8
+|<<privilege-escalation-via-windir-environment-variable, Privilege Escalation via Windir Environment Variable>> |Identifies a privilege escalation attempt via a rogue Windows directory (Windir) environment variable. This is a known primitive that is often combined with other vulnerabilities to elevate privileges. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |105
+
+|<<privileged-account-brute-force, Privileged Account Brute Force>> |Identifies multiple consecutive logon failures targeting an Admin account from the same source address and within a short time interval. Adversaries will often brute force login attempts across multiple users with a common or known password, in an attempt to gain access to accounts. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.3.0 |9
 
 |<<privileges-elevation-via-parent-process-pid-spoofing, Privileges Elevation via Parent Process PID Spoofing>> |Identifies parent process spoofing used to create an elevated child process. Adversaries may spoof the parent process identifier (PPID) of a new process to evade process-monitoring defenses or to elevate privileges. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |6
 
-|<<process-activity-via-compiled-html-file, Process Activity via Compiled HTML File>> |Compiled HTML files (.chm) are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. Adversaries may conceal malicious code in a CHM file and deliver it to a victim for execution. CHM content is loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe). |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<process-activity-via-compiled-html-file, Process Activity via Compiled HTML File>> |Compiled HTML files (.chm) are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. Adversaries may conceal malicious code in a CHM file and deliver it to a victim for execution. CHM content is loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe). |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
 
 |<<process-capability-enumeration, Process Capability Enumeration>> |Identifies recursive process capability enumeration of the entire filesystem through the getcap command. Malicious users may manipulate identified capabilities to gain root privileges. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |8.11.0 |2
 
@@ -1476,33 +1482,33 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<process-created-with-an-elevated-token, Process Created with an Elevated Token>> |Identifies the creation of a process running as SYSTEM and impersonating a Windows core binary privileges. Adversaries may create a new process with a different token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.4.0 |5
 
-|<<process-creation-via-secondary-logon, Process Creation via Secondary Logon>> |Identifies process creation with alternate credentials. Adversaries may create a new process with a different token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation] |8.3.0 |8
+|<<process-creation-via-secondary-logon, Process Creation via Secondary Logon>> |Identifies process creation with alternate credentials. Adversaries may create a new process with a different token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation] |8.3.0 |9
 
 |<<process-discovery-using-built-in-tools, Process Discovery Using Built-in Tools>> |This rule identifies the execution of commands that can be used to enumerate running processes. Adversaries may enumerate processes to identify installed applications and security solutions. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |3
 
 |<<process-discovery-via-built-in-applications, Process Discovery via Built-In Applications>> |Identifies the use of built-in tools attackers can use to discover running processes on an endpoint. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |8.3.0 |3
 
-|<<process-execution-from-an-unusual-directory, Process Execution from an Unusual Directory>> |Identifies process execution from suspicious default Windows directories. This is sometimes done by adversaries to hide malware in trusted paths. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<process-execution-from-an-unusual-directory, Process Execution from an Unusual Directory>> |Identifies process execution from suspicious default Windows directories. This is sometimes done by adversaries to hide malware in trusted paths. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
 
 |<<process-injection-detected-elastic-endgame, Process Injection - Detected - Elastic Endgame>> |Elastic Endgame detected Process Injection. Click the Elastic Endgame icon in the event.module column or the link in the rule.reference column for additional information. |[Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation] |8.3.0 |102
 
 |<<process-injection-prevented-elastic-endgame, Process Injection - Prevented - Elastic Endgame>> |Elastic Endgame prevented Process Injection. Click the Elastic Endgame icon in the event.module column or the link in the rule.reference column for additional information. |[Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation] |8.3.0 |102
 
-|<<process-injection-by-the-microsoft-build-engine, Process Injection by the Microsoft Build Engine>> |An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, created a thread in another process. This technique is sometimes used to evade detection or elevate privileges. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Sysmon Only] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<process-injection-by-the-microsoft-build-engine, Process Injection by the Microsoft Build Engine>> |An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, created a thread in another process. This technique is sometimes used to evade detection or elevate privileges. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |106
 
 |<<process-started-from-process-id-pid-file, Process Started from Process ID (PID) File>> |Identifies a new process starting from a process ID (PID), lock or reboot file within the temporary file storage paradigm (tmpfs) directory /var/run directory. On Linux, the PID files typically hold the process ID to track previous copies running and manage other tasks. Certain Linux malware use the /var/run directory for holding data, executables and other tasks, disguising itself or these files as legitimate PID files. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Threat: BPFDoor], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.3.0 |109
 
 |<<process-termination-followed-by-deletion, Process Termination followed by Deletion>> |Identifies a process termination event quickly followed by the deletion of its executable file. Malware tools and other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave traces to indicate to what occurred. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<processes-with-trailing-spaces, Processes with Trailing Spaces>> |Identify instances where adversaries include trailing space characters to mimic regular files, disguising their activity to evade default file handling mechanisms. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |1
+|<<processes-with-trailing-spaces, Processes with Trailing Spaces>> |Identify instances where adversaries include trailing space characters to mimic regular files, disguising their activity to evade default file handling mechanisms. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.3.0 |2
 
-|<<program-files-directory-masquerading, Program Files Directory Masquerading>> |Identifies execution from a directory masquerading as the Windows Program Files directories. These paths are trusted and usually host trusted third party programs. An adversary may leverage masquerading, along with low privileges to bypass detections allowlisting those folders. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<program-files-directory-masquerading, Program Files Directory Masquerading>> |Identifies execution from a directory masquerading as the Windows Program Files directories. These paths are trusted and usually host trusted third party programs. An adversary may leverage masquerading, along with low privileges to bypass detections allowlisting those folders. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<prompt-for-credentials-with-osascript, Prompt for Credentials with OSASCRIPT>> |Identifies the use of osascript to execute scripts via standard input that may prompt a user with a rogue dialog for credentials. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<prompt-for-credentials-with-osascript, Prompt for Credentials with OSASCRIPT>> |Identifies the use of osascript to execute scripts via standard input that may prompt a user with a rogue dialog for credentials. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<proxychains-activity, ProxyChains Activity>> |This rule monitors for the execution of the ProxyChains utility. ProxyChains is a command-line tool that enables the routing of network connections through intermediary proxies, enhancing anonymity and enabling access to restricted resources. Attackers can exploit the ProxyChains utility to hide their true source IP address, evade detection, and perform malicious activities through a chain of proxy servers, potentially masking their identity and intentions. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.3.0 |3
+|<<proxychains-activity, ProxyChains Activity>> |This rule monitors for the execution of the ProxyChains utility. ProxyChains is a command-line tool that enables the routing of network connections through intermediary proxies, enhancing anonymity and enabling access to restricted resources. Attackers can exploit the ProxyChains utility to hide their true source IP address, evade detection, and perform malicious activities through a chain of proxy servers, potentially masking their identity and intentions. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.3.0 |4
 
-|<<psexec-network-connection, PsExec Network Connection>> |Identifies use of the SysInternals tool PsExec.exe making a network connection. This could be an indication of lateral movement. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<psexec-network-connection, PsExec Network Connection>> |Identifies use of the SysInternals tool PsExec.exe making a network connection. This could be an indication of lateral movement. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |108
 
 |<<python-script-execution-via-command-line, Python Script Execution via Command Line>> |Identifies when a Python script is executed using command line input and imports the sys module. Attackers often use this method to execute malicious scripts and avoiding writing it to disk. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [OS: macOS], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |1
 
@@ -1510,7 +1516,7 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<rdp-remote-desktop-protocol-from-the-internet, RDP (Remote Desktop Protocol) from the Internet>> |This rule detects network events that may indicate the use of RDP traffic from the Internet. RDP is commonly used by system administrators to remotely control a system for maintenance or to use shared resources. It should almost never be directly exposed to the Internet, as it is frequently targeted and exploited by threat actors as an initial access or backdoor vector. |[Tactic: Command and Control], [Domain: Endpoint], [Use Case: Threat Detection] |8.3.0 |103
 
-|<<rdp-enabled-via-registry, RDP Enabled via Registry>> |Identifies registry write modifications to enable Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) access. This could be indicative of adversary lateral movement preparation. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<rdp-enabled-via-registry, RDP Enabled via Registry>> |Identifies registry write modifications to enable Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) access. This could be indicative of adversary lateral movement preparation. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |110
 
 |<<rpc-remote-procedure-call-from-the-internet, RPC (Remote Procedure Call) from the Internet>> |This rule detects network events that may indicate the use of RPC traffic from the Internet. RPC is commonly used by system administrators to remotely control a system for maintenance or to use shared resources. It should almost never be directly exposed to the Internet, as it is frequently targeted and exploited by threat actors as an initial access or backdoor vector. |[Tactic: Initial Access], [Domain: Endpoint], [Use Case: Threat Detection] |8.3.0 |103
 
@@ -1522,63 +1528,61 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<rare-aws-error-code, Rare AWS Error Code>> |A machine learning job detected an unusual error in a CloudTrail message. These can be byproducts of attempted or successful persistence, privilege escalation, defense evasion, discovery, lateral movement, or collection. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.9.0 |208
 
-|<<rare-smb-connection-to-the-internet, Rare SMB Connection to the Internet>> |This rule detects rare internet network connections via the SMB protocol. SMB is commonly used to leak NTLM credentials via rogue UNC path injection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Exfiltration], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |1
+|<<rare-smb-connection-to-the-internet, Rare SMB Connection to the Internet>> |This rule detects rare internet network connections via the SMB protocol. SMB is commonly used to leak NTLM credentials via rogue UNC path injection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Exfiltration], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |2
 
 |<<rare-user-logon, Rare User Logon>> |A machine learning job found an unusual user name in the authentication logs. An unusual user name is one way of detecting credentialed access by means of a new or dormant user account. An inactive user account (because the user has left the organization) that becomes active may be due to credentialed access using a compromised account password. Threat actors will sometimes also create new users as a means of persisting in a compromised web application. |[Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.3.0 |104
 
-|<<registry-persistence-via-appcert-dll, Registry Persistence via AppCert DLL>> |Detects attempts to maintain persistence by creating registry keys using AppCert DLLs. AppCert DLLs are loaded by every process using the common API functions to create processes. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<registry-persistence-via-appcert-dll, Registry Persistence via AppCert DLL>> |Detects attempts to maintain persistence by creating registry keys using AppCert DLLs. AppCert DLLs are loaded by every process using the common API functions to create processes. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<registry-persistence-via-appinit-dll, Registry Persistence via AppInit DLL>> |AppInit DLLs are dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are loaded into every process that creates a user interface (loads user32.dll) on Microsoft Windows operating systems. The AppInit DLL mechanism is used to load custom code into user-mode processes, allowing for the customization of the user interface and the behavior of Windows-based applications. Attackers who add those DLLs to the registry locations can execute code with elevated privileges, similar to process injection, and provide a solid and constant persistence on the machine. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<registry-persistence-via-appinit-dll, Registry Persistence via AppInit DLL>> |AppInit DLLs are dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are loaded into every process that creates a user interface (loads user32.dll) on Microsoft Windows operating systems. The AppInit DLL mechanism is used to load custom code into user-mode processes, allowing for the customization of the user interface and the behavior of Windows-based applications. Attackers who add those DLLs to the registry locations can execute code with elevated privileges, similar to process injection, and provide a solid and constant persistence on the machine. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |109
 
 |<<remote-computer-account-dnshostname-update, Remote Computer Account DnsHostName Update>> |Identifies the remote update to a computer account's DnsHostName attribute. If the new value set is a valid domain controller DNS hostname and the subject computer name is not a domain controller, then it's highly likely a preparation step to exploit CVE-2022-26923 in an attempt to elevate privileges from a standard domain user to domain admin privileges. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring], [Data Source: Active Directory], [Use Case: Vulnerability] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<remote-desktop-enabled-in-windows-firewall-by-netsh, Remote Desktop Enabled in Windows Firewall by Netsh>> |Identifies use of the network shell utility (netsh.exe) to enable inbound Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) connections in the Windows Firewall. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<remote-desktop-enabled-in-windows-firewall-by-netsh, Remote Desktop Enabled in Windows Firewall by Netsh>> |Identifies use of the network shell utility (netsh.exe) to enable inbound Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) connections in the Windows Firewall. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
 
 |<<remote-execution-via-file-shares, Remote Execution via File Shares>> |Identifies the execution of a file that was created by the virtual system process. This may indicate lateral movement via network file shares. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
 
-|<<remote-file-copy-to-a-hidden-share, Remote File Copy to a Hidden Share>> |Identifies a remote file copy attempt to a hidden network share. This may indicate lateral movement or data staging activity. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
-
-|<<remote-file-copy-via-teamviewer, Remote File Copy via TeamViewer>> |Identifies an executable or script file remotely downloaded via a TeamViewer transfer session. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<remote-file-copy-to-a-hidden-share, Remote File Copy to a Hidden Share>> |Identifies a remote file copy attempt to a hidden network share. This may indicate lateral movement or data staging activity. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<remote-file-creation-on-a-sensitive-directory, Remote File Creation on a Sensitive Directory>> |Discovery of files created by a remote host on sensitive directories and folders. Remote file creation in these directories could indicate a malicious binary or script trying to compromise the system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [Use Case: Lateral Movement Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.9.0 |1
+|<<remote-file-copy-via-teamviewer, Remote File Copy via TeamViewer>> |Identifies an executable or script file remotely downloaded via a TeamViewer transfer session. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
 
-|<<remote-file-download-via-desktopimgdownldr-utility, Remote File Download via Desktopimgdownldr Utility>> |Identifies the desktopimgdownldr utility being used to download a remote file. An adversary may use desktopimgdownldr to download arbitrary files as an alternative to certutil. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
+|<<remote-file-download-via-desktopimgdownldr-utility, Remote File Download via Desktopimgdownldr Utility>> |Identifies the desktopimgdownldr utility being used to download a remote file. An adversary may use desktopimgdownldr to download arbitrary files as an alternative to certutil. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |111
 
-|<<remote-file-download-via-mpcmdrun, Remote File Download via MpCmdRun>> |Identifies the Windows Defender configuration utility (MpCmdRun.exe) being used to download a remote file. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
+|<<remote-file-download-via-mpcmdrun, Remote File Download via MpCmdRun>> |Identifies the Windows Defender configuration utility (MpCmdRun.exe) being used to download a remote file. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |111
 
 |<<remote-file-download-via-powershell, Remote File Download via PowerShell>> |Identifies powershell.exe being used to download an executable file from an untrusted remote destination. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
 
-|<<remote-file-download-via-script-interpreter, Remote File Download via Script Interpreter>> |Identifies built-in Windows script interpreters (cscript.exe or wscript.exe) being used to download an executable file from a remote destination. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<remote-file-download-via-script-interpreter, Remote File Download via Script Interpreter>> |Identifies built-in Windows script interpreters (cscript.exe or wscript.exe) being used to download an executable file from a remote destination. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |109
 
-|<<remote-ssh-login-enabled-via-systemsetup-command, Remote SSH Login Enabled via systemsetup Command>> |Detects use of the systemsetup command to enable remote SSH Login. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<remote-ssh-login-enabled-via-systemsetup-command, Remote SSH Login Enabled via systemsetup Command>> |Detects use of the systemsetup command to enable remote SSH Login. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<remote-scheduled-task-creation, Remote Scheduled Task Creation>> |Identifies remote scheduled task creations on a target host. This could be indicative of adversary lateral movement. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<remote-scheduled-task-creation, Remote Scheduled Task Creation>> |Identifies remote scheduled task creations on a target host. This could be indicative of adversary lateral movement. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |107
 
 |<<remote-scheduled-task-creation-via-rpc, Remote Scheduled Task Creation via RPC>> |Identifies scheduled task creation from a remote source. This could be indicative of adversary lateral movement. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement] |8.3.0 |8
 
-|<<remote-system-discovery-commands, Remote System Discovery Commands>> |Discovery of remote system information using built-in commands, which may be used to move laterally. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |110
+|<<remote-system-discovery-commands, Remote System Discovery Commands>> |Discovery of remote system information using built-in commands, which may be used to move laterally. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |111
 
 |<<remote-windows-service-installed, Remote Windows Service Installed>> |Identifies a network logon followed by Windows service creation with same LogonId. This could be indicative of lateral movement, but will be noisy if commonly done by administrators." |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.3.0 |6
 
 |<<remote-xsl-script-execution-via-com, Remote XSL Script Execution via COM>> |Identifies the execution of a hosted XSL script using the Microsoft.XMLDOM COM interface via Microsoft Office processes. This behavior may indicate adversarial activity to execute malicious JScript or VBScript on the system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |2
 
-|<<remotely-started-services-via-rpc, Remotely Started Services via RPC>> |Identifies remote execution of Windows services over remote procedure call (RPC). This could be indicative of lateral movement, but will be noisy if commonly done by administrators." |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<remotely-started-services-via-rpc, Remotely Started Services via RPC>> |Identifies remote execution of Windows services over remote procedure call (RPC). This could be indicative of lateral movement, but will be noisy if commonly done by administrators." |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |110
 
-|<<renamed-autoit-scripts-interpreter, Renamed AutoIt Scripts Interpreter>> |Identifies a suspicious AutoIt process execution. Malware written as an AutoIt script tends to rename the AutoIt executable to avoid detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<renamed-autoit-scripts-interpreter, Renamed AutoIt Scripts Interpreter>> |Identifies a suspicious AutoIt process execution. Malware written as an AutoIt script tends to rename the AutoIt executable to avoid detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |109
 
-|<<renamed-utility-executed-with-short-program-name, Renamed Utility Executed with Short Program Name>> |Identifies the execution of a process with a single character process name, differing from the original file name. This is often done by adversaries while staging, executing temporary utilities, or trying to bypass security detections based on the process name. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<renamed-utility-executed-with-short-program-name, Renamed Utility Executed with Short Program Name>> |Identifies the execution of a process with a single character process name, differing from the original file name. This is often done by adversaries while staging, executing temporary utilities, or trying to bypass security detections based on the process name. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<root-network-connection-via-gdb-cap-sys-ptrace, Root Network Connection via GDB CAP_SYS_PTRACE>> |Identifies instances where GDB (granted the CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability) is executed, after which an outbound network connection is initiated by UID/GID 0 (root). In Linux, the CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability grants a process the ability to use the ptrace system call, which is typically used for debugging and allows the process to trace and control other processes. Attackers may leverage this capability to hook and inject into a process that is running with root permissions in order to execute shell code and gain a reverse shell with root privileges. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Execution], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.11.0 |1
+|<<root-network-connection-via-gdb-cap-sys-ptrace, Root Network Connection via GDB CAP_SYS_PTRACE>> |Identifies instances where GDB (granted the CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability) is executed, after which an outbound network connection is initiated by UID/GID 0 (root). In Linux, the CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability grants a process the ability to use the ptrace system call, which is typically used for debugging and allows the process to trace and control other processes. Attackers may leverage this capability to hook and inject into a process that is running with root permissions in order to execute shell code and gain a reverse shell with root privileges. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Execution], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.11.0 |2
 
 |<<roshal-archive-rar-or-powershell-file-downloaded-from-the-internet, Roshal Archive (RAR) or PowerShell File Downloaded from the Internet>> |Detects a Roshal Archive (RAR) file or PowerShell script downloaded from the internet by an internal host. Gaining initial access to a system and then downloading encoded or encrypted tools to move laterally is a common practice for adversaries as a way to protect their more valuable tools and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). This may be atypical behavior for a managed network and can be indicative of malware, exfiltration, or command and control. |[Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Domain: Endpoint] |8.3.0 |103
 
-|<<sip-provider-modification, SIP Provider Modification>> |Identifies modifications to the registered Subject Interface Package (SIP) providers. SIP providers are used by the Windows cryptographic system to validate file signatures on the system. This may be an attempt to bypass signature validation checks or inject code into critical processes. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<sip-provider-modification, SIP Provider Modification>> |Identifies modifications to the registered Subject Interface Package (SIP) providers. SIP providers are used by the Windows cryptographic system to validate file signatures on the system. This may be an attempt to bypass signature validation checks or inject code into critical processes. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |106
 
 |<<smb-windows-file-sharing-activity-to-the-internet, SMB (Windows File Sharing) Activity to the Internet>> |This rule detects network events that may indicate the use of Windows file sharing (also called SMB or CIFS) traffic to the Internet. SMB is commonly used within networks to share files, printers, and other system resources amongst trusted systems. It should almost never be directly exposed to the Internet, as it is frequently targeted and exploited by threat actors as an initial access or backdoor vector or for data exfiltration. |[Tactic: Initial Access], [Domain: Endpoint], [Use Case: Threat Detection] |8.3.0 |103
 
-|<<smtp-on-port-26-tcp, SMTP on Port 26/TCP>> |This rule detects events that may indicate use of SMTP on TCP port 26. This port is commonly used by several popular mail transfer agents to deconflict with the default SMTP port 25. This port has also been used by a malware family called BadPatch for command and control of Windows systems. |[Tactic: Command and Control], [Domain: Endpoint], [Use Case: Threat Detection] |8.3.0 |103
+|<<smtp-on-port-26-tcp, SMTP on Port 26/TCP>> |This rule detects events that may indicate use of SMTP on TCP port 26. This port is commonly used by several popular mail transfer agents to deconflict with the default SMTP port 25. This port has also been used by a malware family called BadPatch for command and control of Windows systems. |[Tactic: Command and Control], [Domain: Endpoint], [Use Case: Threat Detection] |8.3.0 |104
 
-|<<ssh-authorized-keys-file-modification, SSH Authorized Keys File Modification>> |The Secure Shell (SSH) authorized_keys file specifies which users are allowed to log into a server using public key authentication. Adversaries may modify it to maintain persistence on a victim host by adding their own public key(s). |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |204
+|<<ssh-authorized-keys-file-modification, SSH Authorized Keys File Modification>> |The Secure Shell (SSH) authorized_keys file specifies which users are allowed to log into a server using public key authentication. Adversaries may modify it to maintain persistence on a victim host by adding their own public key(s). |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |205
 
 |<<ssh-authorized-keys-file-modified-inside-a-container, SSH Authorized Keys File Modified Inside a Container>> |This rule detects the creation or modification of an authorized_keys or sshd_config file inside a container. The Secure Shell (SSH) authorized_keys file specifies which users are allowed to log into a server using public key authentication. Adversaries may modify it to maintain persistence on a victim host by adding their own public key(s). Unexpected and unauthorized SSH usage inside a container can be an indicator of compromise and should be investigated. |[Data Source: Elastic Defend for Containers], [Domain: Container], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Lateral Movement] |8.8.0 |2
 
@@ -1586,37 +1590,37 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<ssh-process-launched-from-inside-a-container, SSH Process Launched From Inside A Container>> |This rule detects an SSH or SSHD process executed from inside a container. This includes both the client ssh binary and server ssh daemon process. SSH usage inside a container should be avoided and monitored closely when necessary. With valid credentials an attacker may move laterally to other containers or to the underlying host through container breakout. They may also use valid SSH credentials as a persistence mechanism. |[Data Source: Elastic Defend for Containers], [Domain: Container], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.8.0 |2
 
-|<<suid-sguid-enumeration-detected, SUID/SGUID Enumeration Detected>> |This rule monitors for the usage of the "find" command in conjunction with SUID and SGUID permission arguments. SUID (Set User ID) and SGID (Set Group ID) are special permissions in Linux that allow a program to execute with the privileges of the file owner or group, respectively, rather than the privileges of the user running the program. In case an attacker is able to enumerate and find a binary that is misconfigured, they might be able to leverage this misconfiguration to escalate privileges by exploiting vulnerabilities or built-in features in the privileged program. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |4
+|<<suid-sguid-enumeration-detected, SUID/SGUID Enumeration Detected>> |This rule monitors for the usage of the "find" command in conjunction with SUID and SGUID permission arguments. SUID (Set User ID) and SGID (Set Group ID) are special permissions in Linux that allow a program to execute with the privileges of the file owner or group, respectively, rather than the privileges of the user running the program. In case an attacker is able to enumerate and find a binary that is misconfigured, they might be able to leverage this misconfiguration to escalate privileges by exploiting vulnerabilities or built-in features in the privileged program. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |5
 
 |<<sunburst-command-and-control-activity, SUNBURST Command and Control Activity>> |The malware known as SUNBURST targets the SolarWind's Orion business software for command and control. This rule detects post-exploitation command and control activity of the SUNBURST backdoor. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<scheduled-task-created-by-a-windows-script, Scheduled Task Created by a Windows Script>> |A scheduled task was created by a Windows script via cscript.exe, wscript.exe or powershell.exe. This can be abused by an adversary to establish persistence. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<scheduled-task-created-by-a-windows-script, Scheduled Task Created by a Windows Script>> |A scheduled task was created by a Windows script via cscript.exe, wscript.exe or powershell.exe. This can be abused by an adversary to establish persistence. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<scheduled-task-execution-at-scale-via-gpo, Scheduled Task Execution at Scale via GPO>> |Detects the modification of Group Policy Object attributes to execute a scheduled task in the objects controlled by the GPO. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Active Directory], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<scheduled-task-execution-at-scale-via-gpo, Scheduled Task Execution at Scale via GPO>> |Detects the modification of Group Policy Object attributes to execute a scheduled task in the objects controlled by the GPO. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Active Directory], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring] |8.3.0 |110
 
-|<<scheduled-tasks-at-command-enabled, Scheduled Tasks AT Command Enabled>> |Identifies attempts to enable the Windows scheduled tasks AT command via the registry. Attackers may use this method to move laterally or persist locally. The AT command has been deprecated since Windows 8 and Windows Server 2012, but still exists for backwards compatibility. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<scheduled-tasks-at-command-enabled, Scheduled Tasks AT Command Enabled>> |Identifies attempts to enable the Windows scheduled tasks AT command via the registry. Attackers may use this method to move laterally or persist locally. The AT command has been deprecated since Windows 8 and Windows Server 2012, but still exists for backwards compatibility. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<screensaver-plist-file-modified-by-unexpected-process, Screensaver Plist File Modified by Unexpected Process>> |Identifies when a screensaver plist file is modified by an unexpected process. An adversary can maintain persistence on a macOS endpoint by creating a malicious screensaver (.saver) file and configuring the screensaver plist file to execute code each time the screensaver is activated. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<screensaver-plist-file-modified-by-unexpected-process, Screensaver Plist File Modified by Unexpected Process>> |Identifies when a screensaver plist file is modified by an unexpected process. An adversary can maintain persistence on a macOS endpoint by creating a malicious screensaver (.saver) file and configuring the screensaver plist file to execute code each time the screensaver is activated. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<sedebugprivilege-enabled-by-a-suspicious-process, SeDebugPrivilege Enabled by a Suspicious Process>> |Identifies the creation of a process running as SYSTEM and impersonating a Windows core binary privileges. Adversaries may create a new process with a different token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation] |8.3.0 |6
+|<<sedebugprivilege-enabled-by-a-suspicious-process, SeDebugPrivilege Enabled by a Suspicious Process>> |Identifies the creation of a process running as SYSTEM and impersonating a Windows core binary privileges. Adversaries may create a new process with a different token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation] |8.3.0 |7
 
-|<<searching-for-saved-credentials-via-vaultcmd, Searching for Saved Credentials via VaultCmd>> |Windows Credential Manager allows you to create, view, or delete saved credentials for signing into websites, connected applications, and networks. An adversary may abuse this to list or dump credentials stored in the Credential Manager for saved usernames and passwords. This may also be performed in preparation of lateral movement. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<searching-for-saved-credentials-via-vaultcmd, Searching for Saved Credentials via VaultCmd>> |Windows Credential Manager allows you to create, view, or delete saved credentials for signing into websites, connected applications, and networks. An adversary may abuse this to list or dump credentials stored in the Credential Manager for saved usernames and passwords. This may also be performed in preparation of lateral movement. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<security-software-discovery-using-wmic, Security Software Discovery using WMIC>> |Identifies the use of Windows Management Instrumentation Command (WMIC) to discover certain System Security Settings such as AntiVirus or Host Firewall details. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<security-software-discovery-using-wmic, Security Software Discovery using WMIC>> |Identifies the use of Windows Management Instrumentation Command (WMIC) to discover certain System Security Settings such as AntiVirus or Host Firewall details. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |110
 
-|<<security-software-discovery-via-grep, Security Software Discovery via Grep>> |Identifies the use of the grep command to discover known third-party macOS and Linux security tools, such as Antivirus or Host Firewall details. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<security-software-discovery-via-grep, Security Software Discovery via Grep>> |Identifies the use of the grep command to discover known third-party macOS and Linux security tools, such as Antivirus or Host Firewall details. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
 
 |<<segfault-detected, Segfault Detected>> |Monitors kernel logs for segfault messages. A segfault, or segmentation fault, is an error that occurs when a program tries to access a memory location that it's not allowed to access, typically leading to program termination. A segfault can be an indication of malicious behavior if it results from attempts to exploit buffer overflows or other vulnerabilities in software to execute arbitrary code or disrupt its normal operation. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |1
 
-|<<sensitive-files-compression, Sensitive Files Compression>> |Identifies the use of a compression utility to collect known files containing sensitive information, such as credentials and system configurations. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Collection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |207
+|<<sensitive-files-compression, Sensitive Files Compression>> |Identifies the use of a compression utility to collect known files containing sensitive information, such as credentials and system configurations. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Collection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |208
 
 |<<sensitive-files-compression-inside-a-container, Sensitive Files Compression Inside A Container>> |Identifies the use of a compression utility to collect known files containing sensitive information, such as credentials and system configurations inside a container. |[Data Source: Elastic Defend for Containers], [Domain: Container], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Collection], [Tactic: Credential Access] |8.8.0 |2
 
 |<<sensitive-keys-or-passwords-searched-for-inside-a-container, Sensitive Keys Or Passwords Searched For Inside A Container>> |This rule detects the use of system search utilities like grep and find to search for private SSH keys or passwords inside a container. Unauthorized access to these sensitive files could lead to further compromise of the container environment or facilitate a container breakout to the underlying host machine. |[Data Source: Elastic Defend for Containers], [Domain: Container], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access] |8.8.0 |2
 
-|<<sensitive-privilege-seenabledelegationprivilege-assigned-to-a-user, Sensitive Privilege SeEnableDelegationPrivilege assigned to a User>> |Identifies the assignment of the SeEnableDelegationPrivilege sensitive "user right" to a user. The SeEnableDelegationPrivilege "user right" enables computer and user accounts to be trusted for delegation. Attackers can abuse this right to compromise Active Directory accounts and elevate their privileges. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Active Directory], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<sensitive-privilege-seenabledelegationprivilege-assigned-to-a-user, Sensitive Privilege SeEnableDelegationPrivilege assigned to a User>> |Identifies the assignment of the SeEnableDelegationPrivilege sensitive "user right" to a user. The SeEnableDelegationPrivilege "user right" enables computer and user accounts to be trusted for delegation. Attackers can abuse this right to compromise Active Directory accounts and elevate their privileges. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Active Directory], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring] |8.3.0 |110
 
-|<<service-command-lateral-movement, Service Command Lateral Movement>> |Identifies use of sc.exe to create, modify, or start services on remote hosts. This could be indicative of adversary lateral movement but will be noisy if commonly done by admins. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<service-command-lateral-movement, Service Command Lateral Movement>> |Identifies use of sc.exe to create, modify, or start services on remote hosts. This could be indicative of adversary lateral movement but will be noisy if commonly done by admins. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |106
 
 |<<service-control-spawned-via-script-interpreter, Service Control Spawned via Script Interpreter>> |Identifies Service Control (sc.exe) spawning from script interpreter processes to create, modify, or start services. This can potentially indicate an attempt to elevate privileges or maintain persistence. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
 
@@ -1632,25 +1636,25 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<setuid-setgid-bit-set-via-chmod, Setuid / Setgid Bit Set via chmod>> |An adversary may add the setuid or setgid bit to a file or directory in order to run a file with the privileges of the owning user or group. An adversary can take advantage of this to either do a shell escape or exploit a vulnerability in an application with the setuid or setgid bit to get code running in a different user’s context. Additionally, adversaries can use this mechanism on their own malware to make sure they're able to execute in elevated contexts in the future. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |103
 
-|<<sharepoint-malware-file-upload, SharePoint Malware File Upload>> |Identifies the occurence of files uploaded to SharePoint being detected as Malware by the file scanning engine. Attackers can use File Sharing and Organization Repositories to spread laterally within the company and amplify their access. Users can inadvertently share these files without knowing their maliciousness, giving adversaries opportunities to gain initial access to other endpoints in the environment. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Tactic: Lateral Movement] |8.3.0 |103
+|<<sharepoint-malware-file-upload, SharePoint Malware File Upload>> |Identifies the occurence of files uploaded to SharePoint being detected as Malware by the file scanning engine. Attackers can use File Sharing and Organization Repositories to spread laterally within the company and amplify their access. Users can inadvertently share these files without knowing their maliciousness, giving adversaries opportunities to gain initial access to other endpoints in the environment. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Tactic: Lateral Movement] |8.3.0 |105
 
-|<<shared-object-created-or-changed-by-previously-unknown-process, Shared Object Created or Changed by Previously Unknown Process>> |This rule monitors the creation of shared object files by previously unknown processes. The creation of a shared object file involves compiling code into a dynamically linked library that can be loaded by other programs at runtime. While this process is typically used for legitimate purposes, malicious actors can leverage shared object files to execute unauthorized code, inject malicious functionality into legitimate processes, or bypass security controls. This allows malware to persist on the system, evade detection, and potentially compromise the integrity and confidentiality of the affected system and its data. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |6
+|<<shared-object-created-or-changed-by-previously-unknown-process, Shared Object Created or Changed by Previously Unknown Process>> |This rule monitors the creation of shared object files by previously unknown processes. The creation of a shared object file involves compiling code into a dynamically linked library that can be loaded by other programs at runtime. While this process is typically used for legitimate purposes, malicious actors can leverage shared object files to execute unauthorized code, inject malicious functionality into legitimate processes, or bypass security controls. This allows malware to persist on the system, evade detection, and potentially compromise the integrity and confidentiality of the affected system and its data. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |7
 
-|<<shell-execution-via-apple-scripting, Shell Execution via Apple Scripting>> |Identifies the execution of the shell process (sh) via scripting (JXA or AppleScript). Adversaries may use the doShellScript functionality in JXA or do shell script in AppleScript to execute system commands. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<shell-execution-via-apple-scripting, Shell Execution via Apple Scripting>> |Identifies the execution of the shell process (sh) via scripting (JXA or AppleScript). Adversaries may use the doShellScript functionality in JXA or do shell script in AppleScript to execute system commands. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
 |<<shortcut-file-written-or-modified-on-startup-folder, Shortcut File Written or Modified on Startup Folder>> |Identifies shortcut files written to or modified in the startup folder. Adversaries may use this technique to maintain persistence. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |1
 
-|<<signed-proxy-execution-via-ms-work-folders, Signed Proxy Execution via MS Work Folders>> |Identifies the use of Windows Work Folders to execute a potentially masqueraded control.exe file in the current working directory. Misuse of Windows Work Folders could indicate malicious activity. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<signed-proxy-execution-via-ms-work-folders, Signed Proxy Execution via MS Work Folders>> |Identifies the use of Windows Work Folders to execute a potentially masqueraded control.exe file in the current working directory. Misuse of Windows Work Folders could indicate malicious activity. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<softwareupdate-preferences-modification, SoftwareUpdate Preferences Modification>> |Identifies changes to the SoftwareUpdate preferences using the built-in defaults command. Adversaries may abuse this in an attempt to disable security updates. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<softwareupdate-preferences-modification, SoftwareUpdate Preferences Modification>> |Identifies changes to the SoftwareUpdate preferences using the built-in defaults command. Adversaries may abuse this in an attempt to disable security updates. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<solarwinds-process-disabling-services-via-registry, SolarWinds Process Disabling Services via Registry>> |Identifies a SolarWinds binary modifying the start type of a service to be disabled. An adversary may abuse this technique to manipulate relevant security services. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<solarwinds-process-disabling-services-via-registry, SolarWinds Process Disabling Services via Registry>> |Identifies a SolarWinds binary modifying the start type of a service to be disabled. An adversary may abuse this technique to manipulate relevant security services. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |108
 
 |<<spike-in-aws-error-messages, Spike in AWS Error Messages>> |A machine learning job detected a significant spike in the rate of a particular error in the CloudTrail messages. Spikes in error messages may accompany attempts at privilege escalation, lateral movement, or discovery. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.9.0 |208
 
-|<<spike-in-bytes-sent-to-an-external-device, Spike in Bytes Sent to an External Device>> |A machine learning job has detected high bytes of data written to an external device. In a typical operational setting, there is usually a predictable pattern or a certain range of data that is written to external devices. An unusually large amount of data being written is anomalous and can signal illicit data copying or transfer activities. |[Use Case: Data Exfiltration Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Exfiltration] |8.9.0 |2
+|<<spike-in-bytes-sent-to-an-external-device, Spike in Bytes Sent to an External Device>> |A machine learning job has detected high bytes of data written to an external device. In a typical operational setting, there is usually a predictable pattern or a certain range of data that is written to external devices. An unusually large amount of data being written is anomalous and can signal illicit data copying or transfer activities. |[Use Case: Data Exfiltration Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Exfiltration] |8.9.0 |3
 
-|<<spike-in-bytes-sent-to-an-external-device-via-airdrop, Spike in Bytes Sent to an External Device via Airdrop>> |A machine learning job has detected high bytes of data written to an external device via Airdrop. In a typical operational setting, there is usually a predictable pattern or a certain range of data that is written to external devices. An unusually large amount of data being written is anomalous and can signal illicit data copying or transfer activities. |[Use Case: Data Exfiltration Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Exfiltration] |8.9.0 |2
+|<<spike-in-bytes-sent-to-an-external-device-via-airdrop, Spike in Bytes Sent to an External Device via Airdrop>> |A machine learning job has detected high bytes of data written to an external device via Airdrop. In a typical operational setting, there is usually a predictable pattern or a certain range of data that is written to external devices. An unusually large amount of data being written is anomalous and can signal illicit data copying or transfer activities. |[Use Case: Data Exfiltration Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Exfiltration] |8.9.0 |3
 
 |<<spike-in-failed-logon-events, Spike in Failed Logon Events>> |A machine learning job found an unusually large spike in authentication failure events. This can be due to password spraying, user enumeration or brute force activity and may be a precursor to account takeover or credentialed access. |[Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.3.0 |104
 
@@ -1662,31 +1666,31 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<spike-in-network-traffic-to-a-country, Spike in Network Traffic To a Country>> |A machine learning job detected an unusually large spike in network activity to one destination country in the network logs. This could be due to unusually large amounts of reconnaissance or enumeration traffic. Data exfiltration activity may also produce such a surge in traffic to a destination country that does not normally appear in network traffic or business workflows. Malware instances and persistence mechanisms may communicate with command-and-control (C2) infrastructure in their country of origin, which may be an unusual destination country for the source network. |[Use Case: Threat Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning] |8.3.0 |104
 
-|<<spike-in-number-of-connections-made-from-a-source-ip, Spike in Number of Connections Made from a Source IP>> |A machine learning job has detected a high count of destination IPs establishing an RDP connection with a single source IP. Once an attacker has gained access to one system, they might attempt to access more in the network in search of valuable assets, data, or further access points. |[Use Case: Lateral Movement Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Lateral Movement] |8.9.0 |2
+|<<spike-in-number-of-connections-made-from-a-source-ip, Spike in Number of Connections Made from a Source IP>> |A machine learning job has detected a high count of destination IPs establishing an RDP connection with a single source IP. Once an attacker has gained access to one system, they might attempt to access more in the network in search of valuable assets, data, or further access points. |[Use Case: Lateral Movement Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Lateral Movement] |8.9.0 |3
 
-|<<spike-in-number-of-connections-made-to-a-destination-ip, Spike in Number of Connections Made to a Destination IP>> |A machine learning job has detected a high count of source IPs establishing an RDP connection with a single destination IP. Attackers might use multiple compromised systems to attack a target to ensure redundancy in case a source IP gets detected and blocked. |[Use Case: Lateral Movement Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Lateral Movement] |8.9.0 |2
+|<<spike-in-number-of-connections-made-to-a-destination-ip, Spike in Number of Connections Made to a Destination IP>> |A machine learning job has detected a high count of source IPs establishing an RDP connection with a single destination IP. Attackers might use multiple compromised systems to attack a target to ensure redundancy in case a source IP gets detected and blocked. |[Use Case: Lateral Movement Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Lateral Movement] |8.9.0 |3
 
-|<<spike-in-number-of-processes-in-an-rdp-session, Spike in Number of Processes in an RDP Session>> |A machine learning job has detected unusually high number of processes started in a single RDP session. Executing a large number of processes remotely on other machines can be an indicator of lateral movement activity. |[Use Case: Lateral Movement Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Lateral Movement] |8.9.0 |2
+|<<spike-in-number-of-processes-in-an-rdp-session, Spike in Number of Processes in an RDP Session>> |A machine learning job has detected unusually high number of processes started in a single RDP session. Executing a large number of processes remotely on other machines can be an indicator of lateral movement activity. |[Use Case: Lateral Movement Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Lateral Movement] |8.9.0 |3
 
-|<<spike-in-remote-file-transfers, Spike in Remote File Transfers>> |A machine learning job has detected an abnormal volume of remote files shared on the host indicating potential lateral movement activity. One of the primary goals of attackers after gaining access to a network is to locate and exfiltrate valuable information. Attackers might perform multiple small transfers to match normal egress activity in the network, to evade detection. |[Use Case: Lateral Movement Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Lateral Movement] |8.9.0 |2
+|<<spike-in-remote-file-transfers, Spike in Remote File Transfers>> |A machine learning job has detected an abnormal volume of remote files shared on the host indicating potential lateral movement activity. One of the primary goals of attackers after gaining access to a network is to locate and exfiltrate valuable information. Attackers might perform multiple small transfers to match normal egress activity in the network, to evade detection. |[Use Case: Lateral Movement Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Lateral Movement] |8.9.0 |3
 
 |<<spike-in-successful-logon-events-from-a-source-ip, Spike in Successful Logon Events from a Source IP>> |A machine learning job found an unusually large spike in successful authentication events from a particular source IP address. This can be due to password spraying, user enumeration or brute force activity. |[Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.3.0 |104
 
 |<<startup-folder-persistence-via-unsigned-process, Startup Folder Persistence via Unsigned Process>> |Identifies files written or modified in the startup folder by unsigned processes. Adversaries may abuse this technique to maintain persistence in an environment. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<startup-persistence-by-a-suspicious-process, Startup Persistence by a Suspicious Process>> |Identifies files written to or modified in the startup folder by commonly abused processes. Adversaries may use this technique to maintain persistence. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<startup-persistence-by-a-suspicious-process, Startup Persistence by a Suspicious Process>> |Identifies files written to or modified in the startup folder by commonly abused processes. Adversaries may use this technique to maintain persistence. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |109
 
 |<<startup-or-run-key-registry-modification, Startup or Run Key Registry Modification>> |Identifies run key or startup key registry modifications. In order to survive reboots and other system interrupts, attackers will modify run keys within the registry or leverage startup folder items as a form of persistence. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
 
-|<<startup-logon-script-added-to-group-policy-object, Startup/Logon Script added to Group Policy Object>> |Detects the modification of Group Policy Objects (GPO) to add a startup/logon script to users or computer objects. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Active Directory], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<startup-logon-script-added-to-group-policy-object, Startup/Logon Script added to Group Policy Object>> |Detects the modification of Group Policy Objects (GPO) to add a startup/logon script to users or computer objects. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Active Directory], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring] |8.3.0 |109
 
-|<<statistical-model-detected-c2-beaconing-activity, Statistical Model Detected C2 Beaconing Activity>> |A statistical model has identified command-and-control (C2) beaconing activity. Beaconing can help attackers maintain stealthy communication with their C2 servers, receive instructions and payloads, exfiltrate data and maintain persistence in a network. |[Domain: Network], [Use Case: C2 Beaconing Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control] |8.10.1 |3
+|<<statistical-model-detected-c2-beaconing-activity, Statistical Model Detected C2 Beaconing Activity>> |A statistical model has identified command-and-control (C2) beaconing activity. Beaconing can help attackers maintain stealthy communication with their C2 servers, receive instructions and payloads, exfiltrate data and maintain persistence in a network. |[Domain: Network], [Use Case: C2 Beaconing Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control] |8.10.1 |4
 
-|<<statistical-model-detected-c2-beaconing-activity-with-high-confidence, Statistical Model Detected C2 Beaconing Activity with High Confidence>> |A statistical model has identified command-and-control (C2) beaconing activity with high confidence. Beaconing can help attackers maintain stealthy communication with their C2 servers, receive instructions and payloads, exfiltrate data and maintain persistence in a network. |[Domain: Network], [Use Case: C2 Beaconing Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control] |8.10.1 |3
+|<<statistical-model-detected-c2-beaconing-activity-with-high-confidence, Statistical Model Detected C2 Beaconing Activity with High Confidence>> |A statistical model has identified command-and-control (C2) beaconing activity with high confidence. Beaconing can help attackers maintain stealthy communication with their C2 servers, receive instructions and payloads, exfiltrate data and maintain persistence in a network. |[Domain: Network], [Use Case: C2 Beaconing Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control] |8.10.1 |4
 
 |<<stolen-credentials-used-to-login-to-okta-account-after-mfa-reset, Stolen Credentials Used to Login to Okta Account After MFA Reset>> |Detects a sequence of suspicious activities on Windows hosts indicative of credential compromise, followed by efforts to undermine multi-factor authentication (MFA) and single sign-on (SSO) mechanisms for an Okta user account. |[Tactic: Persistence], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Data Source: Okta], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Rule Type: Higher-Order Rule], [Domain: Endpoint], [Domain: Cloud] |8.10.0 |1
 
-|<<sublime-plugin-or-application-script-modification, Sublime Plugin or Application Script Modification>> |Adversaries may create or modify the Sublime application plugins or scripts to execute a malicious payload each time the Sublime application is started. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<sublime-plugin-or-application-script-modification, Sublime Plugin or Application Script Modification>> |Adversaries may create or modify the Sublime application plugins or scripts to execute a malicious payload each time the Sublime application is started. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
 
 |<<sudo-command-enumeration-detected, Sudo Command Enumeration Detected>> |This rule monitors for the usage of the sudo -l command, which is used to list the allowed and forbidden commands for the invoking user. Attackers may execute this command to enumerate commands allowed to be executed with sudo permissions, potentially allowing to escalate privileges to root. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |5
 
@@ -1694,61 +1698,61 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<sudoers-file-modification, Sudoers File Modification>> |A sudoers file specifies the commands that users or groups can run and from which terminals. Adversaries can take advantage of these configurations to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |204
 
-|<<suspicious-net-code-compilation, Suspicious .NET Code Compilation>> |Identifies executions of .NET compilers with suspicious parent processes, which can indicate an attacker's attempt to compile code after delivery in order to bypass security mechanisms. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<suspicious-net-code-compilation, Suspicious .NET Code Compilation>> |Identifies executions of .NET compilers with suspicious parent processes, which can indicate an attacker's attempt to compile code after delivery in order to bypass security mechanisms. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
 
-|<<suspicious-net-reflection-via-powershell, Suspicious .NET Reflection via PowerShell>> |Detects the use of Reflection.Assembly to load PEs and DLLs in memory in PowerShell scripts. Attackers use this method to load executables and DLLs without writing to the disk, bypassing security solutions. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs] |8.3.0 |111
+|<<suspicious-net-reflection-via-powershell, Suspicious .NET Reflection via PowerShell>> |Detects the use of Reflection.Assembly to load PEs and DLLs in memory in PowerShell scripts. Attackers use this method to load executables and DLLs without writing to the disk, bypassing security solutions. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs] |8.3.0 |112
 
-|<<suspicious-proc-maps-discovery, Suspicious /proc/maps Discovery>> |Monitors for /proc/*/maps file reads. The /proc/*/maps file in Linux provides a memory map for a specific process, detailing the memory segments, permissions, and what files are mapped to these segments. Attackers may read a process's memory map to identify memory addresses for code injection or process hijacking. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |1
+|<<suspicious-proc-maps-discovery, Suspicious /proc/maps Discovery>> |Monitors for /proc/*/maps file reads. The /proc/*/maps file in Linux provides a memory map for a specific process, detailing the memory segments, permissions, and what files are mapped to these segments. Attackers may read a process's memory map to identify memory addresses for code injection or process hijacking. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |2
 
-|<<suspicious-apt-package-manager-execution, Suspicious APT Package Manager Execution>> |Detects suspicious process events executed by the APT package manager, potentially indicating persistence through an APT backdoor. In Linux, APT (Advanced Package Tool) is a command-line utility used for handling packages on Debian-based systems, providing functions for installing, updating, upgrading, and removing software along with managing package repositories. Attackers can backdoor APT to gain persistence by injecting malicious code into scripts that APT runs, thereby ensuring continued unauthorized access or control each time APT is used for package management. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Execution], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |1
+|<<suspicious-apt-package-manager-execution, Suspicious APT Package Manager Execution>> |Detects suspicious process events executed by the APT package manager, potentially indicating persistence through an APT backdoor. In Linux, APT (Advanced Package Tool) is a command-line utility used for handling packages on Debian-based systems, providing functions for installing, updating, upgrading, and removing software along with managing package repositories. Attackers can backdoor APT to gain persistence by injecting malicious code into scripts that APT runs, thereby ensuring continued unauthorized access or control each time APT is used for package management. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Execution], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |2
 
-|<<suspicious-apt-package-manager-network-connection, Suspicious APT Package Manager Network Connection>> |Detects suspicious network events executed by the APT package manager, potentially indicating persistence through an APT backdoor. In Linux, APT (Advanced Package Tool) is a command-line utility used for handling packages on Debian-based systems, providing functions for installing, updating, upgrading, and removing software along with managing package repositories. Attackers can backdoor APT to gain persistence by injecting malicious code into scripts that APT runs, thereby ensuring continued unauthorized access or control each time APT is used for package management. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |1
+|<<suspicious-apt-package-manager-network-connection, Suspicious APT Package Manager Network Connection>> |Detects suspicious network events executed by the APT package manager, potentially indicating persistence through an APT backdoor. In Linux, APT (Advanced Package Tool) is a command-line utility used for handling packages on Debian-based systems, providing functions for installing, updating, upgrading, and removing software along with managing package repositories. Attackers can backdoor APT to gain persistence by injecting malicious code into scripts that APT runs, thereby ensuring continued unauthorized access or control each time APT is used for package management. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |2
 
 |<<suspicious-activity-reported-by-okta-user, Suspicious Activity Reported by Okta User>> |Detects when a user reports suspicious activity for their Okta account. These events should be investigated, as they can help security teams identify when an adversary is attempting to gain access to their network. |[Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Data Source: Okta], [Tactic: Initial Access] |8.10.0 |205
 
-|<<suspicious-antimalware-scan-interface-dll, Suspicious Antimalware Scan Interface DLL>> |Identifies the creation of the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) DLL in an unusual location. This may indicate an attempt to bypass AMSI by loading a rogue AMSI module instead of the legit one. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |7
+|<<suspicious-antimalware-scan-interface-dll, Suspicious Antimalware Scan Interface DLL>> |Identifies the creation of the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) DLL in an unusual location. This may indicate an attempt to bypass AMSI by loading a rogue AMSI module instead of the legit one. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |8
 
-|<<suspicious-automator-workflows-execution, Suspicious Automator Workflows Execution>> |Identifies the execution of the Automator Workflows process followed by a network connection from it's XPC service. Adversaries may drop a custom workflow template that hosts malicious JavaScript for Automation (JXA) code as an alternative to using osascript. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<suspicious-automator-workflows-execution, Suspicious Automator Workflows Execution>> |Identifies the execution of the Automator Workflows process followed by a network connection from it's XPC service. Adversaries may drop a custom workflow template that hosts malicious JavaScript for Automation (JXA) code as an alternative to using osascript. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<suspicious-browser-child-process, Suspicious Browser Child Process>> |Identifies the execution of a suspicious browser child process. Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<suspicious-browser-child-process, Suspicious Browser Child Process>> |Identifies the execution of a suspicious browser child process. Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<suspicious-calendar-file-modification, Suspicious Calendar File Modification>> |Identifies suspicious modifications of the calendar file by an unusual process. Adversaries may create a custom calendar notification procedure to execute a malicious program at a recurring interval to establish persistence. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<suspicious-calendar-file-modification, Suspicious Calendar File Modification>> |Identifies suspicious modifications of the calendar file by an unusual process. Adversaries may create a custom calendar notification procedure to execute a malicious program at a recurring interval to establish persistence. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
 |<<suspicious-certutil-commands, Suspicious CertUtil Commands>> |Identifies suspicious commands being used with certutil.exe. CertUtil is a native Windows component which is part of Certificate Services. CertUtil is often abused by attackers to live off the land for stealthier command and control or data exfiltration. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<suspicious-child-process-of-adobe-acrobat-reader-update-service, Suspicious Child Process of Adobe Acrobat Reader Update Service>> |Detects attempts to exploit privilege escalation vulnerabilities related to the Adobe Acrobat Reader PrivilegedHelperTool responsible for installing updates. For more information, refer to CVE-2020-9615, CVE-2020-9614 and CVE-2020-9613 and verify that the impacted system is patched. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<suspicious-child-process-of-adobe-acrobat-reader-update-service, Suspicious Child Process of Adobe Acrobat Reader Update Service>> |Detects attempts to exploit privilege escalation vulnerabilities related to the Adobe Acrobat Reader PrivilegedHelperTool responsible for installing updates. For more information, refer to CVE-2020-9615, CVE-2020-9614 and CVE-2020-9613 and verify that the impacted system is patched. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<suspicious-cmd-execution-via-wmi, Suspicious Cmd Execution via WMI>> |Identifies suspicious command execution (cmd) via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) on a remote host. This could be indicative of adversary lateral movement. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<suspicious-cmd-execution-via-wmi, Suspicious Cmd Execution via WMI>> |Identifies suspicious command execution (cmd) via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) on a remote host. This could be indicative of adversary lateral movement. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
 
 |<<suspicious-communication-app-child-process, Suspicious Communication App Child Process>> |Identifies suspicious child processes of communications apps, which can indicate a potential masquerading as the communication app or the exploitation of a vulnerability on the application causing it to execute code. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Persistence], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |3
 
-|<<suspicious-content-extracted-or-decompressed-via-funzip, Suspicious Content Extracted or Decompressed via Funzip>> |Identifies when suspicious content is extracted from a file and subsequently decompressed using the funzip utility. Malware may execute the tail utility using the "-c" option to read a sequence of bytes from the end of a file. The output from tail can be piped to funzip in order to decompress malicious code before it is executed. This behavior is consistent with malware families such as Bundlore. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |4
+|<<suspicious-content-extracted-or-decompressed-via-funzip, Suspicious Content Extracted or Decompressed via Funzip>> |Identifies when suspicious content is extracted from a file and subsequently decompressed using the funzip utility. Malware may execute the tail utility using the "-c" option to read a sequence of bytes from the end of a file. The output from tail can be piped to funzip in order to decompress malicious code before it is executed. This behavior is consistent with malware families such as Bundlore. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |5
 
-|<<suspicious-crontab-creation-or-modification, Suspicious CronTab Creation or Modification>> |Identifies attempts to create or modify a crontab via a process that is not crontab (i.e python, osascript, etc.). This activity should not be highly prevalent and could indicate the use of cron as a persistence mechanism by a threat actor. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<suspicious-crontab-creation-or-modification, Suspicious CronTab Creation or Modification>> |Identifies attempts to create or modify a crontab via a process that is not crontab (i.e python, osascript, etc.). This activity should not be highly prevalent and could indicate the use of cron as a persistence mechanism by a threat actor. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<suspicious-dll-loaded-for-persistence-or-privilege-escalation, Suspicious DLL Loaded for Persistence or Privilege Escalation>> |Identifies the loading of a non Microsoft signed DLL that is missing on a default Windows install (phantom DLL) or one that can be loaded from a different location by a native Windows process. This may be abused to persist or elevate privileges via privileged file write vulnerabilities. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<suspicious-dll-loaded-for-persistence-or-privilege-escalation, Suspicious DLL Loaded for Persistence or Privilege Escalation>> |Identifies the loading of a non Microsoft signed DLL that is missing on a default Windows install (phantom DLL) or one that can be loaded from a different location by a native Windows process. This may be abused to persist or elevate privileges via privileged file write vulnerabilities. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |110
 
-|<<suspicious-data-encryption-via-openssl-utility, Suspicious Data Encryption via OpenSSL Utility>> |Identifies when the openssl command-line utility is used to encrypt multiple files on a host within a short time window. Adversaries may encrypt data on a single or multiple systems in order to disrupt the availability of their target's data and may attempt to hold the organization's data to ransom for the purposes of extortion. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Impact], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |5
+|<<suspicious-data-encryption-via-openssl-utility, Suspicious Data Encryption via OpenSSL Utility>> |Identifies when the openssl command-line utility is used to encrypt multiple files on a host within a short time window. Adversaries may encrypt data on a single or multiple systems in order to disrupt the availability of their target's data and may attempt to hold the organization's data to ransom for the purposes of extortion. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Impact], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |6
 
 |<<suspicious-dynamic-linker-discovery-via-od, Suspicious Dynamic Linker Discovery via od>> |Monitors for dynamic linker discovery via the od utility. od (octal dump) is a command-line utility in Unix operating systems used for displaying data in various formats, including octal, hexadecimal, decimal, and ASCII, primarily used for examining and debugging binary files or data streams. Attackers can leverage od to analyze the dynamic linker by identifying injection points and craft exploits based on the observed behaviors and structures within these files. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.3.0 |2
 
-|<<suspicious-emond-child-process, Suspicious Emond Child Process>> |Identifies the execution of a suspicious child process of the Event Monitor Daemon (emond). Adversaries may abuse this service by writing a rule to execute commands when a defined event occurs, such as system start up or user authentication. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<suspicious-emond-child-process, Suspicious Emond Child Process>> |Identifies the execution of a suspicious child process of the Event Monitor Daemon (emond). Adversaries may abuse this service by writing a rule to execute commands when a defined event occurs, such as system start up or user authentication. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<suspicious-endpoint-security-parent-process, Suspicious Endpoint Security Parent Process>> |A suspicious Endpoint Security parent process was detected. This may indicate a process hollowing or other form of code injection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<suspicious-endpoint-security-parent-process, Suspicious Endpoint Security Parent Process>> |A suspicious Endpoint Security parent process was detected. This may indicate a process hollowing or other form of code injection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
 
 |<<suspicious-execution-from-inet-cache, Suspicious Execution from INET Cache>> |Identifies the execution of a process with arguments pointing to the INetCache Folder. Adversaries may deliver malicious content via WININET during initial access. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |1
 
-|<<suspicious-execution-from-a-mounted-device, Suspicious Execution from a Mounted Device>> |Identifies when a script interpreter or signed binary is launched via a non-standard working directory. An attacker may use this technique to evade defenses. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<suspicious-execution-from-a-mounted-device, Suspicious Execution from a Mounted Device>> |Identifies when a script interpreter or signed binary is launched via a non-standard working directory. An attacker may use this technique to evade defenses. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |107
 
 |<<suspicious-execution-via-msiexec, Suspicious Execution via MSIEXEC>> |Identifies suspicious execution of the built-in Windows Installer, msiexec.exe, to install a package from usual paths or parent process. Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to launch malicious local MSI files. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |1
 
-|<<suspicious-execution-via-microsoft-office-add-ins, Suspicious Execution via Microsoft Office Add-Ins>> |Identifies execution of common Microsoft Office applications to launch an Office Add-In from a suspicious path or with an unusual parent process. This may indicate an attempt to get initial access via a malicious phishing MS Office Add-In. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |3
+|<<suspicious-execution-via-microsoft-office-add-ins, Suspicious Execution via Microsoft Office Add-Ins>> |Identifies execution of common Microsoft Office applications to launch an Office Add-In from a suspicious path or with an unusual parent process. This may indicate an attempt to get initial access via a malicious phishing MS Office Add-In. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |4
 
-|<<suspicious-execution-via-scheduled-task, Suspicious Execution via Scheduled Task>> |Identifies execution of a suspicious program via scheduled tasks by looking at process lineage and command line usage. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<suspicious-execution-via-scheduled-task, Suspicious Execution via Scheduled Task>> |Identifies execution of a suspicious program via scheduled tasks by looking at process lineage and command line usage. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
 
 |<<suspicious-execution-via-windows-subsystem-for-linux, Suspicious Execution via Windows Subsystem for Linux>> |Detects Linux Bash commands from the the Windows Subsystem for Linux. Adversaries may enable and use WSL for Linux to avoid detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |5
 
-|<<suspicious-explorer-child-process, Suspicious Explorer Child Process>> |Identifies a suspicious Windows explorer child process. Explorer.exe can be abused to launch malicious scripts or executables from a trusted parent process. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<suspicious-explorer-child-process, Suspicious Explorer Child Process>> |Identifies a suspicious Windows explorer child process. Explorer.exe can be abused to launch malicious scripts or executables from a trusted parent process. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |108
 
 |<<suspicious-file-changes-activity-detected, Suspicious File Changes Activity Detected>> |This rule identifies a sequence of 100 file extension rename events within a set of common file paths by the same process in a timespan of 1 second. Ransomware is a type of malware that encrypts a victim's files or systems and demands payment (usually in cryptocurrency) in exchange for the decryption key. One important indicator of a ransomware attack is the mass encryption of the file system, after which a new file extension is added to the file. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Impact], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |8
 
@@ -1758,139 +1762,139 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<suspicious-file-downloaded-from-google-drive, Suspicious File Downloaded from Google Drive>> |Identifies suspicious file download activity from a Google Drive URL. This could indicate an attempt to deliver phishing payloads via a trusted webservice. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [OS: Windows], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control] |8.3.0 |3
 
-|<<suspicious-html-file-creation, Suspicious HTML File Creation>> |Identifies the execution of a browser process to open an HTML file with high entropy and size. Adversaries may smuggle data and files past content filters by hiding malicious payloads inside of seemingly benign HTML files. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<suspicious-html-file-creation, Suspicious HTML File Creation>> |Identifies the execution of a browser process to open an HTML file with high entropy and size. Adversaries may smuggle data and files past content filters by hiding malicious payloads inside of seemingly benign HTML files. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<suspicious-hidden-child-process-of-launchd, Suspicious Hidden Child Process of Launchd>> |Identifies the execution of a launchd child process with a hidden file. An adversary can establish persistence by installing a new logon item, launch agent, or daemon that executes upon login. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<suspicious-hidden-child-process-of-launchd, Suspicious Hidden Child Process of Launchd>> |Identifies the execution of a launchd child process with a hidden file. An adversary can establish persistence by installing a new logon item, launch agent, or daemon that executes upon login. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<suspicious-image-load-taskschd-dll-from-ms-office, Suspicious Image Load (taskschd.dll) from MS Office>> |Identifies a suspicious image load (taskschd.dll) from Microsoft Office processes. This behavior may indicate adversarial activity where a scheduled task is configured via Windows Component Object Model (COM). This technique can be used to configure persistence and evade monitoring by avoiding the usage of the traditional Windows binary (schtasks.exe) used to manage scheduled tasks. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<suspicious-image-load-taskschd-dll-from-ms-office, Suspicious Image Load (taskschd.dll) from MS Office>> |Identifies a suspicious image load (taskschd.dll) from Microsoft Office processes. This behavior may indicate adversarial activity where a scheduled task is configured via Windows Component Object Model (COM). This technique can be used to configure persistence and evade monitoring by avoiding the usage of the traditional Windows binary (schtasks.exe) used to manage scheduled tasks. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<suspicious-imagepath-service-creation, Suspicious ImagePath Service Creation>> |Identifies the creation of a suspicious ImagePath value. This could be an indication of an adversary attempting to stealthily persist or escalate privileges through abnormal service creation. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<suspicious-imagepath-service-creation, Suspicious ImagePath Service Creation>> |Identifies the creation of a suspicious ImagePath value. This could be an indication of an adversary attempting to stealthily persist or escalate privileges through abnormal service creation. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |106
 
 |<<suspicious-inter-process-communication-via-outlook, Suspicious Inter-Process Communication via Outlook>> |Detects Inter-Process Communication with Outlook via Component Object Model from an unusual process. Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information or send email on their behalf via API. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Collection], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.4.0 |5
 
 |<<suspicious-interactive-shell-spawned-from-inside-a-container, Suspicious Interactive Shell Spawned From Inside A Container>> |This rule detects when an interactive shell is spawned inside a running container. This could indicate a potential container breakout attempt or an attacker's attempt to gain unauthorized access to the underlying host. |[Data Source: Elastic Defend for Containers], [Domain: Container], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution] |8.8.0 |2
 
-|<<suspicious-java-child-process, Suspicious JAVA Child Process>> |Identifies suspicious child processes of the Java interpreter process. This may indicate an attempt to execute a malicious JAR file or an exploitation attempt via a JAVA specific vulnerability. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |207
+|<<suspicious-java-child-process, Suspicious JAVA Child Process>> |Identifies suspicious child processes of the Java interpreter process. This may indicate an attempt to execute a malicious JAR file or an exploitation attempt via a JAVA specific vulnerability. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |208
 
