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Boot frozen at lpddr4 swffc start #2

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JoeSandom opened this issue Jan 28, 2020 · 1 comment
Open

Boot frozen at lpddr4 swffc start #2

JoeSandom opened this issue Jan 28, 2020 · 1 comment

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@JoeSandom
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Hi,

The most recent commits have caused the IMX8MQ to fail to boot (58e9698).

The point at which boot freezes is as follows;

[ 0.688134] imx-sdma 30bd0000.sdma: no iram assigned, using external mem [ 0.695559] imx-sdma 30bd0000.sdma: Falling back to user helper [ 0.696391] imx-sdma 302c0000.sdma: no iram assigned, using external mem lpddr4 swffc start

@macpijan
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macpijan commented Feb 18, 2020

@JoeSandom I also face the same behavior on Hummingboard Pulse. What was your solution / workaround? Simply remove the 58e9698 commit ?

jnettlet pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jan 7, 2021
…d ops

[ Upstream commit 52719fc ]

There are three ways pseries_suspend_begin() can be reached:

1. When "mem" is written to /sys/power/state:

kobj_attr_store()
-> state_store()
  -> pm_suspend()
    -> suspend_devices_and_enter()
      -> pseries_suspend_begin()

This never works because there is no way to supply a valid stream id
using this interface, and H_VASI_STATE is called with a stream id of
zero. So this call path is useless at best.

2. When a stream id is written to /sys/devices/system/power/hibernate.
pseries_suspend_begin() is polled directly from store_hibernate()
until the stream is in the "Suspending" state (i.e. the platform is
ready for the OS to suspend execution):

dev_attr_store()
-> store_hibernate()
  -> pseries_suspend_begin()

3. When a stream id is written to /sys/devices/system/power/hibernate
(continued). After #2, pseries_suspend_begin() is called once again
from the pm core:

dev_attr_store()
-> store_hibernate()
  -> pm_suspend()
    -> suspend_devices_and_enter()
      -> pseries_suspend_begin()

This is redundant because the VASI suspend state is already known to
be Suspending.

The begin() callback of platform_suspend_ops is optional, so we can
simply remove that assignment with no loss of function.

Fixes: 32d8ad4 ("powerpc/pseries: Partition hibernation support")
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
jnettlet pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jan 7, 2021
[ Upstream commit 4a9d81c ]

If the elem is deleted during be iterated on it, the iteration
process will fall into an endless loop.

kernel: NMI watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#4 stuck for 22s! [nfsd:17137]

PID: 17137  TASK: ffff8818d93c0000  CPU: 4   COMMAND: "nfsd"
    [exception RIP: __state_in_grace+76]
    RIP: ffffffffc00e817c  RSP: ffff8818d3aefc98  RFLAGS: 00000246
    RAX: ffff881dc0c38298  RBX: ffffffff81b03580  RCX: ffff881dc02c9f50
    RDX: ffff881e3fce8500  RSI: 0000000000000001  RDI: ffffffff81b03580
    RBP: ffff8818d3aefca0   R8: 0000000000000020   R9: ffff8818d3aefd40
    R10: ffff88017fc03800  R11: ffff8818e83933c0  R12: ffff8818d3aefd40
    R13: 0000000000000000  R14: ffff8818e8391068  R15: ffff8818fa6e4000
    CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #0 [ffff8818d3aefc98] opens_in_grace at ffffffffc00e81e3 [grace]
 #1 [ffff8818d3aefca8] nfs4_preprocess_stateid_op at ffffffffc02a3e6c [nfsd]
 #2 [ffff8818d3aefd18] nfsd4_write at ffffffffc028ed5b [nfsd]
 #3 [ffff8818d3aefd80] nfsd4_proc_compound at ffffffffc0290a0d [nfsd]
 #4 [ffff8818d3aefdd0] nfsd_dispatch at ffffffffc027b800 [nfsd]
 #5 [ffff8818d3aefe08] svc_process_common at ffffffffc02017f3 [sunrpc]
 #6 [ffff8818d3aefe70] svc_process at ffffffffc0201ce3 [sunrpc]
 #7 [ffff8818d3aefe98] nfsd at ffffffffc027b117 [nfsd]
 #8 [ffff8818d3aefec8] kthread at ffffffff810b88c1
 #9 [ffff8818d3aeff50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff816d1607

The troublemake elem:
crash> lock_manager ffff881dc0c38298
struct lock_manager {
  list = {
    next = 0xffff881dc0c38298,
    prev = 0xffff881dc0c38298
  },
  block_opens = false
}

Fixes: c87fb4a ("lockd: NLM grace period shouldn't block NFSv4 opens")
Signed-off-by: Cheng Lin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yi Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
jnettlet pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jan 25, 2021
[ Upstream commit d9e4498 ]

Like other tunneling interfaces, the bareudp doesn't need TXLOCK.
So, It is good to set the NETIF_F_LLTX flag to improve performance and
to avoid lockdep's false-positive warning.

Test commands:
    ip netns add A
    ip netns add B
    ip link add veth0 netns A type veth peer name veth1 netns B
    ip netns exec A ip link set veth0 up
    ip netns exec A ip a a 10.0.0.1/24 dev veth0
    ip netns exec B ip link set veth1 up
    ip netns exec B ip a a 10.0.0.2/24 dev veth1

    for i in {2..1}
    do
            let A=$i-1
            ip netns exec A ip link add bareudp$i type bareudp \
		    dstport $i ethertype ip
            ip netns exec A ip link set bareudp$i up
            ip netns exec A ip a a 10.0.$i.1/24 dev bareudp$i
            ip netns exec A ip r a 10.0.$i.2 encap ip src 10.0.$A.1 \
		    dst 10.0.$A.2 via 10.0.$i.2 dev bareudp$i

            ip netns exec B ip link add bareudp$i type bareudp \
		    dstport $i ethertype ip
            ip netns exec B ip link set bareudp$i up
            ip netns exec B ip a a 10.0.$i.2/24 dev bareudp$i
            ip netns exec B ip r a 10.0.$i.1 encap ip src 10.0.$A.2 \
		    dst 10.0.$A.1 via 10.0.$i.1 dev bareudp$i
    done
    ip netns exec A ping 10.0.2.2

Splat looks like:
[   96.992803][  T822] ============================================
[   96.993954][  T822] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[   96.995102][  T822] 5.10.0+ #819 Not tainted
[   96.995927][  T822] --------------------------------------------
[   96.997091][  T822] ping/822 is trying to acquire lock:
[   96.998083][  T822] ffff88810f753898 (_xmit_NONE#2){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f52/0x2960
[   96.999813][  T822]
[   96.999813][  T822] but task is already holding lock:
[   97.001192][  T822] ffff88810c385498 (_xmit_NONE#2){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f52/0x2960
[   97.002908][  T822]
[   97.002908][  T822] other info that might help us debug this:
[   97.004401][  T822]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[   97.004401][  T822]
[   97.005784][  T822]        CPU0
[   97.006407][  T822]        ----
[   97.007010][  T822]   lock(_xmit_NONE#2);
[   97.007779][  T822]   lock(_xmit_NONE#2);
[   97.008550][  T822]
[   97.008550][  T822]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[   97.008550][  T822]
[   97.010057][  T822]  May be due to missing lock nesting notation
[   97.010057][  T822]
[   97.011594][  T822] 7 locks held by ping/822:
[   97.012426][  T822]  #0: ffff888109a144f0 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: raw_sendmsg+0x12f7/0x2b00
[   97.014191][  T822]  #1: ffffffffbce2f5a0 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_finish_output2+0x249/0x2020
[   97.016045][  T822]  #2: ffffffffbce2f5a0 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x1fd/0x2960
[   97.017897][  T822]  #3: ffff88810c385498 (_xmit_NONE#2){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f52/0x2960
[   97.019684][  T822]  #4: ffffffffbce2f600 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: bareudp_xmit+0x31b/0x3690 [bareudp]
[   97.021573][  T822]  #5: ffffffffbce2f5a0 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_finish_output2+0x249/0x2020
[   97.023424][  T822]  #6: ffffffffbce2f5a0 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x1fd/0x2960
[   97.025259][  T822]
[   97.025259][  T822] stack backtrace:
[   97.026349][  T822] CPU: 3 PID: 822 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.10.0+ #819
[   97.027609][  T822] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[   97.029407][  T822] Call Trace:
[   97.030015][  T822]  dump_stack+0x99/0xcb
[   97.030783][  T822]  __lock_acquire.cold.77+0x149/0x3a9
[   97.031773][  T822]  ? stack_trace_save+0x81/0xa0
[   97.032661][  T822]  ? register_lock_class+0x1910/0x1910
[   97.033673][  T822]  ? register_lock_class+0x1910/0x1910
[   97.034679][  T822]  ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x91/0xc0
[   97.035697][  T822]  ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xa0/0xa0
[   97.036690][  T822]  lock_acquire+0x1b2/0x730
[   97.037515][  T822]  ? __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f52/0x2960
[   97.038466][  T822]  ? check_flags+0x50/0x50
[   97.039277][  T822]  ? netif_skb_features+0x296/0x9c0
[   97.040226][  T822]  ? validate_xmit_skb+0x29/0xb10
[   97.041151][  T822]  _raw_spin_lock+0x30/0x70
[   97.041977][  T822]  ? __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f52/0x2960
[   97.042927][  T822]  __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f52/0x2960
[   97.043852][  T822]  ? netdev_core_pick_tx+0x290/0x290
[   97.044824][  T822]  ? mark_held_locks+0xb7/0x120
[   97.045712][  T822]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x12c/0x3e0
[   97.046824][  T822]  ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0xa5/0xf0
[   97.047771][  T822]  ? ___neigh_create+0x12a8/0x1eb0
[   97.048710][  T822]  ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x41/0x120
[   97.049626][  T822]  ? ___neigh_create+0x12a8/0x1eb0
[   97.050556][  T822]  ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0xa5/0xf0
[   97.051509][  T822]  ? ___neigh_create+0x12a8/0x1eb0
[   97.052443][  T822]  ? check_chain_key+0x244/0x5f0
[   97.053352][  T822]  ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0x56/0xa0
[   97.054317][  T822]  ? ip_finish_output2+0x6ea/0x2020
[   97.055263][  T822]  ? pneigh_lookup+0x410/0x410
[   97.056135][  T822]  ip_finish_output2+0x6ea/0x2020
[ ... ]

Acked-by: Guillaume Nault <[email protected]>
Fixes: 571912c ("net: UDP tunnel encapsulation module for tunnelling different protocols like MPLS, IP, NSH etc.")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
jnettlet pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jan 25, 2021
commit 3a21777 upstream.

We had kernel panic, it is caused by unload module and last
close confirmation.

call trace:
[1196029.743127]  free_sess+0x15/0x50 [rtrs_client]
[1196029.743128]  rtrs_clt_close+0x4c/0x70 [rtrs_client]
[1196029.743129]  ? rnbd_clt_unmap_device+0x1b0/0x1b0 [rnbd_client]
[1196029.743130]  close_rtrs+0x25/0x50 [rnbd_client]
[1196029.743131]  rnbd_client_exit+0x93/0xb99 [rnbd_client]
[1196029.743132]  __x64_sys_delete_module+0x190/0x260

And in the crashdump confirmation kworker is also running.
PID: 6943   TASK: ffff9e2ac8098000  CPU: 4   COMMAND: "kworker/4:2"
 #0 [ffffb206cf337c30] __schedule at ffffffff9f93f891
 #1 [ffffb206cf337cc8] schedule at ffffffff9f93fe98
 #2 [ffffb206cf337cd0] schedule_timeout at ffffffff9f943938
 #3 [ffffb206cf337d50] wait_for_completion at ffffffff9f9410a7
 #4 [ffffb206cf337da0] __flush_work at ffffffff9f08ce0e
 #5 [ffffb206cf337e20] rtrs_clt_close_conns at ffffffffc0d5f668 [rtrs_client]
 #6 [ffffb206cf337e48] rtrs_clt_close at ffffffffc0d5f801 [rtrs_client]
 #7 [ffffb206cf337e68] close_rtrs at ffffffffc0d26255 [rnbd_client]
 #8 [ffffb206cf337e78] free_sess at ffffffffc0d262ad [rnbd_client]
 #9 [ffffb206cf337e88] rnbd_clt_put_dev at ffffffffc0d266a7 [rnbd_client]

The problem is both code path try to close same session, which lead to
panic.

To fix it, just skip the sess if the refcount already drop to 0.

Fixes: f7a7a5c ("block/rnbd: client: main functionality")
Signed-off-by: Jack Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Gioh Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
jnettlet pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jan 25, 2021
[ Upstream commit b774134 ]

The buffer list can have zero skb as following path:
tipc_named_node_up()->tipc_node_xmit()->tipc_link_xmit(), so
we need to check the list before casting an &sk_buff.

Fault report:
 [] tipc: Bulk publication failure
 [] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical [#1] PREEMPT [...]
 [] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000000c8-0x00000000000000cf]
 [] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.10.0-rc4+ #2
 [] Hardware name: Bochs ..., BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
 [] RIP: 0010:tipc_link_xmit+0xc1/0x2180
 [] Code: 24 b8 00 00 00 00 4d 39 ec 4c 0f 44 e8 e8 d7 0a 10 f9 48 [...]
 [] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000006ea0 EFLAGS: 00010202
 [] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8880224da000 RCX: 1ffff11003d3cc0d
 [] RDX: 0000000000000019 RSI: ffffffff886007b9 RDI: 00000000000000c8
 [] RBP: ffffc90000007018 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffff52000000ded
 [] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: fffff52000000dec R12: ffffc90000007148
 [] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffc90000007018
 [] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888037400000(0000) knlGS:000[...]
 [] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 [] CR2: 00007fffd2db5000 CR3: 000000002b08f000 CR4: 00000000000006f0

Fixes: af9b028 ("tipc: make media xmit call outside node spinlock context")
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hoang Le <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
jnettlet pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 1, 2021
commit fb28610 upstream.

While testing the error paths of relocation I hit the following lockdep
splat:

  ======================================================
  WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
  5.10.0-rc6+ #217 Not tainted
  ------------------------------------------------------
  mount/779 is trying to acquire lock:
  ffffa0e676945418 (&fs_info->balance_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_recover_balance+0x2f0/0x340

  but task is already holding lock:
  ffffa0e60ee31da8 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x27/0x100

  which lock already depends on the new lock.

  the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

  -> #2 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}:
	 down_read_nested+0x43/0x130
	 __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x27/0x100
	 btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x31/0x40
	 btrfs_search_slot+0x462/0x8f0
	 btrfs_update_root+0x55/0x2b0
	 btrfs_drop_snapshot+0x398/0x750
	 clean_dirty_subvols+0xdf/0x120
	 btrfs_recover_relocation+0x534/0x5a0
	 btrfs_start_pre_rw_mount+0xcb/0x170
	 open_ctree+0x151f/0x1726
	 btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x12/0xea
	 legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50
	 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0
	 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0xb0
	 btrfs_mount+0x10d/0x380
	 legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50
	 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0
	 path_mount+0x433/0xc10
	 __x64_sys_mount+0xe3/0x120
	 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

  -> #1 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}:
	 start_transaction+0x444/0x700
	 insert_balance_item.isra.0+0x37/0x320
	 btrfs_balance+0x354/0xf40
	 btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x2cf/0x380
	 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
	 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

  -> #0 (&fs_info->balance_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
	 __lock_acquire+0x1120/0x1e10
	 lock_acquire+0x116/0x370
	 __mutex_lock+0x7e/0x7b0
	 btrfs_recover_balance+0x2f0/0x340
	 open_ctree+0x1095/0x1726
	 btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x12/0xea
	 legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50
	 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0
	 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0xb0
	 btrfs_mount+0x10d/0x380
	 legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50
	 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0
	 path_mount+0x433/0xc10
	 __x64_sys_mount+0xe3/0x120
	 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

  other info that might help us debug this:

  Chain exists of:
    &fs_info->balance_mutex --> sb_internal#2 --> btrfs-root-00

   Possible unsafe locking scenario:

	 CPU0                    CPU1
	 ----                    ----
    lock(btrfs-root-00);
				 lock(sb_internal#2);
				 lock(btrfs-root-00);
    lock(&fs_info->balance_mutex);

   *** DEADLOCK ***

  2 locks held by mount/779:
   #0: ffffa0e60dc040e0 (&type->s_umount_key#47/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: alloc_super+0xb5/0x380
   #1: ffffa0e60ee31da8 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x27/0x100

  stack backtrace:
  CPU: 0 PID: 779 Comm: mount Not tainted 5.10.0-rc6+ #217
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
  Call Trace:
   dump_stack+0x8b/0xb0
   check_noncircular+0xcf/0xf0
   ? trace_call_bpf+0x139/0x260
   __lock_acquire+0x1120/0x1e10
   lock_acquire+0x116/0x370
   ? btrfs_recover_balance+0x2f0/0x340
   __mutex_lock+0x7e/0x7b0
   ? btrfs_recover_balance+0x2f0/0x340
   ? btrfs_recover_balance+0x2f0/0x340
   ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x80
   ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x2c4/0x2f0
   ? btrfs_get_64+0x5e/0x100
   btrfs_recover_balance+0x2f0/0x340
   open_ctree+0x1095/0x1726
   btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x12/0xea
   ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x80
   legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50
   vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0
   vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0xb0
   btrfs_mount+0x10d/0x380
   ? __kmalloc_track_caller+0x2f2/0x320
   legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50
   vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0
   ? capable+0x3a/0x60
   path_mount+0x433/0xc10
   __x64_sys_mount+0xe3/0x120
   do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

This is straightforward to fix, simply release the path before we setup
the balance_ctl.

CC: [email protected] # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
jnettlet pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 1, 2021
commit cf9d052 upstream.

In Linux, if a driver does disable_irq() and later does enable_irq()
on its interrupt, I believe it's expecting these properties:
* If an interrupt was pending when the driver disabled then it will
  still be pending after the driver re-enables.
* If an edge-triggered interrupt comes in while an interrupt is
  disabled it should assert when the interrupt is re-enabled.

If you think that the above sounds a lot like the disable_irq() and
enable_irq() are supposed to be masking/unmasking the interrupt
instead of disabling/enabling it then you've made an astute
observation.  Specifically when talking about interrupts, "mask"
usually means to stop posting interrupts but keep tracking them and
"disable" means to fully shut off interrupt detection.  It's
unfortunate that this is so confusing, but presumably this is all the
way it is for historical reasons.

Perhaps more confusing than the above is that, even though clients of
IRQs themselves don't have a way to request mask/unmask
vs. disable/enable calls, IRQ chips themselves can implement both.
...and yet more confusing is that if an IRQ chip implements
disable/enable then they will be called when a client driver calls
disable_irq() / enable_irq().

It does feel like some of the above could be cleared up.  However,
without any other core interrupt changes it should be clear that when
an IRQ chip gets a request to "disable" an IRQ that it has to treat it
like a mask of that IRQ.

In any case, after that long interlude you can see that the "unmask
and clear" can break things.  Maulik tried to fix it so that we no
longer did "unmask and clear" in commit 71266d9 ("pinctrl: qcom:
Move clearing pending IRQ to .irq_request_resources callback"), but it
only handled the PDC case and it had problems (it caused
sc7180-trogdor devices to fail to suspend).  Let's fix.

>From my understanding the source of the phantom interrupt in the
were these two things:
1. One that could have been introduced in msm_gpio_irq_set_type()
   (only for the non-PDC case).
2. Edges could have been detected when a GPIO was muxed away.

Fixing case #1 is easy.  We can just add a clear in
msm_gpio_irq_set_type().

Fixing case #2 is harder.  Let's use a concrete example.  In
sc7180-trogdor.dtsi we configure the uart3 to have two pinctrl states,
sleep and default, and mux between the two during runtime PM and
system suspend (see geni_se_resources_{on,off}() for more
details). The difference between the sleep and default state is that
the RX pin is muxed to a GPIO during sleep and muxed to the UART
otherwise.

As per Qualcomm, when we mux the pin over to the UART function the PDC
(or the non-PDC interrupt detection logic) is still watching it /
latching edges.  These edges don't cause interrupts because the
current code masks the interrupt unless we're entering suspend.
However, as soon as we enter suspend we unmask the interrupt and it's
counted as a wakeup.

Let's deal with the problem like this:
* When we mux away, we'll mask our interrupt.  This isn't necessary in
  the above case since the client already masked us, but it's a good
  idea in general.
* When we mux back will clear any interrupts and unmask.

Fixes: 4b7618f ("pinctrl: qcom: Add irq_enable callback for msm gpio")
Fixes: 71266d9 ("pinctrl: qcom: Move clearing pending IRQ to .irq_request_resources callback")
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Maulik Shah <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Maulik Shah <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210114191601.v7.4.I7cf3019783720feb57b958c95c2b684940264cd1@changeid
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
jnettlet pushed a commit that referenced this issue Mar 14, 2021
commit 2e99ded upstream.

