-
-
-
-
-
-
- Every state is as we see a sort of partnership,The Greek word had not acquired a specially political
- connotation as the English word ‘community’ has.
- and every partnership is formed with a view to some good (since all the
- actions of all mankind are done with a view to what they think to be
- good). It is therefore evident that, while all partnerships aim at some
- good the partnership that is the most supreme of all and includes all the others
- does so most of all, and aims at the most supreme of all goods; and this is the
- partnership entitled the state, the political association. Those then who think that the natures of the
- statesman, the royal ruler, the head of an estate
- oi)kono/mos denoting a higher
- grade than despo/ths is unusual. For their
- ordinary use see 2.1 fin. and the master of a family are the same,
- are mistaken (they imagine that the difference between these various
- forms of authority is one of greater and smaller numbers, not a difference in
- the kind—that is, that the ruler over a few people is a master, over
- more the head of an estate, over more still a statesman or royal ruler, as if
- there were no difference between a large household and a small city; and also as
- to the statesman and the royal ruler, they think that one who governs as sole
- head is royal, and one who, while the government follows the principles of the
- science of royalty, takes turns to govern and be governed is a statesman; but
- these views are not true). And a proof that these people are mistaken will appear if we examine the
- question in accordance with our regular method of investigation. In every other
- matter it is necessary to analyze the composite whole down to its uncompounded
- elements (for these are the smallest parts of the whole); so too with the state, by
- examining the elements of which it is composed we shall better discern in
- relation to these different kinds of rulers what is the difference between them,
- and whether it is possible to obtain any scientific precision in regard to the
- various statements made above.In this subject as
- in others the best method of investigation is to study things in the process of
- development from the beginning. The
- first coupling together of persons then to which necessity gives rise is that
- between those who are unable to exist without one another: for instance the
- union of female and male for the continuance of the species (and this
- not of deliberate purpose, but with man as with the other animals and with
- plants there is a natural instinct to desire to leave behind one another being
- of the same sort as oneself); and the union of natural ruler and
- natural subject for the sake of security (for he that can foresee with
- his mind is naturally ruler and naturally master, and he that can do these
- thingsA probable emendation gives
- ‘that can carry out labor.’ with his body is
- subject and naturally a slave; so that master and slave have the same
- interest).
-
-
-
- Thus
- the female and the slave are by nature distinct (for nature makes
- nothing as the cutlers make the Delphic knife,Uncertain: possibly a dagger and a carving-knife in
- one. in a niggardly way, but one thing for one purpose; for so each
- tool will be turned out in the finest perfection, if it serves not many uses but
- one). Yet among barbarians the female and the slave have the same rank;
- and the cause of this is that barbarians have no class of natural rulers, but
- with them the conjugal partnership is a partnership of female slave and male
- slave. Hence the saying of the poets
- Eur. IA 1400.—
- 'Tis meet that Greeks should rule barbarians,—
-
implying that barbarian and slave are the same in nature. From these two partnerships then is first
- composed the household, and Hesiod
- Hes. WD 405. was right when he wrote
-
- First and foremost a house and a wife and an ox for the
- ploughing—
-
for the ox serves instead of a servant for the poor. The partnership
- therefore that comes about in the course of nature for everyday purposes is the
- ‘house,’ the persons whom CharondasA law-giver of Catana in Sicily,
- 6th century B.C. or earlier. speaks of as
- ‘meal-tub-fellows’ and the Cretan EpimenidesA poet and prophet invited to Athens
- 596 B.C. to purify it of plague. as
- ‘manger-fellows.’The
- variant reading o(moka/pnous,
- ‘smoke-sharers,’ seems to mean
- ‘hearth-fellows.’
-
- On
- the other hand the primary partnership made up of several households for the
- satisfaction of not mere daily needs is the village. The village according to
- the most natural account seems to be a colony fromPerhaps the Greek should be altered to give
- ‘consists of colonies from.’ a household, formed
- of those whom some people speak of as ‘fellow-sucklings,’
- sons and sons' sons.The words
- ‘sons and sons' sons’ are probably an interpolated
- note. It is owing to this that our cities were at first under royal
- sway and that foreign races are so still,because they were made up of parts that were under royal rule;
- for every household is under the royal rule of its eldest member, so that the
- colonies from the household were so too, because of the kinship of their
- members. And this is what Homer
- Hom. Od. 9.114 f. on the Cyclopes.
- means:
- And each one giveth law
- To sons and eke to spouses—
-
for his Cyclopes live in scattered families; and that is the way in
- which people used to live in early times. Also this explains why all races speak
- of the gods as ruled by a king, because they themselves too are some of them
- actually now so ruled and in other cases used to be of old; and as men imagine
- the gods in human form, so also they suppose their manner of life to be like
- their own.
- The partnership finally composed of several villages is the
- city-state; it has at last attained the limit of virtually complete
- self-sufficiency, and thus, while it comes into existence for the sake of life,
- it exists for the good life. Hence every city-state exists by nature, inasmuch
- as the first partnerships so exist; for the city-state is the end of the other
- partnerships, and nature is an end, since that which each thing is when its
- growth is completed we speak of as being the nature of each thing, for instance
- of a man, a horse, a household. Again, the object for which a thing exists, its
- end, is its chief good;
-
-
- and self-sufficiency is an end, and a chief good.
- From these things therefore it
- is clear that the city-state is a natural growth, and that man is by nature a
- political animal, and a man that is by nature and not merely by fortune citiless
- is either low in the scale of humanity or above it (like the
- clanless, lawless, hearthless
-
man reviled by Homer,
- Hom. Il. 9.63; the passage goes on: e)sti\n e)kei=nos | o(\s pole/mou
- e)/ratai. for one by nature unsocial is also ‘a
- lover of war’) inasmuch as he is solitary, like an isolated
- piece at draughts. And why man is a
- political animal in a greater measure than any bee or any gregarious animal is
- clear. For nature, as we declare, does nothing without purpose; and man alone of
- the animals possesses speech. The mere voice, it is true, can indicate pain and
- pleasure, and therefore is possessed by the other animals as well (for
- their nature has been developed so far as to have sensations of what is painful
- and pleasant and to indicate those sensations to one another), but
- speech is designed to indicate the advantageous and the harmful, and therefore
- also the right and the wrong; for
- it is the special property of man in distinction from the other animals that he
- alone has perception of good and bad and right and wrong and the other moral
- qualities, and it is partnership in these things that makes a household and a
- city-state.Thus also the city-state is prior
- in nature to the household and to each of us individually.For the whole must necessarily be prior to the
- part; since when the whole body is destroyed, foot or hand will not exist except
- in an equivocal sense, like the sense in which one speaks of a hand sculptured
- in stone as a hand; because a hand in those circumstances will be a hand
- spoiled, and all things are defined by their function and capacity, so that when
- they are no longer such as to perform their function they must not be said to be
- the same things, but to bear their names in an equivocal sense. It is clear therefore that the state is
- also prior by nature to the individual; for if each individual when separate is
- not self-sufficient, he must be related to the whole state as other parts are to
- their whole, while a man who is incapable of entering into partnership, or who
- is so self-sufficing that he has no need to do so, is no part of a state, so
- that he must be either a lower animal or a god.Therefore the impulse to form a partnership of this kind is present in all men
- by nature; but the man who first united people in such a partnership was the
- greatest of benefactors. For as man is the best of the animals when perfected,
- so he is the worst of all when sundered from law and justice. For
- unrighteousness is most pernicious when possessed of weapons, and man is born
- possessing weapons for the use of wisdom and virtue, which it is possible to
- employ entirely for the opposite ends. Hence when devoid of virtue man is the
- most unholy and savage of animals, and the worst in regard to sexual indulgence
- and gluttony. Justice on the other hand is an element of the state; for judicial
- procedure, which means the decision of what is just, is the regulation of the
- political partnership.
-
-
-
-
- And now that it is clear what are the
- component parts of the state, we have first of all to discuss household
- management; for every state is composed of households. Household management
- falls into departments corresponding to the parts of which the household in its
- turn is composed; and the household in its perfect form consists of slaves and
- freemen. The investigation of everything should begin with its smallest parts,
- and the primary and smallest parts of the household are master and slave,
- husband and wife, father and children; we ought therefore to examine the proper
- constitution and character of each of these three relationships, I mean that of mastership, that of
- marriageThe Greek word properly denotes
- the marriage ceremony, not the married state. (there is no
- exact term denoting the relation uniting wife and husband), and thirdly
- the progenitive relationship (this too has not been designated by a
- special name). Let us then accept these three relationships that we
- have mentioned. There is also a department which some people consider the same
- as household management and others the most important part of it, and the true
- position of which we shall have to consider: I mean what is called the art of
- getting wealth.No English word covers all
- the associations of the Greek, which means ‘dealing in xrh/mata,’
- ‘things,’—goods, property, money—and
- so ‘business.’
- Let us begin by discussing the relation of master
- and slave, in order to observe the facts that have a bearing on practical
- utility, and also in the hope that we may be able to obtain something better
- than the notions at present entertained, with a view to a theoretic knowledge of
- the subject. For some thinkers hold
- the function of the master to be a definite science, and moreover think that
- household management, mastership, statesmanship and monarchy are the same
- thing,as we said at the beginning
- of the treatise; others however maintain that for one man to be another man's
- master is contrary to nature, because it is only convention that makes the one a
- slave and the other a freeman and there is no difference between them by nature,
- and that therefore it is unjust, for it is based on force.Since therefore property is a part of a household and the art
- of acquiring property a part of household management (for without the
- necessaries even life, as well as the good life,‘As well as the good life’ is probably an
- interpolation. is impossible), and since, just as for the particular arts it would be
- necessary for the proper tools to be forthcoming if their work is to be
- accomplished, so also the manager of a household must have his tools, and of
- tools some are lifeless and others living (for example, for a helmsman
- the rudder is a lifeless tool and the look-out man a live tool—for an
- assistant in the arts belongs to the class of tools), so also an
- article of property is a tool for the purpose of life, and property generally is
- a collection of tools, and a slave is a live article of property. And every assistant is as it were a tool
- that serves for several tools; for if every tool could perform its own work when
- ordered, or by seeing what to do in advance, like the statues of Daedalus in the
- story,This legendary sculptor first
- represented the eyes as open and the limbs as in motion, so his statues had
- to be chained to prevent them from running away (Plat. Meno 97d). or the
- tripods of Hephaestus which the poet says ‘enter self-moved the
- company divine,’
- Hom. Il. 18.369
- —if thus shuttles wove and quills played harps of themselves,
- master-craftsmen would have no need of assistants and masters no need of slaves.
-
-
-
- Now the tools mentioned are instruments of production, whereas
- an article of property is an instrument of actioni.e. with it we do not make something but
- do something (e.g. wear a dress, lie in a
- bed).; for from a shuttle we get something else beside the
- mere use of the shuttle, but from a garment or a bed we get only their use.
- And also inasmuch as there is a
- difference in kind between production and action, and both need tools, it
- follows that those tools also must possess the same difference. But life is
- doing things, not making things; hence the slave is an assistant in the class of
- instruments of action.And the term
- ‘article of property’ is used in the same way as the term
- ‘part’: a thing that is a part is not only a part of another
- thing but absolutely belongs to another thing, and so also does an article of
- property. Hence whereas the master is merely the slave's master and does not
- belong to the slave, the slave is not merely the slave of the master but wholly
- belongs to the master. These
- considerations therefore make clear the nature of the slave and his essential
- quality: one who is a human being belonging by nature not to himself but to
- another is by nature a slave, and a person is a human being belonging to another
- if being a man he is an article of property, and an article of property
- is an instrument for action separable from its owner. But we must next consider
- whether or not anyone exists who is by nature of this character, and whether it
- is advantageous and just for anyone to be a slave, or whether on the contrary
- all slavery is against nature.
- And it is not difficult either
- to discern the answer by theory or to learn it empirically. Authority and
- subordination are conditions not only inevitable but also expedient; in some
- cases things are marked out from the moment of birth to rule or to be ruled. And
- there are many varieties both of rulers and of subjects (and the higher
- the type of the subjects, the loftier is the nature of the authority exercised
- over them, for example to control a human being is a higher thing than to tame a
- wild beast; for the higher the type of the parties to the performance of a
- function, the higher is the function, and when one party rules and another is
- ruled, there is a function performed between them)—because in every composite thing, where a
- plurality of parts, whether continuous or discrete, is combined to make a single
- common whole, there is always found a ruling and a subject factor, and this
- characteristic of living things is present in them as an outcome of the whole of
- nature, since even in things that do not partake of life there is a ruling
- principle, as in the case of a musical scale.Each ‘mode’ (Dorian, the modern minor scale,
- Phrygian and Lydian, two forms of major) was ruled by its
- key-note. However, this matter perhaps belongs to an investigation
- lying somewhat outside our subject; but an animal consists primarily of soul and body, of which the former is by
- nature the ruling and the latter the subject factor. And to discover what is
- natural we must study it preferably in things that are in a natural state, and
- not in specimens that are degenerate. Hence in studying man we must consider a
- man that is in the best possible condition in regard to both body and soul, and
- in him the principle stated will clearly appear,—
-
-
- It is
- manifest therefore that there are cases of people of whom some are freemen and
- the others slaves by nature, and for these slavery is an institution both
- expedient and just. But at the same
- time it is not difficult to see that those who assert the opposite are also
- right in a manner. The fact is that the terms ‘slavery’ and
- ‘slave’ are ambiguous; for there is also such a thing as a
- slave or a man that is in slavery by law, for the law is a sort of agreement
- under which the things conquered in war are said to belong to their conquerors.
- Now this conventional right is arraigned by many jurists just as a statesman is
- impeached for proposing an unconstitutional measure; they say that it is
- monstrous if the person powerful enough to use force, and superior in power, is
- to have the victim of his force as his slave and subject; and even among the
- learned some hold this view, though others hold the other. But the reason of this dispute and what makes the
- theories overlap is the fact that in a certain manner virtue when it obtains
- resources has in fact very great power to use force, and the stronger party
- always possesses superiority in something that is good,The difficulty turns on the ambiguity of a)reth/, (a) moral goodness,
- virtue, (b) goodness of any kind, e.g. strength. so
- that it is thought that force cannot be devoid of goodness, but that the dispute
- is merely about the justice of the matter (for it is due to the one
- party holding that the justification of authority is good-will, while the other
- identifies justice with the mere rule of the stronger); because
- obviously if these theories be separated apart,the other theories have no force or plausibility at all,
- implying that the superior in goodness has no claim to rule and be master.
- But some persons, simply
- clinging, as they think, to principle of justice (for the law is a
- principle of justice), assert that the enslavement of prisoners of war
- is just; yet at the same time they deny the assertion, for there is the
- possibility that wars may be unjust in their origin and one would by no means
- admit that a man that does not deserve slavery can be really a
- slave—otherwise we shall have the result that persons reputed of the
- highest nobility are slaves and the descendants of slaves if they happen to be
- taken prisoners of war and sold. Therefore they do not mean to assert that
- Greeks themselves if taken prisoners are slaves, but that barbarians are. Yet
- when they say this, they are merely seeking for the principles of natural
- slavery of which we spoke at the outset; for they are compelled to say that
- there exist certain persons who are essentially slaves everywhere and certain
- others who are so nowhere. And the
- same applies also about nobility: our nobles consider themselves noble not only
- in their own country but everywhere, but they think that barbarian noblemen are
- only noble in their own country—which implies that there are two kinds
- of nobility and of freedom, one absolute and the other relative, as Helen says
- in TheodectesA tragic poet, a friend of
- Aristotle.:
- But who would dare to call me menial,
- The scion of a twofold stock divine?
-
Yet in so speaking they make nothing but virtue and vice the
- distinction between slave and free, the noble and the base-born;
-
-
- for they
- assume that just as from a man springs a man and from brutes a brute, so also
- from good parents comes a good son but as a matter of fact nature frequently
- while intending to do this is unable to bring it about.It is clear therefore that there is some reason for this
- dispute, and that in some instances it is not the case that one set are slaves
- and the other freemen by nature; and also that in some instances such a distinction does exist, when slavery
- for the one and mastership for the other are advantageous and just, and it is
- proper for the one party to be governed and for the other to govern by the form
- of government for which they are by nature fitted, and therefore by the exercise
- of mastership, while to govern badly is to govern disadvantageously for both
- parties (for the same thing is advantageous for a part and for the
- whole body or the whole soul, and the slave is a part of the master—he
- is, as it were, a part of the body, alive but yet separated from it; hence there is a certain community of
- interest and friendship between slave and master in cases when they have been
- qualified by nature for those positions, although when they do not hold them in
- that way but by law and by constraint of force the opposite is the
- case).And even from these
- considerations it is clear that the authority of a master over slaves is not the
- same as the authority of a magistrate in a republic, nor are all forms of
- government the same, as some assert. Republican government controls men who are
- by nature free, the master's authority men who are by nature slaves; and the
- government of a household is monarchy (since every house is governed by
- a single ruler),whereas
- statesmanship is the government of men free and equal. The term ‘master’ therefore
- denotes the possession not of a certain branch of knowledge but of a certain
- character, and similarly also the terms ‘slave’ and
- ‘freeman.’ Yet there might be a science of mastership and a
- slave's science—the latter being the sort of knowledge that used to be
- imparted by the professor at Syracuse (for there used to be a man there who for a
- fee gave lessons to servants in their ordinary duties); and indeed
- there might be more advanced scientific study of such matters, for instance a
- science of cookery and the other such kinds of domestic service—for
- different servants have different functions, some more honorable and some more
- menial, and as the proverb says,
- Slave before slave and master before master.Probably from a comedy of Aristotle's
- contemporary Philemon.
-
-
- The slave's sciences then are all
- the various branches of domestic work; the master's science is the science of
- employing slaves—for the master's function consists not in acquiring
- slaves but in employing them. This science however is one of no particular
- importance or dignity: the master must know how to direct the tasks which the
- slave must know how to execute. Therefore all people rich enough to be able to
- avoid personal trouble have a steward who takes this office, while they
- themselves engage in politics or philosophy. The science of acquiring slaves is
- different both from their ownership and their direction—that is, the
- just acquiring of slaves, which is akin to the art of war or that of the chase.
- Let this then stand as our definition of slave and master.
-
-
-
- But let us follow our normal method and investigate
- generally the nature of all kinds of property and the art of getting wealth,
- inasmuch as we saw the slave to be one division of property. In the first place
- therefore one might raise the question whether the art of getting wealth is the
- same as that of household management, or a part of it, or subsidiary to it; and
- if subsidiary, whether it is so in the sense in which the art of making shuttles
- is subsidiary to the art of weaving or in that in which the art of casting
- bronze is subsidiary to the making of statues (for the two are not
- subsidiary in the same way, but shuttle-making supplies tools whereas
- bronze-founding supplies material—and by material I mean the substance
- out of which certain work is produced, for example fleeces are material for a
- weaver and bronze for a statuary). Now it is clear that wealth-getting is not the same art as
- household management, for the function of the former is to provide and that of
- the latter to use—for what will be the art that will use the contents
- of the house if not the art of household management? but whether wealth-getting
- is a part of the art of household management, or a different sort of science, is
- open to debate. For if it is the function of the getter of wealth to study the
- source from which money and property are to be procured, . . .Some words seem to have fallen out in the
- Greek. But property and riches comprise many divisions; hence first
- of all is husbandry a division of the household art, or is it a different kind
- of science? and so in general of the superintendence and acquisition of articles
- of food. But furthermore, there are
- many sorts of food,owing to which
- both animals and men have many modes of life; for it is impossible to live
- without food, so that the differences of food have made the lives of animals
- different. Among wild animals some are nomadic and others solitary, according to
- whichever habit is advantageous for their supply of food, because some of them
- are carnivorous, others graminivorous, and others eat all kinds of food; so that
- nature has differentiated their modes of life to suit their facilities and their
- predilection for those articles of food. And as different kinds of animals by
- nature relish different sorts of food, and not each kind the same, even within
- the classes of carnivorous and graminivorous animals their modes of life differ
- from one another. And similarly in
- the human race also, for there are wide differences of life among mankind. The
- idlest men are nomads (for to procure food from domesticated animals
- involves no toil or industry, but as it is necessary for the herds to move from
- place to place because of the pastures, the people themselves are forced to
- follow along with them, as though they were farming a live farm). Other
- men live from hunting, and different people from different kinds of hunting, for
- instance some from brigandage,Perhaps
- ‘slave-raiding,’ cf. 3.9, the appropriation of the
- ‘live tools’ that are a part of nature's supplies; but
- Thuc. 1.5 speaks of brigandage and piracy as
- common in earlier times, and as still deemed respectable professions in
- Northern Greece. others from fishing—these are those that
- dwell on the banks of lakes, marshes and rivers or of a sea suitable for
- fishing,—and others live on wild birds and animals. But the largest
- class of men live from the land and the fruits of cultivation. This then virtually completes the list of
- the various modes of life, those at least that have their industry sprung from
- themselves and do not procure their food by barter and trade—
-
-
-
- the lives of the herdsman, the brigand, the fisherman, the
- hunter, the husband-man. Others also live pleasantly by combining some of these
- pursuits, supplementing the more deficient life where it happens to fall short
- in regard to being self-sufficing: for instance, some combine a pastoral life
- and brigandage, others husbandry and hunting, and similarly with the
- others—they pass their time in such a combination of pursuits as their
- need compels. Property of this sort
- then seems to be bestowed by nature herself upon all, as immediately upon their
- first coming into existence, so also when they have reached maturity. For even
- at the original coming into existence of the young some kinds of animals bring
- forth with them at birth enough sustenance to suffice until the offspring can
- provide for itself, for example all the species that bear their young in the
- form of larvae or in eggs. The viviparous species have sustenance for their
- offspring inside themselves for a certain period, the substance called milk.
- So that clearly we must suppose
- that nature also provides for them in a similar way when grown up, and that
- plants exist for the sake of animals and the other animals for the good of man,
- the domestic species both for his service and for his food, and if not all at
- all events most of the wild ones for the sake of his food and of his supplies of
- other kinds, in order thatthey may
- furnish him both with clothing and with other appliances. If therefore nature
- makes nothing without purpose or in vain, it follows that nature has made all
- the animals for the sake of men. Hence even the art of war will by nature be in a manner an art of acquisition
- (for the art of hunting is a part of it) that is properly
- employed both against wild animals and against such of mankind as though
- designed by nature for subjection refuse to submit to it, inasmuch as this
- warfare is by nature just.One kind of acquisition
- therefore in the order of nature is a part of the household art,Rassow would transpose the clause
- (with a slight alteration) to give ‘of the
- household art, that is, the acquisition of those goods capable of
- accumulation that are necessary for life and useful for the community of
- city and household, a supply of which must be forthcoming or else the art
- must procure it to be forthcoming.’ in accordance with
- which either there must be forthcoming or else that art must procure to be
- forthcoming a supply of those goods, capable of accumulation, which are
- necessary for life and useful for the community of city or household. And it is of these goods that riches in the
- true sense at all events seem to consist. For the amount of such property
- sufficient in itself for a good life is not unlimited, as Solon
- Solon
- 13.71. says that it is in the verse
- But of riches no bound has been fixed or revealed to
- men;
-
for a limit has been fixed, as with the other arts, since no tool
- belonging to any art is without a limit whether in number or in size, and riches
- are a collection of tools for the householder and the statesman. Therefore that
- there is a certain art of acquisition belonging in the order of nature to
- householders and to statesmen, and for what reason this is so, is clear.
- But there is another kind of
- acquisition that is specially called wealth-getting, and that is so called with
- justice and to this kind it is due that there is thought to be no limit to
- riches and property.
-
-
- Owing to its affinity to the art of acquisition of
- which we spoke, it is supposed by many people to be one and the same as that;
- and as a matter of fact, while it is not the same as the acquisition spoken of,
- it is not far removed from it. One of them is natural, the other is not natural,
- but carried on rather by means of a certain acquired skill or art. We may take
- our starting-point for its study from the following consideration: with every article of property there is a
- double way of using it; both uses are related to the article itself, but not
- related to it in the same manner—one is peculiar to the thing and the
- other is not peculiar to it. Take for example a shoe—there is its wear
- as a shoe and there is its use as an article of exchange; for both are ways of
- using a shoe, inasmuch as even he that barters a shoe for money or food with the
- customer that wants a shoe uses it as a shoe, though not for the use peculiar to
- a shoe, since shoes have not come into existence for the purpose of barter. And
- the same also holds good about the other articles of property; for all of them
- have an art of exchange related to them, which began in the first instance from
- the natural order of things, because men had more than enough of some things and
- less than enough of others. This
- consideration also shows that the art of trade is not by nature a part of the
- art of wealth-gettingPerhaps Aristotle wrote
- ‘of the art of exchange’: Bernays suggests metablhtikh=s for xrhmatistikh=s.; for the practice of barter was
- necessary only so far as to satisfy men's own needs. In the primaryassociation therefore (I mean the
- household) there is no function for trade, but it only arises after the
- association has become more numerous. For the members of the primitive household
- used to share commodities that were all their own, whereas on the contrary a
- group divided into several households participated also in a number of
- commodities belonging to their neighbors, according to their needs for which
- they were forced to make their interchanges by way of barter, as also many
- barbarian tribes do still; for such tribes do not go beyond exchanging actual
- commodities for actual commodities, for example giving and taking wine for corn,
- and so with the various other things of the sort. Exchange on these lines therefore is not contrary to
- nature, nor is it any branch of the art of wealth-getting, for it existed for
- the replenishment of natural self-sufficiency; yet out of it the art of business
- in due course arose. For when they had come to supply themselves more from
- abroad by importing things in which they were deficient and exporting those of
- which they had a surplus, the employment of money necessarily came to be
- devised. For the natural necessaries are not in every case readily portable;
- hence for the purpose of barter
- men made a mutual compact to give and accept some substance of such a sort as
- being itself a useful commodity was easy to handle in use for general life, iron
- for instance, silver and other metals, at the first stage defined merely by size
- and weight, but finally also by impressing on it a stamp in order that this
- might relieve them of having to measure it; for the stamp was put on as a token
- of the amount.
-
-
-
- So when currency
- had been now invented as an outcome of the necessary interchange of goods, there
- came into existence the other form of wealth-getting, trade, which at first no
- doubt went on in a simple form, but later became more highly organized as
- experience discovered the sources and methods of exchange that would cause most
- profit. Hence arises the idea that the art of wealth-getting deals specially
- with money, and that its function is to be able to discern from what source a
- large supply can be procured, as this art is supposed to be creative of riches
- and wealth; indeed riches are often
- assumed to consist of a quantity of money, because money is the thing with which
- the art of business and of trade deals. But at other times, on the contrary, it
- is thought that money is nonsense, and nothing by nature but entirely a
- convention, because when those who use it have changed the currency it is worth
- nothing, and because it is of no use for any of the necessary needs of life and
- a man well supplied with money may oftene.g.
- on a desert island. be destitute of the bare necessities of
- subsistence, yet it is anomalous that wealth should be of such a kind that a man
- may be well supplied with it and yet die of hunger, like the famous Midas in the
- legend, when owing to the insatiable covetousness of his prayer all the viands
- served up to him turned into gold. Hence people seek for a different definition of riches and the art of getting
- wealth, and rightly; for natural wealth-getting and natural riches are
- different:natural wealth-getting
- belongs to household management, whereas the other kind belongs to trade,
- producing goods not in every way but only by the method of exchanging goods. It
- is this art of wealth-getting that is thought to be concerned with money, for
- money is the first principle and limit of commerce. And these riches, that are
- derived from this art of wealth-getting, are truly unlimitedi.e. a trader cannot get too much of his goods, any more than
- a doctor can make his patient too healthy.; for just as the art of
- medicine is without limit in respect of health, and each of the arts is without
- limit in respect of its end (for they desire to produce that in the
- highest degree possible), whereas they are not without limit as regards
- the means to their end (for with all of them the end is a limit to the
- means), so also this wealth-getting has no limit in respect of its end,
- and its end is riches and the acquisition of goods in the commercial sense.
- But the household branch of
- wealth-getting has a limit, since the acquisition of commercial riches is not
- the function of household management. Hence from this point of view it appears
- necessary that there should be a limit to all riches, yet in actual fact we
- observe that the opposite takes place; for all men engaged in wealth-getting try
- to increase their money to an unlimited amount. The reason of this is the close
- affinity of the two branches of the art of business. Their common ground is that
- the thing that each makes use of is the same; they use the same property,
- although not in the same way—the one has another end in view, the aim
- of the other is the increase of the property. Consequently some people suppose
- that it is the function of household management to increase property, and they
- are continually under the idea that it is their duty to be either safeguarding
- their substance in money or increasing it to an unlimited amount. The cause of this state of mind is that
- their interests are set upon life but not upon the good life;
-
-
- as
- therefore the desire for life is unlimited, they also desire without limit the
- means productive of life. And even those who fix their aim on the good life seek
- the good life as measured by bodily enjoyments, so that inasmuch as this also
- seems to be found in the possession of property, all their energies are occupied
- in the business of getting wealth; and owing to this the second kind of the art
- of wealth-getting has arisen. For as their enjoyment is in excess, they try to
- discover the art that is productive of enjoyable excess; and if they cannot
- procure it by the art of wealth-getting, they try to do so by some other means,
- employing each of the faculties in an unnatural way. For it is not the function of courage to produce wealth,
- but to inspire daring; nor is it the function of the military art nor of the
- medical art, but it belongs to the former to bring victory and to the latter to
- cause health. Yet these people make all these faculties means for the business
- of providing wealth, in the belief that wealth is the end and that everything
- must be directed to the end.We have therefore
- discussed both the unnecessary branch of wealth-getting, defining it and also
- explaining the cause why we require it, and the necessary branch, showing that
- this branch which has to do with food is different from the unnecessary branch
- and is by nature a part of household management, not being like that branch
- unlimited but having a limit. And
- we can also see the answer to the question raised at the beginning,See 3.1. whetherthe art of wealth-getting belongs to the
- householder and the statesman, or whether on the contrary supplies ought to be
- provided already (for just as statesmanship does not create human
- beings but having received them from nature makes use of them, so also it is
- necessary for nature to bestow food by bestowing land or sea or something
- else), and the task of the householder is, starting with these supplies
- given, to dispose of them in the proper way. For it does not belong to the art
- of weaving to make fleeces, but to use them, and also to know what sort of
- fleece is good and suitable or bad and unsuitable. In fact the question might be raised, why the getting of
- wealth is a part of the household art whereas the art of medicine is not a part
- of it, although the members of the household ought to be healthy, just as they
- must be alive or fulfil any of the other essential conditions. But inasmuch as
- although in a way it does belong to the householder and the ruler to see even to
- health, yet in a way it does not belong to them but to the physician, so also
- with regard to wealth, although in a way it is the affair of the house-holder,
- in a way it is not, but is a matter for the subsidiary art. But best of all, as
- has been said before, this provision ought to be made in advance by nature. For
- it is the work of nature to supply nourishment for her offspring, since every
- creature has for nourishment the residue of the substance from which it
- springs.i.e. animals are made of earth
- and water and live on the products of earth and water. Hence the
- business of drawing provision from the fruits of the soil and from animals is
- natural to all. But, as we said,
- this art is twofold, one branch being of the nature of trade while the other
- belongs to the household art; and the latter branch is necessary and in good
- esteem, but the branch connected with exchange is justly discredited
-
-
- (for it is not in accordance with nature, but involves men's taking
- things from one another). As this is so, usury is most reasonably
- hated, because its gain comes from money itself and not from that for the sake
- of which money was invented. For money was brought into existence for the
- purpose of exchange, but interest increases the amount of the money itself
- (and this is the actual origin of the Greek word: offspring resembles
- parent, and interest is money born of money); consequently this form of
- the business of getting wealth is of all forms the most contrary to nature.
- And since we have adequately
- defined the scientific side of the subject, we ought to discuss it from the
- point of view of practice; although, whereas the theory of such matters is a
- liberal study, the practical pursuit of them is narrowing. The practically
- useful branches of the art of wealth-getting are first, an expert knowledge of
- stock, what breeds are most profitable and in what localities and under what
- conditions, for instance what particular stock in horses or cattle or sheep, and
- similarly of the other animals also (for the farmer must be an expert
- as to which of these animals are most profitable compared with one another, and
- also as to what breeds are most profitable on what sorts of land, since
- different breeds flourish in different places); secondly, the subject
- of agriculture, and this again is divided into corn-growing and fruit-farming;
- also bee-keeping, and the breeding of the other creatures finned and
- featheredwhich can be used to
- furnish supplies. These then are the
- branches and primary parts of wealth-getting in the most proper sense. Of the
- kind that deals with exchange, the largest branch is commerce (which
- has three departments, ship-owning, transport and marketing: these departments
- differ from each other in the fact that some are safer and others carry larger
- profits); the second branch is money-lending, and the third labor for
- hire, one department of which is that of the mechanic
- ba/nausos(said to be
- from bau=nos‘furnace,’
- au)/w‘to
- dry’), ‘artisan’ (ranged
- with farmers, traders, and laborers, as forming the common people 1321a
- 6); it acquires the senses of ‘cramped in body’
- (1341a 7) and ‘vulgar in taste’
- (1337b 8). arts and the other that of unskilled
- laborers who are useful only for bodily service. And there is a third form of
- wealth-getting that lies between the latter and the one placed first, since it
- possesses mediate an element both of natural wealth-getting and of the sort that
- employs exchange; it deals with all the commodities that are obtained from the
- earth and from those fruitless but useful things that come from the
- earth—examples are the felling of timbera very probable variant gives ‘the quarrying of
- stone.’ and all sorts of mining; and of mining itself there
- are many classes, since there are many sorts of metals obtained out of the
- earth. TheIn the mss. this sentence follows the next one. most
- scientific of these industries are those which involve the smallest element of
- chance, the most mechanic those in which the operatives undergo the greatest
- amount of bodily degradation, the most servile those in which the most uses are
- made of the body, and the most ignoble those in which there is the least
- requirement of virtue as an accessory. But while we have even now given a
- general description of these various branches, yet a detailed and particular
- account of them, though useful for the practice of the industries, would be
- illiberal as a subject of prolonged study. There are books on these subjects by certain authors, for
- example CharetidesOtherwise unknown.
- of Paros
-
-
-
- and ApollodorusAlso mentioned by Varro and
- Pliny. of Lemnos have
- written about both agriculture and fruit-farming, and similarly others also on
- other topics, so these subjects may be studied from these authors by anybody
- concerned to do so; but in addition a collection ought also to be madeThe author of the Second Book of the
- pseudo-Aristotelian Oeconomica seems to have taken the
- hint. of the scattered accounts of methods that have brought success
- in business to certain individuals. All these methods are serviceable for those
- who value wealth-getting, for
- example the plan of ThalesThe founder of
- Greek philosophy and mathematics, and one of the Seven Sages, 6th-5th cent.
- B.C. of Miletus, which is a
- device for the business of getting wealth, but which, though it is attributed to
- him because of his wisdom, is really of universal application. Thales, so the
- story goes, because of his poverty was taunted with the uselessness of
- philosophy; but from his knowledge of astronomy he had observed while it was
- still winter that there was going to be a large crop of olives, so he raised a
- small sum of money and paid round deposits for the whole of the olive-presses in
- Miletus and Chios, which he hired at a low rent as nobody
- was running him up; and when the season arrived, there was a sudden demand for a
- number of presses at the same time, and by letting them out on what terms he
- liked he realized a large sum of money, so proving that it is easy for
- philosophers to be rich if they choose, but this is not what they care about.
- Thales then is reported to have
- thus displayed his wisdom, but asa
- matter of fact this device of taking an opportunity to secure a monopoly is a
- universal principle of business; hence even some states have recourse to this
- plan as a method of raising revenue when short of funds: they introduce a
- monopoly of marketable goods. There
- was a man in Sicily who used a sum of
- money deposited with him to buy up all the iron from the iron mines, and
- afterwards when the dealers came from the trading-centers he was the only
- seller, though he did not greatly raise the price, but all the same he made a
- profit of a hundred talentsThe talent was
- about 240 pounds. on his capital of fifty. When DionysiusDionysius the elder, tyrant of Syracuse
- 405-367 B.C. came to
- know of it he ordered the man to take his money with him but clear out of
- Syracuse on the spot,cf. Thucydides oi( d'
- ou)ke/ti e)/meinan a)lla\ . . .
- since he was inventing
- means of profit detrimental to the tyrant's own affairs. Yet really this device
- is the same as the discovery of Thales, for both men alike contrived to secure
- themselves a monopoly. An acquaintance with these devices is also serviceable
- for statesmen, for many states need financial aid and modes of revenue like
- those described, just as a household may, but in greater degree; hence some
- statesmen even devote their political activity exclusively to finance.
- And since, as we saw,2 init. the science of household
- management has three divisions, one the relation of master to slave, of which we
- have spoken before,3 fin., 4. one the
- paternal relation, and the third the conjugalThe construction of the sentence is interrupted, and never
- completed.—for it is a part of the household science to
- rule over wife and children (over both as over freemen, yet not with the same mode of government,
- but over the wife to exercise republican government and over the children
- monarchical);
-
-
- for the male is by nature better fitted to command
- than the female (except in some cases where their union has been formed
- contrary to nature) and the older and fully developed person than the
- younger and immature. It is true that in most cases of republican government the
- ruler and the ruled interchange in turn (for they tend to be on in
- equal level in their nature and to have no difference at all), although
- nevertheless during the period when one is ruler and the other ruled they seek
- to have a distinction by means of insignia and titles and honors, just as Amasis
- made his speech about the foot-bath
- Hdt. 1.172. Amasis king of Egypt was despised by his subjects for his
- low birth, so he had a statue made out of a gold foot-bath and set it up for
- them to worship, afterwards explaining to them its lowly origin.; but
- the male stands in this relationship to the female continuously. The rule of the
- father over the children on the other hand is that of a king; for the male
- parent is the ruler in virtue both of affection and of seniority, which is
- characteristic of royal government (and therefore Homer
- Hom. Il.
- 1.544. finely designated Zeus by the words
- father of men and gods,
-
as the king of them all). For though in nature the king must
- be superior, in race he should be the same as his subjects, and this is the
- position of the elder in relation to the younger and of the father in relation
- to the child. It is clear then that
- household management takes more interest in the human members of the household
- than in its inanimate property, andin
- the excellence of these than in that of its property, which we style riches, and
- more in that of its free members than in that of slaves.First of all then as to slaves the difficulty might be raised,
- does a slave possess any other excellence, besides his merits as a tool and a
- servant, more valuable than these, for instance temperance, have the courage,
- justice and any of the other moral virtues, or has he no excellence beside his
- bodily service? For either way there is difficulty; if slaves do possess moral
- virtue, wherein will they differ from freemen? or if they do not, this is
- strange, as they are human beings and participate in reason. And nearly the same is the question also raised
- about the woman and the child: have they too virtues, and ought a woman to be
- temperate, brave and just, and can a child be intemperate or temperate, or not?
- This point therefore requires general consideration in relation to natural ruler
- and subject: is virtue the same for ruler and ruled, or different? If it is
- proper for both to partake in nobility of character, how could it be proper for
- the one to rule and the other to be ruled unconditionally? we cannot say that
- the difference is to be one of degree, for ruling and being ruled differ in
- kind, and difference of degree is not a difference in kind at all. Whereas if on the contrary it is proper for
- the one to have moral nobility but not for the other, this is surprising. For if
- the ruler is not temperate and just, how will he rule well? And if the ruled,
- how will he obey well?
-
-
- If intemperate and cowardly he will not perform any
- of the duties of his position. It is evident therefore that both must possess
- virtue, but that there are differences in their virtue (as also there
- are differences between those who are by nature ruled).This clause seems to have been interpolated;
- one ms. has a marginal correction, ‘by nature rulers and
- ruled.’ And of this we straightway find an indication in
- connection with the soul; for the soul by nature contains a part that rules and
- a part that is ruled, to which we assign different virtues, that is, the virtue
- of the rational and that of the irrational. It is clear then that the case is the same also with the
- other instances of ruler and ruled. Hence there are by nature various classes of
- rulers and ruled. For the free rules the slave, the male the female, and the man
- the child in a different way. And all possess the various parts of the soul, but
- possess them in different ways; for the slave has not got the deliberative part
- at all, and the female has it, but without full authority, while the child has
- it, but in an undeveloped form. HenceIn the mss. this sentence follows
- the next one, ‘We must suppose—function,’ and
- begins ‘Hence the ruler must possess moral
- virtue.’ the ruler must possess intellectual virtue in
- completeness (for any work, taken absolutely, belongs to the
- master-craftsman, and rational principle is a master-craftsman); while
- each of the other parties must have that share of this virtue which is
- appropriate to them. We must suppose therefore that the same necessarily holds
- good of the moral virtues: all must partake of them, but not in the same way,
- but in such measure as is proper to each in relation to his own
- function.
- Hence it is manifest that all the persons mentioned
- have a moral virtue of their own, and that the temperance of a woman and that of
- a man are not the same, nor their courage and justice, as Socrates thought,
- Plat. Meno 74bff.
- but the one is the courage of command, and the other that of
- subordination, and the case is similar with the other virtues. And this is also
- clear when we examine the matter more in detail, for it is misleading to give a
- general definition of virtue, as some do, who say that virtue is being in good
- condition as regards the soul or acting uprightly or the like; those who
- enumerate the virtues of different persons separately, as Gorgias does,i.e. in
- Plato, Meno (see 7 above),
- where this sophist figures as a character in the dialogue; see also 3.1.9,
- note. are much more correct than those who define virtue in that way.
- Hence we must hold that all of these persons have their appropriate virtues, as
- the poet said of woman:
- Silence gives grace to woman
- Soph. Aj. 293
- —
-
though that is not the case likewise with a man. Also the child is not completely developed, so that
- manifestly his virtue also is not personal to himself, but relative to the fully
- developed being, that is, the person in authority over him. And similarly the
- slave's virtue also is in relation to the master.And we laid it down that the slave is serviceable for the mere necessaries of
- life, so that clearly he needs only a small amount of virtue, in fact just
- enough to prevent him from failing in his tasks owing to intemperance and
- cowardice. (But the
- question might be raised, supposing that what has just been said is true, will
- artisans also need to have virtue? for they frequently fall short in their tasks
- owing to intemperance. Or is their case entirely different? For the slave is a
- partner in his master's life, but the artisan is more remote, and only so much
- of virtue falls to his share as of slaveryi.e. his excellences as an artisan are the qualities of a subordinate
- (his virtues as a human being, apart from his trade, are not
- considered).—
-
-
- for the mechanic artisan is
- under a sort of limited slavery, and whereas the slave is one of the natural
- classes, no shoemaker or other craftsman belongs to his trade by
- nature.) It is manifest
- therefore that the master ought to be the cause to the slave of the virtue
- proper to a slave, but not as possessing that art of mastership which teaches a
- slave his tasks. Hence those persons are mistaken who deprive the slave of
- reasoning and tell us to use command only; for admonition is more properly
- employed with slaves than with children.But on
- these subjects let us conclude our decisions in this manner; while the question
- of the virtue severally belonging to man and woman and children and father, and
- of the right and wrong mode of conducting their mutual intercourse and the
- proper way of pursuing the good mode and avoiding the bad one, are matters that
- it will be necessary to follow up in the part of our treatise dealing with the
- various forms of constitution.As a matter of
- fact in Books 7, 8 dealing with the best constitution this subject is not
- reached.
- For since every household is part
- of a state, and these relationships are part of the household, and the
- excellence of the part must have regard to that of the whole, it is necessary
- that the education both of the children and of the women should be carried on
- with a regard to the form of the constitution, if it makes any difference as
- regards the goodness of the state for the children and the women to be good. And
- it must necessarily make a difference; for the women are a half of the free
- population, and the childrengrow up
- to be the partners in the government of the state. So that as these questions
- have been decided, and those that remain must be discussed elsewhere, let us
- relinquish the present subjects as completed, and make a fresh start in our
- discourse, and first let us consider those thinkers who have advanced views
- about the Ideal State.
-
-
- But is it better for a city that
- is to be well ordered to have community in everything which can possibly be made
- common property, or is it better to have some things in common and others not?
- For example, it is possible for the citizens to have children, wives and
- possessions in common with each other, as in Plato's
Republic, in
- which Socrates says that there must be
- community of children, women and possessions. Well then, which is preferable,
- the system that now obtains, or one conforming with the regulation described in
- the
Republic
-
On the following
- criticisms see Grote, Plato, 3, pp. 211-233.?
-
-
Now for all the citizens to have their wives in common involves a variety of
- difficulties; in particular,
(1) 1.3-7; (2) 1.8-2.11;
- (3) 2.11-13; also (4) other objections
- 2.15-16. (1) the object which
- Socrates advances as the reason why this
- enactment should be made clearly does not follow from his arguments; also
- (2) as a means to the end which he asserts should be the
- fundamental object of the city, the scheme as actually set forth in the dialogue
- is not practicable; yet (3) how it is to be further worked out
- has been nowhere definitely stated. I refer to the ideal of the fullest possible
- unity of the entire state, which
- Socrates takes as his fundamental principle.
-
Yet it is clear that
- if the process of unification advances beyond a certain point, the city will not
- be a city at all for a state essentially consists of a multitude of persons, and
- if its unification is carried beyond a certain point, city will be reduced to
- family and family to individual,
for
- we should pronounce the family to be a more complete unity than the city, and
- the single person than the family; so that even if any lawgiver were able to
- unify the state, he must not do so, for he will destroy it in the process. And
- not only does a city consist of a multitude of human beings, it consists of
- human beings differing in kind. A collection of persons all alike does not
- constitute a state. For a city is not the same thing as a league; a league is of
- value by its quantity, even though it is art the same in kind (since
- the essential object of the league is military strength), just as a
- weight would be worth more if it weighed more, whereas
In the mss. of the Greek
- ‘whereas—kind’ comes below after
- ‘
- Arcadian.’ components which are to make up a
- unity must differ in kind
(and it is by this characteristic that a city will also surpass a
- tribe of which the population is not scattered among villages but organized like
- the Arcadians). Hence reciprocal equality
As the best state consists of different classes, its unity is
- secured by each citizen giving services to society and receiving in return
- benefits proportionate to his service. Probably to\
- i)/son is an interpolation (though
- Newman explains it as 'the reciprocal
- rendering of an equal amount of dissimilar things'): omitting
- to\ i)/son, we render
- ‘reciprocity’ and not ‘reciprocal
- equality’; cf. Aristot. Nic.
- Eth. 1132b 33, ‘In the interchange of services Justice
- in the form of Reciprocity is the bond that maintains the association:
- reciprocity, that is, on the basis of proportion, not on the basis of
- equality.’ is the preservative of states, as has been said
- before in the
Ethics. For even among the free and equal this
- principle must necessarily obtain, since all cannot govern at once: they must
- hold office for a year at a time or by some other arrangement or period; and in
- this manner it does actually come about that all govern, just as all shoemakers
- would be also carpenters if the shoemakers and the carpenters kept on changing
- trades instead of the same persons being shoemakers and carpenters always.
-
But since such permanence of
- function is better for the political community also, it is clear that it is
- better for the same persons to govern always, if possible; and among peoples
- where it is impossible because all the citizens are equal in their nature,
-
-
-
- yet at the same time it is only just, whether governing is a
- good thing or a bad, that all should partake in it, and for equals thus to
- submit to authority in turn imitates their being originally dissimilarThe best form of constitution is where there
- is a superior class that governs continuously—an aristocracy; so
- where there are no class-distinctions, the next best thing is for all the
- citizens to take turns in governing and being governed, those in office for
- the time being forming a sort of aristocracy.
- Richards's alteration of the text gives ‘to take
- turns to govern is an imitation of original inequality and
- class-distinction.‘; for some govern and others are
- governed by turn, as though becoming other persons; and also similarly when they
- hold office the holders of different offices are different persons. It is clear then from these considerations
- that it is not an outcome of nature for the state to be a unity in the manner in
- which certain persons say that it is, and that what has been said to be the
- greatest good in states really destroys states; yet surely a thing's particular
- good acts as its preservative.—Another line of consideration also
- shows that to seek to unify the state excessively is not beneficial. In point of
- self-sufficiency the individual is surpassed by the family and the family by the
- state, and in principle a state is fully realized only when it comes to pass
- that the community of numbers is self-sufficing; if therefore the more
- self-sufficing a community is, the more desirable is its condition, then a less
- degree of unity is more desirable than a greater.
- Again, even granting that
- it is best for the community to be as complete a unity as possible, complete
- unity does not seem to be proved by the formula ‘if all the citizens
- say “Mine” and “Not mine” at the same
- time,’ which SocratesThe reference is to Plat. Rep. 462c. Unity is secured when everyone thinks that
- everything belongs equally to him and to everybody else, i.e. everything is
- common property. thinks to be a sign of thecity's being completely one.
- ‘All’ is an ambiguous term. If it means ‘each
- severally,’ very likely this would more fully realize the state of
- things which Socrates wishes to produce
- (for in that case every citizen will call the same boy his son and also
- the same woman his wife, and will speak in the same way of property and indeed
- of each of the accessories of life) but ex hypothesi the citizens, having
- community of women and children, will not call them ‘theirs’
- in this sense, but will mean theirs collectively and not severally, and
- similarly they will call property ‘theirs’ meaning the
- property of them all, not of each of them severally. We see then that the phrase
- ‘all say’ is equivocal (in fact the words
- ‘all,’ ‘both,’
- ‘odd,’ ‘even,’ owing to their ambiguity,
- occasion argumentative quibbling even in philosophical discussions);
- hence really for all to say the same thing is in one sense admirable, although
- impracticable, but in another sense is not at all a sign of concord. And furthermore, the proposal has another
- disadvantage. Property that is common to the greatest number of owners receives
- the least attention; men care most for their private possessions, and for what
- they own in common less, or only so far as it falls to their own individual
- share for in addition to the other reasons, they think less of it on the ground
- that someone else is thinking about it, just as in household service a large
- number of domestics sometimes give worse attendance than a smaller number.
- And it results in each
- citizen's having a thousand sons, and these do not belong to them as individuals
- but any child is equally the son of anyone, so that all alike will regard them
- with indifference.
-
-
-
- Again, each speaks
- of one of his fellow-citizens who is prospering or getting on badly as
- ‘my son’ only in the sense of the fractional part which he
- forms of the whole number—that is, he says ‘my
- son’ or ‘so-and-so's son,’ specifying as the
- father any individual of the thousand citizens or whatever the number be of
- which the state consists, and even this dubiously, for it is uncertain who has
- chanced to have had a son born to him and when born safely reared. Yet which is the better way to use the
- word ‘mine’—this way, each of two thousand or ten
- thousand people applying it to the same thing, or rather the way in which they
- say ‘mine’ in the actual states now? for the same person is
- called ‘my son’ by one man and ‘my
- brother’ by another, and another calls him
- ‘nephew,’ or by some other relationship, whether of blood or
- by affinity and marriage, the speaker's own in the first place, or that of his
- relations; and in addition someone else calls him
- ‘fellow-clansman’ or ‘fellow-tribesman.’
- For it is better for a boy to be one's own private nephew than one's son in the
- way described. Moreover it would
- also be impossible to avoid men's supposing certain persons to be their real
- brothers and sons and fathers and mothers; for they would be bound to form their
- belief about each other by the resemblances which occur between children and
- parents. This indeed is said by some of those who write of travels round the
- worldBooks of geography, founded on
- travellers' reports—a famous one by Hecataeus, scoffed at by Hdt. 4.36. actually to occur;they say that some of the people of Upper
- Libya have their wives in common, yet the children born are divided among them
- according to their personal resemblances. And there are some females both of the
- human race and of the other animals, for instance horses and cattle, who have a
- strong natural tendency to produce off-spring resembling the male parents, as
- was the case with the mare at Pharsalus
- named Honest Lady.Or possibly
- ‘Docile’ (
- Jackson), cf. Xen. Hunt.
- 7.4.
-
- Moreover it is not easy for those who institute this communism to guard
- against such objectionable occurrences as outrage, involuntary and in some cases
- voluntary homicide, fights, abusive language; all of which are violations of
- piety when committed against fathers, mothers and near relatives as if they were
- not relatives; but these are bound to occur more frequently when people do not
- know their relations than when they do, and also, when they do occur, if the
- offenders know their relationship it is possible for them to have the customary
- expiations performed, but for those who do not no expiation is possible.
- Also it is curious that a
- theorist who makes the sons common property only debars lovers from intercourse
- and does not prohibit love, nor the other familiarities, which between father
- and son or brother and brother are most unseemly, since even the fact of love
- between them is unseemly. And it is also strange that he deprives them of
- intercourse for no other reason except because the pleasure is too violent; and
- that he thinks it makes no difference that the parties are in the one case
- father or son and in the other case brothers of one another. And it seems that
- this community of wives and sons is more serviceable for the Farmer class than
- for the Guardians;
-
-
- for there will be less friendship among them if
- their children and women are in common, and unfriendliness in the subject
- classes is a good thing with a view to their being submissive to authority and
- not making revolution. But speaking
- generally such a law is bound to bring about the opposite state of things to
- that which rightly enacted laws ought properly to cause, and because of which
- Socrates thinks it necessary to
- make these regulations about the children and women. For we think that
- friendship is the greatest of blessings for the state, since it is the best
- safeguard against revolution, and the unity of the state, which
- Socrates praises most highly, both appears to
- be and is said by him to be the effect of friendship, just as we know that
- AristophanesThe comic poet, figuring as
- a character in Plato's
- Symposium, see especially Plat.
- Sym. 192c ff.. in the discourses on love describes how the
- lovers owing to their extreme affection desire to grow together and both become
- one instead of being two. In such a
- union it would be inevitable that both would be spoiled, or at least one, and in
- the state friendship would inevitably become watery in consequence of such
- association, and the expressions ‘my father’ and
- ‘my son’ would quite go out. For just as putting a little
- sugar into a quantity of water makes the mixture imperceptible, so it also must
- come about that the mutual relationship based on these names must become
- imperceptible,since in the
- republic described by Plato there will
- be the least possible necessity for people to care for one another as father for
- sons or as son for father or as brother for brother. For there are two things
- that most cause men to care for and to love each other, the sense of ownership
- and the sense of preciousness; and neither motive can be present with the
- citizens of a state so constituted. Again, as to the transference of some of the children at birth from the
- Farmers and Artisans to the GuardiansThe
- three classes in Plato's Republic. and of others from
- the Guardians to the Farmers and Artisans, there is much confusion as to how it
- is to be done; and the parents who give the children and the officials who
- transfer them are bound to know which they give to whom. And again, the things
- spoken of above are bound to occur even more with these transferred children,
- such as outrage, love-making and murder; for the children of the Guardians
- transferred to the other citizens will no longer speak of the Guardians as
- brothers and children and fathers and mothers, nor yet will those living among
- the Guardians so speak of the other classes, so as to be careful not to commit
- any such offence because of their relationship.Such therefore may be our decision as to community of children and women.
-
- In connection with this we have to consider the due regulation of property in
- a community that is to have the best political institutions: should property be
- owned in common or privately? This question might indeed be considered
- separately from the system laid down by law with regard to the children and the
- women:
-
-
- I mean, even if there be separate families as is now the case
- with all nations, is it better for both the ownership and the employment of
- property to be in common. . . ,Something has
- clearly been lost here, signifying ‘or should there be some
- limited form of communism?’ for example, should the farms
- be separate property but the farm-produce be brought into the common stock for
- consumption (as is the practice with some non-Greek races); or
- on the contrary should the land be common and farmed in common, but the produce
- be divided for private use (and this form of communism also is said to
- prevail among some of the barbarians); or should both farms and produce
- be common property? Now if the
- tillers of the soil be of a different classi.e. a class of serfs, like the Helots at Sparta. there might be another and easier system,
- but if the citizens do the work for themselves, the regulations for the common
- ownership of property would give more causes for discontent; for if both in the
- enjoyment of the produce and in the work of production they prove not equal but
- unequal, complaints are bound to arise between those who enjoy or take much but
- work little and those who take less but work more. And in general to live together and share all our human
- affairs is difficult, and especially to share such things as these. And this is
- shown in the partnerships of fellow-travellers, for almost the greatest number
- of them quarrel because they come into collision with one another as a result of
- ordinary matters and trifles; and also we come into collision most with those of
- our servantswhom we employ most often
- for ordinary attendance. Community
- of property therefore involves these and other similar difficulties; and the
- present system, if further improved by good morals and by the regulation of
- correct legislation, would be greatly superior. For it will possess the merit of
- both systems, by which I mean the advantage of property being common and the
- advantage of its being private. For property ought to be common in a sense but
- private speaking absolutely. For the superintendence of properties being divided
- among the owners will not cause these mutual complaints, and will improve the
- more because each will apply himself to it as to private business of his own;
- while on the other hand virtue will be exercised to make ‘friends'
- goods common goods,’ as the proverbThe saying was ascribed to Pythgagoras. goes, for the purpose of
- use. Such a system exists even now
- in outline in some states, showing that it is not impracticable, and especially
- in the ones that are well-administered parts of it are realized already and
- parts might be realized; for individuals while owning their property privately
- put their own possessions at the service of their friends and make use of their
- friends' possessions as common property; for instance in Sparta people use one another's slaves as
- virtually their own, as well as horses and hounds, and also use the produce in
- the fields throughout the country if they need provisions on a journey. It is
- clear therefore that it is better for possessions to be privately owned, but to
- make them common property in use; and to train the citizens to this is the
- special task of the legislator. And
- moreover to feel that a thing is one's private property makes an inexpressibly
- great difference for pleasure; for the universal feeling of love for oneself is
- surely not purposeless, but a natural instinct.