-|<<suspicious-kworker-uid-elevation, Suspicious Kworker UID Elevation>> |Monitors for the elevation of regular user permissions to root permissions through the kworker process. kworker, or kernel worker, processes are part of the kernel's workqueue mechanism. They are responsible for executing work that has been scheduled to be done in kernel space, which might include tasks like handling interrupts, background activities, and other kernel-related tasks. Attackers may attempt to evade detection by masquerading as a kernel worker process, and hijack the execution flow by hooking certain functions/syscalls through a rootkit in order to provide easy access to root via a special modified command. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |1
+|<<suspicious-kworker-uid-elevation, Suspicious Kworker UID Elevation>> |Monitors for the elevation of regular user permissions to root permissions through the kworker process. kworker, or kernel worker, processes are part of the kernel's workqueue mechanism. They are responsible for executing work that has been scheduled to be done in kernel space, which might include tasks like handling interrupts, background activities, and other kernel-related tasks. Attackers may attempt to evade detection by masquerading as a kernel worker process, and hijack the execution flow by hooking certain functions/syscalls through a rootkit in order to provide easy access to root via a special modified command. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |8.3.0 |2
 
-|<<suspicious-lsass-access-via-malseclogon, Suspicious LSASS Access via MalSecLogon>> |Identifies suspicious access to LSASS handle from a call trace pointing to seclogon.dll and with a suspicious access rights value. This may indicate an attempt to leak an LSASS handle via abusing the Secondary Logon service in preparation for credential access. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Sysmon Only] |8.8.0 |207
+|<<suspicious-lsass-access-via-malseclogon, Suspicious LSASS Access via MalSecLogon>> |Identifies suspicious access to LSASS handle from a call trace pointing to seclogon.dll and with a suspicious access rights value. This may indicate an attempt to leak an LSASS handle via abusing the Secondary Logon service in preparation for credential access. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.8.0 |208
 
-|<<suspicious-lsass-process-access, Suspicious Lsass Process Access>> |Identifies access attempts to LSASS handle, this may indicate an attempt to dump credentials from Lsass memory. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Sysmon Only] |8.8.0 |106
+|<<suspicious-lsass-process-access, Suspicious Lsass Process Access>> |Identifies access attempts to LSASS handle, this may indicate an attempt to dump credentials from Lsass memory. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.8.0 |107
 
-|<<suspicious-ms-office-child-process, Suspicious MS Office Child Process>> |Identifies suspicious child processes of frequently targeted Microsoft Office applications (Word, PowerPoint, Excel). These child processes are often launched during exploitation of Office applications or from documents with malicious macros. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
+|<<suspicious-ms-office-child-process, Suspicious MS Office Child Process>> |Identifies suspicious child processes of frequently targeted Microsoft Office applications (Word, PowerPoint, Excel). These child processes are often launched during exploitation of Office applications or from documents with malicious macros. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |111
 
-|<<suspicious-ms-outlook-child-process, Suspicious MS Outlook Child Process>> |Identifies suspicious child processes of Microsoft Outlook. These child processes are often associated with spear phishing activity. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<suspicious-ms-outlook-child-process, Suspicious MS Outlook Child Process>> |Identifies suspicious child processes of Microsoft Outlook. These child processes are often associated with spear phishing activity. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
 
-|<<suspicious-managed-code-hosting-process, Suspicious Managed Code Hosting Process>> |Identifies a suspicious managed code hosting process which could indicate code injection or other form of suspicious code execution. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<suspicious-managed-code-hosting-process, Suspicious Managed Code Hosting Process>> |Identifies a suspicious managed code hosting process which could indicate code injection or other form of suspicious code execution. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<suspicious-memory-grep-activity, Suspicious Memory grep Activity>> |Monitors for grep activity related to memory mapping. The /proc/*/maps file in Linux provides a memory map for a specific process, detailing the memory segments, permissions, and what files are mapped to these segments. Attackers may read a process's memory map to identify memory addresses for code injection or process hijacking. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |8.3.0 |1
+|<<suspicious-memory-grep-activity, Suspicious Memory grep Activity>> |Monitors for grep activity related to memory mapping. The /proc/*/maps file in Linux provides a memory map for a specific process, detailing the memory segments, permissions, and what files are mapped to these segments. Attackers may read a process's memory map to identify memory addresses for code injection or process hijacking. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |8.3.0 |2
 
-|<<suspicious-microsoft-365-mail-access-by-clientappid, Suspicious Microsoft 365 Mail Access by ClientAppId>> |Identifies when a Microsoft 365 Mailbox is accessed by a ClientAppId that was observed for the fist time during the last 10 days. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Initial Access] |8.6.0 |2
+|<<suspicious-microsoft-365-mail-access-by-clientappid, Suspicious Microsoft 365 Mail Access by ClientAppId>> |Identifies when a Microsoft 365 Mailbox is accessed by a ClientAppId that was observed for the fist time during the last 10 days. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Initial Access] |8.6.0 |4
 
-|<<suspicious-microsoft-diagnostics-wizard-execution, Suspicious Microsoft Diagnostics Wizard Execution>> |Identifies potential abuse of the Microsoft Diagnostics Troubleshooting Wizard (MSDT) to proxy malicious command or binary execution via malicious process arguments. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<suspicious-microsoft-diagnostics-wizard-execution, Suspicious Microsoft Diagnostics Wizard Execution>> |Identifies potential abuse of the Microsoft Diagnostics Troubleshooting Wizard (MSDT) to proxy malicious command or binary execution via malicious process arguments. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<suspicious-mining-process-creation-event, Suspicious Mining Process Creation Event>> |Identifies service creation events of common mining services, possibly indicating the infection of a system with a cryptominer. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |5
+|<<suspicious-mining-process-creation-event, Suspicious Mining Process Creation Event>> |Identifies service creation events of common mining services, possibly indicating the infection of a system with a cryptominer. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |6
 
 |<<suspicious-modprobe-file-event, Suspicious Modprobe File Event>> |Detects file events involving kernel modules in modprobe configuration files, which may indicate unauthorized access or manipulation of critical kernel modules. Attackers may tamper with the modprobe files to load malicious or unauthorized kernel modules, potentially bypassing security measures, escalating privileges, or hiding their activities within the system. |[Data Source: Auditd Manager], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.6.0 |107
 
-|<<suspicious-module-loaded-by-lsass, Suspicious Module Loaded by LSASS>> |Identifies LSASS loading an unsigned or untrusted DLL. Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into LSSAS process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |6
+|<<suspicious-module-loaded-by-lsass, Suspicious Module Loaded by LSASS>> |Identifies LSASS loading an unsigned or untrusted DLL. Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into LSSAS process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |7
 
-|<<suspicious-network-activity-to-the-internet-by-previously-unknown-executable, Suspicious Network Activity to the Internet by Previously Unknown Executable>> |This rule monitors for network connectivity to the internet from a previously unknown executable located in a suspicious directory to a previously unknown destination ip. An alert from this rule can indicate the presence of potentially malicious activity, such as the execution of unauthorized or suspicious processes attempting to establish connections to unknown or suspicious destinations such as a command and control server. Detecting and investigating such behavior can help identify and mitigate potential security threats, protecting the system and its data from potential compromise. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |7
+|<<suspicious-network-activity-to-the-internet-by-previously-unknown-executable, Suspicious Network Activity to the Internet by Previously Unknown Executable>> |This rule monitors for network connectivity to the internet from a previously unknown executable located in a suspicious directory to a previously unknown destination ip. An alert from this rule can indicate the presence of potentially malicious activity, such as the execution of unauthorized or suspicious processes attempting to establish connections to unknown or suspicious destinations such as a command and control server. Detecting and investigating such behavior can help identify and mitigate potential security threats, protecting the system and its data from potential compromise. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |8
 
-|<<suspicious-network-connection-via-sudo-binary, Suspicious Network Connection via Sudo Binary>> |Detects network connections initiated by the "sudo" binary. This behavior is uncommon and may occur in instances where reverse shell shellcode is injected into a process run with elevated permissions via "sudo". Attackers may attempt to inject shellcode into processes running as root, to escalate privileges. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |1
+|<<suspicious-network-connection-via-sudo-binary, Suspicious Network Connection via Sudo Binary>> |Detects network connections initiated by the "sudo" binary. This behavior is uncommon and may occur in instances where reverse shell shellcode is injected into a process run with elevated permissions via "sudo". Attackers may attempt to inject shellcode into processes running as root, to escalate privileges. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |8.3.0 |2
 
-|<<suspicious-network-connection-via-systemd, Suspicious Network Connection via systemd>> |Detects suspicious network events executed by systemd, potentially indicating persistence through a systemd backdoor. Systemd is a system and service manager for Linux operating systems, used to initialize and manage system processes. Attackers can backdoor systemd for persistence by creating or modifying systemd unit files to execute malicious scripts or commands, or by replacing legitimate systemd binaries with compromised ones, ensuring that their malicious code is automatically executed at system startup or during certain system events. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |1
+|<<suspicious-network-connection-via-systemd, Suspicious Network Connection via systemd>> |Detects suspicious network events executed by systemd, potentially indicating persistence through a systemd backdoor. Systemd is a system and service manager for Linux operating systems, used to initialize and manage system processes. Attackers can backdoor systemd for persistence by creating or modifying systemd unit files to execute malicious scripts or commands, or by replacing legitimate systemd binaries with compromised ones, ensuring that their malicious code is automatically executed at system startup or during certain system events. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |2
 
 |<<suspicious-network-tool-launched-inside-a-container, Suspicious Network Tool Launched Inside A Container>> |This rule detects commonly abused network utilities running inside a container. Network utilities like nc, nmap, dig, tcpdump, ngrep, telnet, mitmproxy, zmap can be used for malicious purposes such as network reconnaissance, monitoring, or exploitation, and should be monitored closely within a container. |[Data Source: Elastic Defend for Containers], [Domain: Container], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Tactic: Reconnaissance] |8.8.0 |2
 
-|<<suspicious-pdf-reader-child-process, Suspicious PDF Reader Child Process>> |Identifies suspicious child processes of PDF reader applications. These child processes are often launched via exploitation of PDF applications or social engineering. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<suspicious-pdf-reader-child-process, Suspicious PDF Reader Child Process>> |Identifies suspicious child processes of PDF reader applications. These child processes are often launched via exploitation of PDF applications or social engineering. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
 
-|<<suspicious-passwd-file-event-action, Suspicious Passwd File Event Action>> |Monitors for the generation of a passwd password entry via openssl, followed by a file write activity on the "/etc/passwd" file. The "/etc/passwd" file in Linux stores user account information, including usernames, user IDs, group IDs, home directories, and default shell paths. Attackers may exploit a misconfiguration in the "/etc/passwd" file permissions or other privileges to add a new entry to the "/etc/passwd" file with root permissions, and leverage this new user account to login as root. |[Data Source: Auditd Manager], [Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |2
+|<<suspicious-passwd-file-event-action, Suspicious Passwd File Event Action>> |Monitors for the generation of a passwd password entry via openssl, followed by a file write activity on the "/etc/passwd" file. The "/etc/passwd" file in Linux stores user account information, including usernames, user IDs, group IDs, home directories, and default shell paths. Attackers may exploit a misconfiguration in the "/etc/passwd" file permissions or other privileges to add a new entry to the "/etc/passwd" file with root permissions, and leverage this new user account to login as root. |[Data Source: Auditd Manager], [Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |3
 
-|<<suspicious-portable-executable-encoded-in-powershell-script, Suspicious Portable Executable Encoded in Powershell Script>> |Detects the presence of a portable executable (PE) in a PowerShell script by looking for its encoded header. Attackers embed PEs into PowerShell scripts to inject them into memory, avoiding defences by not writing to disk. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<suspicious-portable-executable-encoded-in-powershell-script, Suspicious Portable Executable Encoded in Powershell Script>> |Detects the presence of a portable executable (PE) in a PowerShell script by looking for its encoded header. Attackers embed PEs into PowerShell scripts to inject them into memory, avoiding defences by not writing to disk. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs] |8.3.0 |110
 
 |<<suspicious-powershell-engine-imageload, Suspicious PowerShell Engine ImageLoad>> |Identifies the PowerShell engine being invoked by unexpected processes. Rather than executing PowerShell functionality with powershell.exe, some attackers do this to operate more stealthily. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |209
 
 |<<suspicious-powershell-script, Suspicious Powershell Script>> |A machine learning job detected a PowerShell script with unusual data characteristics, such as obfuscation, that may be a characteristic of malicious PowerShell script text blocks. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Execution] |8.3.0 |104
 
-|<<suspicious-print-spooler-file-deletion, Suspicious Print Spooler File Deletion>> |Detects deletion of print driver files by an unusual process. This may indicate a clean up attempt post successful privilege escalation via Print Spooler service related vulnerabilities. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<suspicious-print-spooler-file-deletion, Suspicious Print Spooler File Deletion>> |Detects deletion of print driver files by an unusual process. This may indicate a clean up attempt post successful privilege escalation via Print Spooler service related vulnerabilities. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<suspicious-print-spooler-point-and-print-dll, Suspicious Print Spooler Point and Print DLL>> |Detects attempts to exploit a privilege escalation vulnerability (CVE-2020-1030) related to the print spooler service. Exploitation involves chaining multiple primitives to load an arbitrary DLL into the print spooler process running as SYSTEM. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |104
+|<<suspicious-print-spooler-point-and-print-dll, Suspicious Print Spooler Point and Print DLL>> |Detects attempts to exploit a privilege escalation vulnerability (CVE-2020-1030) related to the print spooler service. Exploitation involves chaining multiple primitives to load an arbitrary DLL into the print spooler process running as SYSTEM. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |105
 
-|<<suspicious-print-spooler-spl-file-created, Suspicious Print Spooler SPL File Created>> |Detects attempts to exploit privilege escalation vulnerabilities related to the Print Spooler service including CVE-2020-1048 and CVE-2020-1337. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<suspicious-print-spooler-spl-file-created, Suspicious Print Spooler SPL File Created>> |Detects attempts to exploit privilege escalation vulnerabilities related to the Print Spooler service including CVE-2020-1048 and CVE-2020-1337. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
 
-|<<suspicious-printspooler-service-executable-file-creation, Suspicious PrintSpooler Service Executable File Creation>> |Detects attempts to exploit privilege escalation vulnerabilities related to the Print Spooler service. For more information refer to the following CVE's - CVE-2020-1048, CVE-2020-1337 and CVE-2020-1300 and verify that the impacted system is patched. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<suspicious-printspooler-service-executable-file-creation, Suspicious PrintSpooler Service Executable File Creation>> |Detects attempts to exploit privilege escalation vulnerabilities related to the Print Spooler service. For more information refer to the following CVE's - CVE-2020-1048, CVE-2020-1337 and CVE-2020-1300 and verify that the impacted system is patched. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<suspicious-proc-pseudo-file-system-enumeration, Suspicious Proc Pseudo File System Enumeration>> |This rule monitors for a rapid enumeration of 25 different proc cmd, stat, and exe files, which suggests an abnormal activity pattern. Such behavior could be an indicator of a malicious process scanning or gathering information about running processes, potentially for reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or identifying vulnerable targets. |[Data Source: Auditd Manager], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |6
+|<<suspicious-proc-pseudo-file-system-enumeration, Suspicious Proc Pseudo File System Enumeration>> |This rule monitors for a rapid enumeration of 25 different proc cmd, stat, and exe files, which suggests an abnormal activity pattern. Such behavior could be an indicator of a malicious process scanning or gathering information about running processes, potentially for reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or identifying vulnerable targets. |[Data Source: Auditd Manager], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |7
 
-|<<suspicious-process-access-via-direct-system-call, Suspicious Process Access via Direct System Call>> |Identifies suspicious process access events from an unknown memory region. Endpoint security solutions usually hook userland Windows APIs in order to decide if the code that is being executed is malicious or not. It's possible to bypass hooked functions by writing malicious functions that call syscalls directly. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Sysmon Only] |8.8.0 |210
+|<<suspicious-process-access-via-direct-system-call, Suspicious Process Access via Direct System Call>> |Identifies suspicious process access events from an unknown memory region. Endpoint security solutions usually hook userland Windows APIs in order to decide if the code that is being executed is malicious or not. It's possible to bypass hooked functions by writing malicious functions that call syscalls directly. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.8.0 |211
 
-|<<suspicious-process-creation-calltrace, Suspicious Process Creation CallTrace>> |Identifies when a process is created and immediately accessed from an unknown memory code region and by the same parent process. This may indicate a code injection attempt. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Sysmon Only] |8.8.0 |207
+|<<suspicious-process-creation-calltrace, Suspicious Process Creation CallTrace>> |Identifies when a process is created and immediately accessed from an unknown memory code region and by the same parent process. This may indicate a code injection attempt. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.8.0 |208
 
-|<<suspicious-process-execution-via-renamed-psexec-executable, Suspicious Process Execution via Renamed PsExec Executable>> |Identifies suspicious psexec activity which is executing from the psexec service that has been renamed, possibly to evade detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<suspicious-process-execution-via-renamed-psexec-executable, Suspicious Process Execution via Renamed PsExec Executable>> |Identifies suspicious psexec activity which is executing from the psexec service that has been renamed, possibly to evade detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |110
 
 |<<suspicious-process-spawned-from-motd-detected, Suspicious Process Spawned from MOTD Detected>> |Message of the day (MOTD) is the message that is presented to the user when a user connects to a Linux server via SSH or a serial connection. Linux systems contain several default MOTD files located in the "/etc/update-motd.d/" and "/usr/lib/update-notifier/" directories. These scripts run as the root user every time a user connects over SSH or a serial connection. Adversaries may create malicious MOTD files that grant them persistence onto the target every time a user connects to the system by executing a backdoor script or command. This rule detects the execution of potentially malicious processes through the MOTD utility. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |8
 
-|<<suspicious-rdp-activex-client-loaded, Suspicious RDP ActiveX Client Loaded>> |Identifies suspicious Image Loading of the Remote Desktop Services ActiveX Client (mstscax), this may indicate the presence of RDP lateral movement capability. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<suspicious-rdp-activex-client-loaded, Suspicious RDP ActiveX Client Loaded>> |Identifies suspicious Image Loading of the Remote Desktop Services ActiveX Client (mstscax), this may indicate the presence of RDP lateral movement capability. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<suspicious-remote-registry-access-via-sebackupprivilege, Suspicious Remote Registry Access via SeBackupPrivilege>> |Identifies remote access to the registry using an account with Backup Operators group membership. This may indicate an attempt to exfiltrate credentials by dumping the Security Account Manager (SAM) registry hive in preparation for credential access and privileges elevation. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring], [Data Source: Active Directory] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<suspicious-remote-registry-access-via-sebackupprivilege, Suspicious Remote Registry Access via SeBackupPrivilege>> |Identifies remote access to the registry using an account with Backup Operators group membership. This may indicate an attempt to exfiltrate credentials by dumping the Security Account Manager (SAM) registry hive in preparation for credential access and privileges elevation. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring], [Data Source: Active Directory] |8.3.0 |110
 
-|<<suspicious-renaming-of-esxi-files, Suspicious Renaming of ESXI Files>> |Identifies instances where VMware-related files, such as those with extensions like ".vmdk", ".vmx", ".vmxf", ".vmsd", ".vmsn", ".vswp", ".vmss", ".nvram", and ".vmem", are renamed on a Linux system. The rule monitors for the "rename" event action associated with these file types, which could indicate malicious activity. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.5.0 |5
+|<<suspicious-renaming-of-esxi-files, Suspicious Renaming of ESXI Files>> |Identifies instances where VMware-related files, such as those with extensions like ".vmdk", ".vmx", ".vmxf", ".vmsd", ".vmsn", ".vswp", ".vmss", ".nvram", and ".vmem", are renamed on a Linux system. The rule monitors for the "rename" event action associated with these file types, which could indicate malicious activity. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.5.0 |6
 
-|<<suspicious-renaming-of-esxi-index-html-file, Suspicious Renaming of ESXI index.html File>> |Identifies instances where the "index.html" file within the "/usr/lib/vmware/*" directory is renamed on a Linux system. The rule monitors for the "rename" event action associated with this specific file and path, which could indicate malicious activity. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.5.0 |5
+|<<suspicious-renaming-of-esxi-index-html-file, Suspicious Renaming of ESXI index.html File>> |Identifies instances where the "index.html" file within the "/usr/lib/vmware/*" directory is renamed on a Linux system. The rule monitors for the "rename" event action associated with this specific file and path, which could indicate malicious activity. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.5.0 |6
 
-|<<suspicious-script-object-execution, Suspicious Script Object Execution>> |Identifies scrobj.dll loaded into unusual Microsoft processes. This usually means a malicious scriptlet is being executed in the target process. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<suspicious-script-object-execution, Suspicious Script Object Execution>> |Identifies scrobj.dll loaded into unusual Microsoft processes. This usually means a malicious scriptlet is being executed in the target process. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |107
 
 |<<suspicious-service-was-installed-in-the-system, Suspicious Service was Installed in the System>> |Identifies the creation of a new Windows service with suspicious Service command values. Windows services typically run as SYSTEM and can be used for privilege escalation and persistence. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.3.0 |8
 
-|<<suspicious-solarwinds-child-process, Suspicious SolarWinds Child Process>> |A suspicious SolarWinds child process was detected, which may indicate an attempt to execute malicious programs. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<suspicious-solarwinds-child-process, Suspicious SolarWinds Child Process>> |A suspicious SolarWinds child process was detected, which may indicate an attempt to execute malicious programs. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
 
-|<<suspicious-startup-shell-folder-modification, Suspicious Startup Shell Folder Modification>> |Identifies suspicious startup shell folder modifications to change the default Startup directory in order to bypass detections monitoring file creation in the Windows Startup folder. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<suspicious-startup-shell-folder-modification, Suspicious Startup Shell Folder Modification>> |Identifies suspicious startup shell folder modifications to change the default Startup directory in order to bypass detections monitoring file creation in the Windows Startup folder. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |109
 
-|<<suspicious-symbolic-link-created, Suspicious Symbolic Link Created>> |Identifies the creation of a symbolic link to a suspicious file or location. A symbolic link is a reference to a file or directory that acts as a pointer or shortcut, allowing users to access the target file or directory from a different location in the file system. An attacker can potentially leverage symbolic links for privilege escalation by tricking a privileged process into following the symbolic link to a sensitive file, giving the attacker access to data or capabilities they would not normally have. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |4
+|<<suspicious-symbolic-link-created, Suspicious Symbolic Link Created>> |Identifies the creation of a symbolic link to a suspicious file or location. A symbolic link is a reference to a file or directory that acts as a pointer or shortcut, allowing users to access the target file or directory from a different location in the file system. An attacker can potentially leverage symbolic links for privilege escalation by tricking a privileged process into following the symbolic link to a sensitive file, giving the attacker access to data or capabilities they would not normally have. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |5
 
 |<<suspicious-sysctl-file-event, Suspicious Sysctl File Event>> |Monitors file events on sysctl configuration files (e.g., /etc/sysctl.conf, /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf) to identify potential unauthorized access or manipulation of system-level configuration settings. Attackers may tamper with the sysctl configuration files to modify kernel parameters, potentially compromising system stability, performance, or security. |[Data Source: Auditd Manager], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.6.0 |107
 
-|<<suspicious-system-commands-executed-by-previously-unknown-executable, Suspicious System Commands Executed by Previously Unknown Executable>> |This rule monitors for the execution of several commonly used system commands executed by a previously unknown executable located in commonly abused directories. An alert from this rule can indicate the presence of potentially malicious activity, such as the execution of unauthorized or suspicious processes attempting to run malicious code. Detecting and investigating such behavior can help identify and mitigate potential security threats, protecting the system and its data from potential compromise. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |104
+|<<suspicious-system-commands-executed-by-previously-unknown-executable, Suspicious System Commands Executed by Previously Unknown Executable>> |This rule monitors for the execution of several commonly used system commands executed by a previously unknown executable located in commonly abused directories. An alert from this rule can indicate the presence of potentially malicious activity, such as the execution of unauthorized or suspicious processes attempting to run malicious code. Detecting and investigating such behavior can help identify and mitigate potential security threats, protecting the system and its data from potential compromise. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |105
 
 |<<suspicious-termination-of-esxi-process, Suspicious Termination of ESXI Process>> |Identifies instances where VMware processes, such as "vmware-vmx" or "vmx," are terminated on a Linux system by a "kill" command. The rule monitors for the "end" event type, which signifies the termination of a process. The presence of a "kill" command as the parent process for terminating VMware processes may indicate that a threat actor is attempting to interfere with the virtualized environment on the targeted system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Impact], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |8.5.0 |6
 
 |<<suspicious-troubleshooting-pack-cabinet-execution, Suspicious Troubleshooting Pack Cabinet Execution>> |Identifies the execution of the Microsoft Diagnostic Wizard to open a diagcab file from a suspicious path and with an unusual parent process. This may indicate an attempt to execute malicious Troubleshooting Pack Cabinet files. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |1
 
-|<<suspicious-utility-launched-via-proxychains, Suspicious Utility Launched via ProxyChains>> |This rule monitors for the execution of suspicious linux tools through ProxyChains. ProxyChains is a command-line tool that enables the routing of network connections through intermediary proxies, enhancing anonymity and enabling access to restricted resources. Attackers can exploit the ProxyChains utility to hide their true source IP address, evade detection, and perform malicious activities through a chain of proxy servers, potentially masking their identity and intentions. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.3.0 |6
+|<<suspicious-utility-launched-via-proxychains, Suspicious Utility Launched via ProxyChains>> |This rule monitors for the execution of suspicious linux tools through ProxyChains. ProxyChains is a command-line tool that enables the routing of network connections through intermediary proxies, enhancing anonymity and enabling access to restricted resources. Attackers can exploit the ProxyChains utility to hide their true source IP address, evade detection, and perform malicious activities through a chain of proxy servers, potentially masking their identity and intentions. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.3.0 |7
 
-|<<suspicious-wmi-event-subscription-created, Suspicious WMI Event Subscription Created>> |Detects the creation of a WMI Event Subscription. Attackers can abuse this mechanism for persistence or to elevate to SYSTEM privileges. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Sysmon Only] |8.8.0 |105
+|<<suspicious-wmi-event-subscription-created, Suspicious WMI Event Subscription Created>> |Detects the creation of a WMI Event Subscription. Attackers can abuse this mechanism for persistence or to elevate to SYSTEM privileges. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.8.0 |106
 
-|<<suspicious-wmi-image-load-from-ms-office, Suspicious WMI Image Load from MS Office>> |Identifies a suspicious image load (wmiutils.dll) from Microsoft Office processes. This behavior may indicate adversarial activity where child processes are spawned via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). This technique can be used to execute code and evade traditional parent/child processes spawned from Microsoft Office products. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<suspicious-wmi-image-load-from-ms-office, Suspicious WMI Image Load from MS Office>> |Identifies a suspicious image load (wmiutils.dll) from Microsoft Office processes. This behavior may indicate adversarial activity where child processes are spawned via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). This technique can be used to execute code and evade traditional parent/child processes spawned from Microsoft Office products. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<suspicious-wmic-xsl-script-execution, Suspicious WMIC XSL Script Execution>> |Identifies WMIC allowlist bypass techniques by alerting on suspicious execution of scripts. When WMIC loads scripting libraries it may be indicative of an allowlist bypass. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<suspicious-wmic-xsl-script-execution, Suspicious WMIC XSL Script Execution>> |Identifies WMIC allowlist bypass techniques by alerting on suspicious execution of scripts. When WMIC loads scripting libraries it may be indicative of an allowlist bypass. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<suspicious-werfault-child-process, Suspicious WerFault Child Process>> |A suspicious WerFault child process was detected, which may indicate an attempt to run via the SilentProcessExit registry key manipulation. Verify process details such as command line, network connections and file writes. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
+|<<suspicious-werfault-child-process, Suspicious WerFault Child Process>> |A suspicious WerFault child process was detected, which may indicate an attempt to run via the SilentProcessExit registry key manipulation. Verify process details such as command line, network connections and file writes. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |111
 
-|<<suspicious-windows-process-cluster-spawned-by-a-host, Suspicious Windows Process Cluster Spawned by a Host>> |A machine learning job combination has detected a set of one or more suspicious Windows processes with unusually high scores for malicious probability. These process(es) have been classified as malicious in several ways. The process(es) were predicted to be malicious by the ProblemChild supervised ML model. If the anomaly contains a cluster of suspicious processes, each process has the same host name, and the aggregate score of the event cluster was calculated to be unusually high by an unsupervised ML model. Such a cluster often contains suspicious or malicious activity, possibly involving LOLbins, that may be resistant to detection using conventional search rules. |[Use Case: Living off the Land Attack Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.9.0 |2
+|<<suspicious-windows-process-cluster-spawned-by-a-host, Suspicious Windows Process Cluster Spawned by a Host>> |A machine learning job combination has detected a set of one or more suspicious Windows processes with unusually high scores for malicious probability. These process(es) have been classified as malicious in several ways. The process(es) were predicted to be malicious by the ProblemChild supervised ML model. If the anomaly contains a cluster of suspicious processes, each process has the same host name, and the aggregate score of the event cluster was calculated to be unusually high by an unsupervised ML model. Such a cluster often contains suspicious or malicious activity, possibly involving LOLbins, that may be resistant to detection using conventional search rules. |[Use Case: Living off the Land Attack Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.9.0 |3
 
-|<<suspicious-windows-process-cluster-spawned-by-a-parent-process, Suspicious Windows Process Cluster Spawned by a Parent Process>> |A machine learning job combination has detected a set of one or more suspicious Windows processes with unusually high scores for malicious probability. These process(es) have been classified as malicious in several ways. The process(es) were predicted to be malicious by the ProblemChild supervised ML model. If the anomaly contains a cluster of suspicious processes, each process has the same parent process name, and the aggregate score of the event cluster was calculated to be unusually high by an unsupervised ML model. Such a cluster often contains suspicious or malicious activity, possibly involving LOLbins, that may be resistant to detection using conventional search rules. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Living off the Land Attack Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.9.0 |2
+|<<suspicious-windows-process-cluster-spawned-by-a-parent-process, Suspicious Windows Process Cluster Spawned by a Parent Process>> |A machine learning job combination has detected a set of one or more suspicious Windows processes with unusually high scores for malicious probability. These process(es) have been classified as malicious in several ways. The process(es) were predicted to be malicious by the ProblemChild supervised ML model. If the anomaly contains a cluster of suspicious processes, each process has the same parent process name, and the aggregate score of the event cluster was calculated to be unusually high by an unsupervised ML model. Such a cluster often contains suspicious or malicious activity, possibly involving LOLbins, that may be resistant to detection using conventional search rules. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Living off the Land Attack Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.9.0 |3
 
-|<<suspicious-windows-process-cluster-spawned-by-a-user, Suspicious Windows Process Cluster Spawned by a User>> |A machine learning job combination has detected a set of one or more suspicious Windows processes with unusually high scores for malicious probability. These process(es) have been classified as malicious in several ways. The process(es) were predicted to be malicious by the ProblemChild supervised ML model. If the anomaly contains a cluster of suspicious processes, each process has the same user name, and the aggregate score of the event cluster was calculated to be unusually high by an unsupervised ML model. Such a cluster often contains suspicious or malicious activity, possibly involving LOLbins, that may be resistant to detection using conventional search rules. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Living off the Land Attack Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.9.0 |2
+|<<suspicious-windows-process-cluster-spawned-by-a-user, Suspicious Windows Process Cluster Spawned by a User>> |A machine learning job combination has detected a set of one or more suspicious Windows processes with unusually high scores for malicious probability. These process(es) have been classified as malicious in several ways. The process(es) were predicted to be malicious by the ProblemChild supervised ML model. If the anomaly contains a cluster of suspicious processes, each process has the same user name, and the aggregate score of the event cluster was calculated to be unusually high by an unsupervised ML model. Such a cluster often contains suspicious or malicious activity, possibly involving LOLbins, that may be resistant to detection using conventional search rules. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Living off the Land Attack Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.9.0 |3
 
-|<<suspicious-zoom-child-process, Suspicious Zoom Child Process>> |A suspicious Zoom child process was detected, which may indicate an attempt to run unnoticed. Verify process details such as command line, network connections, file writes and associated file signature details as well. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<suspicious-zoom-child-process, Suspicious Zoom Child Process>> |A suspicious Zoom child process was detected, which may indicate an attempt to run unnoticed. Verify process details such as command line, network connections, file writes and associated file signature details as well. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
 
-|<<suspicious-macos-ms-office-child-process, Suspicious macOS MS Office Child Process>> |Identifies suspicious child processes of frequently targeted Microsoft Office applications (Word, PowerPoint, and Excel). These child processes are often launched during exploitation of Office applications or by documents with malicious macros. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<suspicious-macos-ms-office-child-process, Suspicious macOS MS Office Child Process>> |Identifies suspicious child processes of frequently targeted Microsoft Office applications (Word, PowerPoint, and Excel). These child processes are often launched during exploitation of Office applications or by documents with malicious macros. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<suspicious-which-enumeration, Suspicious which Enumeration>> |This rule monitors for the usage of the which command with an unusual amount of process arguments. Attackers may leverage the which command to enumerate the system for useful installed utilities that may be used after compromising a system to escalate privileges or move latteraly across the network. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |8.3.0 |4
+|<<suspicious-which-enumeration, Suspicious which Enumeration>> |This rule monitors for the usage of the which command with an unusual amount of process arguments. Attackers may leverage the which command to enumerate the system for useful installed utilities that may be used after compromising a system to escalate privileges or move latteraly across the network. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |8.3.0 |5
 
-|<<svchost-spawning-cmd, Svchost spawning Cmd>> |Identifies a suspicious parent child process relationship with cmd.exe descending from svchost.exe |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |209
+|<<svchost-spawning-cmd, Svchost spawning Cmd>> |Identifies a suspicious parent child process relationship with cmd.exe descending from svchost.exe |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |210
 
-|<<symbolic-link-to-shadow-copy-created, Symbolic Link to Shadow Copy Created>> |Identifies the creation of symbolic links to a shadow copy. Symbolic links can be used to access files in the shadow copy, including sensitive files such as ntds.dit, System Boot Key and browser offline credentials. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<symbolic-link-to-shadow-copy-created, Symbolic Link to Shadow Copy Created>> |Identifies the creation of symbolic links to a shadow copy. Symbolic links can be used to access files in the shadow copy, including sensitive files such as ntds.dit, System Boot Key and browser offline credentials. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
 
-|<<system-binary-copied-and-or-moved-to-suspicious-directory, System Binary Copied and/or Moved to Suspicious Directory>> |This rule monitors for the copying or moving of a system binary to a suspicious directory. Adversaries may copy/move and rename system binaries to evade detection. Copying a system binary to a different location should not occur often, so if it does, the activity should be investigated. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |6
+|<<system-binary-copied-and-or-moved-to-suspicious-directory, System Binary Copied and/or Moved to Suspicious Directory>> |This rule monitors for the copying or moving of a system binary to a suspicious directory. Adversaries may copy/move and rename system binaries to evade detection. Copying a system binary to a different location should not occur often, so if it does, the activity should be investigated. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |7
 
 |<<system-hosts-file-access, System Hosts File Access>> |Identifies the use of built-in tools to read the contents of \etc\hosts on a local machine. Attackers may use this data to discover remote machines in an environment that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.3.0 |3
 
-|<<system-information-discovery-via-windows-command-shell, System Information Discovery via Windows Command Shell>> |Identifies the execution of discovery commands to enumerate system information, files, and folders using the Windows Command Shell. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |8
+|<<system-information-discovery-via-windows-command-shell, System Information Discovery via Windows Command Shell>> |Identifies the execution of discovery commands to enumerate system information, files, and folders using the Windows Command Shell. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |9
 
-|<<system-log-file-deletion, System Log File Deletion>> |Identifies the deletion of sensitive Linux system logs. This may indicate an attempt to evade detection or destroy forensic evidence on a system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<system-log-file-deletion, System Log File Deletion>> |Identifies the deletion of sensitive Linux system logs. This may indicate an attempt to evade detection or destroy forensic evidence on a system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
 
 |<<system-network-connections-discovery, System Network Connections Discovery>> |Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from a compromised system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.3.0 |3
 
@@ -1902,73 +1906,75 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<system-time-discovery, System Time Discovery>> |Detects the usage of commonly used system time discovery techniques, which attackers may use during the reconnaissance phase after compromising a system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |6
 
-|<<systemkey-access-via-command-line, SystemKey Access via Command Line>> |Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features, including Wi-Fi and website passwords, secure notes, certificates, and Kerberos. Adversaries may collect the keychain storage data from a system to acquire credentials. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<systemkey-access-via-command-line, SystemKey Access via Command Line>> |Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features, including Wi-Fi and website passwords, secure notes, certificates, and Kerberos. Adversaries may collect the keychain storage data from a system to acquire credentials. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<tcc-bypass-via-mounted-apfs-snapshot-access, TCC Bypass via Mounted APFS Snapshot Access>> |Identifies the use of the mount_apfs command to mount the entire file system through Apple File System (APFS) snapshots as read-only and with the noowners flag set. This action enables the adversary to access almost any file in the file system, including all user data and files protected by Apple’s privacy framework (TCC). |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<tcc-bypass-via-mounted-apfs-snapshot-access, TCC Bypass via Mounted APFS Snapshot Access>> |Identifies the use of the mount_apfs command to mount the entire file system through Apple File System (APFS) snapshots as read-only and with the noowners flag set. This action enables the adversary to access almost any file in the file system, including all user data and files protected by Apple’s privacy framework (TCC). |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<tainted-kernel-module-load, Tainted Kernel Module Load>> |This rule monitors the syslog log file for messages related to instances of a tainted kernel module load. Rootkits often leverage kernel modules as their main defense evasion technique. Detecting tainted kernel module loads is crucial for ensuring system security and integrity, as malicious or unauthorized modules can compromise the kernel and lead to system vulnerabilities or unauthorized access. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.3.0 |3
+|<<tainted-kernel-module-load, Tainted Kernel Module Load>> |This rule monitors the syslog log file for messages related to instances of a tainted kernel module load. Rootkits often leverage kernel modules as their main defense evasion technique. Detecting tainted kernel module loads is crucial for ensuring system security and integrity, as malicious or unauthorized modules can compromise the kernel and lead to system vulnerabilities or unauthorized access. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.3.0 |4
 
 |<<tainted-out-of-tree-kernel-module-load, Tainted Out-Of-Tree Kernel Module Load>> |This rule monitors the syslog log file for messages related to instances of a out-of-tree kernel module load, indicating the taining of the kernel. Rootkits often leverage kernel modules as their main defense evasion technique. Detecting tainted kernel module loads is crucial for ensuring system security and integrity, as malicious or unauthorized modules can compromise the kernel and lead to system vulnerabilities or unauthorized access. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.3.0 |2
 
-|<<tampering-of-bash-command-line-history, Tampering of Bash Command-Line History>> |Adversaries may attempt to clear or disable the Bash command-line history in an attempt to evade detection or forensic investigations. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |104
+|<<tampering-of-shell-command-line-history, Tampering of Shell Command-Line History>> |Adversaries may attempt to clear or disable the Bash command-line history in an attempt to evade detection or forensic investigations. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.3.0 |105
 
 |<<temporarily-scheduled-task-creation, Temporarily Scheduled Task Creation>> |Indicates the creation and deletion of a scheduled task within a short time interval. Adversaries can use these to proxy malicious execution via the schedule service and perform clean up. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Execution] |8.3.0 |7
 
-|<<third-party-backup-files-deleted-via-unexpected-process, Third-party Backup Files Deleted via Unexpected Process>> |Identifies the deletion of backup files, saved using third-party software, by a process outside of the backup suite. Adversaries may delete Backup files to ensure that recovery from a ransomware attack is less likely. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Impact], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
+|<<third-party-backup-files-deleted-via-unexpected-process, Third-party Backup Files Deleted via Unexpected Process>> |Identifies the deletion of backup files, saved using third-party software, by a process outside of the backup suite. Adversaries may delete Backup files to ensure that recovery from a ransomware attack is less likely. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Impact], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |111
 
-|<<threat-intel-hash-indicator-match, Threat Intel Hash Indicator Match>> |This rule is triggered when a hash indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or integrations has a match against an event that contains file hashes, such as antivirus alerts, process creation, library load, and file operation events. |[OS: Windows], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Rule Type: Indicator Match] |8.5.0 |6
+|<<threat-intel-hash-indicator-match, Threat Intel Hash Indicator Match>> |This rule is triggered when a hash indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or integrations has a match against an event that contains file hashes, such as antivirus alerts, process creation, library load, and file operation events. |[OS: Windows], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Rule Type: Indicator Match] |8.5.0 |7
 
-|<<threat-intel-ip-address-indicator-match, Threat Intel IP Address Indicator Match>> |This rule is triggered when an IP address indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or integrations has a match against a network event. |[OS: Windows], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Rule Type: Indicator Match] |8.5.0 |5
+|<<threat-intel-ip-address-indicator-match, Threat Intel IP Address Indicator Match>> |This rule is triggered when an IP address indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or integrations has a match against a network event. |[OS: Windows], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Rule Type: Indicator Match] |8.5.0 |6
 
-|<<threat-intel-url-indicator-match, Threat Intel URL Indicator Match>> |This rule is triggered when a URL indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or integrations has a match against an event that contains URL data, like DNS events, network logs, etc. |[OS: Windows], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Rule Type: Indicator Match] |8.5.0 |5
+|<<threat-intel-url-indicator-match, Threat Intel URL Indicator Match>> |This rule is triggered when a URL indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or integrations has a match against an event that contains URL data, like DNS events, network logs, etc. |[OS: Windows], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Rule Type: Indicator Match] |8.5.0 |6
 
-|<<threat-intel-windows-registry-indicator-match, Threat Intel Windows Registry Indicator Match>> |This rule is triggered when a Windows registry indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or integrations has a match against an event that contains registry data. |[OS: Windows], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Rule Type: Indicator Match] |8.5.0 |5
+|<<threat-intel-windows-registry-indicator-match, Threat Intel Windows Registry Indicator Match>> |This rule is triggered when a Windows registry indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or integrations has a match against an event that contains registry data. |[OS: Windows], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Rule Type: Indicator Match] |8.5.0 |6
 
-|<<timestomping-using-touch-command, Timestomping using Touch Command>> |Timestomping is an anti-forensics technique which is used to modify the timestamps of a file, often to mimic files that are in the same folder. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<timestomping-using-touch-command, Timestomping using Touch Command>> |Timestomping is an anti-forensics technique which is used to modify the timestamps of a file, often to mimic files that are in the same folder. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
 |<<trap-signals-execution, Trap Signals Execution>> |Identify activity related where adversaries can include a trap command which then allows programs and shells to specify commands that will be executed upon receiving interrupt signals. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.3.0 |2
 
-|<<uac-bypass-attempt-via-elevated-com-internet-explorer-add-on-installer, UAC Bypass Attempt via Elevated COM Internet Explorer Add-On Installer>> |Identifies User Account Control (UAC) bypass attempts by abusing an elevated COM Interface to launch a malicious program. Attackers may attempt to bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<uac-bypass-attempt-via-elevated-com-internet-explorer-add-on-installer, UAC Bypass Attempt via Elevated COM Internet Explorer Add-On Installer>> |Identifies User Account Control (UAC) bypass attempts by abusing an elevated COM Interface to launch a malicious program. Attackers may attempt to bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<uac-bypass-attempt-via-privileged-ifileoperation-com-interface, UAC Bypass Attempt via Privileged IFileOperation COM Interface>> |Identifies attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) via DLL side-loading. Attackers may attempt to bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<uac-bypass-attempt-via-privileged-ifileoperation-com-interface, UAC Bypass Attempt via Privileged IFileOperation COM Interface>> |Identifies attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) via DLL side-loading. Attackers may attempt to bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<uac-bypass-attempt-via-windows-directory-masquerading, UAC Bypass Attempt via Windows Directory Masquerading>> |Identifies an attempt to bypass User Account Control (UAC) by masquerading as a Microsoft trusted Windows directory. Attackers may bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
+|<<uac-bypass-attempt-via-windows-directory-masquerading, UAC Bypass Attempt via Windows Directory Masquerading>> |Identifies an attempt to bypass User Account Control (UAC) by masquerading as a Microsoft trusted Windows directory. Attackers may bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |111
 
-|<<uac-bypass-attempt-with-ieditionupgrademanager-elevated-com-interface, UAC Bypass Attempt with IEditionUpgradeManager Elevated COM Interface>> |Identifies attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) by abusing an elevated COM Interface to launch a rogue Windows ClipUp program. Attackers may attempt to bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<uac-bypass-attempt-with-ieditionupgrademanager-elevated-com-interface, UAC Bypass Attempt with IEditionUpgradeManager Elevated COM Interface>> |Identifies attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) by abusing an elevated COM Interface to launch a rogue Windows ClipUp program. Attackers may attempt to bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<uac-bypass-via-diskcleanup-scheduled-task-hijack, UAC Bypass via DiskCleanup Scheduled Task Hijack>> |Identifies User Account Control (UAC) bypass via hijacking DiskCleanup Scheduled Task. Attackers bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<uac-bypass-via-diskcleanup-scheduled-task-hijack, UAC Bypass via DiskCleanup Scheduled Task Hijack>> |Identifies User Account Control (UAC) bypass via hijacking DiskCleanup Scheduled Task. Attackers bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<uac-bypass-via-icmluautil-elevated-com-interface, UAC Bypass via ICMLuaUtil Elevated COM Interface>> |Identifies User Account Control (UAC) bypass attempts via the ICMLuaUtil Elevated COM interface. Attackers may attempt to bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<uac-bypass-via-icmluautil-elevated-com-interface, UAC Bypass via ICMLuaUtil Elevated COM Interface>> |Identifies User Account Control (UAC) bypass attempts via the ICMLuaUtil Elevated COM interface. Attackers may attempt to bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<uac-bypass-via-windows-firewall-snap-in-hijack, UAC Bypass via Windows Firewall Snap-In Hijack>> |Identifies attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) by hijacking the Microsoft Management Console (MMC) Windows Firewall snap-in. Attackers bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<uac-bypass-via-windows-firewall-snap-in-hijack, UAC Bypass via Windows Firewall Snap-In Hijack>> |Identifies attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) by hijacking the Microsoft Management Console (MMC) Windows Firewall snap-in. Attackers bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |110
 
-|<<uid-elevation-from-previously-unknown-executable, UID Elevation from Previously Unknown Executable>> |Monitors for the elevation of regular user permissions to root permissions through a previously unknown executable. Attackers may attempt to evade detection by hijacking the execution flow and hooking certain functions/syscalls through a rootkit in order to provide easy access to root via a special modified command. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |1
+|<<uid-elevation-from-previously-unknown-executable, UID Elevation from Previously Unknown Executable>> |Monitors for the elevation of regular user permissions to root permissions through a previously unknown executable. Attackers may attempt to evade detection by hijacking the execution flow and hooking certain functions/syscalls through a rootkit in order to provide easy access to root via a special modified command. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |2
 
 |<<unauthorized-access-to-an-okta-application, Unauthorized Access to an Okta Application>> |Identifies unauthorized access attempts to Okta applications. |[Tactic: Initial Access], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Data Source: Okta] |8.10.0 |206
 
-|<<uncommon-registry-persistence-change, Uncommon Registry Persistence Change>> |Detects changes to registry persistence keys that are not commonly used or modified by legitimate programs. This could be an indication of an adversary's attempt to persist in a stealthy manner. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<uncommon-registry-persistence-change, Uncommon Registry Persistence Change>> |Detects changes to registry persistence keys that are not commonly used or modified by legitimate programs. This could be an indication of an adversary's attempt to persist in a stealthy manner. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<unexpected-child-process-of-macos-screensaver-engine, Unexpected Child Process of macOS Screensaver Engine>> |Identifies when a child process is spawned by the screensaver engine process, which is consistent with an attacker's malicious payload being executed after the screensaver activated on the endpoint. An adversary can maintain persistence on a macOS endpoint by creating a malicious screensaver (.saver) file and configuring the screensaver plist file to execute code each time the screensaver is activated. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<unexpected-child-process-of-macos-screensaver-engine, Unexpected Child Process of macOS Screensaver Engine>> |Identifies when a child process is spawned by the screensaver engine process, which is consistent with an attacker's malicious payload being executed after the screensaver activated on the endpoint. An adversary can maintain persistence on a macOS endpoint by creating a malicious screensaver (.saver) file and configuring the screensaver plist file to execute code each time the screensaver is activated. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
 
 |<<unix-socket-connection, Unix Socket Connection>> |This rule monitors for inter-process communication via Unix sockets. Adversaries may attempt to communicate with local Unix sockets to enumerate application details, find vulnerabilities/configuration mistakes and potentially escalate privileges or set up malicious communication channels via Unix sockets for inter-process communication to attempt to evade detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.3.0 |2
 
+|<<unknown-execution-of-binary-with-rwx-memory-region, Unknown Execution of Binary with RWX Memory Region>> |Monitors for the execution of a previously unknown unix binary with read, write and execute memory region permissions. The mprotect() system call is used to change the access protections on a region of memory that has already been allocated. This syscall allows a process to modify the permissions of pages in its virtual address space, enabling or disabling permissions such as read, write, and execute for those pages. RWX permissions on memory is in many cases overly permissive, and should be analyzed thoroughly. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.6.0 |1
+
 |<<unsigned-bits-service-client-process, Unsigned BITS Service Client Process>> |Identifies an unsigned Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) client process. Attackers may abuse BITS functionality to download or upload data using the BITS service. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |1
 
 |<<unsigned-dll-loaded-by-svchost, Unsigned DLL Loaded by Svchost>> |Identifies an unsigned library created in the last 5 minutes and subsequently loaded by a shared windows service (svchost). Adversaries may use this technique to maintain persistence or run with System privileges. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.4.0 |5
 
 |<<unsigned-dll-loaded-by-a-trusted-process, Unsigned DLL Loaded by a Trusted Process>> |Identifies digitally signed (trusted) processes loading unsigned DLLs. Attackers may plant their payloads into the application folder and invoke the legitimate application to execute the payload, masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted, and potentially elevated system or software process. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.4.0 |101
 
-|<<unsigned-dll-side-loading-from-a-suspicious-folder, Unsigned DLL Side-Loading from a Suspicious Folder>> |Identifies a Windows trusted program running from locations often abused by adversaries to masquerade as a trusted program and loading a recently dropped DLL. This behavior may indicate an attempt to evade defenses via side-loading a malicious DLL within the memory space of a signed processes. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.4.0 |6
+|<<unsigned-dll-side-loading-from-a-suspicious-folder, Unsigned DLL Side-Loading from a Suspicious Folder>> |Identifies a Windows trusted program running from locations often abused by adversaries to masquerade as a trusted program and loading a recently dropped DLL. This behavior may indicate an attempt to evade defenses via side-loading a malicious DLL within the memory space of a signed processes. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.4.0 |7
 
 |<<untrusted-driver-loaded, Untrusted Driver Loaded>> |Identifies attempt to load an untrusted driver. Adversaries may modify code signing policies to enable execution of unsigned or self-signed code. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |6
 
 |<<unusual-aws-command-for-a-user, Unusual AWS Command for a User>> |A machine learning job detected an AWS API command that, while not inherently suspicious or abnormal, is being made by a user context that does not normally use the command. This can be the result of compromised credentials or keys as someone uses a valid account to persist, move laterally, or exfiltrate data. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.9.0 |208
 
-|<<unusual-child-process-from-a-system-virtual-process, Unusual Child Process from a System Virtual Process>> |Identifies a suspicious child process of the Windows virtual system process, which could indicate code injection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<unusual-child-process-from-a-system-virtual-process, Unusual Child Process from a System Virtual Process>> |Identifies a suspicious child process of the Windows virtual system process, which could indicate code injection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
 
-|<<unusual-child-process-of-dns-exe, Unusual Child Process of dns.exe>> |Identifies an unexpected process spawning from dns.exe, the process responsible for Windows DNS server services, which may indicate activity related to remote code execution or other forms of exploitation. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<unusual-child-process-of-dns-exe, Unusual Child Process of dns.exe>> |Identifies an unexpected process spawning from dns.exe, the process responsible for Windows DNS server services, which may indicate activity related to remote code execution or other forms of exploitation. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
 
-|<<unusual-child-processes-of-rundll32, Unusual Child Processes of RunDLL32>> |Identifies child processes of unusual instances of RunDLL32 where the command line parameters were suspicious. Misuse of RunDLL32 could indicate malicious activity. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<unusual-child-processes-of-rundll32, Unusual Child Processes of RunDLL32>> |Identifies child processes of unusual instances of RunDLL32 where the command line parameters were suspicious. Misuse of RunDLL32 could indicate malicious activity. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |107
 
 |<<unusual-city-for-an-aws-command, Unusual City For an AWS Command>> |A machine learning job detected AWS command activity that, while not inherently suspicious or abnormal, is sourcing from a geolocation (city) that is unusual for the command. This can be the result of compromised credentials or keys being used by a threat actor in a different geography than the authorized user(s). |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.9.0 |208
 
@@ -1982,11 +1988,11 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<unusual-discovery-signal-alert-with-unusual-process-executable, Unusual Discovery Signal Alert with Unusual Process Executable>> |This rule leverages Discovery building block rule alert data to alert on signals with unusual unique host.id, user.id and process.executable entries. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Rule Type: Higher-Order Rule] |8.6.0 |2
 
-|<<unusual-executable-file-creation-by-a-system-critical-process, Unusual Executable File Creation by a System Critical Process>> |Identifies an unexpected executable file being created or modified by a Windows system critical process, which may indicate activity related to remote code execution or other forms of exploitation. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<unusual-executable-file-creation-by-a-system-critical-process, Unusual Executable File Creation by a System Critical Process>> |Identifies an unexpected executable file being created or modified by a Windows system critical process, which may indicate activity related to remote code execution or other forms of exploitation. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |110
 
-|<<unusual-file-creation-alternate-data-stream, Unusual File Creation - Alternate Data Stream>> |Identifies suspicious creation of Alternate Data Streams on highly targeted files. This is uncommon for legitimate files and sometimes done by adversaries to hide malware. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |112
+|<<unusual-file-creation-alternate-data-stream, Unusual File Creation - Alternate Data Stream>> |Identifies suspicious creation of Alternate Data Streams on highly targeted files. This is uncommon for legitimate files and sometimes done by adversaries to hide malware. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |113
 
-|<<unusual-file-modification-by-dns-exe, Unusual File Modification by dns.exe>> |Identifies an unexpected file being modified by dns.exe, the process responsible for Windows DNS Server services, which may indicate activity related to remote code execution or other forms of exploitation. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<unusual-file-modification-by-dns-exe, Unusual File Modification by dns.exe>> |Identifies an unexpected file being modified by dns.exe, the process responsible for Windows DNS Server services, which may indicate activity related to remote code execution or other forms of exploitation. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |109
 
 |<<unusual-hour-for-a-user-to-logon, Unusual Hour for a User to Logon>> |A machine learning job detected a user logging in at a time of day that is unusual for the user. This can be due to credentialed access via a compromised account when the user and the threat actor are in different time zones. In addition, unauthorized user activity often takes place during non-business hours. |[Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.3.0 |104
 
@@ -2012,23 +2018,23 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<unusual-login-activity, Unusual Login Activity>> |Identifies an unusually high number of authentication attempts. |[Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Credential Access] |8.3.0 |103
 
-|<<unusual-network-activity-from-a-windows-system-binary, Unusual Network Activity from a Windows System Binary>> |Identifies network activity from unexpected system applications. This may indicate adversarial activity as these applications are often leveraged by adversaries to execute code and evade detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<unusual-network-activity-from-a-windows-system-binary, Unusual Network Activity from a Windows System Binary>> |Identifies network activity from unexpected system applications. This may indicate adversarial activity as these applications are often leveraged by adversaries to execute code and evade detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |110
 
-|<<unusual-network-connection-via-dllhost, Unusual Network Connection via DllHost>> |Identifies unusual instances of dllhost.exe making outbound network connections. This may indicate adversarial Command and Control activity. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<unusual-network-connection-via-dllhost, Unusual Network Connection via DllHost>> |Identifies unusual instances of dllhost.exe making outbound network connections. This may indicate adversarial Command and Control activity. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<unusual-network-connection-via-rundll32, Unusual Network Connection via RunDLL32>> |Identifies unusual instances of rundll32.exe making outbound network connections. This may indicate adversarial Command and Control activity. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<unusual-network-connection-via-rundll32, Unusual Network Connection via RunDLL32>> |Identifies unusual instances of rundll32.exe making outbound network connections. This may indicate adversarial Command and Control activity. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |108
 
 |<<unusual-network-destination-domain-name, Unusual Network Destination Domain Name>> |A machine learning job detected an unusual network destination domain name. This can be due to initial access, persistence, command-and-control, or exfiltration activity. For example, when a user clicks on a link in a phishing email or opens a malicious document, a request may be sent to download and run a payload from an uncommon web server name. When malware is already running, it may send requests to an uncommon DNS domain the malware uses for command-and-control communication. |[Use Case: Threat Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning] |8.3.0 |103
 
-|<<unusual-parent-process-for-cmd-exe, Unusual Parent Process for cmd.exe>> |Identifies a suspicious parent child process relationship with cmd.exe descending from an unusual process. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<unusual-parent-process-for-cmd-exe, Unusual Parent Process for cmd.exe>> |Identifies a suspicious parent child process relationship with cmd.exe descending from an unusual process. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |109
 
-|<<unusual-parent-child-relationship, Unusual Parent-Child Relationship>> |Identifies Windows programs run from unexpected parent processes. This could indicate masquerading or other strange activity on a system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<unusual-parent-child-relationship, Unusual Parent-Child Relationship>> |Identifies Windows programs run from unexpected parent processes. This could indicate masquerading or other strange activity on a system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
 
-|<<unusual-persistence-via-services-registry, Unusual Persistence via Services Registry>> |Identifies processes modifying the services registry key directly, instead of through the expected Windows APIs. This could be an indication of an adversary attempting to stealthily persist through abnormal service creation or modification of an existing service. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<unusual-persistence-via-services-registry, Unusual Persistence via Services Registry>> |Identifies processes modifying the services registry key directly, instead of through the expected Windows APIs. This could be an indication of an adversary attempting to stealthily persist through abnormal service creation or modification of an existing service. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<unusual-print-spooler-child-process, Unusual Print Spooler Child Process>> |Detects unusual Print Spooler service (spoolsv.exe) child processes. This may indicate an attempt to exploit privilege escalation vulnerabilities related to the Printing Service on Windows. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<unusual-print-spooler-child-process, Unusual Print Spooler Child Process>> |Detects unusual Print Spooler service (spoolsv.exe) child processes. This may indicate an attempt to exploit privilege escalation vulnerabilities related to the Printing Service on Windows. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<unusual-process-execution-path-alternate-data-stream, Unusual Process Execution Path - Alternate Data Stream>> |Identifies processes running from an Alternate Data Stream. This is uncommon for legitimate processes and sometimes done by adversaries to hide malware. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<unusual-process-execution-path-alternate-data-stream, Unusual Process Execution Path - Alternate Data Stream>> |Identifies processes running from an Alternate Data Stream. This is uncommon for legitimate processes and sometimes done by adversaries to hide malware. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |108
 
 |<<unusual-process-execution-on-wbem-path, Unusual Process Execution on WBEM Path>> |Identifies unusual processes running from the WBEM path, uncommon outside WMI-related Windows processes. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |1
 
@@ -2040,31 +2046,31 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<unusual-process-for-a-windows-host, Unusual Process For a Windows Host>> |Identifies rare processes that do not usually run on individual hosts, which can indicate execution of unauthorized services, malware, or persistence mechanisms. Processes are considered rare when they only run occasionally as compared with other processes running on the host. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Persistence], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<unusual-process-network-connection, Unusual Process Network Connection>> |Identifies network activity from unexpected system applications. This may indicate adversarial activity as these applications are often leveraged by adversaries to execute code and evade detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<unusual-process-network-connection, Unusual Process Network Connection>> |Identifies network activity from unexpected system applications. This may indicate adversarial activity as these applications are often leveraged by adversaries to execute code and evade detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<unusual-process-spawned-by-a-host, Unusual Process Spawned by a Host>> |A machine learning job has detected a suspicious Windows process. This process has been classified as suspicious in two ways. It was predicted to be suspicious by the ProblemChild supervised ML model, and it was found to be an unusual process, on a host that does not commonly manifest malicious activity. Such a process may be an instance of suspicious or malicious activity, possibly involving LOLbins, that may be resistant to detection using conventional search rules. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Living off the Land Attack Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.9.0 |2
+|<<unusual-process-spawned-by-a-host, Unusual Process Spawned by a Host>> |A machine learning job has detected a suspicious Windows process. This process has been classified as suspicious in two ways. It was predicted to be suspicious by the ProblemChild supervised ML model, and it was found to be an unusual process, on a host that does not commonly manifest malicious activity. Such a process may be an instance of suspicious or malicious activity, possibly involving LOLbins, that may be resistant to detection using conventional search rules. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Living off the Land Attack Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.9.0 |3
 
-|<<unusual-process-spawned-by-a-parent-process, Unusual Process Spawned by a Parent Process>> |A machine learning job has detected a suspicious Windows process. This process has been classified as malicious in two ways. It was predicted to be malicious by the ProblemChild supervised ML model, and it was found to be an unusual child process name, for the parent process, by an unsupervised ML model. Such a process may be an instance of suspicious or malicious activity, possibly involving LOLbins, that may be resistant to detection using conventional search rules. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Living off the Land Attack Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.9.0 |2
+|<<unusual-process-spawned-by-a-parent-process, Unusual Process Spawned by a Parent Process>> |A machine learning job has detected a suspicious Windows process. This process has been classified as malicious in two ways. It was predicted to be malicious by the ProblemChild supervised ML model, and it was found to be an unusual child process name, for the parent process, by an unsupervised ML model. Such a process may be an instance of suspicious or malicious activity, possibly involving LOLbins, that may be resistant to detection using conventional search rules. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Living off the Land Attack Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.9.0 |3
 
-|<<unusual-process-spawned-by-a-user, Unusual Process Spawned by a User>> |A machine learning job has detected a suspicious Windows process. This process has been classified as malicious in two ways. It was predicted to be malicious by the ProblemChild supervised ML model, and it was found to be suspicious given that its user context is unusual and does not commonly manifest malicious activity,by an unsupervised ML model. Such a process may be an instance of suspicious or malicious activity, possibly involving LOLbins, that may be resistant to detection using conventional search rules. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Living off the Land Attack Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.9.0 |2
+|<<unusual-process-spawned-by-a-user, Unusual Process Spawned by a User>> |A machine learning job has detected a suspicious Windows process. This process has been classified as malicious in two ways. It was predicted to be malicious by the ProblemChild supervised ML model, and it was found to be suspicious given that its user context is unusual and does not commonly manifest malicious activity,by an unsupervised ML model. Such a process may be an instance of suspicious or malicious activity, possibly involving LOLbins, that may be resistant to detection using conventional search rules. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Living off the Land Attack Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.9.0 |3
 
-|<<unusual-process-writing-data-to-an-external-device, Unusual Process Writing Data to an External Device>> |A machine learning job has detected a rare process writing data to an external device. Malicious actors often use benign-looking processes to mask their data exfiltration activities. The discovery of such a process that has no legitimate reason to write data to external devices can indicate exfiltration. |[Use Case: Data Exfiltration Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Exfiltration] |8.9.0 |2
+|<<unusual-process-writing-data-to-an-external-device, Unusual Process Writing Data to an External Device>> |A machine learning job has detected a rare process writing data to an external device. Malicious actors often use benign-looking processes to mask their data exfiltration activities. The discovery of such a process that has no legitimate reason to write data to external devices can indicate exfiltration. |[Use Case: Data Exfiltration Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Exfiltration] |8.9.0 |3
 
-|<<unusual-remote-file-directory, Unusual Remote File Directory>> |An anomaly detection job has detected a remote file transfer on an unusual directory indicating a potential lateral movement activity on the host. Many Security solutions monitor well-known directories for suspicious activities, so attackers might use less common directories to bypass monitoring. |[Use Case: Lateral Movement Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Lateral Movement] |8.9.0 |2
+|<<unusual-remote-file-directory, Unusual Remote File Directory>> |An anomaly detection job has detected a remote file transfer on an unusual directory indicating a potential lateral movement activity on the host. Many Security solutions monitor well-known directories for suspicious activities, so attackers might use less common directories to bypass monitoring. |[Use Case: Lateral Movement Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Lateral Movement] |8.9.0 |3
 
-|<<unusual-remote-file-extension, Unusual Remote File Extension>> |An anomaly detection job has detected a remote file transfer with a rare extension, which could indicate potential lateral movement activity on the host. |[Use Case: Lateral Movement Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Lateral Movement] |8.9.0 |2
+|<<unusual-remote-file-extension, Unusual Remote File Extension>> |An anomaly detection job has detected a remote file transfer with a rare extension, which could indicate potential lateral movement activity on the host. |[Use Case: Lateral Movement Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Lateral Movement] |8.9.0 |3
 
