From f8c73edf890e608acb1fb724c5f4bca8ee8e9887 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: protections machine
 <72879786+protectionsmachine@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2024 05:32:27 +1000
Subject: [PATCH] [Detection Rules] Adding Documents for v8.12.14 Pre-Built
 Detection Rules (#5368)

---
 ...-8-12-14-adobe-hijack-persistence.asciidoc | 157 ++++++++++++
 ...gent-spoofing-mismatched-agent-id.asciidoc |  58 +++++
 ...nager-configuration-file-creation.asciidoc | 130 ++++++++++
 ...-12-14-at-job-created-or-modified.asciidoc | 144 +++++++++++
 ...orce-a-microsoft-365-user-account.asciidoc |  78 ++++++
 ...ntication-via-unusual-pam-grantor.asciidoc |  88 +++++++
 ...e-connect-ssh-public-key-uploaded.asciidoc | 126 ++++++++++
 ...m-roles-anywhere-profile-creation.asciidoc | 125 ++++++++++
 ...t-anchor-created-with-external-ca.asciidoc | 125 ++++++++++
 ...pdated-to-allow-public-invocation.asciidoc | 122 +++++++++
 ...-layer-added-to-existing-function.asciidoc | 121 +++++++++
 ...ed-to-share-with-external-account.asciidoc | 128 ++++++++++
 ...ity-api-called-for-the-first-time.asciidoc | 132 ++++++++++
 ...eter-request-with-decryption-flag.asciidoc | 127 ++++++++++
 ...new-gpo-scheduled-task-or-service.asciidoc |  98 ++++++++
 ...ntication-module-or-configuration.asciidoc | 101 ++++++++
 ...2-14-cron-job-created-or-modified.asciidoc | 236 ++++++++++++++++++
 ...le-bit-set-for-rc-local-rc-common.asciidoc | 110 ++++++++
 ...value-accessed-in-secrets-manager.asciidoc | 134 ++++++++++
 ...licy-abuse-for-privilege-addition.asciidoc | 138 ++++++++++
 ...uest-predicted-to-be-a-dga-domain.asciidoc | 103 ++++++++
 ...with-a-high-dga-probability-score.asciidoc | 103 ++++++++
 ...redicted-to-be-malicious-activity.asciidoc | 102 ++++++++
 ...-high-malicious-probability-score.asciidoc | 103 ++++++++
 ...using-a-known-sunburst-dns-domain.asciidoc | 103 ++++++++
 ...age-of-the-day-motd-file-creation.asciidoc | 193 ++++++++++++++
 ...n-initiated-by-sshd-child-process.asciidoc | 101 ++++++++
 ...iated-through-xdg-autostart-entry.asciidoc | 131 ++++++++++
 ...new-or-modified-federation-domain.asciidoc |  82 ++++++
 ...le-8-12-14-potential-dga-activity.asciidoc |  93 +++++++
 ...asquerading-as-communication-apps.asciidoc | 134 ++++++++++
 ...openssh-backdoor-logging-activity.asciidoc | 161 ++++++++++++
 ...persistence-via-file-modification.asciidoc | 197 +++++++++++++++
 ...-8-12-14-potential-sudo-hijacking.asciidoc | 128 ++++++++++
 ...capability-set-via-setcap-utility.asciidoc | 105 ++++++++
 ...wned-from-message-of-the-day-motd.asciidoc | 206 +++++++++++++++
 ...-attempts-from-aws-secretsmanager.asciidoc | 133 ++++++++++
 ...d-task-execution-at-scale-via-gpo.asciidoc | 177 +++++++++++++
 ...guration-creation-or-modification.asciidoc | 132 ++++++++++
 ...-ssh-key-generated-via-ssh-keygen.asciidoc |  88 +++++++
 ...ript-added-to-group-policy-object.asciidoc | 170 +++++++++++++
 ...el-detected-c2-beaconing-activity.asciidoc | 102 ++++++++
 ...r-application-script-modification.asciidoc | 111 ++++++++
 ...-14-system-binary-moved-or-copied.asciidoc | 133 ++++++++++
 ...e-8-12-14-systemd-service-created.asciidoc | 226 +++++++++++++++++
 ...ule-8-12-14-systemd-timer-created.asciidoc | 200 +++++++++++++++
 ...-systemd-udevd-rule-file-creation.asciidoc | 119 +++++++++
 ...14-user-added-to-privileged-group.asciidoc | 155 ++++++++++++
 .../prebuilt-rules-8-12-14-appendix.asciidoc  |  54 ++++
 .../prebuilt-rules-8-12-14-summary.asciidoc   | 108 ++++++++
 ...ebuilt-rules-downloadable-updates.asciidoc |   5 +
 .../prebuilt-rules-reference.asciidoc         | 118 ++++++---
 .../prebuilt-rules/rule-desc-index.asciidoc   |  38 ++-
 .../adobe-hijack-persistence.asciidoc         |   2 +-
 ...gent-spoofing-mismatched-agent-id.asciidoc |   6 +-
 ...nager-configuration-file-creation.asciidoc | 130 ++++++++++
 .../at-job-created-or-modified.asciidoc       | 144 +++++++++++
 ...e-user-data-from-aws-ec2-instance.asciidoc |   4 +-
 ...orce-a-microsoft-365-user-account.asciidoc |   6 +-
 ...ntication-via-unusual-pam-grantor.asciidoc |  88 +++++++
 ...e-connect-ssh-public-key-uploaded.asciidoc | 126 ++++++++++
 ...m-roles-anywhere-profile-creation.asciidoc | 125 ++++++++++
 ...t-anchor-created-with-external-ca.asciidoc | 125 ++++++++++
 ...ambda-function-created-or-updated.asciidoc |  68 +++++
 ...pdated-to-allow-public-invocation.asciidoc | 122 +++++++++
 ...-layer-added-to-existing-function.asciidoc | 121 +++++++++
 ...ed-to-share-with-external-account.asciidoc | 128 ++++++++++
 ...ity-api-called-for-the-first-time.asciidoc | 132 ++++++++++
 ...eter-request-with-decryption-flag.asciidoc | 127 ++++++++++
 ...new-gpo-scheduled-task-or-service.asciidoc |   4 +-
 ...ntication-module-or-configuration.asciidoc | 101 ++++++++
 .../cron-job-created-or-modified.asciidoc     | 236 ++++++++++++++++++
 ...le-bit-set-for-rc-local-rc-common.asciidoc | 110 ++++++++
 ...value-accessed-in-secrets-manager.asciidoc |  22 +-
 ...licy-abuse-for-privilege-addition.asciidoc |   4 +-
 ...uest-predicted-to-be-a-dga-domain.asciidoc |   2 +-
 ...with-a-high-dga-probability-score.asciidoc |   2 +-
 ...redicted-to-be-malicious-activity.asciidoc |   2 +-
 ...-high-malicious-probability-score.asciidoc |   2 +-
 ...using-a-known-sunburst-dns-domain.asciidoc |   2 +-
 ...age-of-the-day-motd-file-creation.asciidoc | 193 ++++++++++++++
 ...n-initiated-by-sshd-child-process.asciidoc | 101 ++++++++
 ...iated-through-xdg-autostart-entry.asciidoc | 131 ++++++++++
 ...new-or-modified-federation-domain.asciidoc |   6 +-
 .../potential-dga-activity.asciidoc           |   2 +-
 ...l-masquerading-as-browser-process.asciidoc |   4 +-
 ...asquerading-as-communication-apps.asciidoc |   4 +-
 ...tial-masquerading-as-system32-dll.asciidoc |   4 +-
 ...squerading-as-system32-executable.asciidoc |   4 +-
 ...potential-masquerading-as-vlc-dll.asciidoc |   4 +-
 ...openssh-backdoor-logging-activity.asciidoc |   4 +-
 ...persistence-via-file-modification.asciidoc | 197 +++++++++++++++
 .../potential-sudo-hijacking.asciidoc         | 128 ++++++++++
 ...capability-set-via-setcap-utility.asciidoc | 105 ++++++++
 ...wned-from-message-of-the-day-motd.asciidoc | 206 +++++++++++++++
 ...-attempts-from-aws-secretsmanager.asciidoc | 133 ++++++++++
 ...d-task-execution-at-scale-via-gpo.asciidoc |   4 +-
 ...guration-creation-or-modification.asciidoc | 132 ++++++++++
 .../ssh-key-generated-via-ssh-keygen.asciidoc |  88 +++++++
 ...ript-added-to-group-policy-object.asciidoc |   4 +-
 ...el-detected-c2-beaconing-activity.asciidoc |   9 +-
 ...r-application-script-modification.asciidoc |   4 +-
 ...s-communication-app-child-process.asciidoc |   4 +-
 .../system-binary-moved-or-copied.asciidoc    | 133 ++++++++++
 .../systemd-service-created.asciidoc          | 226 +++++++++++++++++
 .../systemd-timer-created.asciidoc            | 200 +++++++++++++++
 .../systemd-udevd-rule-file-creation.asciidoc | 119 +++++++++
 .../user-added-to-privileged-group.asciidoc   |  44 +++-
 docs/index.asciidoc                           |   2 +
 109 files changed, 10617 insertions(+), 111 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-adobe-hijack-persistence.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-agent-spoofing-mismatched-agent-id.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-apt-package-manager-configuration-file-creation.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-at-job-created-or-modified.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-attempts-to-brute-force-a-microsoft-365-user-account.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-authentication-via-unusual-pam-grantor.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-ec2-instance-connect-ssh-public-key-uploaded.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-iam-roles-anywhere-profile-creation.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-iam-roles-anywhere-trust-anchor-created-with-external-ca.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-lambda-function-policy-updated-to-allow-public-invocation.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-lambda-layer-added-to-existing-function.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-s3-bucket-policy-added-to-share-with-external-account.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-sts-getcalleridentity-api-called-for-the-first-time.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-systems-manager-securestring-parameter-request-with-decryption-flag.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-creation-or-modification-of-a-new-gpo-scheduled-task-or-service.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-creation-or-modification-of-pluggable-authentication-module-or-configuration.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-cron-job-created-or-modified.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-executable-bit-set-for-rc-local-rc-common.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-first-time-seen-aws-secret-value-accessed-in-secrets-manager.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-group-policy-abuse-for-privilege-addition.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-predicted-to-be-a-dga-domain.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-with-a-high-dga-probability-score.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-predicted-to-be-malicious-activity.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-with-a-high-malicious-probability-score.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-machine-learning-detected-dga-activity-using-a-known-sunburst-dns-domain.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-message-of-the-day-motd-file-creation.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-network-connection-initiated-by-sshd-child-process.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-network-connections-initiated-through-xdg-autostart-entry.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-new-or-modified-federation-domain.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-potential-dga-activity.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-potential-masquerading-as-communication-apps.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-potential-openssh-backdoor-logging-activity.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-potential-persistence-via-file-modification.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-potential-sudo-hijacking.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-process-capability-set-via-setcap-utility.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-process-spawned-from-message-of-the-day-motd.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-rapid-secret-retrieval-attempts-from-aws-secretsmanager.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-scheduled-task-execution-at-scale-via-gpo.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-shell-configuration-creation-or-modification.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-ssh-key-generated-via-ssh-keygen.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-startup-logon-script-added-to-group-policy-object.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-statistical-model-detected-c2-beaconing-activity.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-sublime-plugin-or-application-script-modification.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-system-binary-moved-or-copied.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-systemd-service-created.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-systemd-timer-created.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-systemd-udevd-rule-file-creation.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-user-added-to-privileged-group.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rules-8-12-14-appendix.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rules-8-12-14-summary.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/apt-package-manager-configuration-file-creation.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/at-job-created-or-modified.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/authentication-via-unusual-pam-grantor.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-ec2-instance-connect-ssh-public-key-uploaded.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-iam-roles-anywhere-profile-creation.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-iam-roles-anywhere-trust-anchor-created-with-external-ca.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-lambda-function-created-or-updated.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-lambda-function-policy-updated-to-allow-public-invocation.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-lambda-layer-added-to-existing-function.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-s3-bucket-policy-added-to-share-with-external-account.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-sts-getcalleridentity-api-called-for-the-first-time.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-systems-manager-securestring-parameter-request-with-decryption-flag.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/creation-or-modification-of-pluggable-authentication-module-or-configuration.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/cron-job-created-or-modified.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/executable-bit-set-for-rc-local-rc-common.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/message-of-the-day-motd-file-creation.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-connection-initiated-by-sshd-child-process.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-connections-initiated-through-xdg-autostart-entry.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-persistence-via-file-modification.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-sudo-hijacking.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/process-capability-set-via-setcap-utility.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/process-spawned-from-message-of-the-day-motd.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/rapid-secret-retrieval-attempts-from-aws-secretsmanager.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/shell-configuration-creation-or-modification.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/ssh-key-generated-via-ssh-keygen.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/system-binary-moved-or-copied.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/systemd-service-created.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/systemd-timer-created.asciidoc
 create mode 100644 docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/systemd-udevd-rule-file-creation.asciidoc

diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-adobe-hijack-persistence.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-adobe-hijack-persistence.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..21d07a1dd6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-adobe-hijack-persistence.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-adobe-hijack-persistence]]
+=== Adobe Hijack Persistence
+
+Detects writing executable files that will be automatically launched by Adobe on launch.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.file-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+* logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://twitter.com/pabraeken/status/997997818362155008
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+* Data Source: SentinelOne
+
+*Version*: 213
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Adobe Hijack Persistence*
+
+
+Attackers can replace the `RdrCEF.exe` executable with their own to maintain their access, which will be launched whenever Adobe Acrobat Reader is executed.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
+- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
+  - Analyze the file using a private sandboxed analysis system.
+  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
+    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
+      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+        - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}}
+    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
+    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}}
+      - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}}
+  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
+- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "creation" and
+  file.path : ("?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Adobe\\Acrobat Reader DC\\Reader\\AcroCEF\\RdrCEF.exe",
+               "?:\\Program Files\\Adobe\\Acrobat Reader DC\\Reader\\AcroCEF\\RdrCEF.exe") and
+  not process.name : "msiexec.exe"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Hijack Execution Flow
+** ID: T1574
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Services File Permissions Weakness
+** ID: T1574.010
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/010/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Compromise Host Software Binary
+** ID: T1554
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1554/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-agent-spoofing-mismatched-agent-id.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-agent-spoofing-mismatched-agent-id.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..008079d9b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-agent-spoofing-mismatched-agent-id.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-agent-spoofing-mismatched-agent-id]]
+=== Agent Spoofing - Mismatched Agent ID
+
+Detects events that have a mismatch on the expected event agent ID. The status "agent_id_mismatch/mismatch" occurs when the expected agent ID associated with the API key does not match the actual agent ID in an event. This could indicate attempts to spoof events in order to masquerade actual activity to evade detection.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-*
+* metrics-*
+* traces-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+
+*Version*: 102
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.agent_id_status:(agent_id_mismatch or mismatch)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Masquerading
+** ID: T1036
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-apt-package-manager-configuration-file-creation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-apt-package-manager-configuration-file-creation.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f4d4fce469
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-apt-package-manager-configuration-file-creation.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-apt-package-manager-configuration-file-creation]]
+=== APT Package Manager Configuration File Creation
+
+Detects file creation events in the configuration directory for the APT package manager. In Linux, APT (Advanced Package Tool) is a command-line utility used for handling packages on (by default) Debian-based systems, providing functions for installing, updating, upgrading, and removing software along with managing package repositories. Attackers can backdoor APT to gain persistence by injecting malicious code into scripts that APT runs, thereby ensuring continued unauthorized access or control each time APT is used for package management.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.file*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/152668/APT-Package-Manager-Persistence.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("rename", "creation") and
+file.path : "/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/*" and not (
+  process.executable in (
+    "/bin/dpkg", "/usr/bin/dpkg", "/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/dockerd", "/usr/sbin/dockerd", "/bin/microdnf",
+    "/usr/bin/microdnf", "/bin/rpm", "/usr/bin/rpm", "/bin/snapd", "/usr/bin/snapd", "/bin/yum", "/usr/bin/yum",
+    "/bin/dnf", "/usr/bin/dnf", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/bin/dnf-automatic", "/usr/bin/dnf-automatic",
+    "/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/dpkg-divert", "/bin/dpkg-divert", "/sbin/apk", "/usr/sbin/apk",
+    "/usr/local/sbin/apk", "/usr/bin/apt", "/usr/sbin/pacman", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/puppet",
+    "/bin/puppet", "/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/puppet", "/usr/bin/chef-client", "/bin/chef-client",
+    "/bin/autossl_check", "/usr/bin/autossl_check", "/proc/self/exe", "/dev/fd/*",  "/usr/bin/pamac-daemon",
+    "/bin/pamac-daemon", "/usr/lib/snapd/snapd", "/usr/local/bin/dockerd", "/usr/libexec/netplan/generate",
+    "/usr/local/bin/apt-get", "/usr/bin/apt-get"
+  ) or
+  file.path :("/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/*.tmp*") or
+  file.extension in ("swp", "swpx", "swx", "dpkg-remove") or
+  file.Ext.original.extension == "dpkg-new" or
+  process.executable : (
+    "/nix/store/*", "/var/lib/dpkg/*", "/tmp/vmis.*", "/snap/*", "/dev/fd/*", "/usr/lib/*", "/usr/libexec/*",
+    "/etc/kernel/*"
+  ) or
+  process.executable == null or
+  (process.name == "sed" and file.name : "sed*") or
+  (process.name == "perl" and file.name : "e2scrub_all.tmp*") 
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Create or Modify System Process
+** ID: T1543
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Hijack Execution Flow
+** ID: T1574
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-at-job-created-or-modified.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-at-job-created-or-modified.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..78a545966d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-at-job-created-or-modified.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-at-job-created-or-modified]]
+=== At Job Created or Modified
+
+This rule monitors for at jobs being created or renamed. Linux at jobs are scheduled tasks that can be leveraged by system administrators to set up scheduled tasks, but may be abused by malicious actors for persistence, privilege escalation and command execution. By creating or modifying cron job configurations, attackers can execute malicious commands or scripts at predefined intervals, ensuring their continued presence and enabling unauthorized activities.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.file*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and
+event.action in ("rename", "creation") and file.path : "/var/spool/cron/atjobs/*" and not (
+  process.executable in (
+    "/bin/dpkg", "/usr/bin/dpkg", "/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/dockerd", "/usr/sbin/dockerd", "/bin/microdnf",
+    "/usr/bin/microdnf", "/bin/rpm", "/usr/bin/rpm", "/bin/snapd", "/usr/bin/snapd", "/bin/yum", "/usr/bin/yum",
+    "/bin/dnf", "/usr/bin/dnf", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/bin/dnf-automatic", "/usr/bin/dnf-automatic",
+    "/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/dpkg-divert", "/bin/dpkg-divert", "/sbin/apk", "/usr/sbin/apk",
+    "/usr/local/sbin/apk", "/usr/bin/apt", "/usr/sbin/pacman", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/puppet",
+    "/bin/puppet", "/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/puppet", "/usr/bin/chef-client", "/bin/chef-client",
+    "/bin/autossl_check", "/usr/bin/autossl_check", "/proc/self/exe", "/dev/fd/*",  "/usr/bin/pamac-daemon",
+    "/bin/pamac-daemon", "/usr/local/bin/dockerd"
+  ) or
+  file.extension in ("swp", "swpx", "swx", "dpkg-remove") or
+  file.Ext.original.extension == "dpkg-new" or
+  process.executable : ("/nix/store/*", "/var/lib/dpkg/*", "/tmp/vmis.*", "/snap/*", "/dev/fd/*") or
+  process.executable == null or
+  (process.name == "sed" and file.name : "sed*") or
+  (process.name == "perl" and file.name : "e2scrub_all.tmp*") 
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task/Job
+** ID: T1053
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: At
+** ID: T1053.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task/Job
+** ID: T1053
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: At
+** ID: T1053.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task/Job
+** ID: T1053
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: At
+** ID: T1053.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-attempts-to-brute-force-a-microsoft-365-user-account.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-attempts-to-brute-force-a-microsoft-365-user-account.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..68a617c290
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-attempts-to-brute-force-a-microsoft-365-user-account.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-attempts-to-brute-force-a-microsoft-365-user-account]]
+=== Attempts to Brute Force a Microsoft 365 User Account
+
+Identifies attempts to brute force a Microsoft 365 user account. An adversary may attempt a brute force attack to obtain unauthorized access to user accounts.
+
+*Rule type*: threshold
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* filebeat-*
+* logs-o365*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-30m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://blueteamblog.com/7-ways-to-monitor-your-office-365-logs-using-siem
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Cloud
+* Data Source: Microsoft 365
+* Use Case: Identity and Access Audit
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+
+*Version*: 208
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+* Willem D'Haese
+* Austin Songer
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+The Office 365 Logs Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.dataset:o365.audit and event.provider:(AzureActiveDirectory or Exchange) and
+  event.category:authentication and event.action:(UserLoginFailed or PasswordLogonInitialAuthUsingPassword) and
+  not o365.audit.LogonError:(UserAccountNotFound or EntitlementGrantsNotFound or UserStrongAuthEnrollmentRequired or
+                             UserStrongAuthClientAuthNRequired or InvalidReplyTo or SsoArtifactExpiredDueToConditionalAccess or
+                             PasswordResetRegistrationRequiredInterrupt or SsoUserAccountNotFoundInResourceTenant or
+                             UserStrongAuthExpired)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Brute Force
+** ID: T1110
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-authentication-via-unusual-pam-grantor.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-authentication-via-unusual-pam-grantor.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..61c3bd4bb7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-authentication-via-unusual-pam-grantor.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-authentication-via-unusual-pam-grantor]]
+=== Authentication via Unusual PAM Grantor
+
+This rule detects successful authentications via PAM grantors that are not commonly used. This could indicate an attacker is attempting to escalate privileges or maintain persistence on the system by modifying the default PAM configuration.
+
+*Rule type*: new_terms
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+This rule requires the use of the `auditd_manager` integration. `Auditd_manager` is a tool designed to simplify and enhance the management of the audit subsystem in Linux systems. It provides a user-friendly interface and automation capabilities for configuring and monitoring system auditing through the auditd daemon. With `auditd_manager`, administrators can easily define audit rules, track system events, and generate comprehensive audit reports, improving overall security and compliance in the system. The following steps should be executed in order to install and deploy `auditd_manager` on a Linux system.
+```
+Kibana -->
+Management -->
+Integrations -->
+Auditd Manager -->
+Add Auditd Manager
+```
+`Auditd_manager` subscribes to the kernel and receives events as they occur without any additional configuration. However, if more advanced configuration is required to detect specific behavior, audit rules can be added to the integration in either the "audit rules" configuration box or the "auditd rule files" box by specifying a file to read the audit rules from.
+For this detection rule to trigger, no additional configuration is required.
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:authentication and host.os.type:linux and event.action:authenticated and event.outcome:success and
+auditd.data.grantors:(* and not (pam_rootok or *pam_cap* or *pam_permit*))
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Create or Modify System Process
+** ID: T1543
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Modify Authentication Process
+** ID: T1556
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-ec2-instance-connect-ssh-public-key-uploaded.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-ec2-instance-connect-ssh-public-key-uploaded.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b175f23c39
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-ec2-instance-connect-ssh-public-key-uploaded.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-ec2-instance-connect-ssh-public-key-uploaded]]
+=== AWS EC2 Instance Connect SSH Public Key Uploaded
+
+Identifies when a new SSH public key is uploaded to an AWS EC2 instance using the EC2 Instance Connect service. This action could indicate an adversary attempting to maintain access to the instance. The rule also detects the `SendSerialConsoleSSHPublicKey` API action, which could be used for privilege escalation if the serial console is enabled. Monitoring these activities helps ensure unauthorized access attempts are detected and mitigated promptly.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* filebeat-*
+* logs-aws.cloudtrail-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/AWS/aws.lateral-movement.ec2-instance-connect/
+* https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-privilege-escalation/aws-ec2-privesc
+* https://medium.parttimepolymath.net/aws-ec2-instance-connect-a-very-neat-trick-4d2fc0c28010
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/ec2-instance-connect/latest/APIReference/API_SendSSHPublicKey.html
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/ec2-instance-connect/latest/APIReference/API_SendSerialConsoleSSHPublicKey.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Cloud
+* Data Source: AWS
+* Data Source: Amazon Web Services
+* Data Source: AWS EC2
+* Use Case: Identity and Access Audit
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and Analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating AWS EC2 Instance Connect SSH Public Key Uploaded*
+
+
+This rule detects when a new SSH public key is uploaded to an AWS EC2 instance using the EC2 Instance Connect service. Adversaries may upload SSH public keys to EC2 instances to maintain access to the instance. The rule also covers cases where the `SendSerialConsoleSSHPublicKey` API action is used to upload an SSH public key to a serial connection, which can be exploited for privilege escalation.
+
+
+*Possible Investigation Steps:*
+
+
+- **Identify the Actor**: Review the `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn` and `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.access_key_id` fields to identify who performed the action. Verify if this actor typically performs such actions and if they have the necessary permissions.
+- **Review the Request Details**: Examine the `aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters` to understand the specific details of the SSH public key upload. Look for any unusual parameters that could suggest unauthorized or malicious modifications.
+- **Analyze the Source of the Request**: Investigate the `source.ip` and `source.geo` fields to determine the geographical origin of the request. An external or unexpected location might indicate compromised credentials or unauthorized access.
+- **Contextualize with Timestamp**: Use the `@timestamp` field to check when the SSH public key was uploaded. Changes during non-business hours or outside regular maintenance windows might require further scrutiny.
+- **Correlate with Other Activities**: Search for related CloudTrail events before and after this action to see if the same actor or IP address engaged in other potentially suspicious activities.
+- **Check for Serial Console Access**: If the `SendSerialConsoleSSHPublicKey` action was used, verify if the `ec2:EnableSerialConsoleAccess` permission was also used, which might indicate an attempt to enable and exploit the serial console.
+
+
+*False Positive Analysis:*
+
+
+- **Legitimate Administrative Actions**: Confirm if the SSH public key upload aligns with scheduled updates, development activities, or legitimate administrative tasks documented in change management systems.
+- **Consistency Check**: Compare the action against historical data of similar actions performed by the user or within the organization. If the action is consistent with past legitimate activities, it might indicate a false alarm.
+- **Verify through Outcomes**: Check the `aws.cloudtrail.response_elements` and the `event.outcome` to confirm if the upload was successful and intended according to policy.
+
+
+*Response and Remediation:*
+
+
+- **Immediate Review and Reversal if Necessary**: If the upload was unauthorized, remove the uploaded SSH public key from the EC2 instance and review the instance's access logs for any suspicious activity.
+- **Enhance Monitoring and Alerts**: Adjust monitoring systems to alert on similar actions, especially those involving sensitive instances or unusual file extensions.
+- **Educate and Train**: Provide additional training to users with administrative rights on the importance of security best practices concerning SSH key management and the risks of unauthorized key uploads.
+- **Audit EC2 Instance Policies and Permissions**: Conduct a comprehensive audit of all EC2 instance policies and associated permissions to ensure they adhere to the principle of least privilege.
+- **Incident Response**: If there's an indication of malicious intent or a security breach, initiate the incident response protocol to mitigate any damage and prevent future occurrences.
+
+
+*Additional Information:*
+
+
+For further guidance on managing EC2 instances and securing AWS environments, refer to the https://docs.aws.amazon.com/ec2-instance-connect/latest/APIReference/API_SendSSHPublicKey.html[AWS EC2 Instance Connect documentation] and AWS best practices for security. Additionally, consult the following resources for specific details on SSH key management and privilege escalation techniques:
+- https://stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/AWS/aws.lateral-movement.ec2-instance-connect/[Stratus Red Team - AWS EC2 Instance Connect]
+- https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-privilege-escalation/aws-ec2-privesc[HackTricks - AWS EC2 Privilege Escalation]
+- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/ec2-instance-connect/latest/APIReference/API_SendSSHPublicKey.html[AWS EC2 Instance Connect API Reference]
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.dataset: aws.cloudtrail
+    and event.provider: ec2-instance-connect.amazonaws.com
+    and event.action: (SendSSHPublicKey or SendSerialConsoleSSHPublicKey)
+    and event.outcome: success
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Account Manipulation
+** ID: T1098
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: SSH Authorized Keys
+** ID: T1098.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-iam-roles-anywhere-profile-creation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-iam-roles-anywhere-profile-creation.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..60abd16255
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-iam-roles-anywhere-profile-creation.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-iam-roles-anywhere-profile-creation]]
+=== AWS IAM Roles Anywhere Profile Creation
+
+Identifies the creation of an AWS Roles Anywhere profile. AWS Roles Anywhere is a feature that allows you to use AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) profiles to manage access to your AWS resources from any location via trusted anchors. This rule detects the creation of a profile that can be assumed from any service. Adversaries may create profiles tied to overly permissive roles to maintain access to AWS resources. Ensure that the profile creation is expected and that the trust policy is configured securely.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* filebeat-*
+* logs-aws.cloudtrail-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 10m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-30m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/rolesanywhere/latest/userguide/introduction.html
+* https://docs.datadoghq.com/security/default_rules/cloudtrail-aws-iam-roles-anywhere-trust-anchor-created/
+* https://ermetic.com/blog/aws/keep-your-iam-users-close-keep-your-third-parties-even-closer-part-1/
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/rolesanywhere/latest/APIReference/API_CreateProfile.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Cloud
+* Data Source: AWS
+* Data Source: Amazon Web Services
+* Data Source: AWS IAM
+* Use Case: Identity and Access Audit
+* Tactic: Persistence
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+
+*Triage and Analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating AWS IAM Roles Anywhere Profile Creation*
+
+
+This rule detects the creation of an AWS Roles Anywhere profile. AWS Roles Anywhere allows you to use AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) profiles to manage access to your AWS resources from any location via trusted anchors. Adversaries may create profiles tied to overly permissive roles to maintain access to AWS resources. It is crucial to ensure that the profile creation is expected and that the trust policy is configured securely.
+
+
+*Possible Investigation Steps:*
+
+
+- **Identify the Actor**: Review the `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn` and `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.access_key_id` fields to identify who created the profile. Verify if this actor typically performs such actions and if they have the necessary permissions.
+- **Review the Request Details**: Examine the `aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters` to understand the specific details of the profile creation. Look for any unusual parameters or overly permissive roles that could suggest unauthorized or malicious activity.
+- **Analyze the Source of the Request**: Investigate the `source.ip` and `source.geo` fields to determine the location and origin of the request. Ensure the request originated from a known and trusted location.
+- **Check the Created Profile’s Permissions**: Review the `roleArns` associated with the created profile. Verify that the roles are appropriate for the user's intended actions and do not grant excessive permissions.
+- **Verify the Profile’s Configuration**: Ensure that the profile's `durationSeconds`, `enabled`, and `tags` are configured according to your organization's security policies. Pay particular attention to any configuration that might allow prolonged access or concealment of activity.
+
+
+*False Positive Analysis:*
+
+
+- **Legitimate Administrative Actions**: Confirm if the profile creation aligns with scheduled updates, development activities, or legitimate administrative tasks documented in change management systems.
+- **Consistency Check**: Compare the action against historical data of similar actions performed by the user or within the organization. If the action is consistent with past legitimate activities, it might indicate a false alarm.
+- **Verify through Outcomes**: Check the `aws.cloudtrail.response_elements` and the `event.outcome` to confirm if the profile creation was successful and intended according to policy.
+
+
+*Response and Remediation:*
+
+
+- **Immediate Review and Reversal if Necessary**: If the profile creation was unauthorized, disable or delete the created profile and review the associated roles and permissions for any potential misuse.
+- **Enhance Monitoring and Alerts**: Adjust monitoring systems to alert on similar actions, especially those involving sensitive roles or unexpected locations.
+- **Educate and Train**: Provide additional training to users with administrative rights on the importance of security best practices concerning profile and role management and the risks of unauthorized profile creation.
+- **Audit IAM Policies and Permissions**: Conduct a comprehensive audit of all IAM policies and associated permissions to ensure they adhere to the principle of least privilege.
+- **Incident Response**: If there's an indication of malicious intent or a security breach, initiate the incident response protocol to mitigate any damage and prevent future occurrences.
+
+
+*Additional Information:*
+
+
+For further guidance on managing AWS IAM Roles Anywhere profiles and securing AWS environments, refer to the https://docs.aws.amazon.com/rolesanywhere/latest/userguide/introduction.html[AWS Roles Anywhere documentation] and AWS best practices for security. Additionally, consult the following resources for specific details on profile management and potential abuse:
+- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/rolesanywhere/latest/APIReference/API_CreateProfile.html[AWS IAM Roles Anywhere Profile Creation API Reference]
+- https://ermetic.com/blog/aws/keep-your-iam-users-close-keep-your-third-parties-even-closer-part-1/[Ermetic Blog - Managing Third Party Access]
+
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.dataset:aws.cloudtrail
+    and event.provider: rolesanywhere.amazonaws.com
+    and event.action: CreateProfile
+    and event.outcome: success
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Account Manipulation
+** ID: T1098
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Additional Cloud Roles
+** ID: T1098.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-iam-roles-anywhere-trust-anchor-created-with-external-ca.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-iam-roles-anywhere-trust-anchor-created-with-external-ca.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5206d05801
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-iam-roles-anywhere-trust-anchor-created-with-external-ca.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-iam-roles-anywhere-trust-anchor-created-with-external-ca]]
+=== AWS IAM Roles Anywhere Trust Anchor Created with External CA
+
+Identifies when an AWS IAM Roles Anywhere Trust Anchor with an external certificate authority is created. AWS Roles Anywhere profiles are legitimate profiles that can be created by administrators to allow access from any location. This rule detects when a trust anchor is created with an external certificate authority that is not managed by AWS Certificate Manager Private Certificate Authority (ACM PCA). Adversaries may accomplish this to maintain persistence in the environment.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* filebeat-*
+* logs-aws.cloudtrail-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 10m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-30m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/rolesanywhere/latest/userguide/introduction.html
+* https://ermetic.com/blog/aws/keep-your-iam-users-close-keep-your-third-parties-even-closer-part-1/
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/rolesanywhere/latest/APIReference/API_CreateTrustAnchor.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Cloud
+* Data Source: AWS
+* Data Source: Amazon Web Services
+* Data Source: AWS IAM
+* Use Case: Identity and Access Audit
+* Tactic: Persistence
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+
+*Triage and Analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating AWS IAM Roles Anywhere Trust Anchor Created with External CA*
+
+
+This rule detects when an AWS IAM Roles Anywhere Trust Anchor with an external certificate authority is created. AWS Roles Anywhere profiles are legitimate profiles that can be created by administrators to allow access from any location. This rule identifies when a trust anchor is created with an external certificate authority that is not managed by AWS Certificate Manager Private Certificate Authority (ACM PCA). Adversaries may accomplish this to maintain persistence in the environment.
+
+
+*Possible Investigation Steps:*
+
+
+- **Identify the Actor**: Review the `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn` and `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.access_key_id` fields to identify who made the change. Verify if this actor typically performs such actions and if they have the necessary permissions.
+- **Review the Request Details**: Examine the `aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters` to understand the specific details of the trust anchor creation. Look for any unusual parameters that could suggest unauthorized or malicious modifications.
+- **Analyze the Source of the Request**: Investigate the `source.ip` and `source.geo` fields to determine the geographical origin of the request. An external or unexpected location might indicate compromised credentials or unauthorized access.
+- **Contextualize with Timestamp**: Use the `@timestamp` field to check when the trust anchor was created. Changes during non-business hours or outside regular maintenance windows might require further scrutiny.
+- **Correlate with Other Activities**: Search for related CloudTrail events before and after this change to see if the same actor or IP address engaged in other potentially suspicious activities.
+- **Verify the Certificate Authority**: Ensure that the external certificate authority used is authorized and recognized. Unauthorized external CAs can be a red flag for malicious activity.
+
+
+*False Positive Analysis:*
+
+
+- **Legitimate Administrative Actions**: Confirm if the trust anchor creation aligns with scheduled updates, development activities, or legitimate administrative tasks documented in change management systems.
+- **Consistency Check**: Compare the action against historical data of similar actions performed by the user or within the organization. If the action is consistent with past legitimate activities, it might indicate a false alarm.
+- **Verify through Outcomes**: Check the `aws.cloudtrail.response_elements` and the `event.outcome` to confirm if the creation was successful and intended according to policy.
+
+
+*Response and Remediation:*
+
+
+- **Immediate Review and Reversal if Necessary**: If the creation was unauthorized, remove the trust anchor and revoke any associated permissions.
+- **Enhance Monitoring and Alerts**: Adjust monitoring systems to alert on similar actions, especially those involving the creation of trust anchors with external certificate authorities.
+- **Educate and Train**: Provide additional training to users with administrative rights on the importance of security best practices concerning IAM Roles Anywhere and the use of certificate authorities.
+- **Audit IAM Roles and Policies**: Conduct a comprehensive audit of all IAM roles and associated policies to ensure they adhere to the principle of least privilege.
+- **Incident Response**: If there's an indication of malicious intent or a security breach, initiate the incident response protocol to mitigate any damage and prevent future occurrences.
+
+
+*Additional Information:*
+
+
+For further guidance on managing IAM Roles Anywhere and securing AWS environments, refer to the https://docs.aws.amazon.com/rolesanywhere/latest/userguide/introduction.html[AWS IAM Roles Anywhere documentation] and AWS best practices for security. Additionally, consult the following resources for specific details on IAM roles and trust anchors:
+- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/rolesanywhere/latest/userguide/introduction.html[AWS IAM Roles Anywhere Introduction]
+- https://ermetic.com/blog/aws/keep-your-iam-users-close-keep-your-third-parties-even-closer-part-1/[Ermetic Blog on IAM Users and Third Parties]
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.dataset: aws.cloudtrail
+    and event.provider: rolesanywhere.amazonaws.com
+    and event.action: CreateTrustAnchor
+    and event.outcome: success
+    and not aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters: *sourceType=AWS_ACM_PCA*
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Account Manipulation
+** ID: T1098
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Additional Cloud Roles
+** ID: T1098.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-lambda-function-policy-updated-to-allow-public-invocation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-lambda-function-policy-updated-to-allow-public-invocation.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..457abdbf94
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-lambda-function-policy-updated-to-allow-public-invocation.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-lambda-function-policy-updated-to-allow-public-invocation]]
+=== AWS Lambda Function Policy Updated to Allow Public Invocation
+
+Identifies when an AWS Lambda function policy is updated to allow public invocation. This rule specifically looks for the `AddPermission` API call with the `Principal` set to `*` which allows any AWS account to invoke the Lambda function. Adversaries may abuse this permission to create a backdoor in the Lambda function that allows them to execute arbitrary code.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* filebeat-*
+* logs-aws.cloudtrail-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 10m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-60m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-persistence/aws-lambda-persistence
+* https://stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/AWS/aws.persistence.lambda-backdoor-function/
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/api/API_AddPermission.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Cloud
+* Data Source: AWS
+* Data Source: Amazon Web Services
+* Data Source: AWS Lambda
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and Analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating AWS Lambda Function Policy Updated to Allow Public Invocation*
+
+
+This rule detects when an AWS Lambda function policy is updated to allow public invocation. It specifically looks for the `AddPermission` API call with the `Principal` set to `*`, which allows any AWS account to invoke the Lambda function. Adversaries may abuse this permission to create a backdoor in the Lambda function that allows them to execute arbitrary code. Understanding the context and legitimacy of such changes is crucial to determine if the action is benign or malicious.
+
+
+*Possible Investigation Steps:*
+
+
+- **Identify the Actor**: Review the `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn` and `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.access_key_id` fields to identify who made the change. Verify if this actor typically performs such actions and if they have the necessary permissions.
+- **Review the Request Details**: Examine the `aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters` to understand the specific changes made to the Lambda function policy. Look for any unusual parameters that could suggest unauthorized or malicious modifications.
+- **Analyze the Source of the Request**: Investigate the `source.ip` and `source.geo` fields to determine the geographical origin of the request. An external or unexpected location might indicate compromised credentials or unauthorized access.
+- **Contextualize with Timestamp**: Use the `@timestamp` field to check when the change occurred. Modifications during non-business hours or outside regular maintenance windows might require further scrutiny.
+- **Correlate with Other Activities**: Search for related CloudTrail events before and after this change to see if the same actor or IP address engaged in other potentially suspicious activities.
+
+
+*False Positive Analysis:*
+
+
+- **Legitimate Administrative Actions**: Confirm if the update to allow public invocation aligns with scheduled updates, development activities, or legitimate administrative tasks documented in change management systems.
+- **Consistency Check**: Compare the action against historical data of similar actions performed by the user or within the organization. If the action is consistent with past legitimate activities, it might indicate a false alarm.
+- **Verify through Outcomes**: Check the `aws.cloudtrail.response_elements` and the `event.outcome` to confirm if the change was successful and intended according to policy.
+
+
+*Response and Remediation:*
+
+
+- **Immediate Review and Reversal if Necessary**: If the change was unauthorized, update the Lambda function policy to remove the public invocation permission and restore it to its previous state.
+- **Enhance Monitoring and Alerts**: Adjust monitoring systems to alert on similar actions, especially those involving sensitive functions or permissions.
+- **Educate and Train**: Provide additional training to users with administrative rights on the importance of security best practices concerning Lambda function management and the use of permissions.
+- **Audit Lambda Functions and Policies**: Conduct a comprehensive audit of all Lambda functions and associated policies to ensure they adhere to the principle of least privilege.
+- **Incident Response**: If there's an indication of malicious intent or a security breach, initiate the incident response protocol to mitigate any damage and prevent future occurrences.
+
+
+*Additional Information:*
+
+
+For further guidance on managing Lambda functions and securing AWS environments, refer to the https://docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/dg/welcome.html[AWS Lambda documentation] and AWS best practices for security. Additionally, consult the following resources for specific details on Lambda persistence techniques:
+- https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-persistence/aws-lambda-persistence[AWS Lambda Persistence]
+- https://stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/AWS/aws.persistence.lambda-backdoor-function/[AWS Lambda Backdoor Function]
+- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/api/API_AddPermission.html[AWS API AddPermission]
+
+
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.dataset: aws.cloudtrail
+    and event.provider: lambda.amazonaws.com
+    and event.outcome: success
+    and event.action: AddPermission*
+    and aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters: (*lambda\:InvokeFunction* and *principal=\**)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Event Triggered Execution
+** ID: T1546
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-lambda-layer-added-to-existing-function.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-lambda-layer-added-to-existing-function.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ee864a7cf4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-lambda-layer-added-to-existing-function.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-lambda-layer-added-to-existing-function]]
+=== AWS Lambda Layer Added to Existing Function
+
+Identifies when an Lambda Layer is added to an existing Lambda function. AWS layers are a way to share code and data across multiple functions. By adding a layer to an existing function, an attacker can persist or execute code in the context of the function.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* filebeat-*
+* logs-aws.cloudtrail-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 10m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-60m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-persistence/aws-lambda-persistence/aws-lambda-layers-persistence
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/api/API_PublishLayerVersion.html
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/api/API_UpdateFunctionConfiguration.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Cloud
+* Data Source: AWS
+* Data Source: Amazon Web Services
+* Data Source: AWS Lambda
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+
+*Triage and Analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating AWS Lambda Layer Added to Existing Function*
+
+
+This rule detects when a Lambda layer is added to an existing Lambda function. AWS Lambda layers are a mechanism for sharing code and data across multiple functions. By adding a layer to an existing function, an attacker can persist or execute code in the context of the function. Understanding the context and legitimacy of such changes is crucial to determine if the action is benign or malicious.
+
+
+*Possible Investigation Steps:*
+
+
+- **Identify the Actor**: Review the `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn` and `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.access_key_id` fields to identify who made the change. Verify if this actor typically performs such actions and if they have the necessary permissions.
+- **Review the Request Details**: Examine the `aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters` to understand the specific layer added to the Lambda function. Look for any unusual parameters that could suggest unauthorized or malicious modifications.
+- **Analyze the Source of the Request**: Investigate the `source.ip` and `source.geo` fields to determine the geographical origin of the request. An external or unexpected location might indicate compromised credentials or unauthorized access.
+- **Contextualize with Timestamp**: Use the `@timestamp` field to check when the change occurred. Modifications during non-business hours or outside regular maintenance windows might require further scrutiny.
+- **Correlate with Other Activities**: Search for related CloudTrail events before and after this change to see if the same actor or IP address engaged in other potentially suspicious activities.
+
+
+*False Positive Analysis:*
+
+
+- **Legitimate Administrative Actions**: Confirm if the addition of the Lambda layer aligns with scheduled updates, development activities, or legitimate administrative tasks documented in change management systems.
+- **Consistency Check**: Compare the action against historical data of similar actions performed by the user or within the organization. If the action is consistent with past legitimate activities, it might indicate a false alarm.
+- **Verify through Outcomes**: Check the `aws.cloudtrail.response_elements` and the `event.outcome` to confirm if the change was successful and intended according to policy.
+
+
+*Response and Remediation:*
+
+
+- **Immediate Review and Reversal if Necessary**: If the change was unauthorized, remove the added layer from the Lambda function to mitigate any unintended code execution or persistence.
+- **Enhance Monitoring and Alerts**: Adjust monitoring systems to alert on similar actions, especially those involving sensitive functions or layers.
+- **Educate and Train**: Provide additional training to users with administrative rights on the importance of security best practices concerning Lambda function management and the use of layers.
+- **Audit Lambda Functions and Policies**: Conduct a comprehensive audit of all Lambda functions and associated policies to ensure they adhere to the principle of least privilege.
+- **Incident Response**: If there's an indication of malicious intent or a security breach, initiate the incident response protocol to mitigate any damage and prevent future occurrences.
+
+
+*Additional Information:*
+
+
+For further guidance on managing Lambda functions and securing AWS environments, refer to the https://docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/dg/welcome.html[AWS Lambda documentation] and AWS best practices for security. Additionally, consult the following resources for specific details on Lambda layers and persistence techniques:
+- https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-persistence/aws-lambda-persistence/aws-lambda-layers-persistence[AWS Lambda Layers Persistence]
+- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/api/API_PublishLayerVersion.html[AWS API PublishLayerVersion]
+- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/api/API_UpdateFunctionConfiguration.html[AWS API UpdateFunctionConfiguration]
+
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.dataset: aws.cloudtrail
+    and event.provider: lambda.amazonaws.com
+    and event.outcome: success
+    and event.action: (PublishLayerVersion* or UpdateFunctionConfiguration)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Serverless Execution
+** ID: T1648
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1648/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-s3-bucket-policy-added-to-share-with-external-account.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-s3-bucket-policy-added-to-share-with-external-account.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ab504ee6f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-s3-bucket-policy-added-to-share-with-external-account.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-s3-bucket-policy-added-to-share-with-external-account]]
+=== AWS S3 Bucket Policy Added to Share with External Account
+
+Identifies an AWS S3 bucket policy change to share permissions with an external account. Adversaries may attempt to backdoor an S3 bucket by sharing it with an external account. This can be used to exfiltrate data or to provide access to other adversaries. This rule identifies changes to a bucket policy via the `PutBucketPolicy` API call where the policy includes an `Effect=Allow` statement that does not contain the AWS account ID of the bucket owner.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* filebeat-*
+* logs-aws.cloudtrail-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: None ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/AWS/aws.exfiltration.s3-backdoor-bucket-policy/
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_PutBucketPolicy.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Cloud
+* Data Source: AWS
+* Data Source: Amazon Web Services
+* Data Source: AWS S3
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Exfiltration
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+
+*Triage and Analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating AWS S3 Bucket Policy Change to Share with External Account*
+
+
+This rule detects when an AWS S3 bucket policy is changed to share permissions with an external account. Adversaries may attempt to backdoor an S3 bucket by sharing it with an external account to exfiltrate data or provide access to other adversaries. This rule identifies changes to a bucket policy via the `PutBucketPolicy` API call where the policy includes an `Effect=Allow` statement that does not contain the AWS account ID of the bucket owner.
+
+
+*Possible Investigation Steps:*
+
+
+- **Identify the Actor**: Review the `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn` and `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.access_key_id` fields to identify who made the change. Verify if this actor typically performs such actions and if they have the necessary permissions.
+- **Review the Request Details**: Examine the `aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters` to understand the specific changes made to the bucket policy. Look for any unusual parameters that could suggest unauthorized or malicious modifications.
+- **Analyze the Source of the Request**: Investigate the `source.ip` and `source.geo` fields to determine the geographical origin of the request. An external or unexpected location might indicate compromised credentials or unauthorized access.
+- **Contextualize with Timestamp**: Use the `@timestamp` field to check when the change occurred. Modifications during non-business hours or outside regular maintenance windows might require further scrutiny.
+- **Correlate with Other Activities**: Search for related CloudTrail events before and after this change to see if the same actor or IP address engaged in other potentially suspicious activities.
+
+
+*False Positive Analysis:*
+
+
+- **Legitimate Administrative Actions**: Confirm if the bucket policy change aligns with scheduled updates, development activities, or legitimate administrative tasks documented in change management systems.
+- **Consistency Check**: Compare the action against historical data of similar actions performed by the user or within the organization. If the action is consistent with past legitimate activities, it might indicate a false alarm.
+- **Verify through Outcomes**: Check the `aws.cloudtrail.response_elements` and the `event.outcome` to confirm if the change was successful and intended according to policy.
+
+
+*Response and Remediation:*
+
+
+- **Immediate Review and Reversal if Necessary**: If the change was unauthorized, update the bucket policy to remove any unauthorized permissions and restore it to its previous state.
+- **Enhance Monitoring and Alerts**: Adjust monitoring systems to alert on similar actions, especially those involving sensitive data or permissions.
+- **Educate and Train**: Provide additional training to users with administrative rights on the importance of security best practices concerning bucket policy management and sharing permissions.
+- **Audit Bucket Policies and Permissions**: Conduct a comprehensive audit of all bucket policies and associated permissions to ensure they adhere to the principle of least privilege.
+- **Incident Response**: If there's an indication of malicious intent or a security breach, initiate the incident response protocol to mitigate any damage and prevent future occurrences.
+
+
+*Additional Information:*
+
+
+For further guidance on managing S3 bucket policies and securing AWS environments, refer to the https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/enable-cloudtrail-logging-for-s3.html[AWS S3 documentation] and AWS best practices for security.
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+S3 data event types must be collected in the AWS CloudTrail logs. Please refer to https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/enable-cloudtrail-logging-for-s3.html[AWS documentation] for more information.
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+any where event.dataset == "aws.cloudtrail"
+    and event.provider == "s3.amazonaws.com"
+    and event.action == "PutBucketPolicy" and event.outcome == "success"
+    and stringContains(aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters, "Effect=Allow")
+    and not stringContains(aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters, aws.cloudtrail.recipient_account_id)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Exfiltration
+** ID: TA0010
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Transfer Data to Cloud Account
+** ID: T1537
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-sts-getcalleridentity-api-called-for-the-first-time.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-sts-getcalleridentity-api-called-for-the-first-time.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8cdcc66696
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-sts-getcalleridentity-api-called-for-the-first-time.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-sts-getcalleridentity-api-called-for-the-first-time]]
+=== AWS STS GetCallerIdentity API Called for the First Time
+
+An adversary with access to a set of compromised credentials may attempt to verify that the credentials are valid and determine what account they are using. This rule looks for the first time an identity has called the STS `GetCallerIdentity` API operation in the last 15 days, which may be an indicator of compromised credentials. A legitimate user would not need to call this operation as they should know the account they are using.
+
+*Rule type*: new_terms
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* filebeat-*
+* logs-aws.cloudtrail-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 10m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-60m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/STS/latest/APIReference/API_GetCallerIdentity.html
+* https://www.secureworks.com/research/detecting-the-use-of-stolen-aws-lambda-credentials
+* https://detectioninthe.cloud/ttps/discovery/get_caller_identity/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Cloud
+* Data Source: AWS
+* Data Source: Amazon Web Services
+* Data Source: AWS STS
+* Use Case: Identity and Access Audit
+* Tactic: Discovery
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating AWS GetCallerIdentity API Called for the First Time*
+
+
+AWS Security Token Service (AWS STS) is a service that enables you to request temporary, limited-privilege credentials for users.
+The `GetCallerIdentity` function returns details about the IAM user or role owning the credentials used to call the operation. 
+No permissions are required to run this operation and the same information is returned even when access is denied.
+This rule looks for use of the `GetCallerIdentity` operation. This is a https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/rules-ui-create.html#create-new-terms-rule[New Terms] rule indicating this is the first time a specific user identity has called this operation within the last 15 days.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Identify the account and its role in the environment, a role belonging to a service like Lambda or an EC2 instance would be highly suspicious.
+- Identify the applications or users that should use this account.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the account during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate abnormal values in the `user_agent.original` field by comparing them with the intended and authorized usage and historical data. Suspicious user agent values include non-SDK, AWS CLI, custom user agents, etc.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences involving other users.
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Considering the source IP address and geolocation of the user who issued the command:
+    - Do they look normal for the calling user?
+    - If the source is an EC2 IP address, is it associated with an EC2 instance in one of your accounts or is the source IP from an EC2 instance that's not under your control?
+    - If it is an authorized EC2 instance, is the activity associated with normal behavior for the instance role or roles? Are there any other alerts or signs of suspicious activity involving this instance?
+- Review IAM permission policies for the user identity.
+- If you suspect the account has been compromised, scope potentially compromised assets by tracking servers, services, and data accessed by the account in the last 24 hours.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- False positives may occur due to the intended usage of the service. Tuning is needed in order to have higher confidence. Consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user agent and IP address conditions.
+- Automation workflows that rely on the results from this API request may also generate false-positives. We recommend adding exceptions related to the `user.name` or `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn` values to ignore these.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Disable or limit the account during the investigation and response.
+- Identify the possible impact of the incident and prioritize accordingly; the following actions can help you gain context:
+    - Identify the account role in the cloud environment.
+    - Assess the criticality of affected services and servers.
+    - Work with your IT team to identify and minimize the impact on users.
+    - Identify if the attacker is moving laterally and compromising other accounts, servers, or services.
+    - Identify any regulatory or legal ramifications related to this activity.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Rotate secrets or delete API keys as needed to revoke the attacker's access to the environment. Work with your IT teams to minimize the impact on business operations during these actions.
+- Check if unauthorized new users were created, remove unauthorized new accounts, and request password resets for other IAM users.
+- Consider enabling multi-factor authentication for users.
+- Review the permissions assigned to the implicated user to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
+- Implement security best practices https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/security-best-practices/[outlined] by AWS.
+- Take the actions needed to return affected systems, data, or services to their normal operational levels.
+- Identify the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection via the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.dataset:"aws.cloudtrail" and event.provider:"sts.amazonaws.com" and event.action:"GetCallerIdentity"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Discovery
+** ID: TA0007
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Account Discovery
+** ID: T1087
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Cloud Account
+** ID: T1087.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-systems-manager-securestring-parameter-request-with-decryption-flag.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-systems-manager-securestring-parameter-request-with-decryption-flag.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2a43359ec3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-systems-manager-securestring-parameter-request-with-decryption-flag.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-systems-manager-securestring-parameter-request-with-decryption-flag]]
+=== AWS Systems Manager SecureString Parameter Request with Decryption Flag
+
+Detects the first occurrence of a user identity accessing AWS Systems Manager (SSM) SecureString parameters using the GetParameter or GetParameters API actions with credentials in the request parameters. This could indicate that the user is accessing sensitive information. This rule detects when a user accesses a SecureString parameter with the `withDecryption` parameter set to true. This is a [NewTerms](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/rules-ui-create.html#create-new-terms-rule) rule that detects the first occurrence of a specific AWS ARN accessing SecureString parameters with decryption within the last 10 days.
+
+*Rule type*: new_terms
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* filebeat-*
+* logs-aws.cloudtrail*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vsts/latest/userguide/systemsmanager-getparameter.html
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/systems-manager/latest/userguide/systems-manager-parameter-store.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Cloud
+* Data Source: AWS
+* Data Source: Amazon Web Services
+* Data Source: AWS Systems Manager
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+
+*Triage and Analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating AWS Systems Manager SecureString Parameter Request with Decryption Flag*
+
+
+This rule detects when an AWS resource accesses SecureString parameters within AWS Systems Manager (SSM) with the decryption flag set to true. SecureStrings are encrypted using a KMS key, and accessing these with decryption can indicate attempts to access sensitive data.
+
+Adversaries may target SecureStrings to retrieve sensitive information such as encryption keys, passwords, and other credentials that are stored securely. Accessing these parameters with decryption enabled is particularly concerning because it implies the adversary is attempting to bypass the encryption to obtain plain text values that can be immediately used or exfiltrated. This behavior might be part of a larger attack strategy aimed at escalating privileges or moving laterally within an environment to access protected data or critical infrastructure.
+
+
+*Possible Investigation Steps*
+
+
+- **Review the Access Event**: Identify the specific API call (`GetParameter` or `GetParameters`) that triggered the rule. Examine the `request_parameters` for `withDecryption` set to true and the name of the accessed parameter.
+- **Verify User Identity and Access Context**: Check the `user_identity` details to understand who accessed the parameter and their role within the organization. This includes checking the ARN and access key ID to determine if the access was authorized.
+- **Contextualize with User Behavior**: Assess whether the access pattern fits the user’s normal behavior or job responsibilities. Investigate any out-of-pattern activities around the time of the event.
+- **Analyze Geographic and IP Context**: Using the `source.ip` and `source.geo` information, verify if the request came from a trusted location or if there are any anomalies that suggest a compromised account.
+- **Inspect Related CloudTrail Events**: Look for other related events in CloudTrail to see if there was unusual activity before or after this event, such as unusual login attempts, changes to permissions, or other API calls that could indicate broader unauthorized actions.
+
+
+*False Positive Analysis*
+
+
+- **Legitimate Administrative Use**: Verify if the decryption of SecureString parameters is a common practice for the user’s role, particularly if used in automation scripts or deployment processes like those involving Terraform or similar tools.
+
+
+*Response and Remediation*
+
+
+- **Immediate Verification**: Contact the user or team responsible for the API call to verify their intent and authorization.
+- **Review and Revise Permissions**: If the access was unauthorized, review the permissions assigned to the user or role to ensure they align with the principle of least privilege.
+- **Audit Parameter Access Policies**: Ensure that policies governing access to SecureString parameters are strict and audit logs are enabled to track access with decryption.
+- **Incident Response**: If suspicious activity is confirmed, follow through with your organization's incident response plan to mitigate any potential security issues.
+- **Enhanced Monitoring and Alerting**: Strengthen monitoring rules to detect unusual accesses to SecureString parameters, especially those that involve decryption.
+
+
+*Additional Information*
+
+
+This rule focuses solely on SecureStrings in AWS Systems Manager (SSM) parameters. SecureStrings are encrypted using an AWS Key Management Service (KMS) key. When a user accesses a SecureString parameter, they can specify whether the parameter should be decrypted. If the user specifies that the parameter should be decrypted, the decrypted value is returned in the response.
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+This rule requires that AWS CloudTrail logs are ingested into the Elastic Stack. Ensure that the AWS integration is properly configured to collect AWS CloudTrail logs. This rule also requires event logging for AWS Systems Manager (SSM) API actions which can be enabled in CloudTrail's data events settings.
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.dataset: aws.cloudtrail
+    and event.provider: "ssm.amazonaws.com"
+    and event.action: (GetParameters or GetParameter)
+    and event.outcome: success
+    and aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters: *withDecryption=true*
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Credentials from Password Stores
+** ID: T1555
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Cloud Secrets Management Stores
+** ID: T1555.006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/006/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-creation-or-modification-of-a-new-gpo-scheduled-task-or-service.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-creation-or-modification-of-a-new-gpo-scheduled-task-or-service.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..246b0108e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-creation-or-modification-of-a-new-gpo-scheduled-task-or-service.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-creation-or-modification-of-a-new-gpo-scheduled-task-or-service]]
+=== Creation or Modification of a new GPO Scheduled Task or Service
+
+Detects the creation or modification of a new Group Policy based scheduled task or service. These methods are used for legitimate system administration, but can also be abused by an attacker with domain admin permissions to execute a malicious payload remotely on all or a subset of the domain joined machines.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.file-*
+* logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Data Source: Sysmon
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type != "deletion" and
+  file.path : ("?:\\Windows\\SYSVOL\\domain\\Policies\\*\\MACHINE\\Preferences\\ScheduledTasks\\ScheduledTasks.xml",
+               "?:\\Windows\\SYSVOL\\domain\\Policies\\*\\MACHINE\\Preferences\\Services\\Services.xml") and
+  not process.name : "dfsrs.exe"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Domain or Tenant Policy Modification
+** ID: T1484
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Group Policy Modification
+** ID: T1484.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task/Job
+** ID: T1053
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task
+** ID: T1053.005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-creation-or-modification-of-pluggable-authentication-module-or-configuration.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-creation-or-modification-of-pluggable-authentication-module-or-configuration.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9b45af30a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-creation-or-modification-of-pluggable-authentication-module-or-configuration.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-creation-or-modification-of-pluggable-authentication-module-or-configuration]]
+=== Creation or Modification of Pluggable Authentication Module or Configuration
+
+This rule monitors for the creation or modification of Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) shared object files or configuration files. Attackers may create or modify these files to maintain persistence on a compromised system, or harvest account credentials.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.file*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/zephrax/linux-pam-backdoor
+* https://github.com/eurialo/pambd
+* http://0x90909090.blogspot.com/2016/06/creating-backdoor-in-pam-in-5-line-of.html
+* https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/i/skidmap-linux-malware-uses-rootkit-capabilities-to-hide-cryptocurrency-mining-payload.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("rename", "creation") and 
+process.executable != null and (
+  (file.path : ("/lib/security/*", "/lib64/security/*", "/usr/lib/security/*", "/usr/lib64/security/*",
+  "/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/security/*") and file.extension == "so") or
+  (file.path : "/etc/pam.d/*" and file.extension == null) or 
+  (file.path : "/etc/security/pam_*" or file.path == "/etc/pam.conf")
+) and not (
+  process.executable in (
+    "/bin/dpkg", "/usr/bin/dpkg", "/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/dockerd", "/usr/sbin/dockerd", "/bin/microdnf",
+    "/usr/bin/microdnf", "/bin/rpm", "/usr/bin/rpm", "/bin/snapd", "/usr/bin/snapd", "/bin/yum", "/usr/bin/yum",
+    "/bin/dnf", "/usr/bin/dnf", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/bin/dnf-automatic", "/usr/bin/dnf-automatic",
+    "/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/dpkg-divert", "/bin/dpkg-divert", "/sbin/apk", "/usr/sbin/apk",
+    "/usr/local/sbin/apk", "/usr/bin/apt", "/usr/sbin/pacman", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/puppet",
+    "/bin/puppet", "/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/puppet", "/usr/bin/chef-client", "/bin/chef-client",
+    "/bin/autossl_check", "/usr/bin/autossl_check", "/proc/self/exe", "/dev/fd/*",  "/usr/bin/pamac-daemon",
+    "/bin/pamac-daemon", "/usr/lib/snapd/snapd", "/usr/local/bin/dockerd", "/usr/sbin/pam-auth-update",
+    "/usr/lib/systemd/systemd", "/usr/libexec/packagekitd", "/usr/bin/bsdtar"
+  ) or
+  file.path : (
+    "/tmp/snap.rootfs_*/pam_*.so", "/tmp/newroot/lib/*/pam_*.so", "/tmp/newroot/usr/lib64/security/pam_*.so"
+  ) or
+  file.extension in ("swp", "swpx", "swx", "dpkg-remove") or
+  file.Ext.original.extension == "dpkg-new" or
+  process.executable : (
+    "/nix/store/*", "/var/lib/dpkg/*", "/snap/*", "/dev/fd/*", "/usr/lib/virtualbox/*"
+  ) or
+  (process.name == "sed" and file.name : "sed*") or
+  (process.name == "perl" and file.name : "e2scrub_all.tmp*") 
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Create or Modify System Process
+** ID: T1543
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Modify Authentication Process
+** ID: T1556
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-cron-job-created-or-modified.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-cron-job-created-or-modified.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a01e98a5f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-cron-job-created-or-modified.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-cron-job-created-or-modified]]
+=== Cron Job Created or Modified
+
+This rule monitors for (ana)cron jobs being created or renamed. Linux cron jobs are scheduled tasks that can be leveraged by system administrators to set up scheduled tasks, but may be abused by malicious actors for persistence, privilege escalation and command execution. By creating or modifying cron job configurations, attackers can execute malicious commands or scripts at predefined intervals, ensuring their continued presence and enabling unauthorized activities.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.file*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://pberba.github.io/security/2022/01/30/linux-threat-hunting-for-persistence-systemd-timers-cron/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 11
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Cron Job Created or Modified*
+
+Linux cron jobs are scheduled tasks that run at specified intervals or times, managed by the cron daemon. 
+
+By creating or modifying cron job configurations, attackers can execute malicious commands or scripts at predefined intervals, ensuring their continued presence and enabling unauthorized activities.
+
+This rule monitors the creation of cron jobs by monitoring for file creation and rename events in the most common cron job task location directories.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html[placeholder fields] to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+
+*Possible Investigation Steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the cron job file that was created or modified.
+- Investigate whether any other files in any of the available cron job directories have been altered through OSQuery.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve File Listing Information","query":"SELECT * FROM file WHERE (path LIKE '/etc/cron.allow.d/%' OR path LIKE '/etc/cron.d/%' OR path LIKE\n'/etc/cron.hourly/%' OR path LIKE '/etc/cron.daily/%' OR path LIKE '/etc/cron.weekly/%' OR path LIKE\n'/etc/cron.monthly/%' OR path LIKE '/var/spool/cron/crontabs/%')\n"}}
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Cron File Information","query":"SELECT * FROM file WHERE (path = '/etc/cron.allow' OR path = '/etc/cron.deny' OR path = '/etc/crontab')\n"}}
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Additional File Listing Information","query":"SELECT f.path, u.username AS file_owner, g.groupname AS group_owner, datetime(f.atime, 'unixepoch') AS\nfile_last_access_time, datetime(f.mtime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_modified_time, datetime(f.ctime, 'unixepoch') AS\nfile_last_status_change_time, datetime(f.btime, 'unixepoch') AS file_created_time, f.size AS size_bytes FROM file f LEFT\nJOIN users u ON f.uid = u.uid LEFT JOIN groups g ON f.gid = g.gid WHERE ( path LIKE '/etc/cron.allow.d/%' OR path LIKE\n'/etc/cron.d/%' OR path LIKE '/etc/cron.hourly/%' OR path LIKE '/etc/cron.daily/%' OR path LIKE '/etc/cron.weekly/%' OR\npath LIKE '/etc/cron.monthly/%' OR path LIKE '/var/spool/cron/crontabs/%')\n"}}
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User","query":"SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"}}
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+- Investigate whether the altered scripts call other malicious scripts elsewhere on the file system. 
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+- Investigate abnormal behaviors by the subject process/user such as network connections, file modifications, and any other spawned child processes.
+  - Investigate listening ports and open sockets to look for potential command and control traffic or data exfiltration.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Listening Ports","query":"SELECT pid, address, port, socket, protocol, path FROM listening_ports"}}
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Open Sockets","query":"SELECT pid, family, remote_address, remote_port, socket, state FROM process_open_sockets"}}
+  - Identify the user account that performed the action, analyze it, and check whether it should perform this kind of action.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific User","query":"SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = {{user.name}}"}}
+- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Investigate the Account Authentication Status","query":"SELECT * FROM logged_in_users WHERE user = {{user.name}}"}}
+
+
+*False Positive Analysis*
+
+
+- If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+- If this activity is related to a system administrator who uses cron jobs for administrative purposes, consider adding exceptions for this specific administrator user account. 
+- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
+
+
+*Related Rules*
+
+
+- Suspicious File Creation in /etc for Persistence - 1c84dd64-7e6c-4bad-ac73-a5014ee37042
+- Potential Persistence Through Run Control Detected - 0f4d35e4-925e-4959-ab24-911be207ee6f
+- Potential Persistence Through init.d Detected - 474fd20e-14cc-49c5-8160-d9ab4ba16c8b
+- Systemd Timer Created - 7fb500fa-8e24-4bd1-9480-2a819352602c
+- Systemd Service Created - 17b0a495-4d9f-414c-8ad0-92f018b8e001
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Delete the service/timer or restore its original configuration.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and
+event.action in ("rename", "creation") and file.path : (
+  "/etc/cron.allow", "/etc/cron.deny", "/etc/cron.d/*", "/etc/cron.hourly/*", "/etc/cron.daily/*", "/etc/cron.weekly/*",
+  "/etc/cron.monthly/*", "/etc/crontab", "/var/spool/cron/crontabs/*", "/var/spool/anacron/*"
+) and not (
+  process.executable in (
+    "/bin/dpkg", "/usr/bin/dpkg", "/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/dockerd", "/usr/sbin/dockerd", "/bin/microdnf",
+    "/usr/bin/microdnf", "/bin/rpm", "/usr/bin/rpm", "/bin/snapd", "/usr/bin/snapd", "/bin/yum", "/usr/bin/yum",
+    "/bin/dnf", "/usr/bin/dnf", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/bin/dnf-automatic", "/usr/bin/dnf-automatic",
+    "/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/dpkg-divert", "/bin/dpkg-divert", "/sbin/apk", "/usr/sbin/apk",
+    "/usr/local/sbin/apk", "/usr/bin/apt", "/usr/sbin/pacman", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/puppet",
+    "/bin/puppet", "/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/puppet", "/usr/bin/chef-client", "/bin/chef-client",
+    "/bin/autossl_check", "/usr/bin/autossl_check", "/proc/self/exe", "/dev/fd/*",  "/usr/bin/pamac-daemon",
+    "/bin/pamac-daemon", "/usr/local/bin/dockerd"
+  ) or
+  file.path : "/var/spool/cron/crontabs/tmp.*" or
+  file.extension in ("swp", "swpx", "swx", "dpkg-remove") or
+  file.Ext.original.extension == "dpkg-new" or
+  process.executable : ("/nix/store/*", "/var/lib/dpkg/*", "/tmp/vmis.*", "/snap/*", "/dev/fd/*") or
+  process.executable == null or
+  (process.name == "sed" and file.name : "sed*") or
+  (process.name == "perl" and file.name : "e2scrub_all.tmp*") 
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task/Job
+** ID: T1053
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Cron
+** ID: T1053.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task/Job
+** ID: T1053
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Cron
+** ID: T1053.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task/Job
+** ID: T1053
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Cron
+** ID: T1053.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-executable-bit-set-for-rc-local-rc-common.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-executable-bit-set-for-rc-local-rc-common.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..610aa853b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-executable-bit-set-for-rc-local-rc-common.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-executable-bit-set-for-rc-local-rc-common]]
+=== Executable Bit Set for rc.local/rc.common
+
+This rule monitors for the addition of an executable bit of the `/etc/rc.local` or `/etc/rc.common` files. These files are used to start custom applications, services, scripts or commands during start-up. They require executable permissions to be executed on boot. An alert of this rule is an indicator that this method is being set up within your environment. This method has mostly been replaced by Systemd. However, through the `systemd-rc-local-generator`, these files can be converted to services that run at boot. Adversaries may alter these files to execute malicious code at start-up, and gain persistence onto the system.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.process*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.intezer.com/blog/malware-analysis/hiddenwasp-malware-targeting-linux-systems/
+* https://pberba.github.io/security/2022/02/06/linux-threat-hunting-for-persistence-initialization-scripts-and-shell-configuration/#8-boot-or-logon-initialization-scripts-rc-scripts
+* https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/how-to-enable-rc-local-shell-script-on-systemd-while-booting-linux-system/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and
+process.args in ("/etc/rc.local", "/etc/rc.common") and (
+  (process.name == "chmod" and process.args : ("*+x*", "1*", "3*", "5*", "7*")) or
+  (process.name == "install" and process.args : "-m*" and process.args : ("*7*", "*5*", "*3*", "*1*"))
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
+** ID: T1037
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: RC Scripts
+** ID: T1037.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-first-time-seen-aws-secret-value-accessed-in-secrets-manager.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-first-time-seen-aws-secret-value-accessed-in-secrets-manager.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d8a47f507c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-first-time-seen-aws-secret-value-accessed-in-secrets-manager.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-first-time-seen-aws-secret-value-accessed-in-secrets-manager]]
+=== First Time Seen AWS Secret Value Accessed in Secrets Manager
+
+An adversary with access to a compromised AWS service such as an EC2 instance, Lambda function, or other service may attempt to leverage the compromised service to access secrets in AWS Secrets Manager. This rule looks for the first time a specific user identity has programmatically retrieved a secret value from Secrets Manager using the `GetSecretValue` or `BatchGetSecretValue` actions. This rule assumes that AWS services such as Lambda functions and EC2 instances are setup with IAM role's assigned that have the necessary permissions to access the secrets in Secrets Manager. An adversary with access to a compromised AWS service such as an EC2 instance, Lambda function, or other service would rely on the compromised service's IAM role to access the secrets in Secrets Manager.
+
+*Rule type*: new_terms
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* filebeat-*
+* logs-aws.cloudtrail-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 10m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-60m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/secretsmanager/latest/apireference/API_GetSecretValue.html
+* https://detectioninthe.cloud/ttps/credential_access/access_secret_in_secrets_manager/
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/secretsmanager/latest/apireference/API_BatchGetSecretValue.html
+* https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-services/aws-secrets-manager-enum
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Cloud
+* Data Source: AWS
+* Data Source: Amazon Web Services
+* Data Source: AWS Secrets Manager
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+
+*Version*: 312
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Nick Jones
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating First Time Seen AWS Secret Value Accessed in Secrets Manager*
+
+
+AWS Secrets Manager is a service that enables the replacement of hardcoded credentials in code, including passwords, with an API call to Secrets Manager to retrieve the secret programmatically.
+
+This rule looks for the retrieval of credentials using `GetSecretValue` action in Secrets Manager programmatically. This is a https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/rules-ui-create.html#create-new-terms-rule[New Terms] rule indicating this is the first time a specific user identity has successfuly retrieved a specific secret value from Secrets Manager within the last 15 days.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Identify the account and its role in the environment, and inspect the related policy.
+- Identify the applications that should use this account.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user account during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate abnormal values in the `user_agent.original` field by comparing them with the intended and authorized usage and historical data. Suspicious user agent values include non-SDK, AWS CLI, custom user agents, etc.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences involving other users.
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Considering the source IP address and geolocation of the user who issued the command:
+    - Do they look normal for the calling user?
+    - If the source is an EC2 IP address, is it associated with an EC2 instance in one of your accounts or is the source IP from an EC2 instance that's not under your control?
+    - If it is an authorized EC2 instance, is the activity associated with normal behavior for the instance role or roles? Are there any other alerts or signs of suspicious activity involving this instance?
+- Review IAM permission policies for the user identity and specific secrets accessed.
+- Examine the request parameters. These might indicate the source of the program or the nature of its tasks.
+- If you suspect the account has been compromised, scope potentially compromised assets by tracking servers, services, and data accessed by the account in the last 24 hours.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- False positives may occur due to the intended usage of the service. Tuning is needed in order to have higher confidence. Consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user agent and IP address conditions.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Disable or limit the account during the investigation and response.
+- Identify the possible impact of the incident and prioritize accordingly; the following actions can help you gain context:
+    - Identify the account role in the cloud environment.
+    - Assess the criticality of affected services and servers.
+    - Work with your IT team to identify and minimize the impact on users.
+    - Identify if the attacker is moving laterally and compromising other accounts, servers, or services.
+    - Identify any regulatory or legal ramifications related to this activity.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Rotate secrets or delete API keys as needed to revoke the attacker's access to the environment. Work with your IT teams to minimize the impact on business operations during these actions.
+- Check if unauthorized new users were created, remove unauthorized new accounts, and request password resets for other IAM users.
+- Consider enabling multi-factor authentication for users.
+- Review the permissions assigned to the implicated user to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
+- Implement security best practices https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/security-best-practices/[outlined] by AWS.
+- Take the actions needed to return affected systems, data, or services to their normal operational levels.
+- Identify the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection via the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.dataset:aws.cloudtrail and event.provider:secretsmanager.amazonaws.com and
+    event.action: (GetSecretValue or BatchGetSecretValue) and event.outcome:success and
+    not user_agent.name: ("Chrome" or "Firefox" or "Safari" or "Edge" or "Brave" or "Opera")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Credentials from Password Stores
+** ID: T1555
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Cloud Secrets Management Stores
+** ID: T1555.006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/006/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-group-policy-abuse-for-privilege-addition.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-group-policy-abuse-for-privilege-addition.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a2b1d69686
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-group-policy-abuse-for-privilege-addition.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-group-policy-abuse-for-privilege-addition]]
+=== Group Policy Abuse for Privilege Addition
+
+Detects the first occurrence of a modification to Group Policy Object Attributes to add privileges to user accounts or use them to add users as local admins.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-system.*
+* logs-windows.*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: None ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/atc-project/atc-data/blob/master/docs/Logging_Policies/LP_0025_windows_audit_directory_service_changes.md
+* https://labs.f-secure.com/tools/sharpgpoabuse
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: Active Directory
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Group Policy Abuse for Privilege Addition*
+
+
+Group Policy Objects (GPOs) can be used to add rights and/or modify Group Membership on GPOs by changing the contents of an INF file named GptTmpl.inf, which is responsible for storing every setting under the Security Settings container in the GPO. This file is unique for each GPO, and only exists if the GPO contains security settings. Example Path: "\\DC.com\SysVol\DC.com\Policies\{PolicyGUID}\Machine\Microsoft\Windows NT\SecEdit\GptTmpl.inf"
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- This attack abuses a legitimate mechanism of Active Directory, so it is important to determine whether the activity is legitimate and the administrator is authorized to perform this operation.
+- Retrieve the contents of the `GptTmpl.inf` file, and under the `Privilege Rights` section, look for potentially dangerous high privileges, for example: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege, SeEnableDelegationPrivilege, etc.
+- Inspect the user security identifiers (SIDs) associated with these privileges, and if they should have these privileges.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Inspect whether the user that has done the modifications should be allowed to. The user name can be found in the `winlog.event_data.SubjectUserName` field.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- Scheduled Task Execution at Scale via GPO - 15a8ba77-1c13-4274-88fe-6bd14133861e
+- Startup/Logon Script added to Group Policy Object - 16fac1a1-21ee-4ca6-b720-458e3855d046
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- The investigation and containment must be performed in every computer controlled by the GPO, where necessary.
+- Remove the script from the GPO.
+- Check if other GPOs have suspicious scripts attached.
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The 'Audit Directory Service Changes' audit policy must be configured (Success Failure).
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Policies >
+Windows Settings >
+Security Settings >
+Advanced Audit Policies Configuration >
+Audit Policies >
+DS Access >
+Audit Directory Service Changes (Success,Failure)
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.code: "5136" and
+  winlog.event_data.AttributeLDAPDisplayName:"gPCMachineExtensionNames" and
+  winlog.event_data.AttributeValue:(*827D319E-6EAC-11D2-A4EA-00C04F79F83A* and *803E14A0-B4FB-11D0-A0D0-00A0C90F574B*)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Domain or Tenant Policy Modification
+** ID: T1484
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Group Policy Modification
+** ID: T1484.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-predicted-to-be-a-dga-domain.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-predicted-to-be-a-dga-domain.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b9e23894cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-predicted-to-be-a-dga-domain.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-predicted-to-be-a-dga-domain]]
+=== Machine Learning Detected a DNS Request Predicted to be a DGA Domain
+
+A supervised machine learning model has identified a DNS question name that is predicted to be the result of a Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA), which could indicate command and control network activity.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-network_traffic.*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-10m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html
+* https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/dga
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/detect-domain-generation-algorithm-activity-with-new-kibana-integration
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Network
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Use Case: Domain Generation Algorithm Detection
+* Rule Type: ML
+* Rule Type: Machine Learning
+* Tactic: Command and Control
+
+*Version*: 5
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The rule requires the Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as DNS events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend, Network Packet Capture, or Packetbeat.  
+
+
+*DGA Detection Setup*
+
+The DGA Detection integration consists of an ML-based framework to detect DGA activity in DNS events.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for DGA Detection.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+- DNS events collected by the https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/endpoint[Elastic Defend], https://docs.elastic.co/integrations/network_traffic[Network Packet Capture] integration, or https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/packetbeat/current/packetbeat-overview.html[Packetbeat].
+- To install Elastic Defend, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[documentation].
+- To add the Network Packet Capture integration to an Elastic Agent policy, refer to https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/add-integration-to-policy.html[this] guide.
+- To set up and run Packetbeat, follow https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/packetbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[this] guide.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed to install assets associated with the DGA Detection integration:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Domain Generation Algorithm Detection and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Follow the instructions under the **Installation** section.
+- For this rule to work, complete the instructions through **Configure the ingest pipeline**.
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+ml_is_dga.malicious_prediction:1 and not dns.question.registered_domain:avsvmcloud.com
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Dynamic Resolution
+** ID: T1568
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Domain Generation Algorithms
+** ID: T1568.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-with-a-high-dga-probability-score.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-with-a-high-dga-probability-score.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..68ee52d284
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-with-a-high-dga-probability-score.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-with-a-high-dga-probability-score]]
+=== Machine Learning Detected a DNS Request With a High DGA Probability Score
+
+A supervised machine learning model has identified a DNS question name with a high probability of sourcing from a Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA), which could indicate command and control network activity.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-network_traffic.*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-10m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html
+* https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/dga
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/detect-domain-generation-algorithm-activity-with-new-kibana-integration
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Network
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Use Case: Domain Generation Algorithm Detection
+* Rule Type: ML
+* Rule Type: Machine Learning
+* Tactic: Command and Control
+
+*Version*: 5
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The rule requires the Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as DNS events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend, Network Packet Capture, or Packetbeat.  
+
+
+*DGA Detection Setup*
+
+The DGA Detection integration consists of an ML-based framework to detect DGA activity in DNS events.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for DGA Detection.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+- DNS events collected by the https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/endpoint[Elastic Defend], https://docs.elastic.co/integrations/network_traffic[Network Packet Capture] integration, or https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/packetbeat/current/packetbeat-overview.html[Packetbeat].
+- To install Elastic Defend, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[documentation].
+- To add the Network Packet Capture integration to an Elastic Agent policy, refer to https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/add-integration-to-policy.html[this] guide.
+- To set up and run Packetbeat, follow https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/packetbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[this] guide.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed to install assets associated with the DGA Detection integration:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Domain Generation Algorithm Detection and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Follow the instructions under the **Installation** section.
+- For this rule to work, complete the instructions through **Configure the ingest pipeline**.
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+ml_is_dga.malicious_probability > 0.98
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Dynamic Resolution
+** ID: T1568
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Domain Generation Algorithms
+** ID: T1568.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-predicted-to-be-malicious-activity.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-predicted-to-be-malicious-activity.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6f9cb24590
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-predicted-to-be-malicious-activity.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-predicted-to-be-malicious-activity]]
+=== Machine Learning Detected a Suspicious Windows Event Predicted to be Malicious Activity
+
+A supervised machine learning model (ProblemChild) has identified a suspicious Windows process event with high probability of it being malicious activity. Alternatively, the model's blocklist identified the event as being malicious.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* endgame-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.process-*
+* winlogbeat-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-10m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html
+* https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/problemchild
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/detecting-living-off-the-land-attacks-with-new-elastic-integration
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* OS: Windows
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Use Case: Living off the Land Attack Detection
+* Rule Type: ML
+* Rule Type: Machine Learning
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+
+*Version*: 6
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The rule requires the Living off the Land (LotL) Attack Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as Windows process events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend or Winlogbeat.  
+
+
+*LotL Attack Detection Setup*
+
+The LotL Attack Detection integration detects living-off-the-land activity in Windows process events.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for LotL Attack Detection.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+- Windows process events collected by the https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/endpoint[Elastic Defend] integration or Winlogbeat(https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/winlogbeat/current/_winlogbeat_overview.html).
+- To install Elastic Defend, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[documentation].
+- To set up and run Winlogbeat, follow https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/winlogbeat/current/winlogbeat-installation-configuration.html[this] guide.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed to install assets associated with the LotL Attack Detection integration:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Living off the Land Attack Detection and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Follow the instructions under the **Installation** section.
+- For this rule to work, complete the instructions through **Configure the ingest pipeline**.
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where (problemchild.prediction == 1 or blocklist_label == 1) and not process.args : ("*C:\\WINDOWS\\temp\\nessus_*.txt*", "*C:\\WINDOWS\\temp\\nessus_*.tmp*")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Masquerading
+** ID: T1036
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Masquerade Task or Service
+** ID: T1036.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-with-a-high-malicious-probability-score.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-with-a-high-malicious-probability-score.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..60172dbe4d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-with-a-high-malicious-probability-score.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-with-a-high-malicious-probability-score]]
+=== Machine Learning Detected a Suspicious Windows Event with a High Malicious Probability Score
+
+A supervised machine learning model (ProblemChild) has identified a suspicious Windows process event with high probability of it being malicious activity. Alternatively, the model's blocklist identified the event as being malicious.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* endgame-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.process-*
+* winlogbeat-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-10m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html
+* https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/problemchild
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/detecting-living-off-the-land-attacks-with-new-elastic-integration
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* OS: Windows
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Use Case: Living off the Land Attack Detection
+* Rule Type: ML
+* Rule Type: Machine Learning
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+
+*Version*: 6
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The rule requires the Living off the Land (LotL) Attack Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as Windows process events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend or Winlogbeat.  
+
+
+*LotL Attack Detection Setup*
+
+The LotL Attack Detection integration detects living-off-the-land activity in Windows process events.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for LotL Attack Detection.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+- Windows process events collected by the https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/endpoint[Elastic Defend] integration or Winlogbeat(https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/winlogbeat/current/_winlogbeat_overview.html).
+- To install Elastic Defend, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[documentation].
+- To set up and run Winlogbeat, follow https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/winlogbeat/current/winlogbeat-installation-configuration.html[this] guide.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed to install assets associated with the LotL Attack Detection integration:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Living off the Land Attack Detection and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Follow the instructions under the **Installation** section.
+- For this rule to work, complete the instructions through **Configure the ingest pipeline**.
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where ((problemchild.prediction == 1 and problemchild.prediction_probability > 0.98) or
+blocklist_label == 1) and not process.args : ("*C:\\WINDOWS\\temp\\nessus_*.txt*", "*C:\\WINDOWS\\temp\\nessus_*.tmp*")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Masquerading
+** ID: T1036
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Masquerade Task or Service
+** ID: T1036.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-machine-learning-detected-dga-activity-using-a-known-sunburst-dns-domain.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-machine-learning-detected-dga-activity-using-a-known-sunburst-dns-domain.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e233fde75f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-machine-learning-detected-dga-activity-using-a-known-sunburst-dns-domain.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-machine-learning-detected-dga-activity-using-a-known-sunburst-dns-domain]]
+=== Machine Learning Detected DGA activity using a known SUNBURST DNS domain
+
+A supervised machine learning model has identified a DNS question name that used by the SUNBURST malware and is predicted to be the result of a Domain Generation Algorithm.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* logs-network_traffic.*
+
+*Severity*: critical
+
+*Risk score*: 99
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-10m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html
+* https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/dga
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/detect-domain-generation-algorithm-activity-with-new-kibana-integration
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Network
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+* Use Case: Domain Generation Algorithm Detection
+* Rule Type: ML
+* Rule Type: Machine Learning
+* Tactic: Command and Control
+
+*Version*: 5
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The rule requires the Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as DNS events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend, Network Packet Capture, or Packetbeat.  
+
+
+*DGA Detection Setup*
+
+The DGA Detection integration consists of an ML-based framework to detect DGA activity in DNS events.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for DGA Detection.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+- DNS events collected by the https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/endpoint[Elastic Defend], https://docs.elastic.co/integrations/network_traffic[Network Packet Capture] integration, or https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/packetbeat/current/packetbeat-overview.html[Packetbeat].
+- To install Elastic Defend, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[documentation].
+- To add the Network Packet Capture integration to an Elastic Agent policy, refer to https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/add-integration-to-policy.html[this] guide.
+- To set up and run Packetbeat, follow https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/packetbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[this] guide.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed to install assets associated with the DGA Detection integration:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Domain Generation Algorithm Detection and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Follow the instructions under the **Installation** section.
+- For this rule to work, complete the instructions through **Configure the ingest pipeline**.
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+ml_is_dga.malicious_prediction:1 and dns.question.registered_domain:avsvmcloud.com
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Dynamic Resolution
+** ID: T1568
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Domain Generation Algorithms
+** ID: T1568.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-message-of-the-day-motd-file-creation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-message-of-the-day-motd-file-creation.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f51e40b9f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-message-of-the-day-motd-file-creation.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-message-of-the-day-motd-file-creation]]
+=== Message-of-the-Day (MOTD) File Creation
+
+This rule detects the creation of potentially malicious files within the default MOTD file directories. Message of the day (MOTD) is the message that is presented to the user when a user connects to a Linux server via SSH or a serial connection. Linux systems contain several default MOTD files located in the "/etc/update-motd.d/" directory. These scripts run as the root user every time a user connects over SSH or a serial connection. Adversaries may create malicious MOTD files that grant them persistence onto the target every time a user connects to the system by executing a backdoor script or command.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.file*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://pberba.github.io/security/2022/02/06/linux-threat-hunting-for-persistence-initialization-scripts-and-shell-configuration/#10-boot-or-logon-initialization-scripts-motd
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 11
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Message-of-the-Day (MOTD) File Creation*
+
+
+The message-of-the-day (MOTD) is used to display a customizable system-wide message or information to users upon login in Linux.
+
+Attackers can abuse message-of-the-day (motd) files to run scripts, commands or malicious software every time a user connects to a system over SSH or a serial connection, by creating a new file within the `/etc/update-motd.d/` directory. Executable files in these directories automatically run with root privileges.
+
+This rule identifies the creation of new files within the `/etc/update-motd.d/` directory.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html[placeholder fields] to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+
+*Possible Investigation Steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the file that was created or modified.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve File Information","query":"SELECT * FROM file WHERE path = {{file.path}}"}}
+- Investigate whether any other files in the `/etc/update-motd.d/` directory have been altered.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve File Listing Information","query":"SELECT * FROM file WHERE path LIKE '/etc/update-motd.d/%'"}}
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Additional File Listing Information","query":"SELECT f.path, u.username AS file_owner, g.groupname AS group_owner, datetime(f.atime, 'unixepoch') AS\nfile_last_access_time, datetime(f.mtime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_modified_time, datetime(f.ctime, 'unixepoch') AS\nfile_last_status_change_time, datetime(f.btime, 'unixepoch') AS file_created_time, f.size AS size_bytes FROM file f LEFT\nJOIN users u ON f.uid = u.uid LEFT JOIN groups g ON f.gid = g.gid WHERE path LIKE '/etc/update-motd.d/%'\n"}}
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User","query":"SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"}}
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate whether the modified scripts call other malicious scripts elsewhere on the file system.
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+        - Cron jobs, services and other persistence mechanisms.
+            - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Crontab Information","query":"SELECT * FROM crontab"}}
+
+
+*Related Rules*
+
+
+- Process Spawned from Message-of-the-Day (MOTD) - 4ec47004-b34a-42e6-8003-376a123ea447
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Any activity that triggered the alert and is not inherently malicious must be monitored by the security team.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Delete the MOTD files or restore their original configuration.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("rename", "creation") and
+file.path : "/etc/update-motd.d/*" and not (
+  process.executable in (
+    "/bin/dpkg", "/usr/bin/dpkg", "/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/dockerd", "/usr/sbin/dockerd", "/bin/microdnf",
+    "/usr/bin/microdnf", "/bin/rpm", "/usr/bin/rpm", "/bin/snapd", "/usr/bin/snapd", "/bin/yum", "/usr/bin/yum",
+    "/bin/dnf", "/usr/bin/dnf", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/bin/dnf-automatic", "/usr/bin/dnf-automatic",
+    "/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/dpkg-divert", "/bin/dpkg-divert", "/sbin/apk", "/usr/sbin/apk",
+    "/usr/local/sbin/apk", "/usr/bin/apt", "/usr/sbin/pacman", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/puppet",
+    "/bin/puppet", "/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/puppet", "/usr/bin/chef-client", "/bin/chef-client",
+    "/bin/autossl_check", "/usr/bin/autossl_check", "/proc/self/exe", "/dev/fd/*",  "/usr/bin/pamac-daemon",
+    "/bin/pamac-daemon", "/usr/lib/snapd/snapd", "/usr/local/bin/dockerd"
+  ) or
+  file.extension in ("swp", "swpx", "swx", "dpkg-remove") or
+  file.Ext.original.extension == "dpkg-new" or
+  process.executable : (
+    "/nix/store/*", "/var/lib/dpkg/*", "/tmp/vmis.*", "/snap/*", "/dev/fd/*", "/usr/lib/virtualbox/*"
+  ) or
+  process.executable == null or
+  (process.name == "sed" and file.name : "sed*") or
+  (process.name == "perl" and file.name : "e2scrub_all.tmp*") 
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
+** ID: T1037
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-network-connection-initiated-by-sshd-child-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-network-connection-initiated-by-sshd-child-process.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f3e798c840
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-network-connection-initiated-by-sshd-child-process.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-network-connection-initiated-by-sshd-child-process]]
+=== Network Connection Initiated by SSHD Child Process
+
+This rule identifies an egress internet connection initiated by an SSH Daemon child process. This behavior is indicative of the alteration of a shell configuration file or other mechanism that launches a process when a new SSH login occurs. Attackers can also backdoor the SSH daemon to allow for persistence, call out to a C2 or to steal credentials.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://hadess.io/the-art-of-linux-persistence/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id with maxspan=1s
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
+   process.parent.executable == "/usr/sbin/sshd"] by process.entity_id
+  [network where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "connection_attempted" and not (
+     destination.ip == null or destination.ip == "0.0.0.0" or cidrmatch(
+     destination.ip, "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.0.0.0/24", "192.0.0.0/29",
+     "192.0.0.8/32", "192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.0.10/32", "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32", "192.0.2.0/24",
+     "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "100.64.0.0/10",
+     "192.175.48.0/24","198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "240.0.0.0/4", "::1", "FE80::/10",
+     "FF00::/8", "172.31.0.0/16"
+     )
+    )
+  ] by process.parent.entity_id