Similar to commit 165ae7a ("igb: Report speed and duplex as unknown
when device is runtime suspended"), if we try to read speed and duplex
sysfs while the device is runtime suspended, igc will complain and
stops working:

[  123.449883] igc 0000:03:00.0 enp3s0: PCIe link lost, device now detached
[  123.450052] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008
[  123.450056] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[  123.450058] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[  123.450059] PGD 0 P4D 0
[  123.450064] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[  123.450068] CPU: 0 PID: 2525 Comm: udevadm Tainted: G     U  W  OE     5.10.0-1002-oem #2+rkl2-Ubuntu
[  123.450078] RIP: 0010:igc_rd32+0x1c/0x90 [igc]
[  123.450080] Code: c0 5d c3 b8 fd ff ff ff c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89 f0 48 89 e5 41 56 41 55 41 54 49 89 c4 53 48 8b 57 08 48 01 d0 <44> 8b 28 41 83 fd ff 74 0c 5b 44 89 e8 41 5c 41 5d 4

[  123.450083] RSP: 0018:ffffb0d100d6fcc0 EFLAGS: 00010202
[  123.450085] RAX: 0000000000000008 RBX: ffffb0d100d6fd30 RCX: 0000000000000000
[  123.450087] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff945a12716c10
[  123.450089] RBP: ffffb0d100d6fce0 R08: ffff945a12716550 R09: ffff945a09874000
[  123.450090] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000008
[  123.450092] R13: ffff945a12716000 R14: ffff945a037da280 R15: ffff945a037da290
[  123.450094] FS:  00007f3b34c868c0(0000) GS:ffff945b89200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  123.450096] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  123.450098] CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 00000001144de006 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
[  123.450100] PKRU: 55555554
[  123.450101] Call Trace:
[  123.450111]  igc_ethtool_get_link_ksettings+0xd6/0x1b0 [igc]
[  123.450118]  __ethtool_get_link_ksettings+0x71/0xb0
[  123.450123]  duplex_show+0x74/0xc0
[  123.450129]  dev_attr_show+0x1d/0x40
[  123.450134]  sysfs_kf_seq_show+0xa1/0x100
[  123.450137]  kernfs_seq_show+0x27/0x30
[  123.450142]  seq_read+0xb7/0x400
[  123.450148]  ? common_file_perm+0x72/0x170
[  123.450151]  kernfs_fop_read+0x35/0x1b0
[  123.450155]  vfs_read+0xb5/0x1b0
[  123.450157]  ksys_read+0x67/0xe0
[  123.450160]  __x64_sys_read+0x1a/0x20
[  123.450164]  do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[  123.450168]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[  123.450170] RIP: 0033:0x7f3b351fe142
[  123.450173] Code: c0 e9 c2 fe ff ff 50 48 8d 3d 3a ca 0a 00 e8 f5 19 02 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 56 c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24
[  123.450174] RSP: 002b:00007fffef2ec138 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
[  123.450177] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f3b351fe142
[  123.450179] RDX: 0000000000001001 RSI: 00005644c047f070 RDI: 0000000000000003
[  123.450180] RBP: 00007fffef2ec340 R08: 00005644c047f070 R09: 00007f3b352d9320
[  123.450182] R10: 00005644c047c010 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005644c047cbf0
[  123.450184] R13: 00005644c047e6d0 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 00007fffef2ec140
[  123.450189] Modules linked in: rfcomm ccm cmac algif_hash algif_skcipher af_alg bnep toshiba_acpi industrialio toshiba_haps hp_accel lis3lv02d btusb btrtl btbcm btintel bluetooth ecdh_generic ecc joydev input_leds nls_iso8859_1 snd_sof_pci snd_sof_intel_byt snd_sof_intel_ipc snd_sof_intel_hda_common snd_soc_hdac_hda snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_sof_xtensa_dsp snd_sof_intel_hda snd_sof snd_hda_ext_core snd_soc_acpi_intel_match snd_soc_acpi snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic ledtrig_audio snd_hda_intel snd_intel_dspcfg soundwire_intel soundwire_generic_allocation soundwire_cadence snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core ath10k_pci snd_hwdep intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common ath10k_core soundwire_bus snd_soc_core x86_pkg_temp_thermal ath intel_powerclamp snd_compress ac97_bus snd_pcm_dmaengine mac80211 snd_pcm coretemp snd_seq_midi snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi kvm_intel cfg80211 snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_timer mei_hdcp kvm libarc4 snd crct10dif_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel
 mei_me dell_wmi
[  123.450266]  dell_smbios soundcore sparse_keymap dcdbas crypto_simd cryptd mei dell_uart_backlight glue_helper ee1004 wmi_bmof intel_wmi_thunderbolt dell_wmi_descriptor mac_hid efi_pstore acpi_pad acpi_tad intel_cstate sch_fq_codel parport_pc ppdev lp parport ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx xor raid6_pq libcrc32c raid1 raid0 multipath linear dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log hid_generic usbhid hid i915 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops cec crc32_pclmul rc_core drm intel_lpss_pci i2c_i801 ahci igc intel_lpss i2c_smbus idma64 xhci_pci libahci virt_dma xhci_pci_renesas wmi video pinctrl_tigerlake
[  123.450335] CR2: 0000000000000008
[  123.450338] ---[ end trace 9f731e38b53c35cc ]---

The more generic approach will be wrap get_link_ksettings() with begin()
and complete() callbacks, and calls runtime resume and runtime suspend
routine respectively. However, igc is like igb, runtime resume routine
uses rtnl_lock() which upper ethtool layer also uses.

So to prevent a deadlock on rtnl, take a different approach, use
pm_runtime_suspended() to avoid reading register while device is runtime
suspended.

Fixes: 8c5ad0d ("igc: Add ethtool support")
Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Sasha Neftin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
jnettlet pushed a commit that referenced this issue Mar 14, 2021
commit 3f618ab upstream.

When building with KASAN and LKDTM, clang may implictly generate an
asan.module_ctor function in the LKDTM rodata object. The Makefile moves
the lkdtm_rodata_do_nothing() function into .rodata by renaming the
file's .text section to .rodata, and consequently also moves the ctor
function into .rodata, leading to a boot time crash (splat below) when
the ctor is invoked by do_ctors().

Let's prevent this by marking the function as noinstr rather than
notrace, and renaming the file's .noinstr.text to .rodata. Marking the
function as noinstr will prevent tracing and kprobes, and will inhibit
any undesireable compiler instrumentation.

The ctor function (if any) will be placed in .text and will work
correctly.

Example splat before this patch is applied:

[    0.916359] Unable to handle kernel execute from non-executable memory at virtual address ffffa0006b60f5ac
[    0.922088] Mem abort info:
[    0.922828]   ESR = 0x8600000e
[    0.923635]   EC = 0x21: IABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[    0.925036]   SET = 0, FnV = 0
[    0.925838]   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[    0.926714] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000000427b3000
[    0.928489] [ffffa0006b60f5ac] pgd=000000023ffff003, p4d=000000023ffff003, pud=000000023fffe003, pmd=0068000042000f01
[    0.931330] Internal error: Oops: 8600000e [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[    0.932806] Modules linked in:
[    0.933617] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.10.0-rc7 #2
[    0.935620] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
[    0.936924] pstate: 40400005 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
[    0.938609] pc : asan.module_ctor+0x0/0x14
[    0.939759] lr : do_basic_setup+0x4c/0x70
[    0.940889] sp : ffff27b600177e30
[    0.941815] x29: ffff27b600177e30 x28: 0000000000000000
[    0.943306] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000000
[    0.944803] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000
[    0.946289] x23: 0000000000000001 x22: 0000000000000000
[    0.947777] x21: ffffa0006bf4a890 x20: ffffa0006befb6c0
[    0.949271] x19: ffffa0006bef9358 x18: 0000000000000068
[    0.950756] x17: fffffffffffffff8 x16: 0000000000000000
[    0.952246] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000
[    0.953734] x13: 00000000838a16d5 x12: 0000000000000001
[    0.955223] x11: ffff94000da74041 x10: dfffa00000000000
[    0.956715] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : ffffa0006b60f5ac
[    0.958199] x7 : f9f9f9f9f9f9f9f9 x6 : 000000000000003f
[    0.959683] x5 : 0000000000000040 x4 : 0000000000000000
[    0.961178] x3 : ffffa0006bdc15a0 x2 : 0000000000000005
[    0.962662] x1 : 00000000000000f9 x0 : ffffa0006bef9350
[    0.964155] Call trace:
[    0.964844]  asan.module_ctor+0x0/0x14
[    0.965895]  kernel_init_freeable+0x158/0x198
[    0.967115]  kernel_init+0x14/0x19c
[    0.968104]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x30
[    0.969110] Code: 00000003 00000000 00000000 00000000 (00000000)
[    0.970815] ---[ end trace b5339784e20d015c ]---

Cc: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
jnettlet pushed a commit that referenced this issue Mar 14, 2021
Whenever we attempt to do a non-aligned direct IO write with O_DSYNC, we
end up triggering an assertion and crashing. Example reproducer:

  $ cat test.sh
  #!/bin/bash

  DEV=/dev/sdj
  MNT=/mnt/sdj

  mkfs.btrfs -f $DEV > /dev/null
  mount $DEV $MNT

  # Do a direct IO write with O_DSYNC into a non-aligned range...
  xfs_io -f -d -s -c "pwrite -S 0xab -b 64K 1111 64K" $MNT/foobar

  umount $MNT

When running the reproducer an assertion fails and produces the following
trace:

  [ 2418.403134] assertion failed: !current->journal_info || flush != BTRFS_RESERVE_FLUSH_DATA, in fs/btrfs/space-info.c:1467
  [ 2418.403745] ------------[ cut here ]------------
  [ 2418.404306] kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.h:3286!
  [ 2418.404862] invalid opcode: 0000 [#2] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI
  [ 2418.405451] CPU: 1 PID: 64705 Comm: xfs_io Tainted: G      D           5.10.15-btrfs-next-87 #1
  [ 2418.406026] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
  [ 2418.407228] RIP: 0010:assertfail.constprop.0+0x18/0x26 [btrfs]
  [ 2418.407835] Code: e6 48 c7 (...)
  [ 2418.409078] RSP: 0018:ffffb06080d13c98 EFLAGS: 00010246
  [ 2418.409696] RAX: 000000000000006c RBX: ffff994c1debbf08 RCX: 0000000000000000
  [ 2418.410302] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
  [ 2418.410904] RBP: ffff994c21770000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
  [ 2418.411504] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000010000
  [ 2418.412111] R13: ffff994c22198400 R14: ffff994c21770000 R15: 0000000000000000
  [ 2418.412713] FS:  00007f54fd7aff00(0000) GS:ffff994d35200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  [ 2418.413326] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  [ 2418.413933] CR2: 000056549596d000 CR3: 000000010b928003 CR4: 0000000000370ee0
  [ 2418.414528] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  [ 2418.415109] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
  [ 2418.415669] Call Trace:
  [ 2418.416254]  btrfs_reserve_data_bytes.cold+0x22/0x22 [btrfs]
  [ 2418.416812]  btrfs_check_data_free_space+0x4c/0xa0 [btrfs]
  [ 2418.417380]  btrfs_buffered_write+0x1b0/0x7f0 [btrfs]
  [ 2418.418315]  btrfs_file_write_iter+0x2a9/0x770 [btrfs]
  [ 2418.418920]  new_sync_write+0x11f/0x1c0
  [ 2418.419430]  vfs_write+0x2bb/0x3b0
  [ 2418.419972]  __x64_sys_pwrite64+0x90/0xc0
  [ 2418.420486]  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80
  [ 2418.420979]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
  [ 2418.421486] RIP: 0033:0x7f54fda0b986
  [ 2418.421981] Code: 48 c7 c0 (...)
  [ 2418.423019] RSP: 002b:00007ffc40569c38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000012
  [ 2418.423547] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f54fda0b986
  [ 2418.424075] RDX: 0000000000010000 RSI: 000056549595e000 RDI: 0000000000000003
  [ 2418.424596] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000400
  [ 2418.425119] R10: 0000000000000400 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff
  [ 2418.425644] R13: 0000000000000400 R14: 0000000000010000 R15: 0000000000000000
  [ 2418.426148] Modules linked in: btrfs blake2b_generic (...)
  [ 2418.429540] ---[ end trace ef2aeb44dc0afa34 ]---

1) At btrfs_file_write_iter() we set current->journal_info to
   BTRFS_DIO_SYNC_STUB;

2) We then call __btrfs_direct_write(), which calls btrfs_direct_IO();

3) We can't do the direct IO write because it starts at a non-aligned
   offset (1111). So at btrfs_direct_IO() we return -EINVAL (coming from
   check_direct_IO() which does the alignment check), but we leave
   current->journal_info set to BTRFS_DIO_SYNC_STUB - we only clear it
   at btrfs_dio_iomap_begin(), because we assume we always get there;

4) Then at __btrfs_direct_write() we see that the attempt to do the
   direct IO write was not successful, 0 bytes written, so we fallback
   to a buffered write by calling btrfs_buffered_write();

5) There we call btrfs_check_data_free_space() which in turn calls
   btrfs_alloc_data_chunk_ondemand() and that calls
   btrfs_reserve_data_bytes() with flush == BTRFS_RESERVE_FLUSH_DATA;

6) Then at btrfs_reserve_data_bytes() we have current->journal_info set to
   BTRFS_DIO_SYNC_STUB, therefore not NULL, and flush has the value
   BTRFS_RESERVE_FLUSH_DATA, triggering the second assertion:

  int btrfs_reserve_data_bytes(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, u64 bytes,
                               enum btrfs_reserve_flush_enum flush)
  {
      struct btrfs_space_info *data_sinfo = fs_info->data_sinfo;
      int ret;

      ASSERT(flush == BTRFS_RESERVE_FLUSH_DATA ||
             flush == BTRFS_RESERVE_FLUSH_FREE_SPACE_INODE);
      ASSERT(!current->journal_info || flush != BTRFS_RESERVE_FLUSH_DATA);
  (...)

So fix that by setting the journal to NULL whenever check_direct_IO()
returns a failure.

This bug only affects 5.10 kernels, and the regression was introduced in
5.10-rc1 by commit 0eb7929 ("btrfs: dio iomap DSYNC workaround").
The bug does not exist in 5.11 kernels due to commit ecfdc08
("btrfs: remove dio iomap DSYNC workaround"), which depends on a large
patchset that went into the merge window for 5.11. So this is a fix only
for 5.10.x stable kernels, as there are people hitting this bug.

Fixes: 0eb7929 ("btrfs: dio iomap DSYNC workaround")
CC: [email protected] # 5.10 (and only 5.10)
Acked-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1181605
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
jnettlet pushed a commit that referenced this issue Mar 14, 2021
[ Upstream commit eaba3b2 ]

Unprivileged user can crash kernel by using DRM_IOCTL_NOUVEAU_CHANNEL_ALLOC
ioctl. This was reported by trinity[1] fuzzer.

[   71.073906] nouveau 0000:01:00.0: crashme[1329]: channel failed to initialise, -17
[   71.081730] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000a0
[   71.088928] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[   71.094059] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[   71.099189] PGD 119590067 P4D 119590067 PUD 1054f5067 PMD 0
[   71.104842] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[   71.108498] CPU: 2 PID: 1329 Comm: crashme Not tainted 5.8.0-rc6+ #2
[   71.114993] Hardware name: AMD Pike/Pike, BIOS RPK1506A 09/03/2014
[   71.121213] RIP: 0010:nouveau_abi16_ioctl_channel_alloc+0x108/0x380 [nouveau]
[   71.128339] Code: 48 89 9d f0 00 00 00 41 8b 4c 24 04 41 8b 14 24 45 31 c0 4c 8d 4b 10 48 89 ee 4c 89 f7 e8 10 11 00 00 85 c0 75 78 48 8b 43 10 <8b> 90 a0 00 00 00 41 89 54 24 08 80 7d 3d 05 0f 86 bb 01 00 00 41
[   71.147074] RSP: 0018:ffffb4a1809cfd38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[   71.152526] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff98cedbaa1d20 RCX: 00000000000003bf
[   71.159651] RDX: 00000000000003be RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000030160
[   71.166774] RBP: ffff98cee776de00 R08: ffffdc0144198a08 R09: ffff98ceeefd4000
[   71.173901] R10: ffff98cee7e81780 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffb4a1809cfe08
[   71.181214] R13: ffff98cee776d000 R14: ffff98cec519e000 R15: ffff98cee776def0
[   71.188339] FS:  00007fd926250500(0000) GS:ffff98ceeac80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   71.196418] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   71.202155] CR2: 00000000000000a0 CR3: 0000000106622000 CR4: 00000000000406e0
[   71.209297] Call Trace:
[   71.211777]  ? nouveau_abi16_ioctl_getparam+0x1f0/0x1f0 [nouveau]
[   71.218053]  drm_ioctl_kernel+0xac/0xf0 [drm]
[   71.222421]  drm_ioctl+0x211/0x3c0 [drm]
[   71.226379]  ? nouveau_abi16_ioctl_getparam+0x1f0/0x1f0 [nouveau]
[   71.232500]  nouveau_drm_ioctl+0x57/0xb0 [nouveau]
[   71.237285]  ksys_ioctl+0x86/0xc0
[   71.240595]  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
[   71.244340]  do_syscall_64+0x4c/0x90
[   71.248110]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[   71.253162] RIP: 0033:0x7fd925d4b88b
[   71.256731] Code: Bad RIP value.
[   71.259955] RSP: 002b:00007ffc743592d8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
[   71.267514] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fd925d4b88b
[   71.274637] RDX: 0000000000601080 RSI: 00000000c0586442 RDI: 0000000000000003
[   71.281986] RBP: 00007ffc74359340 R08: 00007fd926016ce0 R09: 00007fd926016ce0
[   71.289111] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000400620
[   71.296235] R13: 00007ffc74359420 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[   71.303361] Modules linked in: rfkill sunrpc snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic ledtrig_audio snd_hda_intel snd_intel_dspcfg snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core edac_mce_amd snd_hwdep kvm_amd snd_seq ccp snd_seq_device snd_pcm kvm snd_timer snd irqbypass soundcore sp5100_tco pcspkr crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel wmi_bmof joydev i2c_piix4 fam15h_power k10temp acpi_cpufreq ip_tables xfs libcrc32c sd_mod t10_pi sg nouveau video mxm_wmi i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm broadcom bcm_phy_lib ata_generic ahci drm e1000 crc32c_intel libahci serio_raw tg3 libata firewire_ohci firewire_core wmi crc_itu_t dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
[   71.365269] CR2: 00000000000000a0

simplified reproducer
---------------------------------8<----------------------------------------
/*
 * gcc -o crashme crashme.c
 * ./crashme /dev/dri/renderD128
 */

struct drm_nouveau_channel_alloc {
	uint32_t     fb_ctxdma_handle;
	uint32_t     tt_ctxdma_handle;

	int          channel;
	uint32_t     pushbuf_domains;

	/* Notifier memory */
	uint32_t     notifier_handle;

	/* DRM-enforced subchannel assignments */
	struct {
		uint32_t handle;
		uint32_t grclass;
	} subchan[8];
	uint32_t nr_subchan;
};

static struct drm_nouveau_channel_alloc channel;

int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
	int fd;
	int rv;

	if (argc != 2)
		die("usage: %s <dev>", 0, argv[0]);

	if ((fd = open(argv[1], O_RDONLY)) == -1)
		die("open %s", errno, argv[1]);

	if (ioctl(fd, DRM_IOCTL_NOUVEAU_CHANNEL_ALLOC, &channel) == -1 &&
			errno == EACCES)
		die("ioctl %s", errno, argv[1]);

	close(fd);

	printf("PASS\n");

	return 0;
}
---------------------------------8<----------------------------------------

[1] https://github.com/kernelslacker/trinity

Fixes: eeaf06a ("drm/nouveau/svm: initial support for shared virtual memory")
Signed-off-by: Frantisek Hrbata <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Karol Herbst <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Skeggs <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
jnettlet pushed a commit that referenced this issue Mar 14, 2021
[ Upstream commit 661f385 ]

During connection setup, the application may choose to zero-size inbound
and outbound READ queues, as well as the Receive queue.  This patch fixes
handling of zero-sized queues, but not prevents it.

Kamal Heib says in an initial error report:

 When running the blktests over siw the following shift-out-of-bounds is
 reported, this is happening because the passed IRD or ORD from the ulp
 could be zero which will lead to unexpected behavior when calling
 roundup_pow_of_two(), fix that by blocking zero values of ORD or IRD.

   UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in ./include/linux/log2.h:57:13
   shift exponent 64 is too large for 64-bit type 'long unsigned int'
   CPU: 20 PID: 3957 Comm: kworker/u64:13 Tainted: G S     5.10.0-rc6 #2
   Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R630/02C2CP, BIOS 2.1.5 04/11/2016
   Workqueue: iw_cm_wq cm_work_handler [iw_cm]
   Call Trace:
    dump_stack+0x99/0xcb
    ubsan_epilogue+0x5/0x40
    __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold.11+0xb4/0xf3
    ? down_write+0x183/0x3d0
    siw_qp_modify.cold.8+0x2d/0x32 [siw]
    ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0xa5/0xf0
    siw_accept+0x906/0x1b60 [siw]
    ? xa_load+0x147/0x1f0
    ? siw_connect+0x17a0/0x17a0 [siw]
    ? lock_downgrade+0x700/0x700
    ? siw_get_base_qp+0x1c2/0x340 [siw]
    ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x39/0x40
    iw_cm_accept+0x1f4/0x430 [iw_cm]
    rdma_accept+0x3fa/0xb10 [rdma_cm]
    ? check_flush_dependency+0x410/0x410
    ? cma_rep_recv+0x570/0x570 [rdma_cm]
    nvmet_rdma_queue_connect+0x1a62/0x2680 [nvmet_rdma]
    ? nvmet_rdma_alloc_cmds+0xce0/0xce0 [nvmet_rdma]
    ? lock_release+0x56e/0xcc0
    ? lock_downgrade+0x700/0x700
    ? lock_downgrade+0x700/0x700
    ? __xa_alloc_cyclic+0xef/0x350
    ? __xa_alloc+0x2d0/0x2d0
    ? rdma_restrack_add+0xbe/0x2c0 [ib_core]
    ? __ww_mutex_die+0x190/0x190
    cma_cm_event_handler+0xf2/0x500 [rdma_cm]
    iw_conn_req_handler+0x910/0xcb0 [rdma_cm]
    ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x39/0x40
    ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0x150
    ? cma_ib_handler+0x8a0/0x8a0 [rdma_cm]
    ? __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.7+0xc1/0xd0
    cm_work_handler+0x121c/0x17a0 [iw_cm]
    ? iw_cm_reject+0x190/0x190 [iw_cm]
    ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0x150
    process_one_work+0x8fb/0x16c0
    ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x320/0x320
    worker_thread+0x87/0xb40
    ? __kthread_parkme+0xd1/0x1a0
    ? process_one_work+0x16c0/0x16c0
    kthread+0x35f/0x430
    ? kthread_mod_delayed_work+0x180/0x180
    ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30

Fixes: a531975 ("rdma/siw: main include file")
Fixes: f29dd55 ("rdma/siw: queue pair methods")
Fixes: 8b6a361 ("rdma/siw: receive path")
Fixes: b9be6f1 ("rdma/siw: transmit path")
Fixes: 303ae1c ("rdma/siw: application interface")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Reported-by: Kamal Heib <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Yi Zhang <[email protected]>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Bernard Metzler <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
jnettlet pushed a commit that referenced this issue Mar 14, 2021
[ Upstream commit 429fa96 ]

The size of tx_valid_cpus was calculated under the assumption that the
numa nodes identifiers are continuous, which is not the case in all archs
as this could lead to the following panic when trying to access an invalid
tx_valid_cpus index, avoid the following panic by using nr_node_ids
instead of num_online_nodes() to allocate the tx_valid_cpus size.

   Kernel attempted to read user page (8) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
   BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000008
   Faulting instruction address: 0xc0080000081b4a90
   Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
   LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV
   Modules linked in: siw(+) rfkill rpcrdma ib_isert iscsi_target_mod ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm sunrpc ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm i40iw ib_uverbs ib_core i40e ses enclosure scsi_transport_sas ipmi_powernv ibmpowernv at24 ofpart ipmi_devintf regmap_i2c ipmi_msghandler powernv_flash uio_pdrv_genirq uio mtd opal_prd zram ip_tables xfs libcrc32c sd_mod t10_pi ast i2c_algo_bit drm_vram_helper drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops cec drm_ttm_helper ttm drm vmx_crypto aacraid drm_panel_orientation_quirks dm_mod
   CPU: 40 PID: 3279 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G        W      X --------- ---  5.11.0-0.rc4.129.eln108.ppc64le #2
   NIP:  c0080000081b4a90 LR: c0080000081b4a2c CTR: c0000000007ce1c0
   REGS: c000000027fa77b0 TRAP: 0300   Tainted: G        W      X --------- ---   (5.11.0-0.rc4.129.eln108.ppc64le)
   MSR:  9000000002009033 <SF,HV,VEC,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE>  CR: 44224882  XER: 00000000
   CFAR: c0000000007ce200 DAR: 0000000000000008 DSISR: 40000000 IRQMASK: 0
   GPR00: c0080000081b4a2c c000000027fa7a50 c0080000081c3900 0000000000000040
   GPR04: c000000002023080 c000000012e1c300 000020072ad70000 0000000000000001
   GPR08: c000000001726068 0000000000000008 0000000000000008 c0080000081b5758
   GPR12: c0000000007ce1c0 c0000007fffc3000 00000001590b1e40 0000000000000000
   GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 000000011ad68fc8 00007fffcc09c5c8
   GPR20: 0000000000000008 0000000000000000 00000001590b2850 00000001590b1d30
   GPR24: 0000000000043d68 000000011ad67a80 000000011ad67a80 0000000000100000
   GPR28: c000000012e1c300 c0000000020271c8 0000000000000001 c0080000081bf608
   NIP [c0080000081b4a90] siw_init_cpulist+0x194/0x214 [siw]
   LR [c0080000081b4a2c] siw_init_cpulist+0x130/0x214 [siw]
   Call Trace:
   [c000000027fa7a50] [c0080000081b4a2c] siw_init_cpulist+0x130/0x214 [siw] (unreliable)
   [c000000027fa7a90] [c0080000081b4e68] siw_init_module+0x40/0x2a0 [siw]
   [c000000027fa7b30] [c0000000000124f4] do_one_initcall+0x84/0x2e0
   [c000000027fa7c00] [c000000000267ffc] do_init_module+0x7c/0x350
   [c000000027fa7c90] [c00000000026a180] __do_sys_init_module+0x210/0x250
   [c000000027fa7db0] [c0000000000387e4] system_call_exception+0x134/0x230
   [c000000027fa7e10] [c00000000000d660] system_call_common+0xf0/0x27c
   Instruction dump:
   40810044 3d420000 e8bf0000 e88a82d0 3d420000 e90a82c8 792a1f24 7cc4302a
   7d2642aa 79291f24 7d25482a 7d295214 <7d4048a8> 7d4a3b78 7d4049ad 40c2fff4

Fixes: bdcf26b ("rdma/siw: network and RDMA core interface")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Kamal Heib <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Bernard Metzler <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Yi Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
jnettlet pushed a commit that referenced this issue Mar 14, 2021
[ Upstream commit c5c97ca ]

The ubsan reported the following error.  It was because sample's raw
data missed u32 padding at the end.  So it broke the alignment of the
array after it.

The raw data contains an u32 size prefix so the data size should have
an u32 padding after 8-byte aligned data.

27: Sample parsing  :util/synthetic-events.c:1539:4:
  runtime error: store to misaligned address 0x62100006b9bc for type
  '__u64' (aka 'unsigned long long'), which requires 8 byte alignment
0x62100006b9bc: note: pointer points here
  00 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff  ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff  ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff  ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
              ^
    #0 0x561532a9fc96 in perf_event__synthesize_sample util/synthetic-events.c:1539:13
    #1 0x5615327f4a4f in do_test tests/sample-parsing.c:284:8
    #2 0x5615327f3f50 in test__sample_parsing tests/sample-parsing.c:381:9
    #3 0x56153279d3a1 in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:424:9
    #4 0x56153279c836 in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:454:9
    #5 0x56153279b7eb in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:675:4
    #6 0x56153279abf0 in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:821:9
    #7 0x56153264e796 in run_builtin perf.c:312:11
    #8 0x56153264cf03 in handle_internal_command perf.c:364:8
    #9 0x56153264e47d in run_argv perf.c:408:2
    #10 0x56153264c9a9 in main perf.c:538:3
    #11 0x7f137ab6fbbc in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x38bbc)
    #12 0x561532596828 in _start ...

SUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: misaligned-pointer-use
 util/synthetic-events.c:1539:4 in

Fixes: 045f8cd ("perf tests: Add a sample parsing test")
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
jnettlet pushed a commit that referenced this issue Mar 14, 2021
commit 4d14c5c upstream

Calling btrfs_qgroup_reserve_meta_prealloc from
btrfs_delayed_inode_reserve_metadata can result in flushing delalloc
while holding a transaction and delayed node locks. This is deadlock
prone. In the past multiple commits:

 * ae5e070 ("btrfs: qgroup: don't try to wait flushing if we're
already holding a transaction")

 * 6f23277 ("btrfs: qgroup: don't commit transaction when we already
 hold the handle")

Tried to solve various aspects of this but this was always a
whack-a-mole game. Unfortunately those 2 fixes don't solve a deadlock
scenario involving btrfs_delayed_node::mutex. Namely, one thread
can call btrfs_dirty_inode as a result of reading a file and modifying
its atime:

  PID: 6963   TASK: ffff8c7f3f94c000  CPU: 2   COMMAND: "test"
  #0  __schedule at ffffffffa529e07d
  #1  schedule at ffffffffa529e4ff
  #2  schedule_timeout at ffffffffa52a1bdd
  #3  wait_for_completion at ffffffffa529eeea             <-- sleeps with delayed node mutex held
  #4  start_delalloc_inodes at ffffffffc0380db5
  #5  btrfs_start_delalloc_snapshot at ffffffffc0393836
  #6  try_flush_qgroup at ffffffffc03f04b2
  #7  __btrfs_qgroup_reserve_meta at ffffffffc03f5bb6     <-- tries to reserve space and starts delalloc inodes.
  #8  btrfs_delayed_update_inode at ffffffffc03e31aa      <-- acquires delayed node mutex
  #9  btrfs_update_inode at ffffffffc0385ba8
 #10  btrfs_dirty_inode at ffffffffc038627b               <-- TRANSACTIION OPENED
 #11  touch_atime at ffffffffa4cf0000
 #12  generic_file_read_iter at ffffffffa4c1f123
 #13  new_sync_read at ffffffffa4ccdc8a
 #14  vfs_read at ffffffffa4cd0849
 #15  ksys_read at ffffffffa4cd0bd1
 #16  do_syscall_64 at ffffffffa4a052eb
 #17  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffffa540008c

This will cause an asynchronous work to flush the delalloc inodes to
happen which can try to acquire the same delayed_node mutex:

  PID: 455    TASK: ffff8c8085fa4000  CPU: 5   COMMAND: "kworker/u16:30"
  #0  __schedule at ffffffffa529e07d
  #1  schedule at ffffffffa529e4ff
  #2  schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffa529e80a
  #3  __mutex_lock at ffffffffa529fdcb                    <-- goes to sleep, never wakes up.
  #4  btrfs_delayed_update_inode at ffffffffc03e3143      <-- tries to acquire the mutex
  #5  btrfs_update_inode at ffffffffc0385ba8              <-- this is the same inode that pid 6963 is holding
  #6  cow_file_range_inline.constprop.78 at ffffffffc0386be7
  #7  cow_file_range at ffffffffc03879c1
  #8  btrfs_run_delalloc_range at ffffffffc038894c
  #9  writepage_delalloc at ffffffffc03a3c8f
 #10  __extent_writepage at ffffffffc03a4c01
 #11  extent_write_cache_pages at ffffffffc03a500b
 #12  extent_writepages at ffffffffc03a6de2
 #13  do_writepages at ffffffffa4c277eb
 #14  __filemap_fdatawrite_range at ffffffffa4c1e5bb
 #15  btrfs_run_delalloc_work at ffffffffc0380987         <-- starts running delayed nodes
 #16  normal_work_helper at ffffffffc03b706c
 #17  process_one_work at ffffffffa4aba4e4
 #18  worker_thread at ffffffffa4aba6fd
 #19  kthread at ffffffffa4ac0a3d
 #20  ret_from_fork at ffffffffa54001ff

To fully address those cases the complete fix is to never issue any
flushing while holding the transaction or the delayed node lock. This
patch achieves it by calling qgroup_reserve_meta directly which will
either succeed without flushing or will fail and return -EDQUOT. In the
latter case that return value is going to be propagated to
btrfs_dirty_inode which will fallback to start a new transaction. That's
fine as the majority of time we expect the inode will have
BTRFS_DELAYED_NODE_INODE_DIRTY flag set which will result in directly
copying the in-memory state.

Fixes: c53e965 ("btrfs: qgroup: try to flush qgroup space when we get -EDQUOT")
CC: [email protected] # 5.10+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
[sudip: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
jnettlet pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 16, 2021
Pach series "mm: thp: use generic THP migration for NUMA hinting fault", v3.

When the THP NUMA fault support was added THP migration was not supported
yet.  So the ad hoc THP migration was implemented in NUMA fault handling.
Since v4.14 THP migration has been supported so it doesn't make too much
sense to still keep another THP migration implementation rather than using
the generic migration code.  It is definitely a maintenance burden to keep
two THP migration implementation for different code paths and it is more
error prone.  Using the generic THP migration implementation allows us
remove the duplicate code and some hacks needed by the old ad hoc
implementation.

A quick grep shows x86_64, PowerPC (book3s), ARM64 ans S390 support both
THP and NUMA balancing.  The most of them support THP migration except for
S390.  Zi Yan tried to add THP migration support for S390 before but it
was not accepted due to the design of S390 PMD.  For the discussion,
please see: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/4/27/953.

Per the discussion with Gerald Schaefer in v1 it is acceptible to skip
huge PMD for S390 for now.

I saw there were some hacks about gup from git history, but I didn't
figure out if they have been removed or not since I just found FOLL_NUMA
code in the current gup implementation and they seems useful.

Patch #1 ~ #2 are preparation patches.
Patch #3 is the real meat.
Patch #4 ~ #6 keep consistent counters and behaviors with before.
Patch #7 skips change huge PMD to prot_none if thp migration is not supported.

Test
----
Did some tests to measure the latency of do_huge_pmd_numa_page.  The test
VM has 80 vcpus and 64G memory.  The test would create 2 processes to
consume 128G memory together which would incur memory pressure to cause
THP splits.  And it also creates 80 processes to hog cpu, and the memory
consumer processes are bound to different nodes periodically in order to
increase NUMA faults.

The below test script is used:

echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches

# Run stress-ng for 24 hours
./stress-ng/stress-ng --vm 2 --vm-bytes 64G --timeout 24h &
PID=$!

./stress-ng/stress-ng --cpu $NR_CPUS --timeout 24h &

# Wait for vm stressors forked
sleep 5

PID_1=`pgrep -P $PID | awk 'NR == 1'`
PID_2=`pgrep -P $PID | awk 'NR == 2'`

JOB1=`pgrep -P $PID_1`
JOB2=`pgrep -P $PID_2`

# Bind load jobs to different nodes periodically to force generate
# cross node memory access
while [ -d "/proc/$PID" ]
do
        taskset -apc 8 $JOB1
        taskset -apc 8 $JOB2
        sleep 300
        taskset -apc 58 $JOB1
        taskset -apc 58 $JOB2
        sleep 300
done

With the above test the histogram of latency of do_huge_pmd_numa_page is
as shown below.  Since the number of do_huge_pmd_numa_page varies
drastically for each run (should be due to scheduler), so I converted the
raw number to percentage.

                             patched               base
@us[stress-ng]:
[0]                          3.57%                 0.16%
[1]                          55.68%                18.36%
[2, 4)                       10.46%                40.44%
[4, 8)                       7.26%                 17.82%
[8, 16)                      21.12%                13.41%
[16, 32)                     1.06%                 4.27%
[32, 64)                     0.56%                 4.07%
[64, 128)                    0.16%                 0.35%
[128, 256)                   < 0.1%                < 0.1%
[256, 512)                   < 0.1%                < 0.1%
[512, 1K)                    < 0.1%                < 0.1%
[1K, 2K)                     < 0.1%                < 0.1%
[2K, 4K)                     < 0.1%                < 0.1%
[4K, 8K)                     < 0.1%                < 0.1%
[8K, 16K)                    < 0.1%                < 0.1%
[16K, 32K)                   < 0.1%                < 0.1%
[32K, 64K)                   < 0.1%                < 0.1%

Per the result, patched kernel is even slightly better than the base
kernel.  I think this is because the lock contention against THP split is
less than base kernel due to the refactor.

To exclude the affect from THP split, I also did test w/o memory pressure.
No obvious regression is spotted.  The below is the test result *w/o*
memory pressure.

                           patched                  base
@us[stress-ng]:
[0]                        7.97%                   18.4%
[1]                        69.63%                  58.24%
[2, 4)                     4.18%                   2.63%
[4, 8)                     0.22%                   0.17%
[8, 16)                    1.03%                   0.92%
[16, 32)                   0.14%                   < 0.1%
[32, 64)                   < 0.1%                  < 0.1%
[64, 128)                  < 0.1%                  < 0.1%
[128, 256)                 < 0.1%                  < 0.1%
[256, 512)                 0.45%                   1.19%
[512, 1K)                  15.45%                  17.27%
[1K, 2K)                   < 0.1%                  < 0.1%
[2K, 4K)                   < 0.1%                  < 0.1%
[4K, 8K)                   < 0.1%                  < 0.1%
[8K, 16K)                  0.86%                   0.88%
[16K, 32K)                 < 0.1%                  0.15%
[32K, 64K)                 < 0.1%                  < 0.1%
[64K, 128K)                < 0.1%                  < 0.1%
[128K, 256K)               < 0.1%                  < 0.1%

The series also survived a series of tests that exercise NUMA balancing
migrations by Mel.

This patch (of 7):

Add orig_pmd to struct vm_fault so the "orig_pmd" parameter used by huge
page fault could be removed, just like its PTE counterpart does.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
Cc: Zi Yan <[email protected]>
Cc: Huang Ying <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Gerald Schaefer <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
jnettlet pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 16, 2021
Patch series "mm/madvise: introduce MADV_POPULATE_(READ|WRITE) to prefault page tables", v2.

Excessive details on MADV_POPULATE_(READ|WRITE) can be found in patch #2.

This patch (of 5):

Let's make the variable names in the function declaration match the
variable names used in the definition.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Xu <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Chris Zankel <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc: Helge Deller <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <[email protected]>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <[email protected]>
Cc: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <[email protected]>
Cc: Matt Turner <[email protected]>
Cc: Max Filippov <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <[email protected]>
Cc: Minchan Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Ram Pai <[email protected]>
Cc: Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Rolf Eike Beer <[email protected]>
Cc: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
jnettlet pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 16, 2021
ASan reports a memory leak caused by evlist not being deleted on exit in
perf-report, perf-script and perf-data.
The problem is caused by evlist->session not being deleted, which is
allocated in perf_session__read_header, called in perf_session__new if
perf_data is in read mode.
In case of write mode, the session->evlist is filled by the caller.
This patch solves the problem by calling evlist__delete in
perf_session__delete if perf_data is in read mode.

Changes in v2:
 - call evlist__delete from within perf_session__delete

v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

ASan report follows:

$ ./perf script report flamegraph
=================================================================
==227640==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

<SNIP unrelated>

Indirect leak of 2704 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x4f4137 in calloc (/home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf+0x4f4137)
    #1 0xbe3d56 in zalloc /home/user/linux/tools/lib/perf/../../lib/zalloc.c:8:9
    #2 0x7f999e in evlist__new /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/evlist.c:77:26
    #3 0x8ad938 in perf_session__read_header /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/header.c:3797:20
    #4 0x8ec714 in perf_session__open /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/session.c:109:6
    #5 0x8ebe83 in perf_session__new /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/session.c:213:10
    #6 0x60c6de in cmd_script /home/user/linux/tools/perf/builtin-script.c:3856:12
    #7 0x7b2930 in run_builtin /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:313:11
    #8 0x7b120f in handle_internal_command /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:365:8
    #9 0x7b2493 in run_argv /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:409:2
    #10 0x7b0c89 in main /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:539:3
    #11 0x7f5260654b74  (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x27b74)

Indirect leak of 568 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x4f4137 in calloc (/home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf+0x4f4137)
    #1 0xbe3d56 in zalloc /home/user/linux/tools/lib/perf/../../lib/zalloc.c:8:9
    #2 0x80ce88 in evsel__new_idx /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/evsel.c:268:24
    #3 0x8aed93 in evsel__new /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/evsel.h:210:9
    #4 0x8ae07e in perf_session__read_header /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/header.c:3853:11
    #5 0x8ec714 in perf_session__open /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/session.c:109:6
    #6 0x8ebe83 in perf_session__new /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/session.c:213:10
    #7 0x60c6de in cmd_script /home/user/linux/tools/perf/builtin-script.c:3856:12
    #8 0x7b2930 in run_builtin /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:313:11
    #9 0x7b120f in handle_internal_command /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:365:8
    #10 0x7b2493 in run_argv /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:409:2
    #11 0x7b0c89 in main /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:539:3
    #12 0x7f5260654b74  (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x27b74)

Indirect leak of 264 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x4f4137 in calloc (/home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf+0x4f4137)
    #1 0xbe3d56 in zalloc /home/user/linux/tools/lib/perf/../../lib/zalloc.c:8:9
    #2 0xbe3e70 in xyarray__new /home/user/linux/tools/lib/perf/xyarray.c:10:23
    #3 0xbd7754 in perf_evsel__alloc_id /home/user/linux/tools/lib/perf/evsel.c:361:21
    #4 0x8ae201 in perf_session__read_header /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/header.c:3871:7
    #5 0x8ec714 in perf_session__open /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/session.c:109:6
    #6 0x8ebe83 in perf_session__new /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/session.c:213:10
    #7 0x60c6de in cmd_script /home/user/linux/tools/perf/builtin-script.c:3856:12
    #8 0x7b2930 in run_builtin /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:313:11
    #9 0x7b120f in handle_internal_command /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:365:8
    #10 0x7b2493 in run_argv /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:409:2
    #11 0x7b0c89 in main /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:539:3
    #12 0x7f5260654b74  (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x27b74)

Indirect leak of 32 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x4f4137 in calloc (/home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf+0x4f4137)
    #1 0xbe3d56 in zalloc /home/user/linux/tools/lib/perf/../../lib/zalloc.c:8:9
    #2 0xbd77e0 in perf_evsel__alloc_id /home/user/linux/tools/lib/perf/evsel.c:365:14
    #3 0x8ae201 in perf_session__read_header /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/header.c:3871:7
    #4 0x8ec714 in perf_session__open /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/session.c:109:6
    #5 0x8ebe83 in perf_session__new /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/session.c:213:10
    #6 0x60c6de in cmd_script /home/user/linux/tools/perf/builtin-script.c:3856:12
    #7 0x7b2930 in run_builtin /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:313:11
    #8 0x7b120f in handle_internal_command /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:365:8
    #9 0x7b2493 in run_argv /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:409:2
    #10 0x7b0c89 in main /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:539:3
    #11 0x7f5260654b74  (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x27b74)

Indirect leak of 7 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x4b8207 in strdup (/home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf+0x4b8207)
    #1 0x8b4459 in evlist__set_event_name /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/header.c:2292:16
    #2 0x89d862 in process_event_desc /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/header.c:2313:3
    #3 0x8af319 in perf_file_section__process /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/header.c:3651:9
    #4 0x8aa6e9 in perf_header__process_sections /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/header.c:3427:9
    #5 0x8ae3e7 in perf_session__read_header /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/header.c:3886:2
    #6 0x8ec714 in perf_session__open /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/session.c:109:6
    #7 0x8ebe83 in perf_session__new /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/session.c:213:10
    #8 0x60c6de in cmd_script /home/user/linux/tools/perf/builtin-script.c:3856:12
    #9 0x7b2930 in run_builtin /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:313:11
    #10 0x7b120f in handle_internal_command /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:365:8
    #11 0x7b2493 in run_argv /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:409:2
    #12 0x7b0c89 in main /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:539:3
    #13 0x7f5260654b74  (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x27b74)

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 3728 byte(s) leaked in 7 allocation(s).