-|<<unusual-remote-file-size, Unusual Remote File Size>> |A machine learning job has detected an unusually high file size shared by a remote host indicating potential lateral movement activity. One of the primary goals of attackers after gaining access to a network is to locate and exfiltrate valuable information. Instead of multiple small transfers that can raise alarms, attackers might choose to bundle data into a single large file transfer. |[Use Case: Lateral Movement Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Lateral Movement] |8.9.0 |2
+|<<unusual-remote-file-size, Unusual Remote File Size>> |A machine learning job has detected an unusually high file size shared by a remote host indicating potential lateral movement activity. One of the primary goals of attackers after gaining access to a network is to locate and exfiltrate valuable information. Instead of multiple small transfers that can raise alarms, attackers might choose to bundle data into a single large file transfer. |[Use Case: Lateral Movement Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Lateral Movement] |8.9.0 |3
 
-|<<unusual-service-host-child-process-childless-service, Unusual Service Host Child Process - Childless Service>> |Identifies unusual child processes of Service Host (svchost.exe) that traditionally do not spawn any child processes. This may indicate a code injection or an equivalent form of exploitation. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<unusual-service-host-child-process-childless-service, Unusual Service Host Child Process - Childless Service>> |Identifies unusual child processes of Service Host (svchost.exe) that traditionally do not spawn any child processes. This may indicate a code injection or an equivalent form of exploitation. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |109
 
 |<<unusual-source-ip-for-a-user-to-logon-from, Unusual Source IP for a User to Logon from>> |A machine learning job detected a user logging in from an IP address that is unusual for the user. This can be due to credentialed access via a compromised account when the user and the threat actor are in different locations. An unusual source IP address for a username could also be due to lateral movement when a compromised account is used to pivot between hosts. |[Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Initial Access] |8.3.0 |103
 
 |<<unusual-sudo-activity, Unusual Sudo Activity>> |Looks for sudo activity from an unusual user context. An unusual sudo user could be due to troubleshooting activity or it could be a sign of credentialed access via compromised accounts. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation] |8.3.0 |103
 
-|<<unusual-time-or-day-for-an-rdp-session, Unusual Time or Day for an RDP Session>> |A machine learning job has detected an RDP session started at an usual time or weekday. An RDP session at an unusual time could be followed by other suspicious activities, so catching this is a good first step in detecting a larger attack. |[Use Case: Lateral Movement Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Lateral Movement] |8.9.0 |2
+|<<unusual-time-or-day-for-an-rdp-session, Unusual Time or Day for an RDP Session>> |A machine learning job has detected an RDP session started at an usual time or weekday. An RDP session at an unusual time could be followed by other suspicious activities, so catching this is a good first step in detecting a larger attack. |[Use Case: Lateral Movement Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Lateral Movement] |8.9.0 |3
 
-|<<unusual-user-privilege-enumeration-via-id, Unusual User Privilege Enumeration via id>> |This rule monitors for a sequence of 20 "id" command executions within 1 second by the same parent process. This behavior is unusual, and may be indicative of the execution of an enumeration script such as LinPEAS or LinEnum. These scripts leverage the "id" command to enumerate the privileges of all users present on the system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |3
+|<<unusual-user-privilege-enumeration-via-id, Unusual User Privilege Enumeration via id>> |This rule monitors for a sequence of 20 "id" command executions within 1 second by the same parent process. This behavior is unusual, and may be indicative of the execution of an enumeration script such as LinPEAS or LinEnum. These scripts leverage the "id" command to enumerate the privileges of all users present on the system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |4
 
 |<<unusual-web-request, Unusual Web Request>> |A machine learning job detected a rare and unusual URL that indicates unusual web browsing activity. This can be due to initial access, persistence, command-and-control, or exfiltration activity. For example, in a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack, when a trusted website is compromised to target a particular sector or organization, targeted users may receive emails with uncommon URLs for trusted websites. These URLs can be used to download and run a payload. When malware is already running, it may send requests to uncommon URLs on trusted websites the malware uses for command-and-control communication. When rare URLs are observed being requested for a local web server by a remote source, these can be due to web scanning, enumeration or attack traffic, or they can be due to bots and web scrapers which are part of common Internet background traffic. |[Use Case: Threat Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Command and Control] |8.3.0 |103
 
@@ -2086,33 +2092,35 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<unusual-windows-username, Unusual Windows Username>> |A machine learning job detected activity for a username that is not normally active, which can indicate unauthorized changes, activity by unauthorized users, lateral movement, or compromised credentials. In many organizations, new usernames are not often created apart from specific types of system activities, such as creating new accounts for new employees. These user accounts quickly become active and routine. Events from rarely used usernames can point to suspicious activity. Additionally, automated Linux fleets tend to see activity from rarely used usernames only when personnel log in to make authorized or unauthorized changes, or threat actors have acquired credentials and log in for malicious purposes. Unusual usernames can also indicate pivoting, where compromised credentials are used to try and move laterally from one host to another. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Initial Access] |8.3.0 |104
 
-|<<user-account-creation, User Account Creation>> |Identifies attempts to create new users. This is sometimes done by attackers to increase access or establish persistence on a system or domain. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<user-account-creation, User Account Creation>> |Identifies attempts to create new users. This is sometimes done by attackers to increase access or establish persistence on a system or domain. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
 
 |<<user-added-as-owner-for-azure-application, User Added as Owner for Azure Application>> |Identifies when a user is added as an owner for an Azure application. An adversary may add a user account as an owner for an Azure application in order to grant additional permissions and modify the application's configuration using another account. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Azure], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.3.0 |102
 
 |<<user-added-as-owner-for-azure-service-principal, User Added as Owner for Azure Service Principal>> |Identifies when a user is added as an owner for an Azure service principal. The service principal object defines what the application can do in the specific tenant, who can access the application, and what resources the app can access. A service principal object is created when an application is given permission to access resources in a tenant. An adversary may add a user account as an owner for a service principal and use that account in order to define what an application can do in the Azure AD tenant. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Azure], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.3.0 |102
 
-|<<user-added-to-privileged-group, User Added to Privileged Group>> |Identifies a user being added to a privileged group in Active Directory. Privileged accounts and groups in Active Directory are those to which powerful rights, privileges, and permissions are granted that allow them to perform nearly any action in Active Directory and on domain-joined systems. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring], [Data Source: Active Directory] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<user-added-to-privileged-group, User Added to Privileged Group>> |Identifies a user being added to a privileged group in Active Directory. Privileged accounts and groups in Active Directory are those to which powerful rights, privileges, and permissions are granted that allow them to perform nearly any action in Active Directory and on domain-joined systems. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring], [Data Source: Active Directory] |8.3.0 |109
 
-|<<user-account-exposed-to-kerberoasting, User account exposed to Kerberoasting>> |Detects when a user account has the servicePrincipalName attribute modified. Attackers can abuse write privileges over a user to configure Service Principle Names (SPNs) so that they can perform Kerberoasting. Administrators can also configure this for legitimate purposes, exposing the account to Kerberoasting. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Active Directory], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<user-account-exposed-to-kerberoasting, User account exposed to Kerberoasting>> |Detects when a user account has the servicePrincipalName attribute modified. Attackers can abuse write privileges over a user to configure Service Principle Names (SPNs) so that they can perform Kerberoasting. Administrators can also configure this for legitimate purposes, exposing the account to Kerberoasting. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Active Directory], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring] |8.3.0 |109
 
 |<<vnc-virtual-network-computing-from-the-internet, VNC (Virtual Network Computing) from the Internet>> |This rule detects network events that may indicate the use of VNC traffic from the Internet. VNC is commonly used by system administrators to remotely control a system for maintenance or to use shared resources. It should almost never be directly exposed to the Internet, as it is frequently targeted and exploited by threat actors as an initial access or backdoor vector. |[Tactic: Command and Control], [Domain: Endpoint], [Use Case: Threat Detection] |8.3.0 |104
 
 |<<vnc-virtual-network-computing-to-the-internet, VNC (Virtual Network Computing) to the Internet>> |This rule detects network events that may indicate the use of VNC traffic to the Internet. VNC is commonly used by system administrators to remotely control a system for maintenance or to use shared resources. It should almost never be directly exposed to the Internet, as it is frequently targeted and exploited by threat actors as an initial access or backdoor vector. |[Tactic: Command and Control], [Domain: Endpoint], [Use Case: Threat Detection] |8.3.0 |104
 
-|<<virtual-machine-fingerprinting, Virtual Machine Fingerprinting>> |An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware. This rule identifies common locations used to discover virtual machine hardware by a non-root user. This technique has been used by the Pupy RAT and other malware. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<veeam-backup-library-loaded-by-unusual-process, Veeam Backup Library Loaded by Unusual Process>> |Identifies potential credential decrypt operations by PowerShell or unsigned processes using the Veeam.Backup.Common.dll library. Attackers can use Veeam Credentials to target backups as part of destructive operations such as Ransomware attacks. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |1
+
+|<<virtual-machine-fingerprinting, Virtual Machine Fingerprinting>> |An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware. This rule identifies common locations used to discover virtual machine hardware by a non-root user. This technique has been used by the Pupy RAT and other malware. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<virtual-machine-fingerprinting-via-grep, Virtual Machine Fingerprinting via Grep>> |An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware. This rule identifies common locations used to discover virtual machine hardware by a non-root user. This technique has been used by the Pupy RAT and other malware. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |104
+|<<virtual-machine-fingerprinting-via-grep, Virtual Machine Fingerprinting via Grep>> |An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware. This rule identifies common locations used to discover virtual machine hardware by a non-root user. This technique has been used by the Pupy RAT and other malware. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
 
-|<<virtual-private-network-connection-attempt, Virtual Private Network Connection Attempt>> |Identifies the execution of macOS built-in commands to connect to an existing Virtual Private Network (VPN). Adversaries may use VPN connections to laterally move and control remote systems on a network. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
+|<<virtual-private-network-connection-attempt, Virtual Private Network Connection Attempt>> |Identifies the execution of macOS built-in commands to connect to an existing Virtual Private Network (VPN). Adversaries may use VPN connections to laterally move and control remote systems on a network. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<volume-shadow-copy-deleted-or-resized-via-vssadmin, Volume Shadow Copy Deleted or Resized via VssAdmin>> |Identifies use of vssadmin.exe for shadow copy deletion or resizing on endpoints. This commonly occurs in tandem with ransomware or other destructive attacks. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Impact], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<volume-shadow-copy-deleted-or-resized-via-vssadmin, Volume Shadow Copy Deleted or Resized via VssAdmin>> |Identifies use of vssadmin.exe for shadow copy deletion or resizing on endpoints. This commonly occurs in tandem with ransomware or other destructive attacks. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Impact], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
 
-|<<volume-shadow-copy-deletion-via-powershell, Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via PowerShell>> |Identifies the use of the Win32_ShadowCopy class and related cmdlets to achieve shadow copy deletion. This commonly occurs in tandem with ransomware or other destructive attacks. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Impact], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<volume-shadow-copy-deletion-via-powershell, Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via PowerShell>> |Identifies the use of the Win32_ShadowCopy class and related cmdlets to achieve shadow copy deletion. This commonly occurs in tandem with ransomware or other destructive attacks. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Impact], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
 
-|<<volume-shadow-copy-deletion-via-wmic, Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via WMIC>> |Identifies use of wmic.exe for shadow copy deletion on endpoints. This commonly occurs in tandem with ransomware or other destructive attacks. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Impact], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<volume-shadow-copy-deletion-via-wmic, Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via WMIC>> |Identifies use of wmic.exe for shadow copy deletion on endpoints. This commonly occurs in tandem with ransomware or other destructive attacks. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Impact], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
 
-|<<wmi-incoming-lateral-movement, WMI Incoming Lateral Movement>> |Identifies processes executed via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) on a remote host. This could be indicative of adversary lateral movement, but could be noisy if administrators use WMI to remotely manage hosts. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<wmi-incoming-lateral-movement, WMI Incoming Lateral Movement>> |Identifies processes executed via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) on a remote host. This could be indicative of adversary lateral movement, but could be noisy if administrators use WMI to remotely manage hosts. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |109
 
 |<<wmi-wbemtest-utility-execution, WMI WBEMTEST Utility Execution>> |Adversaries may abuse the WMI diagnostic tool, wbemtest.exe, to enumerate WMI object instances or invoke methods against local or remote endpoints. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |1
 
@@ -2120,7 +2128,7 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<wpad-service-exploit, WPAD Service Exploit>> |Identifies probable exploitation of the Web Proxy Auto-Discovery Protocol (WPAD) service. Attackers who have access to the local network or upstream DNS traffic can inject malicious JavaScript to the WPAD service which can lead to a full system compromise. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |1
 
-|<<writedac-access-on-active-directory-object, WRITEDAC Access on Active Directory Object>> |Identifies the access on an object with WRITEDAC permissions. With the WRITEDAC permission, the user can perform a Write Discretionary Access Control List (WriteDACL) operation, which is used to modify the access control rules associated with a specific object within Active Directory. Attackers may abuse this privilege to grant themselves or other compromised accounts additional rights, ultimately compromising the target object, resulting in privilege escalation, lateral movement, and persistence. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Active Directory], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |2
+|<<writedac-access-on-active-directory-object, WRITEDAC Access on Active Directory Object>> |Identifies the access on an object with WRITEDAC permissions. With the WRITEDAC permission, the user can perform a Write Discretionary Access Control List (WriteDACL) operation, which is used to modify the access control rules associated with a specific object within Active Directory. Attackers may abuse this privilege to grant themselves or other compromised accounts additional rights, ultimately compromising the target object, resulting in privilege escalation, lateral movement, and persistence. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Active Directory], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |3
 
 |<<web-application-suspicious-activity-post-request-declined, Web Application Suspicious Activity: POST Request Declined>> |A POST request to a web application returned a 403 response, which indicates the web application declined to process the request because the action requested was not allowed. |[Data Source: APM] |8.3.0 |102
 
@@ -2128,41 +2136,41 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<web-application-suspicious-activity-sqlmap-user-agent, Web Application Suspicious Activity: sqlmap User Agent>> |This is an example of how to detect an unwanted web client user agent. This search matches the user agent for sqlmap 1.3.11, which is a popular FOSS tool for testing web applications for SQL injection vulnerabilities. |[Data Source: APM] |8.3.0 |102
 
-|<<web-shell-detection-script-process-child-of-common-web-processes, Web Shell Detection: Script Process Child of Common Web Processes>> |Identifies suspicious commands executed via a web server, which may suggest a vulnerability and remote shell access. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<web-shell-detection-script-process-child-of-common-web-processes, Web Shell Detection: Script Process Child of Common Web Processes>> |Identifies suspicious commands executed via a web server, which may suggest a vulnerability and remote shell access. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
 
-|<<webproxy-settings-modification, WebProxy Settings Modification>> |Identifies the use of the built-in networksetup command to configure webproxy settings. This may indicate an attempt to hijack web browser traffic for credential access via traffic sniffing or redirection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |105
+|<<webproxy-settings-modification, WebProxy Settings Modification>> |Identifies the use of the built-in networksetup command to configure webproxy settings. This may indicate an attempt to hijack web browser traffic for credential access via traffic sniffing or redirection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106
 
-|<<webserver-access-logs-deleted, WebServer Access Logs Deleted>> |Identifies the deletion of WebServer access logs. This may indicate an attempt to evade detection or destroy forensic evidence on a system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [OS: Windows], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |104
+|<<webserver-access-logs-deleted, WebServer Access Logs Deleted>> |Identifies the deletion of WebServer access logs. This may indicate an attempt to evade detection or destroy forensic evidence on a system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [OS: Windows], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |105
 
 |<<werfault-reflectdebugger-persistence, Werfault ReflectDebugger Persistence>> |Identifies the registration of a Werfault Debugger. Attackers may abuse this mechanism to execute malicious payloads every time the utility is executed with the "-pr" parameter. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |1
 
-|<<whoami-process-activity, Whoami Process Activity>> |Identifies suspicious use of whoami.exe which displays user, group, and privileges information for the user who is currently logged on to the local system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<whoami-process-activity, Whoami Process Activity>> |Identifies suspicious use of whoami.exe which displays user, group, and privileges information for the user who is currently logged on to the local system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |110
 
 |<<windows-account-or-group-discovery, Windows Account or Group Discovery>> |This rule identifies the execution of commands that enumerates account or group information. Adversaries may use built-in applications to get a listing of local system or domain accounts and groups. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |3
 
-|<<windows-cryptoapi-spoofing-vulnerability-cve-2020-0601-curveball, Windows CryptoAPI Spoofing Vulnerability (CVE-2020-0601 - CurveBall)>> |A spoofing vulnerability exists in the way Windows CryptoAPI (Crypt32.dll) validates Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) certificates. An attacker could exploit the vulnerability by using a spoofed code-signing certificate to sign a malicious executable, making it appear the file was from a trusted, legitimate source. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Use Case: Vulnerability] |8.3.0 |103
+|<<windows-cryptoapi-spoofing-vulnerability-cve-2020-0601-curveball, Windows CryptoAPI Spoofing Vulnerability (CVE-2020-0601 - CurveBall)>> |A spoofing vulnerability exists in the way Windows CryptoAPI (Crypt32.dll) validates Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) certificates. An attacker could exploit the vulnerability by using a spoofed code-signing certificate to sign a malicious executable, making it appear the file was from a trusted, legitimate source. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Use Case: Vulnerability] |8.3.0 |104
 
-|<<windows-defender-disabled-via-registry-modification, Windows Defender Disabled via Registry Modification>> |Identifies modifications to the Windows Defender registry settings to disable the service or set the service to be started manually. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<windows-defender-disabled-via-registry-modification, Windows Defender Disabled via Registry Modification>> |Identifies modifications to the Windows Defender registry settings to disable the service or set the service to be started manually. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |110
 
-|<<windows-defender-exclusions-added-via-powershell, Windows Defender Exclusions Added via PowerShell>> |Identifies modifications to the Windows Defender configuration settings using PowerShell to add exclusions at the folder directory or process level. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<windows-defender-exclusions-added-via-powershell, Windows Defender Exclusions Added via PowerShell>> |Identifies modifications to the Windows Defender configuration settings using PowerShell to add exclusions at the folder directory or process level. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
 
 |<<windows-event-logs-cleared, Windows Event Logs Cleared>> |Identifies attempts to clear Windows event log stores. This is often done by attackers in an attempt to evade detection or destroy forensic evidence on a system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<windows-firewall-disabled-via-powershell, Windows Firewall Disabled via PowerShell>> |Identifies when the Windows Firewall is disabled using PowerShell cmdlets, which can help attackers evade network constraints, like internet and network lateral communication restrictions. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |108
+|<<windows-firewall-disabled-via-powershell, Windows Firewall Disabled via PowerShell>> |Identifies when the Windows Firewall is disabled using PowerShell cmdlets, which can help attackers evade network constraints, like internet and network lateral communication restrictions. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
 
 |<<windows-installer-with-suspicious-properties, Windows Installer with Suspicious Properties>> |Identifies the execution of an installer from an archive or with suspicious properties. Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to launch local or network accessible MSI files in an attempt to bypass application whitelisting. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |1
 
-|<<windows-network-enumeration, Windows Network Enumeration>> |Identifies attempts to enumerate hosts in a network using the built-in Windows net.exe tool. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Tactic: Collection], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<windows-network-enumeration, Windows Network Enumeration>> |Identifies attempts to enumerate hosts in a network using the built-in Windows net.exe tool. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Tactic: Collection], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |110
 
 |<<windows-registry-file-creation-in-smb-share, Windows Registry File Creation in SMB Share>> |Identifies the creation or modification of a medium-size registry hive file on a Server Message Block (SMB) share, which may indicate an exfiltration attempt of a previously dumped Security Account Manager (SAM) registry hive for credential extraction on an attacker-controlled system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
 
-|<<windows-script-executing-powershell, Windows Script Executing PowerShell>> |Identifies a PowerShell process launched by either cscript.exe or wscript.exe. Observing Windows scripting processes executing a PowerShell script, may be indicative of malicious activity. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |109
+|<<windows-script-executing-powershell, Windows Script Executing PowerShell>> |Identifies a PowerShell process launched by either cscript.exe or wscript.exe. Observing Windows scripting processes executing a PowerShell script, may be indicative of malicious activity. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Tactic: Execution], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |110
 
-|<<windows-script-interpreter-executing-process-via-wmi, Windows Script Interpreter Executing Process via WMI>> |Identifies use of the built-in Windows script interpreters (cscript.exe or wscript.exe) being used to execute a process via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). This may be indicative of malicious activity. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<windows-script-interpreter-executing-process-via-wmi, Windows Script Interpreter Executing Process via WMI>> |Identifies use of the built-in Windows script interpreters (cscript.exe or wscript.exe) being used to execute a process via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). This may be indicative of malicious activity. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<windows-service-installed-via-an-unusual-client, Windows Service Installed via an Unusual Client>> |Identifies the creation of a Windows service by an unusual client process. Services may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to SYSTEM. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation] |8.3.0 |107
+|<<windows-service-installed-via-an-unusual-client, Windows Service Installed via an Unusual Client>> |Identifies the creation of a Windows service by an unusual client process. Services may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to SYSTEM. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation] |8.3.0 |108
 
-|<<windows-subsystem-for-linux-distribution-installed, Windows Subsystem for Linux Distribution Installed>> |Detects changes to the registry that indicates the install of a new Windows Subsystem for Linux distribution by name. Adversaries may enable and use WSL for Linux to avoid detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |5
+|<<windows-subsystem-for-linux-distribution-installed, Windows Subsystem for Linux Distribution Installed>> |Detects changes to the registry that indicates the install of a new Windows Subsystem for Linux distribution by name. Adversaries may enable and use WSL for Linux to avoid detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |8.3.0 |6
 
 |<<windows-subsystem-for-linux-enabled-via-dism-utility, Windows Subsystem for Linux Enabled via Dism Utility>> |Detects attempts to enable the Windows Subsystem for Linux using Microsoft Dism utility. Adversaries may enable and use WSL for Linux to avoid detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |6
 
@@ -2174,6 +2182,6 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<wireless-credential-dumping-using-netsh-command, Wireless Credential Dumping using Netsh Command>> |Identifies attempts to dump Wireless saved access keys in clear text using the Windows built-in utility Netsh. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Tactic: Discovery], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |7
 
-|<<zoom-meeting-with-no-passcode, Zoom Meeting with no Passcode>> |This rule identifies Zoom meetings that are created without a passcode. Meetings without a passcode are susceptible to Zoombombing. Zoombombing is carried out by taking advantage of Zoom sessions that are not protected with a passcode. Zoombombing refers to the unwanted, disruptive intrusion, generally by Internet trolls and hackers, into a video conference call. In a typical Zoombombing incident, a teleconferencing session is hijacked by the insertion of material that is lewd, obscene, racist, or antisemitic in nature, typically resulting of the shutdown of the session. |[Data Source: Zoom], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Initial Access] |8.3.0 |102
+|<<zoom-meeting-with-no-passcode, Zoom Meeting with no Passcode>> |This rule identifies Zoom meetings that are created without a passcode. Meetings without a passcode are susceptible to Zoombombing. Zoombombing is carried out by taking advantage of Zoom sessions that are not protected with a passcode. Zoombombing refers to the unwanted, disruptive intrusion, generally by Internet trolls and hackers, into a video conference call. In a typical Zoombombing incident, a teleconferencing session is hijacked by the insertion of material that is lewd, obscene, racist, or antisemitic in nature, typically resulting of the shutdown of the session. |[Data Source: Zoom], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Initial Access] |8.3.0 |103
 
 |==============================================
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-desc-index.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-desc-index.asciidoc
index fd5aac62d2..3833d022ab 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-desc-index.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-desc-index.asciidoc
@@ -201,6 +201,7 @@ include::rule-details/default-cobalt-strike-team-server-certificate.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/delayed-execution-via-ping.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/delete-volume-usn-journal-with-fsutil.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/deleting-backup-catalogs-with-wbadmin.asciidoc[]
+include::rule-details/deprecated-remote-file-creation-on-a-sensitive-directory.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/direct-outbound-smb-connection.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/disable-windows-event-and-security-logs-using-built-in-tools.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/disable-windows-firewall-rules-via-netsh.asciidoc[]
@@ -492,6 +493,7 @@ include::rule-details/netcat-listener-established-via-rlwrap.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/netsh-helper-dll.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/network-activity-detected-via-kworker.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/network-activity-detected-via-cat.asciidoc[]
+include::rule-details/network-connection-from-binary-with-rwx-memory-region.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/network-connection-via-certutil.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/network-connection-via-compiled-html-file.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/network-connection-via-msxsl.asciidoc[]
@@ -602,7 +604,6 @@ include::rule-details/potential-linux-credential-dumping-via-unshadow.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/potential-linux-hack-tool-launched.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/potential-linux-local-account-brute-force-detected.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/potential-linux-ransomware-note-creation-detected.asciidoc[]
-include::rule-details/potential-linux-reverse-connection-through-port-knocking.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/potential-linux-ssh-x11-forwarding.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/potential-linux-tunneling-and-or-port-forwarding.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/potential-local-ntlm-relay-via-http.asciidoc[]
@@ -689,6 +690,7 @@ include::rule-details/potential-suspicious-debugfs-root-device-access.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/potential-suspicious-file-edit.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/potential-unauthorized-access-via-wildcard-injection-detected.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/potential-upgrade-of-non-interactive-shell.asciidoc[]
+include::rule-details/potential-veeam-credential-access-command.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/potential-windows-error-manager-masquerading.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/potential-curl-cve-2023-38545-exploitation.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/potential-macos-ssh-brute-force-detected.asciidoc[]
@@ -709,6 +711,7 @@ include::rule-details/powershell-script-with-log-clear-capabilities.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/powershell-script-with-password-policy-discovery-capabilities.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/powershell-script-with-remote-execution-capabilities-via-winrm.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/powershell-script-with-token-impersonation-capabilities.asciidoc[]
+include::rule-details/powershell-script-with-veeam-credential-access-capabilities.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/powershell-script-with-webcam-video-capture-capabilities.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/powershell-share-enumeration-script.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/powershell-suspicious-discovery-related-windows-api-functions.asciidoc[]
@@ -761,7 +764,6 @@ include::rule-details/remote-desktop-enabled-in-windows-firewall-by-netsh.asciid
 include::rule-details/remote-execution-via-file-shares.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/remote-file-copy-to-a-hidden-share.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/remote-file-copy-via-teamviewer.asciidoc[]
-include::rule-details/remote-file-creation-on-a-sensitive-directory.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/remote-file-download-via-desktopimgdownldr-utility.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/remote-file-download-via-mpcmdrun.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/remote-file-download-via-powershell.asciidoc[]
@@ -946,7 +948,7 @@ include::rule-details/systemkey-access-via-command-line.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/tcc-bypass-via-mounted-apfs-snapshot-access.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/tainted-kernel-module-load.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/tainted-out-of-tree-kernel-module-load.asciidoc[]
-include::rule-details/tampering-of-bash-command-line-history.asciidoc[]
+include::rule-details/tampering-of-shell-command-line-history.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/temporarily-scheduled-task-creation.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/third-party-backup-files-deleted-via-unexpected-process.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/threat-intel-hash-indicator-match.asciidoc[]
@@ -967,6 +969,7 @@ include::rule-details/unauthorized-access-to-an-okta-application.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/uncommon-registry-persistence-change.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/unexpected-child-process-of-macos-screensaver-engine.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/unix-socket-connection.asciidoc[]
+include::rule-details/unknown-execution-of-binary-with-rwx-memory-region.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/unsigned-bits-service-client-process.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/unsigned-dll-loaded-by-svchost.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/unsigned-dll-loaded-by-a-trusted-process.asciidoc[]
@@ -1041,6 +1044,7 @@ include::rule-details/user-added-to-privileged-group.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/user-account-exposed-to-kerberoasting.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/vnc-virtual-network-computing-from-the-internet.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/vnc-virtual-network-computing-to-the-internet.asciidoc[]
+include::rule-details/veeam-backup-library-loaded-by-unusual-process.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/virtual-machine-fingerprinting.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/virtual-machine-fingerprinting-via-grep.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/virtual-private-network-connection-attempt.asciidoc[]
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/abnormal-process-id-or-lock-file-created.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/abnormal-process-id-or-lock-file-created.asciidoc
index f0f199cb4f..723ba62336 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/abnormal-process-id-or-lock-file-created.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/abnormal-process-id-or-lock-file-created.asciidoc
@@ -101,11 +101,13 @@ This rule identifies the creation of PID, lock, or reboot files in the /var/run/
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -136,7 +138,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/access-of-stored-browser-credentials.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/access-of-stored-browser-credentials.asciidoc
index aa7c5e5adf..74a957cbbe 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/access-of-stored-browser-credentials.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/access-of-stored-browser-credentials.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Identifies the execution of a process with arguments pointing to known browser f
 * Tactic: Credential Access
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ Identifies the execution of a process with arguments pointing to known browser f
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,7 +77,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/access-to-a-sensitive-ldap-attribute.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/access-to-a-sensitive-ldap-attribute.asciidoc
index 827652df71..438f8f4359 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/access-to-a-sensitive-ldap-attribute.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/access-to-a-sensitive-ldap-attribute.asciidoc
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Identify access to sensitive Active Directory object attributes that contains cr
 * Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring
 * Data Source: Active Directory
 
-*Version*: 9
+*Version*: 10
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -50,6 +50,9 @@ Identify access to sensitive Active Directory object attributes that contains cr
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 The 'Audit Directory Service Access' logging policy must be configured for (Success, Failure).
 Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/access-to-keychain-credentials-directories.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/access-to-keychain-credentials-directories.asciidoc
index 56a52a7d4e..5b7cfc7a89 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/access-to-keychain-credentials-directories.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/access-to-keychain-credentials-directories.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Adversaries may collect the keychain storage data from a system to acquire crede
 * Tactic: Credential Access
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ Adversaries may collect the keychain storage data from a system to acquire crede
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -75,7 +78,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/account-discovery-command-via-system-account.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/account-discovery-command-via-system-account.asciidoc
index c7c96dc25a..4d6a3646c2 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/account-discovery-command-via-system-account.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/account-discovery-command-via-system-account.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies when the SYSTEM account uses an account discovery utility. This could
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: low
 
@@ -32,8 +32,9 @@ Identifies when the SYSTEM account uses an account discovery utility. This could
 * Tactic: Privilege Escalation
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -85,11 +86,13 @@ This rule looks for the execution of account discovery utilities using the SYSTE
 - Use the data collected through the analysis to investigate other machines affected in the environment.
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/account-or-group-discovery-via-built-in-tools.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/account-or-group-discovery-via-built-in-tools.asciidoc
index 05d44545eb..a3fe5ae5b2 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/account-or-group-discovery-via-built-in-tools.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/account-or-group-discovery-via-built-in-tools.asciidoc
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ Adversaries may use built-in applications to get a listing of local system or do
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started") and event.type == "start" and ( 
+process where event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started") and ( 
   (process.name in ("groups", "id")) or 
   (process.name == "dscl" and process.args : ("/Active Directory/*", "/Users*", "/Groups*")) or
   (process.name == "dscacheutil" and process.args in ("user", "group")) or
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/account-password-reset-remotely.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/account-password-reset-remotely.asciidoc
index 8aba29e5af..99b2aa601d 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/account-password-reset-remotely.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/account-password-reset-remotely.asciidoc
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Identifies an attempt to reset a potentially privileged account password remotel
 * Tactic: Persistence
 * Tactic: Impact
 
-*Version*: 110
+*Version*: 112
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/adfind-command-activity.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/adfind-command-activity.asciidoc
index 3877bb8b45..551d0924d1 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/adfind-command-activity.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/adfind-command-activity.asciidoc
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ This rule detects the Active Directory query tool, AdFind.exe. AdFind has legiti
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -102,11 +102,13 @@ http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/[AdFind] is a freely available com
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/adminsdholder-sdprop-exclusion-added.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/adminsdholder-sdprop-exclusion-added.asciidoc
index 584904f841..1427d3a97c 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/adminsdholder-sdprop-exclusion-added.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/adminsdholder-sdprop-exclusion-added.asciidoc
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Identifies a modification on the dsHeuristics attribute on the bit that holds th
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -96,11 +96,13 @@ This rule matches changes of the dsHeuristics object where the 16th bit is set t
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 The 'Audit Directory Service Changes' logging policy must be configured for (Success).
 Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/adobe-hijack-persistence.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/adobe-hijack-persistence.asciidoc
index 8804016e91..c6e1ed8e09 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/adobe-hijack-persistence.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/adobe-hijack-persistence.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Detects writing executable files that will be automatically launched by Adobe on
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: low
@@ -35,8 +35,9 @@ Detects writing executable files that will be automatically launched by Adobe on
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -108,10 +109,11 @@ Attackers can replace the `RdrCEF.exe` executable with their own to maintain the
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
+==== Setup
 
 
-==== Setup
 
+*Setup*
 
 
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/apple-script-execution-followed-by-network-connection.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/apple-script-execution-followed-by-network-connection.asciidoc
index 45ef109075..31c33c4b3b 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/apple-script-execution-followed-by-network-connection.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/apple-script-execution-followed-by-network-connection.asciidoc
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Detects execution via the Apple script interpreter (osascript) followed by a net
 * Tactic: Execution
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ Detects execution via the Apple script interpreter (osascript) followed by a net
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -76,7 +79,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/apple-scripting-execution-with-administrator-privileges.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/apple-scripting-execution-with-administrator-privileges.asciidoc
index 0946e7f87a..a2f7317cff 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/apple-scripting-execution-with-administrator-privileges.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/apple-scripting-execution-with-administrator-privileges.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Identifies execution of the Apple script interpreter (osascript) without a passw
 * Tactic: Privilege Escalation
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ Identifies execution of the Apple script interpreter (osascript) without a passw
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -75,7 +78,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempt-to-clear-kernel-ring-buffer.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempt-to-clear-kernel-ring-buffer.asciidoc
index 4d751c4e94..a14b6de570 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempt-to-clear-kernel-ring-buffer.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempt-to-clear-kernel-ring-buffer.asciidoc
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Monitors for the deletion of the kernel ring buffer events through dmesg. Attack
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Auditd Manager
 
-*Version*: 3
+*Version*: 4
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ Monitors for the deletion of the kernel ring buffer events through dmesg. Attack
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -77,14 +80,13 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started") and
-event.type == "start" and process.name == "dmesg" and process.args == "-c"
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and process.name == "dmesg" and process.args == "-c"
 
 ----------------------------------
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempt-to-disable-gatekeeper.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempt-to-disable-gatekeeper.asciidoc
index a85585f09b..e76bce00e8 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempt-to-disable-gatekeeper.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempt-to-disable-gatekeeper.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Detects attempts to disable Gatekeeper on macOS. Gatekeeper is a security featur
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ Detects attempts to disable Gatekeeper on macOS. Gatekeeper is a security featur
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -75,7 +78,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempt-to-disable-iptables-or-firewall.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempt-to-disable-iptables-or-firewall.asciidoc
index c47623f239..9e4ace867c 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempt-to-disable-iptables-or-firewall.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempt-to-disable-iptables-or-firewall.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Adversaries may attempt to disable the iptables or firewall service in an attemp
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 
-*Version*: 6
+*Version*: 7
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ Adversaries may attempt to disable the iptables or firewall service in an attemp
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,7 +77,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempt-to-disable-syslog-service.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempt-to-disable-syslog-service.asciidoc
index 45508dfc38..2b01d0d1e9 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempt-to-disable-syslog-service.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempt-to-disable-syslog-service.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Adversaries may attempt to disable the syslog service in an attempt to an attemp
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ Adversaries may attempt to disable the syslog service in an attempt to an attemp
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
 - Elastic Defend
 - Auditbeat
@@ -91,7 +94,6 @@ Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit
 - For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempt-to-enable-the-root-account.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempt-to-enable-the-root-account.asciidoc
index 69b9f3c349..cdadef7731 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempt-to-enable-the-root-account.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempt-to-enable-the-root-account.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Identifies attempts to enable the root account using the dsenableroot command. T
 * Tactic: Persistence
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ Identifies attempts to enable the root account using the dsenableroot command. T
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,7 +77,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempt-to-install-root-certificate.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempt-to-install-root-certificate.asciidoc
index 4b15dd3970..4d9b50dbef 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempt-to-install-root-certificate.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempt-to-install-root-certificate.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warn
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warn
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,7 +77,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempt-to-mount-smb-share-via-command-line.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempt-to-mount-smb-share-via-command-line.asciidoc
index 515f89eedf..f585b736cf 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempt-to-mount-smb-share-via-command-line.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempt-to-mount-smb-share-via-command-line.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Identifies the execution of macOS built-in commands to mount a Server Message Bl
 * Tactic: Lateral Movement
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ Identifies the execution of macOS built-in commands to mount a Server Message Bl
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -75,7 +78,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempt-to-remove-file-quarantine-attribute.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempt-to-remove-file-quarantine-attribute.asciidoc
index 867da82250..c6a9e087a9 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempt-to-remove-file-quarantine-attribute.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempt-to-remove-file-quarantine-attribute.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Identifies a potential Gatekeeper bypass. In macOS, when applications or program
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ Identifies a potential Gatekeeper bypass. In macOS, when applications or program
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -75,7 +78,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempt-to-unload-elastic-endpoint-security-kernel-extension.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempt-to-unload-elastic-endpoint-security-kernel-extension.asciidoc
index 672efb4e38..1365169d02 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempt-to-unload-elastic-endpoint-security-kernel-extension.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempt-to-unload-elastic-endpoint-security-kernel-extension.asciidoc
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Identifies attempts to unload the Elastic Endpoint Security kernel extension via
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ Identifies attempts to unload the Elastic Endpoint Security kernel extension via
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -72,7 +75,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempts-to-brute-force-a-microsoft-365-user-account.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempts-to-brute-force-a-microsoft-365-user-account.asciidoc
index 2b0de922ac..3bf2280836 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempts-to-brute-force-a-microsoft-365-user-account.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempts-to-brute-force-a-microsoft-365-user-account.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Identifies attempts to brute force a Microsoft 365 user account. An adversary ma
 * Use Case: Identity and Access Audit
 * Tactic: Credential Access
 
-*Version*: 104
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/authorization-plugin-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/authorization-plugin-modification.asciidoc
index 2025d21c25..5ba7c83bd0 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/authorization-plugin-modification.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/authorization-plugin-modification.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Authorization plugins are used to extend the authorization services API and impl
 * Tactic: Persistence
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ Authorization plugins are used to extend the authorization services API and impl
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -75,7 +78,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-route-table-created.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-route-table-created.asciidoc
index cf4eb40ca7..986f20fc1b 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-route-table-created.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-route-table-created.asciidoc
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Identifies when an AWS Route Table has been created.
 * Use Case: Network Security Monitoring
 * Tactic: Persistence
 
-*Version*: 205
+*Version*: 206
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ The AWS Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is requ
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-event.dataset:aws.cloudtrail and event.provider:cloudtrail.amazonaws.com and event.action:(CreateRoute or CreateRouteTable) and
+event.dataset:aws.cloudtrail and event.provider:ec2.amazonaws.com and event.action:(CreateRoute or CreateRouteTable) and
 event.outcome:success
 
 ----------------------------------
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-route-table-modified-or-deleted.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-route-table-modified-or-deleted.asciidoc
index de65d17e38..eaf2e9162f 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-route-table-modified-or-deleted.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-route-table-modified-or-deleted.asciidoc
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ Identifies when an AWS Route Table has been modified or deleted.
 * Use Case: Network Security Monitoring
 * Tactic: Persistence
 
-*Version*: 205
+*Version*: 206
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ The AWS Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is requ
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-event.dataset:aws.cloudtrail and event.provider:cloudtrail.amazonaws.com and event.action:(ReplaceRoute or ReplaceRouteTableAssociation or
+event.dataset:aws.cloudtrail and event.provider:ec2.amazonaws.com and event.action:(ReplaceRoute or ReplaceRouteTableAssociation or
 DeleteRouteTable or DeleteRoute or DisassociateRouteTable) and event.outcome:success
 
 ----------------------------------
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/base16-or-base32-encoding-decoding-activity.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/base16-or-base32-encoding-decoding-activity.asciidoc
index 9e076681d2..38e7f73a4d 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/base16-or-base32-encoding-decoding-activity.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/base16-or-base32-encoding-decoding-activity.asciidoc
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Adversaries may encode/decode data in an attempt to evade detection by host- or
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 * Data Source: Auditd Manager
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ Adversaries may encode/decode data in an attempt to evade detection by host- or
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
 - Elastic Defend
 - Auditbeat
@@ -93,14 +96,13 @@ Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit
 - For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started") and
-event.type == "start" and process.name in ("base16", "base32", "base32plain", "base32hex") and
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and process.name in ("base16", "base32", "base32plain", "base32hex") and
 not process.args in ("--help", "--version")
 
 ----------------------------------
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/binary-executed-from-shared-memory-directory.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/binary-executed-from-shared-memory-directory.asciidoc
index 35a2d8cb79..0bd9b799c5 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/binary-executed-from-shared-memory-directory.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/binary-executed-from-shared-memory-directory.asciidoc
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Identifies the execution of a binary by root in Linux shared memory directories:
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ Identifies the execution of a binary by root in Linux shared memory directories:
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -79,7 +82,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/bpf-filter-applied-using-tc.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/bpf-filter-applied-using-tc.asciidoc
index efceb72a0b..3af50692db 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/bpf-filter-applied-using-tc.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/bpf-filter-applied-using-tc.asciidoc
@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@ Detects when the tc (transmission control) binary is utilized to set a BPF (Berk
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -78,7 +81,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/bypass-uac-via-event-viewer.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/bypass-uac-via-event-viewer.asciidoc
index 4e53153f12..afa309a7b9 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/bypass-uac-via-event-viewer.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/bypass-uac-via-event-viewer.asciidoc
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Identifies User Account Control (UAC) bypass via eventvwr.exe. Attackers bypass
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 110
+*Version*: 111
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -113,11 +113,13 @@ During startup, `eventvwr.exe` checks the registry value of the `HKCU\Software\C
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/cap-sys-admin-assigned-to-binary.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/cap-sys-admin-assigned-to-binary.asciidoc
index cb52866b5f..aa802491e7 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/cap-sys-admin-assigned-to-binary.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/cap-sys-admin-assigned-to-binary.asciidoc
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ Identifies instances where a binary is granted the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability. In
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 * Rule Type: BBR
 
-*Version*: 1
+*Version*: 2
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -43,6 +43,10 @@ Identifies instances where a binary is granted the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability. In
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -73,13 +77,12 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-event.category:"process" and host.os.type:"linux" and event.action:"exec" and event.type:"start" and process.name:* and
+event.category:"process" and host.os.type:"linux" and event.type:"start" and event.action:"exec" and process.name:* and
 (process.thread.capabilities.effective:"CAP_SYS_ADMIN" or process.thread.capabilities.permitted:"CAP_SYS_ADMIN") and
 not user.id:"0"
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/chkconfig-service-add.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/chkconfig-service-add.asciidoc
index 2d777eb8f4..d0e9bf9a5f 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/chkconfig-service-add.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/chkconfig-service-add.asciidoc
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Detects the use of the chkconfig binary to manually add a service for management
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 110
+*Version*: 111
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -138,6 +138,9 @@ This rule monitors the usage of the `chkconfig` binary to manually add a service
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -168,7 +171,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/clearing-windows-console-history.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/clearing-windows-console-history.asciidoc
index 42a385a7af..6a1fdcdf81 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/clearing-windows-console-history.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/clearing-windows-console-history.asciidoc
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ Identifies when a user attempts to clear console history. An adversary may clear
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -94,11 +94,13 @@ Attackers can try to cover their tracks by clearing PowerShell console history.
   - Ensure that PowerShell auditing policies and log collection are in place to grant future visibility.
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/clearing-windows-event-logs.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/clearing-windows-event-logs.asciidoc
index 1571fc5dcb..15361ff24d 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/clearing-windows-event-logs.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/clearing-windows-event-logs.asciidoc
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Identifies attempts to clear or disable Windows event log stores using Windows w
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 110
+*Version*: 111
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -90,11 +90,13 @@ This rule looks for the execution of the `wevtutil.exe` utility or the `Clear-Ev
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/code-signing-policy-modification-through-registry.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/code-signing-policy-modification-through-registry.asciidoc
index bb0166e16b..8cdc987349 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/code-signing-policy-modification-through-registry.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/code-signing-policy-modification-through-registry.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies attempts to disable the code signing policy through the registry. Cod
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
@@ -33,8 +33,9 @@ Identifies attempts to disable the code signing policy through the registry. Cod
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 7
+*Version*: 8
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -114,7 +115,11 @@ This rule identifies registry modifications that can disable DSE.
 ----------------------------------
 registry where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type : ("creation", "change") and
 (
-  registry.path : "HKEY_USERS\\*\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\Driver Signing\\BehaviorOnFailedVerify" and
+  registry.path : (
+    "HKEY_USERS\\*\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\Driver Signing\\BehaviorOnFailedVerify",
+    "HKU\\*\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\Driver Signing\\BehaviorOnFailedVerify",
+    "\\REGISTRY\\USER\\*\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\Driver Signing\\BehaviorOnFailedVerify"
+  ) and
   registry.value: "BehaviorOnFailedVerify" and
   registry.data.strings : ("0", "0x00000000", "1", "0x00000001")
 )
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/command-execution-via-solarwinds-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/command-execution-via-solarwinds-process.asciidoc
index 5cdc1ae891..f264682ad3 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/command-execution-via-solarwinds-process.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/command-execution-via-solarwinds-process.asciidoc
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ A suspicious SolarWinds child process (Cmd.exe or Powershell.exe) was detected.
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -51,6 +51,9 @@ A suspicious SolarWinds child process (Cmd.exe or Powershell.exe) was detected.
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/command-prompt-network-connection.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/command-prompt-network-connection.asciidoc
index 995f1d0396..dc2fc0d4bc 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/command-prompt-network-connection.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/command-prompt-network-connection.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies cmd.exe making a network connection. Adversaries could abuse cmd.exe
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: low
 
@@ -33,8 +33,9 @@ Identifies cmd.exe making a network connection. Adversaries could abuse cmd.exe
 * Tactic: Execution
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/command-shell-activity-started-via-rundll32.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/command-shell-activity-started-via-rundll32.asciidoc
index caae6cfb6f..afd5b18d86 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/command-shell-activity-started-via-rundll32.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/command-shell-activity-started-via-rundll32.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies command shell activity started via RunDLL32, which is commonly abused
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: low
@@ -34,8 +34,9 @@ Identifies command shell activity started via RunDLL32, which is commonly abused
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -48,6 +49,9 @@ Identifies command shell activity started via RunDLL32, which is commonly abused
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/component-object-model-hijacking.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/component-object-model-hijacking.asciidoc
index 07478c7499..08ad5977bf 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/component-object-model-hijacking.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/component-object-model-hijacking.asciidoc
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Identifies Component Object Model (COM) hijacking via registry modification. Adv
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 110
+*Version*: 111
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -99,10 +99,11 @@ Adversaries can insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimat
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
+==== Setup
 
 
-==== Setup
 
+*Setup*
 
 
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/conhost-spawned-by-suspicious-parent-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/conhost-spawned-by-suspicious-parent-process.asciidoc
index c68e105da8..5e60eb08ef 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/conhost-spawned-by-suspicious-parent-process.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/conhost-spawned-by-suspicious-parent-process.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Detects when the Console Window Host (conhost.exe) process is spawned by a suspi
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: high
@@ -37,8 +37,9 @@ Detects when the Console Window Host (conhost.exe) process is spawned by a suspi
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -111,11 +112,13 @@ Attackers often rely on custom shell implementations to avoid using built-in com
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/connection-to-commonly-abused-free-ssl-certificate-providers.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/connection-to-commonly-abused-free-ssl-certificate-providers.asciidoc
index de8c7a4b7c..49d54b3545 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/connection-to-commonly-abused-free-ssl-certificate-providers.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/connection-to-commonly-abused-free-ssl-certificate-providers.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies unusual processes connecting to domains using known free SSL certific
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: low
 
@@ -30,8 +30,9 @@ Identifies unusual processes connecting to domains using known free SSL certific
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Command and Control
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +45,9 @@ Identifies unusual processes connecting to domains using known free SSL certific
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/connection-to-external-network-via-telnet.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/connection-to-external-network-via-telnet.asciidoc
index c33e70b141..4e65b0fcbb 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/connection-to-external-network-via-telnet.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/connection-to-external-network-via-telnet.asciidoc
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ Telnet provides a command line interface for communication with a remote device
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
 - Elastic Defend
 - Auditbeat
@@ -90,7 +93,6 @@ Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit
 - For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/connection-to-internal-network-via-telnet.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/connection-to-internal-network-via-telnet.asciidoc
index d606cb09d0..3a5179d833 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/connection-to-internal-network-via-telnet.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/connection-to-internal-network-via-telnet.asciidoc
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ Telnet provides a command line interface for communication with a remote device
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
 - Elastic Defend
 - Auditbeat
@@ -90,7 +93,6 @@ Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit
 - For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/control-panel-process-with-unusual-arguments.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/control-panel-process-with-unusual-arguments.asciidoc
index 7d65300e38..57a3bec3b9 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/control-panel-process-with-unusual-arguments.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/control-panel-process-with-unusual-arguments.asciidoc
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Identifies unusual instances of Control Panel with suspicious keywords or paths
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -50,6 +50,9 @@ Identifies unusual instances of Control Panel with suspicious keywords or paths
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/creation-of-a-hidden-local-user-account.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/creation-of-a-hidden-local-user-account.asciidoc
index f11df7ed44..07a5b5efa0 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/creation-of-a-hidden-local-user-account.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/creation-of-a-hidden-local-user-account.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies the creation of a hidden local user account by appending the dollar s
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: high
@@ -36,8 +36,9 @@ Identifies the creation of a hidden local user account by appending the dollar s
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -87,11 +88,13 @@ This rule uses registry events to identify the creation of local hidden accounts
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/creation-of-hidden-files-and-directories-via-commandline.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/creation-of-hidden-files-and-directories-via-commandline.asciidoc
index 279692449e..a2baa22334 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/creation-of-hidden-files-and-directories-via-commandline.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/creation-of-hidden-files-and-directories-via-commandline.asciidoc
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Users can mark specific files as hidden simply by putting a "." as the first cha
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ Users can mark specific files as hidden simply by putting a "." as the first cha
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
 - Elastic Defend
 - Auditbeat
@@ -93,7 +96,6 @@ Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit
 For versions <8.2, you need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate `event.ingested` with @timestamp for non-elastic-agent indexes, like auditbeats/filebeat/winlogbeat etc. For more details to add a custom ingest pipeline refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html[guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/creation-of-hidden-launch-agent-or-daemon.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/creation-of-hidden-launch-agent-or-daemon.asciidoc
index 20dbc300da..c70981f0c1 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/creation-of-hidden-launch-agent-or-daemon.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/creation-of-hidden-launch-agent-or-daemon.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Identifies the creation of a hidden launch agent or daemon. An adversary may est
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ Identifies the creation of a hidden launch agent or daemon. An adversary may est
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -75,7 +78,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/creation-of-hidden-login-item-via-apple-script.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/creation-of-hidden-login-item-via-apple-script.asciidoc
index ab340f9895..24511de289 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/creation-of-hidden-login-item-via-apple-script.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/creation-of-hidden-login-item-via-apple-script.asciidoc
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ Identifies the execution of osascript to create a hidden login item. This may in
 * Tactic: Execution
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ Identifies the execution of osascript to create a hidden login item. This may in
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -73,7 +76,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/creation-of-hidden-shared-object-file.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/creation-of-hidden-shared-object-file.asciidoc
index dc26b21fbd..78fcebc35c 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/creation-of-hidden-shared-object-file.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/creation-of-hidden-shared-object-file.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Identifies the creation of a hidden shared object (.so) file. Users can mark spe
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ Identifies the creation of a hidden shared object (.so) file. Users can mark spe
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
 - Elastic Defend
 - Auditbeat
@@ -96,7 +99,6 @@ Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit
 For versions <8.2, you need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate `event.ingested` with @timestamp for non-elastic-agent indexes, like auditbeats/filebeat/winlogbeat etc. For more details to add a custom ingest pipeline refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html[guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/creation-or-modification-of-a-new-gpo-scheduled-task-or-service.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/creation-or-modification-of-a-new-gpo-scheduled-task-or-service.asciidoc
index 96c20bef91..3e48acdfba 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/creation-or-modification-of-a-new-gpo-scheduled-task-or-service.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/creation-or-modification-of-a-new-gpo-scheduled-task-or-service.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Detects the creation or modification of a new Group Policy based scheduled task
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: low
@@ -33,8 +33,9 @@ Detects the creation or modification of a new Group Policy based scheduled task
 * Tactic: Persistence
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -47,6 +48,9 @@ Detects the creation or modification of a new Group Policy based scheduled task
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/creation-or-modification-of-domain-backup-dpapi-private-key.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/creation-or-modification-of-domain-backup-dpapi-private-key.asciidoc
index fe49d272fa..68e450f29b 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/creation-or-modification-of-domain-backup-dpapi-private-key.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/creation-or-modification-of-domain-backup-dpapi-private-key.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies the creation or modification of Domain Backup private keys. Adversari
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: high
@@ -35,8 +35,9 @@ Identifies the creation or modification of Domain Backup private keys. Adversari
 * Tactic: Credential Access
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -55,11 +56,13 @@ Identifies the creation or modification of Domain Backup private keys. Adversari
 Domain DPAPI Backup keys are stored on domain controllers and can be dumped remotely with tools such as Mimikatz. The resulting .pvk private key can be used to decrypt ANY domain user masterkeys, which then can be used to decrypt any secrets protected by those keys.
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/creation-or-modification-of-root-certificate.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/creation-or-modification-of-root-certificate.asciidoc
index cc032effeb..9ac6e0e303 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/creation-or-modification-of-root-certificate.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/creation-or-modification-of-root-certificate.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies the creation or modification of a local trusted root certificate in W
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: low
@@ -36,8 +36,9 @@ Identifies the creation or modification of a local trusted root certificate in W
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -105,11 +106,13 @@ This rule identifies the creation or modification of a root certificate by monit
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/credential-acquisition-via-registry-hive-dumping.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/credential-acquisition-via-registry-hive-dumping.asciidoc
index 75262db7d1..e2adc673de 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/credential-acquisition-via-registry-hive-dumping.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/credential-acquisition-via-registry-hive-dumping.asciidoc
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ Identifies attempts to export a registry hive which may contain credentials usin
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -102,11 +102,13 @@ This rule identifies the usage of `reg.exe` to dump SECURITY and/or SAM hives, w
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/cron-job-created-or-changed-by-previously-unknown-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/cron-job-created-or-changed-by-previously-unknown-process.asciidoc
index 8797e0ba67..eb5cba29ad 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/cron-job-created-or-changed-by-previously-unknown-process.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/cron-job-created-or-changed-by-previously-unknown-process.asciidoc
@@ -134,6 +134,9 @@ This rule monitors the creation of previously unknown cron jobs by monitoring fo
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -164,7 +167,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/deleting-backup-catalogs-with-wbadmin.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/deleting-backup-catalogs-with-wbadmin.asciidoc
index b3cda04ef8..7cc5565c6c 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/deleting-backup-catalogs-with-wbadmin.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/deleting-backup-catalogs-with-wbadmin.asciidoc
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Identifies use of the wbadmin.exe to delete the backup catalog. Ransomware and o
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -99,11 +99,13 @@ This rule identifies the deletion of the backup catalog using the `wbadmin.exe`
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/deprecated-remote-file-creation-on-a-sensitive-directory.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/deprecated-remote-file-creation-on-a-sensitive-directory.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4134c6bbfc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/deprecated-remote-file-creation-on-a-sensitive-directory.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+[[deprecated-remote-file-creation-on-a-sensitive-directory]]
+=== Deprecated - Remote File Creation on a Sensitive Directory
+
+Discovery of files created by a remote host on sensitive directories and folders. Remote file creation in these directories could indicate a malicious binary or script trying to compromise the system.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-10m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/es/blog/remote-desktop-protocol-connections-elastic-security
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* Use Case: Lateral Movement Detection
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 2
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where event.action in ("creation", "modification") and
+  not user.name:("SYSTEM", "root") and
+  process.name in ("System", "scp", "sshd", "smbd", "vsftpd", "sftp-server") and
+  (
+    file.path : (
+        "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Roaming*", "?:\\Program Files*",
+        "?:\\Windows\\*", "?:\\Windows\\System\\*",
+        "?:\\Windows\\System32\\*", "/etc/*", "/tmp*",
+        "/var/tmp*", "/home/*/.*", "/home/.*", "/usr/bin/*",
+        "/sbin/*", "/bin/*", "/usr/lib/*", "/usr/sbin/*",
+        "/usr/share/*", "/usr/local/*", "/var/lib/dpkg/*",
+        "/lib/systemd/*"
+    )
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Exploitation of Remote Services
+** ID: T1210
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/disable-windows-event-and-security-logs-using-built-in-tools.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/disable-windows-event-and-security-logs-using-built-in-tools.asciidoc
index 9c5443e925..d6621c2ca7 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/disable-windows-event-and-security-logs-using-built-in-tools.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/disable-windows-event-and-security-logs-using-built-in-tools.asciidoc
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ Identifies attempts to disable EventLog via the logman Windows utility, PowerShe
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 110
+*Version*: 111
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -94,11 +94,13 @@ This rule looks for the usage of different utilities to disable the EventLog ser
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/disable-windows-firewall-rules-via-netsh.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/disable-windows-firewall-rules-via-netsh.asciidoc
index 5e45278333..230c05928b 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/disable-windows-firewall-rules-via-netsh.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/disable-windows-firewall-rules-via-netsh.asciidoc
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Identifies use of the netsh.exe to disable or weaken the local firewall. Attacke
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -88,11 +88,13 @@ This rule identifies patterns related to disabling the Windows firewall or its r
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/disabling-user-account-control-via-registry-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/disabling-user-account-control-via-registry-modification.asciidoc
index 01ba87a833..c860d3da46 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/disabling-user-account-control-via-registry-modification.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/disabling-user-account-control-via-registry-modification.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ User Account Control (UAC) can help mitigate the impact of malware on Windows ho
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
@@ -37,8 +37,9 @@ User Account Control (UAC) can help mitigate the impact of malware on Windows ho
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -108,11 +109,13 @@ Attackers may disable UAC to execute code directly in high integrity. This rule
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/disabling-windows-defender-security-settings-via-powershell.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/disabling-windows-defender-security-settings-via-powershell.asciidoc
index ce7fd9f083..9b560ff739 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/disabling-windows-defender-security-settings-via-powershell.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/disabling-windows-defender-security-settings-via-powershell.asciidoc
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ Identifies use of the Set-MpPreference PowerShell command to disable or weaken c
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * logs-windows.*
 * endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -37,7 +38,7 @@ Identifies use of the Set-MpPreference PowerShell command to disable or weaken c
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -99,11 +100,13 @@ This rule monitors the execution of commands that can tamper the Windows Defende
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
@@ -117,8 +120,11 @@ For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
 process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
- (process.name : ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe") or process.pe.original_file_name in ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.dll", "powershell_ise.exe")) and
- process.args : "Set-MpPreference" and process.args : ("-Disable*", "Disabled", "NeverSend", "-Exclusion*")
+  (
+    process.name : ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe") or
+    ?process.pe.original_file_name in ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.dll", "powershell_ise.exe")
+  ) and
+  process.args : "Set-MpPreference" and process.args : ("-Disable*", "Disabled", "NeverSend", "-Exclusion*")
 
 ----------------------------------
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/discovery-of-domain-groups.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/discovery-of-domain-groups.asciidoc
index cf60253a80..255484890c 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/discovery-of-domain-groups.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/discovery-of-domain-groups.asciidoc
@@ -49,8 +49,8 @@ Identifies the execution of Linux built-in commands related to account or group
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started") and
-event.type == "start" and (
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and (
   process.name in ("ldapsearch", "dscacheutil") or (process.name == "dscl" and process.args : "*-list*")
 )
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/dns-over-https-enabled-via-registry.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/dns-over-https-enabled-via-registry.asciidoc
index 8b4b9749a3..d04db677af 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/dns-over-https-enabled-via-registry.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/dns-over-https-enabled-via-registry.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies when a user enables DNS-over-HTTPS. This can be used to hide internet
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: low
@@ -35,8 +35,9 @@ Identifies when a user enables DNS-over-HTTPS. This can be used to hide internet
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -49,6 +50,9 @@ Identifies when a user enables DNS-over-HTTPS. This can be used to hide internet
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/dumping-account-hashes-via-built-in-commands.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/dumping-account-hashes-via-built-in-commands.asciidoc
index 201343c073..1403d56380 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/dumping-account-hashes-via-built-in-commands.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/dumping-account-hashes-via-built-in-commands.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Identifies the execution of macOS built-in commands used to dump user account ha
 * Tactic: Credential Access
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ Identifies the execution of macOS built-in commands used to dump user account ha
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -75,7 +78,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/dumping-of-keychain-content-via-security-command.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/dumping-of-keychain-content-via-security-command.asciidoc
index a7d33585a0..4abed2ac65 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/dumping-of-keychain-content-via-security-command.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/dumping-of-keychain-content-via-security-command.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Adversaries may dump the content of the keychain storage data from a system to a
 * Tactic: Credential Access
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ Adversaries may dump the content of the keychain storage data from a system to a
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,7 +77,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/dynamic-linker-copy.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/dynamic-linker-copy.asciidoc
index c41f3ed748..bd2446f141 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/dynamic-linker-copy.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/dynamic-linker-copy.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Detects the copying of the Linux dynamic loader binary and subsequent file creat
 * Threat: Orbit
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -128,6 +128,9 @@ The detection rule 'Dynamic Linker Copy' is designed to identify such abuse by m
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -158,7 +161,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/elastic-agent-service-terminated.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/elastic-agent-service-terminated.asciidoc
index 6127155e0d..2b61bcd98d 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/elastic-agent-service-terminated.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/elastic-agent-service-terminated.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Identifies the Elastic endpoint agent has stopped and is no longer running on th
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ Identifies the Elastic endpoint agent has stopped and is no longer running on th
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/emond-rules-creation-or-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/emond-rules-creation-or-modification.asciidoc
index a92edf9ce1..76c3c7dcf3 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/emond-rules-creation-or-modification.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/emond-rules-creation-or-modification.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Identifies the creation or modification of the Event Monitor Daemon (emond) rule
 * Tactic: Persistence
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ Identifies the creation or modification of the Event Monitor Daemon (emond) rule
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -75,7 +78,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/enable-host-network-discovery-via-netsh.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/enable-host-network-discovery-via-netsh.asciidoc
index 60c4083e98..3118d80dfc 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/enable-host-network-discovery-via-netsh.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/enable-host-network-discovery-via-netsh.asciidoc
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ Identifies use of the netsh.exe program to enable host discovery via the network
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * logs-windows.*
 * endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -34,7 +35,7 @@ Identifies use of the netsh.exe program to enable host discovery via the network
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -88,11 +89,13 @@ Attackers can enable Network Discovery on the Windows firewall to find other sys
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/encoded-executable-stored-in-the-registry.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/encoded-executable-stored-in-the-registry.asciidoc
index 02aa4bed3c..0844a11beb 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/encoded-executable-stored-in-the-registry.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/encoded-executable-stored-in-the-registry.asciidoc
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ Identifies registry write modifications to hide an encoded portable executable.
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * endgame-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -30,8 +31,9 @@ Identifies registry write modifications to hide an encoded portable executable.
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/encrypting-files-with-winrar-or-7z.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/encrypting-files-with-winrar-or-7z.asciidoc
index 17c40b670a..05f3d2fc1b 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/encrypting-files-with-winrar-or-7z.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/encrypting-files-with-winrar-or-7z.asciidoc
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Identifies use of WinRar or 7z to create an encrypted files. Adversaries will of
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -91,10 +91,11 @@ These steps are usually done in preparation for exfiltration, meaning the attack
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
+==== Setup
 
