The-Uncanny.txt

The “Uncanny”1
(1919)

SIGMUND FREUD
I
It is only rarely that a psychoanalyst feels impelled to investigate the subject of aesthetics even when aesthetics is
understood to mean not merely the theory of beauty, but
the theory of the qualities of feeling. He works in other
planes of mental life and has little to do with those subdued emotional activities which, inhibited in their aims
and dependent upon a multitude of concurrent factors,
usually furnish the material for the study of aesthetics. But
it does occasionally happen that he has to interest himself
in some particular province of that subject; and then it usually proves to be a rather remote region of it and one that
has been neglected in standard works.
The subject of the “uncanny” is a province of this kind.
It undoubtedly belongs to all that is terrible—to all that
arouses dread and creeping horror; it is equally certain,
too, that the word is not always used in a clearly definable
sense, so that it tends to coincide with whatever excites
dread. Yet we may expect that it implies some intrinsic
quality which justifies the use of a special name. One is
curious to know what this peculiar quality is which allows
us to distinguish as “uncanny” certain things within the
boundaries of what is “fearful.”
As good as nothing is to be found upon this subject in
elaborate treatises on aesthetics, which in general prefer to
concern themselves with what is beautiful, attractive and
sublime, that is with feelings of a positive nature, with the
1

First published in Imago, Bd. V., 1919; reprinted in Sammlung, Fünfte
Folge. [Translated by Alix Strachey.]

circumstances and the objects that call them forth, rather
than with the opposite feelings of unpleasantness and repulsion. I know of only one attempt in medicopsychological literature, a fertile but not exhaustive paper
by E. Jentsch.2 But I must confess that I have not made a
very thorough examination of the bibliography, especially
the foreign literature, relating to this present modest contribution of mine, for reasons which must be obvious at
this time;3 so that my paper is presented to the reader without any claim of priority.
In his study of the “uncanny,” Jentsch quite rightly lays
stress on the obstacle presented by the fact that people vary
so very greatly in their sensitivity to this quality of feeling.
The writer of the present contribution, indeed, must himself plead guilty to a special obtuseness in the matter,
where extreme delicacy of perception would be more in
place. It is long since he has experienced or heard of anything which has given him an uncanny impression, and he
will be obliged to translate himself into that state of feeling, and to awaken in himself the possibility of it before he
begins. Still, difficulties of this kind make themselves felt
powerfully in many other branches of aesthetics; we need
not on this account despair of finding instances in which
the quality in question will be recognized without hesitation by most people.
Two courses are open to us at the start. Either we can
find out what meaning has come to be attached to the word
“uncanny” in the course of its history; or we can collect all
those properties of persons, things, sensations, experiences
and situations which arouse in us the feeling of uncanniness, and then infer the unknown nature of the uncanny
from what they all have in common. I will say at once that
both courses lead to the same result: the “uncanny” is that
class of the terrifying which leads back to something long
2
3

“Zur Psychologie des Unheimlichen.”
[An allusion to the European War only just concluded.—Trans.]

1

known to us, once very familiar. How this is possible, in
what circumstances the familiar can become uncanny and
frightening, I shall show in what follows. Let me also add
that my investigation was actually begun by collecting a
number of individual cases, and only later received confirmation after I had examined what language could tell us.
In this discussion, however, I shall follow the opposite
course.
The German word unheimlich4 is obviously the opposite
of heimlich, heimisch, meaning “familiar,” “native,” “belonging to the home”; and we are tempted to conclude that
what is “uncanny” is frightening precisely because it is not
known and familiar. Naturally not everything which is new
and unfamiliar is frightening, however; the relation cannot
be inverted. We can only say that what is novel can easily
become frightening and uncanny; some new things are
frightening but not by any means all. Something has to be
added to what is novel and unfamiliar to make it uncanny.
On the whole, Jentsch did not get beyond this relation of
the uncanny to the novel and unfamiliar. He ascribes the
essential factor in the production of the feeling of uncanniness to intellectual uncertainty; so that the uncanny would
always be that in which one does not know where one is,
as it were. The better orientated in his environment a person is, the less readily will he get the impression of something uncanny in regard to the objects and events in it.
It is not difficult to see that this definition is incomplete,
and we will therefore try to proceed beyond the equation
of unheimlich with unfamiliar. We will first turn to other
languages. But foreign dictionaries tell us nothing new,
perhaps only because we speak a different language. Indeed, we get the impression that many languages are without a word for this particular variety of what is fearful.
4

[Throughout this paper “uncanny” is used as the English translation of
“unheimlich,” literally “unhomely” —Trans.]

I wish to express my indebtedness to Dr. Th. Reik for
the following excerpts:
LATIN: (K. E. Gorges, Deutschlateinisches Wörterbuch,
1898). Ein unheimlicher Ort [an uncanny place]—locus
suspectus; in unheimlicher Nachtzeit [in the dismal night
hours]—intempesta nocte.
GREEK: (Rost’s and Schenki’s Lexikons). Xenos
strange, foreign.
ENGLISH: (from dictionaries by Lucas, Bellow, Flügel,
Muret-Sanders). Uncomfortable, uneasy, gloomy, dismal,
uncanny, ghastly; (of a house) haunted; (of a man) a repulsive fellow.
FRENCH: (Sachs-Villatte). Inquiétant, sinistre, lugubre,
mal à son aise.
SPANISH: (Tollhausen, 1889). Sospechoso, de mal
aguëro, lugubre, siniestro.
The Italian and the Portuguese seem to content themselves with words which we should describe as circumlocutions. In Arabic and Hebrew “uncanny” means the same
as “daemonic,” “gruesome.”
Let us therefore return to the German language. In Daniel Sanders’ Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache (1860),
the following remarksi [abstracted in translation] are found
upon the word heimlich; I have laid stress on certain passages by italicizing them.
Heimlich, adj.: I. Also heimelich, heinielig, belonging to
the house, not strange, familiar, tame, intimate, comfortable, homely, etc.
(a) (Obsolete) belonging to the house or the family, or
regarded as so belonging (cf. Latin familiaris): Die Heimlichen, the members of the household; Der heimliche Rat
[him to whom secrets are revealed] Gen. xli. 45; 2 Sam.
xxiii. 23; now more usually Geheimer Rat [Privy Councillor], cf. Heimlicher.
(b) Of animals: tame, companionable to man. As opposed to wild, e.g. “Wild animals . . . that are trained to be

2

heimlich and accustomed to men.” “If these young creatures are brought up from early days among men they become quite heimlich, friendly,” etc.
(c) Friendly, intimate, homelike; the enjoyment of quiet
content, etc., arousing a sense of peaceful pleasure and security as in one within the four walls of his house. “Is it
still heimlich to you in your country where strangers are
felling your woods?” “She did not feel all too heimlich
with him.” “To destroy the Heimlichkeit of the home.” “I
could not readily find another spot so intimate and heimlich as this.” “In quiet Heinzlichkeit, surrounded by close
walls.” “A careful housewife, who knows how to make a
pleasing Heimlichkeit (Häuslichkeit)5 out of the smallest
means.” “The protestant rulers do not feel . . . heimlich
among their catholic subjects.” “When it grows heimlich
and still, and the evening quiet alone watches over your
cell.” “Quiet, lovely and heimlich, no place more fitted for
her rest.” “The in and out flowing waves of the currents
dreamy and heimlich as a cradle-song.” Cf. in especial
Unheimlich. Among Swabian and Swiss authors in especial, often as trisyllable: “How heimelich it seemed again
of an evening, back at home.” “The warm room and the
heimelig afternoon.” “Little by little they grew at ease and
heimelig among themselves.” “That which comes from
afar . . . assuredly does not live quite heimelig (heimatlich
[at home], freundnachbarlich [in a neighborly way])
among the people.” “The sentinel’s horn sounds so heimelig from the tower, and his voice invites so hospitably.”
This form of the word ought to become general in order to
protect the word from becoming obsolete in its good sense
through an easy confusion with II. [see below]. ‘“The
Zecks [a family name] are all “heimlich.”’ ‘“Heimlich”?
What do you understand by “heimlich”?’ ‘Well, . . . they
are like a buried spring or a dried-up pond. One cannot
5

walk over it without always having the feeling that water
might come up there again.’ ‘Oh, we call it “unheimlich”;
you call it “heimlich.” Well, what makes you think that
there is something secret and untrustworthy about this
family?”’ Gutzkow.
II. Concealed, kept from sight, so that others do not get
to know about it, withheld from others, cf. Geheim [secret]; so also Heimlichkeit for Geheimnis [secret]. To do
something heimlich, i.e. behind someone’s back; to steal
away heimlich; heimlich meetings and appointments; to
look on with heimlich pleasure at someone’s discomfiture;
to sigh or weep heimlich; to behave heimlich, as though
there was something to conceal; heimlich love, love-affair,
sin; heimlich places (which good manners oblige us to
conceal). 1 Sam, v. 6; “The heimlich chamber” [privy]. 2
Kings x. 27 etc.; “To throw into pits or Heimlichkeit.” Led
the steeds heimlich before Laomedon.” “As secretive,
heimlich, deceitful and malicious towards cruel masters . .
. as frank, open, sympathetic and helpful towards a friend
in misfortune.” “The heimlich art” (magic). “Where public
ventilation has to stop, there heimlich machinations begin.” “Freedom is the whispered watchword of heimlich
conspirators and the loud battle-cry of professed revolutionaries.” “A holy, heimlich effect.” “I have roots that are
most heimlich, I am grown in the deep earth.” “My heimlich pranks.” (Cf. Heimtücke [mischief]). To discover, disclose, betray someone’s Heimlichkeiten; “to concoct
Heimlichkeiten behind my back.” Cf. Geheimnis.
Compounds and especially also the opposite follow
meaning I. (above): Unheimlich, uneasy, eerie, bloodcurdling; “Seeming almost unheimlich and ‘ghostly’ to him.”
“I had already long since felt an unheimlich, even gruesome feeling.” “Feels an unheimlich horror.” “Unheimlich
and motionless like a stone-image.” “The unheimlich mist
called hill-fog.” “These pale youths are unheimlich and are
brewing heaven knows what mischief.” “‘Unheimlich’ is

[From Haus = house; Häuslichkeit = domestic life. —Trans.]

