%%% title = "Selective Disclosure for JWTs (SD-JWT)" abbrev = "SD-JWT" ipr = "trust200902" area = "Security" workgroup = "Web Authorization Protocol" keyword = ["security", "oauth2"]
[seriesInfo] name = "Internet-Draft" value = "draft-ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-00" stream = "IETF" status = "standard"
[[author]] initials="D." surname="Fett" fullname="Daniel Fett" organization="yes.com" [author.address] email = "[email protected]" uri = "https://danielfett.de/"
[[author]] initials="K." surname="Yasuda" fullname="Kristina Yasuda" organization="Microsoft" [author.address] email = "[email protected]"
%%%
.# Abstract
This document specifies conventions for creating JSON Web Token (JWT) documents that support selective disclosure of JWT claim values.
{mainmatter}
The JSON-based representation of claims in a signed JSON Web Token (JWT) [@!RFC7519] is secured against modification using JSON Web Signature (JWS) [@!RFC7515] digital signatures. A consumer of a signed JWT that has checked the signature can safely assume that the contents of the token have not been modified. However, anyone receiving an unencrypted JWT can read all of the claims and likewise, anyone with the decryption key receiving an encrypted JWT can also read all of the claims.
This document describes a format for signed JWTs that supports selective disclosure (SD-JWT), enabling sharing only a subset of the claims included in the original signed JWT instead of releasing all the claims to every verifier. During issuance, an SD-JWT is sent from the issuer to the holder alongside an SD-JWT Salt/Value Container (SVC), a JSON object that contains the mapping between raw claim values contained in the SD-JWT and the salts for each claim value.
This document also defines a format for SD-JWT Releases (SD-JWT-R), which convey a subset of the claim values of an SD-JWT to the verifier. For presentation, the holder creates an SD-JWT-R and sends it together with the SD-JWT to the verifier. To verify claim values received in SD-JWT-R, the verifier uses the salts values in the SD-JWT-R to compute the hash digests of the claim values and compare them to the ones in the SD-JWT.
One of the common use cases of a signed JWT is representing a user's identity created by an issuer. As long as the signed JWT is one-time use, it typically only contains those claims the user has consented to release to a specific verifier. However, when a signed JWT is intended to be multi-use, it needs to contain the superset of all claims the user might want to release to verifiers at some point. The ability to selectively disclose a subset of these claims depending on the verifier becomes crucial to ensure minimum disclosure and prevent verifiers from obtaining claims irrelevant for the transaction at hand.
One example of such a multi-use JWT is a verifiable credential, a tamper-evident credential with a cryptographically verifiable authorship that contains claims about a subject. SD-JWTs defined in this document enable such selective disclosure of claims.
While JWTs for claims describing natural persons are a common use case, the mechanisms defined in this document can be used for many other use cases as well.
This document also describes holder binding, or the concept of binding SD-JWT to key material controlled by the subject of SD-JWT. Holder binding is optional to implement.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [@!RFC2119] [@!RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
base64url denotes the URL-safe base64 encoding without padding defined in Section 2 of [@!RFC7515].
Selectively Disclosable JWT (SD-JWT) : A JWT [@!RFC7515] created by the issuer, which is signed as a JWS [@!RFC7515], that supports selective disclosure as defined in this document.
SD-JWT Salt/Value Container (SVC) : A JSON object created by the issuer that contains mapping between raw claim values contained in the SD-JWT and the salts for each claim value.
SD-JWT Release (SD-JWT-R) : A JWT created by the holder that contains a subset of the claim values of an SD-JWT in a verifiable way.
Holder binding : Ability of the holder to prove legitimate possession of SD-JWT by proving control over the same private key during the issuance and presentation. SD-JWT signed by the issuer contains a public key or a reference to a public key that matches to the private key controlled by the holder.
Claim name blinding : Feature that enables to blind not only claim values, but also claim names of the claims that are included in SD-JWT but are not disclosed to the verifier in the SD-JWT-Release.
Issuer : An entity that creates SD-JWTs (2.1).
Holder : An entity that received SD-JWTs (2.1) from the issuer and has control over them.
Verifier : An entity that requests, checks and extracts the claims from SD-JWT-R (2.2)
Selective disclosure : Process of a Holder disclosing to a Verifier a subset of claims contained in a claim set issued by an Issuer.
Note: discuss if we want to include Client, Authorization Server for the purpose of ensuring continuity and separating the entity from the actor.
+------------+
| |
| Issuer |
| |
+------------+
|
Issues
SD-JWT and SVC
|
v
+------------+
| |
| Holder |
| |
+------------+
|
Presents
SD-JWT-R and SD-JWT
|
v
+-------------+
| |+
| Verifiers ||+
| |||
+-------------+||
+-------------+|
+-------------+
Figure: SD-JWT Issuance and Presentation Flow
In the following, the contents of SD-JWTs and SD-JWT Releases are described at a conceptual level, abstracting from the data formats described afterwards.
An SD-JWT, at its core, is a digitally signed document containing hash digests over the claim values with unique random salts and other metadata. It MUST be digitally signed using the issuer's private key.
SD-JWT-DOC = (METADATA, SD-CLAIMS)
SD-JWT = SD-JWT-DOC | SIG(SD-JWT-DOC, ISSUER-PRIV-KEY)
SD-CLAIMS
can be a simple object with claim names mapped to hash digests over the claim values with unique random salts:
SD-CLAIMS = (
CLAIM-NAME: HASH(SALT | CLAIM-VALUE)
)*
The claim name (CLAIM-NAME
) is an optional
SD-CLAIMS
can also be nested deeper to capture more complex objects, as will be shown later.
SD-JWT
is sent from the issuer to the holder, together with the mapping of the plain-text claim values, the salt values, and potentially some other information.
To disclose to a verifier a subset of the SD-JWT claim values, a holder creates a JWT such as the following:
SD-JWT-RELEASE-DOC = (METADATA, SD-RELEASES)
SD-JWT-RELEASE = SD-JWT-RELEASE-DOC
SD-RELEASES
follows the structure of SD-CLAIMS
and can be a simple object with claim names mapped to values and salts:
SD-RELEASES = (
CLAIM-NAME: (DISCLOSED-SALT, DISCLOSED-VALUE)
)
Just as SD-CLAIMS
, SD-RELEASES
can be more complex as well.
SD-JWT-RELEASE
is sent together with SD-JWT
from the holder to the
verifier.
Some use-cases may require holder binding.
If holder binding is desired, SD-JWT
must contain information about key material controlled by the holder:
SD-JWT-DOC = (METADATA, HOLDER-PUBLIC-KEY, SD-CLAIMS)
Note: How the public key is included in SD-JWT is out of scope of this document. It can be passed by value or by reference.
With holder binding, the SD-JWT-RELEASE
is signed by the holder using its private key. It therefore looks as follows:
SD-JWT-RELEASE = SD-JWT-RELEASE-DOC | SIG(SD-JWT-RELEASE-DOC, HOLDER-PRIV-KEY)
If claim name blinding is used, SD-CLAIMS
is created as follows:
SD-CLAIMS = (
CLAIM-NAME-PLACEHOLDER: HASH(SALT | CLAIM-VALUE | CLAIM-NAME)
)*
CLAIM-NAME-PLACEHOLDER
is a placeholder used instead of the original claim
name, chosen such that it does not leak information about the claim name (e.g.,
randomly).
The contents of SD-RELEASES
are modified as follows:
SD-RELEASES = (
CLAIM-NAME-PLACEHOLDER: (DISCLOSED-SALT, DISCLOSED-VALUE, DISCLOSED-CLAIM-NAME)
)
Note that blinded and unblinded claim names can be mixed in SD-CLAIMS
and accordingly in SD-RELEASES
.
A verifier checks that
- for each claim in
SD-JWT-RELEASE
, the hash digest over the disclosed values matches the hash digest under the given claim name inSD-JWT
, - if holder binding is used, the
SD-JWT-RELEASE
was signed by the private key belonging toHOLDER-PUBLIC-KEY
.
The detailed algorithm is described below.
This section defines data formats for SD-JWTs (containing hash digests of the salted claim values), SD-JWT Salt/Value Containers (containing the mapping of the plain-text claim values and the salt values), and SD-JWT Releases (containing a subset of the same mapping).