-
-
- Selfishness on the
- other hand is justly blamed; but this is not to love oneself but to love oneself
- more than one ought, just as covetousness means loving money to
- excess—since some love of self, money and so on is practically
- universal. Moreover, to bestow favors and assistance on friends or visitors or
- comrades is a great pleasure, and a condition of this is the private ownership
- of property. These advantages
- therefore do not come to those who carry the unification of the state too far;
- and in addition to this they manifestly do away with the practice of two
- virtues, temperance in relation to women (for it is a noble deed to
- refrain from one through temperance when she belongs to another) and
- liberality in relation to possessions (for one will not be able to
- display liberality nor perform a single liberal action, since the active
- exercise of liberality takes place in the use of
- possessions).
- Such legislation therefore has an attractive appearance,
- and might be thought to be humane; for he who is told about it welcomes it with
- gladness, thinking that it will result in a marvellous friendliness of everybody
- towards everybody, especially when somebody denounces the evils at present
- existing in states as due to the fact thatwealth is not owned in common— I mean lawsuits
- between citizens about breach of contract, and trials for perjury, and the
- flattery of the rich. But the real
- cause of all these evils is not the absence of communism, but wickedness, since
- we see far more quarrels occurring among those who own or use property in common
- than among those who have their estates separate; but we notice that those who
- quarrel as a result of their partnerships are few when compared with the total
- number of private owners. And again it is just to state not only all the evils
- that men will lose by adopting communism, but also all the good things; and life
- in such circumstances is seen to be utterly impossible. The cause of
- Socrates' error must be deemed to be that his
- fundamental assumption was incorrect. It is certain that in a way both the
- household and the state should be a unit, but they should not be so in every
- way. For in one way the state as its unification proceeds will cease to be a
- state, and in another way, though it continues a state, yet by coming near to
- ceasing to be one it will be a worse state, just as if one turned a harmony into
- unison or a rhythm into a single foot. The proper thing is for the state, while being a
- multitude, to be made a partnership and a unity by means of education, as has
- been said before and it is strange that the very philosopher who intends to
- introduce a system of education and thinks that this will make the city morally
- good should fancy that he can regulate society by such measures as have been
- mentioned instead of by manners and culture and laws, just as the legislator
- introduced community of property in Sparta and Crete by
- the institution of public messes.
-
-
- And this very point also must
- not be ignored, that attention must be paid to length of time and to the long
- period of years, in which it would not have escaped notice if these measures
- were good ones; for nearly all of them have been discovered already, although
- some of them have not been collected together and others though brought to
- knowledge are not put into practice. And their value would become most manifest if one could see such a
- constitution in actual process of formation; for one will only be able to
- construct Plato's state by introducing its partitions and dividing up the
- community into common messes and also into brotherhoods and tribes. So that in
- the upshot no other regulation will have been enacted except the exemption of
- the Guardians from the work of agriculture, which is a measure that even now the
- Spartans attempt to introduce.Moreover, the
- working of the constitution as a whole in regard to the members of the state has
- also not been described by Socrates,
- nor is it easy to say what it will be. Yet the general mass of the citizens of
- the other classes make almost the bulk of the state, and about these no definite
- regulations are laid down, as to whether the Farmers also are to have their
- property in common or to hold it in private ownership, and also whether
- community of wives and children is to apply to them or not. For if the Farmers are to have the same complete
- communism, what will be the difference between them and the Guardian class? or
- what advantage will they gain by submitting to their government? or what
- consideration will induce them to submit tothe government, unless the Guardians adopt some clever device
- like that of the Cretans? These have conceded to their slaves all the same
- rights as they have themselves except that they are forbidden gymnastic
- exercises and the possession of arms. But if the family life and property of the
- Farmers are to be such as they are in other states, what sort of communism will
- there be? For there will inevitably be two states in one, and these antagonistic
- to one another. For Socrates makes the
- Guardians a sort of garrison, while the Farmers, Artisans and other classes are
- the citizens.Or (omitting tou\s before texni/tas) ‘For
- Socrates makes one set of men guardians, a
- sort of garrison, and another set farmers and artisans and citizens of the
- other sorts.’
- But quarrels and lawsuits and all
- the other evils which according to
- Socrates exist in actual states will all be found among his
- citizens too. Yet he says that owing to their education they will not need many
- regulations such as city and market by-laws and the other regulations of that
- sort, although he assigns his education only to the Guardians. Again, he makes
- the Farmers the masters of the estates, for which they pay rent; but they are
- likely to be far more unmanageable and rebellious than the classes of helots,
- serfs and slaves in certain states today. However, whether this communism is to be compulsory for
- the Farmers in the same way as for the Guardians or whether it is not, has as a
- matter of fact not been definitely stated anywhere, nor is there any information
- about the connected questions, what are to be the political functions and the
- education of the lower classes, and the laws affecting them. But it is not easy
- to discover the answers to these questions, yet the character of the lower
- classes is of no small importance for the preservation of the community of the
- Guardians.
-
-
- But again, if Socrates
- intends to make the Farmers have their wives in common but their property
- private, who is to manage the household in the way in which the women's husbands
- will carry on the work of the farms? And if the property and the wives of the
- Farmers are to be common . . . A passage has
- been lost here.
-
- It
- is also strange that Socrates employs
- the comparison of the lower animals to show that the women are to have the same
- occupations as the men, considering that animals have no households to manage.
- Also Socrates' method of appointing the
- magistrates is not a safe one. For he makes the same persons hold office always;
- but this occasions rebellion even among people of no special distinction, much
- more so then among high-spirited and warlike men. But it is clear that he is
- compelled to make the same persons govern always, for the god-given admixture of
- gold in the soul is not bestowed on some at one time and others at another time,
- but is always in the same men, and
- Socrates says that at the moment of birth some men receive an
- admixture of gold and others of silver and those who are to be the Artisans and
- Farmers an admixture of copper and iron. And again, although he deprives the Guardians of
- happiness, he says that it is the duty of the law-giver to make the whole city
- happy. But it is not possible for the whole to be happy unless most or all of
- its parts, or some of them, possess happiness. For happiness is not a thing of
- the same sortas being an even number:
- that may belong to a whole but not to either of its parts, but happiness cannot
- belong to the whole and not to its parts. But yet, if the Guardians are not
- happy, what other class is? For clearly the Artisans and the general mass of the
- vulgar classes are not.The Republic discussed by
- Socrates therefore possesses these
- difficulties and also others not smaller than these.
- And almost the same holds
- good of the
Laws also, which was written later, so that it will
- be advantageous to make some small examination of the constitution described in
- that book as well. For in the
Republic
- Socrates has laid down details about
- very few matters—regulations about community of wives and children and
- about property, and the structure of the constitution (for the mass of
- the population is divided into two parts, one forming the Farmer class and the
- other the class that defends the state in war, and there is a third class drawn
- from these latter that forms the council and governs the state), but
- about the Farmers and the Artisans, whether they are excluded from government or
- have some part in it, and whether these classes also are to possess arms and to
- serve in war with the others or not, on these points
- Socrates has made no decision, but though he
- thinks that the women ought to serve in war with the Guardians and share the
- same education, the rest of the discourse he has filled up with external topics,
- and about the sort of education which it is proper for the Guardians to
- have.
The last clause, ‘and
- about—to have,’ has almost certainly been misplaced by a
- copyist, and should come near the beginning of the sentence, after
- ‘about property.’
-
-
-
-
- But though the
-
Laws consists for the most part of a treatise on law, the
- author has said a little about the form of the constitution, and in a desire to
- make this more suitable for adoption by actual states he brings it round by
- degrees back to the other form, that of the
Republic. For except
- community in wives and property, he assigns all his other regulations in the
- same form to both states, for he prescribes for both the same scheme of
- education, and a life detached from menial tasks, and similarly as regards
- common meals, except that in the state described in the
Laws he
- says there are to be common meals for women also, and he makes the Republic
- consist of a class possessing arms that numbers a thousand, but the state of the
-
Laws has five thousand.
-
Now it is true that all the
- discourses of Socrates possess brilliance, cleverness, originality and keenness
- of inquiry, but it is no doubt difficult to be right about everything: for
- instance with regard to the size of population just mentioned it must not be
- over-looked that a territory as large as that of
Babylon will be needed for so many inhabitants, or some other
- country of unlimited extent, to support five thousand men in idleness and
- another swarm of women and servants around them many times as numerous. It is
- proper no doubt to assume ideal conditions, but not to go beyond all bounds of
- possibility.
And it is said that in
- laying down the laws the legislator must have his attention fixed on two
- things,
the territory and the
- population. But also it would be well to add that he must take into account the
- neighboring regions also, if the city is to live a life of politics
i.e. a life of intercourse with other states,
- cf. 1327b 5. Some mss. add ‘not one of isolation’; this
- looks like an explanatory note interpolated. (for it is
- necessary for it to use for war not only such arms as are serviceable within its
- own territory but also such as are serviceable against places outside
- it); and if one does not accept such a description whether for the life
- of the individual or for the common life of the state, yet it is none the less
- necessary for the citizens to be formidable to their enemies not only when they
- have entered the country but also when they have left it.
Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give ‘when
- they are away from it.’
-
Also the amount of property requires
- consideration: would it not perhaps be better to define it differently, by a
- clearer formula? The writer says that it ought to be sufficiently large for the
- citizens ‘to live a temperate life’—as if one were
- to say ‘to live a good life’; but really that phrase is too
- general, since it is possible to live temperately yet miserably. But a better
- definition would be ‘to live temperately and liberally’
- (for if the two are separated a liberal mode of life is liable to slip
- into luxury and a temperate one into a life of hardship), since surely
- these are the only desirable qualities relating to the use of
- wealth—for instance you cannot use wealth gently or bravely, but you
- can use it temperately and liberally, so that it follows that these are
- qualities that have to do with wealth.
And it is also strange that although equalizing properties
- the writer does not regulate the number of the citizens, but leaves the
- birth-rate uncontrolled, on the assumption that it will be sufficiently levelled
- up to the same total owing to childless marriages, however many children are
- begotten,
-
-
- because this seems to take place in the states at present. But
- this ought to be regulated much more in the supposed case than it is now, for
- now nobody is destitute, because estates are divided among any number, but then,
- as division of estates will not be allowed, the extra children will necessarily
- have nothing, whether they are fewer in number or more. And one might think that restriction ought to be
- put on the birth-rate rather than on property, so as not to allow more than a
- certain number of children to be produced, and that in fixing their number
- consideration should be paid to the chances of its happening that some of the
- children born may die, and to the absence of children in the other marriages;
- but for the matter to be left alone, as it is in most states, is bound to lead
- to poverty among the citizens, and poverty produces sedition and crime. The
- Corinthian PhidonOtherwise unknown.
- in fact, one of the most ancient lawgivers, thought that the house-holds and the
- citizen population ought to remain at the same numbers, even though at the
- outset the estates of all were unequal in size; but in Plato's
-
Laws the opposite is the case.
i.e. the estates are equal, and the number of households
- fixed, but not the number of citizens. However, we must say later
- what we think would be a better system in these matters;
but another question omitted in the
-
Laws is how the rulers will be different from the classes
- ruled; the writer prescribes
that the
- rulers are to stand in the same relation to the ruled as the warp of cloth
- stands to the woof by being made of different wool.
- Plat. Laws 734e ff. In
- weaving cloth the warp (the threads set up first) must be
- of strong wool, the woof (the threads woven across the
- warp) must be softer. And inasmuch as he allows a man's
- total property to be increased up to five times its original value, for what
- reason should not an increase in his landed estate be allowed up to a certain
- point? Also it must be considered whether the proposed separation of homesteads
- is not inexpedient for household economy—for the writer allotted two
- homesteads separate from one another to each citizen; but it is difficult to
- manage two households.
The object was to
- provide a separate establishment for a married son, Plat. Laws 776a.
-
And the whole constitution is
- intended, it is true, to be neither a democracy nor an oligarchy, but of the
- form intermediate between them which is termed a republic, for the government is
- constituted from the class that bears arms. If therefore he introduces this
- constitution as the one most commonly existing of all forms of constitution in
- the actual states, he has perhaps made a good proposal, but if he introduces it
- as the next best to the first form of constitution, it is not a good proposal;
- for very likely one might approve the Spartan constitution more highly, or
- perhaps some other form nearer to an aristocracy.
In fact some people assert that the best constitution must
- be a combination of all the forms of constitution, and therefore praise the
- constitution of
Sparta (for
- some people say that it consists of oligarchy, monarchy and democracy, meaning
- that the kingship is monarchy and the rule of the ephors oligarchy, but that an
- element of democracy is introduced by the rule of the ephors because the ephors
- come from the common people; while others pronounce the ephorate a tyranny but
- find an element of democracy in the public mess-tables and in the other
- regulations of daily life).
-
-
-
- In Plato's
Laws on the other hand it is
- stated that the best constitution must consist of a combination of democracy and
- tyranny,
Plato wrote
- ‘monarchy,’ Plat. Laws
- 693d (cf. here 3.13). which one might
- refuse to count as constitutional governments at all, or else rank as the worst
- of all constitutions. A better theory therefore is put forward by those who
- intermingle a larger number of forms, for the constitution composed of a
- combination of a larger number of forms is better. In the next place, the
- constitution in the
Laws proves as a matter of fact not to
- contain any element of monarchy at all, but its factors are taken from oligarchy
- and democracy, and for the most part it tends to incline towards oligarchy. This
- appears from the regulations for the appointment of the magistrates; for their
- selection by lot from a list previously elected by vote is a feature common to
- both oligarchy and democracy, but the compulsion put upon the richer citizens to
- attend the assembly and vote for magistrates or perform any other political
- function, while the others are allowed to do as they like, is oligarchical, as
- is the endeavor to secure that a majority of the magistrates shall be drawn from
- the wealthy and that the highest offices shall be filled from the highest of the
- classes assessed by wealth.
But the
- writer also makes the election of the council oligarchical for everybody is
- compelled to elect, but from the first property-class, and then again an equal
- number from the second class, and then from the members of the third class,
- except that it was not to be compulsory for all to vote for those to be elected
- from the members of the third or the fourth class, and to elect from the fourth
- class was only compulsory for the members of the first and second classes; and
- afterwards from those thus selected he says that they are to appoint
an equal number from each class. Thus those
- who elect the members from the highest property classes will be more numerous
- and better,
i.e. a better ellective body
- because representative of all classes. because some of the lower
- orders will abstain from voting
i.e. from
- voting for the preliminary list from the third and fourth classes. as
- it is not compulsory.
Accordingly
- that it is not proper to establish a constitution of this character from a blend
- of democracy and monarchy appears clearly from these considerations, and from
- what will be said later when our inquiry comes to deal with this class of
- constitution; also the provision for the election of the rulers from among
- candidates chosen at a preliminary election is dangerous, for if even a moderate
- number of people choose to combine into a party, the elections will always go
- according to their wish.
Such are the points as to
- the constitution in the
Laws.
-
-
There
- are also certain other constitutional schemes, some drawn up by amateurs and
- others by philosophers and statesmen, but all of them are nearer to those which
- have been actually established and by which states are governed at present than
- are both of those which have been considered; for nobody else has introduced the
- innovation of community of children and women, nor that of public meals for the
- women, but they start rather with the necessary reforms. For some persons think
- that the right regulation of property is the most important; for the question of
- property, they say, is universally the cause of party strife. Therefore the
- Chalcedonian Phaleas
Otherwise
- unknown. was the first who introduced this expedient;
for he says that the citizens' estates
- ought to be equal
-
-
- and he thought that this would not be difficult to
- secure at the outset for cities in process of foundation, while in those already
- settled, although it would be a more irksome task, nevertheless a levelling
- would most easily be effected by the rich giving dowries but not receiving them
- and the poor receiving but not giving them. Plato when writing the
-
Laws thought that up to a certain point inequality ought to
- be allowed, but that no citizen should be permitted to acquire more land than
- would make his estate five times the size of the smallest, as has also been said
- before.
-
But those who bring in legislation of this sort must also not
- overlook this point, which is overlooked at present, that when regulating the
- amount of property legislators ought also to regulate the size of the family;
- for if the number of children becomes too large for the property, the law is
- quite sure to be broken, and apart from the breach of the law it is a bad thing
- that many citizens who were rich should become poor, for it is difficult for
- such men not to be advocates of a new order.
That a level standard of property affects the community of
- the citizens in an important manner some men even in old times clearly have
- recognized; for example there is the legislation of Solon, and other states have
- a law prohibiting the acquisition of land to any amount that the individual may
- desire; and similarly there is legislation to prevent the sale of estates, as at
-
Locri there is a law
that a man shall not sell unless he can
- prove that manifest misfortune has befallen him and also there is legislation to
- preserve the old allotments, and the repeal of this restriction at
Leucas made the Leucadian constitution
- excessively democratic, for it came about that the offices were no longer filled
- from the established property-qualifications.
But it is possible that equality of estates may be
- maintained, but their size may be either too large and promote luxury, or too
- small, causing a penurious standard of living; it is clear therefore that it is
- not enough for the lawgiver to make the estates equal, but he must aim at
- securing a medium size. And again, even if one prescribed a moderate property
- for all, it would be of no avail, since it is more needful to level men's
- desires than their properties, and this can only be done by an adequate system
- of education enforced by law.
But
- perhaps Phaleas would say that he himself actually prescribes this, as he
- considers it fundamentally necessary for states to have equality in these two
- things, property and education. But the nature of the education needs to be
- defined: it is no use merely for it to be one and the same for all, for it is
- possible for all to have one and the same education but for this to be of such a
- nature as to make them desirous of getting more than their share of money or
- honor or both;
moreover
Probably the Greek should be altered to give
- ‘because’ instead of
- ‘moreover.’ civil strife is caused not only by
- inequality of property but also by inequality of honors, though the two motives
- operate in opposite ways—the masses are discontented if possessions
- are unequally distributed,
-
-
- the upper classes if honors are equally
- distributed, bringing it about that
- Noble and base in equal honor stand.
- Hom. Il. 9.319
-
-
-
Nor do men do wrong for the sake of the bare necessities only, the sort
- of wrongdoing for which Phaleas thinks that equality of substance is a
- cure—preventing highway robbery by removing the motive of cold or
- hunger; men also do wrong to gain pleasure and to satisfy desire. For if they
- have a desire above the bare necessities of existence, they will transgress to
- cure this desire; and moreover not because of desire only, but in order that
- they may enjoy the pleasures that are not associated with pains. What remedy then is there for these three
- classes of offenders? For the first class, a modest competence and work; for the
- second, temperance; and as for the third sort, any people who desire pleasures
- that depend on themselves would require no cure for their desires save that
- which is derived from philosophy, for the other pleasures require the aid of
- fellow-creatures. Since clearly the greatest transgressions spring from a desire
- for superfluities, not for bare necessaries (for example, men do not
- become tyrants in order to avoid shivering with cold, and accordingly high
- honors are awarded to one who kills a tyrant, but not to one who kills a
- thief); so that the method of the constitution of Phaleas is
- efficacious only against the minor social disorders. Again, Phaleas desires to frame institutions for the most
- part which will lead to a right state of affairs in the internal relations of
- the citizens, but the legislator should also have regard to relations with the
- neighboring peoples and with all foreign nations.It is essential therefore for the constitution to be framed
- with a view to military strength, about which Phaleas has said nothing. And the
- same is true also about property; for the citizens should not only possess
- enough to meet their requirements in civic life, but also to encounter the
- perils that face them from outside; hence they should possess neither so large
- an amount of wealth that it will be coveted by their neighbors and by stronger
- states while its possessors will be unable to repel their assailants, nor yet so
- small an amount as not to be capable of sustaining a war even against equal and
- similar states. Phaleas, it is
- true, has laid down no rule at all, but the question must not be overlooked,
- what amount of wealth is advantageous. Perhaps therefore the best limit to
- prescribe is that it must not profit a stronger people to make war upon the
- state because of its excessive wealth, but only just as it might do even if the
- citizens had not got so much property. For example, when Autophradates was about
- to lay siege to Atarneus,A stronghold on the coast of Asia Minor acquired by Eubulus, a
- Bithynian banker, when the Persian empire was breaking up, middle 4th
- century B.C.; Autophradates was a Persian general. Eubulus bade him
- consider how long it would take him to capture the place, and then calculate
- what his expenditure would be for that period, for he himself was willing for
- the payment of a smaller sum than that to evacuate Atarneus at once; these words caused
- Autophradates to ponder and led him to abandon the siege. Now equality of property among the citizens is
- certainly one of the factors that contribute to the avoidance of party faction;
- it is not however a particularly important one. For the upper classes may resent
- it on the ground that their merits are not equal, owing to which we actually see
- them often attacking the government and rebelling;
-
-
- and also the
- baseness of human beings is a thing insatiable, and though at the first a dole
- of only two obolsTwopence-halfpenny for a
- seat in the theater at Athens
- paid for citizens by the State after the time of Pericles. is enough,
- yet when this has now become an established custom, they always want more, until
- they get to an unlimited amount; for appetite is in its nature unlimited, and
- the majority of mankind live for the satisfaction of appetite. The starting-point in such matters
- therefore, rather than levelling estates, is to train those that are respectable
- by nature so that they may not wish for excessive wealth, and to contrive that
- the base may not be able to do so, and this is secured if they are inferior in
- number and not unjustly treated. And also we cannot approve what Phaleas has
- said about equality of property, for he makes the citizens equal in respect of
- landed estate only, but wealth also consists in slaves and cattle and money, and
- there is an abundance of property in the shape of what is called furniture; we
- must therefore either seek to secure equality or some moderate regulation as
- regards all these things, or we must permit all forms of wealth. And it is clear from Phaleas's legislation
- that he makes the citizen-population a small one, inasmuch as all the artisans
- are to be publicly owned slaves and are not to furnish any complement of the
- citizen-body. But if it is proper to have public slaves, the laborers employed
- upon the public works ought to be of that status (as is the case at
- Epidamnus and as Diophantus once
- tried to institute at Athens).These remarks
- may serve fairly well to indicate such meritsand defects as may be contained in the constitution of
- Phaleas.
- HippodamusA famous
- architect and town-planner (see 1330b 24) circa 475 B.C. son of Euryphon, a Milesian
- (who invented the division of cities into blocks and cut up Piraeus, and who also became somewhat
- eccentric in his general mode of life owing to a desire for distinction, so that
- some people thought that he lived too fussily, with a quantity of hairAt Sparta men wore their hair long, but at Athens this was the mark of a
- dandy. and expensive ornaments, and also a quantity of cheap yet warm
- clothes not only in winter but also in the summer periods, and who wished to be
- a man of learning in natural science generally), was the first man not
- engaged in politics who attempted to speak on the subject of the best form of
- constitution. His system was for a
- city with a population of ten thousand, divided into three classes; for he made
- one class of artisans, one of farmers, and the third the class that fought for
- the state in war and was the armed class. He divided the land into three parts,
- one sacred, one public and one private: sacred land to supply the customary
- offerings to the gods, common land to provide the warrior class with food, and
- private land to be owned by the farmers. He thought that there are only three
- divisions of the law, since the matters about which lawsuits take place are
- three in number—outrage, damage, homicide. He also proposed to establish one supreme court of
- justice, to which were to be carried up all the cases at law thought to have
- been decided wrongly, and this court he made to consist of certain selected
- elders.
-
-
- He held that the verdicts in the courts ought not to be given
- by ballot, but that each juryman should bring a tablet on which if he found a
- simple verdict of guilty he should write the penalty, and if simply not guilty
- leave a blank, but if he found the prisoner guilty on some counts but not on
- others he should state this; for the present state of the law he thought
- unsatisfactory, since it forces jurors to commit perjury by giving either the
- one verdict or the other. He
- proposed a law that those who discovered something of advantage to the state
- should receive honor, and that the children of those who died in war should have
- their maintenance from the state, in the belief that this had never yet been
- provided by law among other people—but as a matter of fact this law
- exists at present both at Athens and
- in others of the cities. The governing officials were all to be chosen by the
- assembly of the people, and this he made to consist of the three classes of the
- city; and the officials elected were to superintend the business of the
- community and the affairs of foreign residents and of orphans. These then are
- the greatest number and the most noteworthy of the provisions in the system of
- Hippodamus. But doubt might be
- raised first of all about the division of the general mass of the citizens. The
- artisans, the farmers and the military class all participate in the government,
- though the farmers have not got arms and the artisans neither arms nor
- land,which makes them almost the
- slaves of those who possess the arms. Therefore for them to share in all the
- offices is impossible (for it is inevitable that both military
- commanders and civic guards and in general the most important offices should be
- appointed from those that have the arms); but if they do not share in
- the government of the state, how is it possible for them to be friendly towards
- the constitution? But it may be said
- that the ruling class as possessing the arms is bound to be stronger than both
- classes. But this is not easy if they are not numerous and if this be the case,
- why should the other classes participate in the government and control the
- appointment of the rulers?As military posts
- must be filled by the military class, the civilians will feel excluded and
- be disaffected; and the military class may not be strong enough to control
- them. Better, then, not to give full citizenship to civilians. Again,
- what use are the farmers to the state? artisans there must necessarily be
- (for every state requires artisans), and they can make a
- living as in the other states from the practice of their craft; but as for the
- farmers, although it would have been reasonable for them to be a portion of the
- state if they provided the class possessing the arms with its food, as it is
- they have private land of their own and farm it for themselves. And again, if the common land from which
- those who fight for the state are to have their food is to be farmed by
- themselves, the military class would not be different from the agricultural, but
- the legislator intends it to be; while if the cultivators of the common land are
- to be a different set of people from both those who cultivate the private farms
- and the soldiers, this will be yet a forth section of the state, holding no part
- in it but quite estranged from the government. But yet if one is to make those
- who cultivate the private and the common land the same people, the amount of the
- produce from the farms which each man will cultivate will be scanty for two
- households,
-
-
- and moreover why are they not both to take food for themselves
- and to supply it to the soldiers direct from the land and from the same
- allotments? All these points
- therefore involve much confusion. Also the law about trials is
- unsatisfactory—the requirement that the verdict shall be given on
- separate counts when the charge in the indictment is single, and the conversion
- of the juror into an arbitrator. A qualified verdict is practicable in an
- arbitration even when there are several arbitrators (for they confer
- with one another about their verdict), but it is not practicable in the
- law-courts, but the contrary to this is actually provided for by most lawgivers,
- who prohibit consultation between the jurymen. Then the verdict will inevitably be a confused one when
- the juror thinks that the defendant is liable for damages but not in so large an
- amount as the plaintiff claims; for the plaintiff will sue for twenty minaeThe mina, 100 drachmas, may be put at 4 pounds
- (gold). and the juror will adjudge ten minae
- (or the former some larger and the latter some smaller sum),
- and another juror five minae, and yet another four (and so they will
- obviously go on making fractions), while others will award the whole
- sum, and others nothing; what then will be the method of counting the votes?
- Again, nobody compels the juror to commit perjury who, if the indictment has
- been drawn in simple form, gives a simple verdict of acquittal or condemnation,
- and gives it justly; for the jurorwho
- gives a verdict of acquittal does not give judgement that the defendant owes
- nothing, but that he does not owe the twenty minae for which he is sued; it is
- only the juror who gives a verdict condemning the defendant when he does not
- think that he owes twenty minae who commits perjury. As for the view that an honor ought to be awarded to those
- who invent something advantageous to the state, legislation to this effect is
- not safe, but only specious to the ear; for it involves malicious prosecutions
- and, it may even happen, constitutional upheavals. And the matter leads to
- another problem and a different inquiry: some persons raise the question whether
- to alter the ancestral laws, supposing another law is better, is harmful or
- advantageous to states. Hence it is not easy to give a speedy agreement to the
- above proposal to honor reformers, if really it is disadvantageous to alter the
- laws; yet it is possible that persons may bring forward the repeal of laws or of
- the constitution as a benefit to the community. And since we have made mention of this question, it will
- be better if we set out a few further observations about it, for, as we said, it
- involves difficulty. And it might be thought that it would be better for
- alteration to take place; at all events in the other fields of knowledge this
- has proved beneficial—for example, medicine has been improved by being
- altered from the ancestral system, and gymnastic training, and in general all
- the arts and faculties so that since statesmanship also is to be counted as one
- of these, it is clear that the same thing necessarily holds good in regard to it
- as well. And it might be said that a sign of this has occurred in the actual
- events of history, for (one might argue) the laws of ancient
- times were too simple and uncivilized: the Hellenes, for instance, used both to
- carry arms and to purchase their wives from one another, and all the survivals of the customs of antiquity
- existing anywhere are utterly foolish,
-
-
- as for example at Cyme there is
- a law relating to trials for murder, that if the prosecutor on the charge of
- murder produces a certain number of his own relatives as witnesses, the
- defendant is guilty of the murder. And in general all men really seek what is
- good, not what was customary with their forefathers; and it is probable that
- primitive mankind, whether sprung from the earthSo Hes. WD 108, Pind. N. 6.1. or the survivors of some
- destructive cataclysm,So Plat. Laws 676 ff., Plat. Tim. 22 ff. Aristotle believed that man had existed for
- ever, and that the world had experienced only local cataclysms. were
- just like ordinary foolish people, as indeed is actually said of the earth-born
- race, so that it is odd that we should abide by their notions. Moreover even
- written codes of law may with advantage not be left unaltered. For just as in
- the other arts as well, so with the structure of the state it is impossible that
- it should have been framed aright in all its details; for it must of necessity
- be couched in general terms, but our actions deal with particular things. These
- considerations therefore make it clear that it is proper for some laws sometimes
- to be altered. But if we consider
- the matter in another way, it would seem to be a thing that needs much caution.
- For when it is the case that the improvement would be small, but it is a bad
- thing to accustom men to repeal the laws lightly, it is clear that some mistakes
- both of the legislator and of the magistrate should be passed over; for the
- people will not be as much benefited by making an alteration as they will be
- harmed by becoming accustomed to distrust their rulers. Also, the example from the case of the arts is a
- mistake,as to change the practice
- of an art is a different thing from altering a law; for the law has no power to
- compel obedience beside the force of custom, and custom only grows up in long
- lapse of time, so that lightly to change from the existing laws to other new
- laws is to weaken the power of the law. Again, even if alteration of the laws is
- proper, are all the laws to be open to alteration, and in every form of
- constitution, or not? and is any chance person to be competent to introduce
- alterations or only certain people? for there is a great difference between
- these alternatives. Therefore let us abandon this inquiry for the present, since
- it belongs to other occasions.
- On the subject of the constitution of
- Sparta and that of Crete, and virtually in regard to the other
- forms of constitution also, the questions that arise for consideration are two,
- one whether their legal structure has any feature that is admirable or the
- reverse in comparison with the best system, another whether it contains any
- provision that is really opposed to the fundamental principle and character of
- the constitution that the founders had in view.
- Now it is a thing admitted
- that a state that is to be well governed must be provided with leisure from
- menial occupations; but how this is to be provided it is not easy to ascertain.
- The serf class in Thessaly repeatedly
- rose against its masters, and so did the Helots at Sparta, where they are like an enemy
- constantly sitting in wait for the disasters of the Spartiates. Nothing of the kind has hitherto occurred
- in Crete, the reason perhaps being that
- the neighboring cities,
-
-
- even when at war with one another, in no instance
- ally themselves with the rebels, because as they themselves also possess a serf
- class this would not be for their interest; whereas the Laconians were entirely
- surrounded by hostile neighbors, Argives, Messenians and Arcadians. For with the
- Thessalians too the serf risings originally began because they were still at war
- with their neighbors, the Achaeans, Perraebi and Magnesians. Also, apart from other drawbacks, the mere
- necessity of policing a serf class is an irksome burden—the problem of
- how intercourse with them is to be carried on: if allowed freedom they grow
- insolent and claim equal rights with their masters, and if made to live a hard
- life they plot against them and hate them. It is clear therefore that those
- whose helot-system works out in this way do not discover the best mode of
- treating the problem. Again, the
- freedom in regard to women is detrimental both in regard to the purpose of the
- constitution and in regard to the happiness of the state. For just as man and
- wife are part of a household, it is clear that the state also is divided nearly
- in half into its male and female population, so that in all constitutions in
- which the position of the women is badly regulated one half of the state must be
- deemed to have been neglected in framing the law. And this has taken place in
- the state under consideration,for the
- lawgiver wishing the whole city to be of strong character displays his intention
- clearly in relation to the men, but in the case of the women has entirely
- neglected the matter; for they live dissolutelyThe textual emendation giving ‘live without
- restraint’ is probably correct. in respect of every sort of
- dissoluteness, and luxuriously. So
- that the inevitable result is that in a state thus constituted wealth is held in
- honor, especially if it is the case that the people are under the sway of their
- women, as most of the military and warlike races are, except the Celts and such
- other races as have openly held in honor passionate friendship between males.
- For it appears that the original teller of the legend had good reason for
- uniting Ares with Aphrodite, for all men of martial spirit appear to be
- attracted to the companionship either of male associates or of women. Hence this characteristic existed among the
- Spartans, and in the time of their empire many things were controlled by the
- women; yet what difference does it make whether the women rule or the rulers are
- ruled by the women? The result is the same. And although bravery is of service
- for none of the regular duties of life, but if at all, in war, even in this
- respect the Spartans' women were most harmful; and they showed this at the time
- of the Theban invasion,Under Epaminondas,
- 369 B.C. for they rendered no useful
- service, as the women do in other states, while they caused more confusion than
- the enemy. It is true therefore that
- at the outset the freedom allowed to women at Sparta seems to have come about with good reason,
-
-
- for the
- Spartans used to be away in exile abroad for long periods on account of their
- military expeditions, both when fighting the war against the Argives and again
- during the war against the Arcadians and Messenians; but when they had turned to
- peaceful pursuits, although they handed over themselves to the lawgiver already
- prepared for obedience by military life (for this has many elements of
- virtue), as for the women it is said that Lycurgus did attempt to bring
- them under the laws, but since they resisted he gave it up. So the Spartan women are, it is true, responsible
- for what took place, and therefore manifestly for this mistake among the rest;
- although for our own part we are not considering the question who deserves
- excuse or does not, but what is the right or wrong mode of action. But, as was
- also said before, errors as regards the status of women seem not only to cause a
- certain unseemliness in the actual conduct of the state but to contribute in
- some degree to undue love of money. For next to the things just spoken of one might censure the Spartan
- institutions with respect to the unequal distribution of wealth. It has come
- about that some of the Spartans own too much property and some extremely little;
- owing to which the land has fallen into few hands, and this has also been badly
- regulated by the laws;for the
- lawgiver made it dishonorable to sell a family's existing estate, and did so
- rightly, but he granted liberty to alienate land at will by gift or bequest; yet
- the result that has happened was bound to follow in the one case as well as in
- the other. And also nearly
- two-fifths of the whole area of the country is owned by women, because of the
- number of women who inherit estates and the practice of giving large dowries;
- yet it would have been better if dowries had been prohibited by law or limited
- to a small or moderate amount . . .A clause
- seems to have been lost: ‘Also it would have been better to
- regulate by law the marriage of heiresses.’ But as it is he
- is allowed to give an heiress in marriage to whomever he likes; and if he dies
- without having made directions as to this by will, whoever he leaves as his
- executor bestows her upon whom he chooses. As a result of thisi.e. the consequent fall in the number of men
- rich enough to keep a horse or even to provide themselves with heavy
- arms. although the country is capable of supporting fifteen hundred
- cavalry and thirty thousand heavy-armed troopers, they numbered not even a
- thousand. And the defective nature
- of their system of land-tenure has been proved by the actual facts of history:
- the state did not succeed in enduring a single blow,The battle of Leuctra, 371
- B.C. but perished owing to the smallness of its population. They have
- a tradition that in the earlier reigns they used to admit foreigners to their
- citizenship, with the result that dearth of population did not occur in those
- days, although they were at war for a long period; and it is stated that at one
- time the Spartiates numbered as many as ten thousand. However, whether this is
- true or not, it is better for a state's male population to be kept up by
- measures to equalize property. The
- law in relation to parentage is also somewhat adverse to the correction of this
- evil.
-
-
- For the lawgiver desiring to make the Spartiates as numerous as
- possible holds out inducements to the citizens to have as many children as
- possible: for they have a law releasing the man who has been father of three
- sons from military service, and exempting the father of four from all taxes. Yet
- it is clear that if a number of sons are born and the land is correspondingly
- divided there will inevitably come to be many poor men.
- Moreover the
- regulations for the EphorateThe five Ephors,
- elected for a year by the people, were the real rulers of Sparta. The two kings were hereditary;
- the senate of twenty-eight nobles advised them, and the Ephors presided at
- the Assembly of citizens over thirty years old, who voted on the measures of
- the Kings and Ephors but could not discuss them. The small fleet was
- commanded by a single admiral appointed for a year by the Ephors and not
- allowed to hold office twice. are also bad. For this office has
- absolute control over their most important affairs, but the Ephors are appointed
- from the entire people, so that quite poor men often happen to get into the
- office, who owing to their poverty used to bePerhaps the Greek should be altered to give
- ‘are.’ easily bought. This was often manifested
- in earlier times, and also lately in the affairUnknown at Andros; for certain Ephors were corrupted with money and so far
- as lay in their power ruined the whole state. And because the office was too
- powerful, and equal to a tyranny, the kings also were compelled to cultivate
- popular favor, so that in this way too the constitution was jointly injured, for
- out of an aristocracy came to be evolved a democracy. Thus this office does, it is true, hold together the
- constitution—for the common people keep quiet because they have a
- share in the highest office of state, so that whether this is due to the
- lawgiver orhas come about by chance,
- the Ephorate is advantageous for the conduct of affairs; for if a constitution
- is to be preserved, all the sections of the state must wish it to exist and to
- continue on the same lines; so the kings are in this frame of mind owing to
- their own honorable rank, the nobility owing to the office of the Elders, which
- is a prize of virtue, and the common people because of the Ephorate, which is
- appointed from the whole population—but yet the Ephorate, though rightly open to all the
- citizens, ought not to be elected as it is now, for the method is too
- childish.There is no clear evidence what
- the method was. And further the Ephors have jurisdiction in lawsuits
- of high importance, although they are any chance people, so that it would be
- better if they did not decide cases on their own judgement but by written rules
- and according to the laws. Also the mode of life of the Ephors is not in
- conformity with the aim of the state, for it is itself too luxurious, whereas in
- the case of the other citizens the prescribed life goes too far in the direction
- of harshness, so that they are unable to endure it, and secretly desert the law
- and enjoy the pleasures of the body. Also their regulations for the office of the Elders are not good; it is true
- that if these were persons of a high class who had been adequately trained in
- manly valor, one might perhaps say that the institution was advantageous to the
- state, although their life-tenure of the judgeship in important trials is indeed
- a questionable feature (for there is old age of mind as well as of
- body);
-
-
- but as their education has been on such lines that
- even the lawgiver himself cannot trust in them as men of virtue, it is a
- dangerous institution. And it is
- known that those who have been admitted to this office take bribes and betray
- many of the public interests by favoritism; so that it would be better if they
- were not exempt from having to render an account of their office, but at present
- they are. And it might be held that the magistracy of the Ephors serves to hold
- all the offices to account; but this gives altogether too much to the Ephorate,
- and it is not the way in which, as we maintain, officials ought to be called to
- account. Again, the procedure in the election of the Elders as a mode of
- selection is not only childish, but it is wrong that one who is to be the holder
- of this honorable office should canvass for it, for the man worthy of the office
- ought to hold it whether he wants to or not. But as it is the lawgiver clearly does the same here as in
- the rest of the constitution: he makes the citizens ambitious and has used this
- for the election of the Elders, for nobody would ask for office if he were not
- ambitious; yet surely ambition and love of money are the motives that bring
- about almost the greatest part of the voluntary wrongdoing that takes place
- among mankind. As to monarchy, the
- question whether it is not or is an advantageous institution for states to
- possessmay be left to another
- discussion; but at all events it would be advantageous that kings should not be
- appointed as they are now, but chosen in each case with regard to their own life
- and conduct. But it is clear that even the lawgiver himself does not suppose
- that he can make the kings men of high character: at all events he distrusts
- them as not being persons of sufficient worth owing to which the Spartans used
- to send kings who were enemies as colleagues on embassies, and thought that the
- safety of the state depended on division between the kings. Also the regulations for the the public mess-tables
- called Phiditia have been badly laid down by their originator. The revenue for
- these ought to come rather from public funds, as in Crete; but among the Spartans everybody has to contribute,
- although some of them are very poor and unable to find money for this charge, so
- that the result is the opposite of what the lawgiver purposed. For he intends
- the organization of the common tables to be democratic, but when regulated by
- the law in this manner it works out as by no means democratic; for it is not
- easy for the very poor to participate, yet their ancestral regulation of the
- citizenship is that it is not to belong to one who is unable to pay this tax.
- The law about the Admirals has
- been criticized by some other writers also, and rightly criticized; for it acts
- as a cause of sedition, since in addition to the kings who are military
- commanders the office of Admiral stands almost as another kingship. Another
- criticism that may be made against the fundamental principle of the lawgiver
-
-
-
- is one that Plato has made in the
Laws. The
- entire system of the laws is directed towards one part of virtue only, military
- valor, because this is serviceable for conquest. Owing to this they remained
- secure while at war, but began to decline when they had won an empire, because
- they did not know how to live a life of leisure, and had been trained in no
- other form of training more important than the art of war.
And another error no less serious than that one is
- this: they think that the coveted prizes of life are won by valor more than by
- cowardice, and in this they are right, yet they imagine wrongly that these
- prizes are worth more than the valor that wins them. The public finance of
-
Sparta is also badly regulated:
- when compelled to carry on wars on a large scale she has nothing in the state
- treasury, and the Spartiates pay war taxes badly because, as most of the land is
- owned by them, they do not scrutinize each other's contributions. And the
- lawgiver has achieved the opposite result to what is advantageous—he
- has made the state poor and the individual citizen covetous.
So much for a discussion of the constitution of
Sparta: for these are the main points in it
- for criticism.
-
-
The Cretan
- constitution approximates to that of
Sparta, but though in a few points it is not worse framed, for
- the larger part it has a less perfect finish. For the Spartan constitution
- appears and indeed is actually stated
e.g. by
- Hdt 1.65. to have been copied in most of its provisions from the
- Cretan; and as a rule old things have been less fully elaborated than newer
- ones. For it is said that when Lycurgus relinquished his post as guardian of
- King Charilaus
Posthumous son of Lycurgus's
- elder brother King Polydectes; cf.1316a 34. and went abroad, he
- subsequently passed most of his time in
Crete because of the relationship between the Cretans and the
- Spartans; for the Lyctians
- Lyctus was an inland city in the east
- of Crete, not far from Cnossus. were colonists from
-
Sparta, and the settlers that
- went out to the colony found the system of laws already existing among the
- previous inhabitants of the place; owing to which the neighboring villagers even
- now use these laws in the same manner, in the belief that Minos
Legendary ruler of Crete, son of Zeus and Europa, and after
- death a judge in the lower world. first instituted this code of laws.
-
And also the island appears to
- have been designed by nature and to be well situated to be under Greek rule, as
- it lies across the whole of the sea, round which almost all the Greeks are
- settled; for
Crete is only a short
- distance from the
Peloponnese in one
- direction, and from the part of
Asia
- around Triopium and from
Rhodes in the
- other. Owing to this Minos won the empire of the sea,
See Thuc. 1.4, 8. The tradition of
- the wealth of Minos is supported by the recent excavations at Cnossus. and made some of the
- islands subject to him and settled colonies in others, but finally when making
- an attack on
Sicily he ended his life
- there near Camicus.
-
The Cretan organization is on the same lines as that of
-
Sparta. In
Sparta the land is tilled by the Helots and
- in
Crete by the serfs;
-
-
- and also
- both have public mess-tables, and in old days the Spartans called them not
- ‘phiditia’ but ‘men's messes,’ as the
- Cretans do, which is a proof that they came from Crete. And so also did the system of government; for the Ephors
- have the same power as the magistrates called Cosmi in Crete, except that the Ephors are five in
- number and the Cosmi ten; and the Elders at Sparta are equal in number to the Elders whom the Cretans call
- the Council; and monarchy existed in former times, but then the Cretans
- abolished it, and the Cosmi hold the leadership in war; and all are members of the Assembly, though it has
- no powers except the function of confirming by vote the resolutions already
- formed by the Elders and the Cosmi.Now the Cretan
- arrangements for the public mess-tables are better than the Spartan; for at
- Sparta each citizen pays a fixed
- poll-tax, failing which he is prevented by law from taking part in the
- government, as has been said before; but in Crete the system is more communal, for out of all the crops and
- cattle produced from the public lands, and the tributes paid by the serfs, one
- part is assigned for the worship of the gods and the maintenance of the public
- services,and the other for the
- public mess-tables, so that all the citizens are maintained from the common
- funds, women and children as well as men; and the lawgiver has devised many wise measures to secure
- the benefit of moderation at table, and the segregation of the women in order
- that they may not bear many children, for which purpose he instituted
- association with the male sex, as to which there will be another occasionThis promise is not fulfilled to
- consider whether it was a bad thing or a good one. That the regulations for the
- common mess-tables therefore are better in Crete than at Sparta is manifest; but the regulations for the Cosmi are even
- worse than those regarding the Ephors. For the evil attaching to the office of
- the Ephors belongs to the Cosmi also, as the post is filled by any chance
- persons, while the benefit conferred on the government by this office at
- Sparta is lacking in Crete. At Sparta, as the election is made from all the citizens, the
- common people sharing in the highest office desire the maintenance of the
- constitution, but in Crete they do not
- elect the Cosmi from all the citizens but from certain clans, and the Elders
- from those who have held the office of Cosmos, about which regulations the same comments might be made as
- about what takes place at Sparta:
- their freedom from being called to account and their tenure for life gives them
- greater rank than their merit deserves, and their administration of their office
- at their own discretion and not under the guidance of a written code is
- dangerous. And the fact that the common people quietly tolerate their exclusion
- is no proof that the arrangement is a sound one; for the Cosmi unlike the Ephors
- make no sort of profit,
-
-
- as they live in an island remote from any people to
- corrupt them. Also the remedy which they employ for this defecti.e. the defect of the undue restriction of
- the office. is a curious one, and less characteristic of a republic
- than of a dynastySee 1292b 10 n.:
- often the Cosmi are expelled by
- a conspiracy formed among some of their actual colleagues or the private
- citizens. Also the Cosmi are allowed to resign during their term of office. Now
- it would be preferable for all these expedients to be put in force by law rather
- than at the discretion of individuals, for that is a dangerous principle. And
- the worst expedient of all is that of the suspension of the office of Cosmi,
- which is often brought about by members of the powerful class who wish to escape
- being punished; this proves that the constitution has a republican element,
- although it is not actually a republic but rather a dynasty.See 1292b 10 n. And the nobles frequently form parties
- among the common people and among their friends and so bring about a suspension
- of government,The MSS. give ‘bring
- about a monarchy.’ and form factions and engage in war with
- one another. Yet such a state of
- things is virtually the same as if for a period of time the state underwent an
- entire revolution, and the bonds of civil society were loosened.And it is a precarious position for a state to be in,
- when those who wish to attack it also have the power to do so. But, as has been
- said, it is saved by its locality; for distance has had the same effect as
- alien-acts.Aliens required special
- permission to reside at Sparta,
- and the ephors had powers to expel them for undesirable conduct. A
- result of this is that with the Cretans the serf population stands firm, whereas
- the Helots often revolt; for the Cretanstake no part in foreign empire, and also the island has only
- lately been invaded by warfare from abroad, rendering manifest the weakness of
- the legal system there.Let this suffice for our
- discussion of this form of constitution.
-
- Carthage also appears to have a good
- constitution, with many outstanding features as compared with those of other
- nations, but most nearly resembling the Spartan in some points. For these three
- constitutions are in a way near to one another and are widely different from the
- others—the Cretan, the Spartan and, thirdly, that of Carthage. Many regulations at Carthage are good; and a proof of a
- well-regulated constitution is that the populace willingly remain faithful to
- the constitutional system, and that neither civil strife has arisen in any
- degree worth mentioning, nor yet a tyrant.
- Points in which the
- Carthaginian constitution resembles the Spartan are the common mess-tables of
- its Comradeships corresponding to the Phiditia, and the magistracy of the
- Hundred and Four corresponding to the Ephors (except one point of
- superiority—the Ephors are drawn from any class, but the Carthaginians
- elect this magistracy by merit); the kings and the council of Elders
- correspond to the kings and Elders at Sparta, and it is another superior feature that the
- Carthaginian kings are not confined to the same family and that one of no
- particular distinction, and also that if any family distinguishes itself . .
- .Clauses seem to have been lost
- concluding the account of the appointment of the Kings and turning to the
- Elders and their selection on grounds of wealth. the Elders are to be
- chosen from these rather than by age; for as they are put in control of
- important matters, if they are men of no value they do great harm,
-
-
- and they
- have already injured the Spartan State.
- Most of the points
- therefore in the Carthaginian system that would be criticized on the ground of
- their divergences happen to be common to all the constitutions of which we have
- spoken; but the features open to criticism as judged by the principle of an
- aristocracy or republic are some of them departures in the direction of
- democracy and others in the direction of oligarchy. The reference of some
- matters and not of others to the popular assembly rests with the kings in
- consultation with the Elders in case they agreei.e. agree to refer or not to refer unanimously, but
- failing that, these matters also lie with the peoplei.e. even when the Kings only or the Elders only desire
- reference, it takes place; and when the kings introduce business in
- the assembly, they do not merely let the people sit and listen to the decisions
- that have been taken by their rulers, but the people have the sovereign
- decision, and anybody who wishes may speak against the proposals introduced, a
- right that does not exist under the other constitutions. The appointment by co-optation of the Boards of
- Five which control many important matters, and the election by these boards of
- the supreme magistracy of the Hundred, and also their longer tenure of authority
- than that of any other officers (for they are in power after they have
- gone out of office and before they have actually entered upon it) are
- oligarchical features; their receiving no pay and not being chosen by lot and
- other similar regulations must be set down as aristocratic, and so must the fact
- that the members of the Boards are the judges in all lawsuits,instead of different suits being tried by different
- courts as at Sparta. But the Carthaginian system diverges from
- aristocracy in the direction of oligarchy most signally in respect of a certain
- idea that is shared by the mass of mankind; they think that the rulers should be
- chosen not only for their merit but also for their wealth, as it is not possible
- for a poor man to govern well or to have leisure for his duties. If therefore
- election by wealth is oligarchical and election by merit aristocratic, this will
- be a third system exhibited in the organization of the constitution of
- Carthage, for there elections
- are made with an eye to these two qualifications, and especially elections to
- the most important offices, those of the kings and of the generals. But it must be held that this divergence
- from aristocracy is an error on the part of a lawgiver; for one of the most
- important points to keep in view from the outset is that the best citizens may
- be able to have leisure and may not have to engage in any unseemly occupation,
- not only when in office but also when living in private life. And if it is
- necessary to look to the question of means for the sake of leisure, it is a bad
- thing that the greatest offices of state, the kingship and the generalship,
- should be for sale. For this law makes wealth more honored than worth, and
- renders the whole state avaricious; and whatever the holders of supreme power deem honorable, the opinion of the
- other citizens also is certain to follow them, and a state in which virtue is
- not held in the highest honor
-
-
- cannot be securely governed by an
- aristocracy. And it is probable that those who purchase office will learn by
- degrees to make a profit out of it, when they hold office for money spent; for
- it would be odd if a man of small means but respectable should want to make a
- profit but an inferior person when he has spent money to get elected should not
- want to. Hence the persons who should be in office are those most capable of
- holding office. And even if the lawgiver neglected to secure comfortable means
- for respectable people, it would at all events be better that he should provide
- for their leisure while in office.
- And it might also be thought a bad thing
- for the same person to hold several offices, which is considered a distinction
- at Carthage. One man one job is
- the best rule for efficiency, and the lawgiver ought to see that this may be
- secured, and not appoint the same man to play the flute and make shoes. Hence
- except in a small city it is more statesmanlike for a larger number to share in
- the offices and more democratic, for it is fairer to all, as we said, and also
- functions are performed better and more quickly when separate than by the same
- people. This is clear in military and naval matters; for in both of these
- departments command and subordination penetrate throughout almost the whole
- body.i.e. everyone in command
- (except the commander-in-chief) has someone of higher rank
- over him.
-
- But
- the constitution being oligarchical they best escape the dangers by being
- wealthy, as they constantly send out a portion of the common people toappointments in the cities; by this means
- they heal the social sore and make the constitution stable. However, this is the
- achievement of fortune, whereas freedom from civil strife ought to be secured by
- the lawgiver; but as it is, suppose some misfortune occurs and the multitude of
- the subject class revolts, there is no remedy provided by the laws to restore
- tranquillity.This then is the character of
- the Spartan, Cretan and Carthaginian constitutions, which are justly
- famous.
- Of those that have put forward views about politics, some have
- taken no part in any political activities whatever but have passed their whole
- life as private citizens; and something has been said about almost all the
- writers of this class about whom there is anything noteworthy. Some on the other
- hand have been lawgivers, either for their native cities or even for certain
- foreign peoples, after having themselves been actively engaged in government;
- and of these some have been framers of laws only, and others of a constitution
- also, for instance Solon and Lycurgus, who instituted both laws and
- constitutions. The Spartan constitution has been discussed. As for Solon, he is considered by some people to
- have been a good lawgiver, as having put an end to oligarchy when it was too
- unqualified and having liberated the people from slavery and restored the
- ancestral democracy with a skilful blending of the constitution: the Council on
- the Areopagus being an oligarchic element, the elective magistracies
- aristocratic and the law-courts democratic. And although really in regard to
- certain of these features, the Council and the election of magistrates,
-
-
-
- Solon seems merely to have abstained from destroying
- institutions that existed already, he does appear to have founded the democracy
- by constituting the jury-courts from all the citizens. For this he is actually blamed by some persons, as having
- dissolved the power of the other parts of the community by making the law-court,
- which was elected by lot, all-powerful. For as the law-court grew strong, men
- courted favor with the people as with a tyrant, and so brought the constitution
- to the present democracy; and Ephialtes and Pericles docked the power of the
- Council on the Areopagus, while Pericles instituted payment for serving in the
- law-courts, and in this manner finally the successive leaders of the people led
- them on by growing stages to the present democracy. But this does not seem to
- have come about in accordance with the intention of Solon, but rather as a
- result of accident (for the
- common people having been the cause of the naval victories at the time of the
- Persian invasion became proud and adopted bad men as popular leaders when the
- respectable classes opposed their policy); inasmuch as Solon for his
- part appears to bestow only the minimum of power upon the people, the function
- of electing the magistrates and of calling them to account (for if even
- this were not under the control of the populace it would be a mere slave and a
- foreign enemy), whereas he appointed all the offices from the notable
- and the wealthy, the Five-hundred-bushel classand the Teamsters and a third property-class called the
- Knighthood; while the fourth class, the Thetes, were admitted to no office.For Solon's classification of the citizens by
- the annual income of their estates see Aristot. Ath. Pol. 7.
-
- Laws
- were givenPerhaps 664 B.C. by Zaleucus to the Epizephyrian
- Zephyrium, a promontory in S. Italy. Locrians and by
- CharondasSee 1252b 14. of
- Catana to his fellow-citizens
- and to the other Chalcidic citiesColonies
- from Chalcis in Euboea. on the coasts of Italy and
- Sicily. Some persons try to connect
- Zaleucus and Charondas together: they say that Onomacritus first arose as an
- able lawgiver, and that he was trained in Crete, being a Locrian and travelling there to practise the art
- of soothsaying, and Thales became his companion, and Lycurgus and Zaleucus were
- pupils of Thales, and Charondas of Zaleucus; but these stories give too little
- attention to the dates. Philolaus of
- Corinth also arose as lawgiver
- at Thebes. Philolaus belonged by
- birth to the Bacchiad family; he became the lover of Diocles the winnerIn 728 B.C.
- at Olympia, but when Diocles
- quitted the city because of his loathing for the passion of his mother Alcyone,
- he went away to Thebes, and there
- they both ended their life. Even now people still show their tombs, in full view
- of each other and one of them fully open to view in the direction of the
- Corinthian country but the other one not; for the story goes that they arranged to be buried in this
- manner, Diocles owing to his hatred for his misfortune securing that the land of
- Corinth might not be visible
- from his tomb, and Philolaus that it might be from his.