3

the name for everything that ought to have remained . . .
hidden and secret and has become visible,” Schelling. “To
veil the divine, to surround it with a certain Unheimlichkeit.”—Unheimlich is not often used as opposite to
meaning II. (above).
What interests us most in this long extract is to find that
among its different shades of meaning the word heimlich
exhibits one which is identical with its opposite, unheimlich. What is heimlich thus comes to be unheimlich. (Cf.
the quotation from Gutzkow: “We call it unheimlich; you
call it heimlich.”) In general we are reminded that the
word heimlich is not unambiguous, but belongs to two sets
of ideas, which without being contradictory are yet very
different: on the one hand, it means that which is familiar
and congenial, and on the other, that which is concealed
and kept out of sight. The word unheimlich is only used
customarily, we are told, as the contrary of the first signification, and not of the second. Sanders tells us nothing
concerning a possible genetic connection between these
two sorts of meanings. On the other hand, we notice that
Schelling says something which throws quite a new light
on the concept of the “uncanny,” one which we had certainly not awaited. According to him everything is uncanny that ought to have remained hidden and secret, and
yet comes to light.
Some of the doubts that have thus arisen are removed if
we consult Grimm’s dictionary.ii
We read:
Heimlich; adj. and adv. vernaculus, occultus; MHG.
heîmelich, heîmlich.
P. 874. In a slightly different sense: “I feel heimlich, well, free
from fear. . . .
(b) Heimlich, also in the sense of a place free from ghostly influences . . . familiar, friendly, intimate.
4. From the idea of “homelike,” “belonging to the house,” the
further idea is developed of something withdrawn from the eyes

of others, something concealed, secret, and this idea is expanded
in many ways. . . .
P. 876. “On the left bank of the lake there lies a meadow heimlich in the wood.” Schiller, Tell. . . . Poetic licence, rarely so
used in modern speech . . . In conjunction with a verb expressing
the act of concealing: “In the secret of his tabernacle he shall
hide me (heimlich).” Ps. xxvii. 5 . . . Heimlich places in the human body, pudenda. . . “the men that died not were smitten” (on
their heimlich parts). 1 Samuel v. 12.
(c) Officials who give important advice which has to be kept
secret in matters of state are called heimlich councillors; the adjective, according to modern usage, having been replaced by geheim [secret] . . . ‘Pharaoh called Joseph’s name “him to whom
secrets are revealed”’ (heimlich councillor). Gen. xli. 45.
P. 878. 6. Heimlich, as used of knowledge, mystic, allegorical:
a heimlich meaning, mysticus, divinus, occultus, figuratus.
P. 878. Heimlich in a different sense, as withdrawn from
knowledge, unconscious: . . . Heimlich also has the meaning of
that which is obscure, inaccessible to knowledge. . . . “Do you
not see? They do not trust me; they fear the heimlich face of the
Duke of Friedland.” Wallensteins Lager, Act. 2.
9. The notion of something hidden and dangerous, which is
expressed in the last paragraph, is still further developed, so
that “heimlich” comes to have the meaning usually ascribed to
“unheimlich.” Thus: “At times I feel like a man who walks in
the night and believes in ghosts; every corner is heimlich and full
of terrors for him.” Klinger.

Thus heimlich is a word the meaning of which develops
towards an ambivalence, until it finally coincides with its
opposite, unheimlich. Unheimlich is in some way or other
a sub-species of heimlich. Let us retain this discovery,
which we do not yet properly understand, alongside of
Schelling’s definition of the “uncanny.” Then if we examine individual instances of uncanniness, these indications
will become comprehensible to us.

4

II
In proceeding to review those things, persons, impressions, events and situations which are able to arouse in us a
feeling of the uncanny in a very forcible and definite form,
the first requirement is obviously to select a suitable example to start upon. Jentsch has taken as a very good instance “doubts whether an apparently animate being is
really alive; or conversely, whether a lifeless object might
not be in fact animate”; and he refers in this connection to
the impression made by wax-work figures, artificial dolls
and automatons. He adds to this class the uncanny effect of
epileptic seizures and the manifestations of insanity, because these excite in the spectator the feeling that automatic, mechanical processes are at work, concealed beneath the ordinary appearance of animation. Without entirely accepting the author’s view, we will take it as a starting-point for our investigation because it leads us on to
consider a writer who has succeeded better than anyone
else in producing uncanny effects.
Jentsch says: “In telling a story, one of the most successful devices for easily creating uncanny effects is to leave
the reader in uncertainty whether a particular figure in the
story is a human being or an automaton; and to do it in
such a way that his attention is not directly focused upon
his uncertainty, so that he may not be urged to go into the
matter and clear it up immediately, since that, as we have
said, would quickly dissipate the peculiar emotional effect
of the thing. Hoffmann has repeatedly employed this psychological artifice with success in his fantastic narratives.”
This observation, undoubtedly a correct one, refers primarily to the story of “The Sand-Man” in Hoffmann’s
Nachtstücken,6 which contains the original of Olympia, the
doll in the first act of Offenbach’s opera, Tales of
6

Hoffmann. But I cannot think—and I hope that most readers of the story will agree with me—that the theme of the
doll, Olympia, who is to all appearances a living being, is
by any means the only element to be held responsible for
the quite unparalleled atmosphere of uncanniness which
the story evokes; or, indeed, that it is the most important
among them. Nor is this effect of the story heightened by
the fact that the author himself treats the episode of Olympia with a faint touch of satire and uses it to make fun of
the young man’s idealization of his mistress. The main
theme of the story is, on the contrary, something different,
something which gives its name to the story, and which is
always re-introduced at the critical moment: it is the theme
of the “Sand-Man” who tears out children’s eyes.
This fantastic tale begins with the childhoodrecollections of the student Nathaniel: in spite of his present happiness, he cannot banish the memories associated
with the mysterious and terrifying death of the father he
loved. On certain evenings his mother used to send the
children to bed early, warning them that “the Sand-Man
was coming”; and sure enough Nathaniel would not fail to
hear the heavy tread of a visitor with whom his father
would then be occupied that evening. When questioned
about the Sand-Man, his mother, it is true, denied that such
a person existed except as a form of speech; but his nurse
could give him more definite information: “He is a wicked
man who comes when children won’t go to bed, and
throws handfuls of sand in their eyes so that they jump out
of their heads all bleeding. Then he puts the eyes in a sack
and carries them off to the moon to feed his children. They
sit up there in their nest, and their beaks are hooked like
owls’ beaks, and they use them to peck up naughty boys’
and girls’ eyes with.”
Although little Nathaniel was sensible and old enough
not to believe in such gruesome attributes to the figure of
the Sand-Man, yet the dread of him became fixed in his

[From Haus = house; Häuslichkeit = domestic life. —Trans.]

5

breast. He determined to find out what the Sand-Man
looked like; and one evening, when the Sand-Man was
again expected, he hid himself in his father’s study. He
recognized the visitor as the lawyer Coppelius, a repulsive
person of whom the children were frightened when he occasionally came to a meal; and he now identified this Coppelius with the dreaded Sand-Man. Concerning the rest of
the scene, Hoffmann already leaves us in doubt whether
we are witnessing the first delirium of the panic-stricken
boy, or a succession of events which are to be regarded in
the story as being real. His father and the guest begin to
busy themselves at a hearth with glowing flames. The little
eavesdropper hears Coppelius call out, “Here with your
eyes!” and betrays himself by screaming aloud; Coppelius
seizes him and is about to drop grains of red-hot coal out
of the fire into his eyes, so as to cast them out on the
hearth. His father begs him off and saves his eyes. After
this the boy falls into a deep swoon; and a long illness followed upon his experience. Those who lean towards a rationalistic interpretation of the Sand-Man will not fail to
recognize in the child’s phantasy the continued influence
of his nurse’s story. The grains of sand that are to be
thrown into the child’s eyes turn into red-hot grains of coal
out of the flames; and in both cases they are meant to make
his eyes jump out. In the course of another visit of the
Sand-Man’s, a year later, his father was killed in his study
by an explosion. The lawyer Coppelius vanished from the
place without leaving a trace behind.
Nathaniel, now a student, believes that he has recognized
this childhood’s phantom of horror in an itinerant optician,
an Italian called Giuseppe Coppola. This man had offered
him barometers for sale in his university town and when
Nathaniel refused had added: “Eh, not barometers, not barometers—also got fine eyes, beautiful eyes.” The student’s terror was allayed on finding that the proffered eyes
were only harmless spectacles, and he bought a pocket-

