Tell me, what is law?
To what kind of law does your question refer?
What! Is there any difference between law and law, in this particular point of being law? For just consider what is the actual question I am putting to you. It is as though I had asked, what is gold: if you had asked me in the same manner, to what kind of gold I refer, I think your question would have been incorrect. For I presume there is no difference between gold and gold,
-
Well, what else should law be, Socrates, but things loyally accepted?
And so speech, you think, is the things that are spoken, or sight the things seen, or hearing the things heard? Or is speech
-
I find it now to be something distinct.
Then law is not things loyally accepted.
I think not.
Now what can law be? Let us consider it in this way. Suppose someone had asked us about what was stated just now:
-
Certainly.
Then what thing especially of this sort shall we surmise law to be?
Our resolutions and decrees, I imagine: for how else can one describe law?
-
State opinion, it seems, is what you call law.
I do.
And perhaps you are right: but I fancy we shall get a better knowledge in this way. You call some men wise?
I do.
And the wise are wise by wisdom?
Yes.
And again, the just are just by justice?
Certainly.
And so the law-abiding are law-abiding by law?
-
Yes.
And the lawless are lawless by lawlessness?
Yes.
And the law-abiding are just?
Yes.
And the lawless are unjust?
Unjust.
And justice and law are most noble?
That is so.
And injustice and lawlessness most base?
Yes.
And the former preserve cities and everything else, while the latter destroy and overturn them?
Yes.
Hence we must regard law as something noble, and seek after it as a good.
Undeniably.
And we said that law is a city's resolution?
-
So we did.
Well now, are not some resolutions good, and others evil?
Yes, to be sure.
And, you know, law was not evil.
No, indeed.
So it is not right to reply, in that simple fashion, that law is a city's resolution.
I agree that it is not.
An evil resolution, you see, cannot properly be a law.
No, to be sure.
But still, I am quite clear myself that law is some sort of opinion; and since it is not evil opinion, is it not manifest by this time that it is good opinion, granting that law is opinion?
Yes.
But what is good opinion? Is it not true opinion?
Yes.
-
And true opinion is discovery of reality?
Yes, it is.
So law tends to be discovery of reality.
Then how is it, Socrates, if law is discovery of reality, that we do not use always the same laws on the same matters, if we have thus got realities discovered?
Law tends none the less to be discovery of reality: but men, who do not use
-
Why, that, Socrates, is no difficult matter to determine—that the same men do not use always the same laws, and also that different men use different ones. With us, for instance, human sacrifice is not legal, but unholy,
-
And it is no wonder, my excellent friend, if what you say is correct, and I have overlooked it. But if you continue to express your views after your own fashion in lengthy speeches,
-
Why, I am willing, Socrates, to answer anything you like.
Come then, do you consider
I consider just things to be just, and unjust things unjust.
-
And are they so considered among all men elsewhere as they are here?
Yes.
And among the Persians also?
Among the Persians also.
Always, I presume?
Always.
Are things that weigh more considered heavier here, and things that weigh less lighter, or the contrary?
No, those that weigh more are considered heavier, and those that weigh less lighter.
And is it so in
Yes.
Noble things, it would seem, are everywhere considered noble,
-
That is so.
And thus, as a universal rule, realities, and not unrealities, are accepted as real, both among us and among all other men.
I agree.
Then whoever fails to attain reality, fails to attain accepted law.
In your present way of putting it, Socrates, the same things appear to be accepted as lawful both by us and by the rest of the world, always:
-
Perhaps it is because you do not reflect that when we change our pieces at draughts they are the same pieces. But look at it, as I do, in this way. Have you in your time come across a treatise on healing the sick?
I have.
Then do you know to what art such a treatise belongs?
I do: medicine.
And you give the name of doctors to those who have knowledge of these matters?
Yes.
-
Then do those who have knowledge accept the same views on the same things, or do they accept different views?
The same, in my opinion.
Do Greeks only accept the same views as Greeks on what they know, or do foreigners also agree on these matters, both among themselves and with Greeks?
It is quite inevitable, I should say, that those who know should agree in accepting the same views, whether Greeks or foreigners.
Well answered. And do they so always?
Yes, it is so always.
And do doctors on their part, in their treatises on health,
-
Yes.
Then these treatises of the doctors are medical, and medical laws.
Medical, to be sure.
And are agricultural treatises likewise agricultural laws?
Yes.
And whose are the treatises and accepted rules about garden-work?
Gardeners'.
So these are our gardening laws.
Yes.
Of people who know how to control gardens?
Certainly.
And it is the gardeners who know.
Yes.
And whose are the treatises and accepted rules about the confection of tasty dishes?
Cooks'.
Then there are laws of cookery?
Of cookery.
Of people who know, it would seem, how to control the confection of tasty dishes?
-
Yes.
And it is the cooks, they say, who know?
Yes, it is they who know.
Very well; and now, whose are the treatises and accepted rules about the government of a state? Of the people who know how to control states, are they not?
I agree.
And is it anyone else than statesmen and royal persons
It is they, to be sure.
Then what people call “laws” are treatises of state,—
-
That is true.
And must it not be that those who know will not write differently at different times on the same matters?
They will not.
Nor will they ever change one set of accepted rules for another in respect of the same matters.
No, indeed.
So if we see some persons anywhere doing this, shall we say that those who do so have knowledge, or have none?
That they have no knowledge.
And again, whatever is right, we shall say is lawful for each person, whether in medicine or in cookery or in gardening?
Yes.
-
And whatever is not right we shall decline to call lawful?
We shall decline.
Then it becomes unlawful.
It must.
And again, in writings about what is just and unjust, and generally about the government of a state and the proper way of governing it, that which is right is the king's law, but not so that which is not right, though it seems to be law to those who do not know; for it is unlawful.
Yes.
-
Then we rightly admitted that law is discovery of reality.
So it appears.
Now let us observe this further point about it. Who has knowledge of distributing
A farmer.
And does he distribute the suitable seed to each sort of land?
Yes.
Then the farmer is a good apportioner of it, and his laws and distributions are right in this matter?
Yes.
And who is a good apportioner of notes struck for a tune, skilled in distributing suitable notes, and who is it whose laws are right here?
-
The flute-player and the harp-player.
Then he who is the best lawyer in these matters is the best flute-player.
Yes.
And who is most skilled in distributing food to human bodies? Is it not he who assigns suitable food?
Yes.
Then his distributions and laws are best, and whoever is the best lawyer in this matter is also the best apportioner.
Certainly.
Who is he?
A trainer.
-
He is the best man to pasture
Yes.
And who is the best man to pasture a flock of sheep? What is his name?
A shepherd.
Then the shepherd's laws are best for sheep.
Yes.
And the herdsman's for oxen.
Yes.
And whose laws are best for the souls of men? The king's, are they not? Say if you agree.
I do.
-
Then you are quite right. Now can you tell me who, in former times, has proved himself a good lawgiver in regard to the laws of flute-playing? Perhaps you cannot think of him: would you like me to remind you?
Do by all means.
Then is it Marsyas, by tradition, and his beloved
That is true.
And their flute-tunes also are most divine, and alone stir and make manifest those who are in need of the gods;
That is so.
And who by tradition has shown himself a good lawgiver among the ancient kings, so that to this day his ordinances remain, as being divine?
I cannot think.
Do you not know which of the Greeks use the most ancient laws?
Do you mean the Spartans, and Lycurgus the lawgiver?
Why, that is a matter, I daresay, of less than three hundred years ago, or but a little more. But whence is it that
-
From
Then the people there use the most ancient laws in
Yes.
Then do you know who were their good kings? Minos and Rhadamanthus, the sons of Zeus and Europa; those laws were theirs.
Rhadamanthus, they do say, Socrates, was a just man; but Minos was a savage sort of person, harsh and unjust.
Your tale, my excellent friend, is a fiction of Attic tragedy.
-
What! Is not this the tradition about Minos?
Not in Homer and Hesiod; and yet they are more to be believed than all the tragedians together, from whom you heard your tale.