Signed-off-by: Riccardo Mancini <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Cc: Kan Liang <[email protected]>
Cc: Leo Yan <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
jnettlet pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 16, 2021
On trogdor devices I see the following lockdep splat when stopping
youtube with lockdep enabled in the kernel.

 ======================================================
 WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
 5.13.0-rc2 #71 Not tainted
 ------------------------------------------------------
 ThreadPoolSingl/3969 is trying to acquire lock:
 ffffff80d4d5c080 (&inst->lock#3){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: vdec_buf_cleanup+0x3c/0x17c [venus_dec]

 but task is already holding lock:
 ffffff80d3c3c4f8 (&q->mmap_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: vb2_core_reqbufs+0xe4/0x390 [videobuf2_common]

 which lock already depends on the new lock.

 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

 -> #5 (&q->mmap_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
        __mutex_lock_common+0xcc/0xb88
        mutex_lock_nested+0x5c/0x68
        vb2_mmap+0xf4/0x290 [videobuf2_common]
        v4l2_m2m_fop_mmap+0x44/0x50 [v4l2_mem2mem]
        v4l2_mmap+0x5c/0xa4
        mmap_region+0x310/0x5a4
        do_mmap+0x348/0x43c
        vm_mmap_pgoff+0xfc/0x178
        ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x84/0xfc
        __arm64_compat_sys_aarch32_mmap2+0x2c/0x38
        invoke_syscall+0x54/0x110
        el0_svc_common+0x88/0xf0
        do_el0_svc_compat+0x28/0x34
        el0_svc_compat+0x24/0x34
        el0_sync_compat_handler+0xc0/0xf0
        el0_sync_compat+0x19c/0x1c0

 -> #4 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}:
        __might_fault+0x60/0x88
        filldir64+0x124/0x3a0
        dcache_readdir+0x7c/0x1ec
        iterate_dir+0xc4/0x184
        __arm64_sys_getdents64+0x78/0x170
        invoke_syscall+0x54/0x110
        el0_svc_common+0xa8/0xf0
        do_el0_svc_compat+0x28/0x34
        el0_svc_compat+0x24/0x34
        el0_sync_compat_handler+0xc0/0xf0
        el0_sync_compat+0x19c/0x1c0

 -> #3 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3){++++}-{3:3}:
        down_write+0x94/0x1f4
        start_creating+0xb0/0x174
        debugfs_create_dir+0x28/0x138
        opp_debug_register+0x88/0xc0
        _add_opp_dev+0x84/0x9c
        _add_opp_table_indexed+0x16c/0x310
        _of_add_table_indexed+0x70/0xb5c
        dev_pm_opp_of_add_table_indexed+0x20/0x2c
        of_genpd_add_provider_onecell+0xc4/0x1c8
        rpmhpd_probe+0x21c/0x278
        platform_probe+0xb4/0xd4
        really_probe+0x140/0x35c
        driver_probe_device+0x90/0xcc
        __device_attach_driver+0xa4/0xc0
        bus_for_each_drv+0x8c/0xd8
        __device_attach+0xc4/0x150
        device_initial_probe+0x20/0x2c
        bus_probe_device+0x40/0xa4
        device_add+0x22c/0x3fc
        of_device_add+0x44/0x54
        of_platform_device_create_pdata+0xb0/0xf4
        of_platform_bus_create+0x1d0/0x350
        of_platform_populate+0x80/0xd4
        devm_of_platform_populate+0x64/0xb0
        rpmh_rsc_probe+0x378/0x3dc
        platform_probe+0xb4/0xd4
        really_probe+0x140/0x35c
        driver_probe_device+0x90/0xcc
        __device_attach_driver+0xa4/0xc0
        bus_for_each_drv+0x8c/0xd8
        __device_attach+0xc4/0x150
        device_initial_probe+0x20/0x2c
        bus_probe_device+0x40/0xa4
        device_add+0x22c/0x3fc
        of_device_add+0x44/0x54
        of_platform_device_create_pdata+0xb0/0xf4
        of_platform_bus_create+0x1d0/0x350
        of_platform_bus_create+0x21c/0x350
        of_platform_populate+0x80/0xd4
        of_platform_default_populate_init+0xb8/0xd4
        do_one_initcall+0x1b4/0x400
        do_initcall_level+0xa8/0xc8
        do_initcalls+0x5c/0x9c
        do_basic_setup+0x2c/0x38
        kernel_init_freeable+0x1a4/0x1ec
        kernel_init+0x20/0x118
        ret_from_fork+0x10/0x30

 -> #2 (gpd_list_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
        __mutex_lock_common+0xcc/0xb88
        mutex_lock_nested+0x5c/0x68
        __genpd_dev_pm_attach+0x70/0x18c
        genpd_dev_pm_attach_by_id+0xe4/0x158
        genpd_dev_pm_attach_by_name+0x48/0x60
        dev_pm_domain_attach_by_name+0x2c/0x38
        dev_pm_opp_attach_genpd+0xac/0x160
        vcodec_domains_get+0x94/0x14c [venus_core]
        core_get_v4+0x150/0x188 [venus_core]
        venus_probe+0x138/0x444 [venus_core]
        platform_probe+0xb4/0xd4
        really_probe+0x140/0x35c
        driver_probe_device+0x90/0xcc
        device_driver_attach+0x58/0x7c
        __driver_attach+0xc8/0xe0
        bus_for_each_dev+0x88/0xd4
        driver_attach+0x30/0x3c
        bus_add_driver+0x10c/0x1e0
        driver_register+0x70/0x108
        __platform_driver_register+0x30/0x3c
        0xffffffde113e1044
        do_one_initcall+0x1b4/0x400
        do_init_module+0x64/0x1fc
        load_module+0x17f4/0x1958
        __arm64_sys_finit_module+0xb4/0xf0
        invoke_syscall+0x54/0x110
        el0_svc_common+0x88/0xf0
        do_el0_svc_compat+0x28/0x34
        el0_svc_compat+0x24/0x34
        el0_sync_compat_handler+0xc0/0xf0
        el0_sync_compat+0x19c/0x1c0

 -> #1 (&opp_table->genpd_virt_dev_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
        __mutex_lock_common+0xcc/0xb88
        mutex_lock_nested+0x5c/0x68
        _set_required_opps+0x74/0x120
        _set_opp+0x94/0x37c
        dev_pm_opp_set_rate+0xa0/0x194
        core_clks_set_rate+0x28/0x58 [venus_core]
        load_scale_v4+0x228/0x2b4 [venus_core]
        session_process_buf+0x160/0x198 [venus_core]
        venus_helper_vb2_buf_queue+0xcc/0x130 [venus_core]
        vdec_vb2_buf_queue+0xc4/0x140 [venus_dec]
        __enqueue_in_driver+0x164/0x188 [videobuf2_common]
        vb2_core_qbuf+0x13c/0x47c [videobuf2_common]
        vb2_qbuf+0x88/0xec [videobuf2_v4l2]
        v4l2_m2m_qbuf+0x84/0x15c [v4l2_mem2mem]
        v4l2_m2m_ioctl_qbuf+0x24/0x30 [v4l2_mem2mem]
        v4l_qbuf+0x54/0x68
        __video_do_ioctl+0x2bc/0x3bc
        video_usercopy+0x558/0xb04
        video_ioctl2+0x24/0x30
        v4l2_ioctl+0x58/0x68
        v4l2_compat_ioctl32+0x84/0xa0
        __arm64_compat_sys_ioctl+0x12c/0x140
        invoke_syscall+0x54/0x110
        el0_svc_common+0x88/0xf0
        do_el0_svc_compat+0x28/0x34
        el0_svc_compat+0x24/0x34
        el0_sync_compat_handler+0xc0/0xf0
        el0_sync_compat+0x19c/0x1c0

 -> #0 (&inst->lock#3){+.+.}-{3:3}:
        __lock_acquire+0x248c/0x2d6c
        lock_acquire+0x240/0x314
        __mutex_lock_common+0xcc/0xb88
        mutex_lock_nested+0x5c/0x68
        vdec_buf_cleanup+0x3c/0x17c [venus_dec]
        __vb2_queue_free+0x98/0x204 [videobuf2_common]
        vb2_core_reqbufs+0x14c/0x390 [videobuf2_common]
        vb2_reqbufs+0x58/0x74 [videobuf2_v4l2]
        v4l2_m2m_reqbufs+0x58/0x90 [v4l2_mem2mem]
        v4l2_m2m_ioctl_reqbufs+0x24/0x30 [v4l2_mem2mem]
        v4l_reqbufs+0x58/0x6c
        __video_do_ioctl+0x2bc/0x3bc
        video_usercopy+0x558/0xb04
        video_ioctl2+0x24/0x30
        v4l2_ioctl+0x58/0x68
        v4l2_compat_ioctl32+0x84/0xa0
        __arm64_compat_sys_ioctl+0x12c/0x140
        invoke_syscall+0x54/0x110
        el0_svc_common+0x88/0xf0
        do_el0_svc_compat+0x28/0x34
        el0_svc_compat+0x24/0x34
        el0_sync_compat_handler+0xc0/0xf0
        el0_sync_compat+0x19c/0x1c0

 other info that might help us debug this:

 Chain exists of:
   &inst->lock#3 --> &mm->mmap_lock --> &q->mmap_lock

  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

        CPU0                    CPU1
        ----                    ----
   lock(&q->mmap_lock);
                                lock(&mm->mmap_lock);
                                lock(&q->mmap_lock);
   lock(&inst->lock#3);

  *** DEADLOCK ***

 1 lock held by ThreadPoolSingl/3969:
  #0: ffffff80d3c3c4f8 (&q->mmap_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: vb2_core_reqbufs+0xe4/0x390 [videobuf2_common]

 stack backtrace:
 CPU: 2 PID: 3969 Comm: ThreadPoolSingl Not tainted 5.13.0-rc2 #71
 Hardware name: Google Lazor (rev3+) with KB Backlight (DT)
 Call trace:
  dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1b4
  show_stack+0x24/0x30
  dump_stack+0xe0/0x15c
  print_circular_bug+0x32c/0x388
  check_noncircular+0x138/0x140
  __lock_acquire+0x248c/0x2d6c
  lock_acquire+0x240/0x314
  __mutex_lock_common+0xcc/0xb88
  mutex_lock_nested+0x5c/0x68
  vdec_buf_cleanup+0x3c/0x17c [venus_dec]
  __vb2_queue_free+0x98/0x204 [videobuf2_common]
  vb2_core_reqbufs+0x14c/0x390 [videobuf2_common]
  vb2_reqbufs+0x58/0x74 [videobuf2_v4l2]
  v4l2_m2m_reqbufs+0x58/0x90 [v4l2_mem2mem]
  v4l2_m2m_ioctl_reqbufs+0x24/0x30 [v4l2_mem2mem]
  v4l_reqbufs+0x58/0x6c
  __video_do_ioctl+0x2bc/0x3bc
  video_usercopy+0x558/0xb04
  video_ioctl2+0x24/0x30
  v4l2_ioctl+0x58/0x68
  v4l2_compat_ioctl32+0x84/0xa0
  __arm64_compat_sys_ioctl+0x12c/0x140
  invoke_syscall+0x54/0x110
  el0_svc_common+0x88/0xf0
  do_el0_svc_compat+0x28/0x34
  el0_svc_compat+0x24/0x34
  el0_sync_compat_handler+0xc0/0xf0
  el0_sync_compat+0x19c/0x1c0

The 'gpd_list_lock' is nominally named as such to protect the 'gpd_list'
from concurrent access and mutation. Unfortunately, holding that mutex
around various OPP framework calls leads to lockdep splats because now
we're doing various operations in OPP core such as registering with
debugfs while holding the list lock. We don't need to hold any list
mutex while we're calling into OPP, so let's shrink the locking area of
the 'gpd_list_lock' so that lockdep isn't triggered. This also helps
reduce contention on this lock, which probably doesn't matter much but
at least is nice to have.

Cc: Len Brown <[email protected]>
Cc: Pavel Machek <[email protected]>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Cc: Viresh Kumar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ulf Hansson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
jnettlet pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 16, 2021
ASan reports a heap-buffer-overflow in elf_sec__is_text when using perf-top.

The bug is caused by the fact that secstrs is built from runtime_ss, while
shdr is built from syms_ss if shdr.sh_type != SHT_NOBITS. Therefore, they
point to two different ELF files.

This patch renames secstrs to secstrs_run and adds secstrs_sym, so that
the correct secstrs is chosen depending on shdr.sh_type.

  $ ASAN_OPTIONS=abort_on_error=1:disable_coredump=0:unmap_shadow_on_exit=1 ./perf top
  =================================================================
  ==363148==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x61300009add6 at pc 0x00000049875c bp 0x7f4f56446440 sp 0x7f4f56445bf0
  READ of size 1 at 0x61300009add6 thread T6
    #0 0x49875b in StrstrCheck(void*, char*, char const*, char const*) (/home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf+0x49875b)
    #1 0x4d13a2 in strstr (/home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf+0x4d13a2)
    #2 0xacae36 in elf_sec__is_text /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/symbol-elf.c:176:9
    #3 0xac3ec9 in elf_sec__filter /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/symbol-elf.c:187:9
    #4 0xac2c3d in dso__load_sym /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/symbol-elf.c:1254:20
    #5 0x883981 in dso__load /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/symbol.c:1897:9
    #6 0x8e6248 in map__load /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/map.c:332:7
    #7 0x8e66e5 in map__find_symbol /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/map.c:366:6
    #8 0x7f8278 in machine__resolve /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/event.c:707:13
    #9 0x5f3d1a in perf_event__process_sample /home/user/linux/tools/perf/builtin-top.c:773:6
    #10 0x5f30e4 in deliver_event /home/user/linux/tools/perf/builtin-top.c:1197:3
    #11 0x908a72 in do_flush /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/ordered-events.c:244:9
    #12 0x905fae in __ordered_events__flush /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/ordered-events.c:323:8
    #13 0x9058db in ordered_events__flush /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/ordered-events.c:341:9
    #14 0x5f19b1 in process_thread /home/user/linux/tools/perf/builtin-top.c:1109:7
    #15 0x7f4f6a21a298 in start_thread /usr/src/debug/glibc-2.33-16.fc34.x86_64/nptl/pthread_create.c:481:8
    #16 0x7f4f697d0352 in clone ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95

0x61300009add6 is located 10 bytes to the right of 332-byte region [0x61300009ac80,0x61300009adcc)
allocated by thread T6 here:

    #0 0x4f3f7f in malloc (/home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf+0x4f3f7f)
    #1 0x7f4f6a0a88d9  (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xa8d9)

Thread T6 created by T0 here:

    #0 0x464856 in pthread_create (/home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf+0x464856)
    #1 0x5f06e0 in __cmd_top /home/user/linux/tools/perf/builtin-top.c:1309:6
    #2 0x5ef19f in cmd_top /home/user/linux/tools/perf/builtin-top.c:1762:11
    #3 0x7b28c0 in run_builtin /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:313:11
    #4 0x7b119f in handle_internal_command /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:365:8
    #5 0x7b2423 in run_argv /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:409:2
    #6 0x7b0c19 in main /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:539:3
    #7 0x7f4f696f7b74 in __libc_start_main /usr/src/debug/glibc-2.33-16.fc34.x86_64/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:332:16

  SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow (/home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf+0x49875b) in StrstrCheck(void*, char*, char const*, char const*)
  Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
    0x0c268000b560: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
    0x0c268000b570: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
    0x0c268000b580: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
    0x0c268000b590: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x0c268000b5a0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  =>0x0c268000b5b0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04[fa]fa fa fa fa fa
    0x0c268000b5c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x0c268000b5d0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x0c268000b5e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x0c268000b5f0: 07 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
    0x0c268000b600: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd
  Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
    Addressable:           00
    Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
    Heap left redzone:       fa
    Freed heap region:       fd
    Stack left redzone:      f1
    Stack mid redzone:       f2
    Stack right redzone:     f3
    Stack after return:      f5
    Stack use after scope:   f8
    Global redzone:          f9
    Global init order:       f6
    Poisoned by user:        f7
    Container overflow:      fc
    Array cookie:            ac
    Intra object redzone:    bb
    ASan internal:           fe
    Left alloca redzone:     ca
    Right alloca redzone:    cb
    Shadow gap:              cc
  ==363148==ABORTING

Suggested-by: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Riccardo Mancini <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc: Fabian Hemmer <[email protected]>
Cc: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Remi Bernon <[email protected]>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
jnettlet pushed a commit that referenced this issue Dec 10, 2021
[ Upstream commit 8ef9dc0 ]

We got the following lockdep splat while running fstests (specifically
btrfs/003 and btrfs/020 in a row) with the new rc.  This was uncovered
by 87579e9 ("loop: use worker per cgroup instead of kworker") which
converted loop to using workqueues, which comes with lockdep
annotations that don't exist with kworkers.  The lockdep splat is as
follows:

  WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
  5.14.0-rc2-custom+ #34 Not tainted
  ------------------------------------------------------
  losetup/156417 is trying to acquire lock:
  ffff9c7645b02d38 ((wq_completion)loop0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: flush_workqueue+0x84/0x600

  but task is already holding lock:
  ffff9c7647395468 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __loop_clr_fd+0x41/0x650 [loop]

  which lock already depends on the new lock.

  the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

  -> #5 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
	 __mutex_lock+0xba/0x7c0
	 lo_open+0x28/0x60 [loop]
	 blkdev_get_whole+0x28/0xf0
	 blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0x168/0x3c0
	 blkdev_open+0xd2/0xe0
	 do_dentry_open+0x163/0x3a0
	 path_openat+0x74d/0xa40
	 do_filp_open+0x9c/0x140
	 do_sys_openat2+0xb1/0x170
	 __x64_sys_openat+0x54/0x90
	 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

  -> #4 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
	 __mutex_lock+0xba/0x7c0
	 blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0xd1/0x3c0
	 blkdev_get_by_path+0xc0/0xd0
	 btrfs_scan_one_device+0x52/0x1f0 [btrfs]
	 btrfs_control_ioctl+0xac/0x170 [btrfs]
	 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
	 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

  -> #3 (uuid_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
	 __mutex_lock+0xba/0x7c0
	 btrfs_rm_device+0x48/0x6a0 [btrfs]
	 btrfs_ioctl+0x2d1c/0x3110 [btrfs]
	 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
	 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

  -> #2 (sb_writers#11){.+.+}-{0:0}:
	 lo_write_bvec+0x112/0x290 [loop]
	 loop_process_work+0x25f/0xcb0 [loop]
	 process_one_work+0x28f/0x5d0
	 worker_thread+0x55/0x3c0
	 kthread+0x140/0x170
	 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30

  -> #1 ((work_completion)(&lo->rootcg_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
	 process_one_work+0x266/0x5d0
	 worker_thread+0x55/0x3c0
	 kthread+0x140/0x170
	 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30

  -> #0 ((wq_completion)loop0){+.+.}-{0:0}:
	 __lock_acquire+0x1130/0x1dc0
	 lock_acquire+0xf5/0x320
	 flush_workqueue+0xae/0x600
	 drain_workqueue+0xa0/0x110
	 destroy_workqueue+0x36/0x250
	 __loop_clr_fd+0x9a/0x650 [loop]
	 lo_ioctl+0x29d/0x780 [loop]
	 block_ioctl+0x3f/0x50
	 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
	 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

  other info that might help us debug this:
  Chain exists of:
    (wq_completion)loop0 --> &disk->open_mutex --> &lo->lo_mutex
   Possible unsafe locking scenario:
	 CPU0                    CPU1
	 ----                    ----
    lock(&lo->lo_mutex);
				 lock(&disk->open_mutex);
				 lock(&lo->lo_mutex);
    lock((wq_completion)loop0);

   *** DEADLOCK ***
  1 lock held by losetup/156417:
   #0: ffff9c7647395468 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __loop_clr_fd+0x41/0x650 [loop]

  stack backtrace:
  CPU: 8 PID: 156417 Comm: losetup Not tainted 5.14.0-rc2-custom+ #34
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  Call Trace:
   dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x72
   check_noncircular+0x10a/0x120
   __lock_acquire+0x1130/0x1dc0
   lock_acquire+0xf5/0x320
   ? flush_workqueue+0x84/0x600
   flush_workqueue+0xae/0x600
   ? flush_workqueue+0x84/0x600
   drain_workqueue+0xa0/0x110
   destroy_workqueue+0x36/0x250
   __loop_clr_fd+0x9a/0x650 [loop]
   lo_ioctl+0x29d/0x780 [loop]
   ? __lock_acquire+0x3a0/0x1dc0
   ? update_dl_rq_load_avg+0x152/0x360
   ? lock_is_held_type+0xa5/0x120
   ? find_held_lock.constprop.0+0x2b/0x80
   block_ioctl+0x3f/0x50
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
   do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
  RIP: 0033:0x7f645884de6b

Usually the uuid_mutex exists to protect the fs_devices that map
together all of the devices that match a specific uuid.  In rm_device
we're messing with the uuid of a device, so it makes sense to protect
that here.