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Event Triggered Execution
+** ID: T1546
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Unix Shell Configuration Modification
+** ID: T1546.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote Services
+** ID: T1021
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: SSH
+** ID: T1021.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote Service Session Hijacking
+** ID: T1563
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: SSH Hijacking
+** ID: T1563.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/001/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-network-connections-initiated-through-xdg-autostart-entry.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-network-connections-initiated-through-xdg-autostart-entry.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c69d23edd3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-network-connections-initiated-through-xdg-autostart-entry.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-network-connections-initiated-through-xdg-autostart-entry]]
+=== Network Connections Initiated Through XDG Autostart Entry
+
+Detects network connections initiated through Cross-Desktop Group (XDG) autostart entries for GNOME and XFCE-based Linux distributions. XDG Autostart entries can be used to execute arbitrary commands or scripts when a user logs in. This rule helps to identify potential malicious activity where an attacker may have modified XDG autostart scripts to establish persistence on the system.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://specifications.freedesktop.org/autostart-spec/autostart-spec-latest.html
+* https://hadess.io/the-art-of-linux-persistence/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
+- Elastic Defend
+- Auditbeat
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Auditbeat Setup*
+
+Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit the activities of users and processes on your systems. For example, you can use Auditbeat to collect and centralize audit events from the Linux Audit Framework. You can also use Auditbeat to detect changes to critical files, like binaries and configuration files, and identify potential security policy violations.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Auditbeat on a Linux System:*
+
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setup-repositories.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-docker.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html[helper guide].
+- For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Custom Ingest Pipeline*
+
+For versions <8.2, you need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate `event.ingested` with @timestamp for non-elastic-agent indexes, like auditbeats/filebeat/winlogbeat etc. For more details to add a custom ingest pipeline refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html[guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id, process.entity_id with maxspan=1s
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and (
+     (process.parent.executable == "/usr/bin/xfce4-session") or
+     (process.executable == "/bin/sh" and process.args == "-e" and process.args == "-u" and
+      process.args == "-c" and process.args : "export GIO_LAUNCHED_DESKTOP_FILE_PID=$$;*")
+   )
+  ]
+  [network where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "connection_attempted"]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
+** ID: T1547
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: XDG Autostart Entries
+** ID: T1547.013
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/013/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-new-or-modified-federation-domain.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-new-or-modified-federation-domain.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..62132ddc2d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-new-or-modified-federation-domain.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-new-or-modified-federation-domain]]
+=== New or Modified Federation Domain
+
+Identifies a new or modified federation domain, which can be used to create a trust between O365 and an external identity provider.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* filebeat-*
+* logs-o365*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: None ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/remove-accepteddomain?view=exchange-ps
+* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/remove-federateddomain?view=exchange-ps
+* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/new-accepteddomain?view=exchange-ps
+* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/add-federateddomain?view=exchange-ps
+* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/set-accepteddomain?view=exchange-ps
+* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/msonline/set-msoldomainfederationsettings?view=azureadps-1.0
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Cloud
+* Data Source: Microsoft 365
+* Use Case: Identity and Access Audit
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+
+*Version*: 207
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Austin Songer
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+The Office 365 Logs Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.dataset:o365.audit and event.provider:Exchange and event.category:web and event.action:("Set-AcceptedDomain" or
+"Set-MsolDomainFederationSettings" or "Add-FederatedDomain" or "New-AcceptedDomain" or "Remove-AcceptedDomain" or "Remove-FederatedDomain") and
+event.outcome:success
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Domain or Tenant Policy Modification
+** ID: T1484
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Trust Modification
+** ID: T1484.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-potential-dga-activity.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-potential-dga-activity.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a9cbf4d8b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-potential-dga-activity.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-potential-dga-activity]]
+=== Potential DGA Activity
+
+A population analysis machine learning job detected potential DGA (domain generation algorithm) activity. Such activity is often used by malware command and control (C2) channels. This machine learning job looks for a source IP address making DNS requests that have an aggregate high probability of being DGA activity.
+
+*Rule type*: machine_learning
+
+*Rule indices*: None
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 15m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-45m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html
+* https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/dga
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/detect-domain-generation-algorithm-activity-with-new-kibana-integration
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Use Case: Domain Generation Algorithm Detection
+* Rule Type: ML
+* Rule Type: Machine Learning
+* Tactic: Command and Control
+
+*Version*: 5
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The rule requires the Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as DNS events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend, Network Packet Capture, or Packetbeat.  
+
+
+*DGA Detection Setup*
+
+The DGA Detection integration consists of an ML-based framework to detect DGA activity in DNS events.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for DGA Detection.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+- DNS events collected by the https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/endpoint[Elastic Defend], https://docs.elastic.co/integrations/network_traffic[Network Packet Capture] integration, or https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/packetbeat/current/packetbeat-overview.html[Packetbeat].
+- To install Elastic Defend, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[documentation].
+- To add the Network Packet Capture integration to an Elastic Agent policy, refer to https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/add-integration-to-policy.html[this] guide.
+- To set up and run Packetbeat, follow https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/packetbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[this] guide.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed to install assets associated with the DGA Detection integration:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Domain Generation Algorithm Detection and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Follow the instructions under the **Installation** section.
+- For this rule to work, complete the instructions through **Add preconfigured anomaly detection jobs**.
+
+
+*Anomaly Detection Setup*
+
+Before you can enable this rule, you'll need to enable the corresponding Anomaly Detection job. 
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Analytics, click Machine Learning.
+- Under Anomaly Detection, click Jobs, and then click "Create job". Select the Data View containing your enriched DNS events. For example, this would be `logs-endpoint.events.*` if you used Elastic Defend to collect events, or `logs-network_traffic.*` if you used Network Packet Capture.
+- If the selected Data View contains events that match the query in https://github.com/elastic/integrations/blob/main/packages/dga/kibana/ml_module/dga-ml.json[this] configuration file, you will see a card for DGA under "Use preconfigured jobs".
+- Keep the default settings and click "Create jobs" to start the anomaly detection job and datafeed.
+
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Dynamic Resolution
+** ID: T1568
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-potential-masquerading-as-communication-apps.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-potential-masquerading-as-communication-apps.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8ba641ce5b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-potential-masquerading-as-communication-apps.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-potential-masquerading-as-communication-apps]]
+=== Potential Masquerading as Communication Apps
+
+Identifies suspicious instances of communications apps, both unsigned and renamed ones, that can indicate an attempt to conceal malicious activity, bypass security features such as allowlists, or trick users into executing malware.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.process-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 6
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "windows" and
+  event.type == "start" and
+  (
+    /* Slack */
+    (process.name : "slack.exe" and not
+      (process.code_signature.subject_name in (
+        "Slack Technologies, Inc.",
+        "Slack Technologies, LLC"
+       ) and process.code_signature.trusted == true)
+    ) or
+
+    /* WebEx */
+    (process.name : "WebexHost.exe" and not
+      (process.code_signature.subject_name in ("Cisco WebEx LLC", "Cisco Systems, Inc.") and process.code_signature.trusted == true)
+    ) or
+
+    /* Teams */
+    (process.name : "Teams.exe" and not
+      (process.code_signature.subject_name == "Microsoft Corporation" and process.code_signature.trusted == true)
+    ) or
+
+    /* Discord */
+    (process.name : "Discord.exe" and not
+      (process.code_signature.subject_name == "Discord Inc." and process.code_signature.trusted == true)
+    ) or
+
+    /* RocketChat */
+    (process.name : "Rocket.Chat.exe" and not
+      (process.code_signature.subject_name == "Rocket.Chat Technologies Corp." and process.code_signature.trusted == true)
+    ) or
+
+    /* Mattermost */
+    (process.name : "Mattermost.exe" and not
+      (process.code_signature.subject_name == "Mattermost, Inc." and process.code_signature.trusted == true)
+    ) or
+
+    /* WhatsApp */
+    (process.name : "WhatsApp.exe" and not
+      (process.code_signature.subject_name in (
+        "WhatsApp LLC",
+        "WhatsApp, Inc",
+        "24803D75-212C-471A-BC57-9EF86AB91435"
+       ) and process.code_signature.trusted == true)
+    ) or
+
+    /* Zoom */
+    (process.name : "Zoom.exe" and not
+      (process.code_signature.subject_name == "Zoom Video Communications, Inc." and process.code_signature.trusted == true)
+    ) or
+
+    /* Outlook */
+    (process.name : "outlook.exe" and not
+      (process.code_signature.subject_name == "Microsoft Corporation" and process.code_signature.trusted == true)
+    ) or
+
+    /* Thunderbird */
+    (process.name : "thunderbird.exe" and not
+      (process.code_signature.subject_name == "Mozilla Corporation" and process.code_signature.trusted == true)
+    )
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Masquerading
+** ID: T1036
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Invalid Code Signature
+** ID: T1036.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/001/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Match Legitimate Name or Location
+** ID: T1036.005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Compromise Host Software Binary
+** ID: T1554
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1554/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-potential-openssh-backdoor-logging-activity.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-potential-openssh-backdoor-logging-activity.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..52b4d4b6f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-potential-openssh-backdoor-logging-activity.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-potential-openssh-backdoor-logging-activity]]
+=== Potential OpenSSH Backdoor Logging Activity
+
+Identifies a Secure Shell (SSH) client or server process creating or writing to a known SSH backdoor log file. Adversaries may modify SSH related binaries for persistence or credential access via patching sensitive functions to enable unauthorized access or to log SSH credentials for exfiltration.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/eset/malware-ioc/tree/master/sshdoor
+* https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/ESET_Kobalos.pdf
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
+- Elastic Defend
+- Auditbeat
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Auditbeat Setup*
+
+Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit the activities of users and processes on your systems. For example, you can use Auditbeat to collect and centralize audit events from the Linux Audit Framework. You can also use Auditbeat to detect changes to critical files, like binaries and configuration files, and identify potential security policy violations.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Auditbeat on a Linux System:*
+
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setup-repositories.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-docker.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html[helper guide].
+- For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Custom Ingest Pipeline*
+
+For versions <8.2, you need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate `event.ingested` with @timestamp for non-elastic-agent indexes, like auditbeats/filebeat/winlogbeat etc. For more details to add a custom ingest pipeline refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html[guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "change" and process.executable : ("/usr/sbin/sshd", "/usr/bin/ssh") and
+  (
+    (file.name : (".*", "~*", "*~") and not file.name : (".cache", ".viminfo", ".bash_history", ".google_authenticator",
+      ".jelenv", ".csvignore", ".rtreport")) or
+    file.extension : ("in", "out", "ini", "h", "gz", "so", "sock", "sync", "0", "1", "2", "3", "4", "5", "6", "7", "8", "9") or
+    file.path :
+    (
+      "/private/etc/*--",
+      "/usr/share/*",
+      "/usr/include/*",
+      "/usr/local/include/*",
+      "/private/tmp/*",
+      "/private/var/tmp/*",
+      "/usr/tmp/*",
+      "/usr/share/man/*",
+      "/usr/local/share/*",
+      "/usr/lib/*.so.*",
+      "/private/etc/ssh/.sshd_auth",
+      "/usr/bin/ssd",
+      "/private/var/opt/power",
+      "/private/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts",
+      "/private/var/html/lol",
+      "/private/var/log/utmp",
+      "/private/var/lib",
+      "/var/run/sshd/sshd.pid",
+      "/var/run/nscd/ns.pid",
+      "/var/run/udev/ud.pid",
+      "/var/run/udevd.pid"
+    )
+  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Modify Authentication Process
+** ID: T1556
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Compromise Host Software Binary
+** ID: T1554
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1554/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-potential-persistence-via-file-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-potential-persistence-via-file-modification.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dade12dfbf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-potential-persistence-via-file-modification.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-potential-persistence-via-file-modification]]
+=== Potential Persistence via File Modification
+
+This rule leverages the File Integrity Monitoring (FIM) integration to detect file modifications of files that are commonly used for persistence on Linux systems. The rule detects modifications to files that are commonly used for cron jobs, systemd services, message-of-the-day (MOTD), SSH configurations, shell configurations, runtime control, init daemon, passwd/sudoers/shadow files, Systemd udevd, and XDG/KDE autostart entries. To leverage this rule, the paths specified in the query need to be added to the FIM policy in the Elastic Security app.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-fim.event-*
+* auditbeat-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: File Integrity Monitoring
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from the Elastic File Integrity Monitoring (FIM) integration.
+
+
+*Elastic FIM Integration Setup*
+
+To configure the Elastic FIM integration, follow these steps:
+
+1. Install and configure the Elastic Agent on your Linux system. You can refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/elastic-agent-installation.html[Elastic Agent documentation] for detailed instructions.
+2. Once the Elastic Agent is installed, navigate to the Elastic Security app in Kibana.
+3. In the Kibana home page, click on "Integrations" in the left sidebar.
+4. Search for "File Integrity Monitoring" in the search bar and select the integration.
+5. Provide a name and optional description for the integration.
+6. Select the appropriate agent policy for your Linux system or create a new one.
+7. Configure the FIM policy by specifying the paths that you want to monitor for file modifications. You can use the same paths mentioned in the `query` field of the rule. Note that FIM does not accept wildcards in the paths, so you need to specify the exact paths you want to monitor.
+8. Save the configuration and the Elastic Agent will start monitoring the specified paths for file modifications.
+
+For more details on configuring the Elastic FIM integration, you can refer to the https://docs.elastic.co/integrations/fim[Elastic FIM documentation].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.dataset == "fim.event" and event.action == "updated" and
+file.path : (
+  // cron, anacron & at
+  "/etc/cron.d/*", "/etc/cron.daily/*", "/etc/cron.hourly/*", "/etc/cron.monthly/*",
+  "/etc/cron.weekly/*", "/etc/crontab", "/var/spool/cron/crontabs/*", "/etc/cron.allow",
+  "/etc/cron.deny",  "/var/spool/anacron/*", "/var/spool/cron/atjobs/*",
+
+  // systemd services & timers
+  "/etc/systemd/system/*", "/usr/local/lib/systemd/system/*", "/lib/systemd/system/*",
+  "/usr/lib/systemd/system/*", "/home/*/.config/systemd/user/*", "/home/*/.local/share/systemd/user/*",
+  "/root/.config/systemd/user/*", "/root/.local/share/systemd/user/*",
+
+  // LD_PRELOAD
+  "/etc/ld.so.preload", "/etc/ld.so.conf.d/*", "/etc/ld.so.conf",
+
+  // message-of-the-day (MOTD)
+  "/etc/update-motd.d/*",
+
+  // SSH
+  "/home/*/.ssh/*", "/root/.ssh/*", "/etc/ssh/*",
+
+  // system-wide shell configurations
+  "/etc/profile", "/etc/profile.d/*", "/etc/bash.bashrc", "/etc/zsh/*", "/etc/csh.cshrc",
+  "/etc/csh.login", "/etc/fish/config.fish", "/etc/ksh.kshrc",
+
+  // root and user shell configurations
+  "/home/*/.profile", "/home/*/.bashrc", "/home/*/.bash_login", "/home/*/.bash_logout",
+  "/root/.profile", "/root/.bashrc", "/root/.bash_login", "/root/.bash_logout",
+  "/home/*/.zprofile", "/home/*/.zshrc", "/root/.zprofile", "/root/.zshrc",
+  "/home/*/.cshrc", "/home/*/.login", "/home/*/.logout", "/root/.cshrc", "/root/.login", "/root/.logout",
+  "/home/*/.config/fish/config.fish", "/root/.config/fish/config.fish",
+  "/home/*/.kshrc", "/root/.kshrc",
+
+  // runtime control
+  "/etc/rc.common", "/etc/rc.local",
+
+  // init daemon
+  "/etc/init.d/*",
+
+  // passwd/sudoers/shadow
+  "/etc/passwd", "/etc/shadow", "/etc/sudoers", "/etc/sudoers.d/*",
+
+  // Systemd udevd
+  "/lib/udev/*", "/etc/udev/rules.d/*", "/usr/lib/udev/rules.d/*", "/run/udev/rules.d/*",
+
+  // XDG/KDE autostart entries
+  "/home/*/.config/autostart/*", "/root/.config/autostart/*", "/etc/xdg/autostart/*", "/usr/share/autostart/*",
+  "/home/*/.kde/Autostart/*", "/root/.kde/Autostart/*",
+  "/home/*/.kde4/Autostart/*", "/root/.kde4/Autostart/*",
+  "/home/*/.kde/share/autostart/*", "/root/.kde/share/autostart/*",
+  "/home/*/.kde4/share/autostart/*", "/root/.kde4/share/autostart/*",
+  "/home/*/.local/share/autostart/*", "/root/.local/share/autostart/*",
+  "/home/*/.config/autostart-scripts/*", "/root/.config/autostart-scripts/*"
+) and not (
+  file.path : (
+    "/var/spool/cron/crontabs/tmp.*", "/run/udev/rules.d/*rules.*", "/home/*/.ssh/known_hosts.*", "/root/.ssh/known_hosts.*"
+  ) or
+  file.extension in ("dpkg-new", "dpkg-remove", "SEQ")
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
+** ID: T1037
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: RC Scripts
+** ID: T1037.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Create or Modify System Process
+** ID: T1543
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Systemd Service
+** ID: T1543.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Modify Authentication Process
+** ID: T1556
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Hijack Execution Flow
+** ID: T1574
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Dynamic Linker Hijacking
+** ID: T1574.006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Create Account
+** ID: T1136
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Local Account
+** ID: T1136.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/001/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task/Job
+** ID: T1053
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Cron
+** ID: T1053.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
+** ID: T1548
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Sudo and Sudo Caching
+** ID: T1548.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-potential-sudo-hijacking.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-potential-sudo-hijacking.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5158507b06
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-potential-sudo-hijacking.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-potential-sudo-hijacking]]
+=== Potential Sudo Hijacking
+
+Identifies the creation of a sudo binary located at /usr/bin/sudo. Attackers may hijack the default sudo binary and replace it with a custom binary or script that can read the user's password in clear text to escalate privileges or enable persistence onto the system every time the sudo binary is executed.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.file*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://eapolsniper.github.io/2020/08/17/Sudo-Hijacking/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("creation", "rename") and
+file.path in ("/usr/bin/sudo", "/bin/sudo") and not (
+  file.Ext.original.path in ("/usr/bin/sudo", "/bin/sudo") or
+  process.executable in (
+    "/bin/dpkg", "/usr/bin/dpkg", "/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/dockerd", "/usr/sbin/dockerd", "/bin/microdnf",
+    "/bin/rpm", "/usr/bin/rpm", "/bin/snapd", "/usr/bin/snapd", "/bin/yum", "/usr/bin/yum", "/bin/dnf", "/usr/bin/dnf",
+    "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/bin/dnf-automatic", "/usr/bin/dnf-automatic", "/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/pacman",
+    "/usr/bin/dpkg-divert", "/bin/dpkg-divert", "/sbin/apk", "/usr/sbin/apk", "/usr/local/sbin/apk", "/usr/bin/apt",
+    "/usr/sbin/pacman", "/usr/bin/microdnf", "/usr/local/bin/dockerd", "/usr/local/bin/podman", "/usr/local/bin/dnf",
+    "/kaniko/executor", "/proc/self/exe", "/usr/bin/apt-get", "/usr/bin/apt-cache", "/usr/bin/apt-mark"
+  ) or
+  file.Ext.original.extension == "dpkg-new" or
+  process.executable : (
+    "/nix/store/*", "/var/lib/dpkg/*", "/tmp/vmis.*", "/snap/*", "/dev/fd/*", "/var/lib/docker/*"
+  ) or
+  process.executable == null or
+  (process.name == "sed" and file.name : "sed*")
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
+** ID: T1548
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Sudo and Sudo Caching
+** ID: T1548.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Hijack Execution Flow
+** ID: T1574
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-process-capability-set-via-setcap-utility.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-process-capability-set-via-setcap-utility.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b70d38c887
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-process-capability-set-via-setcap-utility.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-process-capability-set-via-setcap-utility]]
+=== Process Capability Set via setcap Utility
+
+This rule detects the use of the setcap utility to set capabilities on a process. The setcap utility is used to set the capabilities of a binary to allow it to perform privileged operations without needing to run as root. This can be used by attackers to establish persistence by creating a backdoor, or escalate privileges by abusing a misconfiguration on a system.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.process*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows
+the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest to select "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and
+process.name == "setcap" and not (
+  process.parent.executable == null or
+  process.parent.executable : ("/var/lib/dpkg/*", "/var/lib/docker/*", "/tmp/newroot/*", "/var/tmp/newroot/*") or 
+  process.parent.name in ("jem", "vzctl")
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-process-spawned-from-message-of-the-day-motd.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-process-spawned-from-message-of-the-day-motd.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6fb8c9f2de
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-process-spawned-from-message-of-the-day-motd.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-process-spawned-from-message-of-the-day-motd]]
+=== Process Spawned from Message-of-the-Day (MOTD)
+
+Message of the day (MOTD) is the message that is presented to the user when a user connects to a Linux server via SSH or a serial connection. Linux systems contain several default MOTD files located in the "/etc/update-motd.d/" directory. These scripts run as the root user every time a user connects over SSH or a serial connection. Adversaries may create malicious MOTD files that grant them persistence onto the target every time a user connects to the system by executing a backdoor script or command. This rule detects the execution of potentially malicious processes through the MOTD utility.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.process*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://pberba.github.io/security/2022/02/06/linux-threat-hunting-for-persistence-initialization-scripts-and-shell-configuration/#10-boot-or-logon-initialization-scripts-motd
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 10
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Process Spawned from Message-of-the-Day (MOTD)*
+
+
+The message-of-the-day (MOTD) is used to display a customizable system-wide message or information to users upon login in Linux.
+
+Attackers can abuse message-of-the-day (motd) files to run scripts, commands or malicious software every time a user connects to a system over SSH or a serial connection, by creating a new file within the `/etc/update-motd.d/` directory. Files in these directories will automatically run with root privileges when they are made executable.
+
+This rule identifies the execution of potentially malicious processes from a MOTD script, which is not likely to occur as default benign behavior. 
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html[placeholder fields] to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+
+*Possible Investigation Steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the file that was created or modified from which the suspicious process was executed.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve File Information","query":"SELECT * FROM file WHERE path = {{file.path}}"}}
+- Investigate whether any other files in the `/etc/update-motd.d/` directory have been altered.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve File Listing Information","query":"SELECT * FROM file WHERE path LIKE '/etc/update-motd.d/%'"}}
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Additional File Listing Information","query":"SELECT f.path, u.username AS file_owner, g.groupname AS group_owner, datetime(f.atime, 'unixepoch') AS\nfile_last_access_time, datetime(f.mtime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_modified_time, datetime(f.ctime, 'unixepoch') AS\nfile_last_status_change_time, datetime(f.btime, 'unixepoch') AS file_created_time, f.size AS size_bytes FROM file f LEFT\nJOIN users u ON f.uid = u.uid LEFT JOIN groups g ON f.gid = g.gid WHERE path LIKE '/etc/update-motd.d/%'\n"}}
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User","query":"SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"}}
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate whether the altered scripts call other malicious scripts elsewhere on the file system. 
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+        - Cron jobs, services, and other persistence mechanisms.
+            - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Crontab Information","query":"SELECT * FROM crontab"}}
+
+
+*Related Rules*
+
+
+- Message-of-the-Day (MOTD) File Creation - 96d11d31-9a79-480f-8401-da28b194608f
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Any activity that triggered the alert and is not inherently malicious must be monitored by the security team.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Delete the MOTD files or restore them to the original configuration.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where event.type == "start" and host.os.type == "linux" and event.action : ("exec", "exec_event") and
+  process.parent.executable : "/etc/update-motd.d/*" and (
+  (process.name in ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish") and (
+    (process.args : ("-i", "-l")) or (process.parent.name == "socat" and process.parent.args : "*exec*"))) or
+  (process.name : ("nc", "ncat", "netcat", "nc.openbsd") and process.args_count >= 3 and 
+    not process.args : ("-*z*", "-*l*")) or
+  (process.name : "python*" and process.args : "-c" and process.args : (
+     "*import*pty*spawn*", "*import*subprocess*call*"
+  )) or
+  (process.name : "perl*" and process.args : "-e" and process.args : "*socket*" and process.args : (
+     "*exec*", "*system*"
+  )) or
+  (process.name : "ruby*" and process.args : ("-e", "-rsocket") and process.args : (
+     "*TCPSocket.new*", "*TCPSocket.open*"
+  )) or
+  (process.name : "lua*" and process.args : "-e" and process.args : "*socket.tcp*" and process.args : (
+     "*io.popen*", "*os.execute*"
+  )) or
+  (process.name : "php*" and process.args : "-r" and process.args : "*fsockopen*" and process.args : "*/bin/*sh*") or 
+  (process.name : ("awk", "gawk", "mawk", "nawk") and process.args : "*/inet/tcp/*") or 
+  (process.name in ("openssl", "telnet")) or
+  (process.args : (
+    "./*", "/boot/*", "/dev/shm/*", "/etc/cron.*/*", "/etc/init.d/*", "/etc/update-motd.d/*", "/run/*", "/srv/*",
+    "/tmp/*", "/var/tmp/*", "/var/log/*", "/opt/*"
+    ) and process.args_count == 1
+  )
+) and 
+not (
+  process.parent.args == "--force" or
+  process.args in ("/usr/games/lolcat", "/usr/bin/screenfetch") or
+  process.parent.name == "system-crash-notification"
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
+** ID: T1037
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-rapid-secret-retrieval-attempts-from-aws-secretsmanager.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-rapid-secret-retrieval-attempts-from-aws-secretsmanager.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..eb90f800f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-rapid-secret-retrieval-attempts-from-aws-secretsmanager.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-rapid-secret-retrieval-attempts-from-aws-secretsmanager]]
+=== Rapid Secret Retrieval Attempts from AWS SecretsManager
+
+This rule attempts to identify rapid secret retrieval attempts from AWS SecretsManager. Adversaries may attempt to retrieve secrets from the Secrets Manager programmatically using the `GetSecretValue` or `BatchGetSecretValue` API actions.
+
+*Rule type*: threshold
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* filebeat-*
+* logs-aws.cloudtrail*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-5m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/secretsmanager/latest/apireference/API_GetSecretValue.html
+* https://detectioninthe.cloud/ttps/credential_access/access_secret_in_secrets_manager/
+* https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-services/aws-secrets-manager-enum
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/secretsmanager/latest/apireference/API_BatchGetSecretValue.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Cloud
+* Data Source: AWS
+* Data Source: Amazon Web Services
+* Data Source: AWS Secrets Manager
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Rapid Secret Retrieval Attempts from AWS SecretsManager*
+
+
+AWS Secrets Manager is a service that enables the replacement of hardcoded credentials in code, including passwords, with an API call to Secrets Manager to retrieve the secret programmatically.
+
+This rule looks for the rapid retrieval of credentials using `GetSecretValue` or `BatchGetSecretValue` actions in Secrets Manager programmatically. This is a https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/rules-ui-create.html#create-threshold-rule[Threshold] rule indicating 20 or more successful attempts to retrieve a secret value from Secrets Manager by the same user identity within a short timespan. 
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Identify the account and its role in the environment, and inspect the related policy.
+- Identify the applications that should use this account.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user account during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate abnormal values in the `user_agent.original` field by comparing them with the intended and authorized usage and historical data. Suspicious user agent values include non-SDK, AWS CLI, custom user agents, etc.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences involving other users.
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Considering the source IP address and geolocation of the user who issued the command:
+    - Do they look normal for the calling user?
+    - If the source is an EC2 IP address, is it associated with an EC2 instance in one of your accounts or is the source IP from an EC2 instance that's not under your control?
+    - If it is an authorized EC2 instance, is the activity associated with normal behavior for the instance role or roles? Are there any other alerts or signs of suspicious activity involving this instance?
+- Review IAM permission policies for the user identity and specific secrets accessed.
+- Examine the request parameters. These might indicate the source of the program or the nature of its tasks.
+- If you suspect the account has been compromised, scope potentially compromised assets by tracking servers, services, and data accessed by the account in the last 24 hours.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- False positives may occur due to the intended usage of the service. Tuning is needed in order to have higher confidence. Consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user agent and IP address conditions.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Disable or limit the account during the investigation and response.
+- Identify the possible impact of the incident and prioritize accordingly; the following actions can help you gain context:
+    - Identify the account role in the cloud environment.
+    - Assess the criticality of affected services and servers.
+    - Work with your IT team to identify and minimize the impact on users.
+    - Identify if the attacker is moving laterally and compromising other accounts, servers, or services.
+    - Identify any regulatory or legal ramifications related to this activity.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Rotate secrets or delete API keys as needed to revoke the attacker's access to the environment. Work with your IT teams to minimize the impact on business operations during these actions.
+- Check if unauthorized new users were created, remove unauthorized new accounts, and request password resets for other IAM users.
+- Consider enabling multi-factor authentication for users.
+- Review the permissions assigned to the implicated user to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
+- Implement security best practices https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/security-best-practices/[outlined] by AWS.
+- Take the actions needed to return affected systems, data, or services to their normal operational levels.
+- Identify the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection via the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.dataset:aws.cloudtrail and event.provider:secretsmanager.amazonaws.com and
+    event.action: (GetSecretValue or BatchGetSecretValue) and event.outcome:success and
+    not user_agent.name: ("Chrome" or "Firefox" or "Safari" or "Edge" or "Brave" or "Opera")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Credentials from Password Stores
+** ID: T1555
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Cloud Secrets Management Stores
+** ID: T1555.006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/006/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-scheduled-task-execution-at-scale-via-gpo.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-scheduled-task-execution-at-scale-via-gpo.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..25de6a4c61
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-scheduled-task-execution-at-scale-via-gpo.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-scheduled-task-execution-at-scale-via-gpo]]
+=== Scheduled Task Execution at Scale via GPO
+
+Detects the modification of Group Policy Object attributes to execute a scheduled task in the objects controlled by the GPO.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-system.*
+* logs-windows.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: None ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/atc-project/atc-data/blob/master/docs/Logging_Policies/LP_0025_windows_audit_directory_service_changes.md
+* https://github.com/atc-project/atc-data/blob/f2bbb51ecf68e2c9f488e3c70dcdd3df51d2a46b/docs/Logging_Policies/LP_0029_windows_audit_detailed_file_share.md
+* https://labs.f-secure.com/tools/sharpgpoabuse
+* https://twitter.com/menasec1/status/1106899890377052160
+* https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_gpo_scheduledtasks.yml
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+* Data Source: Active Directory
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring
+
+*Version*: 111
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Scheduled Task Execution at Scale via GPO*
+
+
+Group Policy Objects (GPOs) can be used by attackers to execute scheduled tasks at scale to compromise objects controlled by a given GPO. This is done by changing the contents of the `<GPOPath>\Machine\Preferences\ScheduledTasks\ScheduledTasks.xml` file.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- This attack abuses a legitimate mechanism of Active Directory, so it is important to determine whether the activity is legitimate and the administrator is authorized to perform this operation.
+- Retrieve the contents of the `ScheduledTasks.xml` file, and check the `<Command>` and `<Arguments>` XML tags for any potentially malicious commands or binaries.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Scope which objects may be compromised by retrieving information about which objects are controlled by the GPO.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Verify if the execution is allowed and done under change management, and if the execution is legitimate.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- Group Policy Abuse for Privilege Addition - b9554892-5e0e-424b-83a0-5aef95aa43bf
+- Startup/Logon Script added to Group Policy Object - 16fac1a1-21ee-4ca6-b720-458e3855d046
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- The investigation and containment must be performed in every computer controlled by the GPO, where necessary.
+- Remove the script from the GPO.
+- Check if other GPOs have suspicious scheduled tasks attached.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The 'Audit Detailed File Share' audit policy must be configured (Success Failure).
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Policies >
+Windows Settings >
+Security Settings >
+Advanced Audit Policies Configuration >
+Audit Policies >
+Object Access >
+Audit Detailed File Share (Success,Failure)
+```
+
+The 'Audit Directory Service Changes' audit policy must be configured (Success Failure).
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Policies >
+Windows Settings >
+Security Settings >
+Advanced Audit Policies Configuration >
+Audit Policies >
+DS Access >
+Audit Directory Service Changes (Success,Failure)
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+(event.code: "5136" and winlog.event_data.AttributeLDAPDisplayName:("gPCMachineExtensionNames" or "gPCUserExtensionNames") and
+   winlog.event_data.AttributeValue:(*CAB54552-DEEA-4691-817E-ED4A4D1AFC72* and *AADCED64-746C-4633-A97C-D61349046527*))
+or
+(event.code: "5145" and winlog.event_data.ShareName: "\\\\*\\SYSVOL" and winlog.event_data.RelativeTargetName: *ScheduledTasks.xml and
+  (message: WriteData or winlog.event_data.AccessList: *%%4417*))
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task/Job
+** ID: T1053
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task
+** ID: T1053.005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Domain or Tenant Policy Modification
+** ID: T1484
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Group Policy Modification
+** ID: T1484.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Lateral Tool Transfer
+** ID: T1570
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-shell-configuration-creation-or-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-shell-configuration-creation-or-modification.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d24312a8c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-shell-configuration-creation-or-modification.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-shell-configuration-creation-or-modification]]
+=== Shell Configuration Creation or Modification
+
+This rule monitors the creation/alteration of a shell configuration file. Unix systems use shell configuration files to set environment variables, create aliases, and customize the user's environment. Adversaries may modify or add a shell configuration file to execute malicious code and gain persistence in the system. This behavior is consistent with the Kaiji malware family.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.file*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 2
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("rename", "creation") and file.path : (
+  // system-wide configurations
+  "/etc/profile", "/etc/profile.d/*", "/etc/bash.bashrc", "/etc/zsh/*",
+  "/etc/csh.cshrc", "/etc/csh.login", "/etc/fish/config.fish", "/etc/ksh.kshrc",
+  // root and user configurations
+  "/home/*/.profile", "/home/*/.bashrc", "/home/*/.bash_login", "/home/*/.bash_logout",
+  "/root/.profile", "/root/.bashrc", "/root/.bash_login", "/root/.bash_logout",
+  "/home/*/.zprofile", "/home/*/.zshrc", "/root/.zprofile", "/root/.zshrc",
+  "/home/*/.cshrc", "/home/*/.login", "/home/*/.logout", "/root/.cshrc", "/root/.login", "/root/.logout",
+  "/home/*/.config/fish/config.fish", "/root/.config/fish/config.fish",
+  "/home/*/.kshrc", "/root/.kshrc"
+) and not (
+  process.executable in (
+    "/bin/dpkg", "/usr/bin/dpkg", "/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/dockerd", "/usr/sbin/dockerd", "/bin/microdnf",
+    "/usr/bin/microdnf", "/bin/rpm", "/usr/bin/rpm", "/bin/snapd", "/usr/bin/snapd", "/bin/yum", "/usr/bin/yum",
+    "/bin/dnf", "/usr/bin/dnf", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/bin/dnf-automatic", "/usr/bin/dnf-automatic",
+    "/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/dpkg-divert", "/bin/dpkg-divert", "/sbin/apk", "/usr/sbin/apk",
+    "/usr/local/sbin/apk", "/usr/bin/apt", "/usr/sbin/pacman", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/puppet",
+    "/bin/puppet", "/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/puppet", "/usr/bin/chef-client", "/bin/chef-client",
+    "/bin/autossl_check", "/usr/bin/autossl_check", "/proc/self/exe", "/dev/fd/*",  "/usr/bin/pamac-daemon",
+    "/bin/pamac-daemon", "/usr/lib/snapd/snapd", "/usr/sbin/adduser", "/usr/sbin/useradd", "/usr/local/bin/dockerd"
+  ) or
+  file.extension in ("swp", "swpx", "swx", "dpkg-remove") or
+  file.Ext.original.extension == "dpkg-new" or
+  process.executable : (
+    "/nix/store/*", "/var/lib/dpkg/*", "/tmp/vmis.*", "/snap/*", "/dev/fd/*", "/usr/lib/virtualbox/*"
+  ) or
+  process.executable == null or
+  (process.name == "sed" and file.name : "sed*") or
+  (process.name == "perl" and file.name : "e2scrub_all.tmp*") 
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Event Triggered Execution
+** ID: T1546
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Unix Shell Configuration Modification
+** ID: T1546.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-ssh-key-generated-via-ssh-keygen.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-ssh-key-generated-via-ssh-keygen.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5be45b5e9c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-ssh-key-generated-via-ssh-keygen.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-ssh-key-generated-via-ssh-keygen]]
+=== SSH Key Generated via ssh-keygen
+
+This rule identifies the creation of SSH keys using the ssh-keygen tool, which is the standard utility for generating SSH keys. Users often create SSH keys for authentication with remote services. However, threat actors can exploit this tool to move laterally across a network or maintain persistence by generating unauthorized SSH keys, granting them SSH access to systems.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.process*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("creation", "file_create_event") and
+process.executable == "/usr/bin/ssh-keygen" and file.path : ("/home/*/.ssh/*", "/root/.ssh/*", "/etc/ssh/*") and
+not file.name : "known_hosts.*"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Account Manipulation
+** ID: T1098
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: SSH Authorized Keys
+** ID: T1098.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/004/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote Services
+** ID: T1021
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: SSH
+** ID: T1021.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote Service Session Hijacking
+** ID: T1563
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: SSH Hijacking
+** ID: T1563.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-startup-logon-script-added-to-group-policy-object.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-startup-logon-script-added-to-group-policy-object.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..621de356df
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-startup-logon-script-added-to-group-policy-object.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-startup-logon-script-added-to-group-policy-object]]
+=== Startup/Logon Script added to Group Policy Object
+
+Detects the modification of Group Policy Objects (GPO) to add a startup/logon script to users or computer objects.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-system.*
+* logs-windows.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: None ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/atc-project/atc-data/blob/master/docs/Logging_Policies/LP_0025_windows_audit_directory_service_changes.md
+* https://github.com/atc-project/atc-data/blob/f2bbb51ecf68e2c9f488e3c70dcdd3df51d2a46b/docs/Logging_Policies/LP_0029_windows_audit_detailed_file_share.md
+* https://labs.f-secure.com/tools/sharpgpoabuse
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: Active Directory
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Startup/Logon Script added to Group Policy Object*
+
+
+Group Policy Objects (GPOs) can be used by attackers to instruct arbitrarily large groups of clients to execute specified commands at startup, logon, shutdown, and logoff. This is done by creating or modifying the `scripts.ini` or `psscripts.ini` files. The scripts are stored in the following paths:
+  - `<GPOPath>\Machine\Scripts\`
+  - `<GPOPath>\User\Scripts\`
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- This attack abuses a legitimate mechanism of Active Directory, so it is important to determine whether the activity is legitimate and the administrator is authorized to perform this operation.
+- Retrieve the contents of the `ScheduledTasks.xml` file, and check the `<Command>` and `<Arguments>` XML tags for any potentially malicious commands or binaries.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Scope which objects may be compromised by retrieving information about which objects are controlled by the GPO.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- Verify if the execution is legitimately authorized and executed under a change management process.
+
+
+*Related rules*
+
+
+- Group Policy Abuse for Privilege Addition - b9554892-5e0e-424b-83a0-5aef95aa43bf
+- Scheduled Task Execution at Scale via GPO - 15a8ba77-1c13-4274-88fe-6bd14133861e
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- The investigation and containment must be performed in every computer controlled by the GPO, where necessary.
+- Remove the script from the GPO.
+- Check if other GPOs have suspicious scripts attached.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The 'Audit Detailed File Share' audit policy must be configured (Success Failure).
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Policies >
+Windows Settings >
+Security Settings >
+Advanced Audit Policies Configuration >
+Audit Policies >
+Object Access >
+Audit Detailed File Share (Success,Failure)
+```
+
+The 'Audit Directory Service Changes' audit policy must be configured (Success Failure).
+Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
+
+```
+Computer Configuration >
+Policies >
+Windows Settings >
+Security Settings >
+Advanced Audit Policies Configuration >
+Audit Policies >
+DS Access >
+Audit Directory Service Changes (Success,Failure)
+```
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+(
+ event.code:5136 and winlog.event_data.AttributeLDAPDisplayName:(gPCMachineExtensionNames or gPCUserExtensionNames) and
+   winlog.event_data.AttributeValue:(*42B5FAAE-6536-11D2-AE5A-0000F87571E3* and
+                                      (*40B66650-4972-11D1-A7CA-0000F87571E3* or *40B6664F-4972-11D1-A7CA-0000F87571E3*))
+)
+or
+(
+ event.code:5145 and winlog.event_data.ShareName:\\\\*\\SYSVOL and
+   winlog.event_data.RelativeTargetName:(*\\scripts.ini or *\\psscripts.ini) and
+   (message:WriteData or winlog.event_data.AccessList:*%%4417*)
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Domain or Tenant Policy Modification
+** ID: T1484
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Group Policy Modification
+** ID: T1484.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
+** ID: T1547
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-statistical-model-detected-c2-beaconing-activity.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-statistical-model-detected-c2-beaconing-activity.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ea51ef3c9c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-statistical-model-detected-c2-beaconing-activity.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-statistical-model-detected-c2-beaconing-activity]]
+=== Statistical Model Detected C2 Beaconing Activity
+
+A statistical model has identified command-and-control (C2) beaconing activity. Beaconing can help attackers maintain stealthy communication with their C2 servers, receive instructions and payloads, exfiltrate data and maintain persistence in a network.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* ml_beaconing.all
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-1h ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html
+* https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/beaconing
+* https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/identifying-beaconing-malware-using-elastic
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Network
+* Use Case: C2 Beaconing Detection
+* Tactic: Command and Control
+
+*Version*: 6
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+The rule requires the Network Beaconing Identification integration assets to be installed, as well as network logs collected by the Elastic Defend or Network Packet Capture integrations.
+
+
+*Network Beaconing Identification Setup*
+
+The Network Beaconing Identification integration consists of a statistical framework to identify C2 beaconing activity in network logs.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Network Beaconing Identification.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+- Network events collected by the https://docs.elastic.co/en/integrations/endpoint[Elastic Defend] or https://docs.elastic.co/integrations/network_traffic[Network Packet Capture] integration.
+- To install Elastic Defend, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[documentation].
+- To add the Network Packet Capture integration to an Elastic Agent policy, refer to https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/add-integration-to-policy.html[this] guide.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed to install assets associated with the Network Beaconing Identification integration:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Network Beaconing Identification and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Follow the instructions under the **Installation** section.
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+beacon_stats.is_beaconing: true and
+not process.name: ("WaAppAgent.exe" or "metricbeat.exe" or "packetbeat.exe" or "WindowsAzureGuestAgent.exe" or "HealthService.exe" or "Widgets.exe" or "lsass.exe" or "msedgewebview2.exe" or 
+                   "MsMpEng.exe" or "OUTLOOK.EXE" or "msteams.exe" or "FileSyncHelper.exe" or "SearchProtocolHost.exe" or "Creative Cloud.exe" or "ms-teams.exe" or "ms-teamsupdate.exe" or 
+                   "curl.exe" or "rundll32.exe" or "MsSense.exe" or "wermgr.exe" or "java" or "olk.exe" or "iexplore.exe" or "NetworkManager" or "packetbeat" or "Ssms.exe" or "NisSrv.exe" or 
+                   "gamingservices.exe" or "appidcertstorecheck.exe" or "POWERPNT.EXE" or "miiserver.exe" or "Grammarly.Desktop.exe" or "SnagitEditor.exe" or "CRWindowsClientService.exe" or
+                   "agentbeat" or "dnf" or "yum" or "apt"
+                  )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Web Service
+** ID: T1102
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Bidirectional Communication
+** ID: T1102.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-sublime-plugin-or-application-script-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-sublime-plugin-or-application-script-modification.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..027ccfda91
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-sublime-plugin-or-application-script-modification.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-sublime-plugin-or-application-script-modification]]
+=== Sublime Plugin or Application Script Modification
+
+Adversaries may create or modify the Sublime application plugins or scripts to execute a malicious payload each time the Sublime application is started.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://posts.specterops.io/persistent-jxa-66e1c3cd1cf5
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: macOS
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 108
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a macOS System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, for MacOS it is recommended to select "Traditional Endpoints".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type in ("change", "creation") and file.extension : "py" and
+  file.path :
+    (
+      "/Users/*/Library/Application Support/Sublime Text*/Packages/*.py",
+      "/Applications/Sublime Text.app/Contents/MacOS/sublime.py"
+    ) and
+  not process.executable :
+    (
+      "/Applications/Sublime Text*.app/Contents/*",
+      "/usr/local/Cellar/git/*/bin/git",
+      "/Library/Developer/CommandLineTools/usr/bin/git",
+      "/usr/libexec/xpcproxy",
+      "/System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/DesktopServicesPriv.framework/Versions/A/Resources/DesktopServicesHelper"
+    )
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Compromise Host Software Binary
+** ID: T1554
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1554/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-system-binary-moved-or-copied.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-system-binary-moved-or-copied.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e008fa864c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-system-binary-moved-or-copied.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-system-binary-moved-or-copied]]
+=== System Binary Moved or Copied
+
+This rule monitors for the copying or moving of a system binary. Adversaries may copy/move and rename system binaries to evade detection. Copying a system binary to a different location should not occur often, so if it does, the activity should be investigated.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.file*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 9
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "change" and event.action == "rename" and
+file.Ext.original.path : (
+  "/bin/*", "/usr/bin/*", "/usr/local/bin/*", "/sbin/*", "/usr/sbin/*", "/usr/local/sbin/*"
+) and not (
+  process.executable in (
+    "/bin/dpkg", "/usr/bin/dpkg", "/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/dockerd", "/usr/sbin/dockerd", "/bin/microdnf",
+    "/usr/bin/microdnf", "/bin/rpm", "/usr/bin/rpm", "/bin/snapd", "/usr/bin/snapd", "/bin/yum", "/usr/bin/yum",
+    "/bin/dnf", "/usr/bin/dnf", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/bin/dnf-automatic", "/usr/bin/dnf-automatic",
+    "/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/dpkg-divert", "/bin/dpkg-divert", "/sbin/apk", "/usr/sbin/apk",
+    "/usr/local/sbin/apk", "/usr/bin/apt", "/usr/sbin/pacman", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/puppet",
+    "/bin/puppet", "/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/puppet", "/usr/bin/chef-client", "/bin/chef-client",
+    "/bin/autossl_check", "/usr/bin/autossl_check", "/proc/self/exe", "/dev/fd/*",  "/usr/bin/pamac-daemon",
+    "/bin/pamac-daemon", "/usr/lib/snapd/snapd", "/usr/local/bin/dockerd", "/usr/libexec/netplan/generate",
+    "/usr/bin/update-alternatives", "/bin/update-alternatives", "/usr/sbin/update-alternatives",
+    "/sbin/update-alternatives", "/usr/bin/pip3", "/bin/pip3", "/usr/local/bin/pip3", "/usr/local/bin/node",
+    "/bin/node", "/usr/bin/node", "/sbin/apk", "/usr/sbin/apk", "/usr/local/sbin/apk", "/usr/bin/pip", "/bin/pip",
+    "/usr/local/bin/pip"
+  ) or
+  file.Ext.original.path : (
+    "/bin/*.tmp", "/usr/bin/*.tmp", "/usr/local/bin/*.tmp", "/sbin/*.tmp", "/usr/sbin/*.tmp", "/usr/local/sbin/*.tmp"
+  ) or
+  file.extension in ("swp", "swpx", "swx", "dpkg-remove") or
+  file.Ext.original.extension == "dpkg-new" or
+  process.executable : ("/nix/store/*", "/var/lib/dpkg/*", "/tmp/vmis.*", "/snap/*", "/dev/fd/*") or
+  process.executable == null or
+  (process.name == "sed" and file.name : "sed*") or
+  (process.name == "perl" and file.name : "e2scrub_all.tmp*") 
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Masquerading
+** ID: T1036
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Rename System Utilities
+** ID: T1036.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Hide Artifacts
+** ID: T1564
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-systemd-service-created.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-systemd-service-created.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3beb9eff43
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-systemd-service-created.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,226 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-systemd-service-created]]
+=== Systemd Service Created
+
+This rule detects the creation or renaming of a new Systemd file in all of the common Systemd service locations for both root and regular users. Systemd service files are configuration files in Linux systems used to define and manage system services. Malicious actors can leverage systemd service files to achieve persistence by creating or modifying services to execute malicious commands or payloads during system startup or at a predefined interval by adding a systemd timer. This allows them to maintain unauthorized access, execute additional malicious activities, or evade detection.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.file*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://pberba.github.io/security/2022/01/30/linux-threat-hunting-for-persistence-systemd-timers-cron/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 11
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Systemd Service Created*
+
+
+Systemd service files are configuration files in Linux systems used to define and manage system services.
+
+Malicious actors can leverage systemd service files to achieve persistence by creating or modifying service files to execute malicious commands or payloads during system startup. This allows them to maintain unauthorized access, execute additional malicious activities, or evade detection.
+
+This rule monitors the creation of new systemd service files, potentially indicating the creation of a persistence mechanism.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html[placeholder fields] to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+
+*Possible Investigation Steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the systemd service file that was created or modified.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve File Information","query":"SELECT * FROM file WHERE path = {{file.path}}"}}
+- Investigate the currently enabled systemd services through the following command `sudo systemctl list-unit-files`.
+- Investigate whether any other files in any of the available systemd directories have been altered through OSQuery.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve File Listing Information","query":"SELECT * FROM file WHERE (path LIKE '/etc/systemd/system/%' OR path LIKE '/usr/local/lib/systemd/system/%'\nOR path LIKE '/lib/systemd/system/%' OR path LIKE '/usr/lib/systemd/system/%'\nOR path LIKE '/home/{{user.name}}/.config/systemd/user/%' OR path LIKE '/home/{{user.name}}/.local/share/systemd/user/%'\nOR path LIKE '/root/.config/systemd/user/%' OR path LIKE '/root/.local/share/systemd/user/%')\n"}}
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Additional File Listing Information","query":"SELECT f.path, u.username AS file_owner, g.groupname AS group_owner, datetime(f.atime, 'unixepoch') AS\nfile_last_access_time, datetime(f.mtime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_modified_time, datetime(f.ctime, 'unixepoch') AS\nfile_last_status_change_time, datetime(f.btime, 'unixepoch') AS file_created_time, f.size AS size_bytes FROM file f LEFT\nJOIN users u ON f.uid = u.uid LEFT JOIN groups g ON f.gid = g.gid WHERE ( path LIKE '/etc/systemd/system/%' OR path LIKE\n'/usr/local/lib/systemd/system/%' OR path LIKE '/lib/systemd/system/%' OR path LIKE '/usr/lib/systemd/system/%' OR path\nLIKE '/home/{{user.name}}/.config/systemd/user/%' OR path LIKE '/home/{{user.name}}/.local/share/systemd/user/%'\nOR path LIKE '/root/.config/systemd/user/%' OR path LIKE '/root/.local/share/systemd/user/%')\n"}}
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User","query":"SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"}}
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+- Investigate whether the altered scripts call other malicious scripts elsewhere on the file system. 
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+        - Cron jobs, services and other persistence mechanisms.
+            - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Crontab Information","query":"SELECT * FROM crontab"}}
+- Investigate abnormal behaviors by the subject process/user such as network connections, file modifications, and any other spawned child processes.
+  - Investigate listening ports and open sockets to look for potential command and control traffic or data exfiltration.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Listening Ports","query":"SELECT pid, address, port, socket, protocol, path FROM listening_ports"}}
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Open Sockets","query":"SELECT pid, family, remote_address, remote_port, socket, state FROM process_open_sockets"}}
+  - Identify the user account that performed the action, analyze it, and check whether it should perform this kind of action.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific User","query":"SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = {{user.name}}"}}
+- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Investigate the Account Authentication Status","query":"SELECT * FROM logged_in_users WHERE user = {{user.name}}"}}
+
+
+*False Positive Analysis*
+
+
+- If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+- If this activity is related to a system administrator who uses systemd services for administrative purposes, consider adding exceptions for this specific administrator user account. 
+- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
+
+
+*Related Rules*
+
+
+- Potential Persistence Through Run Control Detected - 0f4d35e4-925e-4959-ab24-911be207ee6f
+- Potential Persistence Through init.d Detected - 474fd20e-14cc-49c5-8160-d9ab4ba16c8b
+- Systemd Timer Created - 7fb500fa-8e24-4bd1-9480-2a819352602c
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Delete the service/timer or restore its original configuration.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("rename", "creation") and file.path : (
+  "/etc/systemd/system/*", "/usr/local/lib/systemd/system/*", "/lib/systemd/system/*",
+  "/usr/lib/systemd/system/*", "/home/*/.config/systemd/user/*", "/home/*/.local/share/systemd/user/*",
+  "/root/.config/systemd/user/*", "/root/.local/share/systemd/user/*"
+) and file.extension == "service" and not (
+  process.executable in (
+    "/bin/dpkg", "/usr/bin/dpkg", "/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/dockerd", "/usr/sbin/dockerd", "/bin/microdnf",
+    "/usr/bin/microdnf", "/bin/rpm", "/usr/bin/rpm", "/bin/snapd", "/usr/bin/snapd", "/bin/yum", "/usr/bin/yum",
+    "/bin/dnf", "/usr/bin/dnf", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/bin/dnf-automatic", "/usr/bin/dnf-automatic",
+    "/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/dpkg-divert", "/bin/dpkg-divert", "/sbin/apk", "/usr/sbin/apk",
+    "/usr/local/sbin/apk", "/usr/bin/apt", "/usr/sbin/pacman", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/puppet",
+    "/bin/puppet", "/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/puppet", "/usr/bin/chef-client", "/bin/chef-client",
+    "/bin/autossl_check", "/usr/bin/autossl_check", "/proc/self/exe", "/dev/fd/*",  "/usr/bin/pamac-daemon",
+    "/bin/pamac-daemon", "/usr/lib/snapd/snapd", "/usr/local/bin/dockerd"
+  ) or
+  file.extension in ("swp", "swpx", "swx", "dpkg-remove") or
+  file.Ext.original.extension == "dpkg-new" or
+  process.executable : (
+    "/nix/store/*", "/var/lib/dpkg/*", "/tmp/vmis.*", "/snap/*", "/dev/fd/*", "/usr/lib/virtualbox/*"
+  ) or
+  process.executable == null or
+  (process.name == "sed" and file.name : "sed*") or
+  (process.name == "perl" and file.name : "e2scrub_all.tmp*") 
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Create or Modify System Process
+** ID: T1543
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Systemd Service
+** ID: T1543.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Create or Modify System Process
+** ID: T1543
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Systemd Service
+** ID: T1543.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-systemd-timer-created.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-systemd-timer-created.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9556f564f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-systemd-timer-created.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-systemd-timer-created]]
+=== Systemd Timer Created
+
+Detects the creation of a systemd timer within any of the default systemd timer directories. Systemd timers can be used by an attacker to gain persistence, by scheduling the execution of a command or script. Similarly to cron/at, systemd timers can be set up to execute on boot time, or on a specific point in time, which allows attackers to regain access in case the connection to the infected asset was lost.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.file*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://opensource.com/article/20/7/systemd-timers
+* https://pberba.github.io/security/2022/01/30/linux-threat-hunting-for-persistence-systemd-timers-cron/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 11
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Systemd Timer Created*
+
+
+Systemd timers are used for scheduling and automating recurring tasks or services on Linux systems. 
+
+Attackers can leverage systemd timers to run scripts, commands, or malicious software at system boot or on a set time interval by creating a systemd timer and a corresponding systemd service file. 
+
+This rule monitors the creation of new systemd timer files, potentially indicating the creation of a persistence mechanism.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html[placeholder fields] to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+
+*Possible Investigation Steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the timer file that was created or modified.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve File Information","query":"SELECT * FROM file WHERE path = {{file.path}}"}}
+- Investigate the currently enabled systemd timers through the following command `sudo systemctl list-timers`.
+- Search for the systemd service file named similarly to the timer that was created.
+- Investigate whether any other files in any of the available systemd directories have been altered through OSQuery.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve File Listing Information","query":"SELECT * FROM file WHERE (path LIKE '/etc/systemd/system/%' OR path LIKE '/usr/local/lib/systemd/system/%'\nOR path LIKE '/lib/systemd/system/%' OR path LIKE '/usr/lib/systemd/system/%'\nOR path LIKE '/home/{{user.name}}/.config/systemd/user/%' OR path LIKE '/home/{{user.name}}/.local/share/systemd/user/%'\nOR path LIKE '/root/.config/systemd/user/%' OR path LIKE '/root/.local/share/systemd/user/%')\n"}}
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Additional File Listing Information","query":"SELECT f.path, u.username AS file_owner, g.groupname AS group_owner, datetime(f.atime, 'unixepoch') AS\nfile_last_access_time, datetime(f.mtime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_modified_time, datetime(f.ctime, 'unixepoch') AS\nfile_last_status_change_time, datetime(f.btime, 'unixepoch') AS file_created_time, f.size AS size_bytes FROM file f LEFT\nJOIN users u ON f.uid = u.uid LEFT JOIN groups g ON f.gid = g.gid WHERE ( path LIKE '/etc/systemd/system/%' OR path LIKE\n'/usr/local/lib/systemd/system/%' OR path LIKE '/lib/systemd/system/%' OR path LIKE '/usr/lib/systemd/system/%' OR path\nLIKE '/home/{{user.name}}/.config/systemd/user/%' OR path LIKE '/home/{{user.name}}/.local/share/systemd/user/%'\nOR path LIKE '/root/.config/systemd/user/%' OR path LIKE '/root/.local/share/systemd/user/%')\n"}}
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User","query":"SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"}}
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+- Investigate whether the altered scripts call other malicious scripts elsewhere on the file system. 
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+        - Cron jobs, services and other persistence mechanisms.
+            - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Crontab Information","query":"SELECT * FROM crontab"}}
+
+
+*False Positive Analysis*
+
+
+- If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+- If this activity is related to a system administrator who uses systemd timers for administrative purposes, consider adding exceptions for this specific administrator user account. 
+- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Delete the service/timer or restore its original configuration.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("rename", "creation") and file.path : (
+  "/etc/systemd/system/*", "/usr/local/lib/systemd/system/*", "/lib/systemd/system/*",
+  "/usr/lib/systemd/system/*", "/home/*/.config/systemd/user/*", "/home/*/.local/share/systemd/user/*",
+  "/root/.config/systemd/user/*", "/root/.local/share/systemd/user/*"
+) and file.extension == "timer" and not (
+  process.executable in (
+    "/bin/dpkg", "/usr/bin/dpkg", "/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/dockerd", "/usr/sbin/dockerd", "/bin/microdnf",
+    "/usr/bin/microdnf", "/bin/rpm", "/usr/bin/rpm", "/bin/snapd", "/usr/bin/snapd", "/bin/yum", "/usr/bin/yum",
+    "/bin/dnf", "/usr/bin/dnf", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/bin/dnf-automatic", "/usr/bin/dnf-automatic",
+    "/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/dpkg-divert", "/bin/dpkg-divert", "/sbin/apk", "/usr/sbin/apk",
+    "/usr/local/sbin/apk", "/usr/bin/apt", "/usr/sbin/pacman", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/puppet",
+    "/bin/puppet", "/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/puppet", "/usr/bin/chef-client", "/bin/chef-client",
+    "/bin/autossl_check", "/usr/bin/autossl_check", "/proc/self/exe", "/dev/fd/*",  "/usr/bin/pamac-daemon",
+    "/bin/pamac-daemon", "/usr/lib/snapd/snapd", "/usr/local/bin/dockerd"
+  ) or
+  file.extension in ("swp", "swpx", "swx", "dpkg-remove") or
+  file.Ext.original.extension == "dpkg-new" or
+  process.executable : (
+    "/nix/store/*", "/var/lib/dpkg/*", "/tmp/vmis.*", "/snap/*", "/dev/fd/*", "/usr/lib/virtualbox/*"
+  ) or
+  process.executable == null or
+  (process.name == "sed" and file.name : "sed*") or
+  (process.name == "perl" and file.name : "e2scrub_all.tmp*") 
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task/Job
+** ID: T1053
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Systemd Timers
+** ID: T1053.006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/006/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-systemd-udevd-rule-file-creation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-systemd-udevd-rule-file-creation.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..62c30dfb01
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-systemd-udevd-rule-file-creation.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-systemd-udevd-rule-file-creation]]
+=== Systemd-udevd Rule File Creation
+
+Monitors for the creation of rule files that are used by systemd-udevd to manage device nodes and handle kernel device events in the Linux operating system. Systemd-udevd can be exploited for persistence by adversaries by creating malicious udev rules that trigger on specific events, executing arbitrary commands or payloads whenever a certain device is plugged in or recognized by the system.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.file*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 4
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows
+the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click Add integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Elastic Defend and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click Add Elastic Defend.
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either Traditional Endpoints or Cloud Workloads.
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest to select "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in New agent policy name. If other agent policies already exist, you can click the Existing hosts tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click Save and Continue.
+- To complete the integration, select Add Elastic Agent to your hosts and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("rename", "creation") and 
+process.executable != null and 
+file.path : (
+  "/lib/udev/*", "/etc/udev/rules.d/*", "/usr/lib/udev/rules.d/*", "/run/udev/rules.d/*"
+) and not (
+  process.executable in (
+    "/bin/dpkg", "/usr/bin/dpkg", "/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/dockerd", "/usr/sbin/dockerd", "/bin/microdnf",
+    "/usr/bin/microdnf", "/bin/rpm", "/usr/bin/rpm", "/bin/snapd", "/usr/bin/snapd", "/bin/yum", "/usr/bin/yum",
+    "/bin/dnf", "/usr/bin/dnf", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/bin/dnf-automatic", "/usr/bin/dnf-automatic",
+    "/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/dpkg-divert", "/bin/dpkg-divert", "/sbin/apk", "/usr/sbin/apk",
+    "/usr/local/sbin/apk", "/usr/bin/apt", "/usr/sbin/pacman", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/puppet",
+    "/bin/puppet", "/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/puppet", "/usr/bin/chef-client", "/bin/chef-client",
+    "/bin/autossl_check", "/usr/bin/autossl_check", "/proc/self/exe", "/dev/fd/*",  "/usr/bin/pamac-daemon",
+    "/bin/pamac-daemon", "/usr/lib/snapd/snapd", "/usr/local/bin/dockerd", "/usr/libexec/netplan/generate"
+  ) or
+  file.extension in ("swp", "swpx", "swx", "dpkg-remove") or
+  file.Ext.original.extension == "dpkg-new" or
+  process.executable : (
+    "/nix/store/*", "/var/lib/dpkg/*", "/snap/*", "/dev/fd/*", "/usr/lib/*", "/usr/libexec/*"
+  ) or
+  (process.name == "sed" and file.name : "sed*") or
+  (process.name == "perl" and file.name : "e2scrub_all.tmp*") 
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
+** ID: T1037
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-user-added-to-privileged-group.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-user-added-to-privileged-group.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b36008c74f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-user-added-to-privileged-group.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-user-added-to-privileged-group]]
+=== User Added to Privileged Group
+
+Identifies a user being added to a privileged group in Active Directory. Privileged accounts and groups in Active Directory are those to which powerful rights, privileges, and permissions are granted that allow them to perform nearly any action in Active Directory and on domain-joined systems.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* winlogbeat-*
+* logs-system.*
+* logs-windows.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/appendix-b--privileged-accounts-and-groups-in-active-directory
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Windows
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring
+* Data Source: Active Directory
+
+*Version*: 110
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+* Skoetting
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating User Added to Privileged Group in Active Directory*
+
+
+Privileged accounts and groups in Active Directory are those to which powerful rights, privileges, and permissions are granted that allow them to perform nearly any action in Active Directory and on domain-joined systems.
+
+Attackers can add users to privileged groups to maintain a level of access if their other privileged accounts are uncovered by the security team. This allows them to keep operating after the security team discovers abused accounts.
+
+This rule monitors events related to a user being added to a privileged group.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should manage members of this group.
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This attack abuses a legitimate Active Directory mechanism, so it is important to determine whether the activity is legitimate, if the administrator is authorized to perform this operation, and if there is a need to grant the account this level of privilege.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- If the admin is not aware of the operation, activate your Active Directory incident response plan.
+- If the user does not need the administrator privileges, remove the account from the privileged group.
+- Review the privileges of the administrator account that performed the action.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
+events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
+Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
+`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
+For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+iam where winlog.api == "wineventlog" and event.action == "added-member-to-group" and
+(
+    (
+        group.name : (
+            "Admin*",
+            "Local Administrators",
+            "Domain Admins",
+            "Enterprise Admins",
+            "Backup Admins",
+            "Schema Admins",
+            "DnsAdmins",
+            "Exchange Organization Administrators",
+            "Print Operators",
+            "Server Operators",
+            "Account Operators"
+        )
+    ) or
+    (
+        group.id : (
+            "S-1-5-32-544",
+            "S-1-5-21-*-544",
+            "S-1-5-21-*-512",
+            "S-1-5-21-*-519",
+            "S-1-5-21-*-551",
+            "S-1-5-21-*-518",
+            "S-1-5-21-*-1101",
+            "S-1-5-21-*-1102",
+            "S-1-5-21-*-550",
+            "S-1-5-21-*-549",
+            "S-1-5-21-*-548"
+        )
+    )
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Account Manipulation
+** ID: T1098
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rules-8-12-14-appendix.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rules-8-12-14-appendix.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b108af6716
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rules-8-12-14-appendix.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+["appendix",role="exclude",id="prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-prebuilt-rules-8-12-14-appendix"]
+= Downloadable rule update v8.12.14
+
+This section lists all updates associated with version 8.12.14 of the Fleet integration *Prebuilt Security Detection Rules*.
+
+
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-rapid-secret-retrieval-attempts-from-aws-secretsmanager.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-systems-manager-securestring-parameter-request-with-decryption-flag.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-sts-getcalleridentity-api-called-for-the-first-time.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-lambda-layer-added-to-existing-function.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-s3-bucket-policy-added-to-share-with-external-account.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-iam-roles-anywhere-profile-creation.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-iam-roles-anywhere-trust-anchor-created-with-external-ca.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-lambda-function-policy-updated-to-allow-public-invocation.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-ec2-instance-connect-ssh-public-key-uploaded.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-potential-persistence-via-file-modification.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-apt-package-manager-configuration-file-creation.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-at-job-created-or-modified.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-creation-or-modification-of-pluggable-authentication-module-or-configuration.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-process-capability-set-via-setcap-utility.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-executable-bit-set-for-rc-local-rc-common.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-ssh-key-generated-via-ssh-keygen.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-network-connection-initiated-by-sshd-child-process.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-authentication-via-unusual-pam-grantor.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-network-connections-initiated-through-xdg-autostart-entry.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-agent-spoofing-mismatched-agent-id.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-first-time-seen-aws-secret-value-accessed-in-secrets-manager.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-statistical-model-detected-c2-beaconing-activity.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-machine-learning-detected-dga-activity-using-a-known-sunburst-dns-domain.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-potential-dga-activity.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-with-a-high-dga-probability-score.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-predicted-to-be-a-dga-domain.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-attempts-to-brute-force-a-microsoft-365-user-account.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-new-or-modified-federation-domain.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-predicted-to-be-malicious-activity.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-with-a-high-malicious-probability-score.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-potential-openssh-backdoor-logging-activity.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-system-binary-moved-or-copied.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-cron-job-created-or-modified.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-message-of-the-day-motd-file-creation.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-process-spawned-from-message-of-the-day-motd.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-shell-configuration-creation-or-modification.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-systemd-timer-created.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-systemd-service-created.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-systemd-udevd-rule-file-creation.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-potential-sudo-hijacking.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-sublime-plugin-or-application-script-modification.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-potential-masquerading-as-communication-apps.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-adobe-hijack-persistence.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-user-added-to-privileged-group.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-creation-or-modification-of-a-new-gpo-scheduled-task-or-service.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-startup-logon-script-added-to-group-policy-object.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-group-policy-abuse-for-privilege-addition.asciidoc[]
+include::prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-scheduled-task-execution-at-scale-via-gpo.asciidoc[]
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rules-8-12-14-summary.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rules-8-12-14-summary.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d855eb4c0a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rules-8-12-14-summary.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+[[prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-prebuilt-rules-8-12-14-summary]]
+[role="xpack"]
+== Update v8.12.14
+
+This section lists all updates associated with version 8.12.14 of the Fleet integration *Prebuilt Security Detection Rules*.
+
+
+[width="100%",options="header"]
+|==============================================
+|Rule |Description |Status |Version
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-rapid-secret-retrieval-attempts-from-aws-secretsmanager, Rapid Secret Retrieval Attempts from AWS SecretsManager>> | This rule attempts to identify rapid secret retrieval attempts from AWS SecretsManager. Adversaries may attempt to retrieve secrets from the Secrets Manager programmatically using the `GetSecretValue` or `BatchGetSecretValue` API actions. | new | 1 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-systems-manager-securestring-parameter-request-with-decryption-flag, AWS Systems Manager SecureString Parameter Request with Decryption Flag>> | Detects the first occurrence of a user identity accessing AWS Systems Manager (SSM) SecureString parameters using the GetParameter or GetParameters API actions with credentials in the request parameters. This could indicate that the user is accessing sensitive information. This rule detects when a user accesses a SecureString parameter with the `withDecryption` parameter set to true. This is a [NewTerms](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/rules-ui-create.html#create-new-terms-rule) rule that detects the first occurrence of a specific AWS ARN accessing SecureString parameters with decryption within the last 10 days. | new | 1 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-sts-getcalleridentity-api-called-for-the-first-time, AWS STS GetCallerIdentity API Called for the First Time>> | An adversary with access to a set of compromised credentials may attempt to verify that the credentials are valid and determine what account they are using. This rule looks for the first time an identity has called the STS `GetCallerIdentity` API operation in the last 15 days, which may be an indicator of compromised credentials. A legitimate user would not need to call this operation as they should know the account they are using. | new | 1 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-lambda-layer-added-to-existing-function, AWS Lambda Layer Added to Existing Function>> | Identifies when an Lambda Layer is added to an existing Lambda function. AWS layers are a way to share code and data across multiple functions. By adding a layer to an existing function, an attacker can persist or execute code in the context of the function. | new | 1 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-s3-bucket-policy-added-to-share-with-external-account, AWS S3 Bucket Policy Added to Share with External Account>> | Identifies an AWS S3 bucket policy change to share permissions with an external account. Adversaries may attempt to backdoor an S3 bucket by sharing it with an external account. This can be used to exfiltrate data or to provide access to other adversaries. This rule identifies changes to a bucket policy via the `PutBucketPolicy` API call where the policy includes an `Effect=Allow` statement that does not contain the AWS account ID of the bucket owner. | new | 1 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-iam-roles-anywhere-profile-creation, AWS IAM Roles Anywhere Profile Creation>> | Identifies the creation of an AWS Roles Anywhere profile. AWS Roles Anywhere is a feature that allows you to use AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) profiles to manage access to your AWS resources from any location via trusted anchors. This rule detects the creation of a profile that can be assumed from any service. Adversaries may create profiles tied to overly permissive roles to maintain access to AWS resources. Ensure that the profile creation is expected and that the trust policy is configured securely. | new | 1 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-iam-roles-anywhere-trust-anchor-created-with-external-ca, AWS IAM Roles Anywhere Trust Anchor Created with External CA>> | Identifies when an AWS IAM Roles Anywhere Trust Anchor with an external certificate authority is created. AWS Roles Anywhere profiles are legitimate profiles that can be created by administrators to allow access from any location. This rule detects when a trust anchor is created with an external certificate authority that is not managed by AWS Certificate Manager Private Certificate Authority (ACM PCA). Adversaries may accomplish this to maintain persistence in the environment. | new | 1 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-lambda-function-policy-updated-to-allow-public-invocation, AWS Lambda Function Policy Updated to Allow Public Invocation>> | Identifies when an AWS Lambda function policy is updated to allow public invocation. This rule specifically looks for the `AddPermission` API call with the `Principal` set to `*` which allows any AWS account to invoke the Lambda function. Adversaries may abuse this permission to create a backdoor in the Lambda function that allows them to execute arbitrary code. | new | 1 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-aws-ec2-instance-connect-ssh-public-key-uploaded, AWS EC2 Instance Connect SSH Public Key Uploaded>> | Identifies when a new SSH public key is uploaded to an AWS EC2 instance using the EC2 Instance Connect service. This action could indicate an adversary attempting to maintain access to the instance. The rule also detects the `SendSerialConsoleSSHPublicKey` API action, which could be used for privilege escalation if the serial console is enabled. Monitoring these activities helps ensure unauthorized access attempts are detected and mitigated promptly. | new | 1 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-potential-persistence-via-file-modification, Potential Persistence via File Modification>> | This rule leverages the File Integrity Monitoring (FIM) integration to detect file modifications of files that are commonly used for persistence on Linux systems. The rule detects modifications to files that are commonly used for cron jobs, systemd services, message-of-the-day (MOTD), SSH configurations, shell configurations, runtime control, init daemon, passwd/sudoers/shadow files, Systemd udevd, and XDG/KDE autostart entries. To leverage this rule, the paths specified in the query need to be added to the FIM policy in the Elastic Security app. | new | 1 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-apt-package-manager-configuration-file-creation, APT Package Manager Configuration File Creation>> | Detects file creation events in the configuration directory for the APT package manager. In Linux, APT (Advanced Package Tool) is a command-line utility used for handling packages on (by default) Debian-based systems, providing functions for installing, updating, upgrading, and removing software along with managing package repositories. Attackers can backdoor APT to gain persistence by injecting malicious code into scripts that APT runs, thereby ensuring continued unauthorized access or control each time APT is used for package management. | new | 1 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-at-job-created-or-modified, At Job Created or Modified>> | This rule monitors for at jobs being created or renamed. Linux at jobs are scheduled tasks that can be leveraged by system administrators to set up scheduled tasks, but may be abused by malicious actors for persistence, privilege escalation and command execution. By creating or modifying cron job configurations, attackers can execute malicious commands or scripts at predefined intervals, ensuring their continued presence and enabling unauthorized activities. | new | 1 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-creation-or-modification-of-pluggable-authentication-module-or-configuration, Creation or Modification of Pluggable Authentication Module or Configuration>> | This rule monitors for the creation or modification of Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) shared object files or configuration files. Attackers may create or modify these files to maintain persistence on a compromised system, or harvest account credentials. | new | 1 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-process-capability-set-via-setcap-utility, Process Capability Set via setcap Utility>> | This rule detects the use of the setcap utility to set capabilities on a process. The setcap utility is used to set the capabilities of a binary to allow it to perform privileged operations without needing to run as root. This can be used by attackers to establish persistence by creating a backdoor, or escalate privileges by abusing a misconfiguration on a system. | new | 1 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-executable-bit-set-for-rc-local-rc-common, Executable Bit Set for rc.local/rc.common>> | This rule monitors for the addition of an executable bit of the `/etc/rc.local` or `/etc/rc.common` files. These files are used to start custom applications, services, scripts or commands during start-up. They require executable permissions to be executed on boot. An alert of this rule is an indicator that this method is being set up within your environment. This method has mostly been replaced by Systemd. However, through the `systemd-rc-local-generator`, these files can be converted to services that run at boot. Adversaries may alter these files to execute malicious code at start-up, and gain persistence onto the system. | new | 1 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-ssh-key-generated-via-ssh-keygen, SSH Key Generated via ssh-keygen>> | This rule identifies the creation of SSH keys using the ssh-keygen tool, which is the standard utility for generating SSH keys. Users often create SSH keys for authentication with remote services. However, threat actors can exploit this tool to move laterally across a network or maintain persistence by generating unauthorized SSH keys, granting them SSH access to systems. | new | 1 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-network-connection-initiated-by-sshd-child-process, Network Connection Initiated by SSHD Child Process>> | This rule identifies an egress internet connection initiated by an SSH Daemon child process. This behavior is indicative of the alteration of a shell configuration file or other mechanism that launches a process when a new SSH login occurs. Attackers can also backdoor the SSH daemon to allow for persistence, call out to a C2 or to steal credentials. | new | 1 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-authentication-via-unusual-pam-grantor, Authentication via Unusual PAM Grantor>> | This rule detects successful authentications via PAM grantors that are not commonly used. This could indicate an attacker is attempting to escalate privileges or maintain persistence on the system by modifying the default PAM configuration. | new | 1 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-network-connections-initiated-through-xdg-autostart-entry, Network Connections Initiated Through XDG Autostart Entry>> | Detects network connections initiated through Cross-Desktop Group (XDG) autostart entries for GNOME and XFCE-based Linux distributions. XDG Autostart entries can be used to execute arbitrary commands or scripts when a user logs in. This rule helps to identify potential malicious activity where an attacker may have modified XDG autostart scripts to establish persistence on the system. | new | 1 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-agent-spoofing-mismatched-agent-id, Agent Spoofing - Mismatched Agent ID>> | Detects events that have a mismatch on the expected event agent ID. The status "agent_id_mismatch/mismatch" occurs when the expected agent ID associated with the API key does not match the actual agent ID in an event. This could indicate attempts to spoof events in order to masquerade actual activity to evade detection. | update | 102 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-first-time-seen-aws-secret-value-accessed-in-secrets-manager, First Time Seen AWS Secret Value Accessed in Secrets Manager>> | An adversary with access to a compromised AWS service such as an EC2 instance, Lambda function, or other service may attempt to leverage the compromised service to access secrets in AWS Secrets Manager. This rule looks for the first time a specific user identity has programmatically retrieved a secret value from Secrets Manager using the `GetSecretValue` or `BatchGetSecretValue` actions. This rule assumes that AWS services such as Lambda functions and EC2 instances are setup with IAM role's assigned that have the necessary permissions to access the secrets in Secrets Manager. An adversary with access to a compromised AWS service such as an EC2 instance, Lambda function, or other service would rely on the compromised service's IAM role to access the secrets in Secrets Manager. | update | 312 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-statistical-model-detected-c2-beaconing-activity, Statistical Model Detected C2 Beaconing Activity>> | A statistical model has identified command-and-control (C2) beaconing activity. Beaconing can help attackers maintain stealthy communication with their C2 servers, receive instructions and payloads, exfiltrate data and maintain persistence in a network. | update | 6 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-machine-learning-detected-dga-activity-using-a-known-sunburst-dns-domain, Machine Learning Detected DGA activity using a known SUNBURST DNS domain>> | A supervised machine learning model has identified a DNS question name that used by the SUNBURST malware and is predicted to be the result of a Domain Generation Algorithm. | update | 5 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-potential-dga-activity, Potential DGA Activity>> | A population analysis machine learning job detected potential DGA (domain generation algorithm) activity. Such activity is often used by malware command and control (C2) channels. This machine learning job looks for a source IP address making DNS requests that have an aggregate high probability of being DGA activity. | update | 5 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-with-a-high-dga-probability-score, Machine Learning Detected a DNS Request With a High DGA Probability Score>> | A supervised machine learning model has identified a DNS question name with a high probability of sourcing from a Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA), which could indicate command and control network activity. | update | 5 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-predicted-to-be-a-dga-domain, Machine Learning Detected a DNS Request Predicted to be a DGA Domain>> | A supervised machine learning model has identified a DNS question name that is predicted to be the result of a Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA), which could indicate command and control network activity. | update | 5 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-attempts-to-brute-force-a-microsoft-365-user-account, Attempts to Brute Force a Microsoft 365 User Account>> | Identifies attempts to brute force a Microsoft 365 user account. An adversary may attempt a brute force attack to obtain unauthorized access to user accounts. | update | 208 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-new-or-modified-federation-domain, New or Modified Federation Domain>> | Identifies a new or modified federation domain, which can be used to create a trust between O365 and an external identity provider. | update | 207 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-predicted-to-be-malicious-activity, Machine Learning Detected a Suspicious Windows Event Predicted to be Malicious Activity>> | A supervised machine learning model (ProblemChild) has identified a suspicious Windows process event with high probability of it being malicious activity. Alternatively, the model's blocklist identified the event as being malicious. | update | 6 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-with-a-high-malicious-probability-score, Machine Learning Detected a Suspicious Windows Event with a High Malicious Probability Score>> | A supervised machine learning model (ProblemChild) has identified a suspicious Windows process event with high probability of it being malicious activity. Alternatively, the model's blocklist identified the event as being malicious. | update | 6 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-potential-openssh-backdoor-logging-activity, Potential OpenSSH Backdoor Logging Activity>> | Identifies a Secure Shell (SSH) client or server process creating or writing to a known SSH backdoor log file. Adversaries may modify SSH related binaries for persistence or credential access via patching sensitive functions to enable unauthorized access or to log SSH credentials for exfiltration. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-system-binary-moved-or-copied, System Binary Moved or Copied>> | This rule monitors for the copying or moving of a system binary. Adversaries may copy/move and rename system binaries to evade detection. Copying a system binary to a different location should not occur often, so if it does, the activity should be investigated. | update | 9 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-cron-job-created-or-modified, Cron Job Created or Modified>> | This rule monitors for (ana)cron jobs being created or renamed. Linux cron jobs are scheduled tasks that can be leveraged by system administrators to set up scheduled tasks, but may be abused by malicious actors for persistence, privilege escalation and command execution. By creating or modifying cron job configurations, attackers can execute malicious commands or scripts at predefined intervals, ensuring their continued presence and enabling unauthorized activities. | update | 11 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-message-of-the-day-motd-file-creation, Message-of-the-Day (MOTD) File Creation>> | This rule detects the creation of potentially malicious files within the default MOTD file directories. Message of the day (MOTD) is the message that is presented to the user when a user connects to a Linux server via SSH or a serial connection. Linux systems contain several default MOTD files located in the "/etc/update-motd.d/" directory. These scripts run as the root user every time a user connects over SSH or a serial connection. Adversaries may create malicious MOTD files that grant them persistence onto the target every time a user connects to the system by executing a backdoor script or command. | update | 11 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-process-spawned-from-message-of-the-day-motd, Process Spawned from Message-of-the-Day (MOTD)>> | Message of the day (MOTD) is the message that is presented to the user when a user connects to a Linux server via SSH or a serial connection. Linux systems contain several default MOTD files located in the "/etc/update-motd.d/" directory. These scripts run as the root user every time a user connects over SSH or a serial connection. Adversaries may create malicious MOTD files that grant them persistence onto the target every time a user connects to the system by executing a backdoor script or command. This rule detects the execution of potentially malicious processes through the MOTD utility. | update | 10 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-shell-configuration-creation-or-modification, Shell Configuration Creation or Modification>> | This rule monitors the creation/alteration of a shell configuration file. Unix systems use shell configuration files to set environment variables, create aliases, and customize the user's environment. Adversaries may modify or add a shell configuration file to execute malicious code and gain persistence in the system. This behavior is consistent with the Kaiji malware family. | update | 2 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-systemd-timer-created, Systemd Timer Created>> | Detects the creation of a systemd timer within any of the default systemd timer directories. Systemd timers can be used by an attacker to gain persistence, by scheduling the execution of a command or script. Similarly to cron/at, systemd timers can be set up to execute on boot time, or on a specific point in time, which allows attackers to regain access in case the connection to the infected asset was lost. | update | 11 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-systemd-service-created, Systemd Service Created>> | This rule detects the creation or renaming of a new Systemd file in all of the common Systemd service locations for both root and regular users. Systemd service files are configuration files in Linux systems used to define and manage system services. Malicious actors can leverage systemd service files to achieve persistence by creating or modifying services to execute malicious commands or payloads during system startup or at a predefined interval by adding a systemd timer. This allows them to maintain unauthorized access, execute additional malicious activities, or evade detection. | update | 11 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-systemd-udevd-rule-file-creation, Systemd-udevd Rule File Creation>> | Monitors for the creation of rule files that are used by systemd-udevd to manage device nodes and handle kernel device events in the Linux operating system. Systemd-udevd can be exploited for persistence by adversaries by creating malicious udev rules that trigger on specific events, executing arbitrary commands or payloads whenever a certain device is plugged in or recognized by the system. | update | 4 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-potential-sudo-hijacking, Potential Sudo Hijacking>> | Identifies the creation of a sudo binary located at /usr/bin/sudo. Attackers may hijack the default sudo binary and replace it with a custom binary or script that can read the user's password in clear text to escalate privileges or enable persistence onto the system every time the sudo binary is executed. | update | 106 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-sublime-plugin-or-application-script-modification, Sublime Plugin or Application Script Modification>> | Adversaries may create or modify the Sublime application plugins or scripts to execute a malicious payload each time the Sublime application is started. | update | 108 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-potential-masquerading-as-communication-apps, Potential Masquerading as Communication Apps>> | Identifies suspicious instances of communications apps, both unsigned and renamed ones, that can indicate an attempt to conceal malicious activity, bypass security features such as allowlists, or trick users into executing malware. | update | 6 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-adobe-hijack-persistence, Adobe Hijack Persistence>> | Detects writing executable files that will be automatically launched by Adobe on launch. | update | 213 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-user-added-to-privileged-group, User Added to Privileged Group>> | Identifies a user being added to a privileged group in Active Directory. Privileged accounts and groups in Active Directory are those to which powerful rights, privileges, and permissions are granted that allow them to perform nearly any action in Active Directory and on domain-joined systems. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-creation-or-modification-of-a-new-gpo-scheduled-task-or-service, Creation or Modification of a new GPO Scheduled Task or Service>> | Detects the creation or modification of a new Group Policy based scheduled task or service. These methods are used for legitimate system administration, but can also be abused by an attacker with domain admin permissions to execute a malicious payload remotely on all or a subset of the domain joined machines. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-startup-logon-script-added-to-group-policy-object, Startup/Logon Script added to Group Policy Object>> | Detects the modification of Group Policy Objects (GPO) to add a startup/logon script to users or computer objects. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-group-policy-abuse-for-privilege-addition, Group Policy Abuse for Privilege Addition>> | Detects the first occurrence of a modification to Group Policy Object Attributes to add privileges to user accounts or use them to add users as local admins. | update | 110 
+
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-scheduled-task-execution-at-scale-via-gpo, Scheduled Task Execution at Scale via GPO>> | Detects the modification of Group Policy Object attributes to execute a scheduled task in the objects controlled by the GPO. | update | 111 
+
+|==============================================
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/prebuilt-rules-downloadable-updates.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/prebuilt-rules-downloadable-updates.asciidoc
index 41162c6afd..57f719bcdf 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/prebuilt-rules-downloadable-updates.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/prebuilt-rules-downloadable-updates.asciidoc
@@ -13,6 +13,10 @@ For previous rule updates, please navigate to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/e
 |Update version |Date | New rules | Updated rules | Notes
 