Well, and what, pray, is their tale about Minos?
I will tell you, in order that you may not share the impiety of the multitude: for there cannot conceivably be anything more impious or more to be guarded against than being mistaken in word and deed with regard to the gods, and after them, with regard to divine men; you must take very great precaution, whenever you are about to
-
he was king having colloquy with mighty Zeus in the ninth year” —
Who was most kingly of mortal kings, and lorded it over more neighboring folk than any, holding the scepter of Zeus: therewith it was that he ruled the cities as king.
Then how has it ever come about, Socrates, that this report is spread abroad of Minos, as an uneducated
-
Because of something that will make both you, if you are wise, my excellent friend, and everybody else who cares to have a good reputation, beware of ever quarreling with any man of a poetic turn. For poets have great influence over opinion, according as they create it in the minds of men by either commending or vilifying. And this was the mistake that Minos made, in waging war on this city of ours, which besides all its various culture has poets of every kind, and especially those who write tragedy.
-
In my opinion, Socrates, your statement is a probable one.
Then if what I say is true, do you consider that the Cretan people of Minos and Rhadamanthus use the most ancient laws?
I do.
So these have shown themselves the best lawgivers among men of ancient times—
-
Quite so, indeed.
Come then, in good friendship's name: if someone should ask us what it is that the good lawgiver and apportioner for the body distributes to it when he makes it better, we should say, if we were to make a correct and brief answer, that it was food and labor; the former to strengthen, and the latter to exercise and brace it.
And we should be right.
-
And if he then proceeded to ask us—And what might that be which the good lawgiver and apportioner distributes to the soul to make it better?—what would be our answer if we would avoid being ashamed of ourselves and our years?
This time I am unable to say.
But indeed it is shameful for the soul of either of us to be found ignorant of those things within it on which its good and abject states depend, while it has studied those that pertain to the body and rest.
This pointer pattern extracts section
+Tell me, what is law?
To what kind of law does your question refer?
What! Is there any difference between law and law, in this particular point of being law? For just consider what is the actual question I am putting to you. It is as though I had asked, what is gold: if you had asked me in the same manner, to what kind of gold I refer, I think your question would have been incorrect. For I presume there is no difference between gold and gold,
Well, what else should law be, Socrates, but things loyally accepted? loyally
here attempts to preserve the connection with
And so speech, you think, is the things that are spoken, or sight the things seen, or hearing the things heard? Or is speech
I find it now to be something distinct.
Then law is not things loyally accepted.
I think not.
Now what can law be? Let us consider it in this way. Suppose someone had asked us about what was stated just now:
Certainly.
Then what thing especially of this sort shall we surmise law to be?
Our resolutions and decrees, I imagine: for how else can one describe law?
State opinion, it seems, is what you call law.
I do.
And perhaps you are right: but I fancy we shall get a better knowledge in this way. You call some men wise?
I do.
And the wise are wise by wisdom?
Yes.
And again, the just are just by justice?
Certainly.
And so the law-abiding are law-abiding by law?
Yes.
And the lawless are lawless by lawlessness?
Yes.
And the law-abiding are just?
Yes.
And the lawless are unjust?
Unjust.
And justice and law are most noble?
That is so.
And injustice and lawlessness most base?
Yes.
And the former preserve cities and everything else, while the latter destroy and overturn them?
Yes.
Hence we must regard law as something noble, and seek after it as a good.
Undeniably.
And we said that law is a city’s resolution?
So we did.
Well now, are not some resolutions good, and others evil?
Yes, to be sure.
And, you know, law was not evil.
No, indeed.
So it is not right to reply, in that simple fashion, that law is a city’s resolution.
I agree that it is not.
An evil resolution, you see, cannot properly be a law.
No, to be sure.
But still, I am quite clear myself that law is some sort of opinion; and since it is not evil opinion, is it not manifest by this time that it is good opinion, granting that law is opinion?
Yes.
But what is good opinion? Is it not true opinion?
Yes.
And true opinion is discovery of reality?
Yes, it is.
So law tends to be discovery of reality.
Then how is it, Socrates, if law is discovery of reality, that we do not use always the same laws on the same matters, if we have thus got realities discovered?
Law tends none the less to be discovery of reality: but men, who do not use
Why, that, Socrates, is no difficult matter to determine—that the same men do not use always the same laws, and also that different men use different ones. With us, for instance, human sacrifice is not legal, but unholy,
And it is no wonder, my excellent friend, if what you say is correct, and I have overlooked it. But if you continue to express your views after your own fashion in lengthy speeches,
Why, I am willing, Socrates, to answer anything you like.
Come then, do you consider accepted
law and custom which it had in what precedes; see note, 313 B.
I consider just things to be just, and unjust things unjust.
And are they so considered among all men elsewhere as they are here?
Yes.
And among the Persians also?
Among the Persians also.
Always, I presume?
Always.
Are things that weigh more considered heavier here, and things that weigh less lighter, or the contrary?
No, those that weigh more are considered heavier, and those that weigh less lighter.
And is it so in
Yes.
Noble things, it would seem, are everywhere considered noble,
+
That is so.
And thus, as a universal rule, realities, and not unrealities, are accepted as real, both among us and among all other men.
I agree.
Then whoever fails to attain reality, fails to attain accepted law.
In your present way of putting it, Socrates, the same things appear to be accepted as lawful both by us and by the rest of the world, always:
Perhaps it is because you do not reflect that when we change our pieces at draughts they are the same pieces. But look at it, as I do, in this way. Have you in your time come across a treatise on healing the sick?
I have.
Then do you know to what art such a treatise belongs?
I do: medicine.
And you give the name of doctors to those who have knowledge of these matters?
Yes.
Then do those who have knowledge accept the same views on the same things, or do they accept different views?
The same, in my opinion.
Do Greeks only accept the same views as Greeks on what they know, or do foreigners also agree on these matters, both among themselves and with Greeks?
It is quite inevitable, I should say, that those who know should agree in accepting the same views, whether Greeks or foreigners.
Well answered. And do they so always?
Yes, it is so always.
And do doctors on their part, in their treatises on health,
Yes.
Then these treatises of the doctors are medical, and medical laws.
Medical, to be sure.
And are agricultural treatises likewise agricultural laws?
Yes.
And whose are the treatises and accepted rules about garden-work?
Gardeners’.
So these are our gardening laws.
Yes.
Of people who know how to control gardens?
Certainly.
And it is the gardeners who know.
Yes.
And whose are the treatises and accepted rules about the confection of tasty dishes?
Cooks’.
Then there are laws of cookery?
Of cookery.
Of people who know, it would seem, how to control the confection of tasty dishes?
Yes.
And it is the cooks, they say, who know?
Yes, it is they who know.
Very well; and now, whose are the treatises and accepted rules about the government of a state? Of the people who know how to control states, are they not?
I agree.
And is it anyone else than statesmen and royal persons
It is they, to be sure.
Then what people call laws
are treatises of state,—
That is true.
And must it not be that those who know will not write differently at different times on the same matters?
They will not.
Nor will they ever change one set of accepted rules for another in respect of the same matters.
No, indeed.
So if we see some persons anywhere doing this, shall we say that those who do so have knowledge, or have none?
That they have no knowledge.
And again, whatever is right, we shall say is lawful for each person, whether in medicine or in cookery or in gardening?
Yes.
And whatever is not right we shall decline to call lawful?
We shall decline.
Then it becomes unlawful.
It must.
And again, in writings about what is just and unjust, and generally about the government of a state and the proper way of governing it, that which is right is the king’s law, but not so that which is not right, though it seems to be law to those who do not know; for it is unlawful.
Yes.
Then we rightly admitted that law is discovery of reality.
So it appears.
Now let us observe this further point about it. Who has knowledge of distributing
A farmer.
And does he distribute the suitable seed to each sort of land?
Yes.
Then the farmer is a good apportioner of it, and his laws and distributions are right in this matter?
Yes.
And who is a good apportioner of notes struck for a tune, skilled in distributing suitable notes, and who is it whose laws are right here?