However in doing that it pulls in a whole host of lockdep dependencies,
as we call mnt_may_write() on the sb before we grab the uuid_mutex, thus
we end up with the dependency chain under the uuid_mutex being added
under the normal sb write dependency chain, which causes problems with
loop devices.

We don't need the uuid mutex here however.  If we call
btrfs_scan_one_device() before we scratch the super block we will find
the fs_devices and not find the device itself and return EBUSY because
the fs_devices is open.  If we call it after the scratch happens it will
not appear to be a valid btrfs file system.

We do not need to worry about other fs_devices modifying operations here
because we're protected by the exclusive operations locking.

So drop the uuid_mutex here in order to fix the lockdep splat.

A more detailed explanation from the discussion:

We are worried about rm and scan racing with each other, before this
change we'll zero the device out under the UUID mutex so when scan does
run it'll make sure that it can go through the whole device scan thing
without rm messing with us.

We aren't worried if the scratch happens first, because the result is we
don't think this is a btrfs device and we bail out.

The only case we are concerned with is we scratch _after_ scan is able
to read the superblock and gets a seemingly valid super block, so lets
consider this case.

Scan will call device_list_add() with the device we're removing.  We'll
call find_fsid_with_metadata_uuid() and get our fs_devices for this
UUID.  At this point we lock the fs_devices->device_list_mutex.  This is
what protects us in this case, but we have two cases here.

1. We aren't to the device removal part of the RM.  We found our device,
   and device name matches our path, we go down and we set total_devices
   to our super number of devices, which doesn't affect anything because
   we haven't done the remove yet.

2. We are past the device removal part, which is protected by the
   device_list_mutex.  Scan doesn't find the device, it goes down and
   does the

   if (fs_devices->opened)
	   return -EBUSY;

   check and we bail out.

Nothing about this situation is ideal, but the lockdep splat is real,
and the fix is safe, tho admittedly a bit scary looking.

Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
[ copy more from the discussion ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
jnettlet pushed a commit that referenced this issue Dec 10, 2021
…eam state

[ Upstream commit b7b1d02 ]

The internal stream state sets the timeout to 120 seconds 2 seconds
after the creation of the flow, attach this internal stream state to the
IPS_ASSURED flag for consistent event reporting.

Before this patch:

      [NEW] udp      17 30 src=10.246.11.13 dst=216.239.35.0 sport=37282 dport=123 [UNREPLIED] src=216.239.35.0 dst=10.246.11.13 sport=123 dport=37282
   [UPDATE] udp      17 30 src=10.246.11.13 dst=216.239.35.0 sport=37282 dport=123 src=216.239.35.0 dst=10.246.11.13 sport=123 dport=37282
   [UPDATE] udp      17 30 src=10.246.11.13 dst=216.239.35.0 sport=37282 dport=123 src=216.239.35.0 dst=10.246.11.13 sport=123 dport=37282 [ASSURED]
  [DESTROY] udp      17 src=10.246.11.13 dst=216.239.35.0 sport=37282 dport=123 src=216.239.35.0 dst=10.246.11.13 sport=123 dport=37282 [ASSURED]

Note IPS_ASSURED for the flow not yet in the internal stream state.

after this update:

      [NEW] udp      17 30 src=10.246.11.13 dst=216.239.35.0 sport=37282 dport=123 [UNREPLIED] src=216.239.35.0 dst=10.246.11.13 sport=123 dport=37282
   [UPDATE] udp      17 30 src=10.246.11.13 dst=216.239.35.0 sport=37282 dport=123 src=216.239.35.0 dst=10.246.11.13 sport=123 dport=37282
   [UPDATE] udp      17 120 src=10.246.11.13 dst=216.239.35.0 sport=37282 dport=123 src=216.239.35.0 dst=10.246.11.13 sport=123 dport=37282 [ASSURED]
  [DESTROY] udp      17 src=10.246.11.13 dst=216.239.35.0 sport=37282 dport=123 src=216.239.35.0 dst=10.246.11.13 sport=123 dport=37282 [ASSURED]

Before this patch, short-lived UDP flows never entered IPS_ASSURED, so
they were already candidate flow to be deleted by early_drop under
stress.

Before this patch, IPS_ASSURED is set on regardless the internal stream
state, attach this internal stream state to IPS_ASSURED.

packet #1 (original direction) enters NEW state
packet #2 (reply direction) enters ESTABLISHED state, sets on IPS_SEEN_REPLY
paclet #3 (any direction) sets on IPS_ASSURED (if 2 seconds since the
          creation has passed by).

Reported-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
jnettlet pushed a commit that referenced this issue Dec 10, 2021
[ Upstream commit 64ea2d0 ]

The change of devlink_alloc() to accept device makes sure that device
is fully initialized and device_register() does nothing except allowing
users to use that devlink instance.

Such change ensures that no user input will be usable till that point and
it eliminates the need to worry about internal locking as long as devlink_register
is called last since all accesses to the devlink are during initialization.

This change fixes the following lockdep warning.

 ======================================================
 WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
 5.14.0-rc2+ #27 Not tainted
 ------------------------------------------------------
 devlink/265 is trying to acquire lock:
 ffff8880133c2bc0 (&dev->intf_state_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_unload_one+0x1e/0xa0 [mlx5_core]
 but task is already holding lock:
 ffffffff8362b468 (devlink_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: devlink_nl_pre_doit+0x2b/0x8d0
 which lock already depends on the new lock.
 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

 -> #1 (devlink_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
        __mutex_lock+0x149/0x1310
        devlink_register+0xe7/0x280
        mlx5_devlink_register+0x118/0x480 [mlx5_core]
        mlx5_init_one+0x34b/0x440 [mlx5_core]
        probe_one+0x480/0x6e0 [mlx5_core]
        pci_device_probe+0x2a0/0x4a0
        really_probe+0x1cb/0xba0
        __driver_probe_device+0x18f/0x470
        driver_probe_device+0x49/0x120
        __driver_attach+0x1ce/0x400
        bus_for_each_dev+0x11e/0x1a0
        bus_add_driver+0x309/0x570
        driver_register+0x20f/0x390
        0xffffffffa04a0062
        do_one_initcall+0xd5/0x400
        do_init_module+0x1c8/0x760
        load_module+0x7d9d/0xa4b0
        __do_sys_finit_module+0x118/0x1a0
        do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

 -> #0 (&dev->intf_state_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
        __lock_acquire+0x2999/0x5a40
        lock_acquire+0x1a9/0x4a0
        __mutex_lock+0x149/0x1310
        mlx5_unload_one+0x1e/0xa0 [mlx5_core]
        mlx5_devlink_reload_down+0x185/0x2b0 [mlx5_core]
        devlink_reload+0x1f2/0x640
        devlink_nl_cmd_reload+0x6c3/0x10d0
        genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1e9/0x2f0
        genl_rcv_msg+0x27f/0x4a0
        netlink_rcv_skb+0x11e/0x340
        genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
        netlink_unicast+0x433/0x700
        netlink_sendmsg+0x6fb/0xbe0
        sock_sendmsg+0xb0/0xe0
        __sys_sendto+0x192/0x240
        __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0
        do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

 other info that might help us debug this:

  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

        CPU0                    CPU1
        ----                    ----
   lock(devlink_mutex);
                                lock(&dev->intf_state_mutex);
                                lock(devlink_mutex);
   lock(&dev->intf_state_mutex);

  *** DEADLOCK ***

 3 locks held by devlink/265:
  #0: ffffffff836371d0 (cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv+0x15/0x40
  #1: ffffffff83637288 (genl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv_msg+0x31a/0x4a0
  #2: ffffffff8362b468 (devlink_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: devlink_nl_pre_doit+0x2b/0x8d0

 stack backtrace:
 CPU: 0 PID: 265 Comm: devlink Not tainted 5.14.0-rc2+ #27
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x59
  check_noncircular+0x268/0x310
  ? print_circular_bug+0x460/0x460
  ? __kernel_text_address+0xe/0x30
  ? alloc_chain_hlocks+0x1e6/0x5a0
  __lock_acquire+0x2999/0x5a40
  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x3e0/0x3e0
  ? add_lock_to_list.constprop.0+0x6c/0x530
  lock_acquire+0x1a9/0x4a0
  ? mlx5_unload_one+0x1e/0xa0 [mlx5_core]
  ? lock_release+0x6c0/0x6c0
  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x3e0/0x3e0
  ? lock_is_held_type+0x98/0x110
  __mutex_lock+0x149/0x1310
  ? mlx5_unload_one+0x1e/0xa0 [mlx5_core]
  ? lock_is_held_type+0x98/0x110
  ? mlx5_unload_one+0x1e/0xa0 [mlx5_core]
  ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x110
  ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x1160/0x1160
  ? mlx5_lag_is_active+0x72/0x90 [mlx5_core]
  ? lock_downgrade+0x6d0/0x6d0
  ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x12e/0x270
  ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90
  ? mlx5_unload_one+0x1e/0xa0 [mlx5_core]
  mlx5_unload_one+0x1e/0xa0 [mlx5_core]
  mlx5_devlink_reload_down+0x185/0x2b0 [mlx5_core]
  ? netlink_broadcast_filtered+0x308/0xac0
  ? mlx5_devlink_info_get+0x1f0/0x1f0 [mlx5_core]
  ? __build_skb_around+0x110/0x2b0
  ? __alloc_skb+0x113/0x2b0
  devlink_reload+0x1f2/0x640
  ? devlink_unregister+0x1e0/0x1e0
  ? security_capable+0x51/0x90
  devlink_nl_cmd_reload+0x6c3/0x10d0
  ? devlink_nl_cmd_get_doit+0x1e0/0x1e0
  ? devlink_nl_pre_doit+0x72/0x8d0
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1e9/0x2f0
  ? __lock_acquire+0x15e2/0x5a40
  ? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse.constprop.0+0x240/0x240
  ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x1160/0x1160
  ? security_capable+0x51/0x90
  genl_rcv_msg+0x27f/0x4a0
  ? genl_get_cmd+0x3c0/0x3c0
  ? lock_acquire+0x1a9/0x4a0
  ? devlink_nl_cmd_get_doit+0x1e0/0x1e0
  ? lock_release+0x6c0/0x6c0
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x11e/0x340
  ? genl_get_cmd+0x3c0/0x3c0
  ? netlink_ack+0x930/0x930
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x433/0x700
  ? netlink_attachskb+0x750/0x750
  ? __alloc_skb+0x113/0x2b0
  netlink_sendmsg+0x6fb/0xbe0
  ? netlink_unicast+0x700/0x700
  ? netlink_unicast+0x700/0x700
  sock_sendmsg+0xb0/0xe0
  __sys_sendto+0x192/0x240
  ? __x64_sys_getpeername+0xb0/0xb0
  ? do_sys_openat2+0x10a/0x370
  ? down_write_nested+0x150/0x150
  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x215/0xd50
  ? __x64_sys_openat+0x11f/0x1d0
  ? __x64_sys_open+0x1a0/0x1a0
  __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0
  ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x1d/0x50
  do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f50b50b6b3a
 Code: d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b8 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 89 ca 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 15 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 76 c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 83 ec 30 44 89 4c
 RSP: 002b:00007fff6c0d3f38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 00007f50b50b6b3a
 RDX: 0000000000000038 RSI: 000055763ac08440 RDI: 0000000000000003
 RBP: 000055763ac08410 R08: 00007f50b5192200 R09: 000000000000000c
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000055763ac08410 R15: 000055763ac08440
 mlx5_core 0000:00:09.0: firmware version: 4.8.9999
 mlx5_core 0000:00:09.0: 0.000 Gb/s available PCIe bandwidth (8.0 GT/s PCIe x255 link)
 mlx5_core 0000:00:09.0 eth1: Link up

Fixes: a6f3b62 ("net/mlx5: Move devlink registration before interfaces load")
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
jnettlet pushed a commit that referenced this issue Dec 10, 2021
commit 2aa3660 upstream.

It is generally unsafe to call put_device() with dpm_list_mtx held,
because the given device's release routine may carry out an action
depending on that lock which then may deadlock, so modify the
system-wide suspend and resume of devices to always drop dpm_list_mtx
before calling put_device() (and adjust white space somewhat while
at it).

For instance, this prevents the following splat from showing up in
the kernel log after a system resume in certain configurations:

[ 3290.969514] ======================================================
[ 3290.969517] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[ 3290.969519] 5.15.0+ #2420 Tainted: G S
[ 3290.969523] ------------------------------------------------------
[ 3290.969525] systemd-sleep/4553 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 3290.969529] ffff888117ab1138 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: flush_workqueue+0x87/0x4a0
[ 3290.969554]
               but task is already holding lock:
[ 3290.969556] ffffffff8280fca8 (dpm_list_mtx){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dpm_resume+0x12e/0x3e0
[ 3290.969571]
               which lock already depends on the new lock.

[ 3290.969573]
               the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[ 3290.969575]
               -> #3 (dpm_list_mtx){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[ 3290.969583]        __mutex_lock+0x9d/0xa30
[ 3290.969591]        device_pm_add+0x2e/0xe0
[ 3290.969597]        device_add+0x4d5/0x8f0
[ 3290.969605]        hci_conn_add_sysfs+0x43/0xb0 [bluetooth]
[ 3290.969689]        hci_conn_complete_evt.isra.71+0x124/0x750 [bluetooth]
[ 3290.969747]        hci_event_packet+0xd6c/0x28a0 [bluetooth]
[ 3290.969798]        hci_rx_work+0x213/0x640 [bluetooth]
[ 3290.969842]        process_one_work+0x2aa/0x650
[ 3290.969851]        worker_thread+0x39/0x400
[ 3290.969859]        kthread+0x142/0x170
[ 3290.969865]        ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[ 3290.969872]
               -> #2 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[ 3290.969881]        __mutex_lock+0x9d/0xa30
[ 3290.969887]        hci_event_packet+0xba/0x28a0 [bluetooth]
[ 3290.969935]        hci_rx_work+0x213/0x640 [bluetooth]
[ 3290.969978]        process_one_work+0x2aa/0x650
[ 3290.969985]        worker_thread+0x39/0x400
[ 3290.969993]        kthread+0x142/0x170
[ 3290.969999]        ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[ 3290.970004]
               -> #1 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
[ 3290.970013]        process_one_work+0x27d/0x650
[ 3290.970020]        worker_thread+0x39/0x400
[ 3290.970028]        kthread+0x142/0x170
[ 3290.970033]        ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[ 3290.970038]
               -> #0 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}:
[ 3290.970047]        __lock_acquire+0x15cb/0x1b50
[ 3290.970054]        lock_acquire+0x26c/0x300
[ 3290.970059]        flush_workqueue+0xae/0x4a0
[ 3290.970066]        drain_workqueue+0xa1/0x130
[ 3290.970073]        destroy_workqueue+0x34/0x1f0
[ 3290.970081]        hci_release_dev+0x49/0x180 [bluetooth]
[ 3290.970130]        bt_host_release+0x1d/0x30 [bluetooth]
[ 3290.970195]        device_release+0x33/0x90
[ 3290.970201]        kobject_release+0x63/0x160
[ 3290.970211]        dpm_resume+0x164/0x3e0
[ 3290.970215]        dpm_resume_end+0xd/0x20
[ 3290.970220]        suspend_devices_and_enter+0x1a4/0xba0
[ 3290.970229]        pm_suspend+0x26b/0x310
[ 3290.970236]        state_store+0x42/0x90
[ 3290.970243]        kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x135/0x1b0
[ 3290.970251]        new_sync_write+0x125/0x1c0
[ 3290.970257]        vfs_write+0x360/0x3c0
[ 3290.970263]        ksys_write+0xa7/0xe0
[ 3290.970269]        do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80
[ 3290.970276]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 3290.970284]
               other info that might help us debug this:

[ 3290.970285] Chain exists of:
                 (wq_completion)hci0#2 --> &hdev->lock --> dpm_list_mtx

[ 3290.970297]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

[ 3290.970299]        CPU0                    CPU1
[ 3290.970300]        ----                    ----
[ 3290.970302]   lock(dpm_list_mtx);
[ 3290.970306]                                lock(&hdev->lock);
[ 3290.970310]                                lock(dpm_list_mtx);
[ 3290.970314]   lock((wq_completion)hci0#2);
[ 3290.970319]
                *** DEADLOCK ***

[ 3290.970321] 7 locks held by systemd-sleep/4553:
[ 3290.970325]  #0: ffff888103bcd448 (sb_writers#4){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0xa7/0xe0
[ 3290.970341]  #1: ffff888115a14488 (&of->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x103/0x1b0
[ 3290.970355]  #2: ffff888100f719e0 (kn->active#233){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x10c/0x1b0
[ 3290.970369]  #3: ffffffff82661048 (autosleep_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: state_store+0x12/0x90
[ 3290.970384]  #4: ffffffff82658ac8 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: pm_suspend+0x9f/0x310
[ 3290.970399]  #5: ffffffff827f2a48 (acpi_scan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: acpi_suspend_begin+0x4c/0x80
[ 3290.970416]  #6: ffffffff8280fca8 (dpm_list_mtx){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dpm_resume+0x12e/0x3e0
[ 3290.970428]
               stack backtrace:
[ 3290.970431] CPU: 3 PID: 4553 Comm: systemd-sleep Tainted: G S                5.15.0+ #2420
[ 3290.970438] Hardware name: Dell Inc. XPS 13 9380/0RYJWW, BIOS 1.5.0 06/03/2019
[ 3290.970441] Call Trace:
[ 3290.970446]  dump_stack_lvl+0x44/0x57
[ 3290.970454]  check_noncircular+0x105/0x120
[ 3290.970468]  ? __lock_acquire+0x15cb/0x1b50
[ 3290.970474]  __lock_acquire+0x15cb/0x1b50
[ 3290.970487]  lock_acquire+0x26c/0x300
[ 3290.970493]  ? flush_workqueue+0x87/0x4a0
[ 3290.970503]  ? __raw_spin_lock_init+0x3b/0x60
[ 3290.970510]  ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x58/0x240
[ 3290.970519]  flush_workqueue+0xae/0x4a0
[ 3290.970526]  ? flush_workqueue+0x87/0x4a0
[ 3290.970544]  ? drain_workqueue+0xa1/0x130
[ 3290.970552]  drain_workqueue+0xa1/0x130
[ 3290.970561]  destroy_workqueue+0x34/0x1f0
[ 3290.970572]  hci_release_dev+0x49/0x180 [bluetooth]
[ 3290.970624]  bt_host_release+0x1d/0x30 [bluetooth]
[ 3290.970687]  device_release+0x33/0x90
[ 3290.970695]  kobject_release+0x63/0x160
[ 3290.970705]  dpm_resume+0x164/0x3e0
[ 3290.970710]  ? dpm_resume_early+0x251/0x3b0
[ 3290.970718]  dpm_resume_end+0xd/0x20
[ 3290.970723]  suspend_devices_and_enter+0x1a4/0xba0
[ 3290.970737]  pm_suspend+0x26b/0x310
[ 3290.970746]  state_store+0x42/0x90
[ 3290.970755]  kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x135/0x1b0
[ 3290.970764]  new_sync_write+0x125/0x1c0
[ 3290.970777]  vfs_write+0x360/0x3c0
[ 3290.970785]  ksys_write+0xa7/0xe0
[ 3290.970794]  do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80
[ 3290.970803]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 3290.970811] RIP: 0033:0x7f41b1328164
[ 3290.970819] Code: 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 8b 05 4a d2 2c 00 48 63 ff 85 c0 75 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 f3 c3 66 90 55 53 48 89 d5 48 89 f3 48 83
[ 3290.970824] RSP: 002b:00007ffe6ae21b28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[ 3290.970831] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00007f41b1328164
[ 3290.970836] RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 000055965e651070 RDI: 0000000000000004
[ 3290.970839] RBP: 000055965e651070 R08: 000055965e64f390 R09: 00007f41b1e3d1c0
[ 3290.970843] R10: 000000000000000a R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000004
[ 3290.970846] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 000055965e64f2b0 R15: 0000000000000004

Cc: All applicable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
jnettlet pushed a commit that referenced this issue Dec 10, 2021
[ Upstream commit 54659ca ]

when turning off a connection, lockdep complains with the
following warning (a modprobe has been done but the same
happens with a disconnection from NetworkManager,
it's enough to trigger a cfg80211_disconnect call):

[  682.855867] ======================================================
[  682.855877] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[  682.855887] 5.14.0-rc6+ #16 Tainted: G         C OE
[  682.855898] ------------------------------------------------------
[  682.855906] modprobe/1770 is trying to acquire lock:
[  682.855916] ffffb6d000332b00 (&pxmitpriv->lock){+.-.}-{2:2},
		at: rtw_free_stainfo+0x52/0x4a0 [r8723bs]
[  682.856073]
               but task is already holding lock:
[  682.856081] ffffb6d0003336a8 (&pstapriv->sta_hash_lock){+.-.}-{2:2},
		at: rtw_free_assoc_resources+0x48/0x110 [r8723bs]
[  682.856207]
               which lock already depends on the new lock.