telescope from Coppola. With its aid he looks across into
Professor Spalanzani’s house opposite and there spies
Spalanzani’s beautiful, but strangely silent and motionless
daughter, Olympia. He soon falls in love with her so violently that he quite forgets his clever and sensible betrothed on her account. But Olympia was an automaton
whose works Spalanzani had made, and whose eyes Coppola, the Sand-Man, had put in. The student surprises the
two men quarrelling over their handiwork. The optician
carries off the wooden eyeless doll; and the mechanician,
Spalanzani, takes up Olympia’s bleeding eye-balls from
the ground and throws them at Nathaniel’s breast, saying
that Coppola had stolen them from him (Nathaniel). Nathaniel succumbs to a fresh attack of madness, and in his
delirium his recollection of his father’s death is mingled
with this new experience. He cries, “Faster—faster—
faster—rings of fire—rings of fire! Whirl about, rings of
fire—round and round! Wooden doll, ho! lovely wooden
doll, whirl about——,” then falls upon the professor,
Olympia’s so-called father, and tries to strangle him.
Rallying from a long and serious illness, Nathaniel
seemed at last to have recovered. He was going to marry
his betrothed with whom he was reconciled. One day he
was walking through the town and marketplace, where the
high tower of the Town-Hall threw its huge shadow. On
the girl’s suggestion they mounted the tower, leaving her
brother, who was walking with them, down below. Up
there, Clara’s attention is drawn to a curious object coming
along the street. Nathaniel looks at this thing through Coppola’s spyglass, which he finds in his pocket, and falls into
a new fit of madness. Shouting out, “Whirl about, my
wooden doll!” he tries to fling the girl into the depths below. Her brother, brought to her side by her cries, rescues
her and hastens down to safety with her. Up above, the
raving man rushes round, shrieking “Rings of fire, whirl
about!”—words whose origin we know. Among the people

6

who begin to gather below there comes forward the figure
of the lawyer Coppelius, suddenly returned. We may suppose it was his approach, seen through the telescope, that
threw Nathaniel into his madness. People want to go up
and overpower the madman, but Coppelius7 laughs and
says, “Wait a bit; he’ll come down of himself.” Nathaniel
suddenly stands still, catches sight of Coppelius, and with
a wild shriek “Yes! ‘Fine eyes-beautiful eyes,’” flings
himself down over the parapet. No sooner does he lie on
the paving-stones with a shattered skull than the Sand-Man
vanishes in the throng.
This short summary leaves, I think, no doubt that the
feeling of something uncanny is directly attached to the
figure of the Sand-Man, that is, to the idea of being robbed
of one’s eyes; and that Jentsch’s point of an intellectual
uncertainty has nothing to do with this effect. Uncertainty
whether an object is living or inanimate, which we must
admit in regard to the doll Olympia, is quite irrelevant in
connection with this other, more striking instance of uncanniness. It is true that the writer creates a kind of uncertainty in us in the beginning by not letting us know, no
doubt purposely, whether he is taking us into the real
world or into a purely fantastic one of his own creation. He
has admitted the right to do either; and if he chooses to
stage his action in a world peopled with spirits, demons
and ghosts, as Shakespeare does in Hamlet, in Macbeth
and, in a different sense, in The Tempest and A Midsummer-Night’s Dream, we must bow to his decision and treat
his setting as though it were real for as long as we put ourselves into his hands. But this uncertainty disappears in the
course of Hoffmann’s story, and we perceive that he
means to make us, too, look through the fell Coppola’s
glasses—perhaps, indeed, that he himself once gazed
7

Frau Dr. Rank has pointed out the association of the name with “Coppella” = crucible, connecting it with the chemical operations that caused
the father’s death; and also with “coppo” = eye-socket.

through such an instrument. For the conclusion of the story
makes it quite clear that Coppola the optician really is the
lawyer Coppelius and thus also the Sand-Man.
There is no question, therefore, of any “intellectual uncertainty”; we know now that we are not supposed to be
looking on at the products of a madman’s imagination behind which we, with the superiority of rational minds, are
able to detect the sober truth; and yet this knowledge does
not lessen the impression of uncanniness in the least degree. The theory of “intellectual uncertainty” is thus incapable of explaining that impression.
We know from psychoanalytic experience, however, that
this fear of damaging or losing one’s eyes is a terrible fear
of childhood. Many adults still retain their apprehensiveness in this respect, and no bodily injury is so much
dreaded by them as an injury to the eye. We are accustomed to say, too, that we will treasure a thing as the apple
of our eye. A study of dreams, phantasies and myths has
taught us that a morbid anxiety connected with the eyes
and with going blind is often enough a substitute for the
dread of castration. In blinding himself, Oedipus, that
mythical law-breaker, was simply carrying out a mitigated
form of the punishment of castration—the only punishment that according to the lex talionis was fitted for him.
We may try to reject the derivation of fears about the eye
from the fear of castration on rationalistic grounds, and say
that it is very natural that so precious an organ as the eye
should be guarded by a proportionate dread; indeed, we
might go further and say that the fear of castration itself
contains no other significance and no deeper secret than a
justifiable dread of this kind. But this view does not account adequately for the substitutive relation between the
eye and the male member which is seen to exist in dreams
and myths and phantasies; nor can it dispel the impression
one gains that it is the threat of being castrated in especial
which excites a peculiarly violent and obscure emotion,

7

and that this emotion is what first gives the idea of losing
other organs its intense colouring. All further doubts are
removed when we get the details of their “castrationcomplex” from the analyses of neurotic patients, and realize its immense importance in their mental life.
Moreover, I would not recommend any opponent of the
psychoanalytic view to select precisely the story of the
Sand-Man upon which to build his case that morbid anxiety about the eyes has nothing to do with the castrationcomplex. For why does Hoffmann bring the anxiety about
eyes into such intimate connection with the father’s death?
And why does the Sand-Man appear each time in order to
interfere with love? He divides the unfortunate Nathaniel
from his betrothed and from her brother, his best friend; he
destroys his second object of love, Olympia, the lovely
doll; and he drives him into suicide at the moment when he
has won back his Clara and is about to be happily united to
her. Things like these and many more seem arbitrary and
meaningless in the story so long as we deny all connection
between fears about the eye and castration; but they become intelligible as soon as we replace the Sand-Man by
the dreaded father at whose hands castration is awaited.8
8

In fact, Hoffmann’s imaginative treatment of his material has not
played such havoc with its elements that we cannot reconstruct their
original arrangement. In the story from Nathaniel’s childhood, the figures of his father and Coppelius represent the two opposites into which
the father-imago is split by the ambivalence of the child’s feeling;
whereas the one threatens to blind him, that is, to castrate him, the
other, the loving father, intercedes for his sight. That part of the complex which is most strongly repressed, the death-wish against the father,
finds expression in the death of the good father, and Coppelius is made
answerable for it. Later, in his student days, Professor Spalanzani and
Coppola the optician reproduce this double representation of the fatherimago, the Professor as a member of the father-series, Coppola openly
identified with the lawyer Coppelius. Just as before they used to work
together over the fire, so now they have jointly created the doll Olympia; the Professor is even called the father of Olympia. This second occurrence of work in common shows that the optician and the mechani-

We shall venture, therefore, to refer the uncanny effect
of the Sand-Man to the child’s dread in relation to its castration-complex. But having gained the idea that we can
take this infantile factor to account for feelings of uncanniness, we are drawn to examine whether we can apply it
to other instances of uncanny things. We find in the story
of the Sand-Man the other theme upon which Jentsch lays
stress, of a doll that appears to be alive. Jentsch believes
that a particularly favourable condition for awakening uncanny sensations is created when there is intellectual uncertainty whether an object is alive or not, and when an incian are also components of the father-imago, that is, both are Nathaniel’s father as well as Olympia’s. I ought to have added that in the terrifying scene in childhood, Coppelius, after sparing Nathaniel’s eyes, had
screwed off his arms and legs as an experiment; that is, he had experimented on him as a mechanician would on a doll. This singular feature,
which seems quite out of perspective in the picture of the Sand-Man, introduces a new castration-equivalent; but it also emphasizes the identity
of Coppelius and his later counterpart, Spalanzani the mechanician, and
helps us to understand who Olympia is. She, the automatic doll, can be
nothing else than a personification of Nathaniel’s feminine attitude towards his father in his infancy. The father of both, Spalanzani and Coppola, are, as we know, new editions, reincarnations of Nathaniel’s “two”
fathers. Now Spalaazani’s otherwise incomprehensible statement that
the optician has stolen Nathaniel’s eyes so as to set them in the doll becomes significant and supplies fresh evidence for the identity of Olympia and Nathaniel. Olympia is, as it were, a dissociated complex of Nathaniel’s which confronts him as a person, and Nathaniel’s enslavement
to this complex is expressed in his senseless obsessive love for Olympia. We may with justice call such love narcissistic, and can understand
why he who has fallen victim to it should relinquish his real, external
object of love. The psychological truth of the situation in which the
young man, fixated upon his father by his castration-complex, is incapable of loving a woman, is amply proved by numerous analyses of patients whose story, though less fantastic, is hardly less tragic than that of
the student Nathaniel.
Hoffmann was the child of an unhappy marriage. When he was three
years old, his father left his small family, never to be united to them
again. According to Grisebach, in his biographical introduction to
Hoffmann’s works, the writer’s relation to his father was always a most
sensitive subject with him.

