To join in a fight or a fray, as the saying is, Socrates, you have chosen your time well enough.
Do you mean, according to the proverb, we have come too late for a feast?
Yes, a most elegant feast; for Gorgias gave us a fine and varied display but a moment ago.
But indeed, Callicles, it is Chaerephon here who must take the blame for this;
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No matter, Socrates I will take the curing of it too for Gorgias is a friend of mine, so that he will give us a display now, if you think fit, or if you prefer, on another occasion.
What, Chaerephon? Has Socrates a desire to hear Gorgias?
Yes, it is for that very purpose we are here.
Then whenever you have a mind to pay me a call—Gorgias is staying with me, and he will give you a display.
Thank you, Callicles: but would he consent
-
The best way is to ask our friend himself, Socrates: for indeed that was one of the features of his performance. Why, only this moment he was pressing for whatever questions anyone in the house might like to ask, and saying he would answer them all.
What a good idea! Ask him, Chaerephon.
What am I to ask?
What he is.
How do you mean?
-
Just as, if he chanced to be in the shoe-making business, his answer would have been, I presume, “a shoemaker.” Now, don’t you see my meaning?
I see, and will ask him. Tell me, Gorgias, is Callicles here correct in saying that you profess to answer any questions one may ask you?
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He is, Chaerephon; indeed, I was just now making this very profession, and I may add that nobody has asked me anything new for many years now.
So I presume you will easily answer, Gorgias.
You are free to make trial of that, Chaerephon.
Yes, to be sure; and, if you like, Chaerephon, of me. For I think Gorgias must be quite tired out, after the long discourse he has just delivered.
Why, Polus, do you suppose you could answer more excellently than Gorgias?
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And what does that matter, if I should satisfy you?
Not at all; since it is your wish, answer.
Ask.
Then I ask you, if Gorgias chanced to be skilled in the same art as his brother Herodicus, what should we be justified in calling him? What we call his brother, should we not?
Certainly.
Then we should make a right statement if we described him as a doctor.
Yes.
And if he were expert in the same art as Aristophon, son of Aglaophon, or his brother,
Obviously that of painter.
But as it is, we would like to know in what art he is skilled, and hence by what name we should rightly call him.
Chaerephon, there are many arts amongst mankind that have been discovered experimentally, as the result of experiences: for experience conducts the course of our life according to art, but inexperience according to chance. Of these several arts various men partake in various ways, and the best men of the best. Gorgias here is one of these, and he is a partner in the finest art of all.
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Fine, at any rate, Gorgias, is the equipment for discourse that Polus seems to have got: but still he is not performing his promise to Chaerephon.
How exactly, Socrates ?
He does not seem to me to be quite answering what he is asked.
Well, will you please ask him?
No, if you yourself will be so good as to answer, why, I would far rather ask you. For I see plainly,
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How so, Socrates ?
Because, Polus, when Chaerephon has asked in what art Gorgias is skilled, you merely eulogize his art as though it were under some censure, instead of replying what it is.
Why, did I not reply that it was the finest?
You certainly did: but nobody asked what was the quality of his art, only what it was, and by what name we ought to call Gorgias. Just as Chaerephon laid out the lines
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Rhetoric, Socrates.
So we are to call you a rhetorician ?
Yes, and a good one, if you would call me what—to use Homer’s phrase—“I vaunt myself to be.”
Well, I shall be pleased to do so.
Then call me such.
-
And are we to say that you are able to make others like yourself?
Yes, that is what I profess to do, not only here, but elsewhere also.
Then would you be willing, Gorgias, to continue this present way of discussion, by alternate question and answer, and defer to some other time that lengthy style of speech in which Polus made a beginning? Come, be true to your promise, and consent to answer each question briefly.
There are some answers, Socrates, that necessitate a lengthy expression:
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That is just what I want, Gorgias: give me a display of this very skill—in brevity of speech; your lengthy style will do another time.
Well, I will do that, and you will admit that you never heard anyone speak more briefly.
Come then; since you claim to be skilled in rhetorical art,
-
Yes.
And music, likewise, with the making of tunes?
Yes.
Upon my word, Gorgias, I do admire your answers! You make them as brief as they well can be.
Yes, Socrates, I consider myself a very fair hand at that.
You are right there. Come now, answer me in the same way about rhetoric: with what particular thing is its skill concerned?
With speech.
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What kind of speech, Gorgias? Do you mean that which shows sick people by what regimen they could get well?
No.
Then rhetoric is not concerned with all kinds of speech.
No, I say.
Yet it does make men able to speak.
Yes.
And to understand also the things about which they speak.
Of course.
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Now, does the medical art, which we mentioned just now, make men able to understand and speak about the sick?
It must.
Hence the medical art also, it seems, is concerned with speech.
Yes.
That is, speech about diseases?
Certainly.
Now, is gymnastic also concerned with speech about the good and bad condition of our bodies?
Quite so.
And moreover it is the same, Gorgias, with all the other arts;
-
Apparently.
Then why, pray, do you not give the name “rhetorical” to those other arts, when they are concerned with speech, if you call that “rhetoric” which has to do with speech?
Because, Socrates, the skill in those other arts is almost wholly concerned with manual work and similar activities, whereas in rhetoric there is no such manual working, but its whole activity
-
Now, do I understand what sort of art you choose to call it? Perhaps, however, I shall get to know this more clearly. But answer me this: we have arts, have we not?
Yes.
Then amongst the various arts some, I take it, consist mainly of work, and so require but brief speech; while others require none, for the art’s object may be achieved actually in silence,
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Your supposition is quite correct, Socrates.
But there is another class of arts which achieve their whole purpose through speech and—to put it roughly—require either no action to aid them, or very little; for example, numeration, calculation, geometry, draught-playing, and many other arts: some of these have the speech in about equal proportion to the action, but most have it as the larger part, or absolutely the whole of their operation and effect is by means of speech. It is one of this class of arts
-
You are right.
But, mind you, I do not think it is any one of these that you mean to call rhetoric; though, so far as your expression went, you did say that the art which has its effect through speech is rhetoric, and one might retort, if one cared to strain at mere words: So, Gorgias, you call numeration rhetoric! But I do not believe it is either numeration or geometry that you call rhetoric.
-
Your belief is correct, Socrates, and your supposition just.
Come now, and do your part in finishing off the answer to my question. Since rhetoric is in fact one of these arts which depend mainly on speech, and there are likewise other arts of the same nature, try if you can tell me with what this rhetoric, which has its effect in speech, is concerned. For instance, suppose some one asked me about one or other of the arts which I was mentioning just now: Socrates, what is the art of numeration? I should tell him,
-
And you would be right, Socrates.
-
Come then and do your part, Gorgias: rhetoric is one of those arts, is it not, which carry out their work and achieve their effect by speech.
That is so.
Then tell me what they deal with: what subject is it, of all in the world, that is dealt with by this speech employed by rhetoric?
The greatest of human affairs, Socrates, and the best.
But that also, Gorgias, is ambiguous,
-“first health, then beauty, and thirdly,” as the maker of the catch puts it, “wealth got without guile.”
Yes, I have heard it; but what is the point of your quotation?
-
I mean that, supposing the producers of those blessings which the maker of the catch commends—namely, the doctor, the trainer, and the money-getter—were to stand before you this moment, and the doctor first should say: “Gorgias is deceiving you, Socrates for it is not his art, but mine, that deals with man’s greatest good.” Then supposing I were to ask him: “And who are you, to say so?” He would probably reply: “A doctor.” “Well, what do you mean? That the work of your art is the greatest good?” “What else, Socrates,” I expect he would reply, “is health? What greater good
-
A thing, Socrates, which in truth is the greatest good, and a cause not merely of freedom to mankind at large, but also of dominion to single persons in their several cities.
Well, and what do you call it?
-
I call it the ability to persuade with speeches either judges in the law courts or statesmen in the council-chamber or the commons in the Assembly or an audience at any other meeting that may be held on public affairs. And I tell you that by virtue of this power you will have the doctor as your slave, and the trainer as your slave; your money-getter will turn out to be making money not for himself, but for another,—in fact for you, who are able to speak and persuade the multitude.
I think now, Gorgias, you have come very near to showing us
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None at all, Socrates; your definition seems to me satisfactory; that is the main substance of the art.
Then listen, Gorgias: I, let me assure you,
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Well, what then, Socrates?
I will now tell you. What the real nature of the persuasion is that you speak of as resulting from rhetoric, and what the matters are with which persuasion deals, I assure you I do not clearly understand; though I may have my suspicions as to what I suppose you to mean by it, and with what things you think it deals. But nevertheless I will ask you what you do mean by the persuasion that results from rhetoric,
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Certainly.
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Would this be the reason—that there are also other painters who depict a variety of other figures?
Yes.
But if no one besides Zeuxis were a painter, your answer would have been right?
Yes, of course.
Come then, tell me now about rhetoric: do you think rhetoric alone effects persuasion, or can other arts do it as well? I mean, for example, when a man teaches anything, does he persuade in his teaching? Or do you think not?
No, to be sure, Socrates, I think he most certainly does persuade.
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Then let us repeat our question with reference to the same arts that we spoke of just now: does not numeration, or the person skilled in numeration, teach us all that pertains to number?
Certainly.
And persuades also?
Yes.
So that numeration also is a producer of persuasion?
Apparently.
Then if we are asked what kind of persuasion, and dealing with what, we shall reply, I suppose: The instructive kind, which deals with the amount of an odd or an even number;
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Yes.
Hence rhetoric is not the only producer of persuasion.
You are right.
Since then it is not the only one that achieves this effect, but others can also, we should be justified in putting this further question to the speaker, as we did concerning the painter: Then of what kind of persuasion, and of persuasion dealing with what, is rhetoric the art?
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Yes, I do.
Then answer me, Gorgias, since you agree with me on that.
Well then, I mean that kind of persuasion, Socrates, which you find in the law-courts and in any public gatherings, as in fact I said just now; and it deals with what is just and unjust.
I, too, I may tell you, had a suspicion that it was this persuasion that you meant, and as dealing with those things, Gorgias; but you must not be surprised if I ask you by-and-by some such question as may seem to be obvious, though I persist in it;
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And I think you are quite right in doing so, Socrates.
Come then, let us consider another point. Is there something that you call “having learnt.”
There is.
And again, “having believed”?
Yes.
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Then do you think that having learnt and having believed, or learning and belief, are the same thing, or different?
In my opinion, Socrates, they are different.
And your opinion is right, as you can prove in this way: if some one asked you—Is there, Gorgias, a false and a true belief?—you would say, Yes, I imagine.
I should.
But now, is there a false and a true knowledge?
Surely not.
So it is evident again that they
You are right.
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But yet those who have learnt have been persuaded, as well as those who have believed.
That is so.
Then would you have us assume two forms of persuasion—one providing belief without knowledge, and the other sure knowledge?
Certainly.
Now which kind of persuasion is it that rhetoric creates in law courts or any public meeting on matters of right and wrong? The kind from which we get belief without knowledge, or that from which we get knowledge?
Obviously, I presume, Socrates, that from which we get belief.
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Thus rhetoric, it seems, is a producer of persuasion for belief, not for instruction in the matter of right and wrong.
Yes.
And so the rhetorician’s business is not to instruct a law court or a public meeting in matters of right and wrong, but only to make them believe; since, I take it, he could not in a short while instruct such a mass of people in matters so important.
No, to be sure.
Come then, let us see what actually is our account of rhetoric:
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Well, I will try, Socrates, to reveal to you clearly the whole power of rhetoric: and in fact you have correctly shown the way to it yourself. You know, I suppose,
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So we are told, Gorgias, of Themistocles; and as to Pericles, I heard him myself when he was advising us about the middle wall.
So whenever there is an election of such persons as you were referring to, Socrates, you see it is the orators who give the advice and get resolutions carried in these matters.
That is just what surprises me, Gorgias, and has made me ask you all this time what in the world the power of rhetoric can be. For, viewed in this light, its greatness comes over me as something supernatural.
Ah yes, if you knew all, Socrates,—how it comprises in itself practically all powers at once!
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I expect, Gorgias, that you as well as I have had no small practice in arguments, and have observed the following fact about them, that it is not easy for people to define to each other the matters which they take in hand to discuss,
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Nay, I too, Socrates, claim to be of the sort you indicate; though perhaps we should have taken thought also for the wishes of our company. For, let me tell you, some time before you and your friend arrived, I gave the company a performance of some length; and if we now have this conversation I expect we shall seriously protract our sitting.
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You hear for yourselves, Gorgias and Socrates, the applause by which these gentlemen show their desire to hear anything you may say; for my own part, however, Heaven forbid that I should ever be so busy as to give up a discussion so interesting and so conducted, because I found it more important to attend to something else.
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Yes, by all that’s holy, Chaerephon; and let me say, moreover, for myself that among the many discussions which I have attended in my time I doubt if there was one that gave me such delight as this present one. So, for my part, I shall count it a favor even if you choose to continue it all day long.
Why, Callicles, I assure you there is no hindrance on my side, if Gorgias is willing.
After that, Socrates, it would be shameful indeed if I were unwilling, when it was I who challenged everybody to ask what questions they pleased.
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Hark you then, Gorgias, to what surprises me in your statements: to be sure, you may possibly be right, and I may take your meaning wrongly. You say you are able to make a rhetorician of any man who chooses to learn from you?
Yes.
Now, do you mean, to make him carry conviction to the crowd on all subjects, not by teaching them, but by persuading?
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Certainly I do.
You were saying just now, you know, that even in the matter of health the orator will be more convincing than the doctor.
Yes, indeed, I was—meaning, to the crowd.
And “to the crowd” means “to the ignorant?” For surely, to those who know, he will not be more convincing than the doctor.
You are right.
And if he is to be more convincing than the doctor, he thus becomes more convincing than he who knows?
Certainly.
Though not himself a doctor, you agree?
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Yes.
But he who is not a doctor is surely without knowledge of that whereof the doctor has knowledge.
Clearly.
So he who does not know will be more convincing to those who do not know than he who knows, supposing the orator to be more convincing than the doctor. Is that, or something else, the consequence?
In this case it does follow.
Then the case is the same in all the other arts for the orator and his rhetoric: there is no need to know
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Well, and is it not a great convenience, Socrates, to make oneself a match for the professionals by learning just this single art and omitting all the others?
Whether the orator is or is not a match for the rest of them by reason of that skill, is a question we shall look into presently, if our argument so requires: for the moment let us consider first whether the rhetorician is in the same relation to what is just and unjust,
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Why, I suppose, Socrates, if he happens not to know these things he will learn them too from me.
Stop there: I am glad of that statement. If you make a man a rhetorician he must needs know what is just and unjust either previously or by learning afterwards from you.
Quite so.
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Well now, a man who has learnt building is a builder, is he not?
Yes.
And he who has learnt music, a musician?
Yes.
Then he who has learnt medicine is a medical man, and so on with the rest on the same principle; anyone who has learnt a certain art has the qualification acquired by his particular knowledge?
Certainly.
And so, on this principle, he who has learnt what is just is just?
Absolutely, I presume.
And the just man, I suppose, does what is just.
Yes.
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Now the just man must wish to do what is just?
Apparently.
Hence the just man will never wish to act unjustly?
That must needs be so.
But it follows from our statements
Yes.
Hence the rhetorician will never wish to do wrong.
Apparently not.
Then do you remember saying a little while ago that
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It was.
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But now we find that this very person, the rhetorician, could never be guilty of wrongdoing, do we not?
We do.
And in our first statements, Gorgias, we said that rhetoric dealt with speech, not on even and odd, but on the just and unjust, did we not?
Yes.
Well then, I supposed at the time when you were saying this that rhetoric could never be an unjust thing, since the speeches it made were always about justice but when a little later you told us that the orator
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How is this, Socrates? Is that really your opinion of rhetoric, as you now express it? Or, think you, because Gorgias was ashamed not to admit your point that the rhetorician knows what is just and noble and good, and will himself teach these to anyone who comes to him without knowing them; and then from this admission
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Ah, sweet Polus, of course it is for this very purpose we possess ourselves of companions and sons, that when the advance of years begins to make us stumble, you younger ones may be at hand to set our lives upright again in words as well as deeds. So now if Gorgias and I
-
What do you mean by that?
That you keep a check on that lengthy way of speaking, Polus, which you tried to employ at first.
Why, shall I not be at liberty to say as much as I like?
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It would indeed be a hard fate for you, my excellent friend, if having come to
I do.
Then are you with him also in bidding us ask at each point any questions we like of you, as one who knows how to answer?
Certainly I am.
-
So now, take whichever course you like: either put questions, or answer them.
Well, I will do as you say. So answer me this, Socrates: since you think that Gorgias is at a loss about rhetoric, what is your own account of it?
Are you asking what art I call it?
Yes.
None at all, I consider, Polus, if you would have the honest truth.
But what do you consider rhetoric to be?
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A thing which you say—in the treatise which I read of late—“made art.”
What thing do you mean?
I mean a certain habitude.
Then do you take rhetoric to be a habitude?
I do, if you have no other suggestion.
Habitude of what?
Of producing a kind of gratification and pleasure.
Then you take rhetoric to be something fine—an ability to gratify people?
How now, Polus? Have you as yet heard me tell you
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Why, did I not hear you call it a certain habitude?
Then please—since you value “gratification”—be so good as gratify me in a small matter.
I will.
Ask me now what art I take cookery to be.
Then I ask you, what art is cookery ?
None at all, Polus.
Well, what is it ? Tell me.
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Then I reply, a certain habitude.
Of what? Tell me.
Then I reply, of production of gratification and pleasure, Polus.
So cookery and rhetoric are the same thing?
Not at all, only parts of the same practice.
What practice do you mean?
I fear it may be too rude to tell the truth; for I shrink from saying it on Gorgias’ account, lest he suppose I am making satirical fun of his own profession. Yet indeed I do not know
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What is that, Socrates? Tell us, without scruple on my account.
It seems to me then, Gorgias, to be a pursuit that is not a matter of art, but showing a shrewd, gallant spirit which has a natural bent for clever dealing with mankind, and I sum up its substance in the name flattery.
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I ask you then; so answer, what sort of branch it is.
Now, will you understand when I answer? Rhetoric,
-
Well then, do you call it a fine or a base thing?
A base one, I call it—for all that is bad I call base—since I am to answer you as though you had already understood my meaning.
Nor do I myself, upon my word, Socrates,
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And no wonder, Gorgias, for as yet my statement is not at all clear; but Polus
Ah, do not mind him; but tell me what you mean by rhetoric being a semblance of a branch of politics.
Well, I will try to express what rhetoric appears to me to be: if it is not in fact what I say, Polus here will refute me. There are things, I suppose, that you call body and soul?
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Of course.
And each of these again you believe to have a good condition?
I do.
And again, a good condition that may seem so, but is not? As an example, let me give the following: many people seem to be in good bodily condition when it would not be easy for anyone but a doctor, or one of the athletic trainers, to perceive that they are not so.
You are right.
Something of this sort I say there is in body and in soul, which makes the body or the soul seem to be in good condition, though it is none the more so in fact.
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Quite so.
Now let me see if I can explain my meaning to you more clearly. There are two different affairs to which I assign two different arts: the one, which has to do with the soul, I call politics; the other, which concerns the body, though I cannot give you a single name for it offhand, is all one business, the tendance of the body, which I can designate in two branches as gymnastic and medicine. Under politics I set legislation in the place of gymnastic, and justice to match medicine.
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Then what is it you say? Do you take rhetoric to be flattery?
Well, I said rather a branch of flattery. Why, at your age, Polus, have you no memory? What will you do later on?
Then do you think that good orators are considered to be flatterers in their cities, and so worthless?
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Is that a question you are asking, or are you beginning a speech?
I am asking a question.
To my mind, they are not considered at all.
How not considered? Have they not the chief power in their cities?
No, if you mean power in the sense of something good for him who has it.
Why, of course I mean that.
Then, to my thinking, the orators have the smallest power of all who are in their city.
-
What? Are they not like the despots, in putting to death anyone they please, and depriving anyone of his property and expelling him from their cities as they may think fit?
By the Dog, I fear I am still in two minds, Polus, at everything you say, as to whether this is a statement on your own part, and a declaration of your own opinion, or a question you are putting to me.
Why, I am asking you.
Very well, my friend then are you asking me two things at once?
How two?
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Were you not this moment saying something like this: Is it not the case that the orators put to death anyone they wish, like the despots, and deprive people of property and expel them from their cities as they may think fit?
I was.
Then I tell you that there are two questions here, and I will give you answers to them both. For I say, Polus, that the orators and the despots alike have the least power in their cities, as I stated just now; since they do nothing
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Well, and is not that a great power to have?
No, judging at least by what Polus says.
I say no! Pardon me, I say yes.
No, by the ————, you do not; for you said that great power is a good to him who has it.
Yes, and I maintain it.
Then do you regard it as a good, when a man does what he thinks to be best, without having intelligence? Is that what you call having a great power?
No, I do not.
Then will you prove that the orators have intelligence, and that rhetoric is an art, not a flattery, and so refute me ?
-
Yes, I do.
How then can the orators or the despots have great power in their cities, unless Socrates is refuted by Polus, and admits that they do what they wish?
-
Hark at the man————!
I deny that they do what they wish: there, refute me.
Did you not admit just now that they do what they think best?
Yes, and I admit it now.
Then do they not do what they wish?
I say no.
When they do what they think fit?
Yes.
What shocking, nay, monstrous answers, Socrates!
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Spare your invective, peerless Polus—if I may address you in your own style:
Well, I am ready to answer, in order that I may know what you mean.
Then is it your view that people wish merely that which they do each time, or that which is the object of their doing what they do? For instance, do those who take medicine by doctor’s orders wish, in your opinion, merely what they do,—to take the medicine and suffer the pain of it,—or rather to be healthy, which is the object of their taking it?
-
To be healthy, without a doubt.
And so with seafarers and such as pursue profit generally in trade; what they wish is not what they are doing at each moment—for who wishes to go on a voyage, and incur all its danger and trouble? It is rather, I conceive, the object of their voyage—to get wealth; since it is for wealth that they go on it.
Certainly.
And is it not just the same in every case? If a man does something for an object, he does not wish the thing that he does, but the thing for which he does it.
-
Yes.
Now is there any existent thing that is not either good or bad or between these—neither good nor bad?
Most assuredly nothing, Socrates.
Well, do you call wisdom and health and wealth and everything else of that kind good, and their opposites bad?
I do.
And by things neither good nor bad do you mean such things
-
No, these are what I mean.
Then do people do these intermediate things, when they do them, for the sake of the good things, or the good things for the intermediate?
The intermediate, I presume, for the good.
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Thus it is in pursuit of the good that we walk, when we walk, conceiving it to be better; or on the contrary, stand, when we stand, for the sake of the same thing, the good: is it not so?
Yes.
And so we put a man to death, if we do put him to death, or expel him or deprive him of his property, because we think it better for us to do this than not?
Certainly.
So it is for the sake of the good that the doers of all these things do them?
I agree.
And we have admitted that when we do things for an object, we do not wish those things, but the object for which we do them?
-
Quite so.
Then we do not wish to slaughter people or expel them from our cities or deprive them of their property as an act in itself, but if these things are beneficial we wish to do them, while if they are harmful, we do not wish them. For we wish what is good, as you say; but what is neither good nor bad we do not wish, nor what is bad either, do we? Is what I say true in your opinion, Polus, or not? Why do you not answer?
It is true.
-
Then, as we agree on this, if a man puts anyone to death or expels him from a city or deprives him of his property, whether he does it as a despot or an orator, because he thinks it better for himself though it is really worse, that man, I take it, does what he thinks fit, does he not?
Yes.
Now is it also what he wishes, supposing it to be really bad? Why do you not answer?
No, I do not think he does what he wishes.
-
Can such a man then be said to have great power in that city, if to have great power is something good, according to your admission?
He cannot.
Then I spoke the truth when I said that it is possible for a man to do what he thinks fit in a city and yet not to have great power nor to do what he wishes.
As if you, Socrates, would not accept the liberty of doing what you think fit in your city rather than not, and would not envy a man whom you observed to have put some one to death as he thought fit, or deprived him of his property or sent him to prison!
Justly, do you mean, or unjustly?
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Whichever way he does it, is it not enviable in either case?
Hush, Polus!
Why?
Because we ought not to envy either the unenviable or the wretched, but pity them.
What! Is that the state in which you consider those people, of whom I speak, to be?
Yes, for so I must.
Then do you consider that a man who puts another to death as he thinks fit, and justly puts him to death, is wretched and pitiable?
Not I; but not enviable either.
Did you not say just now that he was wretched?
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Only he who unjustly put some one to death, my friend, and I called him pitiable as well: if he acted justly, then he is unenviable.
I suppose, at any rate, the man who is put to death unjustly is both pitiable and wretched.
Less so than he who puts him to death, Polus, and less so than he who is put to death justly.
In what way can that be, Socrates ?
In this, that to do wrong is the greatest of evils.
What, is this the greatest? Is not to suffer wrong a greater?
By no means.
Then would you wish rather to suffer wrong than to do it?
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I should wish neither, for my own part; but if it were necessary either to do wrong or to suffer it, I should choose to suffer rather than do it.
Then you would not accept a despot’s power?
No, if you mean by a despot’s power the same as I do.
Why, what I mean is, as I did just now, the liberty of doing anything one thinks fit in one’s city—putting people to death and expelling them and doing everything at one’s own discretion.
My gifted friend, let me speak, and you shall take me to task in your turn.
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Oh no, not in that way.
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Then can you tell me why you disapprove of this kind of power?
I can.
Why, then? Tell me.
Because it is inevitable that he who acts thus will be punished.
And is it not a bad thing to be punished?
Certainly.
So, my remarkable friend, you have come round again to the view that if doing what one thinks fit is attended by advantage in doing it, this is not merely a good thing but at the same time, it seems, the possession of great power; otherwise
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To be sure.
Then here is a point, it seems, that is admitted both on your side and on mine.
Yes.
Then when do you say it is better to do these things? Tell me where you draw the line.
Nay, I would rather that you, Socrates, answered that.
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Well then I say, Polus, if you prefer to hear it from me, that it is better when these things are done justly, and worse when unjustly.
So hard to refute you, Socrates! Nay, a mere child could do it, could he not, and prove your words are untrue?
Then I shall be most grateful to the child, and equally to you, if you refute me and rid me of foolery. Come, do not grow weary in well-doing towards your friend, but refute me.
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Well, to be sure, Socrates, there is no need to refute you with ancient instances; for those happenings of but a day or two ago are enough to refute you, and prove that many a wrongdoer is happy.
What sort of thing do you mean?
I suppose you see that Archelaus, son of Perdiccas, is ruler of
Well, if I do not, at any rate I hear it.
Do you consider him happy or wretched?
I do not know, Polus; I have never met the man.
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What? Could you find out by meeting him, and cannot otherwise tell, straight off, that he is happy?
No, indeed, upon my word.
Then doubtless you will say, Socrates, that you do not know that even the Great King is happy.
Yes, and I shall be speaking the truth; for I do not know how he stands in point of education and justice.
Why, does happiness entirely consist in that?
Yes, by my account, Polus; for a good and honorable man or woman, I say, is happy, and an unjust and wicked one is wretched.
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Then this Archelaus, on your statement, is wretched?
Yes, my friend, supposing he is unjust.
Well, but how can he be other than unjust? He had no claim to the throne which he now occupies, being the son of a woman who was a slave of Perdiccas’ brother Alcetas, and in mere justice he was Alcetas’ slave; and if he wished to do what is just, he would be serving Alcetas and would be happy, by your account; but, as it is, he has become a prodigy of wretchedness,
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At the beginning of our discussion, Polus, I complimented you on having had, as I consider, a good training in rhetoric, while you seem to have neglected disputation; and now, accordingly, this is the argument, is it, with which any child could refute me? By this statement, you think, I now stand refuted at your hands, when I assert that the wrongdoer is not happy? How so, my good friend? Why, I tell you I do not admit a single point in what you say.
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No, because you do not want to; for you really agree with my statement.
My gifted friend, that is because you attempt to refute me in rhetorical fashion, as they understand refuting in the law courts. For there, one party is supposed to refute the other when they bring forward a number of reputable witnesses to any statements they may make, whilst their opponent produces only one, or none. But this sort of refutation is quite worthless
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Certainly.
And I say it is impossible. There we have one point at issue. Very good but then, will a man be happy in wrongdoing if he comes in for requital and punishment?
Not at all, since in that case he would be most wretched.
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But if the wrongdoer escapes requital, by your account he will be happy?
Yes.
Whereas in my opinion, Polus, the wrongdoer or the unjust is wretched anyhow; more wretched, however, if he does not pay the penalty and gets no punishment for his wrongdoing, but less wretched if he pays the penalty and meets with requital from gods and men.
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What a strange doctrine, Socrates, you are trying to maintain!
Yes, and I will endeavor to make you too, my friend, maintain it with me: for I count you as a friend. Well now, these are the points on which we differ; just examine them yourself. I think I told you at an earlier stage that wrongdoing was worse than being wronged.
Certainly you did.
And you thought that being wronged was worse.
Yes.
And I said that wrongdoers were wretched, and I was refuted by you.
Upon my word, yes.
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At least to your thinking, Polus.
Yes, and true thinking too.
Perhaps. But you said, on the other hand, that wrongdoers are happy, if they pay no penalty.
Certainly.
Whereas I say they are most wretched, and those who pay the penalty, less so. Do you wish to refute that as well?
Why, that is still harder to refute, Socrates, than the other!
Not merely so, Polus, but impossible; for the truth is never refuted.
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How do you mean? If a man be caught criminally plotting to make himself a despot, and he be straightway put on the rack and castrated and have his eyes burnt out, and after suffering himself, and seeing inflicted on his wife and children, a number of grievous torments of every kind, he be finally crucified or burnt in a coat of pitch, will he be happier than if he escape and make himself despot, and pass his life as the ruler in his city, doing whatever he likes, and envied and congratulated by the citizens and the foreigners besides?