 
-==== Setup
 
+*Setup*
 
 
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
@@ -113,13 +114,13 @@ process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
 (
   (
     (
-      process.name:"rar.exe" or process.code_signature.subject_name == "win.rar GmbH" or
-      process.pe.original_file_name == "Command line RAR"
+      process.name:"rar.exe" or ?process.code_signature.subject_name == "win.rar GmbH" or
+      ?process.pe.original_file_name == "Command line RAR"
     ) and
     process.args == "a" and process.args : ("-hp*", "-p*", "/hp*", "/p*")
   ) or
   (
-    process.pe.original_file_name in ("7z.exe", "7za.exe") and
+    ?process.pe.original_file_name in ("7z.exe", "7za.exe") and
     process.args == "a" and process.args : "-p*"
   )
 ) and
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/enumeration-command-spawned-via-wmiprvse.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/enumeration-command-spawned-via-wmiprvse.asciidoc
index ae65116427..1b89f2783b 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/enumeration-command-spawned-via-wmiprvse.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/enumeration-command-spawned-via-wmiprvse.asciidoc
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Identifies native Windows host and network enumeration commands spawned by the W
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ Identifies native Windows host and network enumeration commands spawned by the W
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/enumeration-of-administrator-accounts.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/enumeration-of-administrator-accounts.asciidoc
index 1b4536b9b5..6e0c7bc462 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/enumeration-of-administrator-accounts.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/enumeration-of-administrator-accounts.asciidoc
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Identifies instances of lower privilege accounts enumerating Administrator accou
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 110
+*Version*: 111
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -92,11 +92,13 @@ This rule looks for the execution of the `net` and `wmic` utilities to enumerate
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/enumeration-of-kernel-modules-via-proc.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/enumeration-of-kernel-modules-via-proc.asciidoc
index 7473dd9f87..65a8bd816e 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/enumeration-of-kernel-modules-via-proc.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/enumeration-of-kernel-modules-via-proc.asciidoc
@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ Loadable Kernel Modules (or LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unlo
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires the use of the `auditd_manager` integration. `Auditd_manager` is a tool designed to simplify and enhance the management of the audit subsystem in Linux systems. It provides a user-friendly interface and automation capabilities for configuring and monitoring system auditing through the auditd daemon. With `auditd_manager`, administrators can easily define audit rules, track system events, and generate comprehensive audit reports, improving overall security and compliance in the system. The following steps should be executed in order to install and deploy `auditd_manager` on a Linux system.
 ```
 Kibana -->
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/enumeration-of-kernel-modules.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/enumeration-of-kernel-modules.asciidoc
index 7fb130c468..a89fb609ec 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/enumeration-of-kernel-modules.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/enumeration-of-kernel-modules.asciidoc
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ Loadable Kernel Modules (or LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unlo
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,13 +77,12 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-event.category:process and host.os.type:linux and event.action:(exec or exec_event) and event.type:start and (
+event.category:process and host.os.type:linux and event.type:start and event.action:(exec or exec_event) and (
  (process.name:(lsmod or modinfo)) or 
  (process.name:kmod and process.args:list) or 
  (process.name:depmod and process.args:(--all or -a))
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/enumeration-of-privileged-local-groups-membership.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/enumeration-of-privileged-local-groups-membership.asciidoc
index ecde7e6b95..ed4e425663 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/enumeration-of-privileged-local-groups-membership.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/enumeration-of-privileged-local-groups-membership.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Identifies instances of an unusual process enumerating built-in Windows privileg
 * Tactic: Discovery
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 
-*Version*: 210
+*Version*: 211
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -100,13 +100,15 @@ This rule looks for the enumeration of privileged local groups' membership by su
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 The 'Audit Security Group Management' audit policy must be configured (Success).
-Steps to implement the logging policy with with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
 ```
 Computer Configuration >
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/enumeration-of-users-or-groups-via-built-in-commands.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/enumeration-of-users-or-groups-via-built-in-commands.asciidoc
index e0af26fd1a..8845bfbbae 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/enumeration-of-users-or-groups-via-built-in-commands.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/enumeration-of-users-or-groups-via-built-in-commands.asciidoc
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Identifies the execution of macOS built-in commands related to account or group
 * Tactic: Discovery
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ Identifies the execution of macOS built-in commands related to account or group
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -72,7 +75,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/esxi-discovery-via-find.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/esxi-discovery-via-find.asciidoc
index f44b35d1df..0f00097488 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/esxi-discovery-via-find.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/esxi-discovery-via-find.asciidoc
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ Identifies instances where the 'find' command is started on a Linux system with
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -79,14 +82,13 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started") and
-event.type == "start" and process.name == "find" and process.args : ("/etc/vmware/*", "/usr/lib/vmware/*", "/vmfs/*")
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and process.name == "find" and process.args : ("/etc/vmware/*", "/usr/lib/vmware/*", "/vmfs/*")
 
 ----------------------------------
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/esxi-discovery-via-grep.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/esxi-discovery-via-grep.asciidoc
index bdf5819956..d70ae73344 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/esxi-discovery-via-grep.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/esxi-discovery-via-grep.asciidoc
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ Identifies instances where a process named 'grep', 'egrep', or 'pgrep' is starte
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -79,14 +82,13 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started") and
-event.type == "start" and process.name in ("grep", "egrep", "pgrep") and process.args in (
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and process.name in ("grep", "egrep", "pgrep") and process.args in (
   "vmdk", "vmx", "vmxf", "vmsd", "vmsn", "vswp", "vmss", "nvram", "vmem"
 )
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/esxi-timestomping-using-touch-command.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/esxi-timestomping-using-touch-command.asciidoc
index d6b7b39caf..3661d65648 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/esxi-timestomping-using-touch-command.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/esxi-timestomping-using-touch-command.asciidoc
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Identifies instances where the 'touch' command is executed on a Linux system wit
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 * Data Source: Auditd Manager
 
-*Version*: 7
+*Version*: 8
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ Identifies instances where the 'touch' command is executed on a Linux system wit
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -79,14 +82,13 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started") and
-event.type == "start" and process.name == "touch" and process.args == "-r" and
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and process.name == "touch" and process.args == "-r" and
 process.args : ("/etc/vmware/*", "/usr/lib/vmware/*", "/vmfs/*")
 
 ----------------------------------
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/exchange-mailbox-export-via-powershell.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/exchange-mailbox-export-via-powershell.asciidoc
index 6405144658..c86ae862d4 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/exchange-mailbox-export-via-powershell.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/exchange-mailbox-export-via-powershell.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Identifies the use of the Exchange PowerShell cmdlet, New-MailBoxExportRequest,
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Identifies the use of the Exchange PowerShell cmdlet, New-MailBoxExportRequest,
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: PowerShell Logs
 
-*Version*: 7
+*Version*: 8
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/executable-file-creation-with-multiple-extensions.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/executable-file-creation-with-multiple-extensions.asciidoc
index ae8228ee89..5536d169d9 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/executable-file-creation-with-multiple-extensions.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/executable-file-creation-with-multiple-extensions.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Masquerading can allow an adversary to evade defenses and better blend in with t
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
@@ -32,8 +32,9 @@ Masquerading can allow an adversary to evade defenses and better blend in with t
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -46,6 +47,9 @@ Masquerading can allow an adversary to evade defenses and better blend in with t
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/executable-masquerading-as-kernel-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/executable-masquerading-as-kernel-process.asciidoc
index 32a234c4d2..bdb258f624 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/executable-masquerading-as-kernel-process.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/executable-masquerading-as-kernel-process.asciidoc
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Monitors for kernel processes with associated process executable fields that are
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 
-*Version*: 1
+*Version*: 2
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -46,6 +46,10 @@ Monitors for kernel processes with associated process executable fields that are
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -76,13 +80,12 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and event.type == "start" and
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and
 process.name : ("kworker*", "kthread*") and process.executable != null
 
 ----------------------------------
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/execution-from-unusual-directory-command-line.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/execution-from-unusual-directory-command-line.asciidoc
index 47bbd374dc..06958730c0 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/execution-from-unusual-directory-command-line.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/execution-from-unusual-directory-command-line.asciidoc
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Identifies process execution from suspicious default Windows directories. This m
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 110
+*Version*: 111
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -112,11 +112,13 @@ This rule looks for the execution of scripts from unusual directories. Attackers
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/execution-of-com-object-via-xwizard.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/execution-of-com-object-via-xwizard.asciidoc
index eb39c11022..7683a97272 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/execution-of-com-object-via-xwizard.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/execution-of-com-object-via-xwizard.asciidoc
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ Windows Component Object Model (COM) is an inter-process communication (IPC) com
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * logs-windows.*
 * endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -36,7 +37,7 @@ Windows Component Object Model (COM) is an inter-process communication (IPC) com
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -49,6 +50,9 @@ Windows Component Object Model (COM) is an inter-process communication (IPC) com
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
@@ -62,7 +66,7 @@ For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
 process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
- process.pe.original_file_name : "xwizard.exe" and
+ (process.name : "xwizard.exe" or ?process.pe.original_file_name : "xwizard.exe") and
  (
    (process.args : "RunWizard" and process.args : "{*}") or
    (process.executable != null and
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/execution-of-file-written-or-modified-by-microsoft-office.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/execution-of-file-written-or-modified-by-microsoft-office.asciidoc
index 57c8508a97..4200ee8900 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/execution-of-file-written-or-modified-by-microsoft-office.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/execution-of-file-written-or-modified-by-microsoft-office.asciidoc
@@ -8,8 +8,6 @@ Identifies an executable created by a Microsoft Office application and subsequen
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: high
@@ -34,7 +32,7 @@ Identifies an executable created by a Microsoft Office application and subsequen
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/execution-of-file-written-or-modified-by-pdf-reader.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/execution-of-file-written-or-modified-by-pdf-reader.asciidoc
index ada1e65678..fceee567b9 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/execution-of-file-written-or-modified-by-pdf-reader.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/execution-of-file-written-or-modified-by-pdf-reader.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies a suspicious file that was written by a PDF reader application and su
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: high
@@ -33,8 +33,9 @@ Identifies a suspicious file that was written by a PDF reader application and su
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/execution-of-persistent-suspicious-program.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/execution-of-persistent-suspicious-program.asciidoc
index 9aa1ed7453..90219c97d7 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/execution-of-persistent-suspicious-program.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/execution-of-persistent-suspicious-program.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies execution of suspicious persistent programs (scripts, rundll32, etc.)
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
@@ -32,8 +32,9 @@ Identifies execution of suspicious persistent programs (scripts, rundll32, etc.)
 * Tactic: Persistence
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/execution-via-electron-child-process-node-js-module.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/execution-via-electron-child-process-node-js-module.asciidoc
index acc2e82f48..067fa58707 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/execution-via-electron-child-process-node-js-module.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/execution-via-electron-child-process-node-js-module.asciidoc
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Identifies attempts to execute a child process from within the context of an Ele
 * Tactic: Execution
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ Identifies attempts to execute a child process from within the context of an Ele
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -77,7 +80,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/execution-via-local-sxs-shared-module.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/execution-via-local-sxs-shared-module.asciidoc
index f34a8b804e..accd9e7bc3 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/execution-via-local-sxs-shared-module.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/execution-via-local-sxs-shared-module.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies the creation, change, or deletion of a DLL module within a Windows Sx
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
@@ -34,8 +34,9 @@ Identifies the creation, change, or deletion of a DLL module within a Windows Sx
 * Tactic: Execution
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -54,11 +55,13 @@ Identifies the creation, change, or deletion of a DLL module within a Windows Sx
 The SxS DotLocal folder is a legitimate feature that can be abused to hijack standard modules loading order by forcing an executable on the same application.exe.local folder to load a malicious DLL module from the same directory.
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/execution-via-mssql-xp-cmdshell-stored-procedure.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/execution-via-mssql-xp-cmdshell-stored-procedure.asciidoc
index 0f021b7048..416c437751 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/execution-via-mssql-xp-cmdshell-stored-procedure.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/execution-via-mssql-xp-cmdshell-stored-procedure.asciidoc
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Identifies execution via MSSQL xp_cmdshell stored procedure. Malicious users may
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -93,11 +93,13 @@ The xp_cmdshell procedure is disabled by default, but when used, it has the same
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/execution-via-tsclient-mountpoint.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/execution-via-tsclient-mountpoint.asciidoc
index bbcc39a5aa..5f4353934f 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/execution-via-tsclient-mountpoint.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/execution-via-tsclient-mountpoint.asciidoc
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ Identifies execution from the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) shared mountpoint ts
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-windows.*
 * endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
 
 *Severity*: high
 
@@ -35,7 +36,7 @@ Identifies execution from the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) shared mountpoint ts
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -48,6 +49,9 @@ Identifies execution from the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) shared mountpoint ts
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/execution-with-explicit-credentials-via-scripting.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/execution-with-explicit-credentials-via-scripting.asciidoc
index 19686ed85e..a1175f5ebf 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/execution-with-explicit-credentials-via-scripting.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/execution-with-explicit-credentials-via-scripting.asciidoc
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Identifies execution of the security_authtrampoline process via a scripting inte
 * Tactic: Privilege Escalation
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ Identifies execution of the security_authtrampoline process via a scripting inte
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -76,7 +79,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/exporting-exchange-mailbox-via-powershell.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/exporting-exchange-mailbox-via-powershell.asciidoc
index d38447c85d..c8ba959e8d 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/exporting-exchange-mailbox-via-powershell.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/exporting-exchange-mailbox-via-powershell.asciidoc
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ Identifies the use of the Exchange PowerShell cmdlet, New-MailBoxExportRequest,
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-windows.*
 * endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -38,7 +39,7 @@ Identifies the use of the Exchange PowerShell cmdlet, New-MailBoxExportRequest,
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -102,11 +103,13 @@ Attackers can abuse this functionality in preparation for exfiltrating contents,
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/file-compressed-or-archived-into-common-format.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/file-compressed-or-archived-into-common-format.asciidoc
index 0a6989343c..732ffb8507 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/file-compressed-or-archived-into-common-format.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/file-compressed-or-archived-into-common-format.asciidoc
@@ -27,13 +27,12 @@ Detects files being compressed or archived into common formats. This is a common
 
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 * Domain: Endpoint
-* OS: Linux
 * OS: macOS
 * OS: Windows
 * Tactic: Collection
 * Rule Type: BBR
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/file-creation-execution-and-self-deletion-in-suspicious-directory.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/file-creation-execution-and-self-deletion-in-suspicious-directory.asciidoc
index 8242efd16a..e5d9e4a768 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/file-creation-execution-and-self-deletion-in-suspicious-directory.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/file-creation-execution-and-self-deletion-in-suspicious-directory.asciidoc
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ This rule monitors for the creation of a file, followed by its execution and sel
 * Tactic: Execution
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 3
+*Version*: 4
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ This rule monitors for the creation of a file, followed by its execution and sel
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -72,7 +75,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
@@ -83,7 +85,7 @@ sequence by host.id, user.id with maxspan=1m
    process.name in ("curl", "wget", "fetch", "ftp", "sftp", "scp", "rsync", "ld") and 
    file.path : ("/dev/shm/*", "/run/shm/*", "/tmp/*", "/var/tmp/*",
      "/run/*", "/var/run/*", "/var/www/*", "/proc/*/fd/*")] by file.name
-  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "exec" and event.type == "start" and 
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and 
    process.parent.name in ("bash", "dash", "ash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish")] by process.name
   [file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "deletion" and not process.name in ("rm", "ld") and 
    file.path : ("/dev/shm/*", "/run/shm/*", "/tmp/*", "/var/tmp/*",
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/file-creation-time-changed.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/file-creation-time-changed.asciidoc
index 2bab2fd6c4..3611c2af54 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/file-creation-time-changed.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/file-creation-time-changed.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Identifies modification of a file creation time. Adversaries may modify file tim
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -28,8 +28,9 @@ Identifies modification of a file creation time. Adversaries may modify file tim
 * OS: Windows
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 4
+*Version*: 5
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/file-deletion-via-shred.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/file-deletion-via-shred.asciidoc
index a7280ee735..36b9e7553d 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/file-deletion-via-shred.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/file-deletion-via-shred.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Malware or other files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ Malware or other files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,7 +77,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/file-made-immutable-by-chattr.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/file-made-immutable-by-chattr.asciidoc
index 7c1b870733..b4c47f7d03 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/file-made-immutable-by-chattr.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/file-made-immutable-by-chattr.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Detects a file being made immutable using the chattr binary. Making a file immut
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 110
+*Version*: 111
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ Detects a file being made immutable using the chattr binary. Making a file immut
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
 - Elastic Defend
 - Auditbeat
@@ -96,7 +99,6 @@ Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit
 For versions <8.2, you need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate `event.ingested` with @timestamp for non-elastic-agent indexes, like auditbeats/filebeat/winlogbeat etc. For more details to add a custom ingest pipeline refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html[guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/file-permission-modification-in-writable-directory.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/file-permission-modification-in-writable-directory.asciidoc
index b170b66fbc..1b84fa945a 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/file-permission-modification-in-writable-directory.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/file-permission-modification-in-writable-directory.asciidoc
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Identifies file permission modifications in common writable directories by a non
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 209
+*Version*: 210
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ Identifies file permission modifications in common writable directories by a non
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
 - Elastic Defend
 - Auditbeat
@@ -88,7 +91,6 @@ Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit
 - For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/file-transfer-or-listener-established-via-netcat.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/file-transfer-or-listener-established-via-netcat.asciidoc
index eebd9adbb6..2db3ddbbf8 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/file-transfer-or-listener-established-via-netcat.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/file-transfer-or-listener-established-via-netcat.asciidoc
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ A netcat process is engaging in network activity on a Linux host. Netcat is ofte
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -99,11 +99,13 @@ This rule identifies potential reverse shell or bind shell activity using Netcat
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
 - Elastic Defend
 - Auditbeat
@@ -150,7 +152,6 @@ Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit
 - For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/finder-sync-plugin-registered-and-enabled.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/finder-sync-plugin-registered-and-enabled.asciidoc
index 2bf3f0fecc..f494746f5b 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/finder-sync-plugin-registered-and-enabled.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/finder-sync-plugin-registered-and-enabled.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Finder Sync plugins enable users to extend Finder’s functionality by modifying
 * Tactic: Persistence
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ Finder Sync plugins enable users to extend Finder’s functionality by modifying
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,7 +77,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/first-time-seen-aws-secret-value-accessed-in-secrets-manager.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/first-time-seen-aws-secret-value-accessed-in-secrets-manager.asciidoc
index 59b4fd0db8..42e074f962 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/first-time-seen-aws-secret-value-accessed-in-secrets-manager.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/first-time-seen-aws-secret-value-accessed-in-secrets-manager.asciidoc
@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
 [[first-time-seen-aws-secret-value-accessed-in-secrets-manager]]
 === First Time Seen AWS Secret Value Accessed in Secrets Manager
 
-An adversary equipped with compromised credentials may attempt to access the secrets in secrets manager to steal certificates, credentials, or other sensitive material.
+An adversary with access to a compromised AWS service such as an EC2 instance, Lambda function, or other service may attempt to leverage the compromised service to access secrets in AWS Secrets Manager. This rule looks for the first time a specific user identity has programmatically retrieved a specific secret value from Secrets Manager using the `GetSecretValue` action.  This rule assumes that AWS services such as Lambda functions and EC2 instances are setup with IAM role's assigned that have the necessary permissions to access the secrets in Secrets Manager. An adversary with access to a compromised AWS service such as an EC2 instance, Lambda function, or other service would rely on the compromised service's IAM role to access the secrets in Secrets Manager.
 
 *Rule type*: new_terms
 
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * filebeat-*
-* logs-aws*
+* logs-aws.cloudtrail*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -23,7 +23,8 @@ An adversary equipped with compromised credentials may attempt to access the sec
 *References*: 
 
 * https://docs.aws.amazon.com/secretsmanager/latest/apireference/API_GetSecretValue.html
-* http://detectioninthe.cloud/credential_access/access_secret_in_secrets_manager/
+* https://detectioninthe.cloud/ttps/credential_access/access_secret_in_secrets_manager/
+* https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-services/aws-secrets-manager-enum
 
 *Tags*: 
 
@@ -33,7 +34,7 @@ An adversary equipped with compromised credentials may attempt to access the sec
 * Tactic: Credential Access
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 
-*Version*: 308
+*Version*: 309
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -56,7 +57,7 @@ An adversary equipped with compromised credentials may attempt to access the sec
 
 AWS Secrets Manager is a service that enables the replacement of hardcoded credentials in code, including passwords, with an API call to Secrets Manager to retrieve the secret programmatically.
 
-This rule looks for the retrieval of credentials using `GetSecretValue` action in Secrets Manager programmatically. This is a https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/rules-ui-create.html#create-new-terms-rule[New Terms] rule indicating this is the first time a specific user identity has successfuly retrieved a secret value from Secrets Manager.
+This rule looks for the retrieval of credentials using `GetSecretValue` action in Secrets Manager programmatically. This is a https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/rules-ui-create.html#create-new-terms-rule[New Terms] rule indicating this is the first time a specific user identity has successfuly retrieved a specific secret value from Secrets Manager within the last 15 days.
 
 
 *Possible investigation steps*
@@ -114,8 +115,8 @@ The AWS Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is requ
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
 event.dataset:aws.cloudtrail and event.provider:secretsmanager.amazonaws.com and
-    event.action:GetSecretValue and event.outcome:success and
-    not user_agent.name: ("Chrome" or "Firefox" or "Safari" or "Edge" or "Brave" or "Opera" or "aws-cli")
+    event.action:GetSecretValue and event.outcome:success and aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.session_context.session_issuer.type: Role and
+    not user_agent.name: ("Chrome" or "Firefox" or "Safari" or "Edge" or "Brave" or "Opera")
 