An SD-JWT is a JWT that MUST be signed using the issuer's private key. The
payload of an SD-JWT MUST contain the sd_digests
and sd_hash_alg
claims
described in the following, and MAY contain a holder's public key or a reference
thereto, as well as further claims such as iss
, iat
, etc. as defined or
required by the application using SD-JWTs.
An SD-JWT MUST include hash digests of the salted claim values that are included by the issuer
under the property sd_digests
.
The issuer MUST choose a unique and cryptographically random salt value for each claim value. Each salt value SHOULD contain at least 128 bits of pseudorandom data, making it hard for an attacker to guess. The salt value MUST then be encoded as a string. It is RECOMMENDED to base64url-encode the salt value.
The issuer MUST build the digests by hashing over a JSON literal according to [@!RFC8259] that is formed by JSON-encoding an object with the following contents:
- REQUIRED with the key
s
: the salt value, - REQUIRED with the key
v
: the claim value (either a string or a more complex object, e.g., for the [@OIDC]address
claim), - OPTIONAL, with the key
n
: the claim name (if claim name blinding is to be used for this claim).
The following is an example for a JSON literal without claim name blinding:
{"s": "6qMQvRL5haj", "v": "Peter"}
The following is an example for a JSON literal with claim name blinding:
{"s": "6qMQvRL5haj", "v": "Peter", "n": "given_name"}
IMPORTANT: JSON encoding according to [@!RFC8259] allows for white space characters and other variations in the encoded representation. To ensure that issuer and verifier produce the same hash digest, the issuer therefore sends the JSON literal to the holder along with the SD-JWT, as described below.
The sd_digests
claim contains an object where claim names are mapped to the
respective digests. If a claim name is to be blinded, the digests MUST contain
the n
key as described above and the claim name in sd_digests
MUST be
replaced by a placeholder value that does not leak information about the claim's original name. The same placeholder value is to be used in the SVC and SD-JWT-R described below.
The sd_digests
object can be a 'flat' object, directly containing all claim
names and hashed claim values without any deeper structure. The sd_digests
object can also be a 'structured' object, where some claims and their respective
hash digests are contained in places deeper in the structure. It is at the issuer's
discretion whether to use a 'flat' or 'structured' sd_digests
SD-JWT object,
and how to structure it such that it is suitable for the use case.
Example 1 below is a non-normative example of an SD-JWT using a 'flat'
sd_digests
object and Example 2 in the appendix shows a non-normative example
of an SD-JWT using a 'structured' sd_digests
object. The difference between
the examples is how the address
claim is disclosed.
Appendix 2 shows a more complex example using claims from eKYC (todo: reference).
The claim sd_hash_alg
indicates the hash algorithm used by the Issuer to generate
the hashes of the salted claim values. The hash algorithm identifier MUST be a
value from the "Hash Name String" column in the IANA "Named Information Hash
Algorithm" registry [IANA.Hash.Algorithms]. SD-JWTs with hash algorithm
identifiers not found in this registry are not considered valid and MUST NOT be
accepted by verifiers.
To promote interoperability, implementations MUST support the SHA-256 hash algorithm.
If the issuer wants to enable holder binding, it MAY include a public key associated with the holder, or a reference thereto.
It is out of the scope of this document to describe how the holder key pair is established. For example, the holder MAY provide a key pair to the issuer, the issuer MAY create the key pair for the holder, or holder and issuer MAY use pre-established key material.
Note: Examples in this document use cnf
Claim defined in [@RFC7800] to include raw public key by value in SD-JWT.
This example and Example 2 in the appendix use the following object as the set of claims that the Issuer is issuing:
{#example-simple-user_claims}
{
"sub": "6c5c0a49-b589-431d-bae7-219122a9ec2c",
"given_name": "John",
"family_name": "Doe",
"email": "[email protected]",
"phone_number": "+1-202-555-0101",
"address": {
"street_address": "123 Main St",
"locality": "Anytown",
"region": "Anystate",
"country": "US"
},
"birthdate": "1940-01-01"
}
The following non-normative example shows the payload of an SD-JWT. The issuer
is using a flat structure, i.e., all of the claims the address
claim can only
be disclosed in full.
{#example-simple-sd_jwt_payload}
{
"iss": "https://example.com/issuer",
"cnf": {
"jwk": {
"kty": "RSA",
"n": "pm4bOHBg-oYhAyPWzR56AWX3rUIXp11_ICDkGgS6W3ZWLts-hzwI3x65659kg4hVo9dbGoCJE3ZGF_eaetE30UhBUEgpGwrDrQiJ9zqprmcFfr3qvvkGjtth8Zgl1eM2bJcOwE7PCBHWTKWYs152R7g6Jg2OVph-a8rq-q79MhKG5QoW_mTz10QT_6H4c7PjWG1fjh8hpWNnbP_pv6d1zSwZfc5fl6yVRL0DV0V3lGHKe2Wqf_eNGjBrBLVklDTk8-stX_MWLcR-EGmXAOv0UBWitS_dXJKJu-vXJyw14nHSGuxTIK2hx1pttMft9CsvqimXKeDTU14qQL1eE7ihcw",
"e": "AQAB"
}
},
"iat": 1516239022,
"exp": 1516247022,
"sd_hash_alg": "sha-256",
"sd_digests": {
"sub": "OMdwkk2HPuiInPypWUWMxot1Y2tStGsLuIcDMjKdXMU",
"given_name": "AfKKH4a0IZki8MFDythFaFS_Xqzn-wRvAMfiy_VjYpE",
"family_name": "eUmXmry32JiK_76xMasagkAQQsmSVdW57Ajk18riSF0",
"email": "-Rcr4fDyjwlM_itcMxoQZCE1QAEwyLJcibEpH114KiE",
"phone_number": "Jv2nw0C1wP5ASutYNAxrWEnaDRIpiF0eTUAkUOp8F6Y",
"address": "ZrjKs-RmEAVeAYSzSw6GPFrMpcgctCfaJ6t9qQhbfJ4",
"birthdate": "qXPRRPdpNaebP8jtbEpO-skF4n7v7ASTh8oLg0mkAdQ"
}
}
The SD-JWT is then signed by the issuer to create a document like the following:
{#example-simple-serialized_sd_jwt}
eyJhbGciOiAiUlMyNTYiLCAia2lkIjogImNBRUlVcUowY21MekQxa3pHemhlaUJhZzBZUk
F6VmRsZnhOMjgwTmdIYUEifQ.eyJpc3MiOiAiaHR0cHM6Ly9leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9pc3N1Z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.b0tAGzn4SMc94CN215lS0Ut2J_JBFZlJ3Wu5Ghi1tk0nEwJMMT2xk0Jf5GuQq4WHwPcT
kV4wV7XNFC_-WP_NHVVrMV32q5dxn4G3MLNqRWSyVTZACLaP6Wx8OYIhDTsxPI-HZSdgjl
bRj1QIE-AMZVDAtOEs9bPkweooAFM0moYoQHbTry1Gqgilw5CEQsDrtTZBbDXK3GlT_K4C
bo4O9xMY8NbUgYct5Ix-sEpUBXpCd-o14rYvWnDsGcVxri4Jz453fMgFINi2Vz1skLtQmq
RRgRLgILYetPOZqpVxfsCtgzDN_OGoSUq3pdvLJ3bFAzrt8dHenOvlz_CvlMXx2A
(Line breaks for presentation only.)
Besides the SD-JWT itself, the holder needs to learn the raw claim values that are contained in the SD-JWT, along with the precise input to the hash calculation, and the salts. There MAY be other information the issuer needs to communicate to the holder, such as a private key if the issuer selected the holder key pair.
A SD-JWT Salt/Value Container (SVC) is a JSON object containing at least the
top-level property sd_release
. Its structure mirrors the one of sd_digests
in
the SD-JWT, but the values are the inputs to the hash calculations the issuer
used, as strings.
The SVC MAY contain further properties, for example, to transport the holder private key.