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You are trying to make my flesh creep this time, my spirited Polus, instead of refuting me; a moment ago you were for calling witnesses. However, please refresh my memory a little: “criminally plotting to make himself a despot,” you said?
I did.
Then neither of them will ever be happier than the other—neither he who has unjustly compassed the despotic power, nor he who pays the penalty; for of two wretched persons
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Do you not think yourself utterly refuted, Socrates, when you make such statements as nobody in the world would assent to? You have only to ask anyone of the company here.
Polus, I am not one of your statesmen: indeed, last year, when I was elected a member of the Council, and, as my tribe held the Presidency,
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And I, that neither I nor anyone else in the world believes it. You, it seems, would choose rather to suffer wrong than to do it.
Yes, and so would you and everyone else.
Far from it neither; I nor you nor anybody else.
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Then will you answer?
To be sure I will, for indeed I am eager to know what on earth you will say.
Well then, so that you may know, tell me, just as though I were asking you all over again, which of the two seems to you, Polus, to be the worse—doing wrong or suffering it?
Suffering it, I say.
Now again, which is fouler—doing wrong or suffering it? Answer.
Doing it.
And also more evil, if fouler.
Not at all.
I see: you hold, apparently, that fair
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Just so.
But what of this? All fair things, like bodies and colors and figures and sounds and observances—is it according to no standard that you call these fair in each case? Thus in the first place, when you say that fair bodies are fair, it must be either in view of their use for some particular purpose that each may serve, or in respect of some pleasure arising when, in the act of beholding them, they cause delight to the beholder. Have you any description to give beyond this
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I have not.
And so with all the rest in the same way, whether they be figures or colors, is it for some pleasure or benefit or both that you give them the name of “fair”?
It is.
And sounds also, and the effects of music, are not these all in the same case?
Yes.
And further, in all that belongs to laws and observances, surely the “fairness” of them cannot lie beyond those limits of being either beneficial or pleasant or both.
I think not.
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And is it not just the same with the “fairness” of studies also?
Doubtless; and this time, Socrates, your definition is quite fair, when you define what is fair by pleasure and good.
And foul by their opposites, pain and evil?
That needs must follow.
Thus when of two fair things one is fairer, the cause is that it surpasses in either one or both of these effects, either in pleasure, or in benefit, or in both.
Certainly.
And again, when one of two foul things is fouler,
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Yes.
Come then, what was it we heard just now about doing and suffering wrong? Were you not saying that suffering wrong is more evil, but doing it fouler?
I was.
Well now, if doing wrong is fouler than suffering it, it is either more painful, and fouler by an excess of pain or evil or both; must not this also be the case?
Yes, of course.
Then let us first consider if doing wrong
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Not so at all, Socrates.
Then it does not surpass in pain.
No, indeed.
And so, if not in pain, it can no longer be said to exceed in both.
Apparently.
It remains, then, that it exceeds in the other.
Yes.
In evil.
So it seems.
Then it is by an excess of evil that doing wrong is fouler than suffering it.
Yes, obviously.
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Now it is surely admitted by the mass of mankind, as it was too by you in our talk a while ago, that doing wrong is fouler than suffering it.
Yes.
And now it has been found to be more evil.
So it seems.
Then would you rather have the evil and foul when it is more than when it is less? Do not shrink from answering, Polus you will get no hurt by it: but submit yourself bravely to the argument, as to a doctor, and reply yes or no to my question.
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Why, I should not so choose, Socrates.
And would anybody else in the world?
I think not, by this argument at least.
Then I spoke the truth when I said that neither you nor anyone else in the world would choose to do wrong rather than suffer it, since it really is more evil.
Apparently.
So you see, Polus, that when one proof is contrasted with the other they have no resemblance, but whereas you have the assent of every one else except myself, I am satisfied with your sole and single assent and evidence,
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I do.
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And can you maintain that all just things are not fair, in so far as they are just? Consider well before you speak.
No, I think they are, Socrates.
Then take another point: if a man does anything, must there be something which is also acted upon by this doer of the thing?
I think so.
And does it suffer what the doer does, and is the effect such as the agentÕs action makes it? I mean, for example, when one strikes a blow something must needs be struck?
It must.
And if the striker strikes hard or quick,
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Yes.
Hence the effect in the thing struck is such as the striker makes it?
Certainly.
And so again, if one burns, something must be burnt?
Yes, of course.
And if one burns severely or sorely, the thing burnt is burnt according as the burner burns it?
Certainly.
And again, if one cuts, the same may be said? For something is cut.
Yes.
And if the cut is large or deep or sore,
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Apparently.
Then putting it all in a word, see if you agree that what I was just saying applies to all cases—that the patient receives an effect of the same kind as the agentÕs action.
I do agree.
Then this being admitted, is paying the penalty suffering something, or doing it?
Suffering it must be, Socrates.
And at the hands of an agent?
Yes, of course; at the hands of the punisher.
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And he who punishes aright punishes justly?
Yes.
Doing what is just, or not?
What is just.
And he who pays the penalty by being punished suffers what is just?
Apparently.
And what is just, I think we have agreed, is fair?
Certainly.
Then of these two, the one does what is fair and the other, he who is punished, suffers it.
Yes.
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And so, if fair, good? For that is either pleasant or beneficial.
It must be so.
So he who pays the penalty suffers what is good?
It seems so.
Then he is benefited?
Yes.
Is it the benefit I imagine—that he becomes better in soul if he is justly punished?
Quite likely.
Then is he who pays the penalty relieved from badness of soul?
Yes.
And so relieved from the greatest evil?
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No, only poverty.
And what in his bodily resources? You would say that badness there is weakness or disease or ugliness or the like?
I would.
And in soul too you believe there is a certain wickedness?
Of course.
And do you not call this injustice, ignorance, cowardice, and so forth?
Certainly I do.
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So now in property, body, and soul, these three, you have mentioned three vices—poverty, disease, and injustice?
Yes.
Then which of these vices is the foulest? Is it not injustice—in short, the vice of the soul?
Far the foulest.
And if foulest, then also most evil?
How do you mean, Socrates?
Just this: the foulest is foulest in each case because it produces the greatest pain or harm or both; this follows from our previous admissions.
Quite so.
And foulest of all, we have just agreed, is injustice and,
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Yes, we have.
So then either it is most painful, that is, foulest of these vices by an excess of painfulness, or else of harmfulness, or in both ways?
Necessarily.
Then do you think that being unjust, licentious, cowardly, and ignorant is more painful than being poor and sick?
No, I do not, Socrates, from what we have said.
Portentous then must be the extent of harm, and astonishing the evil, by which the soul’s vice exceeds all the others
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Apparently.
But further, I suppose, whatever has an excess of harm in the greatest measure, must be the greatest evil in the world.
Yes.
So injustice, licentiousness, and in general, vice of soul, are the greatest evils in the world?
Apparently.
Now what is the art that relieves from poverty? Is it not money-making?
Yes.
And what from disease? Is it not medicine?
It must be.
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And what from wickedness and injustice? If you are not ready for that offhand, consider it thus: whither and to whom do we take those who are in bodily sickness?
To the doctor, Socrates.
And whither the wrongdoers and libertines?
To the law-court, do you mean?
Yes, and to pay the penalty?
I agree.
Then is it not by employing a kind of justice that those punish who punish aright?
Clearly so.
Then money-making relieves us from poverty,
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Apparently.
Which then is the fairest of these things?
Of what things, pray?
Moneymaking, medicine, justice.
Justice, Socrates, is far above the others.
Now again, if it is fairest, it causes either most pleasure or benefit or both.
Yes.
Well then, is it pleasant to be medically treated, and do those who undergo such treatment enjoy it?
I do not think so.
But it is beneficial, is it not?
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Yes.
Because one is relieved of a great evil, and hence it is worth while to endure the pain and be well.
Of course.
Is this then the happiest state of body for a man to be in—that of being medically treated—or that of never being ill at all?
Clearly, never being ill.
Yes, for what we regarded as happiness, it seems, was not this relief from evil, but its non-acquisition at any time.
That is so.
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Well now, which is the more wretched of two persons who have something evil either in body or in soul, he who is medically treated and is relieved of the evil, or he who is not treated and keeps it?
To my thinking, he who is not treated.
And we found that paying the penalty is a relief from the greatest evil, wickedness?
We did.
Because, I suppose, the justice of the court reforms us and makes us juster, and acts as a medicine for wickedness.
Yes.
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Happiest therefore is he who has no vice in his soul, since we found this to be the greatest of evils.
Clearly so.
Next after him, I take it, is he who is relieved of it.
So it seems.
And that was the man who is reproved, reprimanded, and made to pay the penalty.
Yes.
Hence the worst life is led by him who has the vice and is not relieved of it.
Apparently.
And this is the man who in committing the greatest wrongs and practicing the greatest injustice has contrived to escape reproof and chastisement and penalty alike,
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So it seems.
Because, I conceive, my excellent friend, what these persons have contrived for themselves is very much as though a man who was the victim of the worst diseases should contrive not to submit to the doctor’s penalty for his bodily transgressions and take the prescribed treatment, from a childish fear of cautery or incision, as being so painful.
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I do.
Since he was ignorant, it would seem, of the virtue of bodily health and fitness. For it is very probable, from what we have just agreed, that something like this is done also by those who evade their due penalty, Polus; they perceive its painfulness, but are blind to its benefits, and are unaware how much more wretched than lack of health in the body it is to dwell with a soul that is not healthy, but corrupt, unjust, and unholy;
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Yes, if you do not mind.
Then does it result that injustice and wrongdoing is the greatest evil?
Yes, apparently.
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And further, it appeared that paying the penalty is a relief from this evil?
It looks like it.
Whereas not paying it is a retention of the evil in us?
Yes.
Thus wrongdoing is second of evils in greatness; but to do wrong and not pay the penalty is the greatest and takes the first place among all evils.
It seems so.
Well now, my friend, was this the point at issue between us, that you counted Archelaus,
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Yes.
Then has it not been proved that this was a true statement?
Apparently.
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Very well: so if this is true, Polus, what is the great use of rhetoric? For you see by what we have just agreed that a man must keep a close watch over himself so as to avoid wrongdoing, since it would bring a great deal of evil upon him; must he not?
Certainly.
But if he is guilty of wrongdoing, either himself or anyone else he may care for, he must go of his own freewill where he may soonest pay the penalty, to the judge
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Yes, what else, indeed, are we to say, Socrates?
Then for pleading in defence of injustice, whether it is oneself or one’s parents or friends or children or country that has done the wrong, rhetoric is of no use to us at all, Polus; except one were to suppose, perchance, to the contrary,
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An extraordinary one, Socrates, it seems to me, though perhaps you do find it agrees with what went before.
Well, either that must be upset, or this necessarily follows.
Yes, that certainly is so.
And so again conversely, supposing it is our duty to injure somebody, whether an enemy or anyone else—provided only that it is not against oneself that wrong has been done by such enemy, for this we must take care to avoid
Tell me, Chaerephon, is Socrates in earnest over this, or only joking?
To my thinking, Callicles, prodigiously in earnest: still, there is nothing like asking him.
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Upon my word, just what I want to do. Tell me, Socrates, are we to take you as serious just now, or joking? For if you are serious and what you say is really true, must not the life of us human beings have been turned upside down, and must we not be doing quite the opposite, it seems, of what we ought to do?
Callicles, if men had not certain feelings, each common to one sort of people,
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Socrates, you seem to be roistering recklessly in your talk, like the true demagogue that you are; and you are declaiming now in this way because Polus has got into the same plight as he was accusing Gorgias of letting himself be led into by you. For he said, I think, when you asked Gorgias whether, supposing a man came to him with no knowledge of justice but a desire to learn rhetoric, he would instruct the man,
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If my soul had happened to be made of gold, Callicles, do you not think I should have been delighted to find one of those stones with which they test gold, and the best one; which, if I applied it, and it confirmed to me that my soul had been properly tended, would give me full assurance that I am in a satisfactory state and
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What is the point of that question, Socrates?
I will tell you. I am just thinking what a lucky stroke I have had in striking up with you.
How so?
I am certain that whenever you agree with me in any view that my soul takes, this must be the very truth.
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Why, that is what I said then, and I say it now also.
Is it the same person that you call “better” and “superior”?
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Well, I tell you plainly, they are all the same.
Now, are the many superior by nature to the one? I mean those who make the laws to keep a check on the one, as you were saying yourself just now.
Of course.
Then the ordinances of the many are those of the superior.
Certainly.
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And so of the better? For the superior are far better, by your account.
Yes.
And so their ordinances are by nature “fair,” since they are superior who made them?
I agree.
Then is it the opinion of the many that—as you also said a moment ago—justice means having an equal share, and it is fouler to wrong
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Well, most people do think so.
Then it is not only by convention that doing wrong is fouler than suffering it, and having oneÕs equal share is just,
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What an inveterate driveller the man is! Tell me, Socrates, are you not ashamed to be word-catching at your age,
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Very well, most sapient Callicles: you mean that, do you?
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Certainly I do.
Why, my wonderful friend, I have myself been guessing ever so long that you meant something of this sort by “superior,” and if I repeat my questions it is because I am so keen to know definitely what your meaning may be. For I presume you do not consider that two are better than one, or that your slaves are better than yourself, just because they are stronger than you are. Come now, tell me again from the beginning what it is you mean by the better, since you do not mean the stronger only, admirable sir, do be more gentle with me over my first lessons, or I shall cease attending your school.
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You are sarcastic, Socrates.
No, by Zethus, Callicles, whom you made use of just now
I mean the more excellent.
So you see, you are uttering mere words yourself, and explaining nothing. Will you not tell us whether by the better and superior you mean the wiser, or some other sort?
Why, to be sure, I mean those, and very much so.
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Then one wise man is often superior to ten thousand fools, by your account, and he ought to rule and they to be ruled, and the ruler should have more than they whom he rules. That is what you seem to me to intend by your statement—and I am not word-catching here—if the one is superior to the ten thousand.
Why, that is my meaning. For this is what I regard as naturally just—that being better and wiser he should have both rule and advantage over the baser people.
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Stop there now. Once more, what is your meaning this time? Suppose that a number of us are assembled together, as now, in the same place, and we have in common a good supply of food and drink, and we are of all sorts—some strong, some weak; and one of us, a doctor, is wiser than the rest in this matter and, as may well be, is stronger than some and weaker than others; will not he, being wiser than we are, be better and superior in this affair?
Certainly.
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Then is he to have a larger ration than the rest of us because he is better, or ought he as ruler to have the distribution of the whole stock, with no advantage in spending and consuming it upon his own person, if he is to avoid retribution, but merely having more than some and less than others? Or if he chance to be the weakest of all, ought he not to get the smallest share of all though he be the best, Callicles? Is it not so, good sir?
You talk of food and drink and doctors and drivel:
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Then tell me, do you call the wiser better? Yes or no?
Yes, I do.
But do you not think the better should have a larger share?
Yes, but not of food and drink.
I see; of clothes, perhaps; and the ablest weaver should have the largest coat, and go about arrayed in the greatest variety of the finest clothes?
What have clothes to do with it?
Well, shoes then; clearly he who is wisest
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Shoes—what have they to do with it? You keep on drivelling.
Well, if you do not mean things of that sort, perhaps you mean something like this: a farmer, for instance, who knows all about the land and is highly accomplished in the matter, should perhaps have an advantage in sharing the seed, and have the largest possible amount of it for use on his own land.
How you keep repeating the same thing, Socrates!
Yes, and not only that, Callicles, but on the same subjects too.
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I believe, on my soul, you absolutely cannot ever stop talking of cobblers and fullers, cooks and doctors, as though our discussion had to do with them.
Then will you tell me in what things the superior and wiser man has a right to the advantage of a larger share? Or will you neither put up with a suggestion from me nor make one yourself?
Why, I have been making mine for sometime past. First of all,
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Do you perceive, my excellent Callicles, that your count against me is not the same as mine against you? For you say I am ever repeating the same things, and reproach me with it, whereas I charge you, on the contrary, with never saying the same thing on the same subject;
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But I have told you already: men of wisdom and manliness in public affairs.
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How so? Than themselves, my friend?
What do you mean?
I mean that every man is his own ruler; or is there no need of one’s ruling oneself, but only of ruling others?
What do you mean by one who rules himself?
Nothing recondite; merely what most people mean—one who is temperate and self-mastering, ruler of the pleasures and desires
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You will have your pleasantry! You mean “the simpletons” by “the temperate.”
How so? Nobody can fail to see that I do not mean that.
Oh, you most certainly do, Socrates. For how can a man be happy if he is a slave to anybody at all? No, natural fairness and justice, I tell you now quite frankly, is this—that he who would live rightly should let his desires be
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Far from ignoble, at any rate, Callicles, is the frankness with which you develop your thesis: for you are now stating in clear terms what the rest of the world think indeed, but are loth to say. So I beg you not to give up on any account, that it may be made really evident how one ought to live. Now tell me: do you say the desires are not to be chastened if a man would be such as he ought to be, but he should let them be as great as possible and provide them with satisfaction from some source or other, and this is virtue?
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Yes, I say that.
Then it is not correct to say, as people do, that those who want nothing are happy.
No, for at that rate stones and corpses would be extremely happy.
Well, well, as you say, life is strange. For I tell you I should not wonder if EuripidesÕ words were true, when he says:
The latter is more like the truth, Socrates.
Come now, let me tell you another parable from the same school
You fail, Socrates. For that man who has taken his fill can have no pleasure any more; in fact it is what I just now called living like a stone, when one has filled up and no longer feels any joy or pain.
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Well then, if the inflow be large, must not that which runs away be of large amount also, and must not the holes for such outflow be of great size?
Certainly.
Then it is a plover’s life
Yes, it is.
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And feeling thirst and drinking when thirsty?
Yes, and having all the other desires, and being able to satisfy them, and so with these enjoyments leading a happy life.
Bravo, my fine fellow! Do go on as you have begun, and mind you show no bashfulness about it. I too, it seems, must try not to be too bashful. First of all, tell me whether a man who has an itch and wants to scratch, and may scratch in all freedom, can pass his life happily in continual scratching.
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What an odd person you are, Socrates—a regular stump-orator!
Why, of course, Callicles, that is how I upset Polus and Gorgias, and struck them with bashfulness; but you, I know, will never be upset or abashed; you are such a manly fellow. Come, just answer that.
Then I say that the man also who scratches himself will thus spend a pleasant life.
And if a pleasant one, a happy one also?
Certainly.
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Is it so if he only wants to scratch his head? Or what more am I to ask you? See, Callicles, what your answer will be, if you are asked everything in succession that links on to that statement; and the culmination of the case, as stated—the life of catamites—is not that awful, shameful, and wretched? Or will you dare to assert that these are happy if they can freely indulge their wants?
Are you not ashamed, Socrates, to lead the discussion into such topics?
What, is it I who am leading it there, noble sir, or the person who says outright that those who enjoy themselves,
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Then, so that my statement may not be inconsistent through my saying they are different, I say they are the same.
You are spoiling your first statements,
Why, you do the same, Socrates.
Then I am just as much in the wrong if I do, as you are. But look here, my gifted friend, perhaps the good is not mere unconditional enjoyment: for if it is, we have to face not only that string of shameful consequences I have just shadowed forth, but many more besides.
In your opinion, that is, Socrates.
And do you, Callicles, really maintain that it is?
I do.
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Then are we to set about discussing it as your serious view?
Oh yes, to be sure.
Come then, since that is your opinion, resolve me this: there is something, I suppose, that you call knowledge?
Yes.
And were you not saying just now that knowledge can have a certain courage coupled with it?
Yes, I was.
And you surely meant that they were two things, courage being distinct from knowledge?
Quite so.
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Well now, are pleasure and knowledge the same thing, or different?
Different, I presume, O sage of sages.
And courage too, is that different from pleasure?
Of course it is.
Come now, let us be sure to remember this, that Callicles the Acharnian said pleasant and good were the same, but knowledge and courage were different both from each other and from the good.
And Socrates of Alopece refuses to grant us this; or does he grant it?
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He does not; nor, I believe, will Callicles either, when he has rightly considered himself. For tell me, do you not regard people who are well off as being in the opposite condition to those who are badly off?
I do.
Then if these conditions are opposite to each other, must not the same hold of them as of health and disease? For, you know, a man is never well and ill at the same time, nor gets rid of health and disease together.
How do you mean?
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Take, for instance, any part of the body you like by itself, and consider it. A man, I suppose, may have a disease of the eyes, called ophthalmia?
Certainly.
Then I presume he is not sound also at that time in those same eyes?
By no conceivable means.
And what say you, when he gets rid of his ophthalmia? Does he at that time get rid too of the health of his eyes, and so at last is rid of both things together?
Far from it.
Because, I imagine, this would be an astonishing and irrational result, would it not?
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Very much so.
Whereas, I take it, he gets and loses either turn?
I agree.
And so with strength and weakness in just the same way?
Yes.
And speed and slowness?
Certainly.
And so too with good things and happiness and their opposites—bad things and wretchedness—does one take on each of these in turn, and in turn put it off?
Absolutely, I presume.
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Then if we find any things that a man puts off and retains at one and the same moment, clearly these cannot be the good and the bad. Do we admit this? Now consider very carefully before you answer.
Oh, I admit it down to the ground.
So now for our former admissions: did you say that being hungry was pleasant or painful? I mean, hunger itself.
Painful, I said; though eating when one is hungry I call pleasant.
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I see: but at all events hunger itself is painful, is it not?
I agree.
And so too with thirst?
Quite so.
Then am I to ask you any further questions, or do you admit that all want and desire is painful?
I admit it; no, do not question me further.
Very good: but drinking when one is thirsty you surely say is pleasant?
I do.
Now, in this phrase of yours the words “when one is thirsty,” I take it, stand for “when one is in pain”?
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Yes.
But drinking is a satisfaction of the want, and a pleasure?
Yes.
So in the act of drinking, you say, one has enjoyment?
Quite so.
When one is thirsty?
I agree.
That is, in pain?
Yes.
Then do you perceive the conclusion,—that you say one enjoys oneself, though in pain at the same moment, when you say one drinks when one is thirsty? Or does this not occur at once, at the same place and time—in either soul or body, as you please? For I fancy it makes no difference. Is this so or not?
It is.
But further, you say it is impossible to be badly off, or to fare ill, at the same time as one is faring well.
Yes, I do.
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But to enjoy oneself when feeling pain you have admitted to be possible.
Apparently.
Hence enjoyment is not faring well, nor is feeling pain faring ill, so that the pleasant is found to be different from the good.
I cannot follow these subtleties of yours, Socrates.
You can, but you play the innocent, Callicles. Just go on a little further,
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I cannot tell what you mean.
No, no, Callicles, you must answer him, for our sakes also, that the arguments may be brought to a conclusion.
But Socrates is always like this, Gorgias he keeps on asking petty, unimportant questions until he refutes one.
Why, what does that matter to you? In any case it is not your credit that is at stake, Callicles; just permit Socrates to refute you in such manner as he chooses.
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Well then, proceed with those little cramped questions of yours, since Gorgias is so minded.
You are fortunate, Callicles, in having been initiated into the Great Mysteries before the Little:
I grant it.
And so, with hunger and the rest, does he cease to feel the desires and pleasures at the same time?
That is so.
And also ceases to feel the pains and pleasures at the same time?
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Yes.
But still he does not cease to have the good and bad at the same time, as you agreed; and now, you do not agree?
I do; and what then?
Only that we get the result, my friend, that the good things are not the same as the pleasant, nor the bad as the painful. For with the one pair the cessation is of both at once, but with the other two it is not, since they are distinct. How then can pleasant things be the same as good, or painful things as bad? Or if you like, consider it another way—for I fancy that even after that you do not admit it. Just observe: do you not call good people good owing to the presence of good things,
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I do.
Well now, do you give the name of good men to fools and cowards? It was not they just now but brave and wise men whom you so described. Or is it not these that you call good?
To be sure it is.
And now, have you ever seen a silly child enjoying itself?
I have.
And have you never seen a silly man enjoying himself?
I should think I have; but what has that to do with it?
Nothing; only answer.
I have seen one.
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And again, a man of sense in a state of pain or enjoyment?
Yes.
And which sort are more apt to feel enjoyment or pain, the wise or the foolish?
I should think there is not much difference.
Well, that will suffice. In war have you ever seen a coward?
Of course I have.
Well now, when the enemy withdrew, which seemed to you to enjoy it more, the cowards or the brave?
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Both did, I thought; or if not that, about equally.
No matter. Anyhow, the cowards do enjoy it?
Very much.
And the fools, it would seem.
Yes.
And when the foe advances, do the cowards alone feel pain, or the brave as well?
Both.
Alike?
More, perhaps, the cowards.
And when the foe withdraws, do they not enjoy it more?
Perhaps.
So the foolish and the wise, and the cowardly and the brave,
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I agree.
But further, are the wise and brave good, and the cowards and fools bad?
Yes.
Then the good and the bad feel enjoyment and pain about equally?
I agree.
Then are the good and the bad about equally good and bad? Or are the bad in some yet greater measure good and bad?
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Why, upon my word, I cannot tell what you mean.
You are aware, are you not, that you hold that the good are good by the presence of good things, and that the bad are so by the presence of bad things? And that the pleasures are the good things, and the pains bad things?
Yes, I am.
Hence in those who have enjoyment the good things—the pleasures—are present, so long as they enjoy?
Of course.
Then, good things being present, those who enjoy are good?
Yes.
Well now, in those who feel pain are not bad things present, namely pains?
They are.
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And it is by the presence of bad things, you say, that the bad are bad? Or do you no longer say so?
I do say so.
Then whoever enjoys is good, and whoever is pained, bad?
Certainly.
You mean, those more so who feel these things more, and those less who feel less, and those about equally who feel about equally?
Yes.
Now you say that the wise and the foolish, the cowardly and the brave, feel enjoyment and pain about equally, or the cowards even more?
I do.
Then just help me to reckon up the results we get from our admissions for you know they say: “That which seemeth well, Ôtis well twice and also thrice to tell,”
Yes.
And that the foolish and cowardly is bad?
Certainly.
And again, that he who enjoys is good?
Yes.
And that he who feels pain is bad?
Necessarily.
And that the good and the bad feel enjoyment and pain in a like manner, or perhaps the bad rather more?
Yes.
Then is the bad man made bad or good in a like manner to the good man,
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Let me tell you, Socrates, all the time that I have been listening to you and yielding you agreement, I have been remarking the puerile delight with which you cling to any concession one may make to you, even in jest. So you suppose that I or anybody else in the world does not regard some pleasures as better, and others worse!
Oh ho, Callicles, what a rascal you are,
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Yes.
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Then are the beneficial ones good, and the harmful ones bad?
Certainly.
And are those beneficial which do some good, and those evil which do some evil?
I agree.
Now are these the sort you mean—for instance, in the body, the pleasures of eating and drinking that we mentioned a moment ago? Then the pleasures of this sort which produce health in the body, or strength, or any other bodily excellence,—are these good, and those which have the opposite effects, bad?
Certainly.
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And similarly in the case of pains, are some worthy and some base?
Of course.
So it is the worthy pleasures and pains that we ought to choose in all our doings?
Certainly.
And the base ones not?
Clearly so.
Because, you know, Polus and I, if you recollect, decided
I do.
Then it is for the sake of what is good that we should do everything, including what is pleasant, not the good for the sake of the pleasant.
Certainly.
Now is it in every manÕs power to pick out which sort of pleasant things are good and which bad, or is professional skill required in each case?
Professional skill.
Then let us recall those former points I was putting to Polus and Gorgias.
No, I do not.
Well, I will put it to you more plainly. Seeing that we have agreed, you and I, that there is such a thing as “good,” and such a thing as “pleasant,” and that the pleasant is other than the good, and that for the acquisition of either there is a certain practice or preparation—the quest of the pleasant in the one case, and that of the good in the other—but first you must either assent or object to this statement of mine:
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I am with you entirely.
Then try and come to a definite agreement with me on what I was saying to our friends here, and see if you now find that what I then said was true. I was saying, I think, that cookery seems to me
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Not I; I agree with you, in order that your argument may reach a conclusion, and that I may gratify Gorgias here.
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And is this the case with only one soul, and not with two or many?
No, it is also the case with two or many.
Then is it possible also to gratify them all at once, collectively, with no consideration of what is best?
I should think it is.
Then can you say what are the pursuits which effect this? Or rather, if you like, when I ask you, and one of them seems to you to be of this class, say yes, and when one does not, say no. And first let us consider flute-playing. Does it not seem to you one of this sort,
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It does seem so to me.
And so too with all similar pursuits, such as harp-playing in the contests?
Yes.
And what of choral productions and dithyrambic compositions? Are they not manifestly, in your view, of the same kind? Or do you suppose Cinesias,
Clearly the latter is the case, Socrates, with Cinesias.
And what of his father Meles? Did he ever strike you as looking to what was best in his minstrelsy? Or did he, perhaps, not even make the pleasantest his aim? For his singing used to be a pain to the audience. But consider now: do you not think that all minstrelsy and composing of dithyrambs have been invented for the sake of pleasure?
I do.
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Then what of the purpose that has inspired our stately and wonderful tragic poetry? Are her endeavor and purpose, to your mind, merely for the gratification of the spectators, or does she strive hard, if there be anything pleasant and gratifying, but bad for them, to leave that unsaid, and if there be anything unpleasant, but beneficial, both to speak and sing that, whether they enjoy it or not? To which of these two aims, think you, is tragic poetry devoted ?
It is quite obvious, in her case, Socrates, that
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Well now, that kind of thing, Callicles, did we say just now, is flattery ?
Certainly.
Pray then, if we strip any kind of poetry of its melody, its rhythm and its meter, we get mere speeches as the residue, do we not?
That must be so.
And those speeches are spoken to a great crowd of people?
Yes.
Hence poetry is a kind of public speaking.
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Apparently.