-
-
- It was due then to
- a reason of this nature that they went to live at Thebes; but Philolaus became the Thebans'
- lawgiver in regard to various matters, among others the size of
- families,—the laws called by the Thebans laws of adoption; about this
- Philolaus enacted special legislation, in order that the number of the estates
- in land might be preserved. There is
- nothing special in the code of Charondas except the trials for false witness
- (for he was the first to introduce the procedure of
- denunciation), but in the accuracy of his laws he is a more finished
- workman even than the legislators of today. (Peculiar to PhaleasDealt with already in 4. is the measure
- for equalizing properties; to Plato,Above,
- 1-3 community of wives and children and of property, and the common
- meals for the women, and also the law about drunkenness, enacting that sober
- persons are to be masters of the drinking-bouts, and the regulation for military
- training to make men ambidextrous during drill, on the ground that it is a
- mistake to have one of the two hands useful but the other
- useless.)There are laws
- of Draco,Author of the first written code at
- Athens, 621 B.C. (though in Aristot. Ath. Pol. 4, his legislation is hardly mentioned; he
- appears there as the framer of the constitution). but he
- legislated for an existing constitution, and there is nothing peculiar in his
- laws that is worthy of mention, except their severity in imposing heavy
- punishment. PittacusOf Mitylene in Lesbos, one of the Seven Sages, dictator 589-579 B.C. also was a framer
- of laws, but not of a constitution; a special law of his is that if men commit
- any offence when drunk,they are to
- pay a larger fine than those who offend when sober; because since more men are
- insolent when drunk than when sober he had regard not to the view that drunken
- offenders are to be shown more mercy, but to expediency. AndrodamasOtherwise unknown. of Rhegium also became lawgiver to the
- Chalcidians in the direction of Thrace,
- Chalcidice, the peninsula in the N.
- Aegean, was colonized from Chalcis in Euboea. and to him belong the laws dealing with cases of
- murder and with heiresses; however one cannot mention any provision that is
- peculiar to him.Let such be our examination of
- the constitutional schemes actually in force and of those that have been
- proposed by certain persons.
-
-
-
-
- For the student of government, and of nature and characteristics of the
- various forms of constitution, almost the first question to consider is in
- regard to the state: what exactly is the essential nature of a state? As it is,
- this is a matter of dispute: a public act is spoken of by some people as the
- action of the state, others speak of it as the action not of the state but of
- the oligarchy or the tyrant in powerSo we
- speak of an action planned and carried by the party in power as an Act of
- Parliament, and technically as an act of the sovereign.; and we see
- that the activity of the statesman and lawgiver is entirely concerned with a
- state as its object, and a constitution is a form of organization of the
- inhabitants of a state. But a state
- is a composite thing, in the same sense as any other of the things that are
- wholes but consist of many parts; it is therefore clear that we must first
- inquire into the nature of a citizen; for a state is a collection of citizens,
-
-
-
- so that we have to consider who is entitled to the name of
- citizen, and what the essential nature of a citizen is. For there is often a
- difference of opinion as to this: people do not all agree that the same person
- is a citizen; often somebody who would be a citizen in a democracy is not a
- citizen under an oligarchy. We need
- not here consider those who acquire the title of citizen in some exceptional
- manner, for example those who are citizens by adoption; and citizenship is not
- constituted by domicile in a certain place (for resident aliens and
- slaves share the domicile of citizens), nor are those citizens who
- participate in a common system of justice, conferring the right to defend an
- action and to bring one in the law-courts (for this right belongs also
- to the parties under a commercial treaty, as they too can sue and be sued at
- law,—or rather, in many places even the right of legal action is not
- shared completely by resident aliens, but they are obliged to produce a patron,
- so that they only share in a common legal procedure to an incomplete
- degree), but these are only
- citizens in the manner in which children who are as yet too young to have been
- enrolled in the list and old men who have been dischargedThis seems to imply that aged citizens were excused
- attendance at the assembly and law-courts, as well as military
- service must be pronounced to be citizens in a sense, yet not quite
- absolutely, but with the added qualification of ‘under age’
- in the case of the former and ‘superannuated’ or some other
- similar term (it makes no difference, the meaning being clear)
- in that of the latter. For we seek to define a citizen in the absolute sense,
- and one possessing nodisqualification
- of this nature that requires a correcting term, since similar difficulties may
- also be raised, and solved, about citizens who have been disfranchised or
- exiled. A citizen pure and simple is defined by nothing else so much as by the
- right to participate in judicial functions and in office. But some offices of
- government are definitely limited in regard to time, so that some of them are
- not allowed to be held twice by the same person at all, or only after certain
- fixed intervals of time; other officials are without limit of tenure, for
- example the juryman and the member of the assembly. It might perhaps be said that such persons are not
- officials at all, and that the exercise of these functions does not constitute
- the holding of office;Or, amending the text,
- ‘and yet that it is absurd to deny the title of citizen to
- those—’ and yet it is absurd to deny the title of
- official to those who have the greatest power in the state. But it need not make
- any difference, as it is only the question of a name, since there is no common
- name for a juryman and a member of the assembly that is properly applied to
- both. For the sake of distinction therefore let us call the combination of the
- two functions ‘office’ without limitation. Accordingly we
- lay it down that those are citizens who participate in office in this
- manner.Such more or less is the definition of
- ‘citizen’ that would best fit with all of those to whom the
- name is applied. But it must not be
- forgotten that things in the case of which the things to which they are related
- differ in kind, one of them being primary, another one secondary and so on,
- either do not contain a common nature at all, as being what they are, or barely
- do so.The meaning of this abstract principle
- is most easily seen from its application here: if states are generically
- different from one another, membership of a state, citizenship, can hardly
- be a single thing, and come under a single definition. Now we see
- that constitutions differ from one another in kind, and that some are subsequent
- and others prior;
-
-
- for erroneous and divergent forms are necessarily
- subsequent to correct forms (in what sense we employ the terms
- ‘divergent’ of constitutions will appear later).
- Hence the citizen corresponding to each form of constitution will also
- necessarily be different. Therefore the definition of a citizen that we have
- given applies especially to citizenship in a democracy; under other forms of
- government it may hold good, but will not necessarily do so. For in some states there is no body of common
- citizens, and they do not have the custom of a popular assembly but councils of
- specially convened members, and the office of trying law-suits goes by
- sections—for example at Sparta suits for breach of contract are tried by different
- ephors in different cases, while cases of homicide are tried by the ephors and
- doubtless other suits by some other magistrate. The same method is notThe negative is a conjectural insertion, cf.
- 1273a 20. followed at Carthage, where certain magistrates judge all the law-suits.
- But still, our definition of a
- citizen admits of correction. For under the other forms of constitution a member
- of the assembly and of a jury-court is not ‘an official’
- without restriction, but an official defined according to his office; either all
- of them or some among them are assigned deliberative and judicial duties either
- in all matters or in certain matters. What constitutes a citizen is therefore
- clear from these considerations: we now declare that one who has the right to
- participate in deliberative or judicial office is a citizen of the
- statein which he has that right,
- and a state is a collection of such persons sufficiently numerous, speaking
- broadly, to secure independence of life.
- But in practice citizenship
- is limited to the child of citizens on both sides, not on one side only, that
- is, the child of a citizen father or of a citizen mother; and other people carry
- this requirement further back, for example to the second or the third preceding
- generation or further. But given this as a practical and hasty definition, some
- people raise the difficulty, How will that ancestor three or four generations
- back have been a citizen? GorgiasSicilian
- orator and nihilistic philosopher, visited Athens
- 427 B.C. of Leontini therefore, partly
- perhaps in genuine perplexity but partly in jest, said that just as the vessels
- made by mortar-makers were mortars, so the citizens made by the magistrates were
- Larisaeans, since some of the magistrates were actually larisa-makers.
- Larisa, a city in Thessaly, was famous for the manufacture of a kind of
- kettle called ‘larisa.’ But it is really a simple
- matter; for if they possessed citizenship in the manner stated in our definition
- of a citizen, they were citizens—since it is clearly impossible to
- apply the qualification of descent from a citizen father or mother to the
- original colonizers or founders of a city.
- But perhaps a question
- rather arises about those who were admitted to citizenship when a revolution had
- taken place, for instance such a creation of citizens as that carried outIn 509 B.C.
- at Athens by Cleisthenes after the
- expulsion of the tyrants, when he enrolled in his tribes many resident aliens
- who had been foreigners or slaves. The dispute as to these is not about the fact
- of their citizenship, but whether they received it wrongly or rightly. Yet even
- as to this one might raise the further question,
-
-
- whether, if a man
- is not rightly a citizen, he is a citizen at all, as
- ‘wrongly’ means the same as ‘not truly.’
- But we sometimes see officials governing wrongly, as to whom we shall not deny
- that they do govern, but shall say that they do not do it rightly, and a citizen
- is defined by a certain function of government (a citizen, as we said,
- is one who shares in such and such an office); therefore it is clear
- that even persons wrongly admitted to citizenship are to be pronounced to be
- citizens, although the question whether they are so rightly or not rightly is
- connected with the question that was propounded before.The question, What is a state? 1274b 34. For some
- persons raise the question, When is an occurrence the act of the state and when
- is it not? for example, when the government has been altered from oligarchy or
- tyranny to democracy. In such circumstances some people claim that the new
- government should not discharge public debts, on the ground that the money was
- borrowed by the tyrant and not by the state, and should repudiate many other
- similar claims also, because some forms of government rest upon force and are
- not aimed at the welfare of the community. If therefore some democracies also are governed in that
- manner, the acts of the authorities in their case can only be said to be the
- acts of the state in the same sense as the public acts emanating from an
- oligarchy or a tyranny are said to be. Akin to this controversy seems to be the
- subject, What exactly is the principle on which we ought to pronounce a city to
- be the same city as it was before, or not the same but a different city? The
- most obvious mode of inquiring into this difficultydeals with place and people: the place and the people may have
- been divided, and some may have settled in one place, and some in another. In
- this form the question must be considered as easier of solution; for, as
- ‘city’ has several meanings, the inquiry so put is in a way
- not difficult.i.e. po/lis means both (1)
- ‘city’ (and also
- ‘citadel’) and (2)
- ‘state,’ a collection of citizens; and if the citizens
- divide and settle in two different ‘cities’ with
- different governments, they are clearly not the same
- ‘state’ as before.
- But it may similarly be asked,
- Suppose a set of men inhabit the same place, in what circumstances are we to
- consider their city to be a single city? Its unity clearly does not depend on
- the walls, for it would be possible to throw a single wall round the Peloponnesus; and a case in point perhaps is
- Babylon, and any other city that
- has the circuit of a nation rather than of a city; for it is said that when
- Babylon was captured a considerable
- part of the city was not aware of it three days later. But the consideration of
- this difficulty will be serviceable for another occasion, as the student of
- politics must not ignore the question, What is the most advantageous size for a
- city, and should its population be of one race or of several? But are we to pronounce a city, where the
- same population inhabit the same place, to be the same city so long as the
- population are of the same race, in spite of the fact that all the time some are
- dying and others being born, just as it is our custom to say that a river or a
- spring is the same river or spring although one stream of water is always being
- added to it and another being withdrawn from it, or are we to say that though
- the people are the same people for the similar reason of continuity, yet the
- city is a different city?
-
-
- For inasmuch as a state is a kind of partnership,
- and is in fact a partnership of citizens in a government, when the form of the
- government has been altered and is different it would appear to follow that the
- state is no longer the same state, just as we say that a chorus which on one
- occasion acts a comedy and on another a tragedy is a different chorus although
- it is often composed of the same persons, and similarly with any other common whole or composite
- structure we say it is different if the form of its structure is
- different—for instance a musical tune consisting of the same notes we
- call a different tune if at one time it is played in the Dorian mode and at
- another in the Phrygian. Therefore if this is the case, it is clear that we must
- speak of a state as being the same state chiefly with regard to its
- constitution; and it is possible for it to be called by the same or by a
- different designation both when its inhabitants are the same and when they are
- entirely different persons. But whether a state is or is not bound in justice to
- discharge its engagements when it has changed to a different constitution, is
- another subject.
- The next thing to consider after what has now been said is the
- question whether we are to hold that the goodness of a good man is the same as
- that of a good citizen, or not the same. However, if this point really is to
- receive investigation, we must first ascertain in some general outline what
- constitutes the excellence of a citizen.Now a citizen we pronounced to be one sort of partner in a
- community, as is a sailor. And although sailors differ from each other in
- function—one is an oarsman, another helmsman, another look-out man,
- and another has some other similar special designation—and so clearly
- the most exact definition of their excellence will be special to each, yet there
- will also be a common definition of excellence that will apply alike to all of
- them; for security in navigation is the business of them all, since each of the
- sailors aims at that. Similarly
- therefore with the citizens, although they are dissimilar from one another,
- their business is the security of their community, and this community is the
- constitution, so that the goodness of a citizen must necessarily be relative to
- the constitution of the state. If therefore there are various forms of
- constitution, it is clear that there cannot be one single goodness which is the
- perfect goodness of the good citizen; but when we speak of a good man we mean
- that he possesses one single goodness, perfect goodness. Hence it is manifestly
- possible to be a good citizen without possessing the goodness that constitutes a
- good man. Moreover it is also
- feasible to pursue the same topic by raising the question in another manner in
- relation to the best form of constitution. If it is impossiblePerhaps the Greek should be altered to give
- ‘possible’. If we emend the text with Bernays to
- ei) ga\r du/naton e)c a(pa/ntwn spoudai/wn o)/ntwn
- ei)=nai po/lin, the sense is: assuming the possibility of a
- perfect state, with all its factors the best of their kind, this means that
- all the population will be good citizens, not that they will all be perfect
- specimens of the human race, because the state needs citizens of the working
- classes, etc., and these cannot in the nature of things be perfect human
- beings for a state to consist entirely of good men, and if it is
- necessary for each person to perform well the work of his position, and to do
- this springs from goodness, then because it is impossible for all the citizens
- to be alike,
-
-
- the goodness of a good citizen would not be one and the same as
- the goodness of a good man; for all ought to possess the goodness of the good
- citizen (that is a necessary condition of the state's being the best
- possible), but it is impossible that all should possess the goodness of
- a good man, if it is not necessary that all the citizens in a good state should
- be good men. Again, since the state
- consists of unlike persons—just as an animal (to take this
- instance first) consists of soul and body, and a soul of reason and
- appetite, and a household of husband and wife and [ownership
- involves]These words in the
- Greek are probably an interpolation. a master and slave, in the same
- manner a state consists of all of these persons and also of others of different
- classes in addition to these,—it necessarily follows that the goodness
- of all the citizens is not one and the same, just as among dancers the skill of
- a head dancer is not the same as that of a subordinate leader. It is clear then from these considerations
- that the goodness of a good citizen and that of a good man are not the same in
- general; but will the goodness of a good citizen of a particular sort be the
- same as that of a good man? Now we say that a good ruler is virtuous and wise,
- and that a citizen taking part in politics must be wise. Also some people say
- that even the education of a ruler must be different, as indeed we see that the
- sons of kings are educated in horsemanship and military exercises, and Euripides
- saysFragment 16, from
- Aeolus.
-
- No subtleties for me, but what the state
- Requireth—
-
- implying that there is a
- special education for a ruler. And
- if the goodness of a good ruler is the same as the goodness of a good man, yet
- the person ruled is also a citizen, so that the goodness of a citizen in general
- will not be the same as that of a man, although that of a particular citizen
- will; for goodness as a ruler is not the same as goodness as a citizen, and no
- doubt this is the reason why JasonTyrant of
- Pherae in Thessaly, assassinated
- 370 B.C. said that when he was not
- tyrant he went hungry, meaning that he did not know the art of being a private
- person. Another point is that we
- praise the ability to rule and to be ruled, and it is doubtless held that the
- goodness of a citizen consists in ability both to rule and to be ruled well. If
- then we lay it down that the goodness of the good man is displayed in ruling,
- whereas that of the citizen is shown in both capacities, the two capacities
- cannot be equally laudable. Since therefore both views are sometimes accepted,
- and it is thought that the ruler and the subject do not have to learn the same
- arts but that the citizen must know both arts and share in both capacities, . .
- . .Some words seem to have been lost,
- conveying ‘we must consider how this dual fitness can be
- acquired,’ or possibly considerably more. But the text at the
- beginning of the sentence is also corrupt. And it may be discerned
- from the following illustration: one form of authority is that of a master;
- by this we mean the exercise of
- authority in regard to the necessary work of the house, which it is not
- necessary for the master to know how to execute, but rather how to utilize; the
- other capacity, I mean the ability actually to serve in these menial tasks, is
- indeed a slave's quality. But we distinguish several kinds of slave, as their
- employments are several. One department belongs to the handicraftsmen, who as
- their name implies are the persons that live by their hands,
-
-
- a class
- that includes the mechanic artisan. Hence in some states manual laborers were
- not admitted to office in old times, before the development of extreme
- democracy. The tasks of those who
- are under this form of authority therefore it is not proper for the good man or
- the man fit for citizenship or the good citizen to learn, except for his own
- private use occasionally (for then it ceases to be a case of the one
- party being master and the other slave). But there exists a form of
- authority by which a man rules over persons of the same race as himself, and
- free men (for that is how we describe political authority),
- and this the ruler should learn by being ruled, just as a man should command
- cavalry after having served as a trooper, command a regiment after having served
- in a regiment and been in command of a company and of a platoon. Hence there is
- much truth in the saying that it is impossible to become a good ruler without
- having been a subject. And although
- the goodness of a ruler and that of a subject are different, the good citizen
- must have the knowledge and the ability both to be ruled and to rule, and the
- merit of the good citizen consists in having a knowledge of the government of
- free men on both sides. And therefore both these virtues are characteristic of a
- good man, even if temperance and justice in a ruler are of a different kind from
- temperance and justice in a subject; for clearly a good man's virtue, for
- example his justice, will not be one and the same when he is under government
- and when he is free, but it will be of different kinds,one fitting him to rule and one to be ruled, just
- as temperance and courage are different in a man and in a woman (for a
- man would be thought a coward if he were only as brave as a brave woman, and a
- woman a chatterer if she were only as modest as a good man; since even the
- household functions of a man and of a woman are different—his business
- is to get and hers to keep). And practical wisdom alone of the virtues is a virtue
- peculiar to a ruler; for the other virtues seem to be necessary alike for both
- subjects and rulers to possess, but wisdom assuredly is not a subject's virtue,
- but only right opinion: the subject corresponds to the man who makes flutes and
- the ruler to the flute-player who uses them.The
- question whether the goodness of a good man is the same as that of a good
- citizen or different, and how they are the same and how different, is clear from
- these considerations.
- But one of the difficulties as to what constitutes a
- citizen is still left. Is it truly the case that a citizen is a person who has
- the right to share office in the government, or are the working classes also to
- be counted citizens? If these persons also are to be counted who have no share
- in offices, it is not possible for every citizen to possess the citizen's
- virtue; for the true citizen is the man capable of governing.Or perhaps ‘for the working-man is a
- citizen.’ ou(=tos ga\r poli/ths.
- The translation takes poli/ths as subject
- and ou(=tos as predicate (meaning
- e)/xwn th\n toiau/thn a)reth/n,
- possessing capacity to govern). But possibly the predicate is
- poli/ths and the subject ou(=tos, which then stands for o( ba/nausos; if so, the whole sentence means
- that if the non-official classes are citizens, not all the citizens will
- possess civic virtue (which is capacity to govern), for
- the working-man will be a citizen (and he is not capable of
- governing). If on the other hand no one of the working
- people is a citizen, in what class are the various workers to be ranked? for
- they are neither resident aliens nor foreigners. Or shall we say that so far as
- that argument goes no inconsistency results?
-
-
- for slaves also are not in one
- of the classes mentioned, nor are freedmen. For it is true that not all the persons indispensable for
- the existence of a state are to be deemed citizens, since even the sons of
- citizens are not citizens in the same sense as the adults: the latter are
- citizens in the full sense, the former only by presumptionOr, with Casaubon's probable correction of the Greek,
- ‘only with a qualification.’—they are
- citizens, but incomplete ones. In ancient times in fact the artisan class in
- some states consisted of slaves or aliens, owing to which the great mass of
- artisans are so even now; and the best-ordered state will not make an artisan a
- citizen. While if even the artisan is a citizen, then what we said to be the
- citizen's virtue must not be said to belong to every citizen, nor merely be
- defined as the virtue of a free man, but will only belong to those who are
- released from menial occupations. Among menial occupations those who render such services to an individual are
- slaves, and those who do so for the community are artisans and hired laborers.
- The state of the case about them will be manifest from what follows when we
- consider it a little further[, for what has been said when made known
- itself makes it clear].The
- ill-expressed clause ‘for what—clear’ seems
- almost certainly to be an interpolation. As there are several forms
- of constitution, it follows that there are several kinds of citizen, and
- especially of the citizen in a subject position; hence under one form of
- constitution citizenship will necessarily extend to the artisan and the hired
- laborer, while under other forms this is impossible, for instance in any
- constitution that is of the form entitled aristocratic and in whichthe honors are bestowed according to
- goodness and to merit, since a person living a life of manual toil or as a hired
- laborer cannot practise the pursuits in which goodness is exercised. In oligarchies on the other hand, though it
- is impossible for a hired laborer to be a citizen (since admission to
- office of various grades is based on high property-assessments), it is
- possible for an artisan; for even the general mass of the craftsmen are rich. At
- Thebes there was a law that no
- one who had not kept out of trade for the last ten years might be admitted to
- office. But under many constitutions the law draws recruits even from
- foreigners; for in some democracies the son of a citizen-mother is a citizen,
- and the same rule holds good as
- to base-born sons in many places. Nevertheless, inasmuch as such persons are
- adopted as citizens owing to a lack of citizens of legitimate birth
- (for legislation of this kind is resorted to because of
- under-population), when a state becomes well off for numbers it
- gradually divests itself first of the sons of a slave father or mother, then of
- those whose mothers only were citizens, and finally only allows citizenship to
- the children of citizens on both sides. These facts then show that there are various kinds of
- citizen, and that a citizen in the fullest sense means the man who shares in the
- honors of the state, as is implied in the verse of Homer
- Hom. Il. 9.648, Hom. Il. 16.59
- :
- Like to some alien settler without honor,—
-
since a native not admitted to a share in the public honors is like an
- alien domiciled in the land. But in some places this exclusion is disguised, for
- the purpose of deceiving those who are a part of the population.The MSS. give ‘But where such
- exclusion is disguised, it (this concealment) is for the
- purpose of deceiving’ etc.
- The answer therefore to the question,
-
-
- Is the
- goodness that makes a good man to be deemed the same as that which makes a
- worthy citizen, or different? is now clear from what has been said in one form
- of state the good man and the good citizen are the same, but in another they are
- different, and also in the former case it is not every citizen but only the
- statesman, the man who controls or is competent to control, singly or with
- colleagues, the administration of the commonwealth, that is essentially also a
- good man.
- And since these points have been determined, the next question
- to be considered is whether we are to lay it down that there is only one form of
- constitution or several, and if several, what they are and how many and what are
- the differences between them. Now a constitution is the ordering of a state in
- respect of its various magistracies, and especially the magistracy that is
- supreme over all matters. For the government is everywhere supreme over the
- state and the constitution is the government. I mean that in democratic states
- for example the people are supreme, but in oligarchies on the contrary the few
- are; and we say that they have a different constitution. And we shall use the
- same language about the other forms of government also.
- We have therefore to
- determine first the fundamental points, what is the object for which a state
- exists and how many different kinds of system there are for governing mankind
- and for controlling the common life.Now it has
- been said in our first discourses,1253a 1
- ff. in which we determined the principles concerning household
- management and the control of slaves, that man is by nature a political
- animal;and so even when men have
- no need of assistance from each other they none the less desire to live
- together. At the same time they are
- also brought together by common interest, so far as each achieves a share of the
- good life. The good life then is the chief aim of society, both collectively for
- all its members and individually; but they also come together and maintain the
- political partnership for the sake of life merely, for doubtless there is some
- element of value contained even in the mere state of being alive, provided that
- there is not too great an excess on the side of the hardships of life, and it is
- clear that the mass of mankind cling to life at the cost of enduring much
- suffering, which shows that life contains some measure of well-being and of
- sweetness in its essential nature.
- And again, the several recognized varieties
- of government can easily be defined; in fact we frequently discuss them in our
- external discourses.Mentioned at 1323a 22
- (and also six times in other books); they are there
- appealed to for the tripartite classification of foods which in Aristot. Nic. Eth.1098b 12 is
- ascribed to ‘current opinion of long standing and generally
- accepted by students of philosophy.’ The term may there predenote
- doctrines not peculiar to the Peripatetic school. The authority of a
- master over a slave, although in truth when both master and slave are designed
- by nature for their positions their interests are the same, nevertheless governs
- in the greater degree with a view to the interest of the master, but
- incidentally with a view to that of the slave, for if the slave deteriorates the
- position of the master cannot be saved from injury. Authority over children and wife [and over the
- whole household, which we call the art of household managementAristotle can hardly have written this clause,
- as it includes mastership over slaves.] is exercised either
- in the interest of those ruled or for some common interest of both
- parties,—essentially, in the interest of the ruled, as we see that the
- other arts also,
-
-
- but they can best
- excel in military valor, for this is found with numbers; and therefore with this
- form of constitution the class that fights for the state in war is the most
- powerful, and it is those who possess arms who are admitted to the
- government.) Deviations
- from the constitutions mentioned are tyranny corresponding to kingship,
- oligarchy to aristocracy, and democracy to constitutional government; for
- tyranny is monarchy ruling in the interest of the monarch, oligarchy government
- in the interest of the rich, democracy government in the interest of the poor,
- and none of these forms governs with regard to the profit of the
- community.But it is necessary to say at a
- little greater length what each of these constitutions is; for the question
- involves certain difficulties, and it is the special mark of one who studies any
- subject philosophically, and not solely with regard to its practical aspect,
- that he does not overlook or omit any point, but brings to light the truth about
- each. Now tyranny, as has been said,
- is monarchy exerting despotic power over the political community; oligarchy is
- when the control of the government is in the hands of those that own the
- properties; democracy is when on the contrary it is in the hands of those that
- do not possess much property, but are poor.A first difficulty is with regard to the definition. If the
- majority of the citizens were wealthy and were in control of the state, yet when
- the multitude is in power it is a democracy, and similarly, to take the other
- case, if it were to occur somewhere that the poor were fewer than the rich but
- were stronger than they and accordingly were in control of the government, yet
- where a small number is in control it is said to be an oligarchy, then it would
- seem that our definition of the forms of constitution was not a good one.i.e. it would be absurd to term government by
- the people democracy if the people happened to be very rich, or government
- by a few oligarchy if the few were poor and the many whom they governed
- rich.
- And once again, if one assumed the
- combination of small numbers with wealth and of multitude with poverty, and
- named the constitutions thus—one in which the rich being few in number
- hold the offices, oligarchy: one in which the poor being many in number hold the
- offices, democracy,—this involves another difficulty. What names are
- we to give to the constitutions just described—the one in which there
- are more rich and the one in which the poor are the fewer, and these control
- their respective governments—if there exists no other form of
- constitution beside those mentioned? The argument therefore seems to make it clear that for few or many to have
- power is an accidental feature of oligarchies in the one case and democracies in
- the other, due to the fact that the rich are few and the poor are many
- everywhere (so that it is not really the case that the points mentioned
- constitute a specific difference), but that the real thing in which
- democracy and oligarchy differ from each other is poverty and wealth;
-
-
- and it
- necessarily follows that wherever the rulers owe their power to wealth, whether
- they be a minority or a majority, this is an oligarchy, and when the poor rule,
- it is a democracy, although it does accidentally happen, as we said, that where
- the rulers hold power by wealth they are few and where they hold power by
- poverty they are many, because few men are rich but all men possess freedom, and
- wealth and freedom are the grounds on which the two classes lay claim to the
- government.
- And first we must ascertain what are stated to be the
- determining qualities of oligarchy and democracy, and what is the principle of
- justice under the one form of government and under the other. For all men lay
- hold on justice of some sort, but they only advance to a certain point, and do
- not express the principle of absolute justice in its entirety. For instance, it
- is thought that justice is equality, and so it is, though not for everybody but
- only for those who are equals; and it is thought that inequality is just, for so
- indeed it is, though not for everybody, but for those who are unequal; but these
- partisans strip away the qualification of the persons concerned, and judge
- badly. And the cause of this is that they are themselves concerned in the
- decision, and perhaps most men are bad judges when their own interests are in
- question. Hence inasmuch as
- ‘just’ means just for certain persons, and it is divided in
- the same way in relation to the things to be distributed and the persons that
- receive them, as has been said before in the Ethics,Cf. Aristot. Nic. Eth.
- 1131a 14-24. the two parties agree as to what constitutes
- equality in the thing, but dispute as to what constitutes equality in the
- person,chiefly for the reason
- just now stated, because men are bad judges where they themselves are concerned,
- but also, inasmuch as both parties put forward a plea that is just up to a
- certain point, they think that what they say is absolutely just. For the one
- side think that if they are unequal in some respects, for instance in wealth,
- they are entirely unequal, and the other side think that if they are equal in
- some respects, for instance in freedom, they are entirely equal. But the most important thing they do not
- mention. If men formed the community and came together for the sake of wealth,
- their share in the state is proportionate to their share in the property, so
- that the argument of the champions of oligarchy would appear to be
- valid—namely that in a partnership with a capital of 100 minaeSee 1268b 14 n. it would not be just
- for the man who contributed one mina to have a share whether of the principal or
- of the profits accruing equal to the share of the man who supplied the whole of
- the remainder; but if on the other hand the state was formed not for the sake of
- life only but rather for the good life (for otherwise a collection of
- slaves or of lower animals would be a state, but as it is, it is not a state,
- because slavesSee 1260a 12, and Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1177a 8,
- ‘but no one allows a slave any measure of happiness, any more than
- a life of his own.’ and animals have no share in well-being
- or in purposive life), and if its object is not military alliance for
- defence against injury by anybody, and it does not exist for the sake of trade
- and of business relationsThe sentence here
- breaks off; The inference that should have formed its conclusion is given in
- 5.15.—for if so, Etruscans and Carthaginians and all the
- people that have commercial relations with one another would be virtually
- citizens of a single state; at all
- events they have agreements about imports and covenants as to abstaining from
- dishonesty and treaties of alliance for mutual defence;
-
-
- but they do not
- have officials common to them all appointed to enforce these covenants, but
- different officials with either party, nor yet does either party take any
- concern as to the proper moral character of the other, nor attempt to secure
- that nobody in the states under the covenant shall be dishonest or in any way
- immoral, but only that they shall not commit any wrong against each other. All
- those on the other hand who are concerned about good government do take civic
- virtue and vice into their purview. Thus it is also clear that any state that is
- truly so called and is not a state merely in name must pay attention to virtue;
- for otherwise the community becomes merely an alliance, differing only in
- locality from the other alliances, those of allies that live apart. And the law
- is a covenant or, in the phrase of the sophist Lycophron,Probably a pupil of Gorgias, see 1275b 26 n. a
- guarantee of men's just claims on one another, but it is not designed to make
- the citizens virtuous and just. And
- that this is how the matter stands is manifest. For if one were actually to
- bring the sites of two cities together into one, so that the city-walls of
- Megara and those of Corinth were contiguous, even so they
- would not be one city; nor would they if they enacted rights of intermarriage
- with each other, although intermarriage between citizens is one of the elements
- of community which are characteristic of states. And similarly even if certain
- people lived in separate places yet not so far apart as not to have intercourse,
- but had laws to prevent their wronging one anotherin their interchange of products— for instance, if
- one man were a carpenter, another a farmer, another a shoemaker and another
- something else of the kind,—and the whole population numbered ten
- thousand, but nevertheless they had no mutual dealings in anything else except
- such things as exchange of commodities and military alliance, even then this
- would still not be a state. What
- then exactly is the reason for this? for clearly it is not because their
- intercourse is from a distance since even if they came together for intercourse
- of this sort (each nevertheless using his individual house as a
- city) and for one another's military aid against wrongful aggressors
- only, as under a defensive alliance, not even then would they seem to those who
- consider the matter carefully to constitute a state, if they associated on the
- same footing when they came together as they did when they were apart. It is
- manifest therefore that a state is not merely the sharing of a common locality
- for the purpose of preventing mutual injury and exchanging goods. These are
- necessary preconditions of a state's existence, yet nevertheless, even if all
- these conditions are present, that does not therefore make a state, but a state
- is a partnership of families and of clans in living well, and its object is a
- full and independent life. At the
- same time this will not be realized unless the partners do inhabit one and the
- same locality and practise intermarriage; this indeed is the reason why family
- relationships have arisen throughout the states, and brotherhoods and clubs for
- sacrificial rites and social recreations. But such organization is produced by
- the feeling of friendship, for friendship is the motive of social life;
- therefore, while the object of a state is the good life, these things are means
- to that end. And a state is the partnership of clans and villages in a full and
- independent life,
-
-
- which in our view constitutes a happy and noble
- life; the political fellowship must therefore be deemed to exist for the sake of
- noble actions, not merely for living in common. Hence those who contribute most to such fellowship have a
- larger part in the state than those who are their equals or superiors in freedom
- and birth but not their equals in civic virtue, or than those who surpass them
- in wealth but are surpassed by them in virtue.It
- is therefore clear from what has been said that all those who dispute about the
- forms of constitution assert a part of the just principle.
- But it is a matter
- of question what ought to be the sovereign power in the state. Clearly it must
- be either the multitude, or the rich, or the good, or the one man who is best of
- all, or a tyrant. But all of these arrangements appear to involve disagreeable
- consequences. For instance, if the poor take advantage of their greater numbers
- to divide up the property of the rich, is not this unjust? No, it may be said,
- for it was a resolution made by the supreme authority in just form. Then what
- must be pronounced to be the extreme of injustice? And again, when everybody is
- taken into account, suppose the majority share out among themselves the property
- of the minority, it is manifest that they are destroying the state; but
- assuredly virtue does not destroyits
- possessor, and justice is not destructive of the state, so that it is clear that
- this principle also cannot be just. Also it follows from it that all the actions done by a tyrant are just, for
- his use of force is based upon superior strength, as is the compulsion exerted
- by the multitude against the rich. But is it just that the minority and the rich
- should rule? Suppose therefore they also act in the same way and plunder and
- take away the property of the multitude, is this just? If it is, so also is the
- plunder of the rich by the multitude. It is clear therefore that all these
- things are bad and not just. But
- ought the good to rule, and be in control of all classes? If so, then it follows
- that all the other classes will be dishonored,The term is technical and means disfranchisement and loss of
- civic rights. if they are not honored by holding the offices of
- government; for we speak of offices as honors, and if the same persons are
- always in office the rest must necessarily be excluded from honor. But is it
- better for the most virtuous individual to be the ruler? But that is still more
- oligarchical, for the people excluded from honor will be more numerous. But
- perhaps some one would say that in any case it is a bad thing for a human being,
- having in his soul the passions that are the attributes of humanity, to be
- sovereign, and not the law. Suppose therefore that law is sovereign, but law of
- an oligarchic or democratic nature, what difference will it make as regards the
- difficulties that have been raised? for the results described before will come
- about just the same.
- Most of these points therefore must be discussed on
- another occasion; but the view that it is more proper for the multitude to be
- sovereign than the few of greatest virtue might be thought to be explicable and
- to have some justification, and even to be the true view. For it is possible
- that the many, though not individually good men,
-
-
- yet when they come
- together may be better, not individually but collectively, than those who are
- so, just as public dinners to which many contribute are better than those
- supplied at one man's cost; for where there are many, each individual, it may be
- argued, has some portion of virtue and wisdom, and when they have come together,
- just as the multitude becomes a single man with many feet and many hands and
- many senses, so also it becomes one personality as regards the moral and
- intellectual faculties. This is why the general public is a better judge of the
- works of music and those of the poets, because different men can judge a
- different part of the performance, and all of them all of it. But the superiority of good men over the mass of
- men individually, like that of handsome men, so it is said, over plain men and
- of the works of the painter's art over the real objects, really consists in
- this, that a number of scattered good points have been collected together into
- one example; since if the features be taken separately, the eye of one real
- person is more beautiful than that of the man in the picture, and some other
- feature of somebody else. It is not indeed clear whether this collective
- superiority of the many compared with the few good men can possibly exist in
- regard to every democracy and every multitude, and perhaps it may be urged that
- it is manifestly impossible in the case of some—for the same argument
- would also apply to animals, yet what difference is there,practically, between some multitudes and
- animals?—but nothing prevents what has been said from being true about
- some particular multitude. One might
- therefore employ these considerations to solve not only the previously stated
- difficulty but also the related question, over what matters is the authority of
- the freemen, the mass of the citizens, to extend (using that expression
- to denote those who are not rich nor possessed of any distinguishing excellence
- at all)? For it is not safe for them to participate in the highest
- offices (for injustice and folly would inevitably cause them to act
- unjustly in some things and to make mistakes in others), but yet not to
- admit them and for them not to participate is an alarming situation, for when
- there are a number of persons without political honors and in poverty, the city
- then is bound to be full of enemies. It remains therefore for them to share the
- deliberative and judicial functions. For this reason Solon and certain other lawgivers appoint the common citizens
- toProbably words meaning
- ‘these functions and to’ have fallen out. the
- election of the magistrates and the function of calling them to audit, although
- they do not allow them to hold office singly. For all when assembled together
- have sufficient discernment, and by mingling with the better class are of
- benefit to the state, just as impure food mixed with what is pure makes the
- whole more nourishing than the small amount of pure food alone; but separately
- the individual is immature in judgement. This arrangement of the constitution is however open to
- question in the first place on the ground that it might be held that the best
- man to judge which physician has given the right treatment is the man that is
- himself capable of treating and curing the patient of his present disease, and
- this is the man who is himself a physician;
-
-
- and that this is the case
- similarly with regard to the other arts and crafts. Hence just as a court of
- physicians must judge the work of a physician, so also all other practitioners
- ought to be called to account before their fellows. But
- ‘physician’ means both the ordinary practitioner, and the
- master of the craft, and thirdly, the man who has studied medicine as part of
- his general education (for in almost all the arts there are some such
- students, and we assign the right of judgement just as much to cultivated
- amateurs as to experts). Further the same might be thought to hold good also of the election of
- officials, for to elect rightly is a task for experts—for example, it
- is for experts in the science of mensuration to elect a land-surveyor and for
- experts in navigation to choose a pilot; for even though in some occupations and
- arts some laymen also have a voice in appointments, yet they certainly do not
- have more voice than the experts. Hence according to this argument the masses
- should not be put in control over either the election of magistrates or their
- audit. But perhaps this statement
- is not entirely correct, both for the reason stated above,See 6.4. in case the populace is not of too slavish a
- character (for although each individual separately will be a worse
- judge than the experts, the whole of them assembled together will be better or
- at least as good judges), and also because about some things the man
- who made them would not be the only nor the best judge, in the case of
- professionals whose products come within the knowledge of laymen also:to judge a house, for instance, does not
- belong only to the man who built it, but in fact the man who uses the house
- (that is, the householder) will be an even better judge of it,
- and a steersman judges a rudder better than a carpenter, and the diner judges a
- banquet better than the cook.This difficulty then
- might perhaps be thought to be satisfactorily solved in this way. But there is another connected with it: it
- is thought to be absurd that the base should be in control over more important
- matters than the respectable; but the audits and the elections of magistrates
- are a very important matter, yet in some constitutions, as has been said, they
- are assigned to the common people, for all such matters are under the control of
- the assembly, yet persons of a low property-assessment and of any age take part
- in the assembly and the council and sit on juries, whereas treasury officials,
- generals and the holders of the highest magistracies are drawn from among
- persons of large property. Now this
- difficulty also may be solved in a similar way; for perhaps these regulations
- also are sound, since it is not the individual juryman or councillor or member
- of the assembly in whom authority rests, but the court, the council and the
- people, while each of the individuals named (I mean the councillor, the
- members of assembly and the juryman) is a part of those bodies. Hence
- justly the multitude is sovereign in greater matters, for the popular assembly,
- the council and the jury-court are formed of a number of people, and also the
- assessed property of all these members collectively is more than that of the
- magistrates holding great offices individually or in small groups.
- Let these
- points therefore be decided in this manner.
-
-
- But the difficulty first
- mentionedViz. that in whatever class
- sovereignty is vested, some hardships will result, 1281a 14 ff.
- proves nothing else so clearly as that it is proper for the laws when rightly
- laid down to be sovereign, while the ruler or rulers in office should have
- supreme powers over matters as to which the laws are quite unable to pronounce
- with precision because of the difficulty of making a general rule to cover all
- cases. We have not however yet ascertained at all what particular character a
- code of laws correctly laid down ought to possess, but the difficulty raised at
- the startSee 1281a 36. still
- remains;Probably this clause should
- stand after the next, ‘though—constitution’
- (which will be a parenthesis), and should run
- ‘but <the difficulty is there> for
- necessarily—states.’ for necessarily the laws are
- good or bad, just or unjust, simultaneously with and similarly to the
- constitutions of states (though of course it is obvious that the laws
- are bound to be adapted to the constitution); yet if so, it is clear
- that the laws in conformity with the right constitutions must necessarily be
- just and those in conformity with the divergentThe usual rendering is ‘perverted,’ but
- the Greek term is more neutral. forms of constitution
- unjust.
-
- What follows is a summary
- of Aristot. Nic. Eth. 2.And
- inasmuch as in all the sciences and arts the End is a good, and the greatest
- good and good in the highest degree in the most authoritative of all, which is
- the political faculty, and the good in the political field, that is, the general
- advantage, is justice, it is therefore thought by all men that justice is some
- sort of equality, and up to a certain point at all events they agree with the
- philosophical discourses in whichconclusions have been reached about questions of ethicsSee also Aristot. Nic.
- Eth. 5.3.; for justice is a quality of a thing in relation
- to persons,Literally, ‘the just is
- (a just) something and (something just)
- for somebody.’ and they hold that for persons that are
- equal the thing must be equal. But equality in what characteristics does this
- mean, and inequality in what? This must be made clear, since this too raises a
- difficulty, and calls for political philosophy. For perhaps someone might say that the offices of state
- ought to be distributed unequally according to superiority in every good
- quality, even if the candidates in all other respects did not differ at all but
- were exactly alike, because men that are differenti.e. different in some good quality. have different
- rights and merits. Yet if this is true, those who are superior in complexion or
- stature or any good quality will have an advantage in respect of political
- rights. But surely the error here is obvious, and it comes out clearly if we
- consider the other sciences and faculties. Among flute-players equally good at
- their art it is not proper to give an advantage in respect of the flutes to
- those of better birth, for they will not play any better, but it is the superior
- performers who ought to be given the superior instruments. And if our meaning is not yet plain, it will become
- still clearer when we have carried the matter further. Suppose someone is
- superior in playing the flute but much inferior in birth or in good looks, then,
- even granting that each of these things—birth and beauty—is
- a greater good than ability to play the flute, and even though they surpass
- flute-playing proportionately more than the best flute-player surpasses the
- others in flute-playing, even so the best flute-player ought to be given the
- outstandingly good flutes;
-
-
- for otherwise superiority both in wealth and in
- birth ought to contribute to the excellence of the performance, but they do not
- do so at all. Moreover on this
- theory every good thing would be commensurable with every other. For if to be of
- some particular height gave more claim, then height in general would be in
- competition with wealth and with free birth; therefore if A excels in height
- more than B does in virtue, and speaking generally size gives more superiority
- than virtue,Perhaps we should rewrite the
- Greek to give ‘even though speaking generally virtue gives more
- superiority than size.’ all things would be commensurable
- for; if such-and-such an amount of one thing is better than such-and-such an
- amount of another, it is clear that such-and-such an amount of the one is equal
- to that amount of another. But since
- this is impossible, it is clear that in politics with good reason men do not
- claim a right to office on the ground of inequality of every kind—if
- one set of men are slow runners and another fast, this is no good ground for the
- one set having more and the other lessDoubtless the author meant the other way round, ‘for the slow
- having less and the fast more political power.’ political
- power, but the latter's superiority receives its honor in athletic contests; but
- the claim to office must necessarily be based on superiority in those things
- which go to the making of the state. Hence it is reasonable for the well-born,
- free and wealthy to lay claim to honor; for there must be free men and
- tax-payers, since a state consisting entirely of poor men would not be a state,
- any more than one consisting of slaves. But then, granting there is need of these, it is clear
- thatthere is also need of justice
- and civic virtue, for these are also indispensable in the administration of a
- state; except that wealth and freedom are indispensable for a state's existence,
- whereas justice and civic virtue are indispensable for its good
- administration.As a means therefore towards a
- state's existence all or at all events some of these factors would seem to make
- a good claim, although as means to a good life education and virtue would make
- the most just claim, as has been said also before. On the other hand since those who are equal in one thing
- only ought not to have equality in all things nor those unequal as regards one
- thing inequality in all, it follows that all these forms of constitution must be
- deviations. Now it has been said before that all make a claim that is in a
- manner just, though not all a claim that is absolutely just; the rich claiming
- because they have a larger share of the land, and the land is common property,
- and also as being for the most part more faithful to their covenants; the free
- and well-born as being closely connected together (for the better-born
- are citizens to a greater degree than those of claims, low birth, and good birth
- is in every community held in honor at home), and also because it is
- probable that the children of better parents will be better, for good birth
- means goodness of breed; and we
- shall admit that virtue also makes an equally just claim, for we hold that
- justice is social virtue, which necessarily brings all the other virtues in its
- train; but moreover the majority have a just claim as compared with the
- minority, since they are stronger and richer and better if their superior
- numbers are taken in comparison with the others' inferior numbers. Therefore
- supposing all were in one city,
-
-
- I mean, that is, the good and the wealthy and
- noble and also an additional mass of citizens, will there be a dispute, or will
- there not, as to who ought to govern? It is true that under each of the forms of constitution that have been
- mentioned the decision as to who ought to govern is undisputed (for the
- difference between them lies in their sovereign classes—one is
- distinguished by being governed by the rich men, one by being governed by the
- good men, and similarly each of the others); but nevertheless we are
- considering the question how we are to decide between these classes supposing
- that they all exist in the state at the same period.
- If then the possessors of
- virtue should be quite few in number, how is the decision to be made? ought we
- to consider their fewness in relation to the task, and whether they are able to
- administer the state, or sufficiently numerous to constitute a state? And there
- is some difficulty as regards all the rival claimants to political honors. Those
- who claim to rule because of their wealth might seem to have no justice in their
- proposal, and similarly also those who claim on the score of birth; for it is
- clear that if, to go a step further, a single individual is richer than all the
- others together, according to the same principle of justice it will obviously be
- right for this one man to rule over all, and similarly the man of outstanding
- nobility among the claimantson the
- score of free birth. And this same
- thing will perhaps result in the case of aristocratic government based on
- virtue; for if there be some one man who is better than the other virtuous men
- in the state, by the same principle of justice that man must be sovereign.
- Accordingly if it is actually proper for the multitude to be sovereign because
- they are better than the few, then also, if one person or if more than one but
- fewer than the many are better than the rest, it would be proper for these
- rather than the multitude to be sovereign. All these considerations therefore seem to prove the
- incorrectness of all of the standards on which men claim that they themselves
- shall govern and everybody else be governed by them. For surely even against
- those who claim to be sovereign over the government on account of virtue, and
- similarly against those who claim on account of wealth, the multitudes might be
- able to advance a just plea; for it is quite possible that at some time the
- multitude may be collectively better and richer than the few, although not
- individually.
- Hence it is also possible to meet in this way the question
- which some persons investigate and put forward (for some raise the
- question whether the legislator desiring to lay down the rightest laws should
- legislate with a view to the advantage of the better people or that of the
- larger number) in cases when the situation mentionedAt the end of the last sentence, 7.12.
- occurs. And ‘right’ must be taken in the sense of
- ‘equally right,’ and this means right in regard to the
- interest of the whole state and in regard to the common welfare of the citizens;
- and a citizen is in general one who shares in governing and being governed,
-
-
-
- although he is different according to each form of
- constitution, but in relation to the best form a citizen is one who has the
- capacity and the will to be governed and to govern with a view to the life in
- accordance with virtue.
- But if there is any one man so greatly distinguished in
- outstanding virtue, or more than one but not enough to be able to make up a
- complete state, so that the virtue of all the rest and their political ability
- is not comparable with that of the men mentioned, if they are several, or if
- one, with his alone, it is no longer proper to count these exceptional men a
- part of the state; for they will be treated unjustly if deemed worthy of equal
- status, being so widely unequal in virtue and in their political ability: since
- such a man will naturally be as a god among men. Hence it is clear that legislation also must necessarily
- be concerned with persons who are equal in birth and in ability, but there can
- be no law dealing with such men as those described, for they are themselves a
- law; indeed a man would be ridiculous if he tried to legislate for them, for
- probably they would say what in the story of AntisthenesPupil of Socrates and founder of the Cynic sect of
- philosophers. the lions said‘Where are your claws and teeth?’ when the hares
- made speeches in the assembly and demanded that all should have equality. This
- is why democratically governed states institute the system of ostracism, because
- of a reason of this nature; for these are the states considered to pursue
- equality most of all things,so that
- they used to ostracize men thought to be outstandingly powerful on account of
- wealth or popularity or some other form of political strength, and used to
- banish them out of the city for fixed periods of time. And there is a mythical story that the Argonauts left
- Heracles behind for a similar reason; for the
- ArgoCf. Apollod. 1.9.19
- th=s *)argou=s fqegcame/nhs mh\ du/nasqai pe/rein to\
- tou/tou ba/ros. Argo
- was a live creature, and Athena had built a ‘talking
- timber’ into her cutwater. refused to carry him with the
- others because he was so much heavier than the sailors. Hence also those who
- blame tyranny and Periander's advice to ThrasybulusPeriander was tyrant of Corinth circa 626-585 B.C.; Thrasybulus was tyrant of Miletus. Hdt.
- 5.92 tells the story with their parts reversed. must not
- be thought to be absolutely right in their censure (the story is that
- Periander made no reply to the herald sent to ask his advice, but levelled the
- corn-field by plucking off the ears that stood out above the rest; and
- consequently, although the herald did not know the reason for what was going on,
- when he carried back news of what had occurred, Thrasybulus understood that he
- was to destroy the outstanding citizens); for this policy is advantageous not only for tyrants, nor
- is it only tyrants that use it, but the same is the case with oligarchies and
- democracies as well; for ostracism has in a way the same effect as docking off
- the outstanding men by exile. And the same course is adopted in regard to cities
- and races by the holders of sovereign power, for example the Athenians so dealt
- with the Samians and Chians and LesbiansIn
- 440, 424 and 427 B.C. respectively
- (for no sooner did they get a strong hold of their empire than they
- humbled them in contravention of their covenants),
-
-
- and the king of
- the Persians frequently used to cut down the numbers of the Medes and
- Babylonians and the other races that had waxed proud because they had once been
- head of an empire. And the problem
- applies universally to all the forms of constitution, even the right forms; for
- while the divergent forms of government do this because their regard is fixed on
- their private advantage, nevertheless with the constitutions directed to the
- common good the same is the case. And this is also clear in the field of the
- other arts and sciences; a painter would not let his animal have its foot of
- disproportionately large size, even though it was an exceptionally beautiful
- foot, nor would a shipbuilder make the stern or some other part of a ship
- disproportionately big, nor yet will a trainer of choruses allow a man who sings
- louder and more beautifully than the whole band to be a member of it. Hence as far as this practice goes nothing
- prevents monarchs from being in harmony with the cities they rule, if they
- resort to it when their own personal rule is beneficial to the cities. Therefore
- in relation to acknowledged superiorities the argument for ostracism has a
- certain element of political justice. True, it is better for the lawgiver so to
- constitute the state at the outset that it does not need this medicine; but the
- next best course to steer, if occasion arises, is to endeavor to
- correctthe constitution by some
- such method of rectification. But this was not what happened with the states,
- for they were not looking at what was advantageous for their proper
- constitution, but their acts of ostracism were done in a revolutionary spirit.
- In the divergent forms of constitution therefore it is evident that ostracism is
- advantageous and just under the special constitution, though perhaps it is also
- evident that it is notPerhaps
- ‘not’ should be struck out; but if it stands, the clause
- refers to 8.5 init.—in these cases ostracism is practiced only in
- the interest of those in power. just absolutely; but in the case of the best constitution there is
- much doubt as to what ought to be done, not as regards superiority in the other
- things of value, such as strength and wealth and popularity, but in the case of
- a person becoming exceptionally distinguished for virtue. It certainly would not
- be said that such a man must be banished and got out of the way; yet
- nevertheless no doubt men would not think that they ought to rule over such a
- man, for that would be the same as if they claimed to rule over Zeus, dividing
- up his spheres of government. It remains therefore, and this seems to be the
- natural course, for all to obey such a man gladly, so that men of this sort may
- be kings in the cities for all time.
- And perhaps it is well after the subjects
- that have been discussed to pass over to consider royal government; for we
- pronounce this to be one of the correct constitutions. And it has to be
- considered whether it is advantageous for a city or a country that is to be well
- administered to be ruled by a king, or whether it is not so but some other
- constitution is more expedient, or whether royal rule is expedient for some
- states and not for others. But it is needful to decide first whether there is
- only one sort of kingship or whether it has several varieties.
-
-
-
-
- Now it is at all events easy to discern that kingship includes several kinds,
- and that the mode of government is not the same in all. For the kingship in the
- Spartan constitution, which is held to be a typical royalty of the kind guided
- by law, does not carry sovereignty in all matters, though when a king goes on a
- foreign expedition he is the leader in all matters relating to the war; and also
- matters relating to religion have been assigned to the kings. This kingship
- therefore is a sort of military command vested in generals with absolute powers
- and held for life; for the king has not authority to put a subject to death,
- except [in a certain reign]Inexplicable, and omitted in one of the earliest editions; possibly
- basilei/a| is to be emended to e)la/sei‘except on some
- march-out.’ as in ancient times kings on their military
- expeditions could kill an offender out of hand, as Homer proves, for Agamemnon
- endured being reviled in the assemblies but when they were on an expedition had
- authority to put a man to death: at all events he says
- But whomsoe'er I see far from the fray . . .
- Shall have no hope to fly from dogs and vultures,
- For death is in my hands!Quoted from
- Hom. Il. 2.391, but the last
- line is not in our Homer.
-
-
-
- This
- then is one sort of kingship, a lifelong generalship, and some of the kingships
- of this kind are hereditary, others elective; and by its side there is another
- sort of monarchy, examples of which are kingships existing among some of the
- barbarians. The power possessed by all of these resembles that of tyrannies, but
- they govern according to law and are hereditary;for because the barbarians are more servile in their nature
- than the Greeks, and the Asiatics than the Europeans, they endure despotic rule
- without any resentment. These kingships therefore are for these reasons of a
- tyrannical nature, but they are secure because they are hereditary and rule by
- law. Also their bodyguard is of a
- royal and not a tyrannical type for the same reason; for kings are guarded by
- the citizens in arms, whereas tyrants have foreign guards, for kings rule in
- accordance with law and over willing subjects, but tyrants rule over unwilling
- subjects, owing to which kings take their guards from among the citizens but
- tyrants have them to guard against the citizens. These then are two kinds of monarchy; while another is
- that which existed among the ancient Greeks, the type of rulers called
- aesymnetae. This, to put it simply, is an elective tyranny, and
- it differs from the monarchy that exists among barbarians not in governing
- without the guidance of law but only in not being hereditary. Some holders of
- this type of monarchy ruled for life, others until certain fixed limits of time
- or until certain undertakings were ended, as for example the people of
- Mitylene once elected Pittacus to
- resist the exiles under the leadership of Antimenides and the poet Alcaeus.
- That they elected PittacusPittacus held the office 587-579 B.C. He was one of the Seven
- Sages. Antimenides and Alcaeus were brothers. as tyrant is proved by
- Alcaeus in one of his catches; for he rebukes the people because
- The base-born Pittacus they did set up
- As tyrant of the meek and luckless city,
- And all did greatly praise him.
-
-
-
-
- These monarchies therefore now and in the past are of the nature of tyrannies
- because they are autocratic, but of the nature of kingships because they are
- elective and rule over willing subjects. A fourth class of royal monarchy consists of the
- hereditary legal kingships over willing subjects in the heroic period. For
- because the first of the line had been benefactors of the multitude in the arts
- or in war, or through having drawn them together or provided them with land,
- these kings used to come to the throne with the consent of the subjects and hand
- it on to their successors by lineal descent. And they had supreme command in war
- and control over all sacrifices that were not in the hands of the priestly
- class, and in addition to these functions they were judges in law-suits; some
- gave judgement not on oath and some on oath—the oath was taken by
- holding up the sceptre.This ritual is
- mentioned in Hom. Il. 1.234, Hom. Il. 7.412, Hom.
- Il. 10.328.
- These kings then of ancient times
- used to govern continuously in matters within the city and in the country and
- across the frontiers; but later on when gradually the kings relinquished some of
- their powers and had others taken from them by the multitudes, in the cities in
- general only the sacrifices were left to the kings,The monarchy was reduced to a priesthood at Cyrene (Hdt.
- 4.161) and at Ephesus. while where anything that deserves the name
- of royalty survived the kings only had the command in military expeditions
- across the frontiers.
-
- There are
- then these kinds of kingship, four in number: one belonging to the heroic times,
- which was exercised over willing subjects, but in certain limited fields, for
- the king was general and judge and master of religious ceremonies; second, the
- barbarian monarchy, which is an hereditary despotism governing in conformity
- with law; third, the rule of the functionary called an aesymnetes,
- which is an elective tyranny; and fourth among these is the Spartan kingship,
- which may be described simply as an hereditary generalship held for life. These
- kingships then differ from one another in this manner. But a fifth kind of kingship is when a single ruler
- is sovereign over all matters in the way in which each race and each city is
- sovereign over its common affairs; this monarchy ranges with the rule of a
- master over a household, for just as the master's rule is a sort of monarchy in
- the home, so absolute monarchy is domestic mastership over a city, or over a
- race or several races.There are therefore, we may
- say, virtually two kinds of kingship that have been examined, this one and the
- Spartan. For most of the others lie between these, since with them the king is
- sovereign over fewer things than under absolute monarchy, but over more than
- under the Spartan kingship. Hence our inquiry is virtually about two questions,
- one whether it is expedient or inexpedient for states to have a military
- commander holding office for life, and that either by descent or by class,Some MSS. give ‘or by
- election.’