The SVC for Example 1 is as follows:
{#example-simple-svc_payload}
{
"sd_release": {
"sub": "{\"s\": \"2GLC42sKQveCfGfryNRN9w\", \"v\": \"6c5c0a49-b589-431d-bae7-219122a9ec2c\"}",
"given_name": "{\"s\": \"6Ij7tM-a5iVPGboS5tmvVA\", \"v\": \"John\"}",
"family_name": "{\"s\": \"Qg_O64zqAxe412a108iroA\", \"v\": \"Doe\"}",
"email": "{\"s\": \"Pc33JM2LchcU_lHggv_ufQ\", \"v\": \"[email protected]\"}",
"phone_number": "{\"s\": \"lklxF5jMYlGTPUovMNIvCA\", \"v\": \"+1-202-555-0101\"}",
"address": "{\"s\": \"5bPs1IquZNa0hkaFzzzZNw\", \"v\": {\"street_address\": \"123 Main St\", \"locality\": \"Anytown\", \"region\": \"Anystate\", \"country\": \"US\"}}",
"birthdate": "{\"s\": \"y1sVU5wdfJahVdgwPgS7RQ\", \"v\": \"1940-01-01\"}"
}
}
Important: As described above, hash digests are calculated over the JSON literal formed by serializing an object containing the salt, the claim value, and optionally the claim name. This ensures that issuer and verifier use the same input to their hash functions and avoids issues with canonicalization of JSON values that would lead to different hash digests. The SVC therefore maps claim names to JSON-encoded arrays.
For transporting the SVC together with the SD-JWT from the issuer to the holder,
the SVC is base64url-encoded and appended to the SD-JWT using a period character .
as the
separator.
The SVC and SD-JWT are implicitly linked through the hash values of the claims in the SVC that is included in the SD-JWT. To ensure that the correct SVC and SD-JWT pairings are being used, the holder SHOULD verify the binding between SVC and SD-JWT as defined in the Verification Section of this document.
For Example 1, the combined format looks as follows:
{#example-simple-combined_sd_jwt_svc}
eyJhbGciOiAiUlMyNTYiLCAia2lkIjogImNBRUlVcUowY21MekQxa3pHemhlaUJhZzBZUk
F6VmRsZnhOMjgwTmdIYUEifQ.eyJpc3MiOiAiaHR0cHM6Ly9leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9pc3N1Z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.b0tAGzn4SMc94CN215lS0Ut2J_JBFZlJ3Wu5Ghi1tk0nEwJMMT2xk0Jf5GuQq4WHwPcT
kV4wV7XNFC_-WP_NHVVrMV32q5dxn4G3MLNqRWSyVTZACLaP6Wx8OYIhDTsxPI-HZSdgjl
bRj1QIE-AMZVDAtOEs9bPkweooAFM0moYoQHbTry1Gqgilw5CEQsDrtTZBbDXK3GlT_K4C
bo4O9xMY8NbUgYct5Ix-sEpUBXpCd-o14rYvWnDsGcVxri4Jz453fMgFINi2Vz1skLtQmq
RRgRLgILYetPOZqpVxfsCtgzDN_OGoSUq3pdvLJ3bFAzrt8dHenOvlz_CvlMXx2A.eyJzZ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(Line breaks for presentation only.)
SD-JWT-R contains claim values and the salts of the claims that the holder has consented to release to the Verifier. This enables the Verifier to verify the claims received from the holder by computing the hash digests of the claim values and the salts revealed in the SD-JWT-R using the hashing algorithm specified in SD-JWT and comparing them to the hash digests included in SD-JWT.
For each claim, an array of the salt and the claim value is contained in the
sd_release
object. The structure of an sd_release
object in the SD-JWT-R is the same as the structure of an sd_release
object in SVC.
The SD-JWT-R MAY contain further claims, for example, to ensure a binding
to a concrete transaction (in the example the nonce
and aud
claims).
When the holder sends the SD-JWT-R to the Verifier, the SD-JWT-R MUST be a JWS represented as the JWS Compact Serialization as described in Section 7.1 of [@!RFC7515].
If holder binding is desired, the SD-JWT-R is signed by the holder. If no
holder binding is to be used, the none
algorithm is used, i.e., the document
is not signed. TODO: Change to plain base64 to avoid alg=none issues
The following is a non-normative example of the contents of an SD-JWT-R for Example 1:
{#example-simple-sd_jwt_release_payload}
{
"nonce": "XZOUco1u_gEPknxS78sWWg",
"aud": "https://example.com/verifier",
"sd_release": {
"given_name": "{\"s\": \"6Ij7tM-a5iVPGboS5tmvVA\", \"v\": \"John\"}",
"family_name": "{\"s\": \"Qg_O64zqAxe412a108iroA\", \"v\": \"Doe\"}",
"address": "{\"s\": \"5bPs1IquZNa0hkaFzzzZNw\", \"v\": {\"street_address\": \"123 Main St\", \"locality\": \"Anytown\", \"region\": \"Anystate\", \"country\": \"US\"}}"
}
}
For each claim, a JSON literal that decodes to an object with the and the claim
value (plus optionally the claim name) is contained in the sd_release
object.
Again, the SD-JWT-R follows the same structure as the sd_digests
in the SD-JWT.
Below is a non-normative example of a representation of the SD-JWT-R JWS Compact Serialization:
{#example-simple-serialized_sd_jwt_release}
eyJhbGciOiAiUlMyNTYiLCAia2lkIjogIkxkeVRYd0F5ZnJpcjRfVjZORzFSYzEwVThKZE
xZVHJFQktKaF9oNWlfclUifQ.eyJub25jZSI6ICJYWk9VY28xdV9nRVBrbnhTNzhzV1dnI
iwgImF1ZCI6ICJodHRwczovL2V4YW1wbGUuY29tL3ZlcmlmaWVyIiwgInNkX3JlbGVhc2U
iOiB7ImdpdmVuX25hbWUiOiAie1wic1wiOiBcIjZJajd0TS1hNWlWUEdib1M1dG12VkFcI
iwgXCJ2XCI6IFwiSm9oblwifSIsICJmYW1pbHlfbmFtZSI6ICJ7XCJzXCI6IFwiUWdfTzY
0enFBeGU0MTJhMTA4aXJvQVwiLCBcInZcIjogXCJEb2VcIn0iLCAiYWRkcmVzcyI6ICJ7X
CJzXCI6IFwiNWJQczFJcXVaTmEwaGthRnp6elpOd1wiLCBcInZcIjoge1wic3RyZWV0X2F
kZHJlc3NcIjogXCIxMjMgTWFpbiBTdFwiLCBcImxvY2FsaXR5XCI6IFwiQW55dG93blwiL
CBcInJlZ2lvblwiOiBcIkFueXN0YXRlXCIsIFwiY291bnRyeVwiOiBcIlVTXCJ9fSJ9fQ.
fw4xRl7m1mDPCZvCTn3GOr2PgBZ--fTKfy7s-GuEifNvzW5KsJaBBFvzdZztm25XGhk29u
w-XwEw00r0hyxXLBvWfA0XbDK3JBmdpOSW1bEyNBdSHPJoeq9Xyts2JN40vJzU2UxNaLKD
aEheWf3F_E52yhHxvMLNdvZJ9FksJdSMK6ZCyGfRJadPN2GhNltqph52sWiFKUyUk_4Rtw
XmT_lF49tWOMZqtG-akN9wrBoMsleM0soA0BXIK10rG5cKZoSNr-u2luzbdZx3CFdAenaq
ScIkluPPcrXBZGYyX2zYUbGQs2RRXnBmox_yl6CvLbb0qTTYhDnDEo_MH-ZtWw
(Line breaks for presentation only.)