8

animate object becomes too much like an animate one.
Now, dolls happen to be rather closely connected with infantile life. We remember that in their early games children do not distinguish at all sharply between living and
lifeless objects, and that they are especially fond of treating their dolls like live people. In fact I have occasionally
heard a woman patient declare that even at the age of eight
she had still been convinced that her dolls would be certain
to come to life if she were to look at them in a particular
way, with as concentrated a gaze as possible. So that here,
too, it is not difficult to discover a factor from childhood;
but curiously enough, while the Sand-Man story deals with
the excitation of an early childhood fear, the idea of a “living doll” excites no fear at all; the child had no fear of its
doll coming to life, it may even have desired it. The source
of the feeling of an uncanny thing would not, therefore, be
an infantile fear in this case, but rather an infantile wish or
even only an infantile belief. There seems to be a contradiction here; but perhaps it is only a complication, which
may be helpful to us later on.
Hoffmann is in literature the unrivalled master of conjuring up the uncanny. His Elixire des Teufels [The Devil’s
Elixir] contains a mass of themes to which one is tempted
to ascribe the uncanny effect of the narrative; but it is too
obscure and intricate a story to venture to summarize. Towards the end of the book the reader is told the facts, ////
has hitherto concealed from him, from which the action
springs; with the result, not that he is at last enlightened,
but that he falls into a state of complete bewilderment The
author has piled up too much of a kind; one’s comprehension of the whole suffers as a result, though not the impression it makes. We must content ourselves with selecting those themes of uncanniness which are most prominent, and seeing whether we can fairly trace then also back
to infantile sources. These themes are all concerned with
the idea of a “double” in every shape and degree, with per-

sons, therefore, who are to be considered identical by reason of looking alike; Hoffmann accentuates this relation by
transferring mental processes from the one person to the
other—what we should call telepathy—so that the one
possesses knowledge, feeling and experience in common
with the other, identifies himself with another person, so
that his self becomes confounded, or the foreign self is
substituted for his own—in other words, by doubling, dividing and interchanging the self. And finally there is the
constant recurrence of similar situations, a same face, or
character-trait, or twist of fortune, or a same crime, or even
a same name recurring throughout several consecutive
generations.
The theme of the “double” has been very thoroughly
treated by Otto Rank.9 He has gone into the connections
the “double” has with reflections in mirrors, with shadows,
guardian spirits, with the belief in the soul and the fear of
death; but he also lets in a flood of light on the astonishing
evolution of this idea. For the “double” was originally an
insurance against destruction to the ego, an “energetic denial of the power of death,” as Rank says; and probably the
“immortal” soul was the first “double” of the body. This
invention of doubling as a preservation against extinction
has its counterpart in the language of dreams, which is
fond of representing castration by a doubling or multiplication of the genital symbol; the same desire spurred on the
ancient Egyptians to the art of making images of the dead
in some lasting material. Such ideas, however, have sprung
from the soil of unbounded self-love, from the primary
narcissism which holds sway in the mind of the child as in
that of primitive man; and when this stage has been left
behind the double takes on a different aspect. From having
been an assurance of immortality, he becomes the ghastly
harbinger of death.
9

“Der Doppelgänger.”

9

The idea of the “double” does not necessarily disappear
with the passing of the primary narcissism, for it can receive fresh meaning from the later stages of development
of the ego. A special faculty is slowly formed there, able to
oppose the rest of the ego, with the function of observing
and criticizing the self and exercising a censorship within
the mind, and this we become aware of as our “conscience.” In the pathological case of delusions of being
watched this mental institution becomes isolated, dissociated from the ego, and discernible to a physician’s eye.
The fact that a faculty of this kind exists, which is able to
treat the rest of the ego like an object—the fact, that is, that
man is capable of self-observation—renders it possible to
invest the old idea of a “double” with a new meaning and
to ascribe many things to it, above all, those things which
seem to the new faculty of self-criticism to belong to the
old surmounted narcissism of the earliest period of all.10
But it is not only this narcissism, offensive to the egocriticizing faculty, which may be incorporated in the idea
of a double. There are also all those unfulfilled but possible futures to which we still like to cling in phantasy, all
those strivings of the ego which adverse external circumstances have crushed, and all our suppressed acts of volition which nourish in us the illusion of Free Will.11
10

I cannot help thinking that when poets complain that two souls dwell
within the human breast, and when popular psychologists talk of the
splitting of the ego in an individual, they have some notion of this division (which relates to the sphere of ego-psychology) between the critical faculty and the rest of the ego, and not of the antithesis discovered
by psychoanalysis between the ego and what is unconscious and repressed. It is true that the distinction is to some extent effaced by the
circumstance that derivatives of what is repressed are foremost among
the things reprehended by the ego-criticizing faculty.
11
In Ewers’ Der Student von Prag, which furnishes the starting-point of
Rank’s study on the “double,” the hero has promised his beloved not to
kill his antagonist in a duel. But on his way to the duelling-ground he
meets his “double,” who has already killed his rival.

But, after having thus considered the manifest motivation of the figure of a “double,” we have to admit that none
of it helps us to understand the extraordinarily strong feeling of something uncanny that pervades the conception;
and our knowledge of pathological mental processes enables us to add that nothing in the content arrived at could
account for that impulse towards self-protection which has
caused the ego to project such a content outward as something foreign to itself. The quality of uncanniness can only
come from the circumstance of the “double” being a creation dating back to a very early mental stage, long since
left behind, and one, no doubt, in which it wore a more
friendly aspect. The “double” has become a vision of terror, just as after the fall of their religion the gods took on
daemonic shapes.12
It is not difficult to judge, on the same lines as his theme
of the “double,” the other forms of disturbance in the ego
made use of by Hoffmann. They are a harking-back to particular phases in the evolution of the self-regarding feeling,
a regression to a time when the ego was not yet sharply
differentiated from the external world and from other persons. I believe that these factors are partly responsible for
the impression of the uncanny, although it is not easy to
isolate and determine exactly their share of it.
That factor which consists in a recurrence of the same
situations, things and events, will perhaps not appeal to
everyone as a source of uncanny feeling. From what I have
observed, this phenomenon does undoubtedly, subject to
certain conditions and combined with certain circumstances, awaken an uncanny feeling, which recalls that
sense of helplessness sometimes experienced in dreams.
Once, as I was walking through the deserted streets of a
provincial town in Italy which was strange to me, on a hot
summer afternoon, I found myself in a quarter the charac12

Heine, Die Götter im Exil.

10

ter of which could not long remain in doubt. Nothing but
painted women were to be seen at the windows of the
small houses, and I hastened to leave the narrow street at
the next turning. But after having wandered about for a
while without being directed, I suddenly found myself
back in the same street, where my presence was now beginning to excite attention. I hurried away once more, but
only to arrive yet a third time by devious paths in the same
place. Now, however, a feeling overcame me which I can
only describe as uncanny, and I was glad enough to abandon my exploratory walk and get straight back to the piazza I had left a short while before. Other situations having
in common with my adventure an involuntary return to the
same situation, but which differ radically from it in other
respects, also result in the same feeling of helplessness and
of something uncanny. As, for instance, when one is lost in
a forest in high altitudes, caught, we will suppose, by the
mountain mist, and when every endeavor to find the
marked or familiar path ends again and again in a return to
one and the same spot, recognizable by some particular
landmark. Or when one wanders about in a dark, strange
room, looking for the door or the electric switch, and collides for the hundredth time with the same piece of furniture—a situation which, indeed, has been made irresistibly
comic by Mark Twain, through the wild extravagance of
his narration.
Taking another class of things, it is easy to see that here,
too, it is only this factor of involuntary repetition which
surrounds with an uncanny atmosphere what would otherwise be innocent enough, and forces upon us the idea of
something fateful and unescapable where otherwise we
should have spoken of “chance” only. For instance, we of
course attach no importance to the event when we give up
a coat and get a cloakroom ticket with the number, say, 62;
or when we find that our cabin on board ship is numbered
62. But the impression is altered if two such events, each

in itself indifferent, happen close together, if we come
across the number 62 several times in a single day, or if we
begin to notice that everything which has a number—
addresses, hotel-rooms, compartments in railway-trains—
always has the same one, or one which at least contains the
same figures. We do feel this to be “uncanny,” and unless
a man is utterly hardened and proof against the lure of superstition he will be tempted to ascribe a secret meaning to
this obstinate recurrence of a number, taking it, perhaps, as
an indication of the span of life allotted to him. Or take the
case that one is engaged at the time in reading the works of
Hering, the famous physiologist, and then receives within
the space of a few days two letters from two different
countries, each from a person called Hering; whereas one
has never before had any dealings with anyone of that
name. Not long ago an ingenious scientist attempted to reduce coincidences of this kind to certain laws, and so deprive them of their uncanny effect.13 I will not venture to
decide whether he has succeeded or not.
How exactly we can trace back the uncanny effect of
such recurrent similarities to infantile psychology is a
question I can only lightly touch upon in these pages; and I
must refer the reader instead to another pamphlet,14 now
ready for publication, in which this has been gone into in
detail, but in a different connection. It must be explained
that we are able to postulate the principle of a repetitioncompulsion in the unconscious mind, based upon instinctual activity and probably inherent in the very nature of the
instincts—a principle powerful enough to overrule the
pleasure-principle, lending to certain aspects of the mind
their daemonic character, and still very clearly expressed
in the tendencies of small children; a principle, too, which
is responsible for a part of the course taken by the analyses
of neurotic patients. Taken in all, the foregoing prepares us
13
14

