From 555294fc0b026040636c2b44a5d9e45a7f0baafb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: lcerrato Date: Wed, 23 Aug 2017 16:31:36 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 1/5] (tlg0059.tlg033) first pass on greek conversion #454 --- .../tlg033/tlg0059.tlg033.perseus-grc2.xml | 503 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 503 insertions(+) create mode 100755 data/tlg0059/tlg033/tlg0059.tlg033.perseus-grc2.xml diff --git a/data/tlg0059/tlg033/tlg0059.tlg033.perseus-grc2.xml b/data/tlg0059/tlg033/tlg0059.tlg033.perseus-grc2.xml new file mode 100755 index 000000000..4a69084ef --- /dev/null +++ b/data/tlg0059/tlg033/tlg0059.tlg033.perseus-grc2.xml @@ -0,0 +1,503 @@ + + + + + + + + +Minos +Plato +Perseus Project, Tufts University +Gregory Crane + +Prepared under the supervision of +Lisa Cerrato +William Merrill +Elli Mylonas +David Smith + +The Annenberg CPB/Project + + + + + Trustees of Tufts University + Medford, MA + Perseus Project + + + + + Text was scanned at St. Olaf Spring, 1992. + + + + + Plato + Platonis Opera, ed. John Burnet + + 5 + Oxford University Press + 1914 + + + + + + + + + + + +

This pointer pattern extracts section

+ + + + + + + + +Greek +English + + + Σωκράτης + Ἑταῖρος + + + +EpiDoc and CTS conversion. +split composite text and converted to unicode +Tagged in conformance with Prose.e dtd. + + + + + +
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ὁ νόμος ἡμῖν τί ἐστιν;

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ὁποῖον καὶ ἐρωτᾷς τῶν νόμων;

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τί δʼ; ἔστιν ὅτι διαφέρει νόμος νόμου κατʼ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, κατὰ τὸ νόμος εἶναι; σκόπει γὰρ δὴ ὃ τυγχάνω ἐρωτῶν σε. ἐρωτῶ γάρ, ὥσπερ εἰ ἀνηρόμην τί ἐστιν χρυσός, εἴ με ὡσαύτως ἀνήρου ὁποῖον καὶ λέγω χρυσόν, οἴομαί σε οὐκ ἂν ὀρθῶς ἐρέσθαι. οὐδὲν γάρ που διαφέρει οὔτε χρυσὸς χρυσοῦ οὔτε λίθος λίθου κατά γε τὸ λίθος εἶναι καὶ κατὰ τὸ χρυσός· οὕτω δὲ οὐδὲ νόμος που νόμου οὐδὲν διαφέρει, ἀλλὰ πάντες εἰσὶν ταὐτόν. νόμος γὰρ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἐστιν ὁμοίως, οὐχ ὁ μὲν μᾶλλον, ὁ δʼ ἧττον· τοῦτο δὴ αὐτὸ ἐρωτῶ, τὸ πᾶν τί ἐστιν νόμος. εἰ οὖν σοι πρόχειρον, εἰπέ.

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τί οὖν ἄλλο νόμος εἴη ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλʼ ἢ τὰ νομιζόμενα;

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ἦ καὶ λόγος σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὰ λεγόμενα, ἢ ὄψις τὰ ὁρώμενα, ἢ ἀκοὴ τὰ ἀκουόμενα; ἢ ἄλλο μὲν λόγος, ἄλλο δὲ τὰ λεγόμενα· καὶ ἄλλο μὲν ὄψις, ἄλλο δὲ τὰ ὁρώμενα· καὶ ἄλλο μὲν ἀκοή, ἄλλο δὲ τὰ ἀκουόμενα, καὶ ἄλλο δὴ νόμος, ἄλλο δὲ τὰ νομιζόμενα; οὕτως ἢ πῶς σοι δοκεῖ;

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ἄλλο μοι νῦν ἐφάνη.

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οὐκ ἄρα νόμος ἐστὶν τὰ νομιζόμενα.

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οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.

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τί δῆτʼ ἂν εἴη νόμος; ἐπισκεψώμεθʼ αὐτὸ ὧδε. εἴ τις ἡμᾶς τὰ νυνδὴ λεγόμενα ἀνήρετο, ἐπειδὴ ὄψει φατὲ τὰ ὁρώμενα ὁρᾶσθαι, τίνι ὄντι τῇ ὄψει ὁρᾶται; ἀπεκρινάμεθʼ ἂν αὐτῷ ὅτι αἰσθήσει ταύτῃ τῇ διὰ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν δηλούσῃ τὰ πράγματα· εἰ δʼ αὖ ἤρετο ἡμᾶς, τί δέ; ἐπειδὴ ἀκοῇ τὰ ἀκουόμενα ἀκούεται, τίνι ὄντι τῇ ἀκοῇ; ἀπεκρινάμεθʼ ἂν αὐτῷ ὅτι αἰσθήσει ταύτῃ τῇ διὰ τῶν ὤτων δηλούσῃ ἡμῖν τὰς φωνάς. οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ εἰ ἀνέροιτο ἡμᾶς, ἐπειδὴ νόμῳ τὰ νομιζόμενα νομίζεται, τίνι ὄντι τῷ νόμῳ νομίζεται; πότερον αἰσθήσει τινὶ ἢ δηλώσει, ὥσπερ τὰ μανθανόμενα μανθάνεται δηλούσῃ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, ἢ εὑρέσει τινί, ὥσπερ τὰ εὑρισκόμενα εὑρίσκεται, οἷον τὰ μὲν ὑγιεινὰ καὶ νοσώδη ἰατρικῇ, ἃ δὲ οἱ θεοὶ διανοοῦνται, ὥς φασιν οἱ μάντεις, μαντικῇ; ἡ γάρ που τέχνη ἡμῖν εὕρεσίς ἐστιν τῶν πραγμάτων· ἦ γάρ;

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πάνυ γε.

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τί οὖν ἂν τούτων ὑπολάβοιμεν μάλιστα τὸν νόμον εἶναι;

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τὰ δόγματα ταῦτα καὶ ψηφίσματα, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. τί γὰρ ἂν ἄλλο τις φαίη νόμον εἶναι; ὥστε κινδυνεύει, ὃ σὺ ἐρωτᾷς, τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο, νόμος, δόγμα πόλεως εἶναι.

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δόξαν, ὡς ἔοικε, λέγεις πολιτικὴν τὸν νόμον.

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ἔγωγε.

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καὶ ἴσως καλῶς λέγεις· τάχα δὲ ὧδε ἄμεινον εἰσόμεθα. λέγεις τινὰς σοφούς;

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ἔγωγε.

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οὐκοῦν οἱ σοφοί εἰσιν σοφίᾳ σοφοί;

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ναί.

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τί δέ; οἱ δίκαιοι δικαιοσύνῃ δίκαιοι;

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πάνυ γε.

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οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ νόμιμοι νόμῳ νόμιμοι;

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ναί.

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οἱ δὲ ἄνομοι ἀνομίᾳ ἄνομοι;

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ναί.

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οἱ δὲ νόμιμοι δίκαιοι;

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ναί.

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οἱ δὲ ἄνομοι ἄδικοι;

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ἄδικοι.

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οὐκοῦν κάλλιστον ἡ δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ ὁ νόμος;

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οὕτως.

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αἴσχιστον δὲ ἡ ἀδικία τε καὶ ἡ ἀνομία;

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ναί.

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καὶ τὸ μὲν σῴζει τὰς πόλεις καὶ τἆλλα πάντα, τὸ δὲ ἀπόλλυσι καὶ ἀνατρέπει;

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ναί.

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ὡς περὶ καλοῦ ἄρα τινὸς ὄντος δεῖ τοῦ νόμου διανοεῖσθαι, καὶ ὡς ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ ζητεῖν.

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πῶς δʼ οὔ;

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οὐκοῦν δόγμα ἔφαμεν εἶναι πόλεως τὸν νόμον;

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ἔφαμεν γάρ.

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τί οὖν; οὐκ ἔστιν τὰ μὲν χρηστὰ δόγματα, τὰ δὲ πονηρά;

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ἔστιν μὲν οὖν.

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καὶ μὴν νόμος γε οὐκ ἦν πονηρός.

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οὐ γάρ.

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οὐκ ἄρα ὀρθῶς ἔχει ἀποκρίνεσθαι οὕτως ἁπλῶς ὅτι νόμος ἐστὶ δόγμα πόλεως.

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οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

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οὐκ ἄρα ἁρμόττοι ἂν τὸ πονηρὸν δόγμα νόμος εἶναι.

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οὐ δῆτα.

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ἀλλὰ μὴν δόξα γέ τις καὶ αὐτῷ μοι καταφαίνεται ὁ νόμος εἶναι· ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐχ ἡ πονηρὰ δόξα, ἆρα οὐκ ἤδη τοῦτο κατάδηλον, ὡς ἡ χρηστή, εἴπερ δόξα νόμος ἐστί;

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ναί.

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δόξα δὲ χρηστὴ τίς ἐστιν; οὐχ ἡ ἀληθής;

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ναί.

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οὐκοῦν ἡ ἀληθὴς δόξα τοῦ ὄντος ἐστὶν ἐξεύρεσις;

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ἔστιν γάρ.

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ὁ νόμος ἄρα βούλεται τοῦ ὄντος εἶναι ἐξεύρεσις.

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πῶς οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ ὁ νόμος ἐστὶν τοῦ ὄντος ἐξεύρεσις, οὐκ ἀεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς νόμοις χρώμεθα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, εἰ τὰ ὄντα γε ἡμῖν ἐξηύρηται;

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βούλεται μὲν οὐδὲν ἧττον ὁ νόμος εἶναι τοῦ ὄντος ἐξεύρεσις· οἱ δʼ ἄρα μὴ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀεὶ νόμοις χρώμενοι ἄνθρωποι, ὡς δοκοῦμεν, οὐκ ἀεὶ δύνανται ἐξευρίσκειν ὃ βούλεται ὁ νόμος, τὸ ὄν. ἐπεὶ φέρε ἴδωμεν ἐὰν ἄρα ἡμῖν ἐνθένδε κατάδηλον γένηται εἴτε τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀεὶ νόμοις χρώμεθα ἢ ἄλλοτε ἄλλοις, καὶ εἰ ἅπαντες τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἢ ἄλλοι ἄλλοις.

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ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ χαλεπὸν γνῶναι, ὅτι οὔτε οἱ αὐτοὶ ἀεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς νόμοις χρῶνται ἄλλοι τε ἄλλοις. ἐπεὶ αὐτίκα ἡμῖν μὲν οὐ νόμος ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπους θύειν ἀλλʼ ἀνόσιον, Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ θύουσιν ὡς ὅσιον ὂν καὶ νόμιμον αὐτοῖς, καὶ ταῦτα ἔνιοι αὐτῶν καὶ τοὺς αὑτῶν ὑεῖς τῷ Κρόνῳ, ὡς ἴσως καὶ σὺ ἀκήκοας. καὶ μὴ ὅτι βάρβαροι ἄνθρωποι ἡμῶν ἄλλοις νόμοις χρῶνται, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ Λυκαίᾳ οὗτοι καὶ οἱ τοῦ Ἀθάμαντος ἔκγονοι οἵας θυσίας θύουσιν Ἕλληνες ὄντες. ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς οἶσθά που καὶ αὐτὸς ἀκούων οἵοις νόμοις ἐχρώμεθα πρὸ τοῦ περὶ τοὺς ἀποθανόντας, ἱερεῖά τε προσφάττοντες πρὸ τῆς ἐκφορᾶς τοῦ νεκροῦ καὶ ἐγχυτιστρίας μεταπεμπόμενοι· οἱ δʼ αὖ ἐκείνων ἔτι πρότεροι αὐτοῦ καὶ ἔθαπτον ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τοὺς ἀποθανόντας· ἡμεῖς δὲ τούτων οὐδὲν ποιοῦμεν. μυρία δʼ ἄν τις ἔχοι τοιαῦτα εἰπεῖν· πολλὴ γὰρ εὐρυχωρία τῆς ἀποδείξεως ὡς οὔτε ἡμεῖς ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ νομίζομεν οὔτε ἀλλήλοις οἱ ἄνθρωποι.

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οὐδέν τοι θαυμαστόν ἐστιν, ὦ βέλτιστε, εἰ σὺ μὲν ὀρθῶς λέγεις, ἐμὲ δὲ τοῦτο λέληθεν. ἀλλʼ ἕως ἂν σύ τε κατὰ σαυτὸν λέγῃς ἅ σοι δοκεῖ μακρῷ λόγῳ καὶ πάλιν ἐγώ, οὐδὲν μή ποτε συμβῶμεν, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι· ἐὰν δὲ κοινὸν τεθῇ τὸ σκέμμα, τάχʼ ἂν ὁμολογήσαιμεν. εἰ μὲν οὖν βούλει, πυνθανόμενός τι παρʼ ἐμοῦ κοινῇ μετʼ ἐμοῦ σκόπει· εἰ δʼ αὖ βούλει, ἀποκρινόμενος.

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ἀλλʼ ἐθέλω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὅτι ἂν βούλῃ.

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φέρε δὴ σύ, πότερα νομίζεις τὰ δίκαια ἄδικα εἶναι καὶ τὰ ἄδικα δίκαια, ἢ τὰ μὲν δίκαια δίκαια, τὰ δὲ ἄδικα ἄδικα;

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ἐγὼ μὲν τά τε δίκαια δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα ἄδικα.

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οὐκοῦν καὶ παρὰ πᾶσιν οὕτως ὡς ἐνθάδε νομίζεται;

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ναί.

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οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις;

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καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις.

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ἀλλὰ ἀεὶ δήπου;

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ἀεί.

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πότερον δὲ τὰ πλεῖον ἕλκοντα βαρύτερα νομίζεται ἐνθάδε, τὰ δὲ ἔλαττον κουφότερα, ἢ τοὐναντίον;

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οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τὰ πλεῖον ἕλκοντα βαρύτερα, τὰ δὲ ἔλαττον κουφότερα.

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οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν Καρχηδόνι καὶ ἐν Λυκαίᾳ;

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ναί.

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τὰ μὲν καλά, ὡς ἔοικε, πανταχοῦ νομίζεται καλὰ καὶ τὰ αἰσχρὰ αἰσχρά, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὰ αἰσχρὰ καλὰ οὐδὲ τὰ καλὰ αἰσχρά.

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οὕτως.

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οὐκοῦν, ὡς κατὰ πάντων εἰπεῖν, τὰ ὄντα νομίζεται εἶναι, οὐ τὰ μὴ ὄντα, καὶ παρʼ ἡμῖν καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν.

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ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

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ὃς ἂν ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος ἁμαρτάνῃ, τοῦ νομίμου ἁμαρτάνει.

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οὕτω μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, καὶ φαίνεται ταῦτα νόμιμα καὶ ἡμῖν ἀεὶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις· ἐπειδὰν δʼ ἐννοήσω ὅτι οὐδὲν παυόμεθα ἄνω κάτω μετατιθέμενοι τοὺς νόμους, οὐ δύναμαι πεισθῆναι.

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ἴσως γὰρ οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ταῦτα μεταπεττευόμενα ὅτι ταὐτά ἐστιν. ἀλλʼ ὧδε μετʼ ἐμοῦ αὐτὰ ἄθρει. ἤδη ποτὲ ἐνέτυχες συγγράμματι περὶ ὑγιείας τῶν καμνόντων;

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ἔγωγε.

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οἶσθα οὖν τίνος τέχνης τοῦτʼ ἐστὶ τὸ σύγγραμμα;

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οἶδα, ὅτι ἰατρικῆς.

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οὐκοῦν ἰατροὺς καλεῖς τοὺς ἐπιστήμονας περὶ τούτων;

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φημί.

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πότερον οὖν οἱ ἐπιστήμονες ταὐτὰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν νομίζουσιν ἢ ἄλλοι ἄλλα;

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ταὐτὰ ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσι.

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πότερον οἱ Ἕλληνες μόνοι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἢ καὶ οἱ βάρβαροι αὑτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς Ἕλλησι, περὶ ὧν ἂν εἰδῶσι, ταὐτὰ νομίζουσι;

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ταὐτὰ δήπου πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ἐστὶν τοὺς εἰδότας αὐτοὺς αὑτοῖς συννομίζειν καὶ Ἕλληνας καὶ βαρβάρους.

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καλῶς γε ἀπεκρίνω. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀεί;

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ναί, καὶ ἀεί.

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οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ ἰατροὶ συγγράφουσι περὶ ὑγιείας ἅπερ καὶ νομίζουσιν εἶναι;

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ναί.

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ἰατρικὰ ἄρα καὶ ἰατρικοὶ νόμοι ταῦτα τὰ συγγράμματα ἐστὶν τὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν.

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ἰατρικὰ μέντοι.

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ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ τὰ γεωργικὰ συγγράμματα γεωργικοὶ νόμοι εἰσίν;

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ναί.

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τίνων οὖν ἐστιν τὰ περὶ κήπων ἐργασίας συγγράμματα καὶ νόμιμα;

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κηπουρῶν.

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κηπουρικοὶ ἄρα νόμοι ἡμῖν εἰσιν οὗτοι.

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ναί.

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τῶν ἐπισταμένων κήπων ἄρχειν;

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πῶς δʼ οὔ;

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ἐπίστανται δʼ οἱ κηπουροί.