The SD-JWT and the SD-JWT-R can be combined into one document using period character .
as a separator (here for Example 1):
{#example-simple-combined_sd_jwt_sd_jwt_release}
eyJhbGciOiAiUlMyNTYiLCAia2lkIjogImNBRUlVcUowY21MekQxa3pHemhlaUJhZzBZUk
F6VmRsZnhOMjgwTmdIYUEifQ.eyJpc3MiOiAiaHR0cHM6Ly9leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9pc3N1Z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.b0tAGzn4SMc94CN215lS0Ut2J_JBFZlJ3Wu5Ghi1tk0nEwJMMT2xk0Jf5GuQq4WHwPcT
kV4wV7XNFC_-WP_NHVVrMV32q5dxn4G3MLNqRWSyVTZACLaP6Wx8OYIhDTsxPI-HZSdgjl
bRj1QIE-AMZVDAtOEs9bPkweooAFM0moYoQHbTry1Gqgilw5CEQsDrtTZBbDXK3GlT_K4C
bo4O9xMY8NbUgYct5Ix-sEpUBXpCd-o14rYvWnDsGcVxri4Jz453fMgFINi2Vz1skLtQmq
RRgRLgILYetPOZqpVxfsCtgzDN_OGoSUq3pdvLJ3bFAzrt8dHenOvlz_CvlMXx2A.eyJhb
GciOiAiUlMyNTYiLCAia2lkIjogIkxkeVRYd0F5ZnJpcjRfVjZORzFSYzEwVThKZExZVHJ
FQktKaF9oNWlfclUifQ.eyJub25jZSI6ICJYWk9VY28xdV9nRVBrbnhTNzhzV1dnIiwgIm
F1ZCI6ICJodHRwczovL2V4YW1wbGUuY29tL3ZlcmlmaWVyIiwgInNkX3JlbGVhc2UiOiB7
ImdpdmVuX25hbWUiOiAiW1wiZWx1VjVPZzNnU05JSThFWW5zeEFfQVwiLCBcIkpvaG5cIl
0iLCAiZmFtaWx5X25hbWUiOiAiW1wiNklqN3RNLWE1aVZQR2JvUzV0bXZWQVwiLCBcIkRv
ZVwiXSIsICJhZGRyZXNzIjogIltcIkFKeC0wOTVWUHJwVHRONFFNT3FST0FcIiwge1wic3
RyZWV0X2FkZHJlc3NcIjogXCIxMjMgTWFpbiBTdFwiLCBcImxvY2FsaXR5XCI6IFwiQW55
dG93blwiLCBcInJlZ2lvblwiOiBcIkFueXN0YXRlXCIsIFwiY291bnRyeVwiOiBcIlVTXC
J9XSJ9fQ.j5jtArW1QDK1BNM13sJbQaE00GsAhhiPRYi6oK-iJRtLWE6DAgcWxDirTvxTn
uo7Mbb6gSqGTmdEEtmscWxweFfGQoddObPTDiapjWiR1bUMMqPDKNNkRe0CBkU-pWieYWN
-fQxlRa4BKUqs18jcvGtTGA8Ye-i6t2xLROeXf2U_Seko8b7MQWIFHdbc0LvEFt_-JAcqe
shH5wjVkwhHofVuZq1vGLlINKBveKA2dmn6wuEzi6XRceTwFrG_hTECagfobdO-bYMF3FS
iCQM2KxC_6_aLApYo0aH3zjBv9rm0qNmnL_JGN5FIu6YqwhvPzfdsfkjMd68o8LTWd7F6k
Q
(Line breaks for presentation only.)
The holder SHOULD verify the binding between SD-JWT and SVC by performing the following steps:
- Check that all the claims in the SVC are present in the SD-JWT and that there are no claims in the SD-JWT that are not in the SVC
- Check that the hashes of the claims in the SVC match those in the SD-JWT
Verifiers MUST follow [@RFC8725] for checking the SD-JWT and, if signed, the SD-JWT Release.
Verifiers MUST go through (at least) the following steps before trusting/using any of the contents of an SD-JWT:
- Determine if holder binding is to be checked for the SD-JWT. Refer to (#holder_binding_security) for details.
- Check that the presentation consists of six period-separated (
.
) elements; if holder binding is not required, the last element can be empty. - Separate the SD-JWT from the SD-JWT Release.
- Validate the SD-JWT:
- Ensure that a signing algorithm was used that was deemed secure for the application. Refer to [@RFC8725], Sections 3.1 and 3.2 for details.
- Validate the signature over the SD-JWT.
- Validate the issuer of the SD-JWT and that the signing key belongs to this issuer.
- Check that the SD-JWT is valid using
nbf
,iat
, andexp
claims, if provided in the SD-JWT. - Check that the claim
sd_digests
is present in the SD-JWT. - Check that the
sd_hash_alg
claim is present and its value is understand and the hash algorithm is deemed secure.
- Validate the SD-JWT Release:
- If holder binding is required, validate the signature over the SD-JWT using the same steps as for the SD-JWT plus the following steps:
- Determine that the public key for the private key that used to sign the SD-JWT-R is bound to the SD-JWT, i.e., the SD-JWT either contains a reference to the public key or contains the public key itself.
- Determine that the SD-JWT-R is bound to the current transaction and was created for this verifier (replay protection). This is usually achieved by a
nonce
andaud
field within the SD-JWT Release.
- For each claim in the SD-JWT Release:
- Ensure that the claim is present as well in
sd_release
in the SD-JWT. Ifsd_release
is structured, the claim MUST be present at the same place within the structure. - Compute the base64url-encoded hash digest of the JSON literal released
by the Holder using the
sd_hash_alg
in SD-JWT. - Compare the hash digests computed in the previous step with the one of the same claim in the SD-JWT. Accept the claim only when the two hash digests match.
- Ensure that the claim value in the SD-JWT-R is a JSON-encoded
object containing at least the keys
s
andv
, and optionallyn
. - Store the value of the key
v
as the claim value. Ifn
is contained in the object, use the value of the keyn
as the claim name.
- Ensure that the claim is present as well in
- Once all necessary claims have been verified, their values can be validated and used according to the requirements of the application. It MUST be ensured that all claims required for the application have been released.
- If holder binding is required, validate the signature over the SD-JWT using the same steps as for the SD-JWT plus the following steps:
If any step fails, the input is not valid and processing MUST be aborted.
ToDo: add text explaining mechanisms that should be adopted to ensure that verifiers validate the claim values received in SD-JWT-R by calculating the hashes of those values and comparing them with the hashes in the SD-JWT:
- create a test suite that forces hash computation by the Verifiers, and includes negative test cases in test vectors
- use only implementations/libraries that are compliant to the test suite
- etc.
The SD-JWT MUST be signed by the issuer to protect integrity of the issued claims. An attacker can modify or add claims if an SD-JWT is not signed (e.g., change the "email" attribute to take over the victim's account or add an attribute indicating a fake academic qualification).
The verifier MUST always check the SD-JWT signature to ensure that the SD-JWT has not been tampered with since its issuance. If the signature on the SD-JWT cannot be verified, the SD-JWT MUST be rejected.
The security model relies on the fact that the salt is not learned or guessed by the attacker. It is vitally important to adhere to this principle. As such, the salt MUST be created in such a manner that it is cryptographically random, long enough and has high entropy that it is not practical for the attacker to guess. Each salt value MUST be unique.
The length of the randomly-generated portion of the salt MUST be at least 128 bits.
For the security of this scheme, the hash function is required to be preimage and collision resistant, i.e., it is infeasible to calculate the salt and claim value that result in a particular digest, and it is infeasible to find a different salt and claim value pair that result in a matching digest, respectively.
Furthermore the hash algorithms MD2, MD4, MD5, RIPEMD-160, and SHA-1 revealed fundamental weaknesses and they MUST NOT be used.
TBD
Issuers that chose to blind claim names MUST ensure not to inadvertently leak information about the blinded claim names to verifiers. In particular, issuers MUST choose placeholder claim names accordingly. It is RECOMMENDED to use cryptographically random values with at least 128 bits of entropy as placeholder claim names.
The order of elements in JSON-encoded objects is not relevant to applications, but the order may reveal information about the blinded claim name to the verifier. It is therefore RECOMMENDED to ensure that the order is shuffled or otherwise hidden (e.g., alphabetically ordered using the blinded claim names).
By default, claim names are not blinded in an SD-JWT. In this case, even when
the claim's value is not known to a verifier, the claim name can disclose some
information to the verifier. For example, if the SD-JWT contains a claim named
super_secret_club_membership_no
, the verifier might assume that the end-user
is a member of the Super Secret Club.
Blinding claim names can help to avoid this potential privacy issue. In many cases, however, verifiers can already deduce this or similar information just from the identification of the issuer and the schema used for the SD-JWT. Blinding claim names might not provide additional privacy if this is the case.
Furthermore, re-using the same value to blind a claim name may limit the privacy benefits.
Colluding issuer/verifier or verifier/verifier pairs could link issuance/presentation or two presentation sessions to the same user on the basis of unique values encoded in the SD-JWT (issuer signature, salts, digests, etc.). More advanced cryptographic schemes, outside the scope of this specification, can be used to prevent this type of linkability.