[  682.856215]
               the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[  682.856223]
               -> #1 (&pstapriv->sta_hash_lock){+.-.}-{2:2}:
[  682.856247]        _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x34/0x40
[  682.856265]        rtw_get_stainfo+0x9a/0x110 [r8723bs]
[  682.856389]        rtw_xmit_classifier+0x27/0x130 [r8723bs]
[  682.856515]        rtw_xmitframe_enqueue+0xa/0x20 [r8723bs]
[  682.856642]        rtl8723bs_hal_xmit+0x3b/0xb0 [r8723bs]
[  682.856752]        rtw_xmit+0x4ef/0x890 [r8723bs]
[  682.856879]        _rtw_xmit_entry+0xba/0x350 [r8723bs]
[  682.856981]        dev_hard_start_xmit+0xee/0x320
[  682.856999]        sch_direct_xmit+0x8c/0x330
[  682.857014]        __dev_queue_xmit+0xba5/0xf00
[  682.857030]        packet_sendmsg+0x981/0x1b80
[  682.857047]        sock_sendmsg+0x5b/0x60
[  682.857060]        __sys_sendto+0xf1/0x160
[  682.857073]        __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30
[  682.857087]        do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80
[  682.857102]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[  682.857117]
               -> #0 (&pxmitpriv->lock){+.-.}-{2:2}:
[  682.857142]        __lock_acquire+0xfd9/0x1b50
[  682.857158]        lock_acquire+0xb4/0x2c0
[  682.857172]        _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x34/0x40
[  682.857185]        rtw_free_stainfo+0x52/0x4a0 [r8723bs]
[  682.857308]        rtw_free_assoc_resources+0x53/0x110 [r8723bs]
[  682.857415]        cfg80211_rtw_disconnect+0x4b/0x70 [r8723bs]
[  682.857522]        cfg80211_disconnect+0x12e/0x2f0 [cfg80211]
[  682.857759]        cfg80211_leave+0x2b/0x40 [cfg80211]
[  682.857961]        cfg80211_netdev_notifier_call+0xa9/0x560 [cfg80211]
[  682.858163]        raw_notifier_call_chain+0x41/0x50
[  682.858180]        __dev_close_many+0x62/0x100
[  682.858195]        dev_close_many+0x7d/0x120
[  682.858209]        unregister_netdevice_many+0x416/0x680
[  682.858225]        unregister_netdevice_queue+0xab/0xf0
[  682.858240]        unregister_netdev+0x18/0x20
[  682.858255]        rtw_unregister_netdevs+0x28/0x40 [r8723bs]
[  682.858360]        rtw_dev_remove+0x24/0xd0 [r8723bs]
[  682.858463]        sdio_bus_remove+0x31/0xd0 [mmc_core]
[  682.858532]        device_release_driver_internal+0xf7/0x1d0
[  682.858550]        driver_detach+0x47/0x90
[  682.858564]        bus_remove_driver+0x77/0xd0
[  682.858579]        rtw_drv_halt+0xc/0x678 [r8723bs]
[  682.858685]        __x64_sys_delete_module+0x13f/0x250
[  682.858699]        do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80
[  682.858715]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[  682.858729]
               other info that might help us debug this:

[  682.858737]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

[  682.858744]        CPU0                    CPU1
[  682.858751]        ----                    ----
[  682.858758]   lock(&pstapriv->sta_hash_lock);
[  682.858772]                                lock(&pxmitpriv->lock);
[  682.858786]                                lock(&pstapriv->sta_hash_lock);
[  682.858799]   lock(&pxmitpriv->lock);
[  682.858812]
                *** DEADLOCK ***

[  682.858820] 5 locks held by modprobe/1770:
[  682.858831]  #0: ffff8d870697d980 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3},
		at: device_release_driver_internal+0x1a/0x1d0
[  682.858869]  #1: ffffffffbdbbf1c8 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3},
		at: unregister_netdev+0xe/0x20
[  682.858906]  #2: ffff8d87054ee5e8 (&rdev->wiphy.mtx){+.+.}-{3:3},
		at: cfg80211_netdev_notifier_call+0x9e/0x560 [cfg80211]
[  682.859131]  #3: ffff8d870f2bc8f0 (&wdev->mtx){+.+.}-{3:3},
		at: cfg80211_leave+0x20/0x40 [cfg80211]
[  682.859354]  #4: ffffb6d0003336a8 (&pstapriv->sta_hash_lock){+.-.}-{2:2},
		at: rtw_free_assoc_resources+0x48/0x110 [r8723bs]
[  682.859482]
               stack backtrace:
[  682.859491] CPU: 1 PID: 1770 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G
		C OE     5.14.0-rc6+ #16
[  682.859507] Hardware name: LENOVO 80NR/Madrid, BIOS DACN25WW 08/20/2015
[  682.859517] Call Trace:
[  682.859531]  dump_stack_lvl+0x56/0x6f
[  682.859551]  check_noncircular+0xdb/0xf0
[  682.859579]  __lock_acquire+0xfd9/0x1b50
[  682.859606]  lock_acquire+0xb4/0x2c0
[  682.859623]  ? rtw_free_stainfo+0x52/0x4a0 [r8723bs]
[  682.859752]  ? mark_held_locks+0x48/0x70
[  682.859769]  ? rtw_free_stainfo+0x4a/0x4a0 [r8723bs]
[  682.859898]  _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x34/0x40
[  682.859914]  ? rtw_free_stainfo+0x52/0x4a0 [r8723bs]
[  682.860039]  rtw_free_stainfo+0x52/0x4a0 [r8723bs]
[  682.860171]  rtw_free_assoc_resources+0x53/0x110 [r8723bs]
[  682.860286]  cfg80211_rtw_disconnect+0x4b/0x70 [r8723bs]
[  682.860397]  cfg80211_disconnect+0x12e/0x2f0 [cfg80211]
[  682.860629]  cfg80211_leave+0x2b/0x40 [cfg80211]
[  682.860836]  cfg80211_netdev_notifier_call+0xa9/0x560 [cfg80211]
[  682.861048]  ? __lock_acquire+0x4dc/0x1b50
[  682.861070]  ? lock_is_held_type+0xa8/0x110
[  682.861089]  ? lock_is_held_type+0xa8/0x110
[  682.861104]  ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x90
[  682.861120]  ? packet_notifier+0x173/0x300
[  682.861141]  ? lock_release+0xb3/0x250
[  682.861160]  ? packet_notifier+0x192/0x300
[  682.861184]  raw_notifier_call_chain+0x41/0x50
[  682.861205]  __dev_close_many+0x62/0x100
[  682.861224]  dev_close_many+0x7d/0x120
[  682.861245]  unregister_netdevice_many+0x416/0x680
[  682.861264]  ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x90
[  682.861284]  unregister_netdevice_queue+0xab/0xf0
[  682.861306]  unregister_netdev+0x18/0x20
[  682.861325]  rtw_unregister_netdevs+0x28/0x40 [r8723bs]
[  682.861434]  rtw_dev_remove+0x24/0xd0 [r8723bs]
[  682.861542]  sdio_bus_remove+0x31/0xd0 [mmc_core]
[  682.861615]  device_release_driver_internal+0xf7/0x1d0
[  682.861637]  driver_detach+0x47/0x90
[  682.861656]  bus_remove_driver+0x77/0xd0
[  682.861674]  rtw_drv_halt+0xc/0x678 [r8723bs]
[  682.861782]  __x64_sys_delete_module+0x13f/0x250
[  682.861801]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xf3/0x170
[  682.861817]  ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x20/0x70
[  682.861836]  do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80
[  682.861855]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[  682.861873] RIP: 0033:0x7f6dbe85400b
[  682.861890] Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 6d 1e 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89
01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa
b8 b0 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 3d
1e 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[  682.861906] RSP: 002b:00007ffe7a82f538 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0
[  682.861923] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055a64693bd20 RCX: 00007f6dbe85400b
[  682.861935] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 000055a64693bd88
[  682.861946] RBP: 000055a64693bd20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[  682.861957] R10: 00007f6dbe8c7ac0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 000055a64693bd88
[  682.861967] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000055a64693bd88 R15: 00007ffe7a831848

This happens because when we enqueue a frame for
transmission we do it under xmit_priv lock, then calling
rtw_get_stainfo (needed for enqueuing) takes sta_hash_lock
and this leads to the following lock dependency:

xmit_priv->lock -> sta_hash_lock

Turning off a connection will bring to call
rtw_free_assoc_resources which will set up
the inverse dependency:

sta_hash_lock -> xmit_priv_lock

This could lead to a deadlock as lockdep complains.

Fix it by removing the xmit_priv->lock around
rtw_xmitframe_enqueue call inside rtl8723bs_hal_xmit
and put it in a smaller critical section inside
rtw_xmit_classifier, the only place where
xmit_priv data are actually accessed.

Replace spin_{lock,unlock}_bh(pxmitpriv->lock)
in other tx paths leading to rtw_xmitframe_enqueue
call with spin_{lock,unlock}_bh(psta->sleep_q.lock)
- it's not clear why accessing a sleep_q was protected
by a spinlock on xmitpriv->lock.

This way is avoided the same faulty lock nesting
order.

Extra changes in v2 by Hans de Goede:
-Lift the taking of the struct __queue.lock spinlock out of
 rtw_free_xmitframe_queue() into the callers this allows also
 protecting a bunch of related state in rtw_free_stainfo():
-Protect psta->sleepq_len on rtw_free_xmitframe_queue(&psta->sleep_q);
-Protect struct tx_servq.tx_pending and tx_servq.qcnt when
 calling rtw_free_xmitframe_queue(&tx_servq.sta_pending)
-This also allows moving the spin_lock_bh(&pxmitpriv->lock); to below
 the sleep_q free-ing code, avoiding another ABBA locking issue

CC: Larry Finger <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
Tested-on: Lenovo Ideapad MiiX 300-10IBY
Signed-off-by: Fabio Aiuto <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
jnettlet pushed a commit that referenced this issue Dec 10, 2021
[ Upstream commit bdc1bbd ]

The assoc_timer takes the pmlmepriv->lock and various functions which
take the pmlmepriv->scanned_queue.lock first take the pmlmepriv->lock,
this means that we cannot have code which waits for the timer
(timer_del_sync) while holding the pmlmepriv->scanned_queue.lock
to avoid a triangle deadlock:

[  363.139361] ======================================================
[  363.139377] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[  363.139396] 5.15.0-rc1+ #470 Tainted: G         C  E
[  363.139413] ------------------------------------------------------
[  363.139424] RTW_CMD_THREAD/2466 is trying to acquire lock:
[  363.139441] ffffbacd00699038 (&pmlmepriv->lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: _rtw_join_timeout_handler+0x3c/0x160 [r8723bs]
[  363.139598]
               but task is already holding lock:
[  363.139610] ffffbacd00128ea0 ((&pmlmepriv->assoc_timer)){+.-.}-{0:0}, at: call_timer_fn+0x5/0x260
[  363.139673]
               which lock already depends on the new lock.

[  363.139684]
               the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[  363.139696]
               -> #2 ((&pmlmepriv->assoc_timer)){+.-.}-{0:0}:
[  363.139734]        del_timer_sync+0x59/0x100
[  363.139762]        rtw_joinbss_event_prehandle+0x342/0x640 [r8723bs]
[  363.139870]        report_join_res+0xdf/0x110 [r8723bs]
[  363.139980]        OnAssocRsp+0x17a/0x200 [r8723bs]
[  363.140092]        rtw_recv_entry+0x190/0x1120 [r8723bs]
[  363.140209]        rtl8723b_process_phy_info+0x3f9/0x750 [r8723bs]
[  363.140318]        tasklet_action_common.constprop.0+0xe8/0x110
[  363.140345]        __do_softirq+0xde/0x485
[  363.140372]        __irq_exit_rcu+0xd0/0x100
[  363.140393]        irq_exit_rcu+0xa/0x20
[  363.140413]        common_interrupt+0x83/0xa0
[  363.140440]        asm_common_interrupt+0x1e/0x40
[  363.140463]        finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x157/0x3d0
[  363.140492]        __schedule+0x447/0x1880
[  363.140516]        schedule+0x59/0xc0
[  363.140537]        smpboot_thread_fn+0x161/0x1c0
[  363.140565]        kthread+0x143/0x160
[  363.140585]        ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[  363.140614]
               -> #1 (&pmlmepriv->scanned_queue.lock){+.-.}-{2:2}:
[  363.140653]        _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x34/0x40
[  363.140675]        rtw_free_network_queue+0x31/0x80 [r8723bs]
[  363.140776]        rtw_sitesurvey_cmd+0x79/0x1e0 [r8723bs]
[  363.140869]        rtw_cfg80211_surveydone_event_callback+0x3cf/0x470 [r8723bs]
[  363.140973]        rdev_scan+0x42/0x1a0 [cfg80211]
[  363.141307]        nl80211_trigger_scan+0x566/0x660 [cfg80211]
[  363.141635]        genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xcd/0x110
[  363.141661]        genl_rcv_msg+0xce/0x1c0
[  363.141680]        netlink_rcv_skb+0x50/0xf0
[  363.141699]        genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
[  363.141717]        netlink_unicast+0x16d/0x230
[  363.141736]        netlink_sendmsg+0x22b/0x450
[  363.141755]        sock_sendmsg+0x5e/0x60
[  363.141781]        ____sys_sendmsg+0x22f/0x270
[  363.141803]        ___sys_sendmsg+0x81/0xc0
[  363.141828]        __sys_sendmsg+0x49/0x80
[  363.141851]        do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[  363.141873]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[  363.141895]
               -> #0 (&pmlmepriv->lock){+.-.}-{2:2}:
[  363.141930]        __lock_acquire+0x1158/0x1de0
[  363.141954]        lock_acquire+0xb5/0x2b0
[  363.141974]        _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x34/0x40
[  363.141993]        _rtw_join_timeout_handler+0x3c/0x160 [r8723bs]
[  363.142097]        call_timer_fn+0x94/0x260
[  363.142122]        __run_timers.part.0+0x1bf/0x290
[  363.142147]        run_timer_softirq+0x26/0x50
[  363.142171]        __do_softirq+0xde/0x485
[  363.142193]        __irq_exit_rcu+0xd0/0x100
[  363.142215]        irq_exit_rcu+0xa/0x20
[  363.142235]        sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x72/0x90
[  363.142260]        asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20
[  363.142283]        __module_address.part.0+0x0/0xd0
[  363.142309]        is_module_address+0x25/0x40
[  363.142334]        static_obj+0x4f/0x60
[  363.142361]        lockdep_init_map_type+0x47/0x220
[  363.142382]        __init_swait_queue_head+0x45/0x60
[  363.142408]        mmc_wait_for_req+0x4a/0xc0 [mmc_core]
[  363.142504]        mmc_wait_for_cmd+0x55/0x70 [mmc_core]
[  363.142592]        mmc_io_rw_direct+0x75/0xe0 [mmc_core]
[  363.142691]        sdio_writeb+0x2e/0x50 [mmc_core]
[  363.142788]        _sd_cmd52_write+0x62/0x80 [r8723bs]
[  363.142885]        sd_cmd52_write+0x6c/0xb0 [r8723bs]
[  363.142981]        rtl8723bs_set_hal_ops+0x982/0x9b0 [r8723bs]
[  363.143089]        rtw_write16+0x1e/0x30 [r8723bs]
[  363.143184]        SetHwReg8723B+0xcc9/0xd30 [r8723bs]
[  363.143294]        mlmeext_joinbss_event_callback+0x17a/0x1a0 [r8723bs]
[  363.143405]        rtw_joinbss_event_callback+0x11/0x20 [r8723bs]
[  363.143507]        mlme_evt_hdl+0x4d/0x70 [r8723bs]
[  363.143620]        rtw_cmd_thread+0x168/0x3c0 [r8723bs]
[  363.143712]        kthread+0x143/0x160
[  363.143732]        ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[  363.143757]
               other info that might help us debug this:

[  363.143768] Chain exists of:
                 &pmlmepriv->lock --> &pmlmepriv->scanned_queue.lock --> (&pmlmepriv->assoc_timer)

[  363.143809]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

[  363.143819]        CPU0                    CPU1
[  363.143831]        ----                    ----
[  363.143841]   lock((&pmlmepriv->assoc_timer));
[  363.143862]                                lock(&pmlmepriv->scanned_queue.lock);
[  363.143882]                                lock((&pmlmepriv->assoc_timer));
[  363.143902]   lock(&pmlmepriv->lock);
[  363.143921]
                *** DEADLOCK ***

Make rtw_joinbss_event_prehandle() release the scanned_queue.lock before
it deletes the timer to avoid this (it is still holding pmlmepriv->lock
protecting against racing the timer).

Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
jnettlet pushed a commit that referenced this issue Dec 10, 2021
[ Upstream commit f347c26 ]

The following issue was observed running syzkaller:

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:377 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in sg_copy_buffer+0x150/0x1c0 lib/scatterlist.c:831
Read of size 2132 at addr ffff8880aea95dc8 by task syz-executor.0/9815

CPU: 0 PID: 9815 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 4.19.202-00874-gfc0fe04215a9 #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0xe4/0x14a lib/dump_stack.c:118
 print_address_description+0x73/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:253
 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:352 [inline]
 kasan_report+0x272/0x370 mm/kasan/report.c:410
 memcpy+0x1f/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:302
 memcpy include/linux/string.h:377 [inline]
 sg_copy_buffer+0x150/0x1c0 lib/scatterlist.c:831
 fill_from_dev_buffer+0x14f/0x340 drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:1021
 resp_report_tgtpgs+0x5aa/0x770 drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:1772
 schedule_resp+0x464/0x12f0 drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:4429
 scsi_debug_queuecommand+0x467/0x1390 drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:5835
 scsi_dispatch_cmd+0x3fc/0x9b0 drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c:1896
 scsi_request_fn+0x1042/0x1810 drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c:2034
 __blk_run_queue_uncond block/blk-core.c:464 [inline]
 __blk_run_queue+0x1a4/0x380 block/blk-core.c:484
 blk_execute_rq_nowait+0x1c2/0x2d0 block/blk-exec.c:78
 sg_common_write.isra.19+0xd74/0x1dc0 drivers/scsi/sg.c:847
 sg_write.part.23+0x6e0/0xd00 drivers/scsi/sg.c:716
 sg_write+0x64/0xa0 drivers/scsi/sg.c:622
 __vfs_write+0xed/0x690 fs/read_write.c:485
kill_bdev:block_device:00000000e138492c
 vfs_write+0x184/0x4c0 fs/read_write.c:549
 ksys_write+0x107/0x240 fs/read_write.c:599
 do_syscall_64+0xc2/0x560 arch/x86/entry/common.c:293
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

We get 'alen' from command its type is int. If userspace passes a large
length we will get a negative 'alen'.

Switch n, alen, and rlen to u32.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Acked-by: Douglas Gilbert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
jnettlet pushed a commit that referenced this issue Dec 10, 2021
[ Upstream commit 4d9380e ]

Often some test cases like btrfs/161 trigger lockdep splats that complain
about possible unsafe lock scenario due to the fact that during mount,
when reading the chunk tree we end up calling blkdev_get_by_path() while
holding a read lock on a leaf of the chunk tree. That produces a lockdep
splat like the following:

[ 3653.683975] ======================================================
[ 3653.685148] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[ 3653.686301] 5.15.0-rc7-btrfs-next-103 #1 Not tainted
[ 3653.687239] ------------------------------------------------------
[ 3653.688400] mount/447465 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 3653.689320] ffff8c6b0c76e528 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0xe7/0x320
[ 3653.691054]
               but task is already holding lock:
[ 3653.692155] ffff8c6b0a9f39e0 (btrfs-chunk-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x24/0x110 [btrfs]
[ 3653.693978]
               which lock already depends on the new lock.