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ναί.

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τίνων δὲ τὰ περὶ ὄψου σκευασίας συγγράμματά τε καὶ νόμιμα;

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μαγείρων.

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μαγειρικοὶ ἄρα οὗτοι νόμοι εἰσί;

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μαγειρικοί.

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+

τῶν ἐπισταμένων, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὄψου σκευασίας ἄρχειν;

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ναί.

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ἐπίστανται δέ, ὥς φασιν, οἱ μάγειροι;

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ἐπίστανται γάρ.

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εἶεν· τίνων δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ πόλεως διοικήσεως συγγράμματά τε καὶ νόμιμά ἐστιν; ἆρʼ οὐ τῶν ἐπισταμένων πόλεων ἄρχειν;

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ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

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ἐπίστανται δὲ ἄλλοι τινὲς ἢ οἱ πολιτικοί τε καὶ οἱ βασιλικοί;

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οὗτοι μὲν οὖν.

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πολιτικὰ ἄρα ταῦτα συγγράμματά ἐστιν, οὓς οἱ ἄνθρωποι νόμους καλοῦσι, βασιλέων τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν συγγράμματα.

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ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

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ἄλλο τι οὖν οἵ γε ἐπιστάμενοι οὐκ ἄλλοτε ἄλλα συγγράψουσι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν;

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οὔ.

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οὐδὲ μεταθήσονταί ποτε περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα νόμιμα;

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οὐ δῆτα.

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ἐὰν οὖν ὁρῶμέν τινας ὁπουοῦν τοῦτο ποιοῦντας, πότερα φήσομεν ἐπιστήμονας εἶναι ἢ ἀνεπιστήμονας τοὺς τοῦτο ποιοῦντας;

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ἀνεπιστήμονας.

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οὐκοῦν καὶ ὃ μὲν ἂν ὀρθὸν ᾖ, νόμιμον αὐτὸ φήσομεν ἑκάστῳ εἶναι, ἢ τὸ ἰατρικὸν ἢ τὸ μαγειρικὸν ἢ τὸ κηπουρικόν;

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ναί.

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ὃ δʼ ἂν μὴ ὀρθὸν ᾖ, οὐκέτι φήσομεν τοῦτο νόμιμον εἶναι;

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οὐκέτι.

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ἄνομον ἄρα γίγνεται.

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ἀνάγκη.

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οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν τοῖς συγγράμμασι τοῖς περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ ὅλως περὶ πόλεως διακοσμήσεώς τε καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὡς χρὴ πόλιν διοικεῖν, τὸ μὲν ὀρθὸν νόμος ἐστὶ βασιλικός, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὀρθὸν οὔ, ὃ δοκεῖ νόμος εἶναι τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν· ἔστιν γὰρ ἄνομον.

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ναί.

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ὀρθῶς ἄρα ὡμολογήσαμεν νόμον εἶναι τοῦ ὄντος εὕρεσιν.

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φαίνεται.

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ἔτι δὲ καὶ τόδε ἐν αὐτῷ διαθεώμεθα. τίς ἐπιστήμων διανεῖμαι ἐπὶ γῇ τὰ σπέρματα;

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γεωργός.

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οὗτος δὲ τὰ ἄξια σπέρματα ἑκάστῃ γῇ διανέμει;

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ναί.

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ὁ γεωργὸς ἄρα νομεὺς ἀγαθὸς τούτων, καὶ οἱ τούτου νόμοι καὶ διανομαὶ ἐπὶ ταῦτα ὀρθαί εἰσιν;

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ναί.

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τίς δὲ κρουμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ μέλη ἀγαθὸς νομεύς, καὶ τὰ ἄξια νεῖμαι; καὶ οἱ τίνος νόμοι ὀρθοί εἰσιν;

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οἱ τοῦ αὐλητοῦ καὶ τοῦ κιθαριστοῦ.

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ὁ νομικώτατος ἄρα ἐν τούτοις, οὗτος αὐλητικώτατος.

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ναί.

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τίς δὲ τὴν τροφὴν ἐπὶ τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων σώματα διανεῖμαι ἄριστος; οὐχ ὅσπερ τὴν ἀξίαν;

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ναί.

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αἱ τούτου ἄρα διανομαὶ καὶ οἱ νόμοι βέλτιστοι, καὶ ὅστις περὶ ταῦτα νομικώτατος, καὶ νομεὺς ἄριστος.

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πάνυ γε.

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τίς οὗτος;

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παιδοτρίβης.

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οὗτος τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν ἀγέλην τοῦ σώματος νέμειν κράτιστος;

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ναί.

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τίς δὲ τὴν τῶν προβάτων ἀγέλην κράτιστος νέμειν; τί ὄνομα αὐτῷ;

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ποιμήν.

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οἱ τοῦ ποιμένος ἄρα νόμοι ἄριστοι τοῖς προβάτοις.

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ναί.

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οἱ δὲ τοῦ βουκόλου τοῖς βουσί.

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ναί.

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οἱ δὲ τοῦ τίνος νόμοι ἄριστοι ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων; οὐχ οἱ τοῦ βασιλέως; φάθι.

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φημὶ δή.

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καλῶς τοίνυν λέγεις. ἔχοις ἂν οὖν εἰπεῖν τίς τῶν παλαιῶν ἀγαθὸς γέγονεν ἐν τοῖς αὐλητικοῖς νόμοις νομοθέτης; ἴσως οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ βούλει σε ὑπομνήσω;

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πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

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ἆρʼ οὖν ὁ Μαρσύας λέγεται καὶ τὰ παιδικὰ αὐτοῦ Ὄλυμπος ὁ Φρύξ;

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ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

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τούτων δὴ καὶ τὰ αὐλήματα θειότατά ἐστι, καὶ μόνα κινεῖ καὶ ἐκφαίνει τοὺς τῶν θεῶν ἐν χρείᾳ ὄντας· καὶ ἔτι καὶ νῦν μόνα λοιπά, ὡς θεῖα ὄντα.

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ἔστι ταῦτα.

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τίς δὲ λέγεται τῶν παλαιῶν βασιλέων ἀγαθὸς νομοθέτης γεγονέναι, οὗ ἔτι καὶ νῦν τὰ νόμιμα μένει ὡς θεῖα ὄντα;

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οὐκ ἐννοῶ.

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οὐκ οἶσθα τίνες παλαιοτάτοις νόμοις χρῶνται τῶν Ἑλλήνων;

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ἆρα Λακεδαιμονίους λέγεις καὶ Λυκοῦργον τὸν νομοθέτην;

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ἀλλὰ ταῦτά γε οὐδέπω ἴσως ἔτη τριακόσια ἢ ὀλίγῳ τούτων πλείω. ἀλλὰ τούτων τῶν νομίμων τὰ βέλτιστα πόθεν ἥκει; οἶσθα;

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φασί γε ἐκ Κρήτης.

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οὐκοῦν οὗτοι παλαιοτάτοις νόμοις χρῶνται τῶν Ἑλλήνων;

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ναί.

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οἶσθα οὖν τίνες τούτων ἀγαθοὶ βασιλῆς ἦσαν; Μίνως καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυς, οἱ Διὸς καὶ Εὐρώπης παῖδες, ὧν οἵδε εἰσὶν οἱ νόμοι.

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Ῥαδάμανθύν γέ φασιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, δίκαιον ἄνδρα, τὸν δὲ Μίνων ἄγριόν τινα καὶ χαλεπὸν καὶ ἄδικον.

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Ἀττικόν, ὦ βέλτιστε, λέγεις μῦθον καὶ τραγικόν.

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τί δέ; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεται περὶ Μίνω;

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οὔκουν ὑπό γε Ὁμήρου καὶ Ἡσιόδου· καίτοι γε πιθανώτεροί εἰσιν ἢ σύμπαντες οἱ τραγῳδοποιοί, ὧν σὺ ἀκούων ταῦτα λέγεις.

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ἀλλὰ τί μὴν οὗτοι περὶ Μίνω λέγουσιν;

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ἐγὼ δή σοι ἐρῶ, ἵνα μὴ καὶ σὺ ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ ἀσεβῇς. οὐ γὰρ ἔσθʼ ὅτι τούτου ἀσεβέστερόν ἐστιν οὐδʼ ὅτι χρὴ μᾶλλον εὐλαβεῖσθαι, πλὴν εἰς θεοὺς καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ ἐξαμαρτάνειν, δεύτερον δὲ εἰς τοὺς θείους ἀνθρώπους· ἀλλὰ πάνυ πολλὴν χρὴ προμήθειαν ποιεῖσθαι ἀεί, ὅταν μέλλῃς ἄνδρα ψέξειν ἢ ἐπαινέσεσθαι, μὴ οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἴπῃς. τούτου καὶ ἕνεκα χρὴ μανθάνειν διαγιγνώσκειν χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς ἄνδρας. νεμεσᾷ γὰρ ὁ θεός, ὅταν τις ψέγῃ τὸν ἑαυτῷ ὅμοιον ἢ ἐπαινῇ τὸν ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίως ἔχοντα· ἔστι δʼ οὗτος ὁ ἀγαθός. μὴ γάρ τι οἴου λίθους μὲν εἶναι ἱεροὺς καὶ ξύλα καὶ ὄρνεα καὶ ὄφεις, ἀνθρώπους δὲ μή· ἀλλὰ πάντων τούτων ἱερώτατόν ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἀγαθός, καὶ μιαρώτατον ὁ πονηρός. + +ἤδη οὖν καὶ περὶ Μίνω, ὡς αὐτὸν Ὅμηρός τε καὶ Ἡσίοδος ἐγκωμιάζουσι, τούτου ἕνεκα φράσω, ἵνα μὴ ἄνθρωπος ὢν ἀνθρώπου εἰς ἥρω Διὸς ὑὸν λόγῳ ἐξαμαρτάνῃς. Ὅμηρος γὰρ περὶ Κρήτης λέγων ὅτι πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι ἐν αὐτῇ εἰσιν καὶ ἐνενήκοντα πόληες, τῇσι δέ, φησίν—ἔνι Κνωσὸς μεγάλη πόλις, ἔνθα τε Μίνωςἐννέωρος βασίλευε Διὸς μεγάλου ὀαριστής. Hom. Od. 19.179 ἔστιν οὖν τοῦτο Ὁμήρου ἐγκώμιον εἰς Μίνων διὰ βραχέων εἰρημένον, οἷον οὐδʼ εἰς ἕνα τῶν ἡρώων ἐποίησεν Ὅμηρος. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς σοφιστής ἐστιν καὶ ἡ τέχνη αὕτη παγκάλη ἐστί, πολλαχοῦ καὶ ἄλλοθι δηλοῖ, ἀτὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα. λέγει γὰρ τὸν Μίνων συγγίγνεσθαι ἐνάτῳ ἔτει τῷ Διὶ ἐν λόγοις καὶ φοιτᾶν παιδευθησόμενον ὡς ὑπὸ σοφιστοῦ ὄντος τοῦ Διός. ὅτι οὖν τοῦτο τὸ γέρας οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτῳ ἀπένειμεν Ὅμηρος τῶν ἡρώων, ὑπὸ Διὸς πεπαιδεῦσθαι, ἄλλῳ ἢ Μίνῳ, τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ἔπαινος θαυμαστός. καὶ Ὀδυσσείας ἐν Νεκυίᾳ δικάζοντα χρυσοῦν σκῆπτρον ἔχοντα πεποίηκε τὸν Μίνων, οὐ τὸν Ῥαδάμανθυν· Ῥαδάμανθυν δὲ οὔτʼ ἐνταῦθα δικάζοντα πεποίηκεν οὔτε συγγιγνόμενον τῷ Διὶ οὐδαμοῦ. διὰ ταῦτά φημʼ ἐγὼ Μίνων ἁπάντων μάλιστα ὑπὸ Ὁμήρου ἐγκεκωμιάσθαι. τὸ γὰρ Διὸς ὄντα παῖδα μόνον ὑπὸ Διὸς πεπαιδεῦσθαι οὐκ ἔχει ὑπερβολὴν ἐπαίνου—τοῦτο γὰρ σημαίνει τὸ ἔπος τὸ—ἐννέωρος βασίλευε Διὸς μεγάλου ὀαριστής, Hom. Od. 11.569 συνουσιαστὴν τοῦ Διὸς εἶναι τὸν Μίνων. οἱ γὰρ ὄαροι λόγοι εἰσίν, καὶ ὀαριστὴς συνουσιαστής ἐστιν ἐν λόγοις—ἐφοίτα οὖν διʼ ἐνάτου ἔτους εἰς τὸ τοῦ Διὸς ἄντρον ὁ Μίνως, τὰ μὲν μαθησόμενος, τὰ δὲ ἀποδειξόμενος ἃ τῇ προτέρᾳ ἐννεετηρίδι ἐμεμαθήκει παρὰ τοῦ Διός.

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εἰσὶν δὲ οἳ ὑπολαμβάνουσι τὸν ὀαριστὴν συμπότην καὶ συμπαιστὴν εἶναι τοῦ Διός, ἀλλὰ τῷδε ἄν τις τεκμηρίῳ χρῷτο ὅτι οὐδὲν λέγουσιν οἱ οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνοντες· πολλῶν γὰρ ὄντων ἀνθρώπων καὶ Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων, οὐκ ἔστιν οἵτινες ἀπέχονται συμποσίων καὶ ταύτης τῆς παιδιᾶς, οὗ ἔστιν οἶνος, ἄλλοι ἢ Κρῆτες καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι δεύτεροι, μαθόντες παρὰ Κρητῶν. ἐν Κρήτῃ δὲ εἷς οὗτός ἐστι τῶν ἄλλων νόμων οὓς Μίνως ἔθηκε, μὴ συμπίνειν ἀλλήλοις εἰς μέθην. καίτοι δῆλον ὅτι ἃ ἐνόμιζεν καλὰ εἶναι, ταῦτα νόμιμα ἔθηκεν καὶ τοῖς αὑτοῦ πολίταις. οὐ γάρ που, ὥσπερ γε φαῦλος ἄνθρωπος, ὁ Μίνως ἐνόμιζεν μὲν ἕτερα, ἐποίει δὲ ἄλλα παρʼ ἃ ἐνόμιζεν· ἀλλὰ ἦν αὕτη ἡ συνουσία ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, διὰ λόγων ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ εἰς ἀρετήν. ὅθεν δὴ καὶ τοὺς νόμους τούτους ἔθηκε τοῖς αὑτοῦ πολίταις, διʼ οὓς ἥ τε Κρήτη τὸν πάντα χρόνον εὐδαιμονεῖ καὶ Λακεδαίμων, ἀφʼ οὗ ἤρξατο τούτοις χρῆσθαι, ἅτε θείοις οὖσιν. + +Ῥαδάμανθυς δὲ ἀγαθὸς μὲν ἦν ἀνήρ· ἐπεπαίδευτο γὰρ ὑπὸ τοῦ Μίνω. ἐπεπαίδευτο μέντοι οὐχ ὅλην τὴν βασιλικὴν τέχνην, ἀλλʼ ὑπηρεσίαν τῇ βασιλικῇ, ὅσον ἐπιστατεῖν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις· ὅθεν καὶ δικαστὴς ἀγαθὸς ἐλέχθη εἶναι. νομοφύλακι γὰρ αὐτῷ ἐχρῆτο ὁ Μίνως κατὰ τὸ ἄστυ, τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην Κρήτην τῷ Τάλῳ. ὁ γὰρ Τάλως τρὶς περιῄει τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ κατὰ τὰς κώμας, φυλάττων τοὺς νόμους ἐν αὐταῖς, ἐν χαλκοῖς γραμματείοις ἔχων γεγραμμένους τοὺς νόμους, ὅθεν χαλκοῦς ἐκλήθη. εἴρηκε δὲ καὶ Ἡσίοδος ἀδελφὰ τούτων εἰς τὸν Μίνων. μνησθεὶς γὰρ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὀνόματος φησίν—ὃς βασιλεύτατος γένετο θνητῶν βασιλήων,καὶ πλείστων ἤνασσε περικτιόνων ἀνθρώπων,Ζηνὸς ἔχων σκῆπτρον· τῷ καὶ πολέων βασίλευεν. Hes. fr. 144 καὶ οὗτος λέγει τὸ τοῦ Διὸς σκῆπτρον οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τὴν παιδείαν τὴν τοῦ Διός, ᾗ εὔθυνε τὴν Κρήτην.