The flute-player and the harp-player.
Then he who is the best lawyer in these matters is the best flute-player.
Yes.
And who is most skilled in distributing food to human bodies? Is it not he who assigns suitable food?
Yes.
Then his distributions and laws are best, and whoever is the best lawyer in this matter is also the best apportioner.
Certainly.
Who is he?
A trainer.
He is the best man to pasture
Yes.
And who is the best man to pasture a flock of sheep? What is his name?
A shepherd.
Then the shepherd’s laws are best for sheep.
Yes.
And the herdsman’s for oxen.
Yes.
And whose laws are best for the souls of men? The king’s, are they not? Say if you agree.
I do.
Then you are quite right. Now can you tell me who, in former times, has proved himself a good lawgiver in regard to the laws of flute-playing? Perhaps you cannot think of him: would you like me to remind you?
Do by all means.
Then is it Marsyas, by tradition, and his beloved
That is true.
And their flute-tunes also are most divine, and alone stir and make manifest those who are in need of the gods;
That is so.
And who by tradition has shown himself a good lawgiver among the ancient kings, so that to this day his ordinances remain, as being divine?
I cannot think.
Do you not know which of the Greeks use the most ancient laws?
Do you mean the Spartans, and Lycurgus the lawgiver?
Why, that is a matter, I daresay, of less than three hundred years ago, or but a little more. But whence is it that
From
Then the people there use the most ancient laws in
Yes.
Then do you know who were their good kings? Minos and Rhadamanthus, the sons of Zeus and Europa; those laws were theirs.
Rhadamanthus, they do say, Socrates, was a just man; but Minos was a savage sort of person, harsh and unjust.
Your tale, my excellent friend, is a fiction of Attic tragedy.
What! Is not this the tradition about Minos?
Not in Homer and Hesiod; and yet they are more to be believed than all the tragedians together, from whom you heard your tale.
Well, and what, pray, is their tale about Minos?
I will tell you, in order that you may not share the impiety of the multitude: for there cannot conceivably be anything more impious or more to be guarded against than being mistaken in word and deed with regard to the gods, and after them, with regard to divine men; you must take very great precaution, whenever you are about to ninety cities,
says:
he was king having colloquy with mighty Zeus in the ninth year” —
Some there are who suppose that he who has colloquy is a cup-companion and fellow-jester of Zeus: but one may take the following as a proof that brazen.
And what Hesiod
Then how has it ever come about, Socrates, that this report is spread abroad of Minos, as an uneducated
Because of something that will make both you, if you are wise, my excellent friend, and everybody else who cares to have a good reputation, beware of ever quarreling with any man of a poetic turn. For poets have great influence over opinion, according as they create it in the minds of men by either commending or vilifying. And this was the mistake that Minos made, in waging war on this city of ours, which besides all its various culture has poets of every kind, and especially those who write tragedy.
In my opinion, Socrates, your statement is a probable one.
Then if what I say is true, do you consider that the Cretan people of Minos and Rhadamanthus use the most ancient laws?
I do.
So these have shown themselves the best lawgivers among men of ancient times— shepherd of the folk.
Quite so, indeed.
Come then, in good friendship’s name: if someone should ask us what it is that the good lawgiver and apportioner for the body distributes to it when he makes it better, we should say, if we were to make a correct and brief answer, that it was food and labor; the former to strengthen, and the latter to exercise and brace it.
And we should be right.
And if he then proceeded to ask us—And what might that be which the good lawgiver and apportioner distributes to the soul to make it better?—what would be our answer if we would avoid being ashamed of ourselves and our years?
This time I am unable to say.
But indeed it is shameful for the soul of either of us to be found ignorant of those things within it on which its good and abject states depend, while it has studied those that pertain to the body and rest.
ὁ νόμος ἡμῖν τί ἐστιν;
ὁποῖον καὶ ἐρωτᾷς τῶν νόμων;
τί δʼ; ἔστιν ὅτι διαφέρει νόμος νόμου κατʼ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, κατὰ τὸ νόμος εἶναι; σκόπει γὰρ δὴ ὃ τυγχάνω ἐρωτῶν σε. ἐρωτῶ γάρ, ὥσπερ εἰ ἀνηρόμην τί ἐστιν χρυσός, εἴ με ὡσαύτως ἀνήρου ὁποῖον καὶ λέγω χρυσόν, οἴομαί σε οὐκ ἂν ὀρθῶς ἐρέσθαι. οὐδὲν γάρ που διαφέρει οὔτε χρυσὸς
-
τί οὖν ἄλλο νόμος εἴη ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλʼ ἢ τὰ νομιζόμενα;
ἦ καὶ λόγος σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὰ λεγόμενα, ἢ ὄψις τὰ ὁρώμενα, ἢ ἀκοὴ τὰ ἀκουόμενα; ἢ ἄλλο μὲν λόγος, ἄλλο
-
ἄλλο μοι νῦν ἐφάνη.
οὐκ ἄρα νόμος ἐστὶν τὰ νομιζόμενα.
οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.
τί δῆτʼ ἂν εἴη νόμος; ἐπισκεψώμεθʼ αὐτὸ ὧδε. εἴ τις ἡμᾶς τὰ νυνδὴ λεγόμενα ἀνήρετο, ἐπειδὴ ὄψει φατὲ
-
ἀπεκρινάμεθʼ ἂν αὐτῷ ὅτι αἰσθήσει ταύτῃ τῇ διὰ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν δηλούσῃ τὰ πράγματα· εἰ δʼ αὖ ἤρετο ἡμᾶς, τί δέ; ἐπειδὴ ἀκοῇ τὰ ἀκουόμενα ἀκούεται, τίνι ὄντι τῇ ἀκοῇ;
ἀπεκρινάμεθʼ ἂν αὐτῷ ὅτι αἰσθήσει ταύτῃ τῇ διὰ τῶν ὤτων δηλούσῃ ἡμῖν τὰς φωνάς. οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ εἰ ἀνέροιτο ἡμᾶς, ἐπειδὴ νόμῳ τὰ νομιζόμενα νομίζεται, τίνι ὄντι τῷ νόμῳ νομίζεται;
-
πάνυ γε.
τί οὖν ἂν τούτων ὑπολάβοιμεν μάλιστα τὸν νόμον εἶναι;
τὰ δόγματα ταῦτα καὶ ψηφίσματα, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. τί γὰρ ἂν ἄλλο τις φαίη νόμον εἶναι; ὥστε κινδυνεύει, ὃ
-
δόξαν, ὡς ἔοικε, λέγεις πολιτικὴν τὸν νόμον.
ἔγωγε.
καὶ ἴσως καλῶς λέγεις· τάχα δὲ ὧδε ἄμεινον εἰσόμεθα. λέγεις τινὰς σοφούς;
ἔγωγε.
οὐκοῦν οἱ σοφοί εἰσιν σοφίᾳ σοφοί;
ναί.
τί δέ; οἱ δίκαιοι δικαιοσύνῃ δίκαιοι;
πάνυ γε.
οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ νόμιμοι νόμῳ νόμιμοι;
ναί.
οἱ δὲ
-
ναί.
οἱ δὲ νόμιμοι δίκαιοι;
ναί.
οἱ δὲ ἄνομοι ἄδικοι;
ἄδικοι.
οὐκοῦν κάλλιστον ἡ δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ ὁ νόμος;
οὕτως.
αἴσχιστον δὲ ἡ ἀδικία τε καὶ ἡ ἀνομία;
ναί.
καὶ τὸ μὲν σῴζει τὰς πόλεις καὶ τἆλλα πάντα, τὸ δὲ ἀπόλλυσι καὶ ἀνατρέπει;
ναί.
ὡς περὶ καλοῦ ἄρα τινὸς ὄντος δεῖ τοῦ νόμου διανοεῖσθαι, καὶ ὡς ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ ζητεῖν.
πῶς δʼ οὔ;
οὐκοῦν δόγμα ἔφαμεν εἶναι πόλεως τὸν νόμον;
-
ἔφαμεν γάρ.