 
+|<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-14-prebuilt-rules-8-12-14-summary, 8.12.14>> | 11 Jun 2024 | 19 | 29 | 
+This release includes new rules for Linux and AWS integration and tuned rules for Windows , Linux, AWS and Microsoft 365. New rules for Linux include detection for persistence. New rules for AWS include detection for execution, persistence, credential access, impact, exfiltration, privilege escalation and discovery. Additionally, significant rule tuning for Windows ,Linux and Microsoft 365 rules has been added for better rule efficacy and performance.
+
+
 |<<prebuilt-rule-8-12-13-prebuilt-rules-8-12-13-summary, 8.12.13>> | 29 May 2024 | 4 | 123 | 
 This release includes new rules for Linux and AWS integration and tuned rules for Windows ,Linux and MacOS. New rules for Linux include detection for persistence. New rules for AWS include detection for lateral movement, defense evasion and discovery. Additionally, significant rule tuning for Windows ,Linux and MacOS rules has been added for better rule efficacy and performance.
 
@@ -106,3 +110,4 @@ include::downloadable-packages/8-12-10/prebuilt-rules-8-12-10-summary.asciidoc[l
 include::downloadable-packages/8-12-11/prebuilt-rules-8-12-11-summary.asciidoc[leveloffset=+1]
 include::downloadable-packages/8-12-12/prebuilt-rules-8-12-12-summary.asciidoc[leveloffset=+1]
 include::downloadable-packages/8-12-13/prebuilt-rules-8-12-13-summary.asciidoc[leveloffset=+1]
+include::downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rules-8-12-14-summary.asciidoc[leveloffset=+1]
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/prebuilt-rules-reference.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/prebuilt-rules-reference.asciidoc
index f21d6d60e6..f0dc85132d 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/prebuilt-rules-reference.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/prebuilt-rules-reference.asciidoc
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<a-scheduled-task-was-updated, A scheduled task was updated>> |Indicates the update of a scheduled task using Windows event logs. Adversaries can use these to establish persistence, by changing the configuration of a legit scheduled task. Some changes such as disabling or enabling a scheduled task are common and may may generate noise. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence] |None |8
 
+|<<apt-package-manager-configuration-file-creation, APT Package Manager Configuration File Creation>> |Detects file creation events in the configuration directory for the APT package manager. In Linux, APT (Advanced Package Tool) is a command-line utility used for handling packages on (by default) Debian-based systems, providing functions for installing, updating, upgrading, and removing software along with managing package repositories. Attackers can backdoor APT to gain persistence by injecting malicious code into scripts that APT runs, thereby ensuring continued unauthorized access or control each time APT is used for package management. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |1
+
 |<<aws-cloudtrail-log-created, AWS CloudTrail Log Created>> |Identifies the creation of an AWS log trail that specifies the settings for delivery of log data. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Log Auditing], [Tactic: Collection] |None |207
 
 |<<aws-cloudtrail-log-deleted, AWS CloudTrail Log Deleted>> |Identifies the deletion of an AWS log trail. An adversary may delete trails in an attempt to evade defenses. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Log Auditing], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |None |209
@@ -46,6 +48,8 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<aws-ec2-full-network-packet-capture-detected, AWS EC2 Full Network Packet Capture Detected>> |Identifies potential Traffic Mirroring in an Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) instance. Traffic Mirroring is an Amazon VPC feature that you can use to copy network traffic from an Elastic network interface. This feature can potentially be abused to exfiltrate sensitive data from unencrypted internal traffic. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Network Security Monitoring], [Tactic: Exfiltration], [Tactic: Collection] |None |206
 
+|<<aws-ec2-instance-connect-ssh-public-key-uploaded, AWS EC2 Instance Connect SSH Public Key Uploaded>> |Identifies when a new SSH public key is uploaded to an AWS EC2 instance using the EC2 Instance Connect service. This action could indicate an adversary attempting to maintain access to the instance. The rule also detects the `SendSerialConsoleSSHPublicKey` API action, which could be used for privilege escalation if the serial console is enabled. Monitoring these activities helps ensure unauthorized access attempts are detected and mitigated promptly. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Data Source: AWS EC2], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation] |8.9.0 |1
+
 |<<aws-ec2-network-access-control-list-creation, AWS EC2 Network Access Control List Creation>> |Identifies the creation of an AWS Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) network access control list (ACL) or an entry in a network ACL with a specified rule number. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Data Source: AWS EC2], [Use Case: Network Security Monitoring], [Tactic: Persistence] |None |206
 
 |<<aws-ec2-network-access-control-list-deletion, AWS EC2 Network Access Control List Deletion>> |Identifies the deletion of an Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) network access control list (ACL) or one of its ingress/egress entries. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Network Security Monitoring], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |None |206
@@ -80,10 +84,20 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<aws-iam-password-recovery-requested, AWS IAM Password Recovery Requested>> |Identifies AWS IAM password recovery requests. An adversary may attempt to gain unauthorized AWS access by abusing password recovery mechanisms. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Data Source: AWS Signin], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Initial Access] |None |206
 
+|<<aws-iam-roles-anywhere-profile-creation, AWS IAM Roles Anywhere Profile Creation>> |Identifies the creation of an AWS Roles Anywhere profile. AWS Roles Anywhere is a feature that allows you to use AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) profiles to manage access to your AWS resources from any location via trusted anchors. This rule detects the creation of a profile that can be assumed from any service. Adversaries may create profiles tied to overly permissive roles to maintain access to AWS resources. Ensure that the profile creation is expected and that the trust policy is configured securely. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Data Source: AWS IAM], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.9.0 |1
+
+|<<aws-iam-roles-anywhere-trust-anchor-created-with-external-ca, AWS IAM Roles Anywhere Trust Anchor Created with External CA>> |Identifies when an AWS IAM Roles Anywhere Trust Anchor with an external certificate authority is created. AWS Roles Anywhere profiles are legitimate profiles that can be created by administrators to allow access from any location. This rule detects when a trust anchor is created with an external certificate authority that is not managed by AWS Certificate Manager Private Certificate Authority (ACM PCA). Adversaries may accomplish this to maintain persistence in the environment. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Data Source: AWS IAM], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.9.0 |1
+
 |<<aws-iam-user-addition-to-group, AWS IAM User Addition to Group>> |Identifies the addition of a user to a specified group in AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM). |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Tactic: Persistence], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |None |209
 
 |<<aws-kms-customer-managed-key-disabled-or-scheduled-for-deletion, AWS KMS Customer Managed Key Disabled or Scheduled for Deletion>> |Identifies attempts to disable or schedule the deletion of an AWS KMS Customer Managed Key (CMK). Deleting an AWS KMS key is destructive and potentially dangerous. It deletes the key material and all metadata associated with the KMS key and is irreversible. After a KMS key is deleted, the data that was encrypted under that KMS key can no longer be decrypted, which means that data becomes unrecoverable. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Data Source: AWS KMS], [Use Case: Log Auditing], [Tactic: Impact] |None |106
 
+|<<aws-lambda-function-created-or-updated, AWS Lambda Function Created or Updated>> |Identifies when an AWS Lambda function is created or updated. AWS Lambda lets you run code without provisioning or managing servers. Adversaries can create or update Lambda functions to execute malicious code, exfiltrate data, or escalate privileges. This is a [building block rule](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/building-block-rule.html) that does not generate alerts, but signals when a Lambda function is created or updated that matches the rule's conditions. To generate alerts, create a rule that uses this signal as a building block. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Data Source: AWS Lambda], [Use Case: Asset Visibility], [Tactic: Execution] |8.9.0 |1
+
+|<<aws-lambda-function-policy-updated-to-allow-public-invocation, AWS Lambda Function Policy Updated to Allow Public Invocation>> |Identifies when an AWS Lambda function policy is updated to allow public invocation. This rule specifically looks for the `AddPermission` API call with the `Principal` set to `*` which allows any AWS account to invoke the Lambda function. Adversaries may abuse this permission to create a backdoor in the Lambda function that allows them to execute arbitrary code. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Data Source: AWS Lambda], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.9.0 |1
+
+|<<aws-lambda-layer-added-to-existing-function, AWS Lambda Layer Added to Existing Function>> |Identifies when an Lambda Layer is added to an existing Lambda function. AWS layers are a way to share code and data across multiple functions. By adding a layer to an existing function, an attacker can persist or execute code in the context of the function. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Data Source: AWS Lambda], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution] |8.9.0 |1
+
 |<<aws-management-console-brute-force-of-root-user-identity, AWS Management Console Brute Force of Root User Identity>> |Identifies a high number of failed authentication attempts to the AWS management console for the Root user identity. An adversary may attempt to brute force the password for the Root user identity, as it has complete access to all services and resources for the AWS account. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Credential Access] |None |207
 
 |<<aws-management-console-root-login, AWS Management Console Root Login>> |Identifies a successful login to the AWS Management Console by the Root user. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Data Source: AWS Signin], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Tactic: Initial Access] |None |209
@@ -120,14 +134,20 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<aws-s3-bucket-expiration-lifecycle-configuration-added, AWS S3 Bucket Expiration Lifecycle Configuration Added>> |Identifies an expiration lifecycle configuration added to an S3 bucket. Lifecycle configurations can be used to manage objects in a bucket, including setting expiration policies. This rule detects when a lifecycle configuration is added to an S3 bucket, which could indicate that objects in the bucket will be automatically deleted after a specified period of time. This could be used to evade detection by deleting objects that contain evidence of malicious activity. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Data Source: Amazon S3], [Use Case: Asset Visibility], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.9.0 |1
 
+|<<aws-s3-bucket-policy-added-to-share-with-external-account, AWS S3 Bucket Policy Added to Share with External Account>> |Identifies an AWS S3 bucket policy change to share permissions with an external account. Adversaries may attempt to backdoor an S3 bucket by sharing it with an external account. This can be used to exfiltrate data or to provide access to other adversaries. This rule identifies changes to a bucket policy via the `PutBucketPolicy` API call where the policy includes an `Effect=Allow` statement that does not contain the AWS account ID of the bucket owner. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Data Source: AWS S3], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Exfiltration] |8.9.0 |1
+
 |<<aws-saml-activity, AWS SAML Activity>> |Identifies when SAML activity has occurred in AWS. An adversary could manipulate SAML to maintain access to the target. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |None |206
 
+|<<aws-sts-getcalleridentity-api-called-for-the-first-time, AWS STS GetCallerIdentity API Called for the First Time>> |An adversary with access to a set of compromised credentials may attempt to verify that the credentials are valid and determine what account they are using. This rule looks for the first time an identity has called the STS `GetCallerIdentity` API operation in the last 15 days, which may be an indicator of compromised credentials. A legitimate user would not need to call this operation as they should know the account they are using. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Data Source: AWS STS], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Discovery], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |None |1
+
 |<<aws-sts-getsessiontoken-abuse, AWS STS GetSessionToken Abuse>> |Identifies the suspicious use of GetSessionToken. Tokens could be created and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Data Source: AWS STS], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation] |None |206
 
 |<<aws-security-group-configuration-change-detection, AWS Security Group Configuration Change Detection>> |Identifies a change to an AWS Security Group Configuration. A security group is like a virtual firewall, and modifying configurations may allow unauthorized access. Threat actors may abuse this to establish persistence, exfiltrate data, or pivot in an AWS environment. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Data Source: AWS EC2], [Use Case: Network Security Monitoring], [Tactic: Persistence] |None |206
 
 |<<aws-security-token-service-sts-assumerole-usage, AWS Security Token Service (STS) AssumeRole Usage>> |Identifies the use of AssumeRole. AssumeRole returns a set of temporary security credentials that can be used to access AWS resources. An adversary could use those credentials to move laterally and escalate privileges. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Data Source: AWS STS], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation] |None |206
 
+|<<aws-systems-manager-securestring-parameter-request-with-decryption-flag, AWS Systems Manager SecureString Parameter Request with Decryption Flag>> |Detects the first occurrence of a user identity accessing AWS Systems Manager (SSM) SecureString parameters using the GetParameter or GetParameters API actions with credentials in the request parameters. This could indicate that the user is accessing sensitive information. This rule detects when a user accesses a SecureString parameter with the `withDecryption` parameter set to true. This is a [NewTerms](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/rules-ui-create.html#create-new-terms-rule) rule that detects the first occurrence of a specific AWS ARN accessing SecureString parameters with decryption within the last 10 days. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Data Source: AWS Systems Manager], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.9.0 |1
+
 |<<aws-vpc-flow-logs-deletion, AWS VPC Flow Logs Deletion>> |Identifies the deletion of one or more flow logs in AWS Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2). An adversary may delete flow logs in an attempt to evade defenses. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Log Auditing], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |None |209
 
 |<<aws-waf-access-control-list-deletion, AWS WAF Access Control List Deletion>> |Identifies the deletion of a specified AWS Web Application Firewall (WAF) access control list. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Network Security Monitoring], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |None |206
@@ -170,7 +190,7 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<adversary-behavior-detected-elastic-endgame, Adversary Behavior - Detected - Elastic Endgame>> |Elastic Endgame detected an Adversary Behavior. Click the Elastic Endgame icon in the event.module column or the link in the rule.reference column for additional information. |[Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |None |104
 
-|<<agent-spoofing-mismatched-agent-id, Agent Spoofing - Mismatched Agent ID>> |Detects events that have a mismatch on the expected event agent ID. The status "agent_id_mismatch" occurs when the expected agent ID associated with the API key does not match the actual agent ID in an event. This could indicate attempts to spoof events in order to masquerade actual activity to evade detection. |[Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |None |101
+|<<agent-spoofing-mismatched-agent-id, Agent Spoofing - Mismatched Agent ID>> |Detects events that have a mismatch on the expected event agent ID. The status "agent_id_mismatch/mismatch" occurs when the expected agent ID associated with the API key does not match the actual agent ID in an event. This could indicate attempts to spoof events in order to masquerade actual activity to evade detection. |[Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |None |102
 
 |<<agent-spoofing-multiple-hosts-using-same-agent, Agent Spoofing - Multiple Hosts Using Same Agent>> |Detects when multiple hosts are using the same agent ID. This could occur in the event of an agent being taken over and used to inject illegitimate documents into an instance as an attempt to spoof events in order to masquerade actual activity to evade detection. |[Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |None |101
 
@@ -194,6 +214,8 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<archive-file-with-unusual-extension, Archive File with Unusual Extension>> |Identifies the creation of an archive file with an unusual extension. Attackers may attempt to evade detection by masquerading files using the file extension values used by image, audio, or document file types. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Rule Type: BBR] |None |2
 
+|<<at-job-created-or-modified, At Job Created or Modified>> |This rule monitors for at jobs being created or renamed. Linux at jobs are scheduled tasks that can be leveraged by system administrators to set up scheduled tasks, but may be abused by malicious actors for persistence, privilege escalation and command execution. By creating or modifying cron job configurations, attackers can execute malicious commands or scripts at predefined intervals, ensuring their continued presence and enabling unauthorized activities. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |1
+
 |<<at-exe-command-lateral-movement, At.exe Command Lateral Movement>> |Identifies use of at.exe to interact with the task scheduler on remote hosts. Remote task creations, modifications or execution could be indicative of adversary lateral movement. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |None |3
 
 |<<attempt-to-clear-kernel-ring-buffer, Attempt to Clear Kernel Ring Buffer>> |Monitors for the deletion of the kernel ring buffer events through dmesg. Attackers may clear kernel ring buffer events to evade detection after installing a Linux kernel module (LKM). |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |None |5
@@ -240,7 +262,7 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<attempt-to-reset-mfa-factors-for-an-okta-user-account, Attempt to Reset MFA Factors for an Okta User Account>> |Detects attempts to reset an Okta user's enrolled multi-factor authentication (MFA) factors. An adversary may attempt to reset the MFA factors for an Okta user's account in order to register new MFA factors and abuse the account to blend in with normal activity in the victim's environment. |[Tactic: Persistence], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Data Source: Okta] |8.10.0 |206
 
-|<<attempt-to-retrieve-user-data-from-aws-ec2-instance, Attempt to Retrieve User Data from AWS EC2 Instance>> |Identifies discovery request `DescribeInstanceAttribute` with the attribute userData and instanceId in AWS CloudTrail logs. This may indicate an attempt to retrieve user data from an EC2 instance. Adversaries may use this information to gather sensitive data from the instance or to identify potential vulnerabilities. This is a building block rule that does not generate an alert on its own, but serves as a signal for anomalous activity. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Data Source: Amazon EC2], [Use Case: Log Auditing], [Tactic: Discovery], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.9.0 |1
+|<<attempt-to-retrieve-user-data-from-aws-ec2-instance, Attempt to Retrieve User Data from AWS EC2 Instance>> |Identifies discovery request `DescribeInstanceAttribute` with the attribute userData and instanceId in AWS CloudTrail logs. This may indicate an attempt to retrieve user data from an EC2 instance. Adversaries may use this information to gather sensitive data from the instance or to identify potential vulnerabilities. This is a building block rule that does not generate an alert on its own, but serves as a signal for anomalous activity. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Data Source: Amazon EC2], [Use Case: Log Auditing], [Tactic: Discovery], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.9.0 |2
 
 |<<attempt-to-revoke-okta-api-token, Attempt to Revoke Okta API Token>> |Identifies attempts to revoke an Okta API token. An adversary may attempt to revoke or delete an Okta API token to disrupt an organization's business operations. |[Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Data Source: Okta], [Tactic: Impact] |8.10.0 |206
 
