optical character recognition
-Plutarch's essay on the study of poetry is not a discussion of the essentials - of poetry, nor an analysis of its various kinds after the manner of - Aristotle's Poetics, but it is concerned with poetry only as a means of - training the young in preparation for the study of philosophy later. Some - experience with the adumbrations of philosophic doctrines which are to be - found in poetry will, in the opinion of the author, make such doctrines seem - less strange when they are met later in the actual study of philosophy.
-This training is to be imparted, not by confining the reading to selected - passages, but by teaching the young to recognize and ignore the false and - fabulous in poetry, to choose always the better interpretation, and, in - immoral passages where art is employed for art's sake, not to be deluded - into approving vicious sentiments because of their artistic presentation. - Such passages may be offset by other passages from the same author or from - another author, and, as a last resort, one may try his hand at emending - unsavoury lines to make them conform to a higher ethical standard. This last - proposal seems to the modern reader a weak subterfuge, but it was a practice - not unknown even before Plutarch's time.
-Philology, in the narrower sense, Plutarch says, is a science in itself, and
- a knowledge of it is not
The various points in the essay are illustrated by plentiful quotations drawn - in the main from Homer, Hesiod, Archilochus, Pindar, Simonides, Theognis, - Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and Menander. These are accompanied by many - keen and intelligent observations (such, for example, as that regarding - Paris), which attest Plutarch's wide and careful reading in the classical - authors.
-The fact that Plutarch does not use the methods of historical criticism will - not escape the reader, and, although this seems to us a great defect in the - essay, it is wholly in keeping with the spirit of Plutarch's age. On the - other hand there is well shown the genial and kindly Plutarch, who wishes to - believe only good of all men, including the poets, however much they may - fall short of the standards set by the divine Homer.
-If, my dear Marcus Sedatus, it is true, as the poet Philoxenus used to say,
- that of meats those that are not meat, and of fish those that are not fish,
- have the best flavour, let us leave the expounding of this matter to those
- persons of whom Cato said that their palates are more sensitive than their
- minds. And so of philosophical discourses it is clear to us that those
- seemingly not at all philosophical, or even serious, are found more
- enjoyable by the very young, who present themselves at such lectures as
- willing and submissive hearers. For in perusing not only Aesop's Fables, and
- Tales from the Poets, but even the Abaris of Heracleides, the Lycon of
- Ariston, and philosophic doctrines about the soul when these are combined
- with tales from mythology,The Last Judgement
(Gorgias, 523 ff.).Preventitives of intoxication
; herbs or
- seeds (Plutarch, Symp. 647 B, Athenaeus, 24 C),
- or nuts (Plutarch, Symp. 624 C) which were
- eaten, or stones (Pliny, N.H. xxxvii. 9. 124)
- which were hung about the neck, in the belief that they would resist
- drunkenness.Bad may be found in the head of the
- cuttle-fish; good there is also,
because it is very pleasant
- to eat but it makes one's sleep full of bad dreams and subject to strange
- and disturbing fancies, as they say. Similarly also in the art of poetry
- there is much that is pleasant and nourishing for the mind of a youth, but
- quite as much Cf.
- Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroemiographi
- Graeci, i. p. 299; Plutarch, Moralia, 734 E.Drugs, and some are good when mixed and
- others baneful
to those who cultivate it. Od. iv.
- 230.Hidden therein are love and desire and winning converse, Suasion that
- steals away the mind of the very wisest.
For the element of deception
- in it does not gain any hold on utterly witless and foolish persons. This is
- the ground of Simonides' answer to the man who said to him, Il. xiv. 216.Why are
- the Thessalians the only people whom you do not deceive ?
His
- answer was, Oh, they are too ignorant to be deceived by me
- ; and Gorgias called tragedy a deception wherein he who deceives is more
- honest than he who does not deceive, and he who is deceived is wiser than he
- who is not deceived. Shall we then stop the ears of the young, as those of
- the Ithacans were stopped, with a hard and unyielding wax, and force them to
- put to sea in the Epicurean boat, and avoid poetry and steer their course
- clear of it; or rather shall we set them against some upright standard of
- reason and there bind them fast, guiding and guarding their judgement, that
- it may not be carried away from the course by pleasure towards that which
- will do them hurt ? No, not even Lycurgus, the
- mighty son of Dryas
had sound sense, because, when many became drunk
- and violent, he went about uprooting the grapevines instead of bringing the
- springs of water nearer, Il. vi.
- 130.
- frenzied god,
as Plato says, through correction by
- another, a sober, god.
- Laws,
- 773 D.Cf.
- Theophrastus, De causis plantarum, iii. 1.
- 5.If one begin each task
- in proper way So is it likely will the ending be,
as Sophocles says. Trag. Graec. Frag., Sophocles, No.
- 747.
First of all, then, the young man should be introduced into poetry with
- nothing in his mind so Many the lies the poets
- tell,
- cf. Aristotle,
- Metaphysics, i. 2.Cf. Plato, Phaedo, 60
- A.
- “Device more subtly cunning than the lynx,a why knit your brows
- when jesting, why pretend to instruct when practising deception
- ?”
-
will not suffer any dire effects or even acquire any base beliefs,
- but he will check himself when he feels afraid of Poseidon Trag. Graec. Frag., adesp. No.
- 349.Iliad, xx. 60.Whose praises he himself did sing,
- himself Was present at the feast, these words he spoke Himself, and yet
- himself brought death to him;
he will
- cease to shed tears over the dead Achilles and over Agamemnon Republic, ii. p. 383 B, who quotes the passage more fully.
- Cf. Nauck, Trag.
- Graec. Frag., Aeschylus, No. 350.Od. xi. 470 and 360.Hasten eager to the light, and all you saw here Lay
- to heart that you may tell your wife hereafter.
Certainly Homer
- has put this gracefully in reference to the visit to the shades, indicating
- that it is fit stuff for a woman's ear because of the element of fable in
- it. Od. xi. 223.
Such things as this are what the poets fabricate intentionally, but more
- numerous are the things which they do not fabricate, but think and believe
- in their own hearts, and then impart to us in their false colouring. Take
- for example what Homer has said relating to Zeus: In the scales he placed two fates of Death so grievous, One of Achilles
- and the other of horse-taming Hector; Grasping the middle he poised it,
- and Hector's fated day descended. Down to Hades he went, and Phoebus
- Apollo forsook him.
Now Aeschylus has fitted a whole tragedy to this
- story, giving it the title of The Weighing of Souls, and has placed beside
- the scales of Zeus on the one side Thetis, and on the other Dawn, entreating
- for their sons who are fighting. But it is patent to everybody that this is
- a mythical fabrication which has been created to please or astound the
- hearer. But in the lines Il. xxii.
- 210.Zeus, appointed to decide the
- outcome of men's fighting
and Ibid. iv.
- 84.A fault doth God create
- in men Whene'er he wills to crush a house in woe,
we have at last statements in accord with their
- opinion and belief, as they thus publish to us and try to make us share
- their delusion and ignorance Niobe, of Aeschylus; Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag., Aeschylus, No.
- 156.From there the slow-moving rivers of dusky night Belch forth a darkness
- immeasurable,
and Frag. 130
- Christ.On past Ocean's
- streams they went and the headland of Leucas,
and Od. xxiv. 11.The narrow throat of Hades and the refluent
- depths.
However, take the case of those who, bewailing
- and fearing death as something piteous, or want of burial as something
- terrible, have given utterance to sentiments like these : Cf. Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag., Sophocles, No.
- 748.Go not hence and leave me behind unwept,
- unburied,
and Od. xi.
- 72.Forth from his body went
- his soul on wing to Hades, Mourning its fate and leaving its vigour and
- manhood,
and Il. xvi. 856 and xxii.
- 362.Destroy me not
- untimely ; for 'tis sweet To see the light. Compel me not to gaze Upon
- the regions underneath the earth.
These are the
- voices of persons affected by emotion Iphigenia at Aulis, 1218.Thus no eye of man hath seen
- nor ear hath heard this, Nor can it be comprehended by the
- mind,
and the words
- of Xenophanes: Adv. math. vii. 122-4; cf. Diels, Poetarum Philosophorum
- Fragmenta, Empedocles, No. 2Never yet was born a man nor ever
- shall be Knowing the truth about the gods and what I say of all
- things,
and by all means the
- words of Socrates, in Plato,Adv. math. vii. 49; cf. Diels, Poet. Philos. Frag.,
- Xenophanes, No. 34.Phaedo, 69
- D.
We shall steady the young man still more if, at his first entrance into
- poetry, we give a general description of the poetic art as an imitative art
- and faculty analogous to painting. And let him not poetry is articulate
- painting, and painting is inarticulate poetry,
but let us teach
- him in addition that when we see a lizard or an ape or the face of Thersites
- in a picture, we are pleased with it and admire it, not as a beautiful
- thing, but as a likeness. For by its essential nature the ugly cannot become
- beautiful ; but the imitation, be it concerned with what is base or with
- what is good, if only it attain to the likeness, is commended. If, on the
- other hand, it produces a beautiful picture of an ugly body, it fails to
- give what propriety and probability require. Some painters even depict
- unnatural acts, as Timomachus painted a picture of Medea slaying her
- children, and Theon of Orestes slaying his mother, and Parrhasius of the
- feigned madness of Odysseus, and Chaerephanes of the lewd commerce of women
- with men. In these matters it is especially necessary that the young man
- should be trained by being taught that what we commend is not the action
- which is the subject of the imitation, but the art, in case the subject in
- hand has been properly imitated. Since, then, poetry also often gives an
- imitative recital of base deeds, or of wicked experiences and characters,
- the young man must not accept as true what is admired and successful
- therein, nor approve it as beautiful, but should simply commend it as
- fitting and proper to the character in hand. For just as when we hear the
- squealing of a pig, the creaking of a windlass, the whistling of the winds,
- and the booming of the sea, we are uneasy and annoyed ; but if anybody gives
- a plausible imitation of these, as Parmeno imitated a pig, and Theodorus a
- windlass, we are pleased ; and just as we avoid a diseased and ulcerous
- person beautifully
means fittingly and properly
-
and ugly things are fitting and proper
for the
- ugly. Witness the boots made for the crippled feet of Damonidas, who prayed
- once, when he had lost them, that the man who had stolen them might have
- feet which they would fit; they were sorry boots, it is true, but they
- fitted their owner. Consider the following lines : If one must needs do wrong, far best it were To do it for a kingdom's
- sake,
and Phoenissae,
- 324.Achieve the just
- man's good repute, but deeds That fit the knave ; therein shall be your
- gain,
and cf. Nauck, Trag. Graec.
- Frag., adesp. No. 4.A talent dowry ! Shall I not accept ? Can I still live
- if I should overlook A talent ? Shall I ever sleep again If I should
- give it up ? In Hell shall I Not suffer for impiety to gold ?
These, it is true, are wicked and fallacious
- sentiments, cf. Kock,
- Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta, iii.
- 430.Il. iii. 369 ff. and
- 441 ff.
In these passages, close attention must be given to see whether the poet
- himself gives any hints against the sentiments expressed to indicate that
- they are distasteful to himself; just as Menander in the prologue of his
- Thais has written : Oh, sing to me, my muse, of
- such a girl, One bold and fair, and of persuasive tongue, Unjust,
- exclusive, and demanding much, In love with none, but always feigning
- love.
But Homer has best employed this method ; for
- he in advance discredits the mean and calls our attention to the good in
- what is said. His favourable introductions are after this manner : Com. Att. Frag., Menander,
- No. 217, and Allinson, Menander, in L.C.L.,
- p. 356.Then at once he spoke ; his words were gentle and
- winning
and Od. vi.
- 148.He would stand by his side, and speak soft words to
- restrain him.
But in discrediting in advance, he all but protests
- and proclaims that we are not to follow or heed the sentiments expressed, as
- being unjustifiable and mean. For example, when he is on the point of
- narrating Agamemnon's harsh treatment of the priest, he says in advance,
- Il. ii.
- 189.Yet Agamemnon, Atreus' son, at heart did not
- like it; Harshly he sent him away ;
that is to say, savagely and wilfully and
- contrary to what he should have done ; and in Achilles' mouth he puts the
- bold words, Ibid.
- i. 24.Drunken sot, with eyes of a dog and the
- wild deer's courage,
but he intimates his own judgement in saying, Ibid. i.
- 225.Then once more with vehement words did the son of
- Peleus Speak to the son of Atreus, nor ceased as yet from his anger;
-
hence
- it is likely that nothing spoken with anger and severity can be good. In
- like manner also, he comments upon actions : Ibid. i. 223.Thus
- he spoke, and Hector divine he treated unseemly, Stretching him prone in
- the dust by the bier of the son of Menoetius.
He also employs his
- closing lines to good purpose, as though adding a sort of verdict of his own
- to what is done or said. Of the adultery of Ares, he represents the gods as
- saying, Ibid., xxiii. 24.Evil deeds do not succeed: the swift by the
- slow is taken,
and on the occasion of Hector's great arrogance
- and boasting he says, Od., viii.
- 329.Thus he spoke in boast; queen Hera's wrath was
- kindled
and regarding Pandarus's archery, Il. viii.
- 198.Thus Athena spoke, and the mind of the fool she
- persuaded.
Now these declarations and opinions contained in the
- words of the text may be discovered by anybody who will pay attention, but
- from the actions themselves the poets supply other lessons : as, for
- example, Euripides is reported to have said to those who railed at his Ixion
- as an impious and detestable character, Ibid. iv.
- 104.But I did not remove him
- from the stage until I had him fastened to the wheel.
In Homer
- this form of instruction is given silently, but it leaves room for a
- reconsideration, which is helpful in the case of those stories which have
- been most discredited. By forcibly distorting these stories through what
- used to be termed deeper meanings,
but are nowadays called
- allegorical interpretations,
some persons say that the
- Sun is represented as giving information about Aphrodite in the arms of
- Ares, because the conjunction of the planet Mars with Venus portends births
- conceived in adultery, and when the sun returns in his course and discovers
- these, they cannot be kept secret. And Hera's beautifying of herself for
- Zeus's eyes,Ibid. xiv. 166 ff.Changes of clothes, warm baths, and the genial bed of
- enjoyment.
This too is the reason why he has represented
- Odysseus as bidding the harper Od. viii.
- 239.Come now, change the
- theme and sing how the horse was builded,
thus admirably indicating
- the duty of musicians and poets to take the subjects of their compositions
- from the lives of those who are discreet and sensible. And in his account of
- Hera, he has shown excellently well how the favour that women win by
- philters and enchantments and the attendant deceit in their relations with
- their husbands, not only is transitory and soon sated and unsure, but
- changes also to anger and enmity, so soon as the pleasurable excitement has
- faded away. Such, in fact, are Zeus's angry threats as he speaks to Hera in
- this wise : Ibid. viii. 492.So you may see if aught you gain from the
- love and caresses Won by your coming afar from the gods to deceive
- me.
- For the description and portrayal of mean actions, if it also represent as
- it should the disgrace and injury resulting to the doers thereof, benefits
- instead of injuring the hearer. Philosophers, at any rate, for admonition
- and instruction, use examples taken from known facts; but the poets
- accomplish the same result by inventing actions of their own imagination,
- and by recounting mythical tales. Thus it was Melanthius who said, whether
- in jest or in earnest, that the Athenian State was perpetually preserved by
- the quarrelling and disorder among its public speakers ; for they were not
- all inclined to crowd to the same side of the boat, and so, in the
- disagreement Il. xv. 32.Oft do the gods, my child,
- cause men to fail,
as
- compared with Archelaus, Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag.,
- Euripides, No. 254. The second line is again quoted by
- Plutarch, Moralia, 1049 F.You've named the simplest way; just
- blame the gods;
and again Archelaus,
- Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag., Euripides, No.
- 254. The second line is again quoted by Plutarch, Moralia, 1049 F.You may rejoice in wealth, but these may
- not,
as compared with Trag. Graec. Frag.,
- Euripides, No. 1069.'Tis loutish to be rich, and know naught
- else;
and Trag. Graec. Frag.,
- Euripides, No. 1069.What need to sacrifice when you must die ?
as
- compared with Ibid., Adesp., No. 350.'Tis better thus ; God's worship is not
- toil.
For such passages as these admit of solutions
- which are obvious, if, as has been said, we direct the young, by the use of
- criticism, toward the better side. But whenever anything said by such
- authors sounds preposterous, and no solution is found close at hand, we must
- nullify its effect by something said by them elsewhere to the opposite
- effect, and we should not be offended or angry at the poet, but with the
- words, which are spoken in character and with humorous intent. As an obvious
- illustration, if you wish, over against Homer's accounts of the gods Ibid., Adesp., No.
- 350.Surely you know how to think of a saying
- better than this one,
and indeed elsewhere you do think of
- better things and say more seemly things, such as these : Il. vii. 358
- and xii. 232.Gods at their ease ever living,
and Ibid. vi. 138; Od.
- iv. 805 and v. 122.There the blessed gods pass all their days in enjoyment,
and Od. vi. 46.Thus the gods have spun the fate of unhappy mortals
- Ever to live in distress, but themselves are free from all
- trouble.
These,
- then, are sound opinions about gods, and true, but those other accounts have
- been fabricated to excite men's astonishment. Again, when Euripides says,
- Il. xxiv. 525 (again
- quoted, infra, 22 B).By many forms of artifice the gods Defeat our
- plans, for they are stronger far,
it is not
- bad to subjoin, Trag.
- Graec. Frag., Euripides, No. 972.If gods do aught that's base, they
- are no gods,
which is a better saying of his. And when
- Pindar very bitterly and exasperatingly has said, Bellerophon,
- according to Stobaeus, Florilegium, c. 3,
- who quotes also six preceding lines; cf.
- Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag., Euripides, No.
- 292. 7.Do what you will, so you vanquish your foe,
- Isthmian Odes, iv. 48.Yet,
we may reply, you yourself say that
a=
- And when Sophocles has said, Most bitter the end Must surely await Sweet
- joys that are gained By a means unfair.
- Isthmian Odes, vii. 47.Sweet is the pelf though
- gained by falsity.
- Trag. Graec. Frag.,
- Sophocles, No. 749.Indeed,
- we may say, but we have heard from you that
And over
- against those statements about wealth : False words unfruitful prove when harvested.
- Ibid., No. 750.Clever is
- wealth at finding ways to reach Both hallowed and unhallowed ground, and
- where A poor man, though he even gain access, Could not withal attain
- his heart's desire. An ugly body, hapless with its tongue, Wealth makes
- both wise and comely to behold,
he will set many of
- Sophocles' words, among which are the following : Aleadae; quoted with additional lines by Stobaeus, Florilegium, xci. 27; cf. Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag.,
- Sophocles, No 85.E'en without wealth a man may be esteemed,
and Trag. Graec. Frag., Sophocles, No.
- 761.To beg doth not
- degrade a noble mind,
and Ibid., No.
- 752.In the blessings of
- plenty What enjoyment is there, If blest wealth owe its increase To
- base-brooding care ?
And Menander certainly exalted the love of
- pleasure, Tereus of Sophocles; cf. Nauck,
- Trag. Graec. Frag., Sophocles, No.
- 534.All things
- that live and see the self-same sun That we behold, to pleasure are
- enslaved.
- But at another time he turns us about and draws us towards the good, and
- uproots the boldness of licentiousness, by saying: Com. Att. Frag. iii.
- Menander, No. 611, and Allinson, Menander, in L.C.L. p. 506.A
- shameful life, though pleasant, is disgrace.
The latter sentiment is
- quite opposed to the former, and it is better and more useful. Such
- comparison and consideration of opposing sentiments will result in one of
- two ways : it will either guide the youth over toward the better side, or
- else cause his belief to revolt from the worse. Com. Att. Frag. iii., Menander, No. 756.
In case the authors themselves do not offer solutions of their unjustifiable
- sayings, it is not a bad idea to put on the other side declarations of other
- writers of repute, and, as in a balance, make the scales incline toward the
- better side. For example, if Alexis stirs some people when he says, The man of sense must gather pleasure's fruits, And three
- there are which have the potency Truly to be of import for this life— To
- eat and drink and have one's way in love, All else must be declared
- accessory,
we must
- recall to their minds that Socrates used to say just the opposite—that
- Ibid. ii., Alexis, No. 271.base men live to eat
And he who wrote Not useless 'gainst the knave is knavery,
thus bidding us, in a way, to make ourselves like
- knaves, may be confronted with the saying of Diogenes ; for, being asked how
- one might defend himself against his adversary, he said, Moralia, 534
- A.By proving
- honourable and upright himself.
We should use Diogenes against
- Sophocles, too; for Sophocles has filled hosts of men with despondency by
- writing these lines about the mysteries : Thrice
- blest are they Who having seen these mystic rites shall pass To Hades'
- house ; for them alone is life Beyond ; for others all is evil
- there.
But Diogenes, hearing
- some such sentiment as this, said, Trag. Graec. Frag.,
- Sophocles, No. 753.What! Do you mean to say that
- Pataecion, the robber, will have a better portion after death than
- Epaminondas, just because he is initiate ?
And when Timotheus,
- in a song in the theatre, spoke of Artemis as Ecstatic
- Bacchic frantic fanatic,
Cinesias at
- once shouted back, Poet. Lyr.
- Gr. iii. p. 620; cf. Plutarch, Moralia, 170 A.May you have a daughter like that I
Neat
- too is Bion s retort to Theognis, who said: Any man that is subject to poverty never is able
- Either to speak or to act; nay, but his tongue is tied.
- How is it, then,
said Bion, that you, who are poor,
- can talk much nonsense, and weary us with this rubbish ?
-
We must not neglect, either, the means for rectifying a statement which are
- afforded by the words that lie near, or by the context; but just as
- physicians, in spite of the fact that the blister-fly is deadly, think that
- its feet and wings are helpful to counteract its potent effect, so in poetry
- if a noun or adjective or a verb by its position next to another word blunts
- the point which the passage, in its worse interpretation, would have, we
- should seize upon it and add explanation, as some do in the case of the
- following: Thus, at the last, can honour be paid by
- miserable mortals Cutting the hair from their heads while the tears
- stream down their faces,
and Od. iv.
- 197.Thus, then, the
- gods have spun the fate of unhappy mortals Ever to live in
- distress.
For he did
- not say that absolutely and to all mankind a grievous life has been allotted
- by the gods, but to the silly and foolish, whom, since they are wretched and
- pitiable on account of wickedness, he is wont to call by the name of Il. xxiv. 525 (quoted
- supra, 20 F).
- unhappy
and miserable.
-
Another method, again, which transfers from the worse to the better sense
- suspicious passages in poetry, is that which works through the normal usage
- of words, in which it were better to have the glosses.
- rhigedanos
- Il. xix. 325.
- dying miserably
(for the Macedonians call death danos
-
), that the Aeolians call a victory won by patience and perseverance
- an outlasting,
- Ibid. xxii. 257 and xxiii. 661.popoi.
- gods.
-
- house
sometimes to a dwelling house, as Into the lofty house,
and
- sometimes to property, as Od. v. 42, vii. 77, and perhaps x. 474.My house is being
- devoured;
- and the term Ibid. iv. 318.living
they apply sometimes to life, as But dark-haired Poseidon Thwarted his spear, nor would
- let him end his foeman's living,
and sometimes to possessions, as Il.
- xiii. 562.And others are eating my living;
and the expression Od. xiii. 419.be distraught
is used sometimes
- instead of be chagrined
and be at one's wits' end
-
: Thus he spoke, and she departed distraught and
- sore troubled
and at other times, instead of Il. v. 352.to be arrogant
-
and be delighted,
as Are you now distraught since
- you vanquished Irus, the vagrant ?
and by Od. xviii. 332, 392.huddle
they
- mean either be in motion,
as Euripides says :Andromeda of Euripides, Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag., Euripides, No. 145.sit down
and
- be seated,
as Sophocles Oedipus Tyrannus, 2.Better commend a small ship, but put your goods on a big one.
For by
- Works and Days, 643.commend
is meant recommend,
and the
- very expression of recommend
to another is used nowadays
- instead of deprecating for one's self, as in everyday speech we say,
- It's very kind,
and Very welcome,
when we do not
- want a thing and do not accept it. In this way also some persons will have
- it that it must be commendable Persephone
because she is
- deprecated.
Let us then observe closely this distinction and discrimination of words in
- greater and more serious matters, and let us begin with the gods, in
- teaching
- Hear my praver, O Lord
- Hephaestus, and propitious Lend thy aid, and bestow what thy mercy bestows,
- is calling on the god himself; but when, lamenting his sister's husband who
- was lost at sea and received no formal burial, he says that he could have
- borne the calamity with greater moderation, Poet. Lyr. Gr. ii. p. 703.If upon his head and his body so
- fair, All in garments clean, Hephaestus had done his office,
it is fire
- that he called by this name and not the god. And again when Euripides Ibid. p. 687.Phoenissae, 1006.By Zeus amidst the stars and Ares murderous,
he named the gods
- themselves ; but when Sophocles Trag. Graec. Frag., Sophocles, No. 574; again cited by Plutarch, Moralia, 757 B.Blind and unseeing Ares, worthy
- dames, With snout like that of swine upturns all ills,
the name is to be
- understood as meaning war ; just as again it suggests weapons of bronze in
- the passage where Homer Il. vii. 329.Dark red blood of these men by the
- fair-flowing river Scamander Keen-edged Ares has shed.
Since, then, many
- words are used in this way, it is
- Father Zeus, enthroned on Ida, most
- glorious and mighty, Grant to Ajax victory,
and Il. iii. 276, vii. 202, xxiv. 308.O Zeus ! who boasts to be
- more wise than thou ?
they mean the god himself; but when they apply the
- name of Zeus to the causes of all that happens, and say, Trag. Graec. Frag., Adesp. No. 351.Many valiant souls
- it sent to the realm of Hades, Goodly men, and their bodies gave to the dogs
- as ravin And to birds a feast—the design of Zeus in fulfilment,
they mean
- Fate. For the poet does not imagine that it is the god who contrives evils
- for mankind, but by the name he rightly implies the compelling force of
- circumstances, that States and armies and leaders, if they show
- self-control, are destined to succeed and to prevail over their enemies, but
- if they fall into passions and errors, if they disagree and quarrel among
- themselves, as these heroes did, then are they destined to act discreditably
- and to become disorganized and to come to a bad end, as Sophocles says Il. i. 3. Trag. Graec. Frag., Adesp. No. 352.For fated is it that from evil plans An evil recompense shall mortals reap ;
- and certainly Hesiod Works and Days, 86.Never to welcome Any gifts from Zeus of Olympus, but
- always return them,
employs the name of Zeus as a synonym for the power of
- Fortune. For he has given the name of gifts of Zeus
to the
- blessings of Fortune, such as wealth, marriage, office, and, in a word, all
- outward things, the possession of which is unprofitable to those who cannot
- make good use of them. Wherefore he thinks that Epimetheus, who is a
- worthless man and a fool, ought to be on his guard against any piece of good
- fortune, and be fearful of it, as he is likely to be injured and corrupted
- by it. And again when the poet says, Never dare to reproach any man for
- accursed and woeful Poverty, gift of the blessed gods whose life is for
- ever,
he now speaks of what happens by chance as godgiven, with the
- suggestion that it is not meet to impugn those who are poor through
- misfortune, but to reproach the penury that is accompanied by laziness, soft
- living, and extravagance, since then it is disgraceful and reprehensible.
- For at a time when men did not as yet use the name Works and Days, 717.Fortune,
- but knew the force of causation as it traverses its irregular and
- indeterminate course, so strong, so impossible for human reason to guard
- against, they tried to express this by the names of the gods, exactly as we
- are wont to call deeds and characters, and in fact even words and men,
- divine
and godlike.
In this manner, then,
- a corrective is to be found for most of the seemingly unjustifiable
- statements regarding Zeus, among which are the following : Fixed on Zeus'
- floor two massive urns stand ever, Filled with happy lives the one, the
- other with sorrows,
and Republic, 379 D, and not Homer, Il. xxiv. 528. The original, however, is quoted in the Moralia, 105 C.Cronos' son, enthroned on high,
- hath made naught of our pledges, But for both our hosts with evil thought is
- planning,
and Il. vii. 69.Then rolled forth the beginning of trouble Both on Trojans
- and Greeks through designs of Zeus the almighty.
These are to be
- interpreted as referring to Fortune or Fate, in which guise are denoted
- those phases of causation which baffle our logic, and are, in a word, beyond
- us. But wherever there is appropriateness, reason, and probability in the
- use of the name, let us believe that there the god himself is meant, as in
- the following : Od. viii. 81.But he ranged to and fro 'gainst the lines of the rest of
- the fighters; Only with Ajax, Telamon's son, he avoided a conflict, Seeing
- that Zeus was wroth if he fight with a man far better,
and Il. xi. 540, 542. The third line is not found in the MSS. of Homer, but on the authority of this passage and 36 A and Aristotle, Rhetoric, ii. 9, and the life of Homer ascribed to Plutarch, it has commonly been printed as line 542 in the editions of Homer.For Zeus takes
- thought for mortals' greatest weal; The little things he leaves to other
- gods.
- Trag. Graec. Frag., Adesp. No. 353.
Particular attention must be paid to the other words also, when their
- signification is shifted about and changed by the poets according to various
- circumstances. An example is the word virtue.
For inasmuch
- as virtue not only renders men sensible, honest, and upright in actions and
- words, but also often enough secures for them repute and influence,
- olives
-
and chestnuts,
the same names as the trees that
- bear them. So then when poets say, Sweat the gods have set before the
- attainment of virtue,
and Works and Days, 289.Then the Greeks by their virtue broke the line of
- their foemen,
and Il. xi. 90.If to die be our fate, Thus to die is our right Merging
- our lives into virtue,
let our young man at once feel that these sayings
- relate to the best and godliest estate to which we can attain, which we
- think of as correctness of reasoning, the height of good sense, and a
- disposition of soul in full agreement therewith. But when at another time,
- in his reading, he finds this line, Trag. Graec. Frag., Euripides, No. 994. Again quoted by Plutarch, Pelopidas, 317 E.Zeus makes virtue in men both to
- increase and diminish,
or this, Il. xx. 242.Virtue and glory are attendant on riches,
- let him not Works and Days, 313.sit
astounded and amazed
at
- the rich, as though they were able to purchase virtue without ado for money,
- nor let him believe either that the increase or diminution of his own wisdom
- rests with Fortune, but let him consider that the poet has employed
- virtue
instead of repute, or influence, or good fortune, or the
- like. For assuredly
- evil
the poets sometimes signify
- badness in its strict sense, and wickedness of soul, as when Hesiod Works and Days, 287.Od. xix. 360.happiness
the
- sense which the philosophers give to it, namely, that of complete possession
- or attainment of good, or the perfection of a life gliding smoothly along in
- accord with nature, and that the poets do not oftentimes by a perversion of
- the word call the rich man happy and blessed, and call influence or repute
- happiness. Now Homer Ibid. iv. 93.No delight
and so has Menander :happy.
See the critical note on the opposite page.Com. Att. Frag. iii. p. 184, and Allinson, Menander in L.C.L. p. 506.A great estate have I, and
- rich am called By all, but I am called by no man blest.
But Euripides Medea, 603.May I ne'er have a painful
- happy life,
and
- Why do you honour show to tyranny, Happy iniquity ?
- unless, as has been said, one follows the figurative and perverted use of
- the words. This, then, is enough on this subject. Phoenissae, 549.
There is a fact, however, which we must recall to the minds of the young not
- once merely, but over and over again, by pointing out to them that while
- poetry, inasmuch as it has an imitative basis, employs embellishment and
- glitter in dealing with the actions and characters that form its groundwork,
- yet it does not forsake the semblance of truth, since imitation depends upon
- plausibility for its allurement. This is the reason why the imitation that
- does not show an utter disregard of the truth brings out, along with the
- actions, indications of both vice and virtue commingled ; as is the case
- with that of Homer, which emphatically says good-bye to the Stoics, who will
- have it that nothing base can attach to virtue, and nothing good to vice,
- but that the ignorant man is quite wrong in all things, while, on the other
- hand, the man of culture is right in everything. These are the doctrines
- that we hear in the schools ; but in the actions and in the life of most
- men, according to Euripides, Aeolus of Euripides; quoted again Moralia, 369 B and 474 A. Cf. Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag., Euripides, No. 21.The good and bad cannot be kept apart But
- there is some commingling.
But when poetic art is divorced from the truth,
- then chiefly it employs variety and diversity. For it is the sudden changes
- that give to its stories the elements of the emotional, the surprising, and
- the unexpected, and these are attended by very great astonishment and
- enjoyment; but sameness is unemotional
Now since this is so, let the young man, when we set him to reading poems,
- not be prepossessed with any such opinions about those good and great names,
- as, for instance, that the men were wise and honest, consummate kings, and
- standards of all virtue and uprightness. For he will be greatly injured if
- he approves everything, and is in a state of wonderment over it, but resents
- nothing, refusing even to listen or accept the opinion of him who, on the
- contrary, censures persons that do and say such things as these: This I
- would, O Zeus, Athena, and Apollo, That not one escape death of all the
- Trojans living And of the Greeks; but that you and I elude destruction, So
- that we alone may raze Troy's sacred bulwarks,
and Il. xvi. 97.Saddest of all the sad
- sounds that I heard was the cry of Cassandra Priam's daughter, whom
- Clytemnestra craftily planning Slew o'er my body,
and Od. xi. 421.That I seduce the
- girl and ensure her hate for my father. So I obeyed her and did it,
and
-
- Il. ix. 452.Father Zeus, none other of the gods is more baleful.
- Let the young man, then, not get into the habit of commending anything like
- this, nor let him be plausible and adroit in making excuses or in contriving
- some specious quibbles to explain base actions, but rather let him cherish
- the belief that poetry is an imitation of character and lives, and of men
- who are not perfect or spotless or unassailable in all respects, but
- pervaded by emotions, false opinions, and sundry forms of ignorance, who yet
- through inborn goodness frequently change their ways for the better. For if
- the young man is so trained, and his understanding so framed, that he feels
- elation and a sympathetic enthusiasm over noble words and deeds, and an
- aversion and repugnance for the mean, such training will render his perusal
- of poetry harmless. But the man who admires everything, and accommodates
- himself to everything, whose judgement, because of his preconceived opinion,
- is enthralled by the heroic names, will, like those who copy Plato's stoop
- or Aristotle's lisp, unwittingly become inclined to conform to much that is
- base. One ought not timorously, or as though under the spell of religious
- dread in a holy place, to shiver with awe at everything, and fall prostrate,
- but should rather acquire the habit of exclaiming with confidence Il. iii. 365.
- wrong
and improper
no less than right
-
and proper.
For example, Achilles summons an
- assembly of the soldiers, who are suffering from an illness, since he is
- most impatient of all over the slow progress of the war because of his
- conspicuous position and reputation on the field; moreover, because he has
- some knowledge of medicine, and perceives now after the ninth day, on Son of Atreus, now, as I think, are we destined to
- wander Back to seek our homes again.