[ 3653.695510]
               the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[ 3653.696915]
               -> #3 (btrfs-chunk-00){++++}-{3:3}:
[ 3653.698053]        down_read_nested+0x4b/0x140
[ 3653.698893]        __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x24/0x110 [btrfs]
[ 3653.699988]        btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x31/0x40 [btrfs]
[ 3653.701205]        btrfs_search_slot+0x537/0xc00 [btrfs]
[ 3653.702234]        btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x32/0x70 [btrfs]
[ 3653.703332]        btrfs_init_new_device+0x563/0x15b0 [btrfs]
[ 3653.704439]        btrfs_ioctl+0x2110/0x3530 [btrfs]
[ 3653.705405]        __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
[ 3653.706215]        do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0
[ 3653.706990]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 3653.708040]
               -> #2 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}:
[ 3653.708994]        lock_release+0x13d/0x4a0
[ 3653.709533]        up_write+0x18/0x160
[ 3653.710017]        btrfs_sync_file+0x3f3/0x5b0 [btrfs]
[ 3653.710699]        __loop_update_dio+0xbd/0x170 [loop]
[ 3653.711360]        lo_ioctl+0x3b1/0x8a0 [loop]
[ 3653.711929]        block_ioctl+0x48/0x50
[ 3653.712442]        __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
[ 3653.712991]        do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0
[ 3653.713519]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 3653.714233]
               -> #1 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[ 3653.715026]        __mutex_lock+0x92/0x900
[ 3653.715648]        lo_open+0x28/0x60 [loop]
[ 3653.716275]        blkdev_get_whole+0x28/0x90
[ 3653.716867]        blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0x142/0x320
[ 3653.717537]        blkdev_open+0x5e/0xa0
[ 3653.718043]        do_dentry_open+0x163/0x390
[ 3653.718604]        path_openat+0x3f0/0xa80
[ 3653.719128]        do_filp_open+0xa9/0x150
[ 3653.719652]        do_sys_openat2+0x97/0x160
[ 3653.720197]        __x64_sys_openat+0x54/0x90
[ 3653.720766]        do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0
[ 3653.721285]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 3653.721986]
               -> #0 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[ 3653.722775]        __lock_acquire+0x130e/0x2210
[ 3653.723348]        lock_acquire+0xd7/0x310
[ 3653.723867]        __mutex_lock+0x92/0x900
[ 3653.724394]        blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0xe7/0x320
[ 3653.725041]        blkdev_get_by_path+0xb8/0xd0
[ 3653.725614]        btrfs_get_bdev_and_sb+0x1b/0xb0 [btrfs]
[ 3653.726332]        open_fs_devices+0xd7/0x2c0 [btrfs]
[ 3653.726999]        btrfs_read_chunk_tree+0x3ad/0x870 [btrfs]
[ 3653.727739]        open_ctree+0xb8e/0x17bf [btrfs]
[ 3653.728384]        btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x12/0xde [btrfs]
[ 3653.729130]        legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50
[ 3653.729676]        vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0
[ 3653.730192]        vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0xb0
[ 3653.730800]        btrfs_mount+0x11d/0x3a0 [btrfs]
[ 3653.731427]        legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50
[ 3653.731970]        vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0
[ 3653.732486]        path_mount+0x2d4/0xbe0
[ 3653.732997]        __x64_sys_mount+0x103/0x140
[ 3653.733560]        do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0
[ 3653.734080]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 3653.734782]
               other info that might help us debug this:

[ 3653.735784] Chain exists of:
                 &disk->open_mutex --> sb_internal#2 --> btrfs-chunk-00

[ 3653.737123]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

[ 3653.737865]        CPU0                    CPU1
[ 3653.738435]        ----                    ----
[ 3653.739007]   lock(btrfs-chunk-00);
[ 3653.739449]                                lock(sb_internal#2);
[ 3653.740193]                                lock(btrfs-chunk-00);
[ 3653.740955]   lock(&disk->open_mutex);
[ 3653.741431]
                *** DEADLOCK ***

[ 3653.742176] 3 locks held by mount/447465:
[ 3653.742739]  #0: ffff8c6acf85c0e8 (&type->s_umount_key#44/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: alloc_super+0xd5/0x3b0
[ 3653.744114]  #1: ffffffffc0b28f70 (uuid_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_read_chunk_tree+0x59/0x870 [btrfs]
[ 3653.745563]  #2: ffff8c6b0a9f39e0 (btrfs-chunk-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x24/0x110 [btrfs]
[ 3653.747066]
               stack backtrace:
[ 3653.747723] CPU: 4 PID: 447465 Comm: mount Not tainted 5.15.0-rc7-btrfs-next-103 #1
[ 3653.748873] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 3653.750592] Call Trace:
[ 3653.750967]  dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x72
[ 3653.751526]  check_noncircular+0xf3/0x110
[ 3653.752136]  ? stack_trace_save+0x4b/0x70
[ 3653.752748]  __lock_acquire+0x130e/0x2210
[ 3653.753356]  lock_acquire+0xd7/0x310
[ 3653.753898]  ? blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0xe7/0x320
[ 3653.754596]  ? lock_is_held_type+0xe8/0x140
[ 3653.755125]  ? blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0xe7/0x320
[ 3653.755729]  ? blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0xe7/0x320
[ 3653.756338]  __mutex_lock+0x92/0x900
[ 3653.756794]  ? blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0xe7/0x320
[ 3653.757400]  ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x4b/0xa0
[ 3653.757930]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x40
[ 3653.758437]  ? bd_prepare_to_claim+0x129/0x150
[ 3653.758999]  ? trace_module_get+0x2b/0xd0
[ 3653.759508]  ? try_module_get.part.0+0x50/0x80
[ 3653.760072]  blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0xe7/0x320
[ 3653.760661]  ? devcgroup_check_permission+0xc1/0x1f0
[ 3653.761288]  blkdev_get_by_path+0xb8/0xd0
[ 3653.761797]  btrfs_get_bdev_and_sb+0x1b/0xb0 [btrfs]
[ 3653.762454]  open_fs_devices+0xd7/0x2c0 [btrfs]
[ 3653.763055]  ? clone_fs_devices+0x8f/0x170 [btrfs]
[ 3653.763689]  btrfs_read_chunk_tree+0x3ad/0x870 [btrfs]
[ 3653.764370]  ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x40
[ 3653.764922]  open_ctree+0xb8e/0x17bf [btrfs]
[ 3653.765493]  ? super_setup_bdi_name+0x79/0xd0
[ 3653.766043]  btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x12/0xde [btrfs]
[ 3653.766780]  ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x80
[ 3653.767488]  ? kfree+0x1f2/0x3c0
[ 3653.767979]  legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50
[ 3653.768548]  vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0
[ 3653.769076]  vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0xb0
[ 3653.769718]  btrfs_mount+0x11d/0x3a0 [btrfs]
[ 3653.770381]  ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x80
[ 3653.771086]  ? kfree+0x1f2/0x3c0
[ 3653.771574]  legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50
[ 3653.772136]  vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0
[ 3653.772673]  path_mount+0x2d4/0xbe0
[ 3653.773201]  __x64_sys_mount+0x103/0x140
[ 3653.773793]  do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0
[ 3653.774333]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 3653.775094] RIP: 0033:0x7f648bc45aaa

This happens because through btrfs_read_chunk_tree(), which is called only
during mount, ends up acquiring the mutex open_mutex of a block device
while holding a read lock on a leaf of the chunk tree while other paths
need to acquire other locks before locking extent buffers of the chunk
tree.

Since at mount time when we call btrfs_read_chunk_tree() we know that
we don't have other tasks running in parallel and modifying the chunk
tree, we can simply skip locking of chunk tree extent buffers. So do
that and move the assertion that checks the fs is not yet mounted to the
top block of btrfs_read_chunk_tree(), with a comment before doing it.

Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
jnettlet pushed a commit that referenced this issue Dec 20, 2021
commit c56c963 upstream.

In line 800 (#1), nfp_cpp_area_alloc() allocates and initializes a
CPP area structure. But in line 807 (#2), when the cache is allocated
failed, this CPP area structure is not freed, which will result in
memory leak.

We can fix it by freeing the CPP area when the cache is allocated
failed (#2).

792 int nfp_cpp_area_cache_add(struct nfp_cpp *cpp, size_t size)
793 {
794 	struct nfp_cpp_area_cache *cache;
795 	struct nfp_cpp_area *area;

800	area = nfp_cpp_area_alloc(cpp, NFP_CPP_ID(7, NFP_CPP_ACTION_RW, 0),
801 				  0, size);
	// #1: allocates and initializes

802 	if (!area)
803 		return -ENOMEM;

805 	cache = kzalloc(sizeof(*cache), GFP_KERNEL);
806 	if (!cache)
807 		return -ENOMEM; // #2: missing free

817	return 0;
818 }

Fixes: 4cb584e ("nfp: add CPP access core")
Signed-off-by: Jianglei Nie <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
jnettlet pushed a commit that referenced this issue Dec 20, 2021
…_lock

[ Upstream commit 598ad0b ]

Taking sb_writers whilst holding mmap_lock isn't allowed and will result in
a lockdep warning like that below.  The problem comes from cachefiles
needing to take the sb_writers lock in order to do a write to the cache,
but being asked to do this by netfslib called from readpage, readahead or
write_begin[1].

Fix this by always offloading the write to the cache off to a worker
thread.  The main thread doesn't need to wait for it, so deadlock can be
avoided.

This can be tested by running the quick xfstests on something like afs or
ceph with lockdep enabled.

WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.15.0-rc1-build2+ #292 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
holetest/65517 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88810c81d730 (mapping.invalidate_lock#3){.+.+}-{3:3}, at: filemap_fault+0x276/0x7a5

but task is already holding lock:
ffff8881595b53e8 (&mm->mmap_lock#2){++++}-{3:3}, at: do_user_addr_fault+0x28d/0x59c

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #2 (&mm->mmap_lock#2){++++}-{3:3}:
       validate_chain+0x3c4/0x4a8
       __lock_acquire+0x89d/0x949
       lock_acquire+0x2dc/0x34b
       __might_fault+0x87/0xb1
       strncpy_from_user+0x25/0x18c
       removexattr+0x7c/0xe5
       __do_sys_fremovexattr+0x73/0x96
       do_syscall_64+0x67/0x7a
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

-> #1 (sb_writers#10){.+.+}-{0:0}:
       validate_chain+0x3c4/0x4a8
       __lock_acquire+0x89d/0x949
       lock_acquire+0x2dc/0x34b
       cachefiles_write+0x2b3/0x4bb
       netfs_rreq_do_write_to_cache+0x3b5/0x432
       netfs_readpage+0x2de/0x39d
       filemap_read_page+0x51/0x94
       filemap_get_pages+0x26f/0x413
       filemap_read+0x182/0x427
       new_sync_read+0xf0/0x161
       vfs_read+0x118/0x16e
       ksys_read+0xb8/0x12e
       do_syscall_64+0x67/0x7a
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

-> #0 (mapping.invalidate_lock#3){.+.+}-{3:3}:
       check_noncircular+0xe4/0x129
       check_prev_add+0x16b/0x3a4
       validate_chain+0x3c4/0x4a8
       __lock_acquire+0x89d/0x949
       lock_acquire+0x2dc/0x34b
       down_read+0x40/0x4a
       filemap_fault+0x276/0x7a5
       __do_fault+0x96/0xbf
       do_fault+0x262/0x35a
       __handle_mm_fault+0x171/0x1b5
       handle_mm_fault+0x12a/0x233
       do_user_addr_fault+0x3d2/0x59c
       exc_page_fault+0x85/0xa5
       asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30

other info that might help us debug this:

Chain exists of:
  mapping.invalidate_lock#3 --> sb_writers#10 --> &mm->mmap_lock#2

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&mm->mmap_lock#2);
                               lock(sb_writers#10);
                               lock(&mm->mmap_lock#2);
  lock(mapping.invalidate_lock#3);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

1 lock held by holetest/65517:
 #0: ffff8881595b53e8 (&mm->mmap_lock#2){++++}-{3:3}, at: do_user_addr_fault+0x28d/0x59c

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 65517 Comm: holetest Not tainted 5.15.0-rc1-build2+ #292
Hardware name: ASUS All Series/H97-PLUS, BIOS 2306 10/09/2014
Call Trace:
 dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x59
 check_noncircular+0xe4/0x129
 ? print_circular_bug+0x207/0x207
 ? validate_chain+0x461/0x4a8
 ? add_chain_block+0x88/0xd9
 ? hlist_add_head_rcu+0x49/0x53
 check_prev_add+0x16b/0x3a4
 validate_chain+0x3c4/0x4a8
 ? check_prev_add+0x3a4/0x3a4
 ? mark_lock+0xa5/0x1c6
 __lock_acquire+0x89d/0x949
 lock_acquire+0x2dc/0x34b
 ? filemap_fault+0x276/0x7a5
 ? rcu_read_unlock+0x59/0x59
 ? add_to_page_cache_lru+0x13c/0x13c
 ? lock_is_held_type+0x7b/0xd3
 down_read+0x40/0x4a
 ? filemap_fault+0x276/0x7a5
 filemap_fault+0x276/0x7a5
 ? pagecache_get_page+0x2dd/0x2dd
 ? __lock_acquire+0x8bc/0x949
 ? pte_offset_kernel.isra.0+0x6d/0xc3
 __do_fault+0x96/0xbf
 ? do_fault+0x124/0x35a
 do_fault+0x262/0x35a
 ? handle_pte_fault+0x1c1/0x20d
 __handle_mm_fault+0x171/0x1b5
 ? handle_pte_fault+0x20d/0x20d
 ? __lock_release+0x151/0x254
 ? mark_held_locks+0x1f/0x78
 ? rcu_read_unlock+0x3a/0x59
 handle_mm_fault+0x12a/0x233
 do_user_addr_fault+0x3d2/0x59c
 ? pgtable_bad+0x70/0x70
 ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xab/0xab
 exc_page_fault+0x85/0xa5
 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x8/0x30
 asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30
RIP: 0033:0x40192f
Code: ff 48 89 c3 48 8b 05 50 28 00 00 48 85 ed 7e 23 31 d2 4b 8d 0c 2f eb 0a 0f 1f 00 48 8b 05 39 28 00 00 48 0f af c2 48 83 c2 01 <48> 89 1c 01 48 39 d5 7f e8 8b 0d f2 27 00 00 31 c0 85 c9 74 0e 8b
RSP: 002b:00007f9931867eb0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007f9931868700 RCX: 00007f993206ac00
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00007ffc13e06ee0
RBP: 0000000000000100 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9931868700
R10: 00007f99318689d0 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007ffc13e06ee0
R13: 0000000000000c00 R14: 00007ffc13e06e00 R15: 00007f993206a000

Fixes: 726218f ("netfs: Define an interface to talk to a cache")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
cc: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
cc: [email protected]
cc: [email protected]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163887597541.1596626.2668163316598972956.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v1
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
jnettlet pushed a commit that referenced this issue Sep 29, 2022
commit 1016fc0 upstream.

A recent commit expanding the scope of the udc_lock mutex in the
gadget core managed to cause an obscure and slightly bizarre lockdep
violation.  In abbreviated form:

======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.19.0-rc7+ #12510 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
udevadm/312 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff80000aae1058 (udc_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: usb_udc_uevent+0x54/0xe0

but task is already holding lock:
ffff000002277548 (kn->active#4){++++}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_seq_start+0x34/0xe0

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #3 (kn->active#4){++++}-{0:0}:
        lock_acquire+0x68/0x84
        __kernfs_remove+0x268/0x380
        kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x58/0xac
        sysfs_remove_file_ns+0x18/0x24
        device_del+0x15c/0x440

-> #2 (device_links_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
        lock_acquire+0x68/0x84
        __mutex_lock+0x9c/0x430
        mutex_lock_nested+0x38/0x64
        device_link_remove+0x3c/0xa0
        _regulator_put.part.0+0x168/0x190
        regulator_put+0x3c/0x54
        devm_regulator_release+0x14/0x20

-> #1 (regulator_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
        lock_acquire+0x68/0x84
        __mutex_lock+0x9c/0x430
        mutex_lock_nested+0x38/0x64
        regulator_lock_dependent+0x54/0x284
        regulator_enable+0x34/0x80
        phy_power_on+0x24/0x130
        __dwc2_lowlevel_hw_enable+0x100/0x130
        dwc2_lowlevel_hw_enable+0x18/0x40
        dwc2_hsotg_udc_start+0x6c/0x2f0
        gadget_bind_driver+0x124/0x1f4

-> #0 (udc_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
        __lock_acquire+0x1298/0x20cc
        lock_acquire.part.0+0xe0/0x230
        lock_acquire+0x68/0x84
        __mutex_lock+0x9c/0x430
        mutex_lock_nested+0x38/0x64
        usb_udc_uevent+0x54/0xe0

Evidently this was caused by the scope of udc_mutex being too large.
The mutex is only meant to protect udc->driver along with a few other
things.  As far as I can tell, there's no reason for the mutex to be
held while the gadget core calls a gadget driver's ->bind or ->unbind
routine, or while a UDC is being started or stopped.  (This accounts
for link #1 in the chain above, where the mutex is held while the
dwc2_hsotg_udc is started as part of driver probing.)

Gadget drivers' ->disconnect callbacks are problematic.  Even though
usb_gadget_disconnect() will now acquire the udc_mutex, there's a
window in usb_gadget_bind_driver() between the times when the mutex is
released and the ->bind callback is invoked.  If a disconnect occurred
during that window, we could call the driver's ->disconnect routine
before its ->bind routine.  To prevent this from happening, it will be
necessary to prevent a UDC from connecting while it has no gadget
driver.  This should be done already but it doesn't seem to be;
currently usb_gadget_connect() has no check for this.  Such a check
will have to be added later.

Some degree of mutual exclusion is required in soft_connect_store(),
which can dereference udc->driver at arbitrary times since it is a
sysfs callback.  The solution here is to acquire the gadget's device
lock rather than the udc_mutex.  Since the driver core guarantees that
the device lock is always held during driver binding and unbinding,
this will make the accesses in soft_connect_store() mutually exclusive
with any changes to udc->driver.

Lastly, it turns out there is one place which should hold the
udc_mutex but currently does not: The function_show() routine needs
protection while it dereferences udc->driver.  The missing lock and
unlock calls are added.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Fixes: 2191c00 ("USB: gadget: Fix use-after-free Read in usb_udc_uevent()")
Cc: Felipe Balbi <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Marek Szyprowski <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Marek Szyprowski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YwkfhdxA/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
jnettlet pushed a commit that referenced this issue Sep 29, 2022
commit 902e02e upstream.

Syzkaller reports the following problem:

BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/printk/printk.c:2347
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 1105, name: syz-executor423
3 locks held by syz-executor423/1105:
 #0: ffff8881468b9098 (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}-{0:0}, at: tty_ldisc_ref_wait+0x22/0x90 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:266
 #1: ffff8881468b9130 (&tty->atomic_write_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: tty_write_lock drivers/tty/tty_io.c:952 [inline]
 #1: ffff8881468b9130 (&tty->atomic_write_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: do_tty_write drivers/tty/tty_io.c:975 [inline]
 #1: ffff8881468b9130 (&tty->atomic_write_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: file_tty_write.constprop.0+0x2a8/0x8e0 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1118
 #2: ffff88801b06c398 (&gsm->tx_lock){....}-{2:2}, at: gsmld_write+0x5e/0x150 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:2717
irq event stamp: 3482
hardirqs last  enabled at (3481): [<ffffffff81d13343>] __get_reqs_available+0x143/0x2f0 fs/aio.c:946
hardirqs last disabled at (3482): [<ffffffff87d39722>] __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:108 [inline]
hardirqs last disabled at (3482): [<ffffffff87d39722>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x52/0x60 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:159
softirqs last  enabled at (3408): [<ffffffff87e01002>] asm_call_irq_on_stack+0x12/0x20
softirqs last disabled at (3401): [<ffffffff87e01002>] asm_call_irq_on_stack+0x12/0x20
Preemption disabled at:
[<0000000000000000>] 0x0
CPU: 2 PID: 1105 Comm: syz-executor423 Not tainted 5.10.137-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x107/0x167 lib/dump_stack.c:118
 ___might_sleep.cold+0x1e8/0x22e kernel/sched/core.c:7304
 console_lock+0x19/0x80 kernel/printk/printk.c:2347
 do_con_write+0x113/0x1de0 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:2909
 con_write+0x22/0xc0 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:3296
 gsmld_write+0xd0/0x150 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:2720
 do_tty_write drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1028 [inline]
 file_tty_write.constprop.0+0x502/0x8e0 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1118
 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1903 [inline]
 aio_write+0x355/0x7b0 fs/aio.c:1580
 __io_submit_one fs/aio.c:1952 [inline]
 io_submit_one+0xf45/0x1a90 fs/aio.c:1999
 __do_sys_io_submit fs/aio.c:2058 [inline]
 __se_sys_io_submit fs/aio.c:2028 [inline]
 __x64_sys_io_submit+0x18c/0x2f0 fs/aio.c:2028
 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xc6

The problem happens in the following control flow:

gsmld_write(...)
spin_lock_irqsave(&gsm->tx_lock, flags) // taken a spinlock on TX data
 con_write(...)
  do_con_write(...)
   console_lock()
    might_sleep() // -> bug

As far as console_lock() might sleep it should not be called with
spinlock held.