τί οὖν; οὐκ ἔστιν τὰ μὲν χρηστὰ δόγματα, τὰ δὲ πονηρά;
ἔστιν μὲν οὖν.
καὶ μὴν νόμος γε οὐκ ἦν πονηρός.
οὐ γάρ.
οὐκ ἄρα ὀρθῶς ἔχει ἀποκρίνεσθαι οὕτως ἁπλῶς ὅτι νόμος ἐστὶ δόγμα πόλεως.
οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
οὐκ ἄρα ἁρμόττοι ἂν τὸ πονηρὸν δόγμα νόμος εἶναι.
οὐ δῆτα.
ἀλλὰ μὴν δόξα γέ τις καὶ αὐτῷ μοι καταφαίνεται ὁ νόμος εἶναι· ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐχ ἡ πονηρὰ δόξα, ἆρα οὐκ ἤδη τοῦτο κατάδηλον, ὡς ἡ χρηστή, εἴπερ δόξα νόμος ἐστί;
ναί.
δόξα δὲ χρηστὴ τίς ἐστιν; οὐχ ἡ ἀληθής;
-
ναί.
οὐκοῦν ἡ ἀληθὴς δόξα τοῦ ὄντος ἐστὶν ἐξεύρεσις;
ἔστιν γάρ.
ὁ νόμος ἄρα βούλεται τοῦ ὄντος εἶναι ἐξεύρεσις.
πῶς οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ ὁ νόμος ἐστὶν τοῦ ὄντος ἐξεύρεσις, οὐκ ἀεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς νόμοις χρώμεθα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, εἰ τὰ ὄντα γε ἡμῖν ἐξηύρηται;
βούλεται μὲν οὐδὲν ἧττον ὁ νόμος εἶναι τοῦ ὄντος ἐξεύρεσις· οἱ δʼ ἄρα μὴ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀεὶ νόμοις χρώμενοι
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ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ χαλεπὸν γνῶναι, ὅτι οὔτε οἱ αὐτοὶ ἀεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς νόμοις χρῶνται ἄλλοι τε ἄλλοις. ἐπεὶ αὐτίκα ἡμῖν μὲν οὐ νόμος ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπους θύειν ἀλλʼ ἀνόσιον, Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ θύουσιν ὡς ὅσιον ὂν
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οὐδέν τοι θαυμαστόν ἐστιν, ὦ βέλτιστε, εἰ σὺ μὲν ὀρθῶς λέγεις, ἐμὲ δὲ τοῦτο λέληθεν. ἀλλʼ ἕως ἂν σύ τε κατὰ σαυτὸν λέγῃς ἅ σοι δοκεῖ μακρῷ λόγῳ καὶ πάλιν ἐγώ,
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ἀλλʼ ἐθέλω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὅτι ἂν βούλῃ.
φέρε δὴ σύ, πότερα νομίζεις τὰ δίκαια ἄδικα εἶναι καὶ τὰ ἄδικα δίκαια, ἢ τὰ μὲν δίκαια δίκαια, τὰ δὲ ἄδικα ἄδικα;
ἐγὼ μὲν τά τε δίκαια δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα
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οὐκοῦν καὶ παρὰ πᾶσιν οὕτως ὡς ἐνθάδε νομίζεται;
ναί.
οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις;
ἀλλὰ ἀεὶ δήπου;
ἀεί.
πότερον δὲ τὰ πλεῖον ἕλκοντα βαρύτερα νομίζεται ἐνθάδε, τὰ δὲ ἔλαττον κουφότερα, ἢ τοὐναντίον;
οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τὰ πλεῖον ἕλκοντα βαρύτερα, τὰ δὲ ἔλαττον κουφότερα.
οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν Καρχηδόνι καὶ ἐν Λυκαίᾳ;
ναί.
τὰ μὲν καλά, ὡς ἔοικε, πανταχοῦ νομίζεται
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οὕτως.
οὐκοῦν, ὡς κατὰ πάντων εἰπεῖν, τὰ ὄντα νομίζεται εἶναι, οὐ τὰ μὴ ὄντα, καὶ παρʼ ἡμῖν καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν.
ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
ὃς ἂν ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος ἁμαρτάνῃ, τοῦ νομίμου ἁμαρτάνει.
οὕτω μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, καὶ φαίνεται ταῦτα νόμιμα καὶ ἡμῖν ἀεὶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις· ἐπειδὰν δʼ ἐννοήσω
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ἴσως γὰρ οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ταῦτα μεταπεττευόμενα ὅτι ταὐτά ἐστιν. ἀλλʼ ὧδε μετʼ ἐμοῦ αὐτὰ ἄθρει. ἤδη ποτὲ ἐνέτυχες συγγράμματι περὶ ὑγιείας τῶν καμνόντων;
ἔγωγε.
οἶσθα οὖν τίνος τέχνης τοῦτʼ ἐστὶ τὸ σύγγραμμα;
οἶδα, ὅτι ἰατρικῆς.
οὐκοῦν ἰατροὺς καλεῖς τοὺς ἐπιστήμονας περὶ τούτων;
φημί.
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ταὐτὰ ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσι.
πότερον οἱ Ἕλληνες μόνοι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἢ καὶ οἱ βάρβαροι αὑτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς Ἕλλησι, περὶ ὧν ἂν εἰδῶσι, ταὐτὰ νομίζουσι;
ταὐτὰ δήπου πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ἐστὶν τοὺς εἰδότας αὐτοὺς αὑτοῖς συννομίζειν καὶ Ἕλληνας καὶ βαρβάρους.
καλῶς γε ἀπεκρίνω. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀεί;
ναί, καὶ ἀεί.
οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ ἰατροὶ συγγράφουσι περὶ ὑγιείας ἅπερ
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ναί.
ἰατρικὰ ἄρα καὶ ἰατρικοὶ νόμοι ταῦτα τὰ συγγράμματα ἐστὶν τὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν.
ἰατρικὰ μέντοι.
ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ τὰ γεωργικὰ συγγράμματα γεωργικοὶ νόμοι εἰσίν;
ναί.
τίνων οὖν ἐστιν τὰ περὶ κήπων ἐργασίας συγγράμματα καὶ νόμιμα;
κηπουρῶν.
κηπουρικοὶ ἄρα νόμοι ἡμῖν εἰσιν οὗτοι.
ναί.
τῶν ἐπισταμένων κήπων ἄρχειν;
πῶς δʼ οὔ;
ἐπίστανται δʼ οἱ κηπουροί.
ναί.
τίνων δὲ τὰ περὶ ὄψου σκευασίας συγγράμματά τε καὶ νόμιμα;
μαγείρων.
μαγειρικοὶ ἄρα οὗτοι νόμοι εἰσί;
μαγειρικοί.
τῶν ἐπισταμένων, ὡς
-
ναί.
ἐπίστανται δέ, ὥς φασιν, οἱ μάγειροι;
ἐπίστανται γάρ.
εἶεν· τίνων δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ πόλεως διοικήσεως συγγράμματά τε καὶ νόμιμά ἐστιν; ἆρʼ οὐ τῶν ἐπισταμένων πόλεων ἄρχειν;
ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
ἐπίστανται δὲ ἄλλοι τινὲς ἢ οἱ πολιτικοί τε καὶ οἱ βασιλικοί;
οὗτοι μὲν οὖν.
πολιτικὰ ἄρα ταῦτα συγγράμματά ἐστιν, οὓς οἱ ἄνθρωποι νόμους καλοῦσι, βασιλέων τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν
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ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
ἄλλο τι οὖν οἵ γε ἐπιστάμενοι οὐκ ἄλλοτε ἄλλα συγγράψουσι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν;
οὔ.
οὐδὲ μεταθήσονταί ποτε περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα νόμιμα;
οὐ δῆτα.
ἐὰν οὖν ὁρῶμέν τινας ὁπουοῦν τοῦτο ποιοῦντας, πότερα φήσομεν ἐπιστήμονας εἶναι ἢ ἀνεπιστήμονας τοὺς τοῦτο ποιοῦντας;
ἀνεπιστήμονας.