@@ -250,10 +272,12 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<attempted-private-key-access, Attempted Private Key Access>> |Attackers may try to access private keys, e.g. ssh, in order to gain further authenticated access to the environment. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Rule Type: BBR] |None |3
 
-|<<attempts-to-brute-force-a-microsoft-365-user-account, Attempts to Brute Force a Microsoft 365 User Account>> |Identifies attempts to brute force a Microsoft 365 user account. An adversary may attempt a brute force attack to obtain unauthorized access to user accounts. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Credential Access] |None |207
+|<<attempts-to-brute-force-a-microsoft-365-user-account, Attempts to Brute Force a Microsoft 365 User Account>> |Identifies attempts to brute force a Microsoft 365 user account. An adversary may attempt a brute force attack to obtain unauthorized access to user accounts. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Credential Access] |None |208
 
 |<<attempts-to-brute-force-an-okta-user-account, Attempts to Brute Force an Okta User Account>> |Identifies when an Okta user account is locked out 3 times within a 3 hour window. An adversary may attempt a brute force or password spraying attack to obtain unauthorized access to user accounts. The default Okta authentication policy ensures that a user account is locked out after 10 failed authentication attempts. |[Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Okta] |8.10.0 |208
 
+|<<authentication-via-unusual-pam-grantor, Authentication via Unusual PAM Grantor>> |This rule detects successful authentications via PAM grantors that are not commonly used. This could indicate an attacker is attempting to escalate privileges or maintain persistence on the system by modifying the default PAM configuration. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |8.6.0 |1
+
 |<<authorization-plugin-modification, Authorization Plugin Modification>> |Authorization plugins are used to extend the authorization services API and implement mechanisms that are not natively supported by the OS, such as multi-factor authentication with third party software. Adversaries may abuse this feature to persist and/or collect clear text credentials as they traverse the registered plugins during user logon. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |107
 
 |<<azure-ad-global-administrator-role-assigned, Azure AD Global Administrator Role Assigned>> |In Azure Active Directory (Azure AD), permissions to manage resources are assigned using roles. The Global Administrator is a role that enables users to have access to all administrative features in Azure AD and services that use Azure AD identities like the Microsoft 365 Defender portal, the Microsoft 365 compliance center, Exchange, SharePoint Online, and Skype for Business Online. Attackers can add users as Global Administrators to maintain access and manage all subscriptions and their settings and resources. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Azure], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Persistence] |None |102
@@ -396,9 +420,11 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<creation-or-modification-of-domain-backup-dpapi-private-key, Creation or Modification of Domain Backup DPAPI private key>> |Identifies the creation or modification of Domain Backup private keys. Adversaries may extract the Data Protection API (DPAPI) domain backup key from a Domain Controller (DC) to be able to decrypt any domain user master key file. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon], [Data Source: SentinelOne] |8.11.0 |210
 
+|<<creation-or-modification-of-pluggable-authentication-module-or-configuration, Creation or Modification of Pluggable Authentication Module or Configuration>> |This rule monitors for the creation or modification of Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) shared object files or configuration files. Attackers may create or modify these files to maintain persistence on a compromised system, or harvest account credentials. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |1
+
 |<<creation-or-modification-of-root-certificate, Creation or Modification of Root Certificate>> |Identifies the creation or modification of a local trusted root certificate in Windows. The install of a malicious root certificate would allow an attacker the ability to masquerade malicious files as valid signed components from any entity (for example, Microsoft). It could also allow an attacker to decrypt SSL traffic. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |None |110
 
-|<<creation-or-modification-of-a-new-gpo-scheduled-task-or-service, Creation or Modification of a new GPO Scheduled Task or Service>> |Detects the creation or modification of a new Group Policy based scheduled task or service. These methods are used for legitimate system administration, but can also be abused by an attacker with domain admin permissions to execute a malicious payload remotely on all or a subset of the domain joined machines. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |None |109
+|<<creation-or-modification-of-a-new-gpo-scheduled-task-or-service, Creation or Modification of a new GPO Scheduled Task or Service>> |Detects the creation or modification of a new Group Policy based scheduled task or service. These methods are used for legitimate system administration, but can also be abused by an attacker with domain admin permissions to execute a malicious payload remotely on all or a subset of the domain joined machines. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |None |110
 
 |<<credential-acquisition-via-registry-hive-dumping, Credential Acquisition via Registry Hive Dumping>> |Identifies attempts to export a registry hive which may contain credentials using the Windows reg.exe tool. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |110
 
@@ -410,7 +436,7 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<credential-manipulation-prevented-elastic-endgame, Credential Manipulation - Prevented - Elastic Endgame>> |Elastic Endgame prevented Credential Manipulation. Click the Elastic Endgame icon in the event.module column or the link in the rule.reference column for additional information. |[Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation] |None |103
 
-|<<cron-job-created-or-changed-by-previously-unknown-process, Cron Job Created or Changed by Previously Unknown Process>> |Linux cron jobs are scheduled tasks that can be leveraged by malicious actors for persistence, privilege escalation and command execution. By creating or modifying cron job configurations, attackers can execute malicious commands or scripts at predefined intervals, ensuring their continued presence and enabling unauthorized activities. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |10
+|<<cron-job-created-or-modified, Cron Job Created or Modified>> |This rule monitors for (ana)cron jobs being created or renamed. Linux cron jobs are scheduled tasks that can be leveraged by system administrators to set up scheduled tasks, but may be abused by malicious actors for persistence, privilege escalation and command execution. By creating or modifying cron job configurations, attackers can execute malicious commands or scripts at predefined intervals, ensuring their continued presence and enabling unauthorized activities. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |11
 
 |<<cyberark-privileged-access-security-error, CyberArk Privileged Access Security Error>> |Identifies the occurrence of a CyberArk Privileged Access Security (PAS) error level audit event. The event.code correlates to the CyberArk Vault Audit Action Code. |[Data Source: CyberArk PAS], [Use Case: Log Auditing], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation] |None |102
 
@@ -494,6 +520,8 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<exchange-mailbox-export-via-powershell, Exchange Mailbox Export via PowerShell>> |Identifies the use of the Exchange PowerShell cmdlet, New-MailBoxExportRequest, to export the contents of a primary mailbox or archive to a .pst file. Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Collection], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: PowerShell Logs] |8.12.0 |108
 
+|<<executable-bit-set-for-rc-local-rc-common, Executable Bit Set for rc.local/rc.common>> |This rule monitors for the addition of an executable bit of the `/etc/rc.local` or `/etc/rc.common` files. These files are used to start custom applications, services, scripts or commands during start-up. They require executable permissions to be executed on boot. An alert of this rule is an indicator that this method is being set up within your environment. This method has mostly been replaced by Systemd. However, through the `systemd-rc-local-generator`, these files can be converted to services that run at boot. Adversaries may alter these files to execute malicious code at start-up, and gain persistence onto the system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |1
+
 |<<executable-file-creation-with-multiple-extensions, Executable File Creation with Multiple Extensions>> |Masquerading can allow an adversary to evade defenses and better blend in with the environment. One way it occurs is when the name or location of a file is manipulated as a means of tricking a user into executing what they think is a benign file type but is actually executable code. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |None |108
 
 |<<executable-file-with-unusual-extension, Executable File with Unusual Extension>> |Identifies the creation or modification of an executable file with an unexpected file extension. Attackers may attempt to evade detection by masquerading files using the file extension values used by image, audio, or document file types. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |2
@@ -592,7 +620,7 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<first-occurrence-of-user-agent-for-a-github-user, First Occurrence of User-Agent For a GitHub User>> |Detects a new user agent used for a GitHub user not previously seen in the last 14 days. |[Domain: Cloud], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Use Case: UEBA], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Github] |None |1
 
-|<<first-time-seen-aws-secret-value-accessed-in-secrets-manager, First Time Seen AWS Secret Value Accessed in Secrets Manager>> |An adversary with access to a compromised AWS service such as an EC2 instance, Lambda function, or other service may attempt to leverage the compromised service to access secrets in AWS Secrets Manager. This rule looks for the first time a specific user identity has programmatically retrieved a specific secret value from Secrets Manager using the `GetSecretValue` action. This rule assumes that AWS services such as Lambda functions and EC2 instances are setup with IAM role's assigned that have the necessary permissions to access the secrets in Secrets Manager. An adversary with access to a compromised AWS service such as an EC2 instance, Lambda function, or other service would rely on the compromised service's IAM role to access the secrets in Secrets Manager. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |None |311
+|<<first-time-seen-aws-secret-value-accessed-in-secrets-manager, First Time Seen AWS Secret Value Accessed in Secrets Manager>> |An adversary with access to a compromised AWS service such as an EC2 instance, Lambda function, or other service may attempt to leverage the compromised service to access secrets in AWS Secrets Manager. This rule looks for the first time a specific user identity has programmatically retrieved a secret value from Secrets Manager using the `GetSecretValue` or `BatchGetSecretValue` actions. This rule assumes that AWS services such as Lambda functions and EC2 instances are setup with IAM role's assigned that have the necessary permissions to access the secrets in Secrets Manager. An adversary with access to a compromised AWS service such as an EC2 instance, Lambda function, or other service would rely on the compromised service's IAM role to access the secrets in Secrets Manager. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Data Source: AWS Secrets Manager], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.9.0 |312
 
 |<<first-time-seen-commonly-abused-remote-access-tool-execution, First Time Seen Commonly Abused Remote Access Tool Execution>> |Adversaries may install legitimate remote access tools (RAT) to compromised endpoints for further command-and-control (C2). Adversaries can rely on installed RATs for persistence, execution of native commands and more. This rule detects when a process is started whose name or code signature resembles commonly abused RATs. This is a New Terms rule type indicating the host has not seen this RAT process started before within the last 30 days. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |None |5
 
@@ -704,7 +732,7 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<google-workspace-user-organizational-unit-changed, Google Workspace User Organizational Unit Changed>> |Users in Google Workspace are typically assigned a specific organizational unit that grants them permissions to certain services and roles that are inherited from this organizational unit. Adversaries may compromise a valid account and change which organizational account the user belongs to which then could allow them to inherit permissions to applications and resources inaccessible prior to. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Google Workspace], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Persistence], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |None |106
 
-|<<group-policy-abuse-for-privilege-addition, Group Policy Abuse for Privilege Addition>> |Detects the first occurrence of a modification to Group Policy Object Attributes to add privileges to user accounts or use them to add users as local admins. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Active Directory], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring] |None |109
+|<<group-policy-abuse-for-privilege-addition, Group Policy Abuse for Privilege Addition>> |Detects the first occurrence of a modification to Group Policy Object Attributes to add privileges to user accounts or use them to add users as local admins. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Active Directory], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring] |None |110
 
 |<<group-policy-discovery-via-microsoft-gpresult-utility, Group Policy Discovery via Microsoft GPResult Utility>> |Detects the usage of gpresult.exe to query group policy objects. Attackers may query group policy objects during the reconnaissance phase after compromising a system to gain a better understanding of the active directory environment and possible methods to escalate privileges or move laterally. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |8
 
@@ -860,15 +888,15 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<macos-installer-package-spawns-network-event, MacOS Installer Package Spawns Network Event>> |Detects the execution of a MacOS installer package with an abnormal child process (e.g bash) followed immediately by a network connection via a suspicious process (e.g curl). Threat actors will build and distribute malicious MacOS installer packages, which have a .pkg extension, many times imitating valid software in order to persuade and infect their victims often using the package files (e.g pre/post install scripts etc.) to download additional tools or malicious software. If this rule fires it should indicate the installation of a malicious or suspicious package. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |107
 
-|<<machine-learning-detected-dga-activity-using-a-known-sunburst-dns-domain, Machine Learning Detected DGA activity using a known SUNBURST DNS domain>> |A supervised machine learning model has identified a DNS question name that used by the SUNBURST malware and is predicted to be the result of a Domain Generation Algorithm. |[Domain: Network], [Domain: Endpoint], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Use Case: Domain Generation Algorithm Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Command and Control] |None |4
+|<<machine-learning-detected-dga-activity-using-a-known-sunburst-dns-domain, Machine Learning Detected DGA activity using a known SUNBURST DNS domain>> |A supervised machine learning model has identified a DNS question name that used by the SUNBURST malware and is predicted to be the result of a Domain Generation Algorithm. |[Domain: Network], [Domain: Endpoint], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Use Case: Domain Generation Algorithm Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Command and Control] |None |5
 
-|<<machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-predicted-to-be-a-dga-domain, Machine Learning Detected a DNS Request Predicted to be a DGA Domain>> |A supervised machine learning model has identified a DNS question name that is predicted to be the result of a Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA), which could indicate command and control network activity. |[Domain: Network], [Domain: Endpoint], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Use Case: Domain Generation Algorithm Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Command and Control] |None |4
+|<<machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-predicted-to-be-a-dga-domain, Machine Learning Detected a DNS Request Predicted to be a DGA Domain>> |A supervised machine learning model has identified a DNS question name that is predicted to be the result of a Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA), which could indicate command and control network activity. |[Domain: Network], [Domain: Endpoint], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Use Case: Domain Generation Algorithm Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Command and Control] |None |5
 
-|<<machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-with-a-high-dga-probability-score, Machine Learning Detected a DNS Request With a High DGA Probability Score>> |A supervised machine learning model has identified a DNS question name with a high probability of sourcing from a Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA), which could indicate command and control network activity. |[Domain: Network], [Domain: Endpoint], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Use Case: Domain Generation Algorithm Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Command and Control] |None |4
+|<<machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-with-a-high-dga-probability-score, Machine Learning Detected a DNS Request With a High DGA Probability Score>> |A supervised machine learning model has identified a DNS question name with a high probability of sourcing from a Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA), which could indicate command and control network activity. |[Domain: Network], [Domain: Endpoint], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Use Case: Domain Generation Algorithm Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Command and Control] |None |5
 
-|<<machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-predicted-to-be-malicious-activity, Machine Learning Detected a Suspicious Windows Event Predicted to be Malicious Activity>> |A supervised machine learning model (ProblemChild) has identified a suspicious Windows process event with high probability of it being malicious activity. Alternatively, the model's blocklist identified the event as being malicious. |[OS: Windows], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Use Case: Living off the Land Attack Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |None |5
+|<<machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-predicted-to-be-malicious-activity, Machine Learning Detected a Suspicious Windows Event Predicted to be Malicious Activity>> |A supervised machine learning model (ProblemChild) has identified a suspicious Windows process event with high probability of it being malicious activity. Alternatively, the model's blocklist identified the event as being malicious. |[OS: Windows], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Use Case: Living off the Land Attack Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |None |6
 
-|<<machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-with-a-high-malicious-probability-score, Machine Learning Detected a Suspicious Windows Event with a High Malicious Probability Score>> |A supervised machine learning model (ProblemChild) has identified a suspicious Windows process event with high probability of it being malicious activity. Alternatively, the model's blocklist identified the event as being malicious. |[OS: Windows], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Use Case: Living off the Land Attack Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |None |5
+|<<machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-with-a-high-malicious-probability-score, Machine Learning Detected a Suspicious Windows Event with a High Malicious Probability Score>> |A supervised machine learning model (ProblemChild) has identified a suspicious Windows process event with high probability of it being malicious activity. Alternatively, the model's blocklist identified the event as being malicious. |[OS: Windows], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Use Case: Living off the Land Attack Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |None |6
 
 |<<malware-detected-elastic-endgame, Malware - Detected - Elastic Endgame>> |Elastic Endgame detected Malware. Click the Elastic Endgame icon in the event.module column or the link in the rule.reference column for additional information. |[Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |None |103
 
@@ -880,6 +908,8 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<memory-dump-file-with-unusual-extension, Memory Dump File with Unusual Extension>> |Identifies the creation of a memory dump file with an unusual extension, which can indicate an attempt to disguise a memory dump as another file type to bypass security defenses. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Rule Type: BBR] |None |2
 
+|<<message-of-the-day-motd-file-creation, Message-of-the-Day (MOTD) File Creation>> |This rule detects the creation of potentially malicious files within the default MOTD file directories. Message of the day (MOTD) is the message that is presented to the user when a user connects to a Linux server via SSH or a serial connection. Linux systems contain several default MOTD files located in the "/etc/update-motd.d/" directory. These scripts run as the root user every time a user connects over SSH or a serial connection. Adversaries may create malicious MOTD files that grant them persistence onto the target every time a user connects to the system by executing a backdoor script or command. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |11
+
 |<<microsoft-365-exchange-anti-phish-policy-deletion, Microsoft 365 Exchange Anti-Phish Policy Deletion>> |Identifies the deletion of an anti-phishing policy in Microsoft 365. By default, Microsoft 365 includes built-in features that help protect users from phishing attacks. Anti-phishing polices increase this protection by refining settings to better detect and prevent attacks. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Initial Access] |None |206
 
 |<<microsoft-365-exchange-anti-phish-rule-modification, Microsoft 365 Exchange Anti-Phish Rule Modification>> |Identifies the modification of an anti-phishing rule in Microsoft 365. By default, Microsoft 365 includes built-in features that help protect users from phishing attacks. Anti-phishing rules increase this protection by refining settings to better detect and prevent attacks. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Initial Access] |None |206
@@ -1014,6 +1044,8 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<network-activity-detected-via-cat, Network Activity Detected via cat>> |This rule monitors for the execution of the cat command, followed by a connection attempt by the same process. Cat is capable of transfering data via tcp/udp channels by redirecting its read output to a /dev/tcp or /dev/udp channel. This activity is highly suspicious, and should be investigated. Attackers may leverage this capability to transfer tools or files to another host in the network or exfiltrate data while attempting to evade detection in the process. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |6
 
+|<<network-connection-initiated-by-sshd-child-process, Network Connection Initiated by SSHD Child Process>> |This rule identifies an egress internet connection initiated by an SSH Daemon child process. This behavior is indicative of the alteration of a shell configuration file or other mechanism that launches a process when a new SSH login occurs. Attackers can also backdoor the SSH daemon to allow for persistence, call out to a C2 or to steal credentials. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |1
+
 |<<network-connection-from-binary-with-rwx-memory-region, Network Connection from Binary with RWX Memory Region>> |Monitors for the execution of a unix binary with read, write and execute memory region permissions, followed by a network connection. The mprotect() system call is used to change the access protections on a region of memory that has already been allocated. This syscall allows a process to modify the permissions of pages in its virtual address space, enabling or disabling permissions such as read, write, and execute for those pages. RWX permissions on memory is in many cases overly permissive, and should (especially in conjunction with an outbound network connection) be analyzed thoroughly. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |None |1
 
 |<<network-connection-via-certutil, Network Connection via Certutil>> |Identifies certutil.exe making a network connection. Adversaries could abuse certutil.exe to download a certificate, or malware, from a remote URL. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |None |111
@@ -1028,6 +1060,8 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<network-connection-via-signed-binary, Network Connection via Signed Binary>> |Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates can execute on Windows systems protected by digital signature validation. Adversaries may use these binaries to 'live off the land' and execute malicious files that could bypass application allowlists and signature validation. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |None |108
 
+|<<network-connections-initiated-through-xdg-autostart-entry, Network Connections Initiated Through XDG Autostart Entry>> |Detects network connections initiated through Cross-Desktop Group (XDG) autostart entries for GNOME and XFCE-based Linux distributions. XDG Autostart entries can be used to execute arbitrary commands or scripts when a user logs in. This rule helps to identify potential malicious activity where an attacker may have modified XDG autostart scripts to establish persistence on the system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |1
+
 |<<network-logon-provider-registry-modification, Network Logon Provider Registry Modification>> |Identifies the modification of the network logon provider registry. Adversaries may register a rogue network logon provider module for persistence and/or credential access via intercepting the authentication credentials in clear text during user logon. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |None |109
 
 |<<network-traffic-capture-via-cap-net-raw, Network Traffic Capture via CAP_NET_RAW>> |Identifies the ability of a process to be able to create RAW and PACKET socket types for the available network namespaces by a non-root user. A malicious process with this capability may exploit routing between hosts, bypass network access controls, and otherwise tamper with host networking if a firewall is not in place to limit the packet types and contents. The CAP_NET_RAW capability allows the process to bind to any address within the available namespaces, which allows network traffic sniffing by a non root user. The rule identifies previously unknown processes executing with CAP_NET_RAW capabilities through the use of the new terms rule type. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.11.0 |2
@@ -1046,13 +1080,9 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<new-okta-identity-provider-idp-added-by-admin, New Okta Identity Provider (IdP) Added by Admin>> |Detects the creation of a new Identity Provider (IdP) by a Super Administrator or Organization Administrator within Okta. |[Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Okta] |8.10.0 |1
 
-|<<new-systemd-service-created-by-previously-unknown-process, New Systemd Service Created by Previously Unknown Process>> |Systemd service files are configuration files in Linux systems used to define and manage system services. Malicious actors can leverage systemd service files to achieve persistence by creating or modifying service files to execute malicious commands or payloads during system startup. This allows them to maintain unauthorized access, execute additional malicious activities, or evade detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |10
-
-|<<new-systemd-timer-created, New Systemd Timer Created>> |Detects the creation of a systemd timer within any of the default systemd timer directories. Systemd timers can be used by an attacker to gain persistence, by scheduling the execution of a command or script. Similarly to cron/at, systemd timers can be set up to execute on boot time, or on a specific point in time, which allows attackers to regain access in case the connection to the infected asset was lost. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |10
-
 |<<new-user-added-to-github-organization, New User Added To GitHub Organization>> |A new user was added to a GitHub organization. |[Domain: Cloud], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Use Case: UEBA], [Tactic: Persistence], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Github] |None |1
 
-|<<new-or-modified-federation-domain, New or Modified Federation Domain>> |Identifies a new or modified federation domain, which can be used to create a trust between O365 and an external identity provider. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation] |None |206
+|<<new-or-modified-federation-domain, New or Modified Federation Domain>> |Identifies a new or modified federation domain, which can be used to create a trust between O365 and an external identity provider. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation] |None |207
 
 |<<nping-process-activity, Nping Process Activity>> |Nping ran on a Linux host. Nping is part of the Nmap tool suite and has the ability to construct raw packets for a wide variety of security testing applications, including denial of service testing. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |None |108
 
@@ -1170,7 +1200,7 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<potential-cross-site-scripting-xss, Potential Cross Site Scripting (XSS)>> |Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) is a type of attack in which malicious scripts are injected into trusted websites. In XSS attacks, an attacker uses a benign web application to send malicious code, generally in the form of a browser-side script. This detection rule identifies the potential malicious executions of such browser-side scripts. |[Data Source: APM], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Initial Access] |None |1
 
-|<<potential-dga-activity, Potential DGA Activity>> |A population analysis machine learning job detected potential DGA (domain generation algorithm) activity. Such activity is often used by malware command and control (C2) channels. This machine learning job looks for a source IP address making DNS requests that have an aggregate high probability of being DGA activity. |[Use Case: Domain Generation Algorithm Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Command and Control] |None |4
+|<<potential-dga-activity, Potential DGA Activity>> |A population analysis machine learning job detected potential DGA (domain generation algorithm) activity. Such activity is often used by malware command and control (C2) channels. This machine learning job looks for a source IP address making DNS requests that have an aggregate high probability of being DGA activity. |[Use Case: Domain Generation Algorithm Detection], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Tactic: Command and Control] |None |5
 
 |<<potential-dll-side-loading-via-microsoft-antimalware-service-executable, Potential DLL Side-Loading via Microsoft Antimalware Service Executable>> |Identifies a Windows trusted program that is known to be vulnerable to DLL Search Order Hijacking starting after being renamed or from a non-standard path. This is uncommon behavior and may indicate an attempt to evade defenses via side-loading a malicious DLL within the memory space of one of those processes. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |None |110
 
@@ -1248,17 +1278,17 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<potential-local-ntlm-relay-via-http, Potential Local NTLM Relay via HTTP>> |Identifies attempt to coerce a local NTLM authentication via HTTP using the Windows Printer Spooler service as a target. An adversary may use this primitive in combination with other techniques to elevate privileges on a compromised system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |109
 
-|<<potential-masquerading-as-browser-process, Potential Masquerading as Browser Process>> |Identifies suspicious instances of browser processes, such as unsigned or signed with unusual certificates, that can indicate an attempt to conceal malicious activity, bypass security features such as allowlists, or trick users into executing malware. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Persistence], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |4
+|<<potential-masquerading-as-browser-process, Potential Masquerading as Browser Process>> |Identifies suspicious instances of browser processes, such as unsigned or signed with unusual certificates, that can indicate an attempt to conceal malicious activity, bypass security features such as allowlists, or trick users into executing malware. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Persistence], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |5
 
 |<<potential-masquerading-as-business-app-installer, Potential Masquerading as Business App Installer>> |Identifies executables with names resembling legitimate business applications but lacking signatures from the original developer. Attackers may trick users into downloading malicious executables that masquerade as legitimate applications via malicious ads, forum posts, and tutorials, effectively gaining initial access. |[Domain: Endpoint], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Tactic: Execution] |None |4
 
-|<<potential-masquerading-as-communication-apps, Potential Masquerading as Communication Apps>> |Identifies suspicious instances of communications apps, both unsigned and renamed ones, that can indicate an attempt to conceal malicious activity, bypass security features such as allowlists, or trick users into executing malware. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |5
+|<<potential-masquerading-as-communication-apps, Potential Masquerading as Communication Apps>> |Identifies suspicious instances of communications apps, both unsigned and renamed ones, that can indicate an attempt to conceal malicious activity, bypass security features such as allowlists, or trick users into executing malware. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |6
 
-|<<potential-masquerading-as-system32-dll, Potential Masquerading as System32 DLL>> |Identifies suspicious instances of default system32 DLLs either unsigned or signed with non-MS certificates. This can potentially indicate the attempt to masquerade as system DLLs, perform DLL Search Order Hijacking or backdoor and resign legitimate DLLs. |[Domain: Endpoint], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Persistence], [Rule Type: BBR] |None |104
+|<<potential-masquerading-as-system32-dll, Potential Masquerading as System32 DLL>> |Identifies suspicious instances of default system32 DLLs either unsigned or signed with non-MS certificates. This can potentially indicate the attempt to masquerade as system DLLs, perform DLL Search Order Hijacking or backdoor and resign legitimate DLLs. |[Domain: Endpoint], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Persistence], [Rule Type: BBR] |None |105
 
-|<<potential-masquerading-as-system32-executable, Potential Masquerading as System32 Executable>> |Identifies suspicious instances of default system32 executables, either unsigned or signed with non-MS certificates. This could indicate the attempt to masquerade as system executables or backdoored and resigned legitimate executables. |[Domain: Endpoint], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Persistence], [Rule Type: BBR] |None |4
+|<<potential-masquerading-as-system32-executable, Potential Masquerading as System32 Executable>> |Identifies suspicious instances of default system32 executables, either unsigned or signed with non-MS certificates. This could indicate the attempt to masquerade as system executables or backdoored and resigned legitimate executables. |[Domain: Endpoint], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Persistence], [Rule Type: BBR] |None |5
 
-|<<potential-masquerading-as-vlc-dll, Potential Masquerading as VLC DLL>> |Identifies instances of VLC-related DLLs which are not signed by the original developer. Attackers may name their payload as legitimate applications to blend into the environment, or embedding its malicious code within legitimate applications to deceive machine learning algorithms by incorporating authentic and benign code. |[Domain: Endpoint], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Persistence], [Rule Type: BBR] |None |3
+|<<potential-masquerading-as-vlc-dll, Potential Masquerading as VLC DLL>> |Identifies instances of VLC-related DLLs which are not signed by the original developer. Attackers may name their payload as legitimate applications to blend into the environment, or embedding its malicious code within legitimate applications to deceive machine learning algorithms by incorporating authentic and benign code. |[Domain: Endpoint], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Persistence], [Rule Type: BBR] |None |4
 
 |<<potential-memory-seeking-activity, Potential Memory Seeking Activity>> |Monitors for the execution of Unix utilities that may be leveraged as memory address seekers. Attackers may leverage built-in utilities to seek specific memory addresses, allowing for potential future manipulation/exploitation. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |None |2
 
@@ -1282,7 +1312,7 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<potential-okta-mfa-bombing-via-push-notifications, Potential Okta MFA Bombing via Push Notifications>> |Detects when an attacker abuses the Multi-Factor authentication mechanism by repeatedly issuing login requests until the user eventually accepts the Okta push notification. An adversary may attempt to bypass the Okta MFA policies configured for an organization to obtain unauthorized access. |[Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Okta] |8.10.0 |3
 
-|<<potential-openssh-backdoor-logging-activity, Potential OpenSSH Backdoor Logging Activity>> |Identifies a Secure Shell (SSH) client or server process creating or writing to a known SSH backdoor log file. Adversaries may modify SSH related binaries for persistence or credential access via patching sensitive functions to enable unauthorized access or to log SSH credentials for exfiltration. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |109
+|<<potential-openssh-backdoor-logging-activity, Potential OpenSSH Backdoor Logging Activity>> |Identifies a Secure Shell (SSH) client or server process creating or writing to a known SSH backdoor log file. Adversaries may modify SSH related binaries for persistence or credential access via patching sensitive functions to enable unauthorized access or to log SSH credentials for exfiltration. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |110
 
 |<<potential-outgoing-rdp-connection-by-unusual-process, Potential Outgoing RDP Connection by Unusual Process>> |Adversaries may attempt to connect to a remote system over Windows Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) to achieve lateral movement. Adversaries may avoid using the Microsoft Terminal Services Client (mstsc.exe) binary to establish an RDP connection to evade detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |3
 
@@ -1290,16 +1320,14 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<potential-password-spraying-of-microsoft-365-user-accounts, Potential Password Spraying of Microsoft 365 User Accounts>> |Identifies a high number (25) of failed Microsoft 365 user authentication attempts from a single IP address within 30 minutes, which could be indicative of a password spraying attack. An adversary may attempt a password spraying attack to obtain unauthorized access to user accounts. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Microsoft 365], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Credential Access] |None |207
 
-|<<potential-persistence-through-motd-file-creation-detected, Potential Persistence Through MOTD File Creation Detected>> |Message of the day (MOTD) is the message that is presented to the user when a user connects to a Linux server via SSH or a serial connection. Linux systems contain several default MOTD files located in the "/etc/update-motd.d/" and "/usr/lib/update-notifier/" directories. These scripts run as the root user every time a user connects over SSH or a serial connection. Adversaries may create malicious MOTD files that grant them persistence onto the target every time a user connects to the system by executing a backdoor script or command. This rule detects the creation of potentially malicious files within the default MOTD file directories. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |10
-
 |<<potential-persistence-through-run-control-detected, Potential Persistence Through Run Control Detected>> |This rule monitors the creation/alteration of the rc.local file by a previously unknown process executable through the use of the new terms rule type. The /etc/rc.local file is used to start custom applications, services, scripts or commands during start-up. The rc.local file has mostly been replaced by Systemd. However, through the "systemd-rc-local-generator", rc.local files can be converted to services that run at boot. Adversaries may alter rc.local to execute malicious code at start-up, and gain persistence onto the system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |111
 
-|<<potential-persistence-through-systemd-udevd, Potential Persistence Through Systemd-udevd>> |Monitors for the creation of rule files that are used by systemd-udevd to manage device nodes and handle kernel device events in the Linux operating system. Systemd-udevd can be exploited for persistence by adversaries by creating malicious udev rules that trigger on specific events, executing arbitrary commands or payloads whenever a certain device is plugged in or recognized by the system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |3
-
 |<<potential-persistence-through-init-d-detected, Potential Persistence Through init.d Detected>> |Files that are placed in the /etc/init.d/ directory in Unix can be used to start custom applications, services, scripts or commands during start-up. Init.d has been mostly replaced in favor of Systemd. However, the "systemd-sysv-generator" can convert init.d files to service unit files that run at boot. Adversaries may add or alter files located in the /etc/init.d/ directory to execute malicious code upon boot in order to gain persistence on the system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |10
 
 |<<potential-persistence-via-atom-init-script-modification, Potential Persistence via Atom Init Script Modification>> |Identifies modifications to the Atom desktop text editor Init File. Adversaries may add malicious JavaScript code to the init.coffee file that will be executed upon the Atom application opening. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |106
 
+|<<potential-persistence-via-file-modification, Potential Persistence via File Modification>> |This rule leverages the File Integrity Monitoring (FIM) integration to detect file modifications of files that are commonly used for persistence on Linux systems. The rule detects modifications to files that are commonly used for cron jobs, systemd services, message-of-the-day (MOTD), SSH configurations, shell configurations, runtime control, init daemon, passwd/sudoers/shadow files, Systemd udevd, and XDG/KDE autostart entries. To leverage this rule, the paths specified in the query need to be added to the FIM policy in the Elastic Security app. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: File Integrity Monitoring] |None |1
+
 |<<potential-persistence-via-login-hook, Potential Persistence via Login Hook>> |Identifies the creation or modification of the login window property list (plist). Adversaries may modify plist files to run a program during system boot or user login for persistence. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |108
 
 |<<potential-persistence-via-periodic-tasks, Potential Persistence via Periodic Tasks>> |Identifies the creation or modification of the default configuration for periodic tasks. Adversaries may abuse periodic tasks to execute malicious code or maintain persistence. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |106
@@ -1406,7 +1434,7 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<potential-successful-ssh-brute-force-attack, Potential Successful SSH Brute Force Attack>> |Identifies multiple SSH login failures followed by a successful one from the same source address. Adversaries can attempt to login into multiple users with a common or known password to gain access to accounts. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access] |None |11
 
-|<<potential-sudo-hijacking-detected, Potential Sudo Hijacking Detected>> |Identifies the creation of a sudo binary located at /usr/bin/sudo. Attackers may hijack the default sudo binary and replace it with a custom binary or script that can read the user's password in clear text to escalate privileges or enable persistence onto the system every time the sudo binary is executed. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |105
+|<<potential-sudo-hijacking, Potential Sudo Hijacking>> |Identifies the creation of a sudo binary located at /usr/bin/sudo. Attackers may hijack the default sudo binary and replace it with a custom binary or script that can read the user's password in clear text to escalate privileges or enable persistence onto the system every time the sudo binary is executed. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |106
 
 |<<potential-sudo-privilege-escalation-via-cve-2019-14287, Potential Sudo Privilege Escalation via CVE-2019-14287>> |This rule monitors for the execution of a suspicious sudo command that is leveraged in CVE-2019-14287 to escalate privileges to root. Sudo does not verify the presence of the designated user ID and proceeds to execute using a user ID that can be chosen arbitrarily. By using the sudo privileges, the command "sudo -u#-1" translates to an ID of 0, representing the root user. This exploit may work for sudo versions prior to v1.28. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |None |4
 
@@ -1506,6 +1534,8 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<process-capability-enumeration, Process Capability Enumeration>> |Identifies recursive process capability enumeration of the entire filesystem through the getcap command. Malicious users may manipulate identified capabilities to gain root privileges. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |8.11.0 |2
 
+|<<process-capability-set-via-setcap-utility, Process Capability Set via setcap Utility>> |This rule detects the use of the setcap utility to set capabilities on a process. The setcap utility is used to set the capabilities of a binary to allow it to perform privileged operations without needing to run as root. This can be used by attackers to establish persistence by creating a backdoor, or escalate privileges by abusing a misconfiguration on a system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |1
+
 |<<process-created-with-a-duplicated-token, Process Created with a Duplicated Token>> |Identifies the creation of a process impersonating the token of another user logon session. Adversaries may create a new process with a different token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |3
 
 |<<process-created-with-an-elevated-token, Process Created with an Elevated Token>> |Identifies the creation of a process running as SYSTEM and impersonating a Windows core binary privileges. Adversaries may create a new process with a different token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |6
@@ -1524,6 +1554,8 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<process-injection-by-the-microsoft-build-engine, Process Injection by the Microsoft Build Engine>> |An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, created a thread in another process. This technique is sometimes used to evade detection or elevate privileges. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Sysmon] |None |106
 
+|<<process-spawned-from-message-of-the-day-motd, Process Spawned from Message-of-the-Day (MOTD)>> |Message of the day (MOTD) is the message that is presented to the user when a user connects to a Linux server via SSH or a serial connection. Linux systems contain several default MOTD files located in the "/etc/update-motd.d/" directory. These scripts run as the root user every time a user connects over SSH or a serial connection. Adversaries may create malicious MOTD files that grant them persistence onto the target every time a user connects to the system by executing a backdoor script or command. This rule detects the execution of potentially malicious processes through the MOTD utility. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |10
+
 |<<process-started-from-process-id-pid-file, Process Started from Process ID (PID) File>> |Identifies a new process starting from a process ID (PID), lock or reboot file within the temporary file storage paradigm (tmpfs) directory /var/run directory. On Linux, the PID files typically hold the process ID to track previous copies running and manage other tasks. Certain Linux malware use the /var/run directory for holding data, executables and other tasks, disguising itself or these files as legitimate PID files. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Threat: BPFDoor], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |None |109
 
 |<<process-termination-followed-by-deletion, Process Termination followed by Deletion>> |Identifies a process termination event quickly followed by the deletion of its executable file. Malware tools and other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave traces to indicate to what occurred. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |109
@@ -1556,6 +1588,8 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<ransomware-prevented-elastic-endgame, Ransomware - Prevented - Elastic Endgame>> |Elastic Endgame prevented ransomware. Click the Elastic Endgame icon in the event.module column or the link in the rule.reference column for additional information. |[Data Source: Elastic Endgame] |None |103
 
+|<<rapid-secret-retrieval-attempts-from-aws-secretsmanager, Rapid Secret Retrieval Attempts from AWS SecretsManager>> |This rule attempts to identify rapid secret retrieval attempts from AWS SecretsManager. Adversaries may attempt to retrieve secrets from the Secrets Manager programmatically using the `GetSecretValue` or `BatchGetSecretValue` API actions. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Data Source: AWS Secrets Manager], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.9.0 |1
+
 |<<rare-aws-error-code, Rare AWS Error Code>> |A machine learning job detected an unusual error in a CloudTrail message. These can be byproducts of attempted or successful persistence, privilege escalation, defense evasion, discovery, lateral movement, or collection. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Rule Type: ML], [Rule Type: Machine Learning], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |None |208
 
 |<<rare-smb-connection-to-the-internet, Rare SMB Connection to the Internet>> |This rule detects rare internet network connections via the SMB protocol. SMB is commonly used to leak NTLM credentials via rogue UNC path injection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Exfiltration], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |None |3
@@ -1620,6 +1654,8 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<ssh-connection-established-inside-a-running-container, SSH Connection Established Inside A Running Container>> |This rule detects an incoming SSH connection established inside a running container. Running an ssh daemon inside a container should be avoided and monitored closely if necessary. If an attacker gains valid credentials they can use it to gain initial access or establish persistence within a compromised environment. |[Data Source: Elastic Defend for Containers], [Domain: Container], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Tactic: Lateral Movement] |None |2
 
+|<<ssh-key-generated-via-ssh-keygen, SSH Key Generated via ssh-keygen>> |This rule identifies the creation of SSH keys using the ssh-keygen tool, which is the standard utility for generating SSH keys. Users often create SSH keys for authentication with remote services. However, threat actors can exploit this tool to move laterally across a network or maintain persistence by generating unauthorized SSH keys, granting them SSH access to systems. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |1
+
 |<<ssh-process-launched-from-inside-a-container, SSH Process Launched From Inside A Container>> |This rule detects an SSH or SSHD process executed from inside a container. This includes both the client ssh binary and server ssh daemon process. SSH usage inside a container should be avoided and monitored closely when necessary. With valid credentials an attacker may move laterally to other containers or to the underlying host through container breakout. They may also use valid SSH credentials as a persistence mechanism. |[Data Source: Elastic Defend for Containers], [Domain: Container], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Tactic: Persistence] |None |2
 
 |<<ssm-session-started-to-ec2-instance, SSM Session Started to EC2 Instance>> |Identifies the first occurrence of an AWS resource establishing a session via SSM to an EC2 instance. Adversaries may use AWS Systems Manager to establish a session to an EC2 instance to execute commands on the instance. This can be used to gain access to the instance and perform actions such as privilege escalation. This rule helps detect the first occurrence of this activity for a given AWS resource. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Data Source: AWS SSM], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement] |8.9.0 |1
@@ -1630,7 +1666,7 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<scheduled-task-created-by-a-windows-script, Scheduled Task Created by a Windows Script>> |A scheduled task was created by a Windows script via cscript.exe, wscript.exe or powershell.exe. This can be abused by an adversary to establish persistence. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |None |107
 
-|<<scheduled-task-execution-at-scale-via-gpo, Scheduled Task Execution at Scale via GPO>> |Detects the modification of Group Policy Object attributes to execute a scheduled task in the objects controlled by the GPO. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Active Directory], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring] |None |110
+|<<scheduled-task-execution-at-scale-via-gpo, Scheduled Task Execution at Scale via GPO>> |Detects the modification of Group Policy Object attributes to execute a scheduled task in the objects controlled by the GPO. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Active Directory], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring] |None |111
 
 |<<scheduled-tasks-at-command-enabled, Scheduled Tasks AT Command Enabled>> |Identifies attempts to enable the Windows scheduled tasks AT command via the registry. Attackers may use this method to move laterally or persist locally. The AT command has been deprecated since Windows 8 and Windows Server 2012, but still exists for backwards compatibility. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |None |109
 
@@ -1676,7 +1712,7 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<shared-object-created-or-changed-by-previously-unknown-process, Shared Object Created or Changed by Previously Unknown Process>> |This rule monitors the creation of shared object files by previously unknown processes. The creation of a shared object file involves compiling code into a dynamically linked library that can be loaded by other programs at runtime. While this process is typically used for legitimate purposes, malicious actors can leverage shared object files to execute unauthorized code, inject malicious functionality into legitimate processes, or bypass security controls. This allows malware to persist on the system, evade detection, and potentially compromise the integrity and confidentiality of the affected system and its data. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |8
 
-|<<shell-configuration-modification, Shell Configuration Modification>> |This rule monitors the creation/alteration of a shell configuration by a previously unknown process executable using the new terms rule type. Unix systems use shell configuration files to set environment variables, create aliases, and customize the user's environment. Adversaries may modify or add a shell configuration file to execute malicious code and gain persistence in the system. This behavior is consistent with the Kaiji malware family. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |1
+|<<shell-configuration-creation-or-modification, Shell Configuration Creation or Modification>> |This rule monitors the creation/alteration of a shell configuration file. Unix systems use shell configuration files to set environment variables, create aliases, and customize the user's environment. Adversaries may modify or add a shell configuration file to execute malicious code and gain persistence in the system. This behavior is consistent with the Kaiji malware family. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |2
 
 |<<shell-execution-via-apple-scripting, Shell Execution via Apple Scripting>> |Identifies the execution of the shell process (sh) via scripting (JXA or AppleScript). Adversaries may use the doShellScript functionality in JXA or do shell script in AppleScript to execute system commands. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |107
 
@@ -1720,15 +1756,15 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<startup-or-run-key-registry-modification, Startup or Run Key Registry Modification>> |Identifies run key or startup key registry modifications. In order to survive reboots and other system interrupts, attackers will modify run keys within the registry or leverage startup folder items as a form of persistence. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |111
 
-|<<startup-logon-script-added-to-group-policy-object, Startup/Logon Script added to Group Policy Object>> |Detects the modification of Group Policy Objects (GPO) to add a startup/logon script to users or computer objects. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Active Directory], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring] |None |109
+|<<startup-logon-script-added-to-group-policy-object, Startup/Logon Script added to Group Policy Object>> |Detects the modification of Group Policy Objects (GPO) to add a startup/logon script to users or computer objects. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Active Directory], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring] |None |110
 
-|<<statistical-model-detected-c2-beaconing-activity, Statistical Model Detected C2 Beaconing Activity>> |A statistical model has identified command-and-control (C2) beaconing activity. Beaconing can help attackers maintain stealthy communication with their C2 servers, receive instructions and payloads, exfiltrate data and maintain persistence in a network. |[Domain: Network], [Use Case: C2 Beaconing Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control] |8.10.1 |5
+|<<statistical-model-detected-c2-beaconing-activity, Statistical Model Detected C2 Beaconing Activity>> |A statistical model has identified command-and-control (C2) beaconing activity. Beaconing can help attackers maintain stealthy communication with their C2 servers, receive instructions and payloads, exfiltrate data and maintain persistence in a network. |[Domain: Network], [Use Case: C2 Beaconing Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control] |8.10.1 |6
 
 |<<statistical-model-detected-c2-beaconing-activity-with-high-confidence, Statistical Model Detected C2 Beaconing Activity with High Confidence>> |A statistical model has identified command-and-control (C2) beaconing activity with high confidence. Beaconing can help attackers maintain stealthy communication with their C2 servers, receive instructions and payloads, exfiltrate data and maintain persistence in a network. |[Domain: Network], [Use Case: C2 Beaconing Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control] |8.10.1 |5
 
 |<<stolen-credentials-used-to-login-to-okta-account-after-mfa-reset, Stolen Credentials Used to Login to Okta Account After MFA Reset>> |Detects a sequence of suspicious activities on Windows hosts indicative of credential compromise, followed by efforts to undermine multi-factor authentication (MFA) and single sign-on (SSO) mechanisms for an Okta user account. |[Tactic: Persistence], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Data Source: Okta], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Rule Type: Higher-Order Rule], [Domain: Endpoint], [Domain: Cloud] |8.10.0 |1
 
-|<<sublime-plugin-or-application-script-modification, Sublime Plugin or Application Script Modification>> |Adversaries may create or modify the Sublime application plugins or scripts to execute a malicious payload each time the Sublime application is started. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |107
+|<<sublime-plugin-or-application-script-modification, Sublime Plugin or Application Script Modification>> |Adversaries may create or modify the Sublime application plugins or scripts to execute a malicious payload each time the Sublime application is started. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |108
 
 |<<sudo-command-enumeration-detected, Sudo Command Enumeration Detected>> |This rule monitors for the usage of the sudo -l command, which is used to list the allowed and forbidden commands for the invoking user. Attackers may execute this command to enumerate commands allowed to be executed with sudo permissions, potentially allowing to escalate privileges to root. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |5
 
@@ -1764,7 +1800,7 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<suspicious-cmd-execution-via-wmi, Suspicious Cmd Execution via WMI>> |Identifies suspicious command execution (cmd) via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) on a remote host. This could be indicative of adversary lateral movement. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |111
 
-|<<suspicious-communication-app-child-process, Suspicious Communication App Child Process>> |Identifies suspicious child processes of communications apps, which can indicate a potential masquerading as the communication app or the exploitation of a vulnerability on the application causing it to execute code. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Persistence], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |4
+|<<suspicious-communication-app-child-process, Suspicious Communication App Child Process>> |Identifies suspicious child processes of communications apps, which can indicate a potential masquerading as the communication app or the exploitation of a vulnerability on the application causing it to execute code. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Tactic: Persistence], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |5
 
 |<<suspicious-content-extracted-or-decompressed-via-funzip, Suspicious Content Extracted or Decompressed via Funzip>> |Identifies when suspicious content is extracted from a file and subsequently decompressed using the funzip utility. Malware may execute the tail utility using the "-c" option to read a sequence of bytes from the end of a file. The output from tail can be piped to funzip in order to decompress malicious code before it is executed. This behavior is consistent with malware families such as Bundlore. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |5
 
@@ -1878,8 +1914,6 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<suspicious-process-execution-via-renamed-psexec-executable, Suspicious Process Execution via Renamed PsExec Executable>> |Identifies suspicious psexec activity which is executing from the psexec service that has been renamed, possibly to evade detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |None |111
 
-|<<suspicious-process-spawned-from-motd-detected, Suspicious Process Spawned from MOTD Detected>> |Message of the day (MOTD) is the message that is presented to the user when a user connects to a Linux server via SSH or a serial connection. Linux systems contain several default MOTD files located in the "/etc/update-motd.d/" and "/usr/lib/update-notifier/" directories. These scripts run as the root user every time a user connects over SSH or a serial connection. Adversaries may create malicious MOTD files that grant them persistence onto the target every time a user connects to the system by executing a backdoor script or command. This rule detects the execution of potentially malicious processes through the MOTD utility. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |9
-
 |<<suspicious-rdp-activex-client-loaded, Suspicious RDP ActiveX Client Loaded>> |Identifies suspicious Image Loading of the Remote Desktop Services ActiveX Client (mstscax), this may indicate the presence of RDP lateral movement capability. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Sysmon] |None |109
 
 |<<suspicious-remote-registry-access-via-sebackupprivilege, Suspicious Remote Registry Access via SeBackupPrivilege>> |Identifies remote access to the registry using an account with Backup Operators group membership. This may indicate an attempt to exfiltrate credentials by dumping the Security Account Manager (SAM) registry hive in preparation for credential access and privileges elevation. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring], [Data Source: Active Directory] |None |110
@@ -1936,7 +1970,7 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<symbolic-link-to-shadow-copy-created, Symbolic Link to Shadow Copy Created>> |Identifies the creation of symbolic links to a shadow copy. Symbolic links can be used to access files in the shadow copy, including sensitive files such as ntds.dit, System Boot Key and browser offline credentials. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |111
 