P. Kammerer, Das Gesetz der Serie (Vienna, 1919).
[Beyond the Pleasure-Principle.—Trans.]

11

for the discovery that whatever reminds us of this inner
repetition-compulsion is perceived as uncanny.
Now, however, it is time to turn from these aspects of
the matter, which are in any case difficult to decide upon,
and look for undeniable instances of the uncanny, in the
hope that analysis of them will settle whether our hypothesis is a valid one.
In the story of “The Ring of Polycrates,” the guest turns
away from his friend with horror because he sees that his
every wish is at once fulfilled, his every care immediately
removed by kindly fate. His host has become “uncanny” to
him. His own explanation, that the too fortunate man has
to fear the envy of the gods, seems still rather obscure to
us; its meaning is veiled in mythological language. We
will therefore turn to another example in a less grandiose
setting. In the case history of an obsessional neurotic,15 I
have described how the patient once stayed in a hydropathic establishment and benefited greatly by it. He had
the good sense, however, to attribute his improvement not
to the therapeutic properties of the water, but to the situation of his room, which immediately adjoined that of very
amiable nurse. So on his second visit to the establishment
he asked for the same room but was told that it was already
occupied by an old gentleman, whereupon he gave vent to
his annoyance in the words “Well, I hope he’ll have a
stroke and die.” A fortnight later the old gentleman really
did have a stroke. My patient thought this an “uncanny”
experience. And that impression of uncanniness would
have been stronger still if less time had elapsed between
his exclamation and the untoward event, or if he had been
able to produce innumerable similar coincidences. As a
matter of fact, he had no difficulty in producing coincidences of this sort, but then not only he but all obsessional
neurotics I have observed are able to relate analogous ex-

periences. They are never surprised when they invariably
run up against the person they have just been thinking of,
perhaps for the first time for many months. If they say one
day “I haven’t had news of so-and-so for a long time,”
they will be sure to get a letter from him the next morning.
And an accident or a death will rarely take place without
having cast its shadow before on their minds. They are in
the habit of mentioning this state of affairs in the most
modest manner, saying that they have “presentiments”
which “usually” come true.
One of the most uncanny and wide-spread forms of superstition is the dread of the evil eye.16 There never seems
to have been any doubt about the source of this dread.
Whoever possesses something at once valuable and fragile
is afraid of the envy of others, in that he projects on to
them the envy he would have felt in their place. A feeling
like this betrays itself in a look even though it is not put
into words; and when a man attracts the attention of others
by noticeable, and particularly by unattractive, attributes,
they are ready to believe that his envy is rising to more
than usual heights and that this intensity in it will convert
it into effective action. What is feared is thus a secret intention of harming someone, and certain signs are taken to
mean that such an intention is capable of becoming an act.
These last examples of the uncanny are to be referred to
that principle in the mind which I have called “omnipotence of thoughts,” taking the name from an expression
used by one of my patients. And now we find ourselves on
well-known ground. Our analysis of instances of the uncanny has led us back to the old, animistic conception of
the universe, which was characterized by the idea that the
world was peopled with the spirits of human beings, and
by the narcissistic overestimation of subjective mental
processes (such as the belief in the omnipotence of

15

16

Freud, “Notes upon a Case of Obessional Neurosis,” Three Case Histories, Collier Books edition BS 191V.

Seligmann, the Hamburg ophthalmologist, has made a thorough study
of this superstition in his Der böse Blick und Verwandtes (Berlin, 1910).

12

thoughts, the magical practices based upon this belief, the
carefully proportioned distribution of magical powers or
“mana” among various outside persons and things), as well
as by all those other figments of the imagination with
which man, in the unrestricted narcissism of that stage of
development, strove to withstand the inexorable laws of
reality. It would seem as though each one of us has been
through a phase of individual development corresponding
to that animistic stage in primitive men, that none of us has
traversed it without preserving certain traces of it which
can be re-activated, and that everything which now strikes
us as “uncanny” fulfils the condition of stirring those vestiges of animistic mental activity within us and bringing
them to expression.17
This is the place now to put forward two considerations
which, I think, contain the gist of this short study. In the
first place, if psychoanalytic theory is correct in maintaining that every emotional affect, whatever its quality, is
transformed by repression into morbid anxiety, then
among such cases of anxiety there must be a class in which
the anxiety can be shown to come from something repressed which recurs. This class of morbid anxiety would
then be no other than what is uncanny, irrespective of
whether it originally aroused dread or some other affect. In
the second place, if this is indeed the secret nature of the
uncanny, we can understand why the usage of speech has
extended das Heimliche into its opposite das Unheimliche;18 for this uncanny is in reality nothing new or foreign,
but something familiar and old—established in the mind
17

Cf. my book Totem und Tabu, part iii., “Animismus, Magie und Allmacht der Gedanken”; also the footnote on p. 7 of the same book: “It
would appear that we invest with a feeling of uncanniness those impressions which lend support to a belief in the omnipotence of thoughts, and
to the animistic attitude of mind, at a time when our judgment has already rejected these same beliefs.”
18
Cf. abstract on p. 23.

that has been estranged only by the process of repression.
This reference to the factor of repression enables us, furthermore, to understand Schelling’s definition of the uncanny as something which ought to have been kept concealed but which has nevertheless come to light.
It only remains for us to test our new hypothesis on one
or two more examples of the uncanny.
Many people experience the feeling in the highest degree
in relation to death and dead bodies, to the return of the
dead, and to spirits and ghosts. As we have seen, many
languages in use today can only render the German expression “an unheimliches house” by “a haunted house.”
We might indeed have begun our investigation with this
example, perhaps the most striking of all, of something
uncanny, but we refrained from doing so because the uncanny in it is too much mingled with and in part covered
by what is purely gruesome. There is scarcely any other
matter, however, upon which our thoughts and feelings
have changed so little since the very earliest times, and in
which discarded forms have been so completely preserved
under a thin disguise, as that of our relation to death. Two
things account for our conservatism: the strength of our
original emotional reaction to it, and the insufficiency of
our scientific knowledge about it. Biology has not yet been
able to decide whether death is the inevitable fate of every
living being or whether it is only a regular but yet perhaps
avoidable event in life. It is true that the proposition “All
men are mortal” is paraded in text-books of logic as an example of a generalization, but no human being really
grasps it, and our unconscious has as little use now as ever
for the idea of its own mortality. Religions continue to dispute the undeniable fact of the death of each one of us and
to postulate a life after death; civil governments still believe that they cannot maintain moral order among the living if they do not uphold this prospect of a better life after
death as a recompense for earthly existence. In our great

13

cities, placards announce lectures which will tell us how to
get into touch with the souls of the departed; and it cannot
be denied that many of the most able and penetrating
minds among our scientific men have come to the conclusion, especially towards the close of their lives, that a contact of this kind is not utterly impossible. Since practically
all of us still think as savages do on this topic, it is no matter for surprise that the primitive fear of the dead is still so
strong within us and always ready to come to the surface at
any opportunity. Most likely our fear still contains the old
belief that the deceased becomes the enemy of his survivor
and wants to carry him off to share his new life with him.
Considering our unchanged attitude towards death, we
might rather inquire what has become of the repression,
that necessary condition for enabling a primitive feeling to
recur in the shape of an uncanny effect. But repression is
there, too. All so-called educated people have ceased to
believe, officially at any rate, that the dead can become
visible as spirits, and have hedged round any such appearances with improbable and remote circumstances; their
emotional attitude towards their dead, moreover, once a
highly dubious and ambivalent one, has been toned down
in the higher strata of the mind into a simple feeling of
reverence.19
We have now only a few more remarks to add, for animism, magic and witchcraft, the omnipotence of thoughts,
man’s attitude to death, involuntary repetition and the castration-complex comprise practically all the factors which
turn something fearful into an uncanny thing.
We also call a living person uncanny, usually when we
ascribe evil motives to him. But that is not all; we must not
only credit him with bad intentions but must attribute to
these intentions capacity to achieve their aim in virtue of
certain special powers. A good instance of this is the “Get19

Cf. Totem und Tabu: “Das Tabu und die Ambivalenz.”

tatore,” that uncanny figure of Roman superstition which
Schaeffer, with intuitive poetic feeling and profound psychoanalytic knowledge, has transformed into a sympathetic figure in his Josef Montfort. But the question of
these secret powers brings us back again to the realm of
animism. It is her intuition that he possesses secret power
of this kind that makes Mephistopheles so uncanny to the
pious Gretchen. “She divines that I am certainly a spirit,
even the devil himself perchance.”20
The uncanny effect of epilepsy and of madness has the
same origin. The ordinary person sees in them the workings of forces hitherto unsuspected in his fellow-man but
which at the same time he is dimly aware of in a remote
corner of his own being. The Middle Ages quite consistently ascribed all such maladies to daemonic influences,
and in this their psychology was not so far out. Indeed, I
should not be surprised to hear that psychoanalysis, which
concerned with laying bare these hidden forces, has itself
become uncanny to many people for that very reason. In
one case, after I had succeeded—though none too rapidly—in effecting a cure which had lasted many years in a
girl who had been an invalid, the patient’s own mother
confessed to this attitude long after the girl’s recovery.
Dismembered limbs, a severed head, a hand cut off at
the wrist,21 feet which dance by themselves 22—all these
have something peculiarly uncanny about them, especially
when, as in the last instance, they prove able to move of
themselves in addition. As we already know, this kind of
uncanniness springs from its association with the castration-complex. To many people the idea of being buried
alive while appearing to be dead is the most uncanny thing
of all. And yet psychoanalysis has taught us that this terri20

“Sie ahnt, dass ich ganz sicher em Genie,
Vielleicht sogar der Teufel bin.”
21
Cf. a fairy-tale of Hauff’s.
22
As in Schaeffer’s book mentioned above.