οὐκοῦν καὶ ὃ μὲν ἂν ὀρθὸν ᾖ, νόμιμον αὐτὸ φήσομεν ἑκάστῳ εἶναι, ἢ τὸ ἰατρικὸν ἢ τὸ μαγειρικὸν ἢ τὸ κηπουρικόν;
-
ναί.
ὃ δʼ ἂν μὴ ὀρθὸν ᾖ, οὐκέτι φήσομεν τοῦτο νόμιμον εἶναι;
οὐκέτι.
ἄνομον ἄρα γίγνεται.
ἀνάγκη.
οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν τοῖς συγγράμμασι τοῖς περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ ὅλως περὶ πόλεως διακοσμήσεώς τε καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὡς χρὴ πόλιν διοικεῖν, τὸ μὲν ὀρθὸν νόμος ἐστὶ βασιλικός, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὀρθὸν οὔ, ὃ δοκεῖ νόμος εἶναι τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν· ἔστιν γὰρ ἄνομον.
ναί.
-
ὀρθῶς ἄρα ὡμολογήσαμεν νόμον εἶναι τοῦ ὄντος εὕρεσιν.
φαίνεται.
ἔτι δὲ καὶ τόδε ἐν αὐτῷ διαθεώμεθα. τίς ἐπιστήμων διανεῖμαι ἐπὶ γῇ τὰ σπέρματα;
γεωργός.
οὗτος δὲ τὰ ἄξια σπέρματα ἑκάστῃ γῇ διανέμει;
ναί.
ὁ γεωργὸς ἄρα νομεὺς ἀγαθὸς τούτων, καὶ οἱ τούτου νόμοι καὶ διανομαὶ ἐπὶ ταῦτα ὀρθαί εἰσιν;
ναί.
τίς δὲ κρουμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ μέλη ἀγαθὸς νομεύς, καὶ τὰ ἄξια νεῖμαι; καὶ οἱ τίνος νόμοι ὀρθοί εἰσιν;
οἱ τοῦ
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ὁ νομικώτατος ἄρα ἐν τούτοις, οὗτος αὐλητικώτατος.
ναί.
τίς δὲ τὴν τροφὴν ἐπὶ τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων σώματα διανεῖμαι ἄριστος; οὐχ ὅσπερ τὴν ἀξίαν;
ναί.
αἱ τούτου ἄρα διανομαὶ καὶ οἱ νόμοι βέλτιστοι, καὶ ὅστις περὶ ταῦτα νομικώτατος, καὶ νομεὺς ἄριστος.
πάνυ γε.
τίς οὗτος;
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παιδοτρίβης.
οὗτος τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν ἀγέλην τοῦ σώματος νέμειν κράτιστος;
ναί.
τίς δὲ τὴν τῶν προβάτων ἀγέλην κράτιστος νέμειν; τί ὄνομα αὐτῷ;
ποιμήν.
οἱ τοῦ ποιμένος ἄρα νόμοι ἄριστοι τοῖς προβάτοις.
ναί.
οἱ δὲ τοῦ βουκόλου τοῖς βουσί.
ναί.
οἱ δὲ τοῦ τίνος νόμοι ἄριστοι ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων; οὐχ οἱ τοῦ βασιλέως; φάθι.
φημὶ δή.
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καλῶς τοίνυν λέγεις. ἔχοις ἂν οὖν εἰπεῖν τίς τῶν παλαιῶν ἀγαθὸς γέγονεν ἐν τοῖς αὐλητικοῖς νόμοις νομοθέτης; ἴσως οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ βούλει σε ὑπομνήσω;
πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ἆρʼ οὖν ὁ Μαρσύας λέγεται καὶ τὰ παιδικὰ αὐτοῦ Ὄλυμπος ὁ Φρύξ;
ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
τούτων δὴ καὶ τὰ αὐλήματα θειότατά ἐστι, καὶ μόνα κινεῖ καὶ ἐκφαίνει τοὺς τῶν θεῶν ἐν χρείᾳ ὄντας· καὶ ἔτι καὶ
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ἔστι ταῦτα.
τίς δὲ λέγεται τῶν παλαιῶν βασιλέων ἀγαθὸς νομοθέτης γεγονέναι, οὗ ἔτι καὶ νῦν τὰ νόμιμα μένει ὡς θεῖα ὄντα;
οὐκ ἐννοῶ.
οὐκ οἶσθα τίνες παλαιοτάτοις νόμοις χρῶνται τῶν Ἑλλήνων;
ἆρα Λακεδαιμονίους λέγεις καὶ Λυκοῦργον τὸν νομοθέτην;
ἀλλὰ ταῦτά γε οὐδέπω ἴσως ἔτη τριακόσια ἢ ὀλίγῳ τούτων πλείω. ἀλλὰ τούτων τῶν νομίμων τὰ βέλτιστα πόθεν
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φασί γε ἐκ Κρήτης.
οὐκοῦν οὗτοι παλαιοτάτοις νόμοις χρῶνται τῶν Ἑλλήνων;
ναί.
οἶσθα οὖν τίνες τούτων ἀγαθοὶ βασιλῆς ἦσαν; Μίνως καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυς, οἱ Διὸς καὶ Εὐρώπης παῖδες, ὧν οἵδε εἰσὶν οἱ νόμοι.
Ῥαδάμανθύν γέ φασιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, δίκαιον ἄνδρα, τὸν δὲ Μίνων ἄγριόν τινα καὶ χαλεπὸν καὶ ἄδικον.
Ἀττικόν, ὦ βέλτιστε, λέγεις μῦθον καὶ τραγικόν.
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τί δέ; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεται περὶ Μίνω;
οὔκουν ὑπό γε Ὁμήρου καὶ Ἡσιόδου· καίτοι γε πιθανώτεροί εἰσιν ἢ σύμπαντες οἱ τραγῳδοποιοί, ὧν σὺ ἀκούων ταῦτα λέγεις.
ἀλλὰ τί μὴν οὗτοι περὶ Μίνω λέγουσιν;
ἐγὼ δή σοι ἐρῶ, ἵνα μὴ καὶ σὺ ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ ἀσεβῇς. οὐ γὰρ ἔσθʼ ὅτι τούτου ἀσεβέστερόν ἐστιν οὐδʼ ὅτι χρὴ μᾶλλον εὐλαβεῖσθαι, πλὴν εἰς θεοὺς καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ ἐξαμαρτάνειν, δεύτερον δὲ εἰς τοὺς θείους ἀνθρώπους· ἀλλὰ πάνυ πολλὴν χρὴ προμήθειαν ποιεῖσθαι ἀεί, ὅταν μέλλῃς
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διὰ τί οὖν ποτε, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὕτη ἡ φήμη κατεσκέδασται
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διʼ ὃ καὶ σύ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἐὰν σωφρονῇς, εὐλαβήσῃ, καὶ ἄλλος πᾶς ἀνὴρ ὅτῳ μέλει τοῦ εὐδόκιμον εἶναι, μηδέποτε ἀπεχθάνεσθαι ἀνδρὶ ποιητικῷ μηδενί. οἱ γὰρ ποιηταὶ μέγα δύνανται εἰς δόξαν, ἐφʼ ὁπότερα ἂν ποιῶσιν εἰς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἢ εὐλογοῦντες ἢ κακηγοροῦντες. ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐξήμαρτεν ὁ Μίνως, πολεμήσας τῇδε τῇ πόλει, ἐν ᾗ ἄλλη τε πολλὴ σοφία ἐστὶ καὶ ποιηταὶ παντοδαποὶ τῆς τε ἄλλης ποιήσεως
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δοκεῖς μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰκότα τὸν λόγον εἰρηκέναι.
οὐκοῦν εἰ ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω, δοκοῦσί σοι παλαιοτάτοις Κρῆτες οἱ Μίνω καὶ Ῥαδαμάνθυος πολῖται νόμοις χρῆσθαι;
φαίνονται.