We would like to thank Alen Horvat, Brian Campbell, Christian Paquin, Fabian Hauck, Giuseppe De Marco, Kushal Das, Mike Jones, Nat Sakimura, Pieter Kasselman, and Torsten Lodderstedt for their contributions (some of which substantial) to this draft and to the initial set of implementations.
The work on this draft was started at OAuth Security Workshop 2022 in Trondheim, Norway.
TBD
<title>OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating errata set 1</title> NRI Ping Identity Microsoft Google Salesforce <title>Verifiable Credentials Data Model 1.0</title> Digital Bazaar ConsenSys Digital Bazaar ConsenSys Evernym University of Kent{backmatter}
This non-normative example is based on the same claim values as Example 1, but this time the issuer decided to create a structured object for the hashes. This allows for the release of individual members of the address claim separately.
{#example-simple_structured-sd_jwt_payload}
{
"iss": "https://example.com/issuer",
"cnf": {
"jwk": {
"kty": "RSA",
"n": "pm4bOHBg-oYhAyPWzR56AWX3rUIXp11_ICDkGgS6W3ZWLts-hzwI3x65659kg4hVo9dbGoCJE3ZGF_eaetE30UhBUEgpGwrDrQiJ9zqprmcFfr3qvvkGjtth8Zgl1eM2bJcOwE7PCBHWTKWYs152R7g6Jg2OVph-a8rq-q79MhKG5QoW_mTz10QT_6H4c7PjWG1fjh8hpWNnbP_pv6d1zSwZfc5fl6yVRL0DV0V3lGHKe2Wqf_eNGjBrBLVklDTk8-stX_MWLcR-EGmXAOv0UBWitS_dXJKJu-vXJyw14nHSGuxTIK2hx1pttMft9CsvqimXKeDTU14qQL1eE7ihcw",
"e": "AQAB"
}
},
"iat": 1516239022,
"exp": 1516247022,
"sd_hash_alg": "sha-256",
"sd_digests": {
"sub": "OMdwkk2HPuiInPypWUWMxot1Y2tStGsLuIcDMjKdXMU",
"given_name": "AfKKH4a0IZki8MFDythFaFS_Xqzn-wRvAMfiy_VjYpE",
"family_name": "eUmXmry32JiK_76xMasagkAQQsmSVdW57Ajk18riSF0",
"email": "-Rcr4fDyjwlM_itcMxoQZCE1QAEwyLJcibEpH114KiE",
"phone_number": "Jv2nw0C1wP5ASutYNAxrWEnaDRIpiF0eTUAkUOp8F6Y",
"address": {
"street_address": "n25N6kth9N0CwjZXHeth1gfovg8_I8fGyzeY0qeLp0k",
"locality": "gJVL_TKoT_SbA4_sv0klLTkg-YEGzVUkC-6egxegsz0",
"region": "zXbstGPuPq2cPJfyD_-HlmqVyFMf03xH-FbeotXxdbo",
"country": "pN-5CZ5hbumsPvLKUADm4Ott6gu0E4xj09s4Z51yb8U"
},
"birthdate": "UxsvgkUgPnawP6wY4hmxJ_jqiNNKni62zrX7hQOUsys"
}
}
The SVC for this SD-JWT is as follows:
{#example-simple_structured-svc_payload}
{
"sd_release": {
"sub": "{\"s\": \"2GLC42sKQveCfGfryNRN9w\", \"v\": \"6c5c0a49-b589-431d-bae7-219122a9ec2c\"}",
"given_name": "{\"s\": \"6Ij7tM-a5iVPGboS5tmvVA\", \"v\": \"John\"}",
"family_name": "{\"s\": \"Qg_O64zqAxe412a108iroA\", \"v\": \"Doe\"}",
"email": "{\"s\": \"Pc33JM2LchcU_lHggv_ufQ\", \"v\": \"[email protected]\"}",
"phone_number": "{\"s\": \"lklxF5jMYlGTPUovMNIvCA\", \"v\": \"+1-202-555-0101\"}",
"address": {
"street_address": "{\"s\": \"5bPs1IquZNa0hkaFzzzZNw\", \"v\": \"123 Main St\"}",
"locality": "{\"s\": \"y1sVU5wdfJahVdgwPgS7RQ\", \"v\": \"Anytown\"}",
"region": "{\"s\": \"C9GSoujviJquEgYfojCb1A\", \"v\": \"Anystate\"}",
"country": "{\"s\": \"H3o1uswP760Fi2yeGdVCEQ\", \"v\": \"US\"}"
},
"birthdate": "{\"s\": \"M0Jb57t41ubrkSuyrDT3xA\", \"v\": \"1940-01-01\"}"
}
}
An SD-JWT-R for the SD-JWT above that discloses only region
and country
of
the address
property:
{#example-simple_structured-sd_jwt_release_payload}
{
"nonce": "XZOUco1u_gEPknxS78sWWg",
"aud": "https://example.com/verifier",
"sd_release": {
"given_name": "{\"s\": \"6Ij7tM-a5iVPGboS5tmvVA\", \"v\": \"John\"}",
"family_name": "{\"s\": \"Qg_O64zqAxe412a108iroA\", \"v\": \"Doe\"}",
"birthdate": "{\"s\": \"M0Jb57t41ubrkSuyrDT3xA\", \"v\": \"1940-01-01\"}",
"address": {
"region": "{\"s\": \"C9GSoujviJquEgYfojCb1A\", \"v\": \"Anystate\"}",
"country": "{\"s\": \"H3o1uswP760Fi2yeGdVCEQ\", \"v\": \"US\"}"
}
}
}
In this example, a complex object such as those used for OIDC4IDA (todo reference) is used.
In this example, the Issuer is using a following object as a set of claims to issue to the Holder:
{#example-complex-user_claims}
{
"verified_claims": {
"verification": {
"trust_framework": "de_aml",
"time": "2012-04-23T18:25Z",
"verification_process": "f24c6f-6d3f-4ec5-973e-b0d8506f3bc7",
"evidence": [
{
"type": "document",
"method": "pipp",
"time": "2012-04-22T11:30Z",
"document": {
"type": "idcard",
"issuer": {
"name": "Stadt Augsburg",
"country": "DE"
},
"number": "53554554",
"date_of_issuance": "2010-03-23",
"date_of_expiry": "2020-03-22"
}
}
]
},
"claims": {
"given_name": "Max",
"family_name": "Meier",
"birthdate": "1956-01-28",
"place_of_birth": {
"country": "DE",
"locality": "Musterstadt"
},
"nationalities": [
"DE"
],
"address": {
"locality": "Maxstadt",
"postal_code": "12344",
"country": "DE",
"street_address": "An der Weide 22"
}
}
},
"birth_middle_name": "Timotheus",
"salutation": "Dr.",
"msisdn": "49123456789"
}
The following shows the resulting SD-JWT payload:
{#example-complex-sd_jwt_payload}
{
"iss": "https://example.com/issuer",
"cnf": {
"jwk": {
"kty": "RSA",
"n": "pm4bOHBg-oYhAyPWzR56AWX3rUIXp11_ICDkGgS6W3ZWLts-hzwI3x65659kg4hVo9dbGoCJE3ZGF_eaetE30UhBUEgpGwrDrQiJ9zqprmcFfr3qvvkGjtth8Zgl1eM2bJcOwE7PCBHWTKWYs152R7g6Jg2OVph-a8rq-q79MhKG5QoW_mTz10QT_6H4c7PjWG1fjh8hpWNnbP_pv6d1zSwZfc5fl6yVRL0DV0V3lGHKe2Wqf_eNGjBrBLVklDTk8-stX_MWLcR-EGmXAOv0UBWitS_dXJKJu-vXJyw14nHSGuxTIK2hx1pttMft9CsvqimXKeDTU14qQL1eE7ihcw",
"e": "AQAB"
}
},
"iat": 1516239022,
"exp": 1516247022,
