diff --git a/_posts/2023-09-09-fees.md b/_posts/2023-09-09-fees.md
index 6158d7f..84efacf 100644
--- a/_posts/2023-09-09-fees.md
+++ b/_posts/2023-09-09-fees.md
@@ -9,20 +9,29 @@ This is part of a series on [Tidwell's Questions](https://twitter.com/miketwenty
 
 ## The Question
 
-If we look at the real world example of Monero:
+Supposedly (acording to Melvin)...
 
-1. Market cap = 3 billion
-2. Daily fees = 1 thousand
+    If we look at the real world example of Monero:
+    
+    1. Market cap = 3 billion
+    2. Daily fees = 1 thousand
+    
+    A self-interested actor (or algorithm) would always take (1), over (2).
 
-A self-interested actor (or algorithm) would always take (1), over (2).
+    The chain gets terminated, and users rugged.
+
+So, why will fees be enough to deter theft? It doesn't seem to add up!
 
-The chain gets terminated, and users rugged.
 
 ## The Answer
 
+Actually, it adds up just fine. Fee revenues will be way, way more than total coins "locked" to a drivechain.
+
+Secondly, even if it didn't add up -- that would just mean that Bitcoin L1 is doomed as well.
+
 ### 1. If DC Breaks, Bitcoin Probably Breaks Also
 
-Yes, Drivechain uses a "fees only" model -- L2 cannot print any new coins.
+Drivechain uses a "fees only" model -- L2 cannot print any new coins.
 
 Eventually, Bitcoin's L1 will share this fate. That's Bitcoin's long run security model. So, if it doesn't work, we had better learn now!