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Ketshash.ps1
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Ketshash.ps1
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function Invoke-DetectPTH(){
<#
.SYNOPSIS
Using event viewer to detect suspicious privileged NTLM connections such as Pass-the-Hash
Author: Eviatar Gerzi (@g3rzi)
Version 1.5: 16.1.2018
- Added check when computer name is NULL.
Version 1.4: 4.1.2018
- Added function to get the current time from a remote machine.
- Modified the detection function to use the current date of the remote machine with the use of stopwatch.
- Added try\catch to timing functions
Version 1.3: 31.12.2017
- Increased the time for checking 4648 to 60 seconds instead of 5.
- Increased the difference time warning notification between machines to 60 seconds.
Version 1.2: 17.12.2017
.DESCRIPTION
This function queries event viewer on remote machine and search for NTLM events (event IDs 4624).
It checks if the NTLM events were generated by a legitimate\illegitimate logon based on event viewer logs and displays the result.
Requirements:
- Privileges to get event viewer logs from remote machines
- Privileges to retrive information about the user and the machine from Active Directory
- Computers synchronized with the same time, otherwise it can affect the results
.PARAMETER TargetComputers
Array of target computers to detect for NTLM connections.
.PARAMETER TargetComputersFile
Path to file with list of target computers to detect for NTLM connections.
.PARAMETER StartTime
Time when the detection starts. The defualt is from the time this function starts.
.PARAMETER UseKerberosCheck
Checks for TGT\TGS logons on the DCs on the organization.
The default is to search for legitimate logon on the source machine.
Anyway, with or without this switch there is still a query for event ID 4648 on the source machine.
.PARAMETER UseNewCredentialsCheck
Checks for logon events with logon type 9 (like Mimikatz).
This is optional, the default algoritm already covers it.
It is exist just to show another option to detect suspicious NTLM connections.
On Windows versions below Windows 10 and Server 2016, "Microsoft-Windows-LSA/Operational" should be enabled in event viewer.
On Windows 10 and Server 2016, enabling "kerenl object audity" will provide more accurate information such as writing to LSASS.
.PARAMETER LogFile
Log file path to save the results
.PARAMETER MaxHoursOfLegitLogonPriorToNTLMEvent
How much hours to look backwards and search for legitimate logon from the time of the NTLM event.
.EXAMPLE
Detect in real time for legit\illegit privileged NTLM connections.
Invoke-DetectPth -TargetComputers "MARS-7"
.EXAMPLE
Execute detection on array of computers.
Invoke-DetectPth -TargetComputers @("MARS-7", "MARS-10")
.EXAMPLE
Execute detection on multiple computers from a list.
Invoke-DetectPth -TargetComputersFile "C:\tmp\Computers.txt"
Comptures.txt content:
MARS-7
MARS-10
.EXAMPLE
Detect legit\illegit privileged NTLM connections in the last 4 hours.
Invoke-DetectPth -TargetComputers "MARS-7" -StartTime (Get-Date).AddHours(-4)
.EXAMPLE
Detect legit\illegit privileged NTLM connections in specific time.
Invoke-DetectPth -TargetComputers "MARS-7" -StartTime ([datetime]"2017-11-23 05:35:27 PM")
.EXAMPLE
Detection is based on Kerberos authentication (TGT\TGS tickets).
Invoke-DetectPth -TargetComputers "MARS-7" -UseKerberosCheck
.EXAMPLE
Detection is based on event 4624 with logon type 9 ("NetCredentials") before the NTLM connection.
Invoke-DetectPth -TargetComputers "MARS-7" -UseNewCredentialsCheck
.EXAMPLE
Results will be write to "C:\tmp\log.txt".
Invoke-DetectPth -TargetComputers "MARS-7" -LogFile "C:\tmp\log.txt"
.EXAMPLE
Searching for legitimate logon 1 hour backwards from the NTLM event.
Invoke-DetectPth -TargetComputers "MARS-7" -MaxHoursOfLegitLogonPriorToNTLMEvent 1
#>
[CmdletBinding()]
param
(
[Parameter(
Mandatory = $true,
ParameterSetName = 'TargetComputers')
]
[array]$TargetComputers,
[datetime]$StartTime = (date).AddSeconds(-5),
[Parameter(
Mandatory = $true,
ParameterSetName ='MultipleComputersFile')
]
[string]$TargetComputersFile,
[switch]$UseKerberosCheck,
[switch]$UseNewCredentialsCheck, # The default logic already covers it.