"sd_hash_alg": "sha-256",
"sd_digests": {
"verified_claims": {
"verification": {
"trust_framework": "T7ivxsfuy-nAuECeh0utPEX8cSlc7QflJDE0RqtWDMU",
"time": "_ecCQoXSR8t9esur66ZwWwC6u4xLuVELjmwFgpRZqcQ",
"verification_process": "BolwKKvU8N7uUhjN2aGH2T54wjXpkcOz5sC9PkIP4s4",
"evidence": [
{
"type": "7jBlUZkZn1Gfj9mybqlJGzTb2z8KcNNHU0IV4B8MxOM",
"method": "BRQgcT09gdBqO-MLTka8d6dlCshZCUNpFgsZoet5I-o",
"time": "-PVLNSmbkCHLp8S7i077YnHZV0yE8gyKWLpWV2o8FJE",
"document": {
"type": "vzDHD-6hQqZ5lSw_7acK1lErxSh3E6dO0zlUYM2hDvw",
"issuer": {
"name": "us9T9ufVdSmytSmjrtdN_TUI0ai3_JNM3q-0qx0CXk4",
"country": "uItKtPRZQBB9v5THHOdi02ALjD0MH0U6jjHDLe91NnY"
},
"number": "QNNXwo3siOWdqNivKBnFsD4X8gZxVIgu3tv6dfpZhUc",
"date_of_issuance": "AYWQphnOlFFN9oSVvtBr_iYCKYlucTi3lsMrXebebgc",
"date_of_expiry": "JIk-APYHW3qy60rvGyFswDCTMfAbBXZyyrZEn8NsBhU"
}
}
]
},
"claims": {
"given_name": "hZtT6FZBzxAeByDUkFJTeqTCpTd2cQKx6MDPkGvVCRE",
"family_name": "5yLYGVxPSfXynhcopbIcrFe0_sMGxv_-6THZAu4eWnU",
"birthdate": "aB3eabkYkRF2DJiFyYtkcC12VECREaqR8UofmXyHhcU",
"place_of_birth": {
"country": "m7zAMJASE0TJkMRHhCfC8QEXAZhS_8DGdLqOsm8Zp7k",
"locality": "iLkBIeq-3PD7pxeMz99Of12IIH7WqXFrgHxvdCJz5Sk"
},
"nationalities": "lQjcMf0lXA-IPW5aQHEX2Ln-Xz5ZE8oG3RY7ZVM4sTw",
"address": "1H0qniEo7vEP_SLiVOEx5F5oiPS-IEoCW_L9wj1IYWA"
}
},
"birth_middle_name": "KpRjGCm3uykvCGFIDrVJ7iTMQhWakBmCItHbAa6vnZE",
"salutation": "IoY5e03e65CUrnaMcRDmPCm0RWPEFE4mVkoCsK86agA",
"msisdn": "XupJick4P8bxaz20kx_VOwbGU1cgslhAUG6IE-tDjms"
}
}
The SD-JWT is then signed by the issuer to create a document like the following:
{#example-complex-serialized_sd_jwt}
eyJhbGciOiAiUlMyNTYiLCAia2lkIjogImNBRUlVcUowY21MekQxa3pHemhlaUJhZzBZUk
F6VmRsZnhOMjgwTmdIYUEifQ.eyJpc3MiOiAiaHR0cHM6Ly9leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9pc3N1Z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.HmoKHnHVbGadegrlrLGWrJfcrc_4AweZ2L
NCPdpj6LSiSoTVI1Ze_VHBShFkD4Na7njkOFdcKgddBYOckq6b5oBiQvkX8LCb9maEwvXV
cxyBcQ1h4oT23yud2LE_kuXFLCE-wGu97dFj0n3pojTNBA6fU8mb62q_CUKQuPvsWSJBfY
PoGSOQjec_bB9VgjWE6S3wXGYQ3E_HIQk--GFIbRBP_cf78ZWeFr0hIJzm5mgYfbDGpY3k
2msqdih4xhneRPgnJGp-PRhB16nxtpgfYY7Ux8uOB_cNgsAEKvZQ8Zu2UaELWnFG9P0McQ
RyF-uzo2u2a6P5SXC3qUkROb8lOA
(Line breaks for presentation only.)
A SD-JWT-R for some of the claims:
{#example-complex-sd_jwt_release_payload}
{
"nonce": "XZOUco1u_gEPknxS78sWWg",
"aud": "https://example.com/verifier",
"sd_release": {
"verified_claims": {
"verification": {
"trust_framework": "{\"s\": \"2GLC42sKQveCfGfryNRN9w\", \"v\": \"de_aml\"}",
"time": "{\"s\": \"6Ij7tM-a5iVPGboS5tmvVA\", \"v\": \"2012-04-23T18:25Z\"}",
"evidence": [
{
"type": "{\"s\": \"Pc33JM2LchcU_lHggv_ufQ\", \"v\": \"document\"}"
}
]
},
"claims": {
"given_name": "{\"s\": \"4KyR32oIZt-zkWvFqbULKg\", \"v\": \"Max\"}",
"family_name": "{\"s\": \"flNP1ncMz9Lg-c9qMIz_9g\", \"v\": \"Meier\"}",
"birthdate": "{\"s\": \"t8EA-tKsh5wZMB6bpjLfTQ\", \"v\": \"1956-01-28\"}",
"place_of_birth": {
"country": "{\"s\": \"yh3cQSKnhdGmpVgd3ydH2Q\", \"v\": \"DE\"}"
}
}
}
}
}
This example illustrates how the artifacts defined in this specification can be represented using W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model as defined in [@VC_DATA].
SD-JWT is equivalent to an issuer-signed W3C Verifiable Credential (VC). SVC is sent alongside a VC.
SD-JWT-Release is equivalent to a holder-signed W3C Verifiable Presentation (VP).
SD-JWT-Release as a VP contains a verifiableCredential
claim inside a vp
claim that is a string array of an SD-JWT as a VC using JWT compact serialization.
Below is a non-normative example of an SD-JWT represented as a verifiable credential encoded as JSON and signed as JWS compliant to [@VC_DATA].
SVC sent alongside this SD-JWT as a JWT-VC is same as in Example 1.
{
"sub": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint:sha-256:NzbLsXh8uDCcd-6MNwXF4W_7noWXFZAfHkxZsRGC9Xs",
"jti": "http://example.edu/credentials/3732",
"iss": "https://example.com/keys/foo.jwk",
"nbf": 1541493724,
"iat": 1541493724,
"exp": 1573029723,
"cnf": {
"jwk": {
"kty":"RSA",
"n": "0vx7agoebGcQSuuPiLJXZptN9nndrQmbXEps2aiAFbWhM78LhWx
4cbbfAAtVT86zwu1RK7aPFFxuhDR1L6tSoc_BJECPebWKRXjBZCiFV4n3oknjhMs
tn64tZ_2W-5JsGY4Hc5n9yBXArwl93lqt7_RN5w6Cf0h4QyQ5v-65YGjQR0_FDW2
QvzqY368QQMicAtaSqzs8KJZgnYb9c7d0zgdAZHzu6qMQvRL5hajrn1n91CbOpbI
SD08qNLyrdkt-bFTWhAI4vMQFh6WeZu0fM4lFd2NcRwr3XPksINHaQ-G_xBniIqb
w0Ls1jF44-csFCur-kEgU8awapJzKnqDKgw",
"e":"AQAB"
}
},
"vc": {
"@context": [
"https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/v1",
"https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/examples/v1"
],
"type": [
"VerifiableCredential",
"UniversityDegreeCredential"
],
"credentialSubject": {
"first_name": "Jane",
"last_name": "Doe"
}
},
"sd_digests": {
"vc": {
"credentialSubject": {
"email": "ET2A1JQLF85ZpBulh6UFstGrSfR4B3KM-bjQVllhxqY",
"phone_number": "SJnciB2DIRVA5cXBrdKoH6n45788mZyUn2rnv74uMVU",
"address": "0FldqLfGnERPPVDC17od9xb4w3iRJTEQbW_Yk9AmnDw",
"birthdate": "-L0kMgIbLXe3OEkKTUGwz_QKhjehDeofKGwoPrxLuo4"
}
}
}
}
Below is a non-normative example of an SD-JWT-R represented as a verifiable presentation encoded as JSON and signed as a JWS compliant to [@VC_DATA].