 ----------------------------------
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/first-time-seen-removable-device.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/first-time-seen-removable-device.asciidoc
index d11a5b6353..2e3c82cd6e 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/first-time-seen-removable-device.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/first-time-seen-removable-device.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies newly seen removable devices by device friendly name using registry m
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: low
@@ -36,8 +36,9 @@ Identifies newly seen removable devices by device friendly name using registry m
 * Tactic: Exfiltration
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/firsttime-seen-account-performing-dcsync.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/firsttime-seen-account-performing-dcsync.asciidoc
index cd5acb5ef4..7d8127b3b0 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/firsttime-seen-account-performing-dcsync.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/firsttime-seen-account-performing-dcsync.asciidoc
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ This rule identifies when a User Account starts the Active Directory Replication
 * Data Source: Active Directory
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 
-*Version*: 9
+*Version*: 10
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -101,11 +101,13 @@ This rule monitors for when a Windows Event ID 4662 (Operation was performed on
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 The 'Audit Directory Service Access' logging policy must be configured for (Success, Failure).
 Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/full-user-mode-dumps-enabled-system-wide.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/full-user-mode-dumps-enabled-system-wide.asciidoc
index 0b7fe66c30..ec1578757f 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/full-user-mode-dumps-enabled-system-wide.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/full-user-mode-dumps-enabled-system-wide.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,8 @@ Identifies the enable of the full user-mode dumps feature system-wide. This feat
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -34,8 +35,10 @@ Identifies the enable of the full user-mode dumps feature system-wide. This feat
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Credential Access
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 5
+*Version*: 6
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -49,7 +52,11 @@ Identifies the enable of the full user-mode dumps feature system-wide. This feat
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-registry where host.os.type == "windows" and registry.path : "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Windows Error Reporting\\LocalDumps\\DumpType" and
+registry where host.os.type == "windows" and
+    registry.path : (
+        "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Windows Error Reporting\\LocalDumps\\DumpType",
+        "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Windows Error Reporting\\LocalDumps\\DumpType"
+    ) and
     registry.data.strings : ("2", "0x00000002") and
     not (process.executable : "?:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe" and user.id : ("S-1-5-18", "S-1-5-19", "S-1-5-20"))
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/group-policy-abuse-for-privilege-addition.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/group-policy-abuse-for-privilege-addition.asciidoc
index e42aebc2a3..20e53d8574 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/group-policy-abuse-for-privilege-addition.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/group-policy-abuse-for-privilege-addition.asciidoc
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Detects the first occurrence of a modification to Group Policy Object Attributes
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -89,13 +89,15 @@ Group Policy Objects (GPOs) can be used to add rights and/or modify Group Member
 - Check if other GPOs have suspicious scripts attached.
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 The 'Audit Directory Service Changes' audit policy must be configured (Success Failure).
-Steps to implement the logging policy with with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
 ```
 Computer Configuration >
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/group-policy-discovery-via-microsoft-gpresult-utility.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/group-policy-discovery-via-microsoft-gpresult-utility.asciidoc
index c30830123b..f9ea827d2a 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/group-policy-discovery-via-microsoft-gpresult-utility.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/group-policy-discovery-via-microsoft-gpresult-utility.asciidoc
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ Detects the usage of gpresult.exe to query group policy objects. Attackers may q
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * logs-windows.*
 * endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
 
 *Severity*: low
 
@@ -33,7 +34,7 @@ Detects the usage of gpresult.exe to query group policy objects. Attackers may q
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 6
+*Version*: 7
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -95,7 +96,7 @@ The detection rule 'Group Policy Discovery via Microsoft GPResult Utility' is de
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
 process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
-(process.name: "gpresult.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name == "gprslt.exe") and process.args: ("/z", "/v", "/r", "/x")
+(process.name: "gpresult.exe" or ?process.pe.original_file_name == "gprslt.exe") and process.args: ("/z", "/v", "/r", "/x")
 
 ----------------------------------
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/hidden-files-and-directories-via-hidden-flag.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/hidden-files-and-directories-via-hidden-flag.asciidoc
index e1bfab1036..32e57f3f62 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/hidden-files-and-directories-via-hidden-flag.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/hidden-files-and-directories-via-hidden-flag.asciidoc
@@ -8,6 +8,9 @@ Identify activity related where adversaries can add the 'hidden' flag to files t
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
 
 *Severity*: low
 
@@ -30,8 +33,10 @@ Identify activity related where adversaries can add the 'hidden' flag to files t
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Rule Type: BBR
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
 
-*Version*: 1
+*Version*: 2
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,7 +50,7 @@ Identify activity related where adversaries can add the 'hidden' flag to files t
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-file where event.type : "creation" and process.name : "chflags"
+file where event.type == "creation" and process.name == "chflags"
 
 ----------------------------------
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/high-mean-of-process-arguments-in-an-rdp-session.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/high-mean-of-process-arguments-in-an-rdp-session.asciidoc
index 4834a105d8..fc91a1e8fe 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/high-mean-of-process-arguments-in-an-rdp-session.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/high-mean-of-process-arguments-in-an-rdp-session.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ A machine learning job has detected unusually high number of process arguments i
 * Rule Type: Machine Learning
 * Tactic: Lateral Movement
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -43,6 +43,10 @@ A machine learning job has detected unusually high number of process arguments i
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 The rule requires the Lateral Movement Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as file and Windows RDP process events collected by the Elastic Defend integration.  
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/high-mean-of-rdp-session-duration.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/high-mean-of-rdp-session-duration.asciidoc
index 757d68e7e7..465bb2ecaf 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/high-mean-of-rdp-session-duration.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/high-mean-of-rdp-session-duration.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ A machine learning job has detected unusually high mean of RDP session duration.
 * Rule Type: Machine Learning
 * Tactic: Lateral Movement
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -43,6 +43,10 @@ A machine learning job has detected unusually high mean of RDP session duration.
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 The rule requires the Lateral Movement Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as file and Windows RDP process events collected by the Elastic Defend integration.  
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/high-number-of-process-and-or-service-terminations.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/high-number-of-process-and-or-service-terminations.asciidoc
index 0f69051d68..f82b7767fb 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/high-number-of-process-and-or-service-terminations.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/high-number-of-process-and-or-service-terminations.asciidoc
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ This rule identifies a high number (10) of process terminations (stop, delete, o
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * logs-windows.*
 * endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -36,7 +37,7 @@ This rule identifies a high number (10) of process terminations (stop, delete, o
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/high-number-of-process-terminations.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/high-number-of-process-terminations.asciidoc
index d0cd1e1d21..6e78d16008 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/high-number-of-process-terminations.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/high-number-of-process-terminations.asciidoc
@@ -91,11 +91,13 @@ This rule identifies a high number (10) of process terminations via pkill from t
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -126,7 +128,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/high-variance-in-rdp-session-duration.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/high-variance-in-rdp-session-duration.asciidoc
index b109187b5d..94d1ce4ded 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/high-variance-in-rdp-session-duration.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/high-variance-in-rdp-session-duration.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ A machine learning job has detected unusually high variance of RDP session durat
 * Rule Type: Machine Learning
 * Tactic: Lateral Movement
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -43,6 +43,10 @@ A machine learning job has detected unusually high variance of RDP session durat
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 The rule requires the Lateral Movement Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as file and Windows RDP process events collected by the Elastic Defend integration.  
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/host-files-system-changes-via-windows-subsystem-for-linux.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/host-files-system-changes-via-windows-subsystem-for-linux.asciidoc
index f3497f6791..7b3fe54c0f 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/host-files-system-changes-via-windows-subsystem-for-linux.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/host-files-system-changes-via-windows-subsystem-for-linux.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Detects files creation and modification on the host system from the the Windows
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -33,8 +33,9 @@ Detects files creation and modification on the host system from the the Windows
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 5
+*Version*: 6
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/hosts-file-modified.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/hosts-file-modified.asciidoc
index 45f84a2ee5..5034791038 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/hosts-file-modified.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/hosts-file-modified.asciidoc
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ The hosts file on endpoints is used to control manual IP address to hostname res
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -91,11 +91,13 @@ This rule identifies modifications in the hosts file across multiple operating s
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 For Windows systems using Auditbeat, this rule requires adding `C:/Windows/System32/drivers/etc` as an additional path in the 'file_integrity' module of auditbeat.yml.
 
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
@@ -105,7 +107,6 @@ Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest
 For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/hping-process-activity.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/hping-process-activity.asciidoc
index 124f5c0243..e0e9269c4b 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/hping-process-activity.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/hping-process-activity.asciidoc
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ Hping ran on a Linux host. Hping is a FOSS command-line packet analyzer and has
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
 - Elastic Defend
 - Auditbeat
@@ -95,14 +98,13 @@ Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit
 - For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started") and
-event.type == "start" and process.name in ("hping", "hping2", "hping3")
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and process.name in ("hping", "hping2", "hping3")
 
 ----------------------------------
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/iis-http-logging-disabled.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/iis-http-logging-disabled.asciidoc
index e3b081ed25..f7f2f41444 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/iis-http-logging-disabled.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/iis-http-logging-disabled.asciidoc
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Identifies when Internet Information Services (IIS) HTTP Logging is disabled on
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -92,11 +92,13 @@ This rule monitors commands that disable IIS logging.
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/image-file-execution-options-injection.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/image-file-execution-options-injection.asciidoc
index 1181ca393c..f7cc8a1f55 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/image-file-execution-options-injection.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/image-file-execution-options-injection.asciidoc
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ The Debugger and SilentProcessExit registry keys can allow an adversary to inter
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * endgame-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -33,8 +34,9 @@ The Debugger and SilentProcessExit registry keys can allow an adversary to inter
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/imageload-via-windows-update-auto-update-client.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/imageload-via-windows-update-auto-update-client.asciidoc
index 3df0a63a67..daae35eb98 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/imageload-via-windows-update-auto-update-client.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/imageload-via-windows-update-auto-update-client.asciidoc
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Identifies abuse of the Windows Update Auto Update Client (wuauclt.exe) to load
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 110
+*Version*: 111
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -115,6 +115,9 @@ This rule identifies potential abuse for code execution by monitoring for specif
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/incoming-dcom-lateral-movement-via-mshta.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/incoming-dcom-lateral-movement-via-mshta.asciidoc
index f961f215f6..7d46564216 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/incoming-dcom-lateral-movement-via-mshta.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/incoming-dcom-lateral-movement-via-mshta.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies the use of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) to execute comma
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: high
 
@@ -32,8 +32,9 @@ Identifies the use of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) to execute comma
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Lateral Movement
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/incoming-dcom-lateral-movement-with-mmc.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/incoming-dcom-lateral-movement-with-mmc.asciidoc
index ee13edaf68..60761bc498 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/incoming-dcom-lateral-movement-with-mmc.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/incoming-dcom-lateral-movement-with-mmc.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies the use of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) to run commands
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: high
 
@@ -33,8 +33,9 @@ Identifies the use of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) to run commands
 * Tactic: Lateral Movement
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/incoming-dcom-lateral-movement-with-shellbrowserwindow-or-shellwindows.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/incoming-dcom-lateral-movement-with-shellbrowserwindow-or-shellwindows.asciidoc
index 0c11a3a30a..9afec4c472 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/incoming-dcom-lateral-movement-with-shellbrowserwindow-or-shellwindows.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/incoming-dcom-lateral-movement-with-shellbrowserwindow-or-shellwindows.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies use of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) to run commands from
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -32,8 +32,9 @@ Identifies use of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) to run commands from
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Lateral Movement
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/incoming-execution-via-powershell-remoting.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/incoming-execution-via-powershell-remoting.asciidoc
index 4b8273e6e7..f3b6256e82 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/incoming-execution-via-powershell-remoting.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/incoming-execution-via-powershell-remoting.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies remote execution via Windows PowerShell remoting. Windows PowerShell
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -33,8 +33,9 @@ Identifies remote execution via Windows PowerShell remoting. Windows PowerShell
 * Tactic: Lateral Movement
 * Tactic: Execution
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/incoming-execution-via-winrm-remote-shell.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/incoming-execution-via-winrm-remote-shell.asciidoc
index b838baf549..20e99efe61 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/incoming-execution-via-winrm-remote-shell.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/incoming-execution-via-winrm-remote-shell.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies remote execution via Windows Remote Management (WinRM) remote shell o
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -30,8 +30,9 @@ Identifies remote execution via Windows Remote Management (WinRM) remote shell o
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Lateral Movement
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/installation-of-custom-shim-databases.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/installation-of-custom-shim-databases.asciidoc
index 44ac980cd9..4073d9cb23 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/installation-of-custom-shim-databases.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/installation-of-custom-shim-databases.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies the installation of custom Application Compatibility Shim databases.
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.registry*
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -30,8 +30,9 @@ Identifies the installation of custom Application Compatibility Shim databases.
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Persistence
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/installation-of-security-support-provider.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/installation-of-security-support-provider.asciidoc
index 0835ed95ae..f674671660 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/installation-of-security-support-provider.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/installation-of-security-support-provider.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies registry modifications related to the Windows Security Support Provid
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
@@ -33,8 +33,9 @@ Identifies registry modifications related to the Windows Security Support Provid
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -47,6 +48,9 @@ Identifies registry modifications related to the Windows Security Support Provid
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/installutil-process-making-network-connections.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/installutil-process-making-network-connections.asciidoc
index 16dbc4408d..cfe8cd35d1 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/installutil-process-making-network-connections.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/installutil-process-making-network-connections.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies InstallUtil.exe making outbound network connections. This may indicat
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -30,8 +30,9 @@ Identifies InstallUtil.exe making outbound network connections. This may indicat
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/interactive-logon-by-an-unusual-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/interactive-logon-by-an-unusual-process.asciidoc
index ea363ebc80..b9b52b18e6 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/interactive-logon-by-an-unusual-process.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/interactive-logon-by-an-unusual-process.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Identifies interactive logon attempt with alternate credentials and by an unusua
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Privilege Escalation
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ Identifies interactive logon attempt with alternate credentials and by an unusua
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 Audit event 4624 is needed to trigger this rule.
 
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/interactive-terminal-spawned-via-perl.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/interactive-terminal-spawned-via-perl.asciidoc
index 145eb38779..9ba96fcaa9 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/interactive-terminal-spawned-via-perl.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/interactive-terminal-spawned-via-perl.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Identifies when a terminal (tty) is spawned via Perl. Attackers may upgrade a si
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ Identifies when a terminal (tty) is spawned via Perl. Attackers may upgrade a si
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
 - Elastic Defend
 - Auditbeat
@@ -91,7 +94,6 @@ Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit
 - For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/interactive-terminal-spawned-via-python.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/interactive-terminal-spawned-via-python.asciidoc
index d11022cc74..0bbbf2d40f 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/interactive-terminal-spawned-via-python.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/interactive-terminal-spawned-via-python.asciidoc
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ Identifies when a terminal (tty) is spawned via Python. Attackers may upgrade a
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,13 +77,12 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and event.type == "start" and
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and
 (
   (process.parent.name : "python*" and process.name in ("bash", "dash", "ash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh",
    "fish") and process.parent.args_count >= 3 and process.parent.args : "*pty.spawn*" and process.parent.args : "-c") or
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/kerberos-cached-credentials-dumping.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/kerberos-cached-credentials-dumping.asciidoc
index 381787ccdd..2603316ffc 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/kerberos-cached-credentials-dumping.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/kerberos-cached-credentials-dumping.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Identifies the use of the Kerberos credential cache (kcc) utility to dump locall
 * Tactic: Credential Access
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ Identifies the use of the Kerberos credential cache (kcc) utility to dump locall
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -75,7 +78,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/kerberos-pre-authentication-disabled-for-user.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/kerberos-pre-authentication-disabled-for-user.asciidoc
index d1f4d7bbe0..9ffd06a57f 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/kerberos-pre-authentication-disabled-for-user.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/kerberos-pre-authentication-disabled-for-user.asciidoc
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ Identifies the modification of an account's Kerberos pre-authentication options.
 * Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring
 * Data Source: Active Directory
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -90,11 +90,13 @@ AS-REP roasting is an attack against Kerberos for user accounts that do not requ
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 The 'Audit User Account Management' logging policy must be configured for (Success, Failure).
 Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/kerberos-traffic-from-unusual-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/kerberos-traffic-from-unusual-process.asciidoc
index 54434d2de7..320861e536 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/kerberos-traffic-from-unusual-process.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/kerberos-traffic-from-unusual-process.asciidoc
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ Identifies network connections to the standard Kerberos port from an unusual pro
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -106,11 +106,13 @@ Domain-joined hosts usually perform Kerberos traffic using the `lsass.exe` proce
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/kernel-driver-load-by-non-root-user.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/kernel-driver-load-by-non-root-user.asciidoc
index d6e28393f7..e19b65b394 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/kernel-driver-load-by-non-root-user.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/kernel-driver-load-by-non-root-user.asciidoc
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ Detects the loading of a Linux kernel module by a non-root user through system c
 * Tactic: Persistence
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -43,6 +43,10 @@ Detects the loading of a Linux kernel module by a non-root user through system c
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Auditd Manager.
 
 
@@ -73,7 +77,6 @@ However, if more advanced configuration is required to detect specific behavior,
   -- "-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S finit_module -S init_module -S delete_module -F auid!=-1 -k modules"
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/kernel-load-or-unload-via-kexec-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/kernel-load-or-unload-via-kexec-detected.asciidoc
index db4b9bf0a3..b7c9d9dd71 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/kernel-load-or-unload-via-kexec-detected.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/kernel-load-or-unload-via-kexec-detected.asciidoc
@@ -8,6 +8,9 @@ This detection rule identifies the usage of kexec, helping to uncover unauthoriz
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -34,8 +37,10 @@ This detection rule identifies the usage of kexec, helping to uncover unauthoriz
 * Tactic: Privilege Escalation
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
 
-*Version*: 5
+*Version*: 6
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -48,6 +53,9 @@ This detection rule identifies the usage of kexec, helping to uncover unauthoriz
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -78,14 +86,13 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "exec" and process.name == "kexec" and 
-process.args in ("--exec", "-e", "--load", "-l", "--unload", "-u")
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and process.name == "kexec" and process.args in ("--exec", "-e", "--load", "-l", "--unload", "-u")
 
 ----------------------------------
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/kernel-module-load-via-insmod.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/kernel-module-load-via-insmod.asciidoc
index 993a88b68e..4e4e75e983 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/kernel-module-load-via-insmod.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/kernel-module-load-via-insmod.asciidoc
@@ -138,6 +138,9 @@ The detection rule 'Kernel module load via insmod' is designed to identify insta
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -168,7 +171,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/kernel-module-removal.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/kernel-module-removal.asciidoc
index cedfa0578b..7daa946950 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/kernel-module-removal.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/kernel-module-removal.asciidoc
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Kernel modules are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kerne
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ Kernel modules are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kerne
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -76,13 +79,12 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and event.type == "start" and
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and
 process.name == "rmmod" or (process.name == "modprobe" and process.args in ("--remove", "-r")) and 
 process.parent.name in ("sudo", "bash", "dash", "ash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish")
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/keychain-password-retrieval-via-command-line.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/keychain-password-retrieval-via-command-line.asciidoc
index d0aeaf2917..da0d972e13 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/keychain-password-retrieval-via-command-line.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/keychain-password-retrieval-via-command-line.asciidoc
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Adversaries may collect keychain storage data from a system to in order to acqui
 * Tactic: Credential Access
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ Adversaries may collect keychain storage data from a system to in order to acqui
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -77,7 +80,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/kirbi-file-creation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/kirbi-file-creation.asciidoc
index a1fcc6cdb1..1190f9434e 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/kirbi-file-creation.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/kirbi-file-creation.asciidoc
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ Identifies the creation of .kirbi files. The creation of this kind of file is an
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -28,8 +29,9 @@ Identifies the creation of .kirbi files. The creation of this kind of file is an
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Credential Access
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 3
+*Version*: 4
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/krbtgt-delegation-backdoor.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/krbtgt-delegation-backdoor.asciidoc
index a561b787e5..46b1d0e3ab 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/krbtgt-delegation-backdoor.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/krbtgt-delegation-backdoor.asciidoc
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Identifies the modification of the msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo attribute to KRBTGT.
 * Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring
 * Data Source: Active Directory
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@ Identifies the modification of the msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo attribute to KRBTGT.
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 The 'Audit User Account Management' logging policy must be configured for (Success, Failure).
 Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/lateral-movement-via-startup-folder.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/lateral-movement-via-startup-folder.asciidoc
index 29ff47388d..63a92b5635 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/lateral-movement-via-startup-folder.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/lateral-movement-via-startup-folder.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies suspicious file creations in the startup folder of a remote system. A
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: high
@@ -34,8 +34,9 @@ Identifies suspicious file creations in the startup folder of a remote system. A
 * Tactic: Lateral Movement
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -48,6 +49,9 @@ Identifies suspicious file creations in the startup folder of a remote system. A
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/launch-agent-creation-or-modification-and-immediate-loading.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/launch-agent-creation-or-modification-and-immediate-loading.asciidoc
index a04a1868c1..f15de7b68a 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/launch-agent-creation-or-modification-and-immediate-loading.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/launch-agent-creation-or-modification-and-immediate-loading.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ An adversary can establish persistence by installing a new launch agent that exe
 * Tactic: Persistence
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ An adversary can establish persistence by installing a new launch agent that exe
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,7 +77,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/launchdaemon-creation-or-modification-and-immediate-loading.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/launchdaemon-creation-or-modification-and-immediate-loading.asciidoc
index dd7e58796c..a735e6a7ed 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/launchdaemon-creation-or-modification-and-immediate-loading.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/launchdaemon-creation-or-modification-and-immediate-loading.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Indicates the creation or modification of a launch daemon, which adversaries may
 * Tactic: Persistence
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ Indicates the creation or modification of a launch daemon, which adversaries may
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,7 +77,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/linux-group-creation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/linux-group-creation.asciidoc
index 9900920876..b1dcaf39f2 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/linux-group-creation.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/linux-group-creation.asciidoc
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Identifies attempts to create a new group. Attackers may create new groups to es
 * Tactic: Persistence
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 
-*Version*: 3
+*Version*: 4
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -99,11 +99,13 @@ This rule identifies the usages of `groupadd` and `addgroup` to create new group
 - Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Filebeat.
 
 
@@ -129,7 +131,6 @@ Filebeat is a lightweight shipper for forwarding and centralizing log data. Inst
 - To run the system module of Filebeat on Linux follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-system.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/linux-init-pid-1-secret-dump-via-gdb.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/linux-init-pid-1-secret-dump-via-gdb.asciidoc
index d48719dbdf..ff15c88c54 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/linux-init-pid-1-secret-dump-via-gdb.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/linux-init-pid-1-secret-dump-via-gdb.asciidoc
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ This rule monitors for the potential memory dump of the init process (PID 1) thr
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 
-*Version*: 5
+*Version*: 6
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ This rule monitors for the potential memory dump of the init process (PID 1) thr
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -77,13 +80,12 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and event.type == "start" and 
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and 
 process.name == "gdb" and process.args in ("--pid", "-p") and process.args == "1"
 
 ----------------------------------
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/linux-process-hooking-via-gdb.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/linux-process-hooking-via-gdb.asciidoc
index 100bcf4b9e..518fa87e65 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/linux-process-hooking-via-gdb.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/linux-process-hooking-via-gdb.asciidoc
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ This rule monitors for potential memory dumping through gdb. Attackers may lever
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Auditd Manager
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -51,8 +51,8 @@ This rule monitors for potential memory dumping through gdb. Attackers may lever
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started") and
-event.type == "start" and process.name == "gdb" and process.args in ("--pid", "-p") and 
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and process.name == "gdb" and process.args in ("--pid", "-p") and 
 /* Covered by d4ff2f53-c802-4d2e-9fb9-9ecc08356c3f */
 process.args != "1"
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s.asciidoc
index 3160f1a5a2..b62203f6de 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s.asciidoc
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ Identifies the abuse of a Linux binary to break out of a restricted shell or env
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 111
+*Version*: 112
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -122,11 +122,13 @@ Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -168,7 +170,6 @@ Session View uses process data collected by the Elastic Defend integration, but
 For more information about the additional fields collected when this setting is enabled and the usage of Session View for Analysis refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/session-view.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/linux-system-information-discovery.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/linux-system-information-discovery.asciidoc
index 27ad3156f1..45263a0d7d 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/linux-system-information-discovery.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/linux-system-information-discovery.asciidoc
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ Enrich process events with uname and other command lines that imply Linux system
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started") and event.type == "start" and (
+process where event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started") and (
   process.name: "uname" or (
   process.name: ("cat", "more", "less") and process.args: ("*issue*", "*version*", "*profile*", "*services*", "*cpuinfo*")
   )
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/linux-user-account-creation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/linux-user-account-creation.asciidoc
index a67495ec89..732790d5b4 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/linux-user-account-creation.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/linux-user-account-creation.asciidoc
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Identifies attempts to create new users. Attackers may add new users to establis
 * Tactic: Persistence
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 
-*Version*: 3
+*Version*: 4
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -98,11 +98,13 @@ This rule identifies the usage of `useradd` and `adduser` to create new accounts
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Filebeat.
 
 
@@ -128,7 +130,6 @@ Filebeat is a lightweight shipper for forwarding and centralizing log data. Inst
 - To run the system module of Filebeat on Linux follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-system.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/linux-user-added-to-privileged-group.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/linux-user-added-to-privileged-group.asciidoc
index 895030d9f1..395357913a 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/linux-user-added-to-privileged-group.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/linux-user-added-to-privileged-group.asciidoc
@@ -104,11 +104,13 @@ This rule identifies the usages of `usermod`, `adduser` and `gpasswd` to assign
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -139,14 +141,13 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started") and
-event.type == "start" and process.args in (
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and process.args in (
   "root", "admin", "wheel", "staff", "sudo","disk", "video", "shadow", "lxc", "lxd"
 ) and
 (
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/local-account-tokenfilter-policy-disabled.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/local-account-tokenfilter-policy-disabled.asciidoc
index 151c7c9709..1f721fcdbc 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/local-account-tokenfilter-policy-disabled.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/local-account-tokenfilter-policy-disabled.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies registry modification to the LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy policy. If
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
@@ -37,8 +37,9 @@ Identifies registry modification to the LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy policy. If
 * Tactic: Lateral Movement
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 6
+*Version*: 7
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/local-scheduled-task-creation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/local-scheduled-task-creation.asciidoc
index 9bf324557b..e13f10fad9 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/local-scheduled-task-creation.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/local-scheduled-task-creation.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Indicates the creation of a scheduled task. Adversaries can use these to establi
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: low
 
@@ -33,8 +33,9 @@ Indicates the creation of a scheduled task. Adversaries can use these to establi
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Persistence
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -55,7 +56,7 @@ sequence with maxspan=1m
     process.pe.original_file_name : ("cmd.exe", "wscript.exe", "rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "wmic.exe", "mshta.exe",
                                      "powershell.exe", "pwsh.dll", "powershell_ise.exe", "WmiPrvSe.exe", "wsmprovhost.exe",
                                      "winrshost.exe")) or
-    process.code_signature.trusted == false)] by process.entity_id
+    ?process.code_signature.trusted == false)] by process.entity_id
   [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
     (process.name : "schtasks.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name == "schtasks.exe") and
     process.args : ("/create", "-create") and process.args : ("/RU", "/SC", "/TN", "/TR", "/F", "/XML") and
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/lsass-memory-dump-creation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/lsass-memory-dump-creation.asciidoc
index a87a3cdebf..c0f5a1aec8 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/lsass-memory-dump-creation.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/lsass-memory-dump-creation.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies the creation of a Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (lsass.e
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: high
@@ -36,8 +36,9 @@ Identifies the creation of a Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (lsass.e
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -111,11 +112,13 @@ This rule looks for the creation of memory dump files with file names compatible
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/lsass-memory-dump-handle-access.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/lsass-memory-dump-handle-access.asciidoc
index 51956d359c..19fc7982c9 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/lsass-memory-dump-handle-access.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/lsass-memory-dump-handle-access.asciidoc
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ Identifies handle requests for the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (L
 * Tactic: Credential Access
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -113,11 +113,13 @@ Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in LSASS process me
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 Ensure advanced audit policies for Windows are enabled, specifically:
 Object Access policies https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4656[Event ID 4656] (Handle to an Object was Requested)
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-predicted-to-be-a-dga-domain.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-predicted-to-be-a-dga-domain.asciidoc
index e9c3542f44..e0c48c1aca 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-predicted-to-be-a-dga-domain.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-predicted-to-be-a-dga-domain.asciidoc
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ A supervised machine learning model has identified a DNS question name that is p
 * Rule Type: Machine Learning
 * Tactic: Command and Control
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ A supervised machine learning model has identified a DNS question name that is p
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 The rule requires the Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as DNS events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend, Network Packet Capture, or Packetbeat.  
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-with-a-high-dga-probability-score.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-with-a-high-dga-probability-score.asciidoc
index c2456658e3..e19070ebe9 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-with-a-high-dga-probability-score.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-with-a-high-dga-probability-score.asciidoc
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ A supervised machine learning model has identified a DNS question name with a hi
 * Rule Type: Machine Learning
 * Tactic: Command and Control
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ A supervised machine learning model has identified a DNS question name with a hi
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 The rule requires the Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as DNS events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend, Network Packet Capture, or Packetbeat.  
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-predicted-to-be-malicious-activity.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-predicted-to-be-malicious-activity.asciidoc
index 6dd172138f..78c74b99b3 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-predicted-to-be-malicious-activity.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-predicted-to-be-malicious-activity.asciidoc
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ A supervised machine learning model (ProblemChild) has identified a suspicious W
 * Rule Type: Machine Learning
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ A supervised machine learning model (ProblemChild) has identified a suspicious W
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 The rule requires the Living off the Land (LotL) Attack Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as Windows process events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend or Winlogbeat.  
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-with-a-high-malicious-probability-score.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-with-a-high-malicious-probability-score.asciidoc
index 14ca265767..0638739990 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-with-a-high-malicious-probability-score.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-with-a-high-malicious-probability-score.asciidoc
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ A supervised machine learning model (ProblemChild) has identified a suspicious W
 * Rule Type: Machine Learning
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ A supervised machine learning model (ProblemChild) has identified a suspicious W
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 The rule requires the Living off the Land (LotL) Attack Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as Windows process events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend or Winlogbeat.  
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/machine-learning-detected-dga-activity-using-a-known-sunburst-dns-domain.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/machine-learning-detected-dga-activity-using-a-known-sunburst-dns-domain.asciidoc
index b68ba26184..a03efbd550 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/machine-learning-detected-dga-activity-using-a-known-sunburst-dns-domain.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/machine-learning-detected-dga-activity-using-a-known-sunburst-dns-domain.asciidoc
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ A supervised machine learning model has identified a DNS question name that used
 * Rule Type: Machine Learning
 * Tactic: Command and Control
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ A supervised machine learning model has identified a DNS question name that used
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 The rule requires the Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as DNS events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend, Network Packet Capture, or Packetbeat.  
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/macos-installer-package-spawns-network-event.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/macos-installer-package-spawns-network-event.asciidoc
index b662545cb5..15b6262e19 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/macos-installer-package-spawns-network-event.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/macos-installer-package-spawns-network-event.asciidoc
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Detects the execution of a MacOS installer package with an abnormal child proces
 * Tactic: Command and Control
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ Detects the execution of a MacOS installer package with an abnormal child proces
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -77,7 +80,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/masquerading-space-after-filename.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/masquerading-space-after-filename.asciidoc
index 4ce91b1d2b..474dc6398f 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/masquerading-space-after-filename.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/masquerading-space-after-filename.asciidoc
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ This rules identifies a process created from an executable with a space appended
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 5
+*Version*: 6
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ This rules identifies a process created from an executable with a space appended
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-anti-phish-policy-deletion.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-anti-phish-policy-deletion.asciidoc
index d6a980338e..9e172f3ea0 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-anti-phish-policy-deletion.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-anti-phish-policy-deletion.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Identifies the deletion of an anti-phishing policy in Microsoft 365. By default,
 * Use Case: Configuration Audit
 * Tactic: Initial Access
 
-*Version*: 103
+*Version*: 105
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-anti-phish-rule-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-anti-phish-rule-modification.asciidoc
index e9f6e8eb9f..712cd5c336 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-anti-phish-rule-modification.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-anti-phish-rule-modification.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Identifies the modification of an anti-phishing rule in Microsoft 365. By defaul
 * Use Case: Configuration Audit
 * Tactic: Initial Access
 
-*Version*: 103
+*Version*: 105
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-dkim-signing-configuration-disabled.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-dkim-signing-configuration-disabled.asciidoc
index b8ee47893e..42ac763877 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-dkim-signing-configuration-disabled.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-dkim-signing-configuration-disabled.asciidoc
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ Identifies when a DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) signing configuration is dis
 * Data Source: Microsoft 365
 * Tactic: Persistence
 
-*Version*: 103
+*Version*: 105
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-dlp-policy-removed.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-dlp-policy-removed.asciidoc
index 0ae0ee050d..5cf85bc621 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-dlp-policy-removed.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-dlp-policy-removed.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Identifies when a Data Loss Prevention (DLP) policy is removed in Microsoft 365.
 * Use Case: Configuration Audit
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 
-*Version*: 103
+*Version*: 105
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-malware-filter-policy-deletion.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-malware-filter-policy-deletion.asciidoc
index b6b29de411..eb340cffd2 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-malware-filter-policy-deletion.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-malware-filter-policy-deletion.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Identifies when a malware filter policy has been deleted in Microsoft 365. A mal
 * Use Case: Configuration Audit
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 
-*Version*: 103
+*Version*: 105
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-malware-filter-rule-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-malware-filter-rule-modification.asciidoc
index 99e7efba9e..e7be6387b7 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-malware-filter-rule-modification.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-malware-filter-rule-modification.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Identifies when a malware filter rule has been deleted or disabled in Microsoft
 * Use Case: Configuration Audit
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 
-*Version*: 103
+*Version*: 105
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-management-group-role-assignment.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-management-group-role-assignment.asciidoc
index 72a02e1a24..7136fcb5ee 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-management-group-role-assignment.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-management-group-role-assignment.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Identifies when a new role is assigned to a management group in Microsoft 365. A
 * Use Case: Identity and Access Audit
 * Tactic: Persistence
 
-*Version*: 103
+*Version*: 105
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-safe-attachment-rule-disabled.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-safe-attachment-rule-disabled.asciidoc
index 1c38ed3d78..4f0e5df97e 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-safe-attachment-rule-disabled.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-safe-attachment-rule-disabled.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Identifies when a safe attachment rule is disabled in Microsoft 365. Safe attach
 * Use Case: Configuration Audit
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 
-*Version*: 103
+*Version*: 105
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-safe-link-policy-disabled.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-safe-link-policy-disabled.asciidoc
index fad4ed6600..fd1eb73870 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-safe-link-policy-disabled.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-safe-link-policy-disabled.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Identifies when a Safe Link policy is disabled in Microsoft 365. Safe Link polic
 * Use Case: Identity and Access Audit
 * Tactic: Initial Access
 
-*Version*: 103
+*Version*: 105
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-transport-rule-creation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-transport-rule-creation.asciidoc
index 7d4120855e..23d9edb681 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-transport-rule-creation.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-transport-rule-creation.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Identifies a transport rule creation in Microsoft 365. As a best practice, Excha
 * Use Case: Configuration Audit
 * Tactic: Exfiltration
 
-*Version*: 103
+*Version*: 105
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-transport-rule-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-transport-rule-modification.asciidoc
index 854d16b42d..71f14e8cfe 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-transport-rule-modification.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-transport-rule-modification.asciidoc
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Identifies when a transport rule has been disabled or deleted in Microsoft 365.
 * Use Case: Configuration Audit
 * Tactic: Exfiltration
 
-*Version*: 103
+*Version*: 105
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-global-administrator-role-assigned.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-global-administrator-role-assigned.asciidoc
index 2968cf59de..baa6939927 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-global-administrator-role-assigned.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-global-administrator-role-assigned.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ In Azure Active Directory (Azure AD), permissions to manage resources are assign
 * Use Case: Identity and Access Audit
 * Tactic: Persistence
 
-*Version*: 103
+*Version*: 105
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-inbox-forwarding-rule-created.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-inbox-forwarding-rule-created.asciidoc
index 7cba1e134d..22b065e254 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-inbox-forwarding-rule-created.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-inbox-forwarding-rule-created.asciidoc
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Identifies when a new Inbox forwarding rule is created in Microsoft 365. Inbox r
 * Use Case: Configuration Audit
 * Tactic: Collection
 
-*Version*: 103
+*Version*: 105
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-potential-ransomware-activity.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-potential-ransomware-activity.asciidoc
index 50efca4007..6c59072200 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-potential-ransomware-activity.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-potential-ransomware-activity.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Identifies when Microsoft Cloud App Security reports that a user has uploaded fi
 * Use Case: Configuration Audit
 * Tactic: Impact
 
-*Version*: 103
+*Version*: 105
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-teams-custom-application-interaction-allowed.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-teams-custom-application-interaction-allowed.asciidoc
index 2067026c7c..6b5fdb28db 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-teams-custom-application-interaction-allowed.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-teams-custom-application-interaction-allowed.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Identifies when custom applications are allowed in Microsoft Teams. If an organi
 * Use Case: Configuration Audit
 * Tactic: Persistence
 
-*Version*: 104
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-teams-external-access-enabled.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-teams-external-access-enabled.asciidoc
index 2e914279d4..7bd58339f2 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-teams-external-access-enabled.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-teams-external-access-enabled.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Identifies when external access is enabled in Microsoft Teams. External access l
 * Use Case: Configuration Audit
 * Tactic: Persistence
 
-*Version*: 103
+*Version*: 105
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-teams-guest-access-enabled.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-teams-guest-access-enabled.asciidoc
index e6aea47a8e..901335abce 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-teams-guest-access-enabled.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-teams-guest-access-enabled.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Identifies when guest access is enabled in Microsoft Teams. Guest access in Team
 * Use Case: Configuration Audit
 * Tactic: Persistence
 
-*Version*: 103
+*Version*: 105
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-unusual-volume-of-file-deletion.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-unusual-volume-of-file-deletion.asciidoc
index fc18c694bc..e7f8e11bc4 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-unusual-volume-of-file-deletion.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-unusual-volume-of-file-deletion.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Identifies that a user has deleted an unusually large volume of files as reporte
 * Use Case: Configuration Audit
 * Tactic: Impact
 
-*Version*: 103
+*Version*: 105
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-user-restricted-from-sending-email.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-user-restricted-from-sending-email.asciidoc
index a028c6ce1f..1739fd5b78 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-user-restricted-from-sending-email.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-365-user-restricted-from-sending-email.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Identifies when a user has been restricted from sending email due to exceeding s
 * Use Case: Configuration Audit
 * Tactic: Initial Access
 
-*Version*: 103
+*Version*: 105
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-build-engine-started-an-unusual-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-build-engine-started-an-unusual-process.asciidoc
index 93d639491f..c2a1f15ee9 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-build-engine-started-an-unusual-process.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-build-engine-started-an-unusual-process.asciidoc
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, started a PowerShell script
 * Tactic: Execution
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 209
+*Version*: 210
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@ An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, started a PowerShell script
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-build-engine-started-by-a-script-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-build-engine-started-by-a-script-process.asciidoc
index 7151cad94b..28c962ccad 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-build-engine-started-by-a-script-process.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-build-engine-started-by-a-script-process.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, was started by a script or t
 * Tactic: Execution
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 207
+*Version*: 208
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, was started by a script or t
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-build-engine-started-by-a-system-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-build-engine-started-by-a-system-process.asciidoc
index caab5caed2..053034a7dd 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-build-engine-started-by-a-system-process.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-build-engine-started-by-a-system-process.asciidoc
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, was started by Explorer or t
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * logs-windows.*
 * endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -34,7 +35,7 @@ An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, was started by Explorer or t
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -47,6 +48,9 @@ An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, was started by Explorer or t
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-build-engine-started-by-an-office-application.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-build-engine-started-by-an-office-application.asciidoc
index b1e0f4066e..eceff987af 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-build-engine-started-by-an-office-application.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-build-engine-started-by-an-office-application.asciidoc
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, was started by Excel or Word
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * logs-windows.*
 * endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
 
 *Severity*: high
 
@@ -37,7 +38,7 @@ An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, was started by Excel or Word
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -110,11 +111,13 @@ This rule looks for the `Msbuild.exe` utility spawned by MS Office programs. Thi
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-build-engine-using-an-alternate-name.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-build-engine-using-an-alternate-name.asciidoc
index 4448aebd28..5d27332ea3 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-build-engine-using-an-alternate-name.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-build-engine-using-an-alternate-name.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, was started after being rena
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: low
@@ -34,8 +34,9 @@ An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, was started after being rena
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 110
+*Version*: 111
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -108,11 +109,13 @@ This rule checks for renamed instances of MSBuild, which can indicate an attempt
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-exchange-server-um-spawning-suspicious-processes.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-exchange-server-um-spawning-suspicious-processes.asciidoc
index 83fcc5fbe6..e3075ddde5 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-exchange-server-um-spawning-suspicious-processes.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-exchange-server-um-spawning-suspicious-processes.asciidoc
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ Identifies suspicious processes being spawned by the Microsoft Exchange Server U
 * Use Case: Vulnerability
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -53,6 +53,9 @@ Identifies suspicious processes being spawned by the Microsoft Exchange Server U
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-exchange-server-um-writing-suspicious-files.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-exchange-server-um-writing-suspicious-files.asciidoc
index c4e2f8abd3..3af7e6df0c 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-exchange-server-um-writing-suspicious-files.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-exchange-server-um-writing-suspicious-files.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies suspicious files being written by the Microsoft Exchange Server Unifi
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
@@ -37,8 +37,9 @@ Identifies suspicious files being written by the Microsoft Exchange Server Unifi
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Use Case: Vulnerability
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -62,10 +63,11 @@ from existing intrusions. Other tools for detecting and mitigating can be found
 https://github.com/microsoft/CSS-Exchange/tree/main/Security[repository]
 
 
+==== Setup
 
 
-==== Setup
 
+*Setup*
 
 
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-exchange-transport-agent-install-script.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-exchange-transport-agent-install-script.asciidoc
index 2bc1db9853..33bdd7115b 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-exchange-transport-agent-install-script.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-exchange-transport-agent-install-script.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Identifies the use of Cmdlets and methods related to Microsoft Exchange Transpor
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
 
 *Severity*: low
 
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Identifies the use of Cmdlets and methods related to Microsoft Exchange Transpor
 * Data Source: PowerShell Logs
 * Rule Type: BBR
 
-*Version*: 3
+*Version*: 4
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ Identifies the use of Cmdlets and methods related to Microsoft Exchange Transpor
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
 Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 ```
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-exchange-worker-spawning-suspicious-processes.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-exchange-worker-spawning-suspicious-processes.asciidoc
index aa3f8604a1..957b5b2cf0 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-exchange-worker-spawning-suspicious-processes.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-exchange-worker-spawning-suspicious-processes.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies suspicious processes being spawned by the Microsoft Exchange Server w
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: high
@@ -37,8 +37,9 @@ Identifies suspicious processes being spawned by the Microsoft Exchange Server w
 * Tactic: Execution
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -51,6 +52,9 @@ Identifies suspicious processes being spawned by the Microsoft Exchange Server w
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-iis-connection-strings-decryption.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-iis-connection-strings-decryption.asciidoc
index 1f65a89d7f..89fde46a00 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-iis-connection-strings-decryption.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-iis-connection-strings-decryption.asciidoc
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Identifies use of aspnet_regiis to decrypt Microsoft IIS connection strings. An
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -50,6 +50,9 @@ Identifies use of aspnet_regiis to decrypt Microsoft IIS connection strings. An
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-iis-service-account-password-dumped.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-iis-service-account-password-dumped.asciidoc
index 209e630f72..318671bf4f 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-iis-service-account-password-dumped.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-iis-service-account-password-dumped.asciidoc
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Identifies the Internet Information Services (IIS) command-line tool, AppCmd, be
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ Identifies the Internet Information Services (IIS) command-line tool, AppCmd, be
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-windows-defender-tampering.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-windows-defender-tampering.asciidoc
index dfdf5fbf02..6916a83b74 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-windows-defender-tampering.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/microsoft-windows-defender-tampering.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies when one or more features on Microsoft Defender are disabled. Adversa
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -40,8 +40,9 @@ Identifies when one or more features on Microsoft Defender are disabled. Adversa
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -103,11 +104,13 @@ This rule monitors the registry for modifications that disable Windows Defender
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/mimikatz-memssp-log-file-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/mimikatz-memssp-log-file-detected.asciidoc
index 9a7451053c..ce8c85eaf8 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/mimikatz-memssp-log-file-detected.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/mimikatz-memssp-log-file-detected.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies the password log file from the default Mimikatz memssp module.
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: high
@@ -35,8 +35,9 @@ Identifies the password log file from the default Mimikatz memssp module.
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -102,11 +103,13 @@ This rule looks for the creation of a file named `mimilsa.log`, which is generat
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/modification-of-amsienable-registry-key.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/modification-of-amsienable-registry-key.asciidoc
index 5bfb2c68af..1676813faf 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/modification-of-amsienable-registry-key.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/modification-of-amsienable-registry-key.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies modifications of the AmsiEnable registry key to 0, which disables the
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: high
@@ -36,8 +36,9 @@ Identifies modifications of the AmsiEnable registry key to 0, which disables the
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -112,11 +113,13 @@ This rule monitors the modifications to the Software\Microsoft\Windows Script\Se
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/modification-of-boot-configuration.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/modification-of-boot-configuration.asciidoc
index d8990a272f..d514786daa 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/modification-of-boot-configuration.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/modification-of-boot-configuration.asciidoc
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ Identifies use of bcdedit.exe to delete boot configuration data. This tactic is
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * logs-windows.*
 * endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
 
 *Severity*: low
 
@@ -34,7 +35,7 @@ Identifies use of bcdedit.exe to delete boot configuration data. This tactic is
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -98,11 +99,13 @@ These are common steps in destructive attacks by adversaries leveraging ransomwa
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
@@ -116,7 +119,7 @@ For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
 process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
-  (process.name : "bcdedit.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name == "bcdedit.exe") and
+  (process.name : "bcdedit.exe" or ?process.pe.original_file_name == "bcdedit.exe") and
     (
       (process.args : "/set" and process.args : "bootstatuspolicy" and process.args : "ignoreallfailures") or
       (process.args : "no" and process.args : "recoveryenabled")
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/modification-of-dynamic-linker-preload-shared-object.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/modification-of-dynamic-linker-preload-shared-object.asciidoc
index b05ee5ef9f..6faa6852d6 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/modification-of-dynamic-linker-preload-shared-object.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/modification-of-dynamic-linker-preload-shared-object.asciidoc
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Identifies modification of the dynamic linker preload shared object (ld.so.prelo
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 208
+*Version*: 209
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ Identifies modification of the dynamic linker preload shared object (ld.so.prelo
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
 - Elastic Defend
 - Auditbeat
@@ -93,14 +96,13 @@ Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit
 - For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-host.os.type:linux and event.category:file and event.action:(updated or renamed or rename) and 
-not event.type:deletion and file.path:/etc/ld.so.preload
+host.os.type:linux and event.category:file and event.action:(updated or renamed or rename or file_rename_event) and 
+not event.type:deletion and file.path:/etc/ld.so.preload and not process.name:(wine or oneagentinstallaction)
 
 ----------------------------------
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/modification-of-environment-variable-via-launchctl.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/modification-of-environment-variable-via-launchctl.asciidoc
index c52e6e16b7..c3222bf5d8 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/modification-of-environment-variable-via-launchctl.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/modification-of-environment-variable-via-launchctl.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Identifies modifications to an environment variable using the built-in launchctl
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ Identifies modifications to an environment variable using the built-in launchctl
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,7 +77,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/modification-of-openssh-binaries.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/modification-of-openssh-binaries.asciidoc
index 662ff3b49a..c08159b37c 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/modification-of-openssh-binaries.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/modification-of-openssh-binaries.asciidoc
@@ -122,6 +122,9 @@ The detection rule 'Modification of OpenSSH Binaries' is designed to identify su
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
 - Elastic Defend
 - Auditbeat
@@ -168,7 +171,6 @@ Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit
 - For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/modification-of-safari-settings-via-defaults-command.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/modification-of-safari-settings-via-defaults-command.asciidoc
index 0235db7f1f..966a9f0f7a 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/modification-of-safari-settings-via-defaults-command.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/modification-of-safari-settings-via-defaults-command.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Identifies changes to the Safari configuration using the built-in defaults comma
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ Identifies changes to the Safari configuration using the built-in defaults comma
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,7 +77,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/modification-of-the-mspkiaccountcredentials.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/modification-of-the-mspkiaccountcredentials.asciidoc
index 1f18bbd157..ad64bceb5f 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/modification-of-the-mspkiaccountcredentials.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/modification-of-the-mspkiaccountcredentials.asciidoc
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Identify the modification of the msPKIAccountCredentials attribute in an Active
 * Tactic: Privilege Escalation
 * Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring
 
-*Version*: 8
+*Version*: 9
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ Identify the modification of the msPKIAccountCredentials attribute in an Active
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 The 'Audit Directory Service Changes' logging policy must be configured for (Success, Failure).
 Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/modification-of-wdigest-security-provider.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/modification-of-wdigest-security-provider.asciidoc
index f4340a75b5..ed8a5b5c15 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/modification-of-wdigest-security-provider.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/modification-of-wdigest-security-provider.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies attempts to modify the WDigest security provider in the registry to f
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: high
@@ -38,8 +38,9 @@ Identifies attempts to modify the WDigest security provider in the registry to f
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -107,11 +108,13 @@ Still, attackers can force WDigest to store the passwords insecurely on the memo
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/mounting-hidden-or-webdav-remote-shares.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/mounting-hidden-or-webdav-remote-shares.asciidoc
index a9bdb3d32e..60d5259384 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/mounting-hidden-or-webdav-remote-shares.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/mounting-hidden-or-webdav-remote-shares.asciidoc
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ Identifies the use of net.exe to mount a WebDav or hidden remote share. This may
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-windows.*
 * endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -34,7 +35,7 @@ Identifies the use of net.exe to mount a WebDav or hidden remote share. This may
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -47,6 +48,9 @@ Identifies the use of net.exe to mount a WebDav or hidden remote share. This may
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
@@ -60,7 +64,7 @@ For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
 process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
- ((process.name : "net.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name == "net.exe") or ((process.name : "net1.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name == "net1.exe") and
+ ((process.name : "net.exe" or ?process.pe.original_file_name == "net.exe") or ((process.name : "net1.exe" or ?process.pe.original_file_name == "net1.exe") and
  not process.parent.name : "net.exe")) and
  process.args : "use" and
  /* including hidden and webdav based online shares such as onedrive  */
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/ms-office-macro-security-registry-modifications.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/ms-office-macro-security-registry-modifications.asciidoc
index 407554a61a..5ee17df7ef 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/ms-office-macro-security-registry-modifications.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/ms-office-macro-security-registry-modifications.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Microsoft Office Products offer options for users and developers to control the
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
@@ -31,8 +31,9 @@ Microsoft Office Products offer options for users and developers to control the
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -102,10 +103,11 @@ This rule looks for registry changes affecting the conditions above.
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
+==== Setup
 
 
-==== Setup
 
+*Setup*
 
 
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/msbuild-making-network-connections.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/msbuild-making-network-connections.asciidoc
index d316dbd5ee..824594fe7f 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/msbuild-making-network-connections.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/msbuild-making-network-connections.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies MsBuild.exe making outbound network connections. This may indicate ad
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -31,8 +31,9 @@ Identifies MsBuild.exe making outbound network connections. This may indicate ad
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/mshta-making-network-connections.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/mshta-making-network-connections.asciidoc
index 3cb0770744..5c82f1f09b 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/mshta-making-network-connections.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/mshta-making-network-connections.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies Mshta.exe making outbound network connections. This may indicate adve
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -30,8 +30,9 @@ Identifies Mshta.exe making outbound network connections. This may indicate adve
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/multiple-logon-failure-followed-by-logon-success.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/multiple-logon-failure-followed-by-logon-success.asciidoc
index 0c0c2bccd3..09ba222aab 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/multiple-logon-failure-followed-by-logon-success.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/multiple-logon-failure-followed-by-logon-success.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies multiple logon failures followed by a successful one from the same so
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-system.security*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.forwarded*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Identifies multiple logon failures followed by a successful one from the same so
 * Tactic: Credential Access
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 
-*Version*: 9
+*Version*: 10
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -111,11 +111,13 @@ This rule identifies potential password guessing/brute force activity from a sin
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/multiple-logon-failure-from-the-same-source-address.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/multiple-logon-failure-from-the-same-source-address.asciidoc
index 40f53100d0..5c75382780 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/multiple-logon-failure-from-the-same-source-address.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/multiple-logon-failure-from-the-same-source-address.asciidoc
@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@ Identifies multiple consecutive logon failures from the same source address and
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-system.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-system.security*
+* logs-windows.forwarded*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Identifies multiple consecutive logon failures from the same source address and
 * Tactic: Credential Access
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 
-*Version*: 8
+*Version*: 9
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -115,11 +115,13 @@ This rule identifies potential password guessing/brute force activity from a sin
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 - In some cases the source network address in Windows events 4625/4624 is not populated due to Microsoft logging limitations (examples in the references links). This edge case will break the rule condition and it won't trigger an alert.
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/multiple-vault-web-credentials-read.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/multiple-vault-web-credentials-read.asciidoc
index 46ae02561a..149360ecba 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/multiple-vault-web-credentials-read.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/multiple-vault-web-credentials-read.asciidoc
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Windows Credential Manager allows you to create, view, or delete saved credentia
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Credential Access
 
-*Version*: 9
+*Version*: 10
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ Windows Credential Manager allows you to create, view, or delete saved credentia
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/my-first-rule.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/my-first-rule.asciidoc
index 0caffd9bf7..37f3bc07b9 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/my-first-rule.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/my-first-rule.asciidoc
@@ -7,15 +7,10 @@ This rule helps you test and practice using alerts with Elastic Security as you
 
 *Rule indices*: 
 
-* apm-*-transaction*
 * auditbeat-*
-* endgame-*
 * filebeat-*
 * logs-*
-* packetbeat-*
-* traces-apm*
 * winlogbeat-*
-* -*elastic-cloud-logs-*
 
 *Severity*: low
 
@@ -23,7 +18,7 @@ This rule helps you test and practice using alerts with Elastic Security as you
 
 *Runs every*: 24h
 
-*Searches indices from*: now-24h ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+*Searches indices from*: now-30m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
 
 *Maximum alerts per execution*: 1
 
@@ -34,11 +29,8 @@ This rule helps you test and practice using alerts with Elastic Security as you
 *Tags*: 
 
 * Use Case: Guided Onboarding
-* Data Source: APM
-* OS: Windows
-* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/namespace-manipulation-using-unshare.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/namespace-manipulation-using-unshare.asciidoc
index c26a4c5439..e527ba7243 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/namespace-manipulation-using-unshare.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/namespace-manipulation-using-unshare.asciidoc
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Identifies suspicious usage of unshare to manipulate system namespaces. Unshare
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 8
+*Version*: 9
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@ Identifies suspicious usage of unshare to manipulate system namespaces. Unshare
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
 - Elastic Defend
 - Auditbeat
@@ -94,7 +97,6 @@ Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit
 - For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
@@ -103,7 +105,7 @@ Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit
 process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action : ("exec", "exec_event") and
 process.executable: "/usr/bin/unshare" and
 not process.parent.executable: ("/usr/bin/udevadm", "*/lib/systemd/systemd-udevd", "/usr/bin/unshare") and
-not process.args : "/usr/bin/snap"
+not process.args == "/usr/bin/snap" and not process.parent.name in ("zz-proxmox-boot", "java")
 
 ----------------------------------
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/netcat-listener-established-via-rlwrap.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/netcat-listener-established-via-rlwrap.asciidoc
index 7125cb6659..1f2783cb6d 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/netcat-listener-established-via-rlwrap.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/netcat-listener-established-via-rlwrap.asciidoc
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ Monitors for the execution of a netcat listener via rlwrap. rlwrap is a 'readlin
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -75,13 +78,12 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and event.type == "start" and 
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and 
 process.name == "rlwrap" and process.args in ("nc", "ncat", "netcat", "nc.openbsd", "socat") and
 process.args : "*l*" and process.args_count >= 4
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-activity-detected-via-cat.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-activity-detected-via-cat.asciidoc
index cd3399ec33..42df1dd1c3 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-activity-detected-via-cat.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-activity-detected-via-cat.asciidoc
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ This rule monitors for the execution of the cat command, followed by a connectio
 * Tactic: Command and Control
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 5
+*Version*: 6
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -115,6 +115,10 @@ This rule looks for a sequence of a `cat` execution event followed by a network
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -151,7 +155,7 @@ For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
 sequence by host.id, process.entity_id with maxspan=1s
-  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "exec" and event.type == "start" and
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
    process.name == "cat" and process.parent.name in ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish")]
   [network where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("connection_attempted", "disconnect_received") and
    process.name == "cat" and not (destination.ip == null or destination.ip == "0.0.0.0" or cidrmatch(
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-activity-detected-via-kworker.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-activity-detected-via-kworker.asciidoc
index 76766ff22d..549366855d 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-activity-detected-via-kworker.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-activity-detected-via-kworker.asciidoc
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ This rule monitors for network connections from a kworker process. kworker, or k
 * Tactic: Command and Control
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ This rule monitors for network connections from a kworker process. kworker, or k
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -73,7 +76,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-connection-from-binary-with-rwx-memory-region.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-connection-from-binary-with-rwx-memory-region.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..416009582a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-connection-from-binary-with-rwx-memory-region.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+[[network-connection-from-binary-with-rwx-memory-region]]
+=== Network Connection from Binary with RWX Memory Region
+
+Monitors for the execution of a unix binary with read, write and execute memory region permissions, followed by a network connection. The mprotect() system call is used to change the access protections on a region of memory that has already been allocated. This syscall allows a process to modify the permissions of pages in its virtual address space, enabling or disabling permissions such as read, write, and execute for those pages. RWX permissions on memory is in many cases overly permissive, and should (especially in conjunction with an outbound network connection) be analyzed thoroughly.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/mprotect.2.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires the use of the `auditd_manager` integration. `Auditd_manager` is a tool designed to simplify and enhance the management of the audit subsystem in Linux systems. It provides a user-friendly interface and automation capabilities for configuring and monitoring system auditing through the auditd daemon. With `auditd_manager`, administrators can easily define audit rules, track system events, and generate comprehensive audit reports, improving overall security and compliance in the system. The following steps should be executed in order to install and deploy `auditd_manager` on a Linux system.
+```
+Kibana -->
+Management -->
+Integrations -->
+Auditd Manager -->
+Add Auditd Manager
+```
+`Auditd_manager` subscribes to the kernel and receives events as they occur without any additional configuration. However, if more advanced configuration is required to detect specific behavior, audit rules can be added to the integration in either the "audit rules" configuration box or the "auditd rule files" box by specifying a file to read the audit rules from.
+For this detection rule to trigger, the following additional audit rules are required to be added to the integration:
+```
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S mprotect
+```
+Add the newly installed `auditd manager` to an agent policy, and deploy the agent on a Linux system from which auditd log files are desirable.
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sample by host.id, process.pid, process.name
+  /* auditd.data.a2 == "7" translates to RWX memory region protection (PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC) */
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and auditd.data.syscall == "mprotect" and auditd.data.a2 == "7"]
+  [network where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "connection_attempted" and
+   not cidrmatch(destination.ip, "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "224.0.0.0/4", "::1")]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Unix Shell
+** ID: T1059.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Application Layer Protocol
+** ID: T1071
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-connection-via-certutil.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-connection-via-certutil.asciidoc
index 1b980fbd9b..2b752ea57e 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-connection-via-certutil.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-connection-via-certutil.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies certutil.exe making a network connection. Adversaries could abuse cer
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: low
 
@@ -34,8 +34,9 @@ Identifies certutil.exe making a network connection. Adversaries could abuse cer
 * Tactic: Command and Control
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-connection-via-compiled-html-file.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-connection-via-compiled-html-file.asciidoc
index 7bb9148669..4b1038c64e 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-connection-via-compiled-html-file.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-connection-via-compiled-html-file.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Compiled HTML files (.chm) are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTM
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: low
 
@@ -33,8 +33,9 @@ Compiled HTML files (.chm) are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTM
 * Tactic: Execution
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-connection-via-msxsl.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-connection-via-msxsl.asciidoc
index 1adcc94eef..074060b6f5 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-connection-via-msxsl.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-connection-via-msxsl.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies msxsl.exe making a network connection. This may indicate adversarial
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: low
 
@@ -32,8 +32,9 @@ Identifies msxsl.exe making a network connection. This may indicate adversarial
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 104
+*Version*: 105
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-connection-via-recently-compiled-executable.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-connection-via-recently-compiled-executable.asciidoc
index 220a0dd4aa..5416c9d218 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-connection-via-recently-compiled-executable.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-connection-via-recently-compiled-executable.asciidoc
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ This rule monitors a sequence involving a program compilation event followed by
 * Tactic: Execution
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 4
+*Version*: 5
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ This rule monitors a sequence involving a program compilation event followed by
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -72,17 +75,16 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
 sequence by host.id with maxspan=1m
-  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "exec" and event.type == "start" and 
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and 
    process.name in ("gcc", "g++", "cc")] by process.args
   [file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "creation" and process.name == "ld"] by file.name
-  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "exec" and event.type == "start"] by process.name
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec"] by process.name
   [network where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "connection_attempted" and destination.ip != null and 
    not cidrmatch(destination.ip, "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "224.0.0.0/4", "::1")] by process.name
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-connection-via-registration-utility.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-connection-via-registration-utility.asciidoc
index 8e97f62362..ed25d83a3a 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-connection-via-registration-utility.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-connection-via-registration-utility.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies the native Windows tools regsvr32.exe, regsvr64.exe, RegSvcs.exe, or
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: low
 
@@ -34,8 +34,9 @@ Identifies the native Windows tools regsvr32.exe, regsvr64.exe, RegSvcs.exe, or
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-connection-via-signed-binary.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-connection-via-signed-binary.asciidoc
index 214a2ef048..df4daa881a 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-connection-via-signed-binary.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-connection-via-signed-binary.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates can execute on Windows systems
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: low
 
@@ -33,8 +33,9 @@ Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates can execute on Windows systems
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-logon-provider-registry-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-logon-provider-registry-modification.asciidoc
index 04e2158f78..9dcb26dc8c 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-logon-provider-registry-modification.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-logon-provider-registry-modification.asciidoc
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ Identifies the modification of the network logon provider registry. Adversaries
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * endgame-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -34,8 +35,9 @@ Identifies the modification of the network logon provider registry. Adversaries
 * Tactic: Credential Access
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-traffic-capture-via-cap-net-raw.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-traffic-capture-via-cap-net-raw.asciidoc
index aafb751ac7..5bc3ca8590 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-traffic-capture-via-cap-net-raw.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-traffic-capture-via-cap-net-raw.asciidoc
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Identifies the ability of a process to be able to create RAW and PACKET socket t
 * Tactic: Discovery
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 1
+*Version*: 2
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -42,6 +42,10 @@ Identifies the ability of a process to be able to create RAW and PACKET socket t
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -72,13 +76,12 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-event.category:"process" and host.os.type:"linux" and event.action:"exec" and event.type:"start" and process.name:* and
+event.category:"process" and host.os.type:"linux" and event.type:"start" and event.action:"exec" and process.name:* and
 (process.thread.capabilities.effective:"CAP_NET_RAW" or process.thread.capabilities.permitted:"CAP_NET_RAW") and
 not user.id:"0"
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/new-activesyncalloweddeviceid-added-via-powershell.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/new-activesyncalloweddeviceid-added-via-powershell.asciidoc
index 4e0a1f4096..5f538f1922 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/new-activesyncalloweddeviceid-added-via-powershell.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/new-activesyncalloweddeviceid-added-via-powershell.asciidoc
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ Identifies the use of the Exchange PowerShell cmdlet, Set-CASMailbox, to add a n
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-windows.*
 * endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -37,7 +38,7 @@ Identifies the use of the Exchange PowerShell cmdlet, Set-CASMailbox, to add a n
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -50,6 +51,9 @@ Identifies the use of the Exchange PowerShell cmdlet, Set-CASMailbox, to add a n
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/new-or-modified-federation-domain.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/new-or-modified-federation-domain.asciidoc
index 2ba1b12d02..a5cf81b645 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/new-or-modified-federation-domain.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/new-or-modified-federation-domain.asciidoc
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Identifies a new or modified federation domain, which can be used to create a tr
 * Use Case: Identity and Access Audit
 * Tactic: Privilege Escalation
 
-*Version*: 103
+*Version*: 105
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/new-systemd-service-created-by-previously-unknown-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/new-systemd-service-created-by-previously-unknown-process.asciidoc
index b9e210d24a..56c9a3ff10 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/new-systemd-service-created-by-previously-unknown-process.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/new-systemd-service-created-by-previously-unknown-process.asciidoc
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Systemd service files are configuration files in Linux systems used to define an
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 8
+*Version*: 9
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -136,6 +136,9 @@ This rule monitors the creation of new systemd service files, potentially indica
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -166,7 +169,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/new-systemd-timer-created.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/new-systemd-timer-created.asciidoc
index 92f73e4008..b1dcab6ef3 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/new-systemd-timer-created.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/new-systemd-timer-created.asciidoc
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Detects the creation of a systemd timer within any of the default systemd timer
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 8
+*Version*: 9
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -117,11 +117,13 @@ This rule monitors the creation of new systemd timer files, potentially indicati
 - Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -152,7 +154,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/nping-process-activity.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/nping-process-activity.asciidoc
index 196e26a4f8..f486800ec3 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/nping-process-activity.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/nping-process-activity.asciidoc
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ Nping ran on a Linux host. Nping is part of the Nmap tool suite and has the abil
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
 - Elastic Defend
 - Auditbeat
@@ -95,14 +98,13 @@ Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit
 - For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started") and
-event.type == "start" and process.name == "nping"
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and process.name == "nping"
 
 ----------------------------------
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/ntds-or-sam-database-file-copied.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/ntds-or-sam-database-file-copied.asciidoc
index 5003bd0979..51cbadb96f 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/ntds-or-sam-database-file-copied.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/ntds-or-sam-database-file-copied.asciidoc
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ Identifies a copy operation of the Active Directory Domain Database (ntds.dit) o
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 110
+*Version*: 111
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -122,6 +122,9 @@ This rule identifies copy operations of these files using specific command-line
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/nullsessionpipe-registry-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/nullsessionpipe-registry-modification.asciidoc
index e6dc11ca07..3f92a257e5 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/nullsessionpipe-registry-modification.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/nullsessionpipe-registry-modification.asciidoc
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ Identifies NullSessionPipe registry modifications that specify which pipes can b
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * endgame-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -34,8 +35,9 @@ Identifies NullSessionPipe registry modifications that specify which pipes can b
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/o365-email-reported-by-user-as-malware-or-phish.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/o365-email-reported-by-user-as-malware-or-phish.asciidoc
index c991748edc..05617e51a8 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/o365-email-reported-by-user-as-malware-or-phish.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/o365-email-reported-by-user-as-malware-or-phish.asciidoc
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ Detects the occurrence of emails reported as Phishing or Malware by Users. Secur
 * Data Source: Microsoft 365
 * Tactic: Initial Access
 
-*Version*: 103
+*Version*: 105
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/o365-excessive-single-sign-on-logon-errors.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/o365-excessive-single-sign-on-logon-errors.asciidoc
index d016429c93..0326bb5dd9 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/o365-excessive-single-sign-on-logon-errors.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/o365-excessive-single-sign-on-logon-errors.asciidoc
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Identifies accounts with a high number of single sign-on (SSO) logon errors. Exc
 * Use Case: Identity and Access Audit
 * Tactic: Credential Access
 
-*Version*: 104
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/o365-exchange-suspicious-mailbox-right-delegation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/o365-exchange-suspicious-mailbox-right-delegation.asciidoc
index 90b8b2da07..82c8e076e9 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/o365-exchange-suspicious-mailbox-right-delegation.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/o365-exchange-suspicious-mailbox-right-delegation.asciidoc
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Identifies the assignment of rights to access content from another mailbox. An a
 * Use Case: Configuration Audit
 * Tactic: Persistence
 
-*Version*: 103
+*Version*: 105
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/o365-mailbox-audit-logging-bypass.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/o365-mailbox-audit-logging-bypass.asciidoc
index 672b744f45..da1864089e 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/o365-mailbox-audit-logging-bypass.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/o365-mailbox-audit-logging-bypass.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Detects the occurrence of mailbox audit bypass associations. The mailbox audit i
 * Tactic: Initial Access
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 
-*Version*: 103
+*Version*: 105
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/onedrive-malware-file-upload.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/onedrive-malware-file-upload.asciidoc
index cd54bcff5d..60993ef895 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/onedrive-malware-file-upload.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/onedrive-malware-file-upload.asciidoc
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ Identifies the occurence of files uploaded to OneDrive being detected as Malware
 * Data Source: Microsoft 365
 * Tactic: Lateral Movement
 
-*Version*: 103
+*Version*: 105
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/outbound-scheduled-task-activity-via-powershell.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/outbound-scheduled-task-activity-via-powershell.asciidoc
index fd97683b7c..445f267fec 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/outbound-scheduled-task-activity-via-powershell.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/outbound-scheduled-task-activity-via-powershell.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies the PowerShell process loading the Task Scheduler COM DLL followed by
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -32,8 +32,9 @@ Identifies the PowerShell process loading the Task Scheduler COM DLL followed by
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Execution
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -49,8 +50,8 @@ Identifies the PowerShell process loading the Task Scheduler COM DLL followed by
 ----------------------------------
 sequence by host.id, process.entity_id with maxspan = 5s
  [any where host.os.type == "windows" and (event.category == "library" or (event.category == "process" and event.action : "Image loaded*")) and
-  (dll.name : "taskschd.dll" or file.name : "taskschd.dll") and process.name : ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe")]
- [network where host.os.type == "windows" and process.name : ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe") and destination.port == 135 and not destination.address in ("127.0.0.1", "::1")]
+  (?dll.name : "taskschd.dll" or file.name : "taskschd.dll") and process.name : ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe")]
+ [network where host.os.type == "windows" and process.name : ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe") and destination.port == 135 and not destination.ip in ("127.0.0.1", "::1")]
 
 ----------------------------------
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/peripheral-device-discovery.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/peripheral-device-discovery.asciidoc
index c91fa1d157..cd37522fea 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/peripheral-device-discovery.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/peripheral-device-discovery.asciidoc
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ Identifies use of the Windows file system utility (fsutil.exe) to gather informa
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * logs-windows.*
 * endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
 
 *Severity*: low
 
@@ -34,7 +35,7 @@ Identifies use of the Windows file system utility (fsutil.exe) to gather informa
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -86,11 +87,13 @@ This rule looks for the execution of the `fsutil` utility with the `fsinfo` subc
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
@@ -104,7 +107,7 @@ For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
 process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
-  (process.name : "fsutil.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name == "fsutil.exe") and
+  (process.name : "fsutil.exe" or ?process.pe.original_file_name == "fsutil.exe") and
   process.args : "fsinfo" and process.args : "drives"
 
 ----------------------------------
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-bits-job-notify-cmdline.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-bits-job-notify-cmdline.asciidoc
index d2017f8f5c..95a2eefe44 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-bits-job-notify-cmdline.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-bits-job-notify-cmdline.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ An adversary can use the Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) SetNotif
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
@@ -37,8 +37,9 @@ An adversary can use the Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) SetNotif
 * Tactic: Persistence
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -51,6 +52,9 @@ An adversary can use the Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) SetNotif
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-directoryservice-plugin-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-directoryservice-plugin-modification.asciidoc
index e5c76fbe00..bf0ad12547 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-directoryservice-plugin-modification.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-directoryservice-plugin-modification.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Identifies the creation or modification of a DirectoryService PlugIns (dsplug) f
 * Tactic: Persistence
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ Identifies the creation or modification of a DirectoryService PlugIns (dsplug) f
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,7 +77,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-docker-shortcut-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-docker-shortcut-modification.asciidoc
index c4cc2a9cb8..05215a5f10 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-docker-shortcut-modification.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-docker-shortcut-modification.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ An adversary can establish persistence by modifying an existing macOS dock prope
 * Tactic: Persistence
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ An adversary can establish persistence by modifying an existing macOS dock prope
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,7 +77,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-folder-action-script.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-folder-action-script.asciidoc
index eb13f80bbc..447964ca05 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-folder-action-script.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-folder-action-script.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Detects modification of a Folder Action script. A Folder Action script is execut
 * Tactic: Persistence
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ Detects modification of a Folder Action script. A Folder Action script is execut
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -75,7 +78,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-hidden-run-key-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-hidden-run-key-detected.asciidoc
index 302156f3ec..6e86457351 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-hidden-run-key-detected.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-hidden-run-key-detected.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies a persistence mechanism that utilizes the NtSetValueKey native API to
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: high
@@ -37,8 +37,9 @@ Identifies a persistence mechanism that utilizes the NtSetValueKey native API to
 * Tactic: Execution
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -51,6 +52,9 @@ Identifies a persistence mechanism that utilizes the NtSetValueKey native API to
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-kde-autostart-script-or-desktop-file-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-kde-autostart-script-or-desktop-file-modification.asciidoc
index e7c72033b6..98c6941439 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-kde-autostart-script-or-desktop-file-modification.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-kde-autostart-script-or-desktop-file-modification.asciidoc
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Identifies the creation or modification of a K Desktop Environment (KDE) AutoSta
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -125,6 +125,9 @@ The detection rule 'Persistence via KDE AutoStart Script or Desktop File Modific
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
 - Elastic Defend
 - Auditbeat
@@ -176,7 +179,6 @@ Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit
 For versions <8.2, you need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate `event.ingested` with @timestamp for non-elastic-agent indexes, like auditbeats/filebeat/winlogbeat etc. For more details to add a custom ingest pipeline refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html[guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-login-or-logout-hook.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-login-or-logout-hook.asciidoc
index 0844689494..4f8036c9ab 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-login-or-logout-hook.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-login-or-logout-hook.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Identifies use of the Defaults command to install a login or logoff hook in MacO
 * Tactic: Persistence
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ Identifies use of the Defaults command to install a login or logoff hook in MacO
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -75,7 +78,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-microsoft-office-addins.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-microsoft-office-addins.asciidoc
index 3cb427fcf8..d3bbd610c5 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-microsoft-office-addins.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-microsoft-office-addins.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Detects attempts to establish persistence on an endpoint by abusing Microsoft Of
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: high
@@ -34,8 +34,9 @@ Detects attempts to establish persistence on an endpoint by abusing Microsoft Of
 * Tactic: Persistence
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -48,6 +49,9 @@ Detects attempts to establish persistence on an endpoint by abusing Microsoft Of
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-microsoft-outlook-vba.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-microsoft-outlook-vba.asciidoc
index 51556e7829..490a76056c 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-microsoft-outlook-vba.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-microsoft-outlook-vba.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Detects attempts to establish persistence on an endpoint by installing a rogue M
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
@@ -35,8 +35,9 @@ Detects attempts to establish persistence on an endpoint by installing a rogue M
 * Tactic: Persistence
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -49,6 +50,9 @@ Detects attempts to establish persistence on an endpoint by installing a rogue M
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-powershell-profile.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-powershell-profile.asciidoc
index 8946c677d1..05d8603552 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-powershell-profile.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-powershell-profile.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies the creation or modification of a PowerShell profile. PowerShell prof
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
@@ -36,8 +36,9 @@ Identifies the creation or modification of a PowerShell profile. PowerShell prof
 * Tactic: Privilege Escalation
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 7
+*Version*: 8
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-scheduled-job-creation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-scheduled-job-creation.asciidoc
index 373d71abc2..f4989e2eef 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-scheduled-job-creation.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-scheduled-job-creation.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ A job can be used to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
@@ -32,8 +32,9 @@ A job can be used to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified
 * Tactic: Persistence
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -46,6 +47,9 @@ A job can be used to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-telemetrycontroller-scheduled-task-hijack.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-telemetrycontroller-scheduled-task-hijack.asciidoc
index 438f0a533d..20bc79b324 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-telemetrycontroller-scheduled-task-hijack.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-telemetrycontroller-scheduled-task-hijack.asciidoc
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Detects the successful hijack of Microsoft Compatibility Appraiser scheduled tas
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -50,6 +50,9 @@ Detects the successful hijack of Microsoft Compatibility Appraiser scheduled tas
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-update-orchestrator-service-hijack.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-update-orchestrator-service-hijack.asciidoc
index 03523997b1..fa81153850 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-update-orchestrator-service-hijack.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-update-orchestrator-service-hijack.asciidoc
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ Identifies potential hijacking of the Microsoft Update Orchestrator Service to e
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -113,11 +113,13 @@ This rule will detect uncommon processes spawned by `svchost.exe` with `UsoSvc`
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-wmi-event-subscription.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-wmi-event-subscription.asciidoc
index 0f0cb581a1..d7b2ba3dff 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-wmi-event-subscription.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-wmi-event-subscription.asciidoc
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ An adversary can use Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to install event f
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -50,6 +50,9 @@ An adversary can use Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to install event f
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-wmi-standard-registry-provider.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-wmi-standard-registry-provider.asciidoc
index ed3e9e1385..8a122a9239 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-wmi-standard-registry-provider.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistence-via-wmi-standard-registry-provider.asciidoc
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Identifies use of the Windows Management Instrumentation StdRegProv (registry pr
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ This rule identifies instances where the WMI StdRegProv is used to modify specif
 registry where host.os.type == "windows" and
  registry.data.strings != null and process.name : "WmiPrvSe.exe" and
  registry.path : (
+                  "HKEY_USERS\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Command Processor\\Autorun",
                   "HKEY_USERS\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\*",
                   "HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\*",
                   "HKLM\\Software\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\*",
@@ -163,8 +164,7 @@ registry where host.os.type == "windows" and
                   "\\REGISTRY\\USER\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\\Scripts\\Startup\\Script",
                   "\\REGISTRY\\USER\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Ctf\\LangBarAddin\\*\\FilePath",
                   "\\REGISTRY\\USER\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Extensions\\*\\Exec",
-                  "\\REGISTRY\\USER\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Extensions\\*\\Script",
-                  "\\REGISTRY\\USER\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Command Processor\\Autorun"
+                  "\\REGISTRY\\USER\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Extensions\\*\\Script"
                   )
 
 ----------------------------------
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistent-scripts-in-the-startup-directory.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistent-scripts-in-the-startup-directory.asciidoc
index 758a880abc..bd79a8eaaa 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistent-scripts-in-the-startup-directory.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/persistent-scripts-in-the-startup-directory.asciidoc
@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@ Identifies script engines creating files in the Startup folder, or the creation
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-endpoint.events.file*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
@@ -33,8 +33,9 @@ Identifies script engines creating files in the Startup folder, or the creation
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -115,11 +116,13 @@ This rule looks for shortcuts created by wscript.exe or cscript.exe, or js/vbs s
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
@@ -132,7 +135,10 @@ For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type != "deletion" and user.domain != "NT AUTHORITY" and
+file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type != "deletion" and
+
+  file.extension : ("lnk", "vbs", "vbe", "wsh", "wsf", "js") and
+  not (startsWith(user.domain, "NT") or endsWith(user.domain, "NT")) and
 
   /* detect shortcuts created by wscript.exe or cscript.exe */
   (file.path : "C:\\*\\Programs\\Startup\\*.lnk" and
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/port-forwarding-rule-addition.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/port-forwarding-rule-addition.asciidoc
index 7d8570e1ba..81070c3fa5 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/port-forwarding-rule-addition.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/port-forwarding-rule-addition.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies the creation of a new port forwarding rule. An adversary may abuse th
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
@@ -36,8 +36,9 @@ Identifies the creation of a new port forwarding rule. An adversary may abuse th
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -101,10 +102,11 @@ This rule monitors the modifications to the `HKLM\SYSTEM\*ControlSet*\Services\P
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
+==== Setup
 
 
-==== Setup
 
+*Setup*
 
 
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/possible-consent-grant-attack-via-azure-registered-application.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/possible-consent-grant-attack-via-azure-registered-application.asciidoc
index 1290e040b2..a0540250c9 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/possible-consent-grant-attack-via-azure-registered-application.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/possible-consent-grant-attack-via-azure-registered-application.asciidoc
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Detects when a user grants permissions to an Azure-registered application or whe
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Tactic: Initial Access
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-admin-group-account-addition.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-admin-group-account-addition.asciidoc
index 0c60c3185c..b8d2ea76b3 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-admin-group-account-addition.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-admin-group-account-addition.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Identifies attempts to add an account to the admin group via the command line. T
 * Tactic: Privilege Escalation
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ Identifies attempts to add an account to the admin group via the command line. T
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,7 +77,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-antimalware-scan-interface-bypass-via-powershell.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-antimalware-scan-interface-bypass-via-powershell.asciidoc
index ee31bb75f1..5b490ba1a8 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-antimalware-scan-interface-bypass-via-powershell.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-antimalware-scan-interface-bypass-via-powershell.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Identifies the execution of PowerShell script with keywords related to different
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
 
 *Severity*: high
 
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Identifies the execution of PowerShell script with keywords related to different
 * Data Source: PowerShell Logs
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 
-*Version*: 7
+*Version*: 8
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-application-shimming-via-sdbinst.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-application-shimming-via-sdbinst.asciidoc
index 78df41dfc1..06c80a6a38 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-application-shimming-via-sdbinst.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-application-shimming-via-sdbinst.asciidoc
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ The Application Shim was created to allow for backward compatibility of software
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ The Application Shim was created to allow for backward compatibility of software
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-buffer-overflow-attack-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-buffer-overflow-attack-detected.asciidoc
index 5feba3df08..57af69941b 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-buffer-overflow-attack-detected.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-buffer-overflow-attack-detected.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Detects potential buffer overflow attacks by querying the "Segfault Detected" pr
 * Use Case: Vulnerability
 * Rule Type: Higher-Order Rule
 
-*Version*: 1
+*Version*: 2
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ Detects potential buffer overflow attacks by querying the "Segfault Detected" pr
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
+
 This rule leverages alert data from other prebuilt detection rules to function correctly. 
 
 
@@ -53,7 +57,6 @@ As a higher-order rule (based on other detections), this rule also requires the
 - Segfault Detected (5c81fc9d-1eae-437f-ba07-268472967013)
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-chroot-container-escape-via-mount.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-chroot-container-escape-via-mount.asciidoc
index e31d4aabc8..a87b06a1b3 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-chroot-container-escape-via-mount.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-chroot-container-escape-via-mount.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Monitors for the execution of a file system mount followed by a chroot execution
 * Domain: Container
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 1
+*Version*: 2
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +45,10 @@ Monitors for the execution of a file system mount followed by a chroot execution
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -86,17 +90,16 @@ Session View uses process data collected by the Elastic Defend integration, but
 For more information about the additional fields collected when this setting is enabled and the usage of Session View for Analysis refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/session-view.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
 sequence by host.id, process.parent.entity_id with maxspan=5m
-  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "exec" and event.type == "start" and
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
    process.name == "mount" and process.args : "/dev/sd*" and process.args_count >= 3 and
    process.parent.name in ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish")]
-  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "exec" and event.type == "start" and
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
    process.name == "chroot"]
 
 ----------------------------------
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-code-execution-via-postgresql.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-code-execution-via-postgresql.asciidoc
index 61b1f5374a..fa44cbb628 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-code-execution-via-postgresql.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-code-execution-via-postgresql.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ This rule monitors for suspicious activities that may indicate an attacker attem
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 5
+*Version*: 6
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ This rule monitors for suspicious activities that may indicate an attacker attem
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,14 +77,13 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "fork", "fork_event") and 
-event.type == "start" and user.name == "postgres" and (
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "fork", "fork_event") and 
+user.name == "postgres" and (
   (process.parent.args : "*sh" and process.parent.args : "echo*") or 
   (process.args : "*sh" and process.args : "echo*")
 ) and not process.parent.name : "puppet"
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-command-and-control-via-internet-explorer.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-command-and-control-via-internet-explorer.asciidoc
index 4ac17fc295..7501278ad7 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-command-and-control-via-internet-explorer.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-command-and-control-via-internet-explorer.asciidoc
@@ -7,9 +7,7 @@ Identifies instances of Internet Explorer (iexplore.exe) being started via the C
 
 *Rule indices*: 
 
-* winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -31,7 +29,7 @@ Identifies instances of Internet Explorer (iexplore.exe) being started via the C
 * Tactic: Command and Control
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 104
+*Version*: 105
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-cookies-theft-via-browser-debugging.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-cookies-theft-via-browser-debugging.asciidoc
index 8654decd20..3d25f16eb5 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-cookies-theft-via-browser-debugging.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-cookies-theft-via-browser-debugging.asciidoc
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ Identifies the execution of a Chromium based browser with the debugging process
 * Tactic: Credential Access
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 104
+*Version*: 105
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -52,6 +52,9 @@ Identifies the execution of a Chromium based browser with the debugging process
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-credential-access-via-dcsync.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-credential-access-via-dcsync.asciidoc
index ab4ccb9412..be7eca8a29 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-credential-access-via-dcsync.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-credential-access-via-dcsync.asciidoc
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ This rule identifies when a User Account starts the Active Directory Replication
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring
 
-*Version*: 112
+*Version*: 113
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -101,11 +101,13 @@ This rule monitors for Event ID 4662 (Operation was performed on an Active Direc
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 The 'Audit Directory Service Access' logging policy must be configured for (Success, Failure).
 Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-credential-access-via-duplicatehandle-in-lsass.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-credential-access-via-duplicatehandle-in-lsass.asciidoc
index 40be6aa2c4..fa473d1124 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-credential-access-via-duplicatehandle-in-lsass.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-credential-access-via-duplicatehandle-in-lsass.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Identifies suspicious access to an LSASS handle via DuplicateHandle from an unkn
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -30,9 +30,9 @@ Identifies suspicious access to an LSASS handle via DuplicateHandle from an unkn
 * OS: Windows
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Credential Access
-* Data Source: Sysmon Only
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 207
+*Version*: 208
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ Identifies suspicious access to an LSASS handle via DuplicateHandle from an unkn
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-credential-access-via-lsass-memory-dump.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-credential-access-via-lsass-memory-dump.asciidoc
index 4812de6f24..d5a44cdaa0 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-credential-access-via-lsass-memory-dump.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-credential-access-via-lsass-memory-dump.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Identifies suspicious access to LSASS handle from a call trace pointing to DBGHe
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: high
 
@@ -32,9 +32,9 @@ Identifies suspicious access to LSASS handle from a call trace pointing to DBGHe
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Credential Access
 * Tactic:Execution
-* Data Source: Sysmon Only
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 208
+*Version*: 209
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ Identifies suspicious access to LSASS handle from a call trace pointing to DBGHe
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-credential-access-via-renamed-com-services-dll.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-credential-access-via-renamed-com-services-dll.asciidoc
index c919fb5b37..ff275568ca 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-credential-access-via-renamed-com-services-dll.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-credential-access-via-renamed-com-services-dll.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Identifies suspicious renamed COMSVCS.DLL Image Load, which exports the MiniDump
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: high
 
@@ -31,9 +31,9 @@ Identifies suspicious renamed COMSVCS.DLL Image Load, which exports the MiniDump
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Credential Access
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
-* Data Source: Sysmon Only
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -124,6 +124,9 @@ This rule identifies suspicious instances of rundll32.exe loading a renamed COMS
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 You will need to enable logging of ImageLoads in your Sysmon configuration to include COMSVCS.DLL by Imphash or Original
 File Name.
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-credential-access-via-trusted-developer-utility.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-credential-access-via-trusted-developer-utility.asciidoc
index aad77b5849..6a549e0148 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-credential-access-via-trusted-developer-utility.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-credential-access-via-trusted-developer-utility.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, loaded DLLs (dynamically lin
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: high
 
@@ -32,8 +32,9 @@ An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, loaded DLLs (dynamically lin
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -117,7 +118,7 @@ This rule looks for the MSBuild process loading `vaultcli.dll` or `SAMLib.DLL`,
 sequence by process.entity_id
  [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and (process.name : "MSBuild.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name == "MSBuild.exe")]
  [any where host.os.type == "windows" and (event.category == "library" or (event.category == "process" and event.action : "Image loaded*")) and
-  (dll.name : ("vaultcli.dll", "SAMLib.DLL") or file.name : ("vaultcli.dll", "SAMLib.DLL"))]
+  (?dll.name : ("vaultcli.dll", "SAMLib.DLL") or file.name : ("vaultcli.dll", "SAMLib.DLL"))]
 
 ----------------------------------
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-credential-access-via-windows-utilities.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-credential-access-via-windows-utilities.asciidoc
index beffbc3320..995aa162f5 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-credential-access-via-windows-utilities.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-credential-access-via-windows-utilities.asciidoc
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ Identifies the execution of known Windows utilities often abused to dump LSASS m
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * logs-windows.*
 * endgame-*
-* logs-system.*
+* logs-system.security*
 
 *Severity*: high
 
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ Identifies the execution of known Windows utilities often abused to dump LSASS m
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 110
+*Version*: 111
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -95,11 +95,13 @@ This rule looks for the execution of utilities that can extract credential data
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
@@ -115,34 +117,34 @@ For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.
 process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
 (
   (
-    (process.pe.original_file_name : "procdump" or process.name : "procdump.exe") and process.args : "-ma"
+    (?process.pe.original_file_name : "procdump" or process.name : "procdump.exe") and process.args : "-ma"
   ) or
   (
     process.name : "ProcessDump.exe" and not process.parent.executable regex~ """C:\\Program Files( \(x86\))?\\Cisco Systems\\.*"""
   ) or
   (
-    (process.pe.original_file_name : "WriteMiniDump.exe" or process.name : "WriteMiniDump.exe") and
+    (?process.pe.original_file_name : "WriteMiniDump.exe" or process.name : "WriteMiniDump.exe") and
       not process.parent.executable regex~ """C:\\Program Files( \(x86\))?\\Steam\\.*"""
   ) or
   (
-    (process.pe.original_file_name : "RUNDLL32.EXE" or process.name : "RUNDLL32.exe") and
+    (?process.pe.original_file_name : "RUNDLL32.EXE" or process.name : "RUNDLL32.exe") and
       (process.args : "MiniDump*" or process.command_line : "*comsvcs.dll*#24*")
   ) or
   (
-    (process.pe.original_file_name : "RdrLeakDiag.exe" or process.name : "RdrLeakDiag.exe") and
+    (?process.pe.original_file_name : "RdrLeakDiag.exe" or process.name : "RdrLeakDiag.exe") and
       process.args : "/fullmemdmp"
   ) or
   (
-    (process.pe.original_file_name : "SqlDumper.exe" or process.name : "SqlDumper.exe") and
+    (?process.pe.original_file_name : "SqlDumper.exe" or process.name : "SqlDumper.exe") and
       process.args : "0x01100*") or
   (
-    (process.pe.original_file_name : "TTTracer.exe" or process.name : "TTTracer.exe") and
+    (?process.pe.original_file_name : "TTTracer.exe" or process.name : "TTTracer.exe") and
       process.args : "-dumpFull" and process.args : "-attach") or
   (
-    (process.pe.original_file_name : "ntdsutil.exe" or process.name : "ntdsutil.exe") and
+    (?process.pe.original_file_name : "ntdsutil.exe" or process.name : "ntdsutil.exe") and
       process.args : "create*full*") or
   (
-    (process.pe.original_file_name : "diskshadow.exe" or process.name : "diskshadow.exe") and process.args : "/s")
+    (?process.pe.original_file_name : "diskshadow.exe" or process.name : "diskshadow.exe") and process.args : "/s")
 )
 
 ----------------------------------
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-curl-cve-2023-38545-exploitation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-curl-cve-2023-38545-exploitation.asciidoc
index f26e972839..1e3308a4c3 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-curl-cve-2023-38545-exploitation.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-curl-cve-2023-38545-exploitation.asciidoc
@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ Detects potential exploitation of curl CVE-2023-38545 by monitoring for vulnerab
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -90,13 +93,12 @@ After saving the integration change, the Elastic Agents running this policy will
 For more information on capturing environment variables refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/environment-variable-capture.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "exec" and event.type == "start" and process.name == "curl" 
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and process.name == "curl" 
 and (
   process.args : ("--socks5-hostname", "--proxy", "--preproxy", "socks5*") or 
   process.env_vars: ("http_proxy=socks5h://*", "HTTPS_PROXY=socks5h://*", "ALL_PROXY=socks5h://*")
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-destination-port.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-destination-port.asciidoc
index c669b849f2..8b9714d938 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-destination-port.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-destination-port.asciidoc
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ A machine learning job has detected data exfiltration to a particular destinatio
 * Rule Type: Machine Learning
 * Tactic: Exfiltration
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -42,6 +42,10 @@ A machine learning job has detected data exfiltration to a particular destinatio
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 The rule requires the Data Exfiltration Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as network and file events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend and Network Packet Capture (for network events only).  
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-ip-address.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-ip-address.asciidoc
index e1a584897d..5732f82689 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-ip-address.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-ip-address.asciidoc
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ A machine learning job has detected data exfiltration to a particular geo-locati
 * Rule Type: Machine Learning
 * Tactic: Exfiltration
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -42,6 +42,10 @@ A machine learning job has detected data exfiltration to a particular geo-locati
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 The rule requires the Data Exfiltration Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as network and file events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend and Network Packet Capture (for network events only).  
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-iso-code.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-iso-code.asciidoc
index 8df728c22d..e5508212fd 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-iso-code.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-iso-code.asciidoc
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ A machine learning job has detected data exfiltration to a particular geo-locati
 * Rule Type: Machine Learning
 * Tactic: Exfiltration
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -42,6 +42,10 @@ A machine learning job has detected data exfiltration to a particular geo-locati
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 The rule requires the Data Exfiltration Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as network and file events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend and Network Packet Capture (for network events only).  
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-region.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-region.asciidoc
index f0afd036f6..850bec3f0f 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-region.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-data-exfiltration-activity-to-an-unusual-region.asciidoc
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ A machine learning job has detected data exfiltration to a particular geo-locati
 * Rule Type: Machine Learning
 * Tactic: Exfiltration
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -42,6 +42,10 @@ A machine learning job has detected data exfiltration to a particular geo-locati
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 The rule requires the Data Exfiltration Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as network and file events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend and Network Packet Capture (for network events only).  
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-defense-evasion-via-proot.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-defense-evasion-via-proot.asciidoc
index dfba733c9b..261b8f8e6c 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-defense-evasion-via-proot.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-defense-evasion-via-proot.asciidoc
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Identifies the execution of the PRoot utility, an open-source tool for user-spac
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 
-*Version*: 6
+*Version*: 7
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ Identifies the execution of the PRoot utility, an open-source tool for user-spac
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -76,13 +79,13 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and process.parent.name == "proot"
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and
+process.parent.name == "proot"
 
 ----------------------------------
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-dga-activity.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-dga-activity.asciidoc
index 924e7f163a..a82b558f4c 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-dga-activity.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-dga-activity.asciidoc
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ A population analysis machine learning job detected potential DGA (domain genera
 * Rule Type: Machine Learning
 * Tactic: Command and Control
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -42,6 +42,10 @@ A population analysis machine learning job detected potential DGA (domain genera
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 The rule requires the Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as DNS events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend, Network Packet Capture, or Packetbeat.  
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-disabling-of-apparmor.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-disabling-of-apparmor.asciidoc
index 4b057ee3ec..4bf1f8219d 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-disabling-of-apparmor.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-disabling-of-apparmor.asciidoc
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ This rule monitors for potential attempts to disable AppArmor. AppArmor is a Lin
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Auditd Manager
 
-*Version*: 5
+*Version*: 6
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ This rule monitors for potential attempts to disable AppArmor. AppArmor is a Lin
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -77,14 +80,13 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started") and
-event.type == "start" and (
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and (
   (process.name == "systemctl" and process.args == "disable" and process.args == "apparmor") or
   (process.name == "ln" and process.args : "/etc/apparmor.d/*" and process.args == "/etc/apparmor.d/disable/")
 )
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-disabling-of-selinux.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-disabling-of-selinux.asciidoc
index 9b6dbc15e8..201f7550b3 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-disabling-of-selinux.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-disabling-of-selinux.asciidoc
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Identifies potential attempts to disable Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux), whic
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 * Data Source: Auditd Manager
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ Identifies potential attempts to disable Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux), whic
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
 - Elastic Defend
 - Auditbeat
@@ -93,14 +96,13 @@ Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit
 - For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started") and
-event.type == "start" and process.name == "setenforce" and process.args == "0"
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and process.name == "setenforce" and process.args == "0"
 
 ----------------------------------
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-dll-side-loading-via-microsoft-antimalware-service-executable.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-dll-side-loading-via-microsoft-antimalware-service-executable.asciidoc
index 53a7fe2dbd..0dc7754bc8 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-dll-side-loading-via-microsoft-antimalware-service-executable.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-dll-side-loading-via-microsoft-antimalware-service-executable.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies a Windows trusted program that is known to be vulnerable to DLL Searc
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: high
@@ -35,8 +35,9 @@ Identifies a Windows trusted program that is known to be vulnerable to DLL Searc
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Tactic: Execution
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -50,6 +51,9 @@ Identifies a Windows trusted program that is known to be vulnerable to DLL Searc
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-dll-side-loading-via-trusted-microsoft-programs.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-dll-side-loading-via-trusted-microsoft-programs.asciidoc
index 65bfcdd52b..0660188161 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-dll-side-loading-via-trusted-microsoft-programs.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-dll-side-loading-via-trusted-microsoft-programs.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies an instance of a Windows trusted program that is known to be vulnerab
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: high
@@ -33,8 +33,9 @@ Identifies an instance of a Windows trusted program that is known to be vulnerab
 * Tactic: Execution
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -47,6 +48,9 @@ Identifies an instance of a Windows trusted program that is known to be vulnerab
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-evasion-via-filter-manager.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-evasion-via-filter-manager.asciidoc
index 386ab36f22..f2d6ea16ae 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-evasion-via-filter-manager.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-evasion-via-filter-manager.asciidoc
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ The Filter Manager Control Program (fltMC.exe) binary may be abused by adversari
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * logs-windows.*
 * endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -34,7 +35,7 @@ The Filter Manager Control Program (fltMC.exe) binary may be abused by adversari
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-evasion-via-windows-filtering-platform.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-evasion-via-windows-filtering-platform.asciidoc
index 8cf0b4372e..ae4c40a8b3 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-evasion-via-windows-filtering-platform.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-evasion-via-windows-filtering-platform.asciidoc
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Identifies multiple Windows Filtering Platform block events and where the proces
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 1
+*Version*: 2
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -50,6 +50,9 @@ Identifies multiple Windows Filtering Platform block events and where the proces
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 The 'Filtering Platform Connection' logging policy must be configured for (Success, Failure).
 Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-external-linux-ssh-brute-force-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-external-linux-ssh-brute-force-detected.asciidoc
index 5c34e4f1fe..bde0289981 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-external-linux-ssh-brute-force-detected.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-external-linux-ssh-brute-force-detected.asciidoc
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ Identifies multiple external consecutive login failures targeting a user account
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Credential Access
 
-*Version*: 5
+*Version*: 6
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -90,11 +90,13 @@ In case this rule generates too much noise and external brute forcing is of not
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Filebeat.
 
 
@@ -120,7 +122,6 @@ Filebeat is a lightweight shipper for forwarding and centralizing log data. Inst
 - To run the system module of Filebeat on Linux follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-system.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-hidden-local-user-account-creation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-hidden-local-user-account-creation.asciidoc
index 297533d112..d70a02e17a 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-hidden-local-user-account-creation.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-hidden-local-user-account-creation.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Identifies attempts to create a local account that will be hidden from the macOS
 * Tactic: Persistence
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ Identifies attempts to create a local account that will be hidden from the macOS
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,7 +77,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-hidden-process-via-mount-hidepid.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-hidden-process-via-mount-hidepid.asciidoc
index b7d1ee2f0e..7b0c90cefe 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-hidden-process-via-mount-hidepid.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-hidden-process-via-mount-hidepid.asciidoc
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Identifies the execution of mount process with hidepid parameter, which can make
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 * Data Source: Auditd Manager
 
-*Version*: 7
+*Version*: 8
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ Identifies the execution of mount process with hidepid parameter, which can make
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -79,14 +82,13 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started") and
-event.type == "start" and process.name == "mount" and process.args == "/proc" and process.args == "-o" and
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and process.name == "mount" and process.args == "/proc" and process.args == "-o" and
 process.args : "*hidepid=2*"
 
 ----------------------------------
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-internal-linux-ssh-brute-force-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-internal-linux-ssh-brute-force-detected.asciidoc
index c90230fab4..ae0f1d9c92 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-internal-linux-ssh-brute-force-detected.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-internal-linux-ssh-brute-force-detected.asciidoc
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ Identifies multiple internal consecutive login failures targeting a user account
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Credential Access
 
-*Version*: 9
+*Version*: 10
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -86,11 +86,13 @@ The rule identifies consecutive internal SSH login failures targeting a user acc
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Filebeat.
 
 
@@ -116,7 +118,6 @@ Filebeat is a lightweight shipper for forwarding and centralizing log data. Inst
 - To run the system module of Filebeat on Linux follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-system.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-invoke-mimikatz-powershell-script.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-invoke-mimikatz-powershell-script.asciidoc
index 9ff52f6e15..6199ec9bd6 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-invoke-mimikatz-powershell-script.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-invoke-mimikatz-powershell-script.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account l
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
 
 *Severity*: high
 
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account l
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: PowerShell Logs
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -106,14 +106,16 @@ More information about Mimikatz components and how to detect/prevent them can be
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be configured (Enable).
 
-Steps to implement the logging policy with with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
 ```
 Computer Configuration >
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-kerberos-attack-via-bifrost.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-kerberos-attack-via-bifrost.asciidoc
index 507a6d81c8..1a3043f387 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-kerberos-attack-via-bifrost.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-kerberos-attack-via-bifrost.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Identifies use of Bifrost, a known macOS Kerberos pentesting tool, which can be
 * Tactic: Lateral Movement
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ Identifies use of Bifrost, a known macOS Kerberos pentesting tool, which can be
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -75,7 +78,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-linux-backdoor-user-account-creation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-linux-backdoor-user-account-creation.asciidoc
index 3e55a2e9aa..6f32d63d6e 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-linux-backdoor-user-account-creation.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-linux-backdoor-user-account-creation.asciidoc
@@ -105,11 +105,13 @@ This rule identifies the usage of the `usermod` command to set a user's UID to 0
 - Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -140,14 +142,13 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started") and
-event.type == "start" and process.name == "usermod" and process.args : "-u" and process.args : "0" and process.args : "-o"
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and process.name == "usermod" and process.args : "-u" and process.args : "0" and process.args : "-o"
 
 ----------------------------------
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-linux-credential-dumping-via-proc-filesystem.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-linux-credential-dumping-via-proc-filesystem.asciidoc
index 600ffee2d9..1a32bf7114 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-linux-credential-dumping-via-proc-filesystem.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-linux-credential-dumping-via-proc-filesystem.asciidoc
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Identifies the execution of the mimipenguin exploit script which is linux adapta
 * Use Case: Vulnerability
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 6
+*Version*: 7
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ Identifies the execution of the mimipenguin exploit script which is linux adapta
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -76,7 +79,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-linux-credential-dumping-via-unshadow.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-linux-credential-dumping-via-unshadow.asciidoc
index de7e2fa928..6b40bf3987 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-linux-credential-dumping-via-unshadow.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-linux-credential-dumping-via-unshadow.asciidoc
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Identifies the execution of the unshadow utility which is part of John the Rippe
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 
-*Version*: 7
+*Version*: 8
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ Identifies the execution of the unshadow utility which is part of John the Rippe
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -76,7 +79,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-linux-hack-tool-launched.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-linux-hack-tool-launched.asciidoc
index 9b73b64974..4ce00f7366 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-linux-hack-tool-launched.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-linux-hack-tool-launched.asciidoc
@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ Monitors for the execution of different processes that might be used by attacker
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -78,14 +81,13 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started") and
-event.type == "start" and process.name in (
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and process.name in (
   // exploitation frameworks
   "crackmapexec", "msfconsole", "msfvenom", "sliver-client", "sliver-server", "havoc",
   // network scanners (nmap left out to reduce noise)
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-linux-local-account-brute-force-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-linux-local-account-brute-force-detected.asciidoc
index 4371adbfca..40ef5e0325 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-linux-local-account-brute-force-detected.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-linux-local-account-brute-force-detected.asciidoc
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Identifies multiple consecutive login attempts executed by one process targeting
 * Tactic: Credential Access
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 5
+*Version*: 6
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ Identifies multiple consecutive login attempts executed by one process targeting
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -72,7 +75,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-linux-ransomware-note-creation-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-linux-ransomware-note-creation-detected.asciidoc
index 6a395557bb..f6d89f4886 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-linux-ransomware-note-creation-detected.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-linux-ransomware-note-creation-detected.asciidoc
@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ This rule identifies a sequence of a mass file encryption event in conjunction w
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -72,7 +75,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-linux-ssh-x11-forwarding.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-linux-ssh-x11-forwarding.asciidoc
index 8d5ed15d88..5b94873e2f 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-linux-ssh-x11-forwarding.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-linux-ssh-x11-forwarding.asciidoc
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ This rule monitors for X11 forwarding via SSH. X11 forwarding is a feature that
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: low
 
@@ -30,9 +31,10 @@ This rule monitors for X11 forwarding via SSH. X11 forwarding is a feature that
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Command and Control
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Rule Type: BBR
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -121,7 +123,7 @@ This rule looks for the execution of SSH in conjunction with command line argume
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "exec" and event.type == "start" and
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and
 process.name in ("ssh", "sshd") and process.args in ("-X", "-Y") and process.args_count >= 3 and 
 process.parent.name in ("bash", "dash", "ash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish")
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-linux-tunneling-and-or-port-forwarding.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-linux-tunneling-and-or-port-forwarding.asciidoc
index 3ebb5c7a36..92c78598dc 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-linux-tunneling-and-or-port-forwarding.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-linux-tunneling-and-or-port-forwarding.asciidoc
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ This rule monitors for a set of Linux utilities that can be used for tunneling a
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 
-*Version*: 5
+*Version*: 6
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -125,6 +125,10 @@ This rule looks for several utilities that are capable of setting up tunnel netw
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -160,8 +164,7 @@ For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and
-event.type == "start" and (
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and (
   (
     // gost & pivotnacci - spawned without process.parent.name
     (process.name == "gost" and process.args : ("-L*", "-C*", "-R*")) or (process.name == "pivotnacci")) or (
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-local-ntlm-relay-via-http.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-local-ntlm-relay-via-http.asciidoc
index 23b998dc0f..d6cc21912c 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-local-ntlm-relay-via-http.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-local-ntlm-relay-via-http.asciidoc
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ Identifies attempt to coerce a local NTLM authentication via HTTP using the Wind
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * logs-windows.*
 * endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
 
 *Severity*: high
 
@@ -38,7 +39,7 @@ Identifies attempt to coerce a local NTLM authentication via HTTP using the Wind
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-lsass-clone-creation-via-psscapturesnapshot.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-lsass-clone-creation-via-psscapturesnapshot.asciidoc
index 8056cd546a..5064c3c7cf 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-lsass-clone-creation-via-psscapturesnapshot.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-lsass-clone-creation-via-psscapturesnapshot.asciidoc
@@ -32,9 +32,9 @@ Identifies the creation of an LSASS process clone via PssCaptureSnapShot where t
 * OS: Windows
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Credential Access
-* Data Source: Sysmon Only
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ Identifies the creation of an LSASS process clone via PssCaptureSnapShot where t
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This is meant to run only on datasources using Windows security event 4688 that captures the process clone creation.
 
