diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-github-protected-branch-settings-changed.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-github-protected-branch-settings-changed.asciidoc new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..624aa7856d --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-github-protected-branch-settings-changed.asciidoc @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +[[prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-github-protected-branch-settings-changed]] +=== GitHub Protected Branch Settings Changed + +This rule detects setting modifications for protected branches of a GitHub repository. Branch protection rules can be used to enforce certain workflows or requirements before a contributor can push changes to a branch in your repository. Changes to these protected branch settings should be investigated and verified as legitimate activity. Unauthorized changes could be used to lower your organization's security posture and leave you exposed for future attacks. + +*Rule type*: eql + +*Rule indices*: + +* logs-github.audit-* + +*Severity*: medium + +*Risk score*: 47 + +*Runs every*: 5m + +*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <>) + +*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100 + +*References*: None + +*Tags*: + +* Domain: Cloud +* Use Case: Threat Detection +* Tactic: Defense Evasion +* Data Source: Github + +*Version*: 1 + +*Rule authors*: + +* Elastic + +*Rule license*: Elastic License v2 + + +==== Rule query + + +[source, js] +---------------------------------- +configuration where event.dataset == "github.audit" + and github.category == "protected_branch" and event.type == "change" + +---------------------------------- + +*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^ + +* Tactic: +** Name: Defense Evasion +** ID: TA0005 +** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/ +* Technique: +** Name: Impair Defenses +** ID: T1562 +** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/ +* Sub-technique: +** Name: Disable or Modify Tools +** ID: T1562.001 +** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/ diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-github-repository-deleted.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-github-repository-deleted.asciidoc new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..de3392b890 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-github-repository-deleted.asciidoc @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +[[prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-github-repository-deleted]] +=== GitHub Repository Deleted + +This rule detects when a GitHub repository is deleted within your organization. Repositories are a critical component used within an organization to manage work, collaborate with others and release products to the public. Any delete action against a repository should be investigated to determine it's validity. Unauthorized deletion of organization repositories could cause irreversible loss of intellectual property and indicate compromise within your organization. + +*Rule type*: eql + +*Rule indices*: + +* logs-github.audit-* + +*Severity*: medium + +*Risk score*: 47 + +*Runs every*: 5m + +*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <>) + +*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100 + +*References*: None + +*Tags*: + +* Domain: Cloud +* Use Case: Threat Detection +* Tactic: Impact +* Data Source: Github + +*Version*: 1 + +*Rule authors*: + +* Elastic + +*Rule license*: Elastic License v2 + + +==== Rule query + + +[source, js] +---------------------------------- +configuration where event.module == "github" and event.action == "repo.destroy" + +---------------------------------- + +*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^ + +* Tactic: +** Name: Impact +** ID: TA0040 +** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/ +* Technique: +** Name: Data Destruction +** ID: T1485 +** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485/ diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-network-activity-detected-via-cat.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-network-activity-detected-via-cat.asciidoc new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0ff6dbcf56 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-network-activity-detected-via-cat.asciidoc @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +[[prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-network-activity-detected-via-cat]] +=== Network Activity Detected via cat + +This rule monitors for the execution of the cat command, followed by a connection attempt by the same process. Cat is capable of transfering data via tcp/udp channels by redirecting its read output to a /dev/tcp or /dev/udp channel. This activity is highly suspicious, and should be investigated. Attackers may leverage this capability to transfer tools or files to another host in the network or exfiltrate data while attempting to evade detection in the process. + +*Rule type*: eql + +*Rule indices*: + +* logs-endpoint.events.* + +*Severity*: medium + +*Risk score*: 47 + +*Runs every*: 5m + +*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <>) + +*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100 + +*References*: None + +*Tags*: + +* Domain: Endpoint +* OS: Linux +* Use Case: Threat Detection +* Tactic: Command and Control +* Data Source: Elastic Defend + +*Version*: 1 + +*Rule authors*: + +* Elastic + +*Rule license*: Elastic License v2 + + +==== Rule query + + +[source, js] +---------------------------------- +sequence by host.id, process.entity_id with maxspan=1s + [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "exec" and event.type == "start" and + process.name == "cat"] + [network where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("connection_attempted", "disconnect_received") and + process.name == "cat"] + +---------------------------------- + +*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^ + +* Tactic: +** Name: Command and Control +** ID: TA0011 +** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/ +* Tactic: +** Name: Defense Evasion +** ID: TA0005 +** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/ +* Tactic: +** Name: Exfiltration +** ID: TA0010 +** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/ diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-persistent-scripts-in-the-startup-directory.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-persistent-scripts-in-the-startup-directory.asciidoc new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7bed62e87b --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-persistent-scripts-in-the-startup-directory.asciidoc @@ -0,0 +1,145 @@ +[[prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-persistent-scripts-in-the-startup-directory]] +=== Persistent Scripts in the Startup Directory + +Identifies script engines creating files in the Startup folder, or the creation of script files in the Startup folder. Adversaries may abuse this technique to maintain persistence in an environment. + +*Rule type*: eql + +*Rule indices*: + +* winlogbeat-* +* logs-endpoint.events.* +* logs-windows.* +* endgame-* + +*Severity*: medium + +*Risk score*: 47 + +*Runs every*: 5m + +*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <>) + +*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100 + +*References*: None + +*Tags*: + +* Domain: Endpoint +* OS: Windows +* Use Case: Threat Detection +* Tactic: Persistence +* Resources: Investigation Guide +* Data Source: Elastic Endgame +* Data Source: Elastic Defend + +*Version*: 108 + +*Rule authors*: + +* Elastic + +*Rule license*: Elastic License v2 + + +==== Investigation guide + + +[source, markdown] +---------------------------------- +## Triage and analysis + +### Investigating Persistent Scripts in the Startup Directory + +The Windows Startup folder is a special folder in Windows. Programs added to this folder are executed during account logon, without user interaction, providing an excellent way for attackers to maintain persistence. + +This rule looks for shortcuts created by wscript.exe or cscript.exe, or js/vbs scripts created by any process. + +> **Note**: +> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide. + +#### Possible investigation steps + +- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures. +- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours. +- Validate if the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations. +- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts. +- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities: + - Analyze the file using a private sandboxed analysis system. + - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host: + - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses. + - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`. + - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries. + - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}} + - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree. + - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries. + - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}} + - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}} + - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}} + - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc. +- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification. + +### False positive analysis + +- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary. + +### Related rules + +- Suspicious Startup Shell Folder Modification - c8b150f0-0164-475b-a75e-74b47800a9ff +- Startup Folder Persistence via Unsigned Process - 2fba96c0-ade5-4bce-b92f-a5df2509da3f + +### Response and remediation + +- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage. +- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior. +- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts. + - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware. + - Stop suspicious processes. + - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs). + - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system. +- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage. +- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services. +- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components. +- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector. +- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR). +---------------------------------- + +==== Rule query + + +[source, js] +---------------------------------- +file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type != "deletion" and user.domain != "NT AUTHORITY" and + + /* detect shortcuts created by wscript.exe or cscript.exe */ + (file.path : "C:\\*\\Programs\\Startup\\*.lnk" and + process.name : ("wscript.exe", "cscript.exe")) or + + /* detect vbs or js files created by any process */ + file.path : ("C:\\*\\Programs\\Startup\\*.vbs", + "C:\\*\\Programs\\Startup\\*.vbe", + "C:\\*\\Programs\\Startup\\*.wsh", + "C:\\*\\Programs\\Startup\\*.wsf", + "C:\\*\\Programs\\Startup\\*.js") + +---------------------------------- + +*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^ + +* Tactic: +** Name: Persistence +** ID: TA0003 +** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/ +* Technique: +** Name: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution +** ID: T1547 +** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/ +* Sub-technique: +** Name: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder +** ID: T1547.001 +** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/ +* Sub-technique: +** Name: Shortcut Modification +** ID: T1547.009 +** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/009/ diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-potential-meterpreter-reverse-shell.