οὗτοι ἄρα τῶν παλαιῶν ἄριστοι νομοθέται γεγόνασιν,
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πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
φέρε δὴ πρὸς Διὸς φιλίου· εἴ τις ἡμᾶς ἔροιτο, ὁ τῷ σώματι ἀγαθὸς νομοθέτης τε καὶ νομεὺς τί ἐστιν ταῦτα ἃ διανέμων ἐπὶ τὸ σῶμα βέλτιον αὐτὸ ποιεῖ, εἴποιμεν ἂν καλῶς τε καὶ διὰ βραχέων ἀποκρινόμενοι, ὅτι τροφήν τε καὶ πόνους, τῇ μὲν αὔξων, τοῖς δὲ γυμνάζων καὶ συνιστὰς τὸ σῶμα αὐτό.
ὀρθῶς γε.
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εἰ οὖν δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔροιτο ἡμᾶς, τί δὲ δή ποτε ἐκεῖνά ἐστιν,
τί ἂν ἀποκρινάμενοι οὐκ ἂν αἰσχυνθεῖμεν καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς ἡλικίας αὑτῶν;
οὐκέτι τοῦτʼ ἔχω εἰπεῖν.
ἀλλὰ μέντοι αἰσχρόν γε τῇ ψυχῇ ἡμῶν ἐστιν ἑκατέρου, τὰ μὲν ἐν αὐταῖς φαίνεσθαι μὴ εἰδυίας, ἐν οἷς αὐταῖς ἔνεστι καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ φλαῦρον, τὰ δὲ τοῦ σώματος καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐσκέφθαι.
This pointer pattern extracts section
+ὁ νόμος ἡμῖν τί ἐστιν;
ὁποῖον καὶ ἐρωτᾷς τῶν νόμων;
τί δʼ; ἔστιν ὅτι διαφέρει νόμος νόμου κατʼ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, κατὰ τὸ νόμος εἶναι; σκόπει γὰρ δὴ ὃ τυγχάνω ἐρωτῶν σε. ἐρωτῶ γάρ, ὥσπερ εἰ ἀνηρόμην τί ἐστιν χρυσός, εἴ με ὡσαύτως ἀνήρου ὁποῖον καὶ λέγω χρυσόν, οἴομαί σε οὐκ ἂν ὀρθῶς ἐρέσθαι. οὐδὲν γάρ που διαφέρει οὔτε χρυσὸς
τί οὖν ἄλλο νόμος εἴη ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλʼ ἢ τὰ νομιζόμενα;
ἦ καὶ λόγος σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὰ λεγόμενα, ἢ ὄψις τὰ ὁρώμενα, ἢ ἀκοὴ τὰ ἀκουόμενα; ἢ ἄλλο μὲν λόγος, ἄλλο
ἄλλο μοι νῦν ἐφάνη.
οὐκ ἄρα νόμος ἐστὶν τὰ νομιζόμενα.
οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.
τί δῆτʼ ἂν εἴη νόμος; ἐπισκεψώμεθʼ αὐτὸ ὧδε. εἴ τις ἡμᾶς τὰ νυνδὴ λεγόμενα ἀνήρετο, ἐπειδὴ ὄψει φατὲ
ἀπεκρινάμεθʼ ἂν αὐτῷ ὅτι αἰσθήσει ταύτῃ τῇ διὰ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν δηλούσῃ τὰ πράγματα· εἰ δʼ αὖ ἤρετο ἡμᾶς, τί δέ; ἐπειδὴ ἀκοῇ τὰ ἀκουόμενα ἀκούεται, τίνι ὄντι τῇ ἀκοῇ;
ἀπεκρινάμεθʼ ἂν αὐτῷ ὅτι αἰσθήσει ταύτῃ τῇ διὰ τῶν ὤτων δηλούσῃ ἡμῖν τὰς φωνάς. οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ εἰ ἀνέροιτο ἡμᾶς, ἐπειδὴ νόμῳ τὰ νομιζόμενα νομίζεται, τίνι ὄντι τῷ νόμῳ νομίζεται;
πάνυ γε.
τί οὖν ἂν τούτων ὑπολάβοιμεν μάλιστα τὸν νόμον εἶναι;
τὰ δόγματα ταῦτα καὶ ψηφίσματα, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. τί γὰρ ἂν ἄλλο τις φαίη νόμον εἶναι; ὥστε κινδυνεύει, ὃ
δόξαν, ὡς ἔοικε, λέγεις πολιτικὴν τὸν νόμον.
ἔγωγε.
καὶ ἴσως καλῶς λέγεις· τάχα δὲ ὧδε ἄμεινον εἰσόμεθα. λέγεις τινὰς σοφούς;
ἔγωγε.
οὐκοῦν οἱ σοφοί εἰσιν σοφίᾳ σοφοί;
ναί.
τί δέ; οἱ δίκαιοι δικαιοσύνῃ δίκαιοι;
πάνυ γε.
οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ νόμιμοι νόμῳ νόμιμοι;
ναί.
οἱ δὲ
ναί.
οἱ δὲ νόμιμοι δίκαιοι;
ναί.
οἱ δὲ ἄνομοι ἄδικοι;
ἄδικοι.
οὐκοῦν κάλλιστον ἡ δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ ὁ νόμος;
οὕτως.
αἴσχιστον δὲ ἡ ἀδικία τε καὶ ἡ ἀνομία;
ναί.
καὶ τὸ μὲν σῴζει τὰς πόλεις καὶ τἆλλα πάντα, τὸ δὲ ἀπόλλυσι καὶ ἀνατρέπει;
ναί.
ὡς περὶ καλοῦ ἄρα τινὸς ὄντος δεῖ τοῦ νόμου διανοεῖσθαι, καὶ ὡς ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ ζητεῖν.
πῶς δʼ οὔ;
οὐκοῦν δόγμα ἔφαμεν εἶναι πόλεως τὸν νόμον;
ἔφαμεν γάρ.
τί οὖν; οὐκ ἔστιν τὰ μὲν χρηστὰ δόγματα, τὰ δὲ πονηρά;
ἔστιν μὲν οὖν.
καὶ μὴν νόμος γε οὐκ ἦν πονηρός.
οὐ γάρ.
οὐκ ἄρα ὀρθῶς ἔχει ἀποκρίνεσθαι οὕτως ἁπλῶς ὅτι νόμος ἐστὶ δόγμα πόλεως.
οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
οὐκ ἄρα ἁρμόττοι ἂν τὸ πονηρὸν δόγμα νόμος εἶναι.
οὐ δῆτα.
ἀλλὰ μὴν δόξα γέ τις καὶ αὐτῷ μοι καταφαίνεται ὁ νόμος εἶναι· ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐχ ἡ πονηρὰ δόξα, ἆρα οὐκ ἤδη τοῦτο κατάδηλον, ὡς ἡ χρηστή, εἴπερ δόξα νόμος ἐστί;
ναί.
δόξα δὲ χρηστὴ τίς ἐστιν; οὐχ ἡ ἀληθής;
ναί.
οὐκοῦν ἡ ἀληθὴς δόξα τοῦ ὄντος ἐστὶν ἐξεύρεσις;
ἔστιν γάρ.
ὁ νόμος ἄρα βούλεται τοῦ ὄντος εἶναι ἐξεύρεσις.