{
"alg": "RS256",
"typ": "JWT",
"jwk": {
"kty":"RSA",
"n": "0vx7agoebGcQSuuPiLJXZptN9nndrQmbXEps2aiAFbWhM78LhWx
4cbbfAAtVT86zwu1RK7aPFFxuhDR1L6tSoc_BJECPebWKRXjBZCiFV4n3oknjhMs
tn64tZ_2W-5JsGY4Hc5n9yBXArwl93lqt7_RN5w6Cf0h4QyQ5v-65YGjQR0_FDW2
QvzqY368QQMicAtaSqzs8KJZgnYb9c7d0zgdAZHzu6qMQvRL5hajrn1n91CbOpbI
SD08qNLyrdkt-bFTWhAI4vMQFh6WeZu0fM4lFd2NcRwr3XPksINHaQ-G_xBniIqb
w0Ls1jF44-csFCur-kEgU8awapJzKnqDKgw",
"e":"AQAB"
}
}.{
"iss": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint:sha-256:NzbLsXh8uDCcd-6MNwXF4W_7noWXFZAfHkxZsRGC9Xs",
"aud": "s6BhdRkqt3",
"nbf": 1560415047,
"iat": 1560415047,
"exp": 1573029723,
"nonce": "660!6345FSer",
"vp": {
"@context": [
"https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/v1"
],
"type": [
"VerifiablePresentation"
],
"verifiableCredential": ["eyJhb...npyXw"]
},
"sd_release": {
"email": "[\"eI8ZWm9QnKPpNPeNenHdhQ\", \"[email protected]\"]",
"phone_number": "[\"Qg_O64zqAxe412a108iroA\", \"+1-202-555-0101\"]",
"address": "[\"AJx-095VPrpTtN4QMOqROA\", {\"street_address\": \"123 Main St\", \"locality\": \"Anytown\", \"region\": \"Anystate\", \"country\": \"US\"}]",
"birthdate": "[\"Pc33JM2LchcU_lHggv_ufQ\", \"1940-01-01\"]"
}
}
The following shows the user information used in this example, included a claim named secret_club_membership_no
:
{#example-simple_structured_some_blinded-user_claims}
{
"sub": "6c5c0a49-b589-431d-bae7-219122a9ec2c",
"given_name": "John",
"family_name": "Doe",
"email": "[email protected]",
"phone_number": "+1-202-555-0101",
"secret_club_membership_no": "23",
"other_secret_club_membership_no": "42",
"address": {
"street_address": "123 Main St",
"locality": "Anytown",
"region": "Anystate",
"country": "US"
},
"birthdate": "1940-01-01"
}
Hiding just this claim, the following SD-JWT payload would result:
{#example-simple_structured_some_blinded-sd_jwt_payload}
{
"iss": "https://example.com/issuer",
"sub_jwk": {
"kty": "RSA",
"n": "pm4bOHBg-oYhAyPWzR56AWX3rUIXp11_ICDkGgS6W3ZWLts-hzwI3x65659kg4hVo9dbGoCJE3ZGF_eaetE30UhBUEgpGwrDrQiJ9zqprmcFfr3qvvkGjtth8Zgl1eM2bJcOwE7PCBHWTKWYs152R7g6Jg2OVph-a8rq-q79MhKG5QoW_mTz10QT_6H4c7PjWG1fjh8hpWNnbP_pv6d1zSwZfc5fl6yVRL0DV0V3lGHKe2Wqf_eNGjBrBLVklDTk8-stX_MWLcR-EGmXAOv0UBWitS_dXJKJu-vXJyw14nHSGuxTIK2hx1pttMft9CsvqimXKeDTU14qQL1eE7ihcw",
"e": "AQAB"
},
"iat": 1516239022,
"exp": 1516247022,
"hash_alg": "sha-256",
"sd_digests": {
"sub": "OMdwkk2HPuiInPypWUWMxot1Y2tStGsLuIcDMjKdXMU",
"given_name": "AfKKH4a0IZki8MFDythFaFS_Xqzn-wRvAMfiy_VjYpE",
"family_name": "eUmXmry32JiK_76xMasagkAQQsmSVdW57Ajk18riSF0",
"email": "-Rcr4fDyjwlM_itcMxoQZCE1QAEwyLJcibEpH114KiE",
"phone_number": "Jv2nw0C1wP5ASutYNAxrWEnaDRIpiF0eTUAkUOp8F6Y",
"5a2W0_NrlEZzfqmk_7Pq-w": "gc8VzGTImYRXzP6j7q5RomXt2C_wtsOJ3hAHJdTuEIY",
"other_secret_club_membership_no": "IirAwgN-MubteYvJ4fmq04p9PnpRTf7hqg0dzSWRboA",
"address": {
"street_address": "o_yJIdfhKuKVzOF7i1EuakzC5ghd99CX8_nitm-DsRM",
"locality": "ogNqsvRqK0-ZPZc9C3Z4_6APvywm-lrm0oF2gcVtl_4",
"region": "8kFihRLSkEheK0zbEsQ3zKXt8csE6OXJE_jv3032BbU",
"country": "11IMcoA18LrFSpbysx-uqe7N3I3-QZKwCJqYeQuOUY4"
},
"birthdate": "PNtcyxm0Q5PyiBuG4f6eAbK6h4tF2FffwG3xqknZ_5A"
}
}
In the SVC it can be seen that the blinded claim's original name is secret_club_membership_no
:
{#example-simple_structured_some_blinded-svc_payload}
{
"sd_release": {
"sub": "{\"s\": \"2GLC42sKQveCfGfryNRN9w\", \"v\": \"6c5c0a49-b589-431d-bae7-219122a9ec2c\"}",
"given_name": "{\"s\": \"6Ij7tM-a5iVPGboS5tmvVA\", \"v\": \"John\"}",
"family_name": "{\"s\": \"Qg_O64zqAxe412a108iroA\", \"v\": \"Doe\"}",
"email": "{\"s\": \"Pc33JM2LchcU_lHggv_ufQ\", \"v\": \"[email protected]\"}",
"phone_number": "{\"s\": \"lklxF5jMYlGTPUovMNIvCA\", \"v\": \"+1-202-555-0101\"}",
"5a2W0_NrlEZzfqmk_7Pq-w": "{\"s\": \"5bPs1IquZNa0hkaFzzzZNw\", \"v\": \"23\", \"n\": \"secret_club_membership_no\"}",
"other_secret_club_membership_no": "{\"s\": \"y1sVU5wdfJahVdgwPgS7RQ\", \"v\": \"42\"}",
"address": {
"street_address": "{\"s\": \"C9GSoujviJquEgYfojCb1A\", \"v\": \"123 Main St\"}",
"locality": "{\"s\": \"H3o1uswP760Fi2yeGdVCEQ\", \"v\": \"Anytown\"}",
"region": "{\"s\": \"M0Jb57t41ubrkSuyrDT3xA\", \"v\": \"Anystate\"}",
"country": "{\"s\": \"eK5o5pHfgupPpltj1qhAJw\", \"v\": \"US\"}"
},
"birthdate": "{\"s\": \"WpxJrFuX8uSi2p4ht09jvw\", \"v\": \"1940-01-01\"}"
}
}
The verifier would learn this information via the SD-JWT-R:
{#example-simple_structured_some_blinded-sd_jwt_release_payload}
{
"nonce": "XZOUco1u_gEPknxS78sWWg",
"aud": "https://example.com/verifier",
"sd_release": {
"given_name": "{\"s\": \"6Ij7tM-a5iVPGboS5tmvVA\", \"v\": \"John\"}",
"family_name": "{\"s\": \"Qg_O64zqAxe412a108iroA\", \"v\": \"Doe\"}",
"birthdate": "{\"s\": \"WpxJrFuX8uSi2p4ht09jvw\", \"v\": \"1940-01-01\"}",
"address": {
"region": "{\"s\": \"M0Jb57t41ubrkSuyrDT3xA\", \"v\": \"Anystate\"}",
"country": "{\"s\": \"eK5o5pHfgupPpltj1qhAJw\", \"v\": \"US\"}"
},
"5a2W0_NrlEZzfqmk_7Pq-w": "{\"s\": \"5bPs1IquZNa0hkaFzzzZNw\", \"v\": \"23\", \"n\": \"secret_club_membership_no\"}"
}
}
The verifier would decode the data as follows:
{#example-simple_structured_some_blinded-verified_contents}
{
"given_name": "John",
"family_name": "Doe",
"birthdate": "1940-01-01",
"address": {
"region": "Anystate",
"country": "US"
},
"secret_club_membership_no": "23"
}