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-lsass-memory-dump-via-psscapturesnapshot.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-lsass-memory-dump-via-psscapturesnapshot.asciidoc
index 6ff990b0e3..02c1ff15ea 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-lsass-memory-dump-via-psscapturesnapshot.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-lsass-memory-dump-via-psscapturesnapshot.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Identifies suspicious access to an LSASS handle via PssCaptureSnapShot where two
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: high
 
@@ -31,9 +31,9 @@ Identifies suspicious access to an LSASS handle via PssCaptureSnapShot where two
 * OS: Windows
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Credential Access
-* Data Source: Sysmon Only
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 207
+*Version*: 208
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ Identifies suspicious access to an LSASS handle via PssCaptureSnapShot where two
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This is meant to run only on datasources using Elastic Agent 7.14+ since versions prior to that will be missing the threshold
 rule cardinality feature.
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-macos-ssh-brute-force-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-macos-ssh-brute-force-detected.asciidoc
index 3310913e08..223b1fdcfd 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-macos-ssh-brute-force-detected.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-macos-ssh-brute-force-detected.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Identifies a high number (20) of macOS SSH KeyGen process executions from the sa
 * Tactic: Credential Access
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ Identifies a high number (20) of macOS SSH KeyGen process executions from the sa
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,7 +77,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-memory-seeking-activity.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-memory-seeking-activity.asciidoc
index f419f315b3..d0198ceb40 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-memory-seeking-activity.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-memory-seeking-activity.asciidoc
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Monitors for the execution of Unix utilities that may be leveraged as memory add
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 
-*Version*: 1
+*Version*: 2
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ Monitors for the execution of Unix utilities that may be leveraged as memory add
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and event.type == "start" and (
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and (
   (process.name == "tail" and process.args == "-c") or
   (process.name == "cmp" and process.args == "-i") or
   (process.name in ("hexdump", "xxd") and process.args == "-s") or
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-meterpreter-reverse-shell.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-meterpreter-reverse-shell.asciidoc
index 58b7348b8b..ef9100a151 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-meterpreter-reverse-shell.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-meterpreter-reverse-shell.asciidoc
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ This detection rule identifies a sample of suspicious Linux system file reads us
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Execution
 
-*Version*: 5
+*Version*: 6
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ This detection rule identifies a sample of suspicious Linux system file reads us
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
 - Auditbeat
 - Auditd Manager
@@ -90,7 +93,6 @@ However, if more advanced configuration is required to detect specific behavior,
   -w /etc/passwd -p wa -k passwd
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-microsoft-office-sandbox-evasion.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-microsoft-office-sandbox-evasion.asciidoc
index 85bdee4853..03cc2b19ca 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-microsoft-office-sandbox-evasion.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-microsoft-office-sandbox-evasion.asciidoc
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Identifies the creation of a suspicious zip file prepended with special characte
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ Identifies the creation of a suspicious zip file prepended with special characte
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -76,7 +79,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-modification-of-accessibility-binaries.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-modification-of-accessibility-binaries.asciidoc
index 38147d2745..233753e166 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-modification-of-accessibility-binaries.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-modification-of-accessibility-binaries.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combinat
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: high
@@ -35,8 +35,9 @@ Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combinat
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -113,10 +114,11 @@ This rule looks for the execution of supposed accessibility binaries that don't
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
+==== Setup
 
 
-==== Setup
 
+*Setup*
 
 
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-network-scan-executed-from-host.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-network-scan-executed-from-host.asciidoc
index 1d176490f5..cf7707acc6 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-network-scan-executed-from-host.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-network-scan-executed-from-host.asciidoc
@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ This threshold rule monitors for the rapid execution of unix utilities that are
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -78,7 +81,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-non-standard-port-http-https-connection.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-non-standard-port-http-https-connection.asciidoc
index 56166f2205..ef179542d9 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-non-standard-port-http-https-connection.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-non-standard-port-http-https-connection.asciidoc
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ Identifies potentially malicious processes communicating via a port paring typic
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: low
 
@@ -30,8 +31,9 @@ Identifies potentially malicious processes communicating via a port paring typic
 * Tactic: Command and Control
 * Rule Type: BBR
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 
-*Version*: 3
+*Version*: 4
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -119,10 +121,9 @@ This rule looks for HTTP/HTTPS processes where the destination port is not any o
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-network where process.name : ("http", "https")
-  and destination.port not in (80, 443)
-  and event.action in ("connection_attempted", "connection_accepted")
-  and destination.ip != "127.0.0.1"
+network where process.name : ("http", "https") and destination.port not in (80, 443) and event.action in (
+  "connection_attempted", "ipv4_connection_attempt_event", "connection_accepted", "ipv4_connection_accept_event"
+) and destination.ip != "127.0.0.1"
 
 ----------------------------------
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-okta-mfa-bombing-via-push-notifications.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-okta-mfa-bombing-via-push-notifications.asciidoc
index 5cf111126e..b7fa21b76b 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-okta-mfa-bombing-via-push-notifications.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-okta-mfa-bombing-via-push-notifications.asciidoc
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Detects when an attacker abuses the Multi-Factor authentication mechanism by rep
 * Tactic: Credential Access
 * Data Source: Okta
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -93,6 +93,10 @@ This rule detects when a user denies MFA Okta Verify push notifications twice, f
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 The Okta Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-openssh-backdoor-logging-activity.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-openssh-backdoor-logging-activity.asciidoc
index 86c8d2702d..376f5997d7 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-openssh-backdoor-logging-activity.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-openssh-backdoor-logging-activity.asciidoc
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Identifies a Secure Shell (SSH) client or server process creating or writing to
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ Identifies a Secure Shell (SSH) client or server process creating or writing to
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
 - Elastic Defend
 - Auditbeat
@@ -100,7 +103,6 @@ Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit
 For versions <8.2, you need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate `event.ingested` with @timestamp for non-elastic-agent indexes, like auditbeats/filebeat/winlogbeat etc. For more details to add a custom ingest pipeline refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html[guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-password-spraying-of-microsoft-365-user-accounts.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-password-spraying-of-microsoft-365-user-accounts.asciidoc
index 8fcecb7d54..43bbdfacfc 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-password-spraying-of-microsoft-365-user-accounts.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-password-spraying-of-microsoft-365-user-accounts.asciidoc
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Identifies a high number (25) of failed Microsoft 365 user authentication attemp
 * Use Case: Identity and Access Audit
 * Tactic: Credential Access
 
-*Version*: 104
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-persistence-through-init-d-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-persistence-through-init-d-detected.asciidoc
index 46b4837aba..7cd6752b03 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-persistence-through-init-d-detected.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-persistence-through-init-d-detected.asciidoc
@@ -123,11 +123,13 @@ This rule looks for the creation of new files within the `/etc/init.d/` director
 - Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -158,7 +160,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-persistence-through-motd-file-creation-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-persistence-through-motd-file-creation-detected.asciidoc
index 60b545802b..803126a3db 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-persistence-through-motd-file-creation-detected.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-persistence-through-motd-file-creation-detected.asciidoc
@@ -117,11 +117,13 @@ This rule identifies the creation of new files within the `/etc/update-motd.d/`
 - Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -152,7 +154,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-persistence-through-run-control-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-persistence-through-run-control-detected.asciidoc
index dd30dcc581..c853f22dc6 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-persistence-through-run-control-detected.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-persistence-through-run-control-detected.asciidoc
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ This rule monitors the creation/alteration of the rc.local file by a previously
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -118,11 +118,13 @@ Detection alerts from this rule indicate the creation of a new `/etc/rc.local` f
 - Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -153,7 +155,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-persistence-via-atom-init-script-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-persistence-via-atom-init-script-modification.asciidoc
index 66206d0469..b747622fe0 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-persistence-via-atom-init-script-modification.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-persistence-via-atom-init-script-modification.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Identifies modifications to the Atom desktop text editor Init File. Adversaries
 * Tactic: Persistence
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ Identifies modifications to the Atom desktop text editor Init File. Adversaries
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -75,7 +78,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-persistence-via-login-hook.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-persistence-via-login-hook.asciidoc
index f13c94af18..769ffe7a9f 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-persistence-via-login-hook.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-persistence-via-login-hook.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Identifies the creation or modification of the login window property list (plist
 * Tactic: Persistence
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -53,6 +53,9 @@ Starting in Mac OS X 10.7 (Lion), users can specify certain applications to be r
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -83,7 +86,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-persistence-via-periodic-tasks.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-persistence-via-periodic-tasks.asciidoc
index 7cf80fb387..347b4f9b69 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-persistence-via-periodic-tasks.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-persistence-via-periodic-tasks.asciidoc
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Identifies the creation or modification of the default configuration for periodi
 * Tactic: Persistence
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ Identifies the creation or modification of the default configuration for periodi
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -76,7 +79,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-persistence-via-time-provider-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-persistence-via-time-provider-modification.asciidoc
index b7948e2532..533af0999d 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-persistence-via-time-provider-modification.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-persistence-via-time-provider-modification.asciidoc
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ Identifies modification of the Time Provider. Adversaries may establish persiste
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * endgame-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -33,8 +34,9 @@ Identifies modification of the Time Provider. Adversaries may establish persiste
 * Tactic: Privilege Escalation
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-powershell-hacktool-script-by-function-names.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-powershell-hacktool-script-by-function-names.asciidoc
index 360b34ac60..a14348d57d 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-powershell-hacktool-script-by-function-names.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-powershell-hacktool-script-by-function-names.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Detects known PowerShell offensive tooling functions names in PowerShell scripts
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Detects known PowerShell offensive tooling functions names in PowerShell scripts
 * Tactic: Execution
 * Data Source: PowerShell Logs
 
-*Version*: 9
+*Version*: 10
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -127,8 +127,11 @@ Adversaries often exploit PowerShell's capabilities to execute malicious scripts
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
-Steps to implement the logging policy with with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
 ```
 Computer Configuration >
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privacy-control-bypass-via-localhost-secure-copy.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privacy-control-bypass-via-localhost-secure-copy.asciidoc
index adcd576296..25ef0afb6a 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privacy-control-bypass-via-localhost-secure-copy.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privacy-control-bypass-via-localhost-secure-copy.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Identifies use of the Secure Copy Protocol (SCP) to copy files locally by abusin
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ Identifies use of the Secure Copy Protocol (SCP) to copy files locally by abusin
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -75,7 +78,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privacy-control-bypass-via-tccdb-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privacy-control-bypass-via-tccdb-modification.asciidoc
index 1ee6cba03a..7b31ce69dd 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privacy-control-bypass-via-tccdb-modification.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privacy-control-bypass-via-tccdb-modification.asciidoc
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Identifies the use of sqlite3 to directly modify the Transparency, Consent, and
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ Identifies the use of sqlite3 to directly modify the Transparency, Consent, and
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -76,7 +79,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-through-writable-docker-socket.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-through-writable-docker-socket.asciidoc
index e9d789ac13..41be2a850e 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-through-writable-docker-socket.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-through-writable-docker-socket.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ This rule monitors for the usage of Docker runtime sockets to escalate privilege
 * Domain: Container
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 4
+*Version*: 5
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ This rule monitors for the usage of Docker runtime sockets to escalate privilege
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -75,7 +78,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-container-misconfiguration.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-container-misconfiguration.asciidoc
index d02b0b3b28..a5e197f614 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-container-misconfiguration.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-container-misconfiguration.asciidoc
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ This rule monitors for the execution of processes that interact with Linux conta
 * Domain: Container
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 4
+*Version*: 5
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ This rule monitors for the execution of processes that interact with Linux conta
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -87,13 +90,12 @@ Session View uses process data collected by the Elastic Defend integration, but
 For more information about the additional fields collected when this setting is enabled and the usage of Session View for Analysis refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/session-view.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "exec" and event.type == "start" and (
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and (
   (process.name == "runc" and process.args == "run") or
   (process.name == "ctr" and process.args == "run" and process.args in ("--privileged", "--mount"))
 ) and not user.Ext.real.id == "0" and not group.Ext.real.id == "0" and 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-cve-2023-4911.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-cve-2023-4911.asciidoc
index d8feebba63..fde07e1925 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-cve-2023-4911.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-cve-2023-4911.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ This rule detects potential privilege escalation attempts through Looney Tunable
 * Use Case: Vulnerability
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 3
+*Version*: 4
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ This rule detects potential privilege escalation attempts through Looney Tunable
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -88,14 +91,13 @@ After saving the integration change, the Elastic Agents running this policy will
 For more information on capturing environment variables refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/environment-variable-capture.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
 sequence by host.id, process.parent.entity_id, process.executable with maxspan=5s
- [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "exec" and event.type == "start" and 
+ [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and 
   process.env_vars : "*GLIBC_TUNABLES=glibc.*=glibc.*=*"] with runs=5
 
 ----------------------------------
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-enlightenment.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-enlightenment.asciidoc
index 622e825e3d..d83371baaa 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-enlightenment.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-enlightenment.asciidoc
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Identifies an attempt to exploit a local privilege escalation CVE-2022-37706 via
 * Use Case: Vulnerability
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 1
+*Version*: 2
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -46,6 +46,10 @@ Identifies an attempt to exploit a local privilege escalation CVE-2022-37706 via
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -76,14 +80,13 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
 sequence by host.id, process.parent.entity_id with maxspan=5s
-  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "exec" and event.type == "start" and
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
     process.name == "enlightenment_sys" and process.args in ("/bin/mount/", "-o","noexec","nosuid","nodev","uid=*") ]
   [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "uid_change" and event.type == "change" and user.id == "0"]
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-installerfiletakeover.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-installerfiletakeover.asciidoc
index 1c7eb350fe..b57989dfff 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-installerfiletakeover.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-installerfiletakeover.asciidoc
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Identifies a potential exploitation of InstallerTakeOver (CVE-2021-41379) defaul
 * Use Case: Vulnerability
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -113,11 +113,13 @@ This rule detects the default execution of the PoC, which overwrites the `elevat
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-linux-dac-permissions.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-linux-dac-permissions.asciidoc
index 3b3456503c..79c40443ad 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-linux-dac-permissions.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-linux-dac-permissions.asciidoc
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 
 Identifies potential privilege escalation exploitation of DAC (Discretionary access control) file permissions. The rule identifies exploitation of DAC checks on sensitive file paths via suspicious processes whose capabilities include CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE (where a process can bypass all read write and execution checks) or CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH (where a process can read any file or perform any executable permission on the directories).
 
-*Rule type*: eql
+*Rule type*: new_terms
 
 *Rule indices*: 
 
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Identifies potential privilege escalation exploitation of DAC (Discretionary acc
 * Tactic: Privilege Escalation
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 1
+*Version*: 2
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -42,6 +42,10 @@ Identifies potential privilege escalation exploitation of DAC (Discretionary acc
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -72,15 +76,14 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
-(process.thread.capabilities.permitted: "CAP_DAC_*" or process.thread.capabilities.effective: "CAP_DAC_*") and
-process.command_line : ("*sudoers*", "*passwd*", "*shadow*", "*/root/*") and user.id != "0"
+event.category:process and host.os.type:linux and event.type:start and event.action:exec and
+(process.thread.capabilities.permitted:CAP_DAC_* or process.thread.capabilities.effective: CAP_DAC_*) and
+process.command_line:(*sudoers* or *passwd* or *shadow* or */root/*) and not user.id:"0"
 
 ----------------------------------
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-overlayfs.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-overlayfs.asciidoc
index 1f8b271806..6c54e79f06 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-overlayfs.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-overlayfs.asciidoc
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Identifies an attempt to exploit a local privilege escalation (CVE-2023-2640 and
 * Use Case: Vulnerability
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 4
+*Version*: 5
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ Identifies an attempt to exploit a local privilege escalation (CVE-2023-2640 and
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -76,14 +79,13 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
 sequence by process.parent.entity_id, host.id with maxspan=5s
-  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "exec" and event.type == "start" and 
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and 
     process.name == "unshare" and process.args : ("-r", "-rm", "m") and process.args : "*cap_setuid*"  and user.id != "0"]
   [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "uid_change" and event.type == "change" and 
     user.id == "0"]
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-pkexec.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-pkexec.asciidoc
index 1116ece582..eeb1303998 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-pkexec.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-pkexec.asciidoc
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Identifies an attempt to exploit a local privilege escalation in polkit pkexec (
 * Use Case: Vulnerability
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@ Identifies an attempt to exploit a local privilege escalation in polkit pkexec (
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -78,7 +81,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-python-cap-setuid.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-python-cap-setuid.asciidoc
index 8f955590d9..ec7e4534d6 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-python-cap-setuid.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-python-cap-setuid.asciidoc
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ This detection rule monitors for the execution of a system command with setuid o
 * Tactic: Privilege Escalation
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ This detection rule monitors for the execution of a system command with setuid o
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -73,14 +76,13 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
 sequence by host.id, process.entity_id with maxspan=1s
-  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "exec" and event.type == "start" and 
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and 
    process.args : "import os;os.set?id(0);os.system(*)" and process.args : "*python*" and user.id != "0"]
   [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("uid_change", "gid_change") and event.type == "change" and 
    (user.id == "0" or group.id == "0")]
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-recently-compiled-executable.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-recently-compiled-executable.asciidoc
index 7e5b8049bd..98e6d93a10 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-recently-compiled-executable.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-recently-compiled-executable.asciidoc
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ This rule monitors a sequence involving a program compilation event followed by
 * Use Case: Vulnerability
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 3
+*Version*: 4
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ This rule monitors a sequence involving a program compilation event followed by
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -73,18 +76,17 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
 sequence by host.id with maxspan=1m
-  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "exec" and event.type == "start" and 
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and 
    process.name in ("gcc", "g++", "cc") and user.id != "0"] by process.args
   [file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "creation" and event.type == "creation" and 
    process.name == "ld" and user.id != "0"] by file.name
-  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "exec" and event.type == "start" and 
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and 
    user.id != "0"] by process.name
   [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("uid_change", "guid_change") and event.type == "change" and 
    user.id == "0"] by process.name
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-uid-int-max-bug-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-uid-int-max-bug-detected.asciidoc
index 1fbf2488f1..b23603f4b0 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-uid-int-max-bug-detected.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-uid-int-max-bug-detected.asciidoc
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ This rule monitors for the execution of the systemd-run command by a user with a
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -32,8 +33,9 @@ This rule monitors for the execution of the systemd-run command by a user with a
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Privilege Escalation
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 
-*Version*: 4
+*Version*: 5
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -46,6 +48,9 @@ This rule monitors for the execution of the systemd-run command by a user with a
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -76,13 +81,12 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "exec" and event.type == "start" and 
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and 
 process.name == "systemd-run" and process.args == "-t" and process.args_count >= 3 and user.id >= "1000000000"
 
 ----------------------------------
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privileged-escalation-via-samaccountname-spoofing.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privileged-escalation-via-samaccountname-spoofing.asciidoc
index d711e7b4f3..28d864ce8c 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privileged-escalation-via-samaccountname-spoofing.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-privileged-escalation-via-samaccountname-spoofing.asciidoc
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ Identifies a suspicious computer account name rename event, which may indicate a
 * Data Source: Active Directory
 * Use Case: Vulnerability
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -52,6 +52,10 @@ Identifies a suspicious computer account name rename event, which may indicate a
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-process-injection-via-powershell.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-process-injection-via-powershell.asciidoc
index 2ace3c919c..e8824f61ba 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-process-injection-via-powershell.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-process-injection-via-powershell.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Detects the use of Windows API functions that are commonly abused by malware and
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Detects the use of Windows API functions that are commonly abused by malware and
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: PowerShell Logs
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -100,13 +100,15 @@ Red Team tooling and malware developers take advantage of these capabilities to
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
-Steps to implement the logging policy with with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
 ```
 Computer Configuration >
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-protocol-tunneling-via-chisel-client.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-protocol-tunneling-via-chisel-client.asciidoc
index c0ad6fa4db..25528aeeac 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-protocol-tunneling-via-chisel-client.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-protocol-tunneling-via-chisel-client.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ This rule monitors for common command line flags leveraged by the Chisel client
 * Tactic: Command and Control
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 4
+*Version*: 5
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -121,6 +121,10 @@ This rule looks for a sequence of command line arguments that are consistent wit
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -157,7 +161,7 @@ For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
 sequence by host.id, process.entity_id with maxspan=1s
-  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "exec" and event.type == "start" and 
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and 
    process.args == "client" and process.args : ("R*", "*:*", "*socks*", "*.*") and process.args_count >= 4 and 
    process.parent.name in ("bash", "dash", "ash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish")]
   [network where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "connection_attempted" and event.type == "start" and 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-protocol-tunneling-via-chisel-server.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-protocol-tunneling-via-chisel-server.asciidoc
index 4d39a66866..c576eb29fb 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-protocol-tunneling-via-chisel-server.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-protocol-tunneling-via-chisel-server.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ This rule monitors for common command line flags leveraged by the Chisel server
 * Tactic: Command and Control
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 5
+*Version*: 6
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -121,6 +121,10 @@ This rule looks for a sequence of command line arguments that are consistent wit
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -157,10 +161,10 @@ For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
 sequence by host.id, process.entity_id with maxspan=1m
-  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "exec" and event.type == "start" and 
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and 
    process.args == "server" and process.args in ("--port", "-p", "--reverse", "--backend", "--socks5") and 
    process.args_count >= 3 and process.parent.name in ("bash", "dash", "ash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish")]
-  [network where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "connection_accepted" and event.type == "start" and 
+  [network where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "connection_accepted" and 
    destination.ip != null and destination.ip != "127.0.0.1" and destination.ip != "::1" and 
    not process.name : (
      "python*", "php*", "perl", "ruby", "lua*", "openssl", "nc", "netcat", "ncat", "telnet", "awk", "java", "telnet",
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-protocol-tunneling-via-earthworm.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-protocol-tunneling-via-earthworm.asciidoc
index c49851b6a7..1a43497f8e 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-protocol-tunneling-via-earthworm.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-protocol-tunneling-via-earthworm.asciidoc
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Identifies the execution of the EarthWorm tunneler. Adversaries may tunnel netwo
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -124,6 +124,10 @@ This rule looks for several command line arguments that are consistent with `ear
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in either from Elastic Defend, or Auditbeat integration.
 
 
@@ -173,7 +177,6 @@ Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit
 For versions <8.2, you need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate `event.ingested` with @timestamp for non-elastic-agent indexes, like auditbeats/filebeat/winlogbeat etc. For more details to add a custom ingest pipeline refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html[guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-pspy-process-monitoring-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-pspy-process-monitoring-detected.asciidoc
index 02bff04fe6..69ae402598 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-pspy-process-monitoring-detected.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-pspy-process-monitoring-detected.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ This rule leverages auditd to monitor for processes scanning different processes
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Discovery
 
-*Version*: 6
+*Version*: 7
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ This rule leverages auditd to monitor for processes scanning different processes
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Auditd Manager.
 
 
@@ -73,7 +76,6 @@ However, if more advanced configuration is required to detect specific behavior,
   -- "-w /proc/ -p r -k audit_proc"
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-remote-code-execution-via-web-server.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-remote-code-execution-via-web-server.asciidoc
index c212a0fac8..5e04750afd 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-remote-code-execution-via-web-server.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-remote-code-execution-via-web-server.asciidoc
@@ -113,11 +113,13 @@ This rule detects a web server process spawning script and command line interfac
 - Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -148,7 +150,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-remote-credential-access-via-registry.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-remote-credential-access-via-registry.asciidoc
index 45414720c8..37b2b75ea8 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-remote-credential-access-via-registry.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-remote-credential-access-via-registry.asciidoc
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Identifies remote access to the registry to potentially dump credential data fro
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -94,11 +94,13 @@ Attackers can use tools like secretsdump.py or CrackMapExec to dump the registry
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule uses Elastic Endpoint file creation and system integration events for correlation. Both data should be collected from the host for this detection to work.
 
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-remote-desktop-shadowing-activity.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-remote-desktop-shadowing-activity.asciidoc
index 06dc9fb6bd..662f0b2460 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-remote-desktop-shadowing-activity.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-remote-desktop-shadowing-activity.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies the modification of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) Shadow registry
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: high
@@ -35,8 +35,9 @@ Identifies the modification of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) Shadow registry
 * Tactic: Lateral Movement
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -49,6 +50,9 @@ Identifies the modification of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) Shadow registry
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-remote-desktop-tunneling-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-remote-desktop-tunneling-detected.asciidoc
index 1c53a27e9a..0c2e1c9bf4 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-remote-desktop-tunneling-detected.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-remote-desktop-tunneling-detected.asciidoc
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ Identifies potential use of an SSH utility to establish RDP over a reverse SSH T
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-windows.*
 * endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
 
 *Severity*: high
 
@@ -37,7 +38,7 @@ Identifies potential use of an SSH utility to establish RDP over a reverse SSH T
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -94,10 +95,11 @@ This rule looks for command lines involving the `3389` port, which RDP uses by d
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
+==== Setup
 
 
-==== Setup
 
+*Setup*
 
 
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-reverse-shell-activity-via-terminal.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-reverse-shell-activity-via-terminal.asciidoc
index 95fba24da1..aad4023b35 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-reverse-shell-activity-via-terminal.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-reverse-shell-activity-via-terminal.asciidoc
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Identifies the execution of a shell process with suspicious arguments which may
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -91,11 +91,13 @@ This rule identifies commands that are potentially related to reverse shell acti
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
@@ -103,7 +105,6 @@ Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest
 For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-reverse-shell-via-background-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-reverse-shell-via-background-process.asciidoc
index e91ac03440..a067dc277c 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-reverse-shell-via-background-process.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-reverse-shell-via-background-process.asciidoc
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ Monitors for the execution of background processes with process arguments capabl
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,13 +77,12 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and event.type == "start" and 
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and 
 process.name in ("setsid", "nohup") and process.args : "*/dev/tcp/*0>&1*" and 
 process.parent.name in ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish")
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-reverse-shell-via-child.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-reverse-shell-via-child.asciidoc
index 03df8a1d9b..6af72f1eba 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-reverse-shell-via-child.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-reverse-shell-via-child.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ This detection rule identifies suspicious network traffic patterns associated wi
 * Tactic: Execution
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 1
+*Version*: 2
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ This detection rule identifies suspicious network traffic patterns associated wi
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -75,7 +79,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-reverse-shell-via-java.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-reverse-shell-via-java.asciidoc
index 5da4aa2c4d..3f0ab8110a 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-reverse-shell-via-java.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-reverse-shell-via-java.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ This detection rule identifies the execution of a Linux shell process from a Jav
 * Tactic: Execution
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 7
+*Version*: 8
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ This detection rule identifies the execution of a Linux shell process from a Jav
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,7 +77,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-reverse-shell-via-suspicious-binary.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-reverse-shell-via-suspicious-binary.asciidoc
index 31f3b70d23..370e8ba664 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-reverse-shell-via-suspicious-binary.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-reverse-shell-via-suspicious-binary.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ This detection rule detects the creation of a shell through a chain consisting o
 * Tactic: Execution
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 6
+*Version*: 7
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ This detection rule detects the creation of a shell through a chain consisting o
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,7 +77,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
@@ -95,7 +97,7 @@ sequence by host.id, process.entity_id with maxspan=1s
   "/etc/crontab", "/etc/cron.*", "/etc/update-motd.d/*", "/usr/lib/update-notifier/*",
   "/boot/*", "/srv/*", "/run/*", "/root/*", "/etc/rc.local"
    ) and destination.ip != null and destination.ip != "127.0.0.1" and destination.ip != "::1" ]
-[ process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "exec" and event.type == "start" and 
+[ process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and 
   process.name : ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish") and 
   process.parent.name : ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish") ]
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-reverse-shell-via-suspicious-child-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-reverse-shell-via-suspicious-child-process.asciidoc
index 49160e69ef..58ae9136e8 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-reverse-shell-via-suspicious-child-process.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-reverse-shell-via-suspicious-child-process.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ This detection rule detects the creation of a shell through a suspicious process
 * Tactic: Execution
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 8
+*Version*: 9
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ This detection rule detects the creation of a shell through a suspicious process
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,7 +77,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-reverse-shell-via-udp.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-reverse-shell-via-udp.asciidoc
index 11d1738364..1f8b91630b 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-reverse-shell-via-udp.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-reverse-shell-via-udp.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ This detection rule identifies suspicious network traffic patterns associated wi
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Execution
 
-*Version*: 5
+*Version*: 6
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ This detection rule identifies suspicious network traffic patterns associated wi
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
 - Auditbeat
 - Auditd Manager
@@ -89,29 +92,26 @@ However, if more advanced configuration is required to detect specific behavior,
 - For this detection rule no additional audit rules are required to be added to the integration.
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
 sample by host.id, process.pid, process.parent.pid
-  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and auditd.data.syscall == "execve" and process.name : (
-     "bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish", "perl", "python*", "nc", "ncat", "netcat", "php*",
-     "ruby", "openssl", "awk", "telnet", "lua*", "socat"
-   )
-  ]
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "executed" and process.name : (
+    "bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish", "perl", "python*", "nc", "ncat", "netcat", "php*",
+    "ruby", "openssl", "awk", "telnet", "lua*", "socat"
+    )]
   [process where host.os.type == "linux" and auditd.data.syscall == "socket" and process.name : (
-     "bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish", "perl", "python*", "nc", "ncat", "netcat", "php*",
-     "ruby", "openssl", "awk", "telnet", "lua*", "socat"
-   ) and
-   auditd.data.a0 == "2" and auditd.data.a1 : ("2", "802")]
-[network where host.os.type == "linux" and auditd.data.syscall == "connect" and process.name : (
-   "bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish", "perl", "python*", "nc", "ncat", "netcat", "php*",
-   "ruby", "openssl", "awk", "telnet", "lua*", "socat"
- ) and
- network.direction == "egress" and destination.ip != null and destination.ip != "127.0.0.1" and
- destination.ip != "127.0.0.53" and destination.ip != "::1"]
+    "bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish", "perl", "python*", "nc", "ncat", "netcat", "php*",
+    "ruby", "openssl", "awk", "telnet", "lua*", "socat"
+    ) and auditd.data.a1 == "2"]
+  [network where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "connected-to" and
+   process.name : (
+    "bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish", "perl", "python*", "nc", "ncat", "netcat", "php*",
+    "ruby", "openssl", "awk", "telnet", "lua*", "socat"
+    ) and network.direction == "egress" and destination.ip != null and
+   not cidrmatch(destination.ip, "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "224.0.0.0/4", "::1")]
 
 ----------------------------------
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-reverse-shell.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-reverse-shell.asciidoc
index 9ef5dd7195..6a78e3dcb2 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-reverse-shell.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-reverse-shell.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ This detection rule identifies suspicious network traffic patterns associated wi
 * Tactic: Execution
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 7
+*Version*: 8
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ This detection rule identifies suspicious network traffic patterns associated wi
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,7 +77,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-secure-file-deletion-via-sdelete-utility.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-secure-file-deletion-via-sdelete-utility.asciidoc
index feb51db940..a6209b12c1 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-secure-file-deletion-via-sdelete-utility.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-secure-file-deletion-via-sdelete-utility.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Detects file name patterns generated by the use of Sysinternals SDelete utility
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: low
@@ -34,8 +34,9 @@ Detects file name patterns generated by the use of Sysinternals SDelete utility
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-shadow-credentials-added-to-ad-object.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-shadow-credentials-added-to-ad-object.asciidoc
index 8503186565..118ad6862f 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-shadow-credentials-added-to-ad-object.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-shadow-credentials-added-to-ad-object.asciidoc
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ Identify the modification of the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute in an Active D
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -92,11 +92,13 @@ Attackers with write privileges on this attribute over an object can abuse it to
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 The 'Audit Directory Service Changes' logging policy must be configured for (Success, Failure).
 Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-shadow-file-read-via-command-line-utilities.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-shadow-file-read-via-command-line-utilities.asciidoc
index 9b02a8f093..34b149bf4c 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-shadow-file-read-via-command-line-utilities.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-shadow-file-read-via-command-line-utilities.asciidoc
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Identifies access to the /etc/shadow file via the commandline using standard sys
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 208
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ Identifies access to the /etc/shadow file via the commandline using standard sys
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -77,7 +80,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-shell-via-wildcard-injection-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-shell-via-wildcard-injection-detected.asciidoc
index 3c52e0f425..b6aa32ff5f 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-shell-via-wildcard-injection-detected.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-shell-via-wildcard-injection-detected.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ This rule monitors for the execution of a set of linux binaries, that are potent
 * Tactic: Execution
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 4
+*Version*: 5
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ This rule monitors for the execution of a set of linux binaries, that are potent
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -75,18 +78,17 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
 sequence by host.id with maxspan=1s
-  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "exec" and event.type == "start" and (
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and (
     (process.name == "tar" and process.args : "--checkpoint=*" and process.args : "--checkpoint-action=*") or
     (process.name == "rsync" and process.args : "-e*") or
     (process.name == "zip" and process.args == "--unzip-command") )]  by process.entity_id
-  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "exec" and event.type == "start" and 
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and 
      process.parent.name : ("tar", "rsync", "zip") and 
      process.name : ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish")] by process.parent.entity_id
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-ssh-it-ssh-worm-downloaded.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-ssh-it-ssh-worm-downloaded.asciidoc
index b441b0eb3a..ff7d9a922f 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-ssh-it-ssh-worm-downloaded.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-ssh-it-ssh-worm-downloaded.asciidoc
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ Identifies processes that are capable of downloading files with command line arg
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -80,14 +83,13 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started") and
-event.type == "start" and process.name in ("curl", "wget") and process.args : (
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and process.name in ("curl", "wget") and process.args : (
   "https://thc.org/ssh-it/x", "http://nossl.segfault.net/ssh-it-deploy.sh", "https://gsocket.io/x",
   "https://thc.org/ssh-it/bs", "http://nossl.segfault.net/bs"
 )
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-successful-linux-ftp-brute-force-attack-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-successful-linux-ftp-brute-force-attack-detected.asciidoc
index 321764452e..ac8065916c 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-successful-linux-ftp-brute-force-attack-detected.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-successful-linux-ftp-brute-force-attack-detected.asciidoc
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ An FTP (file transfer protocol) brute force attack is a method where an attacker
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Credential Access
 
-*Version*: 6
+*Version*: 7
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ An FTP (file transfer protocol) brute force attack is a method where an attacker
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
 - Auditbeat
 - Auditd Manager
@@ -87,7 +90,6 @@ However, if more advanced configuration is required to detect specific behavior,
 - For this detection rule no additional audit rules are required to be added to the integration.
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-successful-linux-rdp-brute-force-attack-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-successful-linux-rdp-brute-force-attack-detected.asciidoc
index da85d20fd9..869628fbed 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-successful-linux-rdp-brute-force-attack-detected.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-successful-linux-rdp-brute-force-attack-detected.asciidoc
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ An RDP (Remote Desktop Protocol) brute force attack involves an attacker repeate
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Credential Access
 
-*Version*: 6
+*Version*: 7
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ An RDP (Remote Desktop Protocol) brute force attack involves an attacker repeate
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
 - Auditbeat
 - Auditd Manager
@@ -87,7 +90,6 @@ However, if more advanced configuration is required to detect specific behavior,
 - For this detection rule no additional audit rules are required to be added to the integration.
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-successful-ssh-brute-force-attack.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-successful-ssh-brute-force-attack.asciidoc
index eff390d1d4..99d0b365a6 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-successful-ssh-brute-force-attack.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-successful-ssh-brute-force-attack.asciidoc
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Identifies multiple SSH login failures followed by a successful one from the sam
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Credential Access
 
-*Version*: 9
+*Version*: 10
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -81,11 +81,13 @@ The rule identifies consecutive SSH login failures followed by a successful logi
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
 - Auditbeat
 - Filebeat
@@ -127,7 +129,6 @@ Filebeat is a lightweight shipper for forwarding and centralizing log data. Inst
 - To run the system module of Filebeat on Linux follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-system.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-sudo-hijacking-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-sudo-hijacking-detected.asciidoc
index ae80f2fe52..138d360f2a 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-sudo-hijacking-detected.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-sudo-hijacking-detected.asciidoc
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Identifies the creation of a sudo binary located at /usr/bin/sudo. Attackers may
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 104
+*Version*: 105
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ Identifies the creation of a sudo binary located at /usr/bin/sudo. Attackers may
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -77,14 +80,13 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
 host.os.type:linux and event.category:file and event.type:("creation" or "file_create_event") and
-file.path:("/usr/bin/sudo" or "/bin/sudo") and not process.name:(docker or dockerd)
+file.path:("/usr/bin/sudo" or "/bin/sudo") and not process.name:(docker or dockerd or pacman)
 
 ----------------------------------
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-sudo-privilege-escalation-via-cve-2019-14287.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-sudo-privilege-escalation-via-cve-2019-14287.asciidoc
index 37629c15b4..13ed13faf4 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-sudo-privilege-escalation-via-cve-2019-14287.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-sudo-privilege-escalation-via-cve-2019-14287.asciidoc
@@ -8,6 +8,9 @@ This rule monitors for the execution of a suspicious sudo command that is levera
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -31,8 +34,10 @@ This rule monitors for the execution of a suspicious sudo command that is levera
 * Tactic: Privilege Escalation
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 * Use Case: Vulnerability
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
 
-*Version*: 3
+*Version*: 4
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +50,9 @@ This rule monitors for the execution of a suspicious sudo command that is levera
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -75,14 +83,13 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "exec" and event.type == "start" and 
-process.name == "sudo" and process.args == "-u#-1"
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and process.name == "sudo" and process.args == "-u#-1"
 
 ----------------------------------
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-sudo-token-manipulation-via-process-injection.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-sudo-token-manipulation-via-process-injection.asciidoc
index c09792f822..d88fd80ba9 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-sudo-token-manipulation-via-process-injection.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-sudo-token-manipulation-via-process-injection.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ This rule detects potential sudo token manipulation attacks through process inje
 * Tactic: Privilege Escalation
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 4
+*Version*: 5
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ This rule detects potential sudo token manipulation attacks through process inje
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,14 +77,13 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
 sequence by host.id, process.session_leader.entity_id with maxspan=15s
-[ process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "exec" and event.type == "start" and 
+[ process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and 
   process.name == "gdb" and process.user.id != "0" and process.group.id != "0" ]
 [ process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "uid_change" and event.type == "change" and 
   process.name == "sudo" and process.user.id == "0" and process.group.id == "0" ]
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-suspicious-clipboard-activity-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-suspicious-clipboard-activity-detected.asciidoc
index f79cbfeaf0..80456d56a2 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-suspicious-clipboard-activity-detected.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-suspicious-clipboard-activity-detected.asciidoc
@@ -8,6 +8,9 @@ This rule monitors for the usage of the most common clipboard utilities on unix
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
 
 *Severity*: low
 
@@ -29,8 +32,10 @@ This rule monitors for the usage of the most common clipboard utilities on unix
 * Tactic: Collection
 * Rule Type: BBR
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
 
-*Version*: 3
+*Version*: 4
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,7 +49,8 @@ This rule monitors for the usage of the most common clipboard utilities on unix
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-event.category:process and host.os.type:"linux" and event.action:"exec" and event.type:"start" and
+event.category:process and host.os.type:"linux" and
+event.type:"start" and event.action:("exec" or "exec_event" or "executed" or "process_started") and
 process.name:("xclip" or "xsel" or "wl-clipboard" or "clipman" or "copyq")
 
 ----------------------------------
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-suspicious-debugfs-root-device-access.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-suspicious-debugfs-root-device-access.asciidoc
index fd7e24bc14..cbfa9da64c 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-suspicious-debugfs-root-device-access.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-suspicious-debugfs-root-device-access.asciidoc
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ This rule monitors for the usage of the built-in Linux DebugFS utility to access
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 4
+*Version*: 5
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ This rule monitors for the usage of the built-in Linux DebugFS utility to access
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -76,13 +79,12 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and event.type == "start" and 
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and 
 process.name == "debugfs" and process.args : "/dev/sd*" and not process.args == "-R" and 
 not user.Ext.real.id == "0" and not group.Ext.real.id == "0"
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-unauthorized-access-via-wildcard-injection-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-unauthorized-access-via-wildcard-injection-detected.asciidoc
index fd7dbe8a5a..d1bfd9448c 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-unauthorized-access-via-wildcard-injection-detected.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-unauthorized-access-via-wildcard-injection-detected.asciidoc
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ This rule monitors for the execution of the "chown" and "chmod" commands with co
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * endgame-*
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
 
 *Severity*: low
 
@@ -33,8 +35,9 @@ This rule monitors for the execution of the "chown" and "chmod" commands with co
 * Tactic: Credential Access
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
 
-*Version*: 4
+*Version*: 5
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -47,6 +50,9 @@ This rule monitors for the execution of the "chown" and "chmod" commands with co
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -77,14 +83,13 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and event.type == "start" and 
-process.name in ("chown", "chmod") and process.args == "-R" and process.args : "--reference=*"
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and process.name in ("chown", "chmod") and process.args == "-R" and process.args : "--reference=*"
 
 ----------------------------------
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-upgrade-of-non-interactive-shell.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-upgrade-of-non-interactive-shell.asciidoc
index 02b43a2425..efb430c0b4 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-upgrade-of-non-interactive-shell.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-upgrade-of-non-interactive-shell.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Identifies when a non-interactive terminal (tty) is being upgraded to a fully in
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ Identifies when a non-interactive terminal (tty) is being upgraded to a fully in
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,13 +77,12 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and event.type == "start" and (
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and (
   (process.name == "stty" and process.args == "raw" and process.args == "-echo" and process.args_count >= 3) or
   (process.name == "script" and process.args in ("-qc", "-c") and process.args == "/dev/null" and 
    process.args_count == 4)
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-veeam-credential-access-command.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-veeam-credential-access-command.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..190aaa57d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-veeam-credential-access-command.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+[[potential-veeam-credential-access-command]]
+=== Potential Veeam Credential Access Command
+
+Identifies commands that can access and decrypt Veeam credentials stored in MSSQL databases. Attackers can use Veeam Credentials to target backups as part of destructive operations such as Ransomware attacks.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.process-*
+* logs-windows.*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://thedfirreport.com/2021/12/13/diavol-ransomware/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
+  (
+    (process.name : "sqlcmd.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name : "sqlcmd.exe") or
+    process.args : ("Invoke-Sqlcmd", "Invoke-SqlExecute", "Invoke-DbaQuery", "Invoke-SqlQuery")
+  ) and
+  process.args : "*[VeeamBackup].[dbo].[Credentials]*"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Credentials from Password Stores
+** ID: T1555
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-windows-error-manager-masquerading.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-windows-error-manager-masquerading.asciidoc
index cfda0fe933..b3f3c917c4 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-windows-error-manager-masquerading.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-windows-error-manager-masquerading.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies suspicious instances of the Windows Error Reporting process (WerFault
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -35,8 +35,9 @@ Identifies suspicious instances of the Windows Error Reporting process (WerFault
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potentially-suspicious-process-started-via-tmux-or-screen.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potentially-suspicious-process-started-via-tmux-or-screen.asciidoc
index 7f1dc4e58c..45f347fa6f 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potentially-suspicious-process-started-via-tmux-or-screen.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potentially-suspicious-process-started-via-tmux-or-screen.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ This rule monitors for the execution of suspicious commands via screen and tmux.
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 
-*Version*: 3
+*Version*: 4
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ This rule monitors for the execution of suspicious commands via screen and tmux.
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and event.type == "start" and 
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and 
 process.parent.name in ("screen", "tmux") and process.name : (
   "nmap", "nc", "ncat", "netcat", "socat", "nc.openbsd", "ngrok", "ping", "java", "python*", "php*", "perl", "ruby",
   "lua*", "openssl", "telnet", "awk", "wget", "curl", "id"
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-invoke-ninjacopy-script.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-invoke-ninjacopy-script.asciidoc
index 3de339267a..298cd07645 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-invoke-ninjacopy-script.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-invoke-ninjacopy-script.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Detects PowerShell scripts that contain the default exported functions used on I
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Detects PowerShell scripts that contain the default exported functions used on I
 * Data Source: PowerShell Logs
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 
-*Version*: 4
+*Version*: 5
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-kerberos-ticket-dump.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-kerberos-ticket-dump.asciidoc
index cd9df9f2fe..0bf5c81549 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-kerberos-ticket-dump.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-kerberos-ticket-dump.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Detects PowerShell scripts that have the capability of dumping Kerberos tickets
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Detects PowerShell scripts that have the capability of dumping Kerberos tickets
 * Tactic: Credential Access
 * Data Source: PowerShell Logs
 
-*Version*: 3
+*Version*: 4
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -106,6 +106,9 @@ This rule indicates the use of scripts that contain code capable of dumping Kerb
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
 Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-kerberos-ticket-request.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-kerberos-ticket-request.asciidoc
index 2127e66385..44cc4861ba 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-kerberos-ticket-request.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-kerberos-ticket-request.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Detects PowerShell scripts that have the capability of requesting kerberos ticke
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Detects PowerShell scripts that have the capability of requesting kerberos ticke
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: PowerShell Logs
 
-*Version*: 110
+*Version*: 111
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -91,13 +91,15 @@ Attackers can use PowerShell to request these Kerberos tickets, with the intent
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
-Steps to implement the logging policy with with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
 ```
 Computer Configuration >
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-keylogging-script.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-keylogging-script.asciidoc
index 173f08aa95..7e9e40ce21 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-keylogging-script.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-keylogging-script.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Detects the use of Win32 API Functions that can be used to capture user keystrok
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Detects the use of Win32 API Functions that can be used to capture user keystrok
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: PowerShell Logs
 
-*Version*: 111
+*Version*: 112
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -97,13 +97,15 @@ Attackers can abuse PowerShell capabilities to capture user keystrokes with the
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
-Steps to implement the logging policy with with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
 ```
 Computer Configuration >
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-mailbox-collection-script.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-mailbox-collection-script.asciidoc
index 5f091403a8..a9383eaf84 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-mailbox-collection-script.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-mailbox-collection-script.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Detects PowerShell scripts that can be used to collect data from mailboxes. Adve
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Detects PowerShell scripts that can be used to collect data from mailboxes. Adve
 * Data Source: PowerShell Logs
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 
-*Version*: 6
+*Version*: 7
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -98,13 +98,15 @@ This rule identifies scripts that contains methods and classes that can be abuse
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
-Steps to implement the logging policy with with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
 ```
 Computer Configuration >
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-minidump-script.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-minidump-script.asciidoc
index 9d3b868ca7..b8270354fb 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-minidump-script.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-minidump-script.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ This rule detects PowerShell scripts capable of dumping process memory using Win
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
 
 *Severity*: high
 
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ This rule detects PowerShell scripts capable of dumping process memory using Win
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: PowerShell Logs
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -96,13 +96,15 @@ Attackers can abuse Process Memory Dump capabilities to extract credentials from
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
-Steps to implement the logging policy with with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
 ```
 Computer Configuration >
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-psreflect-script.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-psreflect-script.asciidoc
index 855c3a8c1e..d8800be1db 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-psreflect-script.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-psreflect-script.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Detects the use of PSReflect in PowerShell scripts. Attackers leverage PSReflect
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Detects the use of PSReflect in PowerShell scripts. Attackers leverage PSReflect
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: PowerShell Logs
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -125,14 +125,16 @@ Detecting the core implementation of PSReflect means detecting most of the tooli
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be configured (Enable).
 
-Steps to implement the logging policy with with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
 ```
 Computer Configuration >
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-script-block-logging-disabled.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-script-block-logging-disabled.asciidoc
index e98ca3debc..21f499b620 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-script-block-logging-disabled.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-script-block-logging-disabled.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies attempts to disable PowerShell Script Block Logging via registry modi
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
@@ -35,8 +35,9 @@ Identifies attempts to disable PowerShell Script Block Logging via registry modi
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-script-with-archive-compression-capabilities.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-script-with-archive-compression-capabilities.asciidoc
index 4bd41ad120..bbfab8b12f 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-script-with-archive-compression-capabilities.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-script-with-archive-compression-capabilities.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Identifies the use of Cmdlets and methods related to archive compression activit
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
 
 *Severity*: low
 
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Identifies the use of Cmdlets and methods related to archive compression activit
 * Data Source: PowerShell Logs
 * Rule Type: BBR
 
-*Version*: 4
+*Version*: 5
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -43,6 +43,10 @@ Identifies the use of Cmdlets and methods related to archive compression activit
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
 Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-script-with-discovery-capabilities.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-script-with-discovery-capabilities.asciidoc
index 178a496116..c7776acc17 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-script-with-discovery-capabilities.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-script-with-discovery-capabilities.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Identifies the use of Cmdlets and methods related to discovery activities. Attac
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
 
 *Severity*: low
 
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Identifies the use of Cmdlets and methods related to discovery activities. Attac
 * Data Source: PowerShell Logs
 * Rule Type: BBR
 
-*Version*: 5
+*Version*: 6
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ Identifies the use of Cmdlets and methods related to discovery activities. Attac
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
 Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-script-with-encryption-decryption-capabilities.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-script-with-encryption-decryption-capabilities.asciidoc
index 08362f7e82..d2857b7798 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-script-with-encryption-decryption-capabilities.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-script-with-encryption-decryption-capabilities.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Identifies the use of Cmdlets and methods related to encryption/decryption of fi
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Identifies the use of Cmdlets and methods related to encryption/decryption of fi
 * Data Source: PowerShell Logs
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 
-*Version*: 5
+*Version*: 6
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-script-with-log-clear-capabilities.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-script-with-log-clear-capabilities.asciidoc
index 393a1f1156..9a09e5331a 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-script-with-log-clear-capabilities.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-script-with-log-clear-capabilities.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Identifies the use of Cmdlets and methods related to Windows event log deletion
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
 
 *Severity*: low
 
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Identifies the use of Cmdlets and methods related to Windows event log deletion
 * Data Source: PowerShell Logs
 * Rule Type: BBR
 
-*Version*: 4
+*Version*: 5
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -46,6 +46,10 @@ Identifies the use of Cmdlets and methods related to Windows event log deletion
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
 Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-script-with-password-policy-discovery-capabilities.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-script-with-password-policy-discovery-capabilities.asciidoc
index 103aa4cb88..7c5ad45b7b 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-script-with-password-policy-discovery-capabilities.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-script-with-password-policy-discovery-capabilities.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Identifies the use of Cmdlets and methods related to remote execution activities
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
 
 *Severity*: low
 
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Identifies the use of Cmdlets and methods related to remote execution activities
 * Data Source: PowerShell Logs
 * Rule Type: BBR
 
-*Version*: 4
+*Version*: 5
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ Identifies the use of Cmdlets and methods related to remote execution activities
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
 Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-script-with-remote-execution-capabilities-via-winrm.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-script-with-remote-execution-capabilities-via-winrm.asciidoc
index bfda625e9c..361ab45c9a 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-script-with-remote-execution-capabilities-via-winrm.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-script-with-remote-execution-capabilities-via-winrm.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Identifies the use of Cmdlets and methods related to remote execution activities
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
 
 *Severity*: low
 
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Identifies the use of Cmdlets and methods related to remote execution activities
 * Data Source: PowerShell Logs
 * Rule Type: BBR
 
-*Version*: 5
+*Version*: 6
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ Identifies the use of Cmdlets and methods related to remote execution activities
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
 Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-script-with-token-impersonation-capabilities.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-script-with-token-impersonation-capabilities.asciidoc
index 10f1c271fa..a4047f286a 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-script-with-token-impersonation-capabilities.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-script-with-token-impersonation-capabilities.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Detects scripts that contain PowerShell functions, structures, or Windows API fu
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Detects scripts that contain PowerShell functions, structures, or Windows API fu
 * Tactic: Privilege Escalation
 * Data Source: PowerShell Logs
 
-*Version*: 10
+*Version*: 11
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ Adversaries can abuse PowerShell to perform token impersonation, which involves
 
 The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be configured (Enable).
 
-Steps to implement the logging policy with with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
 ```
 Computer Configuration >
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-script-with-veeam-credential-access-capabilities.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-script-with-veeam-credential-access-capabilities.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a7a04707b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-script-with-veeam-credential-access-capabilities.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+[[powershell-script-with-veeam-credential-access-capabilities]]
+=== PowerShell Script with Veeam Credential Access Capabilities
+
+Identifies PowerShell scripts that can access and decrypt Veeam credentials stored in MSSQL databases. Attackers can use Veeam Credentials to target backups as part of destructive operations such as Ransomware attacks.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://forums.veeam.com/veeam-backup-replication-f2/recover-esxi-password-in-veeam-t34630.html
+* https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/anatomy-of-alpha-spider-ransomware/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: PowerShell Logs
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Administrative Templates >
+Windows PowerShell >
+Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging (Enable)
+```
+
+Steps to implement the logging policy via registry:
+
+```
+reg add "hklm\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging" /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 1
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:windows and
+  powershell.file.script_block_text : (
+    (
+      "[dbo].[Credentials]" and
+      ("Veeam" or "VeeamBackup")
+    ) or
+    "ProtectedStorage]::GetLocalString"
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Credentials from Password Stores
+** ID: T1555
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-script-with-webcam-video-capture-capabilities.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-script-with-webcam-video-capture-capabilities.asciidoc
index b83bfcf105..7eac664329 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-script-with-webcam-video-capture-capabilities.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-script-with-webcam-video-capture-capabilities.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Detects PowerShell scripts that can be used to record webcam video. Attackers ca
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Detects PowerShell scripts that can be used to record webcam video. Attackers ca
 * Tactic: Collection
 * Data Source: PowerShell Logs
 
-*Version*: 3
+*Version*: 4
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ Detects PowerShell scripts that can be used to record webcam video. Attackers ca
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
 Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-share-enumeration-script.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-share-enumeration-script.asciidoc
index 66b8e0cb1b..cb57836422 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-share-enumeration-script.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-share-enumeration-script.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Detects scripts that contain PowerShell functions, structures, or Windows API fu
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Detects scripts that contain PowerShell functions, structures, or Windows API fu
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: PowerShell Logs
 
-*Version*: 8
+*Version*: 9
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -92,14 +92,16 @@ Attackers can use PowerShell to enumerate shares to search for sensitive data li
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be configured (Enable).
 
-Steps to implement the logging policy with with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
 ```
 Computer Configuration >
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-suspicious-discovery-related-windows-api-functions.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-suspicious-discovery-related-windows-api-functions.asciidoc
index 3db9b4c8aa..72ac13b62f 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-suspicious-discovery-related-windows-api-functions.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-suspicious-discovery-related-windows-api-functions.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ This rule detects the use of discovery-related Windows API functions in PowerShe
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ This rule detects the use of discovery-related Windows API functions in PowerShe
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: PowerShell Logs
 
-*Version*: 112
+*Version*: 113
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -95,13 +95,15 @@ Attackers can use PowerShell to interact with the Win32 API to bypass command li
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
-Steps to implement the logging policy with with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
 ```
 Computer Configuration >
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-suspicious-payload-encoded-and-compressed.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-suspicious-payload-encoded-and-compressed.asciidoc
index cb37c6e44b..5bc56b60ea 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-suspicious-payload-encoded-and-compressed.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-suspicious-payload-encoded-and-compressed.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Identifies the use of .NET functionality for decompression and base64 decoding c
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Identifies the use of .NET functionality for decompression and base64 decoding c
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: PowerShell Logs
 
-*Version*: 110
+*Version*: 111
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -115,13 +115,15 @@ Attackers can embed compressed and encoded payloads in scripts to load directly
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
-Steps to implement the logging policy with with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
 ```
 Computer Configuration >
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-suspicious-script-with-audio-capture-capabilities.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-suspicious-script-with-audio-capture-capabilities.asciidoc
index 4a1cc3ede0..c4472c1120 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-suspicious-script-with-audio-capture-capabilities.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-suspicious-script-with-audio-capture-capabilities.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Detects PowerShell scripts that can record audio, a common feature in popular po
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Detects PowerShell scripts that can record audio, a common feature in popular po
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: PowerShell Logs
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -97,13 +97,15 @@ Attackers can use PowerShell to interact with the Windows API with the intent of
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
-Steps to implement the logging policy with with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
 ```
 Computer Configuration >
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-suspicious-script-with-clipboard-retrieval-capabilities.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-suspicious-script-with-clipboard-retrieval-capabilities.asciidoc
index 4b81f3c0e7..e3ab59d19b 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-suspicious-script-with-clipboard-retrieval-capabilities.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-suspicious-script-with-clipboard-retrieval-capabilities.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Detects PowerShell scripts that can get the contents of the clipboard, which att
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Detects PowerShell scripts that can get the contents of the clipboard, which att
 * Data Source: PowerShell Logs
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 
-*Version*: 7
+*Version*: 8
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -97,13 +97,15 @@ Attackers can abuse PowerShell capabilities to get the contents of the clipboard
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
-Steps to implement the logging policy with with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
 ```
 Computer Configuration >
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-suspicious-script-with-screenshot-capabilities.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-suspicious-script-with-screenshot-capabilities.asciidoc
index fd81b1989c..4c5af2674c 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-suspicious-script-with-screenshot-capabilities.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/powershell-suspicious-script-with-screenshot-capabilities.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Detects PowerShell scripts that can take screenshots, which is a common feature
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Detects PowerShell scripts that can take screenshots, which is a common feature
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: PowerShell Logs
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -95,13 +95,15 @@ Attackers can abuse PowerShell capabilities and take screen captures of desktops
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
-Steps to implement the logging policy with with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
 ```
 Computer Configuration >
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/privilege-escalation-via-cap-chown-cap-fowner-capabilities.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/privilege-escalation-via-cap-chown-cap-fowner-capabilities.asciidoc
index ab7e612c8e..f1c4f6c08f 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/privilege-escalation-via-cap-chown-cap-fowner-capabilities.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/privilege-escalation-via-cap-chown-cap-fowner-capabilities.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Identifies instances where a processes (granted CAP_CHOWN and/or CAP_FOWNER capa
 * Tactic: Privilege Escalation
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +45,10 @@ Identifies instances where a processes (granted CAP_CHOWN and/or CAP_FOWNER capa
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Auditd Manager.
 
 
@@ -75,14 +79,13 @@ However, if more advanced configuration is required to detect specific behavior,
   -- "-w /root/ -p rwxa -k audit_root"
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
 sequence by host.id, process.pid with maxspan=1s
-  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "exec" and event.type == "start" and
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
    process.name != null and process.thread.capabilities.effective : ("CAP_CHOWN", "CAP_FOWNER") and
    process.command_line : ("*sudoers*", "*passwd*", "*shadow*", "*/root/*") and user.id != "0"]
   [file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "changed-file-ownership-of" and event.type == "change" and
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/privilege-escalation-via-cap-setuid-setgid-capabilities.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/privilege-escalation-via-cap-setuid-setgid-capabilities.asciidoc
index f9f9bdb661..f906abb46a 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/privilege-escalation-via-cap-setuid-setgid-capabilities.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/privilege-escalation-via-cap-setuid-setgid-capabilities.asciidoc
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Identifies instances where a process (granted CAP_SETUID and/or CAP_SETGID capab
 * Tactic: Privilege Escalation
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 1
+*Version*: 2
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -42,6 +42,10 @@ Identifies instances where a process (granted CAP_SETUID and/or CAP_SETGID capab
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -72,14 +76,13 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
 sequence by host.id, process.entity_id with maxspan=1s
-  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "exec" and event.type == "start" and process.name != null and
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and process.name != null and
    (process.thread.capabilities.effective : "CAP_SET?ID" or process.thread.capabilities.permitted : "CAP_SET?ID") and 
    user.id != "0"]
   [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "uid_change" and event.type == "change" and 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/privilege-escalation-via-gdb-cap-sys-ptrace.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/privilege-escalation-via-gdb-cap-sys-ptrace.asciidoc
index c795283336..c4403c1c05 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/privilege-escalation-via-gdb-cap-sys-ptrace.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/privilege-escalation-via-gdb-cap-sys-ptrace.asciidoc
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Identifies instances where GDB (granted the CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability) is execut
 * Tactic: Privilege Escalation
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 1
+*Version*: 2
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -42,6 +42,10 @@ Identifies instances where GDB (granted the CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability) is execut
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -72,17 +76,16 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
 sequence by host.id, process.entry_leader.entity_id with maxspan=1m
-  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "exec" and event.type == "start" and process.name == "gdb" and
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and process.name == "gdb" and
    (process.thread.capabilities.effective : "CAP_SYS_PTRACE" or process.thread.capabilities.permitted : "CAP_SYS_PTRACE") and 
    user.id != "0"]
-  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "exec" and event.type == "start" and
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
    process.name != null and user.id == "0"]
 
 ----------------------------------
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/privilege-escalation-via-named-pipe-impersonation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/privilege-escalation-via-named-pipe-impersonation.asciidoc
index 041fe16036..ad9c0fedd0 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/privilege-escalation-via-named-pipe-impersonation.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/privilege-escalation-via-named-pipe-impersonation.asciidoc
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ Identifies a privilege escalation attempt via named pipe impersonation. An adver
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -112,11 +112,13 @@ Attackers can abuse named pipes to elevate their privileges by impersonating the
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/privilege-escalation-via-rogue-named-pipe-impersonation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/privilege-escalation-via-rogue-named-pipe-impersonation.asciidoc
index e2f5a48edc..8039b237f1 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/privilege-escalation-via-rogue-named-pipe-impersonation.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/privilege-escalation-via-rogue-named-pipe-impersonation.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Identifies a privilege escalation attempt via rogue named pipe impersonation. An
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: high
 
@@ -32,9 +32,9 @@ Identifies a privilege escalation attempt via rogue named pipe impersonation. An
 * OS: Windows
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Privilege Escalation
-* Data Source: Sysmon Only
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ Identifies a privilege escalation attempt via rogue named pipe impersonation. An
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 Named Pipe Creation Events need to be enabled within the Sysmon configuration by including the following settings:
 `condition equal "contains" and keyword equal "pipe"`
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/privilege-escalation-via-root-crontab-file-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/privilege-escalation-via-root-crontab-file-modification.asciidoc
index 4b2cc42eb6..a15c728588 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/privilege-escalation-via-root-crontab-file-modification.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/privilege-escalation-via-root-crontab-file-modification.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Identifies modifications to the root crontab file. Adversaries may overwrite thi
 * Tactic: Privilege Escalation
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ Identifies modifications to the root crontab file. Adversaries may overwrite thi
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -75,7 +78,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/privilege-escalation-via-windir-environment-variable.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/privilege-escalation-via-windir-environment-variable.asciidoc
index 47f955d087..3c94ca9198 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/privilege-escalation-via-windir-environment-variable.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/privilege-escalation-via-windir-environment-variable.asciidoc
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ Identifies a privilege escalation attempt via a rogue Windows directory (Windir)
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * endgame-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: high
 
@@ -32,8 +33,9 @@ Identifies a privilege escalation attempt via a rogue Windows directory (Windir)
 * Tactic: Privilege Escalation
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 104
+*Version*: 105
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -50,6 +52,8 @@ Identifies a privilege escalation attempt via a rogue Windows directory (Windir)
 registry where host.os.type == "windows" and registry.path : (
     "HKEY_USERS\\*\\Environment\\windir",
     "HKEY_USERS\\*\\Environment\\systemroot",
+    "HKU\\*\\Environment\\windir",
+    "HKU\\*\\Environment\\systemroot",
     "\\REGISTRY\\USER\\*\\Environment\\windir",
     "\\REGISTRY\\USER\\*\\Environment\\systemroot"
     ) and
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/privileged-account-brute-force.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/privileged-account-brute-force.asciidoc
index d107c87143..0005588c80 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/privileged-account-brute-force.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/privileged-account-brute-force.asciidoc
@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@ Identifies multiple consecutive logon failures targeting an Admin account from t
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-system.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-system.security*
+* logs-windows.forwarded*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Identifies multiple consecutive logon failures targeting an Admin account from t
 * Tactic: Credential Access
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 
-*Version*: 8
+*Version*: 9
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -105,11 +105,13 @@ This rule identifies potential password guessing/brute force activity from a sin
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/process-activity-via-compiled-html-file.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/process-activity-via-compiled-html-file.asciidoc
index 39f4a12989..bffecfee9a 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/process-activity-via-compiled-html-file.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/process-activity-via-compiled-html-file.asciidoc
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ Compiled HTML files (.chm) are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTM
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * logs-windows.*
 * endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -34,7 +35,7 @@ Compiled HTML files (.chm) are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTM
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -114,11 +115,13 @@ When users double-click CHM files, the HTML Help executable program (`hh.exe`) w
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/process-capability-enumeration.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/process-capability-enumeration.asciidoc
index 29b7938f49..88cfd1e639 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/process-capability-enumeration.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/process-capability-enumeration.asciidoc
@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ Identifies recursive process capability enumeration of the entire filesystem thr
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,13 +78,12 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and event.type == "start" and
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and
 process.name == "getcap" and process.args == "-r" and process.args == "/" and process.args_count == 3 and
 user.id != "0"
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/process-creation-via-secondary-logon.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/process-creation-via-secondary-logon.asciidoc
index adce87f2c1..b461bea0be 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/process-creation-via-secondary-logon.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/process-creation-via-secondary-logon.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Identifies process creation with alternate credentials. Adversaries may create a
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Privilege Escalation
 
-*Version*: 8
+*Version*: 9
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ Identifies process creation with alternate credentials. Adversaries may create a
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 Audit events 4624 and 4688 are needed to trigger this rule.
 