Rightly, moderately, and properly is
- this put. But after the seer has said that he fears the wrath of the most
- powerful of the Greeks, Achilles no longer speaks rightly and moderately,
- when he swears that nobody shall lay hands on the seer while he himself is
- alive, Il. i. 59.No, not though you name Agamemnon,
thus making plain his slight
- regard and his contempt for the leader. A moment later his irritation
- becomes more acute, and his impulse is to draw his sword with intent to do
- murder ; not rightly, either for honour or for expediency. Again, later,
- repenting, Ibid. 90.Back he thrust his massive blade once more to its scabbard, Nor
- ignored Athena's words,
this time rightly and honourably, because, although
- he could not altogether eradicate his anger, yet before doing anything
- irreparable he put it aside and checked it by making it obedient to his
- reason. Then again, although Agamemnon is ridiculous in his actions and
- words at the Assembly, yet in the incidents touching Chryseis he is more
- dignified and kingly. For whereas Achilles, as Briseis was being led away,
-
- Ibid. 220.Burst into tears and withdrawing apart sat aloof from
- his comrades,
Agamemnon, as he in person put aboard the ship, and gave up
- and sent away, the woman of whom, a moment before, he has said that he cared
- more for her than for his wedded wife, committed no amorous or disgraceful
- act. Then again, Phoenix, cursed by his father on account of the concubine,
- says : Il. i. 349.True in my heart I had purposed to slay him with keenpointed dagger,
- Save that one of the deathless gods put an end to my anger, Bringing to mind
- the people's talk and men's many reproaches, Lest I be known among the
- Greeks as my father's slayer.
Now Aristarchus removed these lines from the
- text through fear, but they are right in view of the occasion, since Phoenix
- is trying to teach Achilles what sort of a thing anger is, and how many wild
- deeds men are ready to do from temper, if they do not use reason or hearken
- to those who try to soothe them. So also the poet introduces Meleager angry
- at his fellow-citizens, and later mollified, and he rightly finds fault with
- his emotions, but, on the other hand, his refusal to yield, his resistance,
- his mastery over them, and his change of heart the poet commends as good and
- expedient. Now in these cases the difference is manifest; but in cases where
- Homer's judgement is not made clear, a distinction is to be drawn by
- directing the young man's attention in some such manner as the following :
- If, on the one hand, Nausicaa, after merely looking at a strange man,
- Odysseus, and experiencing Calypso's emotions toward him, being, as she was,
-
- Iliad. Plutarch cites the second and part of the third line in the Life of Coriolanus, chap. 32 (229 B), and the last line in Moralia, 72 B.How I wish that a man like this
- might be called my husband, Living here with us, and be contented to tarry,
- then are her boldness and lack of restraint to be blamed. But if, on the
- other hand, she sees into the character of the man from his words, and
- marvels at his conversation, so full of good sense, and then prays that she
- may be the consort of such a person rather than of some sailor man or
- dancing man of her own townsmen, then it is quite right to admire her. And
- again, when Penelope enters into conversation with the suitors, not holding
- herself aloof, and they favour her with gifts of garments and other apparel,
- Odysseus is pleased Od. vi. 244.Since she had coaxed all these gifts from them, and had
- cozened their senses.
If, on the one hand, he rejoices at the receipt of
- the presents and the profit, then in his prostitution of his wife he outdoes
- Poliager, who is satirized in the comedy as Ibid. xviii. 282.Poliager blest Who keeps a
- Cyprian goat to yield him wealth.
But if, on the other hand, he thinks that
- he shall have them more in his power, while they are confident because of
- their hopes and blind to the future, then his pleasure and confidence has a
- reasonable justification. Similarly, in the enumeration of his possessions
- which the Phaeacians had put ashore with him before they sailed away, if on
- the one hand, upon finding himself in such solitude and in such uncertainty
- and ambiguity regarding his surroundings, he really fears about his
- possessions, Com. Att. Frag. iii. 299. Cf. Alciphro, Epist. iii. 62. The reference is probably to the goat Amalthea, the fabled nurse of the infant Zeus, but Pantazides thinks that Uranium (Lest the men on the ship had sailed away
- with something,
then it is quite right to pity or indeed even to loathe his
- avarice. But if, on the other hand, he, as some say, being of two minds
- whether he were in Ithaca, thinks that the safety of his possessions is a
- demonstration of the rectitude of the Phaeacians (for otherwise they would
- not have carried him for nothing, put him ashore in a strange land, and left
- him there, at the same time keeping their hands off his possessions), then
- he makes use of no mean proof, and it is quite right to praise his
- forethought. But some critics find fault also with the very act of putting
- him ashore, if this really was done while he was asleep, and assert that the
- Etruscans still preserve a tradition that Odysseus was naturally sleepy, and
- that for this reason most people found him difficult to converse with. Yet
- if his sleep was not real, but if, being ashamed to send away the Phaeacians
- without gifts and entertainment, and at the same time unable to elude his
- enemies if the Phaeacians were in company with him, he provided himself with
- a cloak for his embarrassment in feigning himself asleep, then they find
- this acceptable. By indicating these things to the young, we shall not allow
- them to acquire any leaning toward such characters as are mean, but rather
- an emulation of the better, and a preference for them, if we unhesitatingly
- award censure to the one class and commendation to the other. It is
- particularly necessary to do this with tragedies in which plausible and
- artful words are framed to accompany disreputable and knavish actions. For
- the statement of Sophocles Od. xiii. 216.Trag. Graec. Frag., Sophocles No. 755.From unfair deed fair word cannot proceed.
For, as a
- fact, he is wont to provide for mean characters and unnatural actions
- alluring words and humane reasons. And you observe also that his
- companion-at-arms in the dramatic art has represented Phaedra Hippolytus Veiled; cf. Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag., Eurip., 491.The Trojan Women, 919.
Now in all cases it is useful also to seek after the cause of each thing that
- is said. Cato, for example, used, even as a child, to do whatever the
- attendant in charge of him ordered, yet he also demanded to know the ground
- and reason for the order. And so the poets are not to be obeyed as though
- they were our keepers or law-givers, unless their subject matter be
- reasonable ; and this it will be if it be good, but if it be vile, it will
- be seen to be vacuous and vain. But most people are sharp in demanding the
- reasons for trivial things like the following, and insist on knowing in what
- sense they are intended : Never ought the ladle atop of the bowl to be
- rested While the bout is on,
- Works and Days, 744.Whoso from his car can
- reach the car of another Let him thrust with his spear.
But in far
- weightier matters they take things on faith without testing them at all,
- such, for example, as these : Il. iv. 306.A man, though bold, is made a slave whene'er
- He learns his mother's or his sire's disgrace,
and Hippolytus, 424; cited also by Plutarch in Moralia, 1 C.Who prospers not must be
- of humble mind.
And yet these sentiments affect our characters and disorder
- our lives, by engendering in us mean judgements and ignoble opinions, unless
- from habit we can say in answer to each of them, Trag. Graec. Frag., Euripides, No. 957.Why must the man
- who has ' not prospered be of humble mind,' and why must he not rather
- rise up against Fortune, and make himself exalted and not humbled ? And
- why, though I be the son of a bad and foolish father, yet if I myself am
- good and sensible, is it unbecoming for me to take pride in my good
- qualities, and why should I be dejected and humble on account of my
- father's crassness ?
For he who thus meets and resists, and
- refuses to entrust himself broadside on to every breath of doctrine, as to a
- wind, but believes in the correctness of the saying that a fool is
- wont to be agog at every word that's said
- Moralia, 41 A; cf. Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, i. p. 95.
But, just as amid the luxuriant foliage and branches of a vine the fruit is
- often hidden and unnoticed from being in the shadow, so also amid the poetic
- diction and the tales that hang clustered about, much that is helpful and
- profitable escapes a young man. This, however, ought not to happen to him,
- nor should he allow his attention to be diverted from the facts, but he
- should cling especially close to those that lead toward virtue and have the
- power to mould character. In which regard it may not be a bad thing to treat
- this topic briefly, touching summarily the principal points, but leaving any
- extended and constructive treatment, and long list of examples, to those who
- write more for display. In the first place, then, as the young man takes
- note of good and bad characters and personages, let him pay attention to the
- lines and the actions which the poet assigns to them as respectively
- befitting. For example, Achilles says to Agamemnon, although he speaks with
- anger : Never a prize like yours is mine whene'er the Achaeans Capture and
- sack some goodly and populous town of the Trojans.
But Thersites in
- reviling the same man says : Il. i. 163.Full of bronze are your quarters, and many,
- too, are the women, Chosen from all the captives for you, and these we
- Achaeans Give to you first of all whenever we capture a city.
And on
- another occasion Achilles says, Ibid. ii. 226.If perchance Zeus ever Grants to us that we
- plunder Troy, the well-walled city,
but Thersites, Ibid. i. 128.One
- that I or another Achaean may bring in as captive.
At another time, in the
- Inspection, when Agamemnon upbraided Diomede, the latter made no answer,
- Il. ii. 231.Showing respect for the stern rebuke of a king so respected.
But Sthenelus,
- a man of no account, says : Ibid. iv. 402.Son of Atreus, speak not to deceive, knowing how
- to speak clearly; We can avow ourselves to be better far than our fathers.
- A difference of this sort then, if not overlooked, will teach the young man
- to regard modesty and moderation as a mark of refinement, but to be on his
- guard against boasting and self-assertion as a mark of meanness. It is
- useful to note also the behaviour of Agamemnon in this case ; for Sthenelus
- he passed by without a word, but Odysseus he did not disregard, but made
- answer and addressed him, Ibid. 404.When he saw he was wroth, and tried to retract his
- saying.
For to defend one's actions to everybody smacks of servility, not
- of dignity, while to despise everybody is arrogant and foolish. And most
- excellently does Diomede in the battle hold his peace, although upbraided by
- the king, but after the battle he uses plain speech to him : Ibid. 357.First let me
- say that you 'mid the Danaans slighted my prowess
- Ibid. ix. 34.
It is well, too, not to miss a difference that exists between a man of sense
- and a seer who courts popularity. For example, Calchas Ibid. i. 94-5.Give a feast for the elders;
- 'tis fitting and not unbefitting; Then, when many are gathered, whoever
- shall offer best counsel Him you will follow,
and after the dinner he sends
- forth the envoys. For this was the way to amend an error; the other was
- arraignment and foul abuse. Il. ix. 70, and 74-5.
Moreover, the difference between the two peoples should be observed, their
- behaviour being as follows : the Trojans advance with shouting and
- confidence, but the Achaeans Silently, fearing their captains.
For to fear
- one's commanders when at close quarters with the enemy is a sign of bravery
- and of obedience to authority as well. Wherefore Plato Ibid. iv. 431.Cf. Platp, Apology, 28 F and E.Cf. Plutarch, Life of Cato, chap. 9 (341 C).Straight to the midst of their host shall I go till I
- come to the vessel Which Agamemnon commands.
Diomede, Il. x. 325.Ibid. 222.Cf. Plutarch, Moralia, 79 D.What a thing is
- training. The onlookers cry out; it is the man who is struck who says
- nothing.
In like manner, when the poet says Il. vii. 214.Dreadful trembling seized on the limbs of every Trojan ; Even Hector
- himself felt his heart beat quick in his bosom,
who could fail to admire the
- difference ? For the heart of the man who is facing the danger only throbs,
- as though indeed he were simply going to wrestle or run a race, while the
- onlookers tremble and shiver in their whole bodies through loyalty and fear
- for their king. Here, too, one should carefully consider the difference
- between the very valiant man and the craven. For Thersites Hateful was most
- of all to Achilles as well as Odysseus,
while Ajax was always friendly to
- Achilles, and says to Hector regarding him— Ibid. ii. 220.Now alone from one man alone
- shall you learn quite clearly What sort of men with us are the Danaans'
- chieftains Even after the smiter of men, lion-hearted Achilles.
This is the
- compliment paid to Achilles, but these succeeding lines in behalf of all are
- put in such a way as to be useful:
- Ibid. vii. 226.Yet are we of such sort as are ready to face you, Yea,
- and many of us,
thereby declaring himself not the only man or the best, but
- only one among many equally capable of offering defence. This is enough on
- the subject of differences, unless perhaps we desire to add, that of the
- Trojans many were taken alive, but none of the Achaeans ; and that of the
- Trojans some fell down at the feet of the enemy, as did Adrastus,Il. vii. 231.Ibid. vi. 37.Ibid. xi. 122.Ibid. xxi. 64.Ibid. xxii. 337.
Now just as in pasturage the bee seeks the flower, the goat the tender shoot,
- the swine the root, and other animals the seed and the fruit, so in the
- reading of poetry one person culls the flowers of the story, another rivets
- his attention upon the beauty of the diction and the arrangement of the
- words, as Aristophanes Com. Att. Frag. i. p. 513.I use the rounded neatness of his
- speech ;
but as for those who are concerned with what is said as being
- useful for character (and it is to these that our present discourse is
- directed), let us remind them how strange it is if the lover of fables does
- not fail to observe the novel and unusual points in the story, and the
- student of language does not allow faultless and elegant forms of expression
- to escape him, whereas he that affects what is honourable and good,
- Son of Tydeus, what has made us forget our swift prowess ? Hither, stand, my
- friend, by me. Disgrace will befall us If yon Hector, gleaming-helmed, shall
- capture our vessels.
For to observe that the most wise and prudent man,
- when he is in danger of being destroyed and lost, together with the whole
- host, fears shame and disapprobation, but not death, will make the young man
- keenly alive to the moral virtues. And by the line, Il. xi. 313; the first line is quoted infra, 71 F.Glad was Athena because
- of the man that was prudent and honest,
the poet permits us to draw a
- similar conclusion in that he represents the goddess as taking delight, not
- in some rich man or in one who is physically handsome or strong, but in one
- who is wise and honest. And again when she says that she does not overlook
- Odysseus, much less desert him, Od. iii. 52.Since he is courteous and clever of mind and
- prudent,
her words indicate that the only one of our attributes that is
- dear to the gods and divine is a virtuous mind, if it be true that it is the
- nature of like to delight in like. Ibid. xiii. 332.
Since it seems to be, and really is, a great thing to master one's anger,
- and since a greater thing is the exercise of precaution and forethought so
- as not to become involved in anger or to be made captive by
- Anger me now no more, old man (to ransom your Hector I myself am disposed;
- from Zeus has come such a message), Lest, old man, even here 'neath my roof
- I leave you not scatheless Suppliant though you are, and sin against Zeus's
- commandments,
and having washed and shrouded the body of Hector, he places
- it with his own hands on the wagon before its disfigurement was seen by the
- father, Il. xxiv. 560-1, 569-70.Lest with heart so distressed he fail to master his anger, Seeing
- his son, and Achilles' heart be stirred with resentment, So that he slay him
- there, and sin against Zeus's commandments.
For it is mark of a wondrous
- foresight for a man whose hold on his temper is uncertain, who is naturally
- rough and quick-tempered, not to be blind to his own weakness, but to
- exercise caution, and to be on his guard against possible grounds for anger,
- and to forestall them by reason long beforehand, so that he may not even
- inadvertently become involved in such emotions. After the same manner should
- he that is fond of wine be on his guard against drunkenness, and he that is
- amorous against love. So did Agesilaus,Ibid. 584.Agesilaus, v. 4.Cyropaedia, v. 1. 4.Even if they within my own
- house shall dishonour me sorely, Let your heart within you endure all the
- wrongs that I suffer: Though through the house they should drag me out by
- the feet to the open, Yea, or with missiles smite me, still you must patient
- behold it.
For just as drivers do not curb their horses during the race,
- but before the race, so with those persons who are quick-tempered and hard
- to hold back when dangers threaten, we first gain control over them by
- reasoning, and make them ready beforehand, and then lead them into the
- strife. While it is also necessary not to pass over the words carelessly,
- yet one should eschew the puerility of Cleanthes ; for there are times when
- he uses a mock seriousness in pretending to interpret the words, Od. xvi. 274.Father
- Zeus, enthroned on Ida,
and Il. iii. 320; vii. 202; xxiv. 208Zeus, lord of Dodona,
bidding us in the latter
- case to read the last two words as one Ibid. xvi. 233. It is of inerest that this reading is attested also in scholia on the passage.lord
-
as the preposition up
) as though the vapour
- exhaled from the earth were updonative
because of its being
- rendered up! And Chrysippus also is often quite petty, although he does not
- indulge in jesting, but wrests the words ingeniously, yet without carrying
- conviction, as when he would force the phrase wide-seeing
- son of Cronos Ibid. i. 498.clever in conversation,
that is to
- say, with a widespread power of speech.
It is better, however, to turn these matters over to the grammarians, and to
- hold fast rather to those in which is to be found both usefulness and
- probability, such as Nor does my heart so bid me, for I have learned to be
- valiant,
and Il. vi. 444.For towards all he understood the way to be gentle.
For by
- declaring that bravery is a thing to be learned, and by expressing the
- belief that friendly and gracious intercourse with others proceeds from
- understanding, and is in keeping with reason, the poet urges us not to
- neglect our own selves, but to learn what is good, and to give heed to our
- teachers, intimating that both boorishness and cowardice are but ignorance
- and defects of learning. With this agrees very well what he says regarding
- Zeus and Poseidon : Ibid. xvii. 671.Both, indeed, were of one descent and of the same
- birthplace, Yet was Zeus the earlier born and his knowledge was wider.
For
- he declares understanding to be a most divine and kingly thing, to which he
- ascribes the very great superiority of Zeus, inasmuch as he believes that
- all the other virtues follow upon this one. Ibid. xiii. 354.
At the same time, the young man must get the habit of perusing with a mind
- wide awake such sayings as these : Falsehood he will not utter because he is
- very prudent,
and Od. iii. 20 and 328.Il. xxiii. 570.Glaucus, what cause has a man like you for words so disdainful
- ? Truly I thought, my friend, that in sense you excelled all the others,
- the implication being that men of sense do not lie or contend unfairly in
- games, or make unwarranted accusations against other people. And from the
- poet's saying Ibid. xvii. 170.Ibid. vi. 104.Mad for him was Proetus' royal wife
- Anteia Lusting to make him her lover in secret, but could not persuade him,
- Since the wise Bellerophon thought more of virtue,
and Ibid. vi. 160.She at the first
- would not consent to a deed so unseemly, Royal Clytemnestra, since her
- thoughts were for virtue.
In these lines the poet attributes to
- understanding the cause of self-control; and in his exhortations to battle
- he says on the several occasions : Od. iii. 265.Shame, men of Lycia, whither now flee ye
- ? Now be ye valiant,
and Il. xvi. 422.But let all your minds be imbued with Shame and
- resentment, for now, as you see, great strife has arisen,
- Ibid. xiii. 121.Poet. Lyr. Gr. iii. 622; Timotheus, Frag. 14 ed. Wilamowitz.Respect for shame that helps the brave in war ;
and Aeschylus Seven Against Thebes, 599; the lines are quoted also, in whole or in part, by Plutarch, Moralia, 8 B, 186 B, and the Life of Aristeides, chap. iii. (320 B).His wish
- is not to seem, but be, the best, Reaping the deep-sown furrow of his mind
- In which all goodly counsels have their root.
For to take pride in oneself
- and in one's state of mind when it is altogether good, marks the man of good
- sense; and since everything may be referred to understanding, it follows
- that every form of virtue is added unto him from reason and instruction.
-
Now the bee, in accordance with nature's laws, discovers amid the most
- pungent flowers and the roughest thorns the smoothest and most palatable
- honey ; so children, if they be rightly nurtured amid poetry, will in some
- way or other learn to draw some wholesome and profitable doctrine even from
- passages that are suspect of what is base and improper. For example,
- Agamemnon is suspected of having, for a bribe, released from service in the
- army the rich man who made him a present of the mare Aetha,
- Gift so he fare not with him to Troy where the wind
- never ceaseth, But enjoy himself at home; for wealth in abundance Zeus had
- bestowed upon him.
But, as Aristotle Il. xxiii. 297.Homeric Questions.
- Il. xxiv. 130.By my tears I
- shall not cure it, nor worse make it By pursuing joys, yea, and
- festivities.
For if he thought that he should not make matters Poet. Lyr. Gr. ii. p. 687.worse
- by pursuing joys, yea, and festivities,
how shall our present
- condition be any the worse if we engage in the study of philosophy or take
- part in public life, if we go out to the market-place or down to the
- Academy, or if we pursue our farming ? Wherefore the corrected versions
- which Cleanthes
- What's shameful if its doer think not so ?
at once
- interpolated, Aeolus of Euripides, Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag., Euripides, No. 17.A shame's a shame, though one think so or no
and Cleanthes,
- taking the lines about riches, Give to your friends, and when your body's
- ill, Save it by spending,
rewrote them in this manner, Electra, 428.To harlots give, and
- when your body's ill Waste it by spending.
And Zeno in amending the lines of
- Sophocles, Whoever comes to traffic with a king To him is slave however free
- he come,
rewrote it thus : Trag. Graec. Frag., Sophocles, No. 789; quoted by Plutarch also in Moralia, 204 D and the Life of Pompey chap. lxxviii. (661 A).Is not a slave if only free he come,
by the word
- free
as he now uses it designating the man who is
- fearless, high-minded, and unhumbled. What, then, is to hinder us also from
- encouraging the young to take the better course by means of similar
- rejoinders, dealing with the citations something like this : Most enviable
- is the lot of him The shaft of whose desire hits what he would.
- Trag. Graec. Frag., Adesp. No. 354.Not
- so,
will be our retort, but
For to gain and achieve one's wish, if what one wishes is
- not right, is pitiable and unenviable. Again, The shaft of whose desire hits what is
- good.
- Not for good and no ill came
- thy life from thy sire, Agamemnon, but joy Thou shalt find interwoven with
- grief.
- Iphigenia at Aulis, 29; quoted also in Moralia, 103 B.No, indeed,
we shall say, but you must find
- joy and not grief if your lot be but moderate, since
and : Not for good and no
- ill came thy life from thy sire, Agamemnon;
- Alas, from God
- this evil comes to men, When, knowing what is good, one does it not.
- Chrysippus of Euripides; Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag., Euripides, No. 841; again quoted by Plutarch, Moralia, 446 A.No, rather is it bestial,
we reply, and
- irrational and pitiable that a man who knows the better should be led
- astray by the worse as a result of a weak will and soft living.
- And again : 'Tis character persuades, and not the speech.
- Com. Att. Frag. iii. p. 135; again quoted by Plutarch, Moralia, 801 C.No,
- rather it is both character and speech, or character by means of speech,
- just as a horseman uses a bridle, or a helmsman uses a rudder, since
- virtue has no instrument so humane or so akin to itself as
- speech.
And:
- To women more than men is he inclined ? Where there is
- beauty, either suits him best.
But it were better to say Trag. Graec. Frag., Adesp. No, 355; again quoted by Plutarch, Moralia, 766 F.
-
Again : Where
- there is virtue, either suits him best,
of a truth, and there is no
- difference in his inclination ; but the man who is influenced by
- pleasure or outward beauty to shift his course hither and thither is
- incompetent and inconstant.God's doings make the wise
- to feel afraid.
- Trag. Graec. Frag., Adesp. No. 356.Not so by any means, but
Such then is the system of amendment. God's doings make the wise
- to feel assured,
but they do make the silly and foolish and ungrateful
- to feel afraid, because such persons suspect and fear the power which is
- the cause and beginning of every good thing, as though it did
- harm.
Chrysippus has rightly indicated how the poet's statements can be given a
- wider application, saying that what is serviceable should be taken over and
- made to apply to like situations. For when Hesiod Works and Days, 348.Nor would even an
- ox disappear were there not a bad neighbour,
he says the same thing also
- about a dog and about an ass and about all things which in a similar way can
- disappear.
And again when Euripides Trag. Graec. Frag., Euripides, No. 958; again quoted by Plutarch, Moralia, 106 D. Cf. CIcero, Ad Atticum, ix. 2a, 2.What man who
- recks not death can be a slave ?
we must understand that he makes the same
- statement
- Blest is the man who has both wealth and
- sense,
they may think of the statement as holding good also about repute
- and leadership and facility in speaking ; and so also that when they hear
- the rebuke which was administered by Odysseus to Achilles as he sat among
- the maidens in Scyrus, Bridal Manager of Menander, cf. Kock, Com. Att. Frag. iii. Menander, No. 114, and Allinson, Menander in L.C.L. p. 342.Dost thou, to dim the glory of thy race, Card wool,
- son of the noblest man in Greece ?
they may imagine it to be addressed
- also to the profligate and the avaricious and the heedless and the ill-bred,
- as, for example, Trag. Graec. Frag., Adesp. No. 9; again quoted by Plutarch with variant reading, Moralia, 72 E.Dost drink, son of the noblest man in Greece,
or gamble, or
- follow quail-fighting, Speak not of Wealth. I can't admire a god Whose ready
- favour basest men secure.
Therefore speak not of repute, either, or of
- personal beauty, or the general's cloak, or the priestly crown, to all which
- we see the worst of men attaining. Aeolus of Euripides. Nauck, TGF., Euripides, No. 20; cf. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, v. 16.For ugly is the brood of cowardice,
and
- the same we may also aver of licentiousness, superstition, envy, and all the
- other pestilent disorders. Most excellently has Homer said TGF., Adesp. No. 357.Paris, poor
- wretch, excelling in looks,
and Il. iii. 39.Hector, excelling in looks
(for he
- declares the man deserving of censure and reproach who is endowed with no
- good quality better than personal comeliness), and this we must make to
- apply to similar cases, thereby curtailing the pride of those who plume
- themselves on things of no worth, and teaching the young to regard as a
- disgrace and reproach such phrases as Ibid. xvii. 142.excelling in wealth
- and excelling in dinners
and excelling in children
-
or oxen,
and in fact even the use of the word
- excelling
in such a connexion. For we ought to aim at
- the pre-eminence which comes from noble qualities, and we should strive to
- be first in matters of first importance, and to be great in the greatest:
- but the repute which comes from small and petty things is disreputable and
- paltry.
This illustration at once reminds us to consider carefully instances of
- censure and commendation, particularly in Homer's poems. For he gives us
- expressly to understand that bodily and adventitious
- Heaven-sprung son of Laertes, Odysseus of many devices,
and Il. ii. 173.Hector,
- son of Priam, peer of Zeus in counsel,
and Ib. vii. 47.Son of Peleus, Achilles, great
- glory to the Achaeans,
and Ib. xix. 216.Noble son of Menoetius, in whom my soul finds
- pleasure.
In the second place they reproach without touching at all upon
- bodily characteristics, but they direct their censure to faults : Ib. xi. 608.Drunken
- sot, with eyes of a dog and the wild deer's courage,
and Ib. i. 225.Ajax, excelling at
- wrangling, ill advised,
and Ib. xxiii. 483.Why, Idomeneus do you brag so soon ? Unfitting
- Is it for you to be braggart,
and Ib. xxiii. 474, 478.Ajax, blundering boaster,
and finally
- Thersites is reproached Ib. xiii. 824.Ib. ii. 246.Up with you, club-foot, my child !
Thus Homer ridicules
- those who feel ashamed of lameness or blindness, in that he does not regard
- as blameworthy that which is not shameful, or as shameful that which is
- brought about, not through our own acts, but by fortune. Plainly, then, two
- great advantages accrue to those who accustom themselves carefully to peruse
- works of poetry : the first is conducive to moderation, that we do not
- odiously and foolishly reproach anybody with his fortune ; while the second
- is conducive to magnanimity, that when we ourselves have met with chances
- and changes we be not humiliated or even disturbed, but bear gently with
- scoffings and revilings and ridicule, having especially before us the words
- of Philemon : Il. xxi. 331.There's naught more pleasing or in better taste Than having
- strength to bear when men revile.
But if anybody is plainly in need of
- reprehension, we should reprehend his faults and his giving way to emotion,
- after the fashion in which Adrastus of the tragedy, when Alcmaeon said to
- him, Epidicazomenus of Philemon; cf. Kock, Com. Att. Frag. ii. p. 484.You are the kin of her who slew her spouse,
replied Trag. Graec. Frag., Adesp. No. 358; again quoted by Plutarch, Moralia, 88 F.And you have
- murdered her who gave you birth.
For just as those who scourge the clothes
- do not
- Ibidem.
- Moralia, 173 D) that Artaxerxes (Longhand) ordained that nobles who had offended should lay off their clothes, and their clothes should be scourged instead of their bodies. Considerable corroborative evidence is cited by Wyttenbach in his note on Moralia, 565 A.
Moreover, just as in what we have said above we felt that by setting against
- cheap and harmful poems the sayings and maxims of statesmen and men of
- repute, we were inducing a revolt and revulsion of faith from such poetry,
- so whenever we find any edifying sentiment neatly expressed in the poets we
- ought to foster and amplify it by means of proofs and testimonies from the
- philosophers, at the same time crediting these with the discovery. For this
- is right and useful, and our faith gains an added strength and dignity
- whenever the doctrines of Pythagoras and of Plato are in agreement with what
- is spoken on the stage or sung to the lyre or studied at school, and when
- the precepts of Chilon and of Bias lead to the same conclusions as our
- children's readings in poetry. Hence it is a duty to make a point of
- indicating that the lines You, my child, have not the gift of arms in
- battle, Your concern must be for loving arms in wedlock,
and Il. v. 428.Seeing
- that Zeus is wroth if you fight with a man far better,
do not differ
- from Iliad, xi. 543. See note on 24 C supra.
- Know thyself,
but have the same purport as this ;
- and the lines,
- Fools ! They know not how much more than all a half is,
- and Works and Days, 40.Evil counsel is the worst for him who gives it
are identical with the
- doctrines of Plato in the Gorgias Ibid. 265.Gorgias, 473 A ff.Republic, end of Book I. and Book IV.; cf. also 335 B.to do wrong is worse than to be wronged
and to
- do evil is more injurious than to suffer evil.
And on the words
- of Aeschylus, Trag. Graec. Frag., Aeschylus, No. 352.Fear not; great stress of pain is not for long,
we ought to
- remark that this is the oft repeated and much admired statement originating
- with Epicurus,leading principles
of Epicurus; cf. Diogenes Laertius, x. 140.that great pains shortly spend their force,
- and long continued pains have no magnitude.
Of these two ideas
- Aeschylus has perspicuously stated the one and the other is a corollary
- thereto ; for if great and intense pain is not lasting, then that which does
- not last is not great or hard to endure. Take these lines of Thespis Trag. Graec. Frag. p. 833.You
- see that Zeus is first of gods in this, Not using lies or boast or silly
- laugh ; With pleasure he alone is unconcerned.
What difference is there
- between this and the statement, for the Divine Being sits throned
- afar from pleasure and pain,
as Plato Letters, iii. 315 C.I shall assert that virtue hath the highest fame, But
- wealth with even wretched men is intimate,
and again by Euripides Trag. Graec. Frag., Euripides, No. 959.There's naught that I hold In a higher esteem Than a
- virtuous life ; 'Twill ever be joined With those that are good.
and Why seek
- vain possessions ? Do ye think Virtue by wealth to compass ? Wretched amid
- your comforts shall ye sit.
Is not this a proof of what the philosophers
- say regarding wealth and external advantages, that without virtue they are
- useless and unprofitable for their owners ? e.g. Moralia, 25 C or 646 C), seems to have condensed this quotation. The original of the first portion appears to have been given by Satyrus in his Life of Euripides (Oxyrhynchus Papyri, ix. 142), Why have you mortals acquired in vain many possessions, and think that by wealth you shall compass virtue? What boots it, should you have in your ancestral halls some fragment of Aetna's cliff or Parian stone, gold-wrought, which you have secured?
- Cf. Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag., Euripides, No. 960.
This method of conjoining and reconciling such sentiments with the doctrines
- of philosophers brings the poet's work out of the realm of myth and
- impersonation, and, moreover, invests with seriousness its helpful sayings.
- Besides, it opens and stimulates in advance the mind of the youth by the
- sayings in philosophy. For he comes to it thus not altogether without a
- foretaste of it, nor without having heard of it, nor indiscriminately
- stuffed with what he has heard always from his mother and nurse, and, I
-
- Republic, vii. chap. 2 (515 E).To mourn the babe for th' ills to which he comes;
- But him that's dead, and from his labours rests, To bear from home with joy
- and cheering words,
and Cresphontes of Euripides. Nauck, TGF., Eurip. No. 449; cf. Cicero, Tusc. Disp. i. 48. 115.What needs have mortals save two things alone,
- Demeter's grain and draught from water-jar ?
and ibid., Eurip. No. 892 (again quoted by Plutarch, Moralia, 1043 E, 1044 B and F).O Tyranny, beloved of
- barbarous folk,
and Ibid., Adesp. o 359.And mortal men's felicity Is gained by such of them as
- feel least grief,
they are less confused and disquieted upon hearing at the
- lectures of the philosophers that Ibid., Adesp. No. 360.Death is nothing to us,
- leading principles,
Diogenes Laertius, x. 139.The wealth allowed by Nature
-
- leading principles,
Diogenes Laertius, x. 144.
- Happiness and blessedness do not consist in vast possessions or exalted
- occupations or offices or authority, but on impassivity, calmness, and a
- disposition of the soul that sets its limitations to accord with
- Nature.
- cf., however, Diogenes Laertius, x. 139, 141, 144.
Wherefore, both because of these considerations and because of those already - adduced, the young man has need of good pilotage in the matter of reading, - to the end that, forestalled with schooling rather than prejudice, in a - spirit of friendship and goodwill and familiarity, he may be convoyed by - poetry into the realm of philosophy. -
-It may be allowed to be a question fit for the determination of those concerning whom Cato said, Their
- palates are more sensitive than their hearts, whether that
- saying of Philoxenus the poet be true or no, The most
- savory flesh is that which is no flesh, and fish that is no fish.
- Yet this to me, Marcus Sedatus, is out of question, that
- those precepts of philosophy which seem not to be delivered with a designed gravity, such as becomes philosophers,
- take most with persons that are very young, and meet
- with a more ready acceptance and compliance from them.
- Whence it is that they do not only read through Esop's
- fables and the fictions of poets and the Abaris of Heraclides and Ariston's Lyco; but they also read such doctrines
- as relate to the souls of men, if something fabulous be
- mixed with them, with an excess of pleasure that borders on
- enthusiasm. Wherefore we are not only to govern their
- appetites in the delights of eating and drinking, but also
- (and much more) to inure them to a like temperance in
- reading and hearing, that, while they make use of pleasure
- as a sauce, they may pursue that which is wholesome and
- profitable in those things which they read. For neither
- can a city be secure if but one gate be left open to receive
- the enemy, though all the rest be shut; nor a young man
- safe, though he be sufficiently fortified against the assaults
- of all other pleasures, whilst he is without any guard against
- those of the ear. Yea, the nearer the commerce is betwixt
-
-
They say of the fish called polypus that
-
-
-
because, though it be very luscious to eat, yet it is thought
- to disturb the fancy with frightful and confused dreams.
- And the like observation may be made concerning poetry,
- that it affords sweet and withal wholesome nourishment to
- the minds of young men, but yet it contains likewise no
- less matter of disturbance and emotion to them that want
- a right conduct in the study thereof. For of it also, as well
- as of Egypt, may it be said that (to those who will use it)
-
-
-
for therein
-
-
-
And indeed such only are endangered thereby, for the - charms of that art ordinarily affect not those that are - downright sots and naturally incapable of learning. Wherefore, when Simonides was asked why of all men he could - not deceive the Thessalians, his answer was, Because they - are not so well bred as to be capable of being cajoled by - me. And Gorgias used to call tragical poems cheats, - wherein he that did cheat was juster than he that did not - cheat, and he that was cheated was wiser than he that was - not cheated.