-|<<system-binary-copied-and-or-moved-to-suspicious-directory, System Binary Copied and/or Moved to Suspicious Directory>> |This rule monitors for the copying or moving of a system binary to a suspicious directory. Adversaries may copy/move and rename system binaries to evade detection. Copying a system binary to a different location should not occur often, so if it does, the activity should be investigated. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |8
+|<<system-binary-moved-or-copied, System Binary Moved or Copied>> |This rule monitors for the copying or moving of a system binary. Adversaries may copy/move and rename system binaries to evade detection. Copying a system binary to a different location should not occur often, so if it does, the activity should be investigated. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |9
 
 |<<system-hosts-file-access, System Hosts File Access>> |Identifies the use of built-in tools to read the contents of \etc\hosts on a local machine. Attackers may use this data to discover remote machines in an environment that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Rule Type: BBR], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Data Source: Elastic Endgame], [Data Source: Auditd Manager] |None |3
 
@@ -1956,8 +1990,14 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<systemkey-access-via-command-line, SystemKey Access via Command Line>> |Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features, including Wi-Fi and website passwords, secure notes, certificates, and Kerberos. Adversaries may collect the keychain storage data from a system to acquire credentials. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |206
 
+|<<systemd-service-created, Systemd Service Created>> |This rule detects the creation or renaming of a new Systemd file in all of the common Systemd service locations for both root and regular users. Systemd service files are configuration files in Linux systems used to define and manage system services. Malicious actors can leverage systemd service files to achieve persistence by creating or modifying services to execute malicious commands or payloads during system startup or at a predefined interval by adding a systemd timer. This allows them to maintain unauthorized access, execute additional malicious activities, or evade detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |11
+
 |<<systemd-service-started-by-unusual-parent-process, Systemd Service Started by Unusual Parent Process>> |Systemctl is a process used in Linux systems to manage systemd processes through service configuration files. Malicious actors can leverage systemd services to achieve persistence by creating or modifying service files to execute malicious commands or payloads during system startup. This allows them to maintain unauthorized access, execute additional malicious activities, or evade detection. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.4.0 |1
 
+|<<systemd-timer-created, Systemd Timer Created>> |Detects the creation of a systemd timer within any of the default systemd timer directories. Systemd timers can be used by an attacker to gain persistence, by scheduling the execution of a command or script. Similarly to cron/at, systemd timers can be set up to execute on boot time, or on a specific point in time, which allows attackers to regain access in case the connection to the infected asset was lost. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |11
+
+|<<systemd-udevd-rule-file-creation, Systemd-udevd Rule File Creation>> |Monitors for the creation of rule files that are used by systemd-udevd to manage device nodes and handle kernel device events in the Linux operating system. Systemd-udevd can be exploited for persistence by adversaries by creating malicious udev rules that trigger on specific events, executing arbitrary commands or payloads whenever a certain device is plugged in or recognized by the system. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |4
+
 |<<tcc-bypass-via-mounted-apfs-snapshot-access, TCC Bypass via Mounted APFS Snapshot Access>> |Identifies the use of the mount_apfs command to mount the entire file system through Apple File System (APFS) snapshots as read-only and with the noowners flag set. This action enables the adversary to access almost any file in the file system, including all user data and files protected by Apple’s privacy framework (TCC). |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Defense Evasion], [Use Case: Vulnerability], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |None |106
 
 |<<tainted-kernel-module-load, Tainted Kernel Module Load>> |This rule monitors the syslog log file for messages related to instances of a tainted kernel module load. Rootkits often leverage kernel modules as their main defense evasion technique. Detecting tainted kernel module loads is crucial for ensuring system security and integrity, as malicious or unauthorized modules can compromise the kernel and lead to system vulnerabilities or unauthorized access. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |None |4
@@ -2150,7 +2190,7 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`.
 
 |<<user-added-as-owner-for-azure-service-principal, User Added as Owner for Azure Service Principal>> |Identifies when a user is added as an owner for an Azure service principal. The service principal object defines what the application can do in the specific tenant, who can access the application, and what resources the app can access. A service principal object is created when an application is given permission to access resources in a tenant. An adversary may add a user account as an owner for a service principal and use that account in order to define what an application can do in the Azure AD tenant. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: Azure], [Use Case: Configuration Audit], [Tactic: Persistence] |None |102
 
-|<<user-added-to-privileged-group, User Added to Privileged Group>> |Identifies a user being added to a privileged group in Active Directory. Privileged accounts and groups in Active Directory are those to which powerful rights, privileges, and permissions are granted that allow them to perform nearly any action in Active Directory and on domain-joined systems. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring], [Data Source: Active Directory] |None |109
+|<<user-added-to-privileged-group, User Added to Privileged Group>> |Identifies a user being added to a privileged group in Active Directory. Privileged accounts and groups in Active Directory are those to which powerful rights, privileges, and permissions are granted that allow them to perform nearly any action in Active Directory and on domain-joined systems. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring], [Data Source: Active Directory] |None |110
 
 |<<user-account-exposed-to-kerberoasting, User account exposed to Kerberoasting>> |Detects when a user account has the servicePrincipalName attribute modified. Attackers can abuse write privileges over a user to configure Service Principle Names (SPNs) so that they can perform Kerberoasting. Administrators can also configure this for legitimate purposes, exposing the account to Kerberoasting. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Active Directory], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring] |None |109
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-desc-index.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-desc-index.asciidoc
index d9d99c89bc..4948c00d8a 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-desc-index.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-desc-index.asciidoc
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 include::rule-details/a-scheduled-task-was-created.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/a-scheduled-task-was-updated.asciidoc[]
+include::rule-details/apt-package-manager-configuration-file-creation.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/aws-cloudtrail-log-created.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/aws-cloudtrail-log-deleted.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/aws-cloudtrail-log-suspended.asciidoc[]
@@ -14,6 +15,7 @@ include::rule-details/aws-deletion-of-rds-instance-or-cluster.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/aws-ec2-admin-credential-fetch-via-assumed-role.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/aws-ec2-encryption-disabled.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/aws-ec2-full-network-packet-capture-detected.asciidoc[]
+include::rule-details/aws-ec2-instance-connect-ssh-public-key-uploaded.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/aws-ec2-network-access-control-list-creation.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/aws-ec2-network-access-control-list-deletion.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/aws-ec2-snapshot-activity.asciidoc[]
@@ -31,8 +33,13 @@ include::rule-details/aws-iam-group-creation.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/aws-iam-group-deletion.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/aws-iam-login-profile-added-to-user.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/aws-iam-password-recovery-requested.asciidoc[]
+include::rule-details/aws-iam-roles-anywhere-profile-creation.asciidoc[]
+include::rule-details/aws-iam-roles-anywhere-trust-anchor-created-with-external-ca.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/aws-iam-user-addition-to-group.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/aws-kms-customer-managed-key-disabled-or-scheduled-for-deletion.asciidoc[]
+include::rule-details/aws-lambda-function-created-or-updated.asciidoc[]
+include::rule-details/aws-lambda-function-policy-updated-to-allow-public-invocation.asciidoc[]
+include::rule-details/aws-lambda-layer-added-to-existing-function.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/aws-management-console-brute-force-of-root-user-identity.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/aws-management-console-root-login.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/aws-rds-cluster-creation.asciidoc[]
@@ -51,10 +58,13 @@ include::rule-details/aws-route-table-modified-or-deleted.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/aws-route53-private-hosted-zone-associated-with-a-vpc.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/aws-s3-bucket-configuration-deletion.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/aws-s3-bucket-expiration-lifecycle-configuration-added.asciidoc[]
+include::rule-details/aws-s3-bucket-policy-added-to-share-with-external-account.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/aws-saml-activity.asciidoc[]
+include::rule-details/aws-sts-getcalleridentity-api-called-for-the-first-time.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/aws-sts-getsessiontoken-abuse.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/aws-security-group-configuration-change-detection.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/aws-security-token-service-sts-assumerole-usage.asciidoc[]
+include::rule-details/aws-systems-manager-securestring-parameter-request-with-decryption-flag.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/aws-vpc-flow-logs-deletion.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/aws-waf-access-control-list-deletion.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/aws-waf-rule-or-rule-group-deletion.asciidoc[]
@@ -88,6 +98,7 @@ include::rule-details/apple-scripting-execution-with-administrator-privileges.as
 include::rule-details/application-added-to-google-workspace-domain.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/application-removed-from-blocklist-in-google-workspace.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/archive-file-with-unusual-extension.asciidoc[]
+include::rule-details/at-job-created-or-modified.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/at-exe-command-lateral-movement.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/attempt-to-clear-kernel-ring-buffer.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/attempt-to-create-okta-api-token.asciidoc[]
@@ -118,6 +129,7 @@ include::rule-details/attempted-bypass-of-okta-mfa.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/attempted-private-key-access.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/attempts-to-brute-force-a-microsoft-365-user-account.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/attempts-to-brute-force-an-okta-user-account.asciidoc[]
+include::rule-details/authentication-via-unusual-pam-grantor.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/authorization-plugin-modification.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/azure-ad-global-administrator-role-assigned.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/azure-active-directory-high-risk-sign-in.asciidoc[]
@@ -189,6 +201,7 @@ include::rule-details/creation-of-settingcontent-ms-files.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/creation-of-a-dns-named-record.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/creation-of-a-hidden-local-user-account.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/creation-or-modification-of-domain-backup-dpapi-private-key.asciidoc[]
+include::rule-details/creation-or-modification-of-pluggable-authentication-module-or-configuration.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/creation-or-modification-of-root-certificate.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/creation-or-modification-of-a-new-gpo-scheduled-task-or-service.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/credential-acquisition-via-registry-hive-dumping.asciidoc[]
@@ -196,7 +209,7 @@ include::rule-details/credential-dumping-detected-elastic-endgame.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/credential-dumping-prevented-elastic-endgame.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/credential-manipulation-detected-elastic-endgame.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/credential-manipulation-prevented-elastic-endgame.asciidoc[]
-include::rule-details/cron-job-created-or-changed-by-previously-unknown-process.asciidoc[]
+include::rule-details/cron-job-created-or-modified.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/cyberark-privileged-access-security-error.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/cyberark-privileged-access-security-recommended-monitor.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/dns-tunneling.asciidoc[]
@@ -238,6 +251,7 @@ include::rule-details/enumeration-of-kernel-modules-via-proc.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/enumeration-of-privileged-local-groups-membership.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/enumeration-of-users-or-groups-via-built-in-commands.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/exchange-mailbox-export-via-powershell.asciidoc[]
+include::rule-details/executable-bit-set-for-rc-local-rc-common.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/executable-file-creation-with-multiple-extensions.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/executable-file-with-unusual-extension.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/executable-masquerading-as-kernel-process.asciidoc[]
@@ -431,6 +445,7 @@ include::rule-details/malware-prevented-elastic-endgame.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/masquerading-space-after-filename.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/member-removed-from-github-organization.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/memory-dump-file-with-unusual-extension.asciidoc[]
+include::rule-details/message-of-the-day-motd-file-creation.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-anti-phish-policy-deletion.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-anti-phish-rule-modification.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-dkim-signing-configuration-disabled.asciidoc[]
@@ -498,6 +513,7 @@ include::rule-details/netcat-listener-established-via-rlwrap.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/netsh-helper-dll.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/network-activity-detected-via-kworker.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/network-activity-detected-via-cat.asciidoc[]
+include::rule-details/network-connection-initiated-by-sshd-child-process.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/network-connection-from-binary-with-rwx-memory-region.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/network-connection-via-certutil.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/network-connection-via-compiled-html-file.asciidoc[]
@@ -505,6 +521,7 @@ include::rule-details/network-connection-via-msxsl.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/network-connection-via-recently-compiled-executable.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/network-connection-via-registration-utility.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/network-connection-via-signed-binary.asciidoc[]
+include::rule-details/network-connections-initiated-through-xdg-autostart-entry.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/network-logon-provider-registry-modification.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/network-traffic-capture-via-cap-net-raw.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/network-traffic-to-rare-destination-country.asciidoc[]
@@ -514,8 +531,6 @@ include::rule-details/new-github-app-installed.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/new-github-owner-added.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/new-okta-authentication-behavior-detected.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/new-okta-identity-provider-idp-added-by-admin.asciidoc[]
-include::rule-details/new-systemd-service-created-by-previously-unknown-process.asciidoc[]
-include::rule-details/new-systemd-timer-created.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/new-user-added-to-github-organization.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/new-or-modified-federation-domain.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/nping-process-activity.asciidoc[]
@@ -636,11 +651,10 @@ include::rule-details/potential-openssh-backdoor-logging-activity.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/potential-outgoing-rdp-connection-by-unusual-process.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/potential-pass-the-hash-pth-attempt.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/potential-password-spraying-of-microsoft-365-user-accounts.asciidoc[]
-include::rule-details/potential-persistence-through-motd-file-creation-detected.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/potential-persistence-through-run-control-detected.asciidoc[]
-include::rule-details/potential-persistence-through-systemd-udevd.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/potential-persistence-through-init-d-detected.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/potential-persistence-via-atom-init-script-modification.asciidoc[]
+include::rule-details/potential-persistence-via-file-modification.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/potential-persistence-via-login-hook.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/potential-persistence-via-periodic-tasks.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/potential-persistence-via-time-provider-modification.asciidoc[]
@@ -694,7 +708,7 @@ include::rule-details/potential-shell-via-wildcard-injection-detected.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/potential-successful-linux-ftp-brute-force-attack-detected.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/potential-successful-linux-rdp-brute-force-attack-detected.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/potential-successful-ssh-brute-force-attack.asciidoc[]
-include::rule-details/potential-sudo-hijacking-detected.asciidoc[]
+include::rule-details/potential-sudo-hijacking.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/potential-sudo-privilege-escalation-via-cve-2019-14287.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/potential-sudo-token-manipulation-via-process-injection.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/potential-suspicious-clipboard-activity-detected.asciidoc[]
@@ -744,6 +758,7 @@ include::rule-details/privileged-account-brute-force.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/privileges-elevation-via-parent-process-pid-spoofing.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/process-activity-via-compiled-html-file.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/process-capability-enumeration.asciidoc[]
+include::rule-details/process-capability-set-via-setcap-utility.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/process-created-with-a-duplicated-token.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/process-created-with-an-elevated-token.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/process-creation-via-secondary-logon.asciidoc[]
@@ -753,6 +768,7 @@ include::rule-details/process-execution-from-an-unusual-directory.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/process-injection-detected-elastic-endgame.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/process-injection-prevented-elastic-endgame.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/process-injection-by-the-microsoft-build-engine.asciidoc[]
+include::rule-details/process-spawned-from-message-of-the-day-motd.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/process-started-from-process-id-pid-file.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/process-termination-followed-by-deletion.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/processes-with-trailing-spaces.asciidoc[]
@@ -769,6 +785,7 @@ include::rule-details/rpc-remote-procedure-call-from-the-internet.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/rpc-remote-procedure-call-to-the-internet.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/ransomware-detected-elastic-endgame.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/ransomware-prevented-elastic-endgame.asciidoc[]
+include::rule-details/rapid-secret-retrieval-attempts-from-aws-secretsmanager.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/rare-aws-error-code.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/rare-smb-connection-to-the-internet.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/rare-user-logon.asciidoc[]
@@ -801,6 +818,7 @@ include::rule-details/smtp-on-port-26-tcp.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/ssh-authorized-keys-file-modification.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/ssh-authorized-keys-file-modified-inside-a-container.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/ssh-connection-established-inside-a-running-container.asciidoc[]
+include::rule-details/ssh-key-generated-via-ssh-keygen.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/ssh-process-launched-from-inside-a-container.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/ssm-session-started-to-ec2-instance.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/suid-sguid-enumeration-detected.asciidoc[]
@@ -829,7 +847,7 @@ include::rule-details/setcap-setuid-setgid-capability-set.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/setuid-setgid-bit-set-via-chmod.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/sharepoint-malware-file-upload.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/shared-object-created-or-changed-by-previously-unknown-process.asciidoc[]
-include::rule-details/shell-configuration-modification.asciidoc[]
+include::rule-details/shell-configuration-creation-or-modification.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/shell-execution-via-apple-scripting.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/shortcut-file-written-or-modified-on-startup-folder.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/signed-proxy-execution-via-ms-work-folders.asciidoc[]
@@ -930,7 +948,6 @@ include::rule-details/suspicious-proc-pseudo-file-system-enumeration.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/suspicious-process-access-via-direct-system-call.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/suspicious-process-creation-calltrace.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/suspicious-process-execution-via-renamed-psexec-executable.asciidoc[]
-include::rule-details/suspicious-process-spawned-from-motd-detected.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/suspicious-rdp-activex-client-loaded.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/suspicious-remote-registry-access-via-sebackupprivilege.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/suspicious-renaming-of-esxi-files.asciidoc[]
@@ -959,7 +976,7 @@ include::rule-details/suspicious-macos-ms-office-child-process.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/suspicious-which-enumeration.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/svchost-spawning-cmd.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/symbolic-link-to-shadow-copy-created.asciidoc[]
-include::rule-details/system-binary-copied-and-or-moved-to-suspicious-directory.asciidoc[]
+include::rule-details/system-binary-moved-or-copied.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/system-hosts-file-access.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/system-information-discovery-via-windows-command-shell.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/system-log-file-deletion.asciidoc[]
@@ -969,7 +986,10 @@ include::rule-details/system-service-discovery-through-built-in-windows-utilitie
 include::rule-details/system-shells-via-services.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/system-time-discovery.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/systemkey-access-via-command-line.asciidoc[]
+include::rule-details/systemd-service-created.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/systemd-service-started-by-unusual-parent-process.asciidoc[]
+include::rule-details/systemd-timer-created.asciidoc[]
+include::rule-details/systemd-udevd-rule-file-creation.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/tcc-bypass-via-mounted-apfs-snapshot-access.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/tainted-kernel-module-load.asciidoc[]
 include::rule-details/tainted-out-of-tree-kernel-module-load.asciidoc[]
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/adobe-hijack-persistence.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/adobe-hijack-persistence.asciidoc
index 57c6f9c111..e613b434b9 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/adobe-hijack-persistence.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/adobe-hijack-persistence.asciidoc
@@ -152,6 +152,6 @@ file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "creation" and
 ** ID: T1574.010
 ** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/010/
 * Technique:
-** Name: Compromise Client Software Binary
+** Name: Compromise Host Software Binary
 ** ID: T1554
 ** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1554/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/agent-spoofing-mismatched-agent-id.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/agent-spoofing-mismatched-agent-id.asciidoc
index 773f386d75..7e7b57b97a 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/agent-spoofing-mismatched-agent-id.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/agent-spoofing-mismatched-agent-id.asciidoc
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 [[agent-spoofing-mismatched-agent-id]]
 === Agent Spoofing - Mismatched Agent ID
 
-Detects events that have a mismatch on the expected event agent ID. The status "agent_id_mismatch" occurs when the expected agent ID associated with the API key does not match the actual agent ID in an event. This could indicate attempts to spoof events in order to masquerade actual activity to evade detection.
+Detects events that have a mismatch on the expected event agent ID. The status "agent_id_mismatch/mismatch" occurs when the expected agent ID associated with the API key does not match the actual agent ID in an event. This could indicate attempts to spoof events in order to masquerade actual activity to evade detection.
 
 *Rule type*: query
 
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ Detects events that have a mismatch on the expected event agent ID. The status "
 * Use Case: Threat Detection
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 
-*Version*: 101
+*Version*: 102
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Detects events that have a mismatch on the expected event agent ID. The status "
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-event.agent_id_status:agent_id_mismatch
+event.agent_id_status:(agent_id_mismatch or mismatch)
 
 ----------------------------------
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/apt-package-manager-configuration-file-creation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/apt-package-manager-configuration-file-creation.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..38026d16bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/apt-package-manager-configuration-file-creation.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+[[apt-package-manager-configuration-file-creation]]
+=== APT Package Manager Configuration File Creation
+
+Detects file creation events in the configuration directory for the APT package manager. In Linux, APT (Advanced Package Tool) is a command-line utility used for handling packages on (by default) Debian-based systems, providing functions for installing, updating, upgrading, and removing software along with managing package repositories. Attackers can backdoor APT to gain persistence by injecting malicious code into scripts that APT runs, thereby ensuring continued unauthorized access or control each time APT is used for package management.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.file*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/152668/APT-Package-Manager-Persistence.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("rename", "creation") and
+file.path : "/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/*" and not (
+  process.executable in (
+    "/bin/dpkg", "/usr/bin/dpkg", "/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/dockerd", "/usr/sbin/dockerd", "/bin/microdnf",
+    "/usr/bin/microdnf", "/bin/rpm", "/usr/bin/rpm", "/bin/snapd", "/usr/bin/snapd", "/bin/yum", "/usr/bin/yum",
+    "/bin/dnf", "/usr/bin/dnf", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/bin/dnf-automatic", "/usr/bin/dnf-automatic",
+    "/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/dpkg-divert", "/bin/dpkg-divert", "/sbin/apk", "/usr/sbin/apk",
+    "/usr/local/sbin/apk", "/usr/bin/apt", "/usr/sbin/pacman", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/puppet",
+    "/bin/puppet", "/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/puppet", "/usr/bin/chef-client", "/bin/chef-client",
+    "/bin/autossl_check", "/usr/bin/autossl_check", "/proc/self/exe", "/dev/fd/*",  "/usr/bin/pamac-daemon",
+    "/bin/pamac-daemon", "/usr/lib/snapd/snapd", "/usr/local/bin/dockerd", "/usr/libexec/netplan/generate",
+    "/usr/local/bin/apt-get", "/usr/bin/apt-get"
+  ) or
+  file.path :("/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/*.tmp*") or
+  file.extension in ("swp", "swpx", "swx", "dpkg-remove") or
+  file.Ext.original.extension == "dpkg-new" or
+  process.executable : (
+    "/nix/store/*", "/var/lib/dpkg/*", "/tmp/vmis.*", "/snap/*", "/dev/fd/*", "/usr/lib/*", "/usr/libexec/*",
+    "/etc/kernel/*"
+  ) or
+  process.executable == null or
+  (process.name == "sed" and file.name : "sed*") or
+  (process.name == "perl" and file.name : "e2scrub_all.tmp*") 
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Create or Modify System Process
+** ID: T1543
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Hijack Execution Flow
+** ID: T1574
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/at-job-created-or-modified.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/at-job-created-or-modified.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..54656e63a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/at-job-created-or-modified.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+[[at-job-created-or-modified]]
+=== At Job Created or Modified
+
+This rule monitors for at jobs being created or renamed. Linux at jobs are scheduled tasks that can be leveraged by system administrators to set up scheduled tasks, but may be abused by malicious actors for persistence, privilege escalation and command execution. By creating or modifying cron job configurations, attackers can execute malicious commands or scripts at predefined intervals, ensuring their continued presence and enabling unauthorized activities.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.file*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and
+event.action in ("rename", "creation") and file.path : "/var/spool/cron/atjobs/*" and not (
+  process.executable in (
+    "/bin/dpkg", "/usr/bin/dpkg", "/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/dockerd", "/usr/sbin/dockerd", "/bin/microdnf",
+    "/usr/bin/microdnf", "/bin/rpm", "/usr/bin/rpm", "/bin/snapd", "/usr/bin/snapd", "/bin/yum", "/usr/bin/yum",
+    "/bin/dnf", "/usr/bin/dnf", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/bin/dnf-automatic", "/usr/bin/dnf-automatic",
+    "/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/dpkg-divert", "/bin/dpkg-divert", "/sbin/apk", "/usr/sbin/apk",
+    "/usr/local/sbin/apk", "/usr/bin/apt", "/usr/sbin/pacman", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/puppet",
+    "/bin/puppet", "/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/puppet", "/usr/bin/chef-client", "/bin/chef-client",
+    "/bin/autossl_check", "/usr/bin/autossl_check", "/proc/self/exe", "/dev/fd/*",  "/usr/bin/pamac-daemon",
+    "/bin/pamac-daemon", "/usr/local/bin/dockerd"
+  ) or
+  file.extension in ("swp", "swpx", "swx", "dpkg-remove") or
+  file.Ext.original.extension == "dpkg-new" or
+  process.executable : ("/nix/store/*", "/var/lib/dpkg/*", "/tmp/vmis.*", "/snap/*", "/dev/fd/*") or
+  process.executable == null or
+  (process.name == "sed" and file.name : "sed*") or
+  (process.name == "perl" and file.name : "e2scrub_all.tmp*") 
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task/Job
+** ID: T1053
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: At
+** ID: T1053.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task/Job
+** ID: T1053
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: At
+** ID: T1053.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task/Job
+** ID: T1053
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: At
+** ID: T1053.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempt-to-retrieve-user-data-from-aws-ec2-instance.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempt-to-retrieve-user-data-from-aws-ec2-instance.asciidoc
index 70180191b9..77fe7d37a8 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempt-to-retrieve-user-data-from-aws-ec2-instance.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempt-to-retrieve-user-data-from-aws-ec2-instance.asciidoc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Identifies discovery request `DescribeInstanceAttribute` with the attribute user
 *Rule indices*: 
 
 * filebeat-*
-* logs.aws.cloudtrail-*
+* logs-aws.cloudtrail-*
 
 *Severity*: low
 
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Identifies discovery request `DescribeInstanceAttribute` with the attribute user
 * Tactic: Discovery
 * Rule Type: BBR
 
-*Version*: 1
+*Version*: 2
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempts-to-brute-force-a-microsoft-365-user-account.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempts-to-brute-force-a-microsoft-365-user-account.asciidoc
index e353b3d292..daccc93d60 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempts-to-brute-force-a-microsoft-365-user-account.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/attempts-to-brute-force-a-microsoft-365-user-account.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Identifies attempts to brute force a Microsoft 365 user account. An adversary ma
 * Use Case: Identity and Access Audit
 * Tactic: Credential Access
 
-*Version*: 207
+*Version*: 208
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -60,7 +60,9 @@ The Office 365 Logs Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured
 event.dataset:o365.audit and event.provider:(AzureActiveDirectory or Exchange) and
   event.category:authentication and event.action:(UserLoginFailed or PasswordLogonInitialAuthUsingPassword) and
   not o365.audit.LogonError:(UserAccountNotFound or EntitlementGrantsNotFound or UserStrongAuthEnrollmentRequired or
-                             UserStrongAuthClientAuthNRequired or InvalidReplyTo)
+                             UserStrongAuthClientAuthNRequired or InvalidReplyTo or SsoArtifactExpiredDueToConditionalAccess or
+                             PasswordResetRegistrationRequiredInterrupt or SsoUserAccountNotFoundInResourceTenant or
+                             UserStrongAuthExpired)
 