-
-
-
- and one whether it is expedient or inexpedient for one man to be sovereign
- over everything. Now the study of a
- military command of the kind mentioned has more the aspect of a legal than of a
- constitutional inquiry (for it is possible for this form of office to
- exist under all constitutions), so let it be dismissed at the first
- stageCf. 1289a 11 ff.; but the promise
- of a full discussion of law is not fulfilled; but the remaining mode
- of kingship is a kind of constitution, so that it is necessary to consider this
- one and to run over the difficulties that it involves.And the starting-point of the inquiry is the question whether
- it is more advantageous to be ruled by the best men or by the best laws.
- Those of the opinion that it is
- advantageous to be governed by a king think that laws enunciate only general
- principles but do not give directions for dealing with circumstances as they
- arise; so that in an art of any kind it is foolish to govern procedure by
- written rules (and indeed in Egypt physicians have the right to alter their prescription
- after four days, although if one of them alters it before he does so at his own
- risk); it is clear therefore that government according to written
- rules, that is laws, is not the best, for the same reason. At the same time,
- however, rulers ought to be in possession of the general principle before
- mentioned as well. And a thing that does not contain the emotional element is
- generally superior to a thing in which it is innate; now the law does not
- possess this factor, but every human soulnecessarily has it. But perhaps someone might say that in compensation for this a single ruler
- will decide better about particular cases. Therefore it is clear that on the one
- hand the ruler must necessarily be a legislator, and that there must or be laws
- laid down, although these must not be sovereigni.e. unalterably binding, and not be set aside by special
- dispensation of the ruler when deemed to be unjust in some particular
- case. where they go astray—admittedly in all other cases
- they ought to be sovereign; but on the other hand in matters which it is
- impossible for the law either to decide at all or to decide well, ought the one
- best man to govern or all the citizens? As it is, the citizens assembled hear
- lawsuits and deliberate and give judgements, but these judgements are all on
- particular cases. Now no doubt any one of them individually is inferior compared
- with the best man, but a state consists of a number of individuals, and just as
- a banquet to which many contribute dishes is finer than a single plain dinner,
- for this reason in many cases a crowd judges better than any single person.
- Also the multitude is more
- incorruptible—just as the larger stream of water is purer, so the mass
- of citizens is less corruptible than the few; and the individual's judgement is
- bound to be corrupted when he is overcome by anger or some other such emotion,
- whereas in the other case it is a difficult thing for all the people to be
- roused to anger and go wrong together. But the multitude must consist of the
- freemen, doing nothing apart from the law except about matters as to which the
- law must of necessity be deficient. And if this is not indeed easy to ensure in
- the case of many men, yet if there were a majority of good men and good
- citizens, would an individual make a more incorruptible ruler or rather those
- who though the majority in number yet are all good?
-
-
- The majority, is
- it not obvious? But it will be said that they will split up into factions,
- whereas with a single ruler this cannot happen. But against this must perhaps be
- set the fact that they are as virtuous in soul as the single ruler. If then the rule of the majority when
- these are all good men is to be considered an aristocracy, and that of the one
- man kingship, aristocracy would be preferable for the states to kingship,
- whether the royal office be conjoined with military force or without it, if it
- be possible to get a larger number of men than one who are of similar quality.
- And it was perhaps only owing to this that kingships existed in earlier times,
- because it was rare to find men who greatly excelled in virtue, especially as in
- those days they dwelt in small cities. Moreover they used to appoint their kings
- on the ground of public service, and to perform this is a task for the good men.
- But as it began to come about that many men arose who were alike in respect of
- virtue, they would no longer submit to royalty, but sought for some form of
- commonwealth, and set up a republican constitution. And as men becoming baser began to make money out of the
- community, it is reasonable to suppose that some such cause as this occasioned
- the rise of oligarchies; for they brought wealth into honor. And from
- oligarchies they first changed to tyrannies, and from tyrannies to democracy;
- for by constantly bringing the government into fewer hands owing to a base love
- of gain, they made the multitude stronger,i.e. more men of ability and position went over to the opposition.
- so that it set upon the oligarchs, and democracies came into
- existence.But now that the states
- have come to be even greater than they were, perhaps it is not easy for yet
- another form of constitution beside democracy to come into existence. And even if one held that royal government
- is best for states, what is to be the position as regards the king's children?
- is the sovereignty to be hereditary? But this will be disastrous if the king's
- sons turn out to be like what some have been. It may be said that the king being
- sovereign will not in that case bequeath the throne to his children. But that is
- too much to be easy to believe: it would be difficult for a king to disinherit
- his sons, and an act of virtue above the level of human nature. And there is a difficulty also about the
- royal power: ought the man who is to reign as king to force to have an armed
- force about him, by means of which he will have power to compel those who may be
- unwilling to obey, or if not, how is it possible for him to administer his
- office? For even if he were a law-abiding sovereign and never acted according to
- his own will against the law, nevertheless it would be essential for him to have
- power behind him whereby to safeguard the laws. Probably therefore it is not
- difficult to define the regulations for a king of this sort: he must have a
- force of his own, but the force must be only so large as to be stronger than a
- single individual or even several individuals banded together, but weaker than
- the multitude, on the principle on which the men of old times used to assign
- bodyguards whenever they appointed somebody as what they termed
- aesymnetes or tyrant‘Or tyrant’ looks like an incorrect note, see 1285b
- 25. of the state, and also, when DionysiusSee 1259a 39 n. asked for his guards, somebody advised
- him to give the same number of guards to the citizens of Syracuse.
-
-
-
-
- Our
- discussion has now reached the case of the king who acts in all matters
- according to his own will, and we must examine this type of royalty. For the
- so-called constitutional monarchy, as we said,See 10.3. is not a special kind of constitution
- (since it is possible for a life-long generalship to exist under all
- constitutions, for example under a democracy and an aristocracy, and many people
- make one man sovereign over the administration, for instance there is a
- government of this sort in Epidamnus,
- Durazzo, on the Adriatic. and also
- at OpusChief town of Locri, near the Straits of Euboea
- to a certain smaller
- extent); but we have now
- to discuss what is called Absolute Monarchy, which is the monarchy under which
- the king governs all men according to his own will. Some people think that it is
- entirely contrary to nature for one person to be sovereign over all the citizens
- where the state consists of men who are alike; for necessarily persons alike in
- nature must in accordance with nature have the same principle of justice and the
- same value, so that inasmuch as for persons who are unequal to have an equal
- amount of food or clothing is harmful for their bodies, the same is the case
- also in regard to honors; similarly
- therefore it is wrong for those who are equal to have inequality, owing to which
- it is just for no one person to govern or be governed more than another, and
- therefore for everybody to govern and be governed alike in turn. And this
- constitutes law for regulation is law. Therefore it is preferable for the law to
- rule rather than any one of the citizens,and according to this same principle, even if it be better for
- certain men to govern, they must be appointed as guardians of the laws and in
- subordination to them; for there must be some government, but it is clearly not
- just, men say, for one person to be governor when all the citizens are alike.
- It may be objected that any
- case which the law appears to be unable to define, a human being also would be
- unable to decide. But the law first specially educates the magistrates for the
- purpose and then commissions them to decide and administer the matters that it
- leaves over ‘according to the best of their judgement,’This formula came in the oath taken by the
- dicasts at Athens. and
- furthermore it allows them to introduce for themselves any amendment that
- experience leads them to think better than the established code. He therefore
- that recommends that the law shall govern seems to recommend that God and reason
- alone shall govern, but he that would have man govern adds a wild animal also;
- for appetite is like a wild animal, and also passion warps the rule even of the
- best men. Therefore the law is wisdom without desire. And there seems to be no truth in the analogy which argues
- from the artsi.e. the practical sciences, of
- which medicine is taken as an example. that it is a bad thing to
- doctor oneself by book, but preferable to employ the experts in the arts. For
- they never act contrary to principle from motives of friendship, but earn their
- fee when (for instance) they have cured their patients,
- whereas holders of political office usually do many things out of spite and to
- win favor; since when people suspect even the physicians of being in the
- confidence of their enemies and of trying to make away with them for gain, in
- that case they would sooner look up the treatment in the books.
-
-
-
- Yet certainly physicians
- themselves call in other physicians to treat them when they are ill, and
- gymnastic trainers put themselves under other trainers when they are doing
- exercises, believing that they are unable to judge truly because they are
- judging about their own cases and when they are under the influence of feeling.
- Hence it is clear that when men seek for what is just they seek for what is
- impartial; forPerhaps this should be
- ‘and.’ the law is that which is impartial. Again,
- customary lawsi.e. the rules of duty and of
- manners that are customary but not embodied in legislation: cf. 1319b 40
- ‘the laws both written and unwritten.’ are more
- sovereign and deal with more sovereign matters than written laws, so that if a
- human ruler is less liable to error than written laws, yet he is not less liable
- to error than the laws of custom. But also it is certainly not easy for the single ruler to oversee a multitude
- of things; it will therefore be necessary for the officials appointed by him to
- be numerous; so that what difference does it make whether this has been the
- arrangement immediately from the outset or the single ruler appoints them in
- this manner? Again, a thing that has also been said before, if the virtuous man
- justly deserves to rule because he is better, yet two good men are better than
- one: for that is the meaning of the line
- Hom. Il. 10.224: The passage goes on
- kai/ te pro\ o(\ tou= e)no/hsen o(/ppws ke/rdos
- e)/h|, ‘then one discerneth Before the other how
- advantage lieth.’
-
- When two together go—
-
and of the prayer of Agamemnon
- Hom. Il. 2.372.
-
- May ten such fellow-councillors be mine.
-
And even now the magistrates, like the Athenian dicast, have power to
- judge certain cases about which the law is unable to give a clear declaration,
- since nobody disputes that in matters about which it can do so the law would be
- the best ruler and judge. But
- since, although some things can be covered by the laws,other things cannot, it is the latter that cause
- doubt and raise the question whether it is preferable for the best law to rule
- or the best man. For to lay down a law about things that are subjects for
- deliberation is an impossibility. Therefore men do not deny that it must be for
- a human being to judge about such matters, but they say that it ought not to be
- a single human being only but a number. For the individual official judges well
- when he has been instructed by the law, and it would doubtless seem curious if a person saw better
- when judging with two eyes and two organs of hearing and acting with two feet
- and hands than many persons with many, since even as it is monarchs make many
- eyes and ears and hands and feet their own, for they adopt persons that are
- friendly to their rule and to themselves as their fellow-rulers. Although
- therefore if these assistants are not friendly they will not act in conformity
- with the monarch's policy, if they are friends of him and of his rule, well, a
- friend is one's equal and like, so that if the monarch thinks that his friends
- ought to rule he thinks that people who are equal to and like himself ought to
- rule like himself.This then more or less is the
- case advanced by those who argue against kingship.
- But perhaps, although this
- is a true account of the matter in some cases, it does not apply in others. For
- there is such a thing as being naturally fitted to be controlled by a master,
- and in another case, to be governed by a king, and in another, for citizenship,
- and this is just and expedient; but there is no such thing as natural fitness
- for tyranny, nor for any other of the forms of government that are divergences,
- for these come about against nature.
-
-
- But merely from what has been
- said, it is clear that among people who are alike and equal it is neither
- expedient nor just for one to be sovereign over all—neither when there
- are no laws, but he himself is in the place of law, nor when there are laws,
- neither when both sovereign and subjects are good nor when both are bad, nor yet
- when the sovereign is superior in virtue, except in a certain manner. What this
- manner is must be stated; and in a way it has been stated already even before.
- But first we must define what
- constitutes fitness for royal government, what fitness for aristocracy, and what
- for a republic. A fit subject for royal government is a populace of such a sort
- as to be naturally capable of producing a family of outstanding excellence for
- political leadership; a community fit for aristocracy is one that naturally
- produces a populaceThe clause translated
- ‘that—populace’ some editors excise as a
- superfluous insertion. capable of being governed under the form of
- government fit for free men by those who are fitted by virtue for taking the
- part of leaders in constitutional government; a republican community, one in
- which there naturally grows up a military populaceThey also excise ‘in
- which-populace’ capable of being governed and of governing
- under a law that distributes the offices among the well-to-do in accordance with
- merit. When therefore it comes
- about that there is either a whole family or even some one individual that
- differs from the other citizens in virtue so greatly that his virtue exceeds
- that of all the others, then it is just for this family to be the royal family
- or this individual king, and sovereign over all matters. For, as has been said
- before,this holds good not only
- in accordance with the right that is usually brought forward by those who are
- founding aristocratic and oligarchic constitutions, and from the other side by
- those who are founding democratic ones (for they all make their claim
- on the ground of superiority, though not the same superiority), but it
- also holds good in accordance with the right spoken of before.i.e. the right of merit, 8.7.
- For it is not seemly to put to
- death or banish, nor yet obviously to ostracize, such a man, nor is it seemly to
- call upon him to take his turn as a subject; for it is not in the order of
- nature for the part to overtop the whole, but the man that is so exceptionally
- outstanding has come to overtop the whole community. Hence it only remains for
- the community to obey such a man, and for him to be sovereign not in turn but
- absolutely.Let this be our answer to the
- questions as regards kingship, what are its varieties, and whether it is
- disadvantageous for states or advantageous, and for what states, and under what
- conditions.
- And since we pronounce the right constitutions to be three, and
- of these the one governed by the best men must necessarily be the best, and such
- is the one in which it has come about either that some one man or a whole family
- or a group of men is superior in virtue to all the citizens together, the latter
- being able to be governed and the former to govern on the principles of the most
- desirable life, and since in the first part of the discourseBook 3.2, 3. it was proved that the virtue of a man
- and that of a citizen in the best state must of necessity be the same, it is
- evident that a man becomes good in the same way and by the same means as one
- might establish an aristocratically or monarchically governed state,Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give
- ‘established a state governed in the best way by an aristocracy or
- a monarchy.’
-
-
-
-
- so that it will be almost the
- same education and habits that make a man good and that make him capable as a
- citizen or a king.These conclusions having been
- laid down, we must now endeavor to discuss the best form of constitution and to
- say in what way it is natural for it to come into existence and how it is
- natural for it to be organized.The
- concluding sentence, by whomever written, clearly leads on to the Book that
- is No. 7 in the MSS. and in this edition; and after it the MSS. add half the
- first sentence of that Book, slightly altered. Some editors therefore
- transfer Books 7 and 8 here and put Books 4, 5 and 6 after them; opinions
- vary as to the proper order of Books 4, 5. and 6 among
- themselves.
-
-
-
-
-
-
- Transposed as Book 6 by some editors;
- see Book 3 fin., note.In all the arts and the sciences that are not
- merely sectional but that in relation to some one class of subject are complete,
- it is the function of a single art or science to study what is suited to each
- class,Perhaps the Greek should be
- altered to give ‘to each individual.’ for
- instance what sort of gymnastic exercise is beneficial for what sort of bodily
- frame, and what is the best sort (for the best must naturally suit the
- person of the finest natural endowment and equipment), and also what
- one exercise taken by all is the best for the largest number (for this
- is also a question for gymnastic science), and in addition, in case
- someone desires a habit of body and a knowledge of athletic exercises that are
- not the ones adapted to him, it is clearly just as much the task of the trainer
- and gymnastic master to produce this capacityi.e. a bodily bearing and athletic skill that are not the ones most suited
- to the pupil's particular physique. also;
- and we
- notice this also happening similarly in regard to medicine, and shipbuilding,
- and the making of clothes, and every other craft. Hence it is clear that in the
- case of the constitution as well it is the business of the same science to study
- which is the best constitution and what character it must have to be the most
- ideal if no external circumstance stands in the way, and what constitution is
- adapted to what people (since for many it is doubtless impossible to
- attain the best one, so that the good lawgiver and the true statesman must be
- acquainted with both the form of constitution that is the highest absolutely and
- that which is best under assumed conditions), and also thirdly the form
- of constitution based on a certain supposition (for he must be also
- capable of considering both how some given constitution could be brought into
- existence originally and also in what way having been brought into existence it
- could be preserved for the longest time: I mean for example if it has befallen
- some state not only not to possess the best constitution and to be unprovided
- even with the things necessary for it, but also not to have the constitution
- that is practicable under the circumstances but an inferior one);
- and beside all these matters he
- must ascertain the form of constitution most suited to all states, since most of
- those who make pronouncements about the constitution, even if the rest of what
- they say is good, entirely miss the points of practical utility. For it is
- proper to considerThe fourfold
- classification given just before is repeated in rather loose terms in this
- sentence. not only what is the best constitution but also what is the
- one possible of achievement, and likewise also what is the one that is easier
- and more generally shared by all states. But as it is, some students inquire
- which is the highest form of all even though requiring much material
- equipment,The word originally denoted
- the duty of the wealthy citizen holding office of Choregus to supply
- dresses, etc., for the chorus and actors in a drama. while those who
- rather state some general form sweep aside the constitutions actually existing
- and praise that of Sparta or some
- other;
-
-
-
- but the proper
- course is to bring forward an organization of such a sort that men will easily
- be persuaded and be able in the existing circumstances to take part in it, since
- to reform a constitution is no less a task than to frame one from the beginning,
- just as to re-learn a science is just as hard as to learn it originally; in
- addition therefore to the things mentioned the student of politics must also be
- able to render aid to the constitutions that exist already, as was also said
- before.Book 3.5. But this is
- impossible if he does not know how many kinds of constitution there are; but at
- present some people think that there is only one kind of democracy and one kind
- of oligarchy, but this is not true. Hence he must take in view the different varieties of the constitutions, and
- know how many there are and how many are their combinations. And after this it
- needs this same discrimination also to discern the laws that are the best, and
- those that are suited to each of the forms of constitution. For the laws should
- be laid down, and all people lay them down, to suit the
- constitutions—the constitutions must not be made to suit the laws; for
- a constitution is the regulation of the offices of the state in regard to the
- mode of their distribution and to the question what is the sovereign power in
- the state and what is the object of each community, but laws are distinct from
- the principles of the constitution, and regulate how the magistrates are to
- govern and to guard against thosewho
- transgress them. So that clearly it
- is necessary to be in possession of the different varieties of each form of
- constitution, and the number of these, even for the purpose of legislation; for
- it is impossible for the same laws to be expedient for all oligarchies or
- democracies if there are really several kinds of them, and not one sort of
- democracy or oligarchy only.
- And inasmuch as in our first inquiryBook 3.5. about the forms of the
- constitution we classified the right constitutions as three, kingship,
- aristocracy and constitutional government, and the deviations from these as
- three, tyranny from kingship, oligarchy from aristocracy and democracy from
- constitutional government, and about aristocracy and kingship we have spoken
- (for to study the best constitution is the same thing as to speak about
- the forms that bear those names, since each of them means a system based on the
- qualification of virtue equipped with means), and as also the question
- what constitutes the difference between aristocracy and kingship and when a
- royal government is to be adopted has been decided before, it remains to discuss
- the form of constitution designated by the namei.e. politei/a,
- ‘polity,’ which denotes not only a constitution of any
- form, but also (like our term ‘constitutional
- government’) a particular form, viz., a republic, cf.
- Book 3.5.2. common to them all, and the other forms, oligarchy,
- democracy and tyranny. Now it is
- manifest also which of these deviationsThe
- three forms of constitution last mentioned. is the worst and which
- the second worst. For necessarily the deviation from the first and most divine
- must be the worst,
- Corruptio optimi
- pessima, a Socratic notion: ‘the men of the best
- natural gifts, when educated, are the worst,’ Xen. Mem. 4.1.3. and kingship must of
- necessity either possess the name only, without really being kingship,
-
-
-
- or be based on the outstanding superiority of the man who is
- king; so that tyranny being the worst form must be the one farthest removed from
- constitutional government, and oligarchy must be the second farthest
- (for aristocracy is widely separated from that constitution),
- while democracy must be the most moderate. An account of their relative merits has indeed already
- been given also by one of the former writers,
- Plat. Stat. 302a ff.
- though not on the same principle as ours; for he inclined to judge that
- there were good varieties of all the forms, for instance a good sort of
- oligarchy and so on, and that democracy was the worst among these, but the best
- among the bad varieties, whereas we
- say that the deviations are wholly wrong, and that it is not right to speak of
- one form of oligarchy as better than another, but only as less bad. But let us
- for the present dismiss the question of a classification of this nature. Our
- business is first to distinguish how many different forms of the constitutions
- there are, assuming that there do exist several kinds of democracy and of
- oligarchy; next, which form is most
- general, and which most desirable after the best constitution, and also if there
- exists some other form that is aristocratic in nature and well constructed but
- not fitted to the largest number of cities, which this is; next, which of the
- other forms too is desirable for what people (since probably for some
- democracy is necessary more than oligarchy, and for others oligarchy more than
- democracy);and after
- this, in what way should one proceed who wishes to set up these constitutions, I
- mean the various forms of democracy and of oligarchy; and finally, when as far
- as possible we have concisely touched upon all these questions, we must endeavor
- to review what are the agencies that destroy and what are those that preserve
- constitutions generally and each variety of constitution in particular, and what
- are the causes by which it is most natural for these events to be brought
- about.
- Now the reason of there being several forms of constitution is
- that every city has a considerable number of parts. For in the first place we
- see that all the cities are composed of households, and then again that of this
- multitude some must necessarily be rich and some poor and some between the two,
- and also of the rich and the poor the former class is heavy-armed and the latter
- without armor. And we see that one portion of the common people is agricultural,
- another engaged in trade and another mechanic. And the upper classes have
- distinctions also corresponding to their wealth and the amounts of their
- property (for example in a stud of horses—for it is not easy
- to rear horses without being rich, and this is why in ancient times there were oligarchies in all the states
- whose strength lay in their cavalry, and they used to use horses for their wars
- against their neighbors, as for instance did the Eretrians and Chalcidians and
- the people of Magnesia on the
- Maeander and many of the other
- Asiatic peoples). Moreover in addition to differences in wealth there
- is the difference of birth, and that in regard to virtue,
-
-
- and indeed any
- other similar distinction that in the discussion of aristocracy has been stated
- to constitute a part of the state (for there we distinguished how many
- necessary parts there are of which every state must consist); for
- sometimes all of these parts participate in the constitution and sometimes a
- smaller or a larger number of them. It is clear therefore that there must necessarily be several forms of
- constitution differing in kind from one another, inasmuch as these parts differ
- in kind among themselves. For a constitution means the arrangement of the
- magistracies, and this all people plan out either according to the power of
- those who share political rights, or according to some common equality between
- them, I mean for example between the poor or between the rich, or some equality
- common to them both.This clause looks like
- an interpolation. It follows therefore that there are as many forms
- of constitution as there are modes of arrangement according to the superiorities
- and the differences of the sections. But the forms mostly are thought to be two—just as in the case of
- the winds we speak of some as north and some as south and regard the rest as
- deviations from these,Aristotle refers to
- this view in Aristot. Meteor. 364a
- 19, saying that west winds are classed with north and east winds
- with south, because wind from the setting sun is cooler and from the rising
- sun warmer. He notes that north and south winds are the most frequent, Aristot. Meteor. 361a 6; this may have
- suggested the idea that they were the typical winds. so also of
- constitutions there are held to be two forms, democracy and oligarchy; for men
- reckon aristocracy as a kind of oligarchy because it is oligarchy of a sort, and
- what is called constitutional government as democracy, just as in the case of
- the winds they reckon the west wind as a kind of north wind and the east wind as
- a kind of south wind.And the case is
- similar with musical modes, as some people say: for there too they posit two
- kinds, the Dorian mode and the Phrygian, and call the other scales some of them
- Dorian and the others Phrygian. For
- the most part therefore they are accustomed to think in this way about the
- constitutions; but it is truer and better to class them as we did, and assuming
- that there are two well-constructed forms, or else one, to say that the others
- are deviations, some from the well-blended constitution and the others from the
- best one, the more tense and masterful constitutions being oligarchic and the
- relaxed and soft ones demotic.
- But it is not right to define democracy, as
- some people are in the custom of doing now, merely as the constitution in which
- the multitude is sovereign (for even in oligarchies and everywhere the
- majority is sovereign) nor oligarchy as the constitution in which a few
- are sovereign over the government. For if the whole number were thirteen
- hundred, and a thousand of these were rich and did not give the three hundred
- poor a share in the government although they were free-born and like themselves
- in all other respects, no one would say that this people was governed
- democratically; and similarly also if there were few poor, but these more
- powerful than the rich who were more numerous, no one would call such a
- government a democracy either, if the other citizens being rich had no share in
- the honors. Rather therefore ought
- we to say that it is a democracy
-
-
- when the free are sovereign and an oligarchy
- when the rich are, but that it comes about that the sovereign class in a
- democracy is numerous and that in an oligarchy small because there are many men
- of free birth and few rich. For otherwise, suppose people assigned the offices
- by height, as some personse.g. Hdt. 3.20. say is done in Ethiopia, or by beauty, that would be an
- oligarchy, because both the handsome and the tall are few in number. Nevertheless it is not enough to define
- these constitutions even by wealth and free birth only; but inasmuch as there
- are more elements than one both in democracy and in oligarchy, we must add the
- further distinction that neither is it a democracy if the freei.e. those of citizen birth. being few
- govern the majority who are not of free birth, as for instance at Apollonia on the Ionian Gulf and at
- Thera (for in each of
- these cities the offices of honor were filled by the specially noble families
- who had been the first settlers of the colonies, and these were few out of
- many), nor is it a democracyPerhaps
- the Greek should be altered here to give ‘an
- oligarchy.’ if the rich rule because they are in a
- majority, as in ancient times at Colophon (for there the majority of the population
- owned large property before the war against the Lydians took place),
- but it is a democracy when those who are free are in the majority and have
- sovereignty over the government, and an oligarchy when the rich and more well
- bornare few and sovereign.
-
- It has then been stated that there are several forms of constitution, and what
- is the cause of this; but let us take the starting-point that was laid down
- beforeSee 3.1. and say that there
- are more forms than those mentioned, and what these forms are, and why they
- vary. For we agree that every state possesses not one part but several.
- Therefore just as, in case we intended to obtain a classification of animals, we
- should first define the properties necessarily belonging to every animal
- (for instance some of the sense organs, and the machinery for
- masticating and for receiving food, such as a mouth and a stomach, and in
- addition to these the locomotive organs of the various species),
- and if there were only so many
- necessary parts, but there were different varieties of these (I mean
- for instance certain various kinds of mouth and stomach and sensory organs, and
- also of the locomotive parts as well), the number of possible
- combinations of these variations will necessarily produce a variety of kinds of
- animals (for it is not possible for the same animal to have several
- different sorts of mouth, nor similarly of ears either), so that when
- all the possible combinations of these are taken they will all produce animal
- species, and there will be as many species of the animal as there are
- combinations of the necessary parts:—so in the same way also we shall classify the varieties of
- the constitutions that have been mentioned. For states also are composed not of
- one but of several parts, as has been said often. One of these parts therefore
- is the mass of persons concerned with food who are called farmers,
-
-
- and
- second is what is called the mechanic class (and this is the group
- engaged in the arts without which it is impossible for a city to be inhabited,
- and some of these arts are indispensably necessary, while others contribute to
- luxury or noble living), and third is a commercial class (by
- which I mean the class that is engaged in selling and buying and in wholesale
- and retail trade), and fourth is the class of manual laborers, and the
- fifth class is the one to defend the state in war, which is no less
- indispensable than the others if the people are not to become the slaves of
- those who come against them; for surely it is quite out of the question that it
- should be proper to give the name of state to a community that is by nature a
- slave, for a state is self-sufficient, but that which is a slave is not
- self-sufficient. Therefore the
- statement made in the
Republic
-
- Plat. Rep. 369b-371e
- is witty but not adequate. For Socrates says that the most necessary
- elements of which a state is composed are four, and he specifies these as a
- weaver, a farmer, a shoemaker and a builder; and then again he adds, on the
- ground that these are not self-sufficient, a copper-smith and the people to look
- after the necessary live-stock, and in addition a merchant and a retail trader.
- These elements together constitute the full complement of his first city,
i.e. the first sketch of the City-state, loc.
- cit. implying that every city is formed for the sake of the
- necessaries of life and not rather for the sake of what is noble, and that it
- has equal need of both shoemakers and farmers;
but the warrior class
he does not assign to it until as the territory is increased
- and comes into contact with that of the neighbors they are brought into war. But
- yet even among the four partners or whatever their number be there must
- necessarily be somebody to assign justice and to judge their claims; inasmuch
- therefore as one would count the soul of an animal to be more a part of it than
- the body, so also the factors in states corresponding to the soul must be deemed
- to be parts of them more than those factors which contribute to necessary
- utility,—the former being the military class and the class that plays
- a part in judicial justice, and in addition to these the deliberative class,
- deliberation being a function of political intelligence. And it makes no
- difference to the argument whether these functions are held by special classes
- separately or by the same persons;
for it often happens for the same men to be both soldiers and farmers. Hence
- inasmuch as both groups
The first four
- classes and the fifth and sixth (the military and
- judicial). of classes must be counted parts of the state, it
- is clear that the heavy-armed soldiery at any rate
Lower grades of the forces may be excluded from citizenship,
- e.g. the rowers of the triremes (see below, 1376b
- 15). must be a part of the state. And a seventh class is the
- one that serves the community by means of its property, the class that we call
- the rich. And an eighth is the class of public servants, that is, those who
- serve in the magistracies, inasmuch as without rulers it is impossible for a
- city to exist; it is therefore necessary that there should be some men who are
- able to govern and who render this service to the state either continuously or
- in turn. And there remain the classes which we happen to have defined just
- before, the deliberative class and the one that judges the claims of litigants.
- If therefore it is proper for the states to have these functions performed, and
- well and justly performed,
-
-
- it is necessary for there also to be some men
- possessing virtue in the form of political excellence. Now as to the other capacities many people think
- that it is possible for them to be possessed in combination, for example, for
- the same men to be the soldiers that defend the state in war and the farmers
- that till the land and the artisans, and also the councillors and judges, and
- indeed all men claim to possess virtue and think themselves capable of filling
- most of the offices of state; but it is not possible for the same men to be poor
- and rich. Hence these seem to be in the fullest sense the parts of the state,
- the rich and the poor. And also the fact that the rich are usually few and the
- poor many makes these two among the parts of the state appear as opposite
- sections; so that the superior claimsCf.
- 3.11, 12 fin. of these classes are even made the guiding principles
- upon which constitutions are constructed, and it is thought that there are two
- forms of constitution, democracy and oligarchy.
- That there are then several
- forms of constitution, and what are the reasons for this, has been stated
- before; let us now say that there are several varieties both of democracy and of
- oligarchy. And this is clear even from what has been said already. For there are
- several classes both of the people and of those called the notables; for
- instance classes of the people are, one the farmers, another the class dealing
- with the arts and crafts, another the commercial classoccupied in buying and selling and another the one
- occupied with the sea—and this is divided into the classes concerned
- with naval warfare, with trade, with ferrying passengers and with fishing
- (for each of these classes is extremely numerous in various places, for
- instance fishermen at Tarentum and
- Byzantium, navy men at
- Athens, the mercantile class at
- Aegina and Chios, and the ferryman-class at Tenedos), and in addition to
- these the hand-working class and the people possessing little substance so that
- they cannot live a life of leisure, also those that are not free men of citizen
- parentage on both sides, and any other similar class of common people; while
- among the notables wealth, birth, virtue, education, and the distinctions that
- are spoken of in the same group as these, form the classes.
- The first kind of
- democracy therefore is the one which receives the name chiefly in respect of
- equality. For the law of this sort of democracy ascribes equality to the state
- of things in which the poor have no more prominence than the rich, and neither
- class is sovereign, but both are alike; for assuming that freedom is chiefly
- found in a democracy, as some persons suppose, and also equality, this would be
- so most fully when to the fullest extent all alike share equally in the
- government. And since the people are in the majority, and a resolution passed by
- a majority is paramount, this must necessarily be a democracy. This therefore is one kind of democracy,
- where the offices are held on property qualifications, but these low ones,
- although it is essential that the man who acquires the specified amount should
- have the right to hold office, and the man who loses it should not hold office.
-
-
-
- And another kind of democracy is for all the citizens that are
- not open to challengei.e. on the score of
- birth, cf. 5.4. to have a share in office, but for the law to rule;
- and another kind of democracy is for all to share in the offices on the mere
- qualification of being a citizen, but for the law to rule. Another kind of
- democracy is where all the other regulations are the same, but the multitude is
- sovereign and not the law; and this
- comes about when the decrees of the assembly over-ride the law. This state of
- things is brought about by the demagogues; for in the states under democratic
- government guided by law a demagogue does not arise, but the best classes of
- citizens are in the most prominent position; but where the laws are not
- sovereign, then demagogues arise; for the common people become a single
- composite monarch, since the many are sovereign not as individuals but
- collectively. Yet what kind of democracy Homer
- Hom. Il. 2.204
- means by the words ‘no blessing is the lordship of the
- many’—whether he means this kind or when those who rule as
- individuals are more numerous, is not clear. However, a people of this sort, as being monarch, seeks to
- exercise monarchic rule through not being ruled by the law, and becomes
- despotic, so that flatterers are held in honor. And a democracy of this nature
- is comparable to the tyrannical form of monarchy, because their spirit is the
- same, and both exercise despotic control over the better classes, and the
- decrees voted by the assemblyare like
- the commands issued in a tyranny, and the demagogues and the flatterers are the
- same people or a corresponding class, and either set has the very strongest
- influence with the respective ruling power, the flatterers with the tyrants and
- the demagogues with democracies of this kind. And these men cause the resolutions of the assembly to be
- supreme and not the laws, by referring all things to the people; for they owe
- their rise to greatness to the fact that the people is sovereign over all things
- while they are sovereign over the opinion of the people, for the multitude
- believes them. Moreover those who bring charges against the magistrates say that
- the people ought to judge the suits, and the people receive the invitation
- gladly, so that all the magistracies are put down. And it would seem to be a reasonable criticism to say that
- such a democracy is not a constitution at all; for where the laws do not govern
- there is no constitution, as the law ought to govern all things while the
- magistrates control particulars, and we ought to judge this to be constitutional
- government; if then democracy really is one of the forms of constitution, it is
- manifest that an organization of this kind, in which all things are administered
- by resolutions of the assembly, is not even a democracy in the proper sense, for
- it is impossible for a voted resolution to be a universal rule.Let this be our discussion of the different kinds of
- democracy.
- Of the kinds of oligarchy, one is for the magistracies to be
- appointed from property-assessments so high that the poor who are the majority
- have no share in the government, but for the man who acquires the requisite
- amount of property to be allowed to take part in it;
-
-
- another is when
- the magistracies are filled from high assessments and the magistrates themselves
- elect to fill vacancies (so that if they do so from all the citizens of
- this assessment, this appears rather to be of the nature of an aristocracy, but
- if from a particular section of them, it is oligarchical); another
- variety of oligarchy is when son succeeds father in office; and a fourth kind is
- when the hereditary system just mentioned exists and also the magistrates govern
- and not the law. This among oligarchies is the form corresponding to tyranny
- among monarchies and to the form of democracy about which we spoke last among
- democracies, and indeed oligarchy of this sort has the special name of
- dynasty.Government controlled by a few
- powerful families. Cf. Thuc. 3.62.4, where the
- Thebans say, ‘In those days our state was not governed by an
- oligarchy that granted equal justice to all, nor yet by a democracy; the
- power was in the hands of a small cabal ( dunastei/a o)li/gwn a)ndrw=n), than which nothing is
- more opposed to law or to true political order, or more nearly resembles a
- tyranny’ (Jowett).
-
- So
- many therefore are the kinds of oligarchy and of democracy; but it must not
- escape notice that in many places it has come about that although the
- constitution as framed by the laws is not democratic, yet owing to custom and
- the social system it is democratically administered, and similarly by a reverse
- process in other states although the legal constitution is more democratic, yet
- by means of the social system and customs it is carried on rather as an
- oligarchy. This occurs chiefly after alterations of the constitutions have taken
- place; for the people do not change over to the new system immediately but are
- content at the first stages to gain small advantages from the other
- party,so that the previously
- existing laws continue although power is in the hands of the party that is
- changing the constitution.
- And that these various kinds of democracy and oligarchy
- exist is manifest from the actual things that have been said. For necessarily
- either all the parts of the population that have been mentioned must have a
- share in the government, or some and not others. When therefore the farmer class
- and the class possessed of moderate property is sovereign over the government,
- they govern according to laws; for they have a livelihood if they work, but are
- not able to be at leisure, so that they put the law in control and hold the
- minimum of assemblies necessary; and the other persons have the right to take
- part when they have acquired the property-assessment fixed by the laws, so that
- to take part in the government is open to all who have got that amount of
- property; since for it not to be open to everybody on any terms at all is a
- characteristic of oligarchy, but then on the other hand it is impossible for it
- to be open to them to have leisure if there are no revenues.i.e. revenues from abroad; the poor can only attend often if
- paid for attendance, and this can only be financed if the state has income
- from tribute or foreign property. This then is one kind of democracy
- for these reasons. Another kind is
- due to the distinction that comes next: it is possible that all the citizens not
- liable to objection on the score of birth may have the right to take part in the
- assembly, but may actually take part only when they are able to be at leisure;
- hence in a democracy of this nature the laws govern because there is no revenue.
- A third kind is when all those who are free men have the right to take part in
- the government yet do not do so because of the aforesaid reason, so that it
- follows that in this form of democracy also the law governs.
-
-
-
- And a fourth kind of democracy
- is the one that has been the last in point of time to come into existence in the
- states. Because the states have become much greater than the original ones and
- possess large supplies of revenue, while all the citizens have a share in the
- government because of the superiorityCf.
- 1288a 20 ff. of the multitude, all actually take part in it and
- exercise their citizenship because even the poor are enabled to be at leisure by
- receiving pay. Indeed the multitude in this kind of state has a very great deal
- of leisure, for they are not hampered at all by the care of their private
- affairs, but the rich are, so that often they take no part in the assembly nor
- in judging lawsuits. Owing to this the multitude of the poor becomes sovereign
- over the government, instead of the laws. Such in number and in nature are the
- kinds of democracy that these causes necessarily bring into existence.
- To turn to the varieties and of
- oligarchy, when more men possess property, but less of it and not a very large
- amount, this is the first form of oligarchy; for they allow the man that
- acquires property the right to participate, and because there is a large number
- of persons participating in the government it necessarily follows that not the
- men but the law is sovereign (for the farther removed they are from
- monarchy, and as they have not so much property as to be idle and neglect it,
- nor yet so little as to be kept at the expense of the state,they are compelled to call upon the law to rule
- instead of ruling themselves). But then if the owners of the properties are fewer than
- those who owned them previously, and own more, the second form of oligarchy
- comes into being; for as they become stronger they claim to have a larger share,
- and therefore they themselves select those from among the rest of the citizens
- who go into the government, but as they are not yet strong enough to rule
- without law they make the law conform with this.i.e. they legalize the recruiting of the ruling class by
- co-optation; or the words may mean ‘they make the law
- ruler.’
- And if they carry matters further by
- becoming fewer and holding larger properties, there comes about the third
- advance in oligarchy, which consists in their keeping the offices in their own
- hands, but under a law enacting that they are to be hereditary. And when finally
- they attain very great pre-eminence by their wealth and their multitude of
- friends, a dynasty of this nature is near to monarchy, and men become supreme
- instead of the law; and this is the fourth kind of oligarchy, the counterpart of
- the last kind of democracy.
- FurthermoreWe now pass from the varieties of Oligarchy and of Democracy
- to those of the other actually existing constitutions, Aristocracy so-called
- and Constitutional Government. there are two constitutions by the
- side of democracy and oligarchy, onei.e.
- aristocracy. of which is counted by everybody and has been referred
- to as one of the four forms of constitution (and the four meant are
- monarchy, oligarchy, democracy and fourth the form called aristocracy),
- but there is a fifth, entitled by the common name of them all (for it
- is called constitutional government), but as it does not often occur it
- is overlooked by those who try to enumerate the forms of constitution, and they
- use the four names only (as does Plato) in the list of
- constitutions.
-
-
-
- Now the name of
- aristocracy is indeed properly given to the constitution that we discussed in
- our first discoursesBook 3. 1279a 35 ff.,
- 1286b 3 ff. (for it is right to apply the name
- ‘aristocracy’—‘government of the
- best’—only to the constitution of which the citizens are
- best in virtue absolutely and not merely good men in relation to some arbitrary
- standard, for under it alone the same person is a good man and a good citizen
- absolutely, whereas those who are good under the other constitutions are good
- relatively to their own form of constitution); nevertheless there are
- also some constitutions that have differences both in comparison with
- oligarchically governed states and with what is termed constitutional
- government, inasmuch as in them they elect the officials not only by wealth but
- also by goodness; this form of
- constitution differs from both and is called aristocratic. For even in the
- states that do not pay any public attention to virtue there are nevertheless
- some men that are held in high esteem and are thought worthy of respect. Where
- then the constitution takes in view wealth and virtue as well as the common
- people, as for instance at Carthage, this is of the nature of an aristocracy; and so also
- are the states, in which the constitution, like that of Sparta, takes in view two of these things
- only, virtue and the common people, and there is a mingling of these two
- factors, democracy and virtue. These then are two kinds of aristocracy beside
- the first, which is the best constitution,and a third kind is those instances of what is called
- constitutional government that incline more in the direction of
- oligarchy.
- It remains for us to speak about what is termed constitutional
- government and also about tyranny. Though neither the former nor the
- aristocracies spoken of just now are really deviations, we have classed them
- thus because in actual truth they have all fallen away from the most correct
- constitution, and consequently are counted with the deviation-forms, and those
- are deviations from them, as we said in our remarks at the beginning.See 1279b 4 ff. Actual aristocracies are a
- falling-off from the Aristocracy and Polity is a decline from Monarchy and
- Aristocracy; but they are not deviations in the technical sense.
- Tyranny is reasonably mentioned last because it is the least constitutional of
- all governments, whereas our investigation is about constitutional
- government.Having then stated the reason for
- this mode of classification, we have now to set forth our view about
- constitutional government. For its
- meaning is clearer now that the characteristics of oligarchy and democracy have
- been defined; since constitutional government is, to put it simply, a mixture of
- oligarchy and democracy. But people customarily give the name of constitutional
- government only to those among such mixed constitutions that incline towards
- democracy, and entitle those that incline more towards oligarchy aristocracies,
- because education and good birth go more with the wealthier classes, and also
- the wealthy are thought to have already the things to get which wrongdoers
- commit wrong; owing to which people apply the terms ‘gentry’
- and ‘notabilities’ to the rich. Since therefore aristocracy means the assignment of the
- highest place to the best of the citizens, oligarchies also are said to be drawn
- rather from the gentry.
-
-
- And it seems an impossibility for a city governed
- not by the aristocracy but by the base to have well-ordered government, and
- similarly also for a city that has not a well-ordered government to be governed
- aristocratically. But to have good laws enacted but not obey them does not
- constitute well-ordered government. Hence one form of good government must be
- understood to consist in the laws enacted being obeyed, and another form in the
- laws which the citizens keep being well enacted (for it is possible to
- obey badly enacted laws). And for laws to be well enacted is possible
- in two ways: they must either be the best laws possible for the given people or
- the best absolutely. But aristocracy
- in the fullest sense seems to consist in the distribution of the honors
- according to virtue; for virtue is the defining factor of aristocracy, as wealth
- is of oligarchy, and freedom of democracy (while the principle that a
- decision of the majority is supreme is found in them all: for in both oligarchy
- and aristocracy and democracies whatever the larger part of those who have a
- share in the government decides is supreme). In most statesi.e. in most states that are considered
- aristocracies. then the name of aristocracy is given to that form of
- constitutional government,i.e. the more
- oligarchical form, 1293b 36. for the combination aims only at the
- well-off and the poor, wealth and freedom (since in almost the largest
- number of states the rich seem to occupy the place of the gentry);
- but as there are three things
- that claim equal participationin the
- constitution, freedom, wealth and virtue (for the fourth, what is
- called nobility, accompanies the two latter—nobility means ancient
- wealth and virtue), it is manifest that the mixture of the two factors,
- the rich and the poor,Loosely put for
- ‘wealth and free birth.’ ought to be termed
- constitutional government, while the mixture of the three factors deserves the
- name of aristocracy most of all the various forms of aristocracy beside the true
- and best form.It has then been stated that other
- forms of constitution also exist besides monarchy, democracy and oligarchy, and
- what their characteristics are, and how the various sorts of aristocracy and of
- constitutional government differ from one another; and it is manifest that
- aristocracy and constitutional government are not widely apart from one
- another.
- Next to what has been said let us state the way in which what
- is called constitutional government comes into existence by the side of
- democracy and oligarchy, and how it is proper to establish it. At the same time
- the defining characteristics of democracy and oligarchy will also be clear; for
- we must grasp the distinction between these and then make a combination out of
- them, taking, so to say, a contribution from each. And there are three
- principles determining this combination or mixture. Under one plan we must adopt both features from the
- legislative schemes of the two different constitutions: for example, in regard
- to the administration of justice, in oligarchies they institute a fine for the
- rich if they do not serve on juries but no pay for the poor for serving, while
- in democracies they assign pay for the poor but no fine for the rich, but a
- common and intermediate principle is to have both payment and fine, and
- therefore this is a mark of a constitutional government, since it is a mixture
- of elements from both oligarchy and democracy.
-
-
-
- This then is one mode of combining the two. Another
- is to take the middle course between the regulations of each: for example,
- democracies permit membership of the assembly on no property-qualification at
- all or a quite small one, oligarchies on a large property-qualification, but the
- combination clearly is to have neither principle, but one which lies in the
- middle between either of these two qualifications. In the third place is a
- combination of the two systems, taking some features from the oligarchical law
- and some from the democratic; I mean, for example, that it is thought to be
- democratic for the offices to be assigned by lot, for them to be elected
- oligarchic, and democratic for them not to have a property-qualification,
- oligarchic to have one; therefore it is aristocratic and constitutional to take
- one feature from one form and the other from the other, from oligarchy that
- offices are to be elected, and from democracy that this is not to be on a
- property-qualification. This then is the mode of the mixture; and the mark of a good mixture of democracy and
- oligarchy is when it is possible to speak of the same constitution as a
- democracy and as an oligarchy; for manifestly this is so when it is said because
- they have been mixed well, and this is the case with the form that lies in the
- middle, for each of the two extreme forms can be seen in it. This is the case with the constitution of
- Sparta. For many
- peopleendeavor to describe it as
- being a democracy, because its system has many democratic features, for instance
- first of all its regulation for the rearing of boys, since the sons of the rich
- are brought up in the same way as those of the poor, and are educated in a
- manner in which the sons of the poor also could be educated, and they are also
- treated similarly at the next age, and in the same manner when they are grown
- up, for there is nothing that distinguishes the rich man from the poor
- man—thus the arrangements for food are the same for all at the common
- messes, and the rich wear clothes such as even any poor man could procure, and
- also because of the two greatest offices the common people elect to one and
- share in the other (they elect the Elders and share in the
- Ephorate); but others call it an oligarchy, because it has many
- oligarchical features, for instance that all the offices are elective and none
- appointed by lot and few persons have the power to sentence to death and exile,
- and a number of other such matters. But in a well-constructed mixed constitution both of the two factors, and
- neither of them,A conjectural emendation
- removes this mysterious epigram, giving ‘and not one of the two
- (only).’ should seem to be present, and
- it should be kept safe by its own means and not by outside aid, and by its own
- means not because those who desire its security are more numerous outside
- itOr, if e)/cwqen is an interpolation, ‘not merely because
- those (citizens) who wish it to survive are more numerous
- (than those who do not).’ (for
- even a bad constitution might possess this quality), but because no
- section of the state whatever would even wish for another
- constitution.The proper way therefore to
- establish a constitutional government, and similarly also the governments named
- aristocracies, has now been stated.
-
-
-
-
- It remained for us to speak
- of tyranny, not because there is much that can be said about it, but in order
- that it may receive its part in our inquiry, since we rank this also as one
- among the kinds of constitution. The nature of kingship we have defined in our
- first discourses,Book 3.9-12. in
- which we examined the question in relation to the constitution most commonly
- denoted by the term ‘kingship,’ whether it is
- disadvantageous or an advantage to states, and what person ought to be set up as king, and from what
- source, and by what procedure; and in the passage in which we were considering
- kingship we distinguished two kinds of tyranny, because their power in a manner
- borders upon royalty, because both these forms of rule are in accordance with
- law (for among some of the barbarians they elect monarchic rulers with
- autocratic powers, and also in old times among the ancient Greeks some men used
- to become monarchs of this sort, the rulers called
- aesymnetae), but these two forms of tyranny have certain
- differences from one another, although they were on the one hand of the nature
- of royalty because they were in accordance with law and because they exercised
- monarchic rule over willing subjects, and on the other hand of the nature of a
- tyranny because they ruled despotically and according to their own judgement.
- But there is a third kind of
- tyranny which is thought to be tyranny in the fullest degree, being the
- counterpart of universal kingship; to this sort of tyranny must necessarily
- belong a monarchythat exercises
- irresponsible rule over subjects all of the same or of a higher class with a
- view to its own private interest and not in the interest of the persons ruled.
- Hence it is held against the will of the subjects, since no free man willingly
- endures such rule.These then are the kinds of
- tyranny and such is their number, for the reasons stated
- But what is the best
- constitution and what is the best mode of life for most cities and most of
- mankind, if we do not judge by the standard of a virtue that is above the level
- of private citizens or of an education that needs natural gifts and means
- supplied by fortune, nor by the standard of the ideal constitution, but of a
- mode of life able to be shared by most men and a constitution possible for most
- states to attain? For the
- constitutions called aristocracies, of which we spoke just now,See 1293b 7-21, cf. 1293b 36-1294a 25.
- in some cases fall somewhat out of the scope of most states, and in others
- approximate to what is called constitutional government, so that it is proper to
- speak of these two forms as if they were one. And indeed the decision in regard
- to all these questions is based on the same elementary principles. For if it has
- been rightly said in the
Ethics
-
- Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1101a
- 14. that the happy life is the life that is lived without
- impediment in accordance with virtue, and that virtue is a middle course, it
- necessarily follows that the middle course of life is the best—such a
- middle course as it is possible for each class of men to attain.
And these same criteria must also
- necessarily apply to the goodness and badness of a state, and of a
- constitution—for a constitution is a certain mode of life of a state.
-
-
-
- In all states therefore there exist three divisions of the
- state, the very rich, the very poor, and thirdly those who are between the two.
- Since then it is admitted that what is moderate or in the middle is best, it is
- manifest that the middle amount of all of the good things of fortune is the best
- amount to possess. For this degree
- of wealth is the readiest to obey reason, whereas for a person who is
- exceedingly beautiful or strong or nobly born or rich, or the
- opposite—exceedingly poor or weak or of very mean station, it is
- difficult to follow the bidding of reason; for the former turn more to insolence
- and grand wickedness, and the latter overmuch to malice and petty wickedness,
- and the motive of all wrongdoing is either insolence or malice. And moreover the
- middle class are the least inclined to shun office and to covet office,The text is an emendation; some MSS. give
- ‘to rule the tribe and to rule the council,’ but most
- have ‘to love office and rule the council,’ apparently
- thinking that the verb translated ‘rule the council’
- meant ‘wish office.’ and both these tendencies
- are injurious to states. And in
- addition to these points, those who have an excess of fortune's goods, strength,
- wealth, friends and the like, are not willing to be governed and do not know how
- to be (and they have acquired this quality even in their boyhood from
- their homelife, which was so luxurious that they have not got used to submitting
- to authority even in school), while those who are excessively in need
- of these things are too humble. Hence the latter class do not know how to govern
- but know how to submit togovernment
- of a servile kind, while the former class do not know how to submit to any
- government, and only know how to govern in the manner of a master. The result is a state consisting of slaves
- and masters, not of free men, and of one class envious and another contemptuous
- of their fellows. This condition of affairs is very far removed from
- friendliness, and from political partnership—for friendliness is an
- element of partnership, since men are not willing to be partners with their
- enemies even on a journey. But surely the ideal of the state is to consist as
- much as possible of persons that are equal and alike, and this similarity is
- most found in the middle classes; therefore the middle-class state will
- necessarily be best constituted in respect of those elementsProbably Lambinus's alteration of the Greek should be
- accepted, giving ‘hence that state will necessarily be best
- governed which consists of those elements—.’ of
- which we say that the state is by nature composed. And also this class of citizens have the greatest security
- in the states; for they do not themselves covet other men's goods as do the
- poor, nor do the other classes covet their substance as the poor covet that of
- the rich; and because they are neither plotted against nor plotting they live
- free from danger. Because of this it was a good prayer of PhocylidesA gnomic poet of Miletus, born 560 B.C.—
- In many things the middle have the best;
- Be mine a middle station.
-
- It is clear therefore also that the
- political community administered by the middle class is the best, and that it is
- possible for those states to be well governed that are of the kind in which the
- middle class is numerous, and preferably stronger than both the other two
- classes, or at all events than one of them, for by throwing in its weight it
- sways the balance and prevents the opposite extremesi.e. extreme democracy and very limited oligarchy.
- from coming into existence. Hence it is the greatest good fortune if the men
- that have political power possess a moderate and sufficient substance,
-
-
-
- since where some own a very great deal of property and others
- none there comes about either an extreme democracy or an unmixed oligarchy, or a
- tyranny may result from both of the two extremes, for tyranny springs from both
- democracy and oligarchy of the most unbridled kind, but much less often from the
- middle forms of constitution and those near to them. The cause of this we will
- speak of later in our treatment of political revolutions. That the middle form of constitution is the best is
- evident; for it alone is free from faction, since where the middle class is
- numerous, factions and party divisions among the citizens are least likely to
- occur. And the great states are more free from faction for the same reason,
- because the middle class is numerous, whereas in the small states it is easy to
- divide the whole people into two parties leaving nothing in between, and also
- almost everybody is needy or wealthy. Also democracies are more secure and more
- long-lived than oligarchies owing to the citizens of the middle class
- (for they are more numerous and have a larger share of the honors in
- democracies than in oligarchies), since when the poor are in a majority
- without the middle class, adversity sets in and they are soon ruined. And it must be deemed a significant fact
- that the best lawgivers are from among the middle citizens; for Solon was of
- that class,as appears from his
- poetry, and so was Lycurgus (for he was not a king) and
- Charondas and almost the greatest number of the other lawgivers.And these considerations also show the reason why the
- constitutions of most states are either democratic or oligarchical; owing to the
- middle class in these states being often a small one, the classes diverging from
- the middle status—whichever of the two, the owners of the estates or
- the people, from time to time has the upper hand—conduct the
- government on their own lines, so that it becomes either a democracy or an
- oligarchy. And in addition to this,
- because factions occur and fights between the people and the wealthy, whichever
- party happens to gain the upper hand over its opponents does not establish a
- common or equal government, but takes the superior share in the government as a
- prize of victory, and makes it a democracy in the one case and an oligarchy in
- the other. Moreover each of the two states that in the past held the leadership
- of Greece took as a pattern the form of
- government that existed among themselves and set up in the one case democracies
- and in the other oligarchies in the cities, not considering the interest of the
- cities but their own advantage. Hence owing to these causes the middle form of constitution either never comes
- into existence or seldom and in few places; for one manIt is quite uncertain who is meant, possibly Solon or
- Theramenes. only among the states that have formerly held the
- leadership was induced to grant this form of organization, and by this time it
- has become a fixed habit with the people of the separate cities also not even to
- desire equality,
-
-
- but either to seek to rule or to endure being under
- a master.These considerations therefore make it
- clear which is the best constitution, and why it is the best; and now that the best has been defined, it
- is not difficult to see, among the other forms of constitution
- (inasmuch as we pronounce that there are various forms of democracy and
- various oligarchies), what kind is to be placed first, what second, and
- what next in this order, by reason of one being better and another worse. For at
- each stage the form nearest to the best one must necessarily be superior, and
- the form that is more remote from the middle must be inferior—unless
- one is judging relatively to given conditions: I make this reservation because
- it is quite possible that although one form of constitution is preferable it may
- often be more advantageous for certain people to have another form.
- The next
- thing after what has been said is to discuss which constitution is advantageous
- for which people, and what sort of constitution for what sort of people. Now we
- must first grasp a general principle that applies equally to all sorts of
- constitution: it is essential that the part of the state that wishes the
- constitution to remain should be stronger than the part that does not wish it.