14

fying phantasy is only a transformation of another phantasy which had originally nothing terrifying about it at all,
but was filled with a certain lustful pleasure—the phantasy, I mean, of intra-uterine existence.
*

*

*

*

*

There is one more point of general application I should
like to add, though, strictly speaking, it has been included
in our statements about animism and mechanisms in the
mind that have been surmounted; for I think it deserves
special mention. This is that an uncanny effect is often and
easily produced by effacing the distinction between imagination and reality, such as when something that we have
hitherto regarded as imaginary appears before us in reality,
or when a symbol takes over the full functions and significance of the thing it symbolizes, and so on. It is this element which contributes not a little to the uncanny effect attaching to magical practices. The infantile element in this,
which also holds sway in the minds of neurotics, is the
over-accentuation of psychical reality in comparison with
physical reality—a feature closely allied to the belief in the
omnipotence of thoughts. In the midst of the isolation of
war-time a number of the English Strand Magazine fell
into my hands; and, amongst other not very interesting
matter, I read a story about a young married couple, who
move into a furnished flat in which there is a curiously
shaped table with carvings of crocodiles on it. Towards
evening they begin to smell an intolerable and very typical
odour that pervades the whole flat; things begin to get in
their way and trip them up in the darkness; they seem to
see a vague form gliding up the stairs—in short, we are
given to understand that the presence of the table causes
ghostly crocodiles to haunt the place, or that the wooden
monsters come to life in the dark, or something of that
sort. It was a thoroughly silly story, but the uncanny feeling it produced was quite remarkable.

To conclude this collection of examples, which is certainly not complete, I will relate an instance taken from
psychoanalytical experience; if it does not rest upon mere
coincidence, it furnishes a beautiful confirmation of our
theory of the uncanny. It often happens that male patients
declare that they feel there is something uncanny about the
female genital organs. This unheimlich place, however, is
the entrance to the former heim [home] of all human beings, to the place where everyone dwelt once upon a time
and in the beginning. There is a humorous saying: “Love is
home-sickness”; and whenever a man dreams of a place or
a country and says to himself, still in the dream, “this place
is familiar to me, I have been there before,” we may interpret the place as being his mother’s genitals or her body. In
this case, too, the unheimlich is what was once heimisch,
homelike, familiar; the prefix ‘‘un’’ is the token of repression.
III
Having followed the discussion as far as this the reader
will have felt certain doubts arising in his mind about
much that has been said; and he must now have an opportunity of collecting them and bringing them forward.
It may be true that the uncanny is nothing else than a
hidden, familiar thing that has undergone repression and
then emerged from it, and that everything that is uncanny
fulfils this condition. But these factors do not solve the
problem of the uncanny. For our proposition is clearly not
convertible. Not everything that fulfils this condition—not
everything that is connected with repressed desires and archaic forms of thought belonging to the past of the individual and of the race—is therefore uncanny.
Nor would we, moreover, conceal the fact that for almost every example adduced in support of our hypothesis
some other analogous one may be found which rebuts it.

15

The story of the severed hand in Hauff’s fairy-tale certainly has an uncanny effect, and we have derived that effect from the castration-complex. But in the story in Herodotus of the treasure of Rhampsenitus, where the masterthief leaves his brother’s severed hand behind him in that
of the princess who wants to hold him fast, most readers
will agree with me that the episode has no trace of uncanniness. Again, the instant fulfillment of the king’s wishes
in “The Ring of Polycrates” undoubtedly does affect us in
the same uncanny way as it did the king of Egypt. Yet our
own fairy-tales are crammed with instantaneous wishfulfillments which produce no uncanny effect whatever. In
the story of “The Three Wishes,” the woman is tempted by
the savoury smell of a sausage to wish that she might have
one too, and immediately it lies on a plate before her. In
his annoyance at her forwardness her husband wishes it
may hang on her nose. And there it is, dangling from her
nose. All this, is very vivid but not in the least uncanny.
Fairy-tales quite frankly adopt the animistic standpoint of
the omnipotence of thoughts and wishes, and yet I cannot
think of any genuine fairy-story which has anything uncanny about it. We have heard that it is in the highest degree uncanny when inanimate objects—a picture or a
doll—come to life; nevertheless in Hans Andersen’s stories the household utensils, furniture and tin soldiers are
alive and nothing could perhaps be more remote from the
uncanny. And we should hardly call it uncanny when
Pygmalion’s beautiful statue comes to life.
Catalepsy and the re-animation of the dead have been
represented as most uncanny themes. But things of this
sort again are very common in fairy-stories. Who would be
so bold as to call it an uncanny moment, for instance,
when Snow-White opens her eyes once more? And the resuscitation of the dead in miracles, as in the New Testament, elicits feelings quite unrelated to the uncanny. Then
the theme that achieves such an indubitably uncanny ef-

fect, the involuntary recurrence of the like, serves, too,
other and quite different purposes in another class of cases.
One case we have already heard about in which it is employed to call forth a feeling of the comic; and we could
multiply instances of this kind. Or again, it works as a
means of emphasis, and so on. Another consideration is
this: whence come the uncanny influences of silence,
darkness and solitude? Do not these factors point to the
part played by danger in the aetiology of what is uncanny,
notwithstanding that they are also the most frequent accompaniment of the expression of fear in infancy? And are
we in truth justified in entirely ignoring intellectual uncertainty as a factor, seeing that we have admitted its importance in relation to death?
It is evident that we must be prepared to admit that there
are other elements besides those set down here determining the production of uncanny feelings. We might say that
these preliminary results have satisfied psychoanalytic interest in the problem of the uncanny, and that what remains probably calls for an aesthetic valuation. But that
would be to open the door to doubts about the exact value
of our general contention that the uncanny proceeds from
something familiar which has been repressed.
One thing we may observe which may help us to resolve
these uncertainties: nearly all the instances which contradict our hypothesis are taken from the realm of fiction and
literary productions. This may suggest a possible differentiation between the uncanny that is actually experienced,
and the uncanny as we merely picture it or read about it.
Something uncanny in real experience is conditioned
much more simply, but is limited to much fewer occasions.
We shall find, I think, that it fits in perfectly with our attempt at solution, and can be traced back without exception to something familiar that has been repressed. But
here, too, we must make a certain important and psycho-

16

logically significant differentiation in our material, best illustrated by turning to suitable examples.
Let us take the uncanny in connection with the omnipotence of thoughts, instantaneous wish-fulfillments, secret
power to do harm and the return of the dead. The condition
under which the feeling of uncanniness arises here is unmistakable. We—or our primitive forefathers—once believed in the possibility of these things and were convinced
that they really happened. Nowadays we no longer believe
in them, we have surmounted such ways of thought; but
we do not feel quite sure of our new set of beliefs, and the
old ones still exist within us ready to seize upon any confirmation. As soon as something actually happens in our
lives which seems to support the old, discarded beliefs, we
get a feeling of the uncanny; and it is as though we were
making a judgment something like this: “So, after all, it is
true that one can kill a person by merely desiring his
death!” or, “Then the dead do continue to live and appear
before our eyes on the scene of their former activities!”,
and so on. And conversely, he who has completely and finally dispelled animistic beliefs in himself, will be insensible to this type of the uncanny. The most remarkable coincidences of desire and fulfillment, the most mysterious
recurrence of similar experiences in a particular place or
on a particular date, the most deceptive sights and suspicious noises—none of these things will take him in or raise
that kind of fear which can be described as “a fear of
something uncanny.” For the whole matter is one of “testing reality,” pure and simple, a question of the material reality of the phenomena.23
23

Since the uncanny effect of a “double” also belongs to this class, it is
interesting to observe what the effect is of suddenly and unexpectedly
meeting one’s own image. E. Mach has related two such observations in
his Analyse der Em findungen (1900, p. 3). On the first occasion he
started violently as soon as he realized that the face before him was his
own. The second time he formed a very unfavorable opinion about the
supposed stranger who got into the omnibus, and thought “What a

The state of affairs is somewhat different when the uncanny proceeds from repressed infantile complexes, from
the castration-complex, womb-phantasies, etc.; but experiences which arouse this kind of uncanny feeling are not of
very frequent occurrence in real life. Actual occurrences of
the uncanny belong for the most part to the first group;
nevertheless the distinction between the two is theoretically very important. Where the uncanny comes from infantile complexes the question of external reality is quite
irrelevant; its place is taken by psychical reality. What is
concerned is an actual repression of some definite material
and a return of this repressed material, not a removal of the
belief in its objective reality. We might say that in the one
case what had been repressed was a particular ideational
content and in the other the belief in its physical existence.
But this last way of putting it no doubt strains the term
“repression” beyond its legitimate meaning. It would be
more correct to respect a perceptible psychological difference here, and to say that the animistic beliefs of civilized
people have been surmounted—more or less. Our conclusion could then be stated thus: An uncanny experience occurs either when repressed infantile complexes have been
revived by some impression, or when the primitive beliefs
we have surmounted seem once more to be confirmed. Fishabby-looking school-master that is getting in now.”—I can supply a
similar experience. I was sitting alone in my wagon-lit compartment
when a more than usually violent jerk of the train swung back the door
of the adjoining washing-cabinet, and an elderly gentleman in a dressing-gown and a traveling cap came in. I assumed that he had been about
to leave the washing-cabinet which divides the two compartments, and
had taken the wrong direction and come into my compartment by mistake. Jumping up with the intention of putting him right, I at once realized to my dismay that the intruder was nothing but my own reflection
in the looking-glass of the open door. I can still recollect that I thoroughly disliked his appearance. Instead, therefore, of being terrified by
our doubles, both Mach and I simply failed to recognize them as such.
Is it not possible, though, that our dislike of them was a vestigial trace
of that older reaction which feels the double to be something uncanny?