 + +

διὰ τί οὖν ποτε, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὕτη ἡ φήμη κατεσκέδασται τοῦ Μίνω ὡς ἀπαιδεύτου τινὸς καὶ χαλεποῦ ὄντος;

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διʼ ὃ καὶ σύ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἐὰν σωφρονῇς, εὐλαβήσῃ, καὶ ἄλλος πᾶς ἀνὴρ ὅτῳ μέλει τοῦ εὐδόκιμον εἶναι, μηδέποτε ἀπεχθάνεσθαι ἀνδρὶ ποιητικῷ μηδενί. οἱ γὰρ ποιηταὶ μέγα δύνανται εἰς δόξαν, ἐφʼ ὁπότερα ἂν ποιῶσιν εἰς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἢ εὐλογοῦντες ἢ κακηγοροῦντες. ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐξήμαρτεν ὁ Μίνως, πολεμήσας τῇδε τῇ πόλει, ἐν ᾗ ἄλλη τε πολλὴ σοφία ἐστὶ καὶ ποιηταὶ παντοδαποὶ τῆς τε ἄλλης ποιήσεως καὶ τραγῳδίας. ἡ δὲ τραγῳδία ἐστὶν παλαιὸν ἐνθάδε, οὐχ ὡς οἴονται ἀπὸ Θέσπιδος ἀρξαμένη οὐδʼ ἀπὸ Φρυνίχου, ἀλλʼ εἰ θέλεις ἐννοῆσαι, πάνυ παλαιὸν αὐτὸ εὑρήσεις ὂν τῆσδε τῆς πόλεως εὕρημα. ἔστιν δὲ τῆς ποιήσεως δημοτερπέστατόν τε καὶ ψυχαγωγικώτατον ἡ τραγῳδία· ἐν ᾗ δὴ καὶ ἐντείνοντες ἡμεῖς τὸν Μίνων τιμωρούμεθα ἀνθʼ ὧν ἡμᾶς ἠνάγκασε τοὺς δασμοὺς τελεῖν ἐκείνους. τοῦτο οὖν ἐξήμαρτεν ὁ Μίνως, ἀπεχθόμενος ἡμῖν, ὅθεν δή, ὃ σὺ ἐρωτᾷς, κακοδοξότερος γέγονεν. ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε ἀγαθὸς ἦν καὶ νόμιμος, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, νομεὺς ἀγαθός, τοῦτο μέγιστον σημεῖον, ὅτι ἀκίνητοι αὐτοῦ οἱ νόμοι εἰσίν, ἅτε τοῦ ὄντος περὶ πόλεως οἰκήσεως ἐξευρόντος εὖ τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

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δοκεῖς μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰκότα τὸν λόγον εἰρηκέναι.

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οὐκοῦν εἰ ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω, δοκοῦσί σοι παλαιοτάτοις Κρῆτες οἱ Μίνω καὶ Ῥαδαμάνθυος πολῖται νόμοις χρῆσθαι;

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φαίνονται.

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οὗτοι ἄρα τῶν παλαιῶν ἄριστοι νομοθέται γεγόνασιν, νομῆς τε καὶ ποιμένες ἀνδρῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἔφη ποιμένα λαῶν εἶναι τὸν ἀγαθὸν στρατηγόν.

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πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

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φέρε δὴ πρὸς Διὸς φιλίου· εἴ τις ἡμᾶς ἔροιτο, ὁ τῷ σώματι ἀγαθὸς νομοθέτης τε καὶ νομεὺς τί ἐστιν ταῦτα ἃ διανέμων ἐπὶ τὸ σῶμα βέλτιον αὐτὸ ποιεῖ, εἴποιμεν ἂν καλῶς τε καὶ διὰ βραχέων ἀποκρινόμενοι, ὅτι τροφήν τε καὶ πόνους, τῇ μὲν αὔξων, τοῖς δὲ γυμνάζων καὶ συνιστὰς τὸ σῶμα αὐτό.

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ὀρθῶς γε.

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εἰ οὖν δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔροιτο ἡμᾶς, τί δὲ δή ποτε ἐκεῖνά ἐστιν, ἃ ὁ ἀγαθὸς νομοθέτης τε καὶ νομεὺς διανέμων ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν βελτίω αὐτὴν ποιεῖ; τί ἂν ἀποκρινάμενοι οὐκ ἂν αἰσχυνθεῖμεν καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς ἡλικίας αὑτῶν;

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οὐκέτι τοῦτʼ ἔχω εἰπεῖν.

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ἀλλὰ μέντοι αἰσχρόν γε τῇ ψυχῇ ἡμῶν ἐστιν ἑκατέρου, τὰ μὲν ἐν αὐταῖς φαίνεσθαι μὴ εἰδυίας, ἐν οἷς αὐταῖς ἔνεστι καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ φλαῦρον, τὰ δὲ τοῦ σώματος καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐσκέφθαι.

+
+ + + + \ No newline at end of file From 881a18fdd88cc94108f1a801f0738e08b15f8108 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: lcerrato Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 16:15:37 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 2/5] (tlg0059.tlg033) work on eng file conversion #454 --- .../tlg033/tlg0059.tlg033.perseus-eng2.xml | 302 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 302 insertions(+) create mode 100755 data/tlg0059/tlg033/tlg0059.tlg033.perseus-eng2.xml diff --git a/data/tlg0059/tlg033/tlg0059.tlg033.perseus-eng2.xml b/data/tlg0059/tlg033/tlg0059.tlg033.perseus-eng2.xml new file mode 100755 index 000000000..53446786c --- /dev/null +++ b/data/tlg0059/tlg033/tlg0059.tlg033.perseus-eng2.xml @@ -0,0 +1,302 @@ + + + + + + + + +Minos +Plato +Perseus Project, Tufts University +Gregory Crane + +Prepared under the supervision of +Lisa Cerrato +William Merrill +Elli Mylonas +David Smith + +The Annenberg CPB/Project + + + + Trustees of Tufts University + Medford, MA + Perseus Project + + + + Text was scanned at St. Olaf Spring, 1992. + + + + Plato + Plato in Twelve Volumes, translated by W.R.M. Lamb. + + + 12 + Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. + 1927 + + + + + + + + + + + +

This pointer pattern extracts section

+ + + + + + + + +English +Greek + + + Socrates + Companion + + + +EpiDoc and CTS conversion. +split composite text and converted to unicode +Tagged in conformance with Prose.e dtd. + + + + + +
+ + +

Tell me, what is law?

 +

To what kind of law does your question refer?

 +

What! Is there any difference between law and law, in this particular point of being law? For just consider what is the actual question I am putting to you. It is as though I had asked, what is gold: if you had asked me in the same manner, to what kind of gold I refer, I think your question would have been incorrect. For I presume there is no difference between gold and gold, or between stone and stone, in point of being gold or stone; and so neither does law differ at all from law, I suppose, but they are all the same thing. For each of them is law alike, not one more so, and another less. That is the particular point of my question—what is law as a whole? So if you are ready, tell me.

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Well, what else should law be, Socrates, but things loyally accepted? νομιζόμενα in ordinary speech meant accepted by custom: loyally here attempts to preserve the connection with νόμος (law in this context, though sometimes custom, as below, 315 D).

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And so speech, you think, is the things that are spoken, or sight the things seen, or hearing the things heard? Or is speech something distinct from the things spoken, sight something distinct from the things seen, and hearing something distinct from the things heard; and so law is something distinct from things loyally accepted? Is this so, or what is your view?

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I find it now to be something distinct.

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Then law is not things loyally accepted.

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I think not.

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Now what can law be? Let us consider it in this way. Suppose someone had asked us about what was stated just now: Since you say it is by sight that things seen are seen, what is this sight whereby they are seen? Our answer to him would have been: That sensation which shows objects by means of the eyes. And if he had asked us again: Well then, since it is by hearing that things heard are heard, what is hearing? Our answer to him would have been: That sensation which shows us sounds by means of the ears. In the same way then, suppose he should also ask us: Since it is by law that loyally accepted things are so accepted, what is this law whereby they are so accepted? Is it some sensation or showing, as when things learnt are learnt by knowledge showing them, or some discovery, as when things discovered are discovered—for instance, the causes of health and sickness by medicine, or the designs of the gods, as the prophets say, by prophecy; for art is surely our discovery of things, is it not?

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Certainly.

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Then what thing especially of this sort shall we surmise law to be?

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Our resolutions and decrees, I imagine: for how else can one describe law? So that apparently the whole thing, law, as you put it in your question, is a city’s resolution.

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State opinion, it seems, is what you call law.

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I do.

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And perhaps you are right: but I fancy we shall get a better knowledge in this way. You call some men wise?

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I do.

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And the wise are wise by wisdom?

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Yes.

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And again, the just are just by justice?

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Certainly.

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And so the law-abiding are law-abiding by law?

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Yes.

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And the lawless are lawless by lawlessness?

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Yes.

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And the law-abiding are just?

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Yes.

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And the lawless are unjust?

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Unjust.

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And justice and law are most noble?

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That is so.

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And injustice and lawlessness most base?

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Yes.

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And the former preserve cities and everything else, while the latter destroy and overturn them?

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Yes.

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Hence we must regard law as something noble, and seek after it as a good.

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Undeniably.

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And we said that law is a city’s resolution?

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So we did.

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Well now, are not some resolutions good, and others evil?

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Yes, to be sure.

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And, you know, law was not evil.

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No, indeed.

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So it is not right to reply, in that simple fashion, that law is a city’s resolution.

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I agree that it is not.

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An evil resolution, you see, cannot properly be a law.

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No, to be sure.

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But still, I am quite clear myself that law is some sort of opinion; and since it is not evil opinion, is it not manifest by this time that it is good opinion, granting that law is opinion?

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Yes.

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But what is good opinion? Is it not true opinion?

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Yes.

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And true opinion is discovery of reality?

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Yes, it is.

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So law tends to be discovery of reality.

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Then how is it, Socrates, if law is discovery of reality, that we do not use always the same laws on the same matters, if we have thus got realities discovered?

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Law tends none the less to be discovery of reality: but men, who do not use always the same laws, as we observe, are not always able to discover what the law is intent on—reality. For come now, let us see if from this point onward we can get it clear whether we use always the same laws or different ones at different times, and whether we all use the same, or some of us use some, and others others.

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Why, that, Socrates, is no difficult matter to determine—that the same men do not use always the same laws, and also that different men use different ones. With us, for instance, human sacrifice is not legal, but unholy, whereas the Carthaginians perform it as a thing they account holy and legal, and that too when some of them sacrifice even their own sons to Cronos, as I daresay you yourself have heard. And not merely is it foreign peoples who use different laws from ours, but our neighbors in Lycaea Or Lycoa, a town in the Arcadian district Maenalia. and the descendants of Athamas Cf. Herod. vii. 197. At Alus in Achaea Xerxes was told of human sacrifices offered to purge the guilt of Athamas in plotting the death of his son Phrixus.—you know their sacrifices, Greeks though they be. And as to ourselves too, you know, of course, from what you have heard yourself, the kind of laws we formerly used in regard to our dead, when we slaughtered sacred victims before the funeral procession, and engaged urn-women to collect the bones from the ashes. Then again, a yet earlier generation used to bury the dead where they were, in the house: but we do none of these things. One might give thousands of other instances; for there is ample means of proving that neither we copy ourselves nor mankind each other always in laws and customs.

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And it is no wonder, my excellent friend, if what you say is correct, and I have overlooked it. But if you continue to express your views after your own fashion in lengthy speeches, and I speak likewise, we shall never come to any agreement, in my opinion: but if we study the matter jointly, we may perhaps concur. Well now, if you like, hold a joint inquiry with me by asking me questions; or if you prefer, by answering them.

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Why, I am willing, Socrates, to answer anything you like.

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Come then, do you consider The word νομίζειν here and in what follows is intended to retain some of the sense of νόμος as accepted law and custom which it had in what precedes; see note, 313 B. just things to be unjust and unjust things just, or just things to be just and unjust things unjust?

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I consider just things to be just, and unjust things unjust.

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And are they so considered among all men elsewhere as they are here?

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Yes.

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And among the Persians also?

 +

Among the Persians also.

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Always, I presume?

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Always.

 +

Are things that weigh more considered heavier here, and things that weigh less lighter, or the contrary?

 +

No, those that weigh more are considered heavier, and those that weigh less lighter.

 +

And is it so in Carthage also, and in Lycaea?

 +

Yes.

 +

Noble things, it would seem, are everywhere considered noble, +and base things base; not base things noble or noble things base.

 +

That is so.

 +

And thus, as a universal rule, realities, and not unrealities, are accepted as real, both among us and among all other men.

 +

I agree.

 +

Then whoever fails to attain reality, fails to attain accepted law.

 +

In your present way of putting it, Socrates, the same things appear to be accepted as lawful both by us and by the rest of the world, always: but when I reflect that we are continually changing our laws in all sorts of ways, I cannot bring myself to assent.

 +

Perhaps it is because you do not reflect that when we change our pieces at draughts they are the same pieces. But look at it, as I do, in this way. Have you in your time come across a treatise on healing the sick?

 +

I have.

 +

Then do you know to what art such a treatise belongs?

 +

I do: medicine.

 +

And you give the name of doctors to those who have knowledge of these matters?

 +

Yes.

 + +

Then do those who have knowledge accept the same views on the same things, or do they accept different views?

 +

The same, in my opinion.

 +

Do Greeks only accept the same views as Greeks on what they know, or do foreigners also agree on these matters, both among themselves and with Greeks?

 +

It is quite inevitable, I should say, that those who know should agree in accepting the same views, whether Greeks or foreigners.

 +

Well answered. And do they so always?

 +

Yes, it is so always.

 +

And do doctors on their part, in their treatises on health, write what they accept as real?

 +

Yes.

 +

Then these treatises of the doctors are medical, and medical laws.

 +

Medical, to be sure.

 +

And are agricultural treatises likewise agricultural laws?

 +

Yes.

 +

And whose are the treatises and accepted rules about garden-work?

 +

Gardeners’.

 +

So these are our gardening laws.

 +

Yes.

 +

Of people who know how to control gardens?

 +

Certainly.

 +

And it is the gardeners who know.

 +

Yes.

 +

And whose are the treatises and accepted rules about the confection of tasty dishes?

 +

Cooks’.

 +

Then there are laws of cookery?

 +

Of cookery.

 +

Of people who know, it would seem, how to control the confection of tasty dishes?

 + +

Yes.

 +

And it is the cooks, they say, who know?

 +

Yes, it is they who know.

 +

Very well; and now, whose are the treatises and accepted rules about the government of a state? Of the people who know how to control states, are they not?

 +

I agree.

 +

And is it anyone else than statesmen and royal persons Cf. Euthyd. 291 C, Politicus 266-7, where Plato identifies the statesman’s and the king’s art. who know?

 +

It is they, to be sure.

 +

Then what people call laws are treatises of state,— writings of kings and good men.

 +

That is true.

 +

And must it not be that those who know will not write differently at different times on the same matters?

 +

They will not.

 +

Nor will they ever change one set of accepted rules for another in respect of the same matters.

 +

No, indeed.

 +

So if we see some persons anywhere doing this, shall we say that those who do so have knowledge, or have none?

 +

That they have no knowledge.

 +

And again, whatever is right, we shall say is lawful for each person, whether in medicine or in cookery or in gardening?

 +

Yes.

 + +

And whatever is not right we shall decline to call lawful?

 +

We shall decline.

 +

Then it becomes unlawful.

 +

It must.

 +

And again, in writings about what is just and unjust, and generally about the government of a state and the proper way of governing it, that which is right is the king’s law, but not so that which is not right, though it seems to be law to those who do not know; for it is unlawful.

 +

Yes.

 + +

Then we rightly admitted that law is discovery of reality.

 +

So it appears.

 +

Now let us observe this further point about it. Who has knowledge of distributing The words διανέμειν and νομεύς in this passage introduce the primitive meaning of νόμος — distribution or apportionment of each person’s status, property, rights, etc. seed over land?

 +

A farmer.

 +

And does he distribute the suitable seed to each sort of land?

 +

Yes.

 +

Then the farmer is a good apportioner of it, and his laws and distributions are right in this matter?

 +

Yes.

 +

And who is a good apportioner of notes struck for a tune, skilled in distributing suitable notes, and who is it whose laws are right here?

 + +

The flute-player and the harp-player.

 +

Then he who is the best lawyer in these matters is the best flute-player.

 +

Yes.

 +

And who is most skilled in distributing food to human bodies? Is it not he who assigns suitable food?

 +

Yes.

 +

Then his distributions and laws are best, and whoever is the best lawyer in this matter is also the best apportioner.

 +

Certainly.

 +

Who is he?

 +

A trainer.

 + +

He is the best man to pasture Here νόμος is connected with a special use of νέμειν — find appropriate pasture for —derived from its original meaning of apportion. the human herd of the body? The awkward imagery of this sentence obviously cannot have come from Plato’s mind or hand.

 +

Yes.

 +

And who is the best man to pasture a flock of sheep? What is his name?

 +

A shepherd.

 +

Then the shepherd’s laws are best for sheep.

 +

Yes.

 +

And the herdsman’s for oxen.

 +

Yes.

 +

And whose laws are best for the souls of men? The king’s, are they not? Say if you agree.

 +

I do.

 + +

Then you are quite right. Now can you tell me who, in former times, has proved himself a good lawgiver in regard to the laws of flute-playing? Perhaps you cannot think of him: would you like me to remind you?

 +

Do by all means.

 +

Then is it Marsyas, by tradition, and his beloved Olympus, the Phrygian?

 +

That is true.

 +

And their flute-tunes also are most divine, and alone stir and make manifest those who are in need of the gods; Cf. Sympos. 215 C (from which this allusion to Marsyas is feebly imitated) δηλοῖ τοὺς τῶν θεῶν τε καὶ τελετῶν δεομένους, where in need of the gods seems to be a mystic phrase for ready for divine possession (ἐνθουσιασμός). and to this day they only remain, as being divine.

 + +

That is so.

 +

And who by tradition has shown himself a good lawgiver among the ancient kings, so that to this day his ordinances remain, as being divine?

 +

I cannot think.

 +

Do you not know which of the Greeks use the most ancient laws?

 +

Do you mean the Spartans, and Lycurgus the lawgiver?