πῶς οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ ὁ νόμος ἐστὶν τοῦ ὄντος ἐξεύρεσις, οὐκ ἀεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς νόμοις χρώμεθα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, εἰ τὰ ὄντα γε ἡμῖν ἐξηύρηται;
βούλεται μὲν οὐδὲν ἧττον ὁ νόμος εἶναι τοῦ ὄντος ἐξεύρεσις· οἱ δʼ ἄρα μὴ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀεὶ νόμοις χρώμενοι
ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ χαλεπὸν γνῶναι, ὅτι οὔτε οἱ αὐτοὶ ἀεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς νόμοις χρῶνται ἄλλοι τε ἄλλοις. ἐπεὶ αὐτίκα ἡμῖν μὲν οὐ νόμος ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπους θύειν ἀλλʼ ἀνόσιον, Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ θύουσιν ὡς ὅσιον ὂν
οὐδέν τοι θαυμαστόν ἐστιν, ὦ βέλτιστε, εἰ σὺ μὲν ὀρθῶς λέγεις, ἐμὲ δὲ τοῦτο λέληθεν. ἀλλʼ ἕως ἂν σύ τε κατὰ σαυτὸν λέγῃς ἅ σοι δοκεῖ μακρῷ λόγῳ καὶ πάλιν ἐγώ,
ἀλλʼ ἐθέλω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὅτι ἂν βούλῃ.
φέρε δὴ σύ, πότερα νομίζεις τὰ δίκαια ἄδικα εἶναι καὶ τὰ ἄδικα δίκαια, ἢ τὰ μὲν δίκαια δίκαια, τὰ δὲ ἄδικα ἄδικα;
ἐγὼ μὲν τά τε δίκαια δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα
οὐκοῦν καὶ παρὰ πᾶσιν οὕτως ὡς ἐνθάδε νομίζεται;
ναί.
οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις;
ἀλλὰ ἀεὶ δήπου;
ἀεί.
πότερον δὲ τὰ πλεῖον ἕλκοντα βαρύτερα νομίζεται ἐνθάδε, τὰ δὲ ἔλαττον κουφότερα, ἢ τοὐναντίον;
οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τὰ πλεῖον ἕλκοντα βαρύτερα, τὰ δὲ ἔλαττον κουφότερα.
οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν Καρχηδόνι καὶ ἐν Λυκαίᾳ;
ναί.
τὰ μὲν καλά, ὡς ἔοικε, πανταχοῦ νομίζεται
οὕτως.
οὐκοῦν, ὡς κατὰ πάντων εἰπεῖν, τὰ ὄντα νομίζεται εἶναι, οὐ τὰ μὴ ὄντα, καὶ παρʼ ἡμῖν καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν.
ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
ὃς ἂν ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος ἁμαρτάνῃ, τοῦ νομίμου ἁμαρτάνει.
οὕτω μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, καὶ φαίνεται ταῦτα νόμιμα καὶ ἡμῖν ἀεὶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις· ἐπειδὰν δʼ ἐννοήσω
ἴσως γὰρ οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ταῦτα μεταπεττευόμενα ὅτι ταὐτά ἐστιν. ἀλλʼ ὧδε μετʼ ἐμοῦ αὐτὰ ἄθρει. ἤδη ποτὲ ἐνέτυχες συγγράμματι περὶ ὑγιείας τῶν καμνόντων;
ἔγωγε.
οἶσθα οὖν τίνος τέχνης τοῦτʼ ἐστὶ τὸ σύγγραμμα;
οἶδα, ὅτι ἰατρικῆς.
οὐκοῦν ἰατροὺς καλεῖς τοὺς ἐπιστήμονας περὶ τούτων;
φημί.
πότερον οὖν οἱ ἐπιστήμονες ταὐτὰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν νομίζουσιν ἢ ἄλλοι ἄλλα;
ταὐτὰ ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσι.
πότερον οἱ Ἕλληνες μόνοι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἢ καὶ οἱ βάρβαροι αὑτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς Ἕλλησι, περὶ ὧν ἂν εἰδῶσι, ταὐτὰ νομίζουσι;
ταὐτὰ δήπου πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ἐστὶν τοὺς εἰδότας αὐτοὺς αὑτοῖς συννομίζειν καὶ Ἕλληνας καὶ βαρβάρους.
καλῶς γε ἀπεκρίνω. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀεί;
ναί, καὶ ἀεί.
οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ ἰατροὶ συγγράφουσι περὶ ὑγιείας ἅπερ
ναί.
ἰατρικὰ ἄρα καὶ ἰατρικοὶ νόμοι ταῦτα τὰ συγγράμματα ἐστὶν τὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν.
ἰατρικὰ μέντοι.
ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ τὰ γεωργικὰ συγγράμματα γεωργικοὶ νόμοι εἰσίν;
ναί.
τίνων οὖν ἐστιν τὰ περὶ κήπων ἐργασίας συγγράμματα καὶ νόμιμα;
κηπουρῶν.
κηπουρικοὶ ἄρα νόμοι ἡμῖν εἰσιν οὗτοι.
ναί.
τῶν ἐπισταμένων κήπων ἄρχειν;
πῶς δʼ οὔ;
ἐπίστανται δʼ οἱ κηπουροί.
ναί.
τίνων δὲ τὰ περὶ ὄψου σκευασίας συγγράμματά τε καὶ νόμιμα;
μαγείρων.
μαγειρικοὶ ἄρα οὗτοι νόμοι εἰσί;
μαγειρικοί.
τῶν ἐπισταμένων, ὡς
ναί.
ἐπίστανται δέ, ὥς φασιν, οἱ μάγειροι;
ἐπίστανται γάρ.
εἶεν· τίνων δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ πόλεως διοικήσεως συγγράμματά τε καὶ νόμιμά ἐστιν; ἆρʼ οὐ τῶν ἐπισταμένων πόλεων ἄρχειν;
ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
ἐπίστανται δὲ ἄλλοι τινὲς ἢ οἱ πολιτικοί τε καὶ οἱ βασιλικοί;
οὗτοι μὲν οὖν.
πολιτικὰ ἄρα ταῦτα συγγράμματά ἐστιν, οὓς οἱ ἄνθρωποι νόμους καλοῦσι, βασιλέων τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν
ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
ἄλλο τι οὖν οἵ γε ἐπιστάμενοι οὐκ ἄλλοτε ἄλλα συγγράψουσι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν;
οὔ.
οὐδὲ μεταθήσονταί ποτε περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα νόμιμα;
οὐ δῆτα.
ἐὰν οὖν ὁρῶμέν τινας ὁπουοῦν τοῦτο ποιοῦντας, πότερα φήσομεν ἐπιστήμονας εἶναι ἢ ἀνεπιστήμονας τοὺς τοῦτο ποιοῦντας;
ἀνεπιστήμονας.
οὐκοῦν καὶ ὃ μὲν ἂν ὀρθὸν ᾖ, νόμιμον αὐτὸ φήσομεν ἑκάστῳ εἶναι, ἢ τὸ ἰατρικὸν ἢ τὸ μαγειρικὸν ἢ τὸ κηπουρικόν;
ναί.
ὃ δʼ ἂν μὴ ὀρθὸν ᾖ, οὐκέτι φήσομεν τοῦτο νόμιμον εἶναι;
οὐκέτι.
ἄνομον ἄρα γίγνεται.
ἀνάγκη.
οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν τοῖς συγγράμμασι τοῖς περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ ὅλως περὶ πόλεως διακοσμήσεώς τε καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὡς χρὴ πόλιν διοικεῖν, τὸ μὲν ὀρθὸν νόμος ἐστὶ βασιλικός, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὀρθὸν οὔ, ὃ δοκεῖ νόμος εἶναι τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν· ἔστιν γὰρ ἄνομον.
ναί.
ὀρθῶς ἄρα ὡμολογήσαμεν νόμον εἶναι τοῦ ὄντος εὕρεσιν.
φαίνεται.
ἔτι δὲ καὶ τόδε ἐν αὐτῷ διαθεώμεθα. τίς ἐπιστήμων διανεῖμαι ἐπὶ γῇ τὰ σπέρματα;
γεωργός.
οὗτος δὲ τὰ ἄξια σπέρματα ἑκάστῃ γῇ διανέμει;
ναί.
ὁ γεωργὸς ἄρα νομεὺς ἀγαθὸς τούτων, καὶ οἱ τούτου νόμοι καὶ διανομαὶ ἐπὶ ταῦτα ὀρθαί εἰσιν;
ναί.