-It deserves therefore our consideration, whether we shall
- put young men into Epicurus's boat,—wherein, having
- their ears stopped with wax, as those of the men of Ithaca
- were, they shall be obliged to sail by and not so much as
- touch at poetry,—or rather keep a guard on them, so as
- to oblige their judgments by principles of right reason to
- use it aright, and preserve them from being seduced to
- their hurt by that which affords them so much delight.
- For neither did Lycurgus, the valiant son of Dryas (as
- Homer
For as, where the mandrake grows near the vine and so
- communicates something of its force thereto, the wine that
- is made of its grapes makes the sleep of those that drink
- it more refreshing; so doth the tempering poetry with the
- principles of philosophy and allaying their roughness with
- its fictions render the study of them more easy and the
- relish of them more grateful to young learners. Wherefore those that would give their minds to philosophical
- studies are not obliged to avoid poetry altogether, but
- rather to prepare themselves for philosophy by poems,
- accustoming themselves to search for and embrace that
- which may profit in that which pleaseth them, and rejecting and discarding that wherein they find nothing of this
- nature. For this discrimination is the first step to learning; and when this is attained, then, according to what
- Sophocles saith,—
-
-
-
Let us therefore in the first place possess those whom
- we initiate in the study of poetry with this notion (as one
- which they ought always to have at hand), that
-
-
-
which they do sometimes with and sometimes against
- their wills. They do it with their wills, because they find
- strict truth too rigid to comply with that sweetness and
- gracefulness of expression, which most are taken with, so
- readily as fiction doth. For real truth, though it disgust
- never so much, must be told as it is, without alteration;
- but that which is feigned in a discourse can easily yield
- and shift its garb from the distasteful to that which is more
- pleasing. And indeed, neither the measures nor the tropes
- nor the grandeur of words nor the aptness of metaphors
-
-
-
-
such a one, I say, will take no harm. by it, nor admit from
- it any absurd thing into his belief. But when he meets in
- poetry with expressions of Neptune's rending the earth to
- pieces and discovering the infernal regions,
-
-
- Yea, he will repress his tears for Achilles and Agamemnon,
- while they are represented as mourning after their death,
- and stretching forth their limber and feeble hands to express their desire to live again. And if at any time the
- charms of poetry transport him into any disquieting passions, he will quickly say to himself, as Homer very elegantly (considering the propension of women to listen after
- fables) says in his Necyia, or relation of the state of
- the dead,—
-
-
-
Such things as I have touched upon are those which the
- poets willingly feign. But more there are which they do
- not feign, but believing them themselves as their own
- proper judgments, they put fictitious colors upon them to
- ingratiate them to us. As when Homer says of Jupiter,—
-
-
-
To this fable Aeschylus hath accommodated a whole tragedy
-
-
-
-
and this other also,—
-
-
-
these passages, I say, express the judgment and belief of
- poets who thereby discover and suggest to us the ignorant
- or mistaken apprehensions they had of the Deities. Moreover, almost every one knows nowadays, that the portentous fancies and contrivances of stories concerning the state
- of the dead are accommodated to popular apprehensions,
- —that the spectres and phantasms of burning rivers and
- horrid regions and terrible tortures expressed by frightful
- names are all mixed with fable and fiction, as poison with
- food; and that neither Homer nor Pindar nor Sophocles
- ever believed themselves when they wrote at this rate:—
-
-
-
and,
-
-
-
and,
-
-
-
And yet, as many of them as deplore death as a lamentable
- thing, or the want of burial after death as a calamitous
- condition, are wont to break out into expressions of this
- nature:—
-
-
-
and,
-
-
-
and again,
-
-
-
These, I say, are the speeches of men persuaded of these
- things, as being possessed by erroneous opinions; and
- therefore they touch us the more nearly and torment us
- inwardly, because we ourselves are full of the same impotent passion from which they were uttered. To fortify us
- therefore against expressions of this nature, let this principle continually ring in our ears, that poetry is not at all
- solicitous to keep to the strict measure of truth. And
- indeed, as to what that truth in these matters is, even
- those men themselves who make it their only study to
- learn and search it out confess that they can hardly discover any certain footsteps to guide them in that enquiry.
- Let us therefore have these verses of Empedocles, in this
- case, at hand:—
-
-
-
as also those of Xenophanes:—
-
-
-
and lastly, that passage concerning Socrates, in Plato, - where he by the solemnity of an oath disclaims all knowledge of those things. For those who perceive that the - searching into such matters makes the heads of philosophers themselves giddy cannot but be the less inclined to - regard what poets say concerning them.
-And we shall fix our young man yet the more if,
- when we enter him in the poets, we first describe poetry
-
-
-
-
These, it is true, are wicked as well as false speeches, but
- yet are decent enough in the mouth of an Eteocles, an
- Ixion, and an old griping usurer. If therefore we mind
- our children that the poets write not such things as praising and approving them, but do really account them base
- and vicious and therefore accommodate such speeches to
-
-
In such passages therefore we are carefully to observe whether or not the poet himself do anywhere give
- any intimation that he dislikes the things he makes such
- persons say; which, in the prologue to his Thais Menander does, in these words:—
-
-
-
But Homer of all the poets does it best. For he doth
- beforehand, as it were, bespeak dislike of the evil things
- and approbation of the good things he utters. Of the
- latter take these instances:—
-
-
-
-
-
-
And for the former, he so performs it as in a manner
- solemnly to forbid us to use or heed such speeches as
- those he mentions, as being foolish and wicked. For example, being to tell us how uncivilly Agamemnon treated
- the priest, he premises these words of his own,—
-
-
-
-
intimating the insolency and unbecomingness of his answer. And when he attributes this passionate speech to Achilles,—
-
-
-
he accompanies it with this censure,—
-
-
-
for it was unlikely that speaking in such anger he should - observe any rules of decency.
-And he passeth like censures on actions. As on
- Achilles's foul usage of Hector's carcass,—
-
-
-
And in like manner he doth very decently shut up relations of things said or done, by adding some sentence
- wherein he declares his judgment of them. As when he
- personates some of the Gods saying, on the occasion of
- the adultery of Mars and Venus discovered by Vulcan's
- artifice,—
-
-
-
And thus concerning Hecter's insolent boasting he says,—
-
-
-
And when he speaks of Pandarus's shooting, he adds,—
-
-
-
Now these verbal intimations of the minds and judgments
- of poets are not difficult to be understood by any one that
- will heedfully observe them. But besides these, they give
-
-
-
-
And therefore also he brings in Ulysses directing the musician thus,—
-
-
-
evidently teaching us that poets and musicians ought to
- receive the arguments of their songs from sober and understanding
-
-
-
-
For the fiction and representation of evil acts, when it
- withal acquaints us with the shame and damage befalling
- the doers, hurts not but rather profits him that reads them.
- For which end philosophers make use of examples for our
- instruction and correction out of historical collections;
- and poets do the very same thing, but with this difference,
- that they invent fabulous examples themselves. There
- was one Melanthius, who (whether in jest or earnest he
- said it, it matters not much) affirmed that the city of
- Athens owed its preservation to the dissensions and factions that were among the orators, giving withal this
- reason for his assertion, that thereby they were kept from
- inclining all of them to one side, so that by means of the
- differences among those statesmen there were always some
- that drew the saw the right way for the defeating of destructive counsels. And thus it is too in the contradictions
- among poets, which, by lessening the credit of what they
- say, render them the less powerful to do mischief; and
- therefore, when comparing one saying with another we
- discover their contrariety, we ought to adhere to the better
- side. As in these instances:—
-
-
- Ans. 'Tis easy, sir, on God to lay our crimes.
-
-
- Ans. No, sir, 'tis bad to be a wealthy sot.Ans. To call God's service toil's a foul mistake.
Such contrarieties as these are easily solved, if (as I said)
- we teach youth to judge aright and to give the better saying preference. But if we chance to meet with any absurd
- passages without any others at their heels to confute them,
- we are then to overthrow them with such others as elsewhere are to be found in the author. Nor must we be
- offended with the poet or grieved at him, but only at the
- speeches themselves, which he utters either according to
- the vulgar manner of speaking or, it may be, but in drollery. So, when thou readest in Homer of Gods thrown
- out of heaven headlong one by another, or Gods wounded
- by men and quarrelling and brawling with each other, thou
- mayest readily, if thou wilt, say to him,—
-
-
-
yea, and thou dost so elsewhere, and according as thou
- thinkest, to wit, in these passages of thine:—
-
-
-
-
-
-
For these argue sound and true opinions of the Gods; but
- those other were only feigned to raise passions in men.
- Again, when Euripides speaks at this rate,—
-
-
-
we may do well to quote him elsewhere against himself,
- where he says better,—
-
-
-
So also, when Pindar saith bitterly and keenly,
-
-
-
tell him: But, Pindar, thou thyself sayest elsewhere,
-
-
-
And when Sophocles speaks thus,
-
-
-
tell him: But we have heard thee say far otherwise,
-
-
-
And as to what he saith of riches, to wit:
-
-
-
here the reader may set in opposition divers other sayings
- of the same author. For example,
-
-
-
And Menander also somewhere magnifies a voluptuous
- life, and inflames the minds of vain persons with these
- amorous strains,
-
-
-
But yet elsewhere, on the other side, he fastens on us and
- pulls us back to the love of virtue, and checks the rage
- of lust, when he says thus,
-
-
-
For these lines are contrary to the former, as they are also - better and more profitable; so that by comparing them - considerately one cannot but either be inclined to the better side, or at least flag in the belief of the worse.
-But now, supposing that any of the poets themselves
- afford no such correcting passages to solve what they have
- said amiss, it will then be advisable to confront them with
- the contrary sayings of other famous men, and therewith to
- sway the scales of our judgment to the better side. As,
- when Alexis tempts to debauchery in these verses,
-
-
-
we must remember that Socrates said the contrary, to wit:
- Bad men live that they may eat and drink, whereas good
- men eat and drink that they may live. And against the
- man that wrote in this manner,
-
-
-
seeing he herein advises us to follow other vicious examples, that of Diogenes may well be returned, who being
- asked by what means a man might revenge himself upon
- his enemy, answered, By becoming himself a good and
- honest man. And the same Diogenes may be quoted also
- against Sophocles, who, writing thus of the sacred mysteries, caused great grief and despair to multitudes of
- men:
-
-
-
This passage being read to Diogenes, What then! says
- he, shall the condition of Pataecion, the notorious robber,
- after death be better than that of Epaminondas, merely for
-
-
-
-
How comes it to pass then, said he, Theognis, that thou - thyself being so poor pratest and gratest our ears in this - manner?
-Nor are we to omit in our reading those hints which,
- from some other words or phrases bordering on those that
- offend us, may help to rectify our apprehensions. But as
- physicians use cantharides, believing that, though their
- bodies be deadly poison, yet their feet and wings are medicinal and can even kill the poison of the flies themselves,
- so must we deal with poems. If any noun or verb near at
- hand may assist to the correction of any such saying, and
- preserve us from putting a bad construction upon it, we
- should take hold of it and employ it to assist a more favorable interpretation. As some do in reference to those
- verses of Homer,—
-
-
-
For, they say, he says not of men simply, or of all men, - that the Gods weave for them the fatal web of a sorrowful - life; but he affirms it only of foolish and imprudent men, - whom, because their vices make them such, he therefore - calls wretched and miserable.
-Another way whereby those passages which are suspicious in poets may be transferred to a better sense may
-
- evil death; for the Macedonians use the word
- death. So the Aeolians call victory gotten
- by patient endurance of hardships
But of all things it is most necessary, and no less profitable if we design to receive profit and not hurt from the
- poets, that we understand how they make use of the names
- of Gods, as also of the terms of Evil and Good; and what
- they mean by Fortune and Fate; and whether these words
- be always taken by them in one and the same sense or
- rather in various senses, as also many other words are.
- For so the word material house,
- as, Into the high-roofed house; and sometimes estate, as,
- My house is devoured. So the word life, and sometimes wealth. And uneasy and disquieted in mind, as in
-
-
- and elsewhere for boasting and rejoicing, as in
-
-
- In like manner to move, as in Euripides when he saith,
-
-
-
or to sit, as in Sophocles when he writes thus,
-
-
-
It is elegant also when they adapt to the present matter, as grammarians teach, the use of words which are commonly of another signification. As here:—
-
-
-
-
For here to praise (instead of to
- praise is used for to refuse. So in conversation it is common with us to say, it is well (i.e., No, I thank
- you), and to bid any thing fare well (deprecated, because death is by all men
- shunned.
And the like distinction of words we ought to observe
- also in things more weighty and serious. To begin with
- the Gods, we should teach our youth that poets, when they
- use the names of Gods, sometimes mean properly the
- Divine Beings so called, but otherwhiles understand by
- those names certain powers of which the Gods are the
- donors and authors, they having first led us into the use of
- them by their own practice. As when Archilochus prays,
-
-
-
it is plain that he means the God himself whom he invokes. But when elsewhere he bewails the drowning of
- his sister's husband, who had not obtained lawful burial,
- and says,
-
-
-
he gives the name of Vulcan to the fire and not to the
- Deity. Again, Euripides, when he says,
-
-
-
means the Gods themselves who bare those names. But
- when Sophocles saith,
-
-
-
we are to understand the word Mars to denote not the God
- so called, but war. And by the same word we are to understand also weapons made of hardened brass, in those verses
- of Homer,
-
-
-
Wherefore, in conformity to the instances given, we must
- conceive and bear in mind that by the names of Jupiter
- also sometimes they mean the God himself, sometimes Fortune, and oftentimes also Fate. For when they say,—
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
they understand Jupiter himself. But when they ascribe
- the event of all things done to Jupiter as the cause, saying
- of him,—
-
-
-
they mean by Jove no more but Fate. For the poet doth
- not conceive that God contrives mischief against mankind,
- but he soundly declares the mere necessity of the things
- themselves, to wit, that prosperity and victory are destined
- by Fate to cities and armies and commanders who govern
- themselves with sobriety, but if they give way to passions
- and commit errors, thereby dividing and crumbling themselves into factions, as those of whom the poet speaks did,
- they do unhandsome actions, and thereby create great disturbances, such as are attended with sad consequences.
-
-
-
But when Hesiod brings in Prometheus thus counselling
- his brother Epimetheus,
-
-
-
-
he useth the name of Jove to express Fortune; for he calls - the good things which come by her (such as riches, and - marriages, and empires, and indeed all external things the - enjoyment whereof is unprofitable to them who know not - how to use them well) the gifts of Jove. And therefore he - adviseth Epimetheus (an ill man, and a fool withal) to stand - in fear of and to guard himself from prosperity, as that - which would be hurtful and destructive to him.
-Again, where he saith,
-
-
-
he calls that which befalls men by Fortune God's gift, and
- intimates that it is an unworthy thing to reproach any man
- for that poverty which he falls into by Fortune, whereas
- poverty is then only a matter of disgrace and reproach
- when it is attendant on sloth and idleness, or wantonness
- and prodigality. For, before the name of Fortune was
- used, they knew there was a powerful cause, which moved
- irregularly and unlimitedly and with such a force that no
- human reason could avoid it; and this cause they called by
- the names of Gods. So we are wont to call divers things
- and qualities and discourses, and even men themselves,
- divine. And thus may we rectify many such sayings concerning Jupiter as would otherwise seem very absurd. As
- these, for instance:—
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
These passages we are to interpret as spoken concerning
- Fortune or Fate, of the causality of both which no account
- can be given by us, nor do their effects fall under our power.
- But where any thing is said of Jupiter that is suitable,
- rational, and probable, there we are to conceive that the
- names of that God is used properly. As in these instances:—
-
-
-
And other words there are which the poets remove and
- translate from their proper sense by accommodation to
- various things, which deserve also our serious notice. Such
- a one, for instance, is virtue. For because virtue
- does not only render men prudent, just, and good, both in
- their words and deeds, but also oftentimes purchaseth to
- them honor and power, therefore they call likewise these
- by that name. So we are wont to call both the olive-tree
- and the fruit
-
-
-
-
-
let him presently conceive that these things are spoken of
- that most excellent and divine habit in us which we understand to be no other than right reason, or the highest
- attainment of the reasonable nature, and most agreeable
-
-
-
-
and this,
-
-
-
- let him not sit down in an astonishing admiration of rich
- men, as if they were enabled by their wealth to purchase
- virtue, nor let him imagine that it is in the power of Fortune to increase or lessen his own wisdom; but let him
- conceive that the poet by virtue meant either glory or power
- or prosperity or something of like import. For poets use
- the same ambiguity also in the word evil, which
- sometimes in them properly signifies a wicked and malicious disposition of mind, as in that of Hesiod,
-
-
-
and sometimes some evil accident or misfortune, as when
- Homer says,
-
-
-
So also in the word
-
-
and Menander in this,—
-
-
-
yet Euripides discourseth more confusedly and perplexedly
- when he writes after this manner,—
-
-
-
-
-
-
except, as I said, we allow him the use of these words in a - metaphorical and abusive sense. But enough hath been - spoken of these matters.
-Nevertheless, this principle is not once only but often
- to be inculcated and pressed on young men, that poetry,
- when it undertakes a fictitious argument by way of imitation, though it make use of such ornament and illustration
- as suit the actions and manners treated of, yet disclaims not
- all likelihood of truth, seeing the force of imitation, in
- order to the persuading of men, lies in probability. Wherefore such imitation as does not altogether shake hands with
- truth carries along with it certain signs of virtue and vice
- mixed together in the actions which it doth represent. And
- of this nature is Homer's poetry, which totally bids adieu
- to Stoicism, the principles whereof will not admit any vice
- to come near where virtue is, nor virtue to have any thing to
- do where any vice lodgeth, but affirms that he that is not
- a wise man can do nothing well, and he that is so can do
- nothing amiss. Thus they determine in the schools. But
- in human actions and the affairs of common life the judgment of Euripides is verified, that
-
-
-
Next, it is to be observed that poetry, waiving the truth of
- things, does most labor to beautify its fictions with variety and
- multiplicity of contrivance. For variety bestows upon fable
- all that is pathetical, unusual, and surprising, and thereby
- makes it more taking and graceful; whereas what is void of
- variety is unsuitable to the nature of fable, and so raiseth no
-
-
These things therefore so standing, we should, when
- we enter a young man into the study of the poets, endeavor to free his mind from that degree of esteem of the
- good and great personages in them described as may incline
- him to think them to be mirrors of wisdom and justice, the
- chief of princes, and the exemplary measures of all virtue
- and goodness. For he will receive much prejudice, if he
- shall approve and admire all that comes from such persons
- as great, if he dislike nothing in them himself, nor will
- endure to hear others blame them, though for such words
- and actions as the following passages import:—
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Our young man is to be taught not to commend such
- things as these, no, nor to show the nimbleness of his wit
- or subtlety in maintaining an argument by finding out plausible colors and pretences to varnish over a bad matter. But
-
-
-
-
And he spake well, and with due moderation and decorum.
- But when the soothsayer Chalcas had told him that he
- feared the wrath of the most potent among the Grecians,
- after an oath that while he lived no man should lay violent
- hands on him, he adds, but not with like wisdom and
- moderation,
-
-
-
in which speech he declares his low opinion or rather his
- contempt of his chief commander. And then, being farther
- provoked, he drew his weapon with a design to kill him,
- which attempt was neither good nor expedient. And therefore by and by he repented his rashness,—
-
-
-
wherein again he did rightly and worthily, in that, though
- he could not altogether quell his passion, yet he restrained
- and reduced it under the command of reason, before it
- brake forth into such an irreparable act of mischief. Again,
- even Agamemnon himself talks in that assembly ridiculously, but carries himself more gravely and more like a
- prince in the matter of Chryseis. For whereas Achilles,
- when his Briseis was taken away from him,
-
-
-
Agamemnon himself hands into the ship, delivers to her
- friends, and so sends from him, the woman concerning
- whom a little before he declared that he loved her better
- than his wife; and in that action did nothing unbecoming or savoring of fond affection. Also Phoenix, when
- his father bitterly cursed him for having to do with one
- that was his own harlot, says,
-
-
-
It is true that Aristarchus was afraid to permit these verses - to stand in the poet, and therefore censured them to be - expunged. But they were inserted by Homer very aptly - to the occasion of Phoenix's instructing Achilles what a - pernicious thing anger is, and what foul acts men do by its - instigation, while they are capable neither of making use - of their own reason nor of hearing the counsel of others. - To which end he also introduceth Meleager at first highly - offended with his citizens, and afterwards pacified; justly - therein reprehending disordered passions, and praising it - as a good and profitable thing not to yield to them, but to - resist and overcome them, and to repent when one hath - been overcome by them.
-Now in these instances the difference is manifest. But
- where a like clear judgment cannot be passed, there we
- are to settle the young man's mind thus, by way of distinction. If Nausicaa, having cast her eyes upon Ulysses,
- a stranger, and feeling the same passion for him as Calypso
- had before, did (as one that was ripe for a husband) out
- of wantonness talk with her maidens at this foolish rate,—
-
-
-
she is blameworthy for her impudence and incontinence.
- But if, perceiving the man's breeding by his discourse, and
- admiring the prudence of his addresses, she rather wisheth
- to have such a one for a husband than a merchant or a
- dancing gallant of her fellow-citizens, she is to be commended. And when Ulysses is represented as rejoicing at
- Penelope's jocular conversation with her wooers, and
- at their presenting her with rich garments and other ornaments,
-
-
-
if that joy were occasioned by greediness and covetous
-
-
-
-
But if through foresight he thought thereby to get them
- the more within his power, as being lulled asleep in security for the future by the hopes she gave them at present,
- this rejoicing, joined with confidence in his wife, was rational. Again, when he is brought in numbering the goods
- which the Phaeacians had set on shore together with himself and departed; if indeed, being himself left in such a
- solitude, so ignorant where he was, and having no security there for his own person, he is yet solicitous for his
- goods, lest
-
-
-
the covetousness of the man deserved in truth to be pitied,
- or rather abhorred. But if, as some say in his defence,
- being doubtful whether or no the place where he was
- landed were Ithaca, he made use of the just tale of his
- goods to infer thence the honesty of the Phaeacians,—because it was not likely they would expose him in a strange
- place and leave him there with his goods by him untouched,
- so as to get nothing by their dishonesty,—then he makes
- use of a very fit test for this purpose, and deserves commendation for his wisdom in that action. Some also there
- are who find fault with that passage of the putting him on
- shore when he was asleep, if it really so happened, and
- they tell us that the people of Tuscany have still a traditional story among them concerning Ulysses, that he was
- naturally sleepy, and therefore a man whom many men
- could not freely converse with. But if his sleep was but
- feigned, and he made use of this pretence only of a natural
-
-
Now, by showing young men these things, we shall preserve them from being carried away to any corruption in
- their manners. and dispose them to the election and imitation of those that are good, as being before instructed
- readily to disapprove those and commend these. But this
- ought with the most care to be done in the reading of
- tragedies wherein probable and subtle speeches are made
- use of in the most foul and wicked actions. For that is
- not always true which Sophocles saith, that
- From naughty acts good words can ne'er proceed.
-
For even he himself is wont to apply pleasant reasonings - and plausible arguments to those manners and actions - which are wicked or unbecoming. And in another of - his fellow-tragedians, we may see even Phaedra herself - represented as justifying her unlawful affection for Hippolytus by accusing Theseus of ill-carriage towards her. And - in his Troades, he allows Helen the same liberty of speech - against Hecuba, whom she judgeth to be more worthy of - punishment than herself for her adultery, because she was - the mother of Paris that tempted her thereto. A young - man therefore must not be accustomed to think any thing - of that nature handsomely or wittily spoken, nor to be - pleased with such colorable inventions; but rather more to - abhor such words as tend to the defence of wanton acts - than the very acts themselves.
-And lastly, it will be useful likewise to enquire into
- the cause why each thing is said. For so Cato, when he
- was a boy, though he was wont to be very observant of all
- his master's commands, yet withal used to ask the cause
-
-
-
-
But to those of greater moment they give credence without
- examination, as to those that follow:
-
-
-
And yet such speeches relate to manners, and disquiet
- men's lives by begetting in them evil opinions and unworthy sentiments, except they have learned to return
- answer to each of them thus: Wherefore is it necessary
- that a man who is crushed by adverse fate should have a
- dejected spirit? Yea, why rather should he not struggle
- against Fortune, and raise himself above the pressures of
- his low circumstances? Why, if I myself be a good and
- wise son of an evil and foolish father, does it not rather
- become me to bear myself confidently upon the account of
- my own virtue, than to be dejected and dispirited because
- of my father's defects?
For he that can encounter such
- speeches and oppose them after this manner, not yielding
- himself up to be overset with the blast of every saying,
- but approving that speech of Heraclitus, that
-
-
-
-
will reject many such things as falsely and idly spoken.
-These things therefore may be of use to preserve - us from the hurt we might get by the study of poems. - Now, as on a vine the fruit oftentimes lies shadowed and - hidden under its large leaves and luxuriant branches, so - in the poet's phrases and fictions that encompass them - there are also many profitable and useful things concealed - from the view of young men. This, however, ought not to - be suffered; nor should we be led away from things themselves thus, but rather adhere to such of them as tend to - the promoting of virtue and the well forming of our manners. It will not be altogether useless therefore, to treat - briefly in the next place of passages of that nature. - Wherein I intend to touch only at some particulars, leaving all longer discourses, and the brimming up and furnishing them with a multitude of instances, to those who write - more for show and ostentation.
-First, therefore, let our young man be taught to understand good and bad manners and persons, and from thence
- apply his mind to the words and deeds which the poet
- decently assigns to either of them. For example, Achilles,
- though in some wrath, speaks to Agamemnon thus decently:
-
-
-
whereas Thersites to the same person speaks reproachfully
- in this manner:—
-
-
-
Again, Achilles thus:—
-
-
-
but Thersites thus:—
- Whom I or some Greek else as captive bring.
-
Again, Diomedes, when Agamemnon taking a view of the
- army spoke reproachfully to him,
-
-
-
whereas Sthenelus, a man of small note, replies on him
- thus:—
-
-
-
Now the observation of such difference will teach the
- young man the decency of a modest and moderate temper,
- and the unbecoming nauseousness of the contrary vices of
- boasting and cracking of a man's own worth. And it is
- worth while also to take notice of the demeanor of Agamemnon in the same passage. For he passeth by Sthenelus unspoken to; but perceiving Ulysses to be offended,
- he neglects not him, but applies himself to answer him:—
- Struck with his generous wrath, the king replies.
-
For to have apologized to every one had been too servile
- and misbecoming the dignity of his person; whereas
- equally to have neglected every one had been an act of
- insolence and imprudence. And very handsome it is that
- Diomedes, though in the heat of the battle he answers the
- king only with silence, yet after the battle was over useth
- more liberty towards him, speaking thus:—
- You called me coward, sir, before the Greeks.
-
It is expedient also to take notice of the different carriage
- of a wise man and of a soothsayer popularly courting the
- multitude. For Chalcas very unseasonably makes no scruple
-
-
-
-
which done, accordingly after supper he sends his ambassadors. Now this speech of Nestor tended to the rectifying - of what he had before done amiss; but that of Chalcas, - only to accuse and disparage him.
-There is likewise consideration to be had of the different
- manners of nations, such as these. The Trojans enter into
- battle with loud outcries and great fierceness; but in the
- army of the Greeks,
-
-
-
For when soldiers are about to engage an enemy, the awe - they stand in of their officers is an argument both of courage and obedience. For which purpose Plato teacheth us - that we ought to inure ourselves to fear blame and disgrace - more than labor and danger. And Cato was wont to say - that he liked men that were apt to blush better than those - that looked pale.
-Moreover, there is a particular character to be noted of
- the men who undertake for any action. For Dolon thus
- promiseth:—
-
-
-
But Diomedes promiseth nothing, but only tells them he
- shall fear the less if they send a companion with him;
- whereby is intimated, that discreet foresight is Grecian and
-
-
It is a matter too of no unprofitable consideration, how
- the minds of the Trojans and of Hector too were affected
- when he and Ajax were about to engage in a single combat.
- For Aeschylus, when, upon one of the fighters at fisticuffs
- in the Isthmian games receiving a blow on the face, there
- was made a great outcry among the people, said: What a
- thing is practice! See how the lookers-on only cry out,
- but the man that received the stroke is silent.
But when
- the poet tells us, that the Greeks rejoiced when they saw
- Ajax in his glistering armor, but
-
-
-
who is there that wonders not at this difference,—when - the heart of him that was to run the risk of the combat - only beats inwardly, as if he were to undertake a mere - wrestling or running match, but the very bodies of the - spectators tremble and shake, out of the kindness and fear - which they had for their king?
-In the same poet also we may observe the difference
- betwixt the humor of a coward and a valiant man. For
- Thersites
-
-
-
but Ajax is always represented as friendly to Achilles; and
- particularly he speaks thus to Hector concerning him:—
-
-
-
wherein he insinuates the high commendation of that valiant man. And in what follows, he speaks like handsome
- things of his fellow-soldiers in general, thus:—
-
-
-
-
wherein he doth not boast himself to be the only or the - best champion, but one of those, among many others, who - were fit to undertake that combat.
-What hath been said is sufficient upon the point of dissimilitudes; except we think fit to add this, that many of - the Trojans came into the enemy's power alive, but none - of the Grecians; and that many of the Trojans supplicated - to their enemies,—as (for instance) Adrastus, the sons of - Antimachus, Lycaon,—and even Hector himself entreats - Achilles for a sepulture; but not one of these doth so, as - judging it barbarous to supplicate to a foe in the field, and - more Greek-like either to conquer or die.
-But as, in the same plant, the bee feeds on the flower,
- the goat on the bud, the hog on the root, and other living
- creatures on the seed and the fruit; so in reading of poems,
- one man singleth out the historical part, another dwells
- upon the elegancy and fit disposal of words, as Aristophanes
- says of Euripides,—
-
-
-
but others, to whom this part of my discourse is directed,
- mind only such things as are useful to the bettering of
- manners. And such we are to put in mind that it is an
- absurd thing, that those who delight in fables should not
- let any thing slip them of the vain and extravagant stories
- they find in poets, and that those who affect language should
- pass by nothing that is elegantly and floridly expressed;
- and that only the lovers of honor and virtue, who apply
- themselves to the study of poems not for delight but for
- instruction's sake, should slightly and negligently observe
- what is spoken in them relating to valor, temperance, or
- justice. Of this nature is the following:—
-
-
-
-
For to see a man of the greatest wisdom in danger of being
- totally cut off with all those that take part with him, and
- yet affected less with fear of death than of shame and dishonor, must needs excite in a young man a passionate
- affection for virtue. And this,
-
-
-
teacheth us to infer that the Deity delights not in a rich or
- a proper or a strong man, but in one that is furnished with
- wisdom and justice. Again, when the same Goddess (Minerva) saith that the reason why she did not desert or neglect Ulysses was that he was
- Gentle, of ready wit, of prudent mind,
-
she therein tells us that, of all things pertaining to us, - nothing is dear to the Gods and divine but our virtue, seeing like naturally delights in like.
-And seeing, moreover, that it both seemeth and really is
- a great thing to be able to moderate a man's anger, but a
- greater by far to guard a man's self beforehand by prudence, that he fall not into it nor be surprised by it, therefore also such passages as tend that way are not slightly to
- be represented to the readers; for example, that Achilles
- himself—who was a man of no great forbearance, nor inclined to such meekness—yet warns Priam to be calm and
- not to provoke him, thus,
-
-
-
and that he himself first washeth and decently covereth the
- body of Hector and then puts it into a chariot, to prevent
- his father's seeing it so unworthily mangled as it was,—
-
-
-
For it is a piece of admirable prudence for a man so prone
- to anger, as being by nature hasty and furious, to understand himself so well as to set a guard upon his own
- inclinations, and by avoiding provocations to keep his passion at due distance by the use of reason, lest he should
- be unawares surprised by it. And after the same manner
- must the man that is apt to be drunken forearm himself
- against that vice; and he that is given to wantonness,
- against lust, as Agesilaus refused to receive a kiss from
- a beautiful person addressing to him, and Cyrus would not
- so much as endure to see Panthea. Whereas, on the contrary, those that are not virtuously bred are wont to gather
- fuel to inflame their passions, and voluntarily to abandon
- themselves to those temptations to which of themselves they
- are endangered. But Ulysses does not only restrain his own
- anger, but (perceiving by the discourse of his son Telemachus, that through indignation conceived against such evil
- men he was greatly provoked) he blunts his passion too
- beforehand, and composeth him to calmness and patience, thus:—
-
-
-
For as men are not wont to put bridles on their horses
- when they are running in full speed, but bring them bridled
- beforehand to the race; so do they use to preoccupy and
- predispose the minds of those persons with rational considerations to enable them to encounter passion, whom they
-
-
Furthermore, the young man is not altogether to neglect
- names themselves when he meets with them; though he is
- not obliged to give much heed to such idle descants as those
- of Cleanthes, who, while he professeth himself an interpreter, plays the trifler, as in these passages of Homer:
-
But such things as these are fitter to be left to the examination of grammarians; and we are rather to insist upon
- such passages as are both profitable and persuasive. Such,
- for instance, as these:—
-
-
-
For while the author tells us that fortitude may be taught,
- and that an obliging and graceful way of conversing with
- others is to be gotten by art and the use of reason, he exhorts us not to neglect the improvement of ourselves, but
- by observing our teachers' instructions to learn a becoming carriage, as knowing that clownishness and cowardice
- argue ill-breeding and ignorance. And very suitable to
- what hath been said is that which is said of Jupiter and
- Neptune:—
-
-
-
-
For the poet therein pronounceth wisdom to be the most
- divine and royal quality of all; as placing therein the
- greatest excellency of Jupiter himself, and judging all
- virtues else to be necessarily consequent thereunto. We
- are also to accustom a young man attentively to hear such
- things as these:—
-
-
-
These speeches teach us that it is beneath wise men to lie
- or to deal otherwise than fairly, even in games, or to blame
- other men without just cause. And when the poet attributes Pindarus's violation of the truce to his folly, he
- withal declares his judgment that a wise man will not be
- guilty of an unjust action. The like may we also infer
- concerning continence, taking our ground for it from these
- passages:—
-
-
-
in which speeches the poet assigns wisdom to be the cause
- of continence. And when in exhortations made to encourage soldiers to fight, he speaks in this manner:—
-
-
-
-
he seems to intimate that continent men are valiant men;
- because they fear the shame of base actions, and can
- trample on pleasures and stand their ground in the greatest hazards. Whence Timotheus, in the play called Persae,
- takes occasion handsomely to exhort the Grecians thus:—
-
-
-
And Aeschylus also makes it a point of wisdom not to be
- blown up with pride when a man is honored, nor to be
- moved or elevated with the acclamations of a multitude,
- writing thus of Amphiaraus:—
-
-
-
For it is the part of a wise man to value himself upon the - consciousness of his own true worth and excellency. - Whereas, therefore, all inward perfections are reducible - to wisdom, it appears that all sorts of virtue and learning - are included in it.