[string]$LogFile = $null,
[int]$MaxHoursOfLegitLogonPriorToNTLMEvent = -2
)
if ($MaxHoursOfLegitLogonPriorToNTLMEvent -gt 0){
$MaxHoursOfLegitLogonPriorToNTLMEvent = $MaxHoursOfLegitLogonPriorToNTLMEvent * -1
}
#region script block section
[ScriptBlock]$detectPTHScriptBlock = {
[CmdletBinding()]
param
(
$targetComputerName,
$startTime,
$LogFile,
$UseKerberosCheck,
$UseNewCredentialsCheck,
$MaxHoursOfLegitLogonPriorToNTLMEvent
)
$global:WellKnownSIDs = @{
'S-1-0' = 'Null Authority'
'S-1-0-0' = 'Nobody'
'S-1-1' = 'World Authority'
'S-1-1-0' = 'Everyone'
'S-1-2' = 'Local Authority'
'S-1-2-0' = 'Local'
'S-1-2-1' = 'Console Logon'
'S-1-3' = 'Creator Authority'
'S-1-3-0' = 'Creator Owner'
'S-1-3-1' = 'Creator Group'
'S-1-3-2' = 'Creator Owner Server'
'S-1-3-3' = 'Creator Group Server'
'S-1-3-4' = 'Owner Rights'
'S-1-5-80-0' = 'All Services'
'S-1-4' = 'Non-unique Authority'
'S-1-5' = 'NT Authority'
'S-1-5-1' = 'Dialup'
'S-1-5-2' = 'Network'
'S-1-5-3' = 'Batch'
'S-1-5-4' = 'Interactive'
'S-1-5-6' = 'Service'
'S-1-5-7' = 'Anonymous'
'S-1-5-8' = 'Proxy'
'S-1-5-9' = 'Enterprise Domain Controllers'
'S-1-5-10' = 'Principal Self'
'S-1-5-11' = 'Authenticated Users'
'S-1-5-12' = 'Restricted Code'
'S-1-5-13' = 'Terminal Server Users'
'S-1-5-14' = 'Remote Interactive Logon'
'S-1-5-15' = 'This Organization'
'S-1-5-17' = 'This Organization'
'S-1-5-18' = 'Local System'
'S-1-5-19' = 'NT Authority'
'S-1-5-20' = 'NT Authority'
'S-1-5-32-544' = 'Administrators'
'S-1-5-32-545' = 'Users'
'S-1-5-32-546' = 'Guests'
'S-1-5-32-547' = 'Power Users'
'S-1-5-32-548' = 'Account Operators'
'S-1-5-32-549' = 'Server Operators'
'S-1-5-32-550' = 'Print Operators'
'S-1-5-32-551' = 'Backup Operators'
'S-1-5-32-552' = 'Replicators'
'S-1-5-64-10' = 'NTLM Authentication'
'S-1-5-64-14' = 'SChannel Authentication'
'S-1-5-64-21' = 'Digest Authority'
'S-1-5-80' = 'NT Service'
'S-1-5-83-0' = 'NT VIRTUAL MACHINE\Virtual Machines'
'S-1-16-0' = 'Untrusted Mandatory Level'
'S-1-16-4096' = 'Low Mandatory Level'
'S-1-16-8192' = 'Medium Mandatory Level'
'S-1-16-8448' = 'Medium Plus Mandatory Level'
'S-1-16-12288' = 'High Mandatory Level'
'S-1-16-16384' = 'System Mandatory Level'
'S-1-16-20480' = 'Protected Process Mandatory Level'
'S-1-16-28672' = 'Secure Process Mandatory Level'
'S-1-5-32-554' = 'BUILTIN\Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access'
'S-1-5-32-555' = 'BUILTIN\Remote Desktop Users'
'S-1-5-32-556' = 'BUILTIN\Network Configuration Operators'
'S-1-5-32-557' = 'BUILTIN\Incoming Forest Trust Builders'
'S-1-5-32-558' = 'BUILTIN\Performance Monitor Users'
'S-1-5-32-559' = 'BUILTIN\Performance Log Users'
'S-1-5-32-560' = 'BUILTIN\Windows Authorization Access Group'
'S-1-5-32-561' = 'BUILTIN\Terminal Server License Servers'
'S-1-5-32-562' = 'BUILTIN\Distributed COM Users'
'S-1-5-32-569' = 'BUILTIN\Cryptographic Operators'
'S-1-5-32-573' = 'BUILTIN\Event Log Readers'
'S-1-5-32-574' = 'BUILTIN\Certificate Service DCOM Access'
'S-1-5-32-575' = 'BUILTIN\RDS Remote Access Servers'
'S-1-5-32-576' = 'BUILTIN\RDS Endpoint Servers'
'S-1-5-32-577' = 'BUILTIN\RDS Management Servers'
'S-1-5-32-578' = 'BUILTIN\Hyper-V Administrators'
'S-1-5-32-579' = 'BUILTIN\Access Control Assistance Operators'
'S-1-5-32-580' = 'BUILTIN\Remote Management Users'
}
$global:Event4624Fields = @(
"TargetUserSid",
"WorkstationName", # source computer
"Time",
"TargetLogonId",
"TargetUserName",
"TargetDomainName"
)
$global:LogonTypes = @{
'2' = 'Interactive'
'3' = 'Network'
'4' = 'Batch'
'5' = 'Service'
'7' = 'Unlock'
'8' = 'NetworkCleartext'
'9' = 'NewCredentials'
'10' = 'RemoteInteractive'
'11' = 'CachedInteractive'
}
$global:SYSTEM_PID_STR = "0x4"
$global:LEGIT_LOGON_MAX_HOURS_PRIOR_TO_NTLM_EVENT = $MaxHoursOfLegitLogonPriorToNTLMEvent
$global:MAX_SECONDS_PRIOR_NTLM_EVENT = -60
$global:MAX_SECONDS_AFTER_NTLM_EVENT = 60
$global:Tab = ""
<#
Add-Type -TypeDefinition @"
public enum NewCredentialsUse
{
USED,
LSASS_WRITING,
UNUSED
}
"@
#>
if(-not ("LegitLogonTechnique" -as [type])){
Add-Type -TypeDefinition @"
public enum LegitLogonTechnique
{
BY_SOURCE,
BY_KERBEROS
}
"@
}
if($UseKerberosCheck){
$global:DCs = Get-ADDomainController -Filter * | Select-Object name
$global:LogonTechnique = [LegitLogonTechnique]::BY_KERBEROS
}else{