 +

Why, that is a matter, I daresay, of less than three hundred years ago, or but a little more. But whence is it that the best of those ordinances come? Do you know?

 +

From Crete, so they say.

 +

Then the people there use the most ancient laws in Greece?

 +

Yes.

 +

Then do you know who were their good kings? Minos and Rhadamanthus, the sons of Zeus and Europa; those laws were theirs.

 +

Rhadamanthus, they do say, Socrates, was a just man; but Minos was a savage sort of person, harsh and unjust.

 +

Your tale, my excellent friend, is a fiction of Attic tragedy.

 + +

What! Is not this the tradition about Minos?

 +

Not in Homer and Hesiod; and yet they are more to be believed than all the tragedians together, from whom you heard your tale.

 +

Well, and what, pray, is their tale about Minos?

 +

I will tell you, in order that you may not share the impiety of the multitude: for there cannot conceivably be anything more impious or more to be guarded against than being mistaken in word and deed with regard to the gods, and after them, with regard to divine men; you must take very great precaution, whenever you are about to blame or praise a man, so as not to speak incorrectly. For this reason you must learn to distinguish honest and dishonest men: for God feels resentment when one blames a man who is like himself, or praises a man who is the opposite; and the former is the good man. For you must not suppose that while stocks and stones and birds and snakes are sacred, men are not; nay, the good man is the most sacred of all these things, and the wicked man is the most defiled. +So if I now proceed to relate how Minos is eulogized by Homer and Hesiod, my purpose is to prevent you, a man sprung from a man, from making a mistake in regard to a hero who was the son of Zeus. Minos and Rhadamanthus were sons of Zeus and Europa. For Homer, in telling of Crete that there were in it many men and ninety cities, says: And amongst them is the mighty city of Cnossos, where Minos was king, having colloquy ὀαριστής means one who has familiar converse (ὄαρος). with mighty Zeus in the ninth year. Hom. Od. 19.179 Now here in Homer we have a eulogy of Minos, briefly expressed, such as the poet never composed for a single one of the heroes. For that Zeus is a sophist, and that sophistry is a highly honorable art, he makes plain in many other places, and particularly here. For he says that Minos consorted and discoursed with Zeus in the ninth year, and went regularly to be educated by Zeus as though he were a sophist. And the fact that Homer assigned this privilege of having been educated by Zeus to no one among the heroes but Minos makes this a marvellous piece of praise. And in the Ghost-raising in the Odyssey Hom. Od. 11.569 he has described Minos as judging with a golden scepter in his hand, but not Rhadamanthus: Rhadamanthus he has neither described here as judging nor anywhere as consorting with Zeus; wherefore I say that Minos above all persons has been eulogized by Homer. For to have been the son of Zeus, and to have been the only one who was educated by Zeus, is praise unsurpassable. +For the meaning of the verse— he was king having colloquy with mighty Zeus in the ninth year” — Hom. Od. 19.179 is that Minos was a disciple of Zeus. For colloquies are discourses, and he who has colloquy is a disciple by means of discourse. So every ninth year Minos repaired to the cave of Zeus, to learn some things, and to show his knowledge of others that he had learnt from Zeus in the preceding nine years. Some there are who suppose that he who has colloquy is a cup-companion and fellow-jester of Zeus: but one may take the following as a proof that they who suppose so are babblers. For of all the many nations of men, both Greek and foreign, the only people who refrain from drinking-bouts and the jesting that occurs where there is wine, are the Cretans, and after them the Spartans, who learnt it from the Cretans. In Crete it is one of their laws which Minos ordained that they are not to drink with each other to intoxication. And yet it is evident that the things he thought honorable were what he ordained as lawful for his people as well. For surely Minos did not, like an inferior person, think one thing and do another, different from what he thought: no, this intercourse, as I say, was held by means of discussion for education in virtue. Wherefore he ordained for his people these very laws, which have made Crete happy through the length of time, and Sparta happy also, since she began to use them; for they are divine. +Rhadamanthus was a good man indeed, for he had been educated by Minos; he had, however, been educated, not in the whole of the kingly art, but in one subsidiary to the kingly, enough for presiding in law courts; so that he was spoken of as a good judge. For Minos used him as guardian of the law in the city, and Talos Talos, the brazen man who was given to Minos by Zeus, is described by Apoll. Rhod. iv. 1639ff., and Apollodorus i. 9. 26 (where see J. G. Frazer’s note in this series). as the same for the rest of Crete. For Talos thrice a year made a round of the villages, guarding the laws in them, by holding their laws inscribed on brazen tablets, which gave him his name of brazen. And what Hesiod The passage quoted does not occur in our text of Hesiod, nor is it quoted by any other writer. The meter of the first line would be improved if we could read βασιλευτότατος, from the βασιλευτός used by Aristotle, Pol.. iii. 17. 1. also has said of Minos is akin to this. For after mentioning him by name he remarks— Who was most kingly of mortal kings, and lorded it over more neighboring folk than any, holding the scepter of Zeus: therewith it was that he ruled the cities as king. Hes. Fr. 144And by the scepter of Zeus he means nothing else than the education that he had of Zeus, whereby he directed Crete.

 +

Then how has it ever come about, Socrates, that this report is spread abroad of Minos, as an uneducated and harsh-tempered person?

 +

Because of something that will make both you, if you are wise, my excellent friend, and everybody else who cares to have a good reputation, beware of ever quarreling with any man of a poetic turn. For poets have great influence over opinion, according as they create it in the minds of men by either commending or vilifying. And this was the mistake that Minos made, in waging war on this city of ours, which besides all its various culture has poets of every kind, and especially those who write tragedy. Now tragedy is a thing of ancient standing here; it did not begin, as people suppose, from Thespis or from Phrynicus, but if you will reflect, you will find it is a very ancient invention of our city. Tragedy is the most popularly delightful and soul-enthralling branch of poetry: in it, accordingly, we get Minos on the rack of verse,This is the meaning most probably intended, from an imperfect understanding of ἐντείνειν (put some story into verse, or accompany it with music) in Plato, Phaedo 60 D;Protag. 326 B. Minos was represented as a harsh despot in Euripides’Cretans, and probably in other lost plays., and thus avenge ourselves for that tribute which he compelled us to pay The legend was that Minos defeated the Athenians in war and compelled them to send a regular tribute of seven youths and seven maidens to be devoured by the Minotaur in the Cretan labyrinth. This, then, was the mistake that Minos made—his quarrel with us—and hence it is that, as you said in your question, he has fallen more and more into evil repute. For that he was a good and law-abiding person, as we stated in what went before—a good apportioner—is most convincingly shown by the fact the his laws are unshaken, since they were made by one who discovered aright the truth of reality in regard to the management of a state.

 +

In my opinion, Socrates, your statement is a probable one.

 +

Then if what I say is true, do you consider that the Cretan people of Minos and Rhadamanthus use the most ancient laws?

 +

I do.

 +

So these have shown themselves the best lawgivers among men of ancient times— apportioners and shepherds of men; just as Homer called the good general a shepherd of the folk.

 +

Quite so, indeed.

 +

Come then, in good friendship’s name: if someone should ask us what it is that the good lawgiver and apportioner for the body distributes to it when he makes it better, we should say, if we were to make a correct and brief answer, that it was food and labor; the former to strengthen, and the latter to exercise and brace it.

 +

And we should be right.

 + +

And if he then proceeded to ask us—And what might that be which the good lawgiver and apportioner distributes to the soul to make it better?—what would be our answer if we would avoid being ashamed of ourselves and our years?

 +

This time I am unable to say.

 +

But indeed it is shameful for the soul of either of us to be found ignorant of those things within it on which its good and abject states depend, while it has studied those that pertain to the body and rest.

 +
+ + + + From 2a9b75b8c6745de68211c1850674bce6038c2391 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: lcerrato Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 16:33:14 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 3/5] (tlg0059.tlg033) remove old grc files #454 --- .../tlg0059.tlg033.perseus-grc1.tracking.json | 14 --- .../tlg033/tlg0059.tlg033.perseus-grc1.xml | 118 ------------------ 2 files changed, 132 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 data/tlg0059/tlg033/tlg0059.tlg033.perseus-grc1.tracking.json delete mode 100755 data/tlg0059/tlg033/tlg0059.tlg033.perseus-grc1.xml diff --git a/data/tlg0059/tlg033/tlg0059.tlg033.perseus-grc1.tracking.json b/data/tlg0059/tlg033/tlg0059.tlg033.perseus-grc1.tracking.json deleted file mode 100644 index e1ae520be..000000000 --- a/data/tlg0059/tlg033/tlg0059.tlg033.perseus-grc1.tracking.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14 +0,0 @@ -{ - "epidoc_compliant": false, - "fully_unicode": true, - "git_repo": "canonical-greekLit", - "has_cts_metadata": false, - "has_cts_refsDecl": false, - "id": "1999.01.0179", - "last_editor": "", - "note": "", - "src": "texts/sdl/Plato/plat.tet789_gk.xml---subdoc---text=Minos", - "status": "migrated", - "target": "canonical-greekLit/data/tlg0059/tlg033/tlg0059.tlg033.perseus-grc1.xml", - "valid_xml": true -} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/tlg0059/tlg033/tlg0059.tlg033.perseus-grc1.xml b/data/tlg0059/tlg033/tlg0059.tlg033.perseus-grc1.xml deleted file mode 100755 index fb921c168..000000000 --- a/data/tlg0059/tlg033/tlg0059.tlg033.perseus-grc1.xml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,118 +0,0 @@ - - - - - - -Minos -Plato -Perseus Project, Tufts University -Gregory Crane - -Prepared under the supervision of -Lisa Cerrato -William Merrill -Elli Mylonas -David Smith - -The Annenberg CPB/Project - - - - - - - - Text was scanned at St. Olaf Spring, 1992. - - - - Plato - Platonis Opera, ed. John Burnet - - 5 - Oxford University Press - 1914 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Greek -English - - - - -Tagged in conformance with Prose.e dtd. - - - - split composite text and converted to unicode - - - - -ΣωκράτηςἙταῖρος -Σωκράτης

ὁ νόμος ἡμῖν τί ἐστιν;

Ἑταῖρος

ὁποῖον καὶ ἐρωτᾷς τῶν νόμων;

Σωκράτης

τί δʼ; ἔστιν ὅτι διαφέρει νόμος νόμου κατʼ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, κατὰ τὸ νόμος εἶναι; σκόπει γὰρ δὴ ὃ τυγχάνω ἐρωτῶν σε. ἐρωτῶ γάρ, ὥσπερ εἰ ἀνηρόμην τί ἐστιν χρυσός, εἴ με ὡσαύτως ἀνήρου ὁποῖον καὶ λέγω χρυσόν, οἴομαί σε οὐκ ἂν ὀρθῶς ἐρέσθαι. οὐδὲν γάρ που διαφέρει οὔτε χρυσὸς -χρυσοῦ οὔτε λίθος λίθου κατά γε τὸ λίθος εἶναι καὶ κατὰ τὸ χρυσός· οὕτω δὲ οὐδὲ νόμος που νόμου οὐδὲν διαφέρει, ἀλλὰ πάντες εἰσὶν ταὐτόν. νόμος γὰρ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἐστιν ὁμοίως, οὐχ ὁ μὲν μᾶλλον, ὁ δʼ ἧττον· τοῦτο δὴ αὐτὸ ἐρωτῶ, τὸ πᾶν τί ἐστιν νόμος. εἰ οὖν σοι πρόχειρον, εἰπέ.

Ἑταῖρος

τί οὖν ἄλλο νόμος εἴη ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλʼ ἢ τὰ νομιζόμενα;

Σωκράτης

ἦ καὶ λόγος σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὰ λεγόμενα, ἢ ὄψις τὰ ὁρώμενα, ἢ ἀκοὴ τὰ ἀκουόμενα; ἢ ἄλλο μὲν λόγος, ἄλλο -δὲ τὰ λεγόμενα· καὶ ἄλλο μὲν ὄψις, ἄλλο δὲ τὰ ὁρώμενα· καὶ ἄλλο μὲν ἀκοή, ἄλλο δὲ τὰ ἀκουόμενα, καὶ ἄλλο δὴ νόμος, ἄλλο δὲ τὰ νομιζόμενα; οὕτως ἢ πῶς σοι δοκεῖ;

Ἑταῖρος

ἄλλο μοι νῦν ἐφάνη.

Σωκράτης

οὐκ ἄρα νόμος ἐστὶν τὰ νομιζόμενα.

Ἑταῖρος

οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.

Σωκράτης

τί δῆτʼ ἂν εἴη νόμος; ἐπισκεψώμεθʼ αὐτὸ ὧδε. εἴ τις ἡμᾶς τὰ νυνδὴ λεγόμενα ἀνήρετο, ἐπειδὴ ὄψει φατὲ -τὰ ὁρώμενα ὁρᾶσθαι, τίνι ὄντι τῇ ὄψει ὁρᾶται; ἀπεκρινάμεθʼ ἂν αὐτῷ ὅτι αἰσθήσει ταύτῃ τῇ διὰ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν δηλούσῃ τὰ πράγματα· εἰ δʼ αὖ ἤρετο ἡμᾶς, τί δέ; ἐπειδὴ ἀκοῇ τὰ ἀκουόμενα ἀκούεται, τίνι ὄντι τῇ ἀκοῇ; ἀπεκρινάμεθʼ ἂν αὐτῷ ὅτι αἰσθήσει ταύτῃ τῇ διὰ τῶν ὤτων δηλούσῃ ἡμῖν τὰς φωνάς. οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ εἰ ἀνέροιτο ἡμᾶς, ἐπειδὴ νόμῳ τὰ νομιζόμενα νομίζεται, τίνι ὄντι τῷ νόμῳ νομίζεται; -πότερον αἰσθήσει τινὶ ἢ δηλώσει, ὥσπερ τὰ μανθανόμενα μανθάνεται δηλούσῃ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, ἢ εὑρέσει τινί, ὥσπερ τὰ εὑρισκόμενα εὑρίσκεται, οἷον τὰ μὲν ὑγιεινὰ καὶ νοσώδη ἰατρικῇ, ἃ δὲ οἱ θεοὶ διανοοῦνται, ὥς φασιν οἱ μάντεις, μαντικῇ; ἡ γάρ που τέχνη ἡμῖν εὕρεσίς ἐστιν τῶν πραγμάτων· ἦ γάρ;

Ἑταῖρος

πάνυ γε.

Σωκράτης

τί οὖν ἂν τούτων ὑπολάβοιμεν μάλιστα τὸν νόμον εἶναι;

Ἑταῖρος

τὰ δόγματα ταῦτα καὶ ψηφίσματα, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. τί γὰρ ἂν ἄλλο τις φαίη νόμον εἶναι; ὥστε κινδυνεύει, ὃ -σὺ ἐρωτᾷς, τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο, νόμος, δόγμα πόλεως εἶναι.

Σωκράτης

δόξαν, ὡς ἔοικε, λέγεις πολιτικὴν τὸν νόμον.

Ἑταῖρος

ἔγωγε.

Σωκράτης

καὶ ἴσως καλῶς λέγεις· τάχα δὲ ὧδε ἄμεινον εἰσόμεθα. λέγεις τινὰς σοφούς;

Ἑταῖρος

ἔγωγε.

Σωκράτης

οὐκοῦν οἱ σοφοί εἰσιν σοφίᾳ σοφοί;

Ἑταῖρος

ναί.

Σωκράτης

τί δέ; οἱ δίκαιοι δικαιοσύνῃ δίκαιοι;

Ἑταῖρος

πάνυ γε.

Σωκράτης

οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ νόμιμοι νόμῳ νόμιμοι;

Ἑταῖρος

ναί.

Σωκράτης

οἱ δὲ -ἄνομοι ἀνομίᾳ ἄνομοι;

Ἑταῖρος

ναί.

Σωκράτης

οἱ δὲ νόμιμοι δίκαιοι;

Ἑταῖρος

ναί.

Σωκράτης

οἱ δὲ ἄνομοι ἄδικοι;

Ἑταῖρος

ἄδικοι.

Σωκράτης

οὐκοῦν κάλλιστον ἡ δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ ὁ νόμος;

Ἑταῖρος

οὕτως.

Σωκράτης

αἴσχιστον δὲ ἡ ἀδικία τε καὶ ἡ ἀνομία;

Ἑταῖρος

ναί.

Σωκράτης

καὶ τὸ μὲν σῴζει τὰς πόλεις καὶ τἆλλα πάντα, τὸ δὲ ἀπόλλυσι καὶ ἀνατρέπει;

Ἑταῖρος

ναί.

Σωκράτης

ὡς περὶ καλοῦ ἄρα τινὸς ὄντος δεῖ τοῦ νόμου διανοεῖσθαι, καὶ ὡς ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ ζητεῖν.

Ἑταῖρος

πῶς δʼ οὔ;

Σωκράτης

οὐκοῦν δόγμα ἔφαμεν εἶναι πόλεως τὸν νόμον; -

Ἑταῖρος

ἔφαμεν γάρ.

Σωκράτης

τί οὖν; οὐκ ἔστιν τὰ μὲν χρηστὰ δόγματα, τὰ δὲ πονηρά;

Ἑταῖρος

ἔστιν μὲν οὖν.

Σωκράτης

καὶ μὴν νόμος γε οὐκ ἦν πονηρός.

Ἑταῖρος

οὐ γάρ.