-Again, boys may be instructed, by reading the poets
- as they ought, to draw something that is useful and profitable even from those passages that are most suspected as
- wicked and absurd; as the bee is taught by Nature to
- gather the sweetest and most pleasant honey from the
- harshest flowers and sharpest thorns. It does indeed at
- the first blush cast a shrewd suspicion on Agamemnon of
- taking a bribe, when Homer tells us that he discharged
- that rich man from the wars who presented him with his
- fleet mare Aethe:—
-
-
-
-
Yet, as saith Aristotle, it was well done of him to prefer a
- good beast before such a man. For, the truth is, a dog or
- ass is of more value than a timorous and cowardly man
- that wallows in wealth and luxury. Again, Thetis seems
- to do indecently, when she exhorts her son to follow his
- pleasures and minds him of companying with women. But
- even here, on the other side, the continency of Achilles is
- worthy to be considered; who, though he dearly loved
- Briseis—newly returned to him too,—yet, when he
- knew his life to be near its end, does not hasten to the
- fruition of pleasures, nor, when he mourns for his friend
- Patroclus, does he (as most men are wont) shut himself up
- from all business and neglect his duty, but only bars himself from recreations for his sorrow's sake, while yet he
- gives himself up to action and military employments.
- And Archilochus is not praiseworthy either, who, in the
- midst of his mourning for his sister's husband drowned
- in the sea, contrives to dispel his grief by drinking and
- merriment. And yet he gives this plausible reason to
- justify that practice of his,
-
-
-
For, if he judged himself to do nothing amiss when he
- followed sports and banquets, sure, we shall not do worse,
- if in whatever circumstances we follow the study of philosophy, or manage public affairs, or go to the market or
- to the Academy, or follow our husbandry. Wherefore
- those corrections also are not to be rejected which
- Cleanthes and Antisthenes have made use of. For Antisthenes, seeing the Athenians all in a tumult in the theatre, and justly, upon the pronunciation of this verse,—
-
- Except what men think base, there's nothing ill,
-
presently subjoined this corrective,
- What's base is base,—believe men what they will.
-
And Cleanthes, hearing this passage concerning wealth:
-
-
-
presently altered it thus:
-
-
-
And Zeno corrected that of Sophocles,
-
-
-
after this manner:
-
-
-
meaning by a free man one that is undaunted and magnanimous, and one of a spirit too great to stoop beneath
- itself. And why may not we also, by some such acclamations as those, call off young men to the better side, by
- using some things spoken by poets after the same manner?
- For example, it is said,
-
-
-
To which we may reply thus:
-
-
-
For it is an unhappy thing and not to be wished, for a
- man to obtain and be master of what he desires if it be
- inexpedient. Again this saying,
-
-
-
we may thus invert:
-
-
-
Again it is said,
-
-
-
Yea, rather, say we, it is a brutish and irrational and
- wretched fault of ours, that when we understand better
- things, we are carried away to the pursuit of those which
- are worse, through our intemperance and effeminacy.
- Again, one says,
- 'Tis not the teacher's speech but practice moves.
-
Yea, rather, say we, both the speech and practice,—or
- the practice by the means of speech,—as the horse is
- managed with the bridle, and the ship with the helm.
- For virtue hath no instrument so suitable and agreeable to
- human nature to work on men withal, as that of rational
- discourse. Again, we meet with this character of some
- person:
- A. Is he more prone to male or female loves ?
- B. He's flexible both ways, where beauty moves.
-
But it had been better said thus:
- He's flexible to both, where virtue moves.
-
For it is no commendation of a man's dexterity to be
- tossed up and down as pleasure and beauty move him,
- but an argument rather of a weak and unstable disposition. Once more, this speech,
-
-
-
is by no means to be allowed; but rather the contrary,
-
-
-
and gives not occasion of fear to any but weak and foolish - persons and such as are ungrateful to the Deity, who are - apt to look on that divine power and principle which is - the cause of all good with suspicion and jealousy, as being - hurtful unto them. And so much for that which I call - correction of poets' sayings.
-There is yet another way of improving poems,
- taught us well by Chrysippus; which is, by accommodation of any saying, to transfer that which is useful and
- serviceable in it to divers things of the same kind. For
- whereas Hesiod saith,
-
-
-
the same may be applied to a man's dog or ass or any
- other beast of his which is liable to the like mischance.
- Again, Euripides saith,
-
-
-
the like whereof may be said of hard labor or painful
- sickness. For as physicians, finding by experience the
- force of any medicine in the cure of some one disease,
- make use of it by accommodation, proportionably to every
- other disease of affinity thereto, so are we to deal with
- such speeches as are of a common import and apt to communicate their value to other things; we must not confine
- them to that one thing only to which they were at first
- adapted, but transfer them to all other of like nature, and
- accustom young men by many parallel instances to see
- the communicableness of them, and exercise the promptness of their wits in such applications. So that when
- Meander says,
- Happy is he who wealth and wisdom hath,
-
they may be able to judge that the same is fitly applicable
- to glory and authority and eloquence also. And the reproof
-
-
-
-
may be as well given to the prodigal, to him that undertakes any dishonest way of living, yea, to the slothful and
- unlearned person, thus:
-
-
-
or dost thou spend thy time in dicing, or quail-striking,
-
-
they may be able to infer, therefore, as little regard is to be
- had to glory and bodily beauty and princely robes and
- priestly garlands, all which also we see to be the enjoyments of very bad men. Again, when they read this passage,
-
-
-
they may in truth apply the same to intemperance, to
- superstition, to envy, and all other diseases of men's minds.
- Again, whereas it is handsomely said of Homer,
- Unhappy Paris, fairest to behold !
-
and
- Hector, of noble form,
-
for herein he shows that a man who hath no greater excellency than that of beauty to commend him deserves to
-
- O thou
- richest of men,
and O thou that excellest in feasting, in
- multitudes of attendants, in herds of cattle, yea, and in
- eloquent speaking itself,
to be (as they are indeed) expressions that import reproach and infamy. For, in truth, a
- man that designs to excel ought to endeavor it in those
- things that are in themselves most excellent, and to become
- chief in the chiefest, and great in the greatest things.
- Whereas glory that ariseth from things in themselves small
- and inconsiderable is inglorious and contemptible. To
- mind us whereof we shall never be at a loss for instances,
- if, in reading Homer especially, we observe how he applieth the expressions that import praise or disgrace;
- wherein we have clear proof that he makes small account
- of the good things either of the body or Fortune. And
- first of all, in meetings and salutations, men do not call
- others fair or rich or strong, but use such terms of commendation as these:
-
-
-
And moreover, when they speak disgracefully of any person, they touch not at bodily defects, but direct all their reproaches to vicious actions; as for instance:
-
-
-
-
-
-
Lastly, when Ulysses reproacheth Thersites, he objecteth
- not to him his lameness nor his baldness nor his hunched
- back, but the vicious quality of indiscreet babbling. On
- the other side, when Juno means to express a dalliance or
- motherly fondness to her son Vulcan, she courts him with
- an epithet taken from his halting, thus,
- Rouse thee, my limping son!
-
In this instance, Homer does (as it were) deride those
- who are ashamed of their lameness or blindness, as not
- thinking any thing a disgrace that is not in itself disgraceful, nor any person liable to a reproach for that which is
- not imputable to himself but to Fortune. These two great
- advantages may be made by those who frequently study
- poets;—the learning moderation, to keep them from unseasonable and foolish reproaching others with their misfortunes, when they themselves enjoy a constant current of
- prosperity; and magnanimity, that under variety of accidents they be not dejected nor disturbed, but meekly bear
- the being scoffed at, reproached, and drolled upon. Especially, let them have that saying of Philemon ready at
- hand in such cases:
-
-
-
And yet, if one that so rails do himself deserve reprehension, thou mayst take occasion to retort upon him his
- own vices and inordinate passions; as when 'Adrastus in
- the tragedy is assaulted thus by Alcmaeon,
- Thy sister's one that did her husband kill,
-
he returns him this answer,
- But thou thyself thy mother's blood did spill.
-
For as they who scourge a man's garments do not touch - the body, so those that turn other men's evil fortunes or - mean births to matter of reproach do only with vanity and - folly enough lash their external circumstances, but touch - not their internal part, the soul, nor those things which - truly need correction and reproof.
-Moreover, as we have above taught you to abate and
- lessen the credit of evil and hurtful poems by setting in
- opposition to them the famous speeches and sentences of
- such worthy men as have managed public affairs, so will it
- be useful to us, where we find any things in them of civil
- and profitable import, to improve and strengthen them by
- testimonies and proofs taken from philosophers, withal giving these the credit of being the first inventors of them.
- For this is both just and profitable to be done, seeing by
- this means such sayings receive an additional strength and
- esteem, when it appears that what is spoken on the stage
- or sung to the harp or occurs in a scholar's lesson is
- agreeable to the doctrines of Pythagoras and Plato, and
- that the sentences of Chilo and Bias tend to the same issue
- with those that are found in the authors which children
- read. Therefore must we industriously show them that
- these poetical sentences,
-
-
-
differ not in substance but bear plainly the same sense
- with that philosophical sentence, Know thyself. And
- these,
-
-
-
-
are of near kin to what we find in the determination of
- Plato, in his books entitled Gorgias and Concerning the
- Commonwealth, to wit, that it is worse to do than to
- suffer injury, and that a man more endamageth himself
- when he hurts another, than he would be damnified if he
- were the sufferer. And that of Aeschylus,
-
-
-
we must inform them, is but the same famous sentence
- which is so much admired in Epicurus, that great griefs
- are but short, and those that are of long continuance are
- but small. The former clause whereof is that which Aeschylus here saith expressly, and the latter but the consequent of that. For if a great and intense sorrow do not
- last, then that which doth last is not great nor hard to be
- borne. And those words of Thespis,
-
-
-
wherein differ they from what Plato says, that the divine
- nature is seated far from both joy and grief? And that
- saying of Bacchylides,
-
-
-
and those of Euripides much of the same import,
-
-
-
do they not evidently confirm to us what the philosophers - say of riches and other external good things, that without - virtue they are fruitless and unprofitable enjoyments?
-Now thus to accommodate and reconcile poetry to the
- doctrines of philosophy strips it of its fabulous and personated parts, and makes those things which it delivers
- usefully to acquire also the reputation of gravity; and over
- and above, it inclines the soul of a young man to receive the
- impressions of philosophical precepts. For he will hereby
- be enabled to come to them not altogether destitute of some
- sort of relish of them, not as to things that he has heard
- nothing of before, nor with an head confusedly full of the
- false notions which he hath sucked in from the daily tattle
- of his mother and nurse,—yea, sometimes too of his
- father and pedant,—who have been wont to speak of rich
- men as the happy men and mention them always with
- honor, and to express themselves concerning death and
- pain with horror, and to look on virtue without riches
- and glory as a thing of nought and not to be desired.
- Whence it comes to pass, that when such youths first do
- hear things of a quite contrary nature from philosophers,
- they are surprised with a kind of amazement, trouble, and
- stupid astonishment, which makes them afraid to entertain
- or endure them, except they be dealt with as those who
- come out of very great darkness into the light of the bright
- sun, that is, be first accustomed for a while to behold those
- doctrines in fabulous authors, as in a kind of false light, which
- hath but a moderate brightness and is easy to be looked on
- and borne without disturbance to the weak sight. For
- having before heard or read from poets such things as
- these are,—
-
-
-
-
-
-
they are the less disturbed and offended when they hear - from philosophers that no man ought to be much concerned - about death; that the riches of nature are defined and - limited; that the happiness of man's life doth not consist in - the abundance of wealth or vastness of employments or - height of authority and power, but in freedom from sorrow, - in moderation of passions, and in such a temper of mind as - measures all things by the use of Nature.
-Wherefore, upon all these accounts, as well as for all - the reasons before mentioned, youth stands in need of good - government to manage it in the reading of poetry, that being - free from all prejudicate opinions, and rather instructed - beforehand in conformity thereunto, it may with more calmness, friendliness, and familiarity pass from thence to the - study of philosophy.
-Text encoded in accordance with the latest EpiDoc standards
The following text is encoded in accordance with EpiDoc standards and with the CTS/CITE Architecture
This pointer pattern extracts sections
Plutarch's essay on the study of poetry is not a discussion of the essentials - of poetry, nor an analysis of its various kinds after the manner of - Aristotle's Poetics, but it is concerned with poetry only as a means of - training the young in preparation for the study of philosophy later. Some - experience with the adumbrations of philosophic doctrines which are to be - found in poetry will, in the opinion of the author, make such doctrines seem - less strange when they are met later in the actual study of philosophy.
-This training is to be imparted, not by confining the reading to selected - passages, but by teaching the young to recognize and ignore the false and - fabulous in poetry, to choose always the better interpretation, and, in - immoral passages where art is employed for art's sake, not to be deluded - into approving vicious sentiments because of their artistic presentation. - Such passages may be offset by other passages from the same author or from - another author, and, as a last resort, one may try his hand at emending - unsavoury lines to make them conform to a higher ethical standard. This last - proposal seems to the modern reader a weak subterfuge, but it was a practice - not unknown even before Plutarch's time.
-Philology, in the narrower sense, Plutarch says, is a science in itself, and
- a knowledge of it is not
The various points in the essay are illustrated by plentiful quotations drawn - in the main from Homer, Hesiod, Archilochus, Pindar, Simonides, Theognis, - Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and Menander. These are accompanied by many - keen and intelligent observations (such, for example, as that regarding - Paris), which attest Plutarch's wide and careful reading in the classical - authors.
-The fact that Plutarch does not use the methods of historical criticism will - not escape the reader, and, although this seems to us a great defect in the - essay, it is wholly in keeping with the spirit of Plutarch's age. On the - other hand there is well shown the genial and kindly Plutarch, who wishes to - believe only good of all men, including the poets, however much they may - fall short of the standards set by the divine Homer.
-If, my dear Marcus Sedatus, it is true, as the poet Philoxenus used to say,
- that of meats those that are not meat, and of fish those that are not fish,
- have the best flavour, let us leave the expounding of this matter to those
- persons of whom Cato said that their palates are more sensitive than their
- minds. And so of philosophical discourses it is clear to us that those
- seemingly not at all philosophical, or even serious, are found more
- enjoyable by the very young, who present themselves at such lectures as
- willing and submissive hearers. For in perusing not only Aesop's Fables, and
- Tales from the Poets, but even the Abaris of Heracleides, the Lycon of
- Ariston, and philosophic doctrines about the soul when these are combined
- with tales from mythology,The Last Judgement
(Preventitives of intoxication
; herbs or
- seeds (Plutarch,Bad may be found in the head of the
- cuttle-fish; good there is also,
because it is very pleasant
- to eat but it makes one's sleep full of bad dreams and subject to strange
- and disturbing fancies, as they say. Similarly also in the art of poetry
- there is much that is pleasant and nourishing for the mind of a youth, but
- quite as much Drugs, and some are good when mixed and
- others baneful
to those who cultivate it. Hidden therein are love and desire and winning converse, Suasion that
- steals away the mind of the very wisest.
For the element of deception
- in it does not gain any hold on utterly witless and foolish persons. This is
- the ground of Simonides' answer to the man who said to him, Why are
- the Thessalians the only people whom you do not deceive?
His
- answer was, Oh, they are too ignorant to be deceived by me
- ; and Gorgias called tragedy a deception wherein he who deceives is more
- honest than he who does not deceive, and he who is deceived is wiser than he
- who is not deceived. Shall we then stop the ears of the young, as those of
- the Ithacans were stopped, with a hard and unyielding wax, and force them to
- put to sea in the Epicurean boat, and avoid poetry and steer their course
- clear of it; or rather shall we set them against some upright standard of
- reason and there bind them fast, guiding and guarding their judgement, that
- it may not be carried away from the course by pleasure towards that which
- will do them hurt? No, not even Lycurgus, the
- mighty son of Dryas
had sound sense, because, when many became drunk
- and violent, he went about uprooting the grapevines instead of bringing the
- springs of water nearer,
- frenzied god,
as Plato says, through correction by
- another, a sober, god.
- If one begin each task
- in proper way So is it likely will the ending be,
as Sophocles says.
First of all, then, the young man should be introduced into poetry with
- nothing in his mind so Many the lies the poets
- tell,
-
- “Device more subtly cunning than the lynx,a why knit your brows
- when jesting, why pretend to instruct when practising deception
- ?”
-
will not suffer any dire effects or even acquire any base beliefs,
- but he will check himself when he feels afraid of Poseidon Whose praises he himself did sing,
- himself Was present at the feast, these words he spoke Himself, and yet
- himself brought death to him;
he will
- cease to shed tears over the dead Achilles and over Agamemnon Hasten eager to the light, and all you saw here Lay
- to heart that you may tell your wife hereafter.
Certainly Homer
- has put this gracefully in reference to the visit to the shades, indicating
- that it is fit stuff for a woman's ear because of the element of fable in
- it.
Such things as this are what the poets fabricate intentionally, but more
- numerous are the things which they do not fabricate, but think and believe
- in their own hearts, and then impart to us in their false colouring. Take
- for example what Homer has said relating to Zeus: In the scales he placed two fates of Death so grievous, One of Achilles
- and the other of horse-taming Hector; Grasping the middle he poised it,
- and Hector's fated day descended. Down to Hades he went, and Phoebus
- Apollo forsook him.
Now Aeschylus has fitted a whole tragedy to this
- story, giving it the title of The Weighing of Souls, and has placed beside
- the scales of Zeus on the one side Thetis, and on the other Dawn, entreating
- for their sons who are fighting. But it is patent to everybody that this is
- a mythical fabrication which has been created to please or astound the
- hearer. But in the lines Zeus, appointed to decide the
- outcome of men's fighting
and A fault doth God create
- in men Whene'er he wills to crush a house in woe,
we have at last statements in accord with their
- opinion and belief, as they thus publish to us and try to make us share
- their delusion and ignorance From there the slow-moving rivers of dusky night Belch forth a darkness
- immeasurable,
and On past Ocean's
- streams they went and the headland of Leucas,
and The narrow throat of Hades and the refluent
- depths.
However, take the case of those who, bewailing
- and fearing death as something piteous, or want of burial as something
- terrible, have given utterance to sentiments like these: Go not hence and leave me behind unwept,
- unburied,
and Forth from his body went
- his soul on wing to Hades, Mourning its fate and leaving its vigour and
- manhood,
and Destroy me not
- untimely; for 'tis sweet To see the light. Compel me not to gaze Upon
- the regions underneath the earth.
These are the
- voices of persons affected by emotion Thus no eye of man hath seen
- nor ear hath heard this, Nor can it be comprehended by the
- mind,
and the words
- of Xenophanes: Never yet was born a man nor ever
- shall be Knowing the truth about the gods and what I say of all
- things,
and by all means the
- words of Socrates, in Plato,
We shall steady the young man still more if, at his first entrance into
- poetry, we give a general description of the poetic art as an imitative art
- and faculty analogous to painting. And let him not poetry is articulate
- painting, and painting is inarticulate poetry,
but let us teach
- him in addition that when we see a lizard or an ape or the face of Thersites
- in a picture, we are pleased with it and admire it, not as a beautiful
- thing, but as a likeness. For by its essential nature the ugly cannot become
- beautiful; but the imitation, be it concerned with what is base or with
- what is good, if only it attain to the likeness, is commended. If, on the
- other hand, it produces a beautiful picture of an ugly body, it fails to
- give what propriety and probability require. Some painters even depict
- unnatural acts, as Timomachus painted a picture of Medea slaying her
- children, and Theon of Orestes slaying his mother, and Parrhasius of the
- feigned madness of Odysseus, and Chaerephanes of the lewd commerce of women
- with men. In these matters it is especially necessary that the young man
- should be trained by being taught that what we commend is not the action
- which is the subject of the imitation, but the art, in case the subject in
- hand has been properly imitated. Since, then, poetry also often gives an
- imitative recital of base deeds, or of wicked experiences and characters,
- the young man must not accept as true what is admired and successful
- therein, nor approve it as beautiful, but should simply commend it as
- fitting and proper to the character in hand. For just as when we hear the
- squealing of a pig, the creaking of a windlass, the whistling of the winds,
- and the booming of the sea, we are uneasy and annoyed; but if anybody gives
- a plausible imitation of these, as Parmeno imitated a pig, and Theodorus a
- windlass, we are pleased; and just as we avoid a diseased and ulcerous
- person beautifully
means fittingly and properly
-
and ugly things are fitting and proper
for the
- ugly. Witness the boots made for the crippled feet of Damonidas, who prayed
- once, when he had lost them, that the man who had stolen them might have
- feet which they would fit; they were sorry boots, it is true, but they
- fitted their owner. Consider the following lines: If one must needs do wrong, far best it were To do it for a kingdom's
- sake,
and Achieve the just
- man's good repute, but deeds That fit the knave; therein shall be your
- gain,
and A talent dowry! Shall I not accept? Can I still live
- if I should overlook A talent? Shall I ever sleep again If I should
- give it up? In Hell shall I Not suffer for impiety to gold?
These, it is true, are wicked and fallacious
- sentiments,
In these passages, close attention must be given to see whether the poet
- himself gives any hints against the sentiments expressed to indicate that
- they are distasteful to himself; just as Menander in the prologue of his
- Thais has written: Oh, sing to me, my muse, of
- such a girl, One bold and fair, and of persuasive tongue, Unjust,
- exclusive, and demanding much, In love with none, but always feigning
- love.
But Homer has best employed this method; for
- he in advance discredits the mean and calls our attention to the good in
- what is said. His favourable introductions are after this manner: Then at once he spoke; his words were gentle and
- winning
and He would stand by his side, and speak soft words to
- restrain him.
But in discrediting in advance, he all but protests
- and proclaims that we are not to follow or heed the sentiments expressed, as
- being unjustifiable and mean. For example, when he is on the point of
- narrating Agamemnon's harsh treatment of the priest, he says in advance,
- Yet Agamemnon, Atreus' son, at heart did not
- like it; Harshly he sent him away;
that is to say, savagely and wilfully and
- contrary to what he should have done; and in Achilles' mouth he puts the
- bold words, Drunken sot, with eyes of a dog and the
- wild deer's courage,
but he intimates his own judgement in saying, Then once more with vehement words did the son of
- Peleus Speak to the son of Atreus, nor ceased as yet from his anger;
-
hence
- it is likely that nothing spoken with anger and severity can be good. In
- like manner also, he comments upon actions: Thus
- he spoke, and Hector divine he treated unseemly, Stretching him prone in
- the dust by the bier of the son of Menoetius.
He also employs his
- closing lines to good purpose, as though adding a sort of verdict of his own
- to what is done or said. Of the adultery of Ares, he represents the gods as
- saying, Evil deeds do not succeed: the swift by the
- slow is taken,
and on the occasion of Hector's great arrogance
- and boasting he says, Thus he spoke in boast; queen Hera's wrath was
- kindled
and regarding Pandarus's archery, Thus Athena spoke, and the mind of the fool she
- persuaded.
Now these declarations and opinions contained in the
- words of the text may be discovered by anybody who will pay attention, but
- from the actions themselves the poets supply other lessons: as, for
- example, Euripides is reported to have said to those who railed at his Ixion
- as an impious and detestable character, But I did not remove him
- from the stage until I had him fastened to the wheel.
In Homer
- this form of instruction is given silently, but it leaves room for a
- reconsideration, which is helpful in the case of those stories which have
- been most discredited. By forcibly distorting these stories through what
- used to be termed deeper meanings,
but are nowadays called
- allegorical interpretations,
some persons say that the
- Sun is represented as giving information about Aphrodite in the arms of
- Ares, because the conjunction of the planet Mars with Venus portends births
- conceived in adultery, and when the sun returns in his course and discovers
- these, they cannot be kept secret. And Hera's beautifying of herself for
- Zeus's eyes,Changes of clothes, warm baths, and the genial bed of
- enjoyment.
This too is the reason why he has represented
- Odysseus as bidding the harper Come now, change the
- theme and sing how the horse was builded,
thus admirably indicating
- the duty of musicians and poets to take the subjects of their compositions
- from the lives of those who are discreet and sensible. And in his account of
- Hera, he has shown excellently well how the favour that women win by
- philters and enchantments and the attendant deceit in their relations with
- their husbands, not only is transitory and soon sated and unsure, but
- changes also to anger and enmity, so soon as the pleasurable excitement has
- faded away. Such, in fact, are Zeus's angry threats as he speaks to Hera in
- this wise: So you may see if aught you gain from the
- love and caresses Won by your coming afar from the gods to deceive
- me.
- For the description and portrayal of mean actions, if it also represent as
- it should the disgrace and injury resulting to the doers thereof, benefits
- instead of injuring the hearer. Philosophers, at any rate, for admonition
- and instruction, use examples taken from known facts; but the poets
- accomplish the same result by inventing actions of their own imagination,
- and by recounting mythical tales. Thus it was Melanthius who said, whether
- in jest or in earnest, that the Athenian State was perpetually preserved by
- the quarrelling and disorder among its public speakers; for they were not
- all inclined to crowd to the same side of the boat, and so, in the
- disagreement Oft do the gods, my child,
- cause men to fail,
as
- compared with You've named the simplest way; just
- blame the gods;
and again You may rejoice in wealth, but these may
- not,
as compared with 'Tis loutish to be rich, and know naught
- else;
and What need to sacrifice when you must die?
as
- compared with 'Tis better thus; God's worship is not
- toil.
For such passages as these admit of solutions
- which are obvious, if, as has been said, we direct the young, by the use of
- criticism, toward the better side. But whenever anything said by such
- authors sounds preposterous, and no solution is found close at hand, we must
- nullify its effect by something said by them elsewhere to the opposite
- effect, and we should not be offended or angry at the poet, but with the
- words, which are spoken in character and with humorous intent. As an obvious
- illustration, if you wish, over against Homer's accounts of the gods Surely you know how to think of a saying
- better than this one,
and indeed elsewhere you do think of
- better things and say more seemly things, such as these: Gods at their ease ever living,
and There the blessed gods pass all their days in enjoyment,
and Thus the gods have spun the fate of unhappy mortals
- Ever to live in distress, but themselves are free from all
- trouble.
These,
- then, are sound opinions about gods, and true, but those other accounts have
- been fabricated to excite men's astonishment. Again, when Euripides says,
- By many forms of artifice the gods Defeat our
- plans, for they are stronger far,
it is not
- bad to subjoin, If gods do aught that's base, they
- are no gods,
which is a better saying of his. And when
- Pindar very bitterly and exasperatingly has said, Do what you will, so you vanquish your foe,
- Yet,
we may reply, you yourself say that
a=
- And when Sophocles has said, Most bitter the end Must surely await Sweet
- joys that are gained By a means unfair.
- Sweet is the pelf though
- gained by falsity.
- Indeed,
- we may say, but we have heard from you that
And over
- against those statements about wealth: False words unfruitful prove when harvested.
- Clever is
- wealth at finding ways to reach Both hallowed and unhallowed ground, and
- where A poor man, though he even gain access, Could not withal attain
- his heart's desire. An ugly body, hapless with its tongue, Wealth makes
- both wise and comely to behold,
he will set many of
- Sophocles' words, among which are the following: E'en without wealth a man may be esteemed,
and To beg doth not
- degrade a noble mind,
and In the blessings of
- plenty What enjoyment is there, If blest wealth owe its increase To
- base-brooding care?
And Menander certainly exalted the love of
- pleasure, All things
- that live and see the self-same sun That we behold, to pleasure are
- enslaved.
- But at another time he turns us about and draws us towards the good, and
- uproots the boldness of licentiousness, by saying: A
- shameful life, though pleasant, is disgrace.
The latter sentiment is
- quite opposed to the former, and it is better and more useful. Such
- comparison and consideration of opposing sentiments will result in one of
- two ways: it will either guide the youth over toward the better side, or
- else cause his belief to revolt from the worse.
In case the authors themselves do not offer solutions of their unjustifiable
- sayings, it is not a bad idea to put on the other side declarations of other
- writers of repute, and, as in a balance, make the scales incline toward the
- better side. For example, if Alexis stirs some people when he says, The man of sense must gather pleasure's fruits, And three
- there are which have the potency Truly to be of import for this life— To
- eat and drink and have one's way in love, All else must be declared
- accessory,
we must
- recall to their minds that Socrates used to say just the opposite—that
- base men live to eat
And he who wrote Not useless 'gainst the knave is knavery,
thus bidding us, in a way, to make ourselves like
- knaves, may be confronted with the saying of Diogenes; for, being asked how
- one might defend himself against his adversary, he said, By proving
- honourable and upright himself.
We should use Diogenes against
- Sophocles, too; for Sophocles has filled hosts of men with despondency by
- writing these lines about the mysteries: Thrice
- blest are they Who having seen these mystic rites shall pass To Hades'
- house; for them alone is life Beyond; for others all is evil
- there.
But Diogenes, hearing
- some such sentiment as this, said, What! Do you mean to say that
- Pataecion, the robber, will have a better portion after death than
- Epaminondas, just because he is initiate?
And when Timotheus,
- in a song in the theatre, spoke of Artemis as Ecstatic
- Bacchic frantic fanatic,
Cinesias at
- once shouted back, May you have a daughter like that I
Neat
- too is Bion s retort to Theognis, who said: Any man that is subject to poverty never is able
- Either to speak or to act; nay, but his tongue is tied.
- How is it, then,
said Bion, that you, who are poor,
- can talk much nonsense, and weary us with this rubbish?
-
We must not neglect, either, the means for rectifying a statement which are
- afforded by the words that lie near, or by the context; but just as
- physicians, in spite of the fact that the blister-fly is deadly, think that
- its feet and wings are helpful to counteract its potent effect, so in poetry
- if a noun or adjective or a verb by its position next to another word blunts
- the point which the passage, in its worse interpretation, would have, we
- should seize upon it and add explanation, as some do in the case of the
- following: Thus, at the last, can honour be paid by
- miserable mortals Cutting the hair from their heads while the tears
- stream down their faces,
and Thus, then, the
- gods have spun the fate of unhappy mortals Ever to live in
- distress.
For he did
- not say that absolutely and to all mankind a grievous life has been allotted
- by the gods, but to the silly and foolish, whom, since they are wretched and
- pitiable on account of wickedness, he is wont to call by the name of
- unhappy
and miserable.
-
Another method, again, which transfers from the worse to the better sense
- suspicious passages in poetry, is that which works through the normal usage
- of words, in which it were better to have the glosses.
- rhigedanos
-
- dying miserably
(for the Macedonians call death danos
-
), that the Aeolians call a victory won by patience and perseverance
- an outlasting,
- popoi.
- gods.
-
- house
sometimes to a dwelling house, as Into the lofty house,
and
- sometimes to property, as My house is being
- devoured;
- and the term living
they apply sometimes to life, as But dark-haired Poseidon Thwarted his spear, nor would
- let him end his foeman's living,
and sometimes to possessions, as And others are eating my living;
and the expression be distraught
is used sometimes
- instead of be chagrined
and be at one's wits' end
-
: Thus he spoke, and she departed distraught and
- sore troubled
and at other times, instead of to be arrogant
-
and be delighted,
as Are you now distraught since
- you vanquished Irus, the vagrant?
and by huddle
they
- mean either be in motion,
as Euripides says:sit down
and
- be seated,
as Sophocles Better commend a small ship, but put your goods on a big one.
For by
- commend
is meant recommend,
and the
- very expression of recommend
to another is used nowadays
- instead of deprecating for one's self, as in everyday speech we say,
- It's very kind,
and Very welcome,
when we do not
- want a thing and do not accept it. In this way also some persons will have
- it that it must be commendable Persephone
because she is
- deprecated.
Let us then observe closely this distinction and discrimination of words in
- greater and more serious matters, and let us begin with the gods, in
- teaching
- Hear my praver, O Lord
- Hephaestus, and propitious Lend thy aid, and bestow what thy mercy bestows,
- is calling on the god himself; but when, lamenting his sister's husband who
- was lost at sea and received no formal burial, he says that he could have
- borne the calamity with greater moderation, If upon his head and his body so
- fair, All in garments clean, Hephaestus had done his office,
it is fire
- that he called by this name and not the god. And again when Euripides By Zeus amidst the stars and Ares murderous,
he named the gods
- themselves; but when Sophocles Blind and unseeing Ares, worthy
- dames, With snout like that of swine upturns all ills,
the name is to be
- understood as meaning war; just as again it suggests weapons of bronze in
- the passage where Homer Dark red blood of these men by the
- fair-flowing river Scamander Keen-edged Ares has shed.
Since, then, many
- words are used in this way, it is
- Father Zeus, enthroned on Ida, most
- glorious and mighty, Grant to Ajax victory,
and O Zeus! who boasts to be
- more wise than thou?
they mean the god himself; but when they apply the
- name of Zeus to the causes of all that happens, and say, Many valiant souls
- it sent to the realm of Hades, Goodly men, and their bodies gave to the dogs
- as ravin And to birds a feast—the design of Zeus in fulfilment,
they mean
- Fate. For the poet does not imagine that it is the god who contrives evils
- for mankind, but by the name he rightly implies the compelling force of
- circumstances, that States and armies and leaders, if they show
- self-control, are destined to succeed and to prevail over their enemies, but
- if they fall into passions and errors, if they disagree and quarrel among
- themselves, as these heroes did, then are they destined to act discreditably
- and to become disorganized and to come to a bad end, as Sophocles says For fated is it that from evil plans An evil recompense shall mortals reap;
- and certainly Hesiod Never to welcome Any gifts from Zeus of Olympus, but
- always return them,
employs the name of Zeus as a synonym for the power of
- Fortune. For he has given the name of gifts of Zeus
to the
- blessings of Fortune, such as wealth, marriage, office, and, in a word, all
- outward things, the possession of which is unprofitable to those who cannot
- make good use of them. Wherefore he thinks that Epimetheus, who is a
- worthless man and a fool, ought to be on his guard against any piece of good
- fortune, and be fearful of it, as he is likely to be injured and corrupted
- by it. And again when the poet says, Never dare to reproach any man for
- accursed and woeful Poverty, gift of the blessed gods whose life is for
- ever,
he now speaks of what happens by chance as godgiven, with the
- suggestion that it is not meet to impugn those who are poor through
- misfortune, but to reproach the penury that is accompanied by laziness, soft
- living, and extravagance, since then it is disgraceful and reprehensible.
- For at a time when men did not as yet use the name Fortune,
- but knew the force of causation as it traverses its irregular and
- indeterminate course, so strong, so impossible for human reason to guard
- against, they tried to express this by the names of the gods, exactly as we
- are wont to call deeds and characters, and in fact even words and men,
- divine
and godlike.
In this manner, then,
- a corrective is to be found for most of the seemingly unjustifiable
- statements regarding Zeus, among which are the following: Fixed on Zeus'
- floor two massive urns stand ever, Filled with happy lives the one, the
- other with sorrows,
and Cronos' son, enthroned on high,
- hath made naught of our pledges, But for both our hosts with evil thought is
- planning,
and Then rolled forth the beginning of trouble Both on Trojans
- and Greeks through designs of Zeus the almighty.