$global:LogonTechnique = [LegitLogonTechnique]::BY_SOURCE
}
function Test-ComputerExistInAD($computerName)
{
$isFound = $false
try{
Get-ADComputer $computerName
$isFound = $true
}
catch{
Write-Verbose "Computer $($computerName) is not exist in AD"
}
return $isFound
}
function Get-SidFromUser($userName){
$sid = $null
try{
$objUser = New-Object System.Security.Principal.NTAccount($userName)
$strSID = $objUser.Translate([System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier])
$sid = $strSID.Value
}
catch{
Write-Warning "Failed to get SID from username: $($userName)"
}
return $sid
}
function Get-SidFromDomainAndUser($domain, $userName){
$sid = $null
try{
$objUser = New-Object System.Security.Principal.NTAccount($domain, $userName)
$strSID = $objUser.Translate([System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier])
$sid = $strSID.Value
}
catch{
Write-Verbose "Failed to get SID from domain and user at 'Get-SidFromDomainAndUser'"
}
return $sid
}
function Get-UserFromSid($SID){
$username = $null
try{
$objSID = New-Object System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier($SID)
$objUser = $objSID.Translate([System.Security.Principal.NTAccount])
$username = $objUser.Value
}
catch{
Write-Verbose "Failed to get user from SID 'Get-UserFromSid'"
}
return $username
}
function Get-HostIPAddress($computerName){
$ip = $null
if(($computerName -ne $null) -and $computerName.EndsWith("$")){
$computerName = $computerName.Remove($computerName.Length-1)
}
try{
$ip = [System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($computerName).IPAddressToString
}
catch{
Write-Verbose "$($global:Tab)[*] Not existing computer name: $($computerName)"
}
return $ip
}
function Get-NtlmEventObject([xml]$ntlmXmlEvent, $targetComputerName){
$ntlmEventObject = New-Object psobject
foreach($field in $global:Event4624Fields){
$value = ($ntlmXmlEvent.Event.EventData.Data | Where-Object {$_.Name -eq $field}).'#text'
$ntlmEventObject | Add-Member -MemberType NoteProperty -Name $field -Value $value
}
# It is possible to remove "Time" from the constant fields of 4624
$ntlmEventObject.Time = [datetime]$ntlmXmlEvent.Event.System.TimeCreated.SystemTime
$value = Get-HostIPAddress $ntlmEventObject.WorkstationName
$ntlmEventObject | Add-Member -MemberType NoteProperty -Name "SourceIp" -Value $value
$value = Get-HostIPAddress $targetComputerName
$ntlmEventObject | Add-Member -MemberType NoteProperty -Name "DestinationIp" -Value $value
$ntlmEventObject | Add-Member -MemberType NoteProperty -Name "DestinationWorkstation" -Value $targetComputerName
return $ntlmEventObject
}
function Compare-Ip($ipA, $ipB){
$isSameIp = $false
try{
if(($ipA -ne $null) -and ($ipB -ne $null)){
$ipA = [ipaddress]$ipA
$ipB = [ipaddress]$ipB
if($ipA.IsIPv4MappedToIPv6){
if(-not $ipB.IsIPv4MappedToIPv6){
$ipB = $ipB.MapToIPv6()
}
}
elseif($ipB.IsIPv4MappedToIPv6){
$ipA = $ipA.MapToIPv6()
}
$isSameIp = ($ipA -eq $ipB)
}
}
catch{
Write-Warning "$($global:Tab)[*] Invalid ip addresses: IpA = '$($ipA)', IpB = '$($ipB)'"
}
return $isSameIp
}
function Is-LegitKerberosLogon($ntlmEventObject){
$isLegit = $false
$kerberosEvents = New-Object System.Collections.ArrayList
try{
# Need solution for number of DCs
foreach($dc in $global:DCs){
try{
$kerberosEventsTemp = Get-WinEvent -ComputerName $dc.Name -FilterHashtable @{LogName="Security"; id=4768,4769; StartTime = ([datetime]$ntlmEventObject.Time).AddHours($global:LEGIT_LOGON_MAX_HOURS_PRIOR_TO_NTLM_EVENT); EndTime=$ntlmEventObject.Time} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
$kerberosEvents.Add($kerberosEventsTemp)
}
catch{
Write-Verbos "$($global:Tab)[*] No Kerberos events on domain controller: "$dc
}
}
foreach($kerbEvent in $kerberosEvents){
[xml]$kerberosXmlEvent = $kerbEvent.ToXml()
$kerberosTargetUserName = ($kerberosXmlEvent.Event.EventData.Data | Where-Object {$_.Name -eq "TargetUserName"}).'#text'
$kerberosTargetSid = Get-SidFromUser $kerberosTargetUserName
$kerberosSourceIp = ($kerberosXmlEvent.Event.EventData.Data | Where-Object {$_.Name -eq "IpAddress"}).'#text'
if(($kerberosTargetSid -eq $ntlmEventObject.TargetUserSid) -and (Compare-Ip $kerberosSourceIp $ntlmEventObject.SourceIp)){
$isLegit = $true
break
}
}
}
catch{
Write-Warning "$($global:Tab)[*] No kerberos events."