- But every state consists of both quality and quantity: by quality I mean
- freedom, wealth, education, good birth, and by quantity the superior numbers of
- the multitude. And it is possible
- that,while the quality of the
- state belongs to one among the parts of which the state consists and its
- quantity to another part—for example the low-born may be more numerous
- than the noble or the poor than the rich, yet the more numerous class may not
- exceed in quantity as much as they fall behind in quality. Hence these two
- factors have to be judged in comparison with one another.Where therefore the multitude of the poor exceeds in the
- proportion stated,i.e. so as to outbalance
- their inferiority in quality. here it is natural for there to be
- democracy, and each kind of democracy in accordance with the superior number of
- the common people of each sort, for example if the number of the farming class
- exceeds, the first sort of democracy, but if that of the common laborers and
- wage-earners, the last sort, and similarly also with the other sorts that lie
- between these two; but where the
- class of the well-to-do and notable exceeds in quality more than it falls behind
- in quantity, here it is natural for there to be an oligarchy, and likewise the
- various kinds of oligarchy according to the degree of superiorityi.e. superiority in quality. of the
- oligarchical multitude.The word is loosely
- used of this small class. But the lawgiver in his constitution must
- always take in the middle class; if he is making the laws of an oligarchical
- character he must keep the middle class in view, and if democratic, he must
- legislate so as to bring them in. And where the number of the middle class exceeds both the extreme classes
- together, or even one of them only, here it is possible for a constitutional
- government to be lasting;
-
-
- second the one connected with the magistracies, that is, what
- there are to be and what matters they are to control, and what is to be the
- method of their election, and a third is, what is to be the judiciary.The deliberative factor is sovereign about war and peace
- and the formation and dissolution of alliances, and about laws, and about
- sentences of death and exile and confiscation of property, and about the audits
- of magistrates. And necessarily
- either all these decisions must be assigned to all the citizens, or all to some
- of them (for instance to some one magistracy or to several),
- or different ones to different magistracies, or some of them to all the citizens
- and some to certain persons.For all the citizens
- to be members of the deliberative body and to decide all these matters is a mark
- of a popular government, for the common people seek for equality of this nature.
- But there are several modes of
- such universal membership. One is for the citizens to serve in rotation and not
- all in a body (as is enacted in the constitution of the Milesian
- Telecles,Otherwise unknown and in
- other constitutions also the boards of magistrates deliberate in joint
- assemblies but all the citizens enter into the magistracies from the tribes or
- from the very smallest sections of the citizen-body in rotation until office has
- gone through the whole body), and for there to be joint assemblies only
- to consider legislation and reforms of the constitution and to hear the reports
- submitted by the magistrates. Another mode isfor all to assemble
- in a body, but only for the purpose of electing magistrates, enacting laws,
- considering the declaration of war and the conclusion of peace and holding the
- audit of magistrates, but for all other matters to be considered by the
- magistrates appointed to deal with each respectively and elected by suffrage or
- by lot from all the citizens. Another mode is for the citizens to meet about the
- magistracies and the audits and in order to deliberate about declaring war and
- concluding an alliance, but for all other matters to be dealt with by the
- magistrates, elected by suffrage in as many cases as circumstances allow,i.e. in an advanced democracy. and such
- magistracies are all those which must of necessity be filled by experts.
- A fourth mode is for all to
- meet in council about all matters, and for the magistracies to decide about
- nothing but only to make preliminary decisions; this is the mode in which
- democracy in its last form is administered at the present day—the form
- of democracy which we pronounce to correspond to dynastic oligarchy and to
- tyrannical monarchy. These modes
- then are all of them democratic. On the other hand for some persons to
- deliberate upon all matters is oligarchic. But this also has several variations.
- For when the members of the deliberative body are elected on comparatively
- moderate property-qualifications, and the eligible persons are comparatively
- numerous because of the moderateness of the qualification, and when they do not
- make changes in things in which the law forbids it but follow the law, and when
- anybody acquiring the property-qualification is allowed to become a member, a
- constitution of this sort is indeed an oligarchy, but one of the nature of
- constitutional government, because of its moderation. When on the other hand not
- everybody thus qualified participates in deliberation but only certain persons
- previously chosen by election,
-
-
- and these govern in accordance with law as in
- the former case, this is oligarchical; and also when the deliberative officials
- are elected by co-optation, and when the office is hereditary and has supreme
- control over the laws, this system is bound to be oligarchical. But when certain persons control certain
- matters, for instance when all the citizens control decisions as to war and
- peace and the audit of officials while everything else is controlled by
- magistrates and these are elected by vote, not by lot,The MSS. give ‘or by lot.’ the
- constitution is an aristocracy; while if some matters are controlled by
- magistrates elected by vote and others by magistrates chosen by lot, and this
- either directly or from a list previously selected by vote, or if magistrates
- elected by vote and by lot sit in a joint body, some of these regulations are
- features of an aristocratic constitution and others of constitutional government
- itself.We have then in this way distinguished
- the different kinds of deliberative body in relation to the forms of
- constitution, and each form of constitution carries on the administration in
- accordance with the distinction stated. But for a democracy of the form that at the present day is
- considered to be democracy in the fullest degree (and I mean one of the
- sort in which the people is sovereign even over the laws) it is
- advantageous for the improvement of its deliberative function for it to do the
- same as is done in oligarchies in the matter of the law-courts (for
- they enact a fine to compel the attendance on juries of those whom they want to
- attend, whereas democratic states institute payment for attendance for the
- benefit of the poor), and also to do this in respect of the
- assemblies(for they will
- deliberate better when all are deliberating jointly, the common people when with
- the notables and these when with the masses), and it is also
- advantageous for those who deliberate to be elected by vote or by lot equally
- from the different sections, and, if the men of the people far exceed the
- political class in number, it is advantageous either not to give pay to all but
- only to as many as are commensurate with the number of the notables, or to
- discard by lot those who exceed this number. In oligarchies on the other hand it is advantageous either
- to co-opt some persons from the multitude, or to institute an office like the
- one that exists in certain constitutional governments under the flame of
- Preliminary Councillors or Guardians of the Law,There were pro/bouloi at
- Corinth as well as a
- boulh/ and an e)kklhsi/a; and nomofu/lakes
- at Sparta, Athens and elsewhere: at Athens they sat with the presidents of
- the boulh/ and e)kklhsi/a to check illegal procedure. and deal with
- the matters about which these officials have held a preliminary deliberation
- (for thus the common people will have a share in deliberation and will
- not have the power to abolish any part of the constitution), and then
- for the people by their vote either to confirm or at all events not to pass
- anything contrary to the resolutions brought before them, or to allow all to
- take part in debate but only the magistrates to frame resolutions; and in fact it is proper to do just the
- opposite of what takes place in constitutionally governed states; for the common
- people ought to be given power to vote the rejection of a measure, but not to
- vote its ratification, but it should be referred back to the magistrates. In
- constitutional governments the procedure is the reverse; the few are competent
- to vote the rejection of a resolution but are not competent to vote its
- ratification, this being always referred back to the most numerous body.
-
-
-
-
- Let us then decide in this
- manner about the deliberative body, which in fact is the sovereign power in the
- constitution.
- Connected with this subject is the determination in regard to
- the magistracies (for this part of the constitution also has many
- varieties), how many magistracies there are to be, and what are to be
- their powers, and what their various periods of tenure (for some people
- make their magistracies tenable for six months, others for less, others for a
- year and others for a longer period)—shall the magistracies
- be for life or for a long period, or if for a shorter term shall the same people
- be allowed to hold them several times or not the same man twice but once only?
- and also as to the appointment
- of magistrates, who shall be eligible, who the electors, and what the mode of
- election? For on all these points it is needful to be able to determine how many
- modes of procedure are possible, and then to settle what modes are expedient for
- what sorts of constitution. Nor is it easy to decide to what kinds of office the
- name of magistracy ought to be applied; for the political community requires a
- great many officials, owing to which it is not proper to reckon all of them
- magistrates, whether elected by vote or by lot,—for instance first the
- priests (for this office must be considered as something different from
- the political magistracies), and again there are leaders of choruses,
- and heralds, and persons are also elected as ambassadors.
- And of
- the offices exercising superintendence some are political, and are exercised
- either over the whole of the citizens in regard to some operation—for
- instance a general superintends them when serving as soldiers, or over a
- section—for instance the superintendent of women or of children; while
- others are economic (for states often elect officers to dole out
- cornDistributions of corn were made at
- times of scarcity, or when the state had received a present of
- corn.); and others are subordinate, and are the sort of services
- to which people when well off appoint slaves. But the title of magistracy, to
- put it simply, is chiefly to be applied to all those offices to which have been
- assigned the duties of deliberating about certain matters and of acting as
- judges and of issuing orders, and especially the last, for to give orders is
- most characteristic of authority. But this question is of virtually no practical
- importance (for no decision has yet been given, our discussion being
- merely about the name), although it does admit of some further inquiry
- of a speculative kind. On the other
- hand the questions what kinds and what number of magistracies are necessary to
- constitute a state at all, and what kinds although not necessary are
- advantageous for a good constitution, are questions that might preferably be
- discussed, both indeed as regards every form of constitution and particularly in
- regard to the small states. For it is true that in the large states it is
- possible and proper for one magistracy to be assigned to one function
- (for the large number of the citizens makes it possible for many people
- to enter on an official career, so as to intermit their tenure of some offices
- for a long time and to hold others only once, and also every task is better
- attended to if the attention is directed to one thing only than if it is busy
- with many);
-
-
-
- but in
- the small states it is inevitable that many offices must be gathered into few
- hands (for owing to shortage of manpower it is not easy for many people
- to be in office, since who will take over the posts as their
- successors?). But sometimes small states require the same magistracies
- and laws as large ones except that the latter require the same persons to serve
- often, but in the former this only occurs after a long interval. Hence it is
- possible to assign several duties to one man at the same time (since
- they will not interfere with one another), and to meet the shortage of
- man-power it is necessary to make the magistracies like spit-lampholders.An implement (its exact shape does
- not appear to be known) used by soldiers on campaign, here
- mentioned as an illustration of one tool serving two purposes, cf. 1252b
- 1.
- If therefore we are able to say how
- many magistracies every state must necessarily possess and how many, though not
- absolutely necessary, it ought to possess, knowing these points one might more
- easily make a combination of those magistracies which are of a suitable nature
- to be combined into a single office. And it is suitable for the further question
- not to be overlooked, what kinds of matters ought to be attended to by a number
- of officials locally distributed and what ought to be under the authority of one
- magistrate for all localities, for example should good order be seen to in the
- market-place by a Controller of the Market and elsewhere by another official, or
- everywhere by the same one? and ought the offices to be divided according to the
- function or according to the persons concerned—I mean, for instance,
- should there be a single official in control of good order, or a different
- onefor children and for women?
- and also under the various
- constitutions does the nature of the magistracies vary in accordance with each
- or does it not vary at all—for example in democracy, oligarchy,
- aristocracy and monarchy are the magistracies the same in their powers, although
- they are not filled from equal ranks nor from similar classes but are different
- in different constitutions (for example in aristocracies drawn from the
- educated, in oligarchies from the wealthy, and in democracies from the
- free), or although some constitutions happen to be correspondent with
- the actual differences of their magistracies, yet in other cases are the same
- magistracies advantageous even where the constitutions differ (for in
- some places it is suitable for the same magistracies to have large functions and
- in other places small ones)? Not but what there are also some offices peculiar to
- special forms of constitution, for instance the office of Preliminary
- Councillors.See 1298b 29 n. This
- is undemocratic, although a Council is a popular body, for there is bound to be
- some body of this nature to have the duty of preparing measures for the popular
- assembly, in order that it may be able to attend to its business; but a
- preparatory committee, if small, is oligarchical, and Preliminary Councillors
- must necessarily be few in number, so that they are an oligarchical element. But
- where both of these magistracies exist, the Preliminary Councillors are in
- authority over the Councillors, since a councillor is a democratic official, but
- a preliminary councillor is an oligarchic one. Also the power of the Council is weakened in democracies
- of the sort in which the people in assembly deals with everything itself;
-
-
-
- and this usually happens when there is a plentiful supply of
- pay for those who attend the assembly, for being at leisure they meet frequently
- and decide all things themselves. But a Superintendent of Children and a
- Superintendent of Women, and any other magistrates that exercise a similar sort
- of supervision, are an aristocratic feature, and not democratic (for
- how is it possible to prevent the wives of the poor from going out of doorsOr possibly ‘from going in
- processions’: Solon made regulations tai=s
- e)co/dois tw=n gunaikw=n kai\ toi=s pe/nqesi kai\ tai=s
- e(ortai=s(Plut. Sol.
- 21).?) nor yet oligarchic (for
- the wives of oligarchic rulers are luxurious). But let the discussion of these matters go no
- further at present, and let us attempt to go through from the beginning the
- question of the ways of appointing the magistrates. The varieties here depend on
- three determinants, the combinations of which must give all the possible modes.
- One of these three determining points is, who are the persons who appoint the
- magistrates? the second is, from whom? and last, in what manner? And of each of
- these three determinants there are three variations: either all the citizens
- appoint or some, and either from all or from a certain class (defined
- for instance by property-assessment or birth or virtue or some other such
- qualification, as at Megara only
- those were eligible who returned in a body from exile and fought together
- against the common people),It is
- quite uncertain when this event took place and whether it is the same as
- those referred to at 1302b 30 f. and l304b 34 ff. and the mode of
- appointment may be either by vote or by lot; again, these systems may be coupled
- together—I mean that
- some citizens may appoint to some offices but all to others, and to some offices
- all citizens may be eligible but to others only a certain class, and to some
- appointment may be by vote but to others by lot. And of each variation of these
- determinants there will be four modes: either all citizens may appoint from all
- by vote, or all from all by lot—and from all either section by
- section, for instance by tribes or demes or brotherhoods until the procedure has
- gone through all the citizens, or from the whole number every time,—or
- else partly in one way and partly in the other. Again, if the electors are some
- of the citizens, they must either appoint from all by vote, or from all by lot,
- or from some by vote, or from some by lot, or partly in one way and partly in
- the other—I mean partly by vote and partly by lot. Hence the modes
- prove to be twelve, apart from the two combinations. And among these, two ways of appointment are
- democratic—for all to appoint from all by vote, or by lot, or by
- both—some offices by lot and others by vote; but for not all to be the
- electors and for them to appoint simultaneously, and either from all or from
- some either by lot or by vote or by both, or some offices from all and others
- from some by both (by which I mean some by lot and others by
- vote) is constitutional. And for some to appoint from all, to some
- offices by vote and to others by lot or by bothPerhaps the Greek should be rewritten to give ‘for
- some to appoint from all either by vote or by lot or by
- both.’ (to some by lot and to others by
- vote) is oligarchical; and it is even more oligarchical to appoint from
- both classes. But to appoint some
- offices from all and the others from a certain class is constitutional with an
- aristocratic bias;
-
-
- or to appoint some by vote and others by lot. And
- for a certain class to appoint from a certain class <by vote>This insertion by Lambinus seems
- certain. is oligarchical, and so it is for a certain class to appoint
- from a certain class by lot (although not working out in the same
- way), and for a certain class to appoint from a certain class by both
- methods. And for a certain class to make a preliminary selection from the whole
- body and then for all to appoint from among certain persons (thus
- selected) is aristocratic.So many in
- number therefore are the modes of appointing to the magistracies, and this is
- how the modes are classified according to the different constitutions; and what
- regulations are advantageous for what people and how the appointments ought to
- be conducted will be made clear at the same time as we consider what are the
- powers of the offices. By the power of an office I mean for instance the control
- of the revenues and the control of the guard; since a different sort of power
- belongs for example to a generalship and to the office that controls market
- contracts.
- Of the three factors of a constitution it remains to speak of
- the judiciary, and of judicial bodies also we must consider the various modes,
- in accordance with the same plan. And a difference among judicial courts rests
- upon three determinants—constituents, sphere of action, and mode of
- appointment. As to their constituents I mean are the courts drawn from all the
- citizens or from a certain class? as to sphere of action, how many kinds of
- courts are there? and as to mode of appointment, are they appointed by lot or by
- vote? First then let us distinguish how many kinds of courts there are. They are
- eight in number, one a court of audit,another to deal with offenders against any public interest, another with
- matters that bear on the constitution, a fourth for both magistrates and private
- persons in disputes about penalties, fifth the court dealing with private
- contracts that are on an important scale, and beside these there is
- (6) the court that tries homicide, and (7)
- that which hears alien suits (of courts of homicide there are four kinds, whether the jury is the
- same or different—namely, for cases of deliberate homicide, of
- involuntary homicide, of homicide admitted but claimed to be justifiable, and
- fourth to deal with charges of homicide brought against men that have fled from
- the country for homicide, upon their return,i.e. men that had been allowed to flee the country when charged with
- accidental homicide, and on their return were accused of another homicide, a
- willful murder. such as at Athens for instance the Court at Phreatto is said to be,
- although such cases are of rare occurrence in the whole course of history, even
- in the great states and of the aliens' court one branch hears suits of aliens
- against aliens and another of aliens against citizens); and also beside
- all of these there are (8) courts to try cases of petty
- contracts, involving sums of one drachma, five drachmas or a little
- more—for even these cases have to be tried, though they are not
- suitable for a numerous jury. But
- let us dismiss the subject of these petty suits, and the courts for homicide and
- those for aliens, and let us speak about political trials, which when not well
- conducted cause party divisions and revolutionary disturbances. And necessarily
- either all the judges of all the cases that have been classified will be
- appointed by vote, or by lot, or all in all cases partly by lot and partly by
- vote, or in some cases some judges will be appointed by lot and others by vote
- for the same case.
-
-
-
-
-
- Book 5 is placed as Book 7 by some
- editors, as Book 8 by others, see Book 3 fin., note.Almost all the
- other subjects which we intended to treathave now been discussed. There must follow the consideration of
- the questions, what are the number and the nature of the causes that give rise
- to revolutions in constitutions, and what are the causes that destroy each form
- of constitution, and out of what forms into what forms do they usually change,
- and again what are the safeguards of constitutions in general and of each form
- in particular, and what are the means by which the safeguarding of each may best
- be put into effect.For this distinction
- between broad methods of guarding against revolution and the practical means
- by which those methods can be put into effect Newman compares 9.2 f., 10 f.;
- 4.2.5 fin., 6.1.1.
-
- And
- we must first assume the starting-point, that many forms of constitution have
- come into existence with everybody agreeing as to what is just, that is
- proportionate equality, but failing to attain it (as has also been said
- before). Thus democracy arose from men's thinking that if they are
- equal in any respect they are equal absolutely (for they suppose that
- because they are all alike free they are equal absolutely), oligarchy
- arose from their assuming that if they are unequal as regards some one thing
- they are unequal wholly (for being unequal in property they assume that
- they are unequal absolutely); and then the democrats claim as being equal to participate
- in all things in equal shares, while the oligarchs as being unequal seek to have
- a larger share, for a larger share is unequal. All these forms of constitution
- then have some element of justice, but from an absolute point of view they are
- erroneous; and owing to this cause, when each of the two parties has not got the
- share in the constitution which accords with the fundamental assumption that
- they happen to entertain, faction ensues. And of all men those who excel in
- virtue would most justifiably stir up faction, though they are least given to
- doing so;
-
-
- for they alone can with the fullest reason be deemed absolutely
- unequal. And there are some men who being superior in birth claim unequal rights
- because of this inequality; for persons who have ancestral virtue and wealth
- behind them are thought to be noble.
- These then roughly speaking are the
- starting-points and sources of factions, which give rise to party strife
- (and revolutions due to this take place in two ways: sometimes they are
- in regard to the constitution, and aim at changing from the one established to
- another, for instance from democracy to oligarchy, or to democracy from
- oligarchy, or from these to constitutional government and aristocracy, or from
- those to these; but sometimes the revolution is not in regard to the established
- constitution, but its promoters desire the same form of government, for instance
- oligarchy or monarchy, but wish it to be in their own control. Again it may be a question of degree; for
- instance, when there is an oligarchy the object may be to change to a more
- oligarchical government or to a less, or when there is a democracy to a more or
- to a less democratic government, and similarly in the case of the remaining
- constitutions, the aim may be either to tighten them up or to relax them. Or
- again the aim may be to change a certain part of the constitution, for example
- to establish or abolish a certain magistracy, as according to some accounts
- Lysanderattempted to abolish the
- kingship at Sparta and the king
- Pausanias the ephorateSee 1307a 34
- n.; and also at Epidamnus the constitution was altered in
- part, for they set up a council instead of the tribal rulers, and it is still
- compulsory for the magistrates alone of the class that has political power to
- come to the popular assembly when an appointment to a magistracy is put to the
- vote; and the single supreme magistrate was also an oligarchical feature in this
- constitution). For party strife is everywhere due to inequality, where
- classes that are unequal do not receive a share of power in proportion
- (for a lifelong monarchy is an unequal feature when it exists among
- equals); for generally the motive for factious strife is the desire for
- equality. But equality is of two
- kinds, numerical equality and equality according to worth—by
- numerically equal I mean that which is the same and equal in number or
- dimension, by equal according to worth that which is equal by proportionThis ethical arithmetic is helped out in Greek
- by the fact that, even without the qualification kat'
- a)ci/an, i)/sos often means ‘equal to
- desert,’ fair, just.; for instance numerically 3 exceeds 2
- and 2 exceeds 1 by an equal amount, but by proportion 4 exceeds 2 and 2 exceeds
- 1 equally, since 2 and 1 are equal parts of 4 and 2, both being halves. But
- although men agree that the absolutely just is what is according to worth, they
- disagree (as was said beforeSee
- 1301a 27 ff. and note.) in that some think that if they are
- equal in something they are wholly equal, and others claim that if they are
- unequal in something they deserve an unequal share of all things. Owing to this two principal varieties of
- constitution come into existence, democracy and oligarchy; for noble birth and
- virtue are found in few men, but the qualifications specifiedThat is, numbers and wealth. in more:
-
-
-
- nowhere are there a hundred men nobly born and good, but there
- are rich menPerhaps the text should be
- emended to give ‘there are many rich men and poor men in many
- places.’ in many places. But for the constitution to be
- framed absolutely and entirely according to either kind of equality is bad. And
- this is proved by experience, for not one of the constitutions formed on such
- lines is permanent. And the cause of this is that it is impossible for some evil
- not to occur ultimately from the first and initial error that has been made.
- Hence the proper course is to employ numerical equality in some things and
- equality according to worth in others. But nevertheless democracy is safer and more free from
- civil strife than oligarchy; for in oligarchies two kinds of strife spring up,
- faction between different members of the oligarchy and also faction between the
- oligarchs and the people, whereas in democracies only strife between the people
- and the oligarchical party occurs, but party strife between different sections
- of the people itself does not occur to any degree worth mentioning. And again
- the government formed of the middle classes is nearer to the people than to the
- few, and it is the safest of the kinds of constitution mentioned.
- And since we
- are considering what circumstances give rise to party factions and revolutions
- in constitutions, we must first ascertain their origins and causes generally.
- They are, speaking roughly, three in number,Viz. the material, final and efficient causes of revolutions
- (Jowett). which we must first define in outline
- separately.For we must ascertain
- what state of affairs gives rise to party strife, and for what objects it is
- waged, and thirdly what are the origins of political disorders and internal
- party struggles.Now the principal cause, speaking
- generally, of the citizens being themselves disposed in a certain manner towards
- revolution is the one about which we happen to have spoken already. Those that
- desire equality enter on party strife if they think that they have too little
- although they are the equals of those who have more, while those that desire
- inequality or superiority do so if they suppose that although they are unequal
- they have not got more but an equal amount or less (and these desires may be felt justly, and they
- may also be felt unjustly); for when inferior, people enter on strife
- in order that they may be equal, and when equal, in order that they may be
- greater. We have therefore said what are the states of feeling in which men
- engage in party strife.The objects about which it
- is waged are gain and honor, and their opposites, for men carry on party faction
- in states in order to avoid dishonor and loss, either on their own behalf or on
- behalf of their friends.
- And the causes and origins of the disturbances which
- occasion the actual states of feeling described and their direction to the
- objects mentioned, according to one account happen to be seven in number, though
- according to another they are more. Two of them are the same as those spoken of
- before although not operating in the same way: the motives of gain and honor
- also stir men up against each other not in order that they may get them for
- themselves, as has been said before,
-
-
- but because they see other men
- in some cases justly and in other cases unjustly getting a larger share of them.
- Other causes are insolence, fear, excessive predominance, contempt,
- disproportionate growth of power; and also other modes of causeThe four causes now mentioned are those
- alluded to just above (1302a 38) as an addition to the
- seven enumerated above, 1302a 38-b 5. are election intrigue,
- carelessness, pettiness, dissimilarity. Among these motives the power possessed by insolence and
- gain, and their mode of operation, is almost obvious; for when the men in office
- show insolence and greed, people rise in revolt against one another and against
- the constitutions that afford the opportunity for such conduct; and greed
- sometimes preys on private property and sometimes on common funds. It is clear
- also what is the power of honor and how it can cause party faction; for men form
- factions both when they are themselves dishonored and when they see others
- honored; and the distribution of honors is unjust when persons are either
- honored or dishonored against their deserts, just when it is according to
- desert. Excessive predominance causes faction, when some individual or body of
- men is greater and more powerful than is suitable to the state and the power of
- the government; for such are the conditions that usually result in the rise of a
- monarchy or dynasty. Owing to this
- in some places they have the custom of temporary banishment,Cf. 1284a 18. as at Argos and Athens;
- yet it would be better to provide from the outset that there may be no persons
- in the stateso greatly predominant,
- than first to allow them to come into existence and afterwards to apply a
- remedy. Fear is the motive of faction with those who have inflicted wrong and
- are afraid of being punished, and also with those who are in danger of suffering
- a wrong and wish to act in time before the wrong is inflicted, as the notables
- at Rhodes banded togetherPerhaps in 390 B.C.,
- cf. 1302b 32 f. and 1304b 27 ff. against the people because of the
- law-suits that were being brought against them. Contempt is a cause of faction and of actual attacks, upon
- the government, for instance in oligarchies when those who have no share in the
- government are more numerous (for they think themselves the stronger
- party), and in democracies when the rich have begun to feel contempt
- for the disorder and anarchy that prevails, as for example at Thebes the democracy was destroyed owing to
- bad government after the battle of Oenophyta,Against Athens, 456 B.C. and that of the Megarians was
- destroyed when they had been defeated owing to disorder and anarchy,See 1300a 18 n. and at Syracuse before the tyranny
- 485 B.C. of
- Gelo, and at Rhodes
- See 1302b 23 n. the common people had fallen into
- contempt before the rising against them. Revolutions in the constitutions also take place on
- account of disproportionate growth; for just as the bodyIt is not clear whether what follows refers to a work of art
- (cf. 1284b 8) or is an exaggerated account of a disease;
- Galen describes one called saturi/asis, in
- which the bones of the temple swell out like satyrs' horns. is
- composed of parts, and needs to grow proportionately in order that its symmetry
- may remain, and if it does not it is spoiled, when the foot is four cubits long
- and the rest of the body two spans, and sometimes it might even change into the
- shape of another animal if it increased disproportionately not only in size but
- also in quality,i.e. if, for example, the
- foot became as hard as a hoof. so also a state is composed of parts,
-
-
-
- one of which often grows without its being noticed, as for
- example the number of the poor in democracies and constitutional states.
- And sometimes this is also
- brought about by accidental occurrences, as for instance at Tarentum when a great many notables were
- defeated and killed by the Iapygians a short time after the Persian wars a
- constitutional government was changed to a democracy, and at Argos when those in the seventh tribeThe word to be understood here may be fulh=|, or possibly h(me/ra|: the seventh day of the month was sacred to Apollo,
- especially at Sparta, and one
- account assigns Cleomenes' victory to that day, in which case the casualties
- may well have been known afterwards as ‘those who fell on the
- seventh.’ had been destroyed by the Spartan Cleomenes the
- citizens were compelled to admit some of the surrounding people, and at
- Athens when they suffered
- disasters by land the notables became fewer because at the time of the war
- against Sparta the army was drawn
- from a muster-roll.i.e. was made up of
- citizens and not of mercenaries. And this happens also in
- democracies, though to a smaller extent; for when the wealthy become more
- numerous or their properties increase, the governments change to oligarchies and
- dynasties.See 1292b 10 n.
- And revolutions in constitutions
- take place even without factious strife, owing to election intrigue, as at
- Heraea
- On the Alpheus, in Arcadia. (for they made their magistrates
- elected by lot instead of by vote for this reason, because the people used to
- elect those who canvassed); and also owing to carelessness, when people
- allow men that are not friends of the constitution to enter into the sovereign
- offices, as at OreusIn Euboea; its secession from Sparta to Athens, 377
- B.C., was perhaps the occasion of this revolution. oligarchy was
- broken up when Heracleodorus became one of the magistrates, who in place of an
- oligarchyformed a constitutional
- government, or rather a democracy. Another cause is alteration by small stages;
- by this I mean that often a great change of institutions takes place unnoticed
- when people overlook a small alteration, as in Ambracia the property-qualification was small, and finally men
- hold office with none at all, as a little is near to nothing, or practically the
- same. Also difference of race is a
- cause of faction, until harmony of spirit is reached; for just as any chance
- multitude of people does not form a state, so a state is not formed in any
- chance period of time. Hence most of the states that have hitherto admitted
- joint settlers or additional settlersi.e.
- colonists not from the mother-city, admitted either at the foundation of the
- colony or later. have split into factions; for example Achaeans
- settled at Sybaris
-
- Sybaris, founded 720 B.C., became
- very wealthy. The Troezenian population when expelled were received at
- Croton, which made war on
- Sybaris and destroyed it
- 510 B.C. To what exactly to\ a)/gos refers is unknown. jointly with
- Troezenians, and afterwards the Achaeans having become more numerous expelled
- the Troezenians, which was the Cause of the curse that fell on the Sybarites;
- and at Thurii Sybarites quarrelled with those who had settled there with them,
- for they claimed to have the larger share in the country as being their own, and
- were ejected; and at Byzantium
- the additional settlers were discovered plotting against the colonists and were
- expelled by force of arms; and the people of Antissa
- In Lesbos. after admitting the Chian
- exiles expelled them by arms; and
- the people of Zancle
- Later Messana, Messina. after admitting settlers from Samos were themselves expelled; and the people
- of Apollonia on the Euxine Sea after bringing in additional
- settlers fell into faction; and the Syracusans after the period of the
- tyrantsThrasybulus succeeded his brother
- Hiero as tyrant in 467 B.C. and fell within a
- year.
-
-
-
- conferred citizenship on their foreign troops and mercenaries and then faction
- set in and they came to battle; and the Amphipolitans having received settlers
- from Chalcis were most of them
- driven out by them.Cf. 1306a 2. The exact
- circumstances are unknown; Amphipolis was colonized from Athens
- 437 B.C.
- (And in oligarchies civil strife is
- raised by the many, on the ground that they are treated unjustly because they
- are not admitted to an equal share although they are equal, as has been said
- before, but in democracies it begins with the notables, because they have an
- equal share although they are not equal.)This sentence is out of place here, and would fit in better
- if placed (as it is by Newman) above at 1301a 39, after
- stasia/zousi, or (with other
- editors) 1301b 26.
-
- Also
- states sometimes enter on faction for geographical reasons, when the nature of
- the country is not suited for there being a single city, as for example at
- ClazomenaeTopography uncertain:
- Clazomenae near Smyrna was
- partly on a small island, which Alexander joined to the mainland with a
- causeway. the people near Chytrum are in feud with the inhabitants of
- the island, and the Colophonians and the Notians
- Notium was the
- port of Colophon.; and
- at Athens the population is not
- uniformly democratic in spirit, but the inhabitants of Piraeus are more so than those of the
- city. For just as in wars the fording of watercourses, even quite small ones,
- causes the formations to lose contact, so every difference seems to cause
- division. Thus perhaps the greatest division is that between virtue and vice,
- next that between wealth and poverty, and so with other differences in varying
- degree, one of which is the one mentioned.i.e. difference of locality.
-
- Factions arise therefore not about but out of small matters; but they are
- carried on about great matters. And even the small ones grow extremely violent
- when they spring up among men of the ruling class,as happened for example at Syracuse in ancient times. For the constitution underwent a
- revolution as a result of a quarrel that arosePerhaps under the oligarch of the Gamori, overthrown by the
- people and followed by Gelo's tyranny, 485
- B.C. between two young men, who belonged to the ruling class, about a
- love affair. While one of them was abroad the other who was his comrade won over
- the youth with whom he was in love, and the former in his anger against him
- retaliated by persuading his wife to come to him; owing to which they stirred up
- a party struggle among all the people in the state, enlisting them on their
- sides. On account of this it is
- necessary to guard against such affairs at their beginning, and to break up the
- factions of the leaders and powerful men; for the error occurs at the beginning,
- and the beginning as the proverb says is half of the whole, so that even a small
- mistake at the beginning stands in the same ratioi.e. the ratio of being a half to the whole: a bad start does
- as much to harm as all the later mistakes put together. to mistakes
- at the other stages. And in general the faction quarrels of the notables involve
- the whole state in the consequences, as happened at HestiaeaAlso called Oreus, see 1303a 18. after the Persian
- wars, when two brothers quarrelled about the division of their patrimony; for
- the poorer of the two, on the ground that the other would not make a return of
- the estate and of the treasure that their father had found, got the common
- people on his side, and the other possessing much property was supported by the
- rich. And at Delphi the beginning of all the factions
- that occurred afterwards was when a quarrel arose out of a marriage;
-
-
- the
- bridegroom interpreted some chance occurrence when he came to fetch the bride as
- a bad omen and went away without taking her, and her relatives thinking
- themselves insulted threw some articles of sacred property into the fire when he
- was performing a sacrifice and then put him to death as guilty of sacrilege. And
- also at Mitylene
- The revolt of Mitylene
- 428 B.C. is ascribed to purely political causes by
- Thuc. 3.1-30. a faction that arose out
- of some heiresses was the beginning of many misfortunes, and of the war with the
- Athenians in which Paches captured the city of Mitylene: a wealthy citizen named Timophanes left two
- daughters, and a man who was rejected in his suit to obtain them for his own
- sons, Doxander, started the faction and kept on stirring up the Athenians, whose
- consul he was at Mitylene. And among the Phocians when a faction
- arising out of an heiress sprang up in connection with Mnaseas the father of
- Mnason and Euthykrates the father of Onomarchus,i.e. the fathers of the two suitors for the heiress's hand
- turned the quarrel into a faction fight. this faction proved to be
- the beginning for the Phocians of the Holy War. At Epidamnus also circumstances
- relating to a marriage gave rise to a revolution in the constitutionPerhaps the same event as that referred to
- 1301b 21.; somebody had betrothed his daughter, and the father of the
- man to whom he had betrothed her became a magistrate, and had to sentence him to
- a fine; the other thinking that he had been treated with insolence formed a
- party of the unenfranchised classes to assist him. And also revolutions to oligarchy and democracy and
- constitutional government arise from the growth in reputation or in power of
- some magistracy or some section of the state;as for example the Council on the Areopagus having risen in
- reputation during the Persian wars was believed to have made the constitution
- more rigid, and then again the naval multitude, having been the cause of the
- victory off Salamis and thereby of the
- leadership of Athens due to her
- power at sea, made the democracy stronger; and at Argos the notables having risen in repute in connection with
- the battle against the Spartans at Mantinea took in hand to put down the people; and at Syracuse the people having been the cause of the victory in the
- war against Athens made a revolution
- from constitutional government to democracy; and at Chalcis the people with the aid of the
- notables overthrew the tyrant PhoxusUnknown. and then immediately seized the government; and again at
- Ambracia similarly the people
- joined with the adversaries of the tyrant Periander in expelling him and then
- brought the government round to themselves.
- 580 B.C; cf. 1311a 39 ff.
- And indeed in general it must not
- escape notice that the persons who have caused a state to win power, whether
- private citizens or magistrates or tribes, or in general a section or group of
- any kind, stir up faction; for either those who envy these men for being honored
- begin the faction, or these men owing to their superiority are not willing to
- remain in a position of equality. And constitutions also undergo revolution when
- what are thought of as opposing sections of the state become equal to one
- another,
-
-
- for instance the rich and the people, and there is no middle
- class or only an extremely small one; for if either of the two sections becomes
- much the superior, the remainder is not willing to risk an encounter with its
- manifestly stronger opponent. Owing to this men who are exceptional in virtue
- generally speaking do not cause faction, because they find themselves few
- against many. Universally then in connection with all the forms of constitution
- the origins and causes of factions and revolutions are of this nature.
- The means
- used to cause revolutions of constitutions are sometimes force and sometimes
- fraud. Force is employed either when the revolutionary leaders exert compulsion
- immediately from the start or later on—as indeed the mode of using
- fraud is also twofold: sometimes the revolutionaries after completely deceiving
- the people at the first stage alter the constitution with their consent, but
- then at a later stage retain their hold on it by force against the people's
- will: for instance, at the time of the Four Hundred,The oligarchy at Athens
- 411 B.C., cf. 1305a 27. they deceived the
- people by saying that the Persian King would supply money for the war against
- the Spartans, and after telling them this falsehood endeavored to keep a hold
- upon the government; but in other cases they both persuade the people at the
- start and afterwards repeat the persuasion and govern them with their
- consent.Speaking generally therefore in
- regard to all the forms of constitution, the causes that have been stated are
- those from which revolutions have occurred.
- But in the light of these
- general rules we must consider the usual course of eventsas classified according to each different kind of
- constitution. In democracies the principal cause of revolutions is the insolence
- of the demagogues; for they cause the owners of property to band together,
- partly by malicious prosecutions of individuals among them (for common
- fear brings together even the greatest enemies), and partly by setting
- on the common people against them as a class. And one may see this taking place in this manner in many
- instances. In Cos the democracy was overthrownDate unknown. when evil demagogues had arisen there,
- for the notables banded themselves together; and also in Rhodes,See
- 1302b 23 n. for the demagogues used to provide pay for public
- services, and also to hinder the payment of money owedi.e. owed for repairs to the ships, and perhaps also for
- advances of pay to the crews. to the naval captains, and these
- because of the lawsuits that were brought against them were forced to make
- common cause and overthrow the people. And also at Heraclea
- Probably the Pontic
- Heraclea (cf. 1305b 5, 36, 1306a 37), founded middle of
- the 6th century B.C., not the Trachinian. the people were put down
- immediately after the foundation of the colony because of the people's leaders;
- for the notables being unjustly treated by them used to be driven out, but later
- on those who were driven out collecting together effected their return and put
- down the people. And also the
- democracy at Megara was put down in
- a similar mannerSee 1300a 18 ff. n.;
- the people's leaders in order to have money to distribute to the people went on
- expelling many of the notables, until they made the exiles a large body, and
- these came back and defeated the people in a battle and set up the oligarchy.
- And the same thing happened also at Cyme
-
-
- in the time of the democracy
- which Thrasymachus put downAn event
- otherwise unknown., and in the case of other states also examination
- would show that revolutions take place very much in this manner. Sometimes they
- make the notables combine by wronging them in order to curry favor, causing
- either their estates to be divided up or their revenues by imposing public
- services, and sometimes by so slandering them that they may have the property of
- the wealthy to confiscate. And in
- old times whenever the same man became both leader of the people and general,
- they used to change the constitution to a tyranny; for almost the largest number
- of the tyrants of early days have risen from being leaders of the people. And
- the reason why this used to happen then but does not do so now is because then
- the leaders of the people were drawn from those who held the office of general
- (for they were not yet skilled in oratory), but now when
- rhetoric has developed the able speakers are leaders of the people, but owing to
- their inexperience in military matters they are not put in control of these,
- except in so far as something of the kind has taken place to a small extent in
- some places. And tyrannies also used
- to occur in former times more than they do now because important offices were
- entrusted to certain men, as at Miletus a tyrannyPerhaps
- that of Thrasybulus (Hdt.
- 1.20), 612 B.C. arose out
- of the presidency (for the president had control of many important
- matters). And moreover, because the cities in those times were not
- large but the common people lived on their farmsbusily engaged in agriculture, the people's champions when they
- became warlike used to aim at tyranny. And they all used to do this when they
- had acquired the confidence of the people, and their pledge of confidence was
- their enmity towards the rich, as at Athens Pisistratus made himself tyrant by
- raising up a party against the men of the plain, and Theagenes at Megara by slaughtering the cattle of the
- well-to-do which he captured grazing by the river, and DionysiusDionysius the elder, see 1259a 29 n.
- established a claim to become tyrant when he accused Daphnaeus and the rich,
- since his hostility to them caused him to be trusted as a true man of the
- people. And revolutions also take
- place from the ancestral form of democracy to one of the most modern kind; for
- where the magistracies are elective, but not on property-assessments, and the
- people elect, men ambitious of office by acting as popular leaders bring things
- to the point of the people's being sovereign even over the laws. A remedy to
- prevent this or to reduce its extent is for the tribes to elect the magistrates,
- and not the people collectively.These then are
- the causes through which almost all the revolutions in democracies take
- place.
- Oligarchies undergo revolution principally through two ways
- that are the most obvious. One is if they treat the multitude unjustly; for
- anybody makes an adequate people's champion, and especially so when their leader
- happens to come from the oligarchy itself, like Lygdamis at Naxos, who afterwards actually became tyrant
- of the Naxians.
-
-
-
- Faction
- originating with other people also has various ways of arising. Sometimes when
- the honors of office are shared by very few, dissolution originates from the
- wealthy themselves,The contrasted case, of
- dissolution of oligarchy arising from the people, should follow, but is
- omitted. but not those that are in office, as for example has
- occurred at Marseilles,Cf. 1321a 29 ff. at Istrus,Near the mouth of the Danube. at Heraclea,See 1304b 31
- n. and in other states; for those who did not share in the
- magistracies raised disturbances until as a first stage the older brothers were
- admitted, and later the younger ones again (for in some places a father
- and a son may not hold office together, and in others an elder and a younger
- brother may not). At Marseilles the oligarchy became more constitutional, while at
- Istrus it ended in becoming
- democracy, and in Heraclea the
- government passed from a smaller number to six hundred. At Cnidus
- also there was a revolutionPerhaps not the
- same as the one mentioned at 1306b 3. of the oligarchy caused by a
- faction formed by the notables against one another, because few shared in the
- government, and the rule stated held, that if a father was a member a son could
- not be, nor if there were several brothers could any except the eldest; for the
- common people seized the opportunity of their quarrel and, taking a champion
- from among the notables, fell upon them and conquered them, for a party divided
- against itself is weak. Another case
- was at Erythrae,Just west of Smyrna. The family name implies a claim
- to royal ancestry. where at the time of the oligarchy of the
- Basilidae in ancient days, althoughthe persons in the government directed affairs well, nevertheless the common
- people were resentful because they were governed by a few, and brought about a
- revolution of the constitution.On the other hand,
- oligarchies are overthrown from within themselves bothThis sentence is interrupted by a parenthesis and is resumed
- in 5.6, ‘And revolution is oligarchy
- also—’. when from motives of rivalry they play
- the demagogue (and this demagogy is of two sorts, one among the
- oligarchs themselves, for a demagogue can arise among them even when they are a
- very small body,—as for instance in the time of the Thirty at
- Athens, the party of Charicles
- rose to power by currying popularity with the Thirty, and in the time of the
- Four HundredSee 1304b 12 n. the party
- of Phrynichus rose in the same way,—the other when the members of the oligarchy curry
- popularity with the mob, as the Civic Guards at Larisa
- See 1275b 29
- n. courted popularity with the mob because it elected them, and in
- all the oligarchies in which the magistracies are not elected by the class from
- which the magistrates come but are filled from high property-grades or from
- political clubs while the electors are the heavy-armed soldiers or the common
- people, as used to be the case at Abydos, and in places where the jury-courts are not made up
- from the governmenti.e.
- (apparently) where membership is not confined to the class
- eligible for the magistracies.—for there members of the
- oligarchy by courting popular favor with a view to their trials cause a
- revolution of the constitution, as took place at Heraclea on the EuxineSee
- 1304b 31 n.; and a
- further instance is when some men try to narrow down the oligarchy to a smaller
- number, for those who seek equality are forced to bring in the people as a
- helper.) And revolutions in oligarchy also take place when they
- squander their private means by riotous living; for also men of this sort seek
- to bring about a new state of affairs, and either aim at tyranny themselves or
- suborn somebody else
-
-
- (as Hipparinus put forward DionysiusSee 1259a 29 n. at Syracuse, and at Amphipolis
- See 1303b 2 n. a man named Cleotimus led the
- additional settlers that came from Chalcis and on their arrival stirred them up to sedition
- against the wealthy, and in Aegina the
- man who carried out the transactions with Chares attempted to cause a revolution
- in the constitution for a reason of this sorti.e. he had squandered his fortune in riotous living; this deal with the
- Athenian general may have been in 367
- B.C.); so sometimes
- they attempt at once to introduce some reform, at other times they rob the
- public funds and in consequence either they or those who fight against them in
- their peculations stir up faction against the government, as happened at
- Apollonia on the Black Sea.
- On the other hand, harmonious oligarchy does not easily cause its own
- destruction; and an indication of this is the constitutional government at
- Pharsalus, for there the ruling
- class though few are masters of many meni.e.
- both of the lower classes and of the subject cities. because on good
- terms with one another. Also
- oligarchical governments break up when they create a second oligarchy within the
- oligarchy. This is when, although the whole citizen class is small, its few
- members are not all admitted to the greatest offices; this is what once occurred
- in Elis, for the government being in
- the hands of a few, very few men used to become members of the Elders,i.e. the small governing body. because
- these numbering ninety held office for life, and the mode of election was of a
- dynastic typei.e. like a
- dynasteia, favorable to the interest of a few very wealthy
- families; see 1292b 10 n. and resembled that of the Elders at
- Sparta.
- Revolutionsof oligarchies occur both during war and in
- time of peace— during war since the oligarchs are forced by their
- distrust of the people to employ mercenary troops (for the man in whose
- hands they place them often becomes tyrant, as Timophanes did at Corinth,
- Corinth was at
- war with Argos circa 350 B.C. Timophanes was killed by his brother the
- famous Timoleon, in order to restore constitutional government. and
- if they put several men in command, these win for themselves dynastic
- power), and when through fear of this they give a share in the
- constitution to the multitude, the oligarchy falls because they are compelled to
- make use of the common people; during peace, on the other hand, because of their
- distrust of one another they place their protection in the hands of mercenary
- troops and a magistrate between the two parties, who sometimes becomes master of
- both, which happened at Larisa in the
- time of the government of the Aleuadae led by Simus,A probable emendation of the Greek gives ‘happened
- at Larisa to Simus and his party at
- the time of the government of the Aleuadae.’ This family were
- hereditary rulers of Larisa
- (see also 1275b 29 ff. n., and 1305b 29 ff.) and at
- Abydos in the time of the political
- clubs of which that of Iphiades was one. And factions arise also in consequence of one set of the
- members of the oligarchy themselves being pushed aside by another set and being
- driven into party strife in regard to marriages or law-suits; examples of such
- disorders arising out of a cause related to marriage are the instances spoken of
- before, and also the oligarchy of the knights at Eretria was put downPossibly before the Persian wars. See 1289b 36 ff. The two
- following cases are unrecorded elsewhere. by Diagoras when he had
- been wronged in respect of a marriage, while the faction at Heraclea and that at Thebes arose out of a judgement of a
- law-court, when the people at Heraclea
- justly but factiously enforced the punishment against Eurytion on a charge of
- adultery
-
-
- and those at Thebes
- did so against Archias; for their personal enemies stirred up party feeling
- against them so as to get them bound in the pillory in the market-place.
- Also many governments have been
- put down by some of their members who had become resentful because the
- oligarchies were too despotic; this is how the oligarchies fell at Cnidus
- See
- 1305b 13 n. and at Chios.
- And revolutions also occur from an accident, both in what is called a
- constitutional government and in those oligarchies in which membership of the
- council and the law-courts and tenure of the other offices are based on a
- property-qualification. For often the qualification first having been fixed to
- suit the circumstances of the time, so that in an oligarchy a few may be members
- and in a constitutional government the middle classes, when peace or some other
- good fortune leads to a good harvest it comes about that the same properties
- become worth many times as large an assessment, so that all the citizens share
- in all the rights, the change sometimes taking place gradually and little by
- little and not being noticed, but at other times more quickly.
- Such then
- are the causes that lead to revolutions and factions in oligarchies
- (and generally, both democracies and oligarchies are sometimes altered
- not into the opposite forms of constitution but into ones of the same class, for
- instancefrom legitimate
- democracies and oligarchies into autocratic ones and from the latter into the
- former).
- In aristocracies factions arise in some cases because
- few men share in the honors (which has also been saidSee 1306a 13 ff. to be the cause of
- disturbances in oligarchies, because an aristocracy too is a sort of oligarchy,
- for in both those who govern are few—although the reason for this is
- not the same in both—since this does cause it to be thought that
- aristocracy is a form of oligarchy). And this is most bound to come
- about when there is a considerable number of people who are proud-spirited on
- the ground of being equals in virtue (for example the clan called the
- Maidens' SonsSaid to be descended from
- irregular unions authorized in order to keep up population during the First
- Messenian War. They founded Taranto
- 708 B.C. at Sparta—for they were
- descended from the Equals—whom the Spartans detected in a conspiracy
- and sent away to colonize Tarentum); or
- when individuals although great men and inferior to nobody in virtue are treated
- dishonorably by certain men in higher honor (for example Lysander by
- the kingsKing Pausanias II. checked Lysander
- after his conquest of Athens in
- 403 B.C. and King Agesilaus thwarted him on
- the expedition into Asia Minor in
- 396.); or when a person of manly nature has no share in the
- honors (for example Cinadon,His
- conspiracy against the *(/omoioi in 398 B.C. was discovered and he was executed.
- who got together the attack upon the Spartans in the reign of
- Agesilaus). Faction in aristocracies also arises when some of the
- well-born are too poor and others too rich (which happens especially
- during wars, and this also occurred at Sparta at the time of the Messenian War—as appears
- from the poem of Tyrtaeus entitled
Law and Order;
-
-
- for some
- men being in distress because of the war put forward a claim to carry out a
- re-division of the land of the country). Also if a man is great and
- capable of being yet greater, he stirs up faction in order that he may be sole
- ruler (as Pausanias who commanded the army through the Persian war
- seems to have done at Sparta, and
- HannoPerhaps Hanno who fought in
- Sicily against the elder
- Dionysius circa 4OO B.C. at Carthage).
- But the actual overthrow of both
- constitutional governments and aristocracies is mostly due to a departure from
- justice in the actual framework of the constitution. For what starts it in the
- case of a constitutional government is that it does not contain a good blend of
- democracy and oligarchy; and in the case of an aristocracy it is the lack of a
- good blend of those two elements and of virtue, but chiefly of the two elements
- (I mean popular government and oligarchy), for both
- constitutional governments and most of the constitutions that are called
- aristocracies aim at blending these. For thisi.e. their mode of blending
- oligarchy and democracy. is the point of distinction between
- aristocracies and what are called constitutional governments, and it is owing to
- this that some of themThe writer loosely
- speaks of aristocracies and polities as a single class, differing only in
- degree of concentration of power in the hands of the upper classes.
- are less and others more stable; for the constitutions inclining more towards
- oligarchy men call aristocracies and those inclining more to the side of the
- multitude constitutional governments, owing to which those of the latter sort
- are more secure than the others, for the greater number is the stronger, and
- also men are more content when they have an equal amount, whereas the owners of
- wealthy properties, if the constitution gives them the superior
- position,seek to behave
- insolently and to gain money. And
- speaking broadly, to whichever side the constitution leans, that is the side to
- which it shifts as either of the two parties increases its own side—a
- constitutional government shifts to democracy and an aristocracy to oligarchy,
- or to the opposite extremes, that is, aristocracy to democracy (for the
- poorer people feeling they are unjustly treated pull it round to the
- opposite) and constitutional governments to oligarchy (for the
- only lasting thing is equality in accordance with desert and the possession of
- what is their own). And the
- change mentionedi.e. from aristocracy to
- democracy. Possibly these events occurred after the defeat of Athens at Syracuse in 413 B.C., when the Athenian party at Thurii was banished (Lysias
- 835 D). The events in 8 were perhaps in the fourth century.
- came about at Thurii, for because
- the property-qualification for honors was too high, the constitution was altered
- to a lower property-qualification and to a larger number of official posts, but
- because the notables illegally bought up the whole of the land (for the
- constitution was too oligarchical, so that they were able to grasp at
- wealth) . . .Probably a clause
- meaning ‘civil strife ensued’ has been lost. And
- the people having been trained in the war overpowered the guards, until those
- who were in the position of having too much land relinquished it.
- Besides, as
- all aristocratic constitutions are inclined towards oligarchy, the notables
- grasp at wealth (for example at Sparta the estates are coming into a few hands); and
- the notables have more power to do what they like, and to form marriage
- connections with whom they like (which was the cause of the fall of the
- state of Locri, as a result of the
- marriage with Dionysius,See 1259a 28 n. He
- married in 397 B.C. the daughter of a Locrian
- citizen, who bore him the younger Dionysius. which would not have
- taken place in a democracy; nor in a well-blended aristocracy).
-
-
-
- And aristocracies are most liable to undergo revolution
- unobserved, through gradual relaxation, just as it has been said in what has
- gone before about all forms of constitution in general, that even a small change
- may cause a revolution. For when they give up one of the details of the
- constitution, afterwards they also make another slightly bigger change more
- readily, until they alter the whole system. This occurred for instance with the constitution of
- Thurii. There was a law that the
- office of general could be held at intervals of four years, but some of the
- younger men, becoming warlike and winning high repute with the mass of the
- guards, came to despise the men engaged in affairs, and thought that they would
- easily get control; so first they tried to repeal the law referred to, so as to
- enable the same persons to serve as generals continuously, as they saw that the
- people would vote for themselves with enthusiasm. And though the magistrates in
- charge of this matter, called the Councillors, at first made a movement to
- oppose them, they were won over, believing that after repealing this law they
- would allow the rest of the constitution to stand; but later, though they wished
- to prevent them when other laws were being repealed, they could no longer do
- anything more, but the whole system of the constitution was converted into a
- dynasty of the men who had initiated the innovations.
- And constitutions of all
- formsare broken up some times
- from movements initiating from within themselves, but sometimes from outside,
- when there is an opposite form of constitution either near by or a long way off
- yet possessed of power. This used to happen in the days of the Athenians and the
- Spartans; the Athenians used to put down oligarchies everywhere and the Spartans
- democracies.We have then approximately stated
- the causes that give rise to revolutions in the constitutions of states and to
- party factions.
- The next thing to speak about is security both in general and
- for each form of constitution separately. First then it is clear that if we know
- the causes by which constitutions are destroyed we also know the causes by which
- they are preserved; for opposites create opposites, and destruction is the
- opposite of security. In well-blended constitutions therefore, if care must be
- taken to prevent men from committing any other breach of the law, most of all
- must a small breach be guarded against, for transgression of the law creeps in unnoticed, just as
- a small expenditure occurring often ruins men's estates; for the expense is not
- noticed because it does not come all at once, for the mind is led astray by the
- repeated small outlays, just like the sophistic puzzle, ‘if each is
- little, then all are a little.’This is the soritesfallacy; add to one stone another, and
- another, and another—when do they make a heap ( swro/s)? and take away stone after
- stone—when do they cease to be a heap? Horace's ‘ratio
- ruentis acerui’ (Hor. Ep.
- 2.47. This is true in one way but in another it is not;
- for the whole or total is not little, but made up of little parts. One thing
- therefore that we must guard against is this beginning; and the next point is
- that we must not put faith in the arguments strung together for the sake of
- tricking the multitude,
-
-
- for they are refuted by the facts (and
- what sort of constitutional sophistries we refer to has been said
- before). And again we must
- observe that not only some aristocracies but also some oligarchies endure not
- because the constitutions are secure but because those who get in the offices
- treat both those outside the constitution and those in the government well, on
- the one hand by not treating those who are not members of it unjustly and by
- bringing their leading men into the constitution and not wronging the ambitious
- ones in the matter of dishonor or the multitude in the matter of gain, and on
- the other hand, in relation to themselves and those who are members, by treating
- one another in a democratic spirit. For that equality which men of democratic
- spirit seek for in the case of the multitude is not only just but also expedient
- in the case of their compeers. Hence
- if there are a greater number in the governing class, many of the legislative
- enactments of a democratic nature are advantageous, for example for the offices
- to be tenable for six months, to enable all the compeers to participate in them;
- for the compeers in this case are as it were the people (owing to which
- demagogues often arise even among them, as has been said already), and
- also oligarchies and aristocracies fall into dynasties less (for it is
- not so easy to do wrongswhen in
- office for a short time as when in for a long time, since it is long tenure of
- office that causes tyrannies to spring up in oligarchies and democracies; for
- either those who are the greatest men in either sort of state aim at tyranny, in
- the one sort the demagogues and in the other the dynasts, or those who hold the
- greatest offices, when they are in office for along time). And constitutions are kept secure not only
- through being at a distance from destroyers but sometimes also through being
- near them,This modifies 1207a 31. for
- when they are afraid the citizens keep a closer hold on the government; hence
- those who take thought for the constitution must contrive causes of fear, in
- order that the citizens may keep guard and not relax their vigilance for the
- constitution like a watch in the night, and they must make the distant near.
- Again, they must also endeavor to guard against the quarrels and party struggles
- of the notables by means of legislation, and to keep out those who are outside
- the quarrel before they too have taken it over; since to discern a growing evil
- at the commencement is not any ordinary person's work but needs a statesman.