Σωκράτης

οὐκ ἄρα ὀρθῶς ἔχει ἀποκρίνεσθαι οὕτως ἁπλῶς ὅτι νόμος ἐστὶ δόγμα πόλεως.

Ἑταῖρος

οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Σωκράτης

οὐκ ἄρα ἁρμόττοι ἂν τὸ πονηρὸν δόγμα νόμος εἶναι.

Ἑταῖρος

οὐ δῆτα.

Σωκράτης

ἀλλὰ μὴν δόξα γέ τις καὶ αὐτῷ μοι καταφαίνεται ὁ νόμος εἶναι· ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐχ ἡ πονηρὰ δόξα, ἆρα οὐκ ἤδη τοῦτο κατάδηλον, ὡς ἡ χρηστή, εἴπερ δόξα νόμος ἐστί;

Ἑταῖρος

ναί.

Σωκράτης

δόξα δὲ χρηστὴ τίς ἐστιν; οὐχ ἡ ἀληθής; -

Ἑταῖρος

ναί.

Σωκράτης

οὐκοῦν ἡ ἀληθὴς δόξα τοῦ ὄντος ἐστὶν ἐξεύρεσις;

Ἑταῖρος

ἔστιν γάρ.

Σωκράτης

ὁ νόμος ἄρα βούλεται τοῦ ὄντος εἶναι ἐξεύρεσις.

Ἑταῖρος

πῶς οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ ὁ νόμος ἐστὶν τοῦ ὄντος ἐξεύρεσις, οὐκ ἀεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς νόμοις χρώμεθα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, εἰ τὰ ὄντα γε ἡμῖν ἐξηύρηται;

Σωκράτης

βούλεται μὲν οὐδὲν ἧττον ὁ νόμος εἶναι τοῦ ὄντος ἐξεύρεσις· οἱ δʼ ἄρα μὴ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀεὶ νόμοις χρώμενοι -ἄνθρωποι, ὡς δοκοῦμεν, οὐκ ἀεὶ δύνανται ἐξευρίσκειν ὃ βούλεται ὁ νόμος, τὸ ὄν. ἐπεὶ φέρε ἴδωμεν ἐὰν ἄρα ἡμῖν ἐνθένδε κατάδηλον γένηται εἴτε τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀεὶ νόμοις χρώμεθα ἢ ἄλλοτε ἄλλοις, καὶ εἰ ἅπαντες τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἢ ἄλλοι ἄλλοις.

Ἑταῖρος

ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ χαλεπὸν γνῶναι, ὅτι οὔτε οἱ αὐτοὶ ἀεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς νόμοις χρῶνται ἄλλοι τε ἄλλοις. ἐπεὶ αὐτίκα ἡμῖν μὲν οὐ νόμος ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπους θύειν ἀλλʼ ἀνόσιον, Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ θύουσιν ὡς ὅσιον ὂν -καὶ νόμιμον αὐτοῖς, καὶ ταῦτα ἔνιοι αὐτῶν καὶ τοὺς αὑτῶν ὑεῖς τῷ Κρόνῳ, ὡς ἴσως καὶ σὺ ἀκήκοας. καὶ μὴ ὅτι βάρβαροι ἄνθρωποι ἡμῶν ἄλλοις νόμοις χρῶνται, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ Λυκαίᾳ οὗτοι καὶ οἱ τοῦ Ἀθάμαντος ἔκγονοι οἵας θυσίας θύουσιν Ἕλληνες ὄντες. ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς οἶσθά που καὶ αὐτὸς ἀκούων οἵοις νόμοις ἐχρώμεθα πρὸ τοῦ περὶ τοὺς ἀποθανόντας, ἱερεῖά τε προσφάττοντες πρὸ τῆς ἐκφορᾶς τοῦ νεκροῦ καὶ ἐγχυτιστρίας μεταπεμπόμενοι· οἱ -δʼ αὖ ἐκείνων ἔτι πρότεροι αὐτοῦ καὶ ἔθαπτον ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τοὺς ἀποθανόντας· ἡμεῖς δὲ τούτων οὐδὲν ποιοῦμεν. μυρία δʼ ἄν τις ἔχοι τοιαῦτα εἰπεῖν· πολλὴ γὰρ εὐρυχωρία τῆς ἀποδείξεως ὡς οὔτε ἡμεῖς ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ νομίζομεν οὔτε ἀλλήλοις οἱ ἄνθρωποι.

Σωκράτης

οὐδέν τοι θαυμαστόν ἐστιν, ὦ βέλτιστε, εἰ σὺ μὲν ὀρθῶς λέγεις, ἐμὲ δὲ τοῦτο λέληθεν. ἀλλʼ ἕως ἂν σύ τε κατὰ σαυτὸν λέγῃς ἅ σοι δοκεῖ μακρῷ λόγῳ καὶ πάλιν ἐγώ, -οὐδὲν μή ποτε συμβῶμεν, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι· ἐὰν δὲ κοινὸν τεθῇ τὸ σκέμμα, τάχʼ ἂν ὁμολογήσαιμεν. εἰ μὲν οὖν βούλει, πυνθανόμενός τι παρʼ ἐμοῦ κοινῇ μετʼ ἐμοῦ σκόπει· εἰ δʼ αὖ βούλει, ἀποκρινόμενος.

Ἑταῖρος

ἀλλʼ ἐθέλω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὅτι ἂν βούλῃ.

Σωκράτης

φέρε δὴ σύ, πότερα νομίζεις τὰ δίκαια ἄδικα εἶναι καὶ τὰ ἄδικα δίκαια, ἢ τὰ μὲν δίκαια δίκαια, τὰ δὲ ἄδικα ἄδικα;

Ἑταῖρος

ἐγὼ μὲν τά τε δίκαια δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα -ἄδικα.

Σωκράτης

οὐκοῦν καὶ παρὰ πᾶσιν οὕτως ὡς ἐνθάδε νομίζεται;

Ἑταῖρος

ναί.

Σωκράτης

οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις;

Ἑταῖρος

καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις.

Σωκράτης

ἀλλὰ ἀεὶ δήπου;

Ἑταῖρος

ἀεί.

Σωκράτης

πότερον δὲ τὰ πλεῖον ἕλκοντα βαρύτερα νομίζεται ἐνθάδε, τὰ δὲ ἔλαττον κουφότερα, ἢ τοὐναντίον;

Ἑταῖρος

οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τὰ πλεῖον ἕλκοντα βαρύτερα, τὰ δὲ ἔλαττον κουφότερα.

Σωκράτης

οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν Καρχηδόνι καὶ ἐν Λυκαίᾳ;

Ἑταῖρος

ναί.

Σωκράτης

τὰ μὲν καλά, ὡς ἔοικε, πανταχοῦ νομίζεται -καλὰ καὶ τὰ αἰσχρὰ αἰσχρά, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὰ αἰσχρὰ καλὰ οὐδὲ τὰ καλὰ αἰσχρά.

Ἑταῖρος

οὕτως.

Σωκράτης

οὐκοῦν, ὡς κατὰ πάντων εἰπεῖν, τὰ ὄντα νομίζεται εἶναι, οὐ τὰ μὴ ὄντα, καὶ παρʼ ἡμῖν καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν.

Ἑταῖρος

ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Σωκράτης

ὃς ἂν ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος ἁμαρτάνῃ, τοῦ νομίμου ἁμαρτάνει.

Ἑταῖρος

οὕτω μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, καὶ φαίνεται ταῦτα νόμιμα καὶ ἡμῖν ἀεὶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις· ἐπειδὰν δʼ ἐννοήσω -ὅτι οὐδὲν παυόμεθα ἄνω κάτω μετατιθέμενοι τοὺς νόμους, οὐ δύναμαι πεισθῆναι.

Σωκράτης

ἴσως γὰρ οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ταῦτα μεταπεττευόμενα ὅτι ταὐτά ἐστιν. ἀλλʼ ὧδε μετʼ ἐμοῦ αὐτὰ ἄθρει. ἤδη ποτὲ ἐνέτυχες συγγράμματι περὶ ὑγιείας τῶν καμνόντων;

Ἑταῖρος

ἔγωγε.

Σωκράτης

οἶσθα οὖν τίνος τέχνης τοῦτʼ ἐστὶ τὸ σύγγραμμα;

Ἑταῖρος

οἶδα, ὅτι ἰατρικῆς.

Σωκράτης

οὐκοῦν ἰατροὺς καλεῖς τοὺς ἐπιστήμονας περὶ τούτων;

Ἑταῖρος

φημί.

Σωκράτης

-πότερον οὖν οἱ ἐπιστήμονες ταὐτὰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν νομίζουσιν ἢ ἄλλοι ἄλλα;

Ἑταῖρος

ταὐτὰ ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσι.

Σωκράτης

πότερον οἱ Ἕλληνες μόνοι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἢ καὶ οἱ βάρβαροι αὑτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς Ἕλλησι, περὶ ὧν ἂν εἰδῶσι, ταὐτὰ νομίζουσι;

Ἑταῖρος

ταὐτὰ δήπου πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ἐστὶν τοὺς εἰδότας αὐτοὺς αὑτοῖς συννομίζειν καὶ Ἕλληνας καὶ βαρβάρους.

Σωκράτης

καλῶς γε ἀπεκρίνω. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀεί;

Ἑταῖρος

ναί, καὶ ἀεί.

Σωκράτης

οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ ἰατροὶ συγγράφουσι περὶ ὑγιείας ἅπερ -καὶ νομίζουσιν εἶναι;

Ἑταῖρος

ναί.

Σωκράτης

ἰατρικὰ ἄρα καὶ ἰατρικοὶ νόμοι ταῦτα τὰ συγγράμματα ἐστὶν τὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν.

Ἑταῖρος

ἰατρικὰ μέντοι.

Σωκράτης

ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ τὰ γεωργικὰ συγγράμματα γεωργικοὶ νόμοι εἰσίν;

Ἑταῖρος

ναί.

Σωκράτης

τίνων οὖν ἐστιν τὰ περὶ κήπων ἐργασίας συγγράμματα καὶ νόμιμα;

Ἑταῖρος

κηπουρῶν.

Σωκράτης

κηπουρικοὶ ἄρα νόμοι ἡμῖν εἰσιν οὗτοι.

Ἑταῖρος

ναί.

Σωκράτης

τῶν ἐπισταμένων κήπων ἄρχειν;

Ἑταῖρος

πῶς δʼ οὔ;

Σωκράτης

ἐπίστανται δʼ οἱ κηπουροί.

Ἑταῖρος

ναί.

Σωκράτης

τίνων δὲ τὰ περὶ ὄψου σκευασίας συγγράμματά τε καὶ νόμιμα;

Ἑταῖρος

μαγείρων.

Σωκράτης

μαγειρικοὶ ἄρα οὗτοι νόμοι εἰσί;

Ἑταῖρος

μαγειρικοί.

Σωκράτης

τῶν ἐπισταμένων, ὡς -ἔοικεν, ὄψου σκευασίας ἄρχειν;

Ἑταῖρος

ναί.

Σωκράτης

ἐπίστανται δέ, ὥς φασιν, οἱ μάγειροι;

Ἑταῖρος

ἐπίστανται γάρ.

Σωκράτης

εἶεν· τίνων δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ πόλεως διοικήσεως συγγράμματά τε καὶ νόμιμά ἐστιν; ἆρʼ οὐ τῶν ἐπισταμένων πόλεων ἄρχειν;

Ἑταῖρος

ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Σωκράτης

ἐπίστανται δὲ ἄλλοι τινὲς ἢ οἱ πολιτικοί τε καὶ οἱ βασιλικοί;

Ἑταῖρος

οὗτοι μὲν οὖν.

Σωκράτης

πολιτικὰ ἄρα ταῦτα συγγράμματά ἐστιν, οὓς οἱ ἄνθρωποι νόμους καλοῦσι, βασιλέων τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν -ἀγαθῶν συγγράμματα.

Ἑταῖρος

ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Σωκράτης

ἄλλο τι οὖν οἵ γε ἐπιστάμενοι οὐκ ἄλλοτε ἄλλα συγγράψουσι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν;

Ἑταῖρος

οὔ.

Σωκράτης

οὐδὲ μεταθήσονταί ποτε περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα νόμιμα;

Ἑταῖρος

οὐ δῆτα.

Σωκράτης

ἐὰν οὖν ὁρῶμέν τινας ὁπουοῦν τοῦτο ποιοῦντας, πότερα φήσομεν ἐπιστήμονας εἶναι ἢ ἀνεπιστήμονας τοὺς τοῦτο ποιοῦντας;

Ἑταῖρος

ἀνεπιστήμονας.

Σωκράτης

οὐκοῦν καὶ ὃ μὲν ἂν ὀρθὸν ᾖ, νόμιμον αὐτὸ φήσομεν ἑκάστῳ εἶναι, ἢ τὸ ἰατρικὸν ἢ τὸ μαγειρικὸν ἢ τὸ κηπουρικόν; -

Ἑταῖρος

ναί.

Σωκράτης

ὃ δʼ ἂν μὴ ὀρθὸν ᾖ, οὐκέτι φήσομεν τοῦτο νόμιμον εἶναι;

Ἑταῖρος

οὐκέτι.

Σωκράτης

ἄνομον ἄρα γίγνεται.

Ἑταῖρος

ἀνάγκη.

Σωκράτης

οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν τοῖς συγγράμμασι τοῖς περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ ὅλως περὶ πόλεως διακοσμήσεώς τε καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὡς χρὴ πόλιν διοικεῖν, τὸ μὲν ὀρθὸν νόμος ἐστὶ βασιλικός, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὀρθὸν οὔ, ὃ δοκεῖ νόμος εἶναι τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν· ἔστιν γὰρ ἄνομον.

Ἑταῖρος

ναί. -

Σωκράτης

ὀρθῶς ἄρα ὡμολογήσαμεν νόμον εἶναι τοῦ ὄντος εὕρεσιν.

Ἑταῖρος

φαίνεται.

Σωκράτης

ἔτι δὲ καὶ τόδε ἐν αὐτῷ διαθεώμεθα. τίς ἐπιστήμων διανεῖμαι ἐπὶ γῇ τὰ σπέρματα;

Ἑταῖρος

γεωργός.

Σωκράτης

οὗτος δὲ τὰ ἄξια σπέρματα ἑκάστῃ γῇ διανέμει;

Ἑταῖρος

ναί.

Σωκράτης

ὁ γεωργὸς ἄρα νομεὺς ἀγαθὸς τούτων, καὶ οἱ τούτου νόμοι καὶ διανομαὶ ἐπὶ ταῦτα ὀρθαί εἰσιν;

Ἑταῖρος

ναί.

Σωκράτης

τίς δὲ κρουμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ μέλη ἀγαθὸς νομεύς, καὶ τὰ ἄξια νεῖμαι; καὶ οἱ τίνος νόμοι ὀρθοί εἰσιν;

Ἑταῖρος

οἱ τοῦ -αὐλητοῦ καὶ τοῦ κιθαριστοῦ.

Σωκράτης

ὁ νομικώτατος ἄρα ἐν τούτοις, οὗτος αὐλητικώτατος.

Ἑταῖρος

ναί.

Σωκράτης

τίς δὲ τὴν τροφὴν ἐπὶ τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων σώματα διανεῖμαι ἄριστος; οὐχ ὅσπερ τὴν ἀξίαν;

Ἑταῖρος

ναί.

Σωκράτης

αἱ τούτου ἄρα διανομαὶ καὶ οἱ νόμοι βέλτιστοι, καὶ ὅστις περὶ ταῦτα νομικώτατος, καὶ νομεὺς ἄριστος.

Ἑταῖρος

πάνυ γε.

Σωκράτης

τίς οὗτος; -

Ἑταῖρος

παιδοτρίβης.

Σωκράτης

οὗτος τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν ἀγέλην τοῦ σώματος νέμειν κράτιστος;

Ἑταῖρος

ναί.

Σωκράτης

τίς δὲ τὴν τῶν προβάτων ἀγέλην κράτιστος νέμειν; τί ὄνομα αὐτῷ;

Ἑταῖρος

ποιμήν.

Σωκράτης

οἱ τοῦ ποιμένος ἄρα νόμοι ἄριστοι τοῖς προβάτοις.

Ἑταῖρος

ναί.

Σωκράτης

οἱ δὲ τοῦ βουκόλου τοῖς βουσί.

Ἑταῖρος

ναί.

Σωκράτης

οἱ δὲ τοῦ τίνος νόμοι ἄριστοι ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων; οὐχ οἱ τοῦ βασιλέως; φάθι.

Ἑταῖρος

φημὶ δή. -

Σωκράτης

καλῶς τοίνυν λέγεις. ἔχοις ἂν οὖν εἰπεῖν τίς τῶν παλαιῶν ἀγαθὸς γέγονεν ἐν τοῖς αὐλητικοῖς νόμοις νομοθέτης; ἴσως οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ βούλει σε ὑπομνήσω;

Ἑταῖρος

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Σωκράτης

ἆρʼ οὖν ὁ Μαρσύας λέγεται καὶ τὰ παιδικὰ αὐτοῦ Ὄλυμπος ὁ Φρύξ;

Ἑταῖρος

ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Σωκράτης

τούτων δὴ καὶ τὰ αὐλήματα θειότατά ἐστι, καὶ μόνα κινεῖ καὶ ἐκφαίνει τοὺς τῶν θεῶν ἐν χρείᾳ ὄντας· καὶ ἔτι καὶ -νῦν μόνα λοιπά, ὡς θεῖα ὄντα.