}
return $isLegit
}
function Is-LegitLogon($ntlmEventObject, $legitLogonOption, [ref]$ntlmDetailsSb){
$isLegit = $false
if($legitLogonOption -eq [LegitLogonTechnique]::BY_SOURCE){
$logonType = $null
if($isLegit = Is-LegitLogonOnSourceMachine $ntlmEventObject ([ref]$logonType)){
($ntlmDetailsSb.value).AppendLine("$($global:Tab)[*] Found legit logon (LogonType: $($logonType), '$($global:LogonTypes[$logonType])') prior to this connection") | Out-Null
}
}
else{
# TODO: Check time differences in the DC
if($isLegit = Is-LegitKerberosLogon $ntlmEventObject){
($ntlmDetailsSb.value).AppendLine("$($global:Tab)[*] Found legit TGT\TGS ticket prior to this connection")
}
}
return $isLegit
}
function Is-LegitLogonOnSourceMachine($ntlmEventObject, [ref]$logonType){
$isLegit = $false
try{
$logonEvents = Get-WinEvent -ComputerName $ntlmEventObject.WorkstationName -FilterHashtable @{LogName="Security"; id=4624; StartTime=([datetime]$ntlmEventObject.Time).AddHours($global:LEGIT_LOGON_MAX_HOURS_PRIOR_TO_NTLM_EVENT); EndTime=$ntlmEventObject.Time} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object {($_.Message -match "Logon Type:`t*[2,7,10,11]{1,2}")}
foreach($logonEvent in $logonEvents){
[xml]$xmlLogonEvent = $logonEvent.ToXml()
$sid = ($xmlLogonEvent.Event.EventData.Data | Where-Object {$_.Name -eq "TargetUserSid"}).'#text'
if(($sid -eq $ntlmEventObject.TargetUserSid)){
$logonType.value = ($xmlLogonEvent.Event.EventData.Data | Where-Object {$_.Name -eq "LogonType"}).'#text'
$isLegit = $true
break
}
}
}
catch{
}
return $isLegit
}
function Is-PrivilegedAccount($ntlmObject){
$isPrivilegedAccount = $false
try{
$speicalLogonEvents = Get-WinEvent -ComputerName $ntlmObject.DestinationWorkstation -FilterHashtable @{LogName="Security"; id=4672; StartTime=([datetime]($ntlmObject.Time)).AddSeconds(-3); EndTime=[datetime]($ntlmObject.Time).AddSeconds(2)} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
foreach($specialLogonEvent in $speicalLogonEvents){
[xml]$xmlSpecialLogonEvent = $specialLogonEvent.ToXml()
$xmlSpecialLogonEventLogonId =($xmlSpecialLogonEvent.Event.EventData.Data | Where-Object {$_.Name -eq "SubjectLogonId"}).'#text'
# Hardening is possible by adding the user's SID\full username to the check
if($ntlmObject.TargetLogonId -eq $xmlSpecialLogonEventLogonId){
$isPrivilegedAccount = $true
}
}
}
catch{
}
return $isPrivilegedAccount
}
function Is-Windows10($computer){
$computerProperties = Get-ADComputer -Properties OperatingSystemVersion $computer
return $computerProperties.OperatingSystemVersion.StartsWith("10")
}
function Is-UsingExplicityPassword($ntlmObject){
$isUsingExplicityPassword = $false
$timeDiff = Get-TimeDifferenceBetweenComputers $ntlmObject.DestinationWorkstation $ntlmObject.WorkstationName
if($timeDiff -eq $null)
{
$syncedTimeOnSourceMachine = ([datetime]($ntlmObject.Time))
}
else
{
if($timeDiff -gt 0){
$timeDiff = $timeDiff * (-1)
}
$syncedTimeOnSourceMachine = ([datetime]($ntlmObject.Time)).AddSeconds($timeDiff)
}
$timeOf4648PriorToNTLM = $syncedTimeOnSourceMachine.AddSeconds($global:MAX_SECONDS_PRIOR_NTLM_EVENT)
$timeOf4648AfterNTLM = $syncedTimeOnSourceMachine.AddSeconds($global:MAX_SECONDS_AFTER_NTLM_EVENT)
try{
$events4648 = Get-WinEvent -ComputerName $ntlmObject.WorkstationName -FilterHashtable @{LogName="Security"; id=4648; StartTime=$timeOf4648PriorToNTLM; EndTime=$timeOf4648AfterNTLM} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
foreach($event4648 in $events4648){
[xml]$xmlevent4648 = $event4648.ToXml()
$userName = ($xmlevent4648.Event.EventData.Data | Where-Object {$_.Name -eq "TargetUserName"}).'#text'
$domain = ($xmlevent4648.Event.EventData.Data | Where-Object {$_.Name -eq "TargetDomainName"}).'#text'
$sid = Get-SidFromDomainAndUser $domain $userName