- And to deal with the revolution
- from oligarchy and constitutional government that arises because of the
- property-qualifications, when this occurs while the rates of qualification
- remain the same but money is becoming plentiful, it is advantageous to examine
- the total amount of the rated value of the community as compared with the past
- amount, in states where the assessment is made yearly, over that period,
-
-
-
- and three years or five years ago in the larger states, and if
- the new total is many times larger or many times smaller than the former one at
- the time when the rates qualifying for citizenship were fixed, it is
- advantageous that there should be a law for the magistrates correspondingly to
- tighten up or to relax the rates, tightening them up in proportion to the ratio
- of increase if the new total rated value exceeds the old, and relaxing them and
- making the qualification lower if the new total falls below the old. For in oligarchies and constitutional
- states, when they do not do this, in the one casei.e. if the total valuation has decreased. the result
- is that in the latter an oligarchy comes into existence and in the former a
- dynasty, and in the other casei.e. if the
- total has increased. a constitutional government turns into a
- democracy and an oligarchy into a constitutional government or a government of
- the people. But it is a policy common to democracy and oligarchy [and
- to monarchy],Some MSS. and many
- editors omit these words. and every form of constitution not to raise
- up any man too much beyond due proportion, but rather to try to assign small
- honors and of long tenure or great ones quicklyThe text should probably be emended ‘with a short
- tenure.’ (for officials grow corrupt, and not
- every man can bear good fortune), or if not, at all events not to
- bestow honors in clusters and take them away again in clusters, but by a gradual
- process; and best of all to try so
- to regulate people by the law that there may be nobody among them specially
- pre-eminent in power due to friends or wealth, or, failing this, to cause their
- periods out of office to be spent abroad.And since men also cause revolutions through their private
- lives, some magistracy must be set up to inspect those whose mode of living is
- unsuited to the constitution—unsuited to democracy in a democracy, to
- oligarchy in an oligarchy, and similarly for each of the other forms of
- constitution. And also sectional prosperity in the state must be guarded against
- for the same reasons; and the way to avert this is always to entrust business
- and office to the opposite sections (I mean that the respectable are
- opposite to the multitude and the poor to the wealthy), and to endeavor
- either to mingle together the multitude of the poor and that of the wealthy or
- to increase the middle class (for this dissolves party factions due to
- inequality). And in every
- form of constitution it is a very great thing for it to be so framed both by its
- laws and by its other institutions that it is impossible for the magistracies to
- make a profit. And this has most to be guarded against in oligarchies; for the
- many are not so much annoyed at being excluded from holding office (but
- in fact they are glad if somebody lets them have leisure to spend on their own
- affairs) as they are if they think that the magistrates are stealing
- the common funds, but then both things annoy them, exclusion from the honors of
- office and exclusion from its profits. And indeed the sole way in which a combination of
- democracy and aristocracy is possible is if someone could contrive this
- arrangementi.e. render it impossible to
- make money out of office;
-
-
- for it would then be possible
- for the notables and also the multitude both to have what they want; for it is
- the democratic principle for all to have the right to hold office and the
- aristocratic one for the offices to be filled by the notables, and this will be
- the case when it is impossible to make money from office; for the poor will not
- want to hold office because of making nothing out of it, but rather to attend to
- their own affairs, while the wealthy will be able to hold office because they
- have no need to add to their resources from the public funds; so that the result
- will be that the poor will become well-off through spending their time upon
- their work, and the notables will not be governed by any casual persons.
- Therefore to prevent peculation
- of the public property, let the transfer of the funds take place in the presence
- of all the citizens, and let copies of the lists be deposited for each
- brotherhood,Groups of citizens normally
- three to a tribe, supposed to be based on relationship. companyOriginally a military, later a civil
- classification. and tribe; and to get men to hold office without
- profit there must be honors assigned by law to officials of good repute. And in
- democracies it is necessary to be sparing of the wealthy not only by not causing
- properties to be divided up, but not incomes either (which under some
- constitutions takes place unnoticed), and it is better to prevent men
- from undertaking costly but useless public services like equipping choruses and
- torch-racesEquipping the chorus and
- actors for tragedies and comedies and providing for the ceremonial
- torch-races were public services borne by individuals at Athens. and all other similar
- services, even if they wish to;
- in an oligarchy on the other
- hand it is necessary to take much care of the poor, and to allot to them the
- offices of profit, and the penalty if one of the rich commits an outrage against
- them must be greater than if it is done by one of themselves,Or possibly ‘than if he does it
- against one of his own class.’ and inheritance must not go
- by bequest but by family, and the same man must not inherit more than one
- estate, for so estates would be more on a level, and more of the poor would
- establish themselves as prosperous. And it is expedient both in a democracy and in an oligarchy to assign to those
- who have a smaller share in the government—in a democracy to the
- wealthy and in an oligarchy to the poor—either equality or precedence
- in all other things excepting the supreme offices of state; but these should be
- entrusted to those prescribed by the constitution exclusively, or to them for
- the most part.
- There are some three qualities which those who are to hold the
- supreme magistracies ought to possess, first, loyalty to the established
- constitution, next, very great capacity to do the duties of the office, and
- third, virtue and justice—in each constitution the sort of justice
- suited to the constitution (for if the rules of justice are not the
- same under all constitutions, it follows that there must be differences in the
- nature of justice also). It is a difficult question how the choice
- ought to be made when it happens that all these qualities are not found in the
- same person;
-
-
- for instance, if one man is a good military commander but a bad
- man and no friend of the constitution, and the other is just and loyal, how
- should the choice be made? It seems
- that two things ought to be considered, what is the quality of which all men
- have a larger share, and what the one of which all have a smaller share?
- Therefore in the case of military command one must consider experience more than
- virtue, for men have a smaller share of military experience and a larger share
- of moral goodness; but in the case of a trusteeship or a stewardship the
- opposite, for these require more virtue than most men possess, but the knowledge
- required is common to all men. And somebody might raise the question, why is
- virtue needed if both capacity and loyalty to the constitution are forthcoming,
- as even these two qualities will do what is suitable? May not the answer be,
- because those who possess these two qualities may possibly lack self-control, so
- that just as they do not serve themselves well although they know how to and
- although they love themselves, so possibly in some cases they may behave in this
- way in regard to the community also? And broadly, whatever provisions in the laws we describe as advantageous to
- constitutions, these are all preservative of the constitutions, and so is the
- supreme elementary principle that has been often stated, that of taking
- precautions that the section desirous of the constitution shall be stronger in
- numbers than the section not desirous off it. And beside all these matters one
- thing must not be overlooked which at present is overlooked by the,
- deviation-formsSee 1279a 20. of
- constitution—the middle party;for many of the institutions thought to be popular destroy
- democracies, and many of those thought oligarchical destroy oligarchies.
- But the adherents of the
- deviation-form, thinking that this form is the only right thing, drag it to
- excess, not knowing that just as there can be a nose that although deviating
- from the most handsome straightness towards being hooked or snub nevertheless is
- still beautiful and agreeable to look at, yet all the same, if a sculptor
- carries it still further in the direction of excess, he will first lose the
- symmetry of the feature and finally will make it not even look like a nose at
- all, because of its excess and deficiency in the two opposite qualities
- (and the same is the ease also in regard to the other parts of the
- body), so this is what happens about constitutions likewise; for it is possible for an oligarchy and a
- democracy to be satisfactory although they have diverged from the best
- structure, but if one strains either of them further, first he will make the
- constitution worse, and finally he will make it not a constitution at all.
- Therefore the legislator and the statesman must not fail to know what sort of
- democratic institutions save and what destroy a democracy, and what sort of
- oligarchical institutions an oligarchy; for neither constitution can exist and
- endure without the well-to-do and the multitude, but when an even level of
- property comes about, the constitution resulting must of necessity be another
- one,
-
-
- so that when men destroy these classes by laws carried to
- excess they destroy the constitutions. And a mistake is made both in democracies and in
- oligarchies—in democracies by the demagogues, where the multitude is
- supreme over the laws; for they always divide the state into two by fighting
- with the well-to-do, but they ought on the contrary always to pretend to be
- speaking on behalf of men that are well-to-do, while in democracies the
- oligarchical statesmen ought to pretend to be speaking on behalf of the people,
- and the oligarchics ought to take oath in terms exactly opposite to those which
- they use now, for at present in some oligarchies they swear, “And I
- will be hostile to the people and will plan whatever evil I can against
- them,”The ‘scoffing
- anapaestic cadence’ of this oath has been noted. In 411 B.C. the democratic reaction at Athens swore ‘to be enemies
- of the Four Hundred and to hold no parley with them.’ but
- they ought to hold, and to act the part of holding, the opposite notion,
- declaring in their oaths, “I will not wrong the people.”
- But the greatest of all the
- means spoken of to secure the stability of constitutions is one that at present
- all people despise: it is a system of education suited to the constitutions. For
- there is no use in the most valuable laws, ratified by the unanimous judgement
- of the whole body of citizens, if these are not trained and educated in the
- constitution, popularly if the laws are popular, oligarchically if they are
- oligarchical; for there is such a thing as want of self-discipline in a state,
- as well as in an individual.But to
- have been educatedto suit the
- constitution does not mean to do the things that give pleasure to the adherents
- of oligarchy or to the supporters of democracy, but the things that will enable
- the former to govern oligarchically and the latter to govern themselves
- democratically. But at present in the oligarchies the sons of the rulers are
- luxurious, and the sons of the badly-off become trained by exercise and labor,
- so that they are both more desirous of reform and more able to bring it about;
- while in the democracies
- thought to be the most democratic the opposite of what is expedient has come
- about. And the cause of this is that they define liberty wrongly (for
- there are two things that are thought to be defining features of democracy, the
- sovereignty of the majority and liberty); for justice is supposed to be
- equality, and equality the sovereignty of what ever may have been decided by the
- multitude, and liberty doing just what one likes. Hence in democracies of this
- sort everybody lives as he likes, and ‘unto what end he
- listeth,’ as EuripidesFragment
- 883, from an unknown play. says. But this is bad; for to live in
- conformity with the constitution ought not to be considered slavery but
- safety.This therefore, speaking broadly, is a
- list of the things that cause the alteration and the destruction of
- constitutions, and of those that cause their “security and
- continuance.”
- It remains to speak of monarchy, the causes
- that destroy it and the natural means of its preservation.
-
-
- And the things
- that happen about royal governments and tyrannies are almost similar to those
- that have been narrated about constitutional governments. For royal government
- corresponds with aristocracy, while tyranny is a combination of the last form of
- oligarchyCf. 1296a 3, 1312b 35.
- and of democracy; and for that very reason it is most harmful to its subjects,
- inasmuch as it is a combination of two bad things, and is liable to the
- deviations and errors that spring from both forms of constitution. And these two different sorts of monarchy
- have their origins from directly opposite sources; royalty has come into
- existence for the assistance of the distinguished against the people, and a king
- is appointed from those distinguished by superiority in virtue or the actions
- that spring from virtue, or by superiority in coming from a family of that
- character, while a tyrant is set up from among the people and the multitude to
- oppose the notables, in order that the people may suffer no injustice from them.
- And this is manifest from the
- facts of history. For almost the greatest number of tyrants have risen, it may
- be said, from being demagogues, having won the people's confidence by slandering
- the notables. For some tyrannies were set up in this manner when the states had
- already grown great, but others that came before them arose from kings departing
- from the ancestral customs and aiming at a more despotic rule,and others from the men elected to fill the supreme
- magistracies (for in old times the peoples used to appoint the popular
- officialsHere dhmiourgi/a means ‘magistracy’ generally;
- dhmiourgo/s was the title of a special
- officer in some Peloponnesian states. and the sacred embassiesOfficial missions to religious games and to
- oracles. for long terms of office), and others from
- oligarchies electing some one supreme official for the greatest magistracies.
- For in all these methods they
- had it in their power to effect their purpose easily, if only they wished,
- because they already possessed the power of royal rule in the one set of cases
- and of their honorable office in the other, for example Phidon in Argos
- Perhaps circa 750 B.C. and others became
- tyrants when they possessed royal power already, while the Ionian tyrantse.g. Thrasybulus, tyrant of Miletus, 612
- B.C. and PhalarisTyrant of
- Agrigentum
- 572 B.C. arose from offices of honor, and
- Panaetius at Leontini and Cypselus at Corinth and PisistratusSee
- 1305a 23 n. at Athens and
- DionysiusSee 1259a 28 n. at
- Syracuse and others in the
- same manner from the position of demagogue. Therefore, as we said, royalty is ranged in correspondence
- with aristocracy, for it goes by merit, either by private virtue or by family or
- by services or by a combination of these things and ability. For in every
- instance this honor fell to men after they had conferred benefit or because they
- had the ability to confer benefit on their cities or their nations, some having
- prevented their enslavement in war, for instance Codrus,The usual tradition was that Codrus was already king when he
- saved Athens by sacrificing his
- life. others having set them free, for instance Cyrus,Cyrus liberated Persia from the Median empire 559
- B.C. or having settled or acquired territory, for instance the kings
- of Sparta and Macedon and the Molossians.Neoptolemus, son of Achilles, conquered the
- Molossi and became their king.
- And a king wishes to be a guardian,
-
-
-
- to protect the owners of estates from suffering injustice and
- the people from suffering insult, but tyranny, as has repeatedly been said, pays
- regard to no common interest unless for the sake of its private benefit; and the
- aim of tyranny is what is pleasant, that of royalty what is noble. Hence even in
- their requisitions money is the aim of tyrants but rather marks of honor that of
- kings; and a king's body-guard consists of citizens, a tyrant's of foreign
- mercenaries. And it is manifest that
- tyranny has the evils of both democracy and oligarchy; it copies oligarchy in
- making wealth its object (for inevitably that is the only way in which
- the tyrant's body-guard and his luxury can be kept up) and in putting
- no trust in the multitude (which is why they resort to the measure of
- stripping the people of arms, and why ill-treatment of the mob and its expulsion
- from the city and settlement in scattered places is common to both forms of
- government, both oligarchy and tyranny), while it copies democracy in
- making war on the notables and destroying them secretly and openly and banishing
- them as plotting against it and obstructive to its rule. For it is from them
- that counter-movements actually spring, some of them wishing themselves to rule,
- and others notto be slaves. Hence
- comes the advice of Periander to Thrasybulus,See 1284a 26 n. his docking of the prominent cornstalks, meaning
- that the prominent citizens must always be made away with.
- Therefore, as was
- virtually stated,This has not been stated,
- but can be inferred from what precedes. the causes of revolutions in
- constitutional and in royal governments must be deemed to be the same; for
- subjects in many cases attack monarchies because of unjust treatment and fear
- and contempt, and among the forms of unjust treatment most of all because of
- insolence, and sometimes the cause is the seizure of private property. Also the
- objects aimed at by the revolutionaries in the case both of tyrannies and of
- royal governments are the same as in revolts against constitutional government;
- for monarchs possess great wealth and great honor, which are desired by all men.
- And in some cases the attack is
- aimed at the person of the rulers, in others at their office. Risings provoked
- by insolence are aimed against the person; and though insolence has many
- varieties, each of them gives rise to anger, and when men are angry they mostly
- attack for the sake of revenge, not of ambition. For example the attack on the
- Pisistratidae took place because they outraged Harmodius's sister and treated
- Harmodius with contumely (for Harmodius attacked them because of his
- sister and Aristogiton because of Harmodius, and also the plot was laid against
- Periander the tyrant in Ambracia
- See 1304a 31
- n. because when drinking
-
-
- with his favorite he asked him
- if he was yet with child by him),and the attack on Philip by PausaniasA Macedonian youth of family, who murdered Philip 336 B.C. Attalus was the uncle of Philip's wife
- Cleopatra. was because he allowed him to be insulted by Attalus and
- his friends, and that on Amyntas the LittlePerhaps the adjective should be transferred to Derdas and expunged as an
- interpolated note. The persons referred to are uncertain. by Derdas
- because he mocked at his youth, and the attack of the eunuch on Evagoras of
- Cyprus was for revenge, for he
- murdered him as being insulted, because Evagoras's son had taken away his wife.
- And many risings have also
- occurred because of shameful personal indignities committed by certain monarchs.
- One instance is the attack of Crataeas on ArchelausKing of Macedon
- 413-399 B.C. Euripides went to
- reside at his court 408 B.C. and died there 406 B.C. at the age of 75.; for he was always
- resentful of the association, so that even a smaller excuse became sufficient,
- or perhaps it was because he did not give him the hand of one of his daughters
- after agreeing to do so, but gave the elder to the king of Elimea when hard
- pressed in a war against Sirras and Arrabaeus, and the younger to his son
- Amyntas, thinking that thus Amyntas would be least likely to quarrel with his
- son by Cleopatra; but at all events Crataeas's estrangement was primarily caused
- by resentment because of the love affair. And Hellanocrates of Larisa also joined in the attack for the same reason; for
- because while enjoying his favors Archelaus would not restore him to his home
- although he had promised to do so, he thought that the motive of the familiarity
- that had taken placehad been
- insolence and not passionate desire. And Pytho and Heraclides of Aenus made away with CotysKing of Thrace
- 382-358 B.C. to avenge
- their father, and Adamas revolted from Cotys because he had been mutilated by
- him when a boy, on the ground of the insult. And also many men when enraged by the indignity of
- corporal chastisement have avenged the insult by destroying or attempting to
- destroy its author, even when a magistrate or member of a royal dynasty. For
- example when the PenthilidaeThe ruling
- family in the early oligarchy there, claiming descent from Penthilus, an
- illegitimate son of Orestes. at Mitylene went about striking people with their staves Megacles
- with his friends set on them and made away with them, and afterwards Smerdis
- when he had been beaten and dragged out from his wife's presence killed
- Penthilus. Also Decamnichus took a leading part in the attack upon Archelaus,
- being the first to stir on the attackers; and the cause of his anger was that he
- had handed him over to Euripides the poet to flog, Euripides being angry because
- he had made a remark about his breath smelling. And many others also for similar reasons have been made
- away with or plotted against. And similarly also from the motive of fear; for
- this was one of the causes we mentioned in the case of monarchies, as also in
- that of constitutional governments; for instance ArtapanesCaptain of Xerxes' body-guard. killed Xerxes fearing
- the charge about Darius, because he had hanged him when Xerxes had ordered him
- not to but he had thought that he would forgive him because he would forget, as
- he had been at dinner. And other attacks on monarchs have been on account of
- contempt,
-
-
- as somebody killed SardanapallusLast king of the Assyrian empire at Nineveh. when he saw him combing
- his hair with his women (if this story told by the narrators of legends
- is true—and if it did not happen with Sardanapallus, it might quite
- well be true of somebody else), and Dion attacked the younger DionysiusTyrant of Syracuse 367-356 and 346-343 B.C., cf. 1312a 34 ff. because he despised
- him, when he saw the citizens despising him and the king himself always drunk.
- And contempt has led some even
- of the friends of monarchs to attack them, for they despise them for trusting
- them and think they will not be found out. And contempt is in a manner the
- motive of those who attack monarchs thinking that they are able to seize the
- government; for they make the attempt with a light heart, feeling that they have
- the power and because of their power despising the danger, as generals
- commanding the armies attack their monarchs; for instance Cyrus attacked
- AstyagesThe last king of Media, reigned
- 594-559 B.C. when he
- despised both his mode of life and his power, because his power had waned and he
- himself was living luxuriously, and the Thracian Seuthes attacked AmadocusBoth these Thracian kings became allies of
- Athens
- 390 B.C., but the event referred to may be
- later. when his general. Others again attack monarchs for more than
- one of these motives, for instance both because they despise them and for the
- sake of gain, as MithridatesPerhaps
- Mithridates II., who succeeded his father Ariobarzanes as satrap of
- Pontus
- 336 B.C. attacked Ariobarzanes.The following sentence may have been shifted
- by mistake from the end of 8.14 above. And it is men of bold nature
- and who hold a military office with monarchs who most often make the attempt for
- this reason; for courage possessing power is boldness,and they make their attacks thinking that with
- courage and power they will easily prevail. But with those whose attack is prompted by ambition the
- motive operates in a different way from those spoken of before; some men attack
- tyrants because they see great profits and great honors belonging to them, but
- that is not the reason that in each case leads the persons who attack from
- motives of ambition to resolve on the venture; those others are led by the
- motive stated, but these attack monarchs from a wish to gain not monarchy but
- glory, just as they would wish to take part in doing any other uncommon deed
- that makes men famous and known to their fellows. Not but what those who make the venture from this motive
- are very few indeed in number, for underlying it there must be an utter
- disregard of safety, if regard for safety is not to check the enterprise; they
- must always have present in their minds the opinion of Dion, although it is not easy for many men to
- have it; Dion marched with a small
- force against Dionysius, saying that his feeling was that, whatever point he
- might be able to get to, it would be enough for him to have had that much share
- in the enterprise—for instance, if it should befall him to die as soon
- as he had just set foot in the country, that death would satisfy him.
- And one way
- in which tyranny is destroyed, as is each of the other forms of constitution
- also, is from without,
-
-
- if some state with an opposite constitution is
- stronger (for the wish to destroy it will clearly be present in such a
- neighbor because of the opposition of principle, and all men do what they wish
- if they have the power)—and the constitutions opposed to
- tyranny are, on the one hand democracy, which is opposed to it as (in
- Hesiod's phrase
- Hes. WD
- 25
- kai\ kerameu\s keramei= kote/ei kai\
- te/ktoni te/ktwn, ‘two of a trade never
- agree.’) ‘potter to potter,’
- because the final form of democracy is tyranny, and on the other hand royalty
- and aristocracy are opposed to tyranny because of the opposite nature of their
- constitutional structure (owing to which the Spartans put down a very
- great many tyrannies, and so did the Syracusans at the period when they were
- governed well.) But one
- way is from within itself, when the partners in it fall into discord, as the
- tyranny of the family of GeloTyrant of
- Syracuse
- 485-478 B.C., succeeded by his
- brother Hiero who died 467. Gelo's son is unknown. Cf. 1315b 35 ff.
- was destroyed, and in modern times
- 356 B.C., a good many years before this book was
- written. that of the family of DionysiusSee 1312a 4 n.—Gelo's, when Thrasybulus the
- brother of Hiero paid court to the son of Gelo and urged him into indulgences in
- order that he himself might rule, and the son's connections banded together a
- body of confederates in order that the tyranny might not be put down entirely
- but only Thrasybulus, but their confederates seizing the opportunity expelled
- them all; Dionysius was put down by Dion, his relative, who got the people on to his side and
- expelled him, but was afterwards killed. There are two causes that chiefly lead men to attack
- tyranny, hatred and contempt; the former, hatred,attaches to tyrants always, but it is their being despised that
- causes their downfall in many cases. A proof of this is that most of those that
- have won tyrannies have also kept their offices to the end, but those that have
- inherited them almost all lose them at once; for they live a life of indulgence,
- and so become despicable and also give many opportunities to their attackers.
- And also anger must be counted
- as an element in the hatred felt for them, for in a way it occasions the same
- actions. And often it is even more active than hatred, since angry men attack
- more vigorously because passion does not employ calculation (and
- insolence most frequently causes men to be led by their angry tempers, which was
- the cause of the fall of the tyranny of the Pisistratidae and many
- others), but hatred calculates more; for anger brings with it an
- element of pain, making calculation difficult, but enmity is not accompanied by
- pain. And to speak summarily, all the things that we have mentioned as causing
- the down fall of unmixed and extreme oligarchy and of the last form of democracy
- must be counted as destructive of tyranny as well, since extreme oligarchy and
- democracy are in reality dividedi.e. divided
- among several persons, ‘put into commission.’
- tyrannies. Royal government on the
- other hand is very seldom destroyed by external causes, so that it is
- long-lasting; but in most cases its destruction arises out of itself. And it is
- destroyed in two ways,
-
-
- one when those who participate in it quarrel, and
- another when the kings try to administer the government too tyrannically,
- claiming to exercise sovereignty in more things and contrary to the law. Royal
- governments do not occur any more now, but if ever monarchies do occur they are
- rather tyrannies, because royalty is government over willing subjects but with
- sovereignty over greater matters, but men of equal quality are numerous and no
- one is so outstanding as to fit the magnitude and dignity of the office; so that
- for this reason the subjects do not submit willingly, and if a man has made
- himself ruler by deception or force, then this is thought to be a tyranny.
- In cases of hereditary royalty
- we must also set down a cause of their destruction, in addition to those
- mentioned, the fact that hereditary kings often become despicable, and that
- although possessing not the power of a tyrant but the dignity of a king they
- commit insolent outrages; for the deposition of kings used to be easy, since a
- king will at once cease to be king if his subjects do not wish him to be,
- whereas a tyrant will still be tyrant even though his subjects do not wish
- it.These causes then and others of the same
- nature are those that bring about the destruction of monarchies.
- On the other
- hand it is clear that monarchies, speaking generally, are preserved in safety as
- a result of the opposite causes to those by which they are destroyed. But taking
- the different sorts of monarchy separately—royalties are preserved by
- bringing theminto a more moderate
- form; for the fewer powers the kings have, the longer time the office in its
- entirety must last, for they themselves become less despotic and more equal to
- their subjects in temper, and their subjects envy them less. For this was the
- cause of the long persistence of the Molossian royalty, and that of Sparta has continued because the office was
- from the beginning divided into two halves, and because it was again limited in
- various ways by Theopompus,King of
- Sparta circa 770-720 B.C. in particular by
- his instituting the office of the ephors to keep a check upon it; for by taking
- away some of the kings' power he increased the permanence of the royal office,
- so that in a manner he did not make it less but greater. This indeed as the
- story goes is what he said in reply to his wife, when she asked if he felt no
- shame in bequeathing the royal power to his sons smaller than he had inherited
- it from his father: “Indeed I do not,” he is said to have
- answered, “for I hand it on more lasting.”
- Tyrannies on the
- other hand are preserved in two extremely opposite ways. One of these is the
- traditional way and the one in which most tyrants administer their office. Most
- of these ordinary safeguards of tyranny are said to have been instituted by
- PerianderSee 1284a 26 n. of
- Corinth, and also many such
- devices may be borrowed from the Persian empire. These are both the measures
- mentioned some time back to secure the safety of a tyranny as far as
- possible—the lopping off of outstanding men and the destruction of the
- proud,—and also the prohibition of common meals and club-fellowship
- and education and all other things of this nature,
-
-
- in fact the close
- watch upon all things that usually engender the two emotions of pride and
- confidence, and the prevention of the formation of study-circles and other
- conferences for debate,The phrases cover
- Plato's gatherings in the Academy, Aristotle's in the Peripatos of the
- Lyceum, and other meetings for the intellectual use of leisure in gymnasia,
- palaestrae and leschae. and the employment of every means that will
- make people as much as possible unknown to one another (for familiarity
- increases mutual confidence); and for the people in the city to be always visible and to
- hang about the palace-gates (for thus there would be least concealment
- about what they are doing, and they would get into a habit of being humble from
- always acting in a servile way); and all the other similar devices of
- Persian and barbarian tyranny (for all have the same effect);
- and to try not to be uninformed about any chance utterances or actions of any of
- the subjects, but to have spies like the women called
- ‘provocatrices’ at Syracuse and the ‘sharp-ears’ that used to
- be sent out by Hiero wherever there was any gathering or conference
- (for when men are afraid of spies of this sort they keep a check on
- their tongues, and if they do speak freely are less likely not to be found
- out); and to set men at
- variance with one another and cause quarrels between friend and friend and
- between the people and the notables and among the rich. And it is a device of
- tyranny to make the subjects poor, so that a guardApparently this means a citizen force side by side with the
- tyrant's mercenaries; a variant gives ‘in order that the
- (tyrant's) guard may be kept.’
- may not be kept, and also that the people
- being busy with their daily affairs may not have leisure to plot against their
- ruler. Instances of this are the pyramids in Egypt and the votive offerings of the Cypselids,Cypselus and his son Periander (1310b
- 29 n., 1284a 26 n.) dedicated a colossal statue of Zeus at
- Olympia and other monuments
- there and at Delphi. and
- the building of the temple of Olympian Zeus by the PisistratidaePisistratus is said to have begun the temple
- of Olympian Zeus at Athens, not
- finished till the time of Hadrian. and of the temples at Samos, works of PolycratesTyrant of Samos, d.
- 522 B.C. (for all these
- undertakings produce the same effect, constant occupation and poverty among the
- subject people); and the
- levying of taxes, as at Syracuse
- (for in the reign of DionysiusSee
- 1259a 28 n. the result of taxation used to be that in five years men
- had contributed the whole of their substance). Also the tyrant is a
- stirrer-up of war, with the deliberate purpose of keeping the people busy and
- also of making them constantly in need of a leader. Also whereas friends are a
- means of security to royalty, it is a mark of a tyrant to be extremely
- distrustful of his friends, on the ground that, while all have the wish, these
- chiefly have the power. Also the
- things that occur in connection with the final form of democracyCf. 1309b 27 ff. are all favorable to
- tyranny—dominance of women in the homes, in order that they may carry
- abroad reports against the men, and lack of discipline among the slaves, for the
- same reason; for slaves and women do not plot against tyrants, and also, if they
- prosper under tyrannies, must feel well-disposed to them, and to democracies as
- well (for the common people also wishes to be sole ruler).
- Hence also the flatterer is in honor with both—with democracies the
- demagogue (for the demagogue is a flatterer of the people),
- and with the tyrants those who associate with them humbly, which is the task of
- flattery.
-
-
- In fact owing to this tyranny is a friend of the base; for
- tyrants enjoy being flattered, but nobody would ever flatter them if he
- possessed a free spirit—men of character love their ruler, or at all
- events do not flatter him. And the base are useful for base business, for nail
- is driven out by nail, as the proverb goes.The proverb h(lw=| h(=los e)kkrou/etai
- usually meant driving out something by a thing of the same kind
- (‘set a thief to catch a thief’), not
- as here the execution of evil designs by appropriate agents.
- And it is a mark of a tyrant to
- dislike anyone that is proud or free-spirited; for the tyrant claims for himself
- alone the right to bear that character, and the man who meets his pride with
- pride and shows a free spirit robs tyranny of its superiority and position of
- mastery; tyrants therefore hate the proud as undermining their authority. And it
- is a mark of a tyrant to have men of foreign extraction rather than citizens as
- guests at table and companions, feeling that citizens are hostile but strangers
- make no claim against him.i.e. do not claim
- honors as against their patron, claim to be his equals. These and
- similar habits are characteristic of tyrants and preservative of their office,
- but they lack no element of baseness. And broadly speaking, they are all included under three heads; for tyranny
- aims at three things, one to keep its subjects humble (for a
- humble-spirited man would not plot against anybody), second to have
- them continually distrust one another (for a tyranny is not destroyed
- until some men come to trust each other, owing to which tyrants also make war on
- the respectable, as detrimentalto
- their rule not only because of their refusal to submit to despotic rule, but
- also because they are faithful to one another and to the other citizens, and do
- not inform against one another nor against the others); and the third
- is lack of power for political action (since nobody attempts
- impossibilities, so that nobody tries to put down a tyranny if he has not power
- behind him). These then in
- fact are the three aims to which the wishes of tyrants are directed; for all the
- measures taken by tyrants one might class under these principles—some
- are designed to prevent mutual confidence among the subjects, others to curtail
- their power, and others to make them humble-spirited.
- Such then is the nature of
- one method by which security is obtained for tyrannies. The other tries to
- operate in a manner almost the opposite of the devices mentioned. And it can be
- ascertained from considering the downfall of royal governments. For just as one
- mode of destroying royalty is to make its government more tyrannical, so a mode
- of securing tyranny is to make it more regal, protecting one thing only, its
- power, in order that the ruler may govern not only with the consent of the
- subjects but even without it; for if he gives up this, he also gives up his
- position as tyrant. But while this must stand as a fundamental principle, all
- the other measures he may either adopt or pretend to adopt by cleverly acting
- the royal part. The first step is
- to be careful of the public funds,
-
-
- if they think that their ruler has religious scruples and pays
- regard to the gods, and also they plot against him less, thinking that he has
- even the gods as allies), though he should not display a foolish
- religiosity. And he must pay such
- honor to those who display merit in any matter that they may think that they
- could never be more honored by the citizens if they were in dependent; and
- honors of this kind he should bestow in person, but inflict his punishments by
- the agency of other magistrates and law-courts. And it is a protection common to
- every sort of monarchy to make no one man great, but if necessary to exalt
- several (for they will keep watch on one another), and if
- after all the ruler has to elevate an individual, at all events not take a man
- of bold spirit (for such a character is most enterprising in all
- undertakings); and if he thinks fit to remove somebody from his power,
- to do this by gradual stages and not take away the whole of his authority at
- once. And again he should carefully
- avoid all forms of outrage, and two beyond all, violent bodily punishments and
- outrage of the young. And this caution must especially be exercised in relation
- to the ambitious, for while to be slighted in regard to property annoys the
- lovers of wealth, slights that involve dishonor are what men of honorable
- ambition and high character resent.Hence the tyrant should either not consort with men of this kind, or appear to
- inflict his punishments paternally and not because of contempt, and to indulge
- in the society of the young for reasons of passion, not because he has the
- power, and in general he should buy off what are thought to be dishonors by
- greater honors. And among those who
- make attempts upon the life of a ruler the most formidable and those against
- whom the greatest precaution is needed are those that are ready to sacrifice
- their lives if they can destroy him. Hence the greatest care must be taken to
- guard against those who think that insolent outrage is being done either to
- themselves or to those who happen to be under their care; for men attacking
- under the influence of anger are reckless of themselves, as HeraclitusThe natural philosopher of Ephesus, fl. circa 513 B.C., known as o( skoteino/s
- for his epigrammatic obscurity. also observed when he said that anger
- was hard to combat because it would buy revenge with a life. And since states consist of two parts, the poor
- people and the rich, the most important thing is for both to think that they owe
- their safety to the government and for it to prevent either from being wronged
- by the other, but whichever class is the stronger, this must be made to be
- entirely on the side of the government, as, if this support for the tyrant's
- interests is secured, there is no need for him to institute a liberation of
- slaves or a disarming of the citizens, for one of the two parts of the state
- added to his power will be enough to make him and them stronger than their
- attackers. But to discuss each of
- such matters separately is superfluous; for the thing to aim at is clear,
-
-
-
- that it is necessary to appear to the subjects to be not a
- tyrannical ruler but a steward and a royal governor, and not an appropriator of
- wealth but a trustee, and to pursue the moderate things of life and not its
- extravagances, and also to make the notables one's comrades and the many one's
- followers. For the result of these methods must be that not only the tyrant's
- rule will be more honorable and more enviable because he will rule nobler
- subjects and not men that have been humiliated, and will not be continually
- hated and feared, but also that his rule will endure longer, and moreover that
- he himself in his personal character will be nobly disposed towards virtue, or
- at all events half-virtuous, and not base but only half-base.
- Nevertheless
- oligarchy and tyrannyOligarchy is not
- mentioned in what follows, and the context deals with the forms of monarchy.
- Tyranny is included among the constitutions at 1312a 40, but not elsewhere
- in this Book. Some editors bracket ll. 19-29 as spurious or out of
- place. are less lasting than any of the constitutional governments.
- For the longest-lived was the tyranny at Sicyon, that of the sonsi.e. descendants; Cleisthenes was his grandson. of Orthagoras and of
- Orthagoras himself, and this lasted a hundred years.From 670 B.C. The cause of
- this was that they treated their subjects moderately and in many matters were
- subservient to the laws, and Cleisthenes because he was a warlike man was not
- easily despised, and in most things they kept the lead of the people by looking
- after their interests. At all events it is said that Cleisthenes placed a wreath
- on the judge who awarded the victory away from him, and some say that the
- statueof a seated figure in the
- market-place is a statue of the man who gave this judgement. And they say that
- PisistratusSee 1305a 23 n. also
- once submitted to a summons for trial before the Areopagus. And the second longest is the tyranny at Corinth, that of the Cypselids,From 655 B.C.
- for even this lasted seventy-three and a half years, as Cypselus was tyrant for
- thirty years, Periander for forty-four,The
- Greek may be corrected to ‘forty and a half’ to give the
- stated total. and Psammetichus son of Gordias for three years. And
- the reasons for the permanence of this tyranny also are the same: Cypselus was a
- leader of the people and continuously throughout his period of office dispensed
- with a bodyguard; and although Periander became tyrannical, yet he was warlike.
- The third longest tyranny is
- that of the Pisistratidae at Athens,
- but it was not continuous; for while PisistratusSee 1305a 23 n. was tyrant he twice fled into exile,
- so that in a period of thirty-three years he was tyrant for seventeen years out
- of the total, and his sons for eighteen years, so that the whole duration of
- their rule was thirty-five years. Among the remaining tyrannies is the one
- connected with Hiero and GeloSee 1312b 12
- n. at Syracuse, but
- even this did not last many years, but only eighteen in all, for Gelo after
- being tyrant for seven years ended his life in the eighth, and Hiero ruled ten
- years, but Thrasybulus was expelled after ten months. And the usual tyrannies
- have all of them been of quite short duration.The
- causes therefore of the destruction of constitutional governments and of
- monarchies and those again of their preservation have almost all of them been
- discussed.
-
-
-
-
- The subject of revolutions is discussed by Socrates in the
- Republic,Plato, Republic,
- Bks. 8, 9 init.; the mathematical formula for the change from Aristocracy to
- Timocracy quoted here occurs at Plat. Rep.
- 546c—see Adam's note there. but is not discussed
- well. For his account of revolution in the constitution that is the best one and
- the first does not apply to it particularly. He says that the cause is that
- nothing is permanent but everything changes in a certain cycle, and that change
- has its origin in those numbers ‘whose basic ratio 4 : 3 linked with
- the number 5 gives two harmonies,’—meaning whenever the
- number of this figure becomes cubed,—in the belief that nature
- sometimes engenders men that are evil, and too strong for education to
- influence—speaking perhaps not ill as far as this particular dictum
- goes (for it is possible that there are some persons incapable of being
- educated and becoming men of noble character), but why should this
- process of revolution belong to the constitution which Socrates speaks of as the
- best, more than to all the other forms of constitution, and to all men that come
- into existence? and why merely by
- the operation of time, which he says is the cause of change in all things, do
- even things that did not begin to exist simultaneously change simultaneously?
- for instance, if a thing came into existence the day before the completion of
- the cycle, why does it yet change simultaneously with everything else? And in
- addition to these points, what is the reason why the republic changes from the
- constitution mentioned into the Spartan formTimocracy, Plat. Rep. 545a.
- ? For
- all constitutions more often change into the opposite form than into
- theone near them. And the same
- remark applies to the other revolutions as well. For from the Spartan
- constitution the state changes, he says, to oligarchy, and from this to
- democracy, and from democracy to tyranny. Yet revolutions also occur the other
- way about, for example from democracy to oligarchy, and more often so than from
- democracy to monarchy. Again as to
- tyranny he does not say whether it will undergo revolution or not, nor, if it
- will, what will be the cause of it, and into what sort of constitution it will
- change; and the reason for this is that he would not have found it easy to say,
- for it is irregular; since according to him tyranny ought to change into the
- first and best constitution, for so the process would be continuous and a
- circle, but as a matter of fact tyranny also changes into tyranny, as the
- constitution of Sicyon
- See 1315b 13 n. passed from the tyranny
- of Myron to that of Cleisthenes, and into oligarchy, as did that of
- AntileonUnknown, cf. 1304a 29 n.
- at Chalcis, and into democracy, as
- that of the family of GeloSee 1302b 33
- n. at Syracuse, and
- into aristocracy, as that of CharilausSee
- 1271b 26 n. at Sparta
- [and as at Carthage].This
- clause seems an interpolation; cf. b 6.
- And constitutions change from
- oligarchy to tyranny, as did almost the greatest number of the ancient
- oligarchies in Sicily, at Leontini to
- the tyranny of Panaetius,See 1310b 29
- n. at Gelo to that of Cleander, at Rhegium to that of Anaxilaus,Unknown. Reggio is
- related to Sicily as Dover is to
- France. and in many other cities similarly. And it is also a strange
- idea that revolutions into oligarchy take place because the occupants of the
- offices are lovers of money and engaged in money-making,
-
-
- but not because
- owners of much more than the average amount of property think it unjust for
- those who do not own any property to have an equal share in the state with those
- who do; and in many oligarchies those in office are not allowed to engage in
- business, but there are laws preventing it, whereas in Carthage, which has a democratic
- government,Apparently this clause also
- is an interpolation, or ‘democratic’ is a copyist's
- mistake for ‘oligarchic’ or
- ‘timocratic,’ see 1272b 24 ff. the magistrates go
- in for business, and they have not yet had a revolution. And it is also a strange remark
- Plat. Rep. 551d
- that the oligarchical state is two states, one of rich men and one of
- poor men. For what has happened to this state rather than to the Spartan or any
- other sort of state where all do not own an equal amount of wealth or where all
- are not equally good men? and when nobody has become poorer than he was before,
- none the less revolution takes place from oligarchy to democracy if the men of
- no property become more numerous, and from democracy to oligarchy if the wealthy
- class is stronger than the multitude and the latter neglect politics but the
- former give their mind to them. And although there are many causes through which
- revolutions in oligarchies occur, he mentions only one—that of men
- becoming poor through riotous living, by paying away their money in interest on
- loans—as if at the start all men or most men were rich. But this is not true, but although when
- some of the leaders have lost their properties they stir up innovations, when
- men of the other classes are ruined nothing strange happens;and even when such a revolution does occur it is no
- more likely to end in a democracy than in another form of constitution. And
- furthermore men also form factions and cause revolutions in the constitution if
- they are not allowed a share of honors, and if they are unjustly or insolently
- treated, even if they have not run through all their property . . .Some words appear to be lost here; what
- follows refers to democracy, cf. Plat. Rep.
- 587b. because of being allowed to do whatever they like;
- the cause of which he states to be excessive liberty. And although there are
- several forms of oligarchy and of democracy, Socrates speaks of the revolutions
- that occur in them as though there were only one form of each.
-
-
-
-
-
- Book 7 in some editions, Book 8 in
- others.We have already discussedBook 4, 1297b 35 ff. how many and what are the varieties of the
- deliberative body or sovereign power in the state, and of the system of
- magistracies and of law-courts, and which variety is adapted to which form of
- constitution, and alsoBook 5. the
- destruction of constitutions and their preservation, from what sort of people
- they originate and what are their causes. But as a matter of fact since there
- have come into existence several kinds of democracy and similarly of the other
- forms of constitution, it will be well at the same time to consider1318b—1319a 6. any point that
- remains about these varieties, and also determine the mode of organization
- appropriate and advantageous for each. And further we must also investigateThese topics do not occur in the extant work. the
- combinations of all the modes of organizing the actual departments of state that
- have been mentioned,i.e. the deliberative,
- executive and judicial, see 1297b 41 ff.
-
-
-
- for these modes when coupled together make the constitutions overlap, so as to
- produce oligarchical aristocracies and republics inclining towards democracy. I
- refer to the combinations which ought to be investigated but have not at present
- been studied, for example if the deliberative body and the system of electing
- magistrates are organized oligarchically but the regulations as to the
- law-courts aristocratically, or these and the structure of the deliberative body
- oligarchically and the election of magistracy aristocratically, or if in some
- other manner not all the parts of the constitution are appropriately
- combined.
- Now it has been stated before1296b 13—1297a 13. what kind of democracy is
- suited to what kind of state, and similarly which of the kinds of oligarchy is
- suited to what kind of populace, and also which of the remaining constitutions
- is advantageous for which people; but nevertheless since it must not only be
- made clear which variety of these constitutions is best for states, but also how
- both these best varieties and the other forms must be established, let us
- briefly pursue the subject. And first let us speak about democracy; for at the
- same time the facts will also become clear about the opposite form of
- constitution, that is, the constitution which some people call oligarchy.‘Rule of the few,’ i.e.
- the few rich, but the name is not exact, for in aristocracy also the rulers
- are few.
-
- And
- for this inquiry we must take into view all the features that are popular and
- that are thoughtto go with
- democracies; for it comes about from combinations of these that the kinds of
- democracy are formed, and that there are different democracies and more than one
- sort. In fact there are two causes for there being several kinds of democracy,
- first the one stated before, the fact that the populations are different
- (for we find one multitude engaged in agriculture and another
- consisting of handicraftsmen and day-laborers, and when the first of these is
- added to the second and again the third to both of them it not only makes a
- difference in that the quality of the democracy becomes better or worse but also
- by its becoming different in kind); and the second cause is the one
- about which we now speak. For the
- institutions that go with democracies and seem to be appropriate to this form of
- constitution make the democracies different by their combinations; for one form
- of democracy will be accompanied by fewer, another by more, and another by all
- of them. And it is serviceable to ascertain each of them both for the purpose of
- instituting whichever of these kinds of democracy one happens to wish and for
- the purpose of amending existing ones. For people setting up constitutions seek
- to collect together all the features appropriate to their fundamental principle,
- but in so doing they make a mistake, as has been said before in the passage
- dealing with the causes of the destruction and the preservation of
- constitutions. And now let us state the postulates, the ethical characters and
- the aims of the various forms of democracy.
- Now a fundamental principle
- of the democratic form of constitution is liberty—that is what is
- usually asserted, implying that only under this constitution do men participate
- in liberty,
-
-
- for they assert this as the aim of every democracy. But one
- factor of liberty is to govern and be governed in turn; for the popular
- principle of justice is to have equality according to number, not worth, and if
- this is the principle of justice prevailing, the multitude must of necessity be
- sovereign and the decision of the majority must be final and must constitute
- justice, for they say that each of the citizens ought to have an equal share; so
- that it results that in democracies the poor are more powerful than the rich,
- because there are more of them and whatever is decided by the majority is
- sovereign. This then is one mark of
- liberty which all democrats set down as a principle of the constitution. And one
- is for a man to live as he likes; for they say that this is the function of
- liberty, inasmuch as to live not as one likes is the life of a man that is a
- slave. This is the second principle of democracy, and from it has come the claim
- not to be governed, preferably not by anybody, or failing that, to govern and be
- governed in turns; and this is the way in which the second principle contributes
- to equalitarian liberty.This clause is
- obscure: perhaps it is an interpolation.
- And these principles having been
- laid down and this being the nature of democratic government, the following
- institutions are democratic in character: election of officials by all from all;
- government of each by all,and of all
- by each in turn; election by lot either to all magistracies or to all that do
- not need experience and skill; no property-qualification for office, or only a
- very low one; no office to be held twice, or more than a few times, by the same
- person, or few offices except the military ones; short tenure either of all
- offices or of as many as possible; judicial functions to be exercised by all
- citizens, that is by persons selected from all, and on all matters, or on most
- and the greatest and most important, for instance the audit of official
- accounts, constitutional questions, private contracts; the assembly to be
- sovereign over all matters, but no official over any or only over extremely few;
- or else a council to be sovereign over the most important matters (and a council is the most
- democratic of magistracies in states where there is not a plentiful supply of
- pay for everybody—for where there is, they deprive even this office of
- its power, since the people draws all the trials to itself when it has plenty of
- pay, as has been said before in the treatise preceding this oneBook 4, 1299b 38 ff. (Books 4. and 5.
- are regarded as forming one treatise).); also
- payment for public duties, preferably in all branches, assembly, law-courts,
- magistracies, or if not, for the magistracies, the law-courts, council and
- sovereign assemblies, or for those magistracies which are boundi.e. owing to the nature of their duties, and
- by general custom. to have common mess tables. Also inasmuch as
- oligarchy is defined by birth, wealth and education, the popular qualifications
- are thought to be the opposite of these, low birth, poverty, vulgarity. And in
- respect of the magistracies it is democratic to have none tenable for life,
-
-
-
- and if any life-office has been left after an ancient
- revolution, at all events to deprive it of its power and to substitute election
- by lot for election by vote.
- TheseThe rest of the chapter is most obscure, and its authenticity is
- questioned. then are the features common to democracies. But what is
- thought to be the extreme form of democracy and of popular government comes
- about as a result of the principle of justice that is admitted to be democratic,
- and this is for all to have equality according to number. For it is equality for
- the poor to have no larger share of power than the rich, and not for the poor
- alone to be supreme but for all to govern equally; for in this way they would
- feel that the constitution possessed both equality and liberty. But the question follows, how will they
- have equality? are the property-assessments of five hundred citizens to be
- divided among a thousand and the thousand to have equal power to the five
- hundredi.e. two groups of voters, with
- equal total wealth and total voting-power, but one group twice as numerous
- as the other, so that a man in the rich group has two votes and one in the
- poor group one, the former being on the average twice as rich as the
- latter.? or is equality on this principlei.e. ‘equality in proportion to
- number.’ not to be arranged in this manner, but the
- division into classes to be on this system, but then an equal number to be taken
- from the five hundred and from the thousand and these to control the elections
- and the law-courts? Is this then the justest form of constitution in accordance
- with popular justice, or is it rather one that goes by counting heads?i.e. ‘one man one
- vote.’ For democrats say that justice is whatever seems
- good to the larger number,but
- advocates of oligarchy think that it is whatever seems good to the owners of the
- larger amount of property, for they say that the decision ought to go by amount
- of property. But both views involve
- inequality and injustice; for if the will of the few is to prevail, this means a
- tyranny, since if one man owns more than the other rich men,i.e. apparently, more than the property of all the others put
- together. according to the oligarchic principle of justice it is just
- for him to rule alone; whereas if the will of the numerical majority is to
- prevail, they will do injustice by confiscating the property of the rich
- minority, as has been said before.1281a
- 14. What form of equality therefore would be one on which both
- parties will agree must be considered in the light of the principles of justice
- as defined by both sets. For they say that whatever seems good to the majority
- of the citizens ought to be sovereign. Let us then accept this principle, yet not wholly without
- qualification, but inasmuch as fortune has brought into existence two component
- parts of the state, rich and poor, let any resolution passed by both classes, or
- by a majority of each, be sovereign, but if the two classes carry opposite
- resolutions, let the decision of the majority, in the sense of the group whose
- total property assessment is the larger, prevail: for instance, if there are ten
- rich citizens and twenty poor ones, and opposite votes have been cast by six of
- the rich on one side and by fifteen of the less wealthy on the other, four of
- the rich have sided with the poor and five of the poor with the rich; then the
- side that has the larger total property when the assessments of both classes on
- either side are added together carries the voting.If the rich citizens are on the average twice as wealthy as
- the poor (1.11), and therefore a rich man has two votes to
- a poor man's one, when 6 rich and 5 poor vote one way, and 15 poor and 4
- rich the other, the division is 17 to 23, and the view of the latter party,
- which is carried, represents a larger total of wealth but a larger
- proportion of poor men.
- But if the totals fall out exactly
- equal, this is to be deemed an impasse common to both sides, as it is at present
- if the assembly or law-court is exactly divided;
-
-
- either a decision
- must be made by casting lots or some other such device must be adopted. But on
- questions of equality and justice, even though it is very difficult to discover
- the truth about them, nevertheless it is easier to hit upon it than to persuade
- people that have the power to get an advantage to agree to it; equality and
- justice are always sought by the weaker party, but those that have the upper
- hand pay no attention to them.
- There being four kinds of democracy, the
- best is the one that stands first in structure, as was said in the discourses
- preceding theseCf. 4, 1291b 30-41, 1292b
- 25-33.; it is also the oldest of them all, but by first I mean first
- as it were in a classification of the kinds of common people. The best common
- people are the agricultural population, so that it is possible to introduce
- democracy as well as other forms of constitution where the multitude lives by
- agriculture or by pasturing cattle. For owing to their not having much property
- they are busy, so that they cannot often meet in the assembly, while owing to
- their havingThe MSS. give ‘not
- having,’ but editors do not explain how in that case people would
- avoid starvation. the necessaries of life they pass their time
- attending to their farm work and do not covet their neighbors' goods, but find
- more pleasure in working than in taking part in politics and holding office,
- where the profits to be made from the offices are not large; for the mass of
- mankind are more covetous of gain than of honor. And this is indicated by the fact that men endured the
- tyrannies of former times, and endure oligarchies, if a ruler does not prevent
- them from working orrob them; for
- then some of them soon get rich and the others free from want. And also, if they
- have any ambition, to have control over electing magistrates and calling them to
- account makes up for the lack of office, since in some democracies even if the
- people have no part in electing the magistrates but these are elected by a
- special committee selected in turn out of the whole number, as at Mantinea, yet if they have the power of
- deliberating on policy, the multitude are satisfied. (And this too must
- be counted as one form of democracy, on the lines on which it once existed at
- Mantinea.) Indeed it is for this reason that it is
- advantageous for the form of democracy spoken of before, and is a customary
- institution in it, for all the citizens to elect the magistrates and call them
- to account, and to try law-suits, but for the holders of the greatest
- magistracies to be elected and to have property-qualifications, the higher
- offices being elected from the higher property-grades, or else for no office to
- be elected on a property-qualification, but for officials to be chosen on the
- ground of capacity. And a state governed in this way is bound to be governed
- well (for the offices will always be administered by the best men with
- the consent of the people and without their being jealous of the upper
- classes), and this arrangement is certain to be satisfactory for the
- upper classes and notables, for they will not be under the government of others
- inferior to themselves, and they will govern justly because a different class
- will be in control of the audits—since it is expedient to be in a state of suspense and not
- to be able to do everything exactly as seems good to one, for liberty to do
- whatever one likes cannot guard against the evil that is in every man's
- character.
-
-
- Hence there necessarily results the condition of affairs that
- is the most advantageous in the government of states—for the upper
- classes to govern without doing wrong, the common people not being deprived of
- any rights. It is manifest therefore that this is the best of the forms of
- democracy, and why this is so—namely, because in it the common people
- are of a certain kind.
- For the purpose of making the people an agricultural
- community, not only were some of the laws that were enacted in many states in
- early times entirely serviceable, prohibiting the ownership of more than a
- certain amount of land under any conditions or else of more than a certain
- amount lying between a certain place and the citadel or city (and in
- early times at all events in many states there was even legislation prohibiting
- the sale of the original allotments; and there is a law said to be due to
- OxylusLeader of the Heraclidae in their
- invasion of the Peloponnese, and
- afterwards king of Elis.
- with some similar provision, forbidding loans secured on a certain portion of a
- man's existing estate), but
- at the present day it would also be well to introduce reform by means of the law
- of the Aphytaeans, as it is serviceable for the purpose of which we are
- speaking; the citizens of AphytisAphytis was
- on the Isthmus of Pallene in
- Macedonia. although
- numerous and possessing a small territory nevertheless are all engaged in
- agriculture, for they are assessed not on the whole of their estates, but on
- divisions of them so small that even the poor can exceed the required minimum in
- their assessments.No satisfactory
- explanation seems to have been suggested of what this means.
-
- After
- the agricultural communitythe best
- kind of democracy is where the people are herdsmen and get their living from
- cattle; for this life has many points of resemblance to agriculture, and as
- regards military duties pastoral people are in a very well trained condition and
- serviceable in body and capable of living in the open. But almost all the other
- classes of populace, of which the remaining kinds of democracy are composed, are
- very inferior to these, for their mode of life is mean, and there is no element
- of virtue in any of the occupations in which the multitude of artisans and
- market-people and the wage-earning class take part, and also owing to their
- loitering about the market-place and the city almost all people of this class
- find it easy to attend the assembly; whereas the farmers owing to their being
- scattered over the country do not attend, and have not an equal desire for this
- opportunity of meeting. And where it
- also happens that the lie of the land is such that the country is widely
- separated from the city, it is easy to establish a good democracy and also a
- good constitutional government, for the multitude is forced to live at a
- distance on the farms; and so, even if there is a crowd that frequents the
- market-place, it is best in democracies not to hold assemblies without the
- multitude scattered over the country.i.e. in
- a largely agricultural democracy, even though there may be a considerable
- idle population, which would attend frequent assemblies, it is best to hold
- them infrequently, so as to secure the attendance of the farmers.
- It has then been stated how the best and first
- kind of democracy is to be organized, and it is clear how we ought to organize
- the other kinds also. For they must diverge in a corresponding order, and at
- each stage we must admit the next inferior class.
-
-
-
- The last kind of democracy, because all the
- population share in the government, it is not within the power of every state to
- endure, and it is not easy for it to persist if it is not well constituted in
- its laws and customs (but the things that result in destroying both
- this state and the other forms of constitution have been nearly all of them
- spoken of beforeIn Book 5.).
- With a view to setting up this kind of democracy and making the people powerful
- their leaders usually acquire as many supporters as possible and admit to
- citizenship not only the legitimate children of citizens but also the base-born
- and those of citizen-birth on one side, I mean those whose father or mother is a
- citizen; for all this element is specially congenial to a to democracy of this
- sort. Popular leaders therefore
- regularly introduce such institutions; they ought however only to go on adding
- citizens up to the point where the multitude outnumbers the notables and the
- middle class and not to go beyond that point; for if they exceed it they make
- the government more disorderly, and also provoke the notables further in the
- direction of being reluctant to endure the democracy, which actually took place
- and caused the revolution at Cyrene
- In N. Africa.
- Diodorus (Diod. 14.34)
- describes a revolution there in 401 B.C., when
- five hundred of the rich were put to death and others fled, but after a
- battle a compromise was arranged.; for a small base element is
- overlooked, but when it grows numerous it is more in evidence.
- A
- democracy of this kind will also find useful such institutions as were employed
- by CleisthenesSee 1275b 36 n. at
- Athens when he wished to
- increase the power of the democracy, and by the party setting up the democracy
- at Cyrene; different tribes and
- brotherhoods must be created outnumbering the old ones, and the celebrations of
- private religious rites must be grouped together into a small number of public
- celebrations, and every device must be employed to make all the people as much
- as possible intermingled with one another, and to break up the previously
- existing groups of associates. Moreover the characteristics of a tyranny also are all thought to be
- democratic, I mean for instance licence among slaves, which may really be
- advantageous for the popular party up to a point, and among women and children,
- and indulgence to live as one likes; a constitution of this sort will have a
- large number of supporters, as disorderly living is pleasanter to the mass of
- mankind than sober living.