Ἑταῖρος

ἔστι ταῦτα.

Σωκράτης

τίς δὲ λέγεται τῶν παλαιῶν βασιλέων ἀγαθὸς νομοθέτης γεγονέναι, οὗ ἔτι καὶ νῦν τὰ νόμιμα μένει ὡς θεῖα ὄντα;

Ἑταῖρος

οὐκ ἐννοῶ.

Σωκράτης

οὐκ οἶσθα τίνες παλαιοτάτοις νόμοις χρῶνται τῶν Ἑλλήνων;

Ἑταῖρος

ἆρα Λακεδαιμονίους λέγεις καὶ Λυκοῦργον τὸν νομοθέτην;

Σωκράτης

ἀλλὰ ταῦτά γε οὐδέπω ἴσως ἔτη τριακόσια ἢ ὀλίγῳ τούτων πλείω. ἀλλὰ τούτων τῶν νομίμων τὰ βέλτιστα πόθεν -ἥκει; οἶσθα;

Ἑταῖρος

φασί γε ἐκ Κρήτης.

Σωκράτης

οὐκοῦν οὗτοι παλαιοτάτοις νόμοις χρῶνται τῶν Ἑλλήνων;

Ἑταῖρος

ναί.

Σωκράτης

οἶσθα οὖν τίνες τούτων ἀγαθοὶ βασιλῆς ἦσαν; Μίνως καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυς, οἱ Διὸς καὶ Εὐρώπης παῖδες, ὧν οἵδε εἰσὶν οἱ νόμοι.

Ἑταῖρος

Ῥαδάμανθύν γέ φασιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, δίκαιον ἄνδρα, τὸν δὲ Μίνων ἄγριόν τινα καὶ χαλεπὸν καὶ ἄδικον.

Σωκράτης

Ἀττικόν, ὦ βέλτιστε, λέγεις μῦθον καὶ τραγικόν. -

Ἑταῖρος

τί δέ; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεται περὶ Μίνω;

Σωκράτης

οὔκουν ὑπό γε Ὁμήρου καὶ Ἡσιόδου· καίτοι γε πιθανώτεροί εἰσιν ἢ σύμπαντες οἱ τραγῳδοποιοί, ὧν σὺ ἀκούων ταῦτα λέγεις.

Ἑταῖρος

ἀλλὰ τί μὴν οὗτοι περὶ Μίνω λέγουσιν;

Σωκράτης

ἐγὼ δή σοι ἐρῶ, ἵνα μὴ καὶ σὺ ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ ἀσεβῇς. οὐ γὰρ ἔσθʼ ὅτι τούτου ἀσεβέστερόν ἐστιν οὐδʼ ὅτι χρὴ μᾶλλον εὐλαβεῖσθαι, πλὴν εἰς θεοὺς καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ ἐξαμαρτάνειν, δεύτερον δὲ εἰς τοὺς θείους ἀνθρώπους· ἀλλὰ πάνυ πολλὴν χρὴ προμήθειαν ποιεῖσθαι ἀεί, ὅταν μέλλῃς -ἄνδρα ψέξειν ἢ ἐπαινέσεσθαι, μὴ οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἴπῃς. τούτου καὶ ἕνεκα χρὴ μανθάνειν διαγιγνώσκειν χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς ἄνδρας. νεμεσᾷ γὰρ ὁ θεός, ὅταν τις ψέγῃ τὸν ἑαυτῷ ὅμοιον ἢ ἐπαινῇ τὸν ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίως ἔχοντα· ἔστι δʼ οὗτος ὁ ἀγαθός. μὴ γάρ τι οἴου λίθους μὲν εἶναι ἱεροὺς καὶ ξύλα καὶ ὄρνεα καὶ ὄφεις, ἀνθρώπους δὲ μή· ἀλλὰ πάντων τούτων ἱερώτατόν ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἀγαθός, καὶ μιαρώτατον ὁ πονηρός.ἤδη οὖν καὶ περὶ Μίνω, ὡς αὐτὸν Ὅμηρός τε καὶ Ἡσίοδος - ἐγκωμιάζουσι, τούτου ἕνεκα φράσω, ἵνα μὴ ἄνθρωπος ὢν ἀνθρώπου εἰς ἥρω Διὸς ὑὸν λόγῳ ἐξαμαρτάνῃς. Ὅμηρος γὰρ περὶ Κρήτης λέγων ὅτι πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι ἐν αὐτῇ εἰσιν καὶ ἐνενήκοντα πόληες, τῇσι δέ, φησίν—ἔνι Κνωσὸς μεγάλη πόλις, ἔνθα τε Μίνωςἐννέωρος βασίλευε Διὸς μεγάλου ὀαριστής.ηομ. οδ. 19.179 -ἔστιν οὖν τοῦτο Ὁμήρου ἐγκώμιον εἰς Μίνων διὰ βραχέων εἰρημένον, οἷον οὐδʼ εἰς ἕνα τῶν ἡρώων ἐποίησεν Ὅμηρος. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς σοφιστής ἐστιν καὶ ἡ τέχνη αὕτη παγκάλη ἐστί, πολλαχοῦ καὶ ἄλλοθι δηλοῖ, ἀτὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα. λέγει γὰρ τὸν Μίνων συγγίγνεσθαι ἐνάτῳ ἔτει τῷ Διὶ ἐν λόγοις καὶ φοιτᾶν παιδευθησόμενον ὡς ὑπὸ σοφιστοῦ ὄντος τοῦ Διός. ὅτι οὖν τοῦτο τὸ γέρας οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτῳ ἀπένειμεν Ὅμηρος τῶν ἡρώων, ὑπὸ Διὸς πεπαιδεῦσθαι, ἄλλῳ ἢ Μίνῳ, - τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ἔπαινος θαυμαστός. καὶ Ὀδυσσείας ἐν Νεκυίᾳ δικάζοντα χρυσοῦν σκῆπτρον ἔχοντα πεποίηκε τὸν Μίνων, οὐ τὸν Ῥαδάμανθυν· Ῥαδάμανθυν δὲ οὔτʼ ἐνταῦθα δικάζοντα πεποίηκεν οὔτε συγγιγνόμενον τῷ Διὶ οὐδαμοῦ. διὰ ταῦτά φημʼ ἐγὼ Μίνων ἁπάντων μάλιστα ὑπὸ Ὁμήρου ἐγκεκωμιάσθαι. τὸ γὰρ Διὸς ὄντα παῖδα μόνον ὑπὸ Διὸς πεπαιδεῦσθαι οὐκ ἔχει ὑπερβολὴν ἐπαίνου—τοῦτο γὰρ σημαίνει τὸ ἔπος τὸ—ἐννέωρος βασίλευε Διὸς μεγάλου ὀαριστής,ηομ. οδ. 11.569 -συνουσιαστὴν τοῦ Διὸς εἶναι τὸν Μίνων. οἱ γὰρ ὄαροι λόγοι εἰσίν, καὶ ὀαριστὴς συνουσιαστής ἐστιν ἐν λόγοις—ἐφοίτα οὖν διʼ ἐνάτου ἔτους εἰς τὸ τοῦ Διὸς ἄντρον ὁ Μίνως, τὰ μὲν μαθησόμενος, τὰ δὲ ἀποδειξόμενος ἃ τῇ προτέρᾳ ἐννεετηρίδι ἐμεμαθήκει παρὰ τοῦ Διός. εἰσὶν δὲ οἳ ὑπολαμβάνουσι τὸν ὀαριστὴν συμπότην καὶ συμπαιστὴν εἶναι τοῦ Διός, ἀλλὰ τῷδε ἄν τις τεκμηρίῳ χρῷτο ὅτι οὐδὲν λέγουσιν οἱ οὕτως -ὑπολαμβάνοντες· πολλῶν γὰρ ὄντων ἀνθρώπων καὶ Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων, οὐκ ἔστιν οἵτινες ἀπέχονται συμποσίων καὶ ταύτης τῆς παιδιᾶς, οὗ ἔστιν οἶνος, ἄλλοι ἢ Κρῆτες καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι δεύτεροι, μαθόντες παρὰ Κρητῶν. ἐν Κρήτῃ δὲ εἷς οὗτός ἐστι τῶν ἄλλων νόμων οὓς Μίνως ἔθηκε, μὴ συμπίνειν ἀλλήλοις εἰς μέθην. καίτοι δῆλον ὅτι ἃ ἐνόμιζεν καλὰ εἶναι, ταῦτα νόμιμα ἔθηκεν καὶ τοῖς αὑτοῦ πολίταις. -οὐ γάρ που, ὥσπερ γε φαῦλος ἄνθρωπος, ὁ Μίνως ἐνόμιζεν μὲν ἕτερα, ἐποίει δὲ ἄλλα παρʼ ἃ ἐνόμιζεν· ἀλλὰ ἦν αὕτη ἡ συνουσία ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, διὰ λόγων ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ εἰς ἀρετήν. ὅθεν δὴ καὶ τοὺς νόμους τούτους ἔθηκε τοῖς αὑτοῦ πολίταις, διʼ οὓς ἥ τε Κρήτη τὸν πάντα χρόνον εὐδαιμονεῖ καὶ Λακεδαίμων, ἀφʼ οὗ ἤρξατο τούτοις χρῆσθαι, ἅτε θείοις οὖσιν.Ῥαδάμανθυς δὲ ἀγαθὸς μὲν ἦν ἀνήρ· ἐπεπαίδευτο γὰρ -ὑπὸ τοῦ Μίνω. ἐπεπαίδευτο μέντοι οὐχ ὅλην τὴν βασιλικὴν τέχνην, ἀλλʼ ὑπηρεσίαν τῇ βασιλικῇ, ὅσον ἐπιστατεῖν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις· ὅθεν καὶ δικαστὴς ἀγαθὸς ἐλέχθη εἶναι. νομοφύλακι γὰρ αὐτῷ ἐχρῆτο ὁ Μίνως κατὰ τὸ ἄστυ, τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην Κρήτην τῷ Τάλῳ. ὁ γὰρ Τάλως τρὶς περιῄει τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ κατὰ τὰς κώμας, φυλάττων τοὺς νόμους ἐν αὐταῖς, ἐν χαλκοῖς γραμματείοις ἔχων γεγραμμένους τοὺς νόμους, ὅθεν χαλκοῦς ἐκλήθη. εἴρηκε δὲ καὶ Ἡσίοδος ἀδελφὰ - τούτων εἰς τὸν Μίνων. μνησθεὶς γὰρ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὀνόματος φησίν—ὃς βασιλεύτατος γένετο θνητῶν βασιλήων,καὶ πλείστων ἤνασσε περικτιόνων ἀνθρώπων,Ζηνὸς ἔχων σκῆπτρον· τῷ καὶ πολέων βασίλευεν.ηες. φρ. 144καὶ οὗτος λέγει τὸ τοῦ Διὸς σκῆπτρον οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τὴν παιδείαν τὴν τοῦ Διός, ᾗ εὔθυνε τὴν Κρήτην.

Ἑταῖρος

διὰ τί οὖν ποτε, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὕτη ἡ φήμη κατεσκέδασται -τοῦ Μίνω ὡς ἀπαιδεύτου τινὸς καὶ χαλεποῦ ὄντος;

Σωκράτης

διʼ ὃ καὶ σύ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἐὰν σωφρονῇς, εὐλαβήσῃ, καὶ ἄλλος πᾶς ἀνὴρ ὅτῳ μέλει τοῦ εὐδόκιμον εἶναι, μηδέποτε ἀπεχθάνεσθαι ἀνδρὶ ποιητικῷ μηδενί. οἱ γὰρ ποιηταὶ μέγα δύνανται εἰς δόξαν, ἐφʼ ὁπότερα ἂν ποιῶσιν εἰς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἢ εὐλογοῦντες ἢ κακηγοροῦντες. ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐξήμαρτεν ὁ Μίνως, πολεμήσας τῇδε τῇ πόλει, ἐν ᾗ ἄλλη τε πολλὴ σοφία ἐστὶ καὶ ποιηταὶ παντοδαποὶ τῆς τε ἄλλης ποιήσεως -καὶ τραγῳδίας. ἡ δὲ τραγῳδία ἐστὶν παλαιὸν ἐνθάδε, οὐχ ὡς οἴονται ἀπὸ Θέσπιδος ἀρξαμένη οὐδʼ ἀπὸ Φρυνίχου, ἀλλʼ εἰ θέλεις ἐννοῆσαι, πάνυ παλαιὸν αὐτὸ εὑρήσεις ὂν τῆσδε τῆς πόλεως εὕρημα. ἔστιν δὲ τῆς ποιήσεως δημοτερπέστατόν τε καὶ ψυχαγωγικώτατον ἡ τραγῳδία· ἐν ᾗ δὴ καὶ ἐντείνοντες ἡμεῖς τὸν Μίνων τιμωρούμεθα ἀνθʼ ὧν ἡμᾶς ἠνάγκασε τοὺς δασμοὺς τελεῖν ἐκείνους. τοῦτο οὖν ἐξήμαρτεν ὁ Μίνως, ἀπεχθόμενος ἡμῖν, ὅθεν δή, ὃ σὺ ἐρωτᾷς, κακοδοξότερος -γέγονεν. ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε ἀγαθὸς ἦν καὶ νόμιμος, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, νομεὺς ἀγαθός, τοῦτο μέγιστον σημεῖον, ὅτι ἀκίνητοι αὐτοῦ οἱ νόμοι εἰσίν, ἅτε τοῦ ὄντος περὶ πόλεως οἰκήσεως ἐξευρόντος εὖ τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

Ἑταῖρος

δοκεῖς μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰκότα τὸν λόγον εἰρηκέναι.

Σωκράτης

οὐκοῦν εἰ ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω, δοκοῦσί σοι παλαιοτάτοις Κρῆτες οἱ Μίνω καὶ Ῥαδαμάνθυος πολῖται νόμοις χρῆσθαι;

Ἑταῖρος

φαίνονται.

Σωκράτης

οὗτοι ἄρα τῶν παλαιῶν ἄριστοι νομοθέται γεγόνασιν, -νομῆς τε καὶ ποιμένες ἀνδρῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἔφη ποιμένα λαῶν εἶναι τὸν ἀγαθὸν στρατηγόν.

Ἑταῖρος

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Σωκράτης

φέρε δὴ πρὸς Διὸς φιλίου· εἴ τις ἡμᾶς ἔροιτο, ὁ τῷ σώματι ἀγαθὸς νομοθέτης τε καὶ νομεὺς τί ἐστιν ταῦτα ἃ διανέμων ἐπὶ τὸ σῶμα βέλτιον αὐτὸ ποιεῖ, εἴποιμεν ἂν καλῶς τε καὶ διὰ βραχέων ἀποκρινόμενοι, ὅτι τροφήν τε καὶ πόνους, τῇ μὲν αὔξων, τοῖς δὲ γυμνάζων καὶ συνιστὰς τὸ σῶμα αὐτό.

Ἑταῖρος

ὀρθῶς γε. -

Σωκράτης

εἰ οὖν δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔροιτο ἡμᾶς, τί δὲ δή ποτε ἐκεῖνά ἐστιν, ἃ ὁ ἀγαθὸς νομοθέτης τε καὶ νομεὺς διανέμων ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν βελτίω αὐτὴν ποιεῖ; τί ἂν ἀποκρινάμενοι οὐκ ἂν αἰσχυνθεῖμεν καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς ἡλικίας αὑτῶν;

Ἑταῖρος

οὐκέτι τοῦτʼ ἔχω εἰπεῖν.

Σωκράτης

ἀλλὰ μέντοι αἰσχρόν γε τῇ ψυχῇ ἡμῶν ἐστιν ἑκατέρου, τὰ μὲν ἐν αὐταῖς φαίνεσθαι μὴ εἰδυίας, ἐν οἷς αὐταῖς ἔνεστι καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ φλαῦρον, τὰ δὲ τοῦ σώματος καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐσκέφθαι.

 - - \ No newline at end of file From fc72c792a13cc219a69afc871712a594b140fbc0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: lcerrato Date: Mon, 25 Sep 2017 14:20:18 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 4/5] (tlg0059.tlg033) add divs to eng file #454 --- .../tlg033/tlg0059.tlg033.perseus-eng2.xml | 38 ++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/data/tlg0059/tlg033/tlg0059.tlg033.perseus-eng2.xml b/data/tlg0059/tlg033/tlg0059.tlg033.perseus-eng2.xml index 53446786c..5f55cdf71 100755 --- a/data/tlg0059/tlg033/tlg0059.tlg033.perseus-eng2.xml +++ b/data/tlg0059/tlg033/tlg0059.tlg033.perseus-eng2.xml @@ -84,7 +84,8 @@
- + +

Tell me, what is law?

To what kind of law does your question refer?

 @@ -93,7 +94,9 @@

And so speech, you think, is the things that are spoken, or sight the things seen, or hearing the things heard? Or is speech something distinct from the things spoken, sight something distinct from the things seen, and hearing something distinct from the things heard; and so law is something distinct from things loyally accepted? Is this so, or what is your view?

I find it now to be something distinct.

Then law is not things loyally accepted.

 -

I think not.

 +

I think not.