Then it must be a rhetorical public speaking or do you not think that the poets use rhetoric in the theaters?
Yes, I do.
So now we have found a kind of rhetoric addressed to such a public as is compounded of children and women and men, and slaves as well as free; an art that we do not quite approve of, since we call it a flattering one.
To be sure.
Very well; but now, the rhetoric addressed to the Athenian people,
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This question of yours is not quite so simple; for there are some who have a regard for the citizens in the words that they utter, while there are also others of the sort that you mention.
That is enough for me. For if this thing also is twofold, one part of it, I presume, will be flattery and a base mob-oratory, while the other is noble—the endeavor, that is, to make the citizens’ souls as good as possible, and the persistent effort to say what is best, whether it prove more or less pleasant to one’s hearers.
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No, upon my word, I cannot tell you of anyone, at least among the orators of today.
Well then, can you mention one among those of older times whom the Athenians have to thank for any betterment that started at the time of his first harangues, as a change from the worse state in which he originally found them? For my part, I have no idea who the man is.
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Why, do you hear no mention of Themistocles and what a good man he was, and Cimon and Miltiades and the great Pericles, who has died recently,
Yes, Callicles, if that which you spoke of just now is true virtue—the satisfaction of one’s own and other men’s desires; but if that is not so, and the truth is—as we were compelled to admit in the subsequent discussion—that only those desires
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Ah, but if you search properly you will find one.
Then let us just consider the matter calmly, and see if any of them has appeared with that skill. Come now: the good man, who is intent on the best when he speaks, will surely not speak at random in whatever he says, but with a view to some object?
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Let it be as you say.
Then if regularity and order are found in a house, it will be a good one, and if irregularity, a bad one?
I agree.
And it will be just the same with a ship?
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Yes.
And further, with our bodies also, can we say?
Certainly.
And what of the soul? If it shows irregularity, will it be good, or if it has a certain regularity and order?
Our former statements oblige us to agree to this also.
Then what name do we give to the effect of regularity and order in the body?
Health and strength, I suppose you mean.
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I do. And what, again, to the effect produced in the soul by regularity and order? Try to find the name here, and tell it me as before.
Why not name it yourself, Socrates ?
Well, if you prefer it, I will; and do you, if I seem to you to name it rightly, say so; if not, you must refute me and not let me have my way. For it seems to me that any regularity of the body is called healthiness, and this leads to health being produced in it, and general bodily excellence. Is that so or not?
It is.
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And the regular and orderly states of the soul are called lawfulness and law, whereby men are similarly made law-abiding and orderly; and these states are justice and temperance. Do you agree or not?
Be it so.
Then it is this that our orator, the man of art and virtue, will have in view, when he applies to our souls the words that he speaks, and also in all his actions, and in giving any gift he will give it, and in taking anything away he will take it, with this thought always before his mind—
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I agree.
For what advantage is there, Callicles, in giving to a sick and ill-conditioned body a quantity of even the most agreeable things to eat and drink, or anything else whatever, if it is not going to profit thereby any more, let us say, than by the opposite treatment, on any fair reckoning, and may profit less? Is this so?
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Be it so.
Because, I imagine, it is no gain for a man to live in a depraved state of body, since in this case his life must be a depraved one also. Or is not that the case?
Yes.
And so the satisfaction of one’s desires—if one is hungry, eating as much as one likes, or if thirsty, drinking—is generally allowed by doctors when one is in health; but they practically never allow one in sickness to take one’s fill of things that one desires: do you agree with me in this?
I do.
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And does not the same rule, my excellent friend, apply to the soul? So long as it is in a bad state—thoughtless, licentious, unjust and unholy—we must restrain its desires and not permit it to do anything except what will help it to be better: do you grant this, or not?
I do.
For thus, I take it, the soul itself is better off?
To be sure.
And is restraining a person from what he desires correcting him?
Yes.
Then correction is better for the soul than uncorrected licence, as you were thinking just now.
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I have no notion what you are referring to, Socrates; do ask some one else.
Here is a fellow who cannot endure a kindness done him, or the experience in himself of what our talk is about—a correction!
Well, and not a jot do I care, either, for anything you say; I only gave you those answers to oblige Gorgias.
Very good. So now, what shall we do? Break off our argument midway?
You must decide that for yourself.
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Why, they say one does wrong to leave off even stories in the middle; one should set a head on the thing, that it may not go about headless. So proceed with the rest of your answers, that our argument may pick up a head.
How overbearing you are, Socrates! Take my advice, and let this argument drop, or find some one else to argue with.
Then who else is willing? Surely we must not leave the argument there, unfinished?
Could you not get through it yourself, either talking on by yourself or answering your own questions?
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So that, in Epicharmus’s phrase,
Well, my opinion is, Socrates,
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Why, to be sure, Gorgias, I myself should have liked to continue discussing with Callicles here until I had paid him an Amphion’s speech in return for his of Zethus.
Proceed, good sir, by yourself, and finish it off.
Give ear, then; but first I will resume our argument from the beginning. Are the pleasant and the good the same thing? Not the same, as Callicles and I agreed. Is the pleasant thing to be done for the sake of the good, or the good for the sake of the pleasant? The pleasant for the sake of the good.
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Proceed, good sir.
I say, then, that if the temperate soul is good, one that is in the opposite state to this sensible
Not otherwise.
Then of these two, doing and suffering wrong, we declare doing wrong to be the greater evil, and suffering it the less. Now with what should a man provide himself in order to come to his own rescue, and so have both of the benefits that arise from doing no wrong on the one hand,
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The answer to that is obvious: by means of power.
But what about doing wrong? Will the mere not wishing to do it suffice—since, in that case, he will not do it—or does it require that he also provide himself with some power or art,
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Let it be as you would have it, Socrates, in order that you may come to a conclusion of your argument.
Then for this purpose also, of not doing wrong, it seems we must provide ourselves with a certain power or art.
To be sure.
Now what can be the art of providing so that we suffer no wrong, or as little as possible? Consider if you take the same view of it as I do. For in my view it is this: one must either be a ruler, or even a despot, in one’s city, or else an associate of the existing government.
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Do you note, Socrates, how ready I am to praise, when you say a good thing? This seems to me excellently spoken.
Then see if this next statement of mine strikes you as a good one too. It seems to me that the closest possible friendship between man and man is that mentioned by the sages of old time as “like to like.” Do you not agree?
I do.
So where you have a savage, uneducated ruler as despot, if there were some one in the city far better than he, I suppose the despot would be afraid of him
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That is so.
Nor a friend to anyone who was much inferior to him either; for the despot would despise him and never show him the attention due to a friend.
That is true also.
Then the only friend of any account that remains for such a person is a man of his own temper, who blames and praises the same things, and is thus willing to be governed by him and to be subject to his rule. He is a man who will have great power in that state;
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Yes.
Hence if one of the young men in that city should reflect: In what way can I have great power, and no one may do me wrong?—this, it would seem, is the path he must take, to accustom himself from his earliest youth to be delighted and annoyed by the same things as his master, and contrive to be as like the other as possible. Is it not so?
Yes.
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And so this man will have attained to a condition of suffering no wrong and having great power—as your party maintain—in the city.
Certainly.
And of doing no wrong likewise? Or is it quite the contrary, if he is to be like his unjust ruler, and have great influence with him? Well, for my part, I think his efforts will be all the opposite way, that is, towards enabling himself to do as much wrong as possible and to pay no penalty for the wrong he does; will they not?
Apparently.
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And thus he will find himself possessed of the greatest evil, that of having his soul depraved and maimed as a result of his imitation of his master and the power he has got.
You have a strange way of twisting your arguments, at each point, this way or that, Socrates! Surely you know that this imitator will put to death anyone who does not imitate his master, if he pleases, and will strip him of his property.
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I know that, my good Callicles, if I am not deaf, as I have heard it so often of late from you and Polus, and from almost every one else in the town; but you in return must hear what I say—that he will put a man to death if he pleases, but it will be a villain slaying a good man and true.
And is not this the very thing that makes one indignant?
Not if one is a man of sense, as our argument indicates. Or do you suppose that the object of a man’s efforts should be to live as long a time as possible, and to cultivate those arts which preserve us from every danger;
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Yes, on my word I do, and sound advice it is that I give you.
But now, my excellent friend, do you think there is anything grand in the accomplishment of swimming?
No, in truth, not I.
Yet, you know, that too saves men from death, when they have got into a plight of the kind in which that accomplishment is needed. But if this seems to you too small a thing, I will tell you of a more important one,
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It seems to me, I cannot tell how, that your statement is right, Socrates, but I share the common feeling; I do not quite believe you.
Because the love of Demus, Callicles, is there in your soul to resist me: but if haply
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Certainly.
Then the one, aiming at pleasure, is ignoble and really nothing but flattery, is it not?
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Be it so, if you like.
And the aim of the other is to make that which we are tending, whether it be body or soul, as good as may be.
To be sure.
Then ought we not to make it our endeavor, in tending our city and its citizens, to make those citizens as good as possible? For without this, you see, as we found in our former argument, there is no use in offering any other service, unless the intentions
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Certainly, if you so prefer.
Then if you and I, Callicles, in setting about some piece of public business for the state, were to invite one another to see to the building part of it, say the most important erections either of walls or arsenals or temples, would it be our duty to consider and examine ourselves,
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Certainly.
And so again, in the second place, whether we had ever erected any building privately for one of our friends or for ourselves, and whether such building was handsome or ugly? And if we found on consideration that we had been under good and reputable masters,
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Yes, to be sure.
And so too with all the rest: suppose, for instance, we had undertaken the duties of state-physicians, and were to invite one another to the work as qualified doctors, we should, I presume, have first inquired of each other, I of you and you of me: Let us see now, in Heaven’s name; how does Socrates himself stand as regards his body’s health? Or has anyone else, slave or free, ever had Socrates to thank for ridding him of a disease? And I also, I fancy, should make the same sort of inquiry about you; and then, if we found we had never been the cause
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I do.
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And now, most excellent sir, since you are yourself just entering upon a public career, and are inviting me to do the same, and reproaching me for not doing it, shall we not inquire of one another: Let us see, has Callicles ever made any of the citizens better? Is there one who was previously wicked, unjust, licentious, and senseless, and has to thank Callicles for making him an upright, honorable man, whether stranger or citizen, bond or free? Tell me,
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You are contentious, Socrates!
No, it is not from contentiousness that I ask you this, but from a real wish to know in what manner you can imagine you ought to conduct yourself as one of our public men. Or can it be, then, that you will let us see you concerning yourself
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Yes, I do.
Then if they were good, clearly each of them was changing the citizens from worse to better. Was this so, or not?
Yes.
So when Pericles began to speak before the people, the Athenians were worse than when he made his last speeches?
Perhaps.
Not “perhaps,” as you say, excellent sir; it follows of necessity from what we have admitted,
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Well, what then?
Nothing: but tell me one thing in addition,—whether the Athenians are said to have become better because of Pericles, or quite the contrary, to have been corrupted by him. What I, for my part, hear is that Pericles has made the Athenians idle, cowardly, talkative, and avaricious, by starting the system of public fees.
You hear that from the folk with battered ears,
Ah, but what is no longer a matter of hearsay, but rather of certain knowledge, for you as well as for me, is that Pericles was popular at first, and the Athenians passed no degrading sentence upon him so long as they were “worse”; but as soon as they had been made upright and honorable by him,
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What then? Was Pericles a bad man on that account?
Well, at any rate a herdsman in charge of asses or horses or oxen would be considered a bad one for being like that—if he took over animals that did not kick him or butt or bite, and in the result they were found to be doing all these things out of sheer wildness. Or do you not consider any keeper
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Certainly I do, to oblige you.
Then oblige me still further by answering this: is man also one of the animals, or not?
Of course he is.
And Pericles had charge of men?
Yes.
Well now, ought they not, as we admitted this moment, to have been made by him more just instead of more unjust,
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Certainly.
And the just are gentle, as Homer said.
Yes.
But, however, he turned them out wilder than when he took them in hand, and that against himself, the last person he would have wished them to attack.
You wish me to agree with you?
Yes, if you consider I am speaking the truth.
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Then be it so.
And if wilder, more unjust and worse?
Be it so.
Then Pericles was not a good statesman, by this argument.
You at least say not.
And you too, I declare, by what you admitted. And now about Cimon once more, tell me, did not the people whom he tended ostracize him in order that they might not hear his voice for ten years? And Themistocles, did they not treat him in just the same way, and add the punishment of exile?
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No, I do not.
So what we said before, it seems, was true,
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But still there can be no suggestion, Socrates, that any of the present-day men has ever achieved anything like
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My admirable friend, neither do I blame the latter, at least as servants of the state; indeed, I consider they have shown themselves more serviceable than those of our time, and more able to procure for the city the things she desired. But in diverting her desires another way instead of complying with them—in persuading or compelling her people to what would help them to be better—
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And you are the man who could not speak unless somebody answered you?
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Apparently I can. Just now, at any rate, I am rather extending my speeches, since you will not answer me. But in the name of friendship, my good fellow, tell me if you do not think it unreasonable for a man, while professing to have made another good, to blame him for being wicked in spite of having been made good by him and still being so?
Yes, I do.
Well, and you hear such things said by those who profess to give men education in virtue?
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I do; but what is one to say of such worthless people?
And what is one to say of those who, professing to govern the state and take every care that she be as good as possible, turn upon her and accuse her, any time it suits them, of being utterly wicked? Do you see any difference between these men and the others? Sophist and orator, my estimable friend, are the same thing, or very much of a piece, as I was telling Polus; but you in your ignorance think the one thing,
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Certainly.
And they alone, I presume, could most likely afford to give away their services without fee, if their words were true. For when a man has received any other service, for example, if he has acquired a fast pace from a trainer’s lessons, he might possibly cheat him of his due if the trainer freely offered himself and did not stipulate for a fee to be paid down by the other as nearly as possible at the moment when he imparted to him the fast pace he required;
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Yes.
And so whoever removes this particular thing, injustice, need never have a fear of being unjustly treated; this benefit alone may be freely bestowed without risk, granted that one really had the power of making people good. Is it not so?
I agree.
Then this, it seems, is the reason why there is no disgrace in taking money for giving every other kind of advice, as about building or the rest of the arts.
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It does seem so.
But about this business of finding the way to be as good as possible, and of managing one’s own household or city for the best, it is recognized to be a disgrace for one to decline to give advice except for a payment in cash, is it not?
Yes.
The reason evidently being that this is the only sort of service that makes the person so served desire to do one in return and hence it is felt to be a good sign when this service that one has done is repaid to one in kind; but when this is not so, the contrary is felt. Is the case as I say?
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It is.
Then please specify to which of these two ministrations to the state you are inviting me—that of struggling hard, like a doctor, with the Athenians to make them as good as possible, or that of seeking to serve their wants and humor them at every turn? Tell me the truth, Callicles; for it is only right that, as you began by speaking to me frankly, you should continue to tell me what you think. So now speak out like a good, generous man.
I say then, the way of seeking to serve them.
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So it is to a flatterer’s work, most noble sir, that you invite me?
Work for a mean Mysian,
Do not tell me, what you have so often repeated, that anyone who pleases will put me to death, lest I on my side should have to tell you that it will be a villain killing a good man; nor that anyone may strip me of whatever I have,
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It quite strikes me, Socrates, that you believe not one of these troubles could befall you, as though you dwelt out of the way, and could never be dragged into a law court by some perhaps utterly paltry rascal.
Then I am a fool, Callicles, in truth, if I do not suppose that in this city anyone, whoever he was, might find himself, as luck should have it, in any sort of plight. Of one thing, however, I am sure—that if ever I am brought before the court and stand in any such danger as you mention, it will be some villain who brings me there,
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Do, by all means.
I think I am one of few, not to say the only one, in Athens who attempts the true art of statesmanship, and the only man of the present time who manages affairs of state: hence, as the speeches that I make from time to time are not aimed at gratification, but at what is best instead of what is most pleasant, and as I do not care to deal in “these pretty toys”
I daresay: one must suppose so.
Then you suppose he would be utterly at a loss
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Quite so.
Such, however, I am sure would be my own fate if I were brought before the court. For not only shall I have no pleasures to plead as having been provided by me—which they regard as services and benefits, whereas I envy neither those who provide them nor those for whom they are provided—but if anyone alleges that I either corrupt the younger men by reducing them to perplexity, or revile the older with bitter expressions whether in private or in public, I shall be unable either to tell the truth and say—“It is on just ground that I say all this, and
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Then do you think, Socrates, that a man in such a case and with no power of standing up for himself makes a fine figure in a city?
Yes, if he had that one resource, Callicles, which you have repeatedly admitted; if he had stood up for himself
-
Well, as you have completed the rest of the business, go on and complete this also.
-
Give ear then, as they say, to a right fine story, which you will regard as a fable, I fancy, but I as an actual account; for what I am about to tell you I mean to offer as the truth. By Homer’s account,
πολέμου καὶ μάχης φασὶ χρῆναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω μεταλαγχάνειν.
ἀλλʼ ἦ, τὸ λεγόμενον, κατόπιν ἑορτῆς ἥκομεν καὶ ὑστεροῦμεν;
καὶ μάλα γε ἀστείας ἑορτῆς· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ καλὰ Γοργίας ἡμῖν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἐπεδείξατο.
τούτων μέντοι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, αἴτιος Χαιρεφῶν ὅδε, ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἀναγκάσας ἡμᾶς διατρῖψαι.
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οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐγὼ γὰρ καὶ ἰάσομαι. φίλος γάρ μοι Γοργίας, ὥστʼ ἐπιδείξεται ἡμῖν, εἰ μὲν δοκεῖ, νῦν, ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, εἰς αὖθις.
τί δέ, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν; ἐπιθυμεῖ Σωκράτης ἀκοῦσαι Γοργίου;
ἐπʼ αὐτό γέ τοι τοῦτο πάρεσμεν.
οὐκοῦν ὅταν βούλησθε παρʼ ἐμὲ ἥκειν οἴκαδε· παρʼ ἐμοὶ γὰρ Γοργίας καταλύει καὶ ἐπιδείξεται ὑμῖν.
εὖ λέγεις, ὦ Καλλίκλεις. ἀλλʼ ἆρα ἐθελήσειεν ἂν
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οὐδὲν οἷον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν, ὦ Σώκρατες. καὶ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἓν τοῦτʼ ἦν τῆς ἐπιδείξεως· ἐκέλευε γοῦν νυνδὴ ἐρωτᾶν ὅτι τις βούλοιτο τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων, καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντα ἔφη ἀποκρινεῖσθαι.
ἦ καλῶς λέγεις. ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, ἐροῦ αὐτόν.
τί ἔρωμαι;
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ὅστις ἐστίν.
πῶς λέγεις;
ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐτύγχανεν ὢν ὑποδημάτων δημιουργός, ἀπεκρίνατο ἂν δήπου σοι ὅτι σκυτοτόμος· ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις ὡς λέγω;
μανθάνω καὶ ἐρήσομαι. εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Γοργία, ἀληθῆ λέγει Καλλικλῆς ὅδε ὅτι ἐπαγγέλλῃ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὅτι ἄν τίς σε ἐρωτᾷ;
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ἀληθῆ, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν· καὶ γὰρ νυνδὴ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐπηγγελλόμην, καὶ λέγω ὅτι οὐδείς μέ πω ἠρώτηκε καινὸν οὐδὲν πολλῶν ἐτῶν.
ἦ που ἄρα ῥᾳδίως ἀποκρινῇ, ὦ Γοργία.
πάρεστι τούτου πεῖραν, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, λαμβάνειν.
νὴ Δία· ἂν δέ γε βούλῃ, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, ἐμοῦ. Γοργίας μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπειρηκέναι μοι δοκεῖ· πολλὰ γὰρ ἄρτι διελήλυθεν.
τί δέ, ὦ Πῶλε; οἴει σὺ κάλλιον ἂν Γοργίου ἀποκρίνασθαι;
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τί δὲ τοῦτο, ἐὰν σοί γε ἱκανῶς;
οὐδέν· ἀλλʼ ἐπειδὴ σὺ βούλει, ἀποκρίνου.
Ἐρώτα.
ἐρωτῶ δή. εἰ ἐτύγχανε Γοργίας ἐπιστήμων ὢν τῆς τέχνης ἧσπερ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Ἡρόδικος, τί ἂν αὐτὸν ὠνομάζομεν δικαίως; οὐχ ὅπερ ἐκεῖνον;
πάνυ γε.
ἰατρὸν ἄρα φάσκοντες αὐτὸν εἶναι καλῶς ἂν ἐλέγομεν.
ναί.
εἰ δέ γε ἧσπερ Ἀριστοφῶν ὁ Ἀγλαοφῶντος ἢ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ ἔμπειρος ἦν τέχνης, τίνα ἂν αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς ἐκαλοῦμεν;
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δῆλον ὅτι ζωγράφον.
νῦν δʼ ἐπειδὴ τίνος τέχνης ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν, τίνα ἂν καλοῦντες αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς καλοῖμεν;
ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, πολλαὶ τέχναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰσὶν ἐκ τῶν ἐμπειριῶν ἐμπείρως ηὑρημέναι· ἐμπειρία μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸν αἰῶνα ἡμῶν πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τέχνην, ἀπειρία δὲ κατὰ τύχην. ἑκάστων δὲ τούτων μεταλαμβάνουσιν ἄλλοι ἄλλων ἄλλως, τῶν δὲ ἀρίστων οἱ ἄριστοι· ὧν καὶ Γοργίας ἐστὶν ὅδε, καὶ μετέχει τῆς καλλίστης τῶν τεχνῶν.
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καλῶς γε, ὦ Γοργία, φαίνεται πῶλος παρεσκευάσθαι εἰς λόγους· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὃ ὑπέσχετο Χαιρεφῶντι οὐ ποιεῖ.
τί μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες;
τὸ ἐρωτώμενον οὐ πάνυ μοι φαίνεται ἀποκρίνεσθαι.
ἀλλὰ σύ, εἰ βούλει, ἐροῦ αὐτόν.
οὔκ, εἰ αὐτῷ γε σοὶ βουλομένῳ ἐστὶν ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ ἂν ἥδιον σέ. δῆλος γάρ μοι πῶλος καὶ ἐξ ὧν εἴρηκεν ὅτι τὴν καλουμένην ῥητορικὴν μᾶλλον μεμελέτηκεν ἢ διαλέγεσθαι.
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τί δή, ὦ Σώκρατες;
ὅτι, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐρομένου Χαιρεφῶντος τίνος Γοργίας ἐπιστήμων τέχνης, ἐγκωμιάζεις μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν τέχνην ὥσπερ τινὸς ψέγοντος, ἥτις δέ ἐστιν οὐκ ἀπεκρίνω.
οὐ γὰρ ἀπεκρινάμην ὅτι εἴη ἡ καλλίστη;
καὶ μάλα. ἀλλʼ οὐδεὶς ἐρωτᾷ ποία τις ἡ Γοργίου τέχνη, ἀλλὰ τίς, καὶ ὅντινα δέοι καλεῖν τὸν Γοργίαν· ὥσπερ τὰ ἔμπροσθέν σοι ὑπετείνατο Χαιρεφῶν καὶ αὐτῷ καλῶς
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τῆς ῥητορικῆς, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ῥήτορα ἄρα χρή σε καλεῖν;
ἀγαθόν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ δὴ ὅ γε εὔχομαι εἶναι, ὡς ἔφη Ὅμηρος, βούλει με καλεῖν.
ἀλλὰ βούλομαι.
κάλει δή.
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οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλους σε φῶμεν δυνατὸν εἶναι ποιεῖν;
ἐπαγγέλλομαί γε δὴ ταῦτα οὐ μόνον ἐνθάδε ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοθι.
ἆρʼ οὖν ἐθελήσαις ἄν, ὦ Γοργία, ὥσπερ νῦν διαλεγόμεθα, διατελέσαι τὸ μὲν ἐρωτῶν, τὸ δʼ ἀποκρινόμενος, τὸ δὲ μῆκος τῶν λόγων τοῦτο, οἷον καὶ πῶλος ἤρξατο, εἰς αὖθις ἀποθέσθαι; ἀλλʼ ὅπερ ὑπισχνῇ, μὴ ψεύσῃ, ἀλλὰ ἐθέλησον κατὰ βραχὺ τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι.
εἰσὶ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔνιαι τῶν ἀποκρίσεων ἀναγκαῖαι διὰ μακρῶν τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ
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τούτου μὴν δεῖ, ὦ Γοργία· καί μοι ἐπίδειξιν αὐτοῦ τούτου ποίησαι, τῆς βραχυλογίας, μακρολογίας δὲ εἰς αὖθις.
ἀλλὰ ποιήσω, καὶ οὐδενὸς φήσεις βραχυλογωτέρου ἀκοῦσαι.
φέρε δή· ῥητορικῆς γὰρ φῂς ἐπιστήμων τέχνης
-
ναί.
οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ μουσικὴ περὶ τὴν τῶν μελῶν ποίησιν;
ναί.
νὴ τὴν Ἥραν, ὦ Γοργία, ἄγαμαί γε τὰς ἀποκρίσεις, ὅτι ἀποκρίνῃ ὡς οἷόν τε διὰ βραχυτάτων.
πάνυ γὰρ οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιεικῶς τοῦτο ποιεῖν.
εὖ λέγεις. ἴθι δή μοι ἀπόκριναι οὕτως καὶ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς, περὶ τί τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη;
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περὶ λόγους.
ποίους τούτους, ὦ Γοργία; ἆρα οἳ δηλοῦσι τοὺς κάμνοντας, ὡς ἂν διαιτώμενοι ὑγιαίνοιεν;
οὔ.
οὐκ ἄρα περὶ πάντας γε τοὺς λόγους ἡ ῥητορική ἐστιν.
οὐ δῆτα.
ἀλλὰ μὴν λέγειν γε ποιεῖ δυνατούς.
ναί.
οὐκοῦν περὶ ὧνπερ λέγειν, καὶ φρονεῖν;
πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
ἆρʼ οὖν,
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ἀνάγκη.
καὶ ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, περὶ λόγους ἐστίν.
ναί.
τούς γε περὶ τὰ νοσήματα;
μάλιστα.
οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ γυμναστικὴ περὶ λόγους ἐστὶν τοὺς περὶ εὐεξίαν τε τῶν σωμάτων καὶ καχεξίαν;
πάνυ γε.
καὶ μὴν καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι, ὦ Γοργία, οὕτως
-
φαίνεται.
τί οὖν δή ποτε τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας οὐ ῥητορικὰς καλεῖς, οὔσας περὶ λόγους, εἴπερ ταύτην ῥητορικὴν καλεῖς, ἣ ἂν ᾖ περὶ λόγους;
ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων τεχνῶν περὶ χειρουργίας τε καὶ τοιαύτας πράξεις ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν πᾶσά ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, τῆς δὲ ῥητορικῆς οὐδέν ἐστιν τοιοῦτον χειρούργημα, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα ἡ πρᾶξις καὶ ἡ κύρωσις διὰ λόγων
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ἆρʼ οὖν μανθάνω οἵαν αὐτὴν βούλει καλεῖν; τάχα δὲ εἴσομαι σαφέστερον. ἀλλʼ ἀπόκριναι· εἰσὶν ἡμῖν τέχναι. ἦ γάρ;
ναί.
πασῶν δὴ οἶμαι τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν μὲν ἐργασία τὸ πολύ ἐστιν καὶ λόγου βραχέος δέονται, ἔνιαι δὲ οὐδενὸς ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆς τέχνης περαίνοιτο ἂν καὶ διὰ σιγῆς, οἷον γραφικὴ καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιία καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαί. τὰς τοιαύτας
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πάνυ μὲν οὖν καλῶς ὑπολαμβάνεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ἕτεραι δέ γέ εἰσι τῶν τεχνῶν αἳ διὰ λόγου πᾶν περαίνουσι, καὶ ἔργου ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἢ οὐδενὸς προσδέονται ἢ βραχέος πάνυ, οἷον ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ καὶ λογιστικὴ καὶ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ πεττευτική γε καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ τέχναι, ὧν ἔνιαι σχεδόν τι ἴσους τοὺς λόγους ἔχουσι ταῖς πράξεσιν, αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ πλείους, καὶ τὸ παράπαν πᾶσα ἡ πρᾶξις καὶ τὸ
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ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
ἀλλʼ οὔτοι τούτων γε οὐδεμίαν οἶμαί σε βούλεσθαι ῥητορικὴν καλεῖν, οὐχ ὅτι τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως εἶπες, ὅτι ἡ διὰ λόγου τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσα ῥητορική ἐστιν, καὶ ὑπολάβοι ἄν τις, εἰ βούλοιτο δυσχεραίνειν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἄρα ῥητορικήν, ὦ Γοργία, λέγεις;
ἀλλʼ οὐκ οἶμαί σε οὔτε τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν οὔτε τὴν γεωμετρίαν ῥητορικὴν λέγειν.
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ὀρθῶς γὰρ οἴει, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ δικαίως ὑπολαμβάνεις.
ἴθι νυν καὶ σὺ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἣν ἠρόμην διαπέρανον. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ῥητορικὴ τυγχάνει μὲν οὖσα τούτων τις τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν τὸ πολὺ λόγῳ χρωμένων, τυγχάνουσιν δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι τοιαῦται οὖσαι, πειρῶ εἰπεῖν ἡ περὶ τί ἐν λόγοις τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσα ῥητορική ἐστιν. ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τίς με ἔροιτο ὧν νυνδὴ ἔλεγον περὶ ἡστινοσοῦν τῶν τεχνῶν· ὦ Σώκρατες, τίς
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εἴποιμʼ ἂν αὐτῷ, ὥσπερ σὺ ἄρτι, ὅτι τῶν διὰ λόγου τις τὸ κῦρος ἐχουσῶν. καὶ εἴ με ἐπανέροιτο· τῶν περὶ τί;
εἴποιμʼ ἂν ὅτι τῶν περὶ τὸ ἄρτιόν τε καὶ περιττὸν γνῶσις, ὅσα ἂν ἑκάτερα τυγχάνῃ ὄντα. εἰ δʼ αὖ ἔροιτο· τὴν δὲ λογιστικὴν τίνα καλεῖς τέχνην;
εἴποιμʼ ἂν ὅτι καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶν τῶν λόγῳ τὸ πᾶν κυρουμένων· καὶ εἰ ἐπανέροιτο· ἡ περὶ τί;
εἴποιμʼ ἂν ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ
-οἱ δὲ λόγοι οἱ τῆς ἀστρονομίας,
εἰ φαίη, περὶ τί εἰσιν, ὦ Σώκρατες;
εἴποιμʼ ἂν ὅτι περὶ τὴν τῶν ἄστρων φορὰν καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης, πῶς πρὸς ἄλληλα τάχους ἔχει.
ὀρθῶς γε λέγων σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
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ἴθι δὴ καὶ σύ, ὦ Γοργία. τυγχάνει μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἡ ῥητορικὴ οὖσα τῶν λόγῳ τὰ πάντα διαπραττομένων τε καὶ κυρουμένων· ἦ γάρ;
ἔστι ταῦτα.
λέγε δὴ τῶν περὶ τί;
τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἄριστα.
ἀλλʼ, ὦ Γοργία, ἀμφισβητήσιμον καὶ τοῦτο λέγεις
-ὑγιαίνειν μὲν ἄριστόν
ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον καλὸν γενέσθαι, τρίτον δέ
, ὥς φησιν ὁ ποιητὴς τοῦ σκολιοῦ, τὸ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως
.
ἀκήκοα γάρ· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τί τοῦτο λέγεις;
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ὅτι εἴ σοι αὐτίκα παρασταῖεν οἱ δημιουργοὶ τούτων ὧν ἐπῄνεσεν ὁ τὸ σκολιὸν ποιήσας, ἰατρός τε καὶ παιδοτρίβης καὶ χρηματιστής, καὶ εἴποι πρῶτον μὲν ὁ ἰατρὸς ὅτι ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐξαπατᾷ σε Γοργίας· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ τούτου τέχνη περὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλʼ ἡ ἐμή
—εἰ οὖν αὐτὸν ἐγὼ ἐροίμην· σὺ δὲ τίς ὢν ταῦτα λέγεις; εἴποι ἂν ἴσως ὅτι ἰατρός. τί οὖν λέγεις; ἦ τὸ τῆς σῆς τέχνης ἔργον μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἀγαθόν; πῶς γὰρ οὔ,
φαίη ἂν ἴσως, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑγίεια; τί δʼ ἐστὶν μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν
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εἰ δʼ αὖ μετὰ τοῦτον ὁ παιδοτρίβης εἴποι ὅτι θαυμάζοιμί τἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ αὐτὸς εἴ σοι ἔχοι Γοργίας μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἐπιδεῖξαι τῆς αὑτοῦ τέχνης ἢ ἐγὼ τῆς ἐμῆς·
εἴποιμʼ ἂν αὖ καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον· σὺ δὲ δὴ τίς εἶ, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, καὶ τί τὸ σὸν ἔργον; παιδοτρίβης,
φαίη ἄν, τὸ δὲ ἔργον μού ἐστιν καλούς τε καὶ ἰσχυροὺς ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τὰ σώματα.
μετὰ δὲ τὸν παιδοτρίβην εἴποι ἂν ὁ χρηματιστής, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι πάνυ καταφρονῶν ἁπάντων·
-σκόπει δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐάν σοι πλούτου φανῇ τι μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ὂν ἢ παρὰ Γοργίᾳ ἢ παρʼ ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν.
φαῖμεν ἂν οὖν πρὸς αὐτόν· τί δὲ δή; ἦ σὺ τούτου δημιουργός; φαίη ἄν. τίς ὤν; χρηματιστής.
τί οὖν; κρίνεις σὺ μέγιστον ἀνθρώποις ἀγαθὸν εἶναι πλοῦτον; φήσομεν. πῶς γὰρ οὔκ;
ἐρεῖ. καὶ μὴν ἀμφισβητεῖ γε Γοργίας ὅδε τὴν παρʼ αὑτῷ τέχνην μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ αἰτίαν εἶναι ἢ τὴν σήν, φαῖμεν ἂν ἡμεῖς. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔροιτʼ ἄν· καὶ τί ἐστιν
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ἴθι οὖν νομίσας, ὦ Γοργία, ἐρωτᾶσθαι καὶ ὑπʼ ἐκείνων καὶ ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ, ἀπόκριναι τί ἐστιν τοῦτο ὃ φῂς σὺ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ σὲ δημιουργὸν εἶναι αὐτοῦ.
ὅπερ ἐστίν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν καὶ αἴτιον ἅμα μὲν ἐλευθερίας αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἅμα δὲ τοῦ ἄλλων ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ πόλει ἑκάστῳ.
τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο λέγεις;
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τὸ πείθειν ἔγωγʼ οἷόν τʼ εἶναι τοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ δικαστὰς καὶ ἐν βουλευτηρίῳ βουλευτὰς καὶ ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ ἐκκλησιαστὰς καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ συλλόγῳ παντί, ὅστις ἂν πολιτικὸς σύλλογος γίγνηται. καίτοι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει δοῦλον μὲν ἕξεις τὸν ἰατρόν, δοῦλον δὲ τὸν παιδοτρίβην· ὁ δὲ χρηματιστὴς οὗτος ἄλλῳ ἀναφανήσεται χρηματιζόμενος καὶ οὐχ αὑτῷ, ἀλλὰ σοὶ τῷ δυναμένῳ λέγειν καὶ πείθειν τὰ πλήθη.
νῦν μοι δοκεῖς δηλῶσαι, ὦ Γοργία, ἐγγύτατα τὴν
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οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖς ἱκανῶς ὁρίζεσθαι· ἔστιν γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῆς.
ἄκουσον δή, ὦ Γοργία. ἐγὼ γὰρ εὖ ἴσθʼ ὅτι, ὡς
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τί οὖν δή, ὦ Σώκρατες;
ἐγὼ ἐρῶ νῦν. ἐγὼ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ῥητορικῆς πειθώ, ἥτις ποτʼ ἐστὶν ἣν σὺ λέγεις καὶ περὶ ὧντινων πραγμάτων ἐστὶν πειθώ, σαφῶς μὲν εὖ ἴσθʼ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδα, οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ ὑποπτεύω γε ἣν οἶμαί σε λέγειν καὶ περὶ ὧν· οὐδὲν μέντοι ἧττον ἐρήσομαί σε τίνα ποτὲ λέγεις τὴν πειθὼ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς
-
πάνυ γε.
-
ἆρα διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλοι εἰσὶ ζωγράφοι γράφοντες ἄλλα πολλὰ ζῷα;
ναί.
εἰ δέ γε μηδεὶς ἄλλος ἢ Ζεῦξις ἔγραφε, καλῶς ἄν σοι ἀπεκέκριτο;
πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
ἴθι δὴ καὶ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἰπέ· πότερόν σοι δοκεῖ πειθὼ ποιεῖν ἡ ῥητορικὴ μόνη ἢ καὶ ἄλλαι τέχναι; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· ὅστις διδάσκει ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα, πότερον ὃ διδάσκει πείθει ἢ οὔ;
οὐ δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα πείθει.
-
πάλιν δὴ ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τεχνῶν λέγωμεν ὧνπερ νυνδή· ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ οὐ διδάσκει ἡμᾶς ὅσα ἐστὶν τὰ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, καὶ ὁ ἀριθμητικὸς ἄνθρωπος;
πάνυ γε.
οὐκοῦν καὶ πείθει;
ναί.
πειθοῦς ἄρα δημιουργός ἐστιν καὶ ἡ ἀριθμητική;
φαίνεται.
οὐκοῦν ἐάν τις ἐρωτᾷ ἡμᾶς ποίας πειθοῦς καὶ περὶ τί, ἀποκρινούμεθά που αὐτῷ ὅτι τῆς διδασκαλικῆς τῆς περὶ τὸ
-
ναί.
οὐκ ἄρα ῥητορικὴ μόνη πειθοῦς ἐστιν δημιουργός.
ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν οὐ μόνη ἀπεργάζεται τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλαι, δικαίως ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ ζωγράφου μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπανεροίμεθʼ ἂν τὸν λέγοντα· ποίας δὴ πειθοῦς καὶ τῆς περὶ τί πειθοῦς ἡ ῥητορική ἐστιν τέχνη; ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι
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ἔμοιγε.
ἀπόκριναι δή, ὦ Γοργία, ἐπειδή γε καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ οὕτως.
ταύτης τοίνυν τῆς πειθοῦς λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῆς ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄχλοις, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, καὶ περὶ τούτων ἅ ἐστι δίκαιά τε καὶ ἄδικα.
καὶ ἐγώ τοι ὑπώπτευον ταύτην σε λέγειν τὴν πειθὼ καὶ περὶ τούτων, ὦ Γοργία· ἀλλʼ ἵνα μὴ θαυμάζῃς ἐὰν καὶ ὀλίγον ὕστερον τοιοῦτόν τί σε ἀνέρωμαι, ὃ δοκεῖ μὲν δῆλον
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καὶ ὀρθῶς γέ μοι δοκεῖς ποιεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ἴθι δὴ καὶ τόδε ἐπισκεψώμεθα. καλεῖς τι μεμαθηκέναι;
καλῶ.
τί δέ; πεπιστευκέναι;
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πότερον οὖν ταὐτὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι μεμαθηκέναι καὶ πεπιστευκέναι, καὶ μάθησις καὶ πίστις, ἢ ἄλλο τι;
οἴομαι μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο.
καλῶς γὰρ οἴει· γνώσῃ δὲ ἐνθένδε. εἰ γάρ τίς σε ἔροιτο· ἆρʼ ἔστιν τις, ὦ Γοργία, πίστις ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθής;
φαίης ἄν, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι.
ναί.
τί δέ; ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθής;
οὐδαμῶς.
δῆλον ἄρʼ αὖ ὅτι οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν.
ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
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ἔστι ταῦτα.
βούλει οὖν δύο εἴδη θῶμεν πειθοῦς, τὸ μὲν πίστιν παρεχόμενον ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι, τὸ δʼ ἐπιστήμην;
πάνυ γε.
ποτέραν οὖν ἡ ῥητορικὴ πειθὼ ποιεῖ ἐν δικαστηρίοις τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄχλοις περὶ τῶν δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων; ἐξ ἧς πιστεύειν γίγνεται ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι ἢ ἐξ ἧς τὸ εἰδέναι;
δῆλον δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἐξ ἧς τὸ πιστεύειν.
ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, πειθοῦς
-
ναί.
οὐδʼ ἄρα διδασκαλικὸς ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐστὶν δικαστηρίων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄχλων δικαίων τε πέρι καὶ ἀδίκων, ἀλλὰ πιστικὸς μόνον· οὐ γὰρ δήπου ὄχλον γʼ ἂν δύναιτο τοσοῦτον ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ διδάξαι οὕτω μεγάλα πράγματα.
οὐ δῆτα.
φέρε δή, ἴδωμεν τί ποτε καὶ λέγομεν περὶ τῆς
-τί ἡμῖν, ὦ Γοργία, ἔσται, ἐάν σοι συνῶμεν; περὶ τίνων τῇ πόλει συμβουλεύειν οἷοί τε ἐσόμεθα; πότερον περὶ δικαίου μόνον καὶ ἀδίκου ἢ καὶ περὶ ὧν νυνδὴ Σωκράτης ἔλεγεν;
πειρῶ οὖν αὐτοῖς ἀποκρίνεσθαι.
ἀλλʼ ἐγώ σοι πειράσομαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, σαφῶς ἀποκαλύψαι τὴν τῆς ῥητορικῆς δύναμιν ἅπασαν· αὐτὸς γὰρ καλῶς ὑφηγήσω. οἶσθα γὰρ δήπου ὅτι τὰ νεώρια ταῦτα
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λέγεται ταῦτα, ὦ Γοργία, περὶ Θεμιστοκλέους· Περικλέους δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἤκουον ὅτε συνεβούλευεν ἡμῖν περὶ τοῦ διὰ μέσου τείχους.
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καὶ ὅταν γέ τις αἵρεσις ᾖ ὧν νυνδὴ σὺ ἔλεγες, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁρᾷς ὅτι οἱ ῥήτορές εἰσιν οἱ συμβουλεύοντες καὶ οἱ νικῶντες τὰς γνώμας περὶ τούτων.
ταῦτα καὶ θαυμάζων, ὦ Γοργία, πάλαι ἐρωτῶ τίς ποτε ἡ δύναμίς ἐστιν τῆς ῥητορικῆς. δαιμονία γάρ τις ἔμοιγε καταφαίνεται τὸ μέγεθος οὕτω σκοποῦντι.
εἰ πάντα γε εἰδείης, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἁπάσας τὰς δυνάμεις συλλαβοῦσα ὑφʼ αὑτῇ ἔχει.
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οἶμαι, ὦ Γοργία, καὶ σὲ ἔμπειρον εἶναι πολλῶν λόγων καὶ καθεωρακέναι ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τοιόνδε, ὅτι οὐ ῥᾳδίως δύνανται περὶ ὧν ἂν ἐπιχειρήσωσιν διαλέγεσθαι διορισάμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ μαθόντες καὶ διδάξαντες ἑαυτούς,
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ἀλλὰ φημὶ μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ αὐτὸς τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷον σὺ ὑφηγῇ· ἴσως μέντοι χρῆν ἐννοεῖν καὶ τὸ τῶν παρόντων. πάλαι γάρ τοι, πρὶν καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐλθεῖν, ἐγὼ τοῖς παροῦσι πολλὰ ἐπεδειξάμην, καὶ νῦν ἴσως πόρρω ἀποτενοῦμεν,
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τοῦ μὲν θορύβου, ὦ Γοργία τε καὶ Σώκρατες, αὐτοὶ ἀκούετε τούτων τῶν ἀνδρῶν βουλομένων ἀκούειν ἐάν τι λέγητε· ἐμοὶ δʼ οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μὴ γένοιτο τοσαύτη ἀσχολία, ὥστε τοιούτων λόγων καὶ οὕτω λεγομένων ἀφεμένῳ προὐργιαίτερόν τι γενέσθαι ἄλλο πράττειν.
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νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς πολλοῖς ἤδη λόγοις παραγενόμενος οὐκ οἶδʼ εἰ πώποτε ἥσθην οὕτως ὥσπερ νυνί· ὥστʼ ἔμοιγε, κἂν τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην ἐθέλητε διαλέγεσθαι, χαριεῖσθε.
ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τό γʼ ἐμὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει, εἴπερ ἐθέλει Γοργίας.
αἰσχρὸν δὴ τὸ λοιπόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, γίγνεται ἐμέ γε μὴ ἐθέλειν, αὐτὸν ἐπαγγειλάμενον ἐρωτᾶν ὅτι τις βούλεται.
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ἄκουε δή, ὦ Γοργία, ἃ θαυμάζω ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ σοῦ· ἴσως γάρ τοι σοῦ ὀρθῶς λέγοντος ἐγὼ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνω. ῥητορικὸν φῂς ποιεῖν οἷός τʼ εἶναι, ἐάν τις βούληται παρὰ σοῦ μανθάνειν;
ναί.
οὐκοῦν περὶ πάντων ὥστʼ ἐν ὄχλῳ πιθανὸν εἶναι, οὐ διδάσκοντα ἀλλὰ
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πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ἔλεγές τοι νυνδὴ ὅτι καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται ὁ ῥήτωρ.
καὶ γὰρ ἔλεγον, ἔν γε ὄχλῳ.
οὐκοῦν τὸ ἐν ὄχλῳ τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἐν τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν; οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἔν γε τοῖς εἰδόσι τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται.
ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται, τοῦ εἰδότος πιθανώτερος γίγνεται;
πάνυ
-
οὐκ ἰατρός γε ὤν· ἦ γάρ;
ναί.
ὁ δὲ μὴ ἰατρός γε δήπου ἀνεπιστήμων ὧν ὁ ἰατρὸς ἐπιστήμων.
δῆλον ὅτι.
ὁ οὐκ εἰδὼς ἄρα τοῦ εἰδότος ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσι πιθανώτερος ἔσται, ὅταν ὁ ῥήτωρ τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος ᾖ. τοῦτο συμβαίνει ἢ ἄλλο τι;
τοῦτο ἐνταῦθά γε συμβαίνει.
οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἁπάσας τέχνας ὡσαύτως ἔχει ὁ ῥήτωρ καὶ ἡ ῥητορική· αὐτὰ μὲν τὰ πράγματα οὐδὲν δεῖ αὐτὴν εἰδέναι ὅπως ἔχει, μηχανὴν
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οὐκοῦν πολλὴ ῥᾳστώνη, ὦ Σώκρατες, γίγνεται, μὴ μαθόντα τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ἀλλὰ μίαν ταύτην, μηδὲν ἐλαττοῦσθαι τῶν δημιουργῶν;
εἰ μὲν ἐλαττοῦται ἢ μὴ ἐλαττοῦται ὁ ῥήτωρ τῶν ἄλλων διὰ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν, αὐτίκα ἐπισκεψόμεθα, ἐάν τι ἡμῖν πρὸς λόγου ᾖ· νῦν δὲ τόδε πρότερον σκεψώμεθα, ἆρα
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ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐὰν τύχῃ μὴ εἰδώς, καὶ ταῦτα παρʼ ἐμοῦ μαθήσεται.
ἔχε δή· καλῶς γὰρ λέγεις. ἐάνπερ ῥητορικὸν σύ τινα ποιήσῃς, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸν εἰδέναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα ἤτοι πρότερόν γε ἢ ὕστερον μαθόντα παρὰ σοῦ.
-
πάνυ γε.
τί οὖν; ὁ τὰ τεκτονικὰ μεμαθηκὼς τεκτονικός, ἢ οὔ;
ναί.
οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ τὰ μουσικὰ μουσικός;
ναί.
καὶ ὁ τὰ ἰατρικὰ ἰατρικός; καὶ τἆλλα οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὁ μεμαθηκὼς ἕκαστα τοιοῦτός ἐστιν οἷον ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἕκαστον ἀπεργάζεται;
πάνυ γε.
οὐκοῦν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον καὶ ὁ τὰ δίκαια μεμαθηκὼς δίκαιος;
πάντως δήπου.
ὁ δὲ δίκαιος δίκαιά που πράττει.
ναί.
-
οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τὸν ῥητορικὸν δίκαιον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ δίκαιον βούλεσθαι δίκαια πράττειν;
φαίνεταί γε.
οὐδέποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται ὅ γε δίκαιος ἀδικεῖν.
ἀνάγκη.
τὸν δὲ ῥητορικὸν ἀνάγκη ἐκ τοῦ λόγου δίκαιον εἶναι.
ναί.
οὐδέποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἀδικεῖν.
οὐ φαίνεταί γε.
μέμνησαι οὖν λέγων ὀλίγῳ πρότερον ὅτι οὐ δεῖ τοῖς
-
ἐρρήθη.
νῦν
-
φαίνεται.
καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις γε, ὦ Γοργία, λόγοις ἐλέγετο ὅτι ἡ ῥητορικὴ περὶ λόγους εἴη οὐ τοὺς τοῦ ἀρτίου καὶ περιττοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοὺς τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου· ἦ γάρ;
ναί.
ἐγὼ τοίνυν σου τότε ταῦτα λέγοντος ὑπέλαβον ὡς οὐδέποτʼ ἂν εἴη ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἄδικον πρᾶγμα, ὅ γʼ ἀεὶ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖται· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἔλεγες ὅτι ὁ ῥήτωρ
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τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες; οὕτω καὶ σὺ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς δοξάζεις ὥσπερ νῦν λέγεις; ἢ οἴει—ὅτι Γοργίας ᾐσχύνθη σοι μὴ προσομολογῆσαι τὸν ῥητορικὸν ἄνδρα μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ τὰ δίκαια εἰδέναι καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ ἀγαθά, καὶ ἐὰν μὴ ἔλθῃ ταῦτα εἰδὼς παρʼ αὐτόν, αὐτὸς διδάξειν, ἔπειτα ἐκ ταύτης ἴσως τῆς ὁμολογίας ἐναντίον τι συνέβη ἐν τοῖς
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ὦ κάλλιστε Πῶλε, ἀλλά τοι ἐξεπίτηδες κτώμεθα ἑταίρους καὶ ὑεῖς, ἵνα ἐπειδὰν αὐτοὶ πρεσβύτεροι γενόμενοι σφαλλώμεθα, παρόντες ὑμεῖς οἱ νεώτεροι ἐπανορθῶτε ἡμῶν τὸν βίον καὶ ἐν ἔργοις καὶ ἐν λόγοις. καὶ νῦν εἴ τι ἐγὼ καὶ
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τί τοῦτο λέγεις;
τὴν μακρολογίαν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἢν καθέρξῃς, ᾗ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπεχείρησας χρῆσθαι.
τί δέ; οὐκ ἐξέσται μοι λέγειν ὁπόσα ἂν βούλωμαι;
-
δεινὰ μεντἂν πάθοις, ὦ βέλτιστε, εἰ Ἀθήναζε ἀφικόμενος, οὗ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πλείστη ἐστὶν ἐξουσία τοῦ λέγειν, ἔπειτα σὺ ἐνταῦθα τούτου μόνος ἀτυχήσαις. ἀλλὰ ἀντίθες τοι· σοῦ μακρὰ λέγοντος καὶ μὴ ἐθέλοντος τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι, οὐ δεινὰ ἂν αὖ ἐγὼ πάθοιμι, εἰ μὴ ἐξέσται
-
ἔγωγε.
οὐκοῦν καὶ σὺ κελεύεις σαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν ἑκάστοτε ὅτι ἄν τις βούληται, ὡς ἐπιστάμενος ἀποκρίνεσθαι;
πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
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καὶ νῦν δὴ τούτων ὁπότερον βούλει ποίει, ἐρώτα ἢ ἀποκρίνου.
ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα. καί μοι ἀπόκριναι, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐπειδὴ Γοργίας ἀπορεῖν σοι δοκεῖ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς, σὺ αὐτὴν τίνα φῂς εἶναι;
ἆρα ἐρωτᾷς ἥντινα τέχνην φημὶ εἶναι;
ἔγωγε.
οὐδεμία ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Πῶλε, ὥς γε πρὸς σὲ τἀληθῆ εἰρῆσθαι.
ἀλλὰ τί σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι;
πρᾶγμα ὃ φῂς σὺ ποιῆσαι τέχνην ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι
-
τί τοῦτο λέγεις;
ἐμπειρίαν ἔγωγέ τινα.
ἐμπειρία ἄρα σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι;
ἔμοιγε, εἰ μή τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις.
τίνος ἐμπειρία;
χάριτός τινος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας.
οὐκοῦν καλόν σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι, χαρίζεσθαι οἷόν τε εἶναι ἀνθρώποις;
τί δέ, ὦ Πῶλε; ἤδη πέπυσαι παρʼ ἐμοῦ ὅτι φημὶ
-
οὐ γὰρ πέπυσμαι ὅτι ἐμπειρίαν τινὰ αὐτὴν φῂς εἶναι;
βούλει οὖν, ἐπειδὴ τιμᾷς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι, σμικρόν τί μοι χαρίσασθαι;
ἔγωγε.
ἐροῦ νῦν με, ὀψοποιία ἥτις μοι δοκεῖ τέχνη εἶναι.
ἐρωτῶ δή, τίς τέχνη ὀψοποιία;
οὐδεμία, ὦ Πῶλε.
ἀλλὰ τί; φάθι.
φημὶ δή, ἐμπειρία τις.
τίς; φάθι.
φημὶ δή, χάριτος καὶ ἡδονῆς
-
ταὐτὸν ἄρʼ ἐστὶν ὀψοποιία καὶ ῥητορική;
οὐδαμῶς γε, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς μὲν ἐπιτηδεύσεως μόριον.
τίνος λέγεις ταύτης;
μὴ ἀγροικότερον ᾖ τὸ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν· ὀκνῶ γὰρ Γοργίου ἕνεκα λέγειν, μὴ οἴηταί με διακωμῳδεῖν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιτήδευμα. ἐγὼ δέ, εἰ μὲν τοῦτό ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἣν Γοργίας
-
τίνος, ὦ Σώκρατες; εἰπέ· μηδὲν ἐμὲ αἰσχυνθῇς.
δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ὦ Γοργία, εἶναί τι ἐπιτήδευμα τεχνικὸν μὲν οὔ, ψυχῆς δὲ στοχαστικῆς καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ φύσει δεινῆς προσομιλεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· καλῶ δὲ αὐτοῦ
-
ἐρωτῶ δή, καὶ ἀπόκριναι ὁποῖον μόριον.
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ἆρʼ οὖν ἂν μάθοις ἀποκριναμένου; ἔστιν γὰρ ἡ ῥητορικὴ κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον πολιτικῆς μορίου εἴδωλον.
τί οὖν; καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν λέγεις αὐτὴν εἶναι;
αἰσχρὸν ἔγωγε—τὰ γὰρ κακὰ αἰσχρὰ καλῶ—ἐπειδὴ δεῖ σοι ἀποκρίνασθαι ὡς ἤδη εἰδότι ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω.
μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ οὐδὲ αὐτὸς συνίημι ὅτι λέγεις.
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εἰκότως γε, ὦ Γοργία· οὐδὲν γάρ πω σαφὲς λέγω, πῶλος δὲ ὅδε νέος ἐστὶ καὶ ὀξύς.
ἀλλὰ τοῦτον μὲν ἔα, ἐμοὶ δʼ εἰπὲ πῶς λέγεις πολιτικῆς μορίου εἴδωλον εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικήν.
ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι ὅ γέ μοι φαίνεται εἶναι ἡ ῥητορική· εἰ δὲ μὴ τυγχάνει ὂν τοῦτο, πῶλος ὅδε
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πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
οὐκοῦν καὶ τούτων οἴει τινὰ εἶναι ἑκατέρου εὐεξίαν;
ἔγωγε.
τί δέ; δοκοῦσαν μὲν εὐεξίαν, οὖσαν δʼ οὔ; οἷον τοιόνδε λέγω· πολλοὶ δοκοῦσιν εὖ ἔχειν τὰ σώματα, οὓς οὐκ ἂν ῥᾳδίως αἴσθοιτό τις ὅτι οὐκ εὖ ἔχουσιν, ἀλλʼ ἢ ἰατρός τε καὶ τῶν γυμναστικῶν τις.
ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγω καὶ ἐν σώματι εἶναι καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ, ὃ ποιεῖ μὲν δοκεῖν εὖ ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν,
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ἔστι ταῦτα.
φέρε δή σοι, ἐὰν δύνωμαι, σαφέστερον ἐπιδείξω ὃ λέγω. δυοῖν ὄντοιν τοῖν πραγμάτοιν δύο λέγω τέχνας· τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ ψυχῇ πολιτικὴν καλῶ, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ σώματι μίαν μὲν οὕτως ὀνομάσαι οὐκ ἔχω σοι, μιᾶς δὲ οὔσης τῆς τοῦ σώματος θεραπείας δύο μόρια λέγω, τὴν μὲν γυμναστικήν, τὴν δὲ ἰατρικήν· τῆς δὲ πολιτικῆς ἀντὶ μὲν τῆς γυμναστικῆς τὴν νομοθετικήν, ἀντίστροφον δὲ τῇ ἰατρικῇ τὴν δικαιοσύνην.
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τί οὖν φῄς; κολακεία δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἡ ῥητορική;
κολακείας μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε εἶπον μόριον. ἀλλʼ οὐ μνημονεύεις τηλικοῦτος ὤν, ὦ Πῶλε; τί τάχα δράσεις;
ἆρʼ οὖν δοκοῦσί σοι ὡς κόλακες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι φαῦλοι νομίζεσθαι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ῥήτορες;
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ἐρώτημα τοῦτʼ ἐρωτᾷς ἢ λόγου τινὸς ἀρχὴν λέγεις;
ἐρωτῶ ἔγωγε.
οὐδὲ νομίζεσθαι ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν.
πῶς οὐ νομίζεσθαι; οὐ μέγιστον δύνανται ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν;
οὔκ, εἰ τὸ δύνασθαί γε λέγεις ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι τῷ δυναμένῳ.
ἀλλὰ μὴν λέγω γε.
ἐλάχιστον τοίνυν μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει δύνασθαι οἱ ῥήτορες.
τί δέ; οὐχ, ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι, ἀποκτεινύασίν τε
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νὴ τὸν κύνα, ἀμφιγνοῶ μέντοι, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐφʼ ἑκάστου ὧν λέγεις πότερον αὐτὸς ταῦτα λέγεις καὶ γνώμην σαυτοῦ ἀποφαίνῃ, ἢ ἐμὲ ἐρωτᾷς.
ἀλλʼ ἔγωγε σὲ ἐρωτῶ.
εἶεν, ὦ φίλε· ἔπειτα δύο ἅμα με ἐρωτᾷς;
πῶς δύο;
οὐκ ἄρτι οὕτω πως ἔλεγες· ἦ οὐχὶ ἀποκτεινύασιν
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ἔγωγε.
λέγω τοίνυν σοι ὅτι δύο ταῦτʼ ἐστιν τὰ ἐρωτήματα, καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαί γέ σοι πρὸς ἀμφότερα. φημὶ γάρ, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐγὼ καὶ τοὺς ῥήτορας καὶ τοὺς τυράννους δύνασθαι μὲν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν σμικρότατον, ὥσπερ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον· οὐδὲν
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οὐκοῦν τοῦτο ἔστιν τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι;
οὔχ, ὥς γέ φησιν πῶλος.
ἐγὼ οὔ φημι; φημὶ μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε.
μὰ τὸν—οὐ σύ γε, ἐπεὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι ἔφης ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τῷ δυναμένῳ.
φημὶ γὰρ οὖν.
ἀγαθὸν οὖν οἴει εἶναι, ἐάν τις ποιῇ ταῦτα ἃ ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ βέλτιστα εἶναι, νοῦν μὴ ἔχων; καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖς σὺ μέγα δύνασθαι;
οὐκ ἔγωγε.
οὐκοῦν ἀποδείξεις τοὺς ῥήτορας νοῦν ἔχοντας καὶ
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ἔγωγε.
πῶς ἂν οὖν οἱ ῥήτορες μέγα δύναιντο ἢ οἱ τύραννοι ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐὰν μὴ Σωκράτης ἐξελεγχθῇ ὑπὸ Πώλου ὅτι ποιοῦσιν ἃ βούλονται;
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οὗτος ἀνήρ—
οὔ φημι ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς ἃ βούλονται· ἀλλά μʼ ἔλεγχε.
οὐκ ἄρτι ὡμολόγεις ποιεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς βέλτιστα εἶναι, τούτου πρόσθεν;
καὶ γὰρ νῦν ὁμολογῶ.
οὐκ οὖν ποιοῦσιν ἃ βούλονται;
οὔ φημι.
ποιοῦντες ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς;
φημί.
σχέτλιά γε λέγεις καὶ ὑπερφυῆ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
μὴ κακηγόρει, ὦ λῷστε Πῶλε, ἵνα προσείπω σε
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ἀλλʼ ἐθέλω ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἵνα καὶ εἰδῶ ὅτι λέγεις.
πότερον οὖν σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τοῦτο βούλεσθαι ὃ ἂν πράττωσιν ἑκάστοτε, ἢ ἐκεῖνο οὗ ἕνεκα πράττουσιν τοῦθʼ ὃ πράττουσιν; οἷον οἱ τὰ φάρμακα πίνοντες παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν πότερόν σοι δοκοῦσιν τοῦτο βούλεσθαι ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν, πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον καὶ ἀλγεῖν, ἢ ἐκεῖνο, τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὗ ἕνεκα πίνουσιν;
δῆλον ὅτι τὸ
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οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ πλέοντές τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον χρηματισμὸν χρηματιζόμενοι οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ βούλονται, ὃ ποιοῦσιν ἑκάστοτε (τίς γὰρ βούλεται πλεῖν τε καὶ κινδυνεύειν καὶ πράγματʼ ἔχειν;) ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο οἶμαι οὗ ἕνεκα πλέουσιν, πλουτεῖν· πλούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα πλέουσιν.
πάνυ γε.
ἄλλο τι οὖν οὕτω καὶ περὶ πάντων; ἐάν τίς τι πράττῃ ἕνεκά του, οὐ τοῦτο βούλεται ὃ πράττει, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο
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ναί.
ἆρʼ οὖν ἔστιν τι τῶν ὄντων ὃ οὐχὶ ἤτοι ἀγαθόν γʼ ἐστὶν ἢ κακὸν ἢ μεταξὺ τούτων, οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν;
πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.
οὐκοῦν λέγεις εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μὲν σοφίαν τε καὶ ὑγίειαν καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, κακὰ δὲ τἀναντία τούτων;
ἔγωγε.
τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ ἆρα τοιάδε λέγεις, ἃ ἐνίοτε μὲν μετέχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ,
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οὔκ, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα.
πότερον οὖν τὰ μεταξὺ ταῦτα ἕνεκα τῶν ἀγαθῶν πράττουσιν ὅταν πράττωσιν, ἢ τἀγαθὰ τῶν μεταξύ;
τὰ
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τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄρα διώκοντες καὶ βαδίζομεν ὅταν βαδίζωμεν, οἰόμενοι βέλτιον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἕσταμεν ὅταν ἑστῶμεν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· ἢ οὔ;
ναί.
οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀποκτείνυμεν, εἴ τινʼ ἀποκτείνυμεν, καὶ ἐκβάλλομεν καὶ ἀφαιρούμεθα χρήματα, οἰόμενοι ἄμεινον εἶναι ἡμῖν ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἢ μή;
πάνυ γε.
ἕνεκʼ ἄρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἅπαντα ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οἱ ποιοῦντες.
φημί.
οὐκοῦν ὡμολογήσαμεν, ἃ ἕνεκά του ποιοῦμεν, μὴ ἐκεῖνα βούλεσθαι,
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μάλιστα.
οὐκ ἄρα σφάττειν βουλόμεθα οὐδʼ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων οὐδὲ χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἁπλῶς οὕτως, ἀλλʼ ἐὰν μὲν ὠφέλιμα ᾖ ταῦτα, βουλόμεθα πράττειν αὐτά, βλαβερὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βουλόμεθα. τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ βουλόμεθα, ὡς φῂς σύ, τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ οὐ βουλόμεθα, οὐδὲ τὰ κακά. ἦ γάρ; ἀληθῆ σοι δοκῶ λέγειν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἢ οὔ; τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνῃ;
ἀληθῆ.
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οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ταῦτα ὁμολογοῦμεν, εἴ τις ἀποκτείνει τινὰ ἢ ἐκβάλλει ἐκ πόλεως ἢ ἀφαιρεῖται χρήματα, εἴτε τύραννος ὢν εἴτε ῥήτωρ, οἰόμενος ἄμεινον εἶναι αὐτῷ, τυγχάνει δὲ ὂν κάκιον, οὗτος δήπου ποιεῖ ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ· ἦ γάρ;
ναί.
ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ ἃ βούλεται, εἴπερ τυγχάνει ταῦτα κακὰ ὄντα; τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνῃ;
ἀλλʼ οὔ μοι δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἃ βούλεται.
ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως ὁ τοιοῦτος
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οὐκ ἔστιν.
ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, λέγων ὅτι ἔστιν ἄνθρωπον ποιοῦντα ἐν πόλει ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ μὴ μέγα δύνασθαι μηδὲ ποιεῖν ἃ βούλεται.
ὡς δὴ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο ἐξεῖναί σοι ποιεῖν ὅτι δοκεῖ σοι ἐν τῇ πόλει μᾶλλον ἢ μή, οὐδὲ ζηλοῖς ὅταν ἴδῃς τινὰ ἢ ἀποκτείναντα ὃν ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ ἢ ἀφελόμενον χρήματα ἢ δήσαντα.
δικαίως λέγεις ἢ ἀδίκως;
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ὁπότερʼ ἂν ποιῇ, οὐκ ἀμφοτέρως ζηλωτόν ἐστιν;
εὐφήμει, ὦ Πῶλε.
τί δή;
ὅτι οὐ χρὴ οὔτε τοὺς ἀζηλώτους ζηλοῦν οὔτε τοὺς ἀθλίους, ἀλλʼ ἐλεεῖν.
τί δέ; οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν περὶ ὧν ἐγὼ λέγω τῶν ἀνθρώπων;
πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
ὅστις οὖν ἀποκτείνυσιν ὃν ἂν δόξῃ αὐτῷ, δικαίως ἀποκτεινύς, ἄθλιος δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι καὶ ἐλεινός;
οὐκ ἔμοιγε, οὐδὲ μέντοι ζηλωτός.
οὐκ ἄρτι ἄθλιον ἔφησθα εἶναι;
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τὸν ἀδίκως γε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἀποκτείναντα, καὶ ἐλεινόν γε πρός· τὸν δὲ δικαίως ἀζήλωτον.
ἦ που ὅ γε ἀποθνῄσκων ἀδίκως ἐλεινός τε καὶ ἄθλιός ἐστιν.
ἧττον ἢ ὁ ἀποκτεινύς, ὦ Πῶλε, καὶ ἧττον ἢ ὁ δικαίως ἀποθνῄσκων.
πῶς δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες;
οὕτως, ὡς μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν τυγχάνει ὂν τὸ ἀδικεῖν.
ἦ γὰρ τοῦτο μέγιστον; οὐ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι μεῖζον;
ἥκιστά γε.
σὺ ἄρα βούλοιο ἂν ἀδικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀδικεῖν;
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βουλοίμην μὲν ἂν ἔγωγε οὐδέτερα· εἰ δʼ ἀναγκαῖον εἴη ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἑλοίμην ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν.
σὺ ἄρα τυραννεῖν οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο;
οὔκ, εἰ τὸ τυραννεῖν γε λέγεις ὅπερ ἐγώ.
ἀλλʼ ἔγωγε τοῦτο λέγω ὅπερ ἄρτι, ἐξεῖναι ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὃ ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ποιεῖν τοῦτο, καὶ ἀποκτεινύντι καὶ ἐκβάλλοντι καὶ πάντα πράττοντι κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ δόξαν.
ὦ μακάριε, ἐμοῦ δὴ λέγοντος τῷ λόγῳ ἐπιλαβοῦ.
-ὦ Πῶλε, ἐμοὶ δύναμίς τις καὶ τυραννὶς θαυμασία ἄρτι προσγέγονεν· ἐὰν γὰρ ἄρα ἐμοὶ δόξῃ τινὰ τουτωνὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὧν σὺ ὁρᾷς αὐτίκα μάλα δεῖν τεθνάναι, τεθνήξει οὗτος ὃν ἂν δόξῃ· κἄν τινα δόξῃ μοι τῆς κεφαλῆς αὐτῶν καταγῆναι δεῖν, κατεαγὼς ἔσται αὐτίκα μάλα, κἂν θοἰμάτιον διεσχίσθαι, διεσχισμένον ἔσται—οὕτω
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εἰ οὖν ἀπιστοῦντί σοι δείξαιμι τὸ ἐγχειρίδιον, ἴσως ἂν εἴποις ἰδὼν ὅτι ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω μὲν πάντες ἂν μέγα δύναιντο, ἐπεὶ κἂν ἐμπρησθείη οἰκία τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἥντινά σοι δοκοῖ, καὶ τά γε Ἀθηναίων νεώρια καὶ αἱ τριήρεις καὶ τὰ πλοῖα πάντα καὶ τὰ δημόσια καὶ τὰ ἴδια·
ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἄρα τοῦτʼ ἔστιν τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι, τὸ ποιεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ· ἢ δοκεῖ σοι;
οὐ δῆτα οὕτω γε.
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ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν διʼ ὅτι μέμφῃ τὴν τοιαύτην δύναμιν;
ἔγωγε.
τί δή; λέγε.
ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον τὸν οὕτω πράττοντα ζημιοῦσθαί ἐστιν.
τὸ δὲ ζημιοῦσθαι οὐ κακόν;
πάνυ γε.
οὐκοῦν, ὦ θαυμάσιε, τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι πάλιν αὖ σοι φαίνεται, ἐὰν μὲν πράττοντι ἃ δοκεῖ ἕπηται τὸ ὠφελίμως πράττειν, ἀγαθόν τε εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐστὶν τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, κακὸν καὶ σμικρὸν δύνασθαι.
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πάνυ γε.
τοῦτο μὲν δή, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ παρὰ σοῦ καὶ παρʼ ἐμοῦ ὁμολογεῖται.
ναί.
πότε οὖν σὺ φῂς ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν; εἰπὲ τίνα ὅρον ὁρίζῃ.
σὺ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπόκριναι ταὐτὸ τοῦτο.
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ἐγὼ μὲν τοίνυν φημί, ὦ Πῶλε, εἴ σοι παρʼ ἐμοῦ ἥδιόν ἐστιν ἀκούειν, ὅταν μὲν δικαίως τις ταῦτα ποιῇ, ἄμεινον εἶναι, ὅταν δὲ ἀδίκως, κάκιον.
χαλεπόν γέ σε ἐλέγξαι, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλʼ οὐχὶ κἂν παῖς σε ἐλέγξειεν ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγεις;
πολλὴν ἄρα ἐγὼ τῷ παιδὶ χάριν ἕξω, ἴσην δὲ καὶ σοί, ἐάν με ἐλέγξῃς καὶ ἀπαλλάξῃς φλυαρίας. ἀλλὰ μὴ κάμῃς φίλον ἄνδρα εὐεργετῶν, ἀλλʼ ἔλεγχε.
ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδέν γέ σε δεῖ παλαιοῖς
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τὰ ποῖα ταῦτα;
Ἀρχέλαον δήπου τοῦτον τὸν Περδίκκου ὁρᾷς ἄρχοντα Μακεδονίας;
εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλʼ ἀκούω γε.
εὐδαίμων οὖν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἢ ἄθλιος;
οὐκ οἶδα, ὦ Πῶλε· οὐ γάρ πω συγγέγονα τῷ ἀνδρί.
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τί δέ; συγγενόμενος ἂν γνοίης, ἄλλως δὲ αὐτόθεν οὐ γιγνώσκεις ὅτι εὐδαιμονεῖ;
μὰ Δίʼ οὐ δῆτα.
δῆλον δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα γιγνώσκειν φήσεις εὐδαίμονα ὄντα.
καὶ ἀληθῆ γε ἐρῶ· οὐ γὰρ οἶδα παιδείας ὅπως ἔχει καὶ δικαιοσύνης.
τί δέ; ἐν τούτῳ ἡ πᾶσα εὐδαιμονία ἐστίν;
ὥς γε ἐγὼ λέγω, ὦ Πῶλε· τὸν μὲν γὰρ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα εὐδαίμονα εἶναί φημι, τὸν δὲ ἄδικον καὶ πονηρὸν ἄθλιον.
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ἄθλιος ἄρα οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ Ἀρχέλαος κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον;
εἴπερ γε, ὦ φίλε, ἄδικος.
ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ πῶς οὐκ ἄδικος; ᾧ γε προσῆκε μὲν τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐδὲν ἣν νῦν ἔχει, ὄντι ἐκ γυναικὸς ἣ ἦν δούλη Ἀλκέτου τοῦ Περδίκκου ἀδελφοῦ, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸ δίκαιον δοῦλος ἦν Ἀλκέτου, καὶ εἰ ἐβούλετο τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν, ἐδούλευεν ἂν Ἀλκέτῃ καὶ ἦν εὐδαίμων κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον. νῦν δὲ θαυμασίως ὡς ἄθλιος γέγονεν, ἐπεὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἠδίκηκεν·
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καὶ κατʼ ἀρχὰς τῶν λόγων, ὦ Πῶλε, ἔγωγέ σε ἐπῄνεσα ὅτι μοι δοκεῖς εὖ πρὸς τὴν ῥητορικὴν πεπαιδεῦσθαι, τοῦ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι ἠμεληκέναι· καὶ νῦν ἄλλο τι οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος, ᾧ με καὶ ἂν παῖς ἐξελέγξειε, καὶ ἐγὼ ὑπὸ σοῦ νῦν, ὡς σὺ οἴει, ἐξελήλεγμαι τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ, φάσκων τὸν ἀδικοῦντα οὐκ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι; πόθεν, ὠγαθέ; καὶ μὴν οὐδέν γέ σοι τούτων ὁμολογῶ ὧν σὺ φῄς.
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οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλεις, ἐπεὶ δοκεῖ γέ σοι ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω.
ὦ μακάριε, ῥητορικῶς γάρ με ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐλέγχειν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἡγούμενοι ἐλέγχειν. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ οἱ ἕτεροι τοὺς ἑτέρους δοκοῦσιν ἐλέγχειν, ἐπειδὰν τῶν λόγων ὧν ἂν λέγωσι μάρτυρας πολλοὺς παρέχωνται καὶ εὐδοκίμους, ὁ δὲ τἀναντία λέγων ἕνα τινὰ παρέχηται ἢ μηδένα. οὗτος δὲ ὁ ἔλεγχος οὐδενὸς ἄξιός ἐστιν πρὸς τὴν
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πάνυ γε.
ἐγὼ δέ φημι ἀδύνατον. ἓν μὲν τουτὶ ἀμφισβητοῦμεν. εἶεν· ἀδικῶν δὲ δὴ εὐδαίμων ἔσται ἆρʼ, ἂν τυγχάνῃ δίκης τε καὶ τιμωρίας;
ἥκιστά γε, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γʼ ἂν ἀθλιώτατος εἴη.
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ἀλλʼ ἐὰν ἄρα μὴ τυγχάνῃ δίκης ὁ ἀδικῶν, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον εὐδαίμων ἔσται;
φημί.
κατὰ δέ γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὦ Πῶλε, ὁ ἀδικῶν τε καὶ ὁ ἄδικος πάντως μὲν ἄθλιος, ἀθλιώτερος μέντοι ἐὰν μὴ διδῷ δίκην μηδὲ τυγχάνῃ τιμωρίας ἀδικῶν, ἧττον δὲ ἄθλιος ἐὰν διδῷ δίκην καὶ τυγχάνῃ δίκης ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων.
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ἄτοπά γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιχειρεῖς λέγειν.
πειράσομαι δέ γε καὶ σὲ ποιῆσαι, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ταὐτὰ ἐμοὶ λέγειν· φίλον γάρ σε ἡγοῦμαι. νῦν μὲν οὖν ἃ διαφερόμεθα ταῦτʼ ἐστιν· σκόπει δὲ καὶ σύ. εἶπον ἐγώ που ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον εἶναι.
πάνυ γε.
σὺ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι.
ναί.
καὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας ἀθλίους ἔφην εἶναι ἐγώ, καὶ ἐξηλέγχθην ὑπὸ σοῦ.
ναὶ μὰ Δία.
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ὡς σύ γε οἴει, ὦ Πῶλε.
ἀληθῆ γε οἰόμενος.
ἴσως. σὺ δέ γε εὐδαίμονας αὖ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας, ἐὰν μὴ διδῶσι δίκην.
πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ἐγὼ δέ γε αὐτοὺς ἀθλιωτάτους φημί, τοὺς δὲ διδόντας δίκην ἧττον. βούλει καὶ τοῦτο ἐλέγχειν;
ἀλλʼ ἔτι τοῦτʼ ἐκείνου χαλεπώτερόν ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐξελέγξαι.
οὐ δῆτα, ὦ Πῶλε, ἀλλʼ ἀδύνατον· τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὲς οὐδέποτε ἐλέγχεται.
πῶς λέγεις; ἐὰν ἀδικῶν ἄνθρωπος ληφθῇ τυραννίδι
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μορμολύττῃ αὖ, ὦ γενναῖε Πῶλε, καὶ οὐκ ἐλέγχεις· ἄρτι δὲ ἐμαρτύρου. ὅμως δὲ ὑπόμνησόν με σμικρόν. ἐὰν ἀδίκως ἐπιβουλεύων τυραννίδι, εἶπες;
ἔγωγε.
εὐδαιμονέστερος μὲν τοίνυν οὐδέποτε ἔσται οὐδέτερος αὐτῶν, οὔτε ὁ κατειργασμένος τὴν τυραννίδα ἀδίκως οὔτε ὁ διδοὺς δίκην—δυοῖν γὰρ ἀθλίοιν εὐδαιμονέστερος μὲν
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οὐκ οἴει ἐξεληλέγχθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅταν τοιαῦτα λέγῃς ἃ οὐδεὶς ἂν φήσειεν ἀνθρώπων; ἐπεὶ ἐροῦ τινα τουτωνί.
ὦ Πῶλε, οὐκ εἰμὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, καὶ πέρυσι βουλεύειν λαχών, ἐπειδὴ ἡ φυλὴ ἐπρυτάνευε καὶ ἔδει με ἐπιψηφίζειν,
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ἐγὼ δέ γε οὔτʼ ἐμὲ οὔτʼ ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα. ἐπεὶ σὺ δέξαιʼ ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν;
καὶ σύ γʼ ἂν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες.
πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ἀλλʼ οὔτʼ ἐγὼ οὔτε σὺ οὔτʼ ἄλλος οὐδείς.
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οὔκουν ἀποκρινῇ;
πάνυ μὲν οὖν· καὶ γὰρ ἐπιθυμῶ εἰδέναι ὅτι ποτʼ ἐρεῖς.
λέγε δή μοι, ἵνʼ εἰδῇς, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς σε ἠρώτων· πότερον δοκεῖ σοι, ὦ Πῶλε, κάκιον εἶναι, τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι;
τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἔμοιγε.
τί δὲ δή; αἴσχιον πότερον τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι; ἀποκρίνου.
τὸ ἀδικεῖν.
οὐκοῦν καὶ κάκιον, εἴπερ αἴσχιον.
ἥκιστά γε.
μανθάνω· οὐ
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οὐ δῆτα.
τί δὲ τόδε; τὰ καλὰ πάντα, οἷον καὶ σώματα καὶ χρώματα καὶ σχήματα καὶ φωνὰς καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα, εἰς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπων καλεῖς ἑκάστοτε καλά; οἷον πρῶτον τὰ σώματα τὰ καλὰ οὐχὶ ἤτοι κατὰ τὴν χρείαν λέγεις καλὰ εἶναι, πρὸς ὃ ἂν ἕκαστον χρήσιμον ᾖ, πρὸς τοῦτο, ἢ κατὰ ἡδονήν τινα, ἐὰν ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖσθαι χαίρειν ποιῇ τοὺς θεωροῦντας; ἔχεις τι ἐκτὸς τούτων λέγειν περὶ σώματος κάλλους;
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οὐκ ἔχω.
οὐκοῦν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα οὕτω καὶ σχήματα καὶ χρώματα ἢ διὰ ἡδονήν τινα ἢ διὰ ὠφελίαν ἢ διʼ ἀμφότερα καλὰ προσαγορεύεις;
ἔγωγε.
οὐ καὶ τὰς φωνὰς καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν μουσικὴν πάντα ὡσαύτως;
ναί.
καὶ μὴν τά γε κατὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα οὐ δήπου ἐκτὸς τούτων ἐστίν, τὰ καλά, τοῦ ἢ ὠφέλιμα εἶναι ἢ ἡδέα ἢ ἀμφότερα.
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οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ τῶν μαθημάτων κάλλος ὡσαύτως;
πάνυ γε· καὶ καλῶς γε νῦν ὁρίζῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡδονῇ τε καὶ ἀγαθῷ ὁριζόμενος τὸ καλόν.
οὐκοῦν τὸ αἰσχρὸν τῷ ἐναντίῳ, λύπῃ τε καὶ κακῷ;
ἀνάγκη.
ὅταν ἄρα δυοῖν καλοῖν θάτερον κάλλιον ᾖ, ἢ τῷ ἑτέρῳ τούτοιν ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ὑπερβάλλον κάλλιόν ἐστιν, ἤτοι ἡδονῇ ἢ ὠφελίᾳ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις.
πάνυ γε.
καὶ ὅταν δὲ δὴ δυοῖν αἰσχροῖν τὸ
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ναί.
φέρε δή, πῶς ἐλέγετο νυνδὴ περὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι; οὐκ ἔλεγες τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν αἴσχιον;
ἔλεγον.
οὐκοῦν εἴπερ αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἤτοι λυπηρότερόν ἐστιν καὶ λύπῃ ὑπερβάλλον αἴσχιον ἂν εἴη ἢ κακῷ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις; οὐ καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη;
πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
πρῶτον
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οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτό γε.
οὐκ ἄρα λύπῃ γε ὑπερέχει.
οὐ δῆτα.
οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ λύπῃ, ἀμφοτέροις μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ὑπερβάλλοι.
οὐ φαίνεται.
οὐκοῦν τῷ ἑτέρῳ λείπεται.
ναί.
τῷ κακῷ.
ἔοικεν.
οὐκοῦν κακῷ ὑπερβάλλον τὸ ἀδικεῖν κάκιον ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι.
δῆλον δὴ ὅτι.
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ἄλλο τι οὖν ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὑπὸ σοῦ ὡμολογεῖτο ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ αἴσχιον εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι;
ναί.
νῦν δέ γε κάκιον ἐφάνη.
ἔοικε.
δέξαιο ἂν οὖν σὺ μᾶλλον τὸ κάκιον καὶ τὸ αἴσχιον ἀντὶ τοῦ ἧττον; μὴ ὄκνει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὦ Πῶλε· οὐδὲν γὰρ βλαβήσῃ· ἀλλὰ γενναίως τῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ ἰατρῷ παρέχων ἀποκρίνου, καὶ ἢ
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ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμην, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ἄλλος δέ τις ἀνθρώπων;
οὔ μοι δοκεῖ κατά γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον.
ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι οὔτʼ ἂν ἐγὼ οὔτʼ ἂν σὺ οὔτʼ ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων δέξαιτʼ ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι· κάκιον γὰρ τυγχάνει ὄν.
φαίνεται.
ὁρᾷς οὖν, ὦ Πῶλε, ὁ ἔλεγχος παρὰ τὸν ἔλεγχον παραβαλλόμενος ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔοικεν, ἀλλὰ σοὶ μὲν οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐμοὶ δὲ σὺ ἐξαρκεῖς εἷς ὢν
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ἔγωγε.
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ἔχεις οὖν λέγειν ὡς οὐχὶ τά γε δίκαια πάντα καλά ἐστιν, καθʼ ὅσον δίκαια; καὶ διασκεψάμενος εἰπέ.
ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
σκόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε· ἆρα εἴ τίς τι ποιεῖ, ἀνάγκη τι εἶναι καὶ πάσχον ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ ποιοῦντος;
ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
ἆρα τοῦτο πάσχον ὃ τὸ ποιοῦν ποιεῖ, καὶ τοιοῦτον οἷον ποιεῖ τὸ ποιοῦν; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· εἴ τις τύπτει, ἀνάγκη τι τύπτεσθαι;
ἀνάγκη.
καὶ εἰ σφόδρα τύπτει ἢ ταχὺ ὁ
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ναί.
τοιοῦτον ἄρα πάθος τῷ τυπτομένῳ ἐστὶν οἷον ἂν τὸ τύπτον ποιῇ;
πάνυ γε.
οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ κάει τις, ἀνάγκη τι κάεσθαι;
πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
καὶ εἰ σφόδρα γε κάει ἢ ἀλγεινῶς, οὕτω κάεσθαι τὸ καόμενον ὡς ἂν τὸ κᾶον κάῃ;
πάνυ γε.
οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ τέμνει τι, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος; τέμνεται γάρ τι.
ναί.
καὶ εἰ μέγα γε ἢ βαθὺ τὸ τμῆμα ἢ ἀλγεινόν, τοιοῦτον
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φαίνεται.
συλλήβδην δὴ ὅρα εἰ ὁμολογεῖς, ὃ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, περὶ πάντων, οἷον ἂν ποιῇ τὸ ποιοῦν, τοιοῦτον τὸ πάσχον πάσχειν.
ἀλλʼ ὁμολογῶ.
τούτων δὴ ὁμολογουμένων, τὸ δίκην διδόναι πότερον πάσχειν τί ἐστιν ἢ ποιεῖν;
ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πάσχειν.
οὐκοῦν ὑπό τινος ποιοῦντος;
πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ὑπό γε τοῦ κολάζοντος.
ὁ δὲ ὀρθῶς κολάζων
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ναί.
δίκαια ποιῶν ἢ οὔ;
δίκαια.
οὐκοῦν ὁ κολαζόμενος δίκην διδοὺς δίκαια πάσχει;
φαίνεται.
τὰ δὲ δίκαιά που καλὰ ὡμολόγηται;
πάνυ γε.
τούτων ἄρα ὁ μὲν ποιεῖ καλά, ὁ δὲ πάσχει, ὁ κολαζόμενος.
ναί.
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οὐκοῦν εἴπερ καλά, ἀγαθά; ἢ γὰρ ἡδέα ἢ ὠφέλιμα.
ἀνάγκη.
ἀγαθὰ ἄρα πάσχει ὁ δίκην διδούς;
ἔοικεν.
ὠφελεῖται ἄρα;
ναί.
ἆρα ἥνπερ ἐγὼ ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν ὠφελίαν; βελτίων τὴν ψυχὴν γίγνεται, εἴπερ δικαίως κολάζεται;
εἰκός γε.
κακίας ἄρα ψυχῆς ἀπαλλάττεται ὁ δίκην διδούς;
ναί.
ἆρα οὖν τοῦ μεγίστου ἀπαλλάττεται
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οὔκ, ἀλλὰ πενίαν.
τί δʼ ἐν σώματος κατασκευῇ; κακίαν ἂν φήσαις ἀσθένειαν εἶναι καὶ νόσον καὶ αἶσχος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα;
ἔγωγε.
οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ πονηρίαν ἡγῇ τινα εἶναι;
πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
ταύτην οὖν οὐκ ἀδικίαν καλεῖς καὶ ἀμαθίαν καὶ δειλίαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα;
πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
οὐκοῦν χρημάτων
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ναί.
τίς οὖν τούτων τῶν πονηριῶν αἰσχίστη; οὐχ ἡ ἀδικία καὶ συλλήβδην ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρία;
πολύ γε.
εἰ δὴ αἰσχίστη, καὶ κακίστη;
πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεις;
ὡδί· ἀεὶ τὸ αἴσχιστον ἤτοι λύπην μεγίστην παρέχον ἢ βλάβην ἢ ἀμφότερα αἴσχιστόν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν.
μάλιστα.
αἴσχιστον δὲ ἀδικία καὶ σύμπασα ψυχῆς πονηρία νυνδὴ
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ὡμολόγηται γάρ.
οὐκοῦν ἢ ἀνιαρότατόν ἐστι καὶ ἀνίᾳ ὑπερβάλλον αἴσχιστον τούτων ἐστὶν ἢ βλάβῃ ἢ ἀμφότερα;
ἀνάγκη.
ἆρʼ οὖν ἀλγεινότερόν ἐστιν τοῦ πένεσθαι καὶ κάμνειν τὸ ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ ἀκόλαστον καὶ δειλὸν καὶ ἀμαθῆ;
οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπὸ τούτων γε.
ὑπερφυεῖ τινι ἄρα ὡς μεγάλῃ βλάβῃ καὶ κακῷ θαυμασίῳ ὑπερβάλλουσα
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φαίνεται.
ἀλλὰ μήν που τό γε μεγίστῃ βλάβῃ ὑπερβάλλον μέγιστον ἂν κακὸν εἴη τῶν ὄντων.
ναί.
ἡ ἀδικία ἄρα καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ψυχῆς πονηρία μέγιστον τῶν ὄντων κακόν ἐστιν;
φαίνεται.
τίς οὖν τέχνη πενίας ἀπαλλάττει; οὐ χρηματιστική;
ναί.
τίς δὲ νόσου; οὐκ ἰατρική;
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ἀνάγκη.
τίς δὲ πονηρίας καὶ ἀδικίας; εἰ μὴ οὕτως εὐπορεῖς, ὧδε σκόπει· ποῖ ἄγομεν καὶ παρὰ τίνας τοὺς κάμνοντας τὰ σώματα;
παρὰ τοὺς ἰατρούς, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ποῖ δὲ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκολασταίνοντας;
παρὰ τοὺς δικαστὰς λέγεις;
οὐκοῦν δίκην δώσοντας;
φημί.
ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ δικαιοσύνῃ τινὶ χρώμενοι κολάζουσιν οἱ ὀρθῶς κολάζοντες;
δῆλον δή.
χρηματιστικὴ μὲν ἄρα πενίας ἀπαλλάττει,
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φαίνεται.
τί οὖν τούτων κάλλιστόν ἐστιν ὧν λέγεις;
τίνων λέγεις;
χρηματιστικῆς, ἰατρικῆς, δίκης.
πολὺ διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡ δίκη.
οὐκοῦν αὖ ἤτοι ἡδονὴν πλείστην ποιεῖ ἢ ὠφελίαν ἢ ἀμφότερα, εἴπερ κάλλιστόν ἐστιν;
ναί.
ἆρʼ οὖν τὸ ἰατρεύεσθαι ἡδύ ἐστιν, καὶ χαίρουσιν οἱ ἰατρευόμενοι;
οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
ἀλλʼ ὠφέλιμόν γε. ἦ γάρ;
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μεγάλου γὰρ κακοῦ ἀπαλλάττεται, ὥστε λυσιτελεῖ ὑπομεῖναι τὴν ἀλγηδόνα καὶ ὑγιῆ εἶναι.
πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
ἆρʼ οὖν οὕτως ἂν περὶ σῶμα εὐδαιμονέστατος ἄνθρωπος εἴη, ἰατρευόμενος, ἢ μηδὲ κάμνων ἀρχήν;
δῆλον ὅτι μηδὲ κάμνων.
οὐ γὰρ τοῦτʼ ἦν εὐδαιμονία, ὡς ἔοικε, κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγή, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν μηδὲ κτῆσις.
ἔστι ταῦτα.
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τί δέ; ἀθλιώτερος πότερος δυοῖν ἐχόντοιν κακὸν εἴτʼ ἐν σώματι εἴτʼ ἐν ψυχῇ, ὁ ἰατρευόμενος καὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενος τοῦ κακοῦ, ἢ ὁ μὴ ἰατρευόμενος, ἔχων δέ;
φαίνεταί μοι ὁ μὴ ἰατρευόμενος.
οὐκοῦν τὸ δίκην διδόναι μεγίστου κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγὴ ἦν, πονηρίας;
ἦν γάρ.
σωφρονίζει γάρ που καὶ δικαιοτέρους ποιεῖ καὶ ἰατρικὴ γίγνεται πονηρίας ἡ δίκη.
ναί.
εὐδαιμονέστατος μὲν ἄρα ὁ μὴ ἔχων κακίαν ἐν ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο
-
δῆλον δή.
δεύτερος δέ που ὁ ἀπαλλαττόμενος.
ἔοικεν.
οὗτος δʼ ἦν ὁ νουθετούμενός τε καὶ ἐπιπληττόμενος καὶ δίκην διδούς.
ναί.
κάκιστα ἄρα ζῇ ὁ ἔχων ἀδικίαν καὶ μὴ ἀπαλλαττόμενος.
φαίνεται.
οὐκοῦν οὗτος τυγχάνει ὢν ὃς ἂν τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικῶν καὶ χρώμενος μεγίστῃ ἀδικίᾳ διαπράξηται ὥστε μήτε νουθετεῖσθαι
-
ἔοικε.
σχεδὸν γάρ που οὗτοι, ὦ ἄριστε, τὸ αὐτὸ διαπεπραγμένοι εἰσὶν ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τοῖς μεγίστοις νοσήμασιν συνισχόμενος διαπράξαιτο μὴ διδόναι δίκην τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἁμαρτημάτων τοῖς ἰατροῖς μηδὲ ἰατρεύεσθαι, φοβούμενος ὡσπερανεὶ παῖς τὸ κάεσθαι καὶ τὸ τέμνεσθαι, ὅτι
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ἔμοιγε.
ἀγνοῶν γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, οἷόν ἐστιν ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ἀρετὴ σώματος. κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἡμῖν ὡμολογημένων τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν καὶ οἱ τὴν δίκην φεύγοντες, ὦ Πῶλε, τὸ ἀλγεινὸν αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ὠφέλιμον τυφλῶς ἔχειν καὶ ἀγνοεῖν ὅσῳ ἀθλιώτερόν ἐστι μὴ ὑγιοῦς σώματος μὴ ὑγιεῖ ψυχῇ συνοικεῖν, ἀλλὰ σαθρᾷ καὶ ἀδίκῳ
-
εἰ σοί γε δοκεῖ.
ἆρʼ οὖν συμβαίνει μέγιστον κακὸν ἡ ἀδικία καὶ τὸ
-
φαίνεταί γε.
καὶ μὴν ἀπαλλαγή γε ἐφάνη τούτου τοῦ κακοῦ τὸ δίκην διδόναι;
κινδυνεύει.
τὸ δέ γε μὴ διδόναι ἐμμονὴ τοῦ κακοῦ;
ναί.
δεύτερον ἄρα ἐστὶν τῶν κακῶν μεγέθει τὸ ἀδικεῖν· τὸ δὲ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην πάντων μέγιστόν τε καὶ πρῶτον κακῶν πέφυκεν.
ἔοικεν.
ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ περὶ τούτου, ὦ φίλε, ἠμφεσβητήσαμεν, σὺ μὲν τὸν Ἀρχέλαον εὐδαιμονίζων τὸν τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικοῦντα
-
ναί.
οὐκοῦν ἀποδέδεικται ὅτι ἀληθῆ ἐλέγετο;
φαίνεται.
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εἶεν· εἰ οὖν δὴ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, ὦ Πῶλε, τίς ἡ μεγάλη χρεία ἐστὶν τῆς ῥητορικῆς; δεῖ μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν νῦν ὡμολογημένων αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα φυλάττειν ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσει, ὡς ἱκανὸν κακὸν ἕξοντα. οὐ γάρ;
πάνυ γε.
ἐὰν δέ γε ἀδικήσῃ ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ ἄλλος τις ὧν ἂν κήδηται, αὐτὸν ἑκόντα ἰέναι ἐκεῖσε ὅπου ὡς τάχιστα δώσει δίκην, παρὰ τὸν δικαστὴν ὥσπερ παρὰ τὸν ἰατρόν,
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τί γὰρ δὴ φῶμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες;
ἐπὶ μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἀπολογεῖσθαι ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀδικίας τῆς αὑτοῦ ἢ γονέων ἢ ἑταίρων ἢ παίδων ἢ πατρίδος ἀδικούσης οὐ χρήσιμος οὐδὲν ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἡμῖν, ὦ Πῶλε, εἰ μὴ εἴ τις
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ἄτοπα μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, τοῖς μέντοι ἔμπροσθεν ἴσως σοι ὁμολογεῖται.
οὐκοῦν ἢ κἀκεῖνα λυτέον ἢ τάδε ἀνάγκη συμβαίνειν;
ναί, τοῦτό γε οὕτως ἔχει.
τοὐναντίον δέ γε αὖ μεταβαλόντα, εἰ ἄρα δεῖ τινα κακῶς ποιεῖν, εἴτʼ ἐχθρὸν εἴτε ὁντινοῦν, ἐὰν μόνον μὴ αὐτὸς ἀδικῆται ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐχθροῦ—τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ εὐλαβητέον—ἐὰν δὲ ἄλλον ἀδικῇ ὁ ἐχθρός, παντὶ τρόπῳ παρασκευαστέον, καὶ
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εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, σπουδάζει ταῦτα Σωκράτης ἢ παίζει;
ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὑπερφυῶς σπουδάζειν· οὐδὲν μέντοι οἷον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν.
νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀλλʼ ἐπιθυμῶ. εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες,
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ὦ Καλλίκλεις, εἰ μή τι ἦν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πάθος, τοῖς μὲν ἄλλο τι, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλά τις ἡμῶν ἴδιόν τι ἔπασχεν πάθος ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι, οὐκ ἂν ἦν ῥᾴδιον
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ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖς νεανιεύεσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγόρος ὤν· καὶ νῦν ταῦτα δημηγορεῖς ταὐτὸν παθόντος Πώλου πάθος ὅπερ Γοργίου κατηγόρει πρὸς σὲ παθεῖν. ἔφη γάρ που Γοργίαν ἐρωτώμενον ὑπὸ σοῦ, ἐὰν ἀφίκηται παρʼ αὐτὸν μὴ ἐπιστάμενος τὰ δίκαια ὁ τὴν ῥητορικὴν
-λαμπρός
ἕκαστος
ἐν τούτῳ, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτʼ ἐπείγεται
,ἀμελεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὧν δεῖ σε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ φύσιν ψυχῆς ὧδε γενναίαν μειρακιώδει
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καίτοι, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες—καί μοι μηδὲν ἀχθεσθῇς· εὐνοίᾳ γὰρ ἐρῶ τῇ σῇ—οὐκ αἰσχρὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς ἐγὼ σὲ οἶμαι ἔχειν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς πόρρω ἀεὶ φιλοσοφίας ἐλαύνοντας; νῦν γὰρ εἴ τις σοῦ λαβόμενος ἢ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν τῶν τοιούτων εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον ἀπάγοι, φάσκων ἀδικεῖν μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντα, οἶσθʼ ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις ὅτι
-ἥτις εὐφυῆ λαβοῦσα τέχνη φῶτα ἔθηκε χείρονα
, μήτε αὐτὸν αὑτῷ δυνάμενον βοηθεῖν μηδʼ ἐκσῶσαι ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων μήτε ἑαυτὸν μήτε ἄλλον μηδένα, ὑπὸ δὲ
-παῦσαι δὲ ἐλέγχων, πραγμάτων δʼ εὐμουσίαν ἄσκει
, καὶ ἄσκει ὁπόθεν δόξεις φρονεῖν, ἄλλοις τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα ἀφείς
, εἴτε ληρήματα χρὴ φάναι εἶναι εἴτε φλυαρίας, ἐξ ὧν κενοῖσιν ἐγκατοικήσεις δόμοις
· ζηλῶν οὐκ ἐλέγχοντας ἄνδρας τὰ μικρὰ
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εἰ χρυσῆν ἔχων ἐτύγχανον τὴν ψυχήν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἂν οἴει με ἅσμενον εὑρεῖν τούτων τινὰ τῶν λίθων ᾗ βασανίζουσιν τὸν χρυσόν, τὴν ἀρίστην, πρὸς ἥντινα ἔμελλον προσαγαγὼν αὐτήν, εἴ μοι ὁμολογήσειεν ἐκείνη καλῶς τεθεραπεῦσθαι τὴν ψυχήν, εὖ εἴσεσθαι ὅτι ἱκανῶς ἔχω καὶ οὐδέν με δεῖ ἄλλης βασάνου;
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πρὸς τί δὴ τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες;
ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ· νῦν οἶμαι ἐγὼ σοὶ ἐντετυχηκὼς τοιούτῳ ἑρμαίῳ ἐντετυχηκέναι.
τί δή;
εὖ οἶδʼ ὅτι, ἅν μοι σὺ ὁμολογήσῃς περὶ ὧν ἡ ἐμὴ ψυχὴ δοξάζει, ταῦτʼ ἤδη ἐστὶν αὐτὰ τἀληθῆ. ἐννοῶ γὰρ
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ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἔλεγον καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν λέγω.
πότερον δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν βελτίω καλεῖς σὺ καὶ κρείττω;
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ἀλλʼ ἐγώ σοι σαφῶς λέγω, ὅτι ταὐτόν ἐστιν.
οὐκοῦν οἱ πολλοὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς κρείττους εἰσὶν κατὰ φύσιν; οἳ δὴ καὶ τοὺς νόμους τίθενται ἐπὶ τῷ ἑνί, ὥσπερ καὶ σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες.
πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
τὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἄρα νόμιμα τὰ τῶν κρειττόνων ἐστίν.
πάνυ γε.
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οὐκοῦν τὰ τῶν βελτιόνων; οἱ γὰρ κρείττους βελτίους πολὺ κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον.
ναί.
οὐκοῦν τὰ τούτων νόμιμα κατὰ φύσιν καλά, κρειττόνων γε ὄντων;
φημί.
ἆρʼ οὖν οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὕτως, ὡς ἄρτι αὖ σὺ ἔλεγες, δίκαιον εἶναι τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν καὶ αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν
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ἀλλʼ οἵ γε πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὕτως.
οὐ νόμῳ ἄρα μόνον ἐστὶν αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ
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οὑτοσὶ ἀνὴρ οὐ παύσεται φλυαρῶν. εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ τηλικοῦτος ὢν ὀνόματα θηρεύων, καὶ
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εἶεν, ὦ σοφώτατε Καλλίκλεις· οὕτω λέγεις;
πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
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ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ μέν, ὦ δαιμόνιε, καὶ αὐτὸς πάλαι τοπάζω τοιοῦτόν τί σε λέγειν τὸ κρεῖττον, καὶ ἀνερωτῶ γλιχόμενος σαφῶς εἰδέναι ὅτι λέγεις. οὐ γὰρ δήπου σύ γε τοὺς δύο βελτίους ἡγῇ τοῦ ἑνός, οὐδὲ τοὺς σοὺς δούλους βελτίους σοῦ, ὅτι ἰσχυρότεροί εἰσιν ἢ σύ. ἀλλὰ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰπὲ τί ποτε λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους, ἐπειδὴ οὐ τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους; καὶ ὦ θαυμάσιε πρᾳότερόν με προδίδασκε, ἵνα μὴ ἀποφοιτήσω παρὰ σοῦ.
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εἰρωνεύῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
μὰ τὸν Ζῆθον, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ᾧ σὺ χρώμενος πολλὰ νυνδὴ εἰρωνεύου πρός με· ἀλλʼ ἴθι εἰπέ, τίνας λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους εἶναι;
τοὺς ἀμείνους ἔγωγε.
ὁρᾷς ἄρα ὅτι σὺ αὐτὸς ὀνόματα λέγεις, δηλοῖς δὲ οὐδέν; οὐκ ἐρεῖς, τοὺς βελτίους καὶ κρείττους πότερον τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους λέγεις ἢ ἄλλους τινάς;
ἀλλὰ ναὶ μὰ Δία τούτους λέγω, καὶ σφόδρα γε.
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πολλάκις ἄρα εἷς φρονῶν μυρίων μὴ φρονούντων κρείττων ἐστὶν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ τοῦτον ἄρχειν δεῖ, τοὺς δʼ ἄρχεσθαι, καὶ πλέον ἔχειν τὸν ἄρχοντα τῶν ἀρχομένων· τοῦτο γάρ μοι δοκεῖς βούλεσθαι λέγειν—καὶ οὐ ῥήματι θηρεύω—εἰ ὁ εἷς τῶν μυρίων κρείττων.
ἀλλὰ ταῦτʼ ἔστιν ἃ λέγω. τοῦτο γὰρ οἶμαι ἐγὼ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι φύσει, τὸ βελτίω ὄντα καὶ φρονιμώτερον καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ πλέον ἔχειν τῶν φαυλοτέρων.
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ἔχε δὴ αὐτοῦ. τί ποτε αὖ νῦν λέγεις; ἐὰν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὦμεν, ὥσπερ νῦν, πολλοὶ ἁθρόοι, καὶ ἡμῖν ᾖ ἐν κοινῷ πολλὰ σιτία καὶ ποτά, ὦμεν δὲ παντοδαποί, οἱ μὲν ἰσχυροί, οἱ δʼ ἀσθενεῖς, εἷς δὲ ἡμῶν ᾖ φρονιμώτερος περὶ ταῦτα, ἰατρὸς ὤν, ᾖ δέ, οἷον εἰκός, τῶν μὲν ἰσχυρότερος, τῶν δὲ ἀσθενέστερος, ἄλλο τι ἢ οὗτος, φρονιμώτερος ἡμῶν ὤν, βελτίων καὶ κρείττων ἔσται εἰς ταῦτα;
πάνυ γε.
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ἦ οὖν τούτων τῶν σιτίων πλέον ἡμῶν ἑκτέον αὐτῷ, ὅτι βελτίων ἐστίν, ἢ τῷ μὲν ἄρχειν πάντα ἐκεῖνον δεῖ νέμειν, ἐν τῷ δὲ ἀναλίσκειν τε αὐτὰ καὶ καταχρῆσθαι εἰς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα οὐ πλεονεκτητέον, εἰ μὴ μέλλει ζημιοῦσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν πλέον, τῶν δʼ ἔλαττον ἑκτέον· ἐὰν δὲ τύχῃ πάντων ἀσθενέστατος ὤν, πάντων ἐλάχιστον τῷ βελτίστῳ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις; οὐχ οὕτως, ὠγαθέ;
περὶ σιτία, λέγεις, καὶ ποτὰ καὶ ἰατροὺς καὶ φλυαρίας·
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πότερον οὐ τὸν φρονιμώτερον βελτίω λέγεις; φάθι ἢ μή.
ἔγωγε.
ἀλλʼ οὐ τὸν βελτίω πλέον δεῖν ἔχειν;
οὐ σιτίων γε οὐδὲ ποτῶν.
μανθάνω, ἀλλʼ ἴσως ἱματίων, καὶ δεῖ τὸν ὑφαντικώτατον μέγιστον ἱμάτιον ἔχειν καὶ πλεῖστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἀμπεχόμενον περιιέναι;
ποίων ἱματίων;
ἀλλʼ εἰς ὑποδήματα δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ πλεονεκτεῖν τὸν
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ποῖα ὑποδήματα; φλυαρεῖς ἔχων.
ἀλλʼ εἰ μὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεις, ἴσως τὰ τοιάδε· οἷον γεωργικὸν ἄνδρα περὶ γῆν φρόνιμόν τε καὶ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, τοῦτον δὴ ἴσως δεῖ πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν σπερμάτων καὶ ὡς πλείστῳ σπέρματι χρῆσθαι εἰς τὴν αὑτοῦ γῆν.
ὡς ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.
οὐ μόνον γε, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν.
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νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ἀτεχνῶς γε ἀεὶ σκυτέας τε καὶ κναφέας καὶ μαγείρους λέγων καὶ ἰατροὺς οὐδὲν παύῃ, ὡς περὶ τούτων ἡμῖν ὄντα τὸν λόγον.
οὐκοῦν σὺ ἐρεῖς περὶ τίνων ὁ κρείττων τε καὶ φρονιμώτερος πλέον ἔχων δικαίως πλεονεκτεῖ; ἢ οὔτε ἐμοῦ ὑποβάλλοντος ἀνέξῃ οὔτʼ αὐτὸς ἐρεῖς;
ἀλλʼ ἔγωγε καὶ πάλαι λέγω. πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς κρείττους οἵ εἰσιν οὐ σκυτοτόμους λέγω οὐδὲ μαγείρους, ἀλλʼ
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ὁρᾷς, ὦ βέλτιστε Καλλίκλεις, ὡς οὐ ταὐτὰ σύ τʼ ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖς καὶ ἐγὼ σοῦ; σὺ μὲν γὰρ ἐμὲ φῂς ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ λέγειν, καὶ μέμφῃ μοι· ἐγὼ δὲ σοῦ τοὐναντίον, ὅτι οὐδέποτε ταὐτὰ λέγεις περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τοτὲ μὲν τοὺς
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ἀλλʼ εἴρηκά γε ἔγωγε τοὺς φρονίμους εἰς τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα καὶ ἀνδρείους. τούτους γὰρ
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τί δέ; αὑτῶν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, τί; ἦ τι ἄρχοντας ἢ ἀρχομένους;
πῶς λέγεις;
ἕνα ἕκαστον λέγω αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχοντα· ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν δεῖ, αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχειν, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων;
πῶς ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχοντα λέγεις;
οὐδὲν ποικίλον ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, σώφρονα ὄντα καὶ ἐγκρατῆ αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ, τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν
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ὡς ἡδὺς εἶ· τοὺς ἠλιθίους λέγεις τοὺς σώφρονας.
πῶς γὰρ οὔ; οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐκ ἂν γνοίη ὅτι οὐ τοῦτο λέγω.
πάνυ γε σφόδρα, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἐπεὶ πῶς ἂν εὐδαίμων γένοιτο ἄνθρωπος δουλεύων ὁτῳοῦν; ἀλλὰ τοῦτʼ ἐστὶν τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον, ὃ ἐγώ σοι νῦν παρρησιαζόμενος λέγω, ὅτι δεῖ τὸν ὀρθῶς βιωσόμενον τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας τὰς ἑαυτοῦ ἐᾶν ὡς μεγίστας εἶναι καὶ μὴ κολάζειν,
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οὐκ ἀγεννῶς γε, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἐπεξέρχῃ τῷ λόγῳ παρρησιαζόμενος· σαφῶς γὰρ σὺ νῦν λέγεις ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι διανοοῦνται μέν, λέγειν δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν. δέομαι οὖν ἐγώ σου μηδενὶ τρόπῳ ἀνεῖναι, ἵνα τῷ ὄντι κατάδηλον γένηται πῶς βιωτέον. καί μοι λέγε· τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας φῂς οὐ κολαστέον, εἰ μέλλει τις οἷον δεῖ εἶναι, ἐῶντα δὲ αὐτὰς ὡς μεγίστας πλήρωσιν αὐταῖς ἁμόθεν γέ ποθεν ἑτοιμάζειν, καὶ
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φημὶ ταῦτα ἐγώ.
οὐκ ἄρα ὀρθῶς λέγονται οἱ μηδενὸς δεόμενοι εὐδαίμονες εἶναι.
οἱ λίθοι γὰρ ἂν οὕτω γε καὶ οἱ νεκροὶ εὐδαιμονέστατοι εἶεν.
ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ ὥς γε σὺ λέγεις δεινὸς ὁ βίος. οὐ γάρ τοι θαυμάζοιμʼ ἂν εἰ Εὐριπίδης ἀληθῆ ἐν τοῖσδε λέγει, λέγων—
τοῦτʼ ἀληθέστερον εἴρηκας, ὦ Σώκρατες.
φέρε δή, ἄλλην σοι εἰκόνα λέγω ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γυμνασίου τῇ νῦν. σκόπει γὰρ εἰ τοιόνδε λέγεις περὶ τοῦ βίου ἑκατέρου, τοῦ τε σώφρονος καὶ τοῦ ἀκολάστου, οἷον εἰ δυοῖν ἀνδροῖν ἑκατέρῳ πίθοι πολλοὶ εἶεν καὶ τῷ μὲν
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οὐ πείθεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. τῷ μὲν γὰρ πληρωσαμένῳ ἐκείνῳ οὐκέτʼ ἔστιν ἡδονὴ οὐδεμία, ἀλλὰ τοῦτʼ ἔστιν, ὃ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, τὸ ὥσπερ λίθον ζῆν, ἐπειδὰν
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οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη γʼ, ἂν πολὺ ἐπιρρέῃ, πολὺ καὶ τὸ ἀπιὸν εἶναι, καὶ μεγάλʼ ἄττα τὰ τρήματα εἶναι ταῖς ἐκροαῖς;
πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
χαραδριοῦ τινα αὖ σὺ βίον λέγεις, ἀλλʼ οὐ νεκροῦ οὐδὲ λίθου. καί μοι λέγε· τὸ τοιόνδε λέγεις οἷον πεινῆν καὶ πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν;
ἔγωγε.
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καὶ διψῆν γε καὶ διψῶντα πίνειν;
λέγω, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ἁπάσας ἔχοντα καὶ δυνάμενον πληροῦντα χαίροντα εὐδαιμόνως ζῆν.
εὖγε, ὦ βέλτιστε· διατέλει γὰρ ὥσπερ ἤρξω, καὶ ὅπως μὴ ἀπαισχυνῇ. δεῖ δέ, ὡς ἔοικε, μηδʼ ἐμὲ ἀπαισχυνθῆναι. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν εἰπὲ εἰ καὶ ψωρῶντα καὶ κνησιῶντα, ἀφθόνως ἔχοντα τοῦ κνῆσθαι, κνώμενον διατελοῦντα τὸν βίον εὐδαιμόνως ἔστι ζῆν.
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ὡς ἄτοπος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς δημηγόρος.
τοιγάρτοι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, Πῶλον μὲν καὶ Γοργίαν καὶ ἐξέπληξα καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐποίησα, σὺ δὲ οὐ μὴ ἐκπλαγῇς οὐδὲ μὴ αἰσχυνθῇς· ἀνδρεῖος γὰρ εἶ. ἀλλʼ ἀποκρίνου μόνον.
φημὶ τοίνυν καὶ τὸν κνώμενον ἡδέως ἂν βιῶναι.
οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἡδέως, καὶ εὐδαιμόνως;
πάνυ γε.
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πότερον εἰ τὴν κεφαλὴν μόνον κνησιῷ—ἢ ἔτι τί σε ἐρωτῶ; ὅρα, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τί ἀποκρινῇ, ἐάν τίς σε τὰ ἐχόμενα τούτοις ἐφεξῆς ἅπαντα ἐρωτᾷ. καὶ τούτων τοιούτων ὄντων κεφάλαιον, ὁ τῶν κιναίδων βίος, οὗτος οὐ δεινὸς καὶ αἰσχρὸς καὶ ἄθλιος; ἢ τούτους τολμήσεις λέγειν εὐδαίμονας εἶναι, ἐὰν ἀφθόνως ἔχωσιν ὧν δέονται;
οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγων, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὺς λόγους;
ἦ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἄγω ἐνταῦθα, ὦ γενναῖε, ἢ ἐκεῖνος ὃς ἂν φῇ ἀνέδην οὕτω τοὺς χαίροντας, ὅπως ἂν χαίρωσιν,
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ἵνα δή μοι μὴ ἀνομολογούμενος ᾖ ὁ λόγος, ἐὰν ἕτερον φήσω εἶναι, τὸ αὐτό φημι εἶναι.
διαφθείρεις, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τοὺς πρώτους λόγους, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι μετʼ ἐμοῦ ἱκανῶς τὰ ὄντα ἐξετάζοις, εἴπερ παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα σαυτῷ ἐρεῖς.
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καὶ γὰρ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
οὐ τοίνυν ὀρθῶς ποιῶ οὔτʼ ἐγώ, εἴπερ ποιῶ τοῦτο, οὔτε σύ. ἀλλʼ, ὦ μακάριε, ἄθρει μὴ οὐ τοῦτο ᾖ τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὸ πάντως χαίρειν· ταῦτά τε γὰρ τὰ νυνδὴ αἰνιχθέντα πολλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ φαίνεται συμβαίνοντα, εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά.
ὡς σύ γε οἴει, ὦ Σώκρατες.
σὺ δὲ τῷ ὄντι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ταῦτα ἰσχυρίζῃ;
ἔγωγε.
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ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἄρα τῷ λόγῳ ὡς σοῦ σπουδάζοντος;
πάνυ γε σφόδρα.
ἴθι δή μοι, ἐπειδὴ οὕτω δοκεῖ, διελοῦ τάδε· ἐπιστήμην που καλεῖς τι;
ἔγωγε.
οὐ καὶ ἀνδρείαν νυνδὴ ἔλεγές τινα εἶναι μετὰ ἐπιστήμης;
ἔλεγον γάρ.
ἄλλο τι οὖν ὡς ἕτερον τὴν ἀνδρείαν τῆς ἐπιστήμης δύο ταῦτα ἔλεγες;
σφόδρα γε.
τί δέ; ἡδονὴν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ταὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερον;
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ἕτερον δήπου, ὦ σοφώτατε σύ.
ἦ καὶ ἀνδρείαν ἑτέραν ἡδονῆς;
πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
φέρε δὴ ὅπως μεμνησόμεθα ταῦτα, ὅτι Καλλικλῆς ἔφη Ἀχαρνεὺς ἡδὺ μὲν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ταὐτὸν εἶναι, ἐπιστήμην δὲ καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ ἀλλήλων καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕτερον.
Σωκράτης δέ γε ἡμῖν ὁ Ἀλωπεκῆθεν οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ ταῦτα. ἢ ὁμολογεῖ;
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οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ· οἶμαι δέ γε οὐδὲ Καλλικλῆς, ὅταν αὐτὸς αὑτὸν θεάσηται ὀρθῶς. εἰπὲ γάρ μοι, τοὺς εὖ πράττοντας τοῖς κακῶς πράττουσιν οὐ τοὐναντίον ἡγῇ πάθος πεπονθέναι;
ἔγωγε.
ἆρʼ οὖν, εἴπερ ἐναντία ἐστὶν ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις, ἀνάγκη περὶ αὐτῶν ἔχειν ὥσπερ περὶ ὑγιείας ἔχει καὶ νόσου; οὐ γὰρ ἅμα δήπου ὑγιαίνει τε καὶ νοσεῖ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲ ἅμα ἀπαλλάττεται ὑγιείας τε καὶ νόσου.
πῶς λέγεις;
οἷον περὶ ὅτου βούλει τοῦ σώματος ἀπολαβὼν
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πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
οὐ δήπου καὶ ὑγιαίνει γε ἅμα τοὺς αὐτούς;
οὐδʼ ὁπωστιοῦν.
τί δὲ ὅταν τῆς ὀφθαλμίας ἀπαλλάττηται; ἆρα τότε καὶ τῆς ὑγιείας ἀπαλλάττεται τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν καὶ τελευτῶν ἅμα ἀμφοτέρων ἀπήλλακται;
ἥκιστά γε.
θαυμάσιον γὰρ
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σφόδρα γε.
ἀλλʼ ἐν μέρει οἶμαι ἑκάτερον καὶ λαμβάνει καὶ ἀπολλύει;
φημί.
οὐκοῦν καὶ ἰσχὺν καὶ ἀσθένειαν ὡσαύτως;
ναί.
καὶ τάχος καὶ βραδυτῆτα;
πάνυ γε.
ἦ καὶ τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τἀναντία τούτων, κακά τε καὶ ἀθλιότητα, ἐν μέρει λαμβάνει καὶ ἐν μέρει ἀπαλλάττεται ἑκατέρου;
πάντως δήπου.
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ἐὰν εὕρωμεν ἄρα ἄττα ὧν ἅμα τε ἀπαλλάττεται ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἅμα ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι ταῦτά γε οὐκ ἂν εἴη τό τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν. ὁμολογοῦμεν ταῦτα; καὶ εὖ μάλα σκεψάμενος ἀποκρίνου.
ἀλλʼ ὑπερφυῶς ὡς ὁμολογῶ.
ἴθι δὴ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ὡμολογημένα. τὸ πεινῆν ἔλεγες πότερον ἡδὺ ἢ ἀνιαρὸν εἶναι; αὐτὸ λέγω τὸ πεινῆν.
ἀνιαρὸν ἔγωγε· τὸ μέντοι πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν ἡδὺ
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μανθάνω· ἀλλʼ οὖν τό γε πεινῆν αὐτὸ ἀνιαρόν. ἢ οὐχί;
φημί.
οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ διψῆν;
σφόδρα γε.
πότερον οὖν ἔτι πλείω ἐρωτῶ, ἢ ὁμολογεῖς ἅπασαν ἔνδειαν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀνιαρὸν εἶναι;
ὁμολογῶ, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐρώτα.
εἶεν· διψῶντα δὲ δὴ πίνειν ἄλλο τι ἢ ἡδὺ φῂς εἶναι;
ἔγωγε.
οὐκοῦν τούτου οὗ λέγεις τὸ μὲν διψῶντα λυπούμενον δήπου ἐστίν;
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ναί.
τὸ δὲ πίνειν πλήρωσίς τε τῆς ἐνδείας καὶ ἡδονή;
ναί.
οὐκοῦν κατὰ τὸ πίνειν χαίρειν λέγεις;
μάλιστα.
διψῶντά γε.
φημί.
λυπούμενον;
ναί.
αἰσθάνῃ οὖν τὸ συμβαῖνον, ὅτι λυπούμενον χαίρειν λέγεις ἅμα, ὅταν διψῶντα πίνειν λέγῃς; ἢ οὐχ ἅμα τοῦτο γίγνεται κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον καὶ χρόνον εἴτε ψυχῆς εἴτε σώματος βούλει; οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι διαφέρει. ἔστι ταῦτα ἢ οὔ;
ἔστιν.
ἀλλὰ μὴν εὖ γε πράττοντα κακῶς
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φημὶ γάρ.
ἀνιώμενον δέ γε χαίρειν δυνατὸν ὡμολόγηκας.
φαίνεται.
οὐκ ἄρα τὸ χαίρειν ἐστὶν εὖ πράττειν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀνιᾶσθαι κακῶς, ὥστε ἕτερον γίγνεται τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.
οὐκ οἶδʼ ἅττα σοφίζῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
οἶσθα, ἀλλὰ ἀκκίζῃ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· καὶ πρόιθί γε ἔτι εἰς τὸ ἔμπροσθεν, ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς ἵνα εἰδῇς ὡς σοφὸς
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οὐκ οἶδα ὅτι λέγεις.
μηδαμῶς, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλʼ ἀποκρίνου καὶ ἡμῶν ἕνεκα, ἵνα περανθῶσιν οἱ λόγοι.
ἀλλʼ ἀεὶ τοιοῦτός ἐστιν Σωκράτης, ὦ Γοργία· σμικρὰ καὶ ὀλίγου ἄξια ἀνερωτᾷ καὶ ἐξελέγχει.
ἀλλὰ τί σοὶ διαφέρει; πάντως οὐ σὴ αὕτη ἡ τιμή, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· ἀλλʼ ὑπόσχες Σωκράτει ἐξελέγξαι ὅπως ἂν βούληται.
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Ἐρώτα δὴ σὺ τὰ σμικρά τε καὶ στενὰ ταῦτα, ἐπείπερ Γοργίᾳ δοκεῖ οὕτως.
εὐδαίμων εἶ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὅτι τὰ μεγάλα μεμύησαι πρὶν τὰ σμικρά· ἐγὼ δʼ οὐκ ᾤμην θεμιτὸν εἶναι. ὅθεν οὖν ἀπέλιπες ἀποκρίνου, εἰ οὐχ ἅμα παύεται διψῶν ἕκαστος ἡμῶν καὶ ἡδόμενος.
φημί.
οὐκοῦν καὶ πεινῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν ἅμα παύεται;
ἔστι ταῦτα.
οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν λυπῶν
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ναί.
ἀλλὰ μὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν γε καὶ κακῶν οὐχ ἅμα παύεται, ὡς σὺ ὡμολόγεις· νῦν δὲ οὐχ ὁμολογεῖς;
ἔγωγε· τί οὖν δή;
ὅτι οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ γίγνεται, ὦ φίλε, τἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἡδέσιν οὐδὲ τὰ κακὰ τοῖς ἀνιαροῖς. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἅμα παύεται, τῶν δὲ οὔ, ὡς ἑτέρων ὄντων· πῶς οὖν ταὐτὰ ἂν εἴη τὰ ἡδέα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τὰ ἀνιαρὰ τοῖς κακοῖς; ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, καὶ τῇδε ἐπίσκεψαι (οἶμαι γάρ σοι οὐδὲ ταύτῃ
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ἔγωγε.
τί δέ; ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας καλεῖς ἄφρονας καὶ δειλούς; οὐ γὰρ ἄρτι γε, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀνδρείους καὶ φρονίμους ἔλεγες· ἢ οὐ τούτους ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς;
πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
τί δέ; παῖδα ἀνόητον χαίροντα ἤδη εἶδες;
ἔγωγε.
ἄνδρα δὲ οὔπω εἶδες ἀνόητον χαίροντα;
οἶμαι ἔγωγε· ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο;
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οὐδέν· ἀλλʼ ἀποκρίνου.
εἶδον.
τί δέ; νοῦν ἔχοντα λυπούμενον καὶ χαίροντα;
φημί.
πότεροι δὲ μᾶλλον χαίρουσι καὶ λυποῦνται, οἱ φρόνιμοι ἢ οἱ ἄφρονες;
οἶμαι ἔγωγε οὐ πολύ τι διαφέρειν.
ἀλλʼ ἀρκεῖ καὶ τοῦτο. ἐν πολέμῳ δὲ ἤδη εἶδες ἄνδρα δειλόν;
πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
τί οὖν; ἀπιόντων τῶν πολεμίων πότεροί σοι ἐδόκουν μᾶλλον χαίρειν, οἱ δειλοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι;
ἀμφότεροι ἔμοιγε
-μᾶλλον· εἰ δὲ μή, παραπλησίως γε.
οὐδὲν διαφέρει. χαίρουσιν δʼ οὖν καὶ οἱ δειλοί;
σφόδρα γε.
καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες, ὡς ἔοικεν.
ναί.
προσιόντων δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ μόνον λυποῦνται ἢ καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι;
ἀμφότεροι.
ἆρα ὁμοίως;
μᾶλλον ἴσως οἱ δειλοί.
ἀπιόντων δʼ οὐ μᾶλλον χαίρουσιν;
ἴσως.
οὐκοῦν λυποῦνται μὲν καὶ χαίρουσιν καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες καὶ οἱ φρόνιμοι καὶ οἱ δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι παραπλησίως,
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φημί.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οἵ γε φρόνιμοι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι ἀγαθοί, οἱ δὲ δειλοὶ καὶ ἄφρονες κακοί;
ναί.
παραπλησίως ἄρα χαίρουσιν καὶ λυποῦνται οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ κακοί;
φημί.
ἆρʼ οὖν παραπλησίως εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοί τε καὶ οἱ κακοί; ἢ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ κακοί εἰσιν οἱ κακοί;
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ἀλλὰ μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ οἶδʼ ὅτι λέγεις.
οὐκ οἶσθʼ ὅτι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἀγαθῶν φῂς παρουσίᾳ εἶναι ἀγαθούς, καὶ κακοὺς δὲ κακῶν; τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι τὰς ἡδονάς, κακὰ δὲ τὰς ἀνίας;
ἔγωγε.
οὐκοῦν τοῖς χαίρουσιν πάρεστιν τἀγαθά, αἱ ἡδοναί, εἴπερ χαίρουσιν;
πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
οὐκοῦν ἀγαθῶν παρόντων ἀγαθοί εἰσιν οἱ χαίροντες;
ναί.
τί δέ; τοῖς ἀνιωμένοις οὐ πάρεστιν τὰ κακά, αἱ λῦπαι;
πάρεστιν.
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κακῶν δέ γε παρουσίᾳ φῂς σὺ εἶναι κακοὺς τοὺς κακούς· ἢ οὐκέτι φῄς;
ἔγωγε.
ἀγαθοὶ ἄρα οἳ ἂν χαίρωσι, κακοὶ δὲ οἳ ἂν ἀνιῶνται;
πάνυ γε.
οἳ μέν γε μᾶλλον μᾶλλον, οἳ δʼ ἧττον ἧττον, οἳ δὲ παραπλησίως παραπλησίως;
ναί.
οὐκοῦν φῂς παραπλησίως χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τοὺς φρονίμους καὶ τοὺς ἄφρονας καὶ τοὺς δειλοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀνδρείους, ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι τοὺς δειλούς;
ἔγωγε.
συλλόγισαι δὴ κοινῇ μετʼ ἐμοῦ τί ἡμῖν συμβαίνει ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων· καὶ δὶς γάρ τοι καὶ τρίς φασιν καλὸν
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ναί.
κακὸν δὲ τὸν ἄφρονα καὶ δειλόν;
πάνυ γε.
ἀγαθὸν δὲ αὖ τὸν χαίροντα;
ναί.
κακὸν δὲ τὸν ἀνιώμενον;
ἀνάγκη.
ἀνιᾶσθαι δὲ καὶ χαίρειν τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ὁμοίως, ἴσως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον τὸν κακόν;
ναί.
οὐκοῦν ὁμοίως γίγνεται κακὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον
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πάλαι τοί σου ἀκροῶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, καθομολογῶν, ἐνθυμούμενος ὅτι, κἂν παίζων τίς σοι ἐνδῷ ὁτιοῦν, τούτου ἅσμενος ἔχῃ ὥσπερ τὰ μειράκια. ὡς δὴ σὺ οἴει ἐμὲ ἢ καὶ ἄλλον ὁντινοῦν ἀνθρώπων οὐχ ἡγεῖσθαι τὰς μὲν βελτίους ἡδονάς, τὰς δὲ χείρους.
ἰοῦ ἰοῦ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὡς πανοῦργος εἶ καί μοι
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ναί.
ἆρʼ οὖν ἀγαθαὶ μὲν αἱ ὠφέλιμοι, κακαὶ δὲ αἱ βλαβεραί;
πάνυ γε.
ὠφέλιμοι δέ γε αἱ ἀγαθόν τι ποιοῦσαι, κακαὶ δὲ αἱ κακόν τι;
φημί.
ἆρʼ οὖν τὰς τοιάσδε λέγεις, οἷον κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἃς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν ἐν τῷ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν ἡδονάς, ἦ ἄρα τούτων αἱ μὲν ὑγίειαν ποιοῦσαι ἐν τῷ σώματι, ἢ ἰσχὺν ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ ἀρετὴν τοῦ σώματος, αὗται μὲν ἀγαθαί, αἱ δὲ
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πάνυ γε.
οὐκοῦν καὶ λῦπαι ὡσαύτως αἱ μὲν χρησταί εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ πονηραί;
πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς καὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας καὶ αἱρετέον ἐστὶν καὶ πρακτέον;
πάνυ γε.
τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς οὔ;
δῆλον δή.
ἕνεκα γάρ που τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἅπαντα ἡμῖν ἔδοξεν πρακτέον εἶναι, εἰ μνημονεύεις, ἐμοί τε καὶ Πώλῳ. ἆρα καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ οὕτω, τέλος εἶναι ἁπασῶν τῶν πράξεων τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα δεῖν πάντα τἆλλα πράττεσθαι
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ἔγωγε.
τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἄρα ἕνεκα δεῖ καὶ τἆλλα καὶ τὰ ἡδέα πράττειν, ἀλλʼ οὐ τἀγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων.
πάνυ γε.
ἆρʼ οὖν παντὸς ἀνδρός ἐστιν ἐκλέξασθαι ποῖα ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων ἐστὶν καὶ ὁποῖα κακά, ἢ τεχνικοῦ δεῖ εἰς ἕκαστον;
τεχνικοῦ.
ἀναμνησθῶμεν δὴ ὧν αὖ ἐγὼ πρὸς Πῶλον καὶ Γοργίαν ἐτύγχανον λέγων. ἔλεγον γὰρ αὖ, εἰ μνημονεύεις,
-ἐπὶ τόνδε τὸν βίον τὸν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, καὶ τί ποτʼ ἐστὶν οὗτος ἐκείνου διαφέρων. ἴσως
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οὐ δῆτα.
ἀλλʼ ἐγώ σοι σαφέστερον ἐρῶ. ἐπειδὴ ὡμολογήκαμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ εἶναι μέν τι ἀγαθόν, εἶναι δέ τι ἡδύ, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἑκατέρου δὲ αὐτοῖν μελέτην τινὰ εἶναι καὶ παρασκευὴν τῆς κτήσεως, τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἡδέος θήραν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ—αὐτὸ δέ μοι τοῦτο πρῶτον ἢ
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οὕτως φημί.
ἴθι δή, ἃ καὶ πρὸς τούσδε ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, διομολόγησαί μοι, εἰ ἄρα σοι ἔδοξα τότε ἀληθῆ λέγειν. ἔλεγον δέ που ὅτι ἡ μὲν ὀψοποιικὴ οὔ μοι δοκεῖ τέχνη εἶναι ἀλλʼ ἐμπειρία,
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οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἀλλὰ συγχωρῶ, ἵνα σοι καὶ περανθῇ ὁ λόγος καὶ Γοργίᾳ τῷδε χαρίσωμαι.
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πότερον δὲ περὶ μὲν μίαν ψυχὴν ἔστιν τοῦτο, περὶ δὲ δύο καὶ πολλὰς οὐκ ἔστιν;
οὔκ, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ δύο καὶ περὶ πολλάς.
οὐκοῦν καὶ ἁθρόαις ἅμα χαρίζεσθαι ἔστι, μηδὲν σκοπούμενον τὸ βέλτιστον;
οἶμαι ἔγωγε.
ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν αἵτινές εἰσιν αἱ ἐπιτηδεύσεις αἱ τοῦτο ποιοῦσαι; μᾶλλον δέ, εἰ βούλει, ἐμοῦ ἐρωτῶντος, ἣ μὲν ἄν σοι δοκῇ τούτων εἶναι, φάθι, ἣ δʼ ἂν μή, μὴ φάθι.
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ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
οὐκοῦν καὶ αἱ τοιαίδε ἅπασαι, οἷον ἡ κιθαριστικὴ ἡ ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσιν;
ναί.
τί δὲ ἡ τῶν χορῶν διδασκαλία καὶ ἡ τῶν διθυράμβων ποίησις; οὐ τοιαύτη τίς σοι καταφαίνεται; ἢ ἡγῇ τι φροντίζειν Κινησίαν τὸν Μέλητος, ὅπως ἐρεῖ τι τοιοῦτον ὅθεν ἂν οἱ ἀκούοντες βελτίους γίγνοιντο, ἢ ὅτι μέλλει
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δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, Κινησίου γε πέρι.
τί δὲ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ Μέλης; ἦ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον βλέπων ἐδόκει σοι κιθαρῳδεῖν; ἢ ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸ ἥδιστον; ἠνία γὰρ ᾁδων τοὺς θεατάς. ἀλλὰ δὴ σκόπει· οὐχὶ ἥ τε κιθαρῳδικὴ δοκεῖ σοι πᾶσα καὶ ἡ τῶν διθυράμβων ποίησις ἡδονῆς χάριν ηὑρῆσθαι;
ἔμοιγε.
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τί δὲ δὴ ἡ σεμνὴ αὕτη καὶ θαυμαστή, ἡ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποίησις, ἐφʼ ᾧ ἐσπούδακεν; πότερόν ἐστιν αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπιχείρημα καὶ ἡ σπουδή, ὡς σοὶ δοκεῖ, χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς θεαταῖς μόνον, ἢ καὶ διαμάχεσθαι, ἐάν τι αὐτοῖς ἡδὺ μὲν ᾖ καὶ κεχαρισμένον, πονηρὸν δέ, ὅπως τοῦτο μὲν μὴ ἐρεῖ, εἰ δέ τι τυγχάνει ἀηδὲς καὶ ὠφέλιμον, τοῦτο δὲ καὶ λέξει καὶ ᾁσεται, ἐάντε χαίρωσιν ἐάντε μή; ποτέρως σοι δοκεῖ παρεσκευάσθαι ἡ τῶν τραγῳδιῶν ποίησις;
δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι πρὸς τὴν
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οὐκοῦν τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἔφαμεν νυνδὴ κολακείαν εἶναι;
πάνυ γε.
φέρε δή, εἴ τις περιέλοι τῆς ποιήσεως πάσης τό τε μέλος καὶ τὸν ῥυθμὸν καὶ τὸ μέτρον, ἄλλο τι ἢ λόγοι γίγνονται τὸ λειπόμενον;
ἀνάγκη.
οὐκοῦν πρὸς πολὺν ὄχλον καὶ δῆμον οὗτοι λέγονται οἱ λόγοι;
φημί.
δημηγορία ἄρα τίς ἐστιν ἡ ποιητική.
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φαίνεται.
οὐκοῦν ῥητορικὴ δημηγορία ἂν εἴη· ἢ οὐ ῥητορεύειν δοκοῦσί σοι οἱ ποιηταὶ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις;
ἔμοιγε.
νῦν ἄρα ἡμεῖς ηὑρήκαμεν ῥητορικήν τινα πρὸς δῆμον τοιοῦτον οἷον παίδων τε ὁμοῦ καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ ἀνδρῶν, καὶ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων, ἣν οὐ πάνυ ἀγάμεθα· κολακικὴν γὰρ αὐτήν φαμεν εἶναι.
πάνυ γε.
εἶεν· τί δὲ ἡ πρὸς τὸν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον ῥητορικὴ
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οὐχ ἁπλοῦν ἔτι τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς· εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ οἳ κηδόμενοι τῶν πολιτῶν λέγουσιν ἃ λέγουσιν, εἰσὶν δὲ καὶ οἵους σὺ λέγεις.
ἐξαρκεῖ. εἰ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι διπλοῦν, τὸ μὲν ἕτερόν που τούτου κολακεία ἂν εἴη καὶ αἰσχρὰ δημηγορία, τὸ δʼ ἕτερον καλόν, τὸ παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ὡς βέλτισται ἔσονται τῶν πολιτῶν αἱ ψυχαί, καὶ διαμάχεσθαι λέγοντα τὰ βέλτιστα, εἴτε ἡδίω εἴτε ἀηδέστερα ἔσται τοῖς ἀκούουσιν.
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ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγέ σοι εἰπεῖν τῶν γε νῦν ῥητόρων οὐδένα.
τί δέ; τῶν παλαιῶν ἔχεις τινὰ εἰπεῖν διʼ ὅντινα αἰτίαν ἔχουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι βελτίους γεγονέναι, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος ἤρξατο δημηγορεῖν, ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ χείρους ὄντες; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ οἶδα τίς ἐστιν οὗτος.
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τί δέ; Θεμιστοκλέα οὐκ ἀκούεις ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γεγονότα καὶ Κίμωνα καὶ Μιλτιάδην καὶ Περικλέα τουτονὶ τὸν νεωστὶ τετελευτηκότα, οὗ καὶ σὺ ἀκήκοας;
εἰ ἔστιν γε, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἣν πρότερον σὺ ἔλεγες ἀρετήν, ἀληθής, τὸ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀποπιμπλάναι καὶ τὰς αὑτοῦ καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων· εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο, ἀλλʼ ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ λόγῳ ἠναγκάσθημεν ἡμεῖς ὁμολογεῖν—ὅτι αἳ μὲν τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν πληρούμεναι βελτίω ποιοῦσι τὸν ἄνθρωπον,
-γεγονέναι οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγε πῶς εἴπω.
ἀλλʼ ἐὰν ζητῇς καλῶς, εὑρήσεις.
ἴδωμεν δὴ οὑτωσὶ ἀτρέμα σκοπούμενοι εἴ τις τούτων τοιοῦτος γέγονεν· φέρε γάρ, ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον λέγων, ἃ ἂν λέγῃ ἄλλο τι οὐκ εἰκῇ ἐρεῖ, ἀλλʼ
-βλέποντες πρὸς τὸ αὑτῶν ἔργον ἕκαστος οὐκ εἰκῇ ἐκλεγόμενος προσφέρει πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ αὑτῶν, ἀλλʼ ὅπως ἂν εἶδός τι αὐτῷ σχῇ τοῦτο ὃ ἐργάζεται. οἷον εἰ βούλει ἰδεῖν τοὺς ζωγράφους, τοὺς οἰκοδόμους, τοὺς ναυπηγούς, τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας δημιουργούς, ὅντινα βούλει αὐτῶν, ὡς εἰς τάξιν τινὰ ἕκαστος ἕκαστον τίθησιν ὃ ἂν τιθῇ, καὶ προσαναγκάζει τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ πρέπον τε εἶναι καὶ ἁρμόττειν, ἕως ἂν τὸ
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ἔστω τοῦτο οὕτω.
τάξεως ἄρα καὶ κόσμου τυχοῦσα οἰκία χρηστὴ ἂν εἴη, ἀταξίας δὲ μοχθηρά;
φημί.
οὐκοῦν καὶ πλοῖον ὡσαύτως;
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ναί.
καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ σώματά φαμεν τὰ ἡμέτερα;
πάνυ γε.
τί δʼ ἡ ψυχή; ἀταξίας τυχοῦσα ἔσται χρηστή, ἢ τάξεώς τε καὶ κόσμου τινός;
ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν καὶ τοῦτο συνομολογεῖν.
τί οὖν ὄνομά ἐστιν ἐν τῷ σώματι τῷ ἐκ τῆς τάξεώς τε καὶ τοῦ κόσμου γιγνομένῳ;
Ὑγίειαν καὶ ἰσχὺν ἴσως λέγεις.
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ἔγωγε. τί δὲ αὖ τῷ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐγγιγνομένῳ ἐκ τῆς τάξεως καὶ τοῦ κόσμου; πειρῶ εὑρεῖν καὶ εἰπεῖν ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ τὸ ὄνομα.
τί δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;
ἀλλʼ εἴ σοι ἥδιόν ἐστιν, ἐγὼ ἐρῶ· σὺ δέ, ἂν μέν σοι δοκῶ ἐγὼ καλῶς λέγειν, φάθι, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔλεγχε καὶ μὴ ἐπίτρεπε. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ ταῖς μὲν τοῦ σώματος τάξεσιν ὄνομα εἶναι ὑγιεινόν, ἐξ οὗ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ὑγίεια γίγνεται καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ἀρετὴ τοῦ σώματος. ἔστιν ταῦτα ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν;
ἔστιν.
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ταῖς δέ γε τῆς ψυχῆς τάξεσι καὶ κοσμήσεσιν νόμιμόν τε καὶ νόμος, ὅθεν καὶ νόμιμοι γίγνονται καὶ κόσμιοι· ταῦτα δʼ ἔστιν δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ σωφροσύνη. φῂς ἢ οὔ;
ἔστω.
οὐκοῦν πρὸς ταῦτα βλέπων ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐκεῖνος, ὁ τεχνικός τε καὶ ἀγαθός, καὶ τοὺς λόγους προσοίσει ταῖς ψυχαῖς οὓς ἂν λέγῃ, καὶ τὰς πράξεις ἁπάσας, καὶ δῶρον ἐάν τι διδῷ, δώσει, καὶ ἐάν τι ἀφαιρῆται, ἀφαιρήσεται, πρὸς τοῦτο ἀεὶ τὸν νοῦν ἔχων, ὅπως ἂν αὐτοῦ τοῖς πολίταις
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συγχωρῶ.
τί γὰρ ὄφελος, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, σώματί γε κάμνοντι καὶ μοχθηρῶς διακειμένῳ σιτία πολλὰ διδόναι καὶ τὰ ἥδιστα ἢ ποτὰ ἢ ἄλλʼ ὁτιοῦν, ὃ μὴ ὀνήσει αὐτὸ ἔσθʼ ὅτι πλέον ἢ τοὐναντίον κατά γε τὸν δίκαιον λόγον καὶ ἔλαττον; ἔστι ταῦτα;
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ἔστω.
οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι λυσιτελεῖ μετὰ μοχθηρίας σώματος ζῆν ἀνθρώπῳ· ἀνάγκη γὰρ οὕτω καὶ ζῆν μοχθηρῶς. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως;
ναί.
οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀποπιμπλάναι, οἷον πεινῶντα φαγεῖν ὅσον βούλεται ἢ διψῶντα πιεῖν, ὑγιαίνοντα μὲν ἐῶσιν οἱ ἰατροὶ ὡς τὰ πολλά, κάμνοντα δὲ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδέποτʼ ἐῶσιν ἐμπίμπλασθαι ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ; συγχωρεῖς τοῦτό γε καὶ σύ;
ἔγωγε.
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περὶ δὲ ψυχήν, ὦ ἄριστε, οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος; ἕως μὲν ἂν πονηρὰ ᾖ, ἀνόητός τε οὖσα καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ ἄδικος καὶ ἀνόσιος, εἴργειν αὐτὴν δεῖ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν ἄλλʼ ἄττα ποιεῖν ἢ ἀφʼ ὧν βελτίων ἔσται· φῂς ἢ οὔ;
φημί.
οὕτω γάρ που αὐτῇ ἄμεινον τῇ ψυχῇ;
πάνυ γε.
οὐκοῦν τὸ εἴργειν ἐστὶν ἀφʼ ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ κολάζειν;
ναί.
τὸ κολάζεσθαι ἄρα τῇ ψυχῇ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ἢ ἡ ἀκολασία, ὥσπερ σὺ νυνδὴ ᾤου.
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οὐκ οἶδʼ ἅττα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλʼ ἄλλον τινὰ ἐρώτα.
οὗτος ἀνὴρ οὐχ ὑπομένει ὠφελούμενος καὶ αὐτὸς τοῦτο πάσχων περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἐστί, κολαζόμενος.
οὐδέ γέ μοι μέλει οὐδὲν ὧν σὺ λέγεις, καὶ ταῦτά σοι Γοργίου χάριν ἀπεκρινάμην.
εἶεν· τί οὖν δὴ ποιήσομεν; μεταξὺ τὸν λόγον καταλύομεν;
αὐτὸς γνώσῃ.
ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ τοὺς μύθους φασὶ μεταξὺ θέμις εἶναι
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ὡς βίαιος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἐὰν δὲ ἐμοὶ πείθῃ, ἐάσεις χαίρειν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, ἢ καὶ ἄλλῳ τῳ διαλέξῃ.
τίς οὖν ἄλλος ἐθέλει; μὴ γάρ τοι ἀτελῆ γε τὸν λόγον καταλίπωμεν.
αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ ἂν δύναιο διελθεῖν τὸν λόγον, ἢ λέγων κατὰ σαυτὸν ἢ ἀποκρινόμενος σαυτῷ;
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ἵνα μοι τὸ τοῦ Ἐπιχάρμου γένηται, ἃ πρὸ τοῦ δύο ἄνδρες ἔλεγον,
εἷς ὢν ἱκανὸς γένωμαι. ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύει ἀναγκαιότατον εἶναι οὕτως. εἰ μέντοι ποιήσομεν, οἶμαι ἔγωγε χρῆναι πάντας ἡμᾶς φιλονίκως ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ ἀληθὲς τί ἐστιν περὶ ὧν λέγομεν καὶ τί ψεῦδος· κοινὸν γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἅπασι φανερὸν γενέσθαι αὐτό. δίειμι
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ἀλλʼ ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐ δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, χρῆναί πω
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ἀλλὰ μὲν δή, ὦ Γοργία, καὶ αὐτὸς ἡδέως μὲν ἂν Καλλικλεῖ τούτῳ ἔτι διελεγόμην, ἕως αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ Ἀμφίονος ἀπέδωκα ῥῆσιν ἀντὶ τῆς τοῦ Ζήθου· ἐπειδὴ δὲ σύ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἐθέλεις συνδιαπερᾶναι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλʼ οὖν ἐμοῦ γε ἀκούων ἐπιλαμβάνου, ἐάν τί σοι δοκῶ μὴ
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λέγε, ὠγαθέ, αὐτὸς καὶ πέραινε.
ἄκουε δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐμοῦ ἀναλαβόντος τὸν λόγον. ἆρα τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν;
οὐ ταὐτόν, ὡς ἐγὼ καὶ Καλλικλῆς ὡμολογήσαμεν.
πότερον δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πρακτέον, ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἕνεκα τοῦ ἡδέος;
τὸ ἡδὺ ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.
ἡδὺ δέ ἐστιν τοῦτο οὗ
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πάνυ γε.
ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθοί γέ ἐσμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ὅσʼ ἀγαθά ἐστιν, ἀρετῆς τινος παραγενομένης;
ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις.
ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἥ γε ἀρετὴ ἑκάστου, καὶ σκεύους καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς αὖ καὶ ζῴου παντός, οὐ τῷ εἰκῇ κάλλιστα παραγίγνεται, ἀλλὰ τάξει καὶ ὀρθότητι καὶ τέχνῃ, ἥτις ἑκάστῳ ἀποδέδοται αὐτῶν· ἆρα ἔστιν ταῦτα;
ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ φημι.
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τάξει ἆρα τεταγμένον καὶ κεκοσμημένον ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἑκάστου;
φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε.
κόσμος τις ἄρα ἐγγενόμενος ἐν ἑκάστῳ ὁ ἑκάστου οἰκεῖος ἀγαθὸν παρέχει ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων;
ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
καὶ ψυχὴ ἄρα κόσμον ἔχουσα τὸν ἑαυτῆς ἀμείνων τῆς ἀκοσμήτου;
ἀνάγκη.
ἀλλὰ μὴν ἥ γε κόσμον ἔχουσα κοσμία;
πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει;
ἡ δέ
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πολλὴ ἀνάγκη.
ἡ ἄρα σώφρων ψυχὴ ἀγαθή. ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἔχω παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλα φάναι, ὦ φίλε Καλλίκλεις· σὺ δʼ εἰ ἔχεις, δίδασκε.
λέγʼ, ὠγαθέ.
λέγω δὴ ὅτι, εἰ ἡ σώφρων ἀγαθή ἐστιν, ἡ τοὐναντίον τῇ σώφρονι πεπονθυῖα κακή ἐστιν· ἦν δὲ αὕτη ἡ ἄφρων τε καὶ ἀκόλαστος.
πάνυ γε.
καὶ μὴν ὅ γε σώφρων τὰ προσήκοντα πράττοι ἂν καὶ περὶ θεοὺς καὶ περὶ ἀνθρώπους· οὐ γὰρ ἂν σωφρονοῖ τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα πράττων;
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ἀνάγκη ταῦτʼ εἶναι οὕτω.
καὶ μὴν περὶ μὲν ἀνθρώπους τὰ προσήκοντα πράττων δίκαιʼ ἂν πράττοι, περὶ δὲ θεοὺς ὅσια· τὸν δὲ τὰ δίκαια καὶ ὅσια πράττοντα ἀνάγκη δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον εἶναι.
ἔστι ταῦτα.
καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ ἀνδρεῖόν γε ἀνάγκη· οὐ γὰρ δὴ σώφρονος ἀνδρός ἐστιν οὔτε διώκειν οὔτε φεύγειν ἃ μὴ προσήκει, ἀλλʼ ἃ δεῖ καὶ πράγματα καὶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας φεύγειν καὶ διώκειν, καὶ ὑπομένοντα καρτερεῖν ὅπου δεῖ· ὥστε πολλὴ
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οὐκ ἄλλως.
δυοῖν οὖν ὄντοιν, τοῦ ἀδικεῖν τε καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι, μεῖζον μέν φαμεν κακὸν τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ἔλαττον δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι. τί οὖν ἂν παρασκευασάμενος ἄνθρωπος βοηθήσειεν αὑτῷ,
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δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὅτι ἐὰν δύναμιν.
τί δὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν; πότερον ἐὰν μὴ βούληται ἀδικεῖν, ἱκανὸν τοῦτʼ ἐστίν—οὐ γὰρ ἀδικήσει—ἢ καὶ ἐπὶ
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ἔστω σοι τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως, ἵνα διαπεράνῃς τὸν λόγον.
καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, παρασκευαστέον ἐστὶ δύναμίν τινα καὶ τέχνην, ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσωμεν.
πάνυ γε.
τίς οὖν ποτʼ ἐστὶν τέχνη τῆς παρασκευῆς τοῦ μηδὲν ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ὡς ὀλίγιστα; σκέψαι εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ ἥπερ ἐμοί. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ ἥδε· ἢ αὐτὸν ἄρχειν δεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ καὶ τυραννεῖν, ἢ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης πολιτείας ἑταῖρον εἶναι.
ὁρᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἐγὼ ἕτοιμός εἰμι ἐπαινεῖν,
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σκόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε ἐάν σοι δοκῶ εὖ λέγειν. φίλος μοι δοκεῖ ἕκαστος ἑκάστῳ εἶναι ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα, ὅνπερ οἱ παλαιοί τε καὶ σοφοὶ λέγουσιν, ὁ ὅμοιος τῷ ὁμοίῳ. οὐ καὶ σοί;
ἔμοιγε.
οὐκοῦν ὅπου τύραννός ἐστιν ἄρχων ἄγριος καὶ ἀπαίδευτος, εἴ τις τούτου ἐν τῇ πόλει πολὺ βελτίων εἴη, φοβοῖτο δήπου ἂν αὐτὸν ὁ τύραννος καὶ τούτῳ ἐξ ἅπαντος
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ἔστι ταῦτα.
οὐδέ γε εἴ τις πολὺ φαυλότερος εἴη, οὐδʼ ἂν οὗτος· καταφρονοῖ γὰρ ἂν αὐτοῦ ὁ τύραννος καὶ οὐκ ἄν ποτε ὡς πρὸς φίλον σπουδάσειεν.
καὶ ταῦτʼ ἀληθῆ.
λείπεται δὴ ἐκεῖνος μόνος ἄξιος λόγου φίλος τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὃς ἂν ὁμοήθης ὤν, ταὐτὰ ψέγων καὶ ἐπαινῶν, ἐθέλῃ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ὑποκεῖσθαι τῷ ἄρχοντι. οὗτος μέγα
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ναί.
εἰ ἄρα τις ἐννοήσειεν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει τῶν νέων, τίνα ἂν τρόπον ἐγὼ μέγα δυναίμην καὶ μηδείς με ἀδικοῖ;
αὕτη, ὡς ἔοικεν, αὐτῷ ὁδός ἐστιν, εὐθὺς ἐκ νέου ἐθίζειν αὑτὸν τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν καὶ ἄχθεσθαι τῷ δεσπότῃ, καὶ παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ὅτι μάλιστα ὅμοιος ἔσται ἐκείνῳ. οὐχ οὕτως;
ναί.
οὐκοῦν τούτῳ τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ μέγα
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πάνυ γε.
ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν; ἢ πολλοῦ δεῖ, εἴπερ ὅμοιος ἔσται τῷ ἄρχοντι ὄντι ἀδίκῳ καὶ παρὰ τούτῳ μέγα δυνήσεται; ἀλλʼ οἶμαι ἔγωγε, πᾶν τοὐναντίον οὑτωσὶ ἡ παρασκευὴ ἔσται αὐτῷ ἐπὶ τὸ οἵῳ τε εἶναι ὡς πλεῖστα ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην. ἦ γάρ;
φαίνεται.
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οὐκοῦν τὸ μέγιστον αὐτῷ κακὸν ὑπάρξει μοχθηρῷ ὄντι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ λελωβημένῳ διὰ τὴν μίμησιν τοῦ δεσπότου καὶ δύναμιν.
οὐκ οἶδʼ ὅπῃ στρέφεις ἑκάστοτε τοὺς λόγους ἄνω καὶ κάτω, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι οὗτος ὁ μιμούμενος τὸν μὴ μιμούμενον ἐκεῖνον ἀποκτενεῖ, ἐὰν βούληται, καὶ ἀφαιρήσεται τὰ ὄντα.
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οἶδα, ὠγαθὲ Καλλίκλεις, εἰ μὴ κωφός γʼ εἰμί, καὶ σοῦ ἀκούων καὶ Πώλου ἄρτι πολλάκις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀλίγου πάντων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει· ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ ἐμοῦ ἄκουε, ὅτι ἀποκτενεῖ μέν, ἂν βούληται, ἀλλὰ πονηρὸς ὢν καλὸν κἀγαθὸν ὄντα.
οὐκοῦν τοῦτο δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀγανακτητόν;
οὐ νοῦν γε ἔχοντι, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει. ἢ οἴει δεῖν τοῦτο παρασκευάζεσθαι ἄνθρωπον, ὡς πλεῖστον χρόνον ζῆν, καὶ μελετᾶν τὰς τέχνας ταύτας αἳ ἡμᾶς ἀεὶ ἐκ τῶν
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ναὶ μὰ Δία ὀρθῶς γέ σοι συμβουλεύων.
τί δέ, ὦ βέλτιστε; ἦ καὶ ἡ τοῦ νεῖν ἐπιστήμη σεμνή τίς σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι;
μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔμοιγε.
καὶ μὴν σῴζει γε καὶ αὕτη ἐκ θανάτου τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ὅταν εἴς τι τοιοῦτον ἐμπέσωσιν οὗ δεῖ ταύτης τῆς ἐπιστήμης. εἰ δʼ αὕτη σοι δοκεῖ σμικρὰ εἶναι, ἐγώ σοι
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οὐκ οἶδʼ ὅντινά μοι τρόπον δοκεῖς εὖ λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, πέπονθα δὲ τὸ τῶν πολλῶν πάθος· οὐ πάνυ σοι πείθομαι.
ὁ δήμου γὰρ ἔρως, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἐνὼν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τῇ σῇ ἀντιστατεῖ μοι· ἀλλʼ ἐὰν πολλάκις ἴσως καὶ βέλτιον
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πάνυ γε.
οὐκοῦν ἡ μὲν ἑτέρα, ἡ πρὸς ἡδονήν, ἀγεννὴς καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ κολακεία τυγχάνει οὖσα· ἦ γάρ;
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ἔστω, εἰ βούλει, σοὶ οὕτως.
ἡ δέ γε ἑτέρα, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστον ἔσται τοῦτο, εἴτε σῶμα τυγχάνει ὂν εἴτε ψυχή, ὃ θεραπεύομεν;
πάνυ γε.
ἆρʼ οὖν οὕτως ἐπιχειρητέον ἡμῖν ἐστιν τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς πολίταις θεραπεύειν, ὡς βελτίστους αὐτοὺς τοὺς πολίτας ποιοῦντας; ἄνευ γὰρ δὴ τούτου, ὡς ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ηὑρίσκομεν, οὐδὲν ὄφελος ἄλλην εὐεργεσίαν οὐδεμίαν
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πάνυ γε, εἴ σοι ἥδιον.
εἰ οὖν παρεκαλοῦμεν ἀλλήλους, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, δημοσίᾳ πράξοντες τῶν πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ οἰκοδομικά, ἢ τειχῶν ἢ νεωρίων ἢ ἱερῶν ἐπὶ τὰ μέγιστα οἰκοδομήματα, πότερον ἔδει ἂν ἡμᾶς σκέψασθαι ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ
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πάνυ γε.
οὐκοῦν δεύτερον αὖ τόδε, εἴ τι πώποτε οἰκοδόμημα ᾠκοδομήκαμεν ἰδίᾳ ἢ τῶν φίλων τινὶ ἢ ἡμέτερον αὐτῶν, καὶ τοῦτο τὸ οἰκοδόμημα καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν ἐστιν· καὶ εἰ μὲν ηὑρίσκομεν σκοπούμενοι διδασκάλους τε ἡμῶν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ
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πάνυ γε.
οὐκοῦν οὕτω πάντα, τά τε ἄλλα κἂν εἰ ἐπιχειρήσαντες δημοσιεύειν παρεκαλοῦμεν ἀλλήλους ὡς ἱκανοὶ ἰατροὶ ὄντες, ἐπεσκεψάμεθα δήπου ἂν ἐγώ τε σὲ καὶ σὺ ἐμέ, φέρε πρὸς θεῶν, αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης πῶς ἔχει τὸ σῶμα πρὸς ὑγίειαν; ἢ ἤδη τις ἄλλος διὰ Σωκράτην ἀπηλλάγη νόσου, ἢ δοῦλος ἢ ἐλεύθερος; κἂν ἐγὼ οἶμαι περὶ σοῦ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἐσκόπουν· καὶ εἰ μὴ ηὑρίσκομεν διʼ ἡμᾶς μηδένα
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ἔμοιγε.
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νῦν δέ, ὦ βέλτιστε ἀνδρῶν, ἐπειδὴ σὺ μὲν αὐτὸς ἄρτι ἄρχῃ πράττειν τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα, ἐμὲ δὲ παρακαλεῖς καὶ ὀνειδίζεις ὅτι οὐ πράττω, οὐκ ἐπισκεψόμεθα ἀλλήλους, φέρε, Καλλικλῆς ἤδη τινὰ βελτίω πεποίηκεν τῶν πολιτῶν; ἔστιν ὅστις πρότερον πονηρὸς ὤν, ἄδικός τε καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ ἄφρων, διὰ Καλλικλέα καλός τε κἀγαθὸς γέγονεν, ἢ ξένος ἢ ἀστός, ἢ δοῦλος ἢ ἐλεύθερος; λέγε μοι,
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φιλόνικος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ἀλλʼ οὐ φιλονικίᾳ γε ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἀληθῶς βουλόμενος εἰδέναι ὅντινά ποτε τρόπον οἴει δεῖν πολιτεύεσθαι ἐν ἡμῖν. ἢ ἄλλου του ἄρα ἐπιμελήσῃ ἡμῖν ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὰ
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ἔμοιγε.
οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἀγαθοί, δῆλον ὅτι ἕκαστος αὐτῶν βελτίους ἐποίει τοὺς πολίτας ἀντὶ χειρόνων. ἐποίει ἢ οὔ;
ναί.
οὐκοῦν ὅτε Περικλῆς ἤρχετο λέγειν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ, χείρους ἦσαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἢ ὅτε τὰ τελευταῖα ἔλεγεν;
ἴσως.
οὐκ ἴσως δή, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἀλλʼ ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων, εἴπερ ἀγαθός γʼ ἦν ἐκεῖνος πολίτης.
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τί οὖν δή;
οὐδέν· ἀλλὰ τόδε μοι εἰπὲ ἐπὶ τούτῳ, εἰ λέγονται Ἀθηναῖοι διὰ Περικλέα βελτίους γεγονέναι, ἢ πᾶν τοὐναντίον διαφθαρῆναι ὑπʼ ἐκείνου. ταυτὶ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἀκούω, Περικλέα πεποιηκέναι Ἀθηναίους ἀργοὺς καὶ δειλοὺς καὶ λάλους καὶ φιλαργύρους, εἰς μισθοφορίαν πρῶτον καταστήσαντα.
τῶν τὰ ὦτα κατεαγότων ἀκούεις ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ἀλλὰ τάδε οὐκέτι ἀκούω, ἀλλʼ οἶδα σαφῶς καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ σύ, ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ηὐδοκίμει Περικλῆς καὶ οὐδεμίαν αἰσχρὰν δίκην κατεψηφίσαντο αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἡνίκα χείρους ἦσαν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ἐγεγόνεσαν
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τί οὖν; τούτου ἕνεκα κακὸς ἦν Περικλῆς;
ὄνων γοῦν ἂν ἐπιμελητὴς καὶ ἵππων καὶ βοῶν τοιοῦτος ὢν κακὸς ἂν ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰ παραλαβὼν μὴ λακτίζοντας ἑαυτὸν μηδὲ κυρίττοντας μηδὲ δάκνοντας ἀπέδειξε ταῦτα ἅπαντα ποιοῦντας διʼ ἀγριότητα. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι
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πάνυ γε, ἵνα σοι χαρίσωμαι.
καὶ τόδε τοίνυν μοι χάρισαι ἀποκρινάμενος· πότερον καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἓν τῶν ζῴων ἐστὶν ἢ οὔ;
πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
οὐκοῦν ἀνθρώπων Περικλῆς ἐπεμέλετο;
ναί.
τί οὖν; οὐκ ἔδει αὐτούς, ὡς ἄρτι ὡμολογοῦμεν, δικαιοτέρους γεγονέναι ἀντὶ ἀδικωτέρων ὑπʼ ἐκείνου, εἴπερ
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πάνυ γε.
οὐκοῦν οἵ γε δίκαιοι ἥμεροι, ὡς ἔφη Ὅμηρος· σὺ δὲ τί φῄς; οὐχ οὕτως;
ναί.
ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγριωτέρους γε αὐτοὺς ἀπέφηνεν ἢ οἵους παρέλαβεν, καὶ ταῦτʼ εἰς αὑτόν, ὃν ἥκιστʼ ἂν ἐβούλετο.
βούλει σοι ὁμολογήσω;
εἰ δοκῶ γε σοι ἀληθῆ λέγειν.
ἔστω δὴ ταῦτα.
οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἀγριωτέρους, ἀδικωτέρους τε καὶ χείρους;
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ἔστω.
οὐκ ἄρʼ ἀγαθὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ Περικλῆς ἦν ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου.
οὐ σύ γε φῄς.
μὰ Δίʼ οὐδέ γε σὺ ἐξ ὧν ὡμολόγεις. πάλιν δὲ λέγε μοι περὶ Κίμωνος· οὐκ ἐξωστράκισαν αὐτὸν οὗτοι οὓς ἐθεράπευεν, ἵνα αὐτοῦ δέκα ἐτῶν μὴ ἀκούσειαν τῆς φωνῆς; καὶ Θεμιστοκλέα ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐποίησαν καὶ φυγῇ προσεζημίωσαν; Μιλτιάδην δὲ τὸν Μαραθῶνι εἰς τὸ βάραθρον
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οὐκ ἔμοιγε.
ἀληθεῖς ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, οἱ ἔμπροσθεν λόγοι ἦσαν,
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ἀλλὰ μέντοι πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μή ποτέ τις τῶν νῦν ἔργα τοιαῦτα ἐργάσηται οἷα τούτων ὅστις
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ὦ δαιμόνιε, οὐδʼ ἐγὼ ψέγω τούτους ὥς γε διακόνους εἶναι πόλεως, ἀλλά μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν γε νῦν διακονικώτεροι γεγονέναι καὶ μᾶλλον οἷοί τε ἐκπορίζειν τῇ πόλει ὧν ἐπεθύμει. ἀλλὰ γὰρ μεταβιβάζειν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν, πείθοντες καὶ βιαζόμενοι ἐπὶ τοῦτο ὅθεν ἔμελλον ἀμείνους ἔσεσθαι οἱ πολῖται, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν
-αὑτούς, τούς τε μισθοὺς ἀποστεροῦντες καὶ ἄλλην χάριν οὐκ ἀποδιδόντες,
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σὺ δʼ οὐκ ἂν οἷός τʼ εἴης λέγειν, εἰ μή τίς σοι ἀποκρίνοιτο;
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ἔοικά γε· νῦν γοῦν συχνοὺς τείνω τῶν λόγων, ἐπειδή μοι οὐκ ἐθέλεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἀλλʼ, ὠγαθέ, εἰπὲ πρὸς Φιλίου, οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἄλογον εἶναι ἀγαθὸν φάσκοντα πεποιηκέναι τινὰ μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ ὅτι ὑφʼ ἑαυτοῦ ἀγαθὸς γεγονώς τε καὶ ὢν ἔπειτα πονηρός ἐστιν;
ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
οὐκοῦν ἀκούεις τοιαῦτα λεγόντων τῶν φασκόντων παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους εἰς ἀρετήν;
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ἔγωγε· ἀλλὰ τί ἂν λέγοις ἀνθρώπων πέρι οὐδενὸς ἀξίων;
τί δʼ ἂν περὶ ἐκείνων λέγοις, οἳ φάσκοντες προεστάναι τῆς πόλεως καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται, πάλιν αὐτῆς κατηγοροῦσιν, ὅταν τύχωσιν, ὡς πονηροτάτης; οἴει τι διαφέρειν τούτους ἐκείνων; ταὐτόν, ὦ μακάριʼ, ἐστὶν σοφιστὴς καὶ ῥήτωρ, ἢ ἐγγύς τι καὶ παραπλήσιον, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον πρὸς Πῶλον· σὺ δὲ διʼ ἄγνοιαν
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πάνυ γε.
καὶ προέσθαι γε δήπου τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἄνευ μισθοῦ, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, μόνοις τούτοις ἐνεχώρει, εἴπερ ἀληθῆ ἔλεγον. ἄλλην μὲν γὰρ εὐεργεσίαν τις εὐεργετηθείς, οἷον ταχὺς γενόμενος διὰ παιδοτρίβην, ἴσως ἂν ἀποστερήσειε τὴν χάριν, εἰ προοῖτο αὐτῷ ὁ παιδοτρίβης καὶ μὴ συνθέμενος αὐτῷ μισθὸν ὅτι μάλιστα ἅμα μεταδιδοὺς τοῦ τάχους λαμβάνοι
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ναί.
οὐκοῦν εἴ τις αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀφαιρεῖ, τὴν ἀδικίαν, οὐδὲν δεινὸν αὐτῷ μήποτε ἀδικηθῇ, ἀλλὰ μόνῳ ἀσφαλὲς ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν προέσθαι, εἴπερ τῷ ὄντι δύναιτό τις ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν. οὐχ οὕτω;
φημί.
διὰ ταῦτʼ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τὰς μὲν ἄλλας συμβουλὰς συμβουλεύειν λαμβάνοντα ἀργύριον, οἷον οἰκοδομίας πέρι ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν, οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν.
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ἔοικέ γε.
περὶ δέ γε ταύτης τῆς πράξεως, ὅντινʼ ἄν τις τρόπον ὡς βέλτιστος εἴη καὶ ἄριστα τὴν αὑτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ ἢ πόλιν, αἰσχρὸν νενόμισται μὴ φάναι συμβουλεύειν, ἐὰν μή τις αὐτῷ ἀργύριον διδῷ. ἦ γάρ;
ναί.
δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τοῦτο αἴτιόν ἐστιν, ὅτι μόνη αὕτη τῶν εὐεργεσιῶν τὸν εὖ παθόντα ἐπιθυμεῖν ποιεῖ ἀντʼ εὖ ποιεῖν, ὥστε καλὸν δοκεῖ τὸ σημεῖον εἶναι, εἰ εὖ ποιήσας ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἀντʼ εὖ πείσεται· εἰ δὲ μή, οὔ. ἔστι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχοντα;
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ἔστιν.
ἐπὶ ποτέραν οὖν με παρακαλεῖς τὴν θεραπείαν τῆς πόλεως, διόρισόν μοι· τὴν τοῦ διαμάχεσθαι Ἀθηναίοις ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστοι ἔσονται, ὡς ἰατρόν, ἢ ὡς διακονήσοντα καὶ πρὸς χάριν ὁμιλήσοντα; τἀληθῆ μοι εἰπέ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· δίκαιος γὰρ εἶ, ὥσπερ ἤρξω παρρησιάζεσθαι πρὸς ἐμέ, διατελεῖν ἃ νοεῖς λέγων. καὶ νῦν εὖ καὶ γενναίως εἰπέ.
λέγω τοίνυν ὅτι ὡς διακονήσοντα.
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κολακεύσοντα ἄρα με, ὦ γενναιότατε, παρακαλεῖς.
εἴ σοι Μυσόν γε ἥδιον καλεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὡς εἰ μὴ ταῦτά γε ποιήσεις—
μὴ εἴπῃς ὃ πολλάκις εἴρηκας, ὅτι ἀποκτενεῖ με ὁ βουλόμενος, ἵνα μὴ αὖ καὶ ἐγὼ εἴπω, ὅτι Πονηρός γε ὢν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα· μηδʼ ὅτι ἀφαιρήσεται ἐάν τι ἔχω, ἵνα μὴ αὖ ἐγὼ εἴπω ὅτι ἀλλʼ ἀφελόμενος οὐχ ἕξει ὅτι χρήσεται αὐτοῖς, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ με ἀδίκως ἀφείλετο, οὕτως καὶ
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ὥς μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, πιστεύειν μηδʼ ἂν ἓν τούτων παθεῖν, ὡς οἰκῶν ἐκποδὼν καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἰσαχθεὶς εἰς δικαστήριον ὑπὸ πάνυ ἴσως μοχθηροῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ φαύλου.
ἀνόητος ἄρα εἰμί, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὡς ἀληθῶς, εἰ μὴ οἴομαι ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει ὁντινοῦν ἂν ὅτι τύχοι, τοῦτο παθεῖν. τόδε μέντοι εὖ οἶδʼ ὅτι, ἐάνπερ εἰσίω εἰς δικαστήριον περὶ
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πάνυ γε.
οἶμαι μετʼ ὀλίγων Ἀθηναίων, ἵνα μὴ εἴπω μόνος, ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ καὶ πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ μόνος τῶν νῦν· ἅτε οὖν οὐ πρὸς χάριν λέγων τοὺς λόγους οὓς λέγω ἑκάστοτε, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, οὐ πρὸς
-ὦ παῖδες, πολλὰ ὑμᾶς καὶ κακὰ ὅδε εἴργασται ἀνὴρ καὶ αὐτούς, καὶ τοὺς νεωτάτους ὑμῶν διαφθείρει τέμνων τε καὶ κάων, καὶ
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τί ἂν οἴει ἐν τούτῳ τῷ κακῷ ἀποληφθέντα ἰατρὸν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν; ἢ εἰ εἴποι τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὅτι ταῦτα πάντα ἐγὼ ἐποίουν, ὦ παῖδες, ὑγιεινῶς,
πόσον τι οἴει ἂν ἀναβοῆσαι τοὺς τοιούτους δικαστάς; οὐ μέγα;
ἴσως· οἴεσθαί γε χρή.
οὐκοῦν οἴει ἐν πάσῃ ἀπορίᾳ ἂν αὐτὸν ἔχεσθαι ὅτι
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πάνυ γε.
τοιοῦτον μέντοι καὶ ἐγὼ οἶδα ὅτι πάθος πάθοιμι ἂν εἰσελθὼν εἰς δικαστήριον. οὔτε γὰρ ἡδονὰς ἃς ἐκπεπόρικα ἕξω αὐτοῖς λέγειν, ἃς οὗτοι εὐεργεσίας καὶ ὠφελίας νομίζουσιν, ἐγὼ δὲ οὔτε τοὺς πορίζοντας ζηλῶ οὔτε οἷς πορίζεται· ἐάν τέ τίς με ἢ νεωτέρους φῇ διαφθείρειν ἀπορεῖν ποιοῦντα, ἢ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους κακηγορεῖν λέγοντα πικροὺς λόγους ἢ ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ, οὔτε τὸ ἀληθὲς ἕξω εἰπεῖν, ὅτι δικαίως
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δοκεῖ οὖν σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, καλῶς ἔχειν ἄνθρωπος ἐν πόλει οὕτως διακείμενος καὶ ἀδύνατος ὢν ἑαυτῷ βοηθεῖν;
εἰ ἐκεῖνό γε ἓν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχοι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὃ σὺ πολλάκις ὡμολόγησας· εἰ βεβοηθηκὼς εἴη αὑτῷ, μήτε περὶ
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ἀλλʼ ἐπείπερ γε καὶ τἆλλα ἐπέρανας, καὶ τοῦτο πέρανον.
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ἄκουε δή, φασί, μάλα καλοῦ λόγου, ὃν σὺ μὲν ἡγήσῃ μῦθον, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον· ὡς ἀληθῆ γὰρ ὄντα σοι λέξω ἃ μέλλω λέγειν. ὥσπερ γὰρ Ὅμηρος λέγει, διενείμαντο τὴν ἀρχὴν ὁ Ζεὺς καὶ ὁ Ποσειδῶν καὶ ὁ Πλούτων, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς παρέλαβον. ἦν οὖν νόμος ὅδε περὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐπὶ Κρόνου, καὶ ἀεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἔστιν ἐν θεοῖς, τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸν μὲν δικαίως τὸν βίον διελθόντα καὶ
-ἀλλʼ ἐγώ,
ἔφη, παύσω τοῦτο γιγνόμενον. νῦν μὲν γὰρ κακῶς αἱ δίκαι δικάζονται. ἀμπεχόμενοι γάρ,
ἔφη, οἱ κρινόμενοι κρίνονται· ζῶντες γὰρ κρίνονται. πολλοὶ οὖν,
ἦ δʼ ὅς, ψυχὰς πονηρὰς ἔχοντες ἠμφιεσμένοι εἰσὶ σώματά τε καλὰ καὶ γένη καὶ πλούτους, καί, ἐπειδὰν ἡ κρίσις ᾖ, ἔρχονται αὐτοῖς πολλοὶ μάρτυρες, μαρτυρήσοντες ὡς δικαίως βεβιώκασιν·
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ἔφη, παυστέον ἐστὶν προειδότας αὐτοὺς τὸν θάνατον· νῦν γὰρ προΐσασι. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ δὴ εἴρηται τῷ Προμηθεῖ
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