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-potential-meterpreter-reverse-shell.asciidoc new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d373d9309a --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-potential-meterpreter-reverse-shell.asciidoc @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +[[prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-potential-meterpreter-reverse-shell]] +=== Potential Meterpreter Reverse Shell + +This detection rule identifies a sample of suspicious Linux system file reads used for system fingerprinting, leveraged by the Metasploit Meterpreter shell to gather information about the target that it is executing its shell on. Detecting this pattern is indicative of a successful meterpreter shell connection. + +*Rule type*: eql + +*Rule indices*: + +* auditbeat-* +* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-* + +*Severity*: medium + +*Risk score*: 47 + +*Runs every*: 5m + +*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <>) + +*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100 + +*References*: None + +*Tags*: + +* Domain: Endpoint +* OS: Linux +* Use Case: Threat Detection +* Tactic: Execution + +*Version*: 1 + +*Rule authors*: + +* Elastic + +*Rule license*: Elastic License v2 + + +==== Investigation guide + + +[source, markdown] +---------------------------------- +## Setup +This rule requires the use of the `auditd_manager` integration. `Auditd_manager` is a tool designed to simplify and enhance the management of the audit subsystem in Linux systems. It provides a user-friendly interface and automation capabilities for configuring and monitoring system auditing through the auditd daemon. With `auditd_manager`, administrators can easily define audit rules, track system events, and generate comprehensive audit reports, improving overall security and compliance in the system. The following steps should be executed in order to install and deploy `auditd_manager` on a Linux system. + +``` +Kibana --> +Management --> +Integrations --> +Auditd Manager --> +Add Auditd Manager +``` + +`Auditd_manager` subscribes to the kernel and receives events as they occur without any additional configuration. However, if more advanced configuration is required to detect specific behavior, audit rules can be added to the integration in either the "audit rules" configuration box or the "auditd rule files" box by specifying a file to read the audit rules from. + +For this detection rule to trigger, the following additional audit rules are required to be added to the integration: + +``` +-w /proc/net/ -p r -k audit_proc +-w /etc/machine-id -p wa -k machineid +-w /etc/passwd -p wa -k passwd +``` + +Add the newly installed `auditd manager` to an agent policy, and deploy the agent on a Linux system from which auditd log files are desirable. +---------------------------------- + +==== Rule query + + +[source, js] +---------------------------------- +sample by host.id, process.pid, user.id +[file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.dataset == "auditd_manager.auditd" and auditd.data.syscall == "open" and + auditd.data.a2 == "1b6" and file.path == "/etc/machine-id"] +[file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.dataset == "auditd_manager.auditd" and auditd.data.syscall == "open" and + auditd.data.a2 == "1b6" and file.path == "/etc/passwd"] +[file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.dataset == "auditd_manager.auditd" and auditd.data.syscall == "open" and + auditd.data.a2 == "1b6" and file.path == "/proc/net/route"] +[file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.dataset == "auditd_manager.auditd" and auditd.data.syscall == "open" and + auditd.data.a2 == "1b6" and file.path == "/proc/net/ipv6_route"] +[file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.dataset == "auditd_manager.auditd" and auditd.data.syscall == "open" and + auditd.data.a2 == "1b6" and file.path == "/proc/net/if_inet6"] + +---------------------------------- + +*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^ + +* Tactic: +** Name: Execution +** ID: TA0002 +** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/ +* Technique: +** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter +** ID: T1059 +** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/ +* Sub-technique: +** Name: Unix Shell +** ID: T1059.004 +** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/ +* Tactic: +** Name: Command and Control +** ID: TA0011 +** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/ +* Technique: +** Name: Application Layer Protocol +** ID: T1071 +** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/ diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-potential-reverse-shell-via-udp.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-potential-reverse-shell-via-udp.asciidoc new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cd347d5ab1 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-potential-reverse-shell-via-udp.asciidoc @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ +[[prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-potential-reverse-shell-via-udp]] +=== Potential Reverse Shell via UDP + +This detection rule identifies suspicious network traffic patterns associated with UDP reverse shell activity. This activity consists of a sample of an execve, socket and connect syscall executed by the same process, where the auditd.data.a0-1 indicate a UDP connection, ending with an egress connection event. An attacker may establish a Linux UDP reverse shell to bypass traditional firewall restrictions and gain remote access to a target system covertly. + +*Rule type*: eql + +*Rule indices*: + +* auditbeat-* +* logs-auditd_manager.auditd-* + +*Severity*: medium + +*Risk score*: 47 + +*Runs every*: 5m + +*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <>) + +*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100 + +*References*: + +* https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Methodology%20and%20Resources/Reverse%20Shell%20Cheatsheet.md + +*Tags*: + +* OS: Linux +* Use Case: Threat Detection +* Tactic: Execution + +*Version*: 1 + +*Rule authors*: + +* Elastic + +*Rule license*: Elastic License v2 + + +==== Investigation guide + + +[source, markdown] +---------------------------------- +## Setup +This rule requires the use of the `auditd_manager` integration. `Auditd_manager` is a tool designed to simplify and enhance the management of the audit subsystem in Linux systems. It provides a user-friendly interface and automation capabilities for configuring and monitoring system auditing through the auditd daemon. With `auditd_manager`, administrators can easily define audit rules, track system events, and generate comprehensive audit reports, improving overall security and compliance in the system. The following steps should be executed in order to install and deploy `auditd_manager` on a Linux system. +``` +Kibana --> +Management --> +Integrations --> +Auditd Manager --> +Add Auditd Manager +``` +`Auditd_manager` subscribes to the kernel and receives events as they occur without any additional configuration. However, if more advanced configuration is required to detect specific behavior, audit rules can be added to the integration in either the "audit rules" configuration box or the "auditd rule files" box by specifying a file to read the audit rules from. +``` +For this detection rule no additional audit rules are required to be added to the integration. +``` +Add the newly installed `auditd manager` to an agent policy, and deploy the agent on a Linux system from which auditd log files are desirable. +---------------------------------- + +==== Rule query + + +[source, js] +---------------------------------- +sample by host.id, process.pid, process.parent.pid +[process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.dataset == "auditd_manager.auditd" and + auditd.data.syscall == "execve" and process.name : ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", + "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish", "perl", "python*", "nc", "ncat", "netcat", "php*", "ruby", + "openssl", "awk", "telnet", "lua*", "socat")] +[process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.dataset == "auditd_manager.auditd" and + auditd.data.syscall == "socket" and process.name : ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", + "zsh", "ksh", "fish", "perl", "python*", "nc", "ncat", "netcat", "php*", "ruby", "openssl", + "awk", "telnet", "lua*", "socat") and auditd.data.a0 == "2" and auditd.data.a1 : ("2", "802")] +[network where host.os.type == "linux" and event.dataset == "auditd_manager.auditd" and + auditd.data.syscall == "connect" and process.name : ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", + "zsh", "ksh", "fish", "perl", "python*", "nc", "ncat", "netcat", "php*", "ruby", "openssl", + "awk", "telnet", "lua*", "socat") and network.direction == "egress" and destination.ip != null and + destination.ip != "127.0.0.1" and destination.ip != "127.0.0.53" and destination.ip != "::1"] + +---------------------------------- + +*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^ + +* Tactic: +** Name: Execution +** ID: TA0002 +** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/ +* Technique: +** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter +** ID: T1059 +** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/ +* Sub-technique: +** Name: Unix Shell +** ID: T1059.004 +** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/ +* Tactic: +** Name: Command and Control +** ID: TA0011 +** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/ +* Technique: +** Name: Application Layer Protocol +** ID: T1071 +** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/ diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-threat-intel-hash-indicator-match.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-threat-intel-hash-indicator-match.asciidoc new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0cf3a35563 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-threat-intel-hash-indicator-match.asciidoc @@ -0,0 +1,118 @@ +[[prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-threat-intel-hash-indicator-match]] +=== Threat Intel Hash Indicator Match + +This rule is triggered when a hash indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or integrations has a match against an event that contains file hashes, such as antivirus alerts, process creation, library load, and file operation events. + +*Rule type*: threat_match + +*Rule indices*: + +* auditbeat-* +* endgame-* +* filebeat-* +* logs-* +* winlogbeat-* + +*Severity*: critical + +*Risk score*: 99 + +*Runs every*: 1h + +*Searches indices from*: now-65m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <>) + +*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100 + +*References*: + +* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-threatintel.html +* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/es-threat-intel-integrations.html +* https://www.elastic.co/security/tip + +*Tags*: + +* OS: Windows +* Data Source: Elastic Endgame +* Rule Type: Indicator Match + +*Version*: 4 + +*Rule authors*: + +* Elastic + +*Rule license*: Elastic License v2 + + +==== Investigation guide + + +[source, markdown] +---------------------------------- +## Triage and Analysis + +### Investigating Threat Intel Hash Indicator Match + +Threat Intel indicator match rules allow matching from a local observation, such as an endpoint event that records a file hash with an entry of a file hash stored within the Threat Intel integrations index. + +Matches are based on threat intelligence data that's been ingested during the last 30 days. Some integrations don't place expiration dates on their threat indicators, so we strongly recommend validating ingested threat indicators and reviewing match results. When reviewing match results, check associated activity to determine whether the event requires additional investigation. + +This rule is triggered when a hash indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or an indicator ingested from a threat intelligence integration matches against an event that contains file hashes, such as antivirus alerts, file operation events, etc. + +> **Note**: +> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide. + +#### Possible investigation steps + +- Gain context about the field that matched the local observation. This information can be found in the `threat.indicator.matched.field` field. +- Investigate the hash , which can be found in the `threat.indicator.matched.atomic` field: + - Search for the existence and reputation of the hash in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc. + - Scope other potentially compromised hosts in your environment by mapping hosts with file operations involving the same hash. +- Identify the process that created the file. + - Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures. + - Enrich the information that you have right now by determining how the file was dropped, where it was downloaded from, etc. This can help you determine if the event is part of an ongoing campaign against the organization. +- Retrieve the involved file and examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities: + - Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system. + - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host: + - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses. + - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`. + - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries. + - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}} + - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree. + - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries. + - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}} + - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}} + - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}} +- Using the data collected through the analysis, scope users targeted and other machines infected in the environment. + +### False Positive Analysis + +- Adversaries often use legitimate tools as network administrators, such as `PsExec` or `AdFind`. These tools are often included in indicator lists, which creates the potential for false positives. + +### Response and Remediation + +- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage. +- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior. +- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts. + - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware. + - Stop suspicious processes. + - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs). + - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system. +- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage. +- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components. +- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector. +- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR). + +This rule needs threat intelligence indicators to work. Threat intelligence indicators can be collected using an [Elastic Agent integration](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#agent-ti-integration), the [Threat Intel module](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#ti-mod-integration), or a [custom integration](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#custom-ti-integration). + +More information can be found [here](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html). +---------------------------------- + +==== Rule query + + +[source, js] +---------------------------------- +file.hash.