These are to be
- interpreted as referring to Fortune or Fate, in which guise are denoted
- those phases of causation which baffle our logic, and are, in a word, beyond
- us. But wherever there is appropriateness, reason, and probability in the
- use of the name, let us believe that there the god himself is meant, as in
- the following: But he ranged to and fro 'gainst the lines of the rest of
- the fighters; Only with Ajax, Telamon's son, he avoided a conflict, Seeing
- that Zeus was wroth if he fight with a man far better,
and For Zeus takes
- thought for mortals' greatest weal; The little things he leaves to other
- gods.
-
Particular attention must be paid to the other words also, when their
- signification is shifted about and changed by the poets according to various
- circumstances. An example is the word virtue.
For inasmuch
- as virtue not only renders men sensible, honest, and upright in actions and
- words, but also often enough secures for them repute and influence,
- olives
-
and chestnuts,
the same names as the trees that
- bear them. So then when poets say, Sweat the gods have set before the
- attainment of virtue,
and Then the Greeks by their virtue broke the line of
- their foemen,
and If to die be our fate, Thus to die is our right Merging
- our lives into virtue,
let our young man at once feel that these sayings
- relate to the best and godliest estate to which we can attain, which we
- think of as correctness of reasoning, the height of good sense, and a
- disposition of soul in full agreement therewith. But when at another time,
- in his reading, he finds this line, Zeus makes virtue in men both to
- increase and diminish,
or this, Virtue and glory are attendant on riches,
- let him not sit
astounded and amazed
at
- the rich, as though they were able to purchase virtue without ado for money,
- nor let him believe either that the increase or diminution of his own wisdom
- rests with Fortune, but let him consider that the poet has employed
- virtue
instead of repute, or influence, or good fortune, or the
- like. For assuredly
- evil
the poets sometimes signify
- badness in its strict sense, and wickedness of soul, as when Hesiod happiness
the
- sense which the philosophers give to it, namely, that of complete possession
- or attainment of good, or the perfection of a life gliding smoothly along in
- accord with nature, and that the poets do not oftentimes by a perversion of
- the word call the rich man happy and blessed, and call influence or repute
- happiness. Now Homer No delight
and so has Menander:happy.
See the critical note on the opposite page.A great estate have I, and
- rich am called By all, but I am called by no man blest.
But Euripides May I ne'er have a painful
- happy life,
and
- Why do you honour show to tyranny, Happy iniquity?
- unless, as has been said, one follows the figurative and perverted use of
- the words. This, then, is enough on this subject.
There is a fact, however, which we must recall to the minds of the young not
- once merely, but over and over again, by pointing out to them that while
- poetry, inasmuch as it has an imitative basis, employs embellishment and
- glitter in dealing with the actions and characters that form its groundwork,
- yet it does not forsake the semblance of truth, since imitation depends upon
- plausibility for its allurement. This is the reason why the imitation that
- does not show an utter disregard of the truth brings out, along with the
- actions, indications of both vice and virtue commingled; as is the case
- with that of Homer, which emphatically says good-bye to the Stoics, who will
- have it that nothing base can attach to virtue, and nothing good to vice,
- but that the ignorant man is quite wrong in all things, while, on the other
- hand, the man of culture is right in everything. These are the doctrines
- that we hear in the schools; but in the actions and in the life of most
- men, according to Euripides, The good and bad cannot be kept apart But
- there is some commingling.
But when poetic art is divorced from the truth,
- then chiefly it employs variety and diversity. For it is the sudden changes
- that give to its stories the elements of the emotional, the surprising, and
- the unexpected, and these are attended by very great astonishment and
- enjoyment; but sameness is unemotional
Now since this is so, let the young man, when we set him to reading poems,
- not be prepossessed with any such opinions about those good and great names,
- as, for instance, that the men were wise and honest, consummate kings, and
- standards of all virtue and uprightness. For he will be greatly injured if
- he approves everything, and is in a state of wonderment over it, but resents
- nothing, refusing even to listen or accept the opinion of him who, on the
- contrary, censures persons that do and say such things as these: This I
- would, O Zeus, Athena, and Apollo, That not one escape death of all the
- Trojans living And of the Greeks; but that you and I elude destruction, So
- that we alone may raze Troy's sacred bulwarks,
and Saddest of all the sad
- sounds that I heard was the cry of Cassandra Priam's daughter, whom
- Clytemnestra craftily planning Slew o'er my body,
and That I seduce the
- girl and ensure her hate for my father. So I obeyed her and did it,
and
-
- Father Zeus, none other of the gods is more baleful.
- Let the young man, then, not get into the habit of commending anything like
- this, nor let him be plausible and adroit in making excuses or in contriving
- some specious quibbles to explain base actions, but rather let him cherish
- the belief that poetry is an imitation of character and lives, and of men
- who are not perfect or spotless or unassailable in all respects, but
- pervaded by emotions, false opinions, and sundry forms of ignorance, who yet
- through inborn goodness frequently change their ways for the better. For if
- the young man is so trained, and his understanding so framed, that he feels
- elation and a sympathetic enthusiasm over noble words and deeds, and an
- aversion and repugnance for the mean, such training will render his perusal
- of poetry harmless. But the man who admires everything, and accommodates
- himself to everything, whose judgement, because of his preconceived opinion,
- is enthralled by the heroic names, will, like those who copy Plato's stoop
- or Aristotle's lisp, unwittingly become inclined to conform to much that is
- base. One ought not timorously, or as though under the spell of religious
- dread in a holy place, to shiver with awe at everything, and fall prostrate,
- but should rather acquire the habit of exclaiming with confidence
- wrong
and improper
no less than right
-
and proper.
For example, Achilles summons an
- assembly of the soldiers, who are suffering from an illness, since he is
- most impatient of all over the slow progress of the war because of his
- conspicuous position and reputation on the field; moreover, because he has
- some knowledge of medicine, and perceives now after the ninth day, on Son of Atreus, now, as I think, are we destined to
- wander Back to seek our homes again.
Rightly, moderately, and properly is
- this put. But after the seer has said that he fears the wrath of the most
- powerful of the Greeks, Achilles no longer speaks rightly and moderately,
- when he swears that nobody shall lay hands on the seer while he himself is
- alive, No, not though you name Agamemnon,
thus making plain his slight
- regard and his contempt for the leader. A moment later his irritation
- becomes more acute, and his impulse is to draw his sword with intent to do
- murder; not rightly, either for honour or for expediency. Again, later,
- repenting, Back he thrust his massive blade once more to its scabbard, Nor
- ignored Athena's words,
this time rightly and honourably, because, although
- he could not altogether eradicate his anger, yet before doing anything
- irreparable he put it aside and checked it by making it obedient to his
- reason. Then again, although Agamemnon is ridiculous in his actions and
- words at the Assembly, yet in the incidents touching Chryseis he is more
- dignified and kingly. For whereas Achilles, as Briseis was being led away,
-
- Burst into tears and withdrawing apart sat aloof from
- his comrades,
Agamemnon, as he in person put aboard the ship, and gave up
- and sent away, the woman of whom, a moment before, he has said that he cared
- more for her than for his wedded wife, committed no amorous or disgraceful
- act. Then again, Phoenix, cursed by his father on account of the concubine,
- says: True in my heart I had purposed to slay him with keenpointed dagger,
- Save that one of the deathless gods put an end to my anger, Bringing to mind
- the people's talk and men's many reproaches, Lest I be known among the
- Greeks as my father's slayer.
Now Aristarchus removed these lines from the
- text through fear, but they are right in view of the occasion, since Phoenix
- is trying to teach Achilles what sort of a thing anger is, and how many wild
- deeds men are ready to do from temper, if they do not use reason or hearken
- to those who try to soothe them. So also the poet introduces Meleager angry
- at his fellow-citizens, and later mollified, and he rightly finds fault with
- his emotions, but, on the other hand, his refusal to yield, his resistance,
- his mastery over them, and his change of heart the poet commends as good and
- expedient. Now in these cases the difference is manifest; but in cases where
- Homer's judgement is not made clear, a distinction is to be drawn by
- directing the young man's attention in some such manner as the following:
- If, on the one hand, Nausicaa, after merely looking at a strange man,
- Odysseus, and experiencing Calypso's emotions toward him, being, as she was,
-
- How I wish that a man like this
- might be called my husband, Living here with us, and be contented to tarry,
- then are her boldness and lack of restraint to be blamed. But if, on the
- other hand, she sees into the character of the man from his words, and
- marvels at his conversation, so full of good sense, and then prays that she
- may be the consort of such a person rather than of some sailor man or
- dancing man of her own townsmen, then it is quite right to admire her. And
- again, when Penelope enters into conversation with the suitors, not holding
- herself aloof, and they favour her with gifts of garments and other apparel,
- Odysseus is pleased Since she had coaxed all these gifts from them, and had
- cozened their senses.
If, on the one hand, he rejoices at the receipt of
- the presents and the profit, then in his prostitution of his wife he outdoes
- Poliager, who is satirized in the comedy as Poliager blest Who keeps a
- Cyprian goat to yield him wealth.
But if, on the other hand, he thinks that
- he shall have them more in his power, while they are confident because of
- their hopes and blind to the future, then his pleasure and confidence has a
- reasonable justification. Similarly, in the enumeration of his possessions
- which the Phaeacians had put ashore with him before they sailed away, if on
- the one hand, upon finding himself in such solitude and in such uncertainty
- and ambiguity regarding his surroundings, he really fears about his
- possessions, Lest the men on the ship had sailed away
- with something,
then it is quite right to pity or indeed even to loathe his
- avarice. But if, on the other hand, he, as some say, being of two minds
- whether he were in Ithaca, thinks that the safety of his possessions is a
- demonstration of the rectitude of the Phaeacians (for otherwise they would
- not have carried him for nothing, put him ashore in a strange land, and left
- him there, at the same time keeping their hands off his possessions), then
- he makes use of no mean proof, and it is quite right to praise his
- forethought. But some critics find fault also with the very act of putting
- him ashore, if this really was done while he was asleep, and assert that the
- Etruscans still preserve a tradition that Odysseus was naturally sleepy, and
- that for this reason most people found him difficult to converse with. Yet
- if his sleep was not real, but if, being ashamed to send away the Phaeacians
- without gifts and entertainment, and at the same time unable to elude his
- enemies if the Phaeacians were in company with him, he provided himself with
- a cloak for his embarrassment in feigning himself asleep, then they find
- this acceptable. By indicating these things to the young, we shall not allow
- them to acquire any leaning toward such characters as are mean, but rather
- an emulation of the better, and a preference for them, if we unhesitatingly
- award censure to the one class and commendation to the other. It is
- particularly necessary to do this with tragedies in which plausible and
- artful words are framed to accompany disreputable and knavish actions. For
- the statement of Sophocles From unfair deed fair word cannot proceed.
For, as a
- fact, he is wont to provide for mean characters and unnatural actions
- alluring words and humane reasons. And you observe also that his
- companion-at-arms in the dramatic art has represented Phaedra
Now in all cases it is useful also to seek after the cause of each thing that
- is said. Cato, for example, used, even as a child, to do whatever the
- attendant in charge of him ordered, yet he also demanded to know the ground
- and reason for the order. And so the poets are not to be obeyed as though
- they were our keepers or law-givers, unless their subject matter be
- reasonable; and this it will be if it be good, but if it be vile, it will
- be seen to be vacuous and vain. But most people are sharp in demanding the
- reasons for trivial things like the following, and insist on knowing in what
- sense they are intended: Never ought the ladle atop of the bowl to be
- rested While the bout is on,
- Whoso from his car can
- reach the car of another Let him thrust with his spear.
But in far
- weightier matters they take things on faith without testing them at all,
- such, for example, as these: A man, though bold, is made a slave whene'er
- He learns his mother's or his sire's disgrace,
and Who prospers not must be
- of humble mind.
And yet these sentiments affect our characters and disorder
- our lives, by engendering in us mean judgements and ignoble opinions, unless
- from habit we can say in answer to each of them, Why must the man
- who has ' not prospered be of humble mind,' and why must he not rather
- rise up against Fortune, and make himself exalted and not humbled? And
- why, though I be the son of a bad and foolish father, yet if I myself am
- good and sensible, is it unbecoming for me to take pride in my good
- qualities, and why should I be dejected and humble on account of my
- father's crassness?
For he who thus meets and resists, and
- refuses to entrust himself broadside on to every breath of doctrine, as to a
- wind, but believes in the correctness of the saying that a fool is
- wont to be agog at every word that's said
-
But, just as amid the luxuriant foliage and branches of a vine the fruit is
- often hidden and unnoticed from being in the shadow, so also amid the poetic
- diction and the tales that hang clustered about, much that is helpful and
- profitable escapes a young man. This, however, ought not to happen to him,
- nor should he allow his attention to be diverted from the facts, but he
- should cling especially close to those that lead toward virtue and have the
- power to mould character. In which regard it may not be a bad thing to treat
- this topic briefly, touching summarily the principal points, but leaving any
- extended and constructive treatment, and long list of examples, to those who
- write more for display. In the first place, then, as the young man takes
- note of good and bad characters and personages, let him pay attention to the
- lines and the actions which the poet assigns to them as respectively
- befitting. For example, Achilles says to Agamemnon, although he speaks with
- anger: Never a prize like yours is mine whene'er the Achaeans Capture and
- sack some goodly and populous town of the Trojans.
But Thersites in
- reviling the same man says: Full of bronze are your quarters, and many,
- too, are the women, Chosen from all the captives for you, and these we
- Achaeans Give to you first of all whenever we capture a city.
And on
- another occasion Achilles says, If perchance Zeus ever Grants to us that we
- plunder Troy, the well-walled city,
but Thersites, One
- that I or another Achaean may bring in as captive.
At another time, in the
- Inspection, when Agamemnon upbraided Diomede, the latter made no answer,
- Showing respect for the stern rebuke of a king so respected.
But Sthenelus,
- a man of no account, says: Son of Atreus, speak not to deceive, knowing how
- to speak clearly; We can avow ourselves to be better far than our fathers.
- A difference of this sort then, if not overlooked, will teach the young man
- to regard modesty and moderation as a mark of refinement, but to be on his
- guard against boasting and self-assertion as a mark of meanness. It is
- useful to note also the behaviour of Agamemnon in this case; for Sthenelus
- he passed by without a word, but Odysseus he did not disregard, but made
- answer and addressed him, When he saw he was wroth, and tried to retract his
- saying.
For to defend one's actions to everybody smacks of servility, not
- of dignity, while to despise everybody is arrogant and foolish. And most
- excellently does Diomede in the battle hold his peace, although upbraided by
- the king, but after the battle he uses plain speech to him: First let me
- say that you 'mid the Danaans slighted my prowess
-
It is well, too, not to miss a difference that exists between a man of sense
- and a seer who courts popularity. For example, Calchas Give a feast for the elders;
- 'tis fitting and not unbefitting; Then, when many are gathered, whoever
- shall offer best counsel Him you will follow,
and after the dinner he sends
- forth the envoys. For this was the way to amend an error; the other was
- arraignment and foul abuse.
Moreover, the difference between the two peoples should be observed, their
- behaviour being as follows: the Trojans advance with shouting and
- confidence, but the Achaeans Silently, fearing their captains.
For to fear
- one's commanders when at close quarters with the enemy is a sign of bravery
- and of obedience to authority as well. Wherefore Plato Straight to the midst of their host shall I go till I
- come to the vessel Which Agamemnon commands.
Diomede, What a thing is
- training. The onlookers cry out; it is the man who is struck who says
- nothing.
In like manner, when the poet says Dreadful trembling seized on the limbs of every Trojan; Even Hector
- himself felt his heart beat quick in his bosom,
who could fail to admire the
- difference? For the heart of the man who is facing the danger only throbs,
- as though indeed he were simply going to wrestle or run a race, while the
- onlookers tremble and shiver in their whole bodies through loyalty and fear
- for their king. Here, too, one should carefully consider the difference
- between the very valiant man and the craven. For Thersites Hateful was most
- of all to Achilles as well as Odysseus,
while Ajax was always friendly to
- Achilles, and says to Hector regarding him— Now alone from one man alone
- shall you learn quite clearly What sort of men with us are the Danaans'
- chieftains Even after the smiter of men, lion-hearted Achilles.
This is the
- compliment paid to Achilles, but these succeeding lines in behalf of all are
- put in such a way as to be useful:
- Yet are we of such sort as are ready to face you, Yea,
- and many of us,
thereby declaring himself not the only man or the best, but
- only one among many equally capable of offering defence. This is enough on
- the subject of differences, unless perhaps we desire to add, that of the
- Trojans many were taken alive, but none of the Achaeans; and that of the
- Trojans some fell down at the feet of the enemy, as did Adrastus,
Now just as in pasturage the bee seeks the flower, the goat the tender shoot,
- the swine the root, and other animals the seed and the fruit, so in the
- reading of poetry one person culls the flowers of the story, another rivets
- his attention upon the beauty of the diction and the arrangement of the
- words, as Aristophanes I use the rounded neatness of his
- speech;
but as for those who are concerned with what is said as being
- useful for character (and it is to these that our present discourse is
- directed), let us remind them how strange it is if the lover of fables does
- not fail to observe the novel and unusual points in the story, and the
- student of language does not allow faultless and elegant forms of expression
- to escape him, whereas he that affects what is honourable and good,
- Son of Tydeus, what has made us forget our swift prowess? Hither, stand, my
- friend, by me. Disgrace will befall us If yon Hector, gleaming-helmed, shall
- capture our vessels.
For to observe that the most wise and prudent man,
- when he is in danger of being destroyed and lost, together with the whole
- host, fears shame and disapprobation, but not death, will make the young man
- keenly alive to the moral virtues. And by the line, Glad was Athena because
- of the man that was prudent and honest,
the poet permits us to draw a
- similar conclusion in that he represents the goddess as taking delight, not
- in some rich man or in one who is physically handsome or strong, but in one
- who is wise and honest. And again when she says that she does not overlook
- Odysseus, much less desert him, Since he is courteous and clever of mind and
- prudent,
her words indicate that the only one of our attributes that is
- dear to the gods and divine is a virtuous mind, if it be true that it is the
- nature of like to delight in like.
Since it seems to be, and really is, a great thing to master one's anger,
- and since a greater thing is the exercise of precaution and forethought so
- as not to become involved in anger or to be made captive by
- Anger me now no more, old man (to ransom your Hector I myself am disposed;
- from Zeus has come such a message), Lest, old man, even here 'neath my roof
- I leave you not scatheless Suppliant though you are, and sin against Zeus's
- commandments,
and having washed and shrouded the body of Hector, he places
- it with his own hands on the wagon before its disfigurement was seen by the
- father, Lest with heart so distressed he fail to master his anger, Seeing
- his son, and Achilles' heart be stirred with resentment, So that he slay him
- there, and sin against Zeus's commandments.
For it is mark of a wondrous
- foresight for a man whose hold on his temper is uncertain, who is naturally
- rough and quick-tempered, not to be blind to his own weakness, but to
- exercise caution, and to be on his guard against possible grounds for anger,
- and to forestall them by reason long beforehand, so that he may not even
- inadvertently become involved in such emotions. After the same manner should
- he that is fond of wine be on his guard against drunkenness, and he that is
- amorous against love. So did Agesilaus,Even if they within my own
- house shall dishonour me sorely, Let your heart within you endure all the
- wrongs that I suffer: Though through the house they should drag me out by
- the feet to the open, Yea, or with missiles smite me, still you must patient
- behold it.
For just as drivers do not curb their horses during the race,
- but before the race, so with those persons who are quick-tempered and hard
- to hold back when dangers threaten, we first gain control over them by
- reasoning, and make them ready beforehand, and then lead them into the
- strife. While it is also necessary not to pass over the words carelessly,
- yet one should eschew the puerility of Cleanthes; for there are times when
- he uses a mock seriousness in pretending to interpret the words, Father
- Zeus, enthroned on Ida,
and Zeus, lord of Dodona,
bidding us in the latter
- case to read the last two words as one lord
-
as the preposition up
) as though the vapour
- exhaled from the earth were updonative
because of its being
- rendered up! And Chrysippus also is often quite petty, although he does not
- indulge in jesting, but wrests the words ingeniously, yet without carrying
- conviction, as when he would force the phrase wide-seeing
- son of Cronos clever in conversation,
that is to
- say, with a widespread power of speech.
It is better, however, to turn these matters over to the grammarians, and to
- hold fast rather to those in which is to be found both usefulness and
- probability, such as Nor does my heart so bid me, for I have learned to be
- valiant,
and For towards all he understood the way to be gentle.
For by
- declaring that bravery is a thing to be learned, and by expressing the
- belief that friendly and gracious intercourse with others proceeds from
- understanding, and is in keeping with reason, the poet urges us not to
- neglect our own selves, but to learn what is good, and to give heed to our
- teachers, intimating that both boorishness and cowardice are but ignorance
- and defects of learning. With this agrees very well what he says regarding
- Zeus and Poseidon: Both, indeed, were of one descent and of the same
- birthplace, Yet was Zeus the earlier born and his knowledge was wider.
For
- he declares understanding to be a most divine and kingly thing, to which he
- ascribes the very great superiority of Zeus, inasmuch as he believes that
- all the other virtues follow upon this one.
At the same time, the young man must get the habit of perusing with a mind
- wide awake such sayings as these: Falsehood he will not utter because he is
- very prudent,
and Glaucus, what cause has a man like you for words so disdainful
- ? Truly I thought, my friend, that in sense you excelled all the others,
- the implication being that men of sense do not lie or contend unfairly in
- games, or make unwarranted accusations against other people. And from the
- poet's saying Mad for him was Proetus' royal wife
- Anteia Lusting to make him her lover in secret, but could not persuade him,
- Since the wise Bellerophon thought more of virtue,
and She at the first
- would not consent to a deed so unseemly, Royal Clytemnestra, since her
- thoughts were for virtue.
In these lines the poet attributes to
- understanding the cause of self-control; and in his exhortations to battle
- he says on the several occasions: Shame, men of Lycia, whither now flee ye
- ? Now be ye valiant,
and But let all your minds be imbued with Shame and
- resentment, for now, as you see, great strife has arisen,
- Respect for shame that helps the brave in war;
and Aeschylus His wish
- is not to seem, but be, the best, Reaping the deep-sown furrow of his mind
- In which all goodly counsels have their root.
For to take pride in oneself
- and in one's state of mind when it is altogether good, marks the man of good
- sense; and since everything may be referred to understanding, it follows
- that every form of virtue is added unto him from reason and instruction.
-
Now the bee, in accordance with nature's laws, discovers amid the most
- pungent flowers and the roughest thorns the smoothest and most palatable
- honey; so children, if they be rightly nurtured amid poetry, will in some
- way or other learn to draw some wholesome and profitable doctrine even from
- passages that are suspect of what is base and improper. For example,
- Agamemnon is suspected of having, for a bribe, released from service in the
- army the rich man who made him a present of the mare Aetha,
- Gift so he fare not with him to Troy where the wind
- never ceaseth, But enjoy himself at home; for wealth in abundance Zeus had
- bestowed upon him.
But, as Aristotle By my tears I
- shall not cure it, nor worse make it By pursuing joys, yea, and
- festivities.
For if he thought that he should not make matters worse
- by pursuing joys, yea, and festivities,
how shall our present
- condition be any the worse if we engage in the study of philosophy or take
- part in public life, if we go out to the market-place or down to the
- Academy, or if we pursue our farming? Wherefore the corrected versions
- which Cleanthes
- What's shameful if its doer think not so?
at once
- interpolated, A shame's a shame, though one think so or no
and Cleanthes,
- taking the lines about riches, Give to your friends, and when your body's
- ill, Save it by spending,
rewrote them in this manner, To harlots give, and
- when your body's ill Waste it by spending.
And Zeno in amending the lines of
- Sophocles, Whoever comes to traffic with a king To him is slave however free
- he come,
rewrote it thus: Is not a slave if only free he come,
by the word
- free
as he now uses it designating the man who is
- fearless, high-minded, and unhumbled. What, then, is to hinder us also from
- encouraging the young to take the better course by means of similar
- rejoinders, dealing with the citations something like this: Most enviable
- is the lot of him The shaft of whose desire hits what he would.
- Not
- so,
will be our retort, but
For to gain and achieve one's wish, if what one wishes is
- not right, is pitiable and unenviable. Again, The shaft of whose desire hits what is
- good.
- Not for good and no ill came
- thy life from thy sire, Agamemnon, but joy Thou shalt find interwoven with
- grief.
- No, indeed,
we shall say, but you must find
- joy and not grief if your lot be but moderate, since
and: Not for good and no
- ill came thy life from thy sire, Agamemnon;
- Alas, from God
- this evil comes to men, When, knowing what is good, one does it not.
- No, rather is it bestial,
we reply, and
- irrational and pitiable that a man who knows the better should be led
- astray by the worse as a result of a weak will and soft living.
- And again: 'Tis character persuades, and not the speech.
- No,
- rather it is both character and speech, or character by means of speech,
- just as a horseman uses a bridle, or a helmsman uses a rudder, since
- virtue has no instrument so humane or so akin to itself as
- speech.
And:
- To women more than men is he inclined? Where there is
- beauty, either suits him best.
But it were better to say
-
Again: Where
- there is virtue, either suits him best,
of a truth, and there is no
- difference in his inclination; but the man who is influenced by
- pleasure or outward beauty to shift his course hither and thither is
- incompetent and inconstant.God's doings make the wise
- to feel afraid.
- Not so by any means, but
Such then is the system of amendment. God's doings make the wise
- to feel assured,
but they do make the silly and foolish and ungrateful
- to feel afraid, because such persons suspect and fear the power which is
- the cause and beginning of every good thing, as though it did
- harm.
Chrysippus has rightly indicated how the poet's statements can be given a
- wider application, saying that what is serviceable should be taken over and
- made to apply to like situations. For when Hesiod Nor would even an
- ox disappear were there not a bad neighbour,
he says the same thing also
- about a dog and about an ass and about all things which in a similar way can
- disappear.
And again when Euripides What man who
- recks not death can be a slave?
we must understand that he makes the same
- statement
- Blest is the man who has both wealth and
- sense,
they may think of the statement as holding good also about repute
- and leadership and facility in speaking; and so also that when they hear
- the rebuke which was administered by Odysseus to Achilles as he sat among
- the maidens in Scyrus, Dost thou, to dim the glory of thy race, Card wool,
- son of the noblest man in Greece?
they may imagine it to be addressed
- also to the profligate and the avaricious and the heedless and the ill-bred,
- as, for example, Dost drink, son of the noblest man in Greece,
or gamble, or
- follow quail-fighting, Speak not of Wealth. I can't admire a god Whose ready
- favour basest men secure.
Therefore speak not of repute, either, or of
- personal beauty, or the general's cloak, or the priestly crown, to all which
- we see the worst of men attaining. For ugly is the brood of cowardice,
and
- the same we may also aver of licentiousness, superstition, envy, and all the
- other pestilent disorders. Most excellently has Homer said Paris, poor
- wretch, excelling in looks,
and Hector, excelling in looks
(for he
- declares the man deserving of censure and reproach who is endowed with no
- good quality better than personal comeliness), and this we must make to
- apply to similar cases, thereby curtailing the pride of those who plume
- themselves on things of no worth, and teaching the young to regard as a
- disgrace and reproach such phrases as excelling in wealth
- and excelling in dinners
and excelling in children
-
or oxen,
and in fact even the use of the word
- excelling
in such a connexion. For we ought to aim at
- the pre-eminence which comes from noble qualities, and we should strive to
- be first in matters of first importance, and to be great in the greatest:
- but the repute which comes from small and petty things is disreputable and
- paltry.
This illustration at once reminds us to consider carefully instances of
- censure and commendation, particularly in Homer's poems. For he gives us
- expressly to understand that bodily and adventitious
- Heaven-sprung son of Laertes, Odysseus of many devices,
and Hector,
- son of Priam, peer of Zeus in counsel,
and Son of Peleus, Achilles, great
- glory to the Achaeans,
and Noble son of Menoetius, in whom my soul finds
- pleasure.
In the second place they reproach without touching at all upon
- bodily characteristics, but they direct their censure to faults: Drunken
- sot, with eyes of a dog and the wild deer's courage,
and Ajax, excelling at
- wrangling, ill advised,
and Why, Idomeneus do you brag so soon? Unfitting
- Is it for you to be braggart,
and Ajax, blundering boaster,
and finally
- Thersites is reproached Up with you, club-foot, my child!
Thus Homer ridicules
- those who feel ashamed of lameness or blindness, in that he does not regard
- as blameworthy that which is not shameful, or as shameful that which is
- brought about, not through our own acts, but by fortune. Plainly, then, two
- great advantages accrue to those who accustom themselves carefully to peruse
- works of poetry: the first is conducive to moderation, that we do not
- odiously and foolishly reproach anybody with his fortune; while the second
- is conducive to magnanimity, that when we ourselves have met with chances
- and changes we be not humiliated or even disturbed, but bear gently with
- scoffings and revilings and ridicule, having especially before us the words
- of Philemon: There's naught more pleasing or in better taste Than having
- strength to bear when men revile.
But if anybody is plainly in need of
- reprehension, we should reprehend his faults and his giving way to emotion,
- after the fashion in which Adrastus of the tragedy, when Alcmaeon said to
- him, You are the kin of her who slew her spouse,
replied And you have
- murdered her who gave you birth.
For just as those who scourge the clothes
- do not
-
Moreover, just as in what we have said above we felt that by setting against
- cheap and harmful poems the sayings and maxims of statesmen and men of
- repute, we were inducing a revolt and revulsion of faith from such poetry,
- so whenever we find any edifying sentiment neatly expressed in the poets we
- ought to foster and amplify it by means of proofs and testimonies from the
- philosophers, at the same time crediting these with the discovery. For this
- is right and useful, and our faith gains an added strength and dignity
- whenever the doctrines of Pythagoras and of Plato are in agreement with what
- is spoken on the stage or sung to the lyre or studied at school, and when
- the precepts of Chilon and of Bias lead to the same conclusions as our
- children's readings in poetry. Hence it is a duty to make a point of
- indicating that the lines You, my child, have not the gift of arms in
- battle, Your concern must be for loving arms in wedlock,
and Seeing
- that Zeus is wroth if you fight with a man far better,
do not differ
- from Know thyself,
but have the same purport as this;
- and the lines,
- Fools! They know not how much more than all a half is,
- and Evil counsel is the worst for him who gives it
are identical with the
- doctrines of Plato in the Gorgias to do wrong is worse than to be wronged
and to
- do evil is more injurious than to suffer evil.
And on the words
- of Aeschylus, Fear not; great stress of pain is not for long,
we ought to
- remark that this is the oft repeated and much admired statement originating
- with Epicurus,leading principles
of Epicurus; that great pains shortly spend their force,
- and long continued pains have no magnitude.
Of these two ideas
- Aeschylus has perspicuously stated the one and the other is a corollary
- thereto; for if great and intense pain is not lasting, then that which does
- not last is not great or hard to endure. Take these lines of Thespis You
- see that Zeus is first of gods in this, Not using lies or boast or silly
- laugh; With pleasure he alone is unconcerned.
What difference is there
- between this and the statement, for the Divine Being sits throned
- afar from pleasure and pain,
as Plato I shall assert that virtue hath the highest fame, But
- wealth with even wretched men is intimate,
and again by Euripides There's naught that I hold In a higher esteem Than a
- virtuous life; 'Twill ever be joined With those that are good.
and Why seek
- vain possessions? Do ye think Virtue by wealth to compass? Wretched amid
- your comforts shall ye sit.
Is not this a proof of what the philosophers
- say regarding wealth and external advantages, that without virtue they are
- useless and unprofitable for their owners? Why have you mortals acquired in vain many possessions, and think that by wealth you shall compass virtue? What boots it, should you have in your ancestral halls some fragment of Aetna's cliff or Parian stone, gold-wrought, which you have secured?
-
This method of conjoining and reconciling such sentiments with the doctrines
- of philosophers brings the poet's work out of the realm of myth and
- impersonation, and, moreover, invests with seriousness its helpful sayings.
- Besides, it opens and stimulates in advance the mind of the youth by the
- sayings in philosophy. For he comes to it thus not altogether without a
- foretaste of it, nor without having heard of it, nor indiscriminately
- stuffed with what he has heard always from his mother and nurse, and, I
-
- To mourn the babe for th' ills to which he comes;
- But him that's dead, and from his labours rests, To bear from home with joy
- and cheering words,
and What needs have mortals save two things alone,
- Demeter's grain and draught from water-jar?
and O Tyranny, beloved of
- barbarous folk,
and And mortal men's felicity Is gained by such of them as
- feel least grief,
they are less confused and disquieted upon hearing at the
- lectures of the philosophers that Death is nothing to us,
- leading principles,
Diogenes Laertius, x. 139.The wealth allowed by Nature
-
- leading principles,
Diogenes Laertius, x. 144.
- Happiness and blessedness do not consist in vast possessions or exalted
- occupations or offices or authority, but on impassivity, calmness, and a
- disposition of the soul that sets its limitations to accord with
- Nature.
-
Wherefore, both because of these considerations and because of those already - adduced, the young man has need of good pilotage in the matter of reading, - to the end that, forestalled with schooling rather than prejudice, in a - spirit of friendship and goodwill and familiarity, he may be convoyed by - poetry into the realm of philosophy. -
-Plutarch’s essay on the study of poetry is not a discussion of the essentials of poetry, nor an analysis of its various kinds after the manner of Aristotle’s Poetics, but it is concerned with poetry only as a means of training the young in preparation for the study of philosophy later. Some experience with the adumbrations of philosophic doctrines which are to be found in poetry will, in the opinion of the author, make such doctrines seem less strange when they are met later in the actual study of philosophy.
+This training is to be imparted, not by confining the reading to selected passages, but by teaching the young to recognize and ignore the false and fabulous in poetry, to choose always the better interpretation, and, in immoral passages where art is employed for art’s sake, not to be deluded into approving vicious sentiments because of their artistic presentation. Such passages may be offset by other passages from the same author or from another author, and, as a last resort, one may try his hand at emending unsavoury lines to make them conform to a higher ethical standard. This last proposal seems to the modern reader a weak subterfuge, but it was a practice not unknown even before Plutarch’s time.
+ rend="indent"Philology, in the narrower sense, Plutarch says, is a science in itself, and a knowledge of it is not
The various points in the essay are illustrated by plentiful quotations drawn in the main from Homer, Hesiod, Archilochus, Pindar, Simonides, Theognis, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and Menander. These are accompanied by many keen and intelligent observations (such, for example, as that regarding Paris), which attest Plutarch’s wide and careful reading in the classical authors.
+The fact that Plutarch does not use the methods of historical criticism will not escape the reader, and, although this seems to us a great defect in the essay, it is wholly in keeping with the spirit of Plutarch’s age. On the other hand there is well shown the genial and kindly Plutarch, who wishes to believe only good of all men, including the poets, however much they may fall short of the standards set by the divine Homer.