- But it is not the greatest or only task of the
- legislator or of those who desire to construct a constitution of this kind
- merely to set it up, but rather to ensure its preservation; for it is not
- difficult for any form of constitution to last for one or two or three days. We
- must therefore employ the results obtained in the inquiries that we have made
- alreadyBook 5. into the causes of
- the preservation and the destruction of constitutions, and attempt in the light
- of those results to establish the safety of the state, carefully avoiding the
- things that cause destruction, and enacting such laws both written and unwritten
-
-
-
- as shall best compass the results preservative of
- constitutions, and not think that a measure is democratic or oligarchic which
- will cause the state to be democratically or oligarchically governed in the
- greatest degree, but which will cause it to be so governed for the longest time.
- But the demagogues of today to
- court the favor of the peoples often use the law-courts to bring about
- confiscations of property. Hence those who are caring for the safety of the
- constitution must counteract this by enacting that nothing belonging to persons
- condemned at law shall be confiscated and liable to be carried to the public
- treasury, but that their property shall be consecrated to the service of
- religion; for male-factors will be no less on their guard, as they will be
- punished just the same, while the mob will less often vote guilty against men on
- trial when it is not going to get anything out of it. Also they must always make
- the public trials that occur as few as possible, checking those who bring
- indictments at random by big penalties; for they do not usually indict men of
- the people but notables, whereas even with this form of constitution it is
- desirable for all the citizens if possible to be friendly to the state, or
- failing that, at all events not to think of their rulers as enemies. And inasmuch as the ultimate forms of
- democracy tend to have large populations and it is difficult for their citizens
- to sit in the assembly without pay, and this in a state where there do not
- happen to be revenues is inimical to the notables (for pay has to be obtained from a property-tax and
- confiscation, and from corruption of the law-courts, which has caused the
- overthrow of many democracies before now),—where therefore
- there happen to be no revenues, few meetings of the assembly must be held, and
- the law-courts must consist of many members but only sit a few days
- (for this not only contributes to the rich not being in fear of the
- cost of the system even if the well-off do not take the pay and only the poor
- do, but also leads to far greater efficiency in the trial of law-suits, for the
- well-to-do, though not wishing to be away from their private affairs for many
- days, are willing to leave them for a short time), while where there are revenues men must not do what
- the popular leaders do now (for they use the surplus for doles, and
- people no sooner get them than they want the same doles again, because this way
- of helping the poor is the legendary jar with a hole in itThe fifty daughters of Danaus were married to their cousins,
- and all but one murdered their husbands on the bridal night, and were
- punished in Hades by having to pour water into the jar
- described.), but the truly democratic statesman must study how
- the multitude may be saved from extreme poverty; for this is what causes
- democracy to be corrupt. Measures must therefore be contrived that may bring
- about lasting prosperity. And since this is advantageous also for the
- well-to-do, the proper course is to collect all the proceeds of the revenues
- into a fund and distribute this in lump sums to the needy, best of all, if one
- can, in sums large enough for acquiring a small estate, or, failing this, to
- serve as capital for trade or husbandry,
-
-
- and if this is not possible for
- all, at all events to distribute the money by tribes or some other division of
- the population in turn, while in the meantime the well-to-do must contribute pay
- for attendance at the necessary assemblies, being themselves excused from
- useless public services. By
- following some such policy as this the Carthaginians have won the friendship of
- the common people; for they constantly send out some of the people to the
- surrounding territories and so make them well-off. And if the notables are men
- of good feeling and sense they may also divide the needy among them in groups
- and supply them with capital to start them in businesses. It is also a good plan
- to imitate the policyCf. 1263a 35. of
- the Tarentines. They get the goodwill of the multitude by making property
- communal for the purpose of use by the needyThis seems to mean that the land was in private ownership, but that there
- was some system of poor-relief, to provide for the destitute out of the
- produce.; also they have divided the whole number of their
- magistracies into two classes, one elected by vote and the other filled by
- lot,—the latter to ensure that the people may have a share in them,
- and the former to improve the conduct of public affairs. And it is also possible
- to effect this by dividing the holders of the same magistracy into two groups,
- one appointed by lot and the other by vote.We
- have then said how democracies should be organized.
- It is also fairly clear
- from these considerations how oligarchies ought to be organized. We must infer
- them from their opposites, reasoning out each form of oligarchywith reference to the form of democracy opposite to
- it, starting with the most well-blended and first form of oligarchyIn contrast with the first and best form of
- democracy, 2 init.—and this is the one near to what is
- called a constitutional government, and for it the property-qualifications must
- be divided into one group of smaller properties and another of larger ones,
- smaller properties qualifying their owners for the indispensable offices and
- larger ones for the more important; and a person owning the qualifying property
- must be allowed to take a share in the government,—introducing by the
- assessment a large enough number of the common people to secure that with them
- the governing class will have a majority over those excluded; and persons to
- share in the government must constantly be brought in from the better class of
- the common people. And the next form
- of oligarchy also must be constructed in a similar way with a slight tightening
- up of the qualification. But the form of oligarchy that stands opposite to the
- last form of democracy, the most autocratic and tyrannical of the oligarchies,
- in as far as it is the worst requires a correspondingly great amount of
- safe-guarding. For just as human bodies in a good state of health and ships well
- equipped with their crews for a voyage admit of more mistakes without being
- destroyed thereby, but bodies of a morbid habit and vessels strained in their
- timbers and manned with bad crews cannot endure even the smallest mistakes, so
- also the worst constitutions need the most safe-guarding.
-
-
-
- Democracies therefore generally speaking are kept
- safe by the largeness of the citizen-body, for this is the antithesis of justice
- according to desert; but oligarchy on the contrary must manifestly obtain its
- security by means of good organization.And since
- the mass of the population falls principally into four divisions, the farming
- class, artisans, retail traders and hired laborers, and military forces are of
- four classes, cavalry, heavy infantry, light infantry and marines, in places
- where the country happens to be suitable for horsemanship, there natural
- conditions favor the establishment of an oligarchy that will be powerful
- (for the security of the inhabitants depends on the strength of this
- element, and keeping studs of horses is the pursuit of those who own extensive
- estates); and where the ground is suitable for heavy infantry,
- conditions favor the next form of oligarchy (for heavy infantry is a
- service for the well-to-do rather than the poor); but light infantry
- and naval forces are an entirely democratic element. As things are therefore, where there is a large multitude
- of this class, when party strife occurs the oligarchs often get the worst of the
- struggle; and a remedy for this must be adopted from military commanders, who
- combine with their cavalry and heavy infantry forces a contingent of light
- infantry. And this is the wayi.e. by
- superior mobility. in which the common people get the better over the
- well-to-do in outbreaks of party strife:being unencumbered they fight easily against cavalry and heavy
- infantry. Therefore to establish
- this force out of this class is to establish it against itself, but the right
- plan is for the men of military age to be separated into a division of older and
- one of younger men, and to have their own sons while still young trained in the
- exercises of light and unarmed troops, and for youths selected from among the
- boys to be themselves trained in active operations. And the bestowal of a share
- in the government upon the multitude should either go on the lines stated
- before,4.1, 1320b 25 ff. and be
- made to those who acquire the property-qualification, or as at Thebes, to people after they have abstained
- for a time from mechanic industries, or as at Marseilles, by making a selection among members of the
- governing classes and those outside it of persons who deserveIf the text is corrected it seems to mean that
- the list was revised from time to time and some old names taken off and new
- ones put on. inclusion. And furthermore the most supreme offices also, which must be retained by those
- within the constitution, must have expensive duties attached to them, in order
- that the common people may be willing to be excluded from them, and may feel no
- resentment against the ruling class, because it pays a high price for office.
- And it fits in with this that they should offer splendid sacrifices and build up
- some public monument on entering upon office, so that the common people sharing
- in the festivities and seeing the city decorated both with votive offerings and
- with building may be glad to see the constitution enduring; and an additional
- result will be that the notables will have memorials of their outlay. But at
- present the members of oligarchies do not adopt this course but the opposite,
- for they seek the gains of office just as much as the honor; hence these
- oligarchies are well described as miniature democracies.The phrase suggests that in democracy public duties are
- cheifly undertaken for their emoluments.
-
-
-
- Let this then be a description of the proper way to organize the various forms
- of democracy and of oligarchy.
- As a consequence of what has been said
- there follow satisfactory conclusions to the questions concerning
- magistracies—how many and what they should be and to whom they should
- belong, as has also been said before.Book 4
- ,1297b 35 ff., 1299a 3 ff. For without the indispensableCf. 4.1. magistracies a state cannot
- exist, while without those that contribute to good order and seemliness it
- cannot be well governed. And furthermore the magistracies are bound to be fewer
- in the small states and more numerous in the large ones, as in fact has been
- said beforeBook 4, 1299b 30 ff.; it
- must therefore be kept in view what kinds of magistracies it is desirable to
- combine and what kinds to keep separate. First among the indispensable services is the
- superintendence of the market, over which there must be an official to
- superintend contracts and good order; since it is a necessity for almost all
- states that people shall sell some things and buy others according to one
- another's necessary requirements, and this is the readiest means of securing
- self-sufficiency, which seems to be the reason for men's having united into a
- single state. Another
- superintendency connected very closely with this one is the curatorship of
- public and private properties in the city,to secure good order and the preservation and rectification of
- falling buildings and roads, and of the bounds between different persons'
- estates, so that disputes may not arise about them, and all the other duties of
- superintendence similar to these. An office of this nature is in most states
- entitled that of City-controller, but it has several departments, each of which
- is filled by separate officials in the states with larger populations, for
- instance Curators of Walls, Superintendents of Wells, Harbors-guardians.
- And another office also is
- indispensable and closely akin to these, for it controls the same matters but
- deals with the country and there regions outside the city; and these magistrates
- are called in some places Land-controllers and in others Custodians of Forests.
- These then are three departments of control over these matters, while another
- office is that to which the revenues of the public funds are paid in, the
- officials who guard them and by whom they are divided out to the several
- administrative departments; these magistrates are called Receivers and Stewards.
- Another magistracy is the one that has to receive a written return of private
- contracts and of the verdicts of the law-courts; and with these same officials
- the registration of legal proceedings and their institution have also to take
- place. In some states this office also is divided into several, but there are
- places where one magistracy controls all these matters; and these officials are
- called Sacred Recorders, Superintendents, Recorders, and other names akin to
- these. And after these is the office
- connected with it but perhaps the most indispensable and most difficult of all,
- the one concerned with the execution of judgement upon persons cast in suits and
- those posted as defaulters according to the lists,
-
-
- and with the
- custody of prisoners. This is an irksome office because it involves great
- unpopularity, so that where it is not possible to make a great deal of profit
- out of it men will not undertake it, or when they have undertaken it are
- reluctant to carry out its functions according to the laws; but it is necessary,
- because there is no use in trials being held about men's rights when the
- verdicts are not put into execution, so that if when no legal trial of disputes
- takes place social intercourse is impossible, so also is it when judgements are
- not executed. Hence it is better for
- this magistracy not to be a single office but to consist of several persons
- drawn from different courts, and it is desirable similarly to try to divide up
- the functions connected with the posting up of people registered as public
- debtors, and further also in some cases for the sentences to be executed by
- magistrates, especially by the newly elected ones preferably in suits tried by
- the outgoing ones, and in those tried by men actually in office for the
- magistrate executing the sentence to be different from the one that passed it,
- for instance the City-controllers to execute the judgements passed on from the
- Market-controllers and other magistrates those passed on by the
- City-controllers. For the less odium involved for those who execute the
- judgements, the more adequately the judgements will be carried out; so for the
- same magistrates to have imposed the sentence and to execute it involves a
- twofold odium, and for the same ones to execute it in all cases makes them the
- enemies of everybody. And in many
- places also the office of keeping custody of prisoners, for example at
- Athens the office of the
- magistrates known as the ElevenThis example
- looks like a mistaken note interpolated in the text. The Eleven had both
- functions.,is separate
- from the magistracy that executes sentences. It is better therefore to keep this
- also separate, and to attempt the same device with regard to this as well. For
- though it is no less necessary than the office of which I spoke, yet in practice
- respectable people avoid it most of all offices, while it is not safe to put it
- into the hands of the base, for they themselves need others to guard them
- instead of being able to keep guard over others. Hence there must not be one
- magistracy specially assigned to the custody of prisoners nor must the same
- magistracy perform this duty continuously, but it should be performed by the
- young, in places where there is a regiment of cadetsAt Athens and
- elsewhere young citizens from eighteen to twenty were enrolled in training
- corps for military instruction; these served as police and home
- troops. or guards, and by the magistrates, in successive
- sections.
- These magistracies therefore must be counted first as supremely
- necessary, and next to them must be put those that are not less necessary but
- are ranked on a higher grade of dignity, because they require much experience
- and trustworthiness; in this class would come the magistracies concerned with
- guarding the city and those assigned to military requirements. And both in peace
- and in war it is equally necessary for there to be magistrates to superintend
- the guarding of gates and walls and the inspection and drill of the citizen
- troops. In some places therefore
- there are more magistracies assigned to all these duties, and in others
- fewer—for instance in the small states there is one to deal with all
- of them. And the officers of this sort are entitled Generals or War-lords.
-
-
-
- And moreover if there are also cavalry or light infantry or
- archers or a navy, sometimes a magistracy is appointed to have charge of each of
- these arms also, and they carry the titles of Admiral, Cavalry-commander and
- Taxiarch, and also the divisional commissions subordinate to these of Captains
- of Triremes, Company-commanders and Captains of Tribes, and all the subdivisions
- of these commands. But the whole of this sort of officers constituted a single
- class, that of military command. This then is how the matter stands in regard to this office; but inasmuch as
- some of the magistracies, if not all, handle large sums of public money, there
- must be another office to receive an account and subject it to audit, which must
- itself handle no other business; and these officials are called Auditors by some
- people, Accountants by others, Examiners by others and Advocates by others. And
- by the side of all these offices is the one that is most supreme over all
- matters, for often the same magistracy has the execution of business that
- controls its introduction, or presides over the general assembly in places where
- the people are supreme; for the magistracy that convenes the sovereign assembly
- is bound to be the sovereign power in the state. It is styled in some places the
- Preliminary Council because it considers business in advance, but where there is
- a democracyCf. 1323a 9 below. Apparently
- plh=qo/s e)sti stands for to\ plh=qos ku/rio/n e)sti, but editors quote no
- parallel. it is more usually called a Council. This more or less
- completes the number of the offices of a political nature; but another kind of superintendence is that
- concerned with divine worship; in this class are priests and superintendents of
- mattersconnected with the
- temples, the preservation of existing buildings and the restoration of those
- that are ruinous, and the other duties relating to the gods. In practice this
- superintendence in some places forms a single office, for instance in the small
- cities, but in others it belongs to a number of officials who are not members of
- the priesthood, for example Sacrificial Officers and Temple-guardians and
- Stewards of Sacred Funds. And connected with this is the office devoted to the
- management of all the public festivals which the law does not assign to the
- priests but the officials in charge of which derive their honor from the common
- sacrificial hearth, and these officials are called in some places Archons, in
- others Kings and in others Presidents. To sum up therefore, the necessary offices of
- superintendence deal with the following matters : institutions of religion,
- military institutions, revenue and expenditure, control of the market, citadel,
- harbors and country, also the arrangements of the law-courts, registration of
- contracts, collection of fines, custody of prisoners, supervision of accounts
- and inspections, and the auditing of officials, and lastly the offices connected
- with the body that deliberates about public affairs. On the other hand, peculiar to the states that have more
- leisure and prosperity, and also pay attention to public decorum, are the
- offices of Superintendent of Women, Guardian of the Laws, Superintendent of
- Children, Controller of Physical Training,
-
-
-
-
-
- Book 4 in some editions.The
- student who is going to make a suitable investigation of the best form of
- constitution must necessarily decide first of all what is the most desirable
- mode of life. For while this is uncertain it is also bound to be uncertain what
- is the best constitution, since it is to be expected that the people that have
- the best form of government available under their given conditions will fare the
- best, exceptional circumstances apart. Hence we must firstagree what life is most desirable for almost all
- men, and after that whether the same life is most desirable both for the
- community and for the individual, or a different one. Believing therefore in the adequacy of much of what is
- said even in extraneous discoursesCf. 3.6.
- It is debated whether the phrase refers to Aristotle's own popular writings,
- or to those of other philosophers, or to discussions of the subject in
- ordinary intercourse. on the subject of the best life, let us make
- use of these pronouncements now. For as regards at all events one classification
- of things good, putting them in three groups, external goods, goods of the soul
- and goods of the body, assuredly nobody would deny that the ideally happy are
- bound to possess all three. For nobody would call a man ideally happy that has
- not got a particle of courage nor of temperance nor of justice nor of wisdom,
- but is afraid of the flies that flutter by him, cannot refrain from any of the
- most outrageous actions in order to gratify a desire to eat or to drink, ruins
- his dearest friends for the sake of a farthing, and similarly in matters of the
- intellect also is as senseless and mistaken as any child or lunatic. But although these are propositions which
- when uttered everybody would agree to, yet men differ about amount and degrees
- of value. They think it is enough to possess however small a quantity of virtue,
- but of wealth, riches, power, glory and everything of that kind they seek a
- larger and larger amount without limit. We on the other hand shall tell them
- that it is easy to arrive at conviction on these matters in the light of the
- actual facts, when one sees that men do not acquire and preserve the virtues by
- means of these external goods, but external goods by means of the virtues,
-
-
-
- and that whether the life of happiness consists for man in
- enjoyment or in virtue or in both, it is found in larger measure with those who
- are of surpassingly high cultivation in character and intellect but only
- moderate as regards the external acquisition of goods, than with those who own
- more than they can use of the latter but are deficient in the former. Not but what the truth is also easily seen
- if we consider the matter in the light of reason. For external goods have a
- limit, as has any instrument (and everything useful is useful for
- something), so an excessive amount of them must necessarily do harm, or
- do no good, to its possessor; whereas with any of the goods of the soul, the
- more abundant it is, the more useful it must be—if even to goods of
- the soul not only the term ‘noble’ but also the term
- ‘useful’ can be properly applied. And broadly, it is clear
- that we shall declare that the best condition of each particular thing,
- comparing things with one another, corresponds in point of superiority to the
- distance that subsists between the things of which we declare these conditions
- themselves to be conditions.e.g. the finest
- man excels the finest monkey to the degree in which the species man excels
- the species monkey. Hence inasmuch as our soul is a more valuable
- thing both absolutely and relatively to ourselves than either our property or
- our body, the best conditions of these things must necessarily stand in the same
- relation to one another as the things themselves do. Moreover it is for the sake
- of the soul that these goods are in their nature desirable, and that all wise
- men mustchoose them, not the soul for
- the sake of those other things. Let
- us then take it as agreed between us that to each man there falls just so large
- a measure of happiness as he achieves of virtue and wisdom and of virtuous and
- wise action: in evidence of this we have the case of God, who is happy and
- blessed, but is so on account of no external goods, but on account of himself,
- and by being of a certain quality in his nature; since it is also for this
- reason that prosperity is necessarily different from happiness—for the
- cause of goods external to the soul is the spontaneous and fortune,Aristotle taught that some events are the
- result of the undesigned interaction of two lines of causation in nature's
- design; he denoted this (1) in general, by ‘the
- automatic’ or self-acting (represented in Latin by
- sponte, spontaneous), (2) as
- concerning man, by ‘fortune.’ but nobody is just
- or temperate as a result of or owing to the action of fortune. And connected is
- a truth requiring the same arguments to prove it, that it is also the best
- state, and the one that does well,The common
- play on the ambiguity of ‘do well,’ meaning either
- ‘prosper’ or ‘act rightly.’
- that is happy. But to do well is impossible save for those who do good actions,
- and there is no good action either of a man or of a state without virtue and
- wisdom; and courage, justice and wisdom belonging to a state have the same
- meaning and form as have those virtues whose possession bestows the titles of
- just and wise and temperate on an individual human being.
- These remarks
- however must suffice by way of preface to our discourse: for neither is it
- possible to abstain from touching on these subjects altogether, nor is it
- feasible to follow out all the arguments that are germane to them, for that is
- the business of another course of study. For the present let us take it as
- established that the best life, whether separately for an individual or
- collectively for states,
-
-
- is the life conjoined with virtue furnished with
- sufficient means for taking part in virtuous actions
- Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1099a
- 32, Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1179a 4
- ff.
- ; while objections to this position we must pass over
- in the course of the present inquiry, and reserve them for future consideration,
- if anyone be found to disagree with what has been said.
- On the other hand it
- remains to say whether the happiness of a state is to be pronounced the same as
- that of each individual man, or whether it is different. Here too the answer is
- clear: everybody would agree that it is the same; for all those who base the
- good life upon wealth in the case of the individual, also assign felicity to the
- state as a whole if it is wealthy; and all who value the life of the tyrant
- highest, would also say that the state which rules the widest empire is the
- happiest; and if any body accepts the individual as happy on account of virtue,
- he will also say that the state which is the better morally is the happier.
- But there now arise these two
- questions that require consideration: first, which mode of life is the more
- desirable, the life of active citizenship and participation in politics, or
- rather the life of an alien and that of detachment from the political
- partnership; next, what constitution and what organization of a state is to be
- deemed the best,—either on the assumption that to take an active part
- in the state is desirable for everybody, or that it is undesirable for some men
- although desirable for most. But as it isthe latter question that is the business of political study and
- speculation, and not the question of what is desirable for the individual, and
- as it is the investigation of politics that we have now taken up, the former
- question would be a side issue, and the latter is the business of political
- inquiry.
- Now it is clear that the best constitution is the system under
- which anybody whatsoever would be best off and would live in felicity; but the
- question is raised even on the part of those who agree that the life accompanied
- by virtue is the most desirable, whether the life of citizenship and activity is
- desirable or rather a life released from all external affairs, for example some
- form of contemplative life, which is said by some to be the only life that is
- philosophic.Perhaps the Greek should be
- altered to give ‘which alone is said to be desirable by some
- philosophers.’ For it is manifest that these are the two
- modes of life principally chosen by the men most ambitious of excelling in
- virtue, both in past times and at the present day—I mean the life of
- politics and the life of philosophy. And it makes no little difference which way the truth lies; for assuredly the
- wise are bound to arrange their affairs in the direction of the better
- goal—and this applies to the state collectively as well as to the
- individual human being. Some persons think that empire over one's neighbors, if
- despotically exercised, involves a definite injustice of the greatest kind, and
- if constitutionally, although it carries no injustice, yet is a hindrance to the
- ruler's own well-being; but others hold almost the opposite view to
- these—they think that the life of action and citizenship is the only
- life fit for a man, since with each of the virtues its exercise in actions is
- just as possible for men engaged in public affairs and in politics as for those
- who live a private life.
-
-
-
- Some
- people then hold the former view, while others declare that the despotic and
- tyrannical form of constitution alone achieves happiness; and in some states it
- is also the distinctive aim of the constitution and the laws to enable them to
- exercise despotic rule over their neighbors. Hence even though with most peoples
- most of the legal ordinances have been laid down virtually at random,
- nevertheless if there are places where the laws aim at one definite object, that
- object is in all cases power, as in Sparta and Crete both
- the system of education and the mass of the laws are framed in the main with a
- view to war; and also among all the non-Hellenic nations that are strong enough
- to expand at the expense of others, military strength has been held in honor,
- for example, among the Scythians, Persians, Thracians and Celts. Indeed among some peoples there are even
- certain laws stimulating military valor; for instance at Carthage, we are told, warriors receive
- the decoration of armlets of the same number as the campaigns on which they have
- served; and at one time there was also a law in Macedonia that a man who had never killed an enemy must wear
- his halter instead of a belt. Among Scythian tribes at a certain festival a cup
- was carried round from which a man that had not killed an enemy was not allowed
- to drink. Among the Iberians, a warlike race, they fix small spitsOr perhaps ‘pointed
- stones.’
- in the
- earth round a man's grave corresponding in number to the enemies he has killed.
- So with other races there are many other practices of a similar kind, some
- established by law and others by custom.
- Nevertheless those who wish
- to examine the matter closely might perhaps think it exceedingly strange that it
- should be the business of a statesman to be able to devise means of holding
- empire and mastery over the neighboring peoples whether they desire it or not.
- How can that be worthy of a statesman or lawgiver which is not even lawful? and
- government is not lawful when it is carried on not only justly but also
- unjustly—and superior strength may be unjustly exercised. Moreover we do not see this in the other
- sciences either: it is no part of a physician's or ship-captain's business to
- use either persuasion or compulsion upon the patients in the one case and the
- crewOr perhaps ‘the
- passengers.’ in the other. Yet most peoples seem to think
- that despotic rule is statesmanship, and are not ashamed to practise towards
- others treatment which they declare to be unjust and detrimental for themselves;
- for in their own internal affairs they demand just government, yet in their
- relations with other peoples they pay no attention to justice. Yet it is strange if there is not a natural
- distinction between peoples suited to be despotically ruled and those not
- suited; so that if this is so, it is not proper to attempt to exercise despotic
- government over all people, but only over those suited for it, just as it is not
- right to hunt human beings for food or sacrifice, but only the game suitable for
- this purpose, that is, such wild creatures as are good to eat. And moreover it
- is possible even for a single state in isolation to be happy,
-
-
- that is
- one that is well governed, in as much as it is conceivable that a state might be
- carried on somewhere in isolation, enjoying good laws, and in such a state the
- system of the constitution will not be framed for the purpose of war or of
- overpowering its enemies—for we are to suppose everything to do with
- war to be excluded. It is evident
- therefore that while all military pursuits are to be deemed honorable, they are
- not so as being the ultimate end of all things but as means to that end. And it
- is the business of the good lawgiver to study how a state, a race of men or any
- other community is to partake of the good life and the happiness possible for
- them. Some however of the regulations laid down will vary; and in case there
- exist any neighbor peoples, it is the business of the legislative art to
- consider what sort of exercises should be practised in relation to what sort of
- neighbors or how the state is to adopt the regulations that are suitable in
- relation to each.But this question of the proper
- end for the best constitutions to aim at may receive its due consideration
- later.See 13, 14.
-
- We
- turn to those who, while agreeing that the life of virtue is the most desirable,
- differ about the way in which that life should be pursued. Some disapprove of
- holding office in the state, thinking that the life of the free manis different from the life of politics and
- is the most desirable of any; whereas others think the political life the best
- life, for they argue that it is impossible for the man who does nothing to do
- well, and doing well and happiness are the same thing.On the ambiguous use of ‘do well’ see
- 1323b 32 n. To these two parties we must reply that both are partly
- right and partly wrong. The former are right in saying that the life of the free
- man is better than the life of mastership, for this is true—there is
- nothing specially dignified in employing a slave, as a slave, for giving orders
- about menial duties has in it nothing of nobility; yet to think that all government is exercising the
- authority of a master is a mistake, for there is as wide a difference between
- ruling free men and ruling slaves as there is between the natural freeman and
- the natural slave themselves. But these things have been adequately decided in
- the first discourses.i.e. Book 1. But
- to praise inaction more highly than action is an error, for happiness is an
- activity, and further the actions of the just and temperate have in them the
- realization of much that is noble. Yet on the strength of these decisions somebody might perhaps suppose that the
- highest good is to be the master of the world, since thus one would have the
- power to compass the greatest number and the noblest kind of actions, and
- therefore it is not the duty of the man that is capable of ruling to surrender
- office to his neighbor, but rather to take it from him, and no account must be
- taken by father of sons nor by sons of father nor in general by one friend of
- another, and no heed must be paid to them in comparison with this; for the best
- thing is the most to be desired, and to do well is the best thing. Now this statement is perhaps true
-
-
-
- if it is the case that the most desirable of existing things
- will belong to men that use robbery and violence. But perhaps it cannot belong
- to them, and this is a false assumption. For a man's acts can no longer be noble
- if he does not excel as greatly as a man excels a woman or a father his children
- or a master his slaves, so that one who transgresses cannot afterwards achieve
- anything sufficient to rectify the lapse from virtue that he had already
- committed; because for equals the noble and just consists in their taking turns,
- since this is equal and alike, but for those that are equal to have an unequal
- share and those that are alike an unlike share is contrary to nature, and
- nothing contrary to nature is noble. Hence in case there is another person who
- is our superior in virtue and in practical capacity for the highest functions,
- him it is noble to follow and him it is just to obey; though he must possess not
- only virtue but also capacity that will render him capable of action. But if these things are well said, and if
- happiness is to be defined as well-doing, the active life is the best life both
- for the whole state collectively and for each man individually. But the active
- life is not necessarily active in relation to other men, as some people think,
- nor are only those processes of thought active that are pursued for the sake of
- the objects that result from action, but far morethose speculations and thoughts that have their end in
- themselves and are pursued for their own sake; for the end is to do well, and
- therefore is a certain form of action.Cf.
- 1323b 32 n., 1325a 21. And even with actions done in relation to
- external objects we predicate action in the full sense chiefly of the
- master-craftsmen who direct the action by their thoughts. Moreover with cities also, those that occupy an
- isolated situation and pursue a policy of isolation are not necessarily
- inactive; for state activities also can be sectional, since the sections of the
- state have many common relations with one another. And this is also possible
- similarly in the case of any individual human being; for otherwise God and the
- whole universe could hardly be well circumstanced, since they have no external
- activities by the side of their own private activities.It is therefore manifest that the same life must be the best
- both for each human being individually and for states and mankind
- collectively.
- And as we have prepared the way by this prefatory discussion of
- the subject, and have previously studied all the other forms of
- constitution,This seems to refer to
- Books 4-6. the starting-point for the remainder of our subject is
- first to specify the nature of the conditions that are necessary in the case of
- the state that is to be constituted in the ideally best manner. For the best
- constitution cannot be realized without suitable equipment.Cf. 1288b 39 n. We must therefore posit as granted in
- advance a number of as it were ideal conditions, although none of these must be
- actually impossible. I mean for instance in reference to number of citizens and
- territory. All other craftsmen, for
- example a weaver or a shipwright,
-
-
- have to be supplied with their
- material in a condition suitable for their trade, for the better this material
- has been prepared, the finer is bound to be the product of their craft; so also
- the statesman and the lawgiver ought to be furnished with their proper material
- in a suitable condition. Under the head of material equipment for the state
- there first come the questions as to a supply of population—what
- precisely ought to be its number and what its natural character? and similarly
- in regard to the territory, what is to be its particular size and nature?
- Most people imagine that the
- prosperous state must be a great state; but granted the truth of this, they fail
- to realize in what quality the greatness or smallness of a state consists: they
- judge a great state by the numerical magnitude of the population, but really the
- more proper thing to look at is not numbers but efficiency. For a state like
- other things has a certain function to perform, so that it is the state most
- capable of performing this function that is to be deemed the greatest, just as
- one would pronounce Hippocrates to be greater, not as a human being but as a
- physician, than somebody who surpassed him in bodily size. All the same, even if it be right to judge the
- state by the test of its multitude, this ought not to be done with regard to the
- multitude of any and every class (for states are doubtless bound to
- contain a large number of slavesand
- resident aliens and foreigners), but the test should be the number of
- those who are a part of the state—the special parts of which a state
- consists. It is superiority in the number of these that indicates a great state;
- a state that sends forth to war a large number of the baser sort and a small
- number of heavy-armed soldiers cannot possibly be a great state—for a
- great state is not the same thing as a state with a large population. But certainly experience also shows that it
- is difficult and perhaps impossible for a state with too large a population to
- have good legal government. At all events we see that none of the states reputed
- to be well governed is without some restriction in regard to numbers. The
- evidence of theory proves the same point. Law is a form of order, and good law
- must necessarily mean good order; but an excessively large number cannot
- participate in order: to give it order would surely be a task for divine power,
- which holds even this universe together.In
- the MSS. this clause follows the next. Hence that state also must
- necessarily be the most beautiful with whose magnitude is combined the
- above-mentioned limiting principle; for certainly beauty is usually found in number and magnitude, but there is a
- due measure of magnitude for a city-state as there also is for all other
- things—animals, plants, tools; each of these if too small or
- excessively large will not possess its own proper efficiency, but in some cases
- will have entirely lost its true nature and in others will be in a defective
- condition: for instance, a ship a span long will not be a ship at all, nor will
- a ship a quarter of a mile long, and even when it reaches a certain size,
-
-
-
- in some cases smallness and in others excessive largeness will
- make it sail badly. Similarly a
- state consisting of too few people will not be self-sufficing (which is
- an essential quality of a state), and one consisting of too many,
- though self-sufficing in the mere necessaries, will be so in the way in which a
- nationi.e. presumably an Ethnos in the
- usual sense, a community composed of villages loosely bound together by
- relationship and trade, and united for defence, but not for political life;
- not an Ethnos of associated cities. is, and not as a state, since it
- will not be easy for it to possess constitutional government—for who
- will command its over-swollen multitude in war? or who will serve as its herald,
- unless he have the lungs of a Stentor? It follows that the lowest limit for the
- existence of a state is when it consists of a population that reaches the
- minimum number that is self-sufficient for the purpose of living the good life
- after the manner of a political community. It is possible also for one that
- exceeds this one in number to be a greater state, but, as we said, this
- possibility of increase is not without limit, and what the limit of the state's
- expansion is can easily be seen from practical considerations. The activities of
- the state are those of the rulers and those of the persons ruled, and the work
- of a ruler is to direct the administration and to judge law-suits; but in order
- to decide questions of justice and in order to distribute the offices according
- to merit it is necessary for the citizens to know each other's personal
- characters, since where this does not happen to be the case the business of
- electing officials and trying law-suits is bound to go badly; haphazard decision
- is unjust in both matters, and thismust obviously prevail in an excessively numerous community. Also in such a community it is easy for
- foreigners and resident aliens to usurp the rights of citizenship, for the
- excessive number of the population makes it not difficult to escape detection.
- It is clear therefore that the best limiting principle for a state is the
- largest expansion of the population, with a view to self-sufficiency that can
- well be taken in at one view.Such may be our
- conclusion on the question of the size of the state.
- Very much the same holds
- good about its territory. As to the question what particular kind of land it
- ought to have, it is clear that everybody would command that which is most
- self-sufficing (and such is necessarily that which bears every sort of
- produce, for self-sufficiency means having a supply of everything and lacking
- nothing). In extent and magnitude the land ought to be of a size that
- will enable the inhabitants to live a life of liberal and at the same time
- temperate leisure. Whether this limiting principle is rightly or wrongly stated
- must be considered more precisely later on,This promise is not fulfilled in the work as it has come down to us.
- when we come to raise the general subject of property and the ownership of
- wealth,—how and in what way it ought to be related to the employment
- of wealthThe distinction seems to be between
- owning (or perhaps getting) wealth and using it; but a
- probable emendation of the Greek gives ‘how we ought to stand in
- relation to its employment.’; about this question there are
- many controversies, owing to those that draw us towards either extreme of life,
- the one school towards parsimony and the other towards luxury. The proper configuration of the country it
- is not difficult to state (though there are some points on which the
- advice of military experts also must be taken): on the one hand it
- should be difficult for enemies to invade and easy for the people themselves to
- march out from,
-
-
- and in addition, on the other hand, the same thing
- holds good of the territory that we said about the size of the
- population—it must be well able to be taken in at one view, and that
- means being a country easy for military defence. As to the site of the city, if
- it is to be ideally placed, it is proper for it to be well situated with regard
- both to the sea and to the country. One defining principle is that mentioned
- aboveAt the beginning of
- 5.2.—the city must be in communication with all parts of the
- territory for the purpose of sending out military assistance; and the remaining
- principle is that it must be easily accessible for the conveyance to it of the
- agricultural produce, and also of timber-wood and any other such material that
- the country happens to possess.
- As to communication with the sea it is in
- fact much debated whether it is advantageous to well-ordered states or harmful.
- It is maintained that the visits of persons brought up under other institutions
- are detrimental to law and order, and so also is a swollen population, which
- grows out of sending out abroad and receiving in a number of traders, but is
- unfavorable to good government. Now
- it is not difficult to see that, if these consequences are avoided, it is
- advantageous in respect of both security and the supply of necessary
- commoditiesthat the city and the
- country should have access to the sea. With a view to enduring wars more easily
- people that are to be secure must be capable of defensive operations on both
- elements, land and sea, and with a view to striking at assailants, even if it be
- not possible on both elements, yet to do so on one or the other will be more in
- the power of people that have access to both. And the importation of commodities
- that they do not happen to have in their own country and the export of their
- surplus products are things indispensable; for the state ought to engage in
- commerce for its own interest, but not for the interest of the foreigner.
- People that throw open their
- market to the world do so for the sake of revenue, but a state that is not to
- take part in that sort of profit-making need not possess a great commercial
- port. But since even now we see many countries and cities possessing sea-ports
- and harbors conveniently situated with regard to the city, so as not to form
- part of the same townPerhaps the Greek
- should be altered to give ‘part of the town
- itself.’ and yet not to be too far off, but commanded by
- walls and other defence-works of the kind, it is manifest that if any advantage
- does result through the communication of city with port the state will possess
- this advantage, and if there is any harmful result it is easy to guard against
- it by means of laws stating and regulating what persons are not and what persons
- are to have intercourse with one another. On the question of naval forces, there is no doubt that to
- possess them up to a certain strength is most desirable
-
-
- (for a
- state ought to be formidable, and also capable of the defence of not only its
- own people but also some of its neighbors, by sea as well as by land);
- but when we come to the question of the number and size of this force, we have
- to consider the state's manner of life if it is to live a life of leadership and
- affairs,i.e. relations with other
- states—a broader term than hegemony, leadership of an
- alliance. it must possess maritime as well as other forces
- commensurate with its activities. On
- the other hand it is not necessary for states to include the teeming population
- that grows up in connection with common sailors, as there is no need for these
- to be citizens; for the marines are free men and are a part of the infantry, and
- it is they who have command and control the crew; and if there exists a mass of
- villagers and tillers of the soil, there is bound to be no lack of sailors too.
- In fact we see this state of thing existing even now in some places, for
- instance in the city of Heraclea; the
- Heracleotes man a large fleet of triremes, although they possess a city of but
- moderate size as compared with others.Let such
- then be our conclusions about the territories and harbors of cities, and the
- sea, and about naval forces.
- About the citizen population, we said
- before what is its proper limit of numbers. Let us now speakof what ought to be the citizens' natural
- character. Now this one might almost discern by looking at the famous cities of
- Greece and by observing how the
- whole inhabited world is divided up among the nations.4. fin. The nations inhabiting the cold places and
- those of Europe are full of spirit but
- somewhat deficient in intelligence and skill, so that they continue
- comparatively free, but lacking in political organization and capacity to rule
- their neighbors. The peoples of Asia on
- the other hand are intelligent and skillful in temperament, but lack spirit, so
- that they are in continuous subjection and slavery. But the Greek race
- participates in both characters, just as it occupies the middle position
- geographically, for it is both spirited and intelligent; hence it continues to
- be free and to have very good political institutions, and to be capable of
- ruling all mankind if it attains constitutional unity. The same diversity also exists among the Greek races
- compared with one another: some have a one-sided nature, others are happily
- blended in regard to both these capacities.i.e. intelligence and high spirit, capacity for self-government and
- capacity for empire. It is clear therefore that people that are to be
- easily guided to virtue by the lawgiver must be both intellectual and spirited
- in their nature. For as to what is said by certain persons about the character
- that should belong to their GuardiansThe
- ruling class in Plato's Ideal State,Plat. Rep.
- 375c.—they should be affectionate to their
- friends but fierce towards strangers—it is spirit that causes
- affectionateness, for spirit is the capacity of the soul whereby we love.
-
-
-
-
- A sign of this is
- that spirit is more roused against associates and friends than against
- strangers, when it thinks itself slighted. Therefore ArchilochusArchilochus of Paros (one of the earliest lyric poets, fl. 600 B.C., the inventor of the iambic meter, which he
- used for lampoons), fr. 61 Bergk, 676 Diehl, 67
- Edmonds,Elegy and Iambus, 2. 133. for instance,
- when reproaching his friends, appropriately apostrophizes his spirit:
- For 'tis thy friends that make thee choke with rage.
-
Moreover it is from this faculty that power to command and love of
- freedom are in all cases derived; for spirit is a commanding and indomitable
- element. But it is a mistake to describe the Guardians as cruel towards
- strangers; it is not right to be cruel towards anybody, and men of great-souled
- nature are not fierce except towards wrongdoers, and their anger is still
- fiercer against their companions if they think that these are wronging them, as
- has been said before. And this is
- reasonable, because they think that in addition to the harm done them they are
- also being defrauded of a benefit by persons whom they believe to owe them one.
- Hence the sayings
- For brothers' wars are cruel,
- Eur. frag.
- 965.
-
-
and
- They that too deeply loved too deeply hate.
- Nauck frag. 78
-
-
-
- We have now approximately decided what are the
- proper numbers and the natural qualities of those who exercise the right of
- citizens, and the proper extent and nature of the territory (for we
- must notseek to attain the same
- exactness by means of theoretical discussions as is obtained by means of the
- facts that come to us through sense-perceptions).
- But since, just as
- with all other natural organisms those things that are indispensable for the
- existence of the whole are not partsi.e.
- they are not all of themparts: the ‘parts’
- of a thing are among the ‘indispensable conditions’ of
- its existence, but there are others also. of the whole organization,
- it is also clear that not all the things that are necessary for states to
- possess are to be counted as parts of a state (any more than this is so
- with any other association that forms something one in kind, for there must be
- something that is one and common and the same for the partners, whether the
- shares that they take be equal or unequal: for example this common property may
- be food or an area of land or something else of the same sort—The sentence is unfinished.
- but when of two related things one
- is a means and the other an end, in their case there is nothing in common except
- for the one to act and the other to receive the action. I mean for instance the
- relation between any instrument or artificer and the work that they produce:
- between a house and a builder there is nothing that is produced in common, but
- the builder's craft exists for the sake of the house. Hence although states need
- property, the property is no part of the state. And there are many living things
- that fall under the head of property.Possibly the words from the beginning of 7.2 ‘But when’
- to this point should be transferred below to 7.3 mid. after
- ‘different constitutions.’ And the state is one
- form of partnership of similar people, and its object is the best life that is
- possible. And since the greatest
- good is happiness, and this is some perfect activity or employment of virtue,
- and since it has so come about that it is possible for some men to participate
- in it, but for others only to a small extent or not at all, it is clear that
- this is the cause for there arising different kinds and varieties of state and
- several forms of constitution;
-
-
- for as each set of people pursues
- participation in happiness in a different manner and by different means they
- make for themselves different modes of life and different constitutions. And we
- must also further consider how many there are of these things referred to that
- are indispensable for the existence of a state; for among them will be the
- things which we pronounce to be parts of a state, owing to which their presence
- is essential. We must therefore
- consider the list of occupations that a state requires : for from these it will
- appear what the indispensable classes are. First then a state must have a supply
- of food; secondly, handicrafts (since life needs many tools);
- third, arms (since the members of the association must necessarily
- possess arms both to use among themselves and for purposes of government, in
- cases of insubordination, and to employ against those who try to molest them
- from without); also a certain abundance of money, in order that they
- may have enough both for their internal needs and for requirements of war;
- fifth, a primary need, the service of religion, termed a priesthood; and sixth
- in number and most necessary of all, a provision for deciding questions of
- interests and of rights between the citizens. These then are the occupations that virtually every state
- requires (for the state is not any chance multitude of people but one
- self-sufficient for the needs of life, as we say,Cf. Books 2.1.7, 3.1.8, 5.2.10. and if any of these
- industries happens to be wanting, it is impossible for that association to be
- absolutely self-sufficient). It is necessary therefore for the state to
- be organizedon the lines of these
- functions; consequently it must possess a number of farmers who will provide the
- food, and craftsmen, and the military class, and the wealthy, and priests and
- judges to decide questions of necessityPerhaps the text should be altered to give ‘matters of
- justice.’ and of interests.
- These matters having been
- settled, it remains to consider whether everybody is to take part in all of
- these functions (for it is possible for the whole of the people to be
- at once farmers and craftsmen and the councillors and judges), or
- whether we are to assume different classes corresponding to each of the
- functions mentioned, or whether some of them must necessarily be specialized and
- others combined. But it will not be the same in every form of constitution; for,
- as we said,Cf. Book 4.4 and 14. it is
- possible either for all the people to take part in all the functions or for not
- all to take part in all but for certain people to have certain functions. In
- fact these different distributions of functions are the cause of the difference
- between constitutions: democracies are states in which all the people
- participate in all the functions, oligarchies where the contrary is the case.
- But at present we are studying
- the best constitution, and this is the constitution under which the state would
- be most happy, and it has been stated before1.5. that happiness cannot be forthcoming without virtue; it is
- therefore clear from these considerations that in the most nobly constituted
- state, and the one that possesses men that are absolutely just, not merely just
- relatively to the principle that is the basis of the constitution, the citizens
- must not live a mechanic or a mercantile life (for such a life is
- ignoble and inimical to virtue), nor yet must those who are to be
- citizens in the best state be tillers of the soil
-
-
- (for
- leisure is needed both for the development of virtue and for active
- participation in politics). And since the state also contains the military class and the class that
- deliberates about matters of policy and judges questions of justice, and these
- are manifestly in a special sense parts of the state, are these classes also to
- be set down as distinct or are both functions to be assigned to the same
- persons? But here also the answer is clear, because in a certain sense they
- should be assigned to the same persons, but in a certain sense to different
- ones. Inasmuch as each of these two functions belongs to a different prime of
- life, and one requires wisdom, the other strength, they are to be assigned to
- different people; but inasmuch as it is a thing impossible that when a set of
- men are able to employ force and to resist control, these should submit always
- to be ruled, from this point of view both functions must be assigned to the same
- people; for those who have the power of arms have the power to decide whether
- the constitution shall stand or fall. The only course left them is to assign this constitutional function to both
- sets of men without distinction,Or, amending
- this curious Greek, ‘for the constitution to assign both these
- functions to the same people.’ yet not simultaneously, but,
- as in the natural order of things strength is found in the younger men and
- wisdom in the elder, it seems to be expedient and just for their functions to be
- allotted to both in this way, for this mode of division possesses conformity
- with merit. Moreover the ownership
- of properties also must be centered round these classes, for the citizens must
- necessarily possess plentiful means, and these are the citizens. For
- theartisan class has no share in
- the state, nor has any other class that is not ‘an artificer of
- virtue.’A Platonic phrase,
- Plat. Rep. 500d. And this is
- clear from our basic principle; for in conjunction with virtue happiness is
- bound to be forthcoming, but we should pronounce a state happy having regard not
- to a particular section of it but to all its citizens. And it is also manifest
- that the properties must belong to these classes, inasmuch asAs this is a new point, perhaps we should
- transpose ‘inasmuch as’ ( ei)/per) and ‘that’ (
- o(/ti) in the line
- above. it is necessary for the tillers of the soil to be slaves, or
- serfs of alien race. There remains
- of the list enumerated the class of priests; and the position of this class also
- is manifest. Priests must be appointed neither from the tillers of the soil nor
- from the artisans, for it is seemly that the gods should be worshipped by
- citizens; and since the citizen body is divided into two parts, the military
- class and the councillor class, and as it is seemly that those who have
- relinquished these duties owing to age should render to the gods their due
- worship and should spend their retirement in their service, it is to these that
- the priestly offices should be assigned.We have
- therefore stated the things indispensable for the constitution of a state, and
- the things that are parts of a state: tillers of the soil, craftsmen and the
- laboring class generally are a necessary appurtenance of states, but the
- military and deliberative classes are parts of the state; and moreover each of
- these divisions is separate from the others, either permanently or by turn.i.e. the ‘appurtenances’
- are permanently separate form the army and the deliberative, which are the
- ‘parts,’ and which are separate from each other only
- ‘by turn,’ i.e. a citizen passes on from one to the
- other.
-
- And
- that it is proper for the state to be divided up into castes and for the
- military class to be distinct from that of the tillers of the soil
-
-
- does not
- seem to be a discovery of political philosophers of today or one made
- recently.Perhaps to be read as denying
- the originality of Plato'sRepublic. In Egypt this arrangement still exists even now,
- as also in Crete; it is said to have
- been established in Egypt by the
- legislation of Sesostris and in Crete
- by that of Minos. Common meals also
- seem to be an ancient institution, those in Crete having begun in the reign of Minos, while those in
- Italy are much older than these.
- According to the historians one of the settlers there, a certain Italus, became
- king of Oenotria, and from him they took the name of Italians instead of that of
- Oenotrians, and the name of Italy was given to all that promontoryi.e. the south-west peninsula or toe of
- Italy. of Europe lying
- between the Gulfs of Scylletium and of Lametus,i.e. the Gulfs of Squillace and Eufemia. which are half a day's
- journey apart. It was this Italus
- then who according to tradition converted the Oenotrians from a pastoral life to
- one of agriculture and gave them various ordinances, being the first to
- institute their system of common meals; hence the common meals and some of his
- laws are still observed by certain of his successors even today. The settlers in
- the direction of TyrrheniaThe modern
- Tuscany, i.e. the people of
- Lucania, Campania and Latium. were Opicans, who today as in former times
- bear the surname ofAusonians; the
- region towards IapygiaThe south-east
- promontory or heel of Italy. and the Ionian Gulf, called Syrtis, was
- inhabited by the Chones, who also were Oenotrians by race. It is from this country that the system of common
- meals has its origin, while the division of the citizen-body by hereditary caste
- came from Egypt, for the reign of
- Sesostris long antedates that of Minos. We may almost take it therefore that all
- other political devices also have been discovered repeatedly, or rather an
- infinite number of times over, in the lapse of ages; for the discoveries of a
- necessary kind are probably taught by need itself, and when the necessaries have
- been provided it is reasonable that things contributing to refinement and luxury
- should find their development; so that we must assume that this is the way with
- political institutions also. The
- antiquity of all of them is indicated by the history of Egypt; for the Egyptians are reputed to be the
- oldest of nations, but they have always had laws and a political system. Hence
- we should use the results of previous discovery when adequate, while endeavoring
- to investigate matters hitherto passed over.It
- has been stated before that the land ought to be owned by those who possess arms
- and those who share the rights of the constitution, and why the cultivators
- ought to be a different caste from these, and what is the proper extent and
- conformation of the country. We have
- now to discuss first the allotment of the land, and the proper class and
- character of its cultivators; since we advocate not common ownership of land, as
- some have done,
-
-
- but community in it brought about in a friendly way
- by the use of it,This vague phrase
- (based on the proverb koina\ ta\ tw=n
- fi/lwn, ‘friends' goods are common
- property’) seems to denote some sort of customary
- communism in the cultivation of the land and enjoyment of the produce,
- combined with private ownership of the freehold. and we hold that no
- citizen should be ill supplied with means of subsistence. As to common meals,
- all agree that this is an institution advantageous for well-organized states to
- possess; our own reasons for sharing this view we will state later.This promise is not fulfilled. But the
- common meals must be shared by all the citizens, and it is not easy for the poor
- to contribute their assessed share from their private means and also to maintain
- their household as well. And
- moreover the expenses connected with religion are the common concern of the
- whole state. It is necessary therefore for the land to be divided into two
- parts, of which one must be common and the other the private property of
- individuals; and each of these two divisions must again be divided in two. Of
- the common land one portion should be assigned to the services of religion, and
- the other to defray the cost of the common meals; of the land in private
- ownership one part should be the district near the frontiers, and another the
- district near the city, in order that two plots may be assigned to each citizen
- and all may have a share in both districts. This arrangement satisfies equity and justice, and also
- conduces to greater unanimity in facing border warfare. Where this system is not
- followed, one set of people are reckless about quarrelling with the neighboring
- states,and the other set are too
- cautious and neglect considerations of honor. Hence some people have a law that
- the citizens whose land is near the frontier are not to take part in
- deliberation as to wars against neighboring states, on the ground that private
- interest would prevent them from being able to take counsel wisely. The land
- must therefore be divided up in this manner because of the reasons
- aforesaid.
- Those who are to cultivate the soil should best of all, if the
- ideal system is to be stated, be slaves, not drawn from people all of one tribe
- nor of a spirited character (for thus they would be both serviceable
- for their work and safe to abstain from insurrection), but as a second
- best they should be alien serfs of a similar nature. Of these laborers those in
- private employment must be among the private possessions of the owners of the
- estates, and those working on the common land common property. How slaves should
- be employed, and why it is advantageous that all slaves should have their
- freedom set before them as a reward, we will say later.This promise is not fulfilled.
-
- It
- has been said before that the city should so far as circumstances permit be in
- communication alike with the mainland, the sea and the whole of its territory.
- The site of the city itself we must pray that fortune may place on sloping
- ground, having regard to four considerationsApparently (1) fresh air, (2) water
- supply, (3) administration, (4) military
- requirements.: first, as a thing essential, the consideration of
- health (for cities whose site slopes east or towards the breezes that
- blow from the sunrise are more healthy, and in the second degree those that face
- away from the north wind,Literally,
- ‘in the direction in which the north wind blows.’
- for these are milder in winter);
-
-
-
- and among the remaining considerations, a sloping site is
- favorable both for political and for military purposes. For military purposes
- therefore the site should be easy of exit for the citizens themselves, and
- difficult for the adversary to approach and to blockade, and it must possess if
- possible a plentiful natural supply of pools and springs, but failing this, a
- mode has been invented of supplying water by means of constructing an abundance
- of large reservoirs for rain-water, so that a supply may never fail the citizens
- when they are debarred from their territory by war. And since we have to consider the health of the
- inhabitants, and this depends upon the place being well situated both on healthy
- ground and with a healthy aspect, and secondly upon using wholesome
- water-supplies, the following matter also must be attended to as of primary
- importance. Those things which we use for the body in the largest quantity, and
- most frequently, contribute most to health; and the influence of the
- water-supply and of the air is of this nature. Hence in wise cities if all the
- sources of water are not equally pure and there is not an abundance of suitable
- springs, the water-supplies for drinking must be kept separate from those for
- other requirements. As to fortified
- positions, what is expedient is not the same for all forms of constitution
- alike; for example, a citadel-hill is suitable for oligarchy and
- monarchy,and a level site for
- democracy; neither is favorable to an aristocracy, but rather several strong
- positions. The arrangement of the private dwellings is thought to be more
- agreeable and more convenient for general purposes if they are laid out in
- straight streets, after the modern fashion, that is, the one introduced by
- HippodamusSee Book 2.5.; but it
- is more suitable for security in war if it is on the contrary plan, as cities
- used to be in ancient times; for that arrangement is difficult for foreign
- troopsi.e. an enemy's mercenaries; but
- the MSS. give ‘difficult for foreign troops to make sorties from
- [i.e. presumably to find their way out when once they have got in,
- cf. Thuc. 2.4.2] and for attackers to
- find their way about in.’ to enter and to find their way
- about in when attacking. Hence it
- is well to combine the advantages of both plans (for this is possible
- if the houses are laid out in the way which among the farmers some people call
- ‘on the slant’The Roman
- quincunx, each plant of one row being in line with the gap
- between two plants of the next row, thus: in the case of
- vines), and not to lay out the whole city in straight streets, but only
- certain parts and districts, for in this way it will combine security with
- beauty.As regards walls, those who aver that
- cities which pretend to valor should not have them hold too old-fashioned a
- view—and that though they see that the cities that indulge in that
- form of vanity are refuted by experience. It is true that against an evenly matched foe and one
- little superior in numbers it is not honorable to try to secure oneself by the
- strength of one's fortifications; but as it does and may happen that the
- superior numbers of the attackers may be too much for the human valor of a small
- force, if the city is to survive and not to suffer disaster or insult, the
- securest fortification of walls must be deemed to be the most warlike,
-
-
-
- particularly in view of the inventions that have now been made
- in the direction of precision with missiles and artillery for sieges. To claim not to encompass cities with
- walls is like desiringPerhaps a word should
- be added to the Greek giving ‘desiring to make the country easy to
- invade, and to strip it—’. the country to be easy
- to invade and stripping it of hilly regions, and similarly not surrounding even
- private dwellings with house-walls on the ground that the inhabitants will be
- cowardly. Another point moreover that must not be forgotten is that those who
- have walls round the city can use their cities in both ways, both as walled
- cities and as open ones, whereas cities not possessing walls cannot be used in
- both ways. If then this is so, not
- only must walls be put round a city, but also attention must be paid to them in
- order that they may be suitable both in regard to the adornment of the city and
- in respect of military requirements, especially the new devices recently
- invented. For just as the attackers of a city are concerned to study the means
- by which they can gain the advantage, so also for the defenders some devices
- have already been invented and others they must discover and think out; for
- people do not even start attempting to attack those who are well
- prepared.And since the multitude of citizens
- must be distributedin separate
- messes, and the city walls must be divided up by guard-posts and towers in
- suitable places, it is clear that these facts themselves call for some of the
- messes to be organized at these guard-posts. These things then might be arranged
- in this manner. But it is fitting
- that the dwellings assigned to the gods and the most important of the official
- messes should have a suitable site, and the same for all, excepting those
- temples which are assigned a special place apart by the law or else by some
- utterance of the Pythian oracle. And the site would be suitable if it is one
- that is sufficiently conspicuous in regard to the excellence of its position,
- and also of superior strength in regard to the adjacent parts of the city.