*:* or process.hash.*:* or dll.hash.*:* + +---------------------------------- diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-threat-intel-ip-address-indicator-match.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-threat-intel-ip-address-indicator-match.asciidoc new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..551ab17b28 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-threat-intel-ip-address-indicator-match.asciidoc @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@ +[[prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-threat-intel-ip-address-indicator-match]] +=== Threat Intel IP Address Indicator Match + +This rule is triggered when an IP address indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or integrations has a match against a network event. + +*Rule type*: threat_match + +*Rule indices*: + +* auditbeat-* +* endgame-* +* filebeat-* +* logs-* +* packetbeat-* +* winlogbeat-* + +*Severity*: critical + +*Risk score*: 99 + +*Runs every*: 1h + +*Searches indices from*: now-65m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <>) + +*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100 + +*References*: + +* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-threatintel.html +* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/es-threat-intel-integrations.html +* https://www.elastic.co/security/tip + +*Tags*: + +* OS: Windows +* Data Source: Elastic Endgame +* Rule Type: Indicator Match + +*Version*: 3 + +*Rule authors*: + +* Elastic + +*Rule license*: Elastic License v2 + + +==== Investigation guide + + +[source, markdown] +---------------------------------- +## Triage and Analysis + +### Investigating Threat Intel IP Address Indicator Match + +Threat Intel indicator match rules allow matching from a local observation, such as an endpoint event that records a file hash with an entry of a file hash stored within the Threat Intel integrations index. + +Matches are based on threat intelligence data that's been ingested during the last 30 days. Some integrations don't place expiration dates on their threat indicators, so we strongly recommend validating ingested threat indicators and reviewing match results. When reviewing match results, check associated activity to determine whether the event requires additional investigation. + +This rule is triggered when an IP address indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or a threat intelligence integration matches against a network event. + +> **Note**: +> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide. + +#### Possible investigation steps + +- Gain context about the field that matched the local observation so you can understand the nature of the connection. This information can be found in the `threat.indicator.matched.field` field. +- Investigate the IP address, which can be found in the `threat.indicator.matched.atomic` field: + - Check the reputation of the IP address in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc. + - Execute a reverse DNS lookup to retrieve hostnames associated with the given IP address. +- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts. +- Identify the process responsible for the connection, and investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures. +- Retrieve the involved process executable and examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities: + - Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system. + - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host: + - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses. + - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`. + - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries. + - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}} + - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree. + - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries. + - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}} + - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}} + - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}} +- Using the data collected through the analysis, scope users targeted and other machines infected in the environment. + +### False Positive Analysis + +- When a match is found, it's important to consider the indicator's initial release date. Threat intelligence is useful for augmenting existing security processes but can quickly become outdated. In other words, some threat intelligence only represents a specific set of activity observed at a specific time. For example, an IP address may have hosted malware observed in a Dridex campaign months ago, but it's possible that IP has been remediated and no longer represents any threat. +- False positives might occur after large and publicly written campaigns if curious employees interact with attacker infrastructure. +- Some feeds may include internal or known benign addresses by mistake (e.g., 8.8.8.8, google.com, 127.0.0.1, etc.). Make sure you understand how blocking a specific domain or address might impact the organization or normal system functioning. + +### Response and Remediation + +- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage. +- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior. +- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts. + - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware. + - Stop suspicious processes. + - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs). + - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system. +- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage. +- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components. +- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector. +- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR). + +This rule needs threat intelligence indicators to work. Threat intelligence indicators can be collected using an [Elastic Agent integration](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#agent-ti-integration), the [Threat Intel module](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#ti-mod-integration), or a [custom integration](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#custom-ti-integration). + +More information can be found [here](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html). +---------------------------------- + +==== Rule query + + +[source, js] +---------------------------------- +source.ip:* or destination.ip:* + +---------------------------------- diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-threat-intel-url-indicator-match.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-threat-intel-url-indicator-match.asciidoc new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6f6d673ec6 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-threat-intel-url-indicator-match.asciidoc @@ -0,0 +1,123 @@ +[[prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-threat-intel-url-indicator-match]] +=== Threat Intel URL Indicator Match + +This rule is triggered when a URL indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or integrations has a match against an event that contains URL data, like DNS events, network logs, etc. + +*Rule type*: threat_match + +*Rule indices*: + +* auditbeat-* +* endgame-* +* filebeat-* +* logs-* +* packetbeat-* +* winlogbeat-* + +*Severity*: critical + +*Risk score*: 99 + +*Runs every*: 1h + +*Searches indices from*: now-65m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <>) + +*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100 + +*References*: + +* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-threatintel.html +* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/es-threat-intel-integrations.html +* https://www.elastic.co/security/tip + +*Tags*: + +* OS: Windows +* Data Source: Elastic Endgame +* Rule Type: Indicator Match + +*Version*: 3 + +*Rule authors*: + +* Elastic + +*Rule license*: Elastic License v2 + + +==== Investigation guide + + +[source, markdown] +---------------------------------- +## Triage and Analysis + +### Investigating Threat Intel URL Indicator Match + +Threat Intel indicator match rules allow matching from a local observation, such as an endpoint event that records a file hash with an entry of a file hash stored within the Threat Intel integrations index. + +Matches are based on threat intelligence data that's been ingested during the last 30 days. Some integrations don't place expiration dates on their threat indicators, so we strongly recommend validating ingested threat indicators and reviewing match results. When reviewing match results, check associated activity to determine whether the event requires additional investigation. + +This rule is triggered when a URL indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or a threat intelligence integration matches against an event that contains URL data, like DNS events, network logs, etc. + +> **Note**: +> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide. + +#### Possible investigation steps + +- Investigate the URL, which can be found in the `threat.indicator.matched.atomic` field: + - Identify the type of malicious activity related to the URL (phishing, malware, etc.). + - Check the reputation of the IP address in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc. + - Execute a WHOIS lookup to retrieve information about the domain registration and contacts to report abuse. + - If dealing with a phishing incident: + - Contact the user to gain more information around the delivery method, information sent, etc. + - Analyze whether the URL is trying to impersonate a legitimate address. Look for typosquatting, extra or unusual subdomains, or other anomalies that could lure the user. + - Investigate the phishing page to identify which information may have been sent to the attacker by the user. +- Identify the process responsible for the connection, and investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures. +- Retrieve the involved process executable and examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities: + - Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system. + - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host: + - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses. + - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`. + - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries. + - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}} + - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree. + - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries. + - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}} + - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}} + - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}} +- Using the data collected through the analysis, scope users targeted and other machines infected in the environment. + +### False Positive Analysis + +- False positives might occur after large and publicly written campaigns if curious employees interact with attacker infrastructure. +- Some feeds may include internal or known benign addresses by mistake (e.g., 8.8.8.8, google.com, 127.0.0.1, etc.). Make sure you understand how blocking a specific domain or address might impact the organization or normal system functioning. + +### Response and Remediation + +- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage. +- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior. +- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts. + - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware. + - Stop suspicious processes. + - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs). + - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system. +- Consider reporting the address for abuse using the provided contact information. +- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage. +- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components. +- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector. +- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR). + +This rule needs threat intelligence indicators to work. Threat intelligence indicators can be collected using an [Elastic Agent integration](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#agent-ti-integration), the [Threat Intel module](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#ti-mod-integration), or a [custom integration](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#custom-ti-integration). + +More information can be found [here](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html). +---------------------------------- + +==== Rule query + + +[source, js] +---------------------------------- +url.full:* + +---------------------------------- diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-threat-intel-windows-registry-indicator-match.