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/process-discovery-via-built-in-applications.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/process-discovery-via-built-in-applications.asciidoc
index 109879df13..d1a5805586 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/process-discovery-via-built-in-applications.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/process-discovery-via-built-in-applications.asciidoc
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ Identifies the use of built-in tools attackers can use to discover running proce
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and event.type == "start" and process.name in (
+process where event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and process.name in (
   "ps", "pstree", "htop", "pgrep"
 ) and 
 not process.parent.name in ("amazon-ssm-agent", "snap")
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/process-execution-from-an-unusual-directory.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/process-execution-from-an-unusual-directory.asciidoc
index beda64b061..e1e9d858d9 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/process-execution-from-an-unusual-directory.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/process-execution-from-an-unusual-directory.asciidoc
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ Identifies process execution from suspicious default Windows directories. This i
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * logs-windows.*
 * endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -33,7 +34,7 @@ Identifies process execution from suspicious default Windows directories. This i
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -117,6 +118,9 @@ This rule identifies processes that are executed from suspicious default Windows
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/process-injection-by-the-microsoft-build-engine.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/process-injection-by-the-microsoft-build-engine.asciidoc
index 2cf76bd7e4..48c90baf51 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/process-injection-by-the-microsoft-build-engine.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/process-injection-by-the-microsoft-build-engine.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, created a thread in another
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: low
 
@@ -29,9 +29,9 @@ An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, created a thread in another
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Tactic: Privilege Escalation
-* Data Source: Sysmon Only
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/process-started-from-process-id-pid-file.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/process-started-from-process-id-pid-file.asciidoc
index f2095e5a64..c6aac8733a 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/process-started-from-process-id-pid-file.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/process-started-from-process-id-pid-file.asciidoc
@@ -65,11 +65,13 @@ Detection alerts from this rule indicate a process spawned from an executable ma
 - Examine the reputation of the SHA256 hash from the PID file in a database like VirusTotal to identify additional pivots and artifacts for investigation.
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -100,7 +102,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/processes-with-trailing-spaces.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/processes-with-trailing-spaces.asciidoc
index 74619b8cd0..1ffee35d2f 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/processes-with-trailing-spaces.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/processes-with-trailing-spaces.asciidoc
@@ -8,6 +8,9 @@ Identify instances where adversaries include trailing space characters to mimic
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
 
 *Severity*: low
 
@@ -30,8 +33,10 @@ Identify instances where adversaries include trailing space characters to mimic
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Rule Type: BBR
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
 
-*Version*: 1
+*Version*: 2
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,7 +50,8 @@ Identify instances where adversaries include trailing space characters to mimic
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where  event.type in ("start", "process_started") and process.name : "* "
+process where event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started") and
+process.name : "* "
 
 ----------------------------------
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/program-files-directory-masquerading.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/program-files-directory-masquerading.asciidoc
index 1c30a1a5bd..4a559c7c84 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/program-files-directory-masquerading.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/program-files-directory-masquerading.asciidoc
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ Identifies execution from a directory masquerading as the Windows Program Files
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * logs-windows.*
 * endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -33,7 +34,7 @@ Identifies execution from a directory masquerading as the Windows Program Files
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -46,6 +47,9 @@ Identifies execution from a directory masquerading as the Windows Program Files
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/prompt-for-credentials-with-osascript.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/prompt-for-credentials-with-osascript.asciidoc
index 81970c17a7..32e4a45946 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/prompt-for-credentials-with-osascript.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/prompt-for-credentials-with-osascript.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Identifies the use of osascript to execute scripts via standard input that may p
 * Tactic: Credential Access
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ Identifies the use of osascript to execute scripts via standard input that may p
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -75,7 +78,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/proxychains-activity.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/proxychains-activity.asciidoc
index 171d1b6662..c04e2bd113 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/proxychains-activity.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/proxychains-activity.asciidoc
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ This rule monitors for the execution of the ProxyChains utility. ProxyChains is
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Auditd Manager
 
-*Version*: 3
+*Version*: 4
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -129,8 +129,8 @@ This rule looks for processes spawned through `proxychains` by analyzing `proxyc
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started") and
-event.type == "start" and process.name == "proxychains"
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and process.name == "proxychains"
 
 ----------------------------------
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/psexec-network-connection.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/psexec-network-connection.asciidoc
index dac57c4ede..0eecc8ea56 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/psexec-network-connection.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/psexec-network-connection.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies use of the SysInternals tool PsExec.exe making a network connection.
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: low
 
@@ -32,8 +32,9 @@ Identifies use of the SysInternals tool PsExec.exe making a network connection.
 * Tactic: Lateral Movement
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/python-script-execution-via-command-line.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/python-script-execution-via-command-line.asciidoc
index 167b12117d..0d369b4d51 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/python-script-execution-via-command-line.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/python-script-execution-via-command-line.asciidoc
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ Identifies when a Python script is executed using command line input and imports
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/rare-smb-connection-to-the-internet.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/rare-smb-connection-to-the-internet.asciidoc
index 36006b40b1..6dd0478fb0 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/rare-smb-connection-to-the-internet.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/rare-smb-connection-to-the-internet.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ This rule detects rare internet network connections via the SMB protocol. SMB is
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
@@ -34,8 +34,9 @@ This rule detects rare internet network connections via the SMB protocol. SMB is
 * Tactic: Exfiltration
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 1
+*Version*: 2
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/rdp-enabled-via-registry.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/rdp-enabled-via-registry.asciidoc
index 5203719ccf..e153db6c29 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/rdp-enabled-via-registry.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/rdp-enabled-via-registry.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies registry write modifications to enable Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP)
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
@@ -34,8 +34,9 @@ Identifies registry write modifications to enable Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP)
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -94,11 +95,13 @@ This rule detects modification of the fDenyTSConnections registry key to the val
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/registry-persistence-via-appcert-dll.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/registry-persistence-via-appcert-dll.asciidoc
index c3765670f0..4feedfcf4b 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/registry-persistence-via-appcert-dll.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/registry-persistence-via-appcert-dll.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Detects attempts to maintain persistence by creating registry keys using AppCert
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
@@ -33,8 +33,9 @@ Detects attempts to maintain persistence by creating registry keys using AppCert
 * Tactic: Privilege Escalation
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -47,6 +48,9 @@ Detects attempts to maintain persistence by creating registry keys using AppCert
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/registry-persistence-via-appinit-dll.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/registry-persistence-via-appinit-dll.asciidoc
index 8a731592c3..be9338a541 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/registry-persistence-via-appinit-dll.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/registry-persistence-via-appinit-dll.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ AppInit DLLs are dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are loaded into every proces
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
@@ -34,8 +34,9 @@ AppInit DLLs are dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are loaded into every proces
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -111,11 +112,13 @@ This rule identifies modifications on the AppInit registry keys.
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/remote-desktop-enabled-in-windows-firewall-by-netsh.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/remote-desktop-enabled-in-windows-firewall-by-netsh.asciidoc
index 401dc407d1..d6e854dc82 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/remote-desktop-enabled-in-windows-firewall-by-netsh.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/remote-desktop-enabled-in-windows-firewall-by-netsh.asciidoc
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Identifies use of the network shell utility (netsh.exe) to enable inbound Remote
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -94,11 +94,13 @@ This rule detects the creation of a Windows Firewall inbound rule that would all
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/remote-file-copy-to-a-hidden-share.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/remote-file-copy-to-a-hidden-share.asciidoc
index 3bfce1a836..55ecdd5b25 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/remote-file-copy-to-a-hidden-share.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/remote-file-copy-to-a-hidden-share.asciidoc
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ Identifies a remote file copy attempt to a hidden network share. This may indica
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-windows.*
 * endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -33,7 +34,7 @@ Identifies a remote file copy attempt to a hidden network share. This may indica
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -46,6 +47,9 @@ Identifies a remote file copy attempt to a hidden network share. This may indica
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/remote-file-copy-via-teamviewer.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/remote-file-copy-via-teamviewer.asciidoc
index 18761929dd..24f333c8c4 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/remote-file-copy-via-teamviewer.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/remote-file-copy-via-teamviewer.asciidoc
@@ -7,10 +7,7 @@ Identifies an executable or script file remotely downloaded via a TeamViewer tra
 
 *Rule indices*: 
 
-* winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
-* endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -36,7 +33,7 @@ Identifies an executable or script file remotely downloaded via a TeamViewer tra
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -109,10 +106,11 @@ TeamViewer is a remote access and remote control tool used by helpdesks and syst
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
+==== Setup
 
 
-==== Setup
 
+*Setup*
 
 
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/remote-file-download-via-desktopimgdownldr-utility.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/remote-file-download-via-desktopimgdownldr-utility.asciidoc
index ca2c63822a..2832cb2e32 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/remote-file-download-via-desktopimgdownldr-utility.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/remote-file-download-via-desktopimgdownldr-utility.asciidoc
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Identifies the desktopimgdownldr utility being used to download a remote file. A
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 110
+*Version*: 111
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -118,10 +118,11 @@ The `Desktopimgdownldr.exe` utility is used to to configure lockscreen/desktop i
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
+==== Setup
 
 
-==== Setup
 
+*Setup*
 
 
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/remote-file-download-via-mpcmdrun.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/remote-file-download-via-mpcmdrun.asciidoc
index b4d2521f28..4659b140f1 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/remote-file-download-via-mpcmdrun.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/remote-file-download-via-mpcmdrun.asciidoc
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ Identifies the Windows Defender configuration utility (MpCmdRun.exe) being used
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 110
+*Version*: 111
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -117,11 +117,13 @@ The `MpCmdRun.exe` is a command-line tool part of Windows Defender and is used t
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/remote-file-download-via-script-interpreter.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/remote-file-download-via-script-interpreter.asciidoc
index 9d1b571fab..7d4b13b281 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/remote-file-download-via-script-interpreter.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/remote-file-download-via-script-interpreter.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies built-in Windows script interpreters (cscript.exe or wscript.exe) bei
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -32,8 +32,9 @@ Identifies built-in Windows script interpreters (cscript.exe or wscript.exe) bei
 * Tactic: Execution
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/remote-scheduled-task-creation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/remote-scheduled-task-creation.asciidoc
index 2cf923f0fa..75effc3b8f 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/remote-scheduled-task-creation.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/remote-scheduled-task-creation.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies remote scheduled task creations on a target host. This could be indic
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -31,8 +31,9 @@ Identifies remote scheduled task creations on a target host. This could be indic
 * Tactic: Lateral Movement
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/remote-ssh-login-enabled-via-systemsetup-command.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/remote-ssh-login-enabled-via-systemsetup-command.asciidoc
index 1fe8305f98..48424403da 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/remote-ssh-login-enabled-via-systemsetup-command.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/remote-ssh-login-enabled-via-systemsetup-command.asciidoc
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Detects use of the systemsetup command to enable remote SSH Login.
 * Tactic: Lateral Movement
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ Detects use of the systemsetup command to enable remote SSH Login.
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -76,7 +79,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/remote-system-discovery-commands.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/remote-system-discovery-commands.asciidoc
index a9d96c6198..360788fc31 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/remote-system-discovery-commands.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/remote-system-discovery-commands.asciidoc
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Discovery of remote system information using built-in commands, which may be use
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Rule Type: BBR
 
-*Version*: 110
+*Version*: 111
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -86,11 +86,13 @@ This rule looks for the execution of the `arp` or `nbstat` utilities to enumerat
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
@@ -98,7 +100,6 @@ Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest
 For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/remotely-started-services-via-rpc.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/remotely-started-services-via-rpc.asciidoc
index f626082bbc..bf577bf4b8 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/remotely-started-services-via-rpc.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/remotely-started-services-via-rpc.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies remote execution of Windows services over remote procedure call (RPC)
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -33,8 +33,9 @@ Identifies remote execution of Windows services over remote procedure call (RPC)
 * Tactic: Lateral Movement
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/renamed-autoit-scripts-interpreter.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/renamed-autoit-scripts-interpreter.asciidoc
index e6d092f3ba..af4fc217b9 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/renamed-autoit-scripts-interpreter.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/renamed-autoit-scripts-interpreter.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies a suspicious AutoIt process execution. Malware written as an AutoIt s
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
@@ -33,8 +33,9 @@ Identifies a suspicious AutoIt process execution. Malware written as an AutoIt s
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -107,11 +108,13 @@ This rule checks for renamed instances of AutoIt, which can indicate an attempt
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/renamed-utility-executed-with-short-program-name.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/renamed-utility-executed-with-short-program-name.asciidoc
index f906a89902..c77948dd22 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/renamed-utility-executed-with-short-program-name.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/renamed-utility-executed-with-short-program-name.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies the execution of a process with a single character process name, diff
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
@@ -33,8 +33,9 @@ Identifies the execution of a process with a single character process name, diff
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/root-network-connection-via-gdb-cap-sys-ptrace.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/root-network-connection-via-gdb-cap-sys-ptrace.asciidoc
index 433bc0e82b..81e96dee33 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/root-network-connection-via-gdb-cap-sys-ptrace.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/root-network-connection-via-gdb-cap-sys-ptrace.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Identifies instances where GDB (granted the CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability) is execut
 * Tactic: Command and Control
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 1
+*Version*: 2
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ Identifies instances where GDB (granted the CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability) is execut
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,14 +78,13 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
 sequence by host.id, process.entry_leader.entity_id with maxspan=30s
-  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "exec" and event.type == "start" and process.name == "gdb" and
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and process.name == "gdb" and
    (process.thread.capabilities.effective : "CAP_SYS_PTRACE" or process.thread.capabilities.permitted : "CAP_SYS_PTRACE") and
    user.id != "0"]
   [network where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "connection_attempted" and event.type == "start" and
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/scheduled-task-created-by-a-windows-script.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/scheduled-task-created-by-a-windows-script.asciidoc
index 5b4f41c2dd..0646e2a5f1 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/scheduled-task-created-by-a-windows-script.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/scheduled-task-created-by-a-windows-script.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ A scheduled task was created by a Windows script via cscript.exe, wscript.exe or
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
@@ -33,8 +33,9 @@ A scheduled task was created by a Windows script via cscript.exe, wscript.exe or
 * Tactic: Execution
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -60,7 +61,7 @@ Decode the base64 encoded Tasks Actions registry value to investigate the task's
 sequence by host.id with maxspan = 30s
   [any where host.os.type == "windows" and 
     (event.category : ("library", "driver") or (event.category == "process" and event.action : "Image loaded*")) and
-    (dll.name : "taskschd.dll" or file.name : "taskschd.dll") and
+    (?dll.name : "taskschd.dll" or file.name : "taskschd.dll") and
     process.name : ("cscript.exe", "wscript.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe")]
   [registry where host.os.type == "windows" and registry.path : (
     "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Schedule\\TaskCache\\Tasks\\*\\Actions",
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/scheduled-task-execution-at-scale-via-gpo.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/scheduled-task-execution-at-scale-via-gpo.asciidoc
index 42bd67a541..bbb86b43d9 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/scheduled-task-execution-at-scale-via-gpo.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/scheduled-task-execution-at-scale-via-gpo.asciidoc
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ Detects the modification of Group Policy Object attributes to execute a schedule
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -96,13 +96,15 @@ Group Policy Objects (GPOs) can be used by attackers to execute scheduled tasks
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 The 'Audit Detailed File Share' audit policy must be configured (Success Failure).
-Steps to implement the logging policy with with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
 ```
 Computer Configuration >
@@ -116,7 +118,7 @@ Audit Detailed File Share (Success,Failure)
 ```
 
 The 'Audit Directory Service Changes' audit policy must be configured (Success Failure).
-Steps to implement the logging policy with with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
 ```
 Computer Configuration >
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/scheduled-tasks-at-command-enabled.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/scheduled-tasks-at-command-enabled.asciidoc
index 3294c8a568..830ce80931 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/scheduled-tasks-at-command-enabled.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/scheduled-tasks-at-command-enabled.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies attempts to enable the Windows scheduled tasks AT command via the reg
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
@@ -35,8 +35,9 @@ Identifies attempts to enable the Windows scheduled tasks AT command via the reg
 * Tactic: Execution
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -49,6 +50,9 @@ Identifies attempts to enable the Windows scheduled tasks AT command via the reg
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/screensaver-plist-file-modified-by-unexpected-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/screensaver-plist-file-modified-by-unexpected-process.asciidoc
index 6cca5cfdf0..8a81ecbd07 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/screensaver-plist-file-modified-by-unexpected-process.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/screensaver-plist-file-modified-by-unexpected-process.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Identifies when a screensaver plist file is modified by an unexpected process. A
 * Tactic: Persistence
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -53,11 +53,13 @@ Identifies when a screensaver plist file is modified by an unexpected process. A
 - Identify if any suspicious or known malicious screensaver (.saver) files were recently written to or modified on the host
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -88,7 +90,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/searching-for-saved-credentials-via-vaultcmd.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/searching-for-saved-credentials-via-vaultcmd.asciidoc
index af66918b67..5a63e59703 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/searching-for-saved-credentials-via-vaultcmd.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/searching-for-saved-credentials-via-vaultcmd.asciidoc
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ Windows Credential Manager allows you to create, view, or delete saved credentia
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * logs-windows.*
 * endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -37,7 +38,7 @@ Windows Credential Manager allows you to create, view, or delete saved credentia
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -50,6 +51,9 @@ Windows Credential Manager allows you to create, view, or delete saved credentia
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
@@ -63,7 +67,7 @@ For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
 process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
-  (process.pe.original_file_name:"vaultcmd.exe" or process.name:"vaultcmd.exe") and
+  (?process.pe.original_file_name:"vaultcmd.exe" or process.name:"vaultcmd.exe") and
   process.args:"/list*"
 
 ----------------------------------
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/security-software-discovery-using-wmic.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/security-software-discovery-using-wmic.asciidoc
index f8f6e5dc0e..6dc4d6e5ba 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/security-software-discovery-using-wmic.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/security-software-discovery-using-wmic.asciidoc
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Identifies the use of Windows Management Instrumentation Command (WMIC) to disco
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 * Rule Type: BBR
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -86,11 +86,13 @@ This rule looks for the execution of the `wmic` utility with arguments compatibl
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
@@ -98,7 +100,6 @@ Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest
 For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/security-software-discovery-via-grep.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/security-software-discovery-via-grep.asciidoc
index d800b9bd42..3775ae0bff 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/security-software-discovery-via-grep.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/security-software-discovery-via-grep.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Identifies the use of the grep command to discover known third-party macOS and L
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -85,11 +85,13 @@ This rule looks for the execution of the `grep` utility with arguments compatibl
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
@@ -97,7 +99,6 @@ Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest
 For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/sedebugprivilege-enabled-by-a-suspicious-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/sedebugprivilege-enabled-by-a-suspicious-process.asciidoc
index 3627730ff7..fcd22c5292 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/sedebugprivilege-enabled-by-a-suspicious-process.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/sedebugprivilege-enabled-by-a-suspicious-process.asciidoc
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Identifies the creation of a process running as SYSTEM and impersonating a Windo
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Privilege Escalation
 
-*Version*: 6
+*Version*: 7
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -46,9 +46,12 @@ Identifies the creation of a process running as SYSTEM and impersonating a Windo
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 Windows Event 4703 logs Token Privileges changes and need to be configured (Enable).
 
-Steps to implement the logging policy with with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
 ```
 Computer Configuration >
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/sensitive-files-compression.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/sensitive-files-compression.asciidoc
index 6c338c0938..6f381f480b 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/sensitive-files-compression.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/sensitive-files-compression.asciidoc
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Identifies the use of a compression utility to collect known files containing se
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 207
+*Version*: 208
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@ Identifies the use of a compression utility to collect known files containing se
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
 - Elastic Defend
 - Auditbeat
@@ -96,7 +99,6 @@ Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit
 - For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/sensitive-privilege-seenabledelegationprivilege-assigned-to-a-user.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/sensitive-privilege-seenabledelegationprivilege-assigned-to-a-user.asciidoc
index 22e4d1dcfd..3fe5eb09c2 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/sensitive-privilege-seenabledelegationprivilege-assigned-to-a-user.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/sensitive-privilege-seenabledelegationprivilege-assigned-to-a-user.asciidoc
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ Identifies the assignment of the SeEnableDelegationPrivilege sensitive "user rig
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -99,11 +99,13 @@ It is critical to control the assignment of this privilege. A user with this pri
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 The 'Audit Authorization Policy Change' logging policy must be configured for (Success, Failure).
 Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/service-command-lateral-movement.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/service-command-lateral-movement.asciidoc
index f86cc97136..184d286b9d 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/service-command-lateral-movement.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/service-command-lateral-movement.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies use of sc.exe to create, modify, or start services on remote hosts. T
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: low
 
@@ -30,8 +30,9 @@ Identifies use of sc.exe to create, modify, or start services on remote hosts. T
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Lateral Movement
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/setcap-setuid-setgid-capability-set.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/setcap-setuid-setgid-capability-set.asciidoc
index 50c51db973..09121daf4f 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/setcap-setuid-setgid-capability-set.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/setcap-setuid-setgid-capability-set.asciidoc
@@ -118,6 +118,9 @@ This rule monitors for the addition of the cap_setuid+ep or cap_setgid+ep capabi
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -148,13 +151,12 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and event.type == "start" and 
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and 
 process.name == "setcap" and process.args : "cap_set?id+ep" and not process.parent.name in ("jem", "vzctl")
 
 ----------------------------------
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/shared-object-created-or-changed-by-previously-unknown-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/shared-object-created-or-changed-by-previously-unknown-process.asciidoc
index 590cad05b8..1addbb7581 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/shared-object-created-or-changed-by-previously-unknown-process.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/shared-object-created-or-changed-by-previously-unknown-process.asciidoc
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ This rule monitors the creation of shared object files by previously unknown pro
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 6
+*Version*: 7
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -122,6 +122,9 @@ This rule monitors the creation of shared object files by previously unknown pro
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -152,16 +155,17 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
 host.os.type:linux and event.action:(creation or file_create_event or file_rename_event or rename) and 
-file.path:(/dev/shm/* or /usr/lib/*) and file.extension:so and 
-process.name: ( * and not ("5" or "dockerd" or "dpkg" or "rpm" or "snapd" or "exe" or "yum" or "vmis-launcher"
-  or "pacman" or "apt-get" or "dnf" or "podman" or "platform-python"))
+file.path:(/dev/shm/* or /usr/lib/*) and file.extension:so and process.name:* and not (
+  process.name:("dockerd" or "dpkg" or "rpm" or "snapd" or "yum" or "vmis-launcher" or "pacman" or
+  "apt-get" or "dnf" or "podman" or "platform-python") or 
+  (process.name:vmware-install.pl and file.path:/usr/lib/vmware-tools/*)
+)
 
 ----------------------------------
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/sharepoint-malware-file-upload.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/sharepoint-malware-file-upload.asciidoc
index d856018187..bc8618fbaf 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/sharepoint-malware-file-upload.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/sharepoint-malware-file-upload.asciidoc
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ Identifies the occurence of files uploaded to SharePoint being detected as Malwa
 * Data Source: Microsoft 365
 * Tactic: Lateral Movement
 
-*Version*: 103
+*Version*: 105
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/shell-execution-via-apple-scripting.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/shell-execution-via-apple-scripting.asciidoc
index d555b1b5df..f128fded1e 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/shell-execution-via-apple-scripting.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/shell-execution-via-apple-scripting.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Identifies the execution of the shell process (sh) via scripting (JXA or AppleSc
 * Tactic: Execution
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ Identifies the execution of the shell process (sh) via scripting (JXA or AppleSc
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -75,7 +78,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/signed-proxy-execution-via-ms-work-folders.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/signed-proxy-execution-via-ms-work-folders.asciidoc
index 7057cdc762..8930fb71e7 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/signed-proxy-execution-via-ms-work-folders.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/signed-proxy-execution-via-ms-work-folders.asciidoc
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Identifies the use of Windows Work Folders to execute a potentially masqueraded
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -92,11 +92,13 @@ disk from a separate binary.
 - Confirm with the user whether this was expected or not, and reset their password.
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/sip-provider-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/sip-provider-modification.asciidoc
index 764b1f029d..05b60ba654 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/sip-provider-modification.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/sip-provider-modification.asciidoc
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ Identifies modifications to the registered Subject Interface Package (SIP) provi
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * endgame-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -32,8 +33,9 @@ Identifies modifications to the registered Subject Interface Package (SIP) provi
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/smtp-on-port-26-tcp.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/smtp-on-port-26-tcp.asciidoc
index caca031c75..1c2924239e 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/smtp-on-port-26-tcp.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/smtp-on-port-26-tcp.asciidoc
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ This rule detects events that may indicate use of SMTP on TCP port 26. This port
 * Domain: Endpoint
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 
-*Version*: 103
+*Version*: 104
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -47,8 +47,7 @@ This rule detects events that may indicate use of SMTP on TCP port 26. This port
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-(event.dataset: network_traffic.flow or (event.category: (network or network_traffic))) and
-    network.transport:tcp and (destination.port:26 or (event.dataset:zeek.smtp and destination.port:26))
+(event.dataset: (network_traffic.flow or zeek.smtp) or event.category:(network or network_traffic)) and network.transport:tcp and destination.port:26
 
 ----------------------------------
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/softwareupdate-preferences-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/softwareupdate-preferences-modification.asciidoc
index 9eb6c2c299..5d01b9e728 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/softwareupdate-preferences-modification.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/softwareupdate-preferences-modification.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Identifies changes to the SoftwareUpdate preferences using the built-in defaults
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ Identifies changes to the SoftwareUpdate preferences using the built-in defaults
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,7 +77,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/solarwinds-process-disabling-services-via-registry.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/solarwinds-process-disabling-services-via-registry.asciidoc
index a03c745f80..fcaf2d9c60 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/solarwinds-process-disabling-services-via-registry.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/solarwinds-process-disabling-services-via-registry.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies a SolarWinds binary modifying the start type of a service to be disab
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
@@ -35,8 +35,9 @@ Identifies a SolarWinds binary modifying the start type of a service to be disab
 * Tactic: Initial Access
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -49,6 +50,9 @@ Identifies a SolarWinds binary modifying the start type of a service to be disab
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/spike-in-bytes-sent-to-an-external-device-via-airdrop.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/spike-in-bytes-sent-to-an-external-device-via-airdrop.asciidoc
index 5e47b2f905..d79c85149c 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/spike-in-bytes-sent-to-an-external-device-via-airdrop.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/spike-in-bytes-sent-to-an-external-device-via-airdrop.asciidoc
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ A machine learning job has detected high bytes of data written to an external de
 * Rule Type: Machine Learning
 * Tactic: Exfiltration
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -42,6 +42,10 @@ A machine learning job has detected high bytes of data written to an external de
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 The rule requires the Data Exfiltration Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as network and file events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend and Network Packet Capture (for network events only).  
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/spike-in-bytes-sent-to-an-external-device.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/spike-in-bytes-sent-to-an-external-device.asciidoc
index 91ce2cb9f9..1f3e4dd10b 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/spike-in-bytes-sent-to-an-external-device.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/spike-in-bytes-sent-to-an-external-device.asciidoc
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ A machine learning job has detected high bytes of data written to an external de
 * Rule Type: Machine Learning
 * Tactic: Exfiltration
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -42,6 +42,10 @@ A machine learning job has detected high bytes of data written to an external de
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 The rule requires the Data Exfiltration Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as network and file events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend and Network Packet Capture (for network events only).  
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/spike-in-number-of-connections-made-from-a-source-ip.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/spike-in-number-of-connections-made-from-a-source-ip.asciidoc
index 1576d1bd83..0551be606d 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/spike-in-number-of-connections-made-from-a-source-ip.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/spike-in-number-of-connections-made-from-a-source-ip.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ A machine learning job has detected a high count of destination IPs establishing
 * Rule Type: Machine Learning
 * Tactic: Lateral Movement
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -43,6 +43,10 @@ A machine learning job has detected a high count of destination IPs establishing
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 The rule requires the Lateral Movement Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as file and Windows RDP process events collected by the Elastic Defend integration.  
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/spike-in-number-of-connections-made-to-a-destination-ip.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/spike-in-number-of-connections-made-to-a-destination-ip.asciidoc
index 784af5c618..b19128f359 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/spike-in-number-of-connections-made-to-a-destination-ip.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/spike-in-number-of-connections-made-to-a-destination-ip.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ A machine learning job has detected a high count of source IPs establishing an R
 * Rule Type: Machine Learning
 * Tactic: Lateral Movement
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -43,6 +43,10 @@ A machine learning job has detected a high count of source IPs establishing an R
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 The rule requires the Lateral Movement Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as file and Windows RDP process events collected by the Elastic Defend integration.  
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/spike-in-number-of-processes-in-an-rdp-session.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/spike-in-number-of-processes-in-an-rdp-session.asciidoc
index 5525d2f4fb..70c5fcd663 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/spike-in-number-of-processes-in-an-rdp-session.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/spike-in-number-of-processes-in-an-rdp-session.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ A machine learning job has detected unusually high number of processes started i
 * Rule Type: Machine Learning
 * Tactic: Lateral Movement
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -43,6 +43,10 @@ A machine learning job has detected unusually high number of processes started i
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 The rule requires the Lateral Movement Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as file and Windows RDP process events collected by the Elastic Defend integration.  
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/spike-in-remote-file-transfers.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/spike-in-remote-file-transfers.asciidoc
index 74d2d024c3..a5e75dd495 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/spike-in-remote-file-transfers.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/spike-in-remote-file-transfers.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ A machine learning job has detected an abnormal volume of remote files shared on
 * Rule Type: Machine Learning
 * Tactic: Lateral Movement
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -43,6 +43,10 @@ A machine learning job has detected an abnormal volume of remote files shared on
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 The rule requires the Lateral Movement Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as file and Windows RDP process events collected by the Elastic Defend integration.  
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/ssh-authorized-keys-file-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/ssh-authorized-keys-file-modification.asciidoc
index 9903c3d908..7fef6c953a 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/ssh-authorized-keys-file-modification.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/ssh-authorized-keys-file-modification.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ The Secure Shell (SSH) authorized_keys file specifies which users are allowed to
 * Tactic: Persistence
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 204
+*Version*: 205
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -60,7 +60,10 @@ event.category:file and event.type:(change or creation) and
               /usr/bin/touch or
               /var/lib/docker/* or
               /usr/bin/google_guest_agent or 
-              /opt/jc/bin/jumpcloud-agent)
+              /opt/jc/bin/jumpcloud-agent or 
+              /opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/puppet or
+              /usr/bin/chef-client
+)
 
 ----------------------------------
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/startup-logon-script-added-to-group-policy-object.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/startup-logon-script-added-to-group-policy-object.asciidoc
index 4445acc8f7..2867d3cafe 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/startup-logon-script-added-to-group-policy-object.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/startup-logon-script-added-to-group-policy-object.asciidoc
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Detects the modification of Group Policy Objects (GPO) to add a startup/logon sc
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -95,13 +95,15 @@ Group Policy Objects (GPOs) can be used by attackers to instruct arbitrarily lar
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 The 'Audit Detailed File Share' audit policy must be configured (Success Failure).
-Steps to implement the logging policy with with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
 ```
 Computer Configuration >
@@ -115,7 +117,7 @@ Audit Detailed File Share (Success,Failure)
 ```
 
 The 'Audit Directory Service Changes' audit policy must be configured (Success Failure).
-Steps to implement the logging policy with with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
 ```
 Computer Configuration >
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/startup-persistence-by-a-suspicious-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/startup-persistence-by-a-suspicious-process.asciidoc
index 794fe0e74c..5ec6ad4a37 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/startup-persistence-by-a-suspicious-process.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/startup-persistence-by-a-suspicious-process.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies files written to or modified in the startup folder by commonly abused
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
@@ -35,8 +35,9 @@ Identifies files written to or modified in the startup folder by commonly abused
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -117,11 +118,13 @@ This rule monitors for commonly abused processes writing to the Startup folder l
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/statistical-model-detected-c2-beaconing-activity-with-high-confidence.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/statistical-model-detected-c2-beaconing-activity-with-high-confidence.asciidoc
index 1fe2e344ff..d362d9d70d 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/statistical-model-detected-c2-beaconing-activity-with-high-confidence.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/statistical-model-detected-c2-beaconing-activity-with-high-confidence.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ A statistical model has identified command-and-control (C2) beaconing activity w
 * Use Case: C2 Beaconing Detection
 * Tactic: Command and Control
 
-*Version*: 3
+*Version*: 4
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -43,6 +43,10 @@ A statistical model has identified command-and-control (C2) beaconing activity w
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 The rule requires the Network Beaconing Identification integration assets to be installed, as well as network logs collected by the Elastic Defend or Network Packet Capture integrations.
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/statistical-model-detected-c2-beaconing-activity.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/statistical-model-detected-c2-beaconing-activity.asciidoc
index a108e30869..9b67032125 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/statistical-model-detected-c2-beaconing-activity.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/statistical-model-detected-c2-beaconing-activity.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ A statistical model has identified command-and-control (C2) beaconing activity.
 * Use Case: C2 Beaconing Detection
 * Tactic: Command and Control
 
-*Version*: 3
+*Version*: 4
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -43,6 +43,10 @@ A statistical model has identified command-and-control (C2) beaconing activity.
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 The rule requires the Network Beaconing Identification integration assets to be installed, as well as network logs collected by the Elastic Defend or Network Packet Capture integrations.
 
 
@@ -72,7 +76,8 @@ The Network Beaconing Identification integration consists of a statistical frame
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-beacon_stats.is_beaconing: true
+beacon_stats.is_beaconing: true and
+not process.name: ("WaAppAgent.exe" or "metricbeat.exe" or "packetbeat.exe" or "WindowsAzureGuestAgent.exe" or "HealthService.exe" or "Widgets.exe" or "lsass.exe" or "msedgewebview2.exe" or "MsMpEng.exe" or "OUTLOOK.EXE" or "msteams.exe" or "FileSyncHelper.exe" or "SearchProtocolHost.exe" or "Creative Cloud.exe" or "ms-teams.exe" or "ms-teamsupdate.exe" or "curl.exe" or "rundll32.exe" or "MsSense.exe" or "wermgr.exe" or "java" or "olk.exe" or "iexplore.exe" or "NetworkManager" or "packetbeat" or "Ssms.exe" or "NisSrv.exe" or "gamingservices.exe" or "appidcertstorecheck.exe" or "POWERPNT.EXE" or "miiserver.exe" or "Grammarly.Desktop.exe" or "SnagitEditor.exe" or "CRWindowsClientService.exe")
 
 ----------------------------------
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/sublime-plugin-or-application-script-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/sublime-plugin-or-application-script-modification.asciidoc
index 7703fdfe07..1d80712edf 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/sublime-plugin-or-application-script-modification.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/sublime-plugin-or-application-script-modification.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Adversaries may create or modify the Sublime application plugins or scripts to e
 * Tactic: Persistence
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ Adversaries may create or modify the Sublime application plugins or scripts to e
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,7 +77,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/sudo-command-enumeration-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/sudo-command-enumeration-detected.asciidoc
index 951e7aba49..80c77b2939 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/sudo-command-enumeration-detected.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/sudo-command-enumeration-detected.asciidoc
@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ This rule monitors for the usage of the sudo -l command, which is used to list t
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -72,7 +75,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suid-sguid-enumeration-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suid-sguid-enumeration-detected.asciidoc
index 51f356bc16..4ad5bacdb2 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suid-sguid-enumeration-detected.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suid-sguid-enumeration-detected.asciidoc
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ This rule monitors for the usage of the "find" command in conjunction with SUID
 * Tactic: Privilege Escalation
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 4
+*Version*: 5
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ This rule monitors for the usage of the "find" command in conjunction with SUID
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -73,7 +76,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-antimalware-scan-interface-dll.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-antimalware-scan-interface-dll.asciidoc
index f6b940580a..102da97ae2 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-antimalware-scan-interface-dll.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-antimalware-scan-interface-dll.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies the creation of the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) DLL in an unusu
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: high
@@ -35,8 +35,9 @@ Identifies the creation of the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) DLL in an unusu
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 7
+*Version*: 8
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-apt-package-manager-execution.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-apt-package-manager-execution.asciidoc
index ffaccf27df..be7750e04d 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-apt-package-manager-execution.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-apt-package-manager-execution.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Detects suspicious process events executed by the APT package manager, potential
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 1
+*Version*: 2
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ Detects suspicious process events executed by the APT package manager, potential
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,19 +78,18 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
 sequence by host.id with maxspan=5s
-  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "exec" and event.type == "start" and
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
    process.parent.name == "apt" and process.args == "-c" and process.name in (
      "bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish"
    )
   ] by process.entity_id
-  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "exec" and event.type == "start" and process.name : (
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and process.name : (
      "bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish", "python*", "php*",
      "perl", "ruby", "lua*", "openssl", "nc", "netcat", "ncat", "telnet", "awk"
    )
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-apt-package-manager-network-connection.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-apt-package-manager-network-connection.asciidoc
index 799db7b642..10e175ebaf 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-apt-package-manager-network-connection.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-apt-package-manager-network-connection.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Detects suspicious network events executed by the APT package manager, potential
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 1
+*Version*: 2
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ Detects suspicious network events executed by the APT package manager, potential
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,14 +78,13 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
 sequence by host.id with maxspan=5s
-  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "exec" and event.type == "start" and
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
    process.parent.name == "apt" and process.args == "-c" and process.name in (
      "bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish"
     )
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-automator-workflows-execution.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-automator-workflows-execution.asciidoc
index f932dfc984..c71c32b2f3 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-automator-workflows-execution.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-automator-workflows-execution.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Identifies the execution of the Automator Workflows process followed by a networ
 * Tactic: Execution
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ Identifies the execution of the Automator Workflows process followed by a networ
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,7 +77,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-browser-child-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-browser-child-process.asciidoc
index 7558e2eb6e..2824311cb5 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-browser-child-process.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-browser-child-process.asciidoc
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Identifies the execution of a suspicious browser child process. Adversaries may
 * Tactic: Execution
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ Identifies the execution of a suspicious browser child process. Adversaries may
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -76,7 +79,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-calendar-file-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-calendar-file-modification.asciidoc
index 1fa87da2c5..fc5ba88684 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-calendar-file-modification.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-calendar-file-modification.asciidoc
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Identifies suspicious modifications of the calendar file by an unusual process.
 * Tactic: Persistence
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ Identifies suspicious modifications of the calendar file by an unusual process.
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -76,7 +79,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-child-process-of-adobe-acrobat-reader-update-service.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-child-process-of-adobe-acrobat-reader-update-service.asciidoc
index 0bb1d1a3f7..df15323b0c 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-child-process-of-adobe-acrobat-reader-update-service.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-child-process-of-adobe-acrobat-reader-update-service.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Detects attempts to exploit privilege escalation vulnerabilities related to the
 * Use Case: Vulnerability
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ Detects attempts to exploit privilege escalation vulnerabilities related to the
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -75,7 +78,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-cmd-execution-via-wmi.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-cmd-execution-via-wmi.asciidoc
index 3215c25637..b7cde92825 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-cmd-execution-via-wmi.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-cmd-execution-via-wmi.asciidoc
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Identifies suspicious command execution (cmd) via Windows Management Instrumenta
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ Identifies suspicious command execution (cmd) via Windows Management Instrumenta
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-content-extracted-or-decompressed-via-funzip.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-content-extracted-or-decompressed-via-funzip.asciidoc
index ebe622a4f5..d707d45de8 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-content-extracted-or-decompressed-via-funzip.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-content-extracted-or-decompressed-via-funzip.asciidoc
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Identifies when suspicious content is extracted from a file and subsequently dec
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 4
+*Version*: 5
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ Identifies when suspicious content is extracted from a file and subsequently dec
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -76,7 +79,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-crontab-creation-or-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-crontab-creation-or-modification.asciidoc
index 03a6be15a7..fd8bfff188 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-crontab-creation-or-modification.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-crontab-creation-or-modification.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Identifies attempts to create or modify a crontab via a process that is not cron
 * Tactic: Persistence
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ Identifies attempts to create or modify a crontab via a process that is not cron
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -75,7 +78,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-data-encryption-via-openssl-utility.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-data-encryption-via-openssl-utility.asciidoc
index e85f78f97d..e6656d04fa 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-data-encryption-via-openssl-utility.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-data-encryption-via-openssl-utility.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Identifies when the openssl command-line utility is used to encrypt multiple fil
 * Tactic: Impact
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 5
+*Version*: 6
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ Identifies when the openssl command-line utility is used to encrypt multiple fil
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -75,7 +78,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-dll-loaded-for-persistence-or-privilege-escalation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-dll-loaded-for-persistence-or-privilege-escalation.asciidoc
index f24fbd97a6..71048822da 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-dll-loaded-for-persistence-or-privilege-escalation.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-dll-loaded-for-persistence-or-privilege-escalation.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies the loading of a non Microsoft signed DLL that is missing on a defaul
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: high
@@ -42,8 +42,9 @@ Identifies the loading of a non Microsoft signed DLL that is missing on a defaul
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -106,11 +107,13 @@ Attackers can execute malicious code by abusing missing modules that processes t
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
@@ -127,11 +130,11 @@ any where host.os.type == "windows" and
  (event.category : ("driver", "library") or (event.category == "process" and event.action : "Image loaded*")) and
  (
   /* compatible with Elastic Endpoint Library Events */
-  (dll.name : ("wlbsctrl.dll", "wbemcomn.dll", "WptsExtensions.dll", "Tsmsisrv.dll", "TSVIPSrv.dll", "Msfte.dll",
+  (?dll.name : ("wlbsctrl.dll", "wbemcomn.dll", "WptsExtensions.dll", "Tsmsisrv.dll", "TSVIPSrv.dll", "Msfte.dll",
                "wow64log.dll", "WindowsCoreDeviceInfo.dll", "Ualapi.dll", "wlanhlp.dll", "phoneinfo.dll", "EdgeGdi.dll",
                "cdpsgshims.dll", "windowsperformancerecordercontrol.dll", "diagtrack_win.dll", "oci.dll", "TPPCOIPW32.dll", 
                "tpgenlic.dll", "thinmon.dll", "fxsst.dll", "msTracer.dll")
-   and (dll.code_signature.trusted != true or dll.code_signature.exists != true)) or
+   and (?dll.code_signature.trusted != true or ?dll.code_signature.exists != true)) or
 
   /* compatible with Sysmon EventID 7 - Image Load */
   (file.name : ("wlbsctrl.dll", "wbemcomn.dll", "WptsExtensions.dll", "Tsmsisrv.dll", "TSVIPSrv.dll", "Msfte.dll",
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-dynamic-linker-discovery-via-od.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-dynamic-linker-discovery-via-od.asciidoc
index 04b17b571b..05a3d94707 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-dynamic-linker-discovery-via-od.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-dynamic-linker-discovery-via-od.asciidoc
@@ -49,6 +49,10 @@ Monitors for dynamic linker discovery via the od utility. od (octal dump) is a c
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -79,14 +83,13 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started") and
-event.type == "start" and process.name == "od" and process.args in (
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and process.name == "od" and process.args in (
   "/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2", "/etc/ld.so.preload", "/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2",
   "/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2", "/usr/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2"
 )
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-emond-child-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-emond-child-process.asciidoc
index 265dff3a70..0cdf98c41b 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-emond-child-process.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-emond-child-process.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Identifies the execution of a suspicious child process of the Event Monitor Daem
 * Tactic: Persistence
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ Identifies the execution of a suspicious child process of the Event Monitor Daem
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,7 +77,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-endpoint-security-parent-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-endpoint-security-parent-process.asciidoc
index e6b2be4ad8..14c244dcd4 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-endpoint-security-parent-process.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-endpoint-security-parent-process.asciidoc
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ A suspicious Endpoint Security parent process was detected. This may indicate a
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * logs-windows.*
 * endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -33,7 +34,7 @@ A suspicious Endpoint Security parent process was detected. This may indicate a
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -46,6 +47,9 @@ A suspicious Endpoint Security parent process was detected. This may indicate a
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-execution-from-a-mounted-device.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-execution-from-a-mounted-device.asciidoc
index 0c192efe5e..a537aec2e8 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-execution-from-a-mounted-device.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-execution-from-a-mounted-device.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies when a script interpreter or signed binary is launched via a non-stan
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -34,8 +34,9 @@ Identifies when a script interpreter or signed binary is launched via a non-stan
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Tactic: Execution
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -48,6 +49,9 @@ Identifies when a script interpreter or signed binary is launched via a non-stan
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-execution-via-microsoft-office-add-ins.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-execution-via-microsoft-office-add-ins.asciidoc
index 3b2663fffb..6422a512da 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-execution-via-microsoft-office-add-ins.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-execution-via-microsoft-office-add-ins.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies execution of common Microsoft Office applications to launch an Office
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
@@ -36,8 +36,9 @@ Identifies execution of common Microsoft Office applications to launch an Office
 * Tactic: Persistence
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 3
+*Version*: 4
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-execution-via-scheduled-task.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-execution-via-scheduled-task.asciidoc
index ce3e6ed92c..72435ecfd4 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-execution-via-scheduled-task.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-execution-via-scheduled-task.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Identifies execution of a suspicious program via scheduled tasks by looking at p
 * Tactic: Execution
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ Identifies execution of a suspicious program via scheduled tasks by looking at p
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-explorer-child-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-explorer-child-process.asciidoc
index ab7101d079..7acc259614 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-explorer-child-process.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-explorer-child-process.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies a suspicious Windows explorer child process. Explorer.exe can be abus
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
@@ -34,8 +34,9 @@ Identifies a suspicious Windows explorer child process. Explorer.exe can be abus
 * Tactic: Execution
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -48,6 +49,9 @@ Identifies a suspicious Windows explorer child process. Explorer.exe can be abus
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-file-changes-activity-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-file-changes-activity-detected.asciidoc
index 46d7ca482b..451cc7371f 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-file-changes-activity-detected.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-file-changes-activity-detected.asciidoc
@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ This rule identifies a sequence of 100 file extension rename events within a set
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -72,7 +75,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-file-creation-in-etc-for-persistence.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-file-creation-in-etc-for-persistence.asciidoc
index 243504e530..4e93a58f17 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-file-creation-in-etc-for-persistence.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-file-creation-in-etc-for-persistence.asciidoc
@@ -137,6 +137,9 @@ This rule monitors for the creation of the most common system-wide configuration
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -167,7 +170,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-file-creation-via-kworker.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-file-creation-via-kworker.asciidoc
index c3999ff2ac..997877ed70 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-file-creation-via-kworker.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-file-creation-via-kworker.asciidoc
@@ -160,7 +160,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-hidden-child-process-of-launchd.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-hidden-child-process-of-launchd.asciidoc
index 31e3580f17..3c60df9739 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-hidden-child-process-of-launchd.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-hidden-child-process-of-launchd.asciidoc
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Identifies the execution of a launchd child process with a hidden file. An adver
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ Identifies the execution of a launchd child process with a hidden file. An adver
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -77,7 +80,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-html-file-creation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-html-file-creation.asciidoc
index 83de153c8e..d671ecd750 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-html-file-creation.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-html-file-creation.asciidoc
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Identifies the execution of a browser process to open an HTML file with high ent
 * Tactic: Initial Access
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ Identifies the execution of a browser process to open an HTML file with high ent
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-image-load-taskschd-dll-from-ms-office.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-image-load-taskschd-dll-from-ms-office.asciidoc
index a3f17cdfba..f69c1ad2a8 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-image-load-taskschd-dll-from-ms-office.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-image-load-taskschd-dll-from-ms-office.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies a suspicious image load (taskschd.dll) from Microsoft Office processe
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: low
@@ -36,8 +36,9 @@ Identifies a suspicious image load (taskschd.dll) from Microsoft Office processe
 * Tactic: Execution
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -131,6 +132,9 @@ This rule looks for an MS Office process loading `taskschd.dll`, which may indic
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
@@ -146,7 +150,7 @@ For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.
 any where host.os.type == "windows" and
  (event.category : ("library", "driver") or (event.category == "process" and event.action : "Image loaded*")) and
   process.name : ("WINWORD.EXE", "EXCEL.EXE", "POWERPNT.EXE", "MSPUB.EXE", "MSACCESS.EXE") and
-  (dll.name : "taskschd.dll" or file.name : "taskschd.dll")
+  (?dll.name : "taskschd.dll" or file.name : "taskschd.dll")
 
 ----------------------------------
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-imagepath-service-creation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-imagepath-service-creation.asciidoc
index ce9dd0079c..c743c89e8b 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-imagepath-service-creation.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-imagepath-service-creation.asciidoc
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ Identifies the creation of a suspicious ImagePath value. This could be an indica
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * endgame-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: high
 
@@ -31,8 +32,9 @@ Identifies the creation of a suspicious ImagePath value. This could be an indica
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-java-child-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-java-child-process.asciidoc
index 577475e9dd..6e7f143658 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-java-child-process.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-java-child-process.asciidoc
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ Identifies suspicious child processes of the Java interpreter process. This may
 * Use Case: Vulnerability
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 207
+*Version*: 208
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -91,11 +91,13 @@ This rule identifies a suspicious child process of the Java interpreter process.
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
@@ -103,14 +105,17 @@ Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest
 For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
 event.category:process and event.type:("start" or "process_started") and process.parent.name:"java" and process.name:(
-  "sh" or "bash" or "dash" or "ksh" or "tcsh" or "zsh" or "curl" or "wget"
+  bash or dash or sh or tcsh or csh or zsh or ksh or fish or python* or php* or perl or ruby or lua* or openssl or
+  nc or netcat or ncat or telnet or awk or socat or wget or curl
+) and process.args :(
+  whoami or id or uname or cat or hostname or ip or curl or wget or pwd or ls or cd or python* or php* or perl or
+  ruby or lua* or openssl or nc or netcat or ncat or telnet or awk or socat
 )
 
 ----------------------------------
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-kworker-uid-elevation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-kworker-uid-elevation.asciidoc
index 2a23933929..cc0bfc527d 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-kworker-uid-elevation.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-kworker-uid-elevation.asciidoc
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ Monitors for the elevation of regular user permissions to root permissions throu
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -29,8 +30,9 @@ Monitors for the elevation of regular user permissions to root permissions throu
 * Tactic: Privilege Escalation
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 
-*Version*: 1
+*Version*: 2
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -43,6 +45,9 @@ Monitors for the elevation of regular user permissions to root permissions throu
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,14 +79,13 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "session_id_change" and event.type == "change" and
-process.name : "kworker*" and user.id == "0"
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "session_id_change" and process.name : "kworker*" and
+user.id == "0"
 
 ----------------------------------
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-lsass-access-via-malseclogon.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-lsass-access-via-malseclogon.asciidoc
index c5a7fcde9c..57bbc5d5ae 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-lsass-access-via-malseclogon.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-lsass-access-via-malseclogon.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Identifies suspicious access to LSASS handle from a call trace pointing to seclo
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: high
 
@@ -30,9 +30,9 @@ Identifies suspicious access to LSASS handle from a call trace pointing to seclo
 * OS: Windows
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Credential Access
-* Data Source: Sysmon Only
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 207
+*Version*: 208
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ Identifies suspicious access to LSASS handle from a call trace pointing to seclo
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-lsass-process-access.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-lsass-process-access.asciidoc
index 7501c82cda..53270c291a 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-lsass-process-access.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-lsass-process-access.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Identifies access attempts to LSASS handle, this may indicate an attempt to dump
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -30,9 +30,9 @@ Identifies access attempts to LSASS handle, this may indicate an attempt to dump
 * OS: Windows
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Credential Access
-* Data Source: Sysmon Only
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ Identifies access attempts to LSASS handle, this may indicate an attempt to dump
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-macos-ms-office-child-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-macos-ms-office-child-process.asciidoc
index 142c55a9a6..f474bff42f 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-macos-ms-office-child-process.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-macos-ms-office-child-process.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Identifies suspicious child processes of frequently targeted Microsoft Office ap
 * Tactic: Initial Access
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ Identifies suspicious child processes of frequently targeted Microsoft Office ap
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,7 +77,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-managed-code-hosting-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-managed-code-hosting-process.asciidoc
index f517d54eca..6e9933b893 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-managed-code-hosting-process.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-managed-code-hosting-process.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies a suspicious managed code hosting process which could indicate code i
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.file-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: high
 
@@ -32,8 +32,9 @@ Identifies a suspicious managed code hosting process which could indicate code i
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-memory-grep-activity.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-memory-grep-activity.asciidoc
index e29f1e3198..b5b3811461 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-memory-grep-activity.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-memory-grep-activity.asciidoc
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Monitors for grep activity related to memory mapping. The /proc/*/maps file in L
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 
-*Version*: 1
+*Version*: 2
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ Monitors for grep activity related to memory mapping. The /proc/*/maps file in L
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and event.type == "start" and
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and
 process.name in ("grep", "egrep", "fgrep", "rgrep") and process.args in ("[stack]", "[vdso]", "[heap]")
 
 ----------------------------------
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-microsoft-365-mail-access-by-clientappid.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-microsoft-365-mail-access-by-clientappid.asciidoc
index 3f40f67e27..6f58622dda 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-microsoft-365-mail-access-by-clientappid.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-microsoft-365-mail-access-by-clientappid.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Identifies when a Microsoft 365 Mailbox is accessed by a ClientAppId that was ob
 * Use Case: Configuration Audit
 * Tactic: Initial Access
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 4
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-microsoft-diagnostics-wizard-execution.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-microsoft-diagnostics-wizard-execution.asciidoc
index 139c896737..beaddc0515 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-microsoft-diagnostics-wizard-execution.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-microsoft-diagnostics-wizard-execution.asciidoc
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Identifies potential abuse of the Microsoft Diagnostics Troubleshooting Wizard (
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ Identifies potential abuse of the Microsoft Diagnostics Troubleshooting Wizard (
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-mining-process-creation-event.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-mining-process-creation-event.asciidoc
index d42dedc037..988742890f 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-mining-process-creation-event.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-mining-process-creation-event.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Identifies service creation events of common mining services, possibly indicatin
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 5
+*Version*: 6
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ Identifies service creation events of common mining services, possibly indicatin
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,14 +77,12 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "creation" and
-event.action : ("creation", "file_create_event") and 
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "creation" and event.action : ("creation", "file_create_event") and 
 file.name : ("aliyun.service", "moneroocean_miner.service", "c3pool_miner.service", "pnsd.service", "apache4.service", "pastebin.service", "xvf.service")
 
 ----------------------------------
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-modprobe-file-event.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-modprobe-file-event.asciidoc
index 334ab26a3f..0b4dbd6037 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-modprobe-file-event.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-modprobe-file-event.asciidoc
@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ Detects file events involving kernel modules in modprobe configuration files, wh
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires the use of the `auditd_manager` integration. `Auditd_manager` is a tool designed to simplify and enhance the management of the audit subsystem in Linux systems. It provides a user-friendly interface and automation capabilities for configuring and monitoring system auditing through the auditd daemon. With `auditd_manager`, administrators can easily define audit rules, track system events, and generate comprehensive audit reports, improving overall security and compliance in the system. The following steps should be executed in order to install and deploy `auditd_manager` on a Linux system.
 
 ```
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-module-loaded-by-lsass.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-module-loaded-by-lsass.asciidoc
index ad45edfc70..3b7dac2d82 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-module-loaded-by-lsass.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-module-loaded-by-lsass.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Identifies LSASS loading an unsigned or untrusted DLL. Windows Security Support
 * Tactic: Credential Access
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 6
+*Version*: 7
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ Identifies LSASS loading an unsigned or untrusted DLL. Windows Security Support
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-ms-office-child-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-ms-office-child-process.asciidoc
index 95c08e2e79..dfe5f6e9a6 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-ms-office-child-process.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-ms-office-child-process.asciidoc
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ Identifies suspicious child processes of frequently targeted Microsoft Office ap
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 110
+*Version*: 111
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -109,11 +109,13 @@ This rule looks for suspicious processes spawned by MS Office programs. This is
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-ms-outlook-child-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-ms-outlook-child-process.asciidoc
index 4f220a14c8..e32d7dc0ff 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-ms-outlook-child-process.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-ms-outlook-child-process.asciidoc
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Identifies suspicious child processes of Microsoft Outlook. These child processe
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -107,11 +107,13 @@ This rule looks for suspicious processes spawned by MS Outlook, which can be the
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-net-code-compilation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-net-code-compilation.asciidoc
index 016eddc51b..8325355f27 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-net-code-compilation.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-net-code-compilation.asciidoc
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ Identifies executions of .NET compilers with suspicious parent processes, which
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * logs-windows.*
 * endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -34,7 +35,7 @@ Identifies executions of .NET compilers with suspicious parent processes, which
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -47,6 +48,9 @@ Identifies executions of .NET compilers with suspicious parent processes, which
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-net-reflection-via-powershell.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-net-reflection-via-powershell.asciidoc
index ed36f133e1..37aad4e9eb 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-net-reflection-via-powershell.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-net-reflection-via-powershell.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Detects the use of Reflection.Assembly to load PEs and DLLs in memory in PowerSh
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Detects the use of Reflection.Assembly to load PEs and DLLs in memory in PowerSh
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: PowerShell Logs
 
-*Version*: 111
+*Version*: 112
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -118,13 +118,15 @@ Attackers can use .NET reflection to load PEs and DLLs in memory. These payloads
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
-Steps to implement the logging policy with with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
 ```
 Computer Configuration >
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-network-activity-to-the-internet-by-previously-unknown-executable.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-network-activity-to-the-internet-by-previously-unknown-executable.asciidoc
index ddc2df3cfe..698cb84d56 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-network-activity-to-the-internet-by-previously-unknown-executable.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-network-activity-to-the-internet-by-previously-unknown-executable.asciidoc
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ This rule monitors for network connectivity to the internet from a previously un
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 7
+*Version*: 8
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ This rule leverages the new terms rule type to detect previously unknown process
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
 - Elastic Defend
 - Auditbeat
@@ -200,7 +203,6 @@ Packetbeat is a real-time network packet analyzer that you can use for applicati
 - For complete “Setup and Run Packetbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/packetbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-network-connection-via-sudo-binary.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-network-connection-via-sudo-binary.asciidoc
index b552167c33..23fcc9f85c 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-network-connection-via-sudo-binary.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-network-connection-via-sudo-binary.asciidoc
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ Detects network connections initiated by the "sudo" binary. This behavior is unc
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -28,8 +29,9 @@ Detects network connections initiated by the "sudo" binary. This behavior is unc
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Privilege Escalation
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 
-*Version*: 1
+*Version*: 2
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -42,6 +44,10 @@ Detects network connections initiated by the "sudo" binary. This behavior is unc
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -72,14 +78,13 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-network where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "connection_attempted" and event.type == "start" and
-process.name == "sudo"
+network where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and
+event.action in ("connection_attempted", "ipv4_connection_attempt_event") and process.name == "sudo"
 
 ----------------------------------
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-network-connection-via-systemd.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-network-connection-via-systemd.asciidoc
index 016567ff40..f869a21e87 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-network-connection-via-systemd.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-network-connection-via-systemd.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Detects suspicious network events executed by systemd, potentially indicating pe
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 1
+*Version*: 2
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ Detects suspicious network events executed by systemd, potentially indicating pe
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,14 +78,13 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
 sequence by host.id with maxspan=5s
-  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "exec" and event.type == "start" and
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
    process.parent.name == "systemd" and process.name in (
      "python*", "php*", "perl", "ruby", "lua*", "openssl", "nc", "netcat", "ncat", "telnet", "awk"
    )
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-passwd-file-event-action.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-passwd-file-event-action.asciidoc
index aef058048e..28bf7edca0 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-passwd-file-event-action.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-passwd-file-event-action.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Monitors for the generation of a passwd password entry via openssl, followed by
 * Tactic: Privilege Escalation
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ Monitors for the generation of a passwd password entry via openssl, followed by
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend and Auditd Manager.
 
 
@@ -101,7 +105,6 @@ However, if more advanced configuration is required to detect specific behavior,
   -- "-w /etc/passwd -p wa -k etcpasswd"
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-pdf-reader-child-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-pdf-reader-child-process.asciidoc
index d43831deb8..3d87dc7271 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-pdf-reader-child-process.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-pdf-reader-child-process.asciidoc
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ Identifies suspicious child processes of PDF reader applications. These child pr
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * logs-windows.*
 * endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
 
 *Severity*: low
 
@@ -35,7 +36,7 @@ Identifies suspicious child processes of PDF reader applications. These child pr
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -106,11 +107,13 @@ This rule looks for commonly abused built-in utilities spawned by a PDF reader p
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-portable-executable-encoded-in-powershell-script.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-portable-executable-encoded-in-powershell-script.asciidoc
index f2af3fc308..e8413713c3 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-portable-executable-encoded-in-powershell-script.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-portable-executable-encoded-in-powershell-script.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Detects the presence of a portable executable (PE) in a PowerShell script by loo
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.powershell*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Detects the presence of a portable executable (PE) in a PowerShell script by loo
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: PowerShell Logs
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -117,13 +117,15 @@ Attackers can abuse PowerShell in-memory capabilities to inject executables into
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
-Steps to implement the logging policy with with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
 ```
 Computer Configuration >
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-print-spooler-file-deletion.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-print-spooler-file-deletion.asciidoc
index 2a66fbed1e..175ca2e1cd 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-print-spooler-file-deletion.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-print-spooler-file-deletion.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Detects deletion of print driver files by an unusual process. This may indicate
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
@@ -35,8 +35,9 @@ Detects deletion of print driver files by an unusual process. This may indicate
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Use Case: Vulnerability
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -49,6 +50,9 @@ Detects deletion of print driver files by an unusual process. This may indicate
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-print-spooler-point-and-print-dll.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-print-spooler-point-and-print-dll.asciidoc
index cf208fe9d8..99f9ccfce9 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-print-spooler-point-and-print-dll.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-print-spooler-point-and-print-dll.asciidoc
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ Detects attempts to exploit a privilege escalation vulnerability (CVE-2020-1030)
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * endgame-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: high
 
@@ -35,8 +36,9 @@ Detects attempts to exploit a privilege escalation vulnerability (CVE-2020-1030)
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Use Case: Vulnerability
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 104
+*Version*: 105
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-print-spooler-spl-file-created.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-print-spooler-spl-file-created.asciidoc
index 5a5394268f..0738e93174 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-print-spooler-spl-file-created.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-print-spooler-spl-file-created.asciidoc
@@ -7,9 +7,7 @@ Detects attempts to exploit privilege escalation vulnerabilities related to the
 
 *Rule indices*: 
 
-* winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
@@ -37,7 +35,7 @@ Detects attempts to exploit privilege escalation vulnerabilities related to the
 * Use Case: Vulnerability
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -113,11 +111,13 @@ The Print Spooler service has some known vulnerabilities that attackers can abus
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-printspooler-service-executable-file-creation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-printspooler-service-executable-file-creation.asciidoc
index 32ffa13b2f..5ee67d7eee 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-printspooler-service-executable-file-creation.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-printspooler-service-executable-file-creation.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Detects attempts to exploit privilege escalation vulnerabilities related to the
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: high
@@ -36,8 +36,9 @@ Detects attempts to exploit privilege escalation vulnerabilities related to the
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Use Case: Vulnerability
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -50,6 +51,9 @@ Detects attempts to exploit privilege escalation vulnerabilities related to the
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-proc-maps-discovery.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-proc-maps-discovery.asciidoc
index 7920a3724b..8d4e8846fc 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-proc-maps-discovery.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-proc-maps-discovery.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Monitors for /proc/*/maps file reads. The /proc/*/maps file in Linux provides a
 * Tactic: Discovery
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 1
+*Version*: 2
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ Monitors for /proc/*/maps file reads. The /proc/*/maps file in Linux provides a
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,13 +78,12 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "exec" and event.type == "start" and
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
 process.name in ("cat", "grep") and process.args : "/proc/*/maps" and process.entry_leader.name in (
   "bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish"
 )
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-proc-pseudo-file-system-enumeration.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-proc-pseudo-file-system-enumeration.asciidoc
index c6855ffd86..35d9a7fbb1 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-proc-pseudo-file-system-enumeration.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-proc-pseudo-file-system-enumeration.asciidoc
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ This rule monitors for a rapid enumeration of 25 different proc cmd, stat, and e
 * Tactic: Discovery
 * Rule Type: BBR
 
-*Version*: 6
+*Version*: 7
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ This rule monitors for a rapid enumeration of 25 different proc cmd, stat, and e
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires the use of the `auditd_manager` integration. `Auditd_manager` is a tool designed to simplify and enhance the management of the audit subsystem in Linux systems. It provides a user-friendly interface and automation capabilities for configuring and monitoring system auditing through the auditd daemon. With `auditd_manager`, administrators can easily define audit rules, track system events, and generate comprehensive audit reports, improving overall security and compliance in the system. The following steps should be executed in order to install and deploy `auditd_manager` on a Linux system.
 
 ```
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-process-access-via-direct-system-call.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-process-access-via-direct-system-call.asciidoc
index 8e5984a8ee..4fc3bd5001 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-process-access-via-direct-system-call.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-process-access-via-direct-system-call.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Identifies suspicious process access events from an unknown memory region. Endpo
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: high
 
@@ -33,9 +33,9 @@ Identifies suspicious process access events from an unknown memory region. Endpo
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Tactic: Execution
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
-* Data Source: Sysmon Only
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 210
+*Version*: 211
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -112,11 +112,13 @@ This rule identifies suspicious process access events from an unknown memory reg
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-process-creation-calltrace.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-process-creation-calltrace.asciidoc
index 92b9ce83e3..a7d2ec42dd 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-process-creation-calltrace.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-process-creation-calltrace.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Identifies when a process is created and immediately accessed from an unknown me
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -29,9 +29,9 @@ Identifies when a process is created and immediately accessed from an unknown me
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
-* Data Source: Sysmon Only
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 207
+*Version*: 208
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-process-execution-via-renamed-psexec-executable.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-process-execution-via-renamed-psexec-executable.asciidoc
index fb0b410a10..8ec4a851b4 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-process-execution-via-renamed-psexec-executable.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-process-execution-via-renamed-psexec-executable.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies suspicious psexec activity which is executing from the psexec service
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
@@ -34,8 +34,9 @@ Identifies suspicious psexec activity which is executing from the psexec service
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -89,11 +90,13 @@ This rule identifies instances where the PsExec service component is executed us
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-process-spawned-from-motd-detected.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-process-spawned-from-motd-detected.asciidoc
index 34cdc9ba57..b07d3e30e6 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-process-spawned-from-motd-detected.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-process-spawned-from-motd-detected.asciidoc
@@ -117,11 +117,13 @@ This rule identifies the execution of potentially malicious processes from a MOT
 - Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -152,7 +154,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-rdp-activex-client-loaded.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-rdp-activex-client-loaded.asciidoc
index 8ab9785c9e..5fb15c20d2 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-rdp-activex-client-loaded.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-rdp-activex-client-loaded.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies suspicious Image Loading of the Remote Desktop Services ActiveX Clien
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
@@ -34,8 +34,9 @@ Identifies suspicious Image Loading of the Remote Desktop Services ActiveX Clien
 * Tactic: Lateral Movement
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -48,6 +49,9 @@ Identifies suspicious Image Loading of the Remote Desktop Services ActiveX Clien
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
@@ -62,7 +66,7 @@ For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.
 ----------------------------------
 any where host.os.type == "windows" and
  (event.category : ("library", "driver") or (event.category == "process" and event.action : "Image loaded*")) and
- (dll.name : "mstscax.dll" or file.name : "mstscax.dll") and
+ (?dll.name : "mstscax.dll" or file.name : "mstscax.dll") and
    /* depending on noise in your env add here extra paths  */
   process.executable : (
     "C:\\Windows\\*",
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-remote-registry-access-via-sebackupprivilege.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-remote-registry-access-via-sebackupprivilege.asciidoc
index b5ce7459af..dc8ba9c1ac 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-remote-registry-access-via-sebackupprivilege.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-remote-registry-access-via-sebackupprivilege.asciidoc
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ Identifies remote access to the registry using an account with Backup Operators
 * Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring
 * Data Source: Active Directory
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -91,13 +91,15 @@ This rule identifies remote access to the registry using an account with Backup
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 The 'Audit Detailed File Share' audit policy is required be configured (Success) on Domain Controllers and Sensitive Windows Servers.
-Steps to implement the logging policy with with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 ```
 Computer Configuration >
 Policies >
@@ -110,7 +112,7 @@ Audit Detailed File Share (Success)
 ```
 