$computerName = ($xmlevent4648.Event.EventData.Data | Where-Object {$_.Name -eq "TargetServerName"}).'#text'
#$computerName = ($xmlevent4648.Event.EventData.Data | Where-Object {$_.Name -eq "TargetInfo"}).'#text'
# [TODO]: It might be faster to run Get-ADComputer and compare between the SIDs
$targetIpAddress = Get-HostIPAddress $computerName
$processId = ($xmlevent4648.Event.EventData.Data | Where-Object {$_.Name -eq "ProcessId"}).'#text'
if(($processId -ne $global:SYSTEM_PID_STR) -and ($ntlmObject.TargetUserSid -eq $sid) -and (($computerName -eq "localhost") -or ($ntlmObject.DestinationIp -eq $targetIpAddress))){
$isUsingExplicityPassword = $true
break
}
}
}
catch{
}
return $isUsingExplicityPassword
}
# [OPTIONAL] Adding another variant to this algorithm by creating correlation with 4648
function Is-LogonWithNewCredentials($ntlmObject, [ref]$ntlmDetailsSb){
$MAX_MINUTES_PRIOR = -60
$isNewCredentials = $false
#$isNewCredentials = [NewCredentialsUse]::UNUSED
try{
$newCredEvents = Get-WinEvent -ComputerName $ntlmObject.WorkstationName -FilterHashtable @{LogName="Security"; id=4624; StartTime=([datetime]($ntlmObject.Time)).AddMinutes($MAX_MINUTES_PRIOR); EndTime=$ntlmObject.Time} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object {($_.Message -match "Logon Type:`t*9") -and ($_.Message -match "Authentication Package:`t*Negotiate")}
$windows10 = Is-Windows10 $ntlmObject.WorkstationName
foreach($newCredEvent in $newCredEvents){
[xml]$xmlnewCredEvent = $newCredEvent.ToXml()
if($windows10){
$userName = ($xmlnewCredEvent.Event.EventData.Data | Where-Object {$_.Name -eq "TargetOutboundUserName"}).'#text'
$domain = ($xmlnewCredEvent.Event.EventData.Data | Where-Object {$_.Name -eq "TargetOutboundDomainName"}).'#text'
$sid = Get-SidFromDomainAndUser $domain $userName
if($sid -eq $ntlmObject.TargetUserSid){
$isNewCredentials = $true
#$isNewCredentials = [NewCredentialsUse]::USED
($ntlmDetailsSb.Value).AppendLine("$($global:Tab)[*] New credentials are being used (CreateProcessWithLogonW) ! ") | Out-Null
# Only if the kerenl object audity is on
$newCredTime = [datetime]$xmlnewCredEvent.Event.System.TimeCreated.SystemTime
$kernelObjectEvents = Get-WinEvent -ComputerName $ntlmObject.WorkstationName -FilterHashtable @{LogName="Security"; id=4656; StartTime=$newCredTime; EndTime=([datetime]$newCredTime).AddSeconds(5)} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if($kernelObjectEvents){
$newCredLogonId = ($xmlnewCredEvent.Event.EventData.Data | Where-Object {$_.Name -eq "SubjectLogonId"}).'#text'
foreach($kernelObjectEvent in $kernelObjectEvents){
[xml]$xmlEvent = $kernelObjectEvent.ToXml()
$accessList = ($xmlEvent.Event.EventData.Data | Where-Object {$_.Name -eq "AccessList"}).'#text'
$objectName = ($xmlEvent.Event.EventData.Data | Where-Object {$_.Name -eq "ObjectName"}).'#text'
# "%4485" - Write to process memory
if($accessList.Contains("%4485") -and $objectName.EndsWith("lsass.exe")){
$kernelLogonId = ($xmlEvent.Event.EventData.Data | Where-Object {$_.Name -eq "SubjectLogonId"}).'#text'
if($kernelLogonId -eq $newCredLogonId){
($ntlmDetailsSb.Value).AppendLine("$($global:Tab)[*] Writing to LSASS after using new credentials ! ") | Out-Null
$isNewCredentials = $true
#$isNewCredentials = [NewCredentialsUse]::LSASS_WRITING
break
}
}
}
}
break
}
}
else{
$newCredEventTime = [datetime]$xmlnewCredEvent.Event.System.TimeCreated.SystemTime
$events303 = Get-WinEvent -ComputerName $ntlmObject.WorkstationName -FilterHashtable @{LogName="Microsoft-Windows-LSA/Operational"; id=303; StartTime=([datetime]$newCredEventTime).AddSeconds(-1); EndTime=([datetime]$newCredEventTime).AddSeconds(1)} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if($events303 -ne $null){
Write-Verbose "$($global:Tab)[*] Does event ID 303 enabled ?"