If, my dear Marcus Sedatus, it is true, as the poet Philoxenus used to say, that of meats those that are not meat, and of fish those that are not fish, have the best flavour, let us leave the expounding of this matter to those persons of whom Cato said that their palates are more sensitive than their minds. And so of philosophical discourses it is clear to us that those seemingly not at all philosophical, or even serious, are found more enjoyable by the very young, who present themselves at such lectures as willing and submissive hearers. For in perusing not only Aesop’s Fables, and Tales from the Poets, but even the Abaris of Heracleides, the Lycon of Ariston, and philosophic doctrines about the soul when these are combined with tales from mythology,The Last Judgement
(Preventitives of intoxication
; herbs or seeds (Plutarch,Bad may be found in the head of the cuttle-fish; good there is also,
because it is very pleasant to eat but it makes one’s sleep full of bad dreams and subject to strange and disturbing fancies, as they say. Similarly also in the art of poetry there is much that is pleasant and nourishing for the mind of a youth, but quite as much Drugs, and some are good when mixed and others baneful
to those who cultivate it. Hidden therein are love and desire and winning converse, Suasion that steals away the mind of the very wisest.
For the element of deception in it does not gain any hold on utterly witless and foolish persons. This is the ground of Simonides’ answer to the man who said to him, Why are the Thessalians the only people whom you do not deceive?
His answer was, Oh, they are too ignorant to be deceived by me
; and Gorgias called tragedy a deception wherein he who deceives is more honest than he who does not deceive, and he who is deceived is wiser than he who is not deceived. Shall we then stop the ears of the young, as those of the Ithacans were stopped, with a hard and unyielding wax, and force them to put to sea in the Epicurean boat, and avoid poetry and steer their course clear of it; or rather shall we set them against some upright standard of reason and there bind them fast, guiding and guarding their judgement, that it may not be carried away from the course by pleasure towards that which will do them hurt? No, not even Lycurgus, the mighty son of Dryas
had sound sense, because, when many became drunk and violent, he went about uprooting the grapevines instead of bringing the springs of water nearer, frenzied god,
as Plato says, through correction by another, a sober, god.
If one begin each task in proper way So is it likely will the ending be,
as Sophocles says.
First of all, then, the young man should be introduced into poetry with nothing in his mind so Many the lies the poets tell,
“Device more subtly cunning than the lynx,a why knit your brows when jesting, why pretend to instruct when practising deception ?”
will not suffer any dire effects or even acquire any base beliefs, but he will check himself when he feels afraid of Poseidon Whose praises he himself did sing, himself Was present at the feast, these words he spoke Himself, and yet himself brought death to him;
he will cease to shed tears over the dead Achilles and over Agamemnon Hasten eager to the light, and all you saw here Lay to heart that you may tell your wife hereafter.
Certainly Homer has put this gracefully in reference to the visit to the shades, indicating that it is fit stuff for a woman’s ear because of the element of fable in it.
Such things as this are what the poets fabricate intentionally, but more numerous are the things which they do not fabricate, but think and believe in their own hearts, and then impart to us in their false colouring. Take for example what Homer has said relating to Zeus: In the scales he placed two fates of Death so grievous, One of Achilles and the other of horse-taming Hector; Grasping the middle he poised it, and Hector’s fated day descended. Down to Hades he went, and Phoebus Apollo forsook him.
Now Aeschylus has fitted a whole tragedy to this story, giving it the title of The Weighing of Souls, and has placed beside the scales of Zeus on the one side Thetis, and on the other Dawn, entreating for their sons who are fighting. But it is patent to everybody that this is a mythical fabrication which has been created to please or astound the hearer. But in the lines Zeus, appointed to decide the outcome of men’s fighting
and A fault doth God create in men Whene’er he wills to crush a house in woe,
we have at last statements in accord with their opinion and belief, as they thus publish to us and try to make us share their delusion and ignorance From there the slow-moving rivers of dusky night Belch forth a darkness immeasurable,
and On past Ocean’s streams they went and the headland of Leucas,
and The narrow throat of Hades and the refluent depths.
However, take the case of those who, bewailing and fearing death as something piteous, or want of burial as something terrible, have given utterance to sentiments like these: Go not hence and leave me behind unwept, unburied,
and Forth from his body went his soul on wing to Hades, Mourning its fate and leaving its vigour and manhood,
and Destroy me not untimely; for ’tis sweet To see the light. Compel me not to gaze Upon the regions underneath the earth.
These are the voices of persons affected by emotion Thus no eye of man hath seen nor ear hath heard this, Nor can it be comprehended by the mind,
and the words of Xenophanes: Never yet was born a man nor ever shall be Knowing the truth about the gods and what I say of all things,
and by all means the words of Socrates, in Plato,
We shall steady the young man still more if, at his first entrance into poetry, we give a general description of the poetic art as an imitative art and faculty analogous to painting. And let him not poetry is articulate painting, and painting is inarticulate poetry,
but let us teach him in addition that when we see a lizard or an ape or the face of Thersites in a picture, we are pleased with it and admire it, not as a beautiful thing, but as a likeness. For by its essential nature the ugly cannot become beautiful; but the imitation, be it concerned with what is base or with what is good, if only it attain to the likeness, is commended. If, on the other hand, it produces a beautiful picture of an ugly body, it fails to give what propriety and probability require. Some painters even depict unnatural acts, as Timomachus painted a picture of Medea slaying her children, and Theon of Orestes slaying his mother, and Parrhasius of the feigned madness of Odysseus, and Chaerephanes of the lewd commerce of women with men. In these matters it is especially necessary that the young man should be trained by being taught that what we commend is not the action which is the subject of the imitation, but the art, in case the subject in hand has been properly imitated. Since, then, poetry also often gives an imitative recital of base deeds, or of wicked experiences and characters, the young man must not accept as true what is admired and successful therein, nor approve it as beautiful, but should simply commend it as fitting and proper to the character in hand. For just as when we hear the squealing of a pig, the creaking of a windlass, the whistling of the winds, and the booming of the sea, we are uneasy and annoyed; but if anybody gives a plausible imitation of these, as Parmeno imitated a pig, and Theodorus a windlass, we are pleased; and just as we avoid a diseased and ulcerous person beautifully
means fittingly and properly
and ugly things are fitting and proper
for the ugly. Witness the boots made for the crippled feet of Damonidas, who prayed once, when he had lost them, that the man who had stolen them might have feet which they would fit; they were sorry boots, it is true, but they fitted their owner. Consider the following lines: If one must needs do wrong, far best it were To do it for a kingdom’s sake,
and Achieve the just man’s good repute, but deeds That fit the knave; therein shall be your gain,
and A talent dowry! Shall I not accept? Can I still live if I should overlook A talent? Shall I ever sleep again If I should give it up? In Hell shall I Not suffer for impiety to gold?
These, it is true, are wicked and fallacious sentiments,
In these passages, close attention must be given to see whether the poet himself gives any hints against the sentiments expressed to indicate that they are distasteful to himself; just as Menander in the prologue of his Thais has written: Oh, sing to me, my muse, of such a girl, One bold and fair, and of persuasive tongue, Unjust, exclusive, and demanding much, In love with none, but always feigning love.
But Homer has best employed this method; for he in advance discredits the mean and calls our attention to the good in what is said. His favourable introductions are after this manner: Then at once he spoke; his words were gentle and winning
and He would stand by his side, and speak soft words to restrain him.
But in discrediting in advance, he all but protests and proclaims that we are not to follow or heed the sentiments expressed, as being unjustifiable and mean. For example, when he is on the point of narrating Agamemnon’s harsh treatment of the priest, he says in advance, Yet Agamemnon, Atreus’ son, at heart did not like it; Harshly he sent him away;
that is to say, savagely and wilfully and contrary to what he should have done; and in Achilles’ mouth he puts the bold words, Drunken sot, with eyes of a dog and the wild deer’s courage,
but he intimates his own judgement in saying, Then once more with vehement words did the son of Peleus Speak to the son of Atreus, nor ceased as yet from his anger;
hence it is likely that nothing spoken with anger and severity can be good. In like manner also, he comments upon actions: Thus he spoke, and Hector divine he treated unseemly, Stretching him prone in the dust by the bier of the son of Menoetius.
He also employs his closing lines to good purpose, as though adding a sort of verdict of his own to what is done or said. Of the adultery of Ares, he represents the gods as saying, Evil deeds do not succeed: the swift by the slow is taken,
and on the occasion of Hector’s great arrogance and boasting he says, Thus he spoke in boast; queen Hera’s wrath was kindled
and regarding Pandarus’s archery, Thus Athena spoke, and the mind of the fool she persuaded.
Now these declarations and opinions contained in the words of the text may be discovered by anybody who will pay attention, but from the actions themselves the poets supply other lessons: as, for example, Euripides is reported to have said to those who railed at his Ixion as an impious and detestable character, But I did not remove him from the stage until I had him fastened to the wheel.
In Homer this form of instruction is given silently, but it leaves room for a reconsideration, which is helpful in the case of those stories which have been most discredited. By forcibly distorting these stories through what used to be termed deeper meanings,
but are nowadays called allegorical interpretations,
some persons say that the Sun is represented as giving information about Aphrodite in the arms of Ares, because the conjunction of the planet Mars with Venus portends births conceived in adultery, and when the sun returns in his course and discovers these, they cannot be kept secret. And Hera’s beautifying of herself for Zeus’s eyes,Changes of clothes, warm baths, and the genial bed of enjoyment.
This too is the reason why he has represented Odysseus as bidding the harper Come now, change the theme and sing how the horse was builded,
thus admirably indicating the duty of musicians and poets to take the subjects of their compositions from the lives of those who are discreet and sensible. And in his account of Hera, he has shown excellently well how the favour that women win by philters and enchantments and the attendant deceit in their relations with their husbands, not only is transitory and soon sated and unsure, but changes also to anger and enmity, so soon as the pleasurable excitement has faded away. Such, in fact, are Zeus’s angry threats as he speaks to Hera in this wise: So you may see if aught you gain from the love and caresses Won by your coming afar from the gods to deceive me.
For the description and portrayal of mean actions, if it also represent as it should the disgrace and injury resulting to the doers thereof, benefits instead of injuring the hearer. Philosophers, at any rate, for admonition and instruction, use examples taken from known facts; but the poets accomplish the same result by inventing actions of their own imagination, and by recounting mythical tales. Thus it was Melanthius who said, whether in jest or in earnest, that the Athenian State was perpetually preserved by the quarrelling and disorder among its public speakers; for they were not all inclined to crowd to the same side of the boat, and so, in the disagreement Oft do the gods, my child, cause men to fail,
as compared with You’ve named the simplest way; just blame the gods;
and again You may rejoice in wealth, but these may not,
as compared with ’Tis loutish to be rich, and know naught else;
and What need to sacrifice when you must die?
as compared with ’Tis better thus; God’s worship is not toil.
For such passages as these admit of solutions which are obvious, if, as has been said, we direct the young, by the use of criticism, toward the better side. But whenever anything said by such authors sounds preposterous, and no solution is found close at hand, we must nullify its effect by something said by them elsewhere to the opposite effect, and we should not be offended or angry at the poet, but with the words, which are spoken in character and with humorous intent. As an obvious illustration, if you wish, over against Homer’s accounts of the gods Surely you know how to think of a saying better than this one,
and indeed elsewhere you do think of better things and say more seemly things, such as these: Gods at their ease ever living,
and There the blessed gods pass all their days in enjoyment,
and Thus the gods have spun the fate of unhappy mortals Ever to live in distress, but themselves are free from all trouble.
These, then, are sound opinions about gods, and true, but those other accounts have been fabricated to excite men’s astonishment. Again, when Euripides says, By many forms of artifice the gods Defeat our plans, for they are stronger far,
it is not bad to subjoin, If gods do aught that’s base, they are no gods,
which is a better saying of his. And when Pindar very bitterly and exasperatingly has said, Do what you will, so you vanquish your foe,
Yet,
we may reply, you yourself say that
a= And when Sophocles has said, Most bitter the end Must surely await Sweet joys that are gained By a means unfair.
Sweet is the pelf though gained by falsity.
Indeed,
we may say, but we have heard from you that
And over against those statements about wealth: False words unfruitful prove when harvested.
Clever is wealth at finding ways to reach Both hallowed and unhallowed ground, and where A poor man, though he even gain access, Could not withal attain his heart’s desire. An ugly body, hapless with its tongue, Wealth makes both wise and comely to behold,
he will set many of Sophocles’ words, among which are the following: E’en without wealth a man may be esteemed,
and To beg doth not degrade a noble mind,
and In the blessings of plenty What enjoyment is there, If blest wealth owe its increase To base-brooding care?
And Menander certainly exalted the love of pleasure, All things that live and see the self-same sun That we behold, to pleasure are enslaved.
But at another time he turns us about and draws us towards the good, and uproots the boldness of licentiousness, by saying: A shameful life, though pleasant, is disgrace.
The latter sentiment is quite opposed to the former, and it is better and more useful. Such comparison and consideration of opposing sentiments will result in one of two ways: it will either guide the youth over toward the better side, or else cause his belief to revolt from the worse.
In case the authors themselves do not offer solutions of their unjustifiable sayings, it is not a bad idea to put on the other side declarations of other writers of repute, and, as in a balance, make the scales incline toward the better side. For example, if Alexis stirs some people when he says, The man of sense must gather pleasure’s fruits, And three there are which have the potency Truly to be of import for this life— To eat and drink and have one’s way in love, All else must be declared accessory,
we must recall to their minds that Socrates used to say just the opposite—that base men live to eat
And he who wrote Not useless ’gainst the knave is knavery,
thus bidding us, in a way, to make ourselves like knaves, may be confronted with the saying of Diogenes; for, being asked how one might defend himself against his adversary, he said, By proving honourable and upright himself.
We should use Diogenes against Sophocles, too; for Sophocles has filled hosts of men with despondency by writing these lines about the mysteries: Thrice blest are they Who having seen these mystic rites shall pass To Hades’ house; for them alone is life Beyond; for others all is evil there.
But Diogenes, hearing some such sentiment as this, said, What! Do you mean to say that Pataecion, the robber, will have a better portion after death than Epaminondas, just because he is initiate?
And when Timotheus, in a song in the theatre, spoke of Artemis as Ecstatic Bacchic frantic fanatic,
Cinesias at once shouted back, May you have a daughter like that I
Neat too is Bion s retort to Theognis, who said: Any man that is subject to poverty never is able Either to speak or to act; nay, but his tongue is tied.
How is it, then,
said Bion, that you, who are poor, can talk much nonsense, and weary us with this rubbish?
We must not neglect, either, the means for rectifying a statement which are afforded by the words that lie near, or by the context; but just as physicians, in spite of the fact that the blister-fly is deadly, think that its feet and wings are helpful to counteract its potent effect, so in poetry if a noun or adjective or a verb by its position next to another word blunts the point which the passage, in its worse interpretation, would have, we should seize upon it and add explanation, as some do in the case of the following: Thus, at the last, can honour be paid by miserable mortals Cutting the hair from their heads while the tears stream down their faces,
and Thus, then, the gods have spun the fate of unhappy mortals Ever to live in distress.
For he did not say that absolutely and to all mankind a grievous life has been allotted by the gods, but to the silly and foolish, whom, since they are wretched and pitiable on account of wickedness, he is wont to call by the name of unhappy
and miserable.
Another method, again, which transfers from the worse to the better sense suspicious passages in poetry, is that which works through the normal usage of words, in which it were better to have the glosses.
rhigedanos
dying miserably
(for the Macedonians call death danos
), that the Aeolians call a victory won by patience and perseverance an outlasting,
popoi.
gods.
house
sometimes to a dwelling house, as Into the lofty house,
and sometimes to property, as My house is being devoured;
and the term living
they apply sometimes to life, as But dark-haired Poseidon Thwarted his spear, nor would let him end his foeman’s living,
and sometimes to possessions, as And others are eating my living;
and the expression be distraught
is used sometimes instead of be chagrined
and be at one’s wits’ end
: Thus he spoke, and she departed distraught and sore troubled
and at other times, instead of to be arrogant
and be delighted,
as Are you now distraught since you vanquished Irus, the vagrant?
and by huddle
they mean either be in motion,
as Euripides says:sit down
and be seated,
as Sophocles Better commend a small ship, but put your goods on a big one.
For by commend
is meant recommend,
and the very expression of recommend
to another is used nowadays instead of deprecating for one’s self, as in everyday speech we say, It’s very kind,
and Very welcome,
when we do not want a thing and do not accept it. In this way also some persons will have it that it must be commendable Persephone
because she is deprecated.
Let us then observe closely this distinction and discrimination of words in greater and more serious matters, and let us begin with the gods, in teaching Hear my praver, O Lord Hephaestus, and propitious Lend thy aid, and bestow what thy mercy bestows,
is calling on the god himself; but when, lamenting his sister’s husband who was lost at sea and received no formal burial, he says that he could have borne the calamity with greater moderation, If upon his head and his body so fair, All in garments clean, Hephaestus had done his office,
it is fire that he called by this name and not the god. And again when Euripides By Zeus amidst the stars and Ares murderous,
he named the gods themselves; but when Sophocles Blind and unseeing Ares, worthy dames, With snout like that of swine upturns all ills,
the name is to be understood as meaning war; just as again it suggests weapons of bronze in the passage where Homer Dark red blood of these men by the fair-flowing river Scamander Keen-edged Ares has shed.
Since, then, many words are used in this way, it is Father Zeus, enthroned on Ida, most glorious and mighty, Grant to Ajax victory,
and O Zeus! who boasts to be more wise than thou?
they mean the god himself; but when they apply the name of Zeus to the causes of all that happens, and say, Many valiant souls it sent to the realm of Hades, Goodly men, and their bodies gave to the dogs as ravin And to birds a feast—the design of Zeus in fulfilment,
they mean Fate. For the poet does not imagine that it is the god who contrives evils for mankind, but by the name he rightly implies the compelling force of circumstances, that States and armies and leaders, if they show self-control, are destined to succeed and to prevail over their enemies, but if they fall into passions and errors, if they disagree and quarrel among themselves, as these heroes did, then are they destined to act discreditably and to become disorganized and to come to a bad end, as Sophocles says For fated is it that from evil plans An evil recompense shall mortals reap;
and certainly Hesiod Never to welcome Any gifts from Zeus of Olympus, but always return them,
employs the name of Zeus as a synonym for the power of Fortune. For he has given the name of gifts of Zeus
to the blessings of Fortune, such as wealth, marriage, office, and, in a word, all outward things, the possession of which is unprofitable to those who cannot make good use of them. Wherefore he thinks that Epimetheus, who is a worthless man and a fool, ought to be on his guard against any piece of good fortune, and be fearful of it, as he is likely to be injured and corrupted by it. And again when the poet says, Never dare to reproach any man for accursed and woeful Poverty, gift of the blessed gods whose life is for ever,
he now speaks of what happens by chance as godgiven, with the suggestion that it is not meet to impugn those who are poor through misfortune, but to reproach the penury that is accompanied by laziness, soft living, and extravagance, since then it is disgraceful and reprehensible. For at a time when men did not as yet use the name Fortune,
but knew the force of causation as it traverses its irregular and indeterminate course, so strong, so impossible for human reason to guard against, they tried to express this by the names of the gods, exactly as we are wont to call deeds and characters, and in fact even words and men, divine
and godlike.
In this manner, then, a corrective is to be found for most of the seemingly unjustifiable statements regarding Zeus, among which are the following: Fixed on Zeus’ floor two massive urns stand ever, Filled with happy lives the one, the other with sorrows,
and Cronos’ son, enthroned on high, hath made naught of our pledges, But for both our hosts with evil thought is planning,
and Then rolled forth the beginning of trouble Both on Trojans and Greeks through designs of Zeus the almighty.
These are to be interpreted as referring to Fortune or Fate, in which guise are denoted those phases of causation which baffle our logic, and are, in a word, beyond us. But wherever there is appropriateness, reason, and probability in the use of the name, let us believe that there the god himself is meant, as in the following: But he ranged to and fro ’gainst the lines of the rest of the fighters; Only with Ajax, Telamon’s son, he avoided a conflict, Seeing that Zeus was wroth if he fight with a man far better,
and For Zeus takes thought for mortals’ greatest weal; The little things he leaves to other gods.
Particular attention must be paid to the other words also, when their signification is shifted about and changed by the poets according to various circumstances. An example is the word virtue.
For inasmuch as virtue not only renders men sensible, honest, and upright in actions and words, but also often enough secures for them repute and influence, olives
and chestnuts,
the same names as the trees that bear them. So then when poets say, Sweat the gods have set before the attainment of virtue,
and Then the Greeks by their virtue broke the line of their foemen,
and If to die be our fate, Thus to die is our right Merging our lives into virtue,
let our young man at once feel that these sayings relate to the best and godliest estate to which we can attain, which we think of as correctness of reasoning, the height of good sense, and a disposition of soul in full agreement therewith. But when at another time, in his reading, he finds this line, Zeus makes virtue in men both to increase and diminish,
or this, Virtue and glory are attendant on riches,
let him not sit
astounded and amazed
at the rich, as though they were able to purchase virtue without ado for money, nor let him believe either that the increase or diminution of his own wisdom rests with Fortune, but let him consider that the poet has employed virtue
instead of repute, or influence, or good fortune, or the like. For assuredly evil
the poets sometimes signify badness in its strict sense, and wickedness of soul, as when Hesiod happiness
the sense which the philosophers give to it, namely, that of complete possession or attainment of good, or the perfection of a life gliding smoothly along in accord with nature, and that the poets do not oftentimes by a perversion of the word call the rich man happy and blessed, and call influence or repute happiness. Now Homer No delight
and so has Menander:happy.
See the critical note on the opposite page.A great estate have I, and rich am called By all, but I am called by no man blest.
But Euripides May I ne’er have a painful happy life,
and Why do you honour show to tyranny, Happy iniquity?
unless, as has been said, one follows the figurative and perverted use of the words. This, then, is enough on this subject.
There is a fact, however, which we must recall to the minds of the young not once merely, but over and over again, by pointing out to them that while poetry, inasmuch as it has an imitative basis, employs embellishment and glitter in dealing with the actions and characters that form its groundwork, yet it does not forsake the semblance of truth, since imitation depends upon plausibility for its allurement. This is the reason why the imitation that does not show an utter disregard of the truth brings out, along with the actions, indications of both vice and virtue commingled; as is the case with that of Homer, which emphatically says good-bye to the Stoics, who will have it that nothing base can attach to virtue, and nothing good to vice, but that the ignorant man is quite wrong in all things, while, on the other hand, the man of culture is right in everything. These are the doctrines that we hear in the schools; but in the actions and in the life of most men, according to Euripides, The good and bad cannot be kept apart But there is some commingling.
But when poetic art is divorced from the truth, then chiefly it employs variety and diversity. For it is the sudden changes that give to its stories the elements of the emotional, the surprising, and the unexpected, and these are attended by very great astonishment and enjoyment; but sameness is unemotional
Now since this is so, let the young man, when we set him to reading poems, not be prepossessed with any such opinions about those good and great names, as, for instance, that the men were wise and honest, consummate kings, and standards of all virtue and uprightness. For he will be greatly injured if he approves everything, and is in a state of wonderment over it, but resents nothing, refusing even to listen or accept the opinion of him who, on the contrary, censures persons that do and say such things as these: This I would, O Zeus, Athena, and Apollo, That not one escape death of all the Trojans living And of the Greeks; but that you and I elude destruction, So that we alone may raze Troy’s sacred bulwarks,
and Saddest of all the sad sounds that I heard was the cry of Cassandra Priam’s daughter, whom Clytemnestra craftily planning Slew o’er my body,
and That I seduce the girl and ensure her hate for my father. So I obeyed her and did it,
and Father Zeus, none other of the gods is more baleful.
Let the young man, then, not get into the habit of commending anything like this, nor let him be plausible and adroit in making excuses or in contriving some specious quibbles to explain base actions, but rather let him cherish the belief that poetry is an imitation of character and lives, and of men who are not perfect or spotless or unassailable in all respects, but pervaded by emotions, false opinions, and sundry forms of ignorance, who yet through inborn goodness frequently change their ways for the better. For if the young man is so trained, and his understanding so framed, that he feels elation and a sympathetic enthusiasm over noble words and deeds, and an aversion and repugnance for the mean, such training will render his perusal of poetry harmless. But the man who admires everything, and accommodates himself to everything, whose judgement, because of his preconceived opinion, is enthralled by the heroic names, will, like those who copy Plato’s stoop or Aristotle’s lisp, unwittingly become inclined to conform to much that is base. One ought not timorously, or as though under the spell of religious dread in a holy place, to shiver with awe at everything, and fall prostrate, but should rather acquire the habit of exclaiming with confidence wrong
and improper
no less than right
and proper.
For example, Achilles summons an assembly of the soldiers, who are suffering from an illness, since he is most impatient of all over the slow progress of the war because of his conspicuous position and reputation on the field; moreover, because he has some knowledge of medicine, and perceives now after the ninth day, on Son of Atreus, now, as I think, are we destined to wander Back to seek our homes again.
Rightly, moderately, and properly is this put. But after the seer has said that he fears the wrath of the most powerful of the Greeks, Achilles no longer speaks rightly and moderately, when he swears that nobody shall lay hands on the seer while he himself is alive, No, not though you name Agamemnon,
thus making plain his slight regard and his contempt for the leader. A moment later his irritation becomes more acute, and his impulse is to draw his sword with intent to do murder; not rightly, either for honour or for expediency. Again, later, repenting, Back he thrust his massive blade once more to its scabbard, Nor ignored Athena’s words,
this time rightly and honourably, because, although he could not altogether eradicate his anger, yet before doing anything irreparable he put it aside and checked it by making it obedient to his reason. Then again, although Agamemnon is ridiculous in his actions and words at the Assembly, yet in the incidents touching Chryseis he is more dignified and kingly. For whereas Achilles, as Briseis was being led away, Burst into tears and withdrawing apart sat aloof from his comrades,
Agamemnon, as he in person put aboard the ship, and gave up and sent away, the woman of whom, a moment before, he has said that he cared more for her than for his wedded wife, committed no amorous or disgraceful act. Then again, Phoenix, cursed by his father on account of the concubine, says: True in my heart I had purposed to slay him with keenpointed dagger, Save that one of the deathless gods put an end to my anger, Bringing to mind the people’s talk and men’s many reproaches, Lest I be known among the Greeks as my father’s slayer.
Now Aristarchus removed these lines from the text through fear, but they are right in view of the occasion, since Phoenix is trying to teach Achilles what sort of a thing anger is, and how many wild deeds men are ready to do from temper, if they do not use reason or hearken to those who try to soothe them. So also the poet introduces Meleager angry at his fellow-citizens, and later mollified, and he rightly finds fault with his emotions, but, on the other hand, his refusal to yield, his resistance, his mastery over them, and his change of heart the poet commends as good and expedient.
Now in these cases the difference is manifest; but in cases where Homer’s judgement is not made clear, a distinction is to be drawn by directing the young man’s attention in some such manner as the following: If, on the one hand, Nausicaa, after merely looking at a strange man, Odysseus, and experiencing Calypso’s emotions toward him, being, as she was, How I wish that a man like this might be called my husband, Living here with us, and be contented to tarry,
then are her boldness and lack of restraint to be blamed. But if, on the other hand, she sees into the character of the man from his words, and marvels at his conversation, so full of good sense, and then prays that she may be the consort of such a person rather than of some sailor man or dancing man of her own townsmen, then it is quite right to admire her. And again, when Penelope enters into conversation with the suitors, not holding herself aloof, and they favour her with gifts of garments and other apparel, Odysseus is pleased Since she had coaxed all these gifts from them, and had cozened their senses.
If, on the one hand, he rejoices at the receipt of the presents and the profit, then in his prostitution of his wife he outdoes Poliager, who is satirized in the comedy as Poliager blest Who keeps a Cyprian goat to yield him wealth.
But if, on the other hand, he thinks that he shall have them more in his power, while they are confident because of their hopes and blind to the future, then his pleasure and confidence has a reasonable justification. Similarly, in the enumeration of his possessions which the Phaeacians had put ashore with him before they sailed away, if on the one hand, upon finding himself in such solitude and in such uncertainty and ambiguity regarding his surroundings, he really fears about his possessions, Lest the men on the ship had sailed away with something,
then it is quite right to pity or indeed even to loathe his avarice. But if, on the other hand, he, as some say, being of two minds whether he were in Ithaca, thinks that the safety of his possessions is a demonstration of the rectitude of the Phaeacians (for otherwise they would not have carried him for nothing, put him ashore in a strange land, and left him there, at the same time keeping their hands off his possessions), then he makes use of no mean proof, and it is quite right to praise his forethought. But some critics find fault also with the very act of putting him ashore, if this really was done while he was asleep, and assert that the Etruscans still preserve a tradition that Odysseus was naturally sleepy, and that for this reason most people found him difficult to converse with. Yet if his sleep was not real, but if, being ashamed to send away the Phaeacians without gifts and entertainment, and at the same time unable to elude his enemies if the Phaeacians were in company with him, he provided himself with a cloak for his embarrassment in feigning himself asleep, then they find this acceptable.
By indicating these things to the young, we shall not allow them to acquire any leaning toward such characters as are mean, but rather an emulation of the better, and a preference for them, if we unhesitatingly award censure to the one class and commendation to the other. It is particularly necessary to do this with tragedies in which plausible and artful words are framed to accompany disreputable and knavish actions. For the statement of Sophocles From unfair deed fair word cannot proceed.
For, as a fact, he is wont to provide for mean characters and unnatural actions alluring words and humane reasons. And you observe also that his companion-at-arms in the dramatic art has represented Phaedra
Now in all cases it is useful also to seek after the cause of each thing that is said. Cato, for example, used, even as a child, to do whatever the attendant in charge of him ordered, yet he also demanded to know the ground and reason for the order. And so the poets are not to be obeyed as though they were our keepers or law-givers, unless their subject matter be reasonable; and this it will be if it be good, but if it be vile, it will be seen to be vacuous and vain. But most people are sharp in demanding the reasons for trivial things like the following, and insist on knowing in what sense they are intended: Never ought the ladle atop of the bowl to be rested While the bout is on,
Whoso from his car can reach the car of another Let him thrust with his spear.
But in far weightier matters they take things on faith without testing them at all, such, for example, as these: A man, though bold, is made a slave whene’er He learns his mother’s or his sire’s disgrace,
and Who prospers not must be of humble mind.
And yet these sentiments affect our characters and disorder our lives, by engendering in us mean judgements and ignoble opinions, unless from habit we can say in answer to each of them, Why must the man who has ’ not prospered be of humble mind,’ and why must he not rather rise up against Fortune, and make himself exalted and not humbled? And why, though I be the son of a bad and foolish father, yet if I myself am good and sensible, is it unbecoming for me to take pride in my good qualities, and why should I be dejected and humble on account of my father’s crassness?
For he who thus meets and resists, and refuses to entrust himself broadside on to every breath of doctrine, as to a wind, but believes in the correctness of the saying that a fool is wont to be agog at every word that’s said
But, just as amid the luxuriant foliage and branches of a vine the fruit is often hidden and unnoticed from being in the shadow, so also amid the poetic diction and the tales that hang clustered about, much that is helpful and profitable escapes a young man. This, however, ought not to happen to him, nor should he allow his attention to be diverted from the facts, but he should cling especially close to those that lead toward virtue and have the power to mould character. In which regard it may not be a bad thing to treat this topic briefly, touching summarily the principal points, but leaving any extended and constructive treatment, and long list of examples, to those who write more for display. In the first place, then, as the young man takes note of good and bad characters and personages, let him pay attention to the lines and the actions which the poet assigns to them as respectively befitting. For example, Achilles says to Agamemnon, although he speaks with anger: Never a prize like yours is mine whene’er the Achaeans Capture and sack some goodly and populous town of the Trojans.
But Thersites in reviling the same man says: Full of bronze are your quarters, and many, too, are the women, Chosen from all the captives for you, and these we Achaeans Give to you first of all whenever we capture a city.
And on another occasion Achilles says, If perchance Zeus ever Grants to us that we plunder Troy, the well-walled city,
but Thersites, One that I or another Achaean may bring in as captive.
At another time, in the Inspection, when Agamemnon upbraided Diomede, the latter made no answer, Showing respect for the stern rebuke of a king so respected.
But Sthenelus, a man of no account, says: Son of Atreus, speak not to deceive, knowing how to speak clearly; We can avow ourselves to be better far than our fathers.
A difference of this sort then, if not overlooked, will teach the young man to regard modesty and moderation as a mark of refinement, but to be on his guard against boasting and self-assertion as a mark of meanness. It is useful to note also the behaviour of Agamemnon in this case; for Sthenelus he passed by without a word, but Odysseus he did not disregard, but made answer and addressed him, When he saw he was wroth, and tried to retract his saying.
For to defend one’s actions to everybody smacks of servility, not of dignity, while to despise everybody is arrogant and foolish. And most excellently does Diomede in the battle hold his peace, although upbraided by the king, but after the battle he uses plain speech to him: First let me say that you ’mid the Danaans slighted my prowess
It is well, too, not to miss a difference that exists between a man of sense and a seer who courts popularity. For example, Calchas Give a feast for the elders; ’tis fitting and not unbefitting; Then, when many are gathered, whoever shall offer best counsel Him you will follow,
and after the dinner he sends forth the envoys. For this was the way to amend an error; the other was arraignment and foul abuse.
Moreover, the difference between the two peoples should be observed, their behaviour being as follows: the Trojans advance with shouting and confidence, but the Achaeans Silently, fearing their captains.
For to fear one’s commanders when at close quarters with the enemy is a sign of bravery and of obedience to authority as well. Wherefore Plato
There is also in the promises of the heroes a special character. For Dolon promises: Straight to the midst of their host shall I go till I come to the vessel Which Agamemnon commands.
Diomede, What a thing is training. The onlookers cry out; it is the man who is struck who says nothing.
In like manner, when the poet says Dreadful trembling seized on the limbs of every Trojan; Even Hector himself felt his heart beat quick in his bosom,
who could fail to admire the difference? For the heart of the man who is facing the danger only throbs, as though indeed he were simply going to wrestle or run a race, while the onlookers tremble and shiver in their whole bodies through loyalty and fear for their king. Here, too, one should carefully consider the difference between the very valiant man and the craven. For Thersites Hateful was most of all to Achilles as well as Odysseus,
while Ajax was always friendly to Achilles, and says to Hector regarding him— Now alone from one man alone shall you learn quite clearly What sort of men with us are the Danaans’ chieftains Even after the smiter of men, lion-hearted Achilles.
This is the compliment paid to Achilles, but these succeeding lines in behalf of all are put in such a way as to be useful: Yet are we of such sort as are ready to face you, Yea, and many of us,
thereby declaring himself not the only man or the best, but only one among many equally capable of offering defence.
This is enough on the subject of differences, unless perhaps we desire to add, that of the Trojans many were taken alive, but none of the Achaeans; and that of the Trojans some fell down at the feet of the enemy, as did Adrastus,
Now just as in pasturage the bee seeks the flower, the goat the tender shoot, the swine the root, and other animals the seed and the fruit, so in the reading of poetry one person culls the flowers of the story, another rivets his attention upon the beauty of the diction and the arrangement of the words, as Aristophanes I use the rounded neatness of his speech;
but as for those who are concerned with what is said as being useful for character (and it is to these that our present discourse is directed), let us remind them how strange it is if the lover of fables does not fail to observe the novel and unusual points in the story, and the student of language does not allow faultless and elegant forms of expression to escape him, whereas he that affects what is honourable and good, Son of Tydeus, what has made us forget our swift prowess? Hither, stand, my friend, by me. Disgrace will befall us If yon Hector, gleaming-helmed, shall capture our vessels.