+ +

Now what can law be? Let us consider it in this way. Suppose someone had asked us about what was stated just now: Since you say it is by sight that things seen are seen, what is this sight whereby they are seen? Our answer to him would have been: That sensation which shows objects by means of the eyes. And if he had asked us again: Well then, since it is by hearing that things heard are heard, what is hearing? Our answer to him would have been: That sensation which shows us sounds by means of the ears. In the same way then, suppose he should also ask us: Since it is by law that loyally accepted things are so accepted, what is this law whereby they are so accepted? Is it some sensation or showing, as when things learnt are learnt by knowledge showing them, or some discovery, as when things discovered are discovered—for instance, the causes of health and sickness by medicine, or the designs of the gods, as the prophets say, by prophecy; for art is surely our discovery of things, is it not?

Certainly.

Then what thing especially of this sort shall we surmise law to be?

 @@ -136,7 +139,9 @@

No, to be sure.

But still, I am quite clear myself that law is some sort of opinion; and since it is not evil opinion, is it not manifest by this time that it is good opinion, granting that law is opinion?

Yes.

 -

But what is good opinion? Is it not true opinion?

 +

But what is good opinion? Is it not true opinion?

+ +

Yes.

And true opinion is discovery of reality?

 @@ -147,7 +152,9 @@

Why, that, Socrates, is no difficult matter to determine—that the same men do not use always the same laws, and also that different men use different ones. With us, for instance, human sacrifice is not legal, but unholy, whereas the Carthaginians perform it as a thing they account holy and legal, and that too when some of them sacrifice even their own sons to Cronos, as I daresay you yourself have heard. And not merely is it foreign peoples who use different laws from ours, but our neighbors in Lycaea Or Lycoa, a town in the Arcadian district Maenalia. and the descendants of Athamas Cf. Herod. vii. 197. At Alus in Achaea Xerxes was told of human sacrifices offered to purge the guilt of Athamas in plotting the death of his son Phrixus.—you know their sacrifices, Greeks though they be. And as to ourselves too, you know, of course, from what you have heard yourself, the kind of laws we formerly used in regard to our dead, when we slaughtered sacred victims before the funeral procession, and engaged urn-women to collect the bones from the ashes. Then again, a yet earlier generation used to bury the dead where they were, in the house: but we do none of these things. One might give thousands of other instances; for there is ample means of proving that neither we copy ourselves nor mankind each other always in laws and customs.

And it is no wonder, my excellent friend, if what you say is correct, and I have overlooked it. But if you continue to express your views after your own fashion in lengthy speeches, and I speak likewise, we shall never come to any agreement, in my opinion: but if we study the matter jointly, we may perhaps concur. Well now, if you like, hold a joint inquiry with me by asking me questions; or if you prefer, by answering them.

Why, I am willing, Socrates, to answer anything you like.

 -

Come then, do you consider The word νομίζειν here and in what follows is intended to retain some of the sense of νόμος as accepted law and custom which it had in what precedes; see note, 313 B. just things to be unjust and unjust things just, or just things to be just and unjust things unjust?

 +

Come then, do you consider The word νομίζειν here and in what follows is intended to retain some of the sense of νόμος as accepted law and custom which it had in what precedes; see note, 313 B. just things to be unjust and unjust things just, or just things to be just and unjust things unjust?

+ +

I consider just things to be just, and unjust things unjust.

And are they so considered among all men elsewhere as they are here?

 @@ -197,7 +204,9 @@

And whose are the treatises and accepted rules about the confection of tasty dishes?

Cooks’.

Then there are laws of cookery?

 -

Of cookery.

 +

Of cookery.

+ +

Of people who know, it would seem, how to control the confection of tasty dishes?

Yes.

 @@ -242,7 +251,9 @@

Yes.

Then his distributions and laws are best, and whoever is the best lawyer in this matter is also the best apportioner.

Certainly.

 -

Who is he?

 +

Who is he?

+ +

A trainer.

He is the best man to pasture Here νόμος is connected with a special use of νέμειν — find appropriate pasture for —derived from its original meaning of apportion. the human herd of the body? The awkward imagery of this sentence obviously cannot have come from Plato’s mind or hand.

 @@ -277,12 +288,19 @@

What! Is not this the tradition about Minos?

Not in Homer and Hesiod; and yet they are more to be believed than all the tragedians together, from whom you heard your tale.

 -

Well, and what, pray, is their tale about Minos?

 +

Well, and what, pray, is their tale about Minos?

+ +

I will tell you, in order that you may not share the impiety of the multitude: for there cannot conceivably be anything more impious or more to be guarded against than being mistaken in word and deed with regard to the gods, and after them, with regard to divine men; you must take very great precaution, whenever you are about to blame or praise a man, so as not to speak incorrectly. For this reason you must learn to distinguish honest and dishonest men: for God feels resentment when one blames a man who is like himself, or praises a man who is the opposite; and the former is the good man. For you must not suppose that while stocks and stones and birds and snakes are sacred, men are not; nay, the good man is the most sacred of all these things, and the wicked man is the most defiled. So if I now proceed to relate how Minos is eulogized by Homer and Hesiod, my purpose is to prevent you, a man sprung from a man, from making a mistake in regard to a hero who was the son of Zeus. Minos and Rhadamanthus were sons of Zeus and Europa. For Homer, in telling of Crete that there were in it many men and ninety cities, says: And amongst them is the mighty city of Cnossos, where Minos was king, having colloquy ὀαριστής means one who has familiar converse (ὄαρος). with mighty Zeus in the ninth year. Hom. Od. 19.179 Now here in Homer we have a eulogy of Minos, briefly expressed, such as the poet never composed for a single one of the heroes. For that Zeus is a sophist, and that sophistry is a highly honorable art, he makes plain in many other places, and particularly here. For he says that Minos consorted and discoursed with Zeus in the ninth year, and went regularly to be educated by Zeus as though he were a sophist. And the fact that Homer assigned this privilege of having been educated by Zeus to no one among the heroes but Minos makes this a marvellous piece of praise. And in the Ghost-raising in the Odyssey Hom. Od. 11.569 he has described Minos as judging with a golden scepter in his hand, but not Rhadamanthus: Rhadamanthus he has neither described here as judging nor anywhere as consorting with Zeus; wherefore I say that Minos above all persons has been eulogized by Homer. For to have been the son of Zeus, and to have been the only one who was educated by Zeus, is praise unsurpassable. -For the meaning of the verse— he was king having colloquy with mighty Zeus in the ninth year” — Hom. Od. 19.179 is that Minos was a disciple of Zeus. For colloquies are discourses, and he who has colloquy is a disciple by means of discourse. So every ninth year Minos repaired to the cave of Zeus, to learn some things, and to show his knowledge of others that he had learnt from Zeus in the preceding nine years. Some there are who suppose that he who has colloquy is a cup-companion and fellow-jester of Zeus: but one may take the following as a proof that they who suppose so are babblers. For of all the many nations of men, both Greek and foreign, the only people who refrain from drinking-bouts and the jesting that occurs where there is wine, are the Cretans, and after them the Spartans, who learnt it from the Cretans. In Crete it is one of their laws which Minos ordained that they are not to drink with each other to intoxication. And yet it is evident that the things he thought honorable were what he ordained as lawful for his people as well. For surely Minos did not, like an inferior person, think one thing and do another, different from what he thought: no, this intercourse, as I say, was held by means of discussion for education in virtue. Wherefore he ordained for his people these very laws, which have made Crete happy through the length of time, and Sparta happy also, since she began to use them; for they are divine. +For the meaning of the verse— he was king having colloquy with mighty Zeus in the ninth year” — Hom. Od. 19.179 is that Minos was a disciple of Zeus. For colloquies are discourses, and he who has colloquy is a disciple by means of discourse. So every ninth year Minos repaired to the cave of Zeus, to learn some things, and to show his knowledge of others that he had learnt from Zeus in the preceding nine years.

+ +
+

Some there are who suppose that he who has colloquy is a cup-companion and fellow-jester of Zeus: but one may take the following as a proof that they who suppose so are babblers. For of all the many nations of men, both Greek and foreign, the only people who refrain from drinking-bouts and the jesting that occurs where there is wine, are the Cretans, and after them the Spartans, who learnt it from the Cretans. In Crete it is one of their laws which Minos ordained that they are not to drink with each other to intoxication. And yet it is evident that the things he thought honorable were what he ordained as lawful for his people as well. For surely Minos did not, like an inferior person, think one thing and do another, different from what he thought: no, this intercourse, as I say, was held by means of discussion for education in virtue. Wherefore he ordained for his people these very laws, which have made Crete happy through the length of time, and Sparta happy also, since she began to use them; for they are divine. Rhadamanthus was a good man indeed, for he had been educated by Minos; he had, however, been educated, not in the whole of the kingly art, but in one subsidiary to the kingly, enough for presiding in law courts; so that he was spoken of as a good judge. For Minos used him as guardian of the law in the city, and Talos Talos, the brazen man who was given to Minos by Zeus, is described by Apoll. Rhod. iv. 1639ff., and Apollodorus i. 9. 26 (where see J. G. Frazer’s note in this series). as the same for the rest of Crete. For Talos thrice a year made a round of the villages, guarding the laws in them, by holding their laws inscribed on brazen tablets, which gave him his name of brazen. And what Hesiod The passage quoted does not occur in our text of Hesiod, nor is it quoted by any other writer. The meter of the first line would be improved if we could read βασιλευτότατος, from the βασιλευτός used by Aristotle, Pol.. iii. 17. 1. also has said of Minos is akin to this. For after mentioning him by name he remarks— Who was most kingly of mortal kings, and lorded it over more neighboring folk than any, holding the scepter of Zeus: therewith it was that he ruled the cities as king. Hes. Fr. 144And by the scepter of Zeus he means nothing else than the education that he had of Zeus, whereby he directed Crete.

 -

Then how has it ever come about, Socrates, that this report is spread abroad of Minos, as an uneducated and harsh-tempered person?

 +

Then how has it ever come about, Socrates, that this report is spread abroad of Minos, as an uneducated and harsh-tempered person?

+ +

Because of something that will make both you, if you are wise, my excellent friend, and everybody else who cares to have a good reputation, beware of ever quarreling with any man of a poetic turn. For poets have great influence over opinion, according as they create it in the minds of men by either commending or vilifying. And this was the mistake that Minos made, in waging war on this city of ours, which besides all its various culture has poets of every kind, and especially those who write tragedy. Now tragedy is a thing of ancient standing here; it did not begin, as people suppose, from Thespis or from Phrynicus, but if you will reflect, you will find it is a very ancient invention of our city. Tragedy is the most popularly delightful and soul-enthralling branch of poetry: in it, accordingly, we get Minos on the rack of verse,This is the meaning most probably intended, from an imperfect understanding of ἐντείνειν (put some story into verse, or accompany it with music) in Plato, Phaedo 60 D;Protag. 326 B. Minos was represented as a harsh despot in Euripides’Cretans, and probably in other lost plays., and thus avenge ourselves for that tribute which he compelled us to pay The legend was that Minos defeated the Athenians in war and compelled them to send a regular tribute of seven youths and seven maidens to be devoured by the Minotaur in the Cretan labyrinth. This, then, was the mistake that Minos made—his quarrel with us—and hence it is that, as you said in your question, he has fallen more and more into evil repute. For that he was a good and law-abiding person, as we stated in what went before—a good apportioner—is most convincingly shown by the fact the his laws are unshaken, since they were made by one who discovered aright the truth of reality in regard to the management of a state.

In my opinion, Socrates, your statement is a probable one.

Then if what I say is true, do you consider that the Cretan people of Minos and Rhadamanthus use the most ancient laws?

 @@ -294,7 +312,7 @@

And if he then proceeded to ask us—And what might that be which the good lawgiver and apportioner distributes to the soul to make it better?—what would be our answer if we would avoid being ashamed of ourselves and our years?

This time I am unable to say.

 -

But indeed it is shameful for the soul of either of us to be found ignorant of those things within it on which its good and abject states depend, while it has studied those that pertain to the body and rest.

 +

But indeed it is shameful for the soul of either of us to be found ignorant of those things within it on which its good and abject states depend, while it has studied those that pertain to the body and rest.

 From 7350e5f03d1a83a534a20b72c38087523e15070f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: lcerrato Date: Mon, 25 Sep 2017 14:50:17 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 5/5] (tlg0059.tlg033) remove old files #454 --- .../tlg0059.tlg033.perseus-eng1.tracking.json | 14 --- .../tlg033/tlg0059.tlg033.perseus-eng1.xml | 114 ------------------ 2 files changed, 128 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 data/tlg0059/tlg033/tlg0059.tlg033.perseus-eng1.tracking.json delete mode 100755 data/tlg0059/tlg033/tlg0059.tlg033.perseus-eng1.xml diff --git a/data/tlg0059/tlg033/tlg0059.tlg033.perseus-eng1.tracking.json b/data/tlg0059/tlg033/tlg0059.tlg033.perseus-eng1.tracking.json deleted file mode 100644 index 7e38ecfa0..000000000 --- a/data/tlg0059/tlg033/tlg0059.tlg033.perseus-eng1.tracking.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14 +0,0 @@ -{ - "epidoc_compliant": false, - "fully_unicode": true, - "git_repo": "canonical-greekLit", - "has_cts_metadata": false, - "has_cts_refsDecl": false, - "id": "1999.01.0180", - "last_editor": "", - "note": "", - "src": "texts/Classics/Plato/opensource/plat.tet789_eng.xml---subdoc---text=Minos", - "status": "migrated", - "target": "canonical-greekLit/data/tlg0059/tlg033/tlg0059.tlg033.perseus-eng1.xml", - "valid_xml": false -} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/tlg0059/tlg033/tlg0059.tlg033.perseus-eng1.xml b/data/tlg0059/tlg033/tlg0059.tlg033.perseus-eng1.xml deleted file mode 100755 index 36b86636b..000000000 --- a/data/tlg0059/tlg033/tlg0059.tlg033.perseus-eng1.xml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,114 +0,0 @@ - - - - - - -Minos -Plato -Perseus Project, Tufts University -Gregory Crane - -Prepared under the supervision of -Lisa Cerrato -William Merrill -Elli Mylonas -David Smith - -The Annenberg CPB/Project - - - - - - Text was scanned at St. Olaf Spring, 1992. - - - - Plato - Plato in Twelve Volumes, translated by W.R.M. Lamb. - - - 12 - Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. - 1927 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -English -Greek - - - - -Tagged in conformance with Prose.e dtd. -split composite text and converted to unicode - - - - - -SocratesCompanion -Socrates

Tell me, what is law?

Companion

To what kind of law does your question refer?

Socrates

What! Is there any difference between law and law, in this particular point of being law? For just consider what is the actual question I am putting to you. It is as though I had asked, what is gold: if you had asked me in the same manner, to what kind of gold I refer, I think your question would have been incorrect. For I presume there is no difference between gold and gold, -or between stone and stone, in point of being gold or stone; and so neither does law differ at all from law, I suppose, but they are all the same thing. For each of them is law alike, not one more so, and another less. That is the particular point of my question—what is law as a whole? So if you are ready, tell me.

Companion

Well, what else should law be, Socrates, but things loyally accepted? NOMIZO/MENA in ordinary speech meant “accepted by custom” : “loyally” here attempts to preserve the connection with NO/MOS ( “law” in this context, though sometimes “custom,” as below, 315 D).

Socrates

And so speech, you think, is the things that are spoken, or sight the things seen, or hearing the things heard? Or is speech -something distinct from the things spoken, sight something distinct from the things seen, and hearing something distinct from the things heard; and so law is something distinct from things loyally accepted? Is this so, or what is your view?

Companion

I find it now to be something distinct.

Socrates

Then law is not things loyally accepted.

Companion

I think not.

Socrates

Now what can law be? Let us consider it in this way. Suppose someone had asked us about what was stated just now: -Since you say it is by sight that things seen are seen, what is this sight whereby they are seen? Our answer to him would have been: That sensation which shows objects by means of the eyes. And if he had asked us again: Well then, since it is by hearing that things heard are heard, what is hearing? Our answer to him would have been: That sensation which shows us sounds by means of the ears. In the same way then, suppose he should also ask us: Since it is by law that loyally accepted things are so accepted, what is this law whereby they are so accepted? -Is it some sensation or showing, as when things learnt are learnt by knowledge showing them, or some discovery, as when things discovered are discovered—for instance, the causes of health and sickness by medicine, or the designs of the gods, as the prophets say, by prophecy; for art is surely our discovery of things, is it not?

Companion

Certainly.

Socrates

Then what thing especially of this sort shall we surmise law to be?

Companion

Our resolutions and decrees, I imagine: for how else can one describe law? -So that apparently the whole thing, law, as you put it in your question, is a city's resolution.

Socrates

State opinion, it seems, is what you call law.

Companion

I do.

Socrates

And perhaps you are right: but I fancy we shall get a better knowledge in this way. You call some men wise?

Companion

I do.

Socrates

And the wise are wise by wisdom?

Companion

Yes.

Socrates

And again, the just are just by justice?

Companion

Certainly.

Socrates

And so the law-abiding are law-abiding by law? -

Companion

Yes.

Socrates

And the lawless are lawless by lawlessness?

Companion

Yes.

Socrates

And the law-abiding are just?

Companion

Yes.

Socrates

And the lawless are unjust?

Companion

Unjust.

Socrates

And justice and law are most noble?

Companion

That is so.

Socrates

And injustice and lawlessness most base?