17

nally, we must not let our predilection for smooth solution
and lucid exposition blind us to the fact that these two
classes of uncanny experience are not always sharply distinguishable. When we consider that primitive beliefs are
most intimately connected with infantile complexes, and
are, in fact, based upon them, we shall not be greatly astonished to find the distinction often rather a hazy one.
The uncanny as it is depicted in literature, in stories and
imaginative productions, merits in truth a separate discussion. To begin with, it is a much more fertile province than
the uncanny in real life, for it contains the whole of the latter and something more besides, something that cannot be
found in real life. The distinction between what has been
repressed and what has been surmounted cannot be transposed on to the uncanny in fiction without profound modification; for the realm of phantasy depends for its very existence on the fact that its content is not submitted to the
reality-testing faculty. The somewhat paradoxical result is
that in the first place a great deal that is not uncanny in
fiction would be so if it happened in real life; and in the
second place that there are many more means of creating
uncanny effects in fiction than there are in real life.
The story-teller has this license among many others, that
he can select his world of representation so that it either
coincides with the realities we are familiar with or departs
from them in what particulars he pleases. We accept his
ruling in every case. In fairy-tales, for instance, the world
of reality is left behind from the very start, and the animistic system of beliefs is frankly adopted. Wish-fulfillments,
secret powers, omnipotence of thoughts, animation of lifeless objects, all the elements so common in fairy-stories,
can exert no uncanny influence here; for, as we have
learnt, that feeling cannot arise unless there is a conflict of
judgement whether things which have been “surmounted”
and are regarded as incredible are not, after all, possible;
and this problem is excluded from the beginning by the

setting of the story. And thus we see that such stories as
have furnished us with most of the contradictions to our
hypothesis of the uncanny confirm the first part of our
proposition—that in the realm of fiction many things are
not uncanny which would be so if they happened in real
life. In the case of the fairy-story there are other contributory factors, which we shall briefly touch upon later.
The story-teller can also choose a setting which, though
less imaginary than the world of fairy tales, does yet differ
from the real world by admitting superior spiritual entities
such as daemonic influences or departed spirits. So long as
they remain within their setting of poetic reality their usual
attribute of uncanniness fails to attach to such beings. The
souls in Dante’s Inferno, or the ghostly apparitions in
Hamlet, Macbeth or Julius Caesar, may be gloomy and
terrible enough, but they are no more really uncanny than
is Homer’s jovial world of gods. We order our judgement
to the imaginary reality imposed on us by the writer, and
regard souls, spirits and spectres as though their existence
had the same validity in their world as our own has in the
external world. And then in this case too we are spared all
trace of the uncanny.
The situation is altered as soon as the writer pretends to
move in the world of common reality. In this case he accepts all the conditions operating to produce uncanny feelings in real life; and everything that would have an uncanny effect in reality has it in his story. But in this case,
too, he can increase his effect and multiply it far beyond
what could happen in reality, by bringing about events
which never or very rarely happen in fact. He takes advantage, as it were, of our supposedly surmounted superstitiousness; he deceives us into thinking that he is giving us
the sober truth, and then after all oversteps the bounds of
possibility. We react to his inventions as we should have
reacted to real experiences; by the time we have seen
through his trick it is already too late and the author has

18

achieved his object; but it must be added that his success is
not unalloyed. We retain a feeling of dissatisfaction, a kind
of grudge against the attempted deceit; I have noticed this
particularly after reading Schnitzler’s Die Weissagung and
similar stories which flirt with the supernatural. The writer
has then one more means he can use to escape our rising
vexation and at the same time to improve his chances of
success. It is this, that he should keep us in the dark for a
long time about the precise nature of the conditions he has
selected for the world he writes about, or that he should
cunningly and ingeniously avoid any definite information
on the point at all throughout the book. Speaking generally, however, we find a confirmation of the second part of
our proposition—that fiction presents more opportunities
for creating uncanny sensations than are possible in real
life.
Strictly speaking, all these complications relate only to
that class of the uncanny which proceeds from forms of
thought that have been surmounted. The class which proceeds from repressed complexes is more irrefragable and
remains as powerful in fiction as in real experience, except
in one point. The uncanny belonging to the first class—
that proceeding from forms of thought that have been surmounted—retains this quality in fiction as in experience so
long as the setting is one of physical reality; but as soon as
it is given an arbitrary and unrealistic setting in fiction, it is
apt to lose its quality of the uncanny.
It is clear that we have not exhausted the possibilities of
poetic license and the privileges enjoyed by storywriters in
evoking or in excluding an uncanny feeling. In the main
we adopt an unvarying passive attitude towards experience
and are acted upon by our physical environment. But the
story-teller has a peculiarly directive influence over us; by
means of the states of mind into which he can put us and
the expectations he can rouse in us, he is able to guide the
current of our emotions, dam it up in one direction and

make it flow in another, and he often obtains a great variety of effects from the same material. All this is nothing
new, and has doubtless long since been fully taken into account by professors of aesthetics. We have drifted into this
field of research half involuntarily, through the temptation
to explain certain instances which contradicted our theory
of the causes of the uncanny. And accordingly we will
now return to the examination of a few instances.
We have already asked why it is that the severed hand in
the story of the treasure of Rhainpsenitus has no uncanny
effect in the way that Hauff’s story of the severed hand
has. The question seems to us to have gained in importance now that we have recognized that class of the uncanny which proceeds from repressed complexes to be the
more durable of the two. The answer is easy. In the Herodotus story our thoughts are concentrated much more on
the superior cunning of the master-thief than on the feelings of the princess. The princess may well have had an
uncanny feeling, indeed she very probably fell into a
swoon; but we have no such sensations, for we put ourselves in the thief’s place, not in hers. In Nestroy’s farce,
Der Zerrissene, another means is used to avoid any impression of the uncanny in the scene in which the fleeing
man, convinced that he is a murderer, lifts up one trapdoor
after another and each time sees what he takes to be the
ghost of his victim rising up out of it. He calls out in despair, “But I’ve only killed one man. Why this horrid multiplication?” We know the truth and do not share the error
of the Zerrissener, so what must be uncanny to him has an
irresistibly comic effect on us. Even a “real” ghost, as in
Oscar Wilde’s Canterville Ghost, loses all power of arousing at any rate an uncanny horror in us as soon as the
author begins to amuse himself at its expense and allows
liberties to be taken with it. Thus we see how independent
emotional effects can be of the actual subject matter in the
world of fiction. In fairy-stories feelings of fear—

19

including uncanny sensations—are ruled out altogether.
We understand this, and that is why we ignore the opportunities we find for any development of a feeling of this
kind.
Concerning the factors of silence, solitude and darkness,
we can only say that they are actually elements in the production of that infantile morbid anxiety from which the
majority of human beings have never become quite free.
This problem has been discussed from a psychoanalytical
point of view in another place.

i

Vol. i. p. 729. Heimlich, a. (-keit, f. -en): 1. auch Heimelich, heimelig,
zum Hause gehörig, nicht fremd, vertraut zahm, traut und traulich, anheimeind etc. (a) (veralt.) zum Haus, zur Familie gehörig, oder: wie
dazu gehörig betrachtet, vgl. lat. familiaris, vertraut: Die Heimlichen,
die Hausgenossen; Der heimliche Rat. 1. Mos. 41, 45; 2. Sam. 23, 23. I
Chr. 12, 25. Weish. 8, 4., wofür jetzt: Geheimer (s. d 1.) Rat üblich ist,
s. Heimlicher—(b) von Tieren zahm, sich den Menschen traulich
anschließend. Ggstz. wild, z. B. Tier, die weder wild noch heimlich
sind, etc. Eppendorf. 88; Wilde Thier . . . so man sie h. und gewohnsam
um die Leute aufzeucht. 92. So diese Thierle von Jugend bei den Menschen erzogen, werden sie ganz h., freundlich etc., Stumpf 608a etc.—
So noch: So h. ist’s (das Lamm) und frißt aus meiner Hand. Hölty; Ein
schöner, heimelicher (s. c) Vogel bleibt der Storch immerhin. Linck,
Schl. 146. s. Häuslich. 1 etc.—(c) traut, traulich anheimelnd; das Wohlgefühl stiller Befriedigung etc., behaglicher Ruhe u. sichern Schutzes,
wie das umschlossne wohnliche Haus erregend (vgl. Geheuer): 1st dir’s
h. noch im Lande, wo die Fremden deine Wälder roden? Alexis H. 1, 1,
289; Es war ihr nicht allzu h. bei ihm. Brentano Wehm. 92; Auf einem
hohen h—en Schattenpfade . . ., längs dem rieselnden rauschenden und
plätschernden Waldbach. Forster B. 1, 417. Die H—keit der Heimath
zerstören. Gervinus Lit. 5, 375. So vertraulich und heimlich habe ich
nicht leicht ein Plätzchen gefunden. G. 14, 14; Wir dachten es uns so
bequem, so artig, so gemütlich und h. 15, 9; In stiller H—keit, umzielt
von engen Schranken. Haller: Einer sorglichen Hausfrau, die mit dem
Wenigsten eine vergnügliche H—keit (Häuslichkeit) zu schaffen versteht. Hartmann Unst. 1, 188; Desto h—er kam ihm jetzt der ihm erst
kurz noch so fremde Mann vor. Kerner 540; Die protestantischen Besitzer fühlen sich . . . nicht h. unter ihren katholischen Unterthanen. Kohl.