}
foreach($event303 in $events303){
[xml]$xmlEvent303= $event303.ToXml()
$packName = ($xmlEvent303.Event.EventData.Data | Where-Object {$_.Name -eq "PackageName"}).'#text'
if($packName -eq "CREDSSP"){
$userName = ($xmlEvent303.Event.EventData.Data | Where-Object {$_.Name -eq "UserName"}).'#text'
$domain = ($xmlEvent303.Event.EventData.Data | Where-Object {$_.Name -eq "DomainName"}).'#text'
$sid = Get-SidFromDomainAndUser $domain $userName
if($sid -eq $ntlmObject.TargetUserSid){
$isNewCredentials = $true
#$isNewCredentials = [NewCredentialsUse]::USED
($ntlmDetailsSb.Value).AppendLine("$($global:Tab)[*] Session with new credentials was used. Might be Mimikatz ?") | Out-Null
break
}
}
}
}
if($isNewCredentials){
break
}
}
}
catch{
}
return $isNewCredentials
}
function Get-FormatedNTLMObject($ntlmObject){
$ntlmDetailsSb = New-Object -TypeName "System.Text.StringBuilder";
$tid = [System.Threading.Thread]::CurrentThread.ManagedThreadId
$ntlmDetailsSb.AppendLine("$($global:Tab)[*] TID: $($tid)") | Out-Null
$ntlmDetailsSb.AppendLine("$($global:Tab)[*] User Sid: $($ntlmObject.TargetUserSid)") | Out-Null
$ntlmDetailsSb.AppendLine("$($global:Tab)[*] Source computer name: $($ntlmObject.WorkstationName)") | Out-Null
$ntlmDetailsSb.AppendLine("$($global:Tab)[*] Target computer name: $($ntlmObject.DestinationWorkstation)") | Out-Null
$fulluser = $ntlmObject.TargetDomainName + "\" +$ntlmObject.TargetUserName
$ntlmDetailsSb.AppendLine("$($global:Tab)[*] User: $($fulluser)") | Out-Null
$ntlmDetailsSb.AppendLine("$($global:Tab)[*] Time: $($ntlmObject.Time)") | Out-Null
return $ntlmDetailsSb
}
function Test-ComputerConnection($TargetComputer){
$isConnected = $false
try{
$isConnected = Test-Connection -ComputerName $TargetComputer -Count 1 -Quiet
}
catch{
Write-Warning "Failed to check computer: $($TargetComputer)"
}
return $isConnected
}
<#
.Synopsis
Write-Log writes a message to a specified log file with the current time stamp.
.DESCRIPTION
The Write-Log function is designed to add logging capability to other scripts.
In addition to writing output and/or verbose you can write to a log file for
later debugging.
.NOTES
Created by: Jason Wasser @wasserja
Modified: 11/24/2015 09:30:19 AM
Changelog:
* Code simplification and clarification - thanks to @juneb_get_help
* Added documentation.
* Renamed LogPath parameter to Path to keep it standard - thanks to @JeffHicks
* Revised the Force switch to work as it should - thanks to @JeffHicks
To Do:
* Add error handling if trying to create a log file in a inaccessible location.
* Add ability to write $Message to $Verbose or $Error pipelines to eliminate
duplicates.
.PARAMETER Message
Message is the content that you wish to add to the log file.
.PARAMETER Path
The path to the log file to which you would like to write. By default the function will
create the path and file if it does not exist.
.PARAMETER Level
Specify the criticality of the log information being written to the log (i.e. Error, Warning, Informational)
.PARAMETER NoClobber
Use NoClobber if you do not wish to overwrite an existing file.
.EXAMPLE
Write-Log -Message 'Log message'
Writes the message to c:\Logs\PowerShellLog.log.
.EXAMPLE
Write-Log -Message 'Restarting Server.' -Path c:\Logs\Scriptoutput.log
Writes the content to the specified log file and creates the path and file specified.
.EXAMPLE
Write-Log -Message 'Folder does not exist.' -Path c:\Logs\Script.log -Level Error
Writes the message to the specified log file as an error message, and writes the message to the error pipeline.
.LINK
https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/scriptcenter/Write-Log-PowerShell-999c32d0
#>
function Write-Log
{
[CmdletBinding()]
Param
(
[Parameter(Mandatory=$true,
ValueFromPipelineByPropertyName=$true)]
[ValidateNotNullOrEmpty()]
[Alias("LogContent")]
[string]$Message,
[Parameter(Mandatory=$false)]
[Alias('LogPath')]
[string]$Path='C:\Logs\PowerShellLog.log',
[Parameter(Mandatory=$false)]
[ValidateSet("Error","Warn","Info")]
[string]$Level="Info",
[Parameter(Mandatory=$false)]
[switch]$NoClobber
)
Begin
{
# Set VerbosePreference to Continue so that verbose messages are displayed.
#$VerbosePreference = 'Continue'
}
Process
{
# If the file already exists and NoClobber was specified, do not write to the log.
if ((Test-Path $Path) -AND $NoClobber) {
Write-Error "Log file $Path already exists, and you specified NoClobber. Either delete the file or specify a different name."