The patch replaces tx_lock spinlock with mutex in order to avoid the
problem.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.

Fixes: 32dd59f ("tty: n_gsm: fix race condition in gsmld_write()")
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Khoroshilov <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
jnettlet pushed a commit that referenced this issue Sep 29, 2022
[ Upstream commit ac56a0b ]

Because rxrpc pretends to be a tunnel on top of a UDP/UDP6 socket, allowing
it to siphon off UDP packets early in the handling of received UDP packets
thereby avoiding the packet going through the UDP receive queue, it doesn't
get ICMP packets through the UDP ->sk_error_report() callback.  In fact, it
doesn't appear that there's any usable option for getting hold of ICMP
packets.

Fix this by adding a new UDP encap hook to distribute error messages for
UDP tunnels.  If the hook is set, then the tunnel driver will be able to
see ICMP packets.  The hook provides the offset into the packet of the UDP
header of the original packet that caused the notification.

An alternative would be to call the ->error_handler() hook - but that
requires that the skbuff be cloned (as ip_icmp_error() or ipv6_cmp_error()
do, though isn't really necessary or desirable in rxrpc's case is we want
to parse them there and then, not queue them).

Changes
=======
ver #3)
 - Fixed an uninitialised variable.

ver #2)
 - Fixed some missing CONFIG_AF_RXRPC_IPV6 conditionals.

Fixes: 5271953 ("rxrpc: Use the UDP encap_rcv hook")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
jnettlet pushed a commit that referenced this issue Sep 29, 2022
[ Upstream commit fb8396a ]

The driver incorrectly frees client instance and subsequent
i40e module removal leads to kernel crash.

Reproducer:
1. Do ethtool offline test followed immediately by another one
host# ethtool -t eth0 offline; ethtool -t eth0 offline
2. Remove recursively irdma module that also removes i40e module
host# modprobe -r irdma

Result:
[ 8675.035651] i40e 0000:3d:00.0 eno1: offline testing starting
[ 8675.193774] i40e 0000:3d:00.0 eno1: testing finished
[ 8675.201316] i40e 0000:3d:00.0 eno1: offline testing starting
[ 8675.358921] i40e 0000:3d:00.0 eno1: testing finished
[ 8675.496921] i40e 0000:3d:00.0: IRDMA hardware initialization FAILED init_state=2 status=-110
[ 8686.188955] i40e 0000:3d:00.1: i40e_ptp_stop: removed PHC on eno2
[ 8686.943890] i40e 0000:3d:00.1: Deleted LAN device PF1 bus=0x3d dev=0x00 func=0x01
[ 8686.952669] i40e 0000:3d:00.0: i40e_ptp_stop: removed PHC on eno1
[ 8687.761787] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000030
[ 8687.768755] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 8687.773895] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 8687.779034] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 8687.781575] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ 8687.785935] CPU: 51 PID: 172891 Comm: rmmod Kdump: loaded Tainted: G        W I        5.19.0+ #2
[ 8687.794800] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFD/S2600WFD, BIOS SE5C620.86B.0X.02.0001.051420190324 05/14/2019
[ 8687.805222] RIP: 0010:i40e_lan_del_device+0x13/0xb0 [i40e]
[ 8687.810719] Code: d4 84 c0 0f 84 b8 25 01 00 e9 9c 25 01 00 41 bc f4 ff ff ff eb 91 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 55 53 48 8b 87 58 08 00 00 48 89 fb <48> 8b 68 30 48 89 ef e8 21 8a 0f d5 48 89 ef e8 a9 78 0f d5 48 8b
[ 8687.829462] RSP: 0018:ffffa604072efce0 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 8687.834689] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8f43833b2000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 8687.841821] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff8f4b0545b298 RDI: ffff8f43833b2000
[ 8687.848955] RBP: ffff8f43833b2000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 8687.856086] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 000ffffffffff000 R12: ffff8f43833b2ef0
[ 8687.863218] R13: ffff8f43833b2ef0 R14: ffff915103966000 R15: ffff8f43833b2008
[ 8687.870342] FS:  00007f79501c3740(0000) GS:ffff8f4adffc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 8687.878427] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 8687.884174] CR2: 0000000000000030 CR3: 000000014276e004 CR4: 00000000007706e0
[ 8687.891306] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 8687.898441] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 8687.905572] PKRU: 55555554
[ 8687.908286] Call Trace:
[ 8687.910737]  <TASK>
[ 8687.912843]  i40e_remove+0x2c0/0x330 [i40e]
[ 8687.917040]  pci_device_remove+0x33/0xa0
[ 8687.920962]  device_release_driver_internal+0x1aa/0x230
[ 8687.926188]  driver_detach+0x44/0x90
[ 8687.929770]  bus_remove_driver+0x55/0xe0
[ 8687.933693]  pci_unregister_driver+0x2a/0xb0
[ 8687.937967]  i40e_exit_module+0xc/0xf48 [i40e]

Two offline tests cause IRDMA driver failure (ETIMEDOUT) and this
failure is indicated back to i40e_client_subtask() that calls
i40e_client_del_instance() to free client instance referenced
by pf->cinst and sets this pointer to NULL. During the module
removal i40e_remove() calls i40e_lan_del_device() that dereferences
pf->cinst that is NULL -> crash.
Do not remove client instance when client open callbacks fails and
just clear __I40E_CLIENT_INSTANCE_OPENED bit. The driver also needs
to take care about this situation (when netdev is up and client
is NOT opened) in i40e_notify_client_of_netdev_close() and
calls client close callback only when __I40E_CLIENT_INSTANCE_OPENED
is set.

Fixes: 0ef2d5a ("i40e: KISS the client interface")
Signed-off-by: Ivan Vecera <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Helena Anna Dubel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
jnettlet pushed a commit that referenced this issue Sep 29, 2022
[ Upstream commit 84a5358 ]

The SRv6 layer allows defining HMAC data that can later be used to sign IPv6
Segment Routing Headers. This configuration is realised via netlink through
four attributes: SEG6_ATTR_HMACKEYID, SEG6_ATTR_SECRET, SEG6_ATTR_SECRETLEN and
SEG6_ATTR_ALGID. Because the SECRETLEN attribute is decoupled from the actual
length of the SECRET attribute, it is possible to provide invalid combinations
(e.g., secret = "", secretlen = 64). This case is not checked in the code and
with an appropriately crafted netlink message, an out-of-bounds read of up
to 64 bytes (max secret length) can occur past the skb end pointer and into
skb_shared_info:

Breakpoint 1, seg6_genl_sethmac (skb=<optimized out>, info=<optimized out>) at net/ipv6/seg6.c:208
208		memcpy(hinfo->secret, secret, slen);
(gdb) bt
 #0  seg6_genl_sethmac (skb=<optimized out>, info=<optimized out>) at net/ipv6/seg6.c:208
 #1  0xffffffff81e012e9 in genl_family_rcv_msg_doit (skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, nlh=nlh@entry=0xffff88800b1b7600,
    extack=extack@entry=0xffffc90000ba7af0, ops=ops@entry=0xffffc90000ba7a80, hdrlen=4, net=0xffffffff84237580 <init_net>, family=<optimized out>,
    family=<optimized out>) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:731
 #2  0xffffffff81e01435 in genl_family_rcv_msg (extack=0xffffc90000ba7af0, nlh=0xffff88800b1b7600, skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00,
    family=0xffffffff82fef6c0 <seg6_genl_family>) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:775
 #3  genl_rcv_msg (skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00, nlh=0xffff88800b1b7600, extack=0xffffc90000ba7af0) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:792
 #4  0xffffffff81dfffc3 in netlink_rcv_skb (skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, cb=cb@entry=0xffffffff81e01350 <genl_rcv_msg>)
    at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2501
 #5  0xffffffff81e00919 in genl_rcv (skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:803
 #6  0xffffffff81dff6ae in netlink_unicast_kernel (ssk=0xffff888010eec800, skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00, sk=0xffff888004aed000)
    at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319
 #7  netlink_unicast (ssk=ssk@entry=0xffff888010eec800, skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, portid=portid@entry=0, nonblock=<optimized out>)
    at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345
 #8  0xffffffff81dff9a4 in netlink_sendmsg (sock=<optimized out>, msg=0xffffc90000ba7e48, len=<optimized out>) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1921
...
(gdb) p/x ((struct sk_buff *)0xffff88800b1f9f00)->head + ((struct sk_buff *)0xffff88800b1f9f00)->end
$1 = 0xffff88800b1b76c0
(gdb) p/x secret
$2 = 0xffff88800b1b76c0
(gdb) p slen
$3 = 64 '@'

The OOB data can then be read back from userspace by dumping HMAC state. This
commit fixes this by ensuring SECRETLEN cannot exceed the actual length of
SECRET.

Reported-by: Lucas Leong <[email protected]>
Tested: verified that EINVAL is correctly returned when secretlen > len(secret)
Fixes: 4f4853d ("ipv6: sr: implement API to control SR HMAC structure")
Signed-off-by: David Lebrun <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
jnettlet pushed a commit that referenced this issue Sep 29, 2022
[ Upstream commit 59bcdb5 ]

Using two different types of workoads, it was observed that
guc_update_engine_gt_clks was being called too frequently and/or
causing a CPU-to-lmem bandwidth hit over PCIE. Details on
the workloads and numbers are in the notes below.

Background: At the moment, guc_update_engine_gt_clks can be invoked
via one of 3 ways. #1 and #2 are infrequent under normal operating
conditions:
     1.When a predefined "ping_delay" timer expires so that GuC-
       busyness can sample the GTPM clock counter to ensure it
       doesn't miss a wrap-around of the 32-bits of the HW counter.
       (The ping_delay is calculated based on 1/8th the time taken
       for the counter go from 0x0 to 0xffffffff based on the
       GT frequency. This comes to about once every 28 seconds at a
       GT frequency of 19.2Mhz).
     2.In preparation for a gt reset.
     3.In response to __gt_park events (as the gt power management
       puts the gt into a lower power state when there is no work
       being done).

Root-cause: For both the workloads described farther below, it was
observed that when user space calls IOCTLs that unparks the
gt momentarily and repeats such calls many times in quick succession,
it triggers calling guc_update_engine_gt_clks as many times. However,
the primary purpose of guc_update_engine_gt_clks is to ensure we don't
miss the wraparound while the counter is ticking. Thus, the solution
is to ensure we skip that check if gt_park is calling this function
earlier than necessary.

Solution: Snapshot jiffies when we do actually update the busyness
stats. Then get the new jiffies every time intel_guc_busyness_park
is called and bail if we are being called too soon. Use half of the
ping_delay as a safe threshold.

NOTE1: Workload1: IGTs' gem_create was modified to create a file handle,
allocate memory with sizes that range from a min of 4K to the max supported
(in power of two step-sizes). Its maps, modifies and reads back the
memory. Allocations and modification is repeated until total memory
allocation reaches the max. Then the file handle is closed. With this
workload, guc_update_engine_gt_clks was called over 188 thousand times
in the span of 15 seconds while this test ran three times. With this patch,
the number of calls reduced to 14.

NOTE2: Workload2: 30 transcode sessions are created in quick succession.
While these sessions are created, pcm-iio tool was used to measure I/O
read operation bandwidth consumption sampled at 100 milisecond intervals
over the course of 20 seconds. The total bandwidth consumed over 20 seconds
without this patch was measured at average at 311KBps per sample. With this
patch, the number went down to about 175Kbps which is about a 43% savings.

Signed-off-by: Alan Previn <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Umesh Nerlige Ramappa <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: John Harrison <[email protected]>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
Stable-dep-of: aee5ae7 ("drm/i915/guc: Cancel GuC engine busyness worker synchronously")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
jnettlet pushed a commit that referenced this issue Sep 29, 2022
[ Upstream commit 23c6191 ]

In the IDC callback that is accessed when the aux drivers request a reset,
the function to unplug the aux devices is called.  This function is also
called in the ice_prepare_for_reset function. This double call is causing
a "scheduling while atomic" BUG.

[  662.676430] ice 0000:4c:00.0 rocep76s0: cqp opcode = 0x1 maj_err_code = 0xffff min_err_code = 0x8003

[  662.676609] ice 0000:4c:00.0 rocep76s0: [Modify QP Cmd Error][op_code=8] status=-29 waiting=1 completion_err=1 maj=0xffff min=0x8003

[  662.815006] ice 0000:4c:00.0 rocep76s0: ICE OICR event notification: oicr = 0x10000003

[  662.815014] ice 0000:4c:00.0 rocep76s0: critical PE Error, GLPE_CRITERR=0x00011424

[  662.815017] ice 0000:4c:00.0 rocep76s0: Requesting a reset

[  662.815475] BUG: scheduling while atomic: swapper/37/0/0x00010002

[  662.815475] BUG: scheduling while atomic: swapper/37/0/0x00010002
[  662.815477] Modules linked in: rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace fscache netfs rfkill 8021q garp mrp stp llc vfat fat rpcrdma intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common sunrpc i10nm_edac rdma_ucm nfit ib_srpt libnvdimm ib_isert iscsi_target_mod x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp target_core_mod snd_hda_intel ib_iser snd_intel_dspcfg libiscsi snd_intel_sdw_acpi scsi_transport_iscsi kvm_intel iTCO_wdt rdma_cm snd_hda_codec kvm iw_cm ipmi_ssif iTCO_vendor_support snd_hda_core irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel snd_hwdep snd_seq snd_seq_device rapl snd_pcm snd_timer isst_if_mbox_pci pcspkr isst_if_mmio irdma intel_uncore idxd acpi_ipmi joydev isst_if_common snd mei_me idxd_bus ipmi_si soundcore i2c_i801 mei ipmi_devintf i2c_smbus i2c_ismt ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter acpi_pad rv(OE) ib_uverbs ib_cm ib_core xfs libcrc32c ast i2c_algo_bit drm_vram_helper drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops drm_ttm_helpe
 r ttm
[  662.815546]  nvme nvme_core ice drm crc32c_intel i40e t10_pi wmi pinctrl_emmitsburg dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse
[  662.815557] Preemption disabled at:
[  662.815558] [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
[  662.815563] CPU: 37 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/37 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S         OE     5.17.1 #2
[  662.815566] Hardware name: Intel Corporation D50DNP/D50DNP, BIOS SE5C6301.86B.6624.D18.2111021741 11/02/2021
[  662.815568] Call Trace:
[  662.815572]  <IRQ>
[  662.815574]  dump_stack_lvl+0x33/0x42
[  662.815581]  __schedule_bug.cold.147+0x7d/0x8a
[  662.815588]  __schedule+0x798/0x990
[  662.815595]  schedule+0x44/0xc0
[  662.815597]  schedule_preempt_disabled+0x14/0x20
[  662.815600]  __mutex_lock.isra.11+0x46c/0x490
[  662.815603]  ? __ibdev_printk+0x76/0xc0 [ib_core]
[  662.815633]  device_del+0x37/0x3d0
[  662.815639]  ice_unplug_aux_dev+0x1a/0x40 [ice]
[  662.815674]  ice_schedule_reset+0x3c/0xd0 [ice]
[  662.815693]  irdma_iidc_event_handler.cold.7+0xb6/0xd3 [irdma]
[  662.815712]  ? bitmap_find_next_zero_area_off+0x45/0xa0
[  662.815719]  ice_send_event_to_aux+0x54/0x70 [ice]
[  662.815741]  ice_misc_intr+0x21d/0x2d0 [ice]
[  662.815756]  __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x4c/0x180
[  662.815762]  handle_irq_event_percpu+0xf/0x40
[  662.815764]  handle_irq_event+0x34/0x60
[  662.815766]  handle_edge_irq+0x9a/0x1c0
[  662.815770]  __common_interrupt+0x62/0x100
[  662.815774]  common_interrupt+0xb4/0xd0
[  662.815779]  </IRQ>
[  662.815780]  <TASK>
[  662.815780]  asm_common_interrupt+0x1e/0x40
[  662.815785] RIP: 0010:cpuidle_enter_state+0xd6/0x380
[  662.815789] Code: 49 89 c4 0f 1f 44 00 00 31 ff e8 65 d7 95 ff 45 84 ff 74 12 9c 58 f6 c4 02 0f 85 64 02 00 00 31 ff e8 ae c5 9c ff fb 45 85 f6 <0f> 88 12 01 00 00 49 63 d6 4c 2b 24 24 48 8d 04 52 48 8d 04 82 49
[  662.815791] RSP: 0018:ff2c2c4f18edbe80 EFLAGS: 00000202
[  662.815793] RAX: ff280805df140000 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 000000000000001f
[  662.815795] RDX: 0000009a52da2d08 RSI: ffffffff93f8240b RDI: ffffffff93f53ee7
[  662.815796] RBP: ff5e2bd11ff41928 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000002f8c0
[  662.815797] R10: 0000010c3f18e2cf R11: 000000000000000f R12: 0000009a52da2d08
[  662.815798] R13: ffffffff94ad7e20 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: 0000000000000000
[  662.815801]  cpuidle_enter+0x29/0x40
[  662.815803]  do_idle+0x261/0x2b0
[  662.815807]  cpu_startup_entry+0x19/0x20
[  662.815809]  start_secondary+0x114/0x150
[  662.815813]  secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xd5/0xdb
[  662.815818]  </TASK>
[  662.815846] bad: scheduling from the idle thread!
[  662.815849] CPU: 37 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/37 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S      W  OE     5.17.1 #2
[  662.815852] Hardware name: Intel Corporation D50DNP/D50DNP, BIOS SE5C6301.86B.6624.D18.2111021741 11/02/2021
[  662.815853] Call Trace:
[  662.815855]  <IRQ>
[  662.815856]  dump_stack_lvl+0x33/0x42
[  662.815860]  dequeue_task_idle+0x20/0x30
[  662.815863]  __schedule+0x1c3/0x990
[  662.815868]  schedule+0x44/0xc0
[  662.815871]  schedule_preempt_disabled+0x14/0x20
[  662.815873]  __mutex_lock.isra.11+0x3a8/0x490
[  662.815876]  ? __ibdev_printk+0x76/0xc0 [ib_core]
[  662.815904]  device_del+0x37/0x3d0
[  662.815909]  ice_unplug_aux_dev+0x1a/0x40 [ice]
[  662.815937]  ice_schedule_reset+0x3c/0xd0 [ice]
[  662.815961]  irdma_iidc_event_handler.cold.7+0xb6/0xd3 [irdma]
[  662.815979]  ? bitmap_find_next_zero_area_off+0x45/0xa0
[  662.815985]  ice_send_event_to_aux+0x54/0x70 [ice]
[  662.816011]  ice_misc_intr+0x21d/0x2d0 [ice]
[  662.816033]  __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x4c/0x180
[  662.816037]  handle_irq_event_percpu+0xf/0x40
[  662.816039]  handle_irq_event+0x34/0x60
[  662.816042]  handle_edge_irq+0x9a/0x1c0
[  662.816045]  __common_interrupt+0x62/0x100
[  662.816048]  common_interrupt+0xb4/0xd0
[  662.816052]  </IRQ>
[  662.816053]  <TASK>
[  662.816054]  asm_common_interrupt+0x1e/0x40
[  662.816057] RIP: 0010:cpuidle_enter_state+0xd6/0x380
[  662.816060] Code: 49 89 c4 0f 1f 44 00 00 31 ff e8 65 d7 95 ff 45 84 ff 74 12 9c 58 f6 c4 02 0f 85 64 02 00 00 31 ff e8 ae c5 9c ff fb 45 85 f6 <0f> 88 12 01 00 00 49 63 d6 4c 2b 24 24 48 8d 04 52 48 8d 04 82 49
[  662.816063] RSP: 0018:ff2c2c4f18edbe80 EFLAGS: 00000202
[  662.816065] RAX: ff280805df140000 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 000000000000001f
[  662.816067] RDX: 0000009a52da2d08 RSI: ffffffff93f8240b RDI: ffffffff93f53ee7
[  662.816068] RBP: ff5e2bd11ff41928 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000002f8c0
[  662.816070] R10: 0000010c3f18e2cf R11: 000000000000000f R12: 0000009a52da2d08
[  662.816071] R13: ffffffff94ad7e20 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: 0000000000000000
[  662.816075]  cpuidle_enter+0x29/0x40
[  662.816077]  do_idle+0x261/0x2b0
[  662.816080]  cpu_startup_entry+0x19/0x20
[  662.816083]  start_secondary+0x114/0x150
[  662.816087]  secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xd5/0xdb
[  662.816091]  </TASK>
[  662.816169] bad: scheduling from the idle thread!

The correct place to unplug the aux devices for a reset is in the
prepare_for_reset function, as this is a common place for all reset flows.
It also has built in protection from being called twice in a single reset
instance before the aux devices are replugged.

Fixes: f9f5301 ("ice: Register auxiliary device to provide RDMA")
Signed-off-by: Dave Ertman <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Helena Anna Dubel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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