τίς δὲ κρουμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ μέλη ἀγαθὸς νομεύς, καὶ τὰ ἄξια νεῖμαι; καὶ οἱ τίνος νόμοι ὀρθοί εἰσιν;
οἱ τοῦ
ὁ νομικώτατος ἄρα ἐν τούτοις, οὗτος αὐλητικώτατος.
ναί.
τίς δὲ τὴν τροφὴν ἐπὶ τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων σώματα διανεῖμαι ἄριστος; οὐχ ὅσπερ τὴν ἀξίαν;
ναί.
αἱ τούτου ἄρα διανομαὶ καὶ οἱ νόμοι βέλτιστοι, καὶ ὅστις περὶ ταῦτα νομικώτατος, καὶ νομεὺς ἄριστος.
πάνυ γε.
τίς οὗτος;
παιδοτρίβης.
οὗτος τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν ἀγέλην τοῦ σώματος νέμειν κράτιστος;
ναί.
τίς δὲ τὴν τῶν προβάτων ἀγέλην κράτιστος νέμειν; τί ὄνομα αὐτῷ;
ποιμήν.
οἱ τοῦ ποιμένος ἄρα νόμοι ἄριστοι τοῖς προβάτοις.
ναί.
οἱ δὲ τοῦ βουκόλου τοῖς βουσί.
ναί.
οἱ δὲ τοῦ τίνος νόμοι ἄριστοι ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων; οὐχ οἱ τοῦ βασιλέως; φάθι.
φημὶ δή.
καλῶς τοίνυν λέγεις. ἔχοις ἂν οὖν εἰπεῖν τίς τῶν παλαιῶν ἀγαθὸς γέγονεν ἐν τοῖς αὐλητικοῖς νόμοις νομοθέτης; ἴσως οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ βούλει σε ὑπομνήσω;
πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ἆρʼ οὖν ὁ Μαρσύας λέγεται καὶ τὰ παιδικὰ αὐτοῦ Ὄλυμπος ὁ Φρύξ;
ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
τούτων δὴ καὶ τὰ αὐλήματα θειότατά ἐστι, καὶ μόνα κινεῖ καὶ ἐκφαίνει τοὺς τῶν θεῶν ἐν χρείᾳ ὄντας· καὶ ἔτι καὶ
ἔστι ταῦτα.
τίς δὲ λέγεται τῶν παλαιῶν βασιλέων ἀγαθὸς νομοθέτης γεγονέναι, οὗ ἔτι καὶ νῦν τὰ νόμιμα μένει ὡς θεῖα ὄντα;
οὐκ ἐννοῶ.
οὐκ οἶσθα τίνες παλαιοτάτοις νόμοις χρῶνται τῶν Ἑλλήνων;
ἆρα Λακεδαιμονίους λέγεις καὶ Λυκοῦργον τὸν νομοθέτην;
ἀλλὰ ταῦτά γε οὐδέπω ἴσως ἔτη τριακόσια ἢ ὀλίγῳ τούτων πλείω. ἀλλὰ τούτων τῶν νομίμων τὰ βέλτιστα πόθεν
φασί γε ἐκ Κρήτης.
οὐκοῦν οὗτοι παλαιοτάτοις νόμοις χρῶνται τῶν Ἑλλήνων;
ναί.
οἶσθα οὖν τίνες τούτων ἀγαθοὶ βασιλῆς ἦσαν; Μίνως καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυς, οἱ Διὸς καὶ Εὐρώπης παῖδες, ὧν οἵδε εἰσὶν οἱ νόμοι.
Ῥαδάμανθύν γέ φασιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, δίκαιον ἄνδρα, τὸν δὲ Μίνων ἄγριόν τινα καὶ χαλεπὸν καὶ ἄδικον.
Ἀττικόν, ὦ βέλτιστε, λέγεις μῦθον καὶ τραγικόν.
τί δέ; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεται περὶ Μίνω;
οὔκουν ὑπό γε Ὁμήρου καὶ Ἡσιόδου· καίτοι γε πιθανώτεροί εἰσιν ἢ σύμπαντες οἱ τραγῳδοποιοί, ὧν σὺ ἀκούων ταῦτα λέγεις.
ἀλλὰ τί μὴν οὗτοι περὶ Μίνω λέγουσιν;
ἐγὼ δή σοι ἐρῶ, ἵνα μὴ καὶ σὺ ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ ἀσεβῇς. οὐ γὰρ ἔσθʼ ὅτι τούτου ἀσεβέστερόν ἐστιν οὐδʼ ὅτι χρὴ μᾶλλον εὐλαβεῖσθαι, πλὴν εἰς θεοὺς καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ ἐξαμαρτάνειν, δεύτερον δὲ εἰς τοὺς θείους ἀνθρώπους· ἀλλὰ πάνυ πολλὴν χρὴ προμήθειαν ποιεῖσθαι ἀεί, ὅταν μέλλῃς
εἰσὶν δὲ οἳ ὑπολαμβάνουσι τὸν ὀαριστὴν συμπότην καὶ συμπαιστὴν εἶναι τοῦ Διός, ἀλλὰ τῷδε ἄν τις τεκμηρίῳ χρῷτο ὅτι οὐδὲν λέγουσιν οἱ οὕτως
διὰ τί οὖν ποτε, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὕτη ἡ φήμη κατεσκέδασται
διʼ ὃ καὶ σύ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἐὰν σωφρονῇς, εὐλαβήσῃ, καὶ ἄλλος πᾶς ἀνὴρ ὅτῳ μέλει τοῦ εὐδόκιμον εἶναι, μηδέποτε ἀπεχθάνεσθαι ἀνδρὶ ποιητικῷ μηδενί. οἱ γὰρ ποιηταὶ μέγα δύνανται εἰς δόξαν, ἐφʼ ὁπότερα ἂν ποιῶσιν εἰς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἢ εὐλογοῦντες ἢ κακηγοροῦντες. ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐξήμαρτεν ὁ Μίνως, πολεμήσας τῇδε τῇ πόλει, ἐν ᾗ ἄλλη τε πολλὴ σοφία ἐστὶ καὶ ποιηταὶ παντοδαποὶ τῆς τε ἄλλης ποιήσεως
δοκεῖς μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰκότα τὸν λόγον εἰρηκέναι.
οὐκοῦν εἰ ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω, δοκοῦσί σοι παλαιοτάτοις Κρῆτες οἱ Μίνω καὶ Ῥαδαμάνθυος πολῖται νόμοις χρῆσθαι;
φαίνονται.
οὗτοι ἄρα τῶν παλαιῶν ἄριστοι νομοθέται γεγόνασιν,
πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
φέρε δὴ πρὸς Διὸς φιλίου· εἴ τις ἡμᾶς ἔροιτο, ὁ τῷ σώματι ἀγαθὸς νομοθέτης τε καὶ νομεὺς τί ἐστιν ταῦτα ἃ διανέμων ἐπὶ τὸ σῶμα βέλτιον αὐτὸ ποιεῖ, εἴποιμεν ἂν καλῶς τε καὶ διὰ βραχέων ἀποκρινόμενοι, ὅτι τροφήν τε καὶ πόνους, τῇ μὲν αὔξων, τοῖς δὲ γυμνάζων καὶ συνιστὰς τὸ σῶμα αὐτό.
ὀρθῶς γε.
εἰ οὖν δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔροιτο ἡμᾶς, τί δὲ δή ποτε ἐκεῖνά ἐστιν,
τί ἂν ἀποκρινάμενοι οὐκ ἂν αἰσχυνθεῖμεν καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς ἡλικίας αὑτῶν;
οὐκέτι τοῦτʼ ἔχω εἰπεῖν.
ἀλλὰ μέντοι αἰσχρόν γε τῇ ψυχῇ ἡμῶν ἐστιν ἑκατέρου, τὰ μὲν ἐν αὐταῖς φαίνεσθαι μὴ εἰδυίας, ἐν οἷς αὐταῖς ἔνεστι καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ φλαῦρον, τὰ δὲ τοῦ σώματος καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐσκέφθαι.