diff --git a/data/tlg0007/tlg108/tlg0007.tlg108.perseus-eng2.xml b/data/tlg0007/tlg108/tlg0007.tlg108.perseus-eng2.xml new file mode 100755 index 000000000..feaac6dc8 --- /dev/null +++ b/data/tlg0007/tlg108/tlg0007.tlg108.perseus-eng2.xml @@ -0,0 +1,617 @@ + + + + + + + Of Fate + Plutarch + William W. Goodwin + A.G. + Perseus Project, Tufts University + Gregory Crane + + Prepared under the supervision of + Lisa Cerrato + Rashmi Singhal + Bridget Almas + + The National Endowment for the Humanities + + + Trustees of Tufts University + Medford, MA + Perseus Project + 2010-12-13 + + + + + Plutarch + Plutarch’s Morals. + + Translated from the Greek by several hands. Corrected and revised by + William W. Goodwin, PH. D. + + + Boston + Little, Brown, and Company + Cambridge + Press Of John Wilson and son + 1874 + + 5 + + The Internet Archive + + + + +

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+ Of fate. + This little Treatise is so pitiously torne, maimed, and dismembred thorowout, + that a man may sooner divine and guess thereat (as I have done) than translate it. + I beseech the readers therefore, to hold me excused, in case I neither please my + selfe, nor content them, in that which I have written. — HOLLAND. + + +
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I will endeavor, my dearest Piso, to send you my + opinion concerning Fate, written with all the clearness + and compendiousness I am capable of; since you, who are + not ignorant how cautious I am of writing, have thought + fit to make it the subject of your request.

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You are first then to know that this word Fate is + spoken and understood two manner of ways; the one as + it is an energy, the other as it is a substance. First therefore, as it is an action, Plato + See Plato, Phaedrus, p. 248 C; Timaeus, p. 41 E; Republic, X. p. 617 D. has under a type described + it, saying thus in his dialogue entitled Phaedrus: And + this is a sanction of Adrastea (or an inevitable ordinance), + that whatever soul being an attendant on God, &c. And + in his treatise called Timaeus: The laws which God in + the nature of the universe has established for immortal + souls. And in his book of a Commonweal he calls Fate + the speech of the virgin Lachesis, who is the daughter + of Necessity. By which sentences he not tragically but + theologically shows us what his sentiments are in this + matter. Now if any one, translating the fore-cited passages, would have them expressed in more familiar terms, + the description in Phaedrus may be thus explained: That + Fate is a divine sentence, intransgressible because its cause + + + + cannot be divested or hindered. And according to what + he has said in his Timaeus, it is a law ensuing on the + nature of the universe, according to which all things that + are done are transacted. For this does Lachesis effect, + who is indeed the daughter of Necessity, — as we have both + already related, and shall yet better understand by that + which will be said in the progress of our discourse. Thus + you see what Fate is, when it is taken for an action.

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But as it is a substance, it seems to be the universal + soul of the world, and admits of a threefold distribution; + the first destiny being that which errs not; the second, + that which is thought to err; and the third that which, + being under the heaven, is conversant about the earth. + Of these, the highest is called Clotho, the next Atropos, + and the lowest, Lachesis; who, receiving the celestial influences and efficacies of her sisters, transmits and fastens + them to the terrestrial things which are under her government. Thus have we declared briefly what is to be said + of Fate, taken as a substance; what it is, what are its parts, + after what manner it is, how it is ordained, and how it + stands, both in respect to itself and to us. But as to the + particularities of these things, there is another fable in his + Commonweal, by which they are in some measure covertly + insinuated, and we ourselves have, in the best manner we + can, endeavored to explain them to you.

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But we now once again turn our discourse to Fate, as + it is an energy. For concerning this it is that there are so + many natural, moral, and logical questions. Having therefore already in some sort sufficiently defined what it is, we + are now in the next place to say something of its quality, + although it may to many seem absurd. I say then that + Fate, though comprehending as it were in a circle the infinity of all those things which are and have been from + infinite times and shall be to infinite ages, is not in itself + infinite, but determinate and finite; for neither law, reason, + + + + nor any other divine thing can be infinite. And this you + will the better understand, if you consider the total revolution and the whole time in which the revolutions of the + eight circles (that is, of the eight spheres of the fixed stars, + sun, moon, and five planets), having (as TimaeusPlato, Tim. p. 39 D. says) + finished their course, return to one and the same point, + being measured by the circle of the Same, which goes + always after one manner. For in this order, which is + finite and determinate, shall all things (which, as well in + heaven as in earth, consist by necessity from above) be reduced to the same situation, and restored again to their + first beginning. Wherefore the habitude of heaven alone, + being thus ordained in all things, as well in regard of itself + as of the earth and all terrestrial matters, shall again (after + long revolutions) one day return; and those things that in + order follow after, and being linked together in a continuity + are maintained in their course, shall be present, every one + of them by necessity bringing what is its own. But for + the better clearing of this matter, let us understand that + whatever is in us or about us is not wrought by the course + of the heavens and heavenly influences, as being entirely + the efficient cause both of my writing what I now write, + and of your doing also what you at present do, and in the + same manner as you do it. Hereafter then, when the same + cause shall return, we shall do the same things we now do, + and in the same manner, and shall again become the same + men; and so it will be with all others. And that which + follows after shall also happen by the following cause; and + in brief, all things that shall happen in the whole and in + every one of these universal revolutions shall again become + the same. By this it appears (as we have said before) that + Fate, being in some sort infinite, is nevertheless determinate + and finite; and it may be also in some sort seen and comprehended, as we have farther said, that it is as it were a + + + + circle. For as a motion of a circle is a circle, and the time + that measures it is also a circle; so the order of things + which are done and happen in a circle may be justly + esteemed and called a circle.

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This therefore, though there should be nothing else, + almost shows us what sort of thing Fate is; but not particularly or in every respect. What kind of thing then is + it in its own form? It is, as far as one can compare it, + like to the civil or politic law. For first it commands the + most part of things at least, if not all, conditionally; and + then it comprises (as far as is possible for it) all things that + belong to the public in general; and the better to make + you understand both the one and the other, we must + specify them by an example. The civil law speaks and + ordains in general of a valiant man, and also of a deserter + and a coward; and in the same manner of others. Now + this is not to make the law speak of this or that man in + particular, but principally to propose such things as are + universal or general, and consequently such as fall under + them. For we may very well say, that it is legal to reward + this man for having demeaned himself valiantly, and to + punish that man for flying from his colors; because the + law has virtually — though not in express terms and particularly yet in such general ones as they are comprehended under, — so determined of them. As the law (if + I may so speak) of physicians and masters of corporal + exercises potentially comprehends particular and special + things within the general; so the law of Nature, determining first and principally general matters, secondarily and + consequently determines such as are particular. Thus, + general things being decreed by Fate, particular and individual things may also in some sort be said to be so, because they are so by consequence with the general. But + perhaps some one of those who more accurately examine + and more subtly search into these things may say, on the + + + + contrary, that particular and individual things precede the + composition of general things, and that the general exist + only for the particular, since that for which another thing + is always goes before that which is for it. Nevertheless, + this is not the proper place to treat of this difficulty, but + it is to be remitted to another. However, that Fate comprehends not all things clearly and expressly, but only such + as are universal and general, let it pass for resolved on at + present, as well for what we have already said a little before, as for what we shall say hereafter. For that which + is finite and determinate, agreeing properly with divine + Providence, is seen more in universal and general things + than in particular; such therefore is the divine law, and + also the civil; but infinity consists in particulars and individuals.

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After this we are to declare what this term conditionally means; for it is to be thought that Fate is also some + such thing. That then is said to be conditionally, which + is supposed to exist not of itself or absolutely, but as + really dependent upon and joined to another; which signifies a suit and consequence. And this is the sanction + of Adrastea (or an inevitable ordinance), that whatever + soul, being an attendant on God, shall see any thing of + truth, shall till another revolution be exempt from punishment; and if it is always able to do the same, it shall + never suffer any damage. + This is the whole passage from Plato’s Phaedrus, p. 248 C, of which part is + quoted in § 1. (G.) This is said both conditionally and also universally. Now that Fate is some such + thing is clearly manifest, as well from its substance as + from its name. For it is called εἱμαρμένη as being εἰρομένη, + that is, dependent and linked; and it is a sanction or law, + because things are therein ordained and disposed consequentially, as is usual in civil government.

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We ought in the next place to consider and treat of + + + + mutual relation and affection; that is, what reference and + respect Fate has to divine Providence, what to Fortune, + what also to that which is in our power, what to contingent and other such like things; and furthermore we are + to determine, how far and in what it is true or false that + all things happen and are done by and according to Fate. + For if the meaning is, that all things are comprehended + and contained in Fate, it must be granted that this proposition is true; and if any would farther have it so understood, that all things which are done amongst men, on + earth, and in heaven are placed in Fate, let this also pass + as granted for the present. But if (as the expression seems + rather to imply) the being done according to Fate signifies not all things, but only that which is an immediate + consequent of Fate, then it must not be said that all things + happen and are done by and according to Fate, though all + things are so according to Fate as to be comprised in it. + For all things that the law comprehends and of which it + speaks are not legal or according to law; for it comprehends treason, it treats of the cowardly running away from + one’s colors in time of battle, of adultery, and many other + such like things, of which it cannot be said that any one + of them is lawful. Neither indeed can I affirm of the performing a valorous act in war, the killing of a tyrant, or + the doing any other virtuous deed, that it is legal; because that only is proper to be called legal, which is commanded by the law. Now if the law commands these + things, how can they avoid being rebels against the law + and transgressors of it, who neither perform valiant feats + of arms, kill tyrants, nor do any other such remarkable + acts of virtue? And if they are transgressors of the law, + why is it not just they should be punished? But if this + is not reasonable, it must then be also confessed that these + things are not legal or according to law; but that legal + and according to law is only that which is particularly prescribed + + + + and expressly commanded by the law, in any action + whatsoever. In like manner, those things only are fatal + and according to Fate, which are the consequences of + causes preceding in the divine disposition. So that Fate + indeed comprehends all things which are done; yet many + of those things that are comprehended in it, and almost all + that precede, should not (to speak properly) be pronounced + to be fatal or according to Fate.

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These things being so, we are next in order to show, + how that which is in our power (or free will), Fortune, + possible, contingent, and other like things which are placed + among the antecedent causes, can consist with Fate, and + Fate with them; for Fate, as it seems, comprehends all + things, and yet all these things will not happen by necessity, but every one of them according to the principle of its + nature. Now the nature of the possible is to presubsist, + as the genus, and to go before the contingent; and the + contingent, as the matter and subject, is to be presupposed + to free will; and our free will ought as a master to make use + of the contingent; and Fortune comes in by the side of + free will, through the property of the contingent of inclining + to either part. Now you will more easily apprehend what + has been said, if you shall consider that every thing which + is generated, and the generation itself, is not done without + a generative faculty or power, and the power is not without a substance. As for example, neither the generation + of man, nor that which is generated, is without a power; + but this power is about man, and man himself is the substance. Now the power or faculty is between the substance, which is the powerful, and the generation and the + thing generated, which are both possibles. There being + then these three things, the power, the powerful, and the + possible; before the power can exist, the powerful must + of necessity be presupposed as its subject, and the power + must also necessarily subsist before the possible. By this + + + + deduction then may in some measure be understood what + is meant by possible; which may be grossly defined as + that which power is able to produce; or yet more + exactly, if to this same there be added, provided there + be nothing from without to hinder or obstruct it. Now + of possible things there are some which can never be + hindered, as are those in heaven, to wit, the rising and + setting of the stars, and the like to these; but others may + indeed be hindered, as are the most part of human things, + and many also of those which are done in the air. The + first, as being done by necessity, are called necessary; the + others, which may fall one way or other, are called contingent; and they may both thus be described. The + necessary possible is that whose contrary is impossible; + and the contingent possible is that whose contrary is also + possible. For that the sun should set is a thing both + necessary and possible, forasmuch as it is contrary to this + that the sun should not set, which is impossible; but that, + when the sun is set, there should be rain or not rain, both + the one and the other is possible and contingent. And + the again of things contingent, some happen oftener, + others rarely and not so often, others fall out equally or + indifferently, as well the one way as the other, even as it + happens. Now it is manifest that those are contrary to + one another, — to wit, those which fall out oftener and + those which happen but seldom, — and they both for the + most part depend on Nature; but that which happens + equally, as much one way as another, depends on ourselves. For that under the Dog it should be either hot or + cold, the one oftener, the other seldomer, are both things + subject to Nature; but to walk and not to walk, and all + such things of which both the one and the other are submitted to the free will of man, are said to be in us and our + election; but rather more generally to be in us. For there + are two sorts of this being in our power; the one of + + + + which proceeds from some sudden passion and motion + of the mind, as from anger or pleasure; the other from + the discourse and judgment of reason, which may properly + be said to be in our election. And some reason there is + to believe that this possible and contingent is the same + thing with that which is said to be in us and according to + our free will, although differently named. For in respect + to the future, it is styled possible and contingent; and in + respect of the present, it is named in our power and + in our free will. So that these things may thus be defined: The contingent is that which is itself — as well + as its contrary — possible; and that which is in our + power is one part of the contingent, to wit, that which + now takes place according to our will. Thus have we in + a manner declared, that the possible in the order of Nature + precedes the contingent, and that the contingent subsists + before free will; as also what each of them is, whence + they are so named, and what are the qualities adjoined or + appertaining to them.

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It now remains, that we treat of Fortune and casual + adventure, and whatever else is to be considered with them. + It is therefore certain that Fortune is a cause. Now of + causes, some are causes by themselves, and others by accident. Thus for example, the proper cause by itself of an + house or a ship is the art of the mason, the carpenter, or + the shipwright; but causes by accident are music, geometry, and whatever else may happen to be joined with the + art of building houses or ships, in respect either of the + body, the soul, or any exterior thing. Whence it appears, + that the cause by itself must needs be determinate and + one; but the causes by accident are never one and the + same, but infinite and undetermined. For many — nay, infinite — accidents, wholly different one from the other, may + be in one and the same subject. Now the cause by accident, when it is found in a thing which not merely is done + + + + for some end but has in it free will and election, is then + called Fortune; as is the finding a treasure while one is + digging a hole to plant a tree, or the doing or suffering + some extraordinary thing whilst one is flying, following, or + otherwise walking, or only turning about, provided it be + not for the sake of that which happens, but for some other + intention. Hence it is, that some of the ancients have declared Fortune to be a cause unknown, that cannot be foreseen by the human reason. But according to the Platonics, + who have approached yet nearer to the true reason of it, + it is thus defined: Fortune is a cause by accident, in those + things which are done for some end, and which are of our + election. And afterwards they add, that it is unforeseen + and unknown to the human reason; although that which + is rare and strange appears also by the same means to be + in this kind of cause by accident. But what this is, if it + is not sufficiently evidenced by the oppositions and disputations made against it, will at least most clearly be seen + by what is written in Plato’s Phaedo, where you will find + these words:

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PHAED. Have you not heard how and in what manner the judgment passed? ECH. Yes indeed; for there + came one and told us of it. At which we wondered very + much that, the judgment having been given long before, + it seems that he died a great while after. And what, + Phaedo, might be the cause of it? PHAED. It was a fortune which happened to him, Echecrates. For it chanced + that, the day before the judgment, the stern of the galley + which the Athenians send every year to the isle of Delos + was crowned.Plato, Phaedo, p. 58 A. +

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In which discourse it is to be observed, that the expression happened to him is not simply to be understood by + was done or came to pass, but it much rather regards + what befell him through the concurrence of many causes + + + + together, one being done with regard to another. For the + priest crowned the ship and adorned it with garlands for + another end and intention, and not for the sake of Socrates; and the judges also had for some other cause condemned him. But the event was strange, and of such a + nature that it might seem to have been effected by the + providence of some human creature, or rather of some + superior powers. And so much may suffice to show with + what Fortune must of necessity subsist, and that there must + be first some subject of such things as are in our free + will: its effect is, moreover, like itself called Fortune.

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But chance or casual adventure is of a larger extent + than Fortune; which it comprehends, and also several + other things which may of their own nature happen sometimes one way, sometimes another. And this, as it appears by the derivation of its name, which is in Greek + αὐτόματον, chance, is that which happens of itself, when that + which is ordinary happens not, but another thing in its + place; such as cold in the dog-days seems to be; for it + is sometimes then cold.... Once for all, as that which + is in our power is a part of the contingent, so Fortune is + a part of chance or casual adventure; and both the two + events are conjoined and dependent on the one and the + other, to wit, chance on contingent, and Fortune on that + which is in our power, — and yet not on all, but on what + is in our election, as we have already said. Wherefore + chance is common to things inanimate, as well as to those + which are animated; whereas Fortune is proper to man + only, who has his actions voluntary. And an argument of + this is, that to be fortunate and to be happy are thought + to be one and the same thing. Now happiness is a certain well-doing, and well-doing is proper only to man, and + to him perfect.

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These then are the things which are comprised in + Fate, to wit, contingent, possible, election, that which is + + + + in our power, Fortune, chance, and their adjuncts, as are + the things signified by the words perhaps and peradventure; all which indeed are contained in Fate, yet none of + them is fatal. It now remains, that we discourse of divine Providence, and show how it comprehends even Fate + itself.

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The supreme therefore and first Providence is the + understanding or (if you had rather) the will of the first + and sovereign God, doing good to every thing that is in + the world, by which all divine things have universally and + throughout been most excellently and most wisely ordained and disposed. The second Providence is that of + the second Gods, who go through the heaven, by which + temporal and mortal things are orderly and regularly generated, and which pertains to the continuation and preservation of every kind. The third may probably be called + the Providence and procuration of the Daemons, which, being placed on the earth, are the guardians and overseers + of human actions. This threefold Providence therefore + being seen, of which the first and supreme is chiefly and + principally so named, we shall not be afraid to say, although we may in this seem to contradict the sentiments + of some philosophers, that all things are done by Fate and + by Providence, but not also by Nature. But some are done + according to Providence, — these according to one, those + according to another, — and some according to Fate; and + Fate is altogether according to Providence, while Providence + is in no wise according to Fate. But let this discourse be + understood of the first and supreme Providence. Now + that which is done according to another, whatever it is, + is always posterior to that according to which it is done; + as that which is according to the law is after the law, and + that which is according to Nature is after Nature, so that + which is according to Fate is after Fate, and must consequently be more new and modern. Wherefore supreme + + + + Providence is the most ancient of all things, except him + whose will or understanding it is, to wit, the sovereign author, maker, and father of all things. Let us + therefore, says Timaeus, discourse for what cause the + Creator made and framed this machine of the universe. + He was good, and in him that is good there can never be + imprinted or engendered any envy against any thing. Being therefore wholly free from this, he desired that all + things should, as far as it is possible, resemble himself. + He therefore, who admits this to have been chiefly the + principal original of the generation and creation of the + world, as it has been delivered to us by wise men, receives + that which is most right. For God, who desired that all + things should be good, and nothing, as far as possibly might + be, evil, taking thus all that was visible, — restless as it was, + and moving rashly and confusedly, — reduced it from disorder to order, esteeming the one to be altogether better than + the other. For it neither was nor is convenient for him + who is in all perfection good, to make any thing that + should not be very excellent and beautiful. + Plato, Timaeus, p. 29 D. This, therefore, and all that follows, even to his disputation concerning human souls, is to be understood of the first Providence, + which in the beginning constituted all things. Afterwards + he speaks thus: Having framed the universe, he ordained souls equal in number to the stars, and distributed + to each of them one; and having set them, as it were, in + a chariot, showed the nature of the universe, and appointed + them the laws of Fate. + Plato, Timaeus, p. 41 D. Who then will not believe, that + by these words he expressly and manifestly declares Fate + to be, as it were, a foundation and political constitution of + laws, fitted for the souls of men? Of which he afterwards renders the cause.

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As for the second Providence, he thus in a manner explains it, saying: Having prescribed them all these laws, + + + + to the end that, if there should afterwards happen any + fault, he might be exempt from being the cause of any of + their evil, he dispersed some of them upon the earth, some + into the moon, and some into the other instruments of + time. And after this dispersion, he gave in charge to the + young Gods the making of human bodies, and the making + up and adding whatever was wanting and deficient in + human souls; and after they had perfected whatever is + adherent and consequent to this, they should rule and + govern, in the best manner they possibly could, this mortal + creature, so far as it should not be the cause of its own + evils. + Plato, Timaeus, p. 42 D. For by these words, that he might be exempt + from being the cause of any of their evil, he most clearly + signifies the cause of Fate; and the order and office of + the young Gods manifests the second Providence; and it + seems also in some sort to have touched a little upon the + third, if he therefore established laws and ordinances that + he might be exempt from being the cause of any of their + evil. For God, who is free from all evil, has no need of + laws or Fate; but every one of these petty Gods, drawn + on by the providence of him who has engendered them, + performs what belongs to his office. Now that this is true + and agreeable to the opinion of Plato, these words of the + lawgiver, spoken by him in his Book of Laws, seems to + me to give sufficient testimony: If there were any man + so sufficient by Nature, being by divine Fortune happily + engendered and born, that he could comprehend this, he + would have no need of laws to command him. For there + is not any law or ordinance more worthy and powerful + than knowledge; nor is it fitting that Mind, provided it + be truly and really free by Nature, should be a subject or + slave to any one, but it ought to command all. + Plato, Laws, IX. p. 875 C. +

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I therefore do for mine own part thus understand + and interpret this sentence of Plato. There being a threefold + + + + Providence, the first, as having engendered Fate, does + in some sort comprehend it; the second, having been engendered with Fate, is with it totally comprehended and + embraced by the first; the third, as having been engendered after Fate, is comprehended by it in the same manner + as are free will and Fortune, as we have already said. + For they whom the assistance of a Daemon’s power does + aid in their intercourse with me says Socrates, declaring + to Theages what is the almost inevitable ordinance of + Adrastea are those whom you also mean; for they grow + and come forward with speed. + Plato, Theages, p. 129 E. In which words, what + he says of a Daemon’s aiding some is to be ascribed to the + third Providence, and the growing and coming forward + with speed, to Fate. In brief, it is not obscure or doubtful + but that this also is a kind of Fate. And perhaps it may + be found much more probable that the second Providence + is also comprehended under Fate, and indeed all things + that are done; since Fate, as a substance, has been rightly + divided by us into three parts, and the fable of the chain + comprehends the revolutions of the heavens in the number + and rank of those things which happen conditionally. But + concerning these things I will not much contend, to wit, + whether they should be called conditional, or rather conjoined with Fate, the precedent cause and commander of + Fate being also fatal.

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Our opinion then, to speak compendiously, is such. + But the contrary sentiment does not only include all things + in Fate, but affirms them all to be done by and according + to Fate. It accords indeed in all things to the other (the + Stoic) doctrine; and that which accords to it, ’tis clear, is + the same thing with it. In this discourse therefore we + have first spoken of the contingent; secondly, of that + which is in our power; thirdly, of Fortune and chance, + and whatever depends on them; fourthly, of praise, blame, + + + + and whatever depends on them; the fifth and last of all + may be said to be prayers to the Gods, with their services + and ceremonies.

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For the rest, as to those which are called idle and reaping arguments, and that which is named the argument + against destiny, they are indeed but vain subtleties and + captious sophisms, according to this discourse. But according to the contrary opinion, the first and principal conclusion seems to be, that there is nothing done without a + cause, but that all things depend upon antecedent causes; + the second, that the world is governed by Nature, and that + it conspires, consents, and is compatible with itself; the + third seems rather to be testimonies, — of which the first + is divination, approved by all sorts of people, as being + truly in God; the second is the equanimity and patience + of wise men, who take mildly and bear patiently whatever + befalls, as happening by divine ordinance and as it ought; + the third is the speech so common and usual in every + one’s mouth, to wit, that every proposition is true or false. + Thus have we contracted this discourse into a small number of short articles, that we might in few words comprehend the whole matter of Fate; into which a scrutiny + ought to be made, and the reasons of both opinions to be + weighed with a most exact balance. But we shall hereafter come to discuss particulars.

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