In this example, all claim names are blinded. The following user data is used:
{#example-simple_structured_all_blinded-user_claims}
{
"sub": "6c5c0a49-b589-431d-bae7-219122a9ec2c",
"given_name": "John",
"family_name": "Doe",
"email": "[email protected]",
"phone_number": "+1-202-555-0101",
"secret_club_membership_no": "23",
"address": {
"street_address": "123 Main St",
"locality": "Anytown",
"region": "Anystate",
"country": "US"
},
"birthdate": "1940-01-01"
}
The resulting SD-JWT payload:
{#example-simple_structured_all_blinded-sd_jwt_payload}
{
"iss": "https://example.com/issuer",
"sub_jwk": {
"kty": "RSA",
"n": "pm4bOHBg-oYhAyPWzR56AWX3rUIXp11_ICDkGgS6W3ZWLts-hzwI3x65659kg4hVo9dbGoCJE3ZGF_eaetE30UhBUEgpGwrDrQiJ9zqprmcFfr3qvvkGjtth8Zgl1eM2bJcOwE7PCBHWTKWYs152R7g6Jg2OVph-a8rq-q79MhKG5QoW_mTz10QT_6H4c7PjWG1fjh8hpWNnbP_pv6d1zSwZfc5fl6yVRL0DV0V3lGHKe2Wqf_eNGjBrBLVklDTk8-stX_MWLcR-EGmXAOv0UBWitS_dXJKJu-vXJyw14nHSGuxTIK2hx1pttMft9CsvqimXKeDTU14qQL1eE7ihcw",
"e": "AQAB"
},
"iat": 1516239022,
"exp": 1516247022,
"hash_alg": "sha-256",
"sd_digests": {
"eluV5Og3gSNII8EYnsxA_A": "bvPLqohL5ROmk2UsuNffH8C1wx9o-ipm-G4SkUwrpAE",
"eI8ZWm9QnKPpNPeNenHdhQ": "pCtjs0hC2Klhsnpe7BIqnGAsXlyXXC-lAEgX6isoYVM",
"AJx-095VPrpTtN4QMOqROA": "HS1Ht-bTrXsSTw9JdcHIbTFDkEI_IY52_cmzUgxWZ0k",
"G02NSrQfjFXQ7Io09syajA": "M2YQ_j8OPPBK3ZLhPPP6_AdSa2-rug2urYjgk_ML_QM",
"nPuoQnkRFq3BIeAm7AnXFA": "-Brzrp2cs-8nLs7rQI89YJ76s3PrbVe3n_5hlYCy1cE",
"5a2W0_NrlEZzfqmk_7Pq-w": "gc8VzGTImYRXzP6j7q5RomXt2C_wtsOJ3hAHJdTuEIY",
"address": {
"HbQ4X8srVW3QDxnIJdqyOA": "39o5dKobVi8c0dLpg4sjd7zW18UONRra0ht9mgu4hec",
"kx5kF17V-x0JmwUx9vgvtw": "wqueD5ABJ3bTyGSckOMpzI7YUvcCO2l-40vi6JMYsYY",
"OBKlTVlvLg-AdwqYGbP8ZA": "S11dsdFN97YtrA2o3yZ0eBbf1zn-izejORU-fyMtynI",
"DsmtKNgpV4dAHpjrcaosAw": "-0XEQHSNzMu244QaOpLmPD3JkdZN8SrqbEQ4VDufu9A"
},
"j7ADdb0UVb0Li0ciPcP0ew": "X_v1hrkQIH_0LBM8TncMMTBzYN9UJc8FmJRda7yfY8g"
}
}
The SVC:
{#example-simple_structured_all_blinded-svc_payload}
{
"sd_release": {
"eluV5Og3gSNII8EYnsxA_A": "{\"s\": \"2GLC42sKQveCfGfryNRN9w\", \"v\": \"6c5c0a49-b589-431d-bae7-219122a9ec2c\", \"n\": \"sub\"}",
"eI8ZWm9QnKPpNPeNenHdhQ": "{\"s\": \"6Ij7tM-a5iVPGboS5tmvVA\", \"v\": \"John\", \"n\": \"given_name\"}",
"AJx-095VPrpTtN4QMOqROA": "{\"s\": \"Qg_O64zqAxe412a108iroA\", \"v\": \"Doe\", \"n\": \"family_name\"}",
"G02NSrQfjFXQ7Io09syajA": "{\"s\": \"Pc33JM2LchcU_lHggv_ufQ\", \"v\": \"[email protected]\", \"n\": \"email\"}",
"nPuoQnkRFq3BIeAm7AnXFA": "{\"s\": \"lklxF5jMYlGTPUovMNIvCA\", \"v\": \"+1-202-555-0101\", \"n\": \"phone_number\"}",
"5a2W0_NrlEZzfqmk_7Pq-w": "{\"s\": \"5bPs1IquZNa0hkaFzzzZNw\", \"v\": \"23\", \"n\": \"secret_club_membership_no\"}",
"address": {
"HbQ4X8srVW3QDxnIJdqyOA": "{\"s\": \"y1sVU5wdfJahVdgwPgS7RQ\", \"v\": \"123 Main St\", \"n\": \"street_address\"}",
"kx5kF17V-x0JmwUx9vgvtw": "{\"s\": \"C9GSoujviJquEgYfojCb1A\", \"v\": \"Anytown\", \"n\": \"locality\"}",
"OBKlTVlvLg-AdwqYGbP8ZA": "{\"s\": \"H3o1uswP760Fi2yeGdVCEQ\", \"v\": \"Anystate\", \"n\": \"region\"}",
"DsmtKNgpV4dAHpjrcaosAw": "{\"s\": \"M0Jb57t41ubrkSuyrDT3xA\", \"v\": \"US\", \"n\": \"country\"}"
},
"j7ADdb0UVb0Li0ciPcP0ew": "{\"s\": \"eK5o5pHfgupPpltj1qhAJw\", \"v\": \"1940-01-01\", \"n\": \"birthdate\"}"
}
}
Here, the holder decided only to release a subset of the claims to the verifier:
{#example-simple_structured_all_blinded-sd_jwt_release_payload}
{
"nonce": "XZOUco1u_gEPknxS78sWWg",
"aud": "https://example.com/verifier",
"sd_release": {
"eI8ZWm9QnKPpNPeNenHdhQ": "{\"s\": \"6Ij7tM-a5iVPGboS5tmvVA\", \"v\": \"John\", \"n\": \"given_name\"}",
"AJx-095VPrpTtN4QMOqROA": "{\"s\": \"Qg_O64zqAxe412a108iroA\", \"v\": \"Doe\", \"n\": \"family_name\"}",
"j7ADdb0UVb0Li0ciPcP0ew": "{\"s\": \"eK5o5pHfgupPpltj1qhAJw\", \"v\": \"1940-01-01\", \"n\": \"birthdate\"}",
"address": {
"OBKlTVlvLg-AdwqYGbP8ZA": "{\"s\": \"H3o1uswP760Fi2yeGdVCEQ\", \"v\": \"Anystate\", \"n\": \"region\"}",
"DsmtKNgpV4dAHpjrcaosAw": "{\"s\": \"M0Jb57t41ubrkSuyrDT3xA\", \"v\": \"US\", \"n\": \"country\"}"
}
}
}
The verifier would decode the SD-JWT-R and SD-JWT as follows:
{#example-simple_structured_all_blinded-verified_contents}
{
"given_name": "John",
"family_name": "Doe",
"birthdate": "1940-01-01",
"address": {
"region": "Anystate",
"country": "US"
}
}
[[ To be removed from the final specification ]]
-01
- clarified relationship between
sd_release
in the Release and SD-JWT - updated examples
- clarifications
- fix
cnf
structure in examples
-00
- Upload as draft-ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-00
[[ pre Working Group Adoption: ]]
-02
- Added acknowledgements
- Improved Security Considerations
- Stressed uniqueness requirements for salts
- Python reference implementation clean-up and refactoring
- hash_alg renamed to sd_hash_alg
-01
- Editorial fixes
- Added
hash_alg
claim - Renamed
_sd
tosd_digests
andsd_release
- Added descriptions on holder binding - more work to do
- Clarify that signing the SD-JWT is mandatory
-00
- Renamed to SD-JWT (focus on JWT instead of JWS since signature is optional)
- Make holder binding optional
- Rename proof to release, since when there is no signature, the term "proof" can be misleading
- Improved the structure of the description
- Described verification steps
- All examples generated from python demo implementation
- Examples for structured objects