- It is convenient that below
- this site should be laid out an agora of the kind customary in Thessaly which they call a free agora, that
- is, one which has to be kept clear of all merchandise and into which no artisan
- or farmer or any other such person may intrude unless summoned by the
- magistrates. It would give amenity to the site if the gymnasia of the older men
- were also situated here—for it is proper to have this institution also
- divided according to ages,Or ‘for
- in this noble practice different ages should be separated’
- (Jowett). and for certain magistrates to pass their
- time among the youths while the older men spend theirs with the magistrates; for
- the presence of the magistrates before men's eyes most engenders true respect
- and a freeman's awe.
-
-
- The agora for merchandise must be different from
- the free agora, and in another place; it must have a site convenient for the
- collection there of all the goods sent from the seaport and from the country.
- And as the divisions of the
- state's populace includePerhaps the Greek
- should be altered to to\ proesto/s,
- ‘as the governing class is divided into.’ priests
- and magistrates, it is suitable that the priests' mess-rooms also should have
- their position round that of the sacred buildings. And all the magistracies that
- superintend contracts, and the registration of actions at law, summonses and
- other such matters of administration, and also those that deal with the control
- of the markets and with what is termed policing the city, should have buildings
- adjacent to an agora or some public place of resort, and such a place is the
- neighborhood of the business agora, for we assign the upper agora as the place
- in which to spend leisure, and this one for necessary business.
- The
- arrangements in the country also should copy the plan described; there too the
- magistrates called in some states Wardens of the Woods and in others
- Land-superintendents must have their guard-posts and mess-rooms for patrol duty,
- and also temples must be distributed over the country, some dedicated to gods
- and some to heroes. But to linger at this point over the detailed statement and
- discussion of questions of this kind is waste of time.The difficulty with such things is not so much in
- the matter of theory but in that of practice; to lay down principles is a work
- of aspiration, but their realization is the task of fortune. Hence we will
- relinquish for the present the further consideration of matters of this
- sort.
- We must now discuss the constitution itself, and ask what and
- of what character should be the components of the state that is to have felicity
- and good government. There are two things in which the welfare of all men
- consists: one of these is the correct establishment of the aim and end of their
- actions, the other the ascertainment of the actions leading to that end.
- (For the end proposed and the means adopted may be inconsistent with
- one another, as also they may be consistent; sometimes the aim has been
- correctly proposed, but people fail to achieve it in action, sometimes they
- achieve all the means successfully but the end that they posited was a bad one,
- and sometimes they err as to both—for instance, in medicine
- practitioners are sometimes both wrong in their judgement of what qualities a
- healthy body ought to possess and unsuccessful in hitting on effective means to
- produce the distinctive aim that they have set before them; whereas in the arts
- and sciences both these things have to be secured, the end and the practical
- means to the end.) Now it
- is clear that all men aim at the good life and at happiness, but though some
- possess the power to attain these things, some do not, owing to some factor of
- fortune or of nature (fortune because the good life needs also a
- certain equipment of means,
-
-
- and although it needs less of this for men of
- better natural disposition it needs more for those of worse); while
- others, although they have the power, go wrong at the start in their search for
- happiness.i.e. they misconceive the
- nature of happiness and select the wrong thing to aim at. But the
- object before us is to discern the best constitution, and this is the one under
- which a state will be best governed, and a state will be best governed under the
- constitution under which it has the most opportunity for happiness; it is
- therefore clear that we must know what happiness is. The view that we maintain (and this is the
- definition that we laid down in the
Ethics,
- Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1098a
- 16 and Aristot. Nic. Eth.
- 1176b 4
- if those discourses are of any value) is
- that happiness is the complete activity and employment of virtue, and this not
- conditionally but absolutely. When I say ‘conditionally’ I
- refer to things necessary, by ‘absolutely’ I mean
- ‘nobly’: for instance, to take the case of just actions,
- just acts of vengeance and of punishment spring it is true from virtue, but are
- necessary, and have the quality of nobility only in a limited manner
- (since it would be preferable that neither individual nor state should
- have any need of such things), whereas actions aiming at honors and
- resources
A conjectural emendation gives
- ‘distinctions.’ are the noblest actions
- absolutely; for the former class of acts consist in the removal
This is a conjectural emendation; the MSS.
- give ‘the adoption.’ of something evil, but
- actions of the latter kind are the opposite—they are the foundation
- and the generation of things good.
The virtuous man will use even poverty, disease, and
the other forms of bad fortune in a noble manner,
- but felicity consists in their opposites (for it is a definition
- established by our ethical discourses
- Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1113a 15 ff.
- that the virtuous man is the man of such a character that because of his
- virtue things absolutely good are good to him, and it is therefore clear that
- his employment of these goods must also be virtuous and noble
- absolutely); and hence men actually suppose that external goods are the
- cause of happiness, just as if they were to assign the cause of a brilliantly
- fine performance on the harp to the instrument rather than to the skill of the
- player. It follows therefore from what has been said that some goods must be
- forthcoming to start with and others must be provided by the legislator.
-
Hence we pray that the
- organization of the state may be successful in securing those goods which are in
- the control of fortune (for that fortune does control external goods we
- take as axiomatic); but when we come to the state's being virtuous, to
- secure this is not the function of fortune but of science and policy. But then
- the virtue of the state is of course caused by the citizens who share in its
- government being virtuous; and in our state all the citizens share in the
- government. The point we have to consider therefore is, how does a man become
- virtuous? For even if it be possible for the citizens to be virtuous
- collectively without being so individually, the latter is preferable, since for
- each individual to be virtuous entails as a consequence the collective virtue of
- all.
But there are admittedly three
- things by which men are made good and virtuous, and these three things are
- nature, habit and reason. For to start with, one must be born with the nature of
- a human being and not of some other animal; and secondly, one must be born of a
- certain quality of body and of soul. But there are some qualities that it is of
- no use to be born with,
-
-
- for our habits make us alter them: some qualities
- in fact are made by nature liable to be modified by the habits in either
- direction, for the worse or for the better. Now the other animals live chiefly by nature, though some
- in small degrees are guided by habits too; but man lives by reason also, for he
- alone of animals possesses reason; so that in him these three things must be in
- harmony with one another; for men often act contrary to their acquired habits
- and to their nature because of their reason, if they are convinced that some
- other course of action is preferable.Now we have
- alreadyIn 4. defined the proper
- natural character of those who are to be amenable to the hand of the legislator;
- what now remains is the task of education, for men learn some things by
- practice, others by precept.
- But since every political community is
- composed of rulers and subjects, we must therefore consider whether the rulers
- and the subjects ought to change, or to remain the same through life; for it is
- clear that their education also will have to be made to correspond with this
- distribution of functions. If then it were the case that the one class differed
- from the other as widely as we believe the gods and heroes to differ from
- mankind, having first a great superiority in regard to the body and then in
- regard tothe soul, so that the
- pre-eminence of the rulers was indisputable and manifest to the subjects, it is
- clear that it would be better for the same persons always to be rulers and
- subjects once for all; but as this
- is not easy to secure, and as we do not find anything corresponding to the great
- difference that Scylax states to exist between kings and subjects in India, it is clear that for many reasons it is
- necessary for all to share alike in ruling and being ruled in turn. For equality
- means for persons who are alike identity of status, and also it is
- difficultThe emendation suggested by
- Richards gives ‘For equality and identity (of
- status) are just for persons who are alike, and it is
- difficult,’ etc. for a constitution to endure that is
- framed in contravention of justice. For all the people throughout the country
- are ranged on the side of the subject class in wishing for a revolution, and it
- is a thing inconceivable that those in the government should be sufficiently
- numerous to over power all of these together. But yet on the other hand that the rulers ought to be
- superior to the subjects cannot be disputed; therefore the lawgiver must
- consider how this is to be secured, and how they are to participate in the
- government. And this has been already8.3,
- 1329a 4 ff. discussed. Nature has given the distinction by making the
- group that is itself the same in race partly younger and partly older, of which
- two sets it is appropriate to the one to be governed and for the other to
- govern; and no one chafes or thinks himself better than his rulers when he is
- governed on the ground of age, especially as he is going to get back what he has
- thus contributed to the common stock when he reaches the proper age. In a sense therefore we must say that the
- rulers and ruled are the same, and in a sense different.
-
-
- Hence their
- education also is bound to be in one way the same and in another different. For
- he who is to be a good ruler must have first been ruled, as the saying isThe sentence here breaks off into a long
- parenthesis, after which it is not resumed. (and government,
- as has been said in the first discourses,Book 3.6.6-12, 1278b 30 ff. is of two sorts, one carried on for the
- sake of the ruler and the other for the sake of the subject; of these the former
- is what we call the rule of a master,the latter is the government of free men .
- . .One sentence or more has been lost
- here.
- But some of the commands given
- differ not in nature of the services commanded but in their object. Hence a
- number of what are thought to be menial services can be honorably performed even
- by freemen in youth; since in regard to honor and dishonor actions do not differ
- so much in themselves as in their end and object). But since we say
- that the goodness of a citizenPerhaps the
- Greek should be altered to give ‘of the best
- citizen.’ and ruler are the same as that of the best man,
- and that the same person ought to become a subject first and a ruler afterwards,
- it will be important for the legislator to study how and by what courses of
- training good men are to be produced, and what is the end of the best
- life.
- The soul is divided into two parts, of which one is in itself
- possessed of reason, while the other is not rational in itself but capable of
- obeying reason. To these parts in our view belong those virtues in accordance
- with which a man is pronounced to be good in some way. But in which of
- thesetwo parts the end of man
- rather resides, those who define the parts of the soul in accordance with our
- view will have no doubt as to how they should decide. The worse always exists as
- a means to the better, and this is manifest alike in the products of art and in
- those of nature; but the rational part of the soul is better than the
- irrational. And the rational part
- is subdivided into two, according to our usual scheme of division; for reason is
- of two kinds, practical and theoretic, so that obviously the rational part of
- the soul must also be subdivided accordingly. A corresponding classification we
- shall also pronounce to hold among its activities: the activities of the part of
- the soul that is by nature superior must be preferable for those persons who are
- capable of attaining either all the soul's activities or twoi.e. the two lower ones, the three being the activities of
- the theoretic reason, of the practical reason, and of the passions that
- although irrational are amenable to reason. out of the three; since
- that thing is always most desirable for each person which is the highest to
- which it is possible for him to attain. Also life as a whole is divided into business and leisure,
- and war and peace, and our actions are aimed some of them at things necessary
- and useful, others at things noble. In these matters the same principle of
- preference that applies to the parts of the soul must apply also to the
- activities of those parts: war must be for the sake of peace, business for the
- sake of leisure, things necessary and useful for the purpose of things noble.
- The statesman therefore must
- legislate with all these considerations in view, both in respect of the parts of
- the soul and of their activities, and aiming more particularly at the greater
- goods and the ends. And the same principle applies in regard to modes of life
- and choices of conduct: a man should be capable of engaging in business and war,
-
-
-
- but still more capable of living in peace and leisure; and he
- should do what is necessary and useful, but still more should he do what is
- noble. These then are the aims that ought to be kept in view in the education of
- the citizens both while still children and at the later ages that require
- education. But the Greek peoples
- reputed at the present day to have the best constitutions, and the lawgivers
- that established them, manifestly did not frame their constitutional systems
- with reference to the best end, nor construct their laws and their scheme of
- education with a view to all the virtues, but they swerved aside in a vulgar
- manner towards those excellences that are supposed to be useful and more
- conducive to gain. And following the same lines as they, some later writers also
- have pronounced the same opinion: in praising the Spartan constitution they
- express admiration for the aim of its founder on the ground that he framed the
- whole of his legislation with a view to conquest and to war. These views are easy to refute on
- theoretical grounds and also have now been refuted by the facts of history. For
- just as most of mankind covet being master of many servantsOr possibly, ‘covet a wide
- empire.’ because this produces a manifold supply of
- fortune's goods, so ThibronUnknown.
- and all the other writers about the Spartan constitutionshow admiration for the lawgiver of the Spartans
- because owing to their having been trained to meet dangers they governed a wide
- empire. Yet it clearly follows
- that since as a matter of fact at the present day the Spartans no longer possess
- an empire, they are not happy, and their lawgiver was not a good one. And it is
- ridiculous that although they have kept to his laws, and although nothing
- hinders their observing the laws, they have lost the noble life. Also writers
- have a wrong conception of the power for which the lawgiver should display
- esteem; to govern freemen is nobler and more conjoined with virtue than to rule
- despotically. And again it is not
- a proper ground for deeming a state happy and for praising its lawgiver, that it
- has practised conquest with a view to rulingA probable emendation gives ‘that he has trained it with a view
- to ruling.’ over its neighbors. This principle is most
- disastrous; it follows from it that an individual citizen who has the capacity
- ought to endeavor to attain the power to hold sway over his own city; but this
- is just what the Spartans charge as a reproach against their king Pausanias,
- although he attained such high honor. No principle therefore and no law of this
- nature is either statesmanlike or profitable, nor is it true; the same ideals
- are the best both for individuals and for communities, and the lawgiver should
- endeavor to implant them in the souls of mankind. The proper object of practising military training is not
- in order that men may enslave those who do not deserve slavery, but in order
- that first they may themselves avoid becoming enslaved to others; then so that
- they may seek suzerainty for the benefit of the subject people,
-
-
- but not
- for the sake of world-wide despotism; and thirdly to hold despotic power over
- those who deserve to be slaves. Experience supports the testimony of theory, that it is the duty of the
- lawgiver rather to study how he may frame his legislation both with regard to
- warfare and in other departments for the object of leisure and of peace. Most
- military states remain safe while at war but perish when they have won their
- empire; in peace-time they lose their keen temper, like iron.i.e. an iron blade when not used loses
- keenness and has to be re-tempered. The lawgiver is to blame, because
- he did not educate them to be able to employ leisure.
- And since it appears that
- men have the same end collectively and individually, and since the same
- distinctive aim must necessarily belong both to the best man and to the best
- government, it is clear that the virtues relating to leisure are essentiali.e. to the state as well as to the
- individual.; since, as has been said repeatedly, peace is the end of
- war, leisure of business. But the
- virtues useful for leisure and for its employment are not only those that
- operate during leisure but also those that operate in business; for many of the
- necessaries must needs be forthcoming to give us opportunity for leisure.
- Therefore it is proper for the state to be temperate,brave and enduring; since, as the proverb goes,
- there is no leisure for slaves, but people unable to face danger bravely are the
- slaves of their assailants. Therefore courage and fortitude are needed for business, love of wisdom for
- leisure, temperance and justice for both seasons, and more especially when men
- are at peace and have leisure; for war compels men to be just and temperate,
- whereas the enjoyment of prosperity and peaceful leisure tend to make them
- insolent. Therefore much justice
- and much temperance are needed by those who are deemed very prosperous and who
- enjoy all the things counted as blessings, like the persons, if such there be,
- as the poets say,
- Hes. WD 170 ff.
- that dwell in the Islands of the Blest; these will most need wisdom,
- temperance and justice, the more they are at leisure and have an abundance of
- such blessings. It is clear therefore why a state that is to be happy and
- righteous must share in these virtues; for if it is disgraceful to be unable to
- use our good things, it is still more disgraceful to be unable to use them in
- time of leisure, and although showing ourselves good men when engaged in
- business and war, in times of peace and leisure to seem no better than slaves.
- Therefore we must not
- cultivate virtue after the manner of the state of Sparta. The superiority of the Spartans
- over other races does not lie
-
-
- in their holding a different opinion from
- others as to what things are the greatest goods, but rather in their believing
- that these are obtained by means of one particular virtue; yet because they both
- deem these things and their enjoyment to be greater goods than the enjoyment of
- the virtues . . .The end of this sentence
- and the beginning of the next appear to have been lost.
- . . . and that it is to be practised for its own
- sake is manifest from these considerations; but it must now be considered how and by what means this
- will come about. Now we have indeed previously decided that it requires nature
- and habit and reason, and among these, what particular quality of nature men
- ought to possess has been defined previously; but it remains to consider whether
- men ought to be educated first by means of the reason or by the habits. For
- between reason and habit the most perfect harmony ought to exist, as it is
- possible both for the reason to have missed the highest principle and for men to
- have been as wrongly trained through the habits. This therefore at all events is clear in the first place,
- in the case of men as of other creatures, that their engendering starts from a
- beginning, and that the end starts from a certain beginning that is another
- end,A conjectural addition to the text
- gives ‘the end to which a certain beginning leads is itself the
- beginning of another end.’ The active use of the reason is the end
- (i.e. the completion and the purpose) of the birth and
- growth of the human animal. and that reason and intelligence are for
- us the end of our natural development, so that it is with a view to these ends
- that our engendering and the training of our habits must be regulated.
- And secondly, as soul and body
- are two, so we observe that the soul also has two parts, the irrational part and
- the part possessing reason, and that the states which they experience are two in
- number,the one being desire and
- the other intelligence; and as the body is prior in its development to the soul,
- so the irrational part of the soul is prior to the rational. And this also is
- obvious, because passion and will, and also appetite,These three emotions are subdivisions of
- ‘desire’ above. exist in children even as soon as
- they are born, but it is the nature of reasoning and intelligence to arise in
- them as they grow older. Therefore in the first place it is necessary for the
- training of the body to precede that of the mind, and secondly for the training
- of the appetite to precede that of the intelligence; but the training of the
- appetite must be for the sake of the intellect, and that of the body for the
- sake of the soul.
- Inasmuch therefore as it is the duty of the lawgiver to
- consider from the start how the children reared are to obtain the best bodily
- frames, he must first pay attention to the union of the sexes, and settle when
- and in what condition a couple should practise matrimonial intercourse. In
- legislating for this partnership he must pay regard partly to the persons
- themselves and to their span of life, so that they may arrive together at the
- same period in their ages, and their powers may not be at discord through the
- man being still capable of parentage and the wife incapable, or the wife capable
- and the man not (for this causes differences and actual discord between
- them), and also he must
- consider as well the succession of the children, for the children must neither
- be too far removed in their ages from the fathers (since elderly
- fathers get no good from their children's return of their favors, nor do the
- children from the help they get from the fathers),
-
-
- nor must they be
- too near them (for this involves much unpleasantness, since in such
- families there is less respect felt between them, as between companions of the
- same age, and also the nearness of age leads to friction in household
- affairs); and in addition, to return to the point from which we began
- this digression, measures must be taken to ensure that the children produced may
- have bodily frames suited to the wish of the lawgiver. These results then are almost all attained by one
- mode of regulation. For since the period of parentage terminates, speaking
- generally, with men at the age of seventy at the outside, and with women at
- fifty, the commencement of their union should correspond in respect of age with
- these times. But the mating of the
- young is bad for child-bearing; for in all animal species the offspring of the
- young are more imperfect and likely to produce female children,Some editors write qhlu/toka and interpret ‘more likely to be born
- females.’ ( qhluto/ka,
- ‘likely to bear females,’ is applied to the young
- parents themselves in Aristot. Hist. An. 766b
- 29.) and small in figure, so that the same thing
- must necessarily occur in the human race also. And a proof of this is that in
- all the states where it is the local custom to mate young men and young women,
- the people are deformed and small of body. And again young women labor more, and
- more of them die in childbirth; indeed according to some accounts such was the
- reason why the oracle
- *mh\ te/mne ne/an a)/loka(‘cut not a new
- furrow’) schol. was givento the people of Troezen, because many were dying owing to its being their
- custom for the women to marry young, and it did not refer to the harvest.
- And again it also contributes
- to chastity for the bestowal of women in marriage to be made when they are
- older, for it is thought that they are more licentious when they have had
- intercourse in youth. Also the males are thought to be arrested in bodily growth
- if they have intercourse while the seed is still growing, for this also has a
- fixed period after passing which it is no longer plentiful. Therefore it is fitting for the women to be married
- at about the age of eighteen and the men at thirty-seven or a little beforeThe word ‘before’ is a
- conjectural insertion.—for that will give long enough for
- the union to take place with their bodily vigor at its prime, and for it to
- arrive with a convenient coincidence of dates at the time when procreation
- ceases. Moreover the succession of the children to the estates, if their birth
- duly occurs soon after the parents marry, will take place when they are
- beginning their prime, and when the parents' period of vigor has now come to a
- close, towards the age of seventy. The proper age therefore for union has been discussed; as to the proper times
- in respect of the season we may accept what is customary with most people, who
- have rightly decided even as it is to practise marital cohabitation in winter.
- And people should also study for themselves, when their time comes, the
- teachings of physicians and natural philosophers on the subject of the
- procreation of children; the suitable bodily seasons are adequately discussed by
- the physicians,
-
-
- and the question of weather by the natural
- philosophers, who say that north winds are more favorable than south. The particular kind of bodily constitution
- in the parents that will be most beneficial for the offspring must be dwelt on
- more in detail in our discussion of the management of childrenThis was never written, or has been
- lost.; it is sufficient to speak of it in outline now. The athlete's
- habit of body is not serviceable for bodily fitness as required by a citizen,
- nor for health and parentage, nor yet is a habit that is too valetudinarian and
- unfit for labor, but the condition that lies between them. The bodily habit
- therefore should have been trained by exercise, but not by exercises that are
- violent, and not for one form of labor only, as is the athlete's habit of body,
- but for the pursuits of free men. And these arrangements must be provided alike
- for men and women. And pregnant
- women also must take care of their bodies, not avoiding exercise nor adopting a
- low diet; this it is easy for the lawgiver to secure by ordering them to make a
- journey daily for the due worship of the deities whose office is the control of
- childbirth. As regards the mind, however, on the contrary it suits them to pass
- the time more indolently than as regards their bodies; for children before birth
- are evidently affected by the mother just as growing plants are by the
- earth.As to exposing
- orrearing the children born, let
- there be a law that no deformed child shall be reared; but on the ground of
- number of children, if the regular customs hinder any of those born being
- exposed, there must be a limit fixed to the procreation of offspring, and if any
- people have a child as a result of intercourse in contravention of these
- regulations, abortion must be practised on it before it has developed sensation
- and life; for the line between lawful and unlawful abortion will be marked by
- the fact of having sensation and being alive. And since the beginning of the fit age for a man and for a
- woman, at which they are to begin their union, has been defined, let it also be
- decided for how long a time it is suitable for them to serve the state in the
- matter of producing children. For the offspring of too elderly parents, as those
- of too young ones, are born imperfect both in body and mind, and the children of
- those that have arrived at old age are weaklings. Therefore the period must be
- limited to correspond with the mental prime; and this in the case of most men is
- the age stated by some of the poets, who measure men's age by periods of seven
- years,
- Solon fr. 27
- —it is about the age of fifty. Therefore persons exceeding this age by four or five years
- must be discharged from the duty of producing children for the community, and
- for the rest of their lives if they have intercourse it must be manifestly for
- the sake of health or for some other similar reason. As to intercourse with
- another woman or man, in general it must be dishonorable for them to be known to
- take any part in it in any circumstances whatsoever as long as they are husband
- and wife and bear those names, but any who may be discovered doing anything of
- the sort during their period of parentage
-
-
- must be punished with a loss of
- privilege suited to the offence.
- When the children have been born, the
- particular mode of rearing adopted must be deemed an important determining
- influence in regard to their power of body. It appears from examining the other
- animals, and is also shown by the foreign races that make it their aim to keep
- up the military habit of body, that a diet giving an abundance of milk is most
- suited to the bodies of children, and one that allows rather little wine because
- of the diseases that it causes. Moreover it is advantageous to subject them to as many movements as are
- practicable with children of that age. To prevent the limbs from being distorted
- owing to softness, some races even now employ certain mechanical appliances that
- keep the bodies of infants from being twisted. And it is also advantageous to
- accustom them at once from early childhood to cold, for this is most useful both
- for health and with a view to military service. Hence among many non-Greek races
- it is customary in the case of some peoples to wash the children at birth by
- dipping them in a cold river, and with others, for instance the Celts, to give
- them scanty covering. For it is
- better to inure them at the very start to everything possible, but to inure them
- gradually;and the bodily habit of
- children is naturally well fitted by warmth to be trained to bear cold. In the
- earliest period of life then it is expedient to employ this or a similar method
- of nursing; and the next period to
- this, up to the age of five, which it is not well to direct as yet to any study
- nor to compulsory labors, in order that they may not hinder the growth, should
- nevertheless be allowed enough movement to avoid bodily inactivity; and this
- exercise should be obtained by means of various pursuits, particularly play. But
- even the games must not be unfit for freemen, nor laborious, nor undisciplined.
- Also the question of the kind
- of tales and stories that should be told to children of this age must be
- attended to by the officials called Children's Tutors. For all such amusements
- should prepare the way for their later pursuits; hence most children's games
- should be imitations of the serious occupations of later life. The legislators in
- the
Laws
-
- Plat. Laws 792a. Plato merely says that a
- child's crying shows it to be annoyed, and that it ought to have as little
- pain as possible or else it will grow up morose. forbid allowing
- children to have paroxysms of crying, but this prohibition is a mistake; violent
- crying contributes to growth, for it serves in a way as exercise for the body,
- since holding the breath is the strength giving factor in hard labor, and this
- takes place also with children when they stretch themselves in crying. The
- Tutors must supervise the children's pastimes, and in particular must see that
- they associate as little as possible with slaves. For children of this age,
-
-
-
- and up to seven years old, must necessarily be reared at home;
- so it is reasonable to suppose
- that even at this age they may acquire a taint of illiberality from what they
- hear and see. The lawgiver ought therefore to banish indecent talk, as much as
- anything else, out of the state altogether (for light talk about
- anything disgraceful soon passes into action)—so most of all
- from among the young, so that they may not say nor hear anything of the sort;
- and anybody found saying or doing any of the things prohibited, if he is of free
- station but not yet promoted to reclining at the public meals, must be punished
- with marks of dishonor and with beating, and an older offender must be punished
- with marks of dishonor degrading to a free man, because of his slavish behavior.
- And since we banish any talk of
- this kind, clearly we must also banish the seeing of either pictures or
- representations that are indecent. The officials must therefore be careful that
- there may be no sculpture or painting that represents indecent actions, except
- in the temples of a certain class of gods to whom the law allows even
- scurrility; but in regard to theseThe MS.
- text gives ‘and in addition to these’; and the word
- ‘still’ may be an interpolation. the law permits
- men still of suitable age to worship the gods both on their own behalf and on
- behalf of the children and women.
- But the younger ones must not
- be allowed in the audience at lampoonsIambic
- verses, often abusive and indecent, recited at festivals of Dionysus.
- and at comedy, before they reach the age at which they will now have the right
- to recline at table in company and to drink deeply, and at which their education
- will render all of them immune to the harmful effects of such things. For the
- present therefore we have merely mentioned these matters in passing, but later
- we must stop to settle them more definitely, first discussing fully whether
- legislation prohibiting the attendance of the young is desirable or not, and how
- such prohibition should be put in force; but on the present occasion we have
- touched on the question only in the manner necessary. For perhaps the tragic actor TheodorusA great Athenian performer of Sophocles; he
- took the part of Antigone. used to put the matter not badly: he had
- never once allowed anybody to produce his partLoosely put for ‘to appear on the
- stage.’ before him, not even one of the poor actors, as he
- said that audiences are attracted by what they hear first; and this happens
- alike in regard to our dealings with people and to our dealings with
- things—all that comes first we like better. On this account we ought
- to make all base things unfamiliar to the young, and especially those that
- involve either depravity or malignity.But when
- the five years from two to seven have passed, the children must now become
- spectators at the lessonsi.e. in gymnastics
- and music. which they will themselves have to learn. And there are two ages corresponding to
- which education should be divided—there must be a break after the
- period from seven to puberty, and again after that from puberty to twenty-one.
- For those who divide the ages by periods of seven years are generally speaking
- not wrong,The MSS. give ‘not
- right.’
-
-
-
-
-
-
- Book 5 in some editions.Now
- nobody would dispute that the education of the young requires the special
- attention of the lawgiver. Indeed the neglect of this in states is injurious to
- their constitutions; for education ought to be adapted to the particular form of
- constitution, since the particular character belonging to each constitution both
- guards the constitution generally and originally establishes it—for
- instance the democratic spirit promotes democracy and the oligarchic spirit
- oligarchy; and the best spirit always causes a better constitution. Moreover in regard to all the faculties and
- crafts certain forms of preliminary educationand training in their various operations are necessarys o that
- manifestly this is also requisite in regard to the actions of virtue. And
- inasmuch as the end for the whole state is one, it is manifest that education
- also must necessarily be one and the same for all and that the superintendence
- of this must be public, and not on private lines, in the way in which at present
- each man superintends the education of his own children, teaching them
- privately, and whatever special branch of knowledge he thinks fit. But matters
- of public interest ought to be under public supervision; at the same time we
- ought not to think that any of the citizens belongs to himself, but that all
- belong to the state, for each is a part of the state, and it is natural for the
- superintendence of the several parts to have regard to the superintendence of
- the whole. And one might praise the
- Spartans in respect of this, for they pay the greatest attention to the training
- of their children, and conduct it on a public system.It is clear then that there should be legislation about
- education and that it should be conducted on a public system. But consideration
- must be given to the question, what constitutes education and what is the proper
- way to be educated. At present there are differences of opinion as to the proper
- tasks to be set; for all peoples do not agree as to the things that the young
- ought to learn, either with a view to virtue or with a view to the best life,
- nor is it clear whether their studies should be regulated more with regard to
- intellect or with regard to character. And confusing questions arise out of the education that
- actually prevails, and it is not at all clear whether the pupils should practise
- pursuits that are practically morally edifying, or higher
- accomplishments—for all these views have won the support of some
- judges;
-
-
- and nothing is agreed as regards the exercise conducive to
- virtue, for, to start with, all men do not honor the same virtue, so that they
- naturally hold different opinions in regard to training in virtue.
- It is
- therefore not difficult to see that the young must be taught those useful arts
- that are indispensably necessary; but it is clear that they should not be taught
- all the useful arts, those pursuits that are liberal being kept distinct from
- those that are illiberal, and that they must participate in such among the
- useful arts as will not render the person who participates in them vulgar. A
- task and also an art or a science must be deemed vulgar if it renders the body
- or soul or mind of free men useless for the employments and actions of virtue.
- Hence we entitle vulgar all such arts as deteriorate the condition of the body,
- and also the industries that earn wages; for they make the mind preoccupied and
- degraded. And even with the liberal
- sciences, although it is not illiberal to take part in some of them up to a
- point, to devote oneself to them too assiduously and carefully is liable to have
- the injurious results specified. Also it makes much difference what object one
- has in view in a pursuit or study; if one follows it for the sake of oneself or
- one's friends, or on moral grounds, it is not illiberal,but the man who follows the same pursuit because of
- other people would often appear to be acting in a menial and servile
- manner.The branches of study at present
- established fall into both classes, as was said before.1.4.
- There are perhaps four customary
- subjects of education, reading and writing, gymnastics, music, and fourth, with
- some people, drawing; reading and writing and drawing being taught as being
- useful for the purposes of life and very serviceable, and gymnastics as
- contributing to manly courage; but as to music, here one might raise a question.
- For at present most people take part in it for the sake of pleasure; but those,
- who originally included it in education did so because, as has often been said,
- nature itself seeks to be able not only to engage rightly in business but also
- to occupy leisure nobly; for—to speak about it yet againCf. Book 7, 1334a 2-10.—this
- is the first principle of all things. For if although both business and leisure are necessary, yet leisure is more
- desirable and more fully an end than business, we must inquire what is the
- proper occupation of leisure. For assuredly it should not be employed in play,
- since it would follow that play is our end in life. But if this is impossible,
- and sports should rather be employed in our times of business (for a
- man who is at work needs rest, and rest is the object of play, while business is
- accompanied by toil and exertion), it follows that in introducing
- sports we must watch the right opportunity for their employment, since we are
- applying them to serve as medicine; for the activity of play is a relaxation of
- the soul, and serves as recreation because of its pleasantness.
-
-
-
- But leisure seems itself to
- contain pleasure and happiness and felicity of life. And this is not possessed
- by the busy but by the leisured; for the busy man busies himself for the sake of
- some end as not being in his possession, but happiness is an end achieved, which
- all men think is accompanied by pleasure and not by pain. But all men do not go
- on to define this pleasure in the same way, but according to their various
- natures and to their own characters, and the pleasure with which the best man
- thinks that happiness is conjoined is the best pleasure and the one arising from
- the noblest sources. So that it is clear that some subjects must be learnt and
- acquired merely with a view to the pleasure in their pursuit, and that these
- studies and these branches of learning are ends in themselves, while the forms
- of learning related to business are studied as necessary and as means to other
- things. Hence our predecessors
- included music in education not as a necessity (for there is nothing
- necessary about it), nor as useful (in the way in which
- reading and writing are useful for business and for household management and for
- acquiring learning and for many pursuits of civil life, while drawing also seems
- to be useful in making us better judges of the works of artists), nor
- yet again as we pursue gymnastics,for
- the sake of health and strength (for we do not see either of these
- things produced as a result of music); it remains therefore that it is
- useful as a pastime in leisure, which is evidently the purpose for which people
- actually introduce it, for they rank it as a form of pastime that they think
- proper for free men. For this reason Homer wrote thus:
- But him alone
- 'Tis meet to summon to the festal banquetThis line is not in our Odyssey, but
- apparently followed Hom. Od.17.383.
- The passage runs (382 ff.):
-
- ti/s ga\r dh\ cei=non kalei= a)/lloqen
- au)to\s e)pelqw\n
-
-
- a)/llon g', ei) mh\ tw=n oi(\
- dhmioergoi\ e)/asi,
-
-
- ma/ntin h)\ i)hth=ra kakw=n h)\
- te/ktona dou/rwn,
-
-
- h)\ kai\ qe/spin a)oido/n, o(/ ken
- te/rph|sin a)ei/dwn;
-
-
- ;
-
and after these words he speaks of certain others
- Who call the bard that he may gladden all.The fourth line quoted corresponds to
- this, but not exactly.
-
-
And also in other verses Odysseus says that this is the best pastime,
- when, as men are enjoying good cheer,
- The banqueters, seated in order due
- Throughout the hall, may hear a minstrel sing.
- Hom. Od.
- 9.5-6.
-
-
-
- It is
- clear therefore that there is a form of education in which boys should be
- trained not because it is useful or necessary but as being liberal and noble;
- though whether there is one such subject of education or several, and what these
- are and how they are to be pursued, must be discussed later,This promise is not fulfilled. but as it is we have
- made this much progress on the way, that we have some testimony even from the
- ancients, derived from the courses of education which they founded—for
- the point is proved by music. And it is also clear that some of the useful
- subjects as well ought to be studied by the young not only because of their
- utility, like the study of reading and writing, but also because they may lead
- on to many other branches of knowledge; and similarly they should study drawing not in order that
- they may not go wrong in their private purchases and may avoid being cheated in
- buying and selling furniture,
-
-
- but rather because this study makes a man
- observant of bodily beauty; and to seek for utility everywhere is entirely
- unsuited to men that are great-souled and free. And since it is plain that
- education by habit must come before education by reason, and training of the
- body before training of the mind, it is clear from these considerations that the
- boys must be handed over to the care of the wrestling-master and the trainer;
- for the latter imparts a certain quality to the habit of the body and the former
- to its actions.
- Now at the present time some of the states reputed to pay the
- greatest attention to children produce in them an athletic habiti.e. premature and disproportionate muscular
- development, directed to some particular competition. Cf. 1288b 12
- ff. to the detriment of their bodily form and growth, while the
- Spartans although they have avoided this error yet make their boys animal in
- nature by their laborious exercises, in the belief that this is most
- contributory to manly courage. Yet, as has often been said, it is not right to
- regulate education with a view to one virtue only, or to this one most of all;
- indeed they do not even investigate the question whether this virtue is to be
- had in view at all. For neither in the lower animals nor in the case of foreign
- races do we see that courage goes with the wildest, but rather with the gentler
- and lion-like temperaments.
- Aristot. Hist. An. 629b 8 (the
- lion is gentle except when hungry); Plat. Soph. 231a (the dog the gentlest of
- animals).
- And there are manyforeign races inclined to murder and cannibalism,
- for example among the tribes of the Black
- Sea the Achaeans and Heniochi, and others of the mainland races,
- some in the same degree as those named and some more, which although piratical
- have got no share of manly courage. And again we know that even the Spartans,
- although so long as they persisted by themselves in their laborious exercises
- they surpassed all other peoples, now fall behind others both in gymnastic and
- in military contests; for they used not to excel because they exercised their
- young men in this fashion but only because they trained and their adversaries
- did not. Consequently honor and not
- animal ferocity should play the first part; for it is not a wolf nor one of the
- other wild animals that will venture upon any noble hazard, but rather a good
- man. But those who let boys pursue these hard exercises too much and turn them
- out untrained in necessary things in real truth render them vulgar, making them
- available for statesmanship to use for one task only, and even for this task
- training them worse than others do, as our argument proves. AndThis sentence would come better at the end of
- 3.4. we must not judge them from their former achievements but from
- the facts of today; for they have rivals in their education now, but they used
- to have none before.
- It is therefore agreed that we should employ gymnastic
- training, and how we should employ it. For until puberty we should apply lighter
- exercises, forbidding hard diet and severe exertions, in order that nothing may
- hinder the growth;
-
-
- for there is no small proof that too severe
- training can produce this result in the fact that in the list of Olympic victors
- one would only find two or three persons who have won both as men and as boys,
- because when people go into training in youth the severe exercises rob them of
- their strength. But when they have
- spent three years after puberty upon their other studies, then it is suitable to
- occupy the next period of life with laborious exercises and strict training
- dieti.e. compulsion to eat very large
- rations of prescribed food—the Greek way of training.; for
- it is wrong to work hard with the mind and the body at the same time; for it is
- the nature of the two different sorts of exertion to produce opposite effects,
- bodily toil impeding the development of the mind and mental toil that of the
- body.
- About music on the other hand we have previously raised some
- questions in the course of our argument, but it is well to take them up again
- and carry them further now, in order that this may give the key so to speak for
- the principles which one might advance in pronouncing about it. For it is not
- easy to say precisely what potency it possesses, nor yet for the sake of what
- object one should participate in it—whether for amusement and
- relaxation, as one indulges in sleep and deep drinking (for these in
- themselves are not serious pursuits but merely pleasant, and ‘relax
- our care,’ as Euripides says
- Eur. Ba. 378 (Bromios)
- o(\s ta/d' e)/xei, qiaseu/ein te xo/rois meta/ t'
- au)lw=n gela=sai a)napau=sai/ te meri/mnas
- ; owing to
- which people actually class music with them andemploy all of these things, sleep, deep drinking and music, in
- the same way, and they also place dancing in the same class);
- or whether we ought rather to
- think that music tends in some degree to virtue (music being capable of
- producing a certain quality of character just as gymnastics are capable of
- producing a certain quality of body, music accustoming men to be able to rejoice
- rightly); or that it contributes something to intellectual
- entertainmentThe term diagwgh/, ‘pastime,’ is
- idiomatically used of the pursuits of cultured leisure—serious
- conversation, music, the drama. and culture (for this must
- be set down as a third alternative among those mentioned). Now it is
- not difficult to see that one must not make amusement the object of the
- education of the young; for amusement does not go with
- learning—learning is a painful process. Nor yet moreover is it
- suitable to assign intellectual entertainment to boys and to the young; for a
- thing that is an end does not belong to anything that is imperfect. But perhaps it might be thought that the
- serious pursuits of boys are for the sake of amusement when they have grown up
- to be men. But, if something of this sort is the case, why should the young need
- to learn this accomplishment themselves, and not, like the Persian and Median
- kings, participate in the pleasure and the education of music by means of others
- performing it? for those who have made music a business and profession must
- necessarily perform better than those who practise only long enough to learn.
- But if it is proper for them to labor at accomplishments of this sort, then it
- would also be right for them to prepare the dishes of an elaborate cuisine; but
- this is absurd. And the same
- difficulty also arises as to the question whether learning music can improve
- their characters; for why should they learn to perform edifying music
- themselves,
-
-
- instead of learning to enjoy it rightly and be able to judge it
- when they hear others performing, as the Spartans do? for the Spartans although
- they do not learn to perform can nevertheless judge good and bad music
- correctly, so it is said. And the same argument applies also if music is to be
- employed for refined enjoyment and entertainment; why need people learn to
- perform themselves instead of enjoying music played by others? And we may consider the conception that we
- have about the gods: Zeus does not sing and harp to the poets himself. But
- professional musicians we speak of as vulgar people, and indeed we think it not
- manly to perform music, except when drunk or for fun.
- But perhaps these points
- will have to be considered afterwards; our first inquiry is whether music ought
- not or ought to be included in education, and what is its efficacy among the
- three uses of it that have been discussed—does it serve for education
- or amusement or entertainment? It is reasonable to reckon it under all of these
- heads, and it appears to participate in them all. Amusement is for the sake of
- relaxation, and relaxation must necessarily be pleasant, for it is a way of
- curing the pain due to laborious work; also entertainment ought admittedly to be
- not only honorable but also pleasant, for happiness is derived from both honor
- and pleasure;but we all pronounce
- music to be one of the pleasantest things, whether instrumental or instrumental
- and vocal music together (at least MusaeusA semi-legendary
- bard, to whom a number of oracular verses that were current were
- attributed. says, ‘Song is man's sweetest joy,’
- and that is why people with good reason introduce it at parties and
- entertainments, for its exhilarating effect), so that for this reason
- also one might suppose that the younger men ought to be educated in music. For
- all harmless pleasures are not only suitable for the ultimate object but also
- for relaxation; and as it but rarely happens for men to reach their ultimate
- object, whereas they often relax and pursue amusement not so much with some
- ulterior object but because of the pleasure of it, it would be serviceable to
- let them relax at intervals in the pleasures derived from music. But it has come about that men make
- amusements an end; for the end also perhaps contains a certain pleasure, but not
- any ordinary pleasure, and seeking this they take the other as being this
- because it has a certain resemblance to the achievement of the end of their
- undertakings. For the end is desirable not for the sake of anything that will
- result from it, and also pleasures of the sort under consideration are not
- desirable for the sake of some future result, but because of things that have
- happened already, for instance labor and pain. One might then perhaps assume
- this to be the reason which causes men to seek to procure happiness by means of
- those pleasures; but in the case of
- taking part in music, this is not because of this reason only, but also because
- performing music is useful, as it seems, for relaxation. But nevertheless we
- must examine whether it is not the case that, although this has come about,
-
-
-
- yet the nature of music is more honorable than corresponds with
- the employment of it mentioned, and it is proper not only to participate in the
- common pleasure that springs from it, which is perceptible to everybody
- (for the pleasure contained in music is of a natural kind, owing to
- which the use of it is dear to those of all ages and characters), but
- to see if its influence reaches also in a manner to the character and to the
- soul. And this would clearly be the case if we are affected in our characters in
- a certain manner by it. But it is
- clear that we are affected in a certain manner, both by many other kinds of
- music and not least by the melodies of Olympus
- A Phrygian composer
- of the seventh century B.C.; for these admittedly make our souls
- enthusiastic, and enthusiasm is an affection of the character of the soul. And
- moreover everybody when listening to imitationsMusic dramatically expressing various states of
- emotion. is thrown into a corresponding state of feeling, even apart
- from the rhythms and tunes themselves.A
- probable correction of the Greek gives ‘by the rhythms and tunes
- themselves, even apart from the words.’ And since it is the
- case that music is one of the things that give pleasure, and that virtue has to
- do with feeling delight and love and hatred rightly, there is obviously nothing
- that it is more needful to learn and become habituated to than to judge
- correctly and to delight in virtuous characters and noble actions; but rhythms and melodies contain
- representations of angerand mildness,
- and also of courage and temperance and all their opposites and the other moral
- qualities, that most closely correspond to the true natures of these qualities
- (and this is clear from the facts of what occurs—when we
- listen to such representations we change in our soul); and habituation
- in feeling pain and delight at representations of reality is close to feeling
- them towards actual reality (for example, if a man delights in
- beholding the statue of somebody for no other reason than because of its actual
- form, the actual sight of the person whose statue he beholds must also of
- necessity give him pleasure); and it is the case that whereas the other objects of
- sensation contain no representation of character, for example the objects of
- touch and taste (though the objects of sight do so slightly, for there
- are forms that represent character, but only to a small extent, and not‘Not’ is a conjectural
- insertion. all men participate in visual perception of such
- qualities; also visual works of art are not representations of character but
- rather the forms and colors produced are mere indications of character, and
- these indications are only bodily sensations during the emotions; not but what
- in so far as there is a difference even in regard to the observation of these
- indications,i.e. these visual
- impressions do vary to some extent in moral effect. the young must
- not look at the works of Pauson but those of Polygnotus,Pauson is a painter otherwise little known. Polygnotus
- decorated the Stoa Poikile and other famous public buildings at Athens, in the middle of the 5th
- century B.C. ‘Polygnotus represented men as better than they
- really were, Pauson as worse’ (Aristot. Poet. 1448a
- 5). and of any other moral painter or
- sculptor), pieces of music
- on the contrary do actually contain in them selves imitations of character; and
- this is manifest, for even in the nature of the mere melodies there are
- differences, so that people when hearing them are affected differently and have
- not the same feelings in regard to each of them, but listen to some in a more
- mournful and restrained state,
-
-
- for instance the mode called Mixolydian, and
- to others in a softer state of mind, but in a midway state and with the greatest
- composure to another, as the Dorian mode alone of tunes seems to act, while the
- Phrygian makes men enthusiastic; for
- these things are well stated by those who have studied this form of education,
- as they derive the evidence for their theories from the actual facts of
- experience. And the same holds good about the rhythms also, for some have a more
- stable and others a more emotional character, and of the latter some are more
- vulgar in their emotional effects and others more liberal. From these
- considerations therefore it is plain that music has the power of producing a
- certain effect on the moral character of the soul, and if it has the power to do
- this, it is clear that the young must be directed to music and must be educated
- in it. Also education in music is
- well adapted to the youthful nature; for the young owing to their youth cannot
- endure any thing not sweetened by pleasure, and music is by nature a thing that
- has a pleasant sweetness. And we seem to have a certain affinity with tunes and
- rhythms; owing to which many wise men say either that the soul is a harmony or
- that it has harmony.The former doctrine is
- Pythagorean, the latter is stated by Plat. Phaedo
- 93.
-
-
- We ought now
- to decide the question raised earlier, whether the young ought to learn music by
- singing and playing themselves or not. It is not difficult to see that it makes
- a great difference in the process of acquiring a certain quality whether one
- takes a part in the actions that impart it oneself; for it is a thing that is
- impossible, or difficult, to become a good judge of performances if one has not
- taken part in them. At the same time also boys must have some occupation, and
- one must think Archytas's rattleArchytas a
- Pythagorean philosopher, mathematician, statesman, and general of Tarentum, contemporary with Plato. He was
- interested in mechanics; but one tradition ascribes the toy in question to a
- carpenter of the same name. a good invention, which people give to
- children in order that while occupied with this they may not break any of the
- furniture; for young things cannot keep still. Whereas then a rattle is a
- suitable occupation for infant children, education serves as a rattle for young
- people when older. Such considerations therefore prove that children should be
- trained in music so as actually to take part in its performance; and it is not difficult to distinguish what
- is suitable and unsuitable for various ages, and to refute those who assert that
- the practice of music is vulgar. For first, inasmuch as it is necessary to take
- part in the performances for the sake of judging them, it is therefore proper
- for the pupils when young actually to engage in the performances, though when
- they get older they should be released from performing, but be able to judge
- what is beautiful and enjoy it rightly because of the study in which they
- engaged in their youth. Then as to
- the objection raised by some people that music makes people vulgar, it is not
- difficult to solve it by considering how far pupils who are being educated with
- a view to civic virtue should take part in the actual performance of music,
-
-
-
- and in what times and what rhythms they should take part, and
- also what kinds of instruments should be used in their studies, as this
- naturally makes a difference. For the solution of the objection depends upon
- these points, as it is quite possible that some modes of music do produce the
- result mentioned. It is manifest
- therefore that the study of music must not place a hindrance in the way of
- subsequent activities, nor vulgarize the bodily frame and make it useless for
- the exercises of the soldier and the citizen, either for their practical pursuit
- now or for their scientific study later on.It is difficult not to think that either the nouns or the adverbs in the
- Greek have been erroneously transposed, and that we should translate
- ‘either for learning them now or for practising them later
- on.’ And this would come about in respect of their study if
- the pupils did not go on toiling at the exercises that aim at professional
- competitions, nor the wonderful and elaborate performances which have now
- entered into the competitions and have passed from the competitions into
- education, but also only practised exercises not of that sort until they are
- able to enjoy beautiful tunes and rhythms, and not merely the charm common to
- all music, which even some lower animals enjoy, as well as a multitude of slaves
- and children. And it is also clear
- from these considerations what sort of instruments they should use. Flutes must
- not be introduced into education, nor any other professional instrument, such as
- the harp or any other of that sort, butsuch instruments as will make them attentive pupils either at their musical
- training or in their other lessons. Moreover the flute is not a moralizing but
- rather an exciting influence, so that it ought to be used for occasions of the
- kind at which attendance has the effect of purification rather than
- instruction.See 1341a 33 ff. And
- let us add that the flute happens to possess the additional property telling
- against its use in education that playing it prevents the employment of speech.
- Hence former ages rightly rejected its use by the young and the free, although
- at first they had employed it. For
- as they came to have more leisure because of their wealth and grew more
- high-spirited and valorous, both at a still earlier date and because after the
- Persian Wars they were filled with pride as a result of their achievements, they
- began to engage in all branches of learning, making no distinction but pursuing
- research further. Because of this they even included flute-playing among their
- studies; for in Sparta a certain
- chorus-leader played the flute to his chorus himself,A wealthy citizen who undertook the duty of equipping and
- training a chorus for a religious celebration (especially the
- production of a drama at Athens) usually had an assistant of lower station to
- supply the instrumental music. The office of choregus is not elsewhere
- referred to as existing at Sparta. and at Athens it became so fashionable that almost the majority of
- freemen went in for flute-playing, as is shown by the tablet erected by
- Thrasippus after having provided the chorus for Ecphantides.Ecphantides was one of the earliest comic poets; Thrasippus
- is not elsewhere recorded. Who the flute-player was is unknown.
- But later on it came to be
- disapproved of as a result of actual experience, when men were more capable of
- judging what music conduced to virtue and what did not; and similarly also many
- of the old instruments were disapproved of, like the pectis and the
- barbitosThese were old-fashioned forms
- of the lyre. and the instruments designed to give pleasure to those
- who hear people playing them,A possible
- emendation of the Greek gives ‘those who listen to their
- modulations.’ the septangle, the triangle and the
- sambyc,Three different stringed
- instruments, the last having four strings stretched in a triangular
- frame.
-
-
-
- and all the instruments that require manual skill.And indeed there is a reasonable foundation for the story
- that was told by the ancients about the flute. The tale goes that Athena found a
- flute and threw it away. Now it is not a bad point in the story that the goddess
- did this out of annoyance because of the ugly distortion of her features; but as
- a matter of fact it is more likely that it was because education in
- flute-playing has no effect on the intelligence, whereas we attribute science
- and art to Athena.
- And since we reject professional education in the instruments
- and in performanceThe Greek should probably
- be altered to give ‘reject, some instruments and professional
- education in performance.’ (and we count
- performance in competitions as professional, for the performer does not take
- part in it for his own improvement, but for his hearers' pleasure, and that a
- vulgar pleasure, owing to which we do not consider performing to be proper for
- free men, but somewhat menial; and indeed performers do become vulgar, since the
- object at which they aim is a low one, as vulgarity in the audience usually
- influences the music, so that it imparts to the artists who practise it with a
- view to suit the audience a special kind of personality, and also of bodily
- frame because of the movements required)—we must therefore give some consideration to tunes
- and rhythms,and to the question
- whether for educational purposes we must employ all the tunes and all the
- rhythms or make distinctions; and next, whether for those who are working at
- music for education we shall lay down the same regulation, or ought we to
- establish some other third one (inasmuch as we see that the factors in
- music are melody and rhythm, and it is important to notice what influence each
- of these has upon education), and whether we are to prefer music with a
- good melody or music with a good rhythm. Now we consider that much is well said on these matters by
- some of the musicians of the present day and by some of those engaged in
- philosophy who happen to be experienced in musical education, and we will
- abandon the precise discussion as to each of these matters for any who wish it
- to seek it from those teachers, while for the present let us lay down general
- principles, merely stating the outlines of the subjects. And since we accept the classification of melodies
- made by some philosophers, as ethical melodies, melodies of action, and
- passionate melodies,i.e. representative of
- character, of action and of emotion. distributing the various
- harmonies among these classes as being in nature akin to one or the other, and
- as we say that music ought to be employed not for the purpose of one benefit
- that it confers but on account of several (for it serves the purpose
- both of education and of purgation—the term purgation we use for the
- present without explanation, but we will return to discuss the meaning that we
- give to it more explicitly in our treatise on poetryIn Aristot. Poet. 6
- tragedy is said to purge the emotion of pity and fear by giving them an
- outlet; the reference here is probably to the lost Second Book of
- Poetics.—and thirdly it serves for
- amusement, serving to relax our tension and to give rest from it),
-
-
-
-
- it is clear that we
- should employ all the harmonies, yet not employ them all in the same way, but
- use the most ethical ones for education, and the active and passionate kinds for
- listening to when others are performing (for any experience that occurs
- violently in some souls is found in all, though with different degrees of
- intensity—for example pity and fear, and also religious excitement;
- for some persons are very liable to this form of emotion, and under the
- influence of sacred music we see these people, when they use tunes that
- violently arouse the soul, being thrown into a state as if they had received
- medicinal treatment and taken a purge; the same experience then must come also to the
- compassionate and the timid and the other emotional people generally in such
- degree as befalls each individual of these classes, and all must undergo a
- purgation and a pleasant feeling of relief; and similarly also the purgative
- melodies afford harmless delight to people). Therefore those who go in
- for theatrical music must be set to compete in harmonies and melodies of this
- kind (and since the
- audience is of two classes, one freemen and educated people, and the
- otherthe vulgar class composed of
- mechanics and laborers and other such persons, the latter sort also must be
- assigned competitions and shows for relaxation; and just as their souls are
- warped from the natural state, so those harmonies and melodies that are highly
- strung and irregular in colorationSaid to
- mean divergent from the regular scale in having smaller intervals.
- are deviations, but people of each sort receive pleasure from what is naturally
- suited to them, owing to which the competitors before an audience of this sort
- must be allowed to employ some such kind of music as this); but for education, as has been said,1342a 2. the ethical class of melodies
- and of harmonies must be employed. And of that nature is the Dorian mode, as we
- said before1343b 3 ff.; but we must
- also accept any other mode that those who take part in the pursuit of philosophy
- and in musical education may recommend to us. Socrates in the
-
Republic
-
- Plat. Rep. 399a
- does not do well in allowing only the Phrygian mode along with the
- Dorian, and that when he has rejected the flute among instruments;
-
-
- for the
- Phrygian mode has the same effect among harmonies as the flute among
- instruments—both are violently exciting and emotional. This is shown by poetry; for all Bacchiac
- versification and all movement of that sortOr perhaps bakxei/a and ki/nhsis denote bodily movement accompanying the
- song; or they may denote the emotional frenzy expressed and stimulated by
- it. The dithyramb was a form of poetry of this class, originally celebrating
- the birth of Dionysus. Philoxenus, one of the most famous dithyrambic poets,
- 435-380 B.C., lived at
- Athens, and later at the court
- of Dionysius of Syracuse.
- belongs particularly to the flute among the instruments, and these meters find
- their suitable accompaniment in tunes in the Phrygian mode among the harmonies:
- for example the dithyramb is admittedly held to be a Phrygian meter, and the
- experts on this subject adduce many instances to prove this, particularly the
- fact that Philoxenus when he attempted to compose a dithyramb,
The
- Mysians, in the Dorian mode
- was unable to do so, but merely by the force of nature fell back again into the
- suitable harmony, the Phrygian.
And
- all agree that the Dorian mode is more
- sedate and of a specially manly character. Moreover since we praise and say that
- we ought to pursue the mean between extremes, and the Dorian mode has this nature in relation to the
- other harmonies, it is clear that it suits the younger pupils to be educated
- rather in the Dorian melodies. But
- there are two objects to aim at, the possible as well as the suitable; for we
- are bound rather to attempt the things that are possible and those that are
- suitable for the particular class of people concerned;
and in these matters also there are dividing lines
- drawn by the ages—for instance, those whose powers have waned through
- lapse of time cannot easily sing the highly strung harmonies, but to persons of
- that age nature suggests the relaxed harmonies.
Therefore some musical experts also rightly criticize
- Socrates
- Plat. Rep. 338e
- because he disapproved of the relaxed harmonies for amusement, taking
- them to have the character of intoxication, not in the sense of the effect of
- strong drink, for that clearly has more the result of making men frenzied
- revellers, but as failing in power. Hence even with a view to the period of life
- that is to follow, that of the comparatively old, it is proper to engage in the
- harmonies and melodies of this kind too, and also any kind of harmony that is
- suited to the age of boyhood because it is capable of being at once decorous and
- educative, which seems to be the nature of the Lydian mode most of all the
- harmonies. It is clear therefore that we should lay down these three canons to
- guide education, moderation, possibility and suitability.
-