 ----------------------------------
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/authentication-via-unusual-pam-grantor.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/authentication-via-unusual-pam-grantor.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c76ca4d6a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/authentication-via-unusual-pam-grantor.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+[[authentication-via-unusual-pam-grantor]]
+=== Authentication via Unusual PAM Grantor
+
+This rule detects successful authentications via PAM grantors that are not commonly used. This could indicate an attacker is attempting to escalate privileges or maintain persistence on the system by modifying the default PAM configuration.
+
+*Rule type*: new_terms
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* auditbeat-*
+* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Auditd Manager
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+This rule requires the use of the `auditd_manager` integration. `Auditd_manager` is a tool designed to simplify and enhance the management of the audit subsystem in Linux systems. It provides a user-friendly interface and automation capabilities for configuring and monitoring system auditing through the auditd daemon. With `auditd_manager`, administrators can easily define audit rules, track system events, and generate comprehensive audit reports, improving overall security and compliance in the system. The following steps should be executed in order to install and deploy `auditd_manager` on a Linux system.
+```
+Kibana -->
+Management -->
+Integrations -->
+Auditd Manager -->
+Add Auditd Manager
+```
+`Auditd_manager` subscribes to the kernel and receives events as they occur without any additional configuration. However, if more advanced configuration is required to detect specific behavior, audit rules can be added to the integration in either the "audit rules" configuration box or the "auditd rule files" box by specifying a file to read the audit rules from.
+For this detection rule to trigger, no additional configuration is required.
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.category:authentication and host.os.type:linux and event.action:authenticated and event.outcome:success and
+auditd.data.grantors:(* and not (pam_rootok or *pam_cap* or *pam_permit*))
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Create or Modify System Process
+** ID: T1543
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Modify Authentication Process
+** ID: T1556
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-ec2-instance-connect-ssh-public-key-uploaded.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-ec2-instance-connect-ssh-public-key-uploaded.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c2a984ac99
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-ec2-instance-connect-ssh-public-key-uploaded.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+[[aws-ec2-instance-connect-ssh-public-key-uploaded]]
+=== AWS EC2 Instance Connect SSH Public Key Uploaded
+
+Identifies when a new SSH public key is uploaded to an AWS EC2 instance using the EC2 Instance Connect service. This action could indicate an adversary attempting to maintain access to the instance. The rule also detects the `SendSerialConsoleSSHPublicKey` API action, which could be used for privilege escalation if the serial console is enabled. Monitoring these activities helps ensure unauthorized access attempts are detected and mitigated promptly.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* filebeat-*
+* logs-aws.cloudtrail-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/AWS/aws.lateral-movement.ec2-instance-connect/
+* https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-privilege-escalation/aws-ec2-privesc
+* https://medium.parttimepolymath.net/aws-ec2-instance-connect-a-very-neat-trick-4d2fc0c28010
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/ec2-instance-connect/latest/APIReference/API_SendSSHPublicKey.html
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/ec2-instance-connect/latest/APIReference/API_SendSerialConsoleSSHPublicKey.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Cloud
+* Data Source: AWS
+* Data Source: Amazon Web Services
+* Data Source: AWS EC2
+* Use Case: Identity and Access Audit
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and Analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating AWS EC2 Instance Connect SSH Public Key Uploaded*
+
+
+This rule detects when a new SSH public key is uploaded to an AWS EC2 instance using the EC2 Instance Connect service. Adversaries may upload SSH public keys to EC2 instances to maintain access to the instance. The rule also covers cases where the `SendSerialConsoleSSHPublicKey` API action is used to upload an SSH public key to a serial connection, which can be exploited for privilege escalation.
+
+
+*Possible Investigation Steps:*
+
+
+- **Identify the Actor**: Review the `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn` and `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.access_key_id` fields to identify who performed the action. Verify if this actor typically performs such actions and if they have the necessary permissions.
+- **Review the Request Details**: Examine the `aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters` to understand the specific details of the SSH public key upload. Look for any unusual parameters that could suggest unauthorized or malicious modifications.
+- **Analyze the Source of the Request**: Investigate the `source.ip` and `source.geo` fields to determine the geographical origin of the request. An external or unexpected location might indicate compromised credentials or unauthorized access.
+- **Contextualize with Timestamp**: Use the `@timestamp` field to check when the SSH public key was uploaded. Changes during non-business hours or outside regular maintenance windows might require further scrutiny.
+- **Correlate with Other Activities**: Search for related CloudTrail events before and after this action to see if the same actor or IP address engaged in other potentially suspicious activities.
+- **Check for Serial Console Access**: If the `SendSerialConsoleSSHPublicKey` action was used, verify if the `ec2:EnableSerialConsoleAccess` permission was also used, which might indicate an attempt to enable and exploit the serial console.
+
+
+*False Positive Analysis:*
+
+
+- **Legitimate Administrative Actions**: Confirm if the SSH public key upload aligns with scheduled updates, development activities, or legitimate administrative tasks documented in change management systems.
+- **Consistency Check**: Compare the action against historical data of similar actions performed by the user or within the organization. If the action is consistent with past legitimate activities, it might indicate a false alarm.
+- **Verify through Outcomes**: Check the `aws.cloudtrail.response_elements` and the `event.outcome` to confirm if the upload was successful and intended according to policy.
+
+
+*Response and Remediation:*
+
+
+- **Immediate Review and Reversal if Necessary**: If the upload was unauthorized, remove the uploaded SSH public key from the EC2 instance and review the instance's access logs for any suspicious activity.
+- **Enhance Monitoring and Alerts**: Adjust monitoring systems to alert on similar actions, especially those involving sensitive instances or unusual file extensions.
+- **Educate and Train**: Provide additional training to users with administrative rights on the importance of security best practices concerning SSH key management and the risks of unauthorized key uploads.
+- **Audit EC2 Instance Policies and Permissions**: Conduct a comprehensive audit of all EC2 instance policies and associated permissions to ensure they adhere to the principle of least privilege.
+- **Incident Response**: If there's an indication of malicious intent or a security breach, initiate the incident response protocol to mitigate any damage and prevent future occurrences.
+
+
+*Additional Information:*
+
+
+For further guidance on managing EC2 instances and securing AWS environments, refer to the https://docs.aws.amazon.com/ec2-instance-connect/latest/APIReference/API_SendSSHPublicKey.html[AWS EC2 Instance Connect documentation] and AWS best practices for security. Additionally, consult the following resources for specific details on SSH key management and privilege escalation techniques:
+- https://stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/AWS/aws.lateral-movement.ec2-instance-connect/[Stratus Red Team - AWS EC2 Instance Connect]
+- https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-privilege-escalation/aws-ec2-privesc[HackTricks - AWS EC2 Privilege Escalation]
+- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/ec2-instance-connect/latest/APIReference/API_SendSSHPublicKey.html[AWS EC2 Instance Connect API Reference]
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.dataset: aws.cloudtrail
+    and event.provider: ec2-instance-connect.amazonaws.com
+    and event.action: (SendSSHPublicKey or SendSerialConsoleSSHPublicKey)
+    and event.outcome: success
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Account Manipulation
+** ID: T1098
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: SSH Authorized Keys
+** ID: T1098.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-iam-roles-anywhere-profile-creation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-iam-roles-anywhere-profile-creation.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..434474da9a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-iam-roles-anywhere-profile-creation.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+[[aws-iam-roles-anywhere-profile-creation]]
+=== AWS IAM Roles Anywhere Profile Creation
+
+Identifies the creation of an AWS Roles Anywhere profile. AWS Roles Anywhere is a feature that allows you to use AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) profiles to manage access to your AWS resources from any location via trusted anchors. This rule detects the creation of a profile that can be assumed from any service. Adversaries may create profiles tied to overly permissive roles to maintain access to AWS resources. Ensure that the profile creation is expected and that the trust policy is configured securely.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* filebeat-*
+* logs-aws.cloudtrail-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 10m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-30m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/rolesanywhere/latest/userguide/introduction.html
+* https://docs.datadoghq.com/security/default_rules/cloudtrail-aws-iam-roles-anywhere-trust-anchor-created/
+* https://ermetic.com/blog/aws/keep-your-iam-users-close-keep-your-third-parties-even-closer-part-1/
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/rolesanywhere/latest/APIReference/API_CreateProfile.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Cloud
+* Data Source: AWS
+* Data Source: Amazon Web Services
+* Data Source: AWS IAM
+* Use Case: Identity and Access Audit
+* Tactic: Persistence
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+
+*Triage and Analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating AWS IAM Roles Anywhere Profile Creation*
+
+
+This rule detects the creation of an AWS Roles Anywhere profile. AWS Roles Anywhere allows you to use AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) profiles to manage access to your AWS resources from any location via trusted anchors. Adversaries may create profiles tied to overly permissive roles to maintain access to AWS resources. It is crucial to ensure that the profile creation is expected and that the trust policy is configured securely.
+
+
+*Possible Investigation Steps:*
+
+
+- **Identify the Actor**: Review the `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn` and `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.access_key_id` fields to identify who created the profile. Verify if this actor typically performs such actions and if they have the necessary permissions.
+- **Review the Request Details**: Examine the `aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters` to understand the specific details of the profile creation. Look for any unusual parameters or overly permissive roles that could suggest unauthorized or malicious activity.
+- **Analyze the Source of the Request**: Investigate the `source.ip` and `source.geo` fields to determine the location and origin of the request. Ensure the request originated from a known and trusted location.
+- **Check the Created Profile’s Permissions**: Review the `roleArns` associated with the created profile. Verify that the roles are appropriate for the user's intended actions and do not grant excessive permissions.
+- **Verify the Profile’s Configuration**: Ensure that the profile's `durationSeconds`, `enabled`, and `tags` are configured according to your organization's security policies. Pay particular attention to any configuration that might allow prolonged access or concealment of activity.
+
+
+*False Positive Analysis:*
+
+
+- **Legitimate Administrative Actions**: Confirm if the profile creation aligns with scheduled updates, development activities, or legitimate administrative tasks documented in change management systems.
+- **Consistency Check**: Compare the action against historical data of similar actions performed by the user or within the organization. If the action is consistent with past legitimate activities, it might indicate a false alarm.
+- **Verify through Outcomes**: Check the `aws.cloudtrail.response_elements` and the `event.outcome` to confirm if the profile creation was successful and intended according to policy.
+
+
+*Response and Remediation:*
+
+
+- **Immediate Review and Reversal if Necessary**: If the profile creation was unauthorized, disable or delete the created profile and review the associated roles and permissions for any potential misuse.
+- **Enhance Monitoring and Alerts**: Adjust monitoring systems to alert on similar actions, especially those involving sensitive roles or unexpected locations.
+- **Educate and Train**: Provide additional training to users with administrative rights on the importance of security best practices concerning profile and role management and the risks of unauthorized profile creation.
+- **Audit IAM Policies and Permissions**: Conduct a comprehensive audit of all IAM policies and associated permissions to ensure they adhere to the principle of least privilege.
+- **Incident Response**: If there's an indication of malicious intent or a security breach, initiate the incident response protocol to mitigate any damage and prevent future occurrences.
+
+
+*Additional Information:*
+
+
+For further guidance on managing AWS IAM Roles Anywhere profiles and securing AWS environments, refer to the https://docs.aws.amazon.com/rolesanywhere/latest/userguide/introduction.html[AWS Roles Anywhere documentation] and AWS best practices for security. Additionally, consult the following resources for specific details on profile management and potential abuse:
+- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/rolesanywhere/latest/APIReference/API_CreateProfile.html[AWS IAM Roles Anywhere Profile Creation API Reference]
+- https://ermetic.com/blog/aws/keep-your-iam-users-close-keep-your-third-parties-even-closer-part-1/[Ermetic Blog - Managing Third Party Access]
+
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.dataset:aws.cloudtrail
+    and event.provider: rolesanywhere.amazonaws.com
+    and event.action: CreateProfile
+    and event.outcome: success
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Account Manipulation
+** ID: T1098
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Additional Cloud Roles
+** ID: T1098.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-iam-roles-anywhere-trust-anchor-created-with-external-ca.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-iam-roles-anywhere-trust-anchor-created-with-external-ca.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..eb4cff3938
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-iam-roles-anywhere-trust-anchor-created-with-external-ca.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+[[aws-iam-roles-anywhere-trust-anchor-created-with-external-ca]]
+=== AWS IAM Roles Anywhere Trust Anchor Created with External CA
+
+Identifies when an AWS IAM Roles Anywhere Trust Anchor with an external certificate authority is created. AWS Roles Anywhere profiles are legitimate profiles that can be created by administrators to allow access from any location. This rule detects when a trust anchor is created with an external certificate authority that is not managed by AWS Certificate Manager Private Certificate Authority (ACM PCA). Adversaries may accomplish this to maintain persistence in the environment.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* filebeat-*
+* logs-aws.cloudtrail-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 10m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-30m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/rolesanywhere/latest/userguide/introduction.html
+* https://ermetic.com/blog/aws/keep-your-iam-users-close-keep-your-third-parties-even-closer-part-1/
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/rolesanywhere/latest/APIReference/API_CreateTrustAnchor.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Cloud
+* Data Source: AWS
+* Data Source: Amazon Web Services
+* Data Source: AWS IAM
+* Use Case: Identity and Access Audit
+* Tactic: Persistence
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+
+*Triage and Analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating AWS IAM Roles Anywhere Trust Anchor Created with External CA*
+
+
+This rule detects when an AWS IAM Roles Anywhere Trust Anchor with an external certificate authority is created. AWS Roles Anywhere profiles are legitimate profiles that can be created by administrators to allow access from any location. This rule identifies when a trust anchor is created with an external certificate authority that is not managed by AWS Certificate Manager Private Certificate Authority (ACM PCA). Adversaries may accomplish this to maintain persistence in the environment.
+
+
+*Possible Investigation Steps:*
+
+
+- **Identify the Actor**: Review the `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn` and `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.access_key_id` fields to identify who made the change. Verify if this actor typically performs such actions and if they have the necessary permissions.
+- **Review the Request Details**: Examine the `aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters` to understand the specific details of the trust anchor creation. Look for any unusual parameters that could suggest unauthorized or malicious modifications.
+- **Analyze the Source of the Request**: Investigate the `source.ip` and `source.geo` fields to determine the geographical origin of the request. An external or unexpected location might indicate compromised credentials or unauthorized access.
+- **Contextualize with Timestamp**: Use the `@timestamp` field to check when the trust anchor was created. Changes during non-business hours or outside regular maintenance windows might require further scrutiny.
+- **Correlate with Other Activities**: Search for related CloudTrail events before and after this change to see if the same actor or IP address engaged in other potentially suspicious activities.
+- **Verify the Certificate Authority**: Ensure that the external certificate authority used is authorized and recognized. Unauthorized external CAs can be a red flag for malicious activity.
+
+
+*False Positive Analysis:*
+
+
+- **Legitimate Administrative Actions**: Confirm if the trust anchor creation aligns with scheduled updates, development activities, or legitimate administrative tasks documented in change management systems.
+- **Consistency Check**: Compare the action against historical data of similar actions performed by the user or within the organization. If the action is consistent with past legitimate activities, it might indicate a false alarm.
+- **Verify through Outcomes**: Check the `aws.cloudtrail.response_elements` and the `event.outcome` to confirm if the creation was successful and intended according to policy.
+
+
+*Response and Remediation:*
+
+
+- **Immediate Review and Reversal if Necessary**: If the creation was unauthorized, remove the trust anchor and revoke any associated permissions.
+- **Enhance Monitoring and Alerts**: Adjust monitoring systems to alert on similar actions, especially those involving the creation of trust anchors with external certificate authorities.
+- **Educate and Train**: Provide additional training to users with administrative rights on the importance of security best practices concerning IAM Roles Anywhere and the use of certificate authorities.
+- **Audit IAM Roles and Policies**: Conduct a comprehensive audit of all IAM roles and associated policies to ensure they adhere to the principle of least privilege.
+- **Incident Response**: If there's an indication of malicious intent or a security breach, initiate the incident response protocol to mitigate any damage and prevent future occurrences.
+
+
+*Additional Information:*
+
+
+For further guidance on managing IAM Roles Anywhere and securing AWS environments, refer to the https://docs.aws.amazon.com/rolesanywhere/latest/userguide/introduction.html[AWS IAM Roles Anywhere documentation] and AWS best practices for security. Additionally, consult the following resources for specific details on IAM roles and trust anchors:
+- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/rolesanywhere/latest/userguide/introduction.html[AWS IAM Roles Anywhere Introduction]
+- https://ermetic.com/blog/aws/keep-your-iam-users-close-keep-your-third-parties-even-closer-part-1/[Ermetic Blog on IAM Users and Third Parties]
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.dataset: aws.cloudtrail
+    and event.provider: rolesanywhere.amazonaws.com
+    and event.action: CreateTrustAnchor
+    and event.outcome: success
+    and not aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters: *sourceType=AWS_ACM_PCA*
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Account Manipulation
+** ID: T1098
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Additional Cloud Roles
+** ID: T1098.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-lambda-function-created-or-updated.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-lambda-function-created-or-updated.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0fa53207c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-lambda-function-created-or-updated.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+[[aws-lambda-function-created-or-updated]]
+=== AWS Lambda Function Created or Updated
+
+Identifies when an AWS Lambda function is created or updated. AWS Lambda lets you run code without provisioning or managing servers. Adversaries can create or update Lambda functions to execute malicious code, exfiltrate data, or escalate privileges. This is a [building block rule](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/building-block-rule.html) that does not generate alerts, but signals when a Lambda function is created or updated that matches the rule's conditions. To generate alerts, create a rule that uses this signal as a building block.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* filebeat-*
+* logs-aws.cloudtrail-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 10m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-60m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://mattslifebytes.com/2023/04/14/from-rebuilds-to-reloads-hacking-aws-lambda-to-enable-instant-code-updates/
+* https://stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/AWS/aws.persistence.lambda-overwrite-code/
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/api/API_UpdateFunctionCode.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Cloud
+* Data Source: AWS
+* Data Source: Amazon Web Services
+* Data Source: AWS Lambda
+* Use Case: Asset Visibility
+* Tactic: Execution
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.dataset: "aws.cloudtrail"
+    and event.provider: "lambda.amazonaws.com"
+    and event.outcome: "success"
+    and event.action: (CreateFunction* or UpdateFunctionCode*)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Serverless Execution
+** ID: T1648
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1648/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-lambda-function-policy-updated-to-allow-public-invocation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-lambda-function-policy-updated-to-allow-public-invocation.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1104679407
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-lambda-function-policy-updated-to-allow-public-invocation.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+[[aws-lambda-function-policy-updated-to-allow-public-invocation]]
+=== AWS Lambda Function Policy Updated to Allow Public Invocation
+
+Identifies when an AWS Lambda function policy is updated to allow public invocation. This rule specifically looks for the `AddPermission` API call with the `Principal` set to `*` which allows any AWS account to invoke the Lambda function. Adversaries may abuse this permission to create a backdoor in the Lambda function that allows them to execute arbitrary code.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* filebeat-*
+* logs-aws.cloudtrail-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 10m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-60m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-persistence/aws-lambda-persistence
+* https://stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/AWS/aws.persistence.lambda-backdoor-function/
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/api/API_AddPermission.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Cloud
+* Data Source: AWS
+* Data Source: Amazon Web Services
+* Data Source: AWS Lambda
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and Analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating AWS Lambda Function Policy Updated to Allow Public Invocation*
+
+
+This rule detects when an AWS Lambda function policy is updated to allow public invocation. It specifically looks for the `AddPermission` API call with the `Principal` set to `*`, which allows any AWS account to invoke the Lambda function. Adversaries may abuse this permission to create a backdoor in the Lambda function that allows them to execute arbitrary code. Understanding the context and legitimacy of such changes is crucial to determine if the action is benign or malicious.
+
+
+*Possible Investigation Steps:*
+
+
+- **Identify the Actor**: Review the `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn` and `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.access_key_id` fields to identify who made the change. Verify if this actor typically performs such actions and if they have the necessary permissions.
+- **Review the Request Details**: Examine the `aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters` to understand the specific changes made to the Lambda function policy. Look for any unusual parameters that could suggest unauthorized or malicious modifications.
+- **Analyze the Source of the Request**: Investigate the `source.ip` and `source.geo` fields to determine the geographical origin of the request. An external or unexpected location might indicate compromised credentials or unauthorized access.
+- **Contextualize with Timestamp**: Use the `@timestamp` field to check when the change occurred. Modifications during non-business hours or outside regular maintenance windows might require further scrutiny.
+- **Correlate with Other Activities**: Search for related CloudTrail events before and after this change to see if the same actor or IP address engaged in other potentially suspicious activities.
+
+
+*False Positive Analysis:*
+
+
+- **Legitimate Administrative Actions**: Confirm if the update to allow public invocation aligns with scheduled updates, development activities, or legitimate administrative tasks documented in change management systems.
+- **Consistency Check**: Compare the action against historical data of similar actions performed by the user or within the organization. If the action is consistent with past legitimate activities, it might indicate a false alarm.
+- **Verify through Outcomes**: Check the `aws.cloudtrail.response_elements` and the `event.outcome` to confirm if the change was successful and intended according to policy.
+
+
+*Response and Remediation:*
+
+
+- **Immediate Review and Reversal if Necessary**: If the change was unauthorized, update the Lambda function policy to remove the public invocation permission and restore it to its previous state.
+- **Enhance Monitoring and Alerts**: Adjust monitoring systems to alert on similar actions, especially those involving sensitive functions or permissions.
+- **Educate and Train**: Provide additional training to users with administrative rights on the importance of security best practices concerning Lambda function management and the use of permissions.
+- **Audit Lambda Functions and Policies**: Conduct a comprehensive audit of all Lambda functions and associated policies to ensure they adhere to the principle of least privilege.
+- **Incident Response**: If there's an indication of malicious intent or a security breach, initiate the incident response protocol to mitigate any damage and prevent future occurrences.
+
+
+*Additional Information:*
+
+
+For further guidance on managing Lambda functions and securing AWS environments, refer to the https://docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/dg/welcome.html[AWS Lambda documentation] and AWS best practices for security. Additionally, consult the following resources for specific details on Lambda persistence techniques:
+- https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-persistence/aws-lambda-persistence[AWS Lambda Persistence]
+- https://stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/AWS/aws.persistence.lambda-backdoor-function/[AWS Lambda Backdoor Function]
+- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/api/API_AddPermission.html[AWS API AddPermission]
+
+
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.dataset: aws.cloudtrail
+    and event.provider: lambda.amazonaws.com
+    and event.outcome: success
+    and event.action: AddPermission*
+    and aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters: (*lambda\:InvokeFunction* and *principal=\**)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Event Triggered Execution
+** ID: T1546
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-lambda-layer-added-to-existing-function.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-lambda-layer-added-to-existing-function.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5e3e56c00d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-lambda-layer-added-to-existing-function.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+[[aws-lambda-layer-added-to-existing-function]]
+=== AWS Lambda Layer Added to Existing Function
+
+Identifies when an Lambda Layer is added to an existing Lambda function. AWS layers are a way to share code and data across multiple functions. By adding a layer to an existing function, an attacker can persist or execute code in the context of the function.
+
+*Rule type*: query
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* filebeat-*
+* logs-aws.cloudtrail-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 10m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-60m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-persistence/aws-lambda-persistence/aws-lambda-layers-persistence
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/api/API_PublishLayerVersion.html
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/api/API_UpdateFunctionConfiguration.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Cloud
+* Data Source: AWS
+* Data Source: Amazon Web Services
+* Data Source: AWS Lambda
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Execution
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+
+*Triage and Analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating AWS Lambda Layer Added to Existing Function*
+
+
+This rule detects when a Lambda layer is added to an existing Lambda function. AWS Lambda layers are a mechanism for sharing code and data across multiple functions. By adding a layer to an existing function, an attacker can persist or execute code in the context of the function. Understanding the context and legitimacy of such changes is crucial to determine if the action is benign or malicious.
+
+
+*Possible Investigation Steps:*
+
+
+- **Identify the Actor**: Review the `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn` and `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.access_key_id` fields to identify who made the change. Verify if this actor typically performs such actions and if they have the necessary permissions.
+- **Review the Request Details**: Examine the `aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters` to understand the specific layer added to the Lambda function. Look for any unusual parameters that could suggest unauthorized or malicious modifications.
+- **Analyze the Source of the Request**: Investigate the `source.ip` and `source.geo` fields to determine the geographical origin of the request. An external or unexpected location might indicate compromised credentials or unauthorized access.
+- **Contextualize with Timestamp**: Use the `@timestamp` field to check when the change occurred. Modifications during non-business hours or outside regular maintenance windows might require further scrutiny.
+- **Correlate with Other Activities**: Search for related CloudTrail events before and after this change to see if the same actor or IP address engaged in other potentially suspicious activities.
+
+
+*False Positive Analysis:*
+
+
+- **Legitimate Administrative Actions**: Confirm if the addition of the Lambda layer aligns with scheduled updates, development activities, or legitimate administrative tasks documented in change management systems.
+- **Consistency Check**: Compare the action against historical data of similar actions performed by the user or within the organization. If the action is consistent with past legitimate activities, it might indicate a false alarm.
+- **Verify through Outcomes**: Check the `aws.cloudtrail.response_elements` and the `event.outcome` to confirm if the change was successful and intended according to policy.
+
+
+*Response and Remediation:*
+
+
+- **Immediate Review and Reversal if Necessary**: If the change was unauthorized, remove the added layer from the Lambda function to mitigate any unintended code execution or persistence.
+- **Enhance Monitoring and Alerts**: Adjust monitoring systems to alert on similar actions, especially those involving sensitive functions or layers.
+- **Educate and Train**: Provide additional training to users with administrative rights on the importance of security best practices concerning Lambda function management and the use of layers.
+- **Audit Lambda Functions and Policies**: Conduct a comprehensive audit of all Lambda functions and associated policies to ensure they adhere to the principle of least privilege.
+- **Incident Response**: If there's an indication of malicious intent or a security breach, initiate the incident response protocol to mitigate any damage and prevent future occurrences.
+
+
+*Additional Information:*
+
+
+For further guidance on managing Lambda functions and securing AWS environments, refer to the https://docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/dg/welcome.html[AWS Lambda documentation] and AWS best practices for security. Additionally, consult the following resources for specific details on Lambda layers and persistence techniques:
+- https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-persistence/aws-lambda-persistence/aws-lambda-layers-persistence[AWS Lambda Layers Persistence]
+- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/api/API_PublishLayerVersion.html[AWS API PublishLayerVersion]
+- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/api/API_UpdateFunctionConfiguration.html[AWS API UpdateFunctionConfiguration]
+
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.dataset: aws.cloudtrail
+    and event.provider: lambda.amazonaws.com
+    and event.outcome: success
+    and event.action: (PublishLayerVersion* or UpdateFunctionConfiguration)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Serverless Execution
+** ID: T1648
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1648/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-s3-bucket-policy-added-to-share-with-external-account.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-s3-bucket-policy-added-to-share-with-external-account.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f09f764590
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-s3-bucket-policy-added-to-share-with-external-account.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+[[aws-s3-bucket-policy-added-to-share-with-external-account]]
+=== AWS S3 Bucket Policy Added to Share with External Account
+
+Identifies an AWS S3 bucket policy change to share permissions with an external account. Adversaries may attempt to backdoor an S3 bucket by sharing it with an external account. This can be used to exfiltrate data or to provide access to other adversaries. This rule identifies changes to a bucket policy via the `PutBucketPolicy` API call where the policy includes an `Effect=Allow` statement that does not contain the AWS account ID of the bucket owner.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* filebeat-*
+* logs-aws.cloudtrail-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: None ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/AWS/aws.exfiltration.s3-backdoor-bucket-policy/
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_PutBucketPolicy.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Cloud
+* Data Source: AWS
+* Data Source: Amazon Web Services
+* Data Source: AWS S3
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Exfiltration
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+
+*Triage and Analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating AWS S3 Bucket Policy Change to Share with External Account*
+
+
+This rule detects when an AWS S3 bucket policy is changed to share permissions with an external account. Adversaries may attempt to backdoor an S3 bucket by sharing it with an external account to exfiltrate data or provide access to other adversaries. This rule identifies changes to a bucket policy via the `PutBucketPolicy` API call where the policy includes an `Effect=Allow` statement that does not contain the AWS account ID of the bucket owner.
+
+
+*Possible Investigation Steps:*
+
+
+- **Identify the Actor**: Review the `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn` and `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.access_key_id` fields to identify who made the change. Verify if this actor typically performs such actions and if they have the necessary permissions.
+- **Review the Request Details**: Examine the `aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters` to understand the specific changes made to the bucket policy. Look for any unusual parameters that could suggest unauthorized or malicious modifications.
+- **Analyze the Source of the Request**: Investigate the `source.ip` and `source.geo` fields to determine the geographical origin of the request. An external or unexpected location might indicate compromised credentials or unauthorized access.
+- **Contextualize with Timestamp**: Use the `@timestamp` field to check when the change occurred. Modifications during non-business hours or outside regular maintenance windows might require further scrutiny.
+- **Correlate with Other Activities**: Search for related CloudTrail events before and after this change to see if the same actor or IP address engaged in other potentially suspicious activities.
+
+
+*False Positive Analysis:*
+
+
+- **Legitimate Administrative Actions**: Confirm if the bucket policy change aligns with scheduled updates, development activities, or legitimate administrative tasks documented in change management systems.
+- **Consistency Check**: Compare the action against historical data of similar actions performed by the user or within the organization. If the action is consistent with past legitimate activities, it might indicate a false alarm.
+- **Verify through Outcomes**: Check the `aws.cloudtrail.response_elements` and the `event.outcome` to confirm if the change was successful and intended according to policy.
+
+
+*Response and Remediation:*
+
+
+- **Immediate Review and Reversal if Necessary**: If the change was unauthorized, update the bucket policy to remove any unauthorized permissions and restore it to its previous state.
+- **Enhance Monitoring and Alerts**: Adjust monitoring systems to alert on similar actions, especially those involving sensitive data or permissions.
+- **Educate and Train**: Provide additional training to users with administrative rights on the importance of security best practices concerning bucket policy management and sharing permissions.
+- **Audit Bucket Policies and Permissions**: Conduct a comprehensive audit of all bucket policies and associated permissions to ensure they adhere to the principle of least privilege.
+- **Incident Response**: If there's an indication of malicious intent or a security breach, initiate the incident response protocol to mitigate any damage and prevent future occurrences.
+
+
+*Additional Information:*
+
+
+For further guidance on managing S3 bucket policies and securing AWS environments, refer to the https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/enable-cloudtrail-logging-for-s3.html[AWS S3 documentation] and AWS best practices for security.
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+S3 data event types must be collected in the AWS CloudTrail logs. Please refer to https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/enable-cloudtrail-logging-for-s3.html[AWS documentation] for more information.
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+any where event.dataset == "aws.cloudtrail"
+    and event.provider == "s3.amazonaws.com"
+    and event.action == "PutBucketPolicy" and event.outcome == "success"
+    and stringContains(aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters, "Effect=Allow")
+    and not stringContains(aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters, aws.cloudtrail.recipient_account_id)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Exfiltration
+** ID: TA0010
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Transfer Data to Cloud Account
+** ID: T1537
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-sts-getcalleridentity-api-called-for-the-first-time.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-sts-getcalleridentity-api-called-for-the-first-time.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..88371798a4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-sts-getcalleridentity-api-called-for-the-first-time.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+[[aws-sts-getcalleridentity-api-called-for-the-first-time]]
+=== AWS STS GetCallerIdentity API Called for the First Time
+
+An adversary with access to a set of compromised credentials may attempt to verify that the credentials are valid and determine what account they are using. This rule looks for the first time an identity has called the STS `GetCallerIdentity` API operation in the last 15 days, which may be an indicator of compromised credentials. A legitimate user would not need to call this operation as they should know the account they are using.
+
+*Rule type*: new_terms
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* filebeat-*
+* logs-aws.cloudtrail-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 10m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-60m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/STS/latest/APIReference/API_GetCallerIdentity.html
+* https://www.secureworks.com/research/detecting-the-use-of-stolen-aws-lambda-credentials
+* https://detectioninthe.cloud/ttps/discovery/get_caller_identity/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Cloud
+* Data Source: AWS
+* Data Source: Amazon Web Services
+* Data Source: AWS STS
+* Use Case: Identity and Access Audit
+* Tactic: Discovery
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating AWS GetCallerIdentity API Called for the First Time*
+
+
+AWS Security Token Service (AWS STS) is a service that enables you to request temporary, limited-privilege credentials for users.
+The `GetCallerIdentity` function returns details about the IAM user or role owning the credentials used to call the operation. 
+No permissions are required to run this operation and the same information is returned even when access is denied.
+This rule looks for use of the `GetCallerIdentity` operation. This is a https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/rules-ui-create.html#create-new-terms-rule[New Terms] rule indicating this is the first time a specific user identity has called this operation within the last 15 days.
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Identify the account and its role in the environment, a role belonging to a service like Lambda or an EC2 instance would be highly suspicious.
+- Identify the applications or users that should use this account.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the account during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate abnormal values in the `user_agent.original` field by comparing them with the intended and authorized usage and historical data. Suspicious user agent values include non-SDK, AWS CLI, custom user agents, etc.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences involving other users.
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Considering the source IP address and geolocation of the user who issued the command:
+    - Do they look normal for the calling user?
+    - If the source is an EC2 IP address, is it associated with an EC2 instance in one of your accounts or is the source IP from an EC2 instance that's not under your control?
+    - If it is an authorized EC2 instance, is the activity associated with normal behavior for the instance role or roles? Are there any other alerts or signs of suspicious activity involving this instance?
+- Review IAM permission policies for the user identity.
+- If you suspect the account has been compromised, scope potentially compromised assets by tracking servers, services, and data accessed by the account in the last 24 hours.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- False positives may occur due to the intended usage of the service. Tuning is needed in order to have higher confidence. Consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user agent and IP address conditions.
+- Automation workflows that rely on the results from this API request may also generate false-positives. We recommend adding exceptions related to the `user.name` or `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn` values to ignore these.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Disable or limit the account during the investigation and response.
+- Identify the possible impact of the incident and prioritize accordingly; the following actions can help you gain context:
+    - Identify the account role in the cloud environment.
+    - Assess the criticality of affected services and servers.
+    - Work with your IT team to identify and minimize the impact on users.
+    - Identify if the attacker is moving laterally and compromising other accounts, servers, or services.
+    - Identify any regulatory or legal ramifications related to this activity.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Rotate secrets or delete API keys as needed to revoke the attacker's access to the environment. Work with your IT teams to minimize the impact on business operations during these actions.
+- Check if unauthorized new users were created, remove unauthorized new accounts, and request password resets for other IAM users.
+- Consider enabling multi-factor authentication for users.
+- Review the permissions assigned to the implicated user to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
+- Implement security best practices https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/security-best-practices/[outlined] by AWS.
+- Take the actions needed to return affected systems, data, or services to their normal operational levels.
+- Identify the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection via the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.dataset:"aws.cloudtrail" and event.provider:"sts.amazonaws.com" and event.action:"GetCallerIdentity"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Discovery
+** ID: TA0007
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Account Discovery
+** ID: T1087
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Cloud Account
+** ID: T1087.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-systems-manager-securestring-parameter-request-with-decryption-flag.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-systems-manager-securestring-parameter-request-with-decryption-flag.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b07db2ab47
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/aws-systems-manager-securestring-parameter-request-with-decryption-flag.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+[[aws-systems-manager-securestring-parameter-request-with-decryption-flag]]
+=== AWS Systems Manager SecureString Parameter Request with Decryption Flag
+
+Detects the first occurrence of a user identity accessing AWS Systems Manager (SSM) SecureString parameters using the GetParameter or GetParameters API actions with credentials in the request parameters. This could indicate that the user is accessing sensitive information. This rule detects when a user accesses a SecureString parameter with the `withDecryption` parameter set to true. This is a [NewTerms](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/rules-ui-create.html#create-new-terms-rule) rule that detects the first occurrence of a specific AWS ARN accessing SecureString parameters with decryption within the last 10 days.
+
+*Rule type*: new_terms
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* filebeat-*
+* logs-aws.cloudtrail*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vsts/latest/userguide/systemsmanager-getparameter.html
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/systems-manager/latest/userguide/systems-manager-parameter-store.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Cloud
+* Data Source: AWS
+* Data Source: Amazon Web Services
+* Data Source: AWS Systems Manager
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+
+*Triage and Analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating AWS Systems Manager SecureString Parameter Request with Decryption Flag*
+
+
+This rule detects when an AWS resource accesses SecureString parameters within AWS Systems Manager (SSM) with the decryption flag set to true. SecureStrings are encrypted using a KMS key, and accessing these with decryption can indicate attempts to access sensitive data.
+
+Adversaries may target SecureStrings to retrieve sensitive information such as encryption keys, passwords, and other credentials that are stored securely. Accessing these parameters with decryption enabled is particularly concerning because it implies the adversary is attempting to bypass the encryption to obtain plain text values that can be immediately used or exfiltrated. This behavior might be part of a larger attack strategy aimed at escalating privileges or moving laterally within an environment to access protected data or critical infrastructure.
+
+
+*Possible Investigation Steps*
+
+
+- **Review the Access Event**: Identify the specific API call (`GetParameter` or `GetParameters`) that triggered the rule. Examine the `request_parameters` for `withDecryption` set to true and the name of the accessed parameter.
+- **Verify User Identity and Access Context**: Check the `user_identity` details to understand who accessed the parameter and their role within the organization. This includes checking the ARN and access key ID to determine if the access was authorized.
+- **Contextualize with User Behavior**: Assess whether the access pattern fits the user’s normal behavior or job responsibilities. Investigate any out-of-pattern activities around the time of the event.
+- **Analyze Geographic and IP Context**: Using the `source.ip` and `source.geo` information, verify if the request came from a trusted location or if there are any anomalies that suggest a compromised account.
+- **Inspect Related CloudTrail Events**: Look for other related events in CloudTrail to see if there was unusual activity before or after this event, such as unusual login attempts, changes to permissions, or other API calls that could indicate broader unauthorized actions.
+
+
+*False Positive Analysis*
+
+
+- **Legitimate Administrative Use**: Verify if the decryption of SecureString parameters is a common practice for the user’s role, particularly if used in automation scripts or deployment processes like those involving Terraform or similar tools.
+
+
+*Response and Remediation*
+
+
+- **Immediate Verification**: Contact the user or team responsible for the API call to verify their intent and authorization.
+- **Review and Revise Permissions**: If the access was unauthorized, review the permissions assigned to the user or role to ensure they align with the principle of least privilege.
+- **Audit Parameter Access Policies**: Ensure that policies governing access to SecureString parameters are strict and audit logs are enabled to track access with decryption.
+- **Incident Response**: If suspicious activity is confirmed, follow through with your organization's incident response plan to mitigate any potential security issues.
+- **Enhanced Monitoring and Alerting**: Strengthen monitoring rules to detect unusual accesses to SecureString parameters, especially those that involve decryption.
+
+
+*Additional Information*
+
+
+This rule focuses solely on SecureStrings in AWS Systems Manager (SSM) parameters. SecureStrings are encrypted using an AWS Key Management Service (KMS) key. When a user accesses a SecureString parameter, they can specify whether the parameter should be decrypted. If the user specifies that the parameter should be decrypted, the decrypted value is returned in the response.
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+This rule requires that AWS CloudTrail logs are ingested into the Elastic Stack. Ensure that the AWS integration is properly configured to collect AWS CloudTrail logs. This rule also requires event logging for AWS Systems Manager (SSM) API actions which can be enabled in CloudTrail's data events settings.
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.dataset: aws.cloudtrail
+    and event.provider: "ssm.amazonaws.com"
+    and event.action: (GetParameters or GetParameter)
+    and event.outcome: success
+    and aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters: *withDecryption=true*
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Credentials from Password Stores
+** ID: T1555
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Cloud Secrets Management Stores
+** ID: T1555.006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/006/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/creation-or-modification-of-a-new-gpo-scheduled-task-or-service.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/creation-or-modification-of-a-new-gpo-scheduled-task-or-service.asciidoc
index ad8b5a2d3e..b6ebf417ae 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/creation-or-modification-of-a-new-gpo-scheduled-task-or-service.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/creation-or-modification-of-a-new-gpo-scheduled-task-or-service.asciidoc
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Detects the creation or modification of a new Group Policy based scheduled task
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 * Data Source: Sysmon
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type != "deletion" and
 ** ID: TA0004
 ** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
 * Technique:
-** Name: Domain Policy Modification
+** Name: Domain or Tenant Policy Modification
 ** ID: T1484
 ** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/
 * Sub-technique:
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/creation-or-modification-of-pluggable-authentication-module-or-configuration.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/creation-or-modification-of-pluggable-authentication-module-or-configuration.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..323631312a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/creation-or-modification-of-pluggable-authentication-module-or-configuration.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+[[creation-or-modification-of-pluggable-authentication-module-or-configuration]]
+=== Creation or Modification of Pluggable Authentication Module or Configuration
+
+This rule monitors for the creation or modification of Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) shared object files or configuration files. Attackers may create or modify these files to maintain persistence on a compromised system, or harvest account credentials.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.file*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://github.com/zephrax/linux-pam-backdoor
+* https://github.com/eurialo/pambd
+* http://0x90909090.blogspot.com/2016/06/creating-backdoor-in-pam-in-5-line-of.html
+* https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/i/skidmap-linux-malware-uses-rootkit-capabilities-to-hide-cryptocurrency-mining-payload.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("rename", "creation") and 
+process.executable != null and (
+  (file.path : ("/lib/security/*", "/lib64/security/*", "/usr/lib/security/*", "/usr/lib64/security/*",
+  "/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/security/*") and file.extension == "so") or
+  (file.path : "/etc/pam.d/*" and file.extension == null) or 
+  (file.path : "/etc/security/pam_*" or file.path == "/etc/pam.conf")
+) and not (
+  process.executable in (
+    "/bin/dpkg", "/usr/bin/dpkg", "/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/dockerd", "/usr/sbin/dockerd", "/bin/microdnf",
+    "/usr/bin/microdnf", "/bin/rpm", "/usr/bin/rpm", "/bin/snapd", "/usr/bin/snapd", "/bin/yum", "/usr/bin/yum",
+    "/bin/dnf", "/usr/bin/dnf", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/bin/dnf-automatic", "/usr/bin/dnf-automatic",
+    "/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/dpkg-divert", "/bin/dpkg-divert", "/sbin/apk", "/usr/sbin/apk",
+    "/usr/local/sbin/apk", "/usr/bin/apt", "/usr/sbin/pacman", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/puppet",
+    "/bin/puppet", "/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/puppet", "/usr/bin/chef-client", "/bin/chef-client",
+    "/bin/autossl_check", "/usr/bin/autossl_check", "/proc/self/exe", "/dev/fd/*",  "/usr/bin/pamac-daemon",
+    "/bin/pamac-daemon", "/usr/lib/snapd/snapd", "/usr/local/bin/dockerd", "/usr/sbin/pam-auth-update",
+    "/usr/lib/systemd/systemd", "/usr/libexec/packagekitd", "/usr/bin/bsdtar"
+  ) or
+  file.path : (
+    "/tmp/snap.rootfs_*/pam_*.so", "/tmp/newroot/lib/*/pam_*.so", "/tmp/newroot/usr/lib64/security/pam_*.so"
+  ) or
+  file.extension in ("swp", "swpx", "swx", "dpkg-remove") or
+  file.Ext.original.extension == "dpkg-new" or
+  process.executable : (
+    "/nix/store/*", "/var/lib/dpkg/*", "/snap/*", "/dev/fd/*", "/usr/lib/virtualbox/*"
+  ) or
+  (process.name == "sed" and file.name : "sed*") or
+  (process.name == "perl" and file.name : "e2scrub_all.tmp*") 
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Create or Modify System Process
+** ID: T1543
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Modify Authentication Process
+** ID: T1556
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/cron-job-created-or-modified.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/cron-job-created-or-modified.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fef98bdf6b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/cron-job-created-or-modified.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
+[[cron-job-created-or-modified]]
+=== Cron Job Created or Modified
+
+This rule monitors for (ana)cron jobs being created or renamed. Linux cron jobs are scheduled tasks that can be leveraged by system administrators to set up scheduled tasks, but may be abused by malicious actors for persistence, privilege escalation and command execution. By creating or modifying cron job configurations, attackers can execute malicious commands or scripts at predefined intervals, ensuring their continued presence and enabling unauthorized activities.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.file*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://pberba.github.io/security/2022/01/30/linux-threat-hunting-for-persistence-systemd-timers-cron/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Tactic: Execution
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 11
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Cron Job Created or Modified*
+
+Linux cron jobs are scheduled tasks that run at specified intervals or times, managed by the cron daemon. 
+
+By creating or modifying cron job configurations, attackers can execute malicious commands or scripts at predefined intervals, ensuring their continued presence and enabling unauthorized activities.
+
+This rule monitors the creation of cron jobs by monitoring for file creation and rename events in the most common cron job task location directories.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html[placeholder fields] to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+
+*Possible Investigation Steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the cron job file that was created or modified.
+- Investigate whether any other files in any of the available cron job directories have been altered through OSQuery.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve File Listing Information","query":"SELECT * FROM file WHERE (path LIKE '/etc/cron.allow.d/%' OR path LIKE '/etc/cron.d/%' OR path LIKE\n'/etc/cron.hourly/%' OR path LIKE '/etc/cron.daily/%' OR path LIKE '/etc/cron.weekly/%' OR path LIKE\n'/etc/cron.monthly/%' OR path LIKE '/var/spool/cron/crontabs/%')\n"}}
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Cron File Information","query":"SELECT * FROM file WHERE (path = '/etc/cron.allow' OR path = '/etc/cron.deny' OR path = '/etc/crontab')\n"}}
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Additional File Listing Information","query":"SELECT f.path, u.username AS file_owner, g.groupname AS group_owner, datetime(f.atime, 'unixepoch') AS\nfile_last_access_time, datetime(f.mtime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_modified_time, datetime(f.ctime, 'unixepoch') AS\nfile_last_status_change_time, datetime(f.btime, 'unixepoch') AS file_created_time, f.size AS size_bytes FROM file f LEFT\nJOIN users u ON f.uid = u.uid LEFT JOIN groups g ON f.gid = g.gid WHERE ( path LIKE '/etc/cron.allow.d/%' OR path LIKE\n'/etc/cron.d/%' OR path LIKE '/etc/cron.hourly/%' OR path LIKE '/etc/cron.daily/%' OR path LIKE '/etc/cron.weekly/%' OR\npath LIKE '/etc/cron.monthly/%' OR path LIKE '/var/spool/cron/crontabs/%')\n"}}
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User","query":"SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"}}
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+- Investigate whether the altered scripts call other malicious scripts elsewhere on the file system. 
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+- Investigate abnormal behaviors by the subject process/user such as network connections, file modifications, and any other spawned child processes.
+  - Investigate listening ports and open sockets to look for potential command and control traffic or data exfiltration.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Listening Ports","query":"SELECT pid, address, port, socket, protocol, path FROM listening_ports"}}
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Open Sockets","query":"SELECT pid, family, remote_address, remote_port, socket, state FROM process_open_sockets"}}
+  - Identify the user account that performed the action, analyze it, and check whether it should perform this kind of action.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific User","query":"SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = {{user.name}}"}}
+- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Investigate the Account Authentication Status","query":"SELECT * FROM logged_in_users WHERE user = {{user.name}}"}}
+
+
+*False Positive Analysis*
+
+
+- If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+- If this activity is related to a system administrator who uses cron jobs for administrative purposes, consider adding exceptions for this specific administrator user account. 
+- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
+
+
+*Related Rules*
+
+
+- Suspicious File Creation in /etc for Persistence - 1c84dd64-7e6c-4bad-ac73-a5014ee37042
+- Potential Persistence Through Run Control Detected - 0f4d35e4-925e-4959-ab24-911be207ee6f
+- Potential Persistence Through init.d Detected - 474fd20e-14cc-49c5-8160-d9ab4ba16c8b
+- Systemd Timer Created - 7fb500fa-8e24-4bd1-9480-2a819352602c
+- Systemd Service Created - 17b0a495-4d9f-414c-8ad0-92f018b8e001
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Delete the service/timer or restore its original configuration.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and
+event.action in ("rename", "creation") and file.path : (
+  "/etc/cron.allow", "/etc/cron.deny", "/etc/cron.d/*", "/etc/cron.hourly/*", "/etc/cron.daily/*", "/etc/cron.weekly/*",
+  "/etc/cron.monthly/*", "/etc/crontab", "/var/spool/cron/crontabs/*", "/var/spool/anacron/*"
+) and not (
+  process.executable in (
+    "/bin/dpkg", "/usr/bin/dpkg", "/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/dockerd", "/usr/sbin/dockerd", "/bin/microdnf",
+    "/usr/bin/microdnf", "/bin/rpm", "/usr/bin/rpm", "/bin/snapd", "/usr/bin/snapd", "/bin/yum", "/usr/bin/yum",
+    "/bin/dnf", "/usr/bin/dnf", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/bin/dnf-automatic", "/usr/bin/dnf-automatic",
+    "/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/dpkg-divert", "/bin/dpkg-divert", "/sbin/apk", "/usr/sbin/apk",
+    "/usr/local/sbin/apk", "/usr/bin/apt", "/usr/sbin/pacman", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/puppet",
+    "/bin/puppet", "/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/puppet", "/usr/bin/chef-client", "/bin/chef-client",
+    "/bin/autossl_check", "/usr/bin/autossl_check", "/proc/self/exe", "/dev/fd/*",  "/usr/bin/pamac-daemon",
+    "/bin/pamac-daemon", "/usr/local/bin/dockerd"
+  ) or
+  file.path : "/var/spool/cron/crontabs/tmp.*" or
+  file.extension in ("swp", "swpx", "swx", "dpkg-remove") or
+  file.Ext.original.extension == "dpkg-new" or
+  process.executable : ("/nix/store/*", "/var/lib/dpkg/*", "/tmp/vmis.*", "/snap/*", "/dev/fd/*") or
+  process.executable == null or
+  (process.name == "sed" and file.name : "sed*") or
+  (process.name == "perl" and file.name : "e2scrub_all.tmp*") 
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task/Job
+** ID: T1053
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Cron
+** ID: T1053.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task/Job
+** ID: T1053
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Cron
+** ID: T1053.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Execution
+** ID: TA0002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task/Job
+** ID: T1053
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Cron
+** ID: T1053.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/executable-bit-set-for-rc-local-rc-common.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/executable-bit-set-for-rc-local-rc-common.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..825e04cba8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/executable-bit-set-for-rc-local-rc-common.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+[[executable-bit-set-for-rc-local-rc-common]]
+=== Executable Bit Set for rc.local/rc.common
+
+This rule monitors for the addition of an executable bit of the `/etc/rc.local` or `/etc/rc.common` files. These files are used to start custom applications, services, scripts or commands during start-up. They require executable permissions to be executed on boot. An alert of this rule is an indicator that this method is being set up within your environment. This method has mostly been replaced by Systemd. However, through the `systemd-rc-local-generator`, these files can be converted to services that run at boot. Adversaries may alter these files to execute malicious code at start-up, and gain persistence onto the system.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.process*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://www.intezer.com/blog/malware-analysis/hiddenwasp-malware-targeting-linux-systems/
+* https://pberba.github.io/security/2022/02/06/linux-threat-hunting-for-persistence-initialization-scripts-and-shell-configuration/#8-boot-or-logon-initialization-scripts-rc-scripts
+* https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/how-to-enable-rc-local-shell-script-on-systemd-while-booting-linux-system/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and
+process.args in ("/etc/rc.local", "/etc/rc.common") and (
+  (process.name == "chmod" and process.args : ("*+x*", "1*", "3*", "5*", "7*")) or
+  (process.name == "install" and process.args : "-m*" and process.args : ("*7*", "*5*", "*3*", "*1*"))
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
+** ID: T1037
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: RC Scripts
+** ID: T1037.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/first-time-seen-aws-secret-value-accessed-in-secrets-manager.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/first-time-seen-aws-secret-value-accessed-in-secrets-manager.asciidoc
index 6ebc419031..196dabdecc 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/first-time-seen-aws-secret-value-accessed-in-secrets-manager.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/first-time-seen-aws-secret-value-accessed-in-secrets-manager.asciidoc
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 [[first-time-seen-aws-secret-value-accessed-in-secrets-manager]]
 === First Time Seen AWS Secret Value Accessed in Secrets Manager
 
-An adversary with access to a compromised AWS service such as an EC2 instance, Lambda function, or other service may attempt to leverage the compromised service to access secrets in AWS Secrets Manager. This rule looks for the first time a specific user identity has programmatically retrieved a specific secret value from Secrets Manager using the `GetSecretValue` action. This rule assumes that AWS services such as Lambda functions and EC2 instances are setup with IAM role's assigned that have the necessary permissions to access the secrets in Secrets Manager. An adversary with access to a compromised AWS service such as an EC2 instance, Lambda function, or other service would rely on the compromised service's IAM role to access the secrets in Secrets Manager.
+An adversary with access to a compromised AWS service such as an EC2 instance, Lambda function, or other service may attempt to leverage the compromised service to access secrets in AWS Secrets Manager. This rule looks for the first time a specific user identity has programmatically retrieved a secret value from Secrets Manager using the `GetSecretValue` or `BatchGetSecretValue` actions. This rule assumes that AWS services such as Lambda functions and EC2 instances are setup with IAM role's assigned that have the necessary permissions to access the secrets in Secrets Manager. An adversary with access to a compromised AWS service such as an EC2 instance, Lambda function, or other service would rely on the compromised service's IAM role to access the secrets in Secrets Manager.
 
 *Rule type*: new_terms
 
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ An adversary with access to a compromised AWS service such as an EC2 instance, L
 
 * https://docs.aws.amazon.com/secretsmanager/latest/apireference/API_GetSecretValue.html
 * https://detectioninthe.cloud/ttps/credential_access/access_secret_in_secrets_manager/
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/secretsmanager/latest/apireference/API_BatchGetSecretValue.html
 * https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-services/aws-secrets-manager-enum
 
 *Tags*: 
@@ -31,10 +32,11 @@ An adversary with access to a compromised AWS service such as an EC2 instance, L
 * Domain: Cloud
 * Data Source: AWS
 * Data Source: Amazon Web Services
+* Data Source: AWS Secrets Manager
 * Tactic: Credential Access
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 
-*Version*: 311
+*Version*: 312
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -104,10 +106,6 @@ This rule looks for the retrieval of credentials using `GetSecretValue` action i
 - Identify the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection via the same vector.
 - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 
-==== Setup
-
-
-The AWS Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.
 
 ==== Rule query
 
@@ -115,7 +113,7 @@ The AWS Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is requ
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
 event.dataset:aws.cloudtrail and event.provider:secretsmanager.amazonaws.com and
-    event.action:GetSecretValue and event.outcome:success and aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.session_context.session_issuer.type: Role and
+    event.action: (GetSecretValue or BatchGetSecretValue) and event.outcome:success and
     not user_agent.name: ("Chrome" or "Firefox" or "Safari" or "Edge" or "Brave" or "Opera")
 
 ----------------------------------
@@ -127,6 +125,10 @@ event.dataset:aws.cloudtrail and event.provider:secretsmanager.amazonaws.com and
 ** ID: TA0006
 ** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
 * Technique:
-** Name: Steal Application Access Token
-** ID: T1528
-** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528/
+** Name: Credentials from Password Stores
+** ID: T1555
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Cloud Secrets Management Stores
+** ID: T1555.006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/006/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/group-policy-abuse-for-privilege-addition.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/group-policy-abuse-for-privilege-addition.asciidoc
index 20e53d8574..5abeaf3d31 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/group-policy-abuse-for-privilege-addition.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/group-policy-abuse-for-privilege-addition.asciidoc
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Detects the first occurrence of a modification to Group Policy Object Attributes
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ event.code: "5136" and
 ** ID: TA0004
 ** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
 * Technique:
-** Name: Domain Policy Modification
+** Name: Domain or Tenant Policy Modification
 ** ID: T1484
 ** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/
 * Sub-technique:
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-predicted-to-be-a-dga-domain.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-predicted-to-be-a-dga-domain.asciidoc
index 0854a8b368..22074271b1 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-predicted-to-be-a-dga-domain.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-predicted-to-be-a-dga-domain.asciidoc
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ A supervised machine learning model has identified a DNS question name that is p
 * Rule Type: Machine Learning
 * Tactic: Command and Control
 
-*Version*: 4
+*Version*: 5
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-with-a-high-dga-probability-score.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-with-a-high-dga-probability-score.asciidoc
index b4abe66a79..30be818e7b 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-with-a-high-dga-probability-score.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/machine-learning-detected-a-dns-request-with-a-high-dga-probability-score.asciidoc
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ A supervised machine learning model has identified a DNS question name with a hi
 * Rule Type: Machine Learning
 * Tactic: Command and Control
 
-*Version*: 4
+*Version*: 5
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-predicted-to-be-malicious-activity.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-predicted-to-be-malicious-activity.asciidoc
index 9c0149800c..1bfcab00fd 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-predicted-to-be-malicious-activity.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-predicted-to-be-malicious-activity.asciidoc
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ A supervised machine learning model (ProblemChild) has identified a suspicious W
 * Rule Type: Machine Learning
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 
-*Version*: 5
+*Version*: 6
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-with-a-high-malicious-probability-score.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-with-a-high-malicious-probability-score.asciidoc
index 551768f145..baf0474257 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-with-a-high-malicious-probability-score.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/machine-learning-detected-a-suspicious-windows-event-with-a-high-malicious-probability-score.asciidoc
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ A supervised machine learning model (ProblemChild) has identified a suspicious W
 * Rule Type: Machine Learning
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 
-*Version*: 5
+*Version*: 6
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/machine-learning-detected-dga-activity-using-a-known-sunburst-dns-domain.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/machine-learning-detected-dga-activity-using-a-known-sunburst-dns-domain.asciidoc
index a64b568833..165de99601 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/machine-learning-detected-dga-activity-using-a-known-sunburst-dns-domain.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/machine-learning-detected-dga-activity-using-a-known-sunburst-dns-domain.asciidoc
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ A supervised machine learning model has identified a DNS question name that used
 * Rule Type: Machine Learning
 * Tactic: Command and Control
 
-*Version*: 4
+*Version*: 5
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/message-of-the-day-motd-file-creation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/message-of-the-day-motd-file-creation.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8bc2dd70a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/message-of-the-day-motd-file-creation.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+[[message-of-the-day-motd-file-creation]]
+=== Message-of-the-Day (MOTD) File Creation
+
+This rule detects the creation of potentially malicious files within the default MOTD file directories. Message of the day (MOTD) is the message that is presented to the user when a user connects to a Linux server via SSH or a serial connection. Linux systems contain several default MOTD files located in the "/etc/update-motd.d/" directory. These scripts run as the root user every time a user connects over SSH or a serial connection. Adversaries may create malicious MOTD files that grant them persistence onto the target every time a user connects to the system by executing a backdoor script or command.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.file*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://pberba.github.io/security/2022/02/06/linux-threat-hunting-for-persistence-initialization-scripts-and-shell-configuration/#10-boot-or-logon-initialization-scripts-motd
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 11
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Message-of-the-Day (MOTD) File Creation*
+
+
+The message-of-the-day (MOTD) is used to display a customizable system-wide message or information to users upon login in Linux.
+
+Attackers can abuse message-of-the-day (motd) files to run scripts, commands or malicious software every time a user connects to a system over SSH or a serial connection, by creating a new file within the `/etc/update-motd.d/` directory. Executable files in these directories automatically run with root privileges.
+
+This rule identifies the creation of new files within the `/etc/update-motd.d/` directory.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html[placeholder fields] to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+
+*Possible Investigation Steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the file that was created or modified.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve File Information","query":"SELECT * FROM file WHERE path = {{file.path}}"}}
+- Investigate whether any other files in the `/etc/update-motd.d/` directory have been altered.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve File Listing Information","query":"SELECT * FROM file WHERE path LIKE '/etc/update-motd.d/%'"}}
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Additional File Listing Information","query":"SELECT f.path, u.username AS file_owner, g.groupname AS group_owner, datetime(f.atime, 'unixepoch') AS\nfile_last_access_time, datetime(f.mtime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_modified_time, datetime(f.ctime, 'unixepoch') AS\nfile_last_status_change_time, datetime(f.btime, 'unixepoch') AS file_created_time, f.size AS size_bytes FROM file f LEFT\nJOIN users u ON f.uid = u.uid LEFT JOIN groups g ON f.gid = g.gid WHERE path LIKE '/etc/update-motd.d/%'\n"}}
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User","query":"SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"}}
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate whether the modified scripts call other malicious scripts elsewhere on the file system.
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+        - Cron jobs, services and other persistence mechanisms.
+            - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Crontab Information","query":"SELECT * FROM crontab"}}
+
+
+*Related Rules*
+
+
+- Process Spawned from Message-of-the-Day (MOTD) - 4ec47004-b34a-42e6-8003-376a123ea447
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Any activity that triggered the alert and is not inherently malicious must be monitored by the security team.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Delete the MOTD files or restore their original configuration.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("rename", "creation") and
+file.path : "/etc/update-motd.d/*" and not (
+  process.executable in (
+    "/bin/dpkg", "/usr/bin/dpkg", "/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/dockerd", "/usr/sbin/dockerd", "/bin/microdnf",
+    "/usr/bin/microdnf", "/bin/rpm", "/usr/bin/rpm", "/bin/snapd", "/usr/bin/snapd", "/bin/yum", "/usr/bin/yum",
+    "/bin/dnf", "/usr/bin/dnf", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/bin/dnf-automatic", "/usr/bin/dnf-automatic",
+    "/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/dpkg-divert", "/bin/dpkg-divert", "/sbin/apk", "/usr/sbin/apk",
+    "/usr/local/sbin/apk", "/usr/bin/apt", "/usr/sbin/pacman", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/puppet",
+    "/bin/puppet", "/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/puppet", "/usr/bin/chef-client", "/bin/chef-client",
+    "/bin/autossl_check", "/usr/bin/autossl_check", "/proc/self/exe", "/dev/fd/*",  "/usr/bin/pamac-daemon",
+    "/bin/pamac-daemon", "/usr/lib/snapd/snapd", "/usr/local/bin/dockerd"
+  ) or
+  file.extension in ("swp", "swpx", "swx", "dpkg-remove") or
+  file.Ext.original.extension == "dpkg-new" or
+  process.executable : (
+    "/nix/store/*", "/var/lib/dpkg/*", "/tmp/vmis.*", "/snap/*", "/dev/fd/*", "/usr/lib/virtualbox/*"
+  ) or
+  process.executable == null or
+  (process.name == "sed" and file.name : "sed*") or
+  (process.name == "perl" and file.name : "e2scrub_all.tmp*") 
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
+** ID: T1037
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-connection-initiated-by-sshd-child-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-connection-initiated-by-sshd-child-process.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..628dc376aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-connection-initiated-by-sshd-child-process.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+[[network-connection-initiated-by-sshd-child-process]]
+=== Network Connection Initiated by SSHD Child Process
+
+This rule identifies an egress internet connection initiated by an SSH Daemon child process. This behavior is indicative of the alteration of a shell configuration file or other mechanism that launches a process when a new SSH login occurs. Attackers can also backdoor the SSH daemon to allow for persistence, call out to a C2 or to steal credentials.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://hadess.io/the-art-of-linux-persistence/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id with maxspan=1s
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
+   process.parent.executable == "/usr/sbin/sshd"] by process.entity_id
+  [network where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "connection_attempted" and not (
+     destination.ip == null or destination.ip == "0.0.0.0" or cidrmatch(
+     destination.ip, "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.0.0.0/24", "192.0.0.0/29",
+     "192.0.0.8/32", "192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.0.10/32", "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32", "192.0.2.0/24",
+     "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "100.64.0.0/10",
+     "192.175.48.0/24","198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "240.0.0.0/4", "::1", "FE80::/10",
+     "FF00::/8", "172.31.0.0/16"
+     )
+    )
+  ] by process.parent.entity_id
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Event Triggered Execution
+** ID: T1546
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Unix Shell Configuration Modification
+** ID: T1546.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote Services
+** ID: T1021
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: SSH
+** ID: T1021.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote Service Session Hijacking
+** ID: T1563
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: SSH Hijacking
+** ID: T1563.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/001/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Command and Control
+** ID: TA0011
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-connections-initiated-through-xdg-autostart-entry.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-connections-initiated-through-xdg-autostart-entry.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cbf9574ea1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/network-connections-initiated-through-xdg-autostart-entry.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+[[network-connections-initiated-through-xdg-autostart-entry]]
+=== Network Connections Initiated Through XDG Autostart Entry
+
+Detects network connections initiated through Cross-Desktop Group (XDG) autostart entries for GNOME and XFCE-based Linux distributions. XDG Autostart entries can be used to execute arbitrary commands or scripts when a user logs in. This rule helps to identify potential malicious activity where an attacker may have modified XDG autostart scripts to establish persistence on the system.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://specifications.freedesktop.org/autostart-spec/autostart-spec-latest.html
+* https://hadess.io/the-art-of-linux-persistence/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
+- Elastic Defend
+- Auditbeat
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Auditbeat Setup*
+
+Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit the activities of users and processes on your systems. For example, you can use Auditbeat to collect and centralize audit events from the Linux Audit Framework. You can also use Auditbeat to detect changes to critical files, like binaries and configuration files, and identify potential security policy violations.
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Auditbeat on a Linux System:*
+
+- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
+- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setup-repositories.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-docker.html[helper guide].
+- To run Auditbeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html[helper guide].
+- For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html[helper guide].
+
+
+*Custom Ingest Pipeline*
+
+For versions <8.2, you need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate `event.ingested` with @timestamp for non-elastic-agent indexes, like auditbeats/filebeat/winlogbeat etc. For more details to add a custom ingest pipeline refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html[guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+sequence by host.id, process.entity_id with maxspan=1s
+  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and (
+     (process.parent.executable == "/usr/bin/xfce4-session") or
+     (process.executable == "/bin/sh" and process.args == "-e" and process.args == "-u" and
+      process.args == "-c" and process.args : "export GIO_LAUNCHED_DESKTOP_FILE_PID=$$;*")
+   )
+  ]
+  [network where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "connection_attempted"]
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
+** ID: T1547
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: XDG Autostart Entries
+** ID: T1547.013
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/013/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/new-or-modified-federation-domain.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/new-or-modified-federation-domain.asciidoc
index 94d820b51a..3f799d1d14 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/new-or-modified-federation-domain.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/new-or-modified-federation-domain.asciidoc
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Identifies a new or modified federation domain, which can be used to create a tr
 * Use Case: Identity and Access Audit
 * Tactic: Privilege Escalation
 
-*Version*: 206
+*Version*: 207
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -73,10 +73,10 @@ event.outcome:success
 ** ID: TA0004
 ** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
 * Technique:
-** Name: Domain Policy Modification
+** Name: Domain or Tenant Policy Modification
 ** ID: T1484
 ** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/
 * Sub-technique:
-** Name: Domain Trust Modification
+** Name: Trust Modification
 ** ID: T1484.002
 ** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-dga-activity.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-dga-activity.asciidoc
index d2a44bcbec..a00aee3be8 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-dga-activity.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-dga-activity.asciidoc
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ A population analysis machine learning job detected potential DGA (domain genera
 * Rule Type: Machine Learning
 * Tactic: Command and Control
 
-*Version*: 4
+*Version*: 5
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-masquerading-as-browser-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-masquerading-as-browser-process.asciidoc
index d8aa33986f..65bab8338c 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-masquerading-as-browser-process.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-masquerading-as-browser-process.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Identifies suspicious instances of browser processes, such as unsigned or signed
 * Rule Type: BBR
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 4
+*Version*: 5
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -193,6 +193,6 @@ process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
 ** ID: TA0003
 ** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
 * Technique:
-** Name: Compromise Client Software Binary
+** Name: Compromise Host Software Binary
 ** ID: T1554
 ** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1554/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-masquerading-as-communication-apps.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-masquerading-as-communication-apps.asciidoc
index 0512a028cd..c4b32002fa 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-masquerading-as-communication-apps.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-masquerading-as-communication-apps.asciidoc
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Identifies suspicious instances of communications apps, both unsigned and rename
 * Tactic: Defense Evasion
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 5
+*Version*: 6
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -129,6 +129,6 @@ process where host.os.type == "windows" and
 ** ID: TA0003
 ** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
 * Technique:
-** Name: Compromise Client Software Binary
+** Name: Compromise Host Software Binary
 ** ID: T1554
 ** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1554/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-masquerading-as-system32-dll.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-masquerading-as-system32-dll.asciidoc
index 19fb32e4c0..163a055b6a 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-masquerading-as-system32-dll.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-masquerading-as-system32-dll.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Identifies suspicious instances of default system32 DLLs either unsigned or sign
 * Tactic: Persistence
 * Rule Type: BBR
 
-*Version*: 104
+*Version*: 105
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -152,6 +152,6 @@ library where event.action == "load" and dll.Ext.relative_file_creation_time <=
 ** ID: TA0003
 ** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
 * Technique:
-** Name: Compromise Client Software Binary
+** Name: Compromise Host Software Binary
 ** ID: T1554
 ** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1554/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-masquerading-as-system32-executable.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-masquerading-as-system32-executable.asciidoc
index 237e63969c..75f9de53a1 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-masquerading-as-system32-executable.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-masquerading-as-system32-executable.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Identifies suspicious instances of default system32 executables, either unsigned
 * Tactic: Persistence
 * Rule Type: BBR
 
-*Version*: 4
+*Version*: 5
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -115,6 +115,6 @@ process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
 ** ID: TA0003
 ** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
 * Technique:
-** Name: Compromise Client Software Binary
+** Name: Compromise Host Software Binary
 ** ID: T1554
 ** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1554/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-masquerading-as-vlc-dll.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-masquerading-as-vlc-dll.asciidoc
index 97240ece86..f30bf169a6 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-masquerading-as-vlc-dll.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-masquerading-as-vlc-dll.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Identifies instances of VLC-related DLLs which are not signed by the original de
 * Tactic: Persistence
 * Rule Type: BBR
 