Return
}
# If attempting to write to a log file in a folder/path that doesn't exist create the file including the path.
elseif (!(Test-Path $Path)) {
Write-Verbose "Creating $Path."
$NewLogFile = New-Item $Path -Force -ItemType File
}
else {
# Nothing to see here yet.
}
# Format Date for our Log File
$FormattedDate = Get-Date -Format "yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss"
# Write message to error, warning, or verbose pipeline and specify $LevelText
switch ($Level) {
'Error' {
Write-Error $Message
$LevelText = 'ERROR:'
}
'Warn' {
Write-Warning $Message
$LevelText = 'WARNING:'
}
'Info' {
Write-Verbose $Message
$LevelText = 'INFO:'
}
}
Write-Verbose "Writing data to $($Path)"
# Write log entry to $Path
"$FormattedDate $LevelText $([environment]::NewLine)$Message" | Out-File -FilePath $Path -Append
}
End
{
}
}
function Write-LogWithMutex($Message, $LogFile)
{
$mtx = New-Object System.Threading.Mutex($false, "TestMutex")
Write-Verbose "Waiting for mutex"
If ($mtx.WaitOne(1000)) { #Calling WaitOne() without parameters creates a blocking call until mutex available
Write-Verbose "Recieved mutex!"
Write-Log -Message $Message -Path $LogFile
Write-Verbose "Releasing mutex"
[void]$mtx.ReleaseMutex()
} Else {
Write-Warning "Timed out acquiring mutex!"
}
}
#region TIME CHECKING
# TODO: Create atomic function to get the time from a remote machine because the checking itself can take time.
# Make sure that the PCs has the same time zone.
# If not, run on the clients:
# 1) net time /set /y
# OR
# 2) w32tm /config /syncfromflags:domhier /update
# net stop w32time
# net start w32time
# You must run it as administrator
# I am using "net time" because it doesn't use WinRM which requires the customer for more changes on the client
function Test-TimeDiffBetweenRemoteComputerToDC($remoteComputer, $maxSecondsToWait=3){
$timeOnRemoteComputer = net time \\$remoteComputer
if($timeOnRemoteComputer -eq $null){
Write-Warning "Failed to get time on $($remoteComputer)"
}
else{
try {
$timeOnRemoteComputerFixed = [datetime]($timeOnRemoteComputer[0].Split("is").Trim()[-1])
$timeOnDc = net time
if($timeOnDc -eq $null){
Write-Warning "Failed to get time on DC"
}
else{
$timeOnDcFixed = [datetime]($timeOnDc[0].Split("is").Trim()[-1])
if([math]::Abs(($timeOnDcFixed - $timeOnRemoteComputerFixed).TotalSeconds) -ge $maxSecondsToWait){
Write-Warning @"
Time differences (>= $($maxSecondsToWait)) found:
$($timeOnRemoteComputer[0])
$($timeOnDc[0])
"@
Write-Warning "It will affect the results"
Write-Warning "Please run as administrator'net time /set /y' on $($timeOnRemoteComputer[0])"
}
}
}
catch {
Write-Warning "Failed to cast datetie of $($remoteComputer)"
}
}
}
# ComputerATime - ComputerBTime
function Get-TimeDifferenceBetweenComputers($computerA, $computerB){
$computerATime = net time \\$computerA
$computerBTime = net time \\$computerB
$timeDiff = $null
if($computerATime -eq $null){
Write-Warning "Failed to get time on $($computerATime)"
}
else{
if($computerBTime -eq $null){
Write-Warning "Failed to get time on $($computerBTime)"
}
else{
try {
$computerATimeFixed = [datetime]($computerATime[0].Split("is").Trim()[-1])
$computerBTimeFixed = [datetime]($computerBTime[0].Split("is").Trim()[-1])
}
catch {
Write-Verbose "Problem with casting date time."