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-threat-intel-windows-registry-indicator-match.asciidoc new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..36846bd453 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-threat-intel-windows-registry-indicator-match.asciidoc @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +[[prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-threat-intel-windows-registry-indicator-match]] +=== Threat Intel Windows Registry Indicator Match + +This rule is triggered when a Windows registry indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or integrations has a match against an event that contains registry data. + +*Rule type*: threat_match + +*Rule indices*: + +* auditbeat-* +* endgame-* +* filebeat-* +* logs-* +* winlogbeat-* + +*Severity*: critical + +*Risk score*: 99 + +*Runs every*: 1h + +*Searches indices from*: now-65m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <>) + +*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100 + +*References*: + +* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-threatintel.html +* https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/es-threat-intel-integrations.html +* https://www.elastic.co/security/tip + +*Tags*: + +* OS: Windows +* Data Source: Elastic Endgame +* Rule Type: Indicator Match + +*Version*: 3 + +*Rule authors*: + +* Elastic + +*Rule license*: Elastic License v2 + + +==== Investigation guide + + +[source, markdown] +---------------------------------- +## Triage and Analysis + +### Investigating Threat Intel Windows Registry Indicator Match + +Threat Intel indicator match rules allow matching from a local observation, such as an endpoint event that records a file hash with an entry of a file hash stored within the Threat Intel integrations index. + +Matches are based on threat intelligence data that's been ingested during the last 30 days. Some integrations don't place expiration dates on their threat indicators, so we strongly recommend validating ingested threat indicators and reviewing match results. When reviewing match results, check associated activity to determine whether the event requires additional investigation. + +This rule is triggered when a Windows registry indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or a threat intelligence integration matches against an event that contains registry data. + +> **Note**: +> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide. + +#### Possible investigation steps + +- Check related threat reports to gain context about the registry indicator of compromise (IoC) and to understand if it's a system-native mechanism abused for persistence, to store data, to disable security mechanisms, etc. Use this information to define the appropriate triage and respond steps. +- Identify the process responsible for the registry operation and investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures. +- Retrieve the involved process executable and examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities: + - Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system. + - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host: + - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses. + - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`. + - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries. + - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}} + - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree. + - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries. + - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}} + - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}} + - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}} +- Using the data collected through the analysis, scope users targeted and other machines infected in the environment. + +### False Positive Analysis + +- Adversaries can leverage dual-use registry mechanisms that are commonly used by normal applications. These registry keys can be added into indicator lists creating the potential for false positives. + +### Response and Remediation + +- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage. +- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior. +- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts. + - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware. + - Stop suspicious processes. + - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs). + - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system. +- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage. +- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components. +- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector. +- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR). + +This rule needs threat intelligence indicators to work. Threat intelligence indicators can be collected using an [Elastic Agent integration](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#agent-ti-integration), the [Threat Intel module](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#ti-mod-integration), or a [custom integration](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#custom-ti-integration). + +More information can be found [here](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html). +---------------------------------- + +==== Rule query + + +[source, js] +---------------------------------- +registry.path:* + +---------------------------------- diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-uncommon-registry-persistence-change.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-uncommon-registry-persistence-change.asciidoc new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f19c682a7d --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-uncommon-registry-persistence-change.asciidoc @@ -0,0 +1,140 @@ +[[prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-uncommon-registry-persistence-change]] +=== Uncommon Registry Persistence Change + +Detects changes to registry persistence keys that are not commonly used or modified by legitimate programs. This could be an indication of an adversary's attempt to persist in a stealthy manner. + +*Rule type*: eql + +*Rule indices*: + +* logs-endpoint.events.* + +*Severity*: medium + +*Risk score*: 47 + +*Runs every*: 5m + +*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <>) + +*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100 + +*References*: + +* https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/articles/article.aspx?p=2762082&seqNum=2 + +*Tags*: + +* Domain: Endpoint +* OS: Windows +* Use Case: Threat Detection +* Tactic: Persistence +* Data Source: Elastic Defend + +*Version*: 105 + +*Rule authors*: + +* Elastic + +*Rule license*: Elastic License v2 + + +==== Rule query + + +[source, js] +---------------------------------- +registry where host.os.type == "windows" and + /* uncomment once stable length(registry.data.strings) > 0 and */ + registry.path : ( + "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Terminal Server\\Install\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\*", + "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Terminal Server\\Install\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Runonce\\*", + "HKEY_USERS\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows\\Load", + "HKEY_USERS\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows\\Run", + "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows\\IconServiceLib", + "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Shell", + "HKEY_USERS\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Shell", + "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\AppSetup", + "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Taskman", + "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Userinit", + "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\VmApplet", + "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run\\*", + "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\Shell", + "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\\Scripts\\Logoff\\Script", + "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\\Scripts\\Logon\\Script", + "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\\Scripts\\Shutdown\\Script", + "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\\Scripts\\Startup\\Script", + "HKEY_USERS\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run\\*", + "HKEY_USERS\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\Shell", + "HKEY_USERS\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\\Scripts\\Logoff\\Script", + "HKEY_USERS\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\\Scripts\\Logon\\Script", + "HKEY_USERS\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\\Scripts\\Shutdown\\Script", + "HKEY_USERS\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\\Scripts\\Startup\\Script", + "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Active Setup\\Installed Components\\*\\ShellComponent", + "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows CE Services\\AutoStartOnConnect\\MicrosoftActiveSync", + "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows CE Services\\AutoStartOnDisconnect\\MicrosoftActiveSync", + "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Ctf\\LangBarAddin\\*\\FilePath", + "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Extensions\\*\\Exec", + "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Extensions\\*\\Script", + "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Command Processor\\Autorun", + "HKEY_USERS\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Ctf\\LangBarAddin\\*\\FilePath", + "HKEY_USERS\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Extensions\\*\\Exec", + "HKEY_USERS\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Extensions\\*\\Script", + "HKEY_USERS\\*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Command Processor\\Autorun", + "HKEY_USERS\\*\\Control Panel\\Desktop\\scrnsave.exe", + "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\*\\VerifierDlls", + "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\GpExtensions\\*\\DllName", + "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet*\\Control\\SafeBoot\\AlternateShell", + "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet*\\Control\\Terminal Server\\Wds\\rdpwd\\StartupPrograms", + "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet*\\Control\\Terminal Server\\WinStations\\RDP-Tcp\\InitialProgram", + "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet*\\Control\\Session Manager\\BootExecute", + "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet*\\Control\\Session Manager\\SetupExecute", + "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet*\\Control\\Session Manager\\Execute", + "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet*\\Control\\Session Manager\\S0InitialCommand", + "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet*\\Control\\ServiceControlManagerExtension", + "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet*\\Control\\BootVerificationProgram\\ImagePath", + "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\Setup\\CmdLine", + "HKEY_USERS\\*\\Environment\\UserInitMprLogonScript") and + + not registry.data.strings : ("C:\\Windows\\system32\\userinit.exe", "cmd.exe", "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe", + "C:\\Program Files\\*.exe") and + not (process.name : "rundll32.exe" and registry.path : "*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Extensions\\*\\Script") and + not process.executable : ("C:\\Windows\\System32\\msiexec.exe", + "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\msiexec.exe", + "C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Platform\\*\\MsMpEng.exe", + "C:\\Program Files\\*.exe", + "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe") + +---------------------------------- + +*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^ + +* Tactic: +** Name: Persistence +** ID: TA0003 +** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/ +* Technique: +** Name: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution +** ID: T1547 +** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/ +* Sub-technique: +** Name: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder +** ID: T1547.001 +** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/ +* Technique: +** Name: Event Triggered Execution +** ID: T1546 +** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/ +* Sub-technique: +** Name: Screensaver +** ID: T1546.002 +** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/002/ +* Tactic: +** Name: Defense Evasion +** ID: TA0005 +** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/ +* Technique: +** Name: Modify Registry +** ID: T1112 +** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/ diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-unusual-parent-process-for-cmd-exe.