Irl. 1, 172; Wenns h. wird und leise/die Abendstille nur an deiner Zelle
lauscht. Tiedge 2, 39; Still und lieb und h., als sie sich/zum Ruhen einen
Platz nur wünschen möchten. W. 11, 144; Es war ihm garnicht h. dabei
27. 170, etc.—Auch: Der Platz war so still, so einsam, so schatten-h.
Scherr Pilug. 1, 170; Die ab- und zuströmenden Fluthwellen, träumend
und wiegenlied-h. Körner, Sch. 3, 320, etc.—Vgl. namentl. Un-h.—
Namentl. bei schwäb., schwzr. Schriftst. oft dreisilbig: Wie “heimelich”
war es dann Ivo Abends wieder, als er zu Hause lag. Auerbach, D. 1,
249; In dem Haus ist mir’s so heimelig gewesen. 4. 307; Die warme
Stube, der heimelige Nachmittag. Gotthelf, Sch. 127, 148; Das ist das
wahre Heimelig, wenn der Mensch so von Herzen fühlt, wie wenig er
ist, wie groß der Herr ist. 147; Wurde man nach und nach recht
gemütlich und heimelig mit einander. U. 1, 297; Die trauliche Heimeligkeit. 380, 2, 86; Heimelicher wird es mir wohl nirgends werden als
hier. 327; Pestalozzi 4, 240; Was von ferne herkommt . . . lebt gw. nicht
ganz heimelig (heimatlich, freundnachbarlich) mit den Leuten. 325; Die
Hütte, wo/er sonst so heimelig, so froh/. . . im Kreis der Seinen oft gesessen. Reithard 20; Da klingt das Horn des Wächters so heimelig vom
Thurm/da ladet seine Stimme so gastlich. 49; Es schläft sich da so lind
und warm/so wunderheim’lig ein. 23, etc.—Diese Weiseverdiente ailgemein zu werden, um das gute Wort vor dem Veralten wegen nahe
liegender Verwechslung mit 2 zu bewahren. vgl.: “Die Zecks sind aile
h. (2)” H . . . ? Was verstehen sie unter h . . . ?—“Nun . . . es kommt mir
mit ihnen vor, wie mit einem zugegrabenen Brunnen oder einem ausgetrockneten Teich. Man kann nicht darüber gehen, ohne daß es Einem
immer ist, als könnte da wieder einmal Wasser zum Vorschein kommen.” Wir nennen das un—h.; Sic nennen’s h. Worin finden Sie denn,
daß diese Familie etwas Verstecktes und Unzuverlässiges hat? etc.
Gutzkow R. 2, 61*).—(d) (s. c) namentl. schles.: fröhlich, heiter, auch
vom Wetter, s. Adelung und Weinhold.—2. versteckt, verborgen gehalten, so daßs man Andre nicht davon oder darum wissen lassen, es ihnen
verbergen will, vgl. Geheim (2), von welchem erst nhd. Ew. es doch
zumal in der älteren Sprache, z. B. in der Bibel, wie Hiob 11, 6; 15, 8,
Weish. 2, 22; 1. Kor. 2, 7 etc., und so auch H—keit statt Geheimnis.
Math. 13, 35 etc., nicht immer genau geschieden wird: H. (hinter Jemandes Rücken) etwas thun, treiben: Sich h. davon schleichen; H—e
Zusammnenkünfte, Verabredungen; Mit h—er Schadenfreude zusehen;
H. seufzen, weinen; H. thun, als ob man etwas zu verbergen hätte; H—e
Liebe, Liebschaft, Sünde; H—e Orte (die der Wohlstand zu verhüllen
gebietet), 1. Sam. 5, 6; Das h—e Gemach (Abtritt) 2. Kön. 10, 27; W. 5,
256 etc., auch: Der h—e Stuhl. Zinkgräf 1, 249; In Graben, in H—
keiten werfen. 3, 75; Rollenhagen Fr. 83 etc.—Führte h. vor Laomedon/die Stuten vor. B. 161 b etc.—Ebenso versteckt, h., hinterlistig und

20

boshaft gegen grausame Herren . . . wie offen, frei, theilnehmend und
dienstwillig gegen den leidenden Freund. Burmeister g B 2, 157; Du
sollst mein h. Heiligstes noch wissen. Chamisso 4, 56; Die h—e Kunst
(der Zauberei). 3, 224; Wo die öffentliche Ventilation aufhören muß,
fängt die h—e Machination an. Forster, Br. 2, 135; Freiheit ist die leise
Parole h. Verschworener, das laute Feldgeschrei der öffentlich Umwälzenden. G. 4, 222; Ein heilig, h. Wirken. 15; Ich habe Wurzeln/die sind
gaf h.,/im tiefen Boden/bin ich gegründet. 2, 109; Meine h—e Tücke
(vgl. Heimtücke). 30, 344; Empfängt er es nicht offenbar und gewissenhaft, so mag er es h. und gewissenlos ergreifen. 39, 22; Ließ h. und geheimnisvoll archromatische Fernröhre zusammensetzen. 375; Von nun
an, will ich, sei nichts H—es mehr unter uns. Sch. 369 b.—Jemandes
H—keiten entdecken, offenbaren, verrathen; H—keiten hinter meinem
Rücken zu brauen. Alexis. H. 2, 3, 168; Zu meiner Zeit/befliß man sich
der H—keit. Hagedorn 3, 92; Die H—keit und das Gepuschele unter der
Hand. Immermann, M. 3, 289; Der H—keit (des verborgnen Golds)
unmächtigen Bann/kann nur die Hand der Einsicht lösen. Novalis. 1,
69; /Sag an, wo du sie verbirgst . . . in weiches Ortes verschwiegener H.
Schr. 495 b; Ihr Bienen, die ihr knetet/der H—keiten Schloß (Wachs
zum Siegeln). Tieck, Cymb. 3, 2; Erfahren in seltnen H—keiten
(Zauberkünsten). Schlegel Sh. 6, 102 etc. vgl. Geheimnis L. 10: 291 ff.
Zsstzg. s. 1 c, so auch nam. der Ggstz.: Un-: unbehagliches, banges
Grauen erregend: Der schier ihm un-h., gespenstisch erschien.
Chamisso 3, 238; Der Nacht un-h. bange Stunden. 4, 148; Mir war
schon lang’ un-h., ja graulich zu Mute. 242; Nun fängts mir an, un-h. zu
werden. Gutzkow R. 2, 82; Empfindet ein u—es Grauen. Verm. 1, 51:
Un-h. und starr wie ein Steinbild. Reis, 1, 10; Den u—en Nebel, Haarrauch geheißen. Immermann M., 3, 299; Diese blassen Jungen sind unh. und brauen Gott weiß was Schlimmes. Laube, Band 1, 119; Un-h.
nennt man Alles, was im Geheimnis, im Verborgnen . . . bleiben sollte
und hervorgetreten ist. Schelling, 2, 2, 649 etc. —Das Göttliche zu
verhüllen, mit einer gewissen U—keit zu umgeben 658, etc. —Unüblich
aIs Ggstz. von (2), wie es Campe ohne Beleg anführt.

4. aus dem heimatlichen, häuslichen entwickelt sich weiter der begriff des fremden augen entzogenen, verborgenen, geheimen, eben auch
in mehrfacher beziehung ausgebildet . . .
S. 876:
“links am see
liegt eine matte heimlich lin gehölz.”
Schiller, Tell I., 4.
. . . frei und für den modernen Sprachgebrauch ungewöhnlich . . . heimlich ist zu einem verbum des verbergens gestellt: er verbirgt mich heimlich in seinem gezelt. ps. 27, 5. (. . . heimliche orte am menschlichen
Körper, pudenda . . . welche leute nicht stürben, die wurden geschlagen
an heimlichen örten. 1 Samuel 5, 12 . . .
(c) Beamtete, die wichtige und geheim zu haltende ratschläge in
staatssachen ertheilen, heißen heimliche räthe, das adjektiv nach heutigem sprachgebrauch durch geheim (s.d.) ersetzt: . . . (Pharao) nennet
ihn (Joseph) den heimlichen rath. 1. Mos. 41, 45;
S. 878. 6. Heimlich für die erkenntnis, mystisch, allegorisch: heimliche bedeutung, mysticus, divinus, occultus, figuratus.
S. 878. Anders ist heimlich im folgenden, der erkenntnis entzogen,
unbewuszt: . . .
Dann aber ist heimlich auch verschlossen, undurchdringlich in bezug
auf erforschung: . . .
“Merkst du wohl? sie trauen mir nicht,
fürchten des Friedländers heimlich gesicht.”
Wallensteins lager, 2. aufz.
9. die bedeutung des versteckten, gefährlichen, die in der vorigen
nummer hervortritt, entwickelt sich noch weiter, so daß heimlich den
sinn empfängt, den sonst unheimlich (gebildet nach heimlich, 3b sp.
874) hat: “mir ist zu zeiten vie dem menschen der in nacht wandelt und
an gespenster glaubt, jeder winkel ist ihm heimlich und schauerhaft.”
Klinger, theater, 3, 298.

ii

Grimm, Jakob und Wilhelm, Deutsches Wörterbuch, Leipzig, 1877,
IV./2, p. 874 et seq.
“Heinthch; adj. und adv. vernaculus, occultus; mhd. heimelîch, heîmlich.
S. 874: In etwas anderem sinne: es ist mir heimlîch, wohl, frei von
furcht. . . .
(b) heimlich ist auch der von gespensterhaften freie ort . . .
S. 875: (ß) vertraut; freundlich, zutraulich.

21