-*Version*: 3
+*Version*: 4
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -77,6 +77,6 @@ library where host.os.type == "windows" and event.action == "load" and
 ** ID: TA0003
 ** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
 * Technique:
-** Name: Compromise Client Software Binary
+** Name: Compromise Host Software Binary
 ** ID: T1554
 ** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1554/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-openssh-backdoor-logging-activity.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-openssh-backdoor-logging-activity.asciidoc
index 376f5997d7..58b981a468 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-openssh-backdoor-logging-activity.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-openssh-backdoor-logging-activity.asciidoc
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Identifies a Secure Shell (SSH) client or server process creating or writing to
 * Data Source: Elastic Endgame
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -156,6 +156,6 @@ file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "change" and process.execut
 ** ID: TA0003
 ** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
 * Technique:
-** Name: Compromise Client Software Binary
+** Name: Compromise Host Software Binary
 ** ID: T1554
 ** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1554/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-persistence-via-file-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-persistence-via-file-modification.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cd76025de4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-persistence-via-file-modification.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+[[potential-persistence-via-file-modification]]
+=== Potential Persistence via File Modification
+
+This rule leverages the File Integrity Monitoring (FIM) integration to detect file modifications of files that are commonly used for persistence on Linux systems. The rule detects modifications to files that are commonly used for cron jobs, systemd services, message-of-the-day (MOTD), SSH configurations, shell configurations, runtime control, init daemon, passwd/sudoers/shadow files, Systemd udevd, and XDG/KDE autostart entries. To leverage this rule, the paths specified in the query need to be added to the FIM policy in the Elastic Security app.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-fim.event-*
+* auditbeat-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: File Integrity Monitoring
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from the Elastic File Integrity Monitoring (FIM) integration.
+
+
+*Elastic FIM Integration Setup*
+
+To configure the Elastic FIM integration, follow these steps:
+
+1. Install and configure the Elastic Agent on your Linux system. You can refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/elastic-agent-installation.html[Elastic Agent documentation] for detailed instructions.
+2. Once the Elastic Agent is installed, navigate to the Elastic Security app in Kibana.
+3. In the Kibana home page, click on "Integrations" in the left sidebar.
+4. Search for "File Integrity Monitoring" in the search bar and select the integration.
+5. Provide a name and optional description for the integration.
+6. Select the appropriate agent policy for your Linux system or create a new one.
+7. Configure the FIM policy by specifying the paths that you want to monitor for file modifications. You can use the same paths mentioned in the `query` field of the rule. Note that FIM does not accept wildcards in the paths, so you need to specify the exact paths you want to monitor.
+8. Save the configuration and the Elastic Agent will start monitoring the specified paths for file modifications.
+
+For more details on configuring the Elastic FIM integration, you can refer to the https://docs.elastic.co/integrations/fim[Elastic FIM documentation].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.dataset == "fim.event" and event.action == "updated" and
+file.path : (
+  // cron, anacron & at
+  "/etc/cron.d/*", "/etc/cron.daily/*", "/etc/cron.hourly/*", "/etc/cron.monthly/*",
+  "/etc/cron.weekly/*", "/etc/crontab", "/var/spool/cron/crontabs/*", "/etc/cron.allow",
+  "/etc/cron.deny",  "/var/spool/anacron/*", "/var/spool/cron/atjobs/*",
+
+  // systemd services & timers
+  "/etc/systemd/system/*", "/usr/local/lib/systemd/system/*", "/lib/systemd/system/*",
+  "/usr/lib/systemd/system/*", "/home/*/.config/systemd/user/*", "/home/*/.local/share/systemd/user/*",
+  "/root/.config/systemd/user/*", "/root/.local/share/systemd/user/*",
+
+  // LD_PRELOAD
+  "/etc/ld.so.preload", "/etc/ld.so.conf.d/*", "/etc/ld.so.conf",
+
+  // message-of-the-day (MOTD)
+  "/etc/update-motd.d/*",
+
+  // SSH
+  "/home/*/.ssh/*", "/root/.ssh/*", "/etc/ssh/*",
+
+  // system-wide shell configurations
+  "/etc/profile", "/etc/profile.d/*", "/etc/bash.bashrc", "/etc/zsh/*", "/etc/csh.cshrc",
+  "/etc/csh.login", "/etc/fish/config.fish", "/etc/ksh.kshrc",
+
+  // root and user shell configurations
+  "/home/*/.profile", "/home/*/.bashrc", "/home/*/.bash_login", "/home/*/.bash_logout",
+  "/root/.profile", "/root/.bashrc", "/root/.bash_login", "/root/.bash_logout",
+  "/home/*/.zprofile", "/home/*/.zshrc", "/root/.zprofile", "/root/.zshrc",
+  "/home/*/.cshrc", "/home/*/.login", "/home/*/.logout", "/root/.cshrc", "/root/.login", "/root/.logout",
+  "/home/*/.config/fish/config.fish", "/root/.config/fish/config.fish",
+  "/home/*/.kshrc", "/root/.kshrc",
+
+  // runtime control
+  "/etc/rc.common", "/etc/rc.local",
+
+  // init daemon
+  "/etc/init.d/*",
+
+  // passwd/sudoers/shadow
+  "/etc/passwd", "/etc/shadow", "/etc/sudoers", "/etc/sudoers.d/*",
+
+  // Systemd udevd
+  "/lib/udev/*", "/etc/udev/rules.d/*", "/usr/lib/udev/rules.d/*", "/run/udev/rules.d/*",
+
+  // XDG/KDE autostart entries
+  "/home/*/.config/autostart/*", "/root/.config/autostart/*", "/etc/xdg/autostart/*", "/usr/share/autostart/*",
+  "/home/*/.kde/Autostart/*", "/root/.kde/Autostart/*",
+  "/home/*/.kde4/Autostart/*", "/root/.kde4/Autostart/*",
+  "/home/*/.kde/share/autostart/*", "/root/.kde/share/autostart/*",
+  "/home/*/.kde4/share/autostart/*", "/root/.kde4/share/autostart/*",
+  "/home/*/.local/share/autostart/*", "/root/.local/share/autostart/*",
+  "/home/*/.config/autostart-scripts/*", "/root/.config/autostart-scripts/*"
+) and not (
+  file.path : (
+    "/var/spool/cron/crontabs/tmp.*", "/run/udev/rules.d/*rules.*", "/home/*/.ssh/known_hosts.*", "/root/.ssh/known_hosts.*"
+  ) or
+  file.extension in ("dpkg-new", "dpkg-remove", "SEQ")
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
+** ID: T1037
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: RC Scripts
+** ID: T1037.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Create or Modify System Process
+** ID: T1543
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Systemd Service
+** ID: T1543.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Modify Authentication Process
+** ID: T1556
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Hijack Execution Flow
+** ID: T1574
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Dynamic Linker Hijacking
+** ID: T1574.006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Create Account
+** ID: T1136
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Local Account
+** ID: T1136.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/001/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task/Job
+** ID: T1053
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Cron
+** ID: T1053.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
+** ID: T1548
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Sudo and Sudo Caching
+** ID: T1548.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-sudo-hijacking.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-sudo-hijacking.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c3949a90a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/potential-sudo-hijacking.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+[[potential-sudo-hijacking]]
+=== Potential Sudo Hijacking
+
+Identifies the creation of a sudo binary located at /usr/bin/sudo. Attackers may hijack the default sudo binary and replace it with a custom binary or script that can read the user's password in clear text to escalate privileges or enable persistence onto the system every time the sudo binary is executed.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.file*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://eapolsniper.github.io/2020/08/17/Sudo-Hijacking/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 106
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("creation", "rename") and
+file.path in ("/usr/bin/sudo", "/bin/sudo") and not (
+  file.Ext.original.path in ("/usr/bin/sudo", "/bin/sudo") or
+  process.executable in (
+    "/bin/dpkg", "/usr/bin/dpkg", "/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/dockerd", "/usr/sbin/dockerd", "/bin/microdnf",
+    "/bin/rpm", "/usr/bin/rpm", "/bin/snapd", "/usr/bin/snapd", "/bin/yum", "/usr/bin/yum", "/bin/dnf", "/usr/bin/dnf",
+    "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/bin/dnf-automatic", "/usr/bin/dnf-automatic", "/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/pacman",
+    "/usr/bin/dpkg-divert", "/bin/dpkg-divert", "/sbin/apk", "/usr/sbin/apk", "/usr/local/sbin/apk", "/usr/bin/apt",
+    "/usr/sbin/pacman", "/usr/bin/microdnf", "/usr/local/bin/dockerd", "/usr/local/bin/podman", "/usr/local/bin/dnf",
+    "/kaniko/executor", "/proc/self/exe", "/usr/bin/apt-get", "/usr/bin/apt-cache", "/usr/bin/apt-mark"
+  ) or
+  file.Ext.original.extension == "dpkg-new" or
+  process.executable : (
+    "/nix/store/*", "/var/lib/dpkg/*", "/tmp/vmis.*", "/snap/*", "/dev/fd/*", "/var/lib/docker/*"
+  ) or
+  process.executable == null or
+  (process.name == "sed" and file.name : "sed*")
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
+** ID: T1548
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Sudo and Sudo Caching
+** ID: T1548.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Hijack Execution Flow
+** ID: T1574
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/process-capability-set-via-setcap-utility.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/process-capability-set-via-setcap-utility.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..695cc5b702
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/process-capability-set-via-setcap-utility.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+[[process-capability-set-via-setcap-utility]]
+=== Process Capability Set via setcap Utility
+
+This rule detects the use of the setcap utility to set capabilities on a process. The setcap utility is used to set the capabilities of a binary to allow it to perform privileged operations without needing to run as root. This can be used by attackers to establish persistence by creating a backdoor, or escalate privileges by abusing a misconfiguration on a system.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.process*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows
+the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest to select "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and
+process.name == "setcap" and not (
+  process.parent.executable == null or
+  process.parent.executable : ("/var/lib/dpkg/*", "/var/lib/docker/*", "/tmp/newroot/*", "/var/tmp/newroot/*") or 
+  process.parent.name in ("jem", "vzctl")
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/process-spawned-from-message-of-the-day-motd.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/process-spawned-from-message-of-the-day-motd.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d0e0e282ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/process-spawned-from-message-of-the-day-motd.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
+[[process-spawned-from-message-of-the-day-motd]]
+=== Process Spawned from Message-of-the-Day (MOTD)
+
+Message of the day (MOTD) is the message that is presented to the user when a user connects to a Linux server via SSH or a serial connection. Linux systems contain several default MOTD files located in the "/etc/update-motd.d/" directory. These scripts run as the root user every time a user connects over SSH or a serial connection. Adversaries may create malicious MOTD files that grant them persistence onto the target every time a user connects to the system by executing a backdoor script or command. This rule detects the execution of potentially malicious processes through the MOTD utility.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.process*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: high
+
+*Risk score*: 73
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://pberba.github.io/security/2022/02/06/linux-threat-hunting-for-persistence-initialization-scripts-and-shell-configuration/#10-boot-or-logon-initialization-scripts-motd
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 10
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Process Spawned from Message-of-the-Day (MOTD)*
+
+
+The message-of-the-day (MOTD) is used to display a customizable system-wide message or information to users upon login in Linux.
+
+Attackers can abuse message-of-the-day (motd) files to run scripts, commands or malicious software every time a user connects to a system over SSH or a serial connection, by creating a new file within the `/etc/update-motd.d/` directory. Files in these directories will automatically run with root privileges when they are made executable.
+
+This rule identifies the execution of potentially malicious processes from a MOTD script, which is not likely to occur as default benign behavior. 
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html[placeholder fields] to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+
+*Possible Investigation Steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the file that was created or modified from which the suspicious process was executed.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve File Information","query":"SELECT * FROM file WHERE path = {{file.path}}"}}
+- Investigate whether any other files in the `/etc/update-motd.d/` directory have been altered.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve File Listing Information","query":"SELECT * FROM file WHERE path LIKE '/etc/update-motd.d/%'"}}
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Additional File Listing Information","query":"SELECT f.path, u.username AS file_owner, g.groupname AS group_owner, datetime(f.atime, 'unixepoch') AS\nfile_last_access_time, datetime(f.mtime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_modified_time, datetime(f.ctime, 'unixepoch') AS\nfile_last_status_change_time, datetime(f.btime, 'unixepoch') AS file_created_time, f.size AS size_bytes FROM file f LEFT\nJOIN users u ON f.uid = u.uid LEFT JOIN groups g ON f.gid = g.gid WHERE path LIKE '/etc/update-motd.d/%'\n"}}
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User","query":"SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"}}
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate whether the altered scripts call other malicious scripts elsewhere on the file system. 
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+        - Cron jobs, services, and other persistence mechanisms.
+            - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Crontab Information","query":"SELECT * FROM crontab"}}
+
+
+*Related Rules*
+
+
+- Message-of-the-Day (MOTD) File Creation - 96d11d31-9a79-480f-8401-da28b194608f
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Any activity that triggered the alert and is not inherently malicious must be monitored by the security team.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Delete the MOTD files or restore them to the original configuration.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+process where event.type == "start" and host.os.type == "linux" and event.action : ("exec", "exec_event") and
+  process.parent.executable : "/etc/update-motd.d/*" and (
+  (process.name in ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish") and (
+    (process.args : ("-i", "-l")) or (process.parent.name == "socat" and process.parent.args : "*exec*"))) or
+  (process.name : ("nc", "ncat", "netcat", "nc.openbsd") and process.args_count >= 3 and 
+    not process.args : ("-*z*", "-*l*")) or
+  (process.name : "python*" and process.args : "-c" and process.args : (
+     "*import*pty*spawn*", "*import*subprocess*call*"
+  )) or
+  (process.name : "perl*" and process.args : "-e" and process.args : "*socket*" and process.args : (
+     "*exec*", "*system*"
+  )) or
+  (process.name : "ruby*" and process.args : ("-e", "-rsocket") and process.args : (
+     "*TCPSocket.new*", "*TCPSocket.open*"
+  )) or
+  (process.name : "lua*" and process.args : "-e" and process.args : "*socket.tcp*" and process.args : (
+     "*io.popen*", "*os.execute*"
+  )) or
+  (process.name : "php*" and process.args : "-r" and process.args : "*fsockopen*" and process.args : "*/bin/*sh*") or 
+  (process.name : ("awk", "gawk", "mawk", "nawk") and process.args : "*/inet/tcp/*") or 
+  (process.name in ("openssl", "telnet")) or
+  (process.args : (
+    "./*", "/boot/*", "/dev/shm/*", "/etc/cron.*/*", "/etc/init.d/*", "/etc/update-motd.d/*", "/run/*", "/srv/*",
+    "/tmp/*", "/var/tmp/*", "/var/log/*", "/opt/*"
+    ) and process.args_count == 1
+  )
+) and 
+not (
+  process.parent.args == "--force" or
+  process.args in ("/usr/games/lolcat", "/usr/bin/screenfetch") or
+  process.parent.name == "system-crash-notification"
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
+** ID: T1037
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/rapid-secret-retrieval-attempts-from-aws-secretsmanager.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/rapid-secret-retrieval-attempts-from-aws-secretsmanager.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2c435913e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/rapid-secret-retrieval-attempts-from-aws-secretsmanager.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+[[rapid-secret-retrieval-attempts-from-aws-secretsmanager]]
+=== Rapid Secret Retrieval Attempts from AWS SecretsManager
+
+This rule attempts to identify rapid secret retrieval attempts from AWS SecretsManager. Adversaries may attempt to retrieve secrets from the Secrets Manager programmatically using the `GetSecretValue` or `BatchGetSecretValue` API actions.
+
+*Rule type*: threshold
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* filebeat-*
+* logs-aws.cloudtrail*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-5m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/secretsmanager/latest/apireference/API_GetSecretValue.html
+* https://detectioninthe.cloud/ttps/credential_access/access_secret_in_secrets_manager/
+* https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-services/aws-secrets-manager-enum
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/secretsmanager/latest/apireference/API_BatchGetSecretValue.html
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Cloud
+* Data Source: AWS
+* Data Source: Amazon Web Services
+* Data Source: AWS Secrets Manager
+* Tactic: Credential Access
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Rapid Secret Retrieval Attempts from AWS SecretsManager*
+
+
+AWS Secrets Manager is a service that enables the replacement of hardcoded credentials in code, including passwords, with an API call to Secrets Manager to retrieve the secret programmatically.
+
+This rule looks for the rapid retrieval of credentials using `GetSecretValue` or `BatchGetSecretValue` actions in Secrets Manager programmatically. This is a https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/rules-ui-create.html#create-threshold-rule[Threshold] rule indicating 20 or more successful attempts to retrieve a secret value from Secrets Manager by the same user identity within a short timespan. 
+
+
+*Possible investigation steps*
+
+
+- Identify the account and its role in the environment, and inspect the related policy.
+- Identify the applications that should use this account.
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user account during the past 48 hours.
+- Investigate abnormal values in the `user_agent.original` field by comparing them with the intended and authorized usage and historical data. Suspicious user agent values include non-SDK, AWS CLI, custom user agents, etc.
+- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences involving other users.
+- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
+- Considering the source IP address and geolocation of the user who issued the command:
+    - Do they look normal for the calling user?
+    - If the source is an EC2 IP address, is it associated with an EC2 instance in one of your accounts or is the source IP from an EC2 instance that's not under your control?
+    - If it is an authorized EC2 instance, is the activity associated with normal behavior for the instance role or roles? Are there any other alerts or signs of suspicious activity involving this instance?
+- Review IAM permission policies for the user identity and specific secrets accessed.
+- Examine the request parameters. These might indicate the source of the program or the nature of its tasks.
+- If you suspect the account has been compromised, scope potentially compromised assets by tracking servers, services, and data accessed by the account in the last 24 hours.
+
+
+*False positive analysis*
+
+
+- False positives may occur due to the intended usage of the service. Tuning is needed in order to have higher confidence. Consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user agent and IP address conditions.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Disable or limit the account during the investigation and response.
+- Identify the possible impact of the incident and prioritize accordingly; the following actions can help you gain context:
+    - Identify the account role in the cloud environment.
+    - Assess the criticality of affected services and servers.
+    - Work with your IT team to identify and minimize the impact on users.
+    - Identify if the attacker is moving laterally and compromising other accounts, servers, or services.
+    - Identify any regulatory or legal ramifications related to this activity.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Rotate secrets or delete API keys as needed to revoke the attacker's access to the environment. Work with your IT teams to minimize the impact on business operations during these actions.
+- Check if unauthorized new users were created, remove unauthorized new accounts, and request password resets for other IAM users.
+- Consider enabling multi-factor authentication for users.
+- Review the permissions assigned to the implicated user to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
+- Implement security best practices https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/security-best-practices/[outlined] by AWS.
+- Take the actions needed to return affected systems, data, or services to their normal operational levels.
+- Identify the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection via the same vector.
+- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+event.dataset:aws.cloudtrail and event.provider:secretsmanager.amazonaws.com and
+    event.action: (GetSecretValue or BatchGetSecretValue) and event.outcome:success and
+    not user_agent.name: ("Chrome" or "Firefox" or "Safari" or "Edge" or "Brave" or "Opera")
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Credential Access
+** ID: TA0006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Credentials from Password Stores
+** ID: T1555
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Cloud Secrets Management Stores
+** ID: T1555.006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/006/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/scheduled-task-execution-at-scale-via-gpo.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/scheduled-task-execution-at-scale-via-gpo.asciidoc
index bbb86b43d9..4276330719 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/scheduled-task-execution-at-scale-via-gpo.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/scheduled-task-execution-at-scale-via-gpo.asciidoc
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ Detects the modification of Group Policy Object attributes to execute a schedule
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring
 
-*Version*: 110
+*Version*: 111
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ or
 ** ID: T1053.005
 ** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/
 * Technique:
-** Name: Domain Policy Modification
+** Name: Domain or Tenant Policy Modification
 ** ID: T1484
 ** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/
 * Sub-technique:
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/shell-configuration-creation-or-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/shell-configuration-creation-or-modification.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..657118b947
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/shell-configuration-creation-or-modification.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+[[shell-configuration-creation-or-modification]]
+=== Shell Configuration Creation or Modification
+
+This rule monitors the creation/alteration of a shell configuration file. Unix systems use shell configuration files to set environment variables, create aliases, and customize the user's environment. Adversaries may modify or add a shell configuration file to execute malicious code and gain persistence in the system. This behavior is consistent with the Kaiji malware family.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.file*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 2
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("rename", "creation") and file.path : (
+  // system-wide configurations
+  "/etc/profile", "/etc/profile.d/*", "/etc/bash.bashrc", "/etc/zsh/*",
+  "/etc/csh.cshrc", "/etc/csh.login", "/etc/fish/config.fish", "/etc/ksh.kshrc",
+  // root and user configurations
+  "/home/*/.profile", "/home/*/.bashrc", "/home/*/.bash_login", "/home/*/.bash_logout",
+  "/root/.profile", "/root/.bashrc", "/root/.bash_login", "/root/.bash_logout",
+  "/home/*/.zprofile", "/home/*/.zshrc", "/root/.zprofile", "/root/.zshrc",
+  "/home/*/.cshrc", "/home/*/.login", "/home/*/.logout", "/root/.cshrc", "/root/.login", "/root/.logout",
+  "/home/*/.config/fish/config.fish", "/root/.config/fish/config.fish",
+  "/home/*/.kshrc", "/root/.kshrc"
+) and not (
+  process.executable in (
+    "/bin/dpkg", "/usr/bin/dpkg", "/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/dockerd", "/usr/sbin/dockerd", "/bin/microdnf",
+    "/usr/bin/microdnf", "/bin/rpm", "/usr/bin/rpm", "/bin/snapd", "/usr/bin/snapd", "/bin/yum", "/usr/bin/yum",
+    "/bin/dnf", "/usr/bin/dnf", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/bin/dnf-automatic", "/usr/bin/dnf-automatic",
+    "/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/dpkg-divert", "/bin/dpkg-divert", "/sbin/apk", "/usr/sbin/apk",
+    "/usr/local/sbin/apk", "/usr/bin/apt", "/usr/sbin/pacman", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/puppet",
+    "/bin/puppet", "/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/puppet", "/usr/bin/chef-client", "/bin/chef-client",
+    "/bin/autossl_check", "/usr/bin/autossl_check", "/proc/self/exe", "/dev/fd/*",  "/usr/bin/pamac-daemon",
+    "/bin/pamac-daemon", "/usr/lib/snapd/snapd", "/usr/sbin/adduser", "/usr/sbin/useradd", "/usr/local/bin/dockerd"
+  ) or
+  file.extension in ("swp", "swpx", "swx", "dpkg-remove") or
+  file.Ext.original.extension == "dpkg-new" or
+  process.executable : (
+    "/nix/store/*", "/var/lib/dpkg/*", "/tmp/vmis.*", "/snap/*", "/dev/fd/*", "/usr/lib/virtualbox/*"
+  ) or
+  process.executable == null or
+  (process.name == "sed" and file.name : "sed*") or
+  (process.name == "perl" and file.name : "e2scrub_all.tmp*") 
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Event Triggered Execution
+** ID: T1546
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Unix Shell Configuration Modification
+** ID: T1546.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/ssh-key-generated-via-ssh-keygen.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/ssh-key-generated-via-ssh-keygen.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..836b5e0600
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/ssh-key-generated-via-ssh-keygen.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+[[ssh-key-generated-via-ssh-keygen]]
+=== SSH Key Generated via ssh-keygen
+
+This rule identifies the creation of SSH keys using the ssh-keygen tool, which is the standard utility for generating SSH keys. Users often create SSH keys for authentication with remote services. However, threat actors can exploit this tool to move laterally across a network or maintain persistence by generating unauthorized SSH keys, granting them SSH access to systems.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.process*
+* endgame-*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Lateral Movement
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Endgame
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 1
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("creation", "file_create_event") and
+process.executable == "/usr/bin/ssh-keygen" and file.path : ("/home/*/.ssh/*", "/root/.ssh/*", "/etc/ssh/*") and
+not file.name : "known_hosts.*"
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Account Manipulation
+** ID: T1098
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: SSH Authorized Keys
+** ID: T1098.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/004/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Lateral Movement
+** ID: TA0008
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote Services
+** ID: T1021
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: SSH
+** ID: T1021.004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Remote Service Session Hijacking
+** ID: T1563
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: SSH Hijacking
+** ID: T1563.001
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/001/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/startup-logon-script-added-to-group-policy-object.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/startup-logon-script-added-to-group-policy-object.asciidoc
index 2867d3cafe..bf5c184022 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/startup-logon-script-added-to-group-policy-object.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/startup-logon-script-added-to-group-policy-object.asciidoc
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Detects the modification of Group Policy Objects (GPO) to add a startup/logon sc
 * Resources: Investigation Guide
 * Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ or
 ** ID: TA0004
 ** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
 * Technique:
-** Name: Domain Policy Modification
+** Name: Domain or Tenant Policy Modification
 ** ID: T1484
 ** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/
 * Sub-technique:
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/statistical-model-detected-c2-beaconing-activity.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/statistical-model-detected-c2-beaconing-activity.asciidoc
index fe4ff38e4e..0fb34dc795 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/statistical-model-detected-c2-beaconing-activity.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/statistical-model-detected-c2-beaconing-activity.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ A statistical model has identified command-and-control (C2) beaconing activity.
 * Use Case: C2 Beaconing Detection
 * Tactic: Command and Control
 
-*Version*: 5
+*Version*: 6
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -77,7 +77,12 @@ The Network Beaconing Identification integration consists of a statistical frame
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
 beacon_stats.is_beaconing: true and
-not process.name: ("WaAppAgent.exe" or "metricbeat.exe" or "packetbeat.exe" or "WindowsAzureGuestAgent.exe" or "HealthService.exe" or "Widgets.exe" or "lsass.exe" or "msedgewebview2.exe" or "MsMpEng.exe" or "OUTLOOK.EXE" or "msteams.exe" or "FileSyncHelper.exe" or "SearchProtocolHost.exe" or "Creative Cloud.exe" or "ms-teams.exe" or "ms-teamsupdate.exe" or "curl.exe" or "rundll32.exe" or "MsSense.exe" or "wermgr.exe" or "java" or "olk.exe" or "iexplore.exe" or "NetworkManager" or "packetbeat" or "Ssms.exe" or "NisSrv.exe" or "gamingservices.exe" or "appidcertstorecheck.exe" or "POWERPNT.EXE" or "miiserver.exe" or "Grammarly.Desktop.exe" or "SnagitEditor.exe" or "CRWindowsClientService.exe")
+not process.name: ("WaAppAgent.exe" or "metricbeat.exe" or "packetbeat.exe" or "WindowsAzureGuestAgent.exe" or "HealthService.exe" or "Widgets.exe" or "lsass.exe" or "msedgewebview2.exe" or 
+                   "MsMpEng.exe" or "OUTLOOK.EXE" or "msteams.exe" or "FileSyncHelper.exe" or "SearchProtocolHost.exe" or "Creative Cloud.exe" or "ms-teams.exe" or "ms-teamsupdate.exe" or 
+                   "curl.exe" or "rundll32.exe" or "MsSense.exe" or "wermgr.exe" or "java" or "olk.exe" or "iexplore.exe" or "NetworkManager" or "packetbeat" or "Ssms.exe" or "NisSrv.exe" or 
+                   "gamingservices.exe" or "appidcertstorecheck.exe" or "POWERPNT.EXE" or "miiserver.exe" or "Grammarly.Desktop.exe" or "SnagitEditor.exe" or "CRWindowsClientService.exe" or
+                   "agentbeat" or "dnf" or "yum" or "apt"
+                  )
 
 ----------------------------------
 
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/sublime-plugin-or-application-script-modification.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/sublime-plugin-or-application-script-modification.asciidoc
index 1d80712edf..23527965f4 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/sublime-plugin-or-application-script-modification.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/sublime-plugin-or-application-script-modification.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Adversaries may create or modify the Sublime application plugins or scripts to e
 * Tactic: Persistence
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 107
+*Version*: 108
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -106,6 +106,6 @@ file where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type in ("change", "creation") and
 ** ID: TA0003
 ** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
 * Technique:
-** Name: Compromise Client Software Binary
+** Name: Compromise Host Software Binary
 ** ID: T1554
 ** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1554/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-communication-app-child-process.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-communication-app-child-process.asciidoc
index 838d628170..cd5511dd6f 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-communication-app-child-process.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/suspicious-communication-app-child-process.asciidoc
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Identifies suspicious child processes of communications apps, which can indicate
 * Rule Type: BBR
 * Data Source: Elastic Defend
 
-*Version*: 4
+*Version*: 5
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -294,6 +294,6 @@ process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
 ** ID: TA0003
 ** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
 * Technique:
-** Name: Compromise Client Software Binary
+** Name: Compromise Host Software Binary
 ** ID: T1554
 ** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1554/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/system-binary-moved-or-copied.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/system-binary-moved-or-copied.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a9b327e56d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/system-binary-moved-or-copied.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+[[system-binary-moved-or-copied]]
+=== System Binary Moved or Copied
+
+This rule monitors for the copying or moving of a system binary. Adversaries may copy/move and rename system binaries to evade detection. Copying a system binary to a different location should not occur often, so if it does, the activity should be investigated.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.file*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Defense Evasion
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 9
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "change" and event.action == "rename" and
+file.Ext.original.path : (
+  "/bin/*", "/usr/bin/*", "/usr/local/bin/*", "/sbin/*", "/usr/sbin/*", "/usr/local/sbin/*"
+) and not (
+  process.executable in (
+    "/bin/dpkg", "/usr/bin/dpkg", "/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/dockerd", "/usr/sbin/dockerd", "/bin/microdnf",
+    "/usr/bin/microdnf", "/bin/rpm", "/usr/bin/rpm", "/bin/snapd", "/usr/bin/snapd", "/bin/yum", "/usr/bin/yum",
+    "/bin/dnf", "/usr/bin/dnf", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/bin/dnf-automatic", "/usr/bin/dnf-automatic",
+    "/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/dpkg-divert", "/bin/dpkg-divert", "/sbin/apk", "/usr/sbin/apk",
+    "/usr/local/sbin/apk", "/usr/bin/apt", "/usr/sbin/pacman", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/puppet",
+    "/bin/puppet", "/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/puppet", "/usr/bin/chef-client", "/bin/chef-client",
+    "/bin/autossl_check", "/usr/bin/autossl_check", "/proc/self/exe", "/dev/fd/*",  "/usr/bin/pamac-daemon",
+    "/bin/pamac-daemon", "/usr/lib/snapd/snapd", "/usr/local/bin/dockerd", "/usr/libexec/netplan/generate",
+    "/usr/bin/update-alternatives", "/bin/update-alternatives", "/usr/sbin/update-alternatives",
+    "/sbin/update-alternatives", "/usr/bin/pip3", "/bin/pip3", "/usr/local/bin/pip3", "/usr/local/bin/node",
+    "/bin/node", "/usr/bin/node", "/sbin/apk", "/usr/sbin/apk", "/usr/local/sbin/apk", "/usr/bin/pip", "/bin/pip",
+    "/usr/local/bin/pip"
+  ) or
+  file.Ext.original.path : (
+    "/bin/*.tmp", "/usr/bin/*.tmp", "/usr/local/bin/*.tmp", "/sbin/*.tmp", "/usr/sbin/*.tmp", "/usr/local/sbin/*.tmp"
+  ) or
+  file.extension in ("swp", "swpx", "swx", "dpkg-remove") or
+  file.Ext.original.extension == "dpkg-new" or
+  process.executable : ("/nix/store/*", "/var/lib/dpkg/*", "/tmp/vmis.*", "/snap/*", "/dev/fd/*") or
+  process.executable == null or
+  (process.name == "sed" and file.name : "sed*") or
+  (process.name == "perl" and file.name : "e2scrub_all.tmp*") 
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Defense Evasion
+** ID: TA0005
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Masquerading
+** ID: T1036
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Rename System Utilities
+** ID: T1036.003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Hide Artifacts
+** ID: T1564
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/systemd-service-created.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/systemd-service-created.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a6d9dc6332
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/systemd-service-created.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,226 @@
+[[systemd-service-created]]
+=== Systemd Service Created
+
+This rule detects the creation or renaming of a new Systemd file in all of the common Systemd service locations for both root and regular users. Systemd service files are configuration files in Linux systems used to define and manage system services. Malicious actors can leverage systemd service files to achieve persistence by creating or modifying services to execute malicious commands or payloads during system startup or at a predefined interval by adding a systemd timer. This allows them to maintain unauthorized access, execute additional malicious activities, or evade detection.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.file*
+
+*Severity*: medium
+
+*Risk score*: 47
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://pberba.github.io/security/2022/01/30/linux-threat-hunting-for-persistence-systemd-timers-cron/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Tactic: Privilege Escalation
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 11
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Systemd Service Created*
+
+
+Systemd service files are configuration files in Linux systems used to define and manage system services.
+
+Malicious actors can leverage systemd service files to achieve persistence by creating or modifying service files to execute malicious commands or payloads during system startup. This allows them to maintain unauthorized access, execute additional malicious activities, or evade detection.
+
+This rule monitors the creation of new systemd service files, potentially indicating the creation of a persistence mechanism.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html[placeholder fields] to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+
+*Possible Investigation Steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the systemd service file that was created or modified.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve File Information","query":"SELECT * FROM file WHERE path = {{file.path}}"}}
+- Investigate the currently enabled systemd services through the following command `sudo systemctl list-unit-files`.
+- Investigate whether any other files in any of the available systemd directories have been altered through OSQuery.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve File Listing Information","query":"SELECT * FROM file WHERE (path LIKE '/etc/systemd/system/%' OR path LIKE '/usr/local/lib/systemd/system/%'\nOR path LIKE '/lib/systemd/system/%' OR path LIKE '/usr/lib/systemd/system/%'\nOR path LIKE '/home/{{user.name}}/.config/systemd/user/%' OR path LIKE '/home/{{user.name}}/.local/share/systemd/user/%'\nOR path LIKE '/root/.config/systemd/user/%' OR path LIKE '/root/.local/share/systemd/user/%')\n"}}
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Additional File Listing Information","query":"SELECT f.path, u.username AS file_owner, g.groupname AS group_owner, datetime(f.atime, 'unixepoch') AS\nfile_last_access_time, datetime(f.mtime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_modified_time, datetime(f.ctime, 'unixepoch') AS\nfile_last_status_change_time, datetime(f.btime, 'unixepoch') AS file_created_time, f.size AS size_bytes FROM file f LEFT\nJOIN users u ON f.uid = u.uid LEFT JOIN groups g ON f.gid = g.gid WHERE ( path LIKE '/etc/systemd/system/%' OR path LIKE\n'/usr/local/lib/systemd/system/%' OR path LIKE '/lib/systemd/system/%' OR path LIKE '/usr/lib/systemd/system/%' OR path\nLIKE '/home/{{user.name}}/.config/systemd/user/%' OR path LIKE '/home/{{user.name}}/.local/share/systemd/user/%'\nOR path LIKE '/root/.config/systemd/user/%' OR path LIKE '/root/.local/share/systemd/user/%')\n"}}
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User","query":"SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"}}
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+- Investigate whether the altered scripts call other malicious scripts elsewhere on the file system. 
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+        - Cron jobs, services and other persistence mechanisms.
+            - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Crontab Information","query":"SELECT * FROM crontab"}}
+- Investigate abnormal behaviors by the subject process/user such as network connections, file modifications, and any other spawned child processes.
+  - Investigate listening ports and open sockets to look for potential command and control traffic or data exfiltration.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Listening Ports","query":"SELECT pid, address, port, socket, protocol, path FROM listening_ports"}}
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Open Sockets","query":"SELECT pid, family, remote_address, remote_port, socket, state FROM process_open_sockets"}}
+  - Identify the user account that performed the action, analyze it, and check whether it should perform this kind of action.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific User","query":"SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = {{user.name}}"}}
+- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
+    - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Investigate the Account Authentication Status","query":"SELECT * FROM logged_in_users WHERE user = {{user.name}}"}}
+
+
+*False Positive Analysis*
+
+
+- If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+- If this activity is related to a system administrator who uses systemd services for administrative purposes, consider adding exceptions for this specific administrator user account. 
+- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
+
+
+*Related Rules*
+
+
+- Potential Persistence Through Run Control Detected - 0f4d35e4-925e-4959-ab24-911be207ee6f
+- Potential Persistence Through init.d Detected - 474fd20e-14cc-49c5-8160-d9ab4ba16c8b
+- Systemd Timer Created - 7fb500fa-8e24-4bd1-9480-2a819352602c
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Delete the service/timer or restore its original configuration.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("rename", "creation") and file.path : (
+  "/etc/systemd/system/*", "/usr/local/lib/systemd/system/*", "/lib/systemd/system/*",
+  "/usr/lib/systemd/system/*", "/home/*/.config/systemd/user/*", "/home/*/.local/share/systemd/user/*",
+  "/root/.config/systemd/user/*", "/root/.local/share/systemd/user/*"
+) and file.extension == "service" and not (
+  process.executable in (
+    "/bin/dpkg", "/usr/bin/dpkg", "/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/dockerd", "/usr/sbin/dockerd", "/bin/microdnf",
+    "/usr/bin/microdnf", "/bin/rpm", "/usr/bin/rpm", "/bin/snapd", "/usr/bin/snapd", "/bin/yum", "/usr/bin/yum",
+    "/bin/dnf", "/usr/bin/dnf", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/bin/dnf-automatic", "/usr/bin/dnf-automatic",
+    "/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/dpkg-divert", "/bin/dpkg-divert", "/sbin/apk", "/usr/sbin/apk",
+    "/usr/local/sbin/apk", "/usr/bin/apt", "/usr/sbin/pacman", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/puppet",
+    "/bin/puppet", "/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/puppet", "/usr/bin/chef-client", "/bin/chef-client",
+    "/bin/autossl_check", "/usr/bin/autossl_check", "/proc/self/exe", "/dev/fd/*",  "/usr/bin/pamac-daemon",
+    "/bin/pamac-daemon", "/usr/lib/snapd/snapd", "/usr/local/bin/dockerd"
+  ) or
+  file.extension in ("swp", "swpx", "swx", "dpkg-remove") or
+  file.Ext.original.extension == "dpkg-new" or
+  process.executable : (
+    "/nix/store/*", "/var/lib/dpkg/*", "/tmp/vmis.*", "/snap/*", "/dev/fd/*", "/usr/lib/virtualbox/*"
+  ) or
+  process.executable == null or
+  (process.name == "sed" and file.name : "sed*") or
+  (process.name == "perl" and file.name : "e2scrub_all.tmp*") 
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Create or Modify System Process
+** ID: T1543
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Systemd Service
+** ID: T1543.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002/
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Privilege Escalation
+** ID: TA0004
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Create or Modify System Process
+** ID: T1543
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Systemd Service
+** ID: T1543.002
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/systemd-timer-created.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/systemd-timer-created.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ae53d572b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/systemd-timer-created.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
+[[systemd-timer-created]]
+=== Systemd Timer Created
+
+Detects the creation of a systemd timer within any of the default systemd timer directories. Systemd timers can be used by an attacker to gain persistence, by scheduling the execution of a command or script. Similarly to cron/at, systemd timers can be set up to execute on boot time, or on a specific point in time, which allows attackers to regain access in case the connection to the infected asset was lost.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.file*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: 
+
+* https://opensource.com/article/20/7/systemd-timers
+* https://pberba.github.io/security/2022/01/30/linux-threat-hunting-for-persistence-systemd-timers-cron/
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Resources: Investigation Guide
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 11
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Investigation guide
+
+
+
+*Triage and analysis*
+
+
+
+*Investigating Systemd Timer Created*
+
+
+Systemd timers are used for scheduling and automating recurring tasks or services on Linux systems. 
+
+Attackers can leverage systemd timers to run scripts, commands, or malicious software at system boot or on a set time interval by creating a systemd timer and a corresponding systemd service file. 
+
+This rule monitors the creation of new systemd timer files, potentially indicating the creation of a persistence mechanism.
+
+> **Note**:
+> This investigation guide uses the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
+> This investigation guide uses https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html[placeholder fields] to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
+
+
+*Possible Investigation Steps*
+
+
+- Investigate the timer file that was created or modified.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve File Information","query":"SELECT * FROM file WHERE path = {{file.path}}"}}
+- Investigate the currently enabled systemd timers through the following command `sudo systemctl list-timers`.
+- Search for the systemd service file named similarly to the timer that was created.
+- Investigate whether any other files in any of the available systemd directories have been altered through OSQuery.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve File Listing Information","query":"SELECT * FROM file WHERE (path LIKE '/etc/systemd/system/%' OR path LIKE '/usr/local/lib/systemd/system/%'\nOR path LIKE '/lib/systemd/system/%' OR path LIKE '/usr/lib/systemd/system/%'\nOR path LIKE '/home/{{user.name}}/.config/systemd/user/%' OR path LIKE '/home/{{user.name}}/.local/share/systemd/user/%'\nOR path LIKE '/root/.config/systemd/user/%' OR path LIKE '/root/.local/share/systemd/user/%')\n"}}
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Additional File Listing Information","query":"SELECT f.path, u.username AS file_owner, g.groupname AS group_owner, datetime(f.atime, 'unixepoch') AS\nfile_last_access_time, datetime(f.mtime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_modified_time, datetime(f.ctime, 'unixepoch') AS\nfile_last_status_change_time, datetime(f.btime, 'unixepoch') AS file_created_time, f.size AS size_bytes FROM file f LEFT\nJOIN users u ON f.uid = u.uid LEFT JOIN groups g ON f.gid = g.gid WHERE ( path LIKE '/etc/systemd/system/%' OR path LIKE\n'/usr/local/lib/systemd/system/%' OR path LIKE '/lib/systemd/system/%' OR path LIKE '/usr/lib/systemd/system/%' OR path\nLIKE '/home/{{user.name}}/.config/systemd/user/%' OR path LIKE '/home/{{user.name}}/.local/share/systemd/user/%'\nOR path LIKE '/root/.config/systemd/user/%' OR path LIKE '/root/.local/share/systemd/user/%')\n"}}
+- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
+  - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User","query":"SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"}}
+- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
+- Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
+- Investigate whether the altered scripts call other malicious scripts elsewhere on the file system. 
+  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
+    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
+      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
+        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
+          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
+          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
+        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
+        - Cron jobs, services and other persistence mechanisms.
+            - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Crontab Information","query":"SELECT * FROM crontab"}}
+
+
+*False Positive Analysis*
+
+
+- If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
+- If this activity is related to a system administrator who uses systemd timers for administrative purposes, consider adding exceptions for this specific administrator user account. 
+- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
+
+
+*Response and remediation*
+
+
+- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
+- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
+- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
+  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
+  - Stop suspicious processes.
+  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
+  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
+- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
+- Delete the service/timer or restore its original configuration.
+- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
+- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
+- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
+- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click "Save and Continue".
+- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("rename", "creation") and file.path : (
+  "/etc/systemd/system/*", "/usr/local/lib/systemd/system/*", "/lib/systemd/system/*",
+  "/usr/lib/systemd/system/*", "/home/*/.config/systemd/user/*", "/home/*/.local/share/systemd/user/*",
+  "/root/.config/systemd/user/*", "/root/.local/share/systemd/user/*"
+) and file.extension == "timer" and not (
+  process.executable in (
+    "/bin/dpkg", "/usr/bin/dpkg", "/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/dockerd", "/usr/sbin/dockerd", "/bin/microdnf",
+    "/usr/bin/microdnf", "/bin/rpm", "/usr/bin/rpm", "/bin/snapd", "/usr/bin/snapd", "/bin/yum", "/usr/bin/yum",
+    "/bin/dnf", "/usr/bin/dnf", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/bin/dnf-automatic", "/usr/bin/dnf-automatic",
+    "/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/dpkg-divert", "/bin/dpkg-divert", "/sbin/apk", "/usr/sbin/apk",
+    "/usr/local/sbin/apk", "/usr/bin/apt", "/usr/sbin/pacman", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/puppet",
+    "/bin/puppet", "/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/puppet", "/usr/bin/chef-client", "/bin/chef-client",
+    "/bin/autossl_check", "/usr/bin/autossl_check", "/proc/self/exe", "/dev/fd/*",  "/usr/bin/pamac-daemon",
+    "/bin/pamac-daemon", "/usr/lib/snapd/snapd", "/usr/local/bin/dockerd"
+  ) or
+  file.extension in ("swp", "swpx", "swx", "dpkg-remove") or
+  file.Ext.original.extension == "dpkg-new" or
+  process.executable : (
+    "/nix/store/*", "/var/lib/dpkg/*", "/tmp/vmis.*", "/snap/*", "/dev/fd/*", "/usr/lib/virtualbox/*"
+  ) or
+  process.executable == null or
+  (process.name == "sed" and file.name : "sed*") or
+  (process.name == "perl" and file.name : "e2scrub_all.tmp*") 
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Scheduled Task/Job
+** ID: T1053
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
+* Sub-technique:
+** Name: Systemd Timers
+** ID: T1053.006
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/006/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/systemd-udevd-rule-file-creation.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/systemd-udevd-rule-file-creation.asciidoc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..65a30beab5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/systemd-udevd-rule-file-creation.asciidoc
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+[[systemd-udevd-rule-file-creation]]
+=== Systemd-udevd Rule File Creation
+
+Monitors for the creation of rule files that are used by systemd-udevd to manage device nodes and handle kernel device events in the Linux operating system. Systemd-udevd can be exploited for persistence by adversaries by creating malicious udev rules that trigger on specific events, executing arbitrary commands or payloads whenever a certain device is plugged in or recognized by the system.
+
+*Rule type*: eql
+
+*Rule indices*: 
+
+* logs-endpoint.events.file*
+
+*Severity*: low
+
+*Risk score*: 21
+
+*Runs every*: 5m
+
+*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <<rule-schedule, `Additional look-back time`>>)
+
+*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100
+
+*References*: None
+
+*Tags*: 
+
+* Domain: Endpoint
+* OS: Linux
+* Use Case: Threat Detection
+* Tactic: Persistence
+* Data Source: Elastic Defend
+
+*Version*: 4
+
+*Rule authors*: 
+
+* Elastic
+
+*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
+
+
+==== Setup
+
+
+
+*Setup*
+
+
+This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
+
+
+*Elastic Defend Integration Setup*
+
+Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows
+the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
+
+
+*Prerequisite Requirements:*
+
+- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
+- To configure Fleet Server refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html[documentation].
+
+
+*The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:*
+
+- Go to the Kibana home page and click Add integrations.
+- In the query bar, search for Elastic Defend and select the integration to see more details about it.
+- Click Add Elastic Defend.
+- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
+- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either Traditional Endpoints or Cloud Workloads.
+- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html[Helper guide].
+- We suggest to select "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
+- Enter a name for the agent policy in New agent policy name. If other agent policies already exist, you can click the Existing hosts tab and select an existing policy instead.
+For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html[helper guide].
+- Click Save and Continue.
+- To complete the integration, select Add Elastic Agent to your hosts and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
+For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html[helper guide].
+
+
+==== Rule query
+
+
+[source, js]
+----------------------------------
+file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("rename", "creation") and 
+process.executable != null and 
+file.path : (
+  "/lib/udev/*", "/etc/udev/rules.d/*", "/usr/lib/udev/rules.d/*", "/run/udev/rules.d/*"
+) and not (
+  process.executable in (
+    "/bin/dpkg", "/usr/bin/dpkg", "/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/dockerd", "/usr/sbin/dockerd", "/bin/microdnf",
+    "/usr/bin/microdnf", "/bin/rpm", "/usr/bin/rpm", "/bin/snapd", "/usr/bin/snapd", "/bin/yum", "/usr/bin/yum",
+    "/bin/dnf", "/usr/bin/dnf", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/bin/dnf-automatic", "/usr/bin/dnf-automatic",
+    "/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/dpkg-divert", "/bin/dpkg-divert", "/sbin/apk", "/usr/sbin/apk",
+    "/usr/local/sbin/apk", "/usr/bin/apt", "/usr/sbin/pacman", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/puppet",
+    "/bin/puppet", "/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/puppet", "/usr/bin/chef-client", "/bin/chef-client",
+    "/bin/autossl_check", "/usr/bin/autossl_check", "/proc/self/exe", "/dev/fd/*",  "/usr/bin/pamac-daemon",
+    "/bin/pamac-daemon", "/usr/lib/snapd/snapd", "/usr/local/bin/dockerd", "/usr/libexec/netplan/generate"
+  ) or
+  file.extension in ("swp", "swpx", "swx", "dpkg-remove") or
+  file.Ext.original.extension == "dpkg-new" or
+  process.executable : (
+    "/nix/store/*", "/var/lib/dpkg/*", "/snap/*", "/dev/fd/*", "/usr/lib/*", "/usr/libexec/*"
+  ) or
+  (process.name == "sed" and file.name : "sed*") or
+  (process.name == "perl" and file.name : "e2scrub_all.tmp*") 
+)
+
+----------------------------------
+
+*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^
+
+* Tactic:
+** Name: Persistence
+** ID: TA0003
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
+* Technique:
+** Name: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
+** ID: T1037
+** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/
diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/user-added-to-privileged-group.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/user-added-to-privileged-group.asciidoc
index 45c68bf3a2..f8e4184475 100644
--- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/user-added-to-privileged-group.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/user-added-to-privileged-group.asciidoc
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Identifies a user being added to a privileged group in Active Directory. Privile
 * Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring
 * Data Source: Active Directory
 
-*Version*: 109
+*Version*: 110
 
 *Rule authors*: 
 
@@ -107,15 +107,39 @@ For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.
 
 [source, js]
 ----------------------------------
-iam where winlog.api:"wineventlog" and event.action == "added-member-to-group" and
-  group.name : ("Admin*",
-                "Local Administrators",
-                "Domain Admins",
-                "Enterprise Admins",
-                "Backup Admins",
-                "Schema Admins",
-                "DnsAdmins",
-                "Exchange Organization Administrators")
+iam where winlog.api == "wineventlog" and event.action == "added-member-to-group" and
+(
+    (
+        group.name : (
+            "Admin*",
+            "Local Administrators",
+            "Domain Admins",
+            "Enterprise Admins",
+            "Backup Admins",
+            "Schema Admins",
+            "DnsAdmins",
+            "Exchange Organization Administrators",
+            "Print Operators",
+            "Server Operators",
+            "Account Operators"
+        )
+    ) or
+    (
+        group.id : (
+            "S-1-5-32-544",
+            "S-1-5-21-*-544",
+            "S-1-5-21-*-512",
+            "S-1-5-21-*-519",
+            "S-1-5-21-*-551",
+            "S-1-5-21-*-518",
+            "S-1-5-21-*-1101",
+            "S-1-5-21-*-1102",
+            "S-1-5-21-*-550",
+            "S-1-5-21-*-549",
+            "S-1-5-21-*-548"
+        )
+    )
+)
 
 ----------------------------------
 
diff --git a/docs/index.asciidoc b/docs/index.asciidoc
index 99ca5bc409..2bc1b1f9f0 100644
--- a/docs/index.asciidoc
+++ b/docs/index.asciidoc
@@ -111,3 +111,5 @@ include::detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-11/prebuilt-rules-
 include::detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-12/prebuilt-rules-8-12-12-appendix.asciidoc[]
 
 include::detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-13/prebuilt-rules-8-12-13-appendix.asciidoc[]
+
+include::detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-12-14/prebuilt-rules-8-12-14-appendix.asciidoc[]