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-unusual-parent-process-for-cmd-exe.asciidoc new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a90df5470d --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-unusual-parent-process-for-cmd-exe.asciidoc @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +[[prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-unusual-parent-process-for-cmd-exe]] +=== Unusual Parent Process for cmd.exe + +Identifies a suspicious parent child process relationship with cmd.exe descending from an unusual process. + +*Rule type*: eql + +*Rule indices*: + +* winlogbeat-* +* logs-endpoint.events.* +* logs-windows.* +* endgame-* + +*Severity*: medium + +*Risk score*: 47 + +*Runs every*: 5m + +*Searches indices from*: now-9m ({ref}/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also <>) + +*Maximum alerts per execution*: 100 + +*References*: None + +*Tags*: + +* Domain: Endpoint +* OS: Windows +* Use Case: Threat Detection +* Tactic: Execution +* Data Source: Elastic Endgame +* Data Source: Elastic Defend + +*Version*: 107 + +*Rule authors*: + +* Elastic + +*Rule license*: Elastic License v2 + + +==== Investigation guide + + +[source, markdown] +---------------------------------- + +---------------------------------- + +==== Rule query + + +[source, js] +---------------------------------- +process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and + process.name : "cmd.exe" and + process.parent.name : ("lsass.exe", + "csrss.exe", + "epad.exe", + "regsvr32.exe", + "dllhost.exe", + "LogonUI.exe", + "wermgr.exe", + "spoolsv.exe", + "jucheck.exe", + "jusched.exe", + "ctfmon.exe", + "taskhostw.exe", + "GoogleUpdate.exe", + "sppsvc.exe", + "sihost.exe", + "slui.exe", + "SIHClient.exe", + "SearchIndexer.exe", + "SearchProtocolHost.exe", + "FlashPlayerUpdateService.exe", + "WerFault.exe", + "WUDFHost.exe", + "unsecapp.exe", + "wlanext.exe" ) and + not (process.parent.name : "dllhost.exe" and process.parent.args : "/Processid:{CA8C87C1-929D-45BA-94DB-EF8E6CB346AD}") + +---------------------------------- + +*Framework*: MITRE ATT&CK^TM^ + +* Tactic: +** Name: Execution +** ID: TA0002 +** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/ +* Technique: +** Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter +** ID: T1059 +** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/ diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rules-8-10-3-appendix.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rules-8-10-3-appendix.asciidoc new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e3ef2742bc --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rules-8-10-3-appendix.asciidoc @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +["appendix",role="exclude",id="prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-prebuilt-rules-8-10-3-appendix"] += Downloadable rule update v8.10.3 + +This section lists all updates associated with version 8.10.3 of the Fleet integration *Prebuilt Security Detection Rules*. + + +include::prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-github-protected-branch-settings-changed.asciidoc[] +include::prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-github-repository-deleted.asciidoc[] +include::prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-network-activity-detected-via-cat.asciidoc[] +include::prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-potential-meterpreter-reverse-shell.asciidoc[] +include::prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-potential-reverse-shell-via-udp.asciidoc[] +include::prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-threat-intel-ip-address-indicator-match.asciidoc[] +include::prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-threat-intel-hash-indicator-match.asciidoc[] +include::prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-threat-intel-windows-registry-indicator-match.asciidoc[] +include::prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-threat-intel-url-indicator-match.asciidoc[] +include::prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-unusual-parent-process-for-cmd-exe.asciidoc[] +include::prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-uncommon-registry-persistence-change.asciidoc[] +include::prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-persistent-scripts-in-the-startup-directory.asciidoc[] diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rules-8-10-3-summary.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rules-8-10-3-summary.asciidoc new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..39061681a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rules-8-10-3-summary.asciidoc @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +[[prebuilt-rule-8-10-3-prebuilt-rules-8-10-3-summary]] +[role="xpack"] +== Update v8.10.3 + +This section lists all updates associated with version 8.10.3 of the Fleet integration *Prebuilt Security Detection Rules*. + + +[width="100%",options="header"] +|============================================== +|Rule |Description |Status |Version + +|<> | This rule detects setting modifications for protected branches of a GitHub repository. Branch protection rules can be used to enforce certain workflows or requirements before a contributor can push changes to a branch in your repository. Changes to these protected branch settings should be investigated and verified as legitimate activity. Unauthorized changes could be used to lower your organization's security posture and leave you exposed for future attacks. | new | 1 + +|<> | This rule detects when a GitHub repository is deleted within your organization. Repositories are a critical component used within an organization to manage work, collaborate with others and release products to the public. Any delete action against a repository should be investigated to determine it's validity. Unauthorized deletion of organization repositories could cause irreversible loss of intellectual property and indicate compromise within your organization. | new | 1 + +|<> | This rule monitors for the execution of the cat command, followed by a connection attempt by the same process. Cat is capable of transfering data via tcp/udp channels by redirecting its read output to a /dev/tcp or /dev/udp channel. This activity is highly suspicious, and should be investigated. Attackers may leverage this capability to transfer tools or files to another host in the network or exfiltrate data while attempting to evade detection in the process. | new | 1 + +|<> | This detection rule identifies a sample of suspicious Linux system file reads used for system fingerprinting, leveraged by the Metasploit Meterpreter shell to gather information about the target that it is executing its shell on. Detecting this pattern is indicative of a successful meterpreter shell connection. | new | 1 + +|<> | This detection rule identifies suspicious network traffic patterns associated with UDP reverse shell activity. This activity consists of a sample of an execve, socket and connect syscall executed by the same process, where the auditd.data.a0-1 indicate a UDP connection, ending with an egress connection event. An attacker may establish a Linux UDP reverse shell to bypass traditional firewall restrictions and gain remote access to a target system covertly. | new | 1 + +|<> | This rule is triggered when an IP address indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or integrations has a match against a network event. | update | 3 + +|<> | This rule is triggered when a hash indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or integrations has a match against an event that contains file hashes, such as antivirus alerts, process creation, library load, and file operation events. | update | 4 + +|<> | This rule is triggered when a Windows registry indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or integrations has a match against an event that contains registry data. | update | 3 + +|<> | This rule is triggered when a URL indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or integrations has a match against an event that contains URL data, like DNS events, network logs, etc. | update | 3 + +|<> | Identifies a suspicious parent child process relationship with cmd.exe descending from an unusual process. | update | 107 + +|<> | Detects changes to registry persistence keys that are not commonly used or modified by legitimate programs. This could be an indication of an adversary's attempt to persist in a stealthy manner. | update | 105 + +|<> | Identifies script engines creating files in the Startup folder, or the creation of script files in the Startup folder. Adversaries may abuse this technique to maintain persistence in an environment. | update | 108 + +|============================================== diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/prebuilt-rules-downloadable-updates.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/prebuilt-rules-downloadable-updates.asciidoc index c285889192..07374eba23 100644 --- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/prebuilt-rules-downloadable-updates.asciidoc +++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/prebuilt-rules-downloadable-updates.asciidoc @@ -6,11 +6,16 @@ This section lists all updates to prebuilt detection rules, made available with To update your installed rules to the latest versions, follow the instructions in <>. +For previous rule updates, please navigate to the https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/8.9/prebuilt-rules-downloadable-updates.html[last version]. [width="100%",options="header"] |============================================== |Update version |Date | New rules | Updated rules | Notes + +|<> | 18 Sep 2023 | 5 | 7 | +updating rules for 8.10.3 release package + |<> | 15 Feb 2023 | 29 | 110 | This release includes new rules for Windows and Linux endpoints. Additionally, significant rule tuning for Windows and Linux rules has been added for better rule efficacy. @@ -137,3 +142,4 @@ include::downloadable-packages/8-4-3/prebuilt-rules-8-4-3-summary.asciidoc[level include::downloadable-packages/8-5-1/prebuilt-rules-8-5-1-summary.asciidoc[leveloffset=+1] include::downloadable-packages/8-6-1/prebuilt-rules-8-6-1-summary.asciidoc[leveloffset=+1] include::downloadable-packages/8-7-1/prebuilt-rules-8-7-1-summary.asciidoc[leveloffset=+1] +include::downloadable-packages/8-10-3/prebuilt-rules-8-10-3-summary.asciidoc[leveloffset=+1] diff --git a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/prebuilt-rules-reference.asciidoc b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/prebuilt-rules-reference.asciidoc index 980b406671..140f444761 100644 --- a/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/prebuilt-rules-reference.asciidoc +++ b/docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/prebuilt-rules-reference.asciidoc @@ -14,1450 +14,1896 @@ and their rule type is `machine_learning`. |Rule |Description |Tags |Added |Version -|<> |Indicates the creation of a scheduled task using Windows event logs. Adversaries can use these to establish persistence, move laterally, and/or escalate privileges. |[Elastic] [Host] [Windows] [Threat Detection] [Persistence] |8.5.0 |2 <> +|<> |Indicates the creation of a scheduled task using Windows event logs. Adversaries can use these to establish persistence, move laterally, and/or escalate privileges. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.3.0 |7 -|<> |Indicates the update of a scheduled task using Windows event logs. Adversaries can use these to establish persistence, by changing the configuration of a legit scheduled task. Some changes such as disabling or enabling a scheduled task are common and may may generate noise. |[Elastic] [Host] [Windows] [Threat Detection] [Persistence] |8.5.0 |2 <> +|<> |Indicates the update of a scheduled task using Windows event logs. Adversaries can use these to establish persistence, by changing the configuration of a legit scheduled task. Some changes such as disabling or enabling a scheduled task are common and may may generate noise. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.3.0 |8 -|<> |An adversary may attempt to access the secrets in secrets manager to steal certificates, credentials, or other sensitive material |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Data Protection] [Credential Access] [Investigation Guide] |7.9.0 |103 <> +|<> |Identifies the creation of an AWS log trail that specifies the settings for delivery of log data. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Log Auditing], [Tactic: Collection] |8.3.0 |104 -|<> |Identifies the creation of an AWS log trail that specifies the settings for delivery of log data. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Log Auditing] |7.9.0 |101 <> +|<> |Identifies the deletion of an AWS log trail. An adversary may delete trails in an attempt to evade defenses. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Log Auditing], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.3.0 |106 -|<> |Identifies the deletion of an AWS log trail. An adversary may delete trails in an attempt to evade defenses. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Log Auditing] [Investigation Guide] |7.9.0 |103 <> +|<> |Identifies suspending the recording of AWS API calls and log file delivery for the specified trail. An adversary may suspend trails in an attempt to evade defenses. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Log Auditing], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.3.0 |106 -|<> |Identifies suspending the recording of AWS API calls and log file delivery for the specified trail. An adversary may suspend trails in an attempt to evade defenses. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Log Auditing] [Investigation Guide] |7.9.0 |103 <> +|<> |Identifies an update to an AWS log trail setting that specifies the delivery of log files. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Log Auditing], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Tactic: Impact] |8.3.0 |106 -|<> |Identifies an update to an AWS log trail setting that specifies the delivery of log files. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Log Auditing] [Investigation Guide] |7.9.0 |103 <> +|<> |Identifies the deletion of an AWS CloudWatch alarm. An adversary may delete alarms in an attempt to evade defenses. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.3.0 |106 -|<> |Identifies the deletion of an AWS CloudWatch alarm. An adversary may delete alarms in an attempt to evade defenses. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Monitoring] [Investigation Guide] |7.9.0 |103 <> +|<> |Identifies the deletion of a specified AWS CloudWatch log group. When a log group is deleted, all the archived log events associated with the log group are also permanently deleted. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Log Auditing], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Tactic: Impact] |8.3.0 |106 -|<> |Identifies the deletion of a specified AWS CloudWatch log group. When a log group is deleted, all the archived log events associated with the log group are also permanently deleted. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Log Auditing] [Investigation Guide] |7.9.0 |103 <> +|<> |Identifies the deletion of an AWS CloudWatch log stream, which permanently deletes all associated archived log events with the stream. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Log Auditing], [Tactic: Impact], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.3.0 |106 -|<> |Identifies the deletion of an AWS CloudWatch log stream, which permanently deletes all associated archived log events with the stream. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Log Auditing] [Impact] [Investigation Guide] |7.9.0 |103 <> +|<> |Identifies attempts to delete an AWS Config Service resource. An adversary may tamper with Config services in order to reduce visibility into the security posture of an account and / or its workload instances. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.3.0 |106 -|<> |Identifies attempts to delete an AWS Config Service resource. An adversary may tamper with Config services in order to reduce visibility into the security posture of an account and / or its workload instances. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Monitoring] [Investigation Guide] |7.9.0 |103 <> +|<> |Identifies an AWS configuration change to stop recording a designated set of resources. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.3.0 |103 -|<> |Identifies an AWS configuration change to stop recording a designated set of resources. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Monitoring] |7.9.0 |101 <> +|<> |This rule detects the use of system search utilities like grep and find to search for AWS credentials inside a container. Unauthorized access to these sensitive files could lead to further compromise of the container environment or facilitate a container breakout to the underlying cloud environment. |[Data Source: Elastic Defend for Containers], [Domain: Container], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access] |8.8.0 |1 -|<> |Identifies the deletion of an Amazon Relational Database Service (RDS) Aurora database cluster, global database cluster, or database instance. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Asset Visibility] |7.9.0 |101 <> +|<> |Identifies the deletion of an Amazon Relational Database Service (RDS) Aurora database cluster, global database cluster, or database instance. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Asset Visibility], [Tactic: Impact] |8.3.0 |103 -|<> |Identifies disabling of Amazon Elastic Block Store (EBS) encryption by default in the current region. Disabling encryption by default does not change the encryption status of your existing volumes. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Data Protection] |7.9.0 |101 <> +|<> |Identifies disabling of Amazon Elastic Block Store (EBS) encryption by default in the current region. Disabling encryption by default does not change the encryption status of your existing volumes. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Tactic: Impact] |8.3.0 |103 -|<> |Identifies potential Traffic Mirroring in an Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) instance. Traffic Mirroring is an Amazon VPC feature that you can use to copy network traffic from an Elastic network interface. This feature can potentially be abused to exfiltrate sensitive data from unencrypted internal traffic. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Network Security] |7.14.0 |101 <> +|<> |Identifies potential Traffic Mirroring in an Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) instance. Traffic Mirroring is an Amazon VPC feature that you can use to copy network traffic from an Elastic network interface. This feature can potentially be abused to exfiltrate sensitive data from unencrypted internal traffic. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Network Security Monitoring], [Tactic: Exfiltration], [Tactic: Collection] |8.3.0 |103 -|<> |Identifies the creation of an AWS Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) network access control list (ACL) or an entry in a network ACL with a specified rule number. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Network Security] |7.9.0 |101 <> +|<> |Identifies the creation of an AWS Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) network access control list (ACL) or an entry in a network ACL with a specified rule number. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Network Security Monitoring], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.3.0 |103 -|<> |Identifies the deletion of an Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) network access control list (ACL) or one of its ingress/egress entries. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Network Security] |7.9.0 |101 <> +|<> |Identifies the deletion of an Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) network access control list (ACL) or one of its ingress/egress entries. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Network Security Monitoring], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.3.0 |103 -|<> |An attempt was made to modify AWS EC2 snapshot attributes. Snapshots are sometimes shared by threat actors in order to exfiltrate bulk data from an EC2 fleet. If the permissions were modified, verify the snapshot was not shared with an unauthorized or unexpected AWS account. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Asset Visibility] [Exfiltration] [Investigation Guide] |7.9.0 |103 <> +|<> |An attempt was made to modify AWS EC2 snapshot attributes. Snapshots are sometimes shared by threat actors in order to exfiltrate bulk data from an EC2 fleet. If the permissions were modified, verify the snapshot was not shared with an unauthorized or unexpected AWS account. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Asset Visibility], [Tactic: Exfiltration], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.3.0 |106 -|<> |Identifies an attempt to export an AWS EC2 instance. A virtual machine (VM) export may indicate an attempt to extract or exfiltrate information. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Asset Visibility] |7.14.0 |101 <> +|<> |Identifies an attempt to export an AWS EC2 instance. A virtual machine (VM) export may indicate an attempt to extract or exfiltrate information. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Asset Visibility], [Tactic: Exfiltration], [Tactic: Collection] |8.3.0 |103 -|<> |Detects when an EFS File System or Mount is deleted. An adversary could break any file system using the mount target that is being deleted, which might disrupt instances or applications using those mounts. The mount must be deleted prior to deleting the File System, or the adversary will be unable to delete the File System. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Data Protection] |7.16.0 |101 <> +|<> |Detects when an EFS File System or Mount is deleted. An adversary could break any file system using the mount target that is being deleted, which might disrupt instances or applications using those mounts. The mount must be deleted prior to deleting the File System, or the adversary will be unable to delete the File System. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Tactic: Impact] |8.3.0 |103 -|<> |Identifies when an ElastiCache security group has been created. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Monitoring] |7.16.0 |101 <> +|<> |Identifies when an ElastiCache security group has been created. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.3.0 |103 -|<> |Identifies when an ElastiCache security group has been modified or deleted. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Monitoring] |7.16.0 |101 <> +|<> |Identifies when an ElastiCache security group has been modified or deleted. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.3.0 |103 -|<> |Identifies when a user has disabled or deleted an EventBridge rule. This activity can result in an unintended loss of visibility in applications or a break in the flow with other AWS services. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Monitoring] [Impact] |7.16.0 |101 <> +|<> |Identifies when a user has disabled or deleted an EventBridge rule. This activity can result in an unintended loss of visibility in applications or a break in the flow with other AWS services. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Tactic: Impact] |8.3.0 |103 -|<> |Identifies the execution of commands and scripts via System Manager. Execution methods such as RunShellScript, RunPowerShellScript, and alike can be abused by an authenticated attacker to install a backdoor or to interact with a compromised instance via reverse-shell using system only commands. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Log Auditing] [Initial Access] [Investigation Guide] |7.9.0 |103 <> +|<> |Identifies the execution of commands and scripts via System Manager. Execution methods such as RunShellScript, RunPowerShellScript, and alike can be abused by an authenticated attacker to install a backdoor or to interact with a compromised instance via reverse-shell using system only commands. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Log Auditing], [Tactic: Initial Access], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.3.0 |106 -|<> |Identifies the deletion of an Amazon GuardDuty detector. Upon deletion, GuardDuty stops monitoring the environment and all existing findings are lost. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Monitoring] |7.9.0 |101 <> +|<> |Identifies the deletion of an Amazon GuardDuty detector. Upon deletion, GuardDuty stops monitoring the environment and all existing findings are lost. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.3.0 |103 -|<> |Identifies attempts to modify an AWS IAM Assume Role Policy. An adversary may attempt to modify the AssumeRolePolicy of a misconfigured role in order to gain the privileges of that role. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Identity and Access] [Investigation Guide] |7.9.0 |103 <> +|<> |Identifies attempts to modify an AWS IAM Assume Role Policy. An adversary may attempt to modify the AssumeRolePolicy of a misconfigured role in order to gain the privileges of that role. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation] |8.3.0 |106 -|<> |Identifies a high number of failed attempts to assume an AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) role. IAM roles are used to delegate access to users or services. An adversary may attempt to enumerate IAM roles in order to determine if a role exists before attempting to assume or hijack the discovered role. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Identity and Access] [Investigation Guide] |7.9.0 |103 <> +|<> |Identifies a high number of failed attempts to assume an AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) role. IAM roles are used to delegate access to users or services. An adversary may attempt to enumerate IAM roles in order to determine if a role exists before attempting to assume or hijack the discovered role. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Tactic: Credential Access] |8.3.0 |106 -|<> |Identifies the deactivation of a specified multi-factor authentication (MFA) device and removes it from association with the user name for which it was originally enabled. In AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM), a device must be deactivated before it can be deleted. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Monitoring] [Investigation Guide] |7.9.0 |103 <> +|<> |Identifies the deactivation of a specified multi-factor authentication (MFA) device and removes it from association with the user name for which it was originally enabled. In AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM), a device must be deactivated before it can be deleted. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Tactic: Impact] |8.3.0 |106 -|<> |Identifies the creation of a group in AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM). Groups specify permissions for multiple users. Any user in a group automatically has the permissions that are assigned to the group. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Identity and Access] |7.9.0 |101 <> +|<> |Identifies the creation of a group in AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM). Groups specify permissions for multiple users. Any user in a group automatically has the permissions that are assigned to the group. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.3.0 |103 -|<> |Identifies the deletion of a specified AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) resource group. Deleting a resource group does not delete resources that are members of the group; it only deletes the group structure. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Monitoring] |7.9.0 |101 <> +|<> |Identifies the deletion of a specified AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) resource group. Deleting a resource group does not delete resources that are members of the group; it only deletes the group structure. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Tactic: Impact] |8.3.0 |103 -|<> |Identifies AWS IAM password recovery requests. An adversary may attempt to gain unauthorized AWS access by abusing password recovery mechanisms. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Identity and Access] |7.9.0 |101 <> +|<> |Identifies AWS IAM password recovery requests. An adversary may attempt to gain unauthorized AWS access by abusing password recovery mechanisms. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Initial Access] |8.3.0 |103 -|<> |Identifies the addition of a user to a specified group in AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM). |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Identity and Access] [Credential Access] [Persistence] [Investigation Guide] |7.9.0 |103 <> +|<> |Identifies the addition of a user to a specified group in AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM). |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Tactic: Persistence], [Resources: Investigation Guide] |8.3.0 |106 -|<> |Identifies attempts to disable or schedule the deletion of an AWS KMS Customer Managed Key (CMK). Deleting an AWS KMS key is destructive and potentially dangerous. It deletes the key material and all metadata associated with the KMS key and is irreversible. After a KMS key is deleted, the data that was encrypted under that KMS key can no longer be decrypted, which means that data becomes unrecoverable. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Log Auditing] [Impact] |8.6.0 |1 +|<> |Identifies attempts to disable or schedule the deletion of an AWS KMS Customer Managed Key (CMK). Deleting an AWS KMS key is destructive and potentially dangerous. It deletes the key material and all metadata associated with the KMS key and is irreversible. After a KMS key is deleted, the data that was encrypted under that KMS key can no longer be decrypted, which means that data becomes unrecoverable. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Log Auditing], [Tactic: Impact] |8.3.0 |3 -|<> |Identifies a high number of failed authentication attempts to the AWS management console for the Root user identity. An adversary may attempt to brute force the password for the Root user identity, as it has complete access to all services and resources for the AWS account. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Identity and Access] |7.10.0 |101 <> +|<> |Identifies a high number of failed authentication attempts to the AWS management console for the Root user identity. An adversary may attempt to brute force the password for the Root user identity, as it has complete access to all services and resources for the AWS account. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Credential Access] |8.3.0 |103 -|<> |Identifies a successful login to the AWS Management Console by the Root user. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Identity and Access] [Investigation Guide] |7.9.0 |103 <> +|<> |Identifies a successful login to the AWS Management Console by the Root user. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Tactic: Initial Access] |8.3.0 |106 -|<> |Identifies the creation of a new Amazon Relational Database Service (RDS) Aurora DB cluster or global database spread across multiple regions. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Asset Visibility] |7.9.0 |101 <> +|<> |Identifies the creation of a new Amazon Relational Database Service (RDS) Aurora DB cluster or global database spread across multiple regions. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Asset Visibility], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.3.0 |103 -|<> |Identifies the creation of an Amazon Relational Database Service (RDS) Aurora database instance. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Asset Visibility] [Persistence] |7.14.0 |101 <> +|<> |Identifies the creation of an Amazon Relational Database Service (RDS) Aurora database instance. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Asset Visibility], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.3.0 |103 -|<> |Identifies that an Amazon Relational Database Service (RDS) cluster or instance has been stopped. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Asset Visibility] |7.9.0 |101 <> +|<> |Identifies that an Amazon Relational Database Service (RDS) cluster or instance has been stopped. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Asset Visibility], [Tactic: Impact] |8.3.0 |103 -|<> |Identifies the creation of an Amazon Relational Database Service (RDS) Security group. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Monitoring] |7.14.0 |101 <> +|<> |Identifies the creation of an Amazon Relational Database Service (RDS) Security group. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.3.0 |103 -|<> |Identifies the deletion of an Amazon Relational Database Service (RDS) Security group. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Monitoring] |7.14.0 |101 <> +|<> |Identifies the deletion of an Amazon Relational Database Service (RDS) Security group. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Tactic: Impact] |8.3.0 |103 -|<> |Identifies the export of an Amazon Relational Database Service (RDS) Aurora database snapshot. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Asset Visibility] [Exfiltration] |7.16.0 |101 <> +|<> |Identifies the export of an Amazon Relational Database Service (RDS) Aurora database snapshot. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Asset Visibility], [Tactic: Exfiltration] |8.3.0 |103 -|<> |Identifies when an attempt was made to restore an RDS Snapshot. Snapshots are sometimes shared by threat actors in order to exfiltrate bulk data or evade detection after performing malicious activities. If the permissions were modified, verify if the snapshot was shared with an unauthorized or unexpected AWS account. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Asset Visibility] [Defense Evasion] |7.16.0 |101 <> +|<> |Identifies when an attempt was made to restore an RDS Snapshot. Snapshots are sometimes shared by threat actors in order to exfiltrate bulk data or evade detection after performing malicious activities. If the permissions were modified, verify if the snapshot was shared with an unauthorized or unexpected AWS account. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Asset Visibility], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.3.0 |103 -|<> |Identifies the creation of an Amazon Redshift cluster. Unexpected creation of this cluster by a non-administrative user may indicate a permission or role issue with current users. If unexpected, the resource may not properly be configured and could introduce security vulnerabilities. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Asset Visibility] [Persistence] |8.3.0 |101 <> +|<> |Identifies the creation of an Amazon Redshift cluster. Unexpected creation of this cluster by a non-administrative user may indicate a permission or role issue with current users. If unexpected, the resource may not properly be configured and could introduce security vulnerabilities. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Asset Visibility], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.3.0 |103 -|<> |Identifies attempts to login to AWS as the root user without using multi-factor authentication (MFA). Amazon AWS best practices indicate that the root user should be protected by MFA. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Identity and Access] [Investigation Guide] |7.9.0 |103 <> +|<> |Identifies attempts to login to AWS as the root user without using multi-factor authentication (MFA). Amazon AWS best practices indicate that the root user should be protected by MFA. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation] |8.3.0 |106 -|<> |Identifies when a transfer lock was removed from a Route 53 domain. It is recommended to refrain from performing this action unless intending to transfer the domain to a different registrar. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Asset Visibility] |7.14.0 |101 <> +|<> |Identifies when a transfer lock was removed from a Route 53 domain. It is recommended to refrain from performing this action unless intending to transfer the domain to a different registrar. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Asset Visibility], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.3.0 |103 -|<> |Identifies when a request has been made to transfer a Route 53 domain to another AWS account. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Asset Visibility] |7.14.0 |101 <> +|<> |Identifies when a request has been made to transfer a Route 53 domain to another AWS account. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Asset Visibility], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.3.0 |103 -|<> |Identifies when an AWS Route Table has been created. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Network Security] [Persistence] |7.16.0 |101 <> +|<> |Identifies when an AWS Route Table has been created. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Network Security Monitoring], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.3.0 |103 -|<> |Identifies when an AWS Route Table has been modified or deleted. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Network Security] [Persistence] |7.16.0 |101 <> +|<> |Identifies when an AWS Route Table has been modified or deleted. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Network Security Monitoring], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.3.0 |103 -|<> |Identifies when a Route53 private hosted zone has been associated with VPC. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Asset Visibility] |7.16.0 |101 <> +|<> |Identifies when a Route53 private hosted zone has been associated with VPC. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Asset Visibility], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.3.0 |103 -|<> |Identifies the deletion of various Amazon Simple Storage Service (S3) bucket configuration components. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Asset Visibility] |7.9.0 |101 <> +|<> |Identifies the deletion of various Amazon Simple Storage Service (S3) bucket configuration components. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Asset Visibility], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.3.0 |104 -|<> |Identifies when SAML activity has occurred in AWS. An adversary could manipulate SAML to maintain access to the target. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Identity and Access] |7.16.0 |101 <> +|<> |Identifies when SAML activity has occurred in AWS. An adversary could manipulate SAML to maintain access to the target. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.3.0 |103 -|<> |Identifies the suspicious use of GetSessionToken. Tokens could be created and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Identity and Access] |7.16.0 |101 <> +|<> |Identifies the suspicious use of GetSessionToken. Tokens could be created and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation] |8.3.0 |103 -|<> |Identifies a change to an AWS Security Group Configuration. A security group is like a virtual firewall, and modifying configurations may allow unauthorized access. Threat actors may abuse this to establish persistence, exfiltrate data, or pivot in an AWS environment. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Network Security] |7.15.0 |101 <> +|<> |Identifies a change to an AWS Security Group Configuration. A security group is like a virtual firewall, and modifying configurations may allow unauthorized access. Threat actors may abuse this to establish persistence, exfiltrate data, or pivot in an AWS environment. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Network Security Monitoring], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.3.0 |103 -|<> |Identifies the use of AssumeRole. AssumeRole returns a set of temporary security credentials that can be used to access AWS resources. An adversary could use those credentials to move laterally and escalate privileges. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Identity and Access] |7.16.0 |101 <> +|<> |Identifies the use of AssumeRole. AssumeRole returns a set of temporary security credentials that can be used to access AWS resources. An adversary could use those credentials to move laterally and escalate privileges. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Identity and Access Audit], [Tactic: Privilege Escalation] |8.3.0 |103 -|<> |Identifies the deletion of one or more flow logs in AWS Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2). An adversary may delete flow logs in an attempt to evade defenses. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Log Auditing] [Investigation Guide] |7.9.0 |103 <> +|<> |Identifies the deletion of one or more flow logs in AWS Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2). An adversary may delete flow logs in an attempt to evade defenses. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Log Auditing], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.3.0 |106 -|<> |Identifies the deletion of a specified AWS Web Application Firewall (WAF) access control list. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Network Security] |7.9.0 |101 <> +|<> |Identifies the deletion of a specified AWS Web Application Firewall (WAF) access control list. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Network Security Monitoring], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.3.0 |103 -|<> |Identifies the deletion of a specified AWS Web Application Firewall (WAF) rule or rule group. |[Elastic] [Cloud] [AWS] [Continuous Monitoring] [SecOps] [Network Security] |7.9.0 |101 <> +|<> |Identifies the deletion of a specified AWS Web Application Firewall (WAF) rule or rule group. |[Domain: Cloud], [Data Source: AWS], [Data Source: Amazon Web Services], [Use Case: Network Security Monitoring], [Tactic: Defense Evasion] |8.3.0 |103 -|<> |Identifies the creation of a Process ID (PID), lock or reboot file created in temporary file storage paradigm (tmpfs) directory /var/run. On Linux, the PID files typically hold the process ID to track previous copies running and manage other tasks. Certain Linux malware use the /var/run directory for holding data, executables and other tasks, disguising itself or these files as legitimate PID files. |[Elastic] [Host] [Linux] [Threat Detection] [Execution] [BPFDoor] [Investigation Guide] |8.3.0 |102 <> +|<> |Identifies the creation of a Process ID (PID), lock or reboot file created in temporary file storage paradigm (tmpfs) directory /var/run. On Linux, the PID files typically hold the process ID to track previous copies running and manage other tasks. Certain Linux malware use the /var/run directory for holding data, executables and other tasks, disguising itself or these files as legitimate PID files. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Linux], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Execution], [Threat: BPFDoor], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.6.0 |209 -|<> |Specially crafted DNS requests can manipulate a known overflow vulnerability in some Windows DNS servers, resulting in Remote Code Execution (RCE) or a Denial of Service (DoS) from crashing the service. |[Elastic] [Network] [Threat Detection] [Lateral Movement] [Investigation Guide] |7.10.0 |102 <> +|<> |Specially crafted DNS requests can manipulate a known overflow vulnerability in some Windows DNS servers, resulting in Remote Code Execution (RCE) or a Denial of Service (DoS) from crashing the service. |[Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Use Case: Vulnerability] |8.3.0 |104 -|<> |This rule detects network events that may indicate the use of Telnet traffic. Telnet is commonly used by system administrators to remotely control older or embedded systems using the command line shell. It should almost never be directly exposed to the Internet, as it is frequently targeted and exploited by threat actors as an initial access or backdoor vector. As a plain-text protocol, it may also expose usernames and passwords to anyone capable of observing the traffic. |[Elastic] [Host] [Network] [Threat Detection] [Command and Control] [Host] [Lateral Movement] [Initial Access] |7.6.0 |101 <> +|<> |This rule detects network events that may indicate the use of Telnet traffic. Telnet is commonly used by system administrators to remotely control older or embedded systems using the command line shell. It should almost never be directly exposed to the Internet, as it is frequently targeted and exploited by threat actors as an initial access or backdoor vector. As a plain-text protocol, it may also expose usernames and passwords to anyone capable of observing the traffic. |[Domain: Endpoint], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Command and Control], [Tactic: Lateral Movement], [Tactic: Initial Access] |8.3.0 |103 -|<> |Identifies the execution of a process with arguments pointing to known browser files that store passwords and cookies. Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser. |[Elastic] [Host] [macOS] [Threat Detection] [Credential Access] |7.12.0 |100 <> +|<> |Identifies the execution of a process with arguments pointing to known browser files that store passwords and cookies. Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |104 -|<> |Adversaries may collect the keychain storage data from a system to acquire credentials. Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features such as WiFi passwords, websites, secure notes and certificates. |[Elastic] [Host] [macOS] [Threat Detection] [Credential Access] |7.10.0 |100 <> +|<> |Adversaries may collect the keychain storage data from a system to acquire credentials. Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features such as WiFi passwords, websites, secure notes and certificates. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: macOS], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |104 -|<> |Identify access to sensitive Active Directory object attributes that contains credentials and decryption keys such as unixUserPassword, ms-PKI-AccountCredentials and msPKI-CredentialRoamingTokens. |[Elastic] [Host] [Windows] [Threat Detection] [Credential Access] [Active Directory] |8.6.0 |1 +|<> |Identify access to sensitive Active Directory object attributes that contains credentials and decryption keys such as unixUserPassword, ms-PKI-AccountCredentials and msPKI-CredentialRoamingTokens. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Credential Access], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring], [Data Source: Active Directory] |8.3.0 |7 -|<> |Detects the creation and modification of an account with the "Don't Expire Password" option Enabled. Attackers can abuse this misconfiguration to persist in the domain and maintain long-term access using compromised accounts with this property. |[Elastic] [Host] [Windows] [Threat Detection] [Persistence] [Active Directory] [Investigation Guide] |8.2.0 |102 <> +|<> |Identifies commands containing references to Outlook data files extensions, which can potentially indicate the search, access, or modification of these files. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Collection], [Data Source: Elastic Defend], [Rule Type: BBR] |8.3.0 |1 -|<> |Identifies when the SYSTEM account uses an account discovery utility. This could be a sign of discovery activity after an adversary has achieved privilege escalation. |[Elastic] [Host] [Windows] [Threat Detection] [Discovery] [Investigation Guide] |7.7.0 |102 <> +|<> |Detects the creation and modification of an account with the "Don't Expire Password" option Enabled. Attackers can abuse this misconfiguration to persist in the domain and maintain long-term access using compromised accounts with this property. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence], [Data Source: Active Directory], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring] |8.3.0 |107 -|<> |Identifies an attempt to reset a potentially privileged account password remotely. Adversaries may manipulate account passwords to maintain access or evade password duration policies and preserve compromised credentials. |[Elastic] [Host] [Windows] [Threat Detection] [Persistence] |8.0.0 |101 <> +|<> |Identifies when the SYSTEM account uses an account discovery utility. This could be a sign of discovery activity after an adversary has achieved privilege escalation. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Discovery], [Resources: Investigation Guide], [Data Source: Elastic Defend] |8.3.0 |106 -|<> |This rule detects the Active Directory query tool, AdFind.exe. AdFind has legitimate purposes, but it is frequently leveraged by threat actors to perform post-exploitation Active Directory reconnaissance. The AdFind tool has been observed in Trickbot, Ryuk, Maze, and FIN6 campaigns. For Winlogbeat, this rule requires Sysmon. |[Elastic] [Host] [Windows] [Threat Detection] [Discovery] [Investigation Guide] [Elastic Endgame] |7.11.0 |102 <> +|<> |Identifies an attempt to reset a potentially privileged account password remotely. Adversaries may manipulate account passwords to maintain access or evade password duration policies and preserve compromised credentials. |[Domain: Endpoint], [OS: Windows], [Use Case: Threat Detection], [Tactic: Persistence] |8.3.0 |106 -|<