 The 'Special Logon' audit policy must be configured (Success).
-Steps to implement the logging policy with with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 ```
 Computer Configuration >
 Policies >
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-renaming-of-esxi-files.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-renaming-of-esxi-files.asciidoc
index ec1b7b93b0..f6261063db 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-renaming-of-esxi-files.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-renaming-of-esxi-files.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Identifies instances where VMware-related files, such as those with extensions l
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 5
+*Version*: 6
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ Identifies instances where VMware-related files, such as those with extensions l
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,7 +77,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-renaming-of-esxi-index-html-file.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-renaming-of-esxi-index-html-file.asciidoc
index e6ea3e1680..baf1776ad8 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-renaming-of-esxi-index-html-file.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-renaming-of-esxi-index-html-file.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Identifies instances where the "index.html" file within the "/usr/lib/vmware/*"
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 5
+*Version*: 6
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ Identifies instances where the "index.html" file within the "/usr/lib/vmware/*"
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,7 +77,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-script-object-execution.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-script-object-execution.asciidoc
index 3d18c7b106..86363c7e94 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-script-object-execution.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-script-object-execution.asciidoc
@@ -29,8 +29,9 @@ Identifies scrobj.dll loaded into unusual Microsoft processes. This usually mean
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-solarwinds-child-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-solarwinds-child-process.asciidoc
index 4b4d739a86..df6177ab42 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-solarwinds-child-process.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-solarwinds-child-process.asciidoc
@@ -7,9 +7,7 @@ A suspicious SolarWinds child process was detected, which may indicate an attemp
 
 *Rule indices*: 
 
-* winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
@@ -36,7 +34,7 @@ A suspicious SolarWinds child process was detected, which may indicate an attemp
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -49,6 +47,9 @@ A suspicious SolarWinds child process was detected, which may indicate an attemp
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-startup-shell-folder-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-startup-shell-folder-modification.asciidoc
index 248edd6c6a..d89e89d0a0 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-startup-shell-folder-modification.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-startup-shell-folder-modification.asciidoc
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ Identifies suspicious startup shell folder modifications to change the default S
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * endgame-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: high
 
@@ -32,8 +33,9 @@ Identifies suspicious startup shell folder modifications to change the default S
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -121,6 +123,8 @@ registry where host.os.type == "windows" and
      "HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\Common Startup",
      "HKEY_USERS\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders\\Startup",
      "HKEY_USERS\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\Startup",
+     "HKU\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders\\Startup",
+     "HKU\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\Startup",
      "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders\\Common Startup",
      "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\Common Startup",
      "\\REGISTRY\\USER\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders\\Startup",
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-symbolic-link-created.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-symbolic-link-created.asciidoc
index 4441a68337..f377b5f267 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-symbolic-link-created.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-symbolic-link-created.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Identifies the creation of a symbolic link to a suspicious file or location. A s
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 4
+*Version*: 5
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ Identifies the creation of a symbolic link to a suspicious file or location. A s
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -75,14 +78,13 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and
-event.type == "start" and process.name == "ln" and process.args in ("-s", "-sf") and 
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and
+process.name == "ln" and process.args in ("-s", "-sf") and 
   (
     /* suspicious files */
     (process.args in ("/etc/shadow", "/etc/shadow-", "/etc/shadow~", "/etc/gshadow", "/etc/gshadow-") or 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-sysctl-file-event.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-sysctl-file-event.asciidoc
index cd940d289a..f4d8cc0858 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-sysctl-file-event.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-sysctl-file-event.asciidoc
@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ Monitors file events on sysctl configuration files (e.g., /etc/sysctl.conf, /etc
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires the use of the `auditd_manager` integration. `Auditd_manager` is a tool designed to simplify and enhance the management of the audit subsystem in Linux systems. It provides a user-friendly interface and automation capabilities for configuring and monitoring system auditing through the auditd daemon. With `auditd_manager`, administrators can easily define audit rules, track system events, and generate comprehensive audit reports, improving overall security and compliance in the system. The following steps should be executed in order to install and deploy `auditd_manager` on a Linux system.
 
 ```
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-system-commands-executed-by-previously-unknown-executable.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-system-commands-executed-by-previously-unknown-executable.asciidoc
index 760cd5a817..cf74d58061 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-system-commands-executed-by-previously-unknown-executable.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-system-commands-executed-by-previously-unknown-executable.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ This rule monitors for the execution of several commonly used system commands ex
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 104
+*Version*: 105
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ This rule monitors for the execution of several commonly used system commands ex
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,7 +77,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-termination-of-esxi-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-termination-of-esxi-process.asciidoc
index 40be44c576..c7428169e9 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-termination-of-esxi-process.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-termination-of-esxi-process.asciidoc
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ Identifies instances where VMware processes, such as "vmware-vmx" or "vmx," are
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -76,7 +79,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-utility-launched-via-proxychains.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-utility-launched-via-proxychains.asciidoc
index 5e6b4e9fb9..fab74fcfeb 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-utility-launched-via-proxychains.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-utility-launched-via-proxychains.asciidoc
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ This rule monitors for the execution of suspicious linux tools through ProxyChai
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Auditd Manager
 
-*Version*: 6
+*Version*: 7
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -127,6 +127,10 @@ This rule looks for a list of suspicious processes spawned through `proxychains`
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -162,8 +166,8 @@ For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started") and
-event.type == "start" and process.name == "proxychains" and process.args : (
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and process.name == "proxychains" and process.args : (
   "ssh", "sshd", "sshuttle", "socat", "iodine", "iodined", "dnscat", "hans", "hans-ubuntu", "ptunnel-ng",
   "ssf", "3proxy", "ngrok", "gost", "pivotnacci", "chisel*", "nmap", "ping", "python*", "php*", "perl", "ruby",
   "lua*", "openssl", "nc", "netcat", "ncat", "telnet", "awk", "java", "telnet", "ftp", "curl", "wget"
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-werfault-child-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-werfault-child-process.asciidoc
index d6add0abef..c96ef5600f 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-werfault-child-process.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-werfault-child-process.asciidoc
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ A suspicious WerFault child process was detected, which may indicate an attempt
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 110
+*Version*: 111
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -53,6 +53,9 @@ A suspicious WerFault child process was detected, which may indicate an attempt
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-which-enumeration.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-which-enumeration.asciidoc
index f01adaa098..ca489c1a49 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-which-enumeration.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-which-enumeration.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ This rule monitors for the usage of the which command with an unusual amount of
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 
-*Version*: 4
+*Version*: 5
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ This rule monitors for the usage of the which command with an unusual amount of
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and event.type == "start" and 
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and 
 process.name == "which" and process.args_count >= 10 and not process.parent.name == "jem" and 
 not process.args == "--tty-only"
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-windows-process-cluster-spawned-by-a-host.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-windows-process-cluster-spawned-by-a-host.asciidoc
index 47aca4cc0b..b1183b9c2e 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-windows-process-cluster-spawned-by-a-host.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-windows-process-cluster-spawned-by-a-host.asciidoc
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ A machine learning job combination has detected a set of one or more suspicious
 * Rule Type: Machine Learning
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -42,6 +42,10 @@ A machine learning job combination has detected a set of one or more suspicious
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 The rule requires the Living off the Land (LotL) Attack Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as Windows process events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend or Winlogbeat.  
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-windows-process-cluster-spawned-by-a-parent-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-windows-process-cluster-spawned-by-a-parent-process.asciidoc
index 6181a679d8..7a30296604 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-windows-process-cluster-spawned-by-a-parent-process.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-windows-process-cluster-spawned-by-a-parent-process.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ A machine learning job combination has detected a set of one or more suspicious
 * Rule Type: Machine Learning
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ A machine learning job combination has detected a set of one or more suspicious
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 The rule requires the Living off the Land (LotL) Attack Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as Windows process events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend or Winlogbeat.  
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-windows-process-cluster-spawned-by-a-user.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-windows-process-cluster-spawned-by-a-user.asciidoc
index 2e09edca9d..e229643f45 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-windows-process-cluster-spawned-by-a-user.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-windows-process-cluster-spawned-by-a-user.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ A machine learning job combination has detected a set of one or more suspicious
 * Rule Type: Machine Learning
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ A machine learning job combination has detected a set of one or more suspicious
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 The rule requires the Living off the Land (LotL) Attack Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as Windows process events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend or Winlogbeat.  
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-wmi-event-subscription-created.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-wmi-event-subscription-created.asciidoc
index 62f1508c4b..fe42a700df 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-wmi-event-subscription-created.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-wmi-event-subscription-created.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Detects the creation of a WMI Event Subscription. Attackers can abuse this mecha
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -31,9 +31,9 @@ Detects the creation of a WMI Event Subscription. Attackers can abuse this mecha
 * OS: Windows
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Persistence
-* Data Source: Sysmon Only
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-wmi-image-load-from-ms-office.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-wmi-image-load-from-ms-office.asciidoc
index 1633377aeb..0e1770f5e4 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-wmi-image-load-from-ms-office.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-wmi-image-load-from-ms-office.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies a suspicious image load (wmiutils.dll) from Microsoft Office processe
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: low
@@ -34,8 +34,9 @@ Identifies a suspicious image load (wmiutils.dll) from Microsoft Office processe
 * Tactic: Execution
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -48,6 +49,9 @@ Identifies a suspicious image load (wmiutils.dll) from Microsoft Office processe
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
@@ -63,7 +67,7 @@ For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.
 any where host.os.type == "windows" and
  (event.category : ("library", "driver") or (event.category == "process" and event.action : "Image loaded*")) and
   process.name : ("WINWORD.EXE", "EXCEL.EXE", "POWERPNT.EXE", "MSPUB.EXE", "MSACCESS.EXE") and
-  (dll.name : "wmiutils.dll" or file.name : "wmiutils.dll")
+  (?dll.name : "wmiutils.dll" or file.name : "wmiutils.dll")
 
 ----------------------------------
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-wmic-xsl-script-execution.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-wmic-xsl-script-execution.asciidoc
index 5bae33e5c8..8b291b7a2b 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-wmic-xsl-script-execution.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-wmic-xsl-script-execution.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies WMIC allowlist bypass techniques by alerting on suspicious execution
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -31,8 +31,9 @@ Identifies WMIC allowlist bypass techniques by alerting on suspicious execution
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Tactic: Execution
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -52,7 +53,7 @@ sequence by process.entity_id with maxspan = 2m
    process.args : ("format*:*", "/format*:*", "*-format*:*") and
    not process.command_line : ("* /format:table *", "* /format:table")]
 [any where host.os.type == "windows" and (event.category == "library" or (event.category == "process" and event.action : "Image loaded*")) and
- (dll.name : ("jscript.dll", "vbscript.dll") or file.name : ("jscript.dll", "vbscript.dll"))]
+ (?dll.name : ("jscript.dll", "vbscript.dll") or file.name : ("jscript.dll", "vbscript.dll"))]
 
 ----------------------------------
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-zoom-child-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-zoom-child-process.asciidoc
index b085de8361..299e8ec39a 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-zoom-child-process.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-zoom-child-process.asciidoc
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ A suspicious Zoom child process was detected, which may indicate an attempt to r
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * logs-windows.*
 * endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -35,7 +36,7 @@ A suspicious Zoom child process was detected, which may indicate an attempt to r
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/svchost-spawning-cmd.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/svchost-spawning-cmd.asciidoc
index 00bcee0c62..82f1c21cbc 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/svchost-spawning-cmd.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/svchost-spawning-cmd.asciidoc
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Identifies a suspicious parent child process relationship with cmd.exe descendin
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 209
+*Version*: 210
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -108,11 +108,13 @@ This rule looks for the creation of the `cmd.exe` process with `svchost.exe` as
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/symbolic-link-to-shadow-copy-created.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/symbolic-link-to-shadow-copy-created.asciidoc
index 56cf3f51b3..984523bd3d 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/symbolic-link-to-shadow-copy-created.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/symbolic-link-to-shadow-copy-created.asciidoc
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ Identifies the creation of symbolic links to a shadow copy. Symbolic links can b
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * logs-windows.*
 * endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -39,7 +40,7 @@ Identifies the creation of symbolic links to a shadow copy. Symbolic links can b
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -103,11 +104,13 @@ Shadow copies are backups or snapshots of an endpoint's files or volumes while t
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 Ensure advanced audit policies for Windows are enabled, specifically:
 Object Access policies https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4656[Event ID 4656] (Handle to an Object was Requested)
 
@@ -140,7 +143,7 @@ For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.
 ----------------------------------
 process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
  (
-    (process.pe.original_file_name in ("Cmd.Exe","PowerShell.EXE")) or
+    (?process.pe.original_file_name in ("Cmd.Exe","PowerShell.EXE")) or
     (process.name : ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe"))
  ) and
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/system-binary-copied-and-or-moved-to-suspicious-directory.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/system-binary-copied-and-or-moved-to-suspicious-directory.asciidoc
index c51e8c9570..ded457a309 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/system-binary-copied-and-or-moved-to-suspicious-directory.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/system-binary-copied-and-or-moved-to-suspicious-directory.asciidoc
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ This rule monitors for the copying or moving of a system binary to a suspicious
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 6
+*Version*: 7
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ This rule monitors for the copying or moving of a system binary to a suspicious
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -72,14 +75,13 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
 sequence by host.id, process.entity_id with maxspan=1s
-  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "exec" and event.type == "start" and 
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and 
    process.name in ("cp", "mv") and process.args : (
    // Shells
    "/bin/*sh", "/usr/bin/*sh", 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/system-information-discovery-via-windows-command-shell.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/system-information-discovery-via-windows-command-shell.asciidoc
index d4e47f6d39..48a80ccb50 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/system-information-discovery-via-windows-command-shell.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/system-information-discovery-via-windows-command-shell.asciidoc
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Identifies the execution of discovery commands to enumerate system information,
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 * Rule Type: BBR
 
-*Version*: 8
+*Version*: 9
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -84,11 +84,13 @@ This rule identifies commands to enumerate system information, files, and folder
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
@@ -96,7 +98,6 @@ Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest
 For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/system-log-file-deletion.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/system-log-file-deletion.asciidoc
index cf8f56d5b6..f15fb76d3d 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/system-log-file-deletion.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/system-log-file-deletion.asciidoc
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Identifies the deletion of sensitive Linux system logs. This may indicate an att
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ Identifies the deletion of sensitive Linux system logs. This may indicate an att
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
 - Elastic Defend
 - Auditbeat
@@ -98,7 +101,6 @@ Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit
 For versions <8.2, you need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate `event.ingested` with @timestamp for non-elastic-agent indexes, like auditbeats/filebeat/winlogbeat etc. For more details to add a custom ingest pipeline refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html[guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/system-network-connections-discovery.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/system-network-connections-discovery.asciidoc
index e8279a2496..54c9ba6b2a 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/system-network-connections-discovery.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/system-network-connections-discovery.asciidoc
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from a com
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started") and event.type == "start" and
+process where event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started") and
 process.name in ("netstat", "lsof", "who", "w")
 
 ----------------------------------
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/systemkey-access-via-command-line.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/systemkey-access-via-command-line.asciidoc
index 52ecaba3f0..8b15b48ffc 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/systemkey-access-via-command-line.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/systemkey-access-via-command-line.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and c
 * Tactic: Credential Access
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and c
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -74,7 +77,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/tainted-kernel-module-load.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/tainted-kernel-module-load.asciidoc
index 589774de44..5fadef1dca 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/tainted-kernel-module-load.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/tainted-kernel-module-load.asciidoc
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ This rule monitors the syslog log file for messages related to instances of a ta
 * Tactic: Persistence
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 
-*Version*: 3
+*Version*: 4
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ This rule monitors the syslog log file for messages related to instances of a ta
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
 - Filebeat
 
@@ -68,7 +71,6 @@ Filebeat is a lightweight shipper for forwarding and centralizing log data. Inst
 - To run the system module of Filebeat on Linux follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-system.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/tampering-of-shell-command-line-history.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/tampering-of-shell-command-line-history.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3f53ba270f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/tampering-of-shell-command-line-history.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+[[tampering-of-shell-command-line-history]]
+=== Tampering of Shell Command-Line History
+
+Adversaries may attempt to clear or disable the Bash command-line history in an attempt to evade detection or forensic investigations.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
+
+*Version*: 105
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started") and event.type == "start" and
+ (
+  ((process.args : ("rm", "echo") or
+    (process.args : "ln" and process.args : "-sf" and process.args : "/dev/null") or
+    (process.args : "truncate" and process.args : "-s0"))
+    and process.args : (".bash_history", "/root/.bash_history", "/home/*/.bash_history","/Users/.bash_history", "/Users/*/.bash_history",
+                        ".zsh_history", "/root/.zsh_history", "/home/*/.zsh_history", "/Users/.zsh_history", "/Users/*/.zsh_history")) or
+  (process.name : "history" and process.args : "-c") or
+  (process.args : "export" and process.args : ("HISTFILE=/dev/null", "HISTFILESIZE=0")) or
+  (process.args : "unset" and process.args : "HISTFILE") or
+  (process.args : "set" and process.args : "history" and process.args : "+o")
+ )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Indicator Removal
+** ID: T1070
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Clear Command History
+** ID: T1070.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/tcc-bypass-via-mounted-apfs-snapshot-access.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/tcc-bypass-via-mounted-apfs-snapshot-access.asciidoc
index b1bfb676cf..3a4a4c5f89 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/tcc-bypass-via-mounted-apfs-snapshot-access.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/tcc-bypass-via-mounted-apfs-snapshot-access.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Identifies the use of the mount_apfs command to mount the entire file system thr
 * Use Case: Vulnerability
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ Identifies the use of the mount_apfs command to mount the entire file system thr
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -75,7 +78,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/third-party-backup-files-deleted-via-unexpected-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/third-party-backup-files-deleted-via-unexpected-process.asciidoc
index bcdfaa6255..527da49f26 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/third-party-backup-files-deleted-via-unexpected-process.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/third-party-backup-files-deleted-via-unexpected-process.asciidoc
@@ -7,9 +7,7 @@ Identifies the deletion of backup files, saved using third-party software, by a
 
 *Rule indices*: 
 
-* winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
@@ -36,7 +34,7 @@ Identifies the deletion of backup files, saved using third-party software, by a
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 110
+*Version*: 111
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -100,11 +98,13 @@ This rule identifies file deletions performed by a process that does not belong
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/threat-intel-hash-indicator-match.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/threat-intel-hash-indicator-match.asciidoc
index cb4fb17fee..d1acbc48a8 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/threat-intel-hash-indicator-match.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/threat-intel-hash-indicator-match.asciidoc
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ This rule is triggered when a hash indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat modu
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Rule Type: Indicator Match
 
-*Version*: 6
+*Version*: 7
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -112,11 +112,13 @@ This rule is triggered when a hash indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat modu
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule needs threat intelligence indicators to work.
 Threat intelligence indicators can be collected using an https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#agent-ti-integration[Elastic Agent integration],
 the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#ti-mod-integration[Threat Intel module],
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/threat-intel-ip-address-indicator-match.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/threat-intel-ip-address-indicator-match.asciidoc
index 19eec72bfd..43e3dce2a0 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/threat-intel-ip-address-indicator-match.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/threat-intel-ip-address-indicator-match.asciidoc
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ This rule is triggered when an IP address indicator from the Threat Intel Filebe
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Rule Type: Indicator Match
 
-*Version*: 5
+*Version*: 6
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -114,11 +114,13 @@ This rule is triggered when an IP address indicator from the Threat Intel Filebe
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule needs threat intelligence indicators to work.
 Threat intelligence indicators can be collected using an https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#agent-ti-integration[Elastic Agent integration],
 the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#ti-mod-integration[Threat Intel module],
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/threat-intel-url-indicator-match.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/threat-intel-url-indicator-match.asciidoc
index d7136e3d21..342a52c68c 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/threat-intel-url-indicator-match.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/threat-intel-url-indicator-match.asciidoc
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ This rule is triggered when a URL indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat modul
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Rule Type: Indicator Match
 
-*Version*: 5
+*Version*: 6
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -117,11 +117,13 @@ This rule is triggered when a URL indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat modul
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule needs threat intelligence indicators to work.
 Threat intelligence indicators can be collected using an https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#agent-ti-integration[Elastic Agent integration],
 the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#ti-mod-integration[Threat Intel module],
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/threat-intel-windows-registry-indicator-match.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/threat-intel-windows-registry-indicator-match.asciidoc
index 49d54e1929..6da1eecf2f 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/threat-intel-windows-registry-indicator-match.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/threat-intel-windows-registry-indicator-match.asciidoc
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ This rule is triggered when a Windows registry indicator from the Threat Intel F
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Rule Type: Indicator Match
 
-*Version*: 5
+*Version*: 6
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -107,11 +107,13 @@ This rule is triggered when a Windows registry indicator from the Threat Intel F
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule needs threat intelligence indicators to work.
 Threat intelligence indicators can be collected using an https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#agent-ti-integration[Elastic Agent integration],
 the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#ti-mod-integration[Threat Intel module],
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/timestomping-using-touch-command.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/timestomping-using-touch-command.asciidoc
index d624fb9685..975ab0867c 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/timestomping-using-touch-command.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/timestomping-using-touch-command.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Timestomping is an anti-forensics technique which is used to modify the timestam
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ Timestomping is an anti-forensics technique which is used to modify the timestam
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/trap-signals-execution.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/trap-signals-execution.asciidoc
index b4e3e203b0..3c8f55dddf 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/trap-signals-execution.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/trap-signals-execution.asciidoc
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ Identify activity related where adversaries can include a trap command which the
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started") and event.type == "start" and
+process where event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started") and
 process.name == "trap" and process.args : "SIG*"
 
 ----------------------------------
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/uac-bypass-attempt-via-elevated-com-internet-explorer-add-on-installer.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/uac-bypass-attempt-via-elevated-com-internet-explorer-add-on-installer.asciidoc
index 40f8c67d93..7a948add8a 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/uac-bypass-attempt-via-elevated-com-internet-explorer-add-on-installer.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/uac-bypass-attempt-via-elevated-com-internet-explorer-add-on-installer.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies User Account Control (UAC) bypass attempts by abusing an elevated COM
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
@@ -36,8 +36,9 @@ Identifies User Account Control (UAC) bypass attempts by abusing an elevated COM
 * Tactic: Execution
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -50,6 +51,9 @@ Identifies User Account Control (UAC) bypass attempts by abusing an elevated COM
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/uac-bypass-attempt-via-privileged-ifileoperation-com-interface.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/uac-bypass-attempt-via-privileged-ifileoperation-com-interface.asciidoc
index 1071dbbe8f..ef6ff4c0b0 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/uac-bypass-attempt-via-privileged-ifileoperation-com-interface.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/uac-bypass-attempt-via-privileged-ifileoperation-com-interface.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) via DLL side-loading. A
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: high
@@ -36,8 +36,9 @@ Identifies attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) via DLL side-loading. A
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -50,6 +51,9 @@ Identifies attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) via DLL side-loading. A
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/uac-bypass-attempt-via-windows-directory-masquerading.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/uac-bypass-attempt-via-windows-directory-masquerading.asciidoc
index 42b816dc48..5b0b796ff8 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/uac-bypass-attempt-via-windows-directory-masquerading.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/uac-bypass-attempt-via-windows-directory-masquerading.asciidoc
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ Identifies an attempt to bypass User Account Control (UAC) by masquerading as a
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 110
+*Version*: 111
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -114,11 +114,13 @@ This rule identifies an attempt to bypass User Account Control (UAC) by masquera
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/uac-bypass-attempt-with-ieditionupgrademanager-elevated-com-interface.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/uac-bypass-attempt-with-ieditionupgrademanager-elevated-com-interface.asciidoc
index ea30362974..f1da8de20f 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/uac-bypass-attempt-with-ieditionupgrademanager-elevated-com-interface.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/uac-bypass-attempt-with-ieditionupgrademanager-elevated-com-interface.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) by abusing an elevated
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: high
@@ -36,8 +36,9 @@ Identifies attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) by abusing an elevated
 * Tactic: Execution
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -50,6 +51,9 @@ Identifies attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) by abusing an elevated
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/uac-bypass-via-diskcleanup-scheduled-task-hijack.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/uac-bypass-via-diskcleanup-scheduled-task-hijack.asciidoc
index 12ceec9809..29bafa261e 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/uac-bypass-via-diskcleanup-scheduled-task-hijack.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/uac-bypass-via-diskcleanup-scheduled-task-hijack.asciidoc
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Identifies User Account Control (UAC) bypass via hijacking DiskCleanup Scheduled
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ Identifies User Account Control (UAC) bypass via hijacking DiskCleanup Scheduled
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/uac-bypass-via-icmluautil-elevated-com-interface.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/uac-bypass-via-icmluautil-elevated-com-interface.asciidoc
index 46711e390f..2d6519605f 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/uac-bypass-via-icmluautil-elevated-com-interface.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/uac-bypass-via-icmluautil-elevated-com-interface.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies User Account Control (UAC) bypass attempts via the ICMLuaUtil Elevate
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: high
@@ -34,8 +34,9 @@ Identifies User Account Control (UAC) bypass attempts via the ICMLuaUtil Elevate
 * Tactic: Execution
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -48,6 +49,9 @@ Identifies User Account Control (UAC) bypass attempts via the ICMLuaUtil Elevate
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/uac-bypass-via-windows-firewall-snap-in-hijack.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/uac-bypass-via-windows-firewall-snap-in-hijack.asciidoc
index b2b9c2168d..e80c3212c7 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/uac-bypass-via-windows-firewall-snap-in-hijack.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/uac-bypass-via-windows-firewall-snap-in-hijack.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) by hijacking the Micros
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
@@ -36,8 +36,9 @@ Identifies attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) by hijacking the Micros
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -113,11 +114,13 @@ This rule identifies attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) by hijacking
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/uid-elevation-from-previously-unknown-executable.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/uid-elevation-from-previously-unknown-executable.asciidoc
index 2c76988d44..860e0cfabd 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/uid-elevation-from-previously-unknown-executable.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/uid-elevation-from-previously-unknown-executable.asciidoc
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ Monitors for the elevation of regular user permissions to root permissions throu
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 1
+*Version*: 2
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -89,7 +89,8 @@ and process.parent.name:("bash" or "dash" or "sh" or "tcsh" or "csh" or "zsh" or
   ) or
   process.name:(
     "bash" or "dash" or "sh" or "tcsh" or "csh" or "zsh" or "ksh" or "fish" or "sudo" or "su" or "apt" or "apt-get" or
-    "aptitude" or "squid" or "snap" or "fusermount" or "pkexec" or "umount"
+    "aptitude" or "squid" or "snap" or "fusermount" or "pkexec" or "umount" or "master" or "omsbaseline" or "dzdo" or
+    "sandfly" or "logrotate"
   ) or
   process.args:/usr/bin/python*
 )
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/uncommon-registry-persistence-change.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/uncommon-registry-persistence-change.asciidoc
index 8b8005f3c4..bc64c43fb8 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/uncommon-registry-persistence-change.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/uncommon-registry-persistence-change.asciidoc
@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ Detects changes to registry persistence keys that are not commonly used or modif
 
 *Rule indices*: 
 
-* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-endpoint.events.registry*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -30,8 +31,9 @@ Detects changes to registry persistence keys that are not commonly used or modif
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Persistence
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,8 +47,8 @@ Detects changes to registry persistence keys that are not commonly used or modif
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-registry where host.os.type == "windows" and
-  /* uncomment once stable length(registry.data.strings) > 0 and */
+registry where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type in ("creation", "change") and
+ length(registry.data.strings) > 0 and
  registry.path : (
       "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Terminal Server\\Install\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\*",
       "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Terminal Server\\Install\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Runonce\\*",
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unexpected-child-process-of-macos-screensaver-engine.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unexpected-child-process-of-macos-screensaver-engine.asciidoc
index 73ca082076..4bdc872bb4 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unexpected-child-process-of-macos-screensaver-engine.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unexpected-child-process-of-macos-screensaver-engine.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Identifies when a child process is spawned by the screensaver engine process, wh
 * Tactic: Persistence
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -54,11 +54,13 @@ as a download of a payload from a server.
 identify whether the file is malicious or not.
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -89,7 +91,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unix-socket-connection.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unix-socket-connection.asciidoc
index 36213840c4..2c2410219f 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unix-socket-connection.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unix-socket-connection.asciidoc
@@ -49,8 +49,8 @@ This rule monitors for inter-process communication via Unix sockets. Adversaries
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started") and
-event.type == "start" and (
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "executed", "process_started")
+ and (
   (process.name in ("nc", "ncat", "netcat", "nc.openbsd") and 
    process.args == "-U" and process.args : ("/usr/local/*", "/run/*", "/var/run/*")) or
   (process.name == "socat" and 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unknown-execution-of-binary-with-rwx-memory-region.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unknown-execution-of-binary-with-rwx-memory-region.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fca9dc59ee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unknown-execution-of-binary-with-rwx-memory-region.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+[[unknown-execution-of-binary-with-rwx-memory-region]]
+=== Unknown Execution of Binary with RWX Memory Region
+
+Monitors for the execution of a previously unknown unix binary with read, write and execute memory region permissions. The mprotect() system call is used to change the access protections on a region of memory that has already been allocated. This syscall allows a process to modify the permissions of pages in its virtual address space, enabling or disabling permissions such as read, write, and execute for those pages. RWX permissions on memory is in many cases overly permissive, and should be analyzed thoroughly.
+
+*Rule type*: new_terms
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/mprotect.2.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires the use of the `auditd_manager` integration. `Auditd_manager` is a tool designed to simplify and enhance the management of the audit subsystem in Linux systems. It provides a user-friendly interface and automation capabilities for configuring and monitoring system auditing through the auditd daemon. With `auditd_manager`, administrators can easily define audit rules, track system events, and generate comprehensive audit reports, improving overall security and compliance in the system. The following steps should be executed in order to install and deploy `auditd_manager` on a Linux system.
+```
+Kibana -->
+Management -->
+Integrations -->
+Auditd Manager -->
+Add Auditd Manager
+```
+`Auditd_manager` subscribes to the kernel and receives events as they occur without any additional configuration. However, if more advanced configuration is required to detect specific behavior, audit rules can be added to the integration in either the "audit rules" configuration box or the "auditd rule files" box by specifying a file to read the audit rules from.
+For this detection rule to trigger, the following additional audit rules are required to be added to the integration:
+```
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S mprotect
+```
+Add the newly installed `auditd manager` to an agent policy, and deploy the agent on a Linux system from which auditd log files are desirable.
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:process and host.os.type:linux and auditd.data.syscall:mprotect and auditd.data.a2:7
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Unix Shell
+** ID: T1059.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unsigned-dll-side-loading-from-a-suspicious-folder.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unsigned-dll-side-loading-from-a-suspicious-folder.asciidoc
index 46fff93b8d..e67a8f013f 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unsigned-dll-side-loading-from-a-suspicious-folder.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unsigned-dll-side-loading-from-a-suspicious-folder.asciidoc
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Identifies a Windows trusted program running from locations often abused by adve
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 6
+*Version*: 7
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ Identifies a Windows trusted program running from locations often abused by adve
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-child-process-from-a-system-virtual-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-child-process-from-a-system-virtual-process.asciidoc
index b8798f51ef..98ec485349 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-child-process-from-a-system-virtual-process.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-child-process-from-a-system-virtual-process.asciidoc
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ Identifies a suspicious child process of the Windows virtual system process, whi
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * logs-windows.*
 * endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
 
 *Severity*: high
 
@@ -33,7 +34,7 @@ Identifies a suspicious child process of the Windows virtual system process, whi
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -46,6 +47,9 @@ Identifies a suspicious child process of the Windows virtual system process, whi
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-child-process-of-dns-exe.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-child-process-of-dns-exe.asciidoc
index 2843080da7..720f6cb6fc 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-child-process-of-dns-exe.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-child-process-of-dns-exe.asciidoc
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ Identifies an unexpected process spawning from dns.exe, the process responsible
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * logs-windows.*
 * endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
 
 *Severity*: high
 
@@ -40,7 +41,7 @@ Identifies an unexpected process spawning from dns.exe, the process responsible
 * Use Case: Vulnerability
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -99,11 +100,13 @@ This rule looks for unusual children of the `dns.exe` process, which can indicat
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-child-processes-of-rundll32.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-child-processes-of-rundll32.asciidoc
index de514978e0..3cddbdb57d 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-child-processes-of-rundll32.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-child-processes-of-rundll32.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies child processes of unusual instances of RunDLL32 where the command li
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: high
 
@@ -30,8 +30,9 @@ Identifies child processes of unusual instances of RunDLL32 where the command li
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-executable-file-creation-by-a-system-critical-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-executable-file-creation-by-a-system-critical-process.asciidoc
index 58fd01f716..acc4e18a7a 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-executable-file-creation-by-a-system-critical-process.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-executable-file-creation-by-a-system-critical-process.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies an unexpected executable file being created or modified by a Windows
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: high
@@ -34,8 +34,9 @@ Identifies an unexpected executable file being created or modified by a Windows
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -108,11 +109,13 @@ This rule looks for the creation of executable files done by system-critical pro
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-file-creation-alternate-data-stream.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-file-creation-alternate-data-stream.asciidoc
index d158a1e2a5..10e019235c 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-file-creation-alternate-data-stream.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-file-creation-alternate-data-stream.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies suspicious creation of Alternate Data Streams on highly targeted file
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -31,8 +31,9 @@ Identifies suspicious creation of Alternate Data Streams on highly targeted file
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 112
+*Version*: 113
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -111,11 +112,13 @@ Attackers can abuse these alternate data streams to hide malicious files, string
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-file-modification-by-dns-exe.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-file-modification-by-dns-exe.asciidoc
index 437e53d805..2cba718f14 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-file-modification-by-dns-exe.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-file-modification-by-dns-exe.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies an unexpected file being modified by dns.exe, the process responsible
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: high
@@ -37,8 +37,9 @@ Identifies an unexpected file being modified by dns.exe, the process responsible
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Use Case: Vulnerability
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -62,11 +63,13 @@ Detection alerts from this rule indicate potential unusual/abnormal file writes
 - Any suspicious or abnormal files written from `dns.exe` should be reviewed and investigated with care.
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-network-activity-from-a-windows-system-binary.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-network-activity-from-a-windows-system-binary.asciidoc
index 6c65903a91..08b485966c 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-network-activity-from-a-windows-system-binary.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-network-activity-from-a-windows-system-binary.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies network activity from unexpected system applications. This may indica
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -31,8 +31,9 @@ Identifies network activity from unexpected system applications. This may indica
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-network-connection-via-dllhost.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-network-connection-via-dllhost.asciidoc
index 37ec4ac237..65f7fb01c8 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-network-connection-via-dllhost.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-network-connection-via-dllhost.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies unusual instances of dllhost.exe making outbound network connections.
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -34,8 +34,9 @@ Identifies unusual instances of dllhost.exe making outbound network connections.
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-network-connection-via-rundll32.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-network-connection-via-rundll32.asciidoc
index 8b75357a14..65e042bd35 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-network-connection-via-rundll32.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-network-connection-via-rundll32.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies unusual instances of rundll32.exe making outbound network connections
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -35,8 +35,9 @@ Identifies unusual instances of rundll32.exe making outbound network connections
 * Tactic: Command and Control
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-parent-child-relationship.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-parent-child-relationship.asciidoc
index 4cfe93160c..0292879cb4 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-parent-child-relationship.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-parent-child-relationship.asciidoc
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ Identifies Windows programs run from unexpected parent processes. This could ind
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -111,11 +111,13 @@ This rule uses this information to spot suspicious parent and child processes.
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-parent-process-for-cmd-exe.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-parent-process-for-cmd-exe.asciidoc
index cbc0d1999d..8e376f13e5 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-parent-process-for-cmd-exe.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-parent-process-for-cmd-exe.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies a suspicious parent child process relationship with cmd.exe descendin
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
@@ -32,8 +32,9 @@ Identifies a suspicious parent child process relationship with cmd.exe descendin
 * Tactic: Execution
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -46,6 +47,9 @@ Identifies a suspicious parent child process relationship with cmd.exe descendin
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-persistence-via-services-registry.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-persistence-via-services-registry.asciidoc
index 18e2f7442c..8d133aff57 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-persistence-via-services-registry.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-persistence-via-services-registry.asciidoc
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ Identifies processes modifying the services registry key directly, instead of th
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * endgame-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: low
 
@@ -31,8 +32,9 @@ Identifies processes modifying the services registry key directly, instead of th
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-print-spooler-child-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-print-spooler-child-process.asciidoc
index aa27129d1b..bdbbbcb64c 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-print-spooler-child-process.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-print-spooler-child-process.asciidoc
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Detects unusual Print Spooler service (spoolsv.exe) child processes. This may in
 * Use Case: Vulnerability
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@ Detects unusual Print Spooler service (spoolsv.exe) child processes. This may in
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-process-execution-path-alternate-data-stream.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-process-execution-path-alternate-data-stream.asciidoc
index 822e380151..9bcf8f6f3f 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-process-execution-path-alternate-data-stream.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-process-execution-path-alternate-data-stream.asciidoc
@@ -9,9 +9,8 @@ Identifies processes running from an Alternate Data Stream. This is uncommon for
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
-* logs-system.security*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -33,8 +32,9 @@ Identifies processes running from an Alternate Data Stream. This is uncommon for
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ Identifies processes running from an Alternate Data Stream. This is uncommon for
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-process-network-connection.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-process-network-connection.asciidoc
index 7104f5a77f..44a487c7cb 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-process-network-connection.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-process-network-connection.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies network activity from unexpected system applications. This may indica
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: low
 
@@ -31,8 +31,9 @@ Identifies network activity from unexpected system applications. This may indica
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-process-spawned-by-a-host.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-process-spawned-by-a-host.asciidoc
index 56d37bc811..93f970f352 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-process-spawned-by-a-host.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-process-spawned-by-a-host.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ A machine learning job has detected a suspicious Windows process. This process h
 * Rule Type: Machine Learning
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ A machine learning job has detected a suspicious Windows process. This process h
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 The rule requires the Living off the Land (LotL) Attack Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as Windows process events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend or Winlogbeat.  
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-process-spawned-by-a-parent-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-process-spawned-by-a-parent-process.asciidoc
index d384d9318a..023caee207 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-process-spawned-by-a-parent-process.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-process-spawned-by-a-parent-process.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ A machine learning job has detected a suspicious Windows process. This process h
 * Rule Type: Machine Learning
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ A machine learning job has detected a suspicious Windows process. This process h
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 The rule requires the Living off the Land (LotL) Attack Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as Windows process events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend or Winlogbeat.  
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-process-spawned-by-a-user.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-process-spawned-by-a-user.asciidoc
index 687081cbb8..e0a7da91de 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-process-spawned-by-a-user.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-process-spawned-by-a-user.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ A machine learning job has detected a suspicious Windows process. This process h
 * Rule Type: Machine Learning
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ A machine learning job has detected a suspicious Windows process. This process h
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 The rule requires the Living off the Land (LotL) Attack Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as Windows process events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend or Winlogbeat.  
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-process-writing-data-to-an-external-device.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-process-writing-data-to-an-external-device.asciidoc
index c63cf04d62..41e6916ac9 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-process-writing-data-to-an-external-device.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-process-writing-data-to-an-external-device.asciidoc
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ A machine learning job has detected a rare process writing data to an external d
 * Rule Type: Machine Learning
 * Tactic: Exfiltration
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -42,6 +42,10 @@ A machine learning job has detected a rare process writing data to an external d
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 The rule requires the Data Exfiltration Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as network and file events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend and Network Packet Capture (for network events only).  
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-remote-file-directory.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-remote-file-directory.asciidoc
index b317fc49dc..a0b2eeb859 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-remote-file-directory.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-remote-file-directory.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ An anomaly detection job has detected a remote file transfer on an unusual direc
 * Rule Type: Machine Learning
 * Tactic: Lateral Movement
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -43,6 +43,10 @@ An anomaly detection job has detected a remote file transfer on an unusual direc
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 The rule requires the Lateral Movement Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as file and Windows RDP process events collected by the Elastic Defend integration.  
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-remote-file-extension.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-remote-file-extension.asciidoc
index a3dbf41d2d..88a4466443 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-remote-file-extension.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-remote-file-extension.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ An anomaly detection job has detected a remote file transfer with a rare extensi
 * Rule Type: Machine Learning
 * Tactic: Lateral Movement
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -43,6 +43,10 @@ An anomaly detection job has detected a remote file transfer with a rare extensi
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 The rule requires the Lateral Movement Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as file and Windows RDP process events collected by the Elastic Defend integration.  
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-remote-file-size.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-remote-file-size.asciidoc
index 6396bf0f33..f60c100148 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-remote-file-size.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-remote-file-size.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ A machine learning job has detected an unusually high file size shared by a remo
 * Rule Type: Machine Learning
 * Tactic: Lateral Movement
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -43,6 +43,10 @@ A machine learning job has detected an unusually high file size shared by a remo
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 The rule requires the Lateral Movement Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as file and Windows RDP process events collected by the Elastic Defend integration.  
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-service-host-child-process-childless-service.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-service-host-child-process-childless-service.asciidoc
index 4e7f909935..163784b791 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-service-host-child-process-childless-service.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-service-host-child-process-childless-service.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies unusual child processes of Service Host (svchost.exe) that traditiona
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
@@ -33,8 +33,9 @@ Identifies unusual child processes of Service Host (svchost.exe) that traditiona
 * Tactic: Privilege Escalation
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -47,6 +48,9 @@ Identifies unusual child processes of Service Host (svchost.exe) that traditiona
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-time-or-day-for-an-rdp-session.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-time-or-day-for-an-rdp-session.asciidoc
index 30f74848ee..18300933e4 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-time-or-day-for-an-rdp-session.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-time-or-day-for-an-rdp-session.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ A machine learning job has detected an RDP session started at an usual time or w
 * Rule Type: Machine Learning
 * Tactic: Lateral Movement
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -43,6 +43,10 @@ A machine learning job has detected an RDP session started at an usual time or w
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 The rule requires the Lateral Movement Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as file and Windows RDP process events collected by the Elastic Defend integration.  
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-user-privilege-enumeration-via-id.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-user-privilege-enumeration-via-id.asciidoc
index 66cb981065..05f64e64d8 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-user-privilege-enumeration-via-id.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/unusual-user-privilege-enumeration-via-id.asciidoc
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ This rule monitors for a sequence of 20 "id" command executions within 1 second
 * Tactic: Discovery
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 3
+*Version*: 4
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ This rule monitors for a sequence of 20 "id" command executions within 1 second
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -72,14 +75,13 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
 sequence by host.id, process.parent.entity_id with maxspan=1s
-  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "exec" and event.type == "start" and 
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and 
    process.name == "id" and process.args_count == 2 and 
    not (process.parent.name == "rpm" or process.parent.args : "/var/tmp/rpm-tmp*")] with runs=20
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/user-account-creation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/user-account-creation.asciidoc
index b55afb7199..7d5e8f501d 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/user-account-creation.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/user-account-creation.asciidoc
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ Identifies attempts to create new users. This is sometimes done by attackers to
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * logs-windows.*
 * endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
 
 *Severity*: low
 
@@ -34,7 +35,7 @@ Identifies attempts to create new users. This is sometimes done by attackers to
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -92,11 +93,13 @@ This rule identifies the usage of `net.exe` to create new accounts.
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/user-account-exposed-to-kerberoasting.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/user-account-exposed-to-kerberoasting.asciidoc
index 5ab7ea71ae..cb27d685ca 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/user-account-exposed-to-kerberoasting.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/user-account-exposed-to-kerberoasting.asciidoc
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ Detects when a user account has the servicePrincipalName attribute modified. Att
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -97,11 +97,13 @@ Attackers can also perform "Targeted Kerberoasting", which consists of adding fa
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 The 'Audit Directory Service Changes' logging policy must be configured for (Success, Failure).
 Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/user-added-to-privileged-group.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/user-added-to-privileged-group.asciidoc
index 27e6046f09..45c68bf3a2 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/user-added-to-privileged-group.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/user-added-to-privileged-group.asciidoc
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Identifies a user being added to a privileged group in Active Directory. Privile
 * Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring
 * Data Source: Active Directory
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -88,11 +88,13 @@ This rule monitors events related to a user being added to a privileged group.
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/veeam-backup-library-loaded-by-unusual-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/veeam-backup-library-loaded-by-unusual-process.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..febf104068
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/veeam-backup-library-loaded-by-unusual-process.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+[[veeam-backup-library-loaded-by-unusual-process]]
+=== Veeam Backup Library Loaded by Unusual Process
+
+Identifies potential credential decrypt operations by PowerShell or unsigned processes using the Veeam.Backup.Common.dll library. Attackers can use Veeam Credentials to target backups as part of destructive operations such as Ransomware attacks.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.library*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+library where host.os.type == "windows" and event.action == "load" and
+  (dll.name : "Veeam.Backup.Common.dll" or dll.pe.original_file_name : "Veeam.Backup.Common.dll") and
+  (
+    process.code_signature.trusted == false or
+    process.code_signature.exists == false or
+    process.name : ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe")
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: OS Credential Dumping
+** ID: T1003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Credentials from Password Stores
+** ID: T1555
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
+** ID: T1059
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: PowerShell
+** ID: T1059.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/virtual-machine-fingerprinting-via-grep.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/virtual-machine-fingerprinting-via-grep.asciidoc
index ed344ddfc9..1a7c699165 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/virtual-machine-fingerprinting-via-grep.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/virtual-machine-fingerprinting-via-grep.asciidoc
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system
 * Tactic: Discovery
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 104
+*Version*: 105
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/virtual-machine-fingerprinting.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/virtual-machine-fingerprinting.asciidoc
index 9922e4ea9d..298f7a66f8 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/virtual-machine-fingerprinting.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/virtual-machine-fingerprinting.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
 - Elastic Defend
 - Auditbeat
@@ -91,7 +94,6 @@ Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit
 - For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/virtual-private-network-connection-attempt.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/virtual-private-network-connection-attempt.asciidoc
index b88b8f379b..e3ccfde63a 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/virtual-private-network-connection-attempt.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/virtual-private-network-connection-attempt.asciidoc
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Identifies the execution of macOS built-in commands to connect to an existing Vi
 * Tactic: Lateral Movement
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 106
+*Version*: 107
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ Identifies the execution of macOS built-in commands to connect to an existing Vi
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -76,7 +79,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/volume-shadow-copy-deleted-or-resized-via-vssadmin.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/volume-shadow-copy-deleted-or-resized-via-vssadmin.asciidoc
index 59b0377085..17a4bd7ee8 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/volume-shadow-copy-deleted-or-resized-via-vssadmin.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/volume-shadow-copy-deleted-or-resized-via-vssadmin.asciidoc
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Identifies use of vssadmin.exe for shadow copy deletion or resizing on endpoints
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -117,10 +117,11 @@ This rule monitors the execution of Vssadmin.exe to either delete or resize shad
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
+==== Setup
 
 
-==== Setup
 
+*Setup*
 
 
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/volume-shadow-copy-deletion-via-powershell.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/volume-shadow-copy-deletion-via-powershell.asciidoc
index b60dd02eb6..99193edbbd 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/volume-shadow-copy-deletion-via-powershell.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/volume-shadow-copy-deletion-via-powershell.asciidoc
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ Identifies the use of the Win32_ShadowCopy class and related cmdlets to achieve
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -122,10 +122,11 @@ This rule monitors the execution of PowerShell cmdlets to interact with the Win3
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
+==== Setup
 
 
-==== Setup
 
+*Setup*
 
 
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/volume-shadow-copy-deletion-via-wmic.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/volume-shadow-copy-deletion-via-wmic.asciidoc
index b5cd8cad82..f8b68d2c5d 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/volume-shadow-copy-deletion-via-wmic.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/volume-shadow-copy-deletion-via-wmic.asciidoc
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ Identifies use of wmic.exe for shadow copy deletion on endpoints. This commonly
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * logs-windows.*
 * endgame-*
+* logs-system.security*
 
 *Severity*: high
 
@@ -35,7 +36,7 @@ Identifies use of wmic.exe for shadow copy deletion on endpoints. This commonly
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -117,10 +118,11 @@ This rule monitors the execution of `wmic.exe` to interact with VSS via the `sha
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
+==== Setup
 
 
-==== Setup
 
+*Setup*
 
 
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
@@ -136,7 +138,7 @@ For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
 process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
-  (process.name : "WMIC.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name == "wmic.exe") and
+  (process.name : "WMIC.exe" or ?process.pe.original_file_name == "wmic.exe") and
   process.args : "delete" and process.args : "shadowcopy"
 
 ----------------------------------
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/web-shell-detection-script-process-child-of-common-web-processes.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/web-shell-detection-script-process-child-of-common-web-processes.asciidoc
index b9fed5250b..e135acf8a1 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/web-shell-detection-script-process-child-of-common-web-processes.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/web-shell-detection-script-process-child-of-common-web-processes.asciidoc
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ Identifies suspicious commands executed via a web server, which may suggest a vu
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -107,11 +107,13 @@ This rule detects a web server process spawning script and command-line interfac
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/webproxy-settings-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/webproxy-settings-modification.asciidoc
index f354becd4c..2ce3fec4eb 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/webproxy-settings-modification.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/webproxy-settings-modification.asciidoc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Identifies the use of the built-in networksetup command to configure webproxy se
 * Tactic: Credential Access
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 105
+*Version*: 106
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ Identifies the use of the built-in networksetup command to configure webproxy se
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
 
 
@@ -75,7 +78,6 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://w
 For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/webserver-access-logs-deleted.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/webserver-access-logs-deleted.asciidoc
index bb983574d7..f3626a21b7 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/webserver-access-logs-deleted.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/webserver-access-logs-deleted.asciidoc
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ Identifies the deletion of WebServer access logs. This may indicate an attempt t
 * auditbeat-*
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -33,8 +33,9 @@ Identifies the deletion of WebServer access logs. This may indicate an attempt t
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 104
+*Version*: 105
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -47,6 +48,9 @@ Identifies the deletion of WebServer access logs. This may indicate an attempt t
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/whoami-process-activity.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/whoami-process-activity.asciidoc
index e6fdd475eb..e3d491e4d9 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/whoami-process-activity.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/whoami-process-activity.asciidoc
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Identifies suspicious use of whoami.exe which displays user, group, and privileg
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -92,11 +92,13 @@ This rule looks for the execution of the `whoami` utility. Attackers commonly us
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/windows-cryptoapi-spoofing-vulnerability-cve-2020-0601-curveball.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/windows-cryptoapi-spoofing-vulnerability-cve-2020-0601-curveball.asciidoc
index a804dc6ca2..5e1c50c596 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/windows-cryptoapi-spoofing-vulnerability-cve-2020-0601-curveball.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/windows-cryptoapi-spoofing-vulnerability-cve-2020-0601-curveball.asciidoc
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ A spoofing vulnerability exists in the way Windows CryptoAPI (Crypt32.dll) valid
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-windows.*
+* logs-system.security*
 
 *Severity*: low
 
@@ -30,7 +31,7 @@ A spoofing vulnerability exists in the way Windows CryptoAPI (Crypt32.dll) valid
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Use Case: Vulnerability
 
-*Version*: 103
+*Version*: 104
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/windows-defender-disabled-via-registry-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/windows-defender-disabled-via-registry-modification.asciidoc
index dfb3821aa6..bb6af69178 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/windows-defender-disabled-via-registry-modification.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/windows-defender-disabled-via-registry-modification.asciidoc
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ Identifies modifications to the Windows Defender registry settings to disable th
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * endgame-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: low
 
@@ -33,8 +34,9 @@ Identifies modifications to the Windows Defender registry settings to disable th
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -96,11 +98,13 @@ This rule monitors the registry for configurations that disable Windows Defender
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/windows-defender-exclusions-added-via-powershell.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/windows-defender-exclusions-added-via-powershell.asciidoc
index 789071e8b9..c361fbd4f6 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/windows-defender-exclusions-added-via-powershell.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/windows-defender-exclusions-added-via-powershell.asciidoc
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Identifies modifications to the Windows Defender configuration settings using Po
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -109,11 +109,13 @@ Microsoft Windows Defender is an antivirus product built into Microsoft Windows.
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/windows-firewall-disabled-via-powershell.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/windows-firewall-disabled-via-powershell.asciidoc
index 2cc9ce14ef..2216b523f2 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/windows-firewall-disabled-via-powershell.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/windows-firewall-disabled-via-powershell.asciidoc
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ Identifies when the Windows Firewall is disabled using PowerShell cmdlets, which
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -96,11 +96,13 @@ This rule identifies patterns related to disabling the Windows firewall or its r
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
@@ -114,7 +116,7 @@ For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
 process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.action == "start" and
-  (process.name : ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe") or process.pe.original_file_name == "PowerShell.EXE") and
+  (process.name : ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe") or ?process.pe.original_file_name == "PowerShell.EXE") and
    process.args : "*Set-NetFirewallProfile*" and
   (process.args : "*-Enabled*" and process.args : "*False*") and
   (process.args : "*-All*" or process.args : ("*Public*", "*Domain*", "*Private*"))
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/windows-network-enumeration.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/windows-network-enumeration.asciidoc
index 1ae8e52aca..d15d14b136 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/windows-network-enumeration.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/windows-network-enumeration.asciidoc
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Identifies attempts to enumerate hosts in a network using the built-in Windows n
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 * Rule Type: BBR
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -87,11 +87,13 @@ This rule looks for the execution of the `net` utility to enumerate servers in t
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
@@ -99,7 +101,6 @@ Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest
 For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
 
 
-
 ==== Rule query
 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/windows-script-executing-powershell.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/windows-script-executing-powershell.asciidoc
index ddace63b47..c0d6195ea4 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/windows-script-executing-powershell.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/windows-script-executing-powershell.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies a PowerShell process launched by either cscript.exe or wscript.exe. O
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: low
@@ -34,8 +34,9 @@ Identifies a PowerShell process launched by either cscript.exe or wscript.exe. O
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -108,11 +109,13 @@ This rule looks for the spawn of the `powershell.exe` process with `cscript.exe`
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
 
-
 ==== Setup
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/windows-script-interpreter-executing-process-via-wmi.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/windows-script-interpreter-executing-process-via-wmi.asciidoc
index 473d3cb9ce..6d7874bfed 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/windows-script-interpreter-executing-process-via-wmi.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/windows-script-interpreter-executing-process-via-wmi.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies use of the built-in Windows script interpreters (cscript.exe or wscri
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
@@ -33,8 +33,9 @@ Identifies use of the built-in Windows script interpreters (cscript.exe or wscri
 * Tactic: Execution
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -51,7 +52,7 @@ Identifies use of the built-in Windows script interpreters (cscript.exe or wscri
 sequence by host.id with maxspan = 5s
     [any where host.os.type == "windows" and 
      (event.category : ("library", "driver") or (event.category == "process" and event.action : "Image loaded*")) and
-     (dll.name : "wmiutils.dll" or file.name : "wmiutils.dll") and process.name : ("wscript.exe", "cscript.exe")]
+     (?dll.name : "wmiutils.dll" or file.name : "wmiutils.dll") and process.name : ("wscript.exe", "cscript.exe")]
     [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
      process.parent.name : "wmiprvse.exe" and
      user.domain != "NT AUTHORITY" and
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/windows-service-installed-via-an-unusual-client.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/windows-service-installed-via-an-unusual-client.asciidoc
index f48d5833f5..68321b2928 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/windows-service-installed-via-an-unusual-client.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/windows-service-installed-via-an-unusual-client.asciidoc
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Identifies the creation of a Windows service by an unusual client process. Servi
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Privilege Escalation
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -47,8 +47,11 @@ Identifies the creation of a Windows service by an unusual client process. Servi
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 The 'Audit Security System Extension' logging policy must be configured for (Success)
-Steps to implement the logging policy with with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
 ```
 Computer Configuration >
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/windows-subsystem-for-linux-distribution-installed.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/windows-subsystem-for-linux-distribution-installed.asciidoc
index 5e9e6870f3..41a36f31cd 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/windows-subsystem-for-linux-distribution-installed.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/windows-subsystem-for-linux-distribution-installed.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Detects changes to the registry that indicates the install of a new Windows Subs
 
 * winlogbeat-*
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 * endgame-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
@@ -34,8 +34,9 @@ Detects changes to the registry that indicates the install of a new Windows Subs
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 5
+*Version*: 6
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/wmi-incoming-lateral-movement.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/wmi-incoming-lateral-movement.asciidoc
index da1d9ca28a..96a77fd0ef 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/wmi-incoming-lateral-movement.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/wmi-incoming-lateral-movement.asciidoc
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Identifies processes executed via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) on a
 
 * logs-endpoint.events.*
 * winlogbeat-*
-* logs-windows.*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
 
 *Severity*: medium
 
@@ -30,8 +30,9 @@ Identifies processes executed via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) on a
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Lateral Movement
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 108
+*Version*: 109
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -55,15 +56,16 @@ sequence by host.id with maxspan = 2s
 
   /* Excluding Common FPs Nessus and SCCM */
 
-  [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and process.parent.name : "WmiPrvSE.exe" and 
-   not process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name : "system" and not user.id : ("S-1-5-18", "S-1-5-19", "S-1-5-20") and 
-   not process.executable : 
-               ("?:\\Program Files\\HPWBEM\\Tools\\hpsum_swdiscovery.exe", 
-                "?:\\Windows\\CCM\\Ccm32BitLauncher.exe", 
-                "?:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\mofcomp.exe", 
-                "?:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework*\\csc.exe", 
-                "?:\\Windows\\System32\\powercfg.exe") and 
-   not (process.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\msiexec.exe" and process.args : "REBOOT=ReallySuppress") and 
+  [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and process.parent.name : "WmiPrvSE.exe" and
+   not (?process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name : "System" or ?winlog.event_data.IntegrityLevel : "System") and
+   not user.id : ("S-1-5-18", "S-1-5-19", "S-1-5-20") and
+   not process.executable :
+               ("?:\\Program Files\\HPWBEM\\Tools\\hpsum_swdiscovery.exe",
+                "?:\\Windows\\CCM\\Ccm32BitLauncher.exe",
+                "?:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\mofcomp.exe",
+                "?:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework*\\csc.exe",
+                "?:\\Windows\\System32\\powercfg.exe") and
+   not (process.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\msiexec.exe" and process.args : "REBOOT=ReallySuppress") and
    not (process.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\inetsrv\\appcmd.exe" and process.args : "uninstall")
    ]
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/writedac-access-on-active-directory-object.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/writedac-access-on-active-directory-object.asciidoc
index 85d738a88d..1792d1b780 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/writedac-access-on-active-directory-object.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/writedac-access-on-active-directory-object.asciidoc
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Identifies the access on an object with WRITEDAC permissions. With the WRITEDAC
 * Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring
 * Rule Type: BBR
 
-*Version*: 2
+*Version*: 3
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -47,6 +47,10 @@ Identifies the access on an object with WRITEDAC permissions. With the WRITEDAC
 ==== Setup
 
 
+
+*Setup*
+
+
 The 'Audit Directory Service Access' logging policy must be configured for (Success, Failure).
 Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/zoom-meeting-with-no-passcode.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/zoom-meeting-with-no-passcode.asciidoc
index 035c76b24c..eddf1a5535 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/zoom-meeting-with-no-passcode.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/zoom-meeting-with-no-passcode.asciidoc
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ This rule identifies Zoom meetings that are created without a passcode. Meetings
 * Use Case: Configuration Audit
 * Tactic: Initial Access
 
-*Version*: 102
+*Version*: 103
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ This rule identifies Zoom meetings that are created without a passcode. Meetings
 
 
 
+*Setup*
+
+
 The Zoom Filebeat module or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.
 
 ==== Rule query
diff --git a/docs/index.asciidoc b/docs/index.asciidoc
index 8315e76da2..f05244d822 100644
--- a/docs/index.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/index.asciidoc
@@ -105,3 +105,5 @@ include::detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-8/prebuilt-rules-8
 include::detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-9/prebuilt-rules-8-11-9-appendix.asciidoc[]
 
 include::detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-10/prebuilt-rules-8-11-10-appendix.asciidoc[]
+
+include::detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rules-8-11-11-appendix.asciidoc[]

From be3891a44b02980816995bb094d4c14582ee9603 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Shashank K S <Shashank.Suryanarayana@elastic.co>
Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2024 19:34:32 +0530
Subject: [PATCH 2/4] Fix Summary for 8.11.11

---
 .../prebuilt-rules-downloadable-updates.asciidoc             | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/prebuilt-rules-downloadable-updates.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/prebuilt-rules-downloadable-updates.asciidoc
index b72698b065..b3ba6c94d9 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/prebuilt-rules-downloadable-updates.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/prebuilt-rules-downloadable-updates.asciidoc
@@ -14,7 +14,10 @@ For previous rule updates, please navigate to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/e
 
 
 |<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-prebuilt-rules-8-11-11-summary, 8.11.11>> | 25 Mar 2024 | 5 | 549 | 
-Adding Release Notes to 8.11.11
+This release includes new rules for Linux and Windows and tuned rules for Linux, Windows and macOS.
+New rules for Linux include detection for execution.
+New rules for Windows include detection for credential access.
+Additionally, significant rule tuning for Windows, Linux and macOS rules has been added for better rule efficacy and performance.
 
 
 |<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-10-prebuilt-rules-8-11-10-summary, 8.11.10>> | 07 Mar 2024 | 9 | 7 | 

From 1c74e4d78c0a40a47ebbac5dc52ce3eca6ac4e07 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Shashank K S <Shashank.Suryanarayana@elastic.co>
Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2024 20:11:05 +0530
Subject: [PATCH 3/4] Fix Build failure

---
 .../8-11-11/prebuilt-rules-8-11-11-appendix.asciidoc             | 1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rules-8-11-11-appendix.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rules-8-11-11-appendix.asciidoc
index 016353d2a1..7aa00ec466 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rules-8-11-11-appendix.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rules-8-11-11-appendix.asciidoc
@@ -558,4 +558,3 @@ include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-print-spooler-child-process.asciidoc[]
 include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-unusual-service-host-child-process-childless-service.asciidoc[]
 include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-privilege-escalation-via-rogue-named-pipe-impersonation.asciidoc[]
 include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-service-installed-via-an-unusual-client.asciidoc[]
-include::prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-reverse-connection-through-port-knocking.asciidoc[]

From 6ee7c3d868b20aa5bc22b40fe268e74072eebb06 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Shashank K S <Shashank.Suryanarayana@elastic.co>
Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2024 10:27:10 +0530
Subject: [PATCH 4/4] Fix Build failure

---
 .../8-11-11/prebuilt-rules-8-11-11-summary.asciidoc           | 2 --
 .../prebuilt-rules/prebuilt-rules-changelog.asciidoc          | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rules-8-11-11-summary.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rules-8-11-11-summary.asciidoc
index 40aa6486e7..db1ebb6fc1 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rules-8-11-11-summary.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-11-11/prebuilt-rules-8-11-11-summary.asciidoc
@@ -1117,6 +1117,4 @@ This section lists all updates associated with version 8.11.11 of the Fleet inte
 
 |<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-windows-service-installed-via-an-unusual-client, Windows Service Installed via an Unusual Client>> | Identifies the creation of a Windows service by an unusual client process. Services may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to SYSTEM. | update | 108 
 
-|<<prebuilt-rule-8-11-11-potential-linux-reverse-connection-through-port-knocking, Potential Linux Reverse Connection through Port Knocking>> | Monitors for a sequence of network activity on atypical ports, prior to receiving a single packet on such a non-standard port, which potentially indicates signal port knocking activity. Port knocking is a covert method of externally opening ports by sending a sequence of packets to previously closed ports, which adversaries may leverage to discreetly gain access without directly alerting traditional monitoring systems. | deprecated | 2 
-
 |==============================================
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/prebuilt-rules-changelog.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/prebuilt-rules-changelog.asciidoc
index 76b152fcb8..bba8d1f0a9 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/prebuilt-rules-changelog.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/prebuilt-rules-changelog.asciidoc
@@ -750,7 +750,7 @@ information about a rule's changes, see the rule's description page.
 
 <<suspicious-ms-office-child-process>>
 
-<<tampering-of-bash-command-line-history>>
+<<tampering-of-shell-command-line-history>>
 
 [float]
 === 8.2.0
@@ -1411,7 +1411,7 @@ information about a rule's changes, see the rule's description page.
 
 <<suspicious-wmic-xsl-script-execution>>
 
-<<tampering-of-bash-command-line-history>>
+<<tampering-of-shell-command-line-history>>
 
 <<timestomping-using-touch-command>>