Companion

Yes.

Socrates

And the former preserve cities and everything else, while the latter destroy and overturn them?

Companion

Yes.

Socrates

Hence we must regard law as something noble, and seek after it as a good.

Companion

Undeniably.

Socrates

And we said that law is a city's resolution? -

Companion

So we did.

Socrates

Well now, are not some resolutions good, and others evil?

Companion

Yes, to be sure.

Socrates

And, you know, law was not evil.

Companion

No, indeed.

Socrates

So it is not right to reply, in that simple fashion, that law is a city's resolution.

Companion

I agree that it is not.

Socrates

An evil resolution, you see, cannot properly be a law.

Companion

No, to be sure.

Socrates

But still, I am quite clear myself that law is some sort of opinion; and since it is not evil opinion, is it not manifest by this time that it is good opinion, granting that law is opinion?

Companion

Yes.

Socrates

But what is good opinion? Is it not true opinion?

Companion

Yes. -

Socrates

And true opinion is discovery of reality?

Companion

Yes, it is.

Socrates

So law tends to be discovery of reality.

Companion

Then how is it, Socrates, if law is discovery of reality, that we do not use always the same laws on the same matters, if we have thus got realities discovered?

Socrates

Law tends none the less to be discovery of reality: but men, who do not use -always the same laws, as we observe, are not always able to discover what the law is intent on—reality. For come now, let us see if from this point onward we can get it clear whether we use always the same laws or different ones at different times, and whether we all use the same, or some of us use some, and others others.

Companion

Why, that, Socrates, is no difficult matter to determine—that the same men do not use always the same laws, and also that different men use different ones. With us, for instance, human sacrifice is not legal, but unholy, -whereas the Carthaginians perform it as a thing they account holy and legal, and that too when some of them sacrifice even their own sons to Cronos, as I daresay you yourself have heard. And not merely is it foreign peoples who use different laws from ours, but our neighbors in Lycaea Or Lycoa, a town in the Arcadian district Maenalia. and the descendants of Athamas Cf. Herod. vii. 197. At Alus in Achaea Xerxes was told of human sacrifices offered to purge the guilt of Athamas in plotting the death of his son Phrixus.—you know their sacrifices, Greeks though they be. And as to ourselves too, you know, of course, from what you have heard yourself, the kind of laws we formerly used in regard to our dead, when we slaughtered sacred victims before -the funeral procession, and engaged urn-women to collect the bones from the ashes. Then again, a yet earlier generation used to bury the dead where they were, in the house: but we do none of these things. One might give thousands of other instances; for there is ample means of proving that neither we copy ourselves nor mankind each other always in laws and customs.

Socrates

And it is no wonder, my excellent friend, if what you say is correct, and I have overlooked it. But if you continue to express your views after your own fashion in lengthy speeches, -and I speak likewise, we shall never come to any agreement, in my opinion: but if we study the matter jointly, we may perhaps concur. Well now, if you like, hold a joint inquiry with me by asking me questions; or if you prefer, by answering them.

Companion

Why, I am willing, Socrates, to answer anything you like.

Socrates

Come then, do you consider The word NOMI/ZEIN here and in what follows is intended to retain some of the sense of NO/MOS as “accepted” law and custom which it had in what precedes; see note, 313 B. just things to be unjust and unjust things just, or just things to be just and unjust things unjust?

Companion

I consider just things to be just, and unjust things unjust. -

Socrates

And are they so considered among all men elsewhere as they are here?

Companion

Yes.

Socrates

And among the Persians also?

Companion

Among the Persians also.

Socrates

Always, I presume?

Companion

Always.

Socrates

Are things that weigh more considered heavier here, and things that weigh less lighter, or the contrary?

Companion

No, those that weigh more are considered heavier, and those that weigh less lighter.

Socrates

And is it so in Carthage also, and in Lycaea?

Companion

Yes.

Socrates

Noble things, it would seem, are everywhere considered noble, -and base things base; not base things noble or noble things base.

Companion

That is so.

Socrates

And thus, as a universal rule, realities, and not unrealities, are accepted as real, both among us and among all other men.

Companion

I agree.

Socrates

Then whoever fails to attain reality, fails to attain accepted law.

Companion

In your present way of putting it, Socrates, the same things appear to be accepted as lawful both by us and by the rest of the world, always: -but when I reflect that we are continually changing our laws in all sorts of ways, I cannot bring myself to assent.

Socrates

Perhaps it is because you do not reflect that when we change our pieces at draughts they are the same pieces. But look at it, as I do, in this way. Have you in your time come across a treatise on healing the sick?

Companion

I have.

Socrates

Then do you know to what art such a treatise belongs?

Companion

I do: medicine.

Socrates

And you give the name of doctors to those who have knowledge of these matters?

Companion

Yes. -

Socrates

Then do those who have knowledge accept the same views on the same things, or do they accept different views?

Companion

The same, in my opinion.

Socrates

Do Greeks only accept the same views as Greeks on what they know, or do foreigners also agree on these matters, both among themselves and with Greeks?

Companion

It is quite inevitable, I should say, that those who know should agree in accepting the same views, whether Greeks or foreigners.

Socrates

Well answered. And do they so always?

Companion

Yes, it is so always.

Socrates

And do doctors on their part, in their treatises on health, -write what they accept as real?

Companion

Yes.

Socrates

Then these treatises of the doctors are medical, and medical laws.

Companion

Medical, to be sure.

Socrates

And are agricultural treatises likewise agricultural laws?

Companion

Yes.

Socrates

And whose are the treatises and accepted rules about garden-work?

Companion

Gardeners'.

Socrates

So these are our gardening laws.

Companion

Yes.

Socrates

Of people who know how to control gardens?

Companion

Certainly.

Socrates

And it is the gardeners who know.

Companion

Yes.

Socrates

And whose are the treatises and accepted rules about the confection of tasty dishes?

Companion

Cooks'.

Socrates

Then there are laws of cookery?

Companion

Of cookery.

Socrates

Of people who know, it would seem, how to control the confection of tasty dishes? -

Companion

Yes.

Socrates

And it is the cooks, they say, who know?

Companion

Yes, it is they who know.

Socrates

Very well; and now, whose are the treatises and accepted rules about the government of a state? Of the people who know how to control states, are they not?

Companion

I agree.

Socrates

And is it anyone else than statesmen and royal persons Cf. Euthyd. 291 C, Politicus 266-7, where Plato identifies the statesman's and the king's art. who know?

Companion

It is they, to be sure.

Socrates

Then what people call “laws” are treatises of state,— -writings of kings and good men.

Companion

That is true.

Socrates

And must it not be that those who know will not write differently at different times on the same matters?

Companion

They will not.

Socrates

Nor will they ever change one set of accepted rules for another in respect of the same matters.

Companion

No, indeed.

Socrates

So if we see some persons anywhere doing this, shall we say that those who do so have knowledge, or have none?

Companion

That they have no knowledge.

Socrates

And again, whatever is right, we shall say is lawful for each person, whether in medicine or in cookery or in gardening?

Companion

Yes. -

Socrates

And whatever is not right we shall decline to call lawful?

Companion

We shall decline.

Socrates

Then it becomes unlawful.

Companion

It must.

Socrates

And again, in writings about what is just and unjust, and generally about the government of a state and the proper way of governing it, that which is right is the king's law, but not so that which is not right, though it seems to be law to those who do not know; for it is unlawful.

Companion

Yes. -

Socrates

Then we rightly admitted that law is discovery of reality.

Companion

So it appears.

Socrates

Now let us observe this further point about it. Who has knowledge of distributing The words DIANE/MEIN and NOMEU/S in this passage introduce the primitive meaning of NO/MOS — “distribution” or “apportionment” of each person's status, property, rights, etc. seed over land?

Companion

A farmer.

Socrates

And does he distribute the suitable seed to each sort of land?

Companion

Yes.

Socrates

Then the farmer is a good apportioner of it, and his laws and distributions are right in this matter?

Companion

Yes.

Socrates

And who is a good apportioner of notes struck for a tune, skilled in distributing suitable notes, and who is it whose laws are right here? -

Companion

The flute-player and the harp-player.

Socrates

Then he who is the best lawyer in these matters is the best flute-player.

Companion

Yes.

Socrates

And who is most skilled in distributing food to human bodies? Is it not he who assigns suitable food?

Companion

Yes.

Socrates

Then his distributions and laws are best, and whoever is the best lawyer in this matter is also the best apportioner.

Companion

Certainly.

Socrates

Who is he?

Companion

A trainer. -

Socrates

He is the best man to pasture Here NO/MOS is connected with a special use of NE/MEIN — “find appropriate pasture for” —derived from its original meaning of “apportion.” the human herd of the body? The awkward imagery of this sentence obviously cannot have come from Plato's mind or hand.

Companion

Yes.

Socrates

And who is the best man to pasture a flock of sheep? What is his name?

Companion

A shepherd.

Socrates

Then the shepherd's laws are best for sheep.

Companion

Yes.

Socrates

And the herdsman's for oxen.

Companion

Yes.

Socrates

And whose laws are best for the souls of men? The king's, are they not? Say if you agree.

Companion

I do. -

Socrates

Then you are quite right. Now can you tell me who, in former times, has proved himself a good lawgiver in regard to the laws of flute-playing? Perhaps you cannot think of him: would you like me to remind you?

Companion

Do by all means.

Socrates

Then is it Marsyas, by tradition, and his beloved Olympus, the Phrygian?

Companion

That is true.

Socrates

And their flute-tunes also are most divine, and alone stir and make manifest those who are in need of the gods; Cf. Sympos. 215 C(from which this allusion to Marsyas is feebly imitated) DHLOI= TOU\S TW=N QEW=N TE KAI\ TELETW=N DEOME/NOUS, where “in need of the gods” seems to be a mystic phrase for “ready for divine possession” (E)NQOUSIASMO/S). and to this day they only remain, as being divine. -

Companion

That is so.

Socrates

And who by tradition has shown himself a good lawgiver among the ancient kings, so that to this day his ordinances remain, as being divine?

Companion

I cannot think.

Socrates

Do you not know which of the Greeks use the most ancient laws?

Companion

Do you mean the Spartans, and Lycurgus the lawgiver?

Socrates

Why, that is a matter, I daresay, of less than three hundred years ago, or but a little more. But whence is it that -the best of those ordinances come? Do you know?

Companion

From Crete, so they say.

Socrates

Then the people there use the most ancient laws in Greece?

Companion

Yes.

Socrates

Then do you know who were their good kings? Minos and Rhadamanthus, the sons of Zeus and Europa; those laws were theirs.

Companion

Rhadamanthus, they do say, Socrates, was a just man; but Minos was a savage sort of person, harsh and unjust.

Socrates

Your tale, my excellent friend, is a fiction of Attic tragedy. -

Companion

What! Is not this the tradition about Minos?

Socrates

Not in Homer and Hesiod; and yet they are more to be believed than all the tragedians together, from whom you heard your tale.

Companion

Well, and what, pray, is their tale about Minos?

Socrates

I will tell you, in order that you may not share the impiety of the multitude: for there cannot conceivably be anything more impious or more to be guarded against than being mistaken in word and deed with regard to the gods, and after them, with regard to divine men; you must take very great precaution, whenever you are about to -blame or praise a man, so as not to speak incorrectly. For this reason you must learn to distinguish honest and dishonest men: for God feels resentment when one blames a man who is like himself, or praises a man who is the opposite; and the former is the good man. For you must not suppose that while stocks and stones and birds and snakes are sacred, men are not; nay, the good man is the most sacred of all these things, and the wicked man is the most defiled.So if I now proceed to relate how Minos is eulogized by Homer -and Hesiod, my purpose is to prevent you, a man sprung from a man, from making a mistake in regard to a hero who was the son of Zeus. Minos and Rhadamanthus were sons of Zeus and Europa. For Homer, in telling of Crete that there were in it many men and “ninety cities,” says:And amongst them is the mighty city of Cnossos, where Minos was king, having colloquy O)ARISTH/S means “one who has familiar converse” (O)/AROS). with mighty Zeus in the ninth year.Hom. Od. 19.179 -Now here in Homer we have a eulogy of Minos, briefly expressed, such as the poet never composed for a single one of the heroes. For that Zeus is a sophist, and that sophistry is a highly honorable art, he makes plain in many other places, and particularly here. For he says that Minos consorted and discoursed with Zeus in the ninth year, and went regularly to be educated by Zeus as though he were a sophist. And the fact that Homer assigned this privilege of having been educated by Zeus to no one among the heroes but Minos makes this a marvellous piece of praise. -And in the Ghost-raising in the Odyssey Hom. Od. 11.569 he has described Minos as judging with a golden scepter in his hand, but not Rhadamanthus: Rhadamanthus he has neither described here as judging nor anywhere as consorting with Zeus; wherefore I say that Minos above all persons has been eulogized by Homer. For to have been the son of Zeus, and to have been the only one who was educated by Zeus, is praise unsurpassable.For the meaning of the verse— he was king having colloquy with mighty Zeus in the ninth year” —Hom. Od. 19.179 -is that Minos was a disciple of Zeus. For colloquies are discourses, and he who has colloquy is a disciple by means of discourse. So every ninth year Minos repaired to the cave of Zeus, to learn some things, and to show his knowledge of others that he had learnt from Zeus in the preceding nine years. Some there are who suppose that he who has colloquy is a cup-companion and fellow-jester of Zeus: but one may take the following as a proof that -they who suppose so are babblers. For of all the many nations of men, both Greek and foreign, the only people who refrain from drinking-bouts and the jesting that occurs where there is wine, are the Cretans, and after them the Spartans, who learnt it from the Cretans. In Crete it is one of their laws which Minos ordained that they are not to drink with each other to intoxication. And yet it is evident that the things he thought honorable were what he ordained as lawful for his people as well. For surely Minos did not, like an inferior person, -think one thing and do another, different from what he thought: no, this intercourse, as I say, was held by means of discussion for education in virtue. Wherefore he ordained for his people these very laws, which have made Crete happy through the length of time, and Sparta happy also, since she began to use them; for they are divine.Rhadamanthus was a good man indeed, for he had been educated by Minos; he had, however, been educated, -not in the whole of the kingly art, but in one subsidiary to the kingly, enough for presiding in law courts; so that he was spoken of as a good judge. For Minos used him as guardian of the law in the city, and Talos Talos, the brazen man who was given to Minos by Zeus, is described by Apoll. Rhod. iv. 1639ff., and Apollodorus i. 9. 26 (where see J. G. Frazer's note in this series). as the same for the rest of Crete. For Talos thrice a year made a round of the villages, guarding the laws in them, by holding their laws inscribed on brazen tablets, which gave him his name of “brazen.” And what Hesiod The passage quoted does not occur in our text of Hesiod, nor is it quoted by any other writer. The meter of the first line would be improved if we could read BASILEUTO/TATOS, . iii. 17. 1. also has said -of Minos is akin to this. For after mentioning him by name he remarks—Who was most kingly of mortal kings, and lorded it over more neighboring folk than any, holding the scepter of Zeus: therewith it was that he ruled the cities as king.Hes. Fr. 144And by the scepter of Zeus he means nothing else than the education that he had of Zeus, whereby he directed Crete.

Companion

Then how has it ever come about, Socrates, that this report is spread abroad of Minos, as an uneducated -and harsh-tempered person?

Socrates

Because of something that will make both you, if you are wise, my excellent friend, and everybody else who cares to have a good reputation, beware of ever quarreling with any man of a poetic turn. For poets have great influence over opinion, according as they create it in the minds of men by either commending or vilifying. And this was the mistake that Minos made, in waging war on this city of ours, which besides all its various culture has poets of every kind, and especially those who write tragedy. -Now tragedy is a thing of ancient standing here; it did not begin, as people suppose, 60 D;Protag. 326 B. Minos was represented as a harsh despot in Euripides'Cretans, and probably in other lost plays., and thus avenge ourselves for that tribute which he compelled us to pay The legend was that Minos defeated the Athenians in war and compelled them to send a regular tribute of seven youths and seven maidens to be devoured by the Minotaur in the Cretan labyrinth. This, then, was the mistake that Minos made—his quarrel with us—and hence it is that, as you said in your question, he has fallen more and more into evil repute. For that he was a good -and law-abiding person, as we stated in what went before—a good apportioner—is most convincingly shown by the fact the his laws are unshaken, since they were made by one who discovered aright the truth of reality in regard to the management of a state.

Companion

In my opinion, Socrates, your statement is a probable one.

Socrates

Then if what I say is true, do you consider that the Cretan people of Minos and Rhadamanthus use the most ancient laws?

Companion

I do.

Socrates

So these have shown themselves the best lawgivers among men of ancient times— -apportioners and shepherds of men; just as Homer called the good general a “shepherd of the folk.”

Companion

Quite so, indeed.

Socrates

Come then, in good friendship's name: if someone should ask us what it is that the good lawgiver and apportioner for the body distributes to it when he makes it better, we should say, if we were to make a correct and brief answer, that it was food and labor; the former to strengthen, and the latter to exercise and brace it.

Companion

And we should be right. -

Socrates

And if he then proceeded to ask us—And what might that be which the good lawgiver and apportioner distributes to the soul to make it better?—what would be our answer if we would avoid being ashamed of ourselves and our years?

Companion

This time I am unable to say.

Socrates

But indeed it is shameful for the soul of either of us to be found ignorant of those things within it on which its good and abject states depend, while it has studied those that pertain to the body and rest.

 - -