Write-Verbose "ComputerATimeFixed: $($computerATimeFixed)"
Write-Verbose "computerBTimeFixed: $($computerATimeFixed)"
}
$timeDiff = ($computerATimeFixed - $computerBTimeFixed).TotalSeconds
if([math]::Abs($timeDiff) -ge 300){
Write-Warning @"
Time differences (>= 5 minute) found:
$($computerATime)
$($computerBTime)
"@
Write-Warning "It will affect the results"
Write-Warning "Please run as administrator'net time /set /y' on $($computerATime) and $($computerBTime)"
}
}
}
return $timeDiff
}
function Get-CurrentTimeOnRemoteComputer($remoteComputer)
{
$computerTime = net time \\$remoteComputer
$computerTimeFixed = $null
if($computerTime -eq $null){
Write-Warning "Failed to get time on remote computer $($remoteComputer)"
}
else{
try {
$computerTimeFixed = [datetime]($computerTime[0].Split("is").Trim()[-1])
}
catch {
Write-Warning "Failed to get fixed time from remote computer $($remoteComputer)"
}
}
return $computerTimeFixed
}
#endregion TIME CHECKING
function Detect-PTH($targetComputerName, $startTime, $logonTechnique, $UseNewCredentialsCheck){
#Test-TimeDiffBetweenRemoteComputerToDC $targetComputerName
[System.Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName("System.Diagnostics")
$stopwatch = new-object system.diagnostics.stopwatch
$previousNtmlEvent = $null
$sleepInterval = 2
$endTime = Get-CurrentTimeOnRemoteComputer $targetComputerName
if(-not $endTime){
try {
$hostname = hostname
}
catch {
Write-Verbose "Failed to get host name"
}
Write-Warning "Using the current time from the current host $($hostname)"
$endTime = (date)
}
Write-Host
while($true){
Start-Sleep -Seconds $sleepInterval
$endTime = $endTime.AddSeconds($stopwatch.Elapsed.TotalSeconds)
$stopwatch.Reset() | Out-Null
$stopwatch.Start() | Out-Null
$mili = $endTime.Millisecond * -1
$endTime = $endTime.AddMilliseconds($mili)
# Adding -2 seconds to cover gaps in the assign
$startTime = $startTime.AddSeconds(-2)
if(Test-ComputerConnection $targetComputerName)
{
try{
$ntlmEvents = Get-WinEvent -ComputerName $targetComputerName -FilterHashtable @{LogName="Security"; id=4624; StartTime=$startTime; EndTime=$endTime} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object {($_.Message -match "Logon Type:`t*3") -and ($_.Message -match "Security ID:`t*S-1-0-0") -and ($_.Message -match "Authentication Package:`t*NTLM")}
}
catch{
continue
}
$startTime = $endTime.AddTicks(1)
foreach($ntlmEvent in $ntlmEvents){
$isLegitNTLMConnection = $false
[xml]$ntlmXmlEvent = $ntlmEvent.ToXml()
$ntlmEventObject = Get-NtlmEventObject $ntlmXmlEvent $targetComputerName
if((Get-UserFromSid $ntlmEventObject.TargetUserSid) -eq $null){
continue
}
if (($global:WellKnownSIDs.ContainsKey($ntlmEventObject.TargetUserSid)) -or ($ntlmEventObject.TargetUserSid -eq $null)){
#Write-Host "Continue, well known sid"
continue
}
if ($ntlmEventObject.WorkstationName -eq $null){
Write-Verbose "$($global:Tab)[*] No computer name in the log"
continue
}
if(($previousNtmlEvent -ne $null) -and ($previousNtmlEvent.TargetUserSid -eq $ntlmEventObject.TargetUserSid) -and ($previousNtmlEvent.WorkstationName -eq $ntlmEventObject.WorkstationName)){
if(($previousNtmlEvent.Time - $ntlmEventObject.Time).Seconds -lt $sleepInterval){
#Write-Host "continue"
continue
}
}
$isPrivilegedAccount = Is-PrivilegedAccount $ntlmEventObject
if ($isPrivilegedAccount){
$ntlmDetailsSb = Get-FormatedNTLMObject $ntlmEventObject
if (-not (Test-ComputerExistInAD($ntlmEventObject.WorkstationName))){
$ntlmDetailsSb.AppendLine("$($global:Tab)[*] Remote login from unidentified computer") | Out-Null
$ntlmDetailsSb.AppendLine("$($global:Tab)[*] Suspicious NTLM logon" ) | Out-Null
}
else{
#Test-TimeDiffBetweenRemoteComputerToDC $ntlmEventObject.WorkstationName 60
$isNewCredUsed = $false
if($UseNewCredentialsCheck){
$isNewCredUsed = Is-LogonWithNewCredentials $ntlmEventObject ([ref]$ntlmDetailsSb)
}
if(-not $isNewCredUsed){
if(Is-LegitLogon $ntlmEventObject $logonTechnique ([ref]$ntlmDetailsSb)){
$isLegitNTLMConnection = $true
}
elseif(Is-UsingExplicityPassword $ntlmEventObject){
$ntlmDetailsSb.AppendLine("$($global:Tab)[*] Found a logon attempt using explicit credentials") | Out-Null
$isLegitNTLMConnection = $true
}
}
}
Write-Host $ntlmDetailsSb.ToString() -NoNewLine
if ($isLegitNTLMConnection){
$result = "$($global:Tab)[*] Legit logon"
Write-Host $result -ForegroundColor Green
}
else{
$result = "$($global:Tab)[*] Illegit logon"
Write-Host $result -ForegroundColor Red
}
$ntlmDetailsSb.AppendLine($result) | Out-Null
if($LogFile){
Write-LogWithMutex -Message $ntlmDetailsSb.ToString() -LogFile $LogFile
}
Write-Host
}
$previousNtmlEvent = $ntlmEventObject
}
}
else{
Write-Host "No connection to computer "$targetComputerName
}