For to observe that the most wise and prudent man, when he is in danger of being destroyed and lost, together with the whole host, fears shame and disapprobation, but not death, will make the young man keenly alive to the moral virtues. And by the line, Glad was Athena because of the man that was prudent and honest,
the poet permits us to draw a similar conclusion in that he represents the goddess as taking delight, not in some rich man or in one who is physically handsome or strong, but in one who is wise and honest. And again when she says that she does not overlook Odysseus, much less desert him, Since he is courteous and clever of mind and prudent,
her words indicate that the only one of our attributes that is dear to the gods and divine is a virtuous mind, if it be true that it is the nature of like to delight in like.
Since it seems to be, and really is, a great thing to master one’s anger, and since a greater thing is the exercise of precaution and forethought so as not to become involved in anger or to be made captive by Anger me now no more, old man (to ransom your Hector I myself am disposed; from Zeus has come such a message), Lest, old man, even here ’neath my roof I leave you not scatheless Suppliant though you are, and sin against Zeus’s commandments,
and having washed and shrouded the body of Hector, he places it with his own hands on the wagon before its disfigurement was seen by the father, Lest with heart so distressed he fail to master his anger, Seeing his son, and Achilles’ heart be stirred with resentment, So that he slay him there, and sin against Zeus’s commandments.
For it is mark of a wondrous foresight for a man whose hold on his temper is uncertain, who is naturally rough and quick-tempered, not to be blind to his own weakness, but to exercise caution, and to be on his guard against possible grounds for anger, and to forestall them by reason long beforehand, so that he may not even inadvertently become involved in such emotions. After the same manner should he that is fond of wine be on his guard against drunkenness, and he that is amorous against love. So did Agesilaus,Even if they within my own house shall dishonour me sorely, Let your heart within you endure all the wrongs that I suffer: Though through the house they should drag me out by the feet to the open, Yea, or with missiles smite me, still you must patient behold it.
For just as drivers do not curb their horses during the race, but before the race, so with those persons who are quick-tempered and hard to hold back when dangers threaten, we first gain control over them by reasoning, and make them ready beforehand, and then lead them into the strife.
While it is also necessary not to pass over the words carelessly, yet one should eschew the puerility of Cleanthes; for there are times when he uses a mock seriousness in pretending to interpret the words, Father Zeus, enthroned on Ida,
and Zeus, lord of Dodona,
bidding us in the latter case to read the last two words as one lord
as the preposition up
) as though the vapour exhaled from the earth were updonative
because of its being rendered up! And Chrysippus also is often quite petty, although he does not indulge in jesting, but wrests the words ingeniously, yet without carrying conviction, as when he would force the phrase wide-seeing
son of Cronos clever in conversation,
that is to say, with a widespread power of speech.
It is better, however, to turn these matters over to the grammarians, and to hold fast rather to those in which is to be found both usefulness and probability, such as Nor does my heart so bid me, for I have learned to be valiant,
and For towards all he understood the way to be gentle.
For by declaring that bravery is a thing to be learned, and by expressing the belief that friendly and gracious intercourse with others proceeds from understanding, and is in keeping with reason, the poet urges us not to neglect our own selves, but to learn what is good, and to give heed to our teachers, intimating that both boorishness and cowardice are but ignorance and defects of learning. With this agrees very well what he says regarding Zeus and Poseidon: Both, indeed, were of one descent and of the same birthplace, Yet was Zeus the earlier born and his knowledge was wider.
For he declares understanding to be a most divine and kingly thing, to which he ascribes the very great superiority of Zeus, inasmuch as he believes that all the other virtues follow upon this one.
At the same time, the young man must get the habit of perusing with a mind wide awake such sayings as these: Falsehood he will not utter because he is very prudent,
and Glaucus, what cause has a man like you for words so disdainful ? Truly I thought, my friend, that in sense you excelled all the others,
the implication being that men of sense do not lie or contend unfairly in games, or make unwarranted accusations against other people. And from the poet’s saying Mad for him was Proetus’ royal wife Anteia Lusting to make him her lover in secret, but could not persuade him, Since the wise Bellerophon thought more of virtue,
and She at the first would not consent to a deed so unseemly, Royal Clytemnestra, since her thoughts were for virtue.
In these lines the poet attributes to understanding the cause of self-control; and in his exhortations to battle he says on the several occasions: Shame, men of Lycia, whither now flee ye ? Now be ye valiant,
and But let all your minds be imbued with Shame and resentment, for now, as you see, great strife has arisen,
Respect for shame that helps the brave in war;
and Aeschylus His wish is not to seem, but be, the best, Reaping the deep-sown furrow of his mind In which all goodly counsels have their root.
For to take pride in oneself and in one’s state of mind when it is altogether good, marks the man of good sense; and since everything may be referred to understanding, it follows that every form of virtue is added unto him from reason and instruction.
Now the bee, in accordance with nature’s laws, discovers amid the most pungent flowers and the roughest thorns the smoothest and most palatable honey; so children, if they be rightly nurtured amid poetry, will in some way or other learn to draw some wholesome and profitable doctrine even from passages that are suspect of what is base and improper. For example, Agamemnon is suspected of having, for a bribe, released from service in the army the rich man who made him a present of the mare Aetha, Gift so he fare not with him to Troy where the wind never ceaseth, But enjoy himself at home; for wealth in abundance Zeus had bestowed upon him.
But, as Aristotle By my tears I shall not cure it, nor worse make it By pursuing joys, yea, and festivities.
For if he thought that he should not make matters worse by pursuing joys, yea, and festivities,
how shall our present condition be any the worse if we engage in the study of philosophy or take part in public life, if we go out to the market-place or down to the Academy, or if we pursue our farming? Wherefore the corrected versions which Cleanthes What’s shameful if its doer think not so?
at once interpolated, A shame’s a shame, though one think so or no
and Cleanthes, taking the lines about riches, Give to your friends, and when your body’s ill, Save it by spending,
rewrote them in this manner, To harlots give, and when your body’s ill Waste it by spending.
And Zeno in amending the lines of Sophocles, Whoever comes to traffic with a king To him is slave however free he come,
rewrote it thus: Is not a slave if only free he come,
by the word free
as he now uses it designating the man who is fearless, high-minded, and unhumbled. What, then, is to hinder us also from encouraging the young to take the better course by means of similar rejoinders, dealing with the citations something like this: Most enviable is the lot of him The shaft of whose desire hits what he would.
Not so,
will be our retort, but
For to gain and achieve one’s wish, if what one wishes is not right, is pitiable and unenviable. Again, The shaft of whose desire hits what is good.
Not for good and no ill came thy life from thy sire, Agamemnon, but joy Thou shalt find interwoven with grief.
No, indeed,
we shall say, but you must find joy and not grief if your lot be but moderate, since
and: Not for good and no ill came thy life from thy sire, Agamemnon;
Alas, from God this evil comes to men, When, knowing what is good, one does it not.
No, rather is it bestial,
we reply, and irrational and pitiable that a man who knows the better should be led astray by the worse as a result of a weak will and soft living.
And again: ’Tis character persuades, and not the speech.
No, rather it is both character and speech, or character by means of speech, just as a horseman uses a bridle, or a helmsman uses a rudder, since virtue has no instrument so humane or so akin to itself as speech.
And: To women more than men is he inclined? Where there is beauty, either suits him best.
But it were better to say
Again: Where there is virtue, either suits him best,
of a truth, and there is no difference in his inclination; but the man who is influenced by pleasure or outward beauty to shift his course hither and thither is incompetent and inconstant.God’s doings make the wise to feel afraid.
Not so by any means, but
Such then is the system of amendment. God’s doings make the wise to feel assured,
but they do make the silly and foolish and ungrateful to feel afraid, because such persons suspect and fear the power which is the cause and beginning of every good thing, as though it did harm.
Chrysippus has rightly indicated how the poet’s statements can be given a wider application, saying that what is serviceable should be taken over and made to apply to like situations. For when Hesiod Nor would even an ox disappear were there not a bad neighbour,
he says the same thing also about a dog and about an ass and about all things which in a similar way can disappear.
And again when Euripides What man who recks not death can be a slave?
we must understand that he makes the same statement Blest is the man who has both wealth and sense,
they may think of the statement as holding good also about repute and leadership and facility in speaking; and so also that when they hear the rebuke which was administered by Odysseus to Achilles as he sat among the maidens in Scyrus, Dost thou, to dim the glory of thy race, Card wool, son of the noblest man in Greece?
they may imagine it to be addressed also to the profligate and the avaricious and the heedless and the ill-bred, as, for example, Dost drink, son of the noblest man in Greece,
or gamble, or follow quail-fighting, Speak not of Wealth. I can’t admire a god Whose ready favour basest men secure.
Therefore speak not of repute, either, or of personal beauty, or the general’s cloak, or the priestly crown, to all which we see the worst of men attaining. For ugly is the brood of cowardice,
and the same we may also aver of licentiousness, superstition, envy, and all the other pestilent disorders. Most excellently has Homer said Paris, poor wretch, excelling in looks,
and Hector, excelling in looks
(for he declares the man deserving of censure and reproach who is endowed with no good quality better than personal comeliness), and this we must make to apply to similar cases, thereby curtailing the pride of those who plume themselves on things of no worth, and teaching the young to regard as a disgrace and reproach such phrases as excelling in wealth
and excelling in dinners
and excelling in children
or oxen,
and in fact even the use of the word excelling
in such a connexion. For we ought to aim at the pre-eminence which comes from noble qualities, and we should strive to be first in matters of first importance, and to be great in the greatest: but the repute which comes from small and petty things is disreputable and paltry.
This illustration at once reminds us to consider carefully instances of censure and commendation, particularly in Homer’s poems. For he gives us expressly to understand that bodily and adventitious Heaven-sprung son of Laertes, Odysseus of many devices,
and Hector, son of Priam, peer of Zeus in counsel,
and Son of Peleus, Achilles, great glory to the Achaeans,
and Noble son of Menoetius, in whom my soul finds pleasure.
In the second place they reproach without touching at all upon bodily characteristics, but they direct their censure to faults: Drunken sot, with eyes of a dog and the wild deer’s courage,
and Ajax, excelling at wrangling, ill advised,
and Why, Idomeneus do you brag so soon? Unfitting Is it for you to be braggart,
and Ajax, blundering boaster,
and finally Thersites is reproached Up with you, club-foot, my child!
Thus Homer ridicules those who feel ashamed of lameness or blindness, in that he does not regard as blameworthy that which is not shameful, or as shameful that which is brought about, not through our own acts, but by fortune.
Plainly, then, two great advantages accrue to those who accustom themselves carefully to peruse works of poetry: the first is conducive to moderation, that we do not odiously and foolishly reproach anybody with his fortune; while the second is conducive to magnanimity, that when we ourselves have met with chances and changes we be not humiliated or even disturbed, but bear gently with scoffings and revilings and ridicule, having especially before us the words of Philemon: There’s naught more pleasing or in better taste Than having strength to bear when men revile.
But if anybody is plainly in need of reprehension, we should reprehend his faults and his giving way to emotion, after the fashion in which Adrastus of the tragedy, when Alcmaeon said to him, You are the kin of her who slew her spouse,
replied And you have murdered her who gave you birth.
For just as those who scourge the clothes do not
Moreover, just as in what we have said above we felt that by setting against cheap and harmful poems the sayings and maxims of statesmen and men of repute, we were inducing a revolt and revulsion of faith from such poetry, so whenever we find any edifying sentiment neatly expressed in the poets we ought to foster and amplify it by means of proofs and testimonies from the philosophers, at the same time crediting these with the discovery. For this is right and useful, and our faith gains an added strength and dignity whenever the doctrines of Pythagoras and of Plato are in agreement with what is spoken on the stage or sung to the lyre or studied at school, and when the precepts of Chilon and of Bias lead to the same conclusions as our children’s readings in poetry. Hence it is a duty to make a point of indicating that the lines You, my child, have not the gift of arms in battle, Your concern must be for loving arms in wedlock,
and Seeing that Zeus is wroth if you fight with a man far better,
do not differ from Know thyself,
but have the same purport as this; and the lines, Fools! They know not how much more than all a half is,
and Evil counsel is the worst for him who gives it
are identical with the doctrines of Plato in the Gorgias to do wrong is worse than to be wronged
and to do evil is more injurious than to suffer evil.
And on the words of Aeschylus, Fear not; great stress of pain is not for long,
we ought to remark that this is the oft repeated and much admired statement originating with Epicurus,leading principles
of Epicurus; that great pains shortly spend their force, and long continued pains have no magnitude.
Of these two ideas Aeschylus has perspicuously stated the one and the other is a corollary thereto; for if great and intense pain is not lasting, then that which does not last is not great or hard to endure. Take these lines of Thespis You see that Zeus is first of gods in this, Not using lies or boast or silly laugh; With pleasure he alone is unconcerned.
What difference is there between this and the statement, for the Divine Being sits throned afar from pleasure and pain,
as Plato I shall assert that virtue hath the highest fame, But wealth with even wretched men is intimate,
and again by Euripides There’s naught that I hold In a higher esteem Than a virtuous life; ’Twill ever be joined With those that are good.
and Why seek vain possessions? Do ye think Virtue by wealth to compass? Wretched amid your comforts shall ye sit.
Is not this a proof of what the philosophers say regarding wealth and external advantages, that without virtue they are useless and unprofitable for their owners? Why have you mortals acquired in vain many possessions, and think that by wealth you shall compass virtue? What boots it, should you have in your ancestral halls some fragment of Aetna’s cliff or Parian stone, gold-wrought, which you have secured?
This method of conjoining and reconciling such sentiments with the doctrines of philosophers brings the poet’s work out of the realm of myth and impersonation, and, moreover, invests with seriousness its helpful sayings. Besides, it opens and stimulates in advance the mind of the youth by the sayings in philosophy. For he comes to it thus not altogether without a foretaste of it, nor without having heard of it, nor indiscriminately stuffed with what he has heard always from his mother and nurse, and, I To mourn the babe for th’ ills to which he comes; But him that’s dead, and from his labours rests, To bear from home with joy and cheering words,
and What needs have mortals save two things alone, Demeter’s grain and draught from water-jar?
and O Tyranny, beloved of barbarous folk,
and And mortal men’s felicity Is gained by such of them as feel least grief,
they are less confused and disquieted upon hearing at the lectures of the philosophers that Death is nothing to us,
leading principles,
Diogenes Laertius, x. 139.The wealth allowed by Nature
leading principles,
Diogenes Laertius, x. 144. Happiness and blessedness do not consist in vast possessions or exalted occupations or offices or authority, but on impassivity, calmness, and a disposition of the soul that sets its limitations to accord with Nature.
Wherefore, both because of these considerations and because of those already adduced, the young man has need of good pilotage in the matter of reading, to the end that, forestalled with schooling rather than prejudice, in a spirit of friendship and goodwill and familiarity, he may be convoyed by poetry into the realm of philosophy.
It may be allowed to be a question fit for the determination of those concerning
- whom Cato said, Their palates are more sensitive than their hearts, whether that
- saying of Philoxenus the poet be true or no, The most savory flesh is that which
- is no flesh, and fish that is no fish. Yet this to me, Marcus Sedatus, is out of
- question, that those precepts of philosophy which seem not to be delivered with a
- designed gravity, such as becomes philosophers, take most with persons that are
- very young, and meet with a more ready acceptance and compliance from them. Whence
- it is that they do not only read through Esop's fables and the fictions of poets
- and the Abaris of Heraclides and Ariston's Lyco; but they also read such doctrines
- as relate to the souls of men, if something fabulous be mixed with them, with an
- excess of pleasure that borders on enthusiasm. Wherefore we are not only to govern
- their appetites in the delights of eating and drinking, but also (and much more)
- to inure them to a like temperance in reading and hearing, that, while they make
- use of pleasure as a sauce, they may pursue that which is wholesome and profitable
- in those things which they read. For neither can a city be secure if but one gate
- be left open to receive the enemy, though all the rest be shut; nor a young man
- safe, though he be sufficiently fortified against the assaults of all other
- pleasures, whilst he is without any guard against those of the ear. Yea, the
- nearer the commerce is betwixt
They say of the fish called polypus that
-
-
because, though it be very luscious to eat, yet it is thought to disturb the fancy
- with frightful and confused dreams. And the like observation may be made
- concerning poetry, that it affords sweet and withal wholesome nourishment to the
- minds of young men, but yet it contains likewise no less matter of disturbance and
- emotion to them that want a right conduct in the study thereof. For of it also, as
- well as of Egypt, may it be said that (to those who will use it)
-
-
for therein
-
-
And indeed such only are endangered thereby, for the charms of that art ordinarily - affect not those that are downright sots and naturally incapable of learning. - Wherefore, when Simonides was asked why of all men he could not deceive the - Thessalians, his answer was, Because they are not so well bred as to be capable of - being cajoled by me. And Gorgias used to call tragical poems cheats, wherein he - that did cheat was juster than he that did not cheat, and he that was cheated was - wiser than he that was not cheated.
-It deserves therefore our consideration, whether we shall put young men into
- Epicurus's boat,—wherein, having their ears stopped with wax, as those of the men
- of Ithaca were, they shall be obliged to sail by and not so much as touch at
- poetry,—or rather keep a guard on them, so as to oblige their judgments by
- principles of right reason to use it aright, and preserve them from being seduced
- to their hurt by that which affords them so much delight. For neither did
- Lycurgus, the valiant son of Dryas (as Homer
For as, where the mandrake grows near the vine and so communicates something of
- its force thereto, the wine that is made of its grapes makes the sleep of those
- that drink it more refreshing; so doth the tempering poetry with the principles of
- philosophy and allaying their roughness with its fictions render the study of them
- more easy and the relish of them more grateful to young learners. Wherefore those
- that would give their minds to philosophical studies are not obliged to avoid
- poetry altogether, but rather to prepare themselves for philosophy by poems,
- accustoming themselves to search for and embrace that which may profit in that
- which pleaseth them, and rejecting and discarding that wherein they find nothing
- of this nature. For this discrimination is the first step to learning; and when
- this is attained, then, according to what Sophocles saith,—
-
-
Let us therefore in the first place possess those whom we initiate in the study of
- poetry with this notion (as one which they ought always to have at hand), that
-
-
-
which they do sometimes with and sometimes against their wills. They do it with
- their wills, because they find strict truth too rigid to comply with that
- sweetness and gracefulness of expression, which most are taken with, so readily as
- fiction doth. For real truth, though it disgust never so much, must be told as it
- is, without alteration; but that which is feigned in a discourse can easily yield
- and shift its garb from the distasteful to that which is more pleasing. And
- indeed, neither the measures nor the tropes nor the grandeur of words nor the
- aptness of metaphors
-
-
such a one, I say, will take no harm. by it, nor admit from it any absurd thing
- into his belief. But when he meets in poetry with expressions of Neptune's rending
- the earth to pieces and discovering the infernal regions,
-
Yea, he will repress his tears for Achilles and Agamemnon, while they are
- represented as mourning after their death, and stretching forth their limber and
- feeble hands to express their desire to live again. And if at any time the charms
- of poetry transport him into any disquieting passions, he will quickly say to
- himself, as Homer very elegantly (considering the propension of women to listen
- after fables) says in his Necyia, or relation of the state of the dead,—
-
-
Such things as I have touched upon are those which the poets willingly feign. But
- more there are which they do not feign, but believing them themselves as their own
- proper judgments, they put fictitious colors upon them to ingratiate them to us.
- As when Homer says of Jupiter,—
-
-
To this fable Aeschylus hath accommodated a whole tragedy
-
-
and this other also,—
-
-
these passages, I say, express the judgment and belief of poets who thereby
- discover and suggest to us the ignorant or mistaken apprehensions they had of the
- Deities. Moreover, almost every one knows nowadays, that the portentous fancies
- and contrivances of stories concerning the state of the dead are accommodated to
- popular apprehensions, —that the spectres and phantasms of burning rivers and
- horrid regions and terrible tortures expressed by frightful names are all mixed
- with fable and fiction, as poison with food; and that neither Homer nor Pindar nor
- Sophocles ever believed themselves when they wrote at this rate:—
-
-
and,
-
-
and,
-
-
And yet, as many of them as deplore death as a lamentable thing, or the want of
- burial after death as a calamitous condition, are wont to break out into
- expressions of this nature:—
-
-
and,
-
-
and again,
-
-
These, I say, are the speeches of men persuaded of these things, as being
- possessed by erroneous opinions; and therefore they touch us the more nearly and
- torment us inwardly, because we ourselves are full of the same impotent passion
- from which they were uttered. To fortify us therefore against expressions of this
- nature, let this principle continually ring in our ears, that poetry is not at all
- solicitous to keep to the strict measure of truth. And indeed, as to what that
- truth in these matters is, even those men themselves who make it their only study
- to learn and search it out confess that they can hardly discover any certain
- footsteps to guide them in that enquiry. Let us therefore have these verses of
- Empedocles, in this case, at hand:—
-
-
as also those of Xenophanes:—
-
-
and lastly, that passage concerning Socrates, in Plato, where he by the solemnity - of an oath disclaims all knowledge of those things. For those who perceive that - the searching into such matters makes the heads of philosophers themselves giddy - cannot but be the less inclined to regard what poets say concerning them.
-And we shall fix our young man yet the more if, when we enter him in the poets, we
- first describe poetry
-
-
These, it is true, are wicked as well as false speeches, but yet are decent enough
- in the mouth of an Eteocles, an Ixion, and an old griping usurer. If therefore we
- mind our children that the poets write not such things as praising and approving
- them, but do really account them base and vicious and therefore accommodate such
- speeches to
In such passages therefore we are carefully to observe whether or not the poet
- himself do anywhere give any intimation that he dislikes the things he makes such
- persons say; which, in the prologue to his Thais Menander does, in these words:—
-
-
-
But Homer of all the poets does it best. For he doth beforehand, as it were,
- bespeak dislike of the evil things and approbation of the good things he utters.
- Of the latter take these instances:—
-
-
-
-
-
And for the former, he so performs it as in a manner solemnly to forbid us to use
- or heed such speeches as those he mentions, as being foolish and wicked. For
- example, being to tell us how uncivilly Agamemnon treated the priest, he premises
- these words of his own,—
-
-
intimating the insolency and unbecomingness of his answer. And when he attributes
- this passionate speech to Achilles,—
-
-
he accompanies it with this censure,—
-
-
for it was unlikely that speaking in such anger he should observe any rules of - decency.
-And he passeth like censures on actions. As on Achilles's foul usage of Hector's
- carcass,—
-
-
And in like manner he doth very decently shut up relations of things said or done,
- by adding some sentence wherein he declares his judgment of them. As when he
- personates some of the Gods saying, on the occasion of the adultery of Mars and
- Venus discovered by Vulcan's artifice,—
-
-
And thus concerning Hecter's insolent boasting he says,—
-
-
And when he speaks of Pandarus's shooting, he adds,—
-
-
Now these verbal intimations of the minds and judgments of poets are not difficult
- to be understood by any one that will heedfully observe them. But besides these,
- they give
-
-
And therefore also he brings in Ulysses directing the musician thus,—
-
-
evidently teaching us that poets and musicians ought to receive the arguments of
- their songs from sober and understanding
-
-
For the fiction and representation of evil acts, when it withal acquaints us with
- the shame and damage befalling the doers, hurts not but rather profits him that
- reads them. For which end philosophers make use of examples for our instruction
- and correction out of historical collections; and poets do the very same thing,
- but with this difference, that they invent fabulous examples themselves. There was
- one Melanthius, who (whether in jest or earnest he said it, it matters not much)
- affirmed that the city of Athens owed its preservation to the dissensions and
- factions that were among the orators, giving withal this reason for his assertion,
- that thereby they were kept from inclining all of them to one side, so that by
- means of the differences among those statesmen there were always some that drew
- the saw the right way for the defeating of destructive counsels. And thus it is
- too in the contradictions among poets, which, by lessening the credit of what they
- say, render them the less powerful to do mischief; and therefore, when comparing
- one saying with another we discover their contrariety, we ought to adhere to the
- better side. As in these instances:—
-
-
-
-
-
Such contrarieties as these are easily solved, if (as I said) we teach youth to
- judge aright and to give the better saying preference. But if we chance to meet
- with any absurd passages without any others at their heels to confute them, we are
- then to overthrow them with such others as elsewhere are to be found in the
- author. Nor must we be offended with the poet or grieved at him, but only at the
- speeches themselves, which he utters either according to the vulgar manner of
- speaking or, it may be, but in drollery. So, when thou readest in Homer of Gods
- thrown out of heaven headlong one by another, or Gods wounded by men and
- quarrelling and brawling with each other, thou mayest readily, if thou wilt, say
- to him,—
-
-
yea, and thou dost so elsewhere, and according as thou thinkest, to wit, in these
- passages of thine:—
-
-
-
-
-
For these argue sound and true opinions of the Gods; but those other were only
- feigned to raise passions in men. Again, when Euripides speaks at this rate,—
-
-
-
we may do well to quote him elsewhere against himself, where he says better,—
-
-
-
So also, when Pindar saith bitterly and keenly,
-
-
tell him: But, Pindar, thou thyself sayest elsewhere,
-
-
And when Sophocles speaks thus,
-
-
tell him: But we have heard thee say far otherwise,
-
-
And as to what he saith of riches, to wit:
-
-
here the reader may set in opposition divers other sayings of the same author. For
- example,
-
-
And Menander also somewhere magnifies a voluptuous life, and inflames the minds of
- vain persons with these amorous strains,
-
-
But yet elsewhere, on the other side, he fastens on us and pulls us back to the
- love of virtue, and checks the rage of lust, when he says thus,
-
-
For these lines are contrary to the former, as they are also better and more - profitable; so that by comparing them considerately one cannot but either be - inclined to the better side, or at least flag in the belief of the worse.
-But now, supposing that any of the poets themselves afford no such correcting
- passages to solve what they have said amiss, it will then be advisable to confront
- them with the contrary sayings of other famous men, and therewith to sway the
- scales of our judgment to the better side. As, when Alexis tempts to debauchery in
- these verses,
-
-
we must remember that Socrates said the contrary, to wit: Bad men live that they
- may eat and drink, whereas good men eat and drink that they may live. And against
- the man that wrote in this manner,
-
-
seeing he herein advises us to follow other vicious examples, that of Diogenes may
- well be returned, who being asked by what means a man might revenge himself upon
- his enemy, answered, By becoming himself a good and honest man. And the same
- Diogenes may be quoted also against Sophocles, who, writing thus of the sacred
- mysteries, caused great grief and despair to multitudes of men:
-
-
This passage being read to Diogenes, What then! says he, shall the condition of
- Pataecion, the notorious robber, after death be better than that of Epaminondas,
- merely for
-
-
How comes it to pass then, said he, Theognis, that thou thyself being so poor - pratest and gratest our ears in this manner?
-Nor are we to omit in our reading those hints which, from some other words or
- phrases bordering on those that offend us, may help to rectify our apprehensions.
- But as physicians use cantharides, believing that, though their bodies be deadly
- poison, yet their feet and wings are medicinal and can even kill the poison of the
- flies themselves, so must we deal with poems. If any noun or verb near at hand may
- assist to the correction of any such saying, and preserve us from putting a bad
- construction upon it, we should take hold of it and employ it to assist a more
- favorable interpretation. As some do in reference to those verses of Homer,—
-
-
-
For, they say, he says not of men simply, or of all men, that the Gods weave for - them the fatal web of a sorrowful life; but he affirms it only of foolish and - imprudent men, whom, because their vices make them such, he therefore calls - wretched and miserable.
-Another way whereby those passages which are suspicious in poets may be
- transferred to a better sense may evil death; for the Macedonians use the word
But of all things it is most necessary, and no less profitable if we design to
- receive profit and not hurt from the poets, that we understand how they make use
- of the names of Gods, as also of the terms of Evil and Good; and what they mean by
- Fortune and Fate; and whether these words be always taken by them in one and the
- same sense or rather in various senses, as also many other words are. For so the
- word material house, as, Into the high-roofed house; and
- sometimes
-
and elsewhere for boasting and rejoicing, as in
-
In like manner
-
-
or
-
-
It is elegant also when they a᾽dapt to the present matter, as grammarians teach,
- the use of words which are commonly of another signification. As here:—
-
-
For here
And the like distinction of words we ought to observe also in things more weighty
- and serious. To begin with the Gods, we should teach our youth that poets, when
- they use the names of Gods, sometimes mean properly the Divine Beings so called,
- but otherwhiles understand by those names certain powers of which the Gods are the
- donors and authors, they having first led us into the use of them by their own
- practice. As when Archilochus prays,
-
-
it is plain that he means the God himself whom he invokes. But when elsewhere he
- bewails the drowning of his sister's husband, who had not obtained lawful burial,
- and says,
-
-
he gives the name of Vulcan to the fire and not to the Deity. Again, Euripides,
- when he says,
-
-
means the Gods themselves who bare those names. But when Sophocles saith,
-
-
we are to understand the word Mars to denote not the God so called, but war. And
- by the same word we are to understand also weapons made of hardened brass, in
- those verses of Homer,
-
-
Wherefore, in conformity to the instances given, we must conceive and bear in mind
- that by the names of Jupiter also sometimes they mean the God himself, sometimes
- Fortune, and oftentimes also Fate. For when they say,—
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
they understand Jupiter himself. But when they ascribe the event of all things
- done to Jupiter as the cause, saying of him,—
-
-
they mean by Jove no more but Fate. For the poet doth not conceive that God
- contrives mischief against mankind, but he soundly declares the mere necessity of
- the things themselves, to wit, that prosperity and victory are destined by Fate to
- cities and armies and commanders who govern themselves with sobriety, but if they
- give way to passions and commit errors, thereby dividing and crumbling themselves
- into factions, as those of whom the poet speaks did, they do unhandsome actions,
- and thereby create great disturbances, such as are attended with sad consequences.
-
-
-
But when Hesiod brings in Prometheus thus counselling his brother Epimetheus,
-
-
he useth the name of Jove to express Fortune; for he calls the good things which - come by her (such as riches, and marriages, and empires, and indeed all external - things the enjoyment whereof is unprofitable to them who know not how to use them - well) the gifts of Jove. And therefore he adviseth Epimetheus (an ill man, and a - fool withal) to stand in fear of and to guard himself from prosperity, as that - which would be hurtful and destructive to him.
-Again, where he saith,
-
-
he calls that which befalls men by Fortune God's gift, and intimates that it is an
- unworthy thing to reproach any man for that poverty which he falls into by
- Fortune, whereas poverty is then only a matter of disgrace and reproach when it is
- attendant on sloth and idleness, or wantonness and prodigality. For, before the
- name of Fortune was used, they knew there was a powerful cause, which moved
- irregularly and unlimitedly and with such a force that no human reason could avoid
- it; and this cause they called by the names of Gods. So we are wont to call divers
- things and qualities and discourses, and even men themselves, divine. And thus may
- we rectify many such sayings concerning Jupiter as would otherwise seem very
- absurd. As these, for instance:—
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
These passages we are to interpret as spoken concerning Fortune or Fate, of the
- causality of both which no account can be given by us, nor do their effects fall
- under our power. But where any thing is said of Jupiter that is suitable,
- rational, and probable, there we are to conceive that the names of that God is
- used properly. As in these instances:—
-
-
And other words there are which the poets remove and translate from their proper
- sense by accommodation to various things, which deserve also our serious notice.
- Such a one, for instance, is virtue. For because virtue does not only render men
- prudent, just, and good, both in their words and deeds, but also oftentimes
- purchaseth to them honor and power, therefore they call likewise these by that
- name. So we are wont to call both the olive-tree and the fruit
-
-
-
-
-
let him presently conceive that these things are spoken of that most excellent and
- divine habit in us which we understand to be no other than right reason, or the
- highest attainment of the reasonable nature, and most agreeable
-
-
and this,
-
let him not sit down in an astonishing admiration of rich men, as if they
- were enabled by their wealth to purchase virtue, nor let him imagine that it is in
- the power of Fortune to increase or lessen his own wisdom; but let him conceive
- that the poet by virtue meant either glory or power or prosperity or something of
- like import. For poets use the same ambiguity also in the word
-
-
and sometimes some evil accident or misfortune, as when Homer says,
-
-
So also in the word
-
-
and Menander in this,—
-
-
yet Euripides discourseth more confusedly and perplexedly when he writes after
- this manner,—
-
-
-
-
-
except, as I said, we allow him the use of these words in a metaphorical and - abusive sense. But enough hath been spoken of these matters.
-Nevertheless, this principle is not once only but often to be inculcated and
- pressed on young men, that poetry, when it undertakes a fictitious argument by way
- of imitation, though it make use of such ornament and illustration as suit the
- actions and manners treated of, yet disclaims not all likelihood of truth, seeing
- the force of imitation, in order to the persuading of men, lies in probability.
- Wherefore such imitation as does not altogether shake hands with truth carries
- along with it certain signs of virtue and vice mixed together in the actions which
- it doth represent. And of this nature is Homer's poetry, which totally bids adieu
- to Stoicism, the principles whereof will not admit any vice to come near where
- virtue is, nor virtue to have any thing to do where any vice lodgeth, but affirms
- that he that is not a wise man can do nothing well, and he that is so can do
- nothing amiss. Thus they determine in the schools. But in human actions and the
- affairs of common life the judgment of Euripides is verified, that
-
-
Next, it is to be observed that poetry, waiving the truth of things, does most
- labor to beautify its fictions with variety and multiplicity of contrivance. For
- variety bestows upon fable all that is pathetical, unusual, and surprising, and
- thereby makes it more taking and graceful; whereas what is void of variety is
- unsuitable to the nature of fable, and so raiseth no
These things therefore so standing, we should, when we enter a young man into the
- study of the poets, endeavor to free his mind from that degree of esteem of the
- good and great personages in them described as may incline him to think them to be
- mirrors of wisdom and justice, the chief of princes, and the exemplary measures of
- all virtue and goodness. For he will receive much prejudice, if he shall approve
- and admire all that comes from such persons as great, if he dislike nothing in
- them himself, nor will endure to hear others blame them, though for such words and
- actions as the following passages import:—
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Our young man is to be taught not to commend such things as these, no, nor to show
- the nimbleness of his wit or subtlety in maintaining an argument by finding out
- plausible colors and pretences to varnish over a bad matter. But
-
-
And he spake well, and with due moderation and decorum. But when the soothsayer
- Chalcas had told him that he feared the wrath of the most potent among the
- Grecians, after an oath that while he lived no man should lay violent hands on
- him, he adds, but not with like wisdom and moderation,
-
-
in which speech he declares his low opinion or rather his contempt of his chief
- commander. And then, being farther provoked, he drew his weapon with a design to
- kill him, which attempt was neither good nor expedient. And therefore by and by he
- repented his rashness,—
-
-
wherein again he did rightly and worthily, in that, though he could not altogether
- quell his passion, yet he restrained and reduced it under the command of reason,
- before it brake forth into such an irreparable act of mischief. Again, even
- Agamemnon himself talks in that assembly ridiculously, but carries himself more
- gravely and more like a prince in the matter of Chryseis. For whereas Achilles,
- when his Briseis was taken away from him,
-
-
Agamemnon himself hands into the ship, delivers to her friends, and so sends from
- him, the woman concerning whom a little before he declared that he loved her
- better than his wife; and in that action did nothing unbecoming or savoring of
- fond affection. Also Phoenix, when his father bitterly cursed him for having to do
- with one that was his own harlot, says,
-
-
It is true that Aristarchus was afraid to permit these verses to stand in the - poet, and therefore censured them to be expunged. But they were inserted by Homer - very aptly to the occasion of Phoenix's instructing Achilles what a pernicious - thing anger is, and what foul acts men do by its instigation, while they are - capable neither of making use of their own reason nor of hearing the counsel of - others. To which end he also introduceth Meleager at first highly offended with - his citizens, and afterwards pacified; justly therein reprehending disordered - passions, and praising it as a good and profitable thing not to yield to them, but - to resist and overcome them, and to repent when one hath been overcome by - them.
-Now in these instances the difference is manifest. But where a like clear judgment
- cannot be passed, there we are to settle the young man's mind thus, by way of
- distinction. If Nausicaa, having cast her eyes upon Ulysses, a stranger, and
- feeling the same passion for him as Calypso had before, did (as one that was ripe
- for a husband) out of wantonness talk with her maidens at this foolish rate,—
-
-
-
she is blameworthy for her impudence and incontinence. But if, perceiving the
- man's breeding by his discourse, and admiring the prudence of his addresses, she
- rather wisheth to have such a one for a husband than a merchant or a dancing
- gallant of her fellow-citizens, she is to be commended. And when Ulysses is
- represented as rejoicing at Penelope's jocular conversation with her wooers, and
- at their presenting her with rich garments and other ornaments,
-
-
if that joy were occasioned by greediness and covetous
-
-
But if through foresight he thought thereby to get them the more within his power,
- as being lulled asleep in security for the future by the hopes she gave them at
- present, this rejoicing, joined with confidence in his wife, was rational. Again,
- when he is brought in numbering the goods which the Phaeacians had set on shore
- together with himself and departed; if indeed, being himself left in such a
- solitude, so ignorant where he was, and having no security there for his own
- person, he is yet solicitous for his goods, lest
-
-
the covetousness of the man deserved in truth to be pitied, or rather abhorred.
- But if, as some say in his defence, being doubtful whether or no the place where
- he was landed were Ithaca, he made use of the just tale of his goods to infer
- thence the honesty of the Phaeacians,—because it was not likely they would expose
- him in a strange place and leave him there with his goods by him untouched, so as
- to get nothing by their dishonesty,—then he makes use of a very fit test for this
- purpose, and deserves commendation for his wisdom in that action. Some also there
- are who find fault with that passage of the putting him on shore when he was
- asleep, if it really so happened, and they tell us that the people of Tuscany have
- still a traditional story among them concerning Ulysses, that he was naturally
- sleepy, and therefore a man whom many men could not freely converse with. But if
- his sleep was but feigned, and he made use of this pretence only of a natural
Now, by showing young men these things, we shall preserve them from being carried
- away to any corruption in their manners. and dispose them to the election and
- imitation of those that are good, as being before instructed readily to disapprove
- those and commend these. But this ought with the most care to be done in the
- reading of tragedies wherein probable and subtle speeches are made use of in the
- most foul and wicked actions. For that is not always true which Sophocles saith,
- that From naughty acts good words can ne'er
- proceed.
-
For even he himself is wont to apply pleasant reasonings and plausible arguments - to those manners and actions which are wicked or unbecoming. And in another of his - fellow-tragedians, we may see even Phaedra herself represented as justifying her - unlawful affection for Hippolytus by accusing Theseus of ill-carriage towards her. - And in his Troades, he allows Helen the same liberty of speech against Hecuba, - whom she judgeth to be more worthy of punishment than herself for her adultery, - because she was the mother of Paris that tempted her thereto. A young man - therefore must not be accustomed to think any thing of that nature handsomely or - wittily spoken, nor to be pleased with such colorable inventions; but rather more - to abhor such words as tend to the defence of wanton acts than the very acts - themselves.
-And lastly, it will be useful likewise to enquire into the cause why each thing is
- said. For so Cato, when he was a boy, though he was wont to be very observant of
- all his master's commands, yet withal used to ask the cause
-
-
But to those of greater moment they give credence without examination, as to those
- that follow:
-
-
And yet such speeches relate to manners, and disquiet men's lives by begetting in
- them evil opinions and unworthy sentiments, except they have learned to return
- answer to each of them thus: Wherefore is it necessary that
- a man who is crushed by adverse fate should have a dejected spirit? Yea, why
- rather should he not struggle against Fortune, and raise himself above the
- pressures of his low circumstances? Why, if I myself be a good and wise son of
- an evil and foolish father, does it not rather become me to bear myself
- confidently upon the account of my own virtue, than to be dejected and
- dispirited because of my father's defects?
For he that can encounter such
- speeches and oppose them after this manner, not yielding himself up to be overset
- with the blast of every saying, but approving that speech of Heraclitus, that
-
-
will reject many such things as falsely and idly spoken.
-These things therefore may be of use to preserve us from the hurt we might get by - the study of poems. Now, as on a vine the fruit oftentimes lies shadowed and - hidden under its large leaves and luxuriant branches, so in the poet's phrases and - fictions that encompass them there are also many profitable and useful things - concealed from the view of young men. This, however, ought not to be suffered; nor - should we be led away from things themselves thus, but rather adhere to such of - them as tend to the promoting of virtue and the well forming of our manners. It - will not be altogether useless therefore, to treat briefly in the next place of - passages of that nature. Wherein I intend to touch only at some particulars, - leaving all longer discourses, and the brimming up and furnishing them with a - multitude of instances, to those who write more for show and ostentation.
-First, therefore, let our young man be taught to understand good and bad manners
- and persons, and from thence apply his mind to the words and deeds which the poet
- decently assigns to either of them. For example, Achilles, though in some wrath,
- speaks to Agamemnon thus decently:
-
-
whereas Thersites to the same person speaks reproachfully in this manner:—
-
-
Again, Achilles thus:—
-
-
but Thersites thus:— Whom I or some Greek else as captive
- bring.
-
Again, Diomedes, when Agamemnon taking a view of the army spoke reproachfully to
- him,
-
-
whereas Sthenelus, a man of small note, replies on him thus:—
-
-
Now the observation of such difference will teach the young man the decency of a
- modest and moderate temper, and the unbecoming nauseousness of the contrary vices
- of boasting and cracking of a man's own worth. And it is worth while also to take
- notice of the demeanor of Agamemnon in the same passage. For he passeth by
- Sthenelus unspoken to; but perceiving Ulysses to be offended, he neglects not him,
- but applies himself to answer him:— Struck with his
- generous wrath, the king replies.
-
For to have apologized to every one had been too servile and misbecoming the
- dignity of his person; whereas equally to have neglected every one had been an act
- of insolence and imprudence. And very handsome it is that Diomedes, though in the
- heat of the battle he answers the king only with silence, yet after the battle was
- over useth more liberty towards him, speaking thus:— You
- called me coward, sir, before the Greeks.
-
It is expedient also to take notice of the different carriage of a wise man and of
- a soothsayer popularly courting the multitude. For Chalcas very unseasonably makes
- no scruple
-
-
which done, accordingly after supper he sends his ambassadors. Now this speech of - Nestor tended to the rectifying of what he had before done amiss; but that of - Chalcas, only to accuse and disparage him.
-There is likewise consideration to be had of the different manners of nations,
- such as these. The Trojans enter into battle with loud outcries and great
- fierceness; but in the army of the Greeks,
-
-
For when soldiers are about to engage an enemy, the awe they stand in of their - officers is an argument both of courage and obedience. For which purpose Plato - teacheth us that we ought to inure ourselves to fear blame and disgrace more than - labor and danger. And Cato was wont to say that he liked men that were apt to - blush better than those that looked pale.
-Moreover, there is a particular character to be noted of the men who undertake for
- any action. For Dolon thus promiseth:—
-
-
But Diomedes promiseth nothing, but only tells them he shall fear the less if they
- send a companion with him; whereby is intimated, that discreet foresight is
- Grecian and
It is a matter too of no unprofitable consideration, how the minds of the Trojans
- and of Hector too were affected when he and Ajax were about to engage in a single
- combat. For Aeschylus, when, upon one of the fighters at fisticuffs in the
- Isthmian games receiving a blow on the face, there was made a great outcry among
- the people, said: What a thing is practice! See how the
- lookers-on only cry out, but the man that received the stroke is silent.
- But when the poet tells us, that the Greeks rejoiced when they saw Ajax in his
- glistering armor, but
-
-
who is there that wonders not at this difference,—when the heart of him that was - to run the risk of the combat only beats inwardly, as if he were to undertake a - mere wrestling or running match, but the very bodies of the spectators tremble and - shake, out of the kindness and fear which they had for their king?
-In the same poet also we may observe the difference betwixt the humor of a coward
- and a valiant man. For Thersites
-
-
but Ajax is always represented as friendly to Achilles; and particularly he speaks
- thus to Hector concerning him:—
-
-
wherein he insinuates the high commendation of that valiant man. And in what
- follows, he speaks like handsome things of his fellow-soldiers in general, thus:—
-
-
-
wherein he doth not boast himself to be the only or the best champion, but one of - those, among many others, who were fit to undertake that combat.
-What hath been said is sufficient upon the point of dissimilitudes; except we - think fit to add this, that many of the Trojans came into the enemy's power alive, - but none of the Grecians; and that many of the Trojans supplicated to their - enemies,—as (for instance) Adrastus, the sons of Antimachus, Lycaon,—and even - Hector himself entreats Achilles for a sepulture; but not one of these doth so, as - judging it barbarous to supplicate to a foe in the field, and more Greek-like - either to conquer or die.
-But as, in the same plant, the bee feeds on the flower, the goat on the bud, the
- hog on the root, and other living creatures on the seed and the fruit; so in
- reading of poems, one man singleth out the historical part, another dwells upon
- the elegancy and fit disposal of words, as Aristophanes says of Euripides,—
-
-
but others, to whom this part of my discourse is directed, mind only such things
- as are useful to the bettering of manners. And such we are to put in mind that it
- is an absurd thing, that those who delight in fables should not let any thing slip
- them of the vain and extravagant stories they find in poets, and that those who
- affect language should pass by nothing that is elegantly and floridly expressed;
- and that only the lovers of honor and virtue, who apply themselves to the study of
- poems not for delight but for instruction's sake, should slightly and negligently
- observe what is spoken in them relating to valor, temperance, or justice. Of this
- nature is the following:—
-
-
For to see a man of the greatest wisdom in danger of being totally cut off with
- all those that take part with him, and yet affected less with fear of death than
- of shame and dishonor, must needs excite in a young man a passionate affection for
- virtue. And this,
-
-
teacheth us to infer that the Deity delights not in a rich or a proper or a strong
- man, but in one that is furnished with wisdom and justice. Again, when the same
- Goddess (Minerva) saith that the reason why she did not desert or neglect Ulysses
- was that he was Gentle, of ready wit, of prudent
- mind,
-
she therein tells us that, of all things pertaining to us, nothing is dear to the - Gods and divine but our virtue, seeing like naturally delights in like.
-And seeing, moreover, that it both seemeth and really is a great thing to be able
- to moderate a man's anger, but a greater by far to guard a man's self beforehand
- by prudence, that he fall not into it nor be surprised by it, therefore also such
- passages as tend that way are not slightly to be represented to the readers; for
- example, that Achilles himself—who was a man of no great forbearance, nor inclined
- to such meekness—yet warns Priam to be calm and not to provoke him, thus,
-
-
and that he himself first washeth and decently covereth the body of Hector and
- then puts it into a chariot, to prevent his father's seeing it so unworthily
- mangled as it was,—
-
-
For it is a piece of admirable prudence for a man so prone to anger, as being by
- nature hasty and furious, to understand himself so well as to set a guard upon his
- own inclinations, and by avoiding provocations to keep his passion at due distance
- by the use of reason, lest he should be unawares surprised by it. And after the
- same manner must the man that is apt to be drunken forearm himself against that
- vice; and he that is given to wantonness, against lust, as Agesilaus refused to
- receive a kiss from a beautiful person addressing to him, and Cyrus would not so
- much as endure to see Panthea. Whereas, on the contrary, those that are not
- virtuously bred are wont to gather fuel to inflame their passions, and voluntarily
- to abandon themselves to those temptations to which of themselves they are
- endangered. But Ulysses does not only restrain his own anger, but (perceiving by
- the discourse of his son Telemachus, that through indignation conceived against
- such evil men he was greatly provoked) he blunts his passion too beforehand, and
- composeth him to calmness and patience, thus:—
-
-
For as men are not wont to put bridles on their horses when they are running in
- full speed, but bring them bridled beforehand to the race; so do they use to
- preoccupy and predispose the minds of those persons with rational considerations
- to enable them to encounter passion, whom they
Furthermore, the young man is not altogether to neglect names themselves when he
- meets with them; though he is not obliged to give much heed to such idle descants
- as those of Cleanthes, who, while he professeth himself an interpreter, plays the
- trifler, as in these passages of Homer:
But such things as these are fitter to be left to the examination of grammarians;
- and we are rather to insist upon such passages as are both profitable and
- persuasive. Such, for instance, as these:—
-
-
For while the author tells us that fortitude may be taught, and that an obliging
- and graceful way of conversing with others is to be gotten by art and the use of
- reason, he exhorts us not to neglect the improvement of ourselves, but by
- observing our teachers' instructions to learn a becoming carriage, as knowing that
- clownishness and cowardice argue ill-breeding and ignorance. And very suitable to
- what hath been said is that which is said of Jupiter and Neptune:—
-
-
For the poet therein pronounceth wisdom to be the most divine and royal quality of
- all; as placing therein the greatest excellency of Jupiter himself, and judging
- all virtues else to be necessarily consequent thereunto. We are also to accustom a
- young man attentively to hear such things as these:—
-
-
These speeches teach us that it is beneath wise men to lie or to deal otherwise
- than fairly, even in games, or to blame other men without just cause. And when the
- poet attributes Pindarus's violation of the truce to his folly, he withal declares
- his judgment that a wise man will not be guilty of an unjust action. The like may
- we also infer concerning continence, taking our ground for it from these
- passages:—
-
-
in which speeches the poet assigns wisdom to be the cause of continence. And when
- in exhortations made to encourage soldiers to fight, he speaks in this manner:—
-
-
-
he seems to intimate that continent men are valiant men; because they fear the
- shame of base actions, and can trample on pleasures and stand their ground in the
- greatest hazards. Whence Timotheus, in the play called Persae, takes occasion
- handsomely to exhort the Grecians thus:—
-
-
And Aeschylus also makes it a point of wisdom not to be blown up with pride when a
- man is honored, nor to be moved or elevated with the acclamations of a multitude,
- writing thus of Amphiaraus:—
-
-
For it is the part of a wise man to value himself upon the consciousness of his - own true worth and excellency. Whereas, therefore, all inward perfections are - reducible to wisdom, it appears that all sorts of virtue and learning are included - in it.
-Again, boys may be instructed, by reading the poets as they ought, to draw
- something that is useful and profitable even from those passages that are most
- suspected as wicked and absurd; as the bee is taught by Nature to gather the
- sweetest and most pleasant honey from the harshest flowers and sharpest thorns. It
- does indeed at the first blush cast a shrewd suspicion on Agamemnon of taking a
- bribe, when Homer tells us that he discharged that rich man from the wars who
- presented him with his fleet mare Aethe:—
-
-
Yet, as saith Aristotle, it was well done of him to prefer a good beast before
- such a man. For, the truth is, a dog or ass is of more value than a timorous and
- cowardly man that wallows in wealth and luxury. Again, Thetis seems to do
- indecently, when she exhorts her son to follow his pleasures and minds him of
- companying with women. But even here, on the other side, the continency of
- Achilles is worthy to be considered; who, though he dearly loved Briseis—newly
- returned to him too,—yet, when he knew his life to be near its end, does not
- hasten to the fruition of pleasures, nor, when he mourns for his friend Patroclus,
- does he (as most men are wont) shut himself up from all business and neglect his
- duty, but only bars himself from recreations for his sorrow's sake, while yet he
- gives himself up to action and military employments. And Archilochus is not
- praiseworthy either, who, in the midst of his mourning for his sister's husband
- drowned in the sea, contrives to dispel his grief by drinking and merriment. And
- yet he gives this plausible reason to justify that practice of his,
-
-
For, if he judged himself to do nothing amiss when he followed sports and
- banquets, sure, we shall not do worse, if in whatever circumstances we follow the
- study of philosophy, or manage public affairs, or go to the market or to the
- Academy, or follow our husbandry. Wherefore those corrections also are not to be
- rejected which Cleanthes and Antisthenes have made use of. For Antisthenes, seeing
- the Athenians all in a tumult in the theatre, and justly, upon the pronunciation
- of this verse,— Except what men think base, there's nothing ill,
-
presently subjoined this corrective, What's base is
- base,—believe men what they will.
-
And Cleanthes, hearing this passage concerning wealth:
-
-
presently altered it thus:
-
-
And Zeno corrected that of Sophocles,
-
-
after this manner:
-
-
meaning by a free man one that is undaunted and magnanimous, and one of a spirit
- too great to stoop beneath itself. And why may not we also, by some such
- acclamations as those, call off young men to the better side, by using some things
- spoken by poets after the same manner? For example, it is said,
-
-
To which we may reply thus:
-
-
For it is an unhappy thing and not to be wished, for a man to obtain and be master
- of what he desires if it be inexpedient. Again this saying,
-
-
we may thus invert:
-
-
Again it is said,
-
-
Yea, rather, say we, it is a brutish and irrational and wretched fault of ours,
- that when we understand better things, we are carried away to the pursuit of those
- which are worse, through our intemperance and effeminacy. Again, one says, 'Tis not the teacher's speech but practice moves.
-
Yea, rather, say we, both the speech and practice,—or the practice by the means of
- speech,—as the horse is managed with the bridle, and the ship with the helm. For
- virtue hath no instrument so suitable and agreeable to human nature to work on men
- withal, as that of rational discourse. Again, we meet with this character of some
- person: A. Is he more prone to male or female loves ? B.
- He's flexible both ways, where beauty moves.
-
But it had been better said thus: He's flexible to both,
- where virtue moves.
-
For it is no commendation of a man's dexterity to be tossed up and down as
- pleasure and beauty move him, but an argument rather of a weak and unstable
- disposition. Once more, this speech,
-
-
is by no means to be allowed; but rather the contrary,
-
-
and gives not occasion of fear to any but weak and foolish persons and such as are - ungrateful to the Deity, who are apt to look on that divine power and principle - which is the cause of all good with suspicion and jealousy, as being hurtful unto - them. And so much for that which I call correction of poets' sayings.
-There is yet another way of improving poems, taught us well by Chrysippus; which
- is, by accommodation of any saying, to transfer that which is useful and
- serviceable in it to divers things of the same kind. For whereas Hesiod saith,
-
-
-
the same may be applied to a man's dog or ass or any other beast of his which is
- liable to the like mischance. Again, Euripides saith,
-
-
the like whereof may be said of hard labor or painful sickness. For as physicians,
- finding by experience the force of any medicine in the cure of some one disease,
- make use of it by accommodation, proportionably to every other disease of affinity
- thereto, so are we to deal with such speeches as are of a common import and apt to
- communicate their value to other things; we must not confine them to that one
- thing only to which they were at first adapted, but transfer them to all other of
- like nature, and accustom young men by many parallel instances to see the
- communicableness of them, and exercise the promptness of their wits in such
- applications. So that when Meander says, Happy is he who
- wealth and wisdom hath,
-
they may be able to judge that the same is fitly applicable to glory and authority
- and eloquence also. And the reproof
-
-
may be as well given to the prodigal, to him that undertakes any dishonest way of
- living, yea, to the slothful and unlearned person, thus:
-
-
or dost thou spend thy time in dicing, or quail-striking,
-
-
they may be able to infer, therefore, as little regard is to be had to glory and
- bodily beauty and princely robes and priestly garlands, all which also we see to
- be the enjoyments of very bad men. Again, when they read this passage,
-
-
they may in truth apply the same to intemperance, to superstition, to envy, and
- all other diseases of men's minds. Again, whereas it is handsomely said of Homer,
- Unhappy Paris, fairest to behold !
-
and Hector, of noble form,
-
for herein he shows that a man who hath no greater excellency than that of beauty
- to commend him deserves to O thou richest of men,
and O thou
- that excellest in feasting, in multitudes of attendants, in herds of cattle,
- yea, and in eloquent speaking itself,
to be (as they are indeed)
- expressions that import reproach and infamy. For, in truth, a man that designs to
- excel ought to endeavor it in those things that are in themselves most excellent,
- and to become chief in the chiefest, and great in the greatest things. Whereas
- glory that ariseth from things in themselves small and inconsiderable is
- inglorious and contemptible. To mind us whereof we shall never be at a loss for
- instances, if, in reading Homer especially, we observe how he applieth the
- expressions that import praise or disgrace; wherein we have clear proof that he
- makes small account of the good things either of the body or Fortune. And first of
- all, in meetings and salutations, men do not call others fair or rich or strong,
- but use such terms of commendation as these:
-
-
And moreover, when they speak disgracefully of any person, they touch not at
- bodily defects, but direct all their reproaches to vicious actions; as for
- instance:
-
-
-
-
-
Lastly, when Ulysses reproacheth Thersites, he objecteth not to him his lameness
- nor his baldness nor his hunched back, but the vicious quality of indiscreet
- babbling. On the other side, when Juno means to express a dalliance or motherly
- fondness to her son Vulcan, she courts him with an epithet taken from his halting,
- thus, Rouse thee, my limping son!
-
In this instance, Homer does (as it were) deride those who are ashamed of their
- lameness or blindness, as not thinking any thing a disgrace that is not in itself
- disgraceful, nor any person liable to a reproach for that which is not imputable
- to himself but to Fortune. These two great advantages may be made by those who
- frequently study poets;—the learning moderation, to keep them from unseasonable
- and foolish reproaching others with their misfortunes, when they themselves enjoy
- a constant current of prosperity; and magnanimity, that under variety of accidents
- they be not dejected nor disturbed, but meekly bear the being scoffed at,
- reproached, and drolled upon. Especially, let them have that saying of Philemon
- ready at hand in such cases:
-
-
And yet, if one that so rails do himself deserve reprehension, thou mayst take
- occasion to retort upon him his own vices and inordinate passions; as when
- 'Adrastus in the tragedy is assaulted thus by Alcmaeon, Thy sister's one that did her husband kill,
-
he returns him this answer, But thou thyself thy mother's
- blood did spill.
-
For as they who scourge a man's garments do not touch the body, so those that turn - other men's evil fortunes or mean births to matter of reproach do only with vanity - and folly enough lash their external circumstances, but touch not their internal - part, the soul, nor those things which truly need correction and reproof.
-Moreover, as we have above taught you to abate and lessen the credit of evil and
- hurtful poems by setting in opposition to them the famous speeches and sentences
- of such worthy men as have managed public affairs, so will it be useful to us,
- where we find any things in them of civil and profitable import, to improve and
- strengthen them by testimonies and proofs taken from philosophers, withal giving
- these the credit of being the first inventors of them. For this is both just and
- profitable to be done, seeing by this means such sayings receive an additional
- strength and esteem, when it appears that what is spoken on the stage or sung to
- the harp or occurs in a scholar's lesson is agreeable to the doctrines of
- Pythagoras and Plato, and that the sentences of Chilo and Bias tend to the same
- issue with those that are found in the authors which children read. Therefore must
- we industriously show them that these poetical sentences,
-
-
differ not in substance but bear plainly the same sense with that philosophical
- sentence, Know thyself. And these,
-
-
are of near kin to what we find in the determination of Plato, in his books
- entitled Gorgias and Concerning the Commonwealth, to wit, that it is worse to do
- than to suffer injury, and that a man more endamageth himself when he hurts
- another, than he would be damnified if he were the sufferer. And that of
- Aeschylus,
-
-
we must inform them, is but the same famous sentence which is so much admired in
- Epicurus, that great griefs are but short, and those that are of long continuance
- are but small. The former clause whereof is that which Aeschylus here saith
- expressly, and the latter but the consequent of that. For if a great and intense
- sorrow do not last, then that which doth last is not great nor hard to be borne.
- And those words of Thespis,
-
-
wherein differ they from what Plato says, that the divine nature is seated far
- from both joy and grief? And that saying of Bacchylides,
-
-
and those of Euripides much of the same import,
-
-
do they not evidently confirm to us what the philosophers say of riches and other - external good things, that without virtue they are fruitless and unprofitable - enjoyments?
-Now thus to accommodate and reconcile poetry to the doctrines of philosophy strips
- it of its fabulous and personated parts, and makes those things which it delivers
- usefully to acquire also the reputation of gravity; and over and above, it
- inclines the soul of a young man to receive the impressions of philosophical
- precepts. For he will hereby be enabled to come to them not altogether destitute
- of some sort of relish of them, not as to things that he has heard nothing of
- before, nor with an head confusedly full of the false notions which he hath sucked
- in from the daily tattle of his mother and nurse,—yea, sometimes too of his father
- and pedant,—who have been wont to speak of rich men as the happy men and mention
- them always with honor, and to express themselves concerning death and pain with
- horror, and to look on virtue without riches and glory as a thing of nought and
- not to be desired. Whence it comes to pass, that when such youths first do hear
- things of a quite contrary nature from philosophers, they are surprised with a
- kind of amazement, trouble, and stupid astonishment, which makes them afraid to
- entertain or endure them, except they be dealt with as those who come out of very
- great darkness into the light of the bright sun, that is, be first accustomed for
- a while to behold those doctrines in fabulous authors, as in a kind of false
- light, which hath but a moderate brightness and is easy to be looked on and borne
- without disturbance to the weak sight. For having before heard or read from poets
- such things as these are,—
-
-
-
-
-
they are the less disturbed and offended when they hear from philosophers that no - man ought to be much concerned about death; that the riches of nature are defined - and limited; that the happiness of man's life doth not consist in the abundance of - wealth or vastness of employments or height of authority and power, but in freedom - from sorrow, in moderation of passions, and in such a temper of mind as measures - all things by the use of Nature.
-Wherefore, upon all these accounts, as well as for all the reasons before - mentioned, youth stands in need of good government to manage it in the reading of - poetry, that being free from all prejudicate opinions, and rather instructed - beforehand in conformity thereunto, it may with more calmness, friendliness, and - familiarity pass from thence to the study of philosophy.
-It may be allowed to be a question fit for the determination of those concerning whom Cato said, Their palates are more sensitive than their hearts, whether that saying of Philoxenus the poet be true or no, The most savory flesh is that which is no flesh, and fish that is no fish. Yet this to me, Marcus Sedatus, is out of question, that those precepts of philosophy which seem not to be delivered with a designed gravity, such as becomes philosophers, take most with persons that are very young, and meet with a more ready acceptance and compliance from them. Whence it is that they do not only read through Esop’s fables and the fictions of poets and the Abaris of Heraclides and Ariston’s Lyco; but they also read such doctrines as relate to the souls of men, if something fabulous be mixed with them, with an excess of pleasure that borders on enthusiasm. Wherefore we are not only to govern their appetites in the delights of eating and drinking, but also (and much more) to inure them to a like temperance in reading and hearing, that, while they make use of pleasure as a sauce, they may pursue that which is wholesome and profitable in those things which they read. For neither can a city be secure if but one gate be left open to receive the enemy, though all the rest be shut; nor a young man safe, though he be sufficiently fortified against the assaults of all other pleasures, whilst he is without any guard against those of the ear. Yea, the nearer the commerce is betwixt
+
They say of the fish called polypus that
because, though it be very luscious to eat, yet it is thought to disturb the fancy with frightful and confused dreams. And the like observation may be made concerning poetry, that it affords sweet and withal wholesome nourishment to the minds of young men, but yet it contains likewise no less matter of disturbance and emotion to them that want a right conduct in the study thereof. For of it also, as well as of Egypt, may it be said that (to those who will use it)
for therein
+
It deserves therefore our consideration, whether we shall put young men into Epicurus’s boat,—wherein, having their ears stopped with wax, as those of the men of Ithaca were, they shall be obliged to sail by and not so much as touch at poetry,—or rather keep a guard on them, so as to oblige their judgments by principles of right reason to use it aright, and preserve them from being seduced to their hurt by that which affords them so much delight. For neither did Lycurgus, the valiant son of Dryas (as Homer
For as, where the mandrake grows near the vine and so communicates something of its force thereto, the wine that is made of its grapes makes the sleep of those that drink it more refreshing; so doth the tempering poetry with the principles of philosophy and allaying their roughness with its fictions render the study of them more easy and the relish of them more grateful to young learners. Wherefore those that would give their minds to philosophical studies are not obliged to avoid poetry altogether, but rather to prepare themselves for philosophy by poems, accustoming themselves to search for and embrace that which may profit in that which pleaseth them, and rejecting and discarding that wherein they find nothing of this nature. For this discrimination is the first step to learning; and when this is attained, then, according to what Sophocles saith,—
Let us therefore in the first place possess those whom we initiate in the study of poetry with this notion (as one which they ought always to have at hand), that
which they do sometimes with and sometimes against their wills. They do it with their wills, because they find strict truth too rigid to comply with that sweetness and gracefulness of expression, which most are taken with, so readily as fiction doth. For real truth, though it disgust never so much, must be told as it is, without alteration; but that which is feigned in a discourse can easily yield and shift its garb from the distasteful to that which is more pleasing. And indeed, neither the measures nor the tropes nor the grandeur of words nor the aptness of metaphors
+
+
Yea, he will repress his tears for Achilles and Agamemnon, while they are represented as mourning after their death, and stretching forth their limber and feeble hands to express their desire to live again. And if at any time the charms of poetry transport him into any disquieting passions, he will quickly say to himself, as Homer very elegantly (considering the propension of women to listen after fables) says in his Necyia, or relation of the state of the dead,—
Such things as I have touched upon are those which the poets willingly feign. But more there are which they do not feign, but believing them themselves as their own proper judgments, they put fictitious colors upon them to ingratiate them to us. As when Homer says of Jupiter,—
To this fable Aeschylus hath accommodated a whole tragedy
+
and this other also,—
these passages, I say, express the judgment and belief of poets who thereby discover and suggest to us the ignorant or mistaken apprehensions they had of the Deities. Moreover, almost every one knows nowadays, that the portentous fancies and contrivances of stories concerning the state of the dead are accommodated to popular apprehensions, —that the spectres and phantasms of burning rivers and horrid regions and terrible tortures expressed by frightful names are all mixed with fable and fiction, as poison with food; and that neither Homer nor Pindar nor Sophocles ever believed themselves when they wrote at this rate:—
and,
and,
And yet, as many of them as deplore death as a lamentable thing, or the want of burial after death as a calamitous condition, are wont to break out into expressions of this nature:—
and again,
These, I say, are the speeches of men persuaded of these things, as being possessed by erroneous opinions; and therefore they touch us the more nearly and torment us inwardly, because we ourselves are full of the same impotent passion from which they were uttered. To fortify us therefore against expressions of this nature, let this principle continually ring in our ears, that poetry is not at all solicitous to keep to the strict measure of truth. And indeed, as to what that truth in these matters is, even those men themselves who make it their only study to learn and search it out confess that they can hardly discover any certain footsteps to guide them in that enquiry. Let us therefore have these verses of Empedocles, in this case, at hand:—
as also those of Xenophanes:—
and lastly, that passage concerning Socrates, in Plato, where he by the solemnity of an oath disclaims all knowledge of those things. For those who perceive that the searching into such matters makes the heads of philosophers themselves giddy cannot but be the less inclined to regard what poets say concerning them.
And we shall fix our young man yet the more if, when we enter him in the poets, we first describe poetry
+
These, it is true, are wicked as well as false speeches, but yet are decent enough in the mouth of an Eteocles, an Ixion, and an old griping usurer. If therefore we mind our children that the poets write not such things as praising and approving them, but do really account them base and vicious and therefore accommodate such speeches to
+
In such passages therefore we are carefully to observe whether or not the poet himself do anywhere give any intimation that he dislikes the things he makes such persons say; which, in the prologue to his Thais Menander does, in these words:—
But Homer of all the poets does it best. For he doth beforehand, as it were, bespeak dislike of the evil things and approbation of the good things he utters. Of the latter take these instances:—
And for the former, he so performs it as in a manner solemnly to forbid us to use or heed such speeches as those he mentions, as being foolish and wicked. For example, being to tell us how uncivilly Agamemnon treated the priest, he premises these words of his own,—
+
intimating the insolency and unbecomingness of his answer. And when he attributes this passionate speech to Achilles,—
he accompanies it with this censure,—
for it was unlikely that speaking in such anger he should observe any rules of decency.
And he passeth like censures on actions. As on Achilles’s foul usage of Hector’s carcass,—
And in like manner he doth very decently shut up relations of things said or done, by adding some sentence wherein he declares his judgment of them. As when he personates some of the Gods saying, on the occasion of the adultery of Mars and Venus discovered by Vulcan’s artifice,—
And thus concerning Hecter’s insolent boasting he says,—
And when he speaks of Pandarus’s shooting, he adds,—
Now these verbal intimations of the minds and judgments of poets are not difficult to be understood by any one that will heedfully observe them. But besides these, they give
+
And therefore also he brings in Ulysses directing the musician thus,—
evidently teaching us that poets and musicians ought to receive the arguments of their songs from sober and understanding
+
For the fiction and representation of evil acts, when it withal acquaints us with the shame and damage befalling the doers, hurts not but rather profits him that reads them. For which end philosophers make use of examples for our instruction and correction out of historical collections; and poets do the very same thing, but with this difference, that they invent fabulous examples themselves. There was one Melanthius, who (whether in jest or earnest he said it, it matters not much) affirmed that the city of Athens owed its preservation to the dissensions and factions that were among the orators, giving withal this reason for his assertion, that thereby they were kept from inclining all of them to one side, so that by means of the differences among those statesmen there were always some that drew the saw the right way for the defeating of destructive counsels. And thus it is too in the contradictions among poets, which, by lessening the credit of what they say, render them the less powerful to do mischief; and therefore, when comparing one saying with another we discover their contrariety, we ought to adhere to the better side. As in these instances:—
Such contrarieties as these are easily solved, if (as I said) we teach youth to judge aright and to give the better saying preference. But if we chance to meet with any absurd passages without any others at their heels to confute them, we are then to overthrow them with such others as elsewhere are to be found in the author. Nor must we be offended with the poet or grieved at him, but only at the speeches themselves, which he utters either according to the vulgar manner of speaking or, it may be, but in drollery. So, when thou readest in Homer of Gods thrown out of heaven headlong one by another, or Gods wounded by men and quarrelling and brawling with each other, thou mayest readily, if thou wilt, say to him,—
yea, and thou dost so elsewhere, and according as thou thinkest, to wit, in these passages of thine:—
For these argue sound and true opinions of the Gods; but those other were only feigned to raise passions in men. Again, when Euripides speaks at this rate,—
we may do well to quote him elsewhere against himself, where he says better,—
tell him: But, Pindar, thou thyself sayest elsewhere,
And when Sophocles speaks thus,
tell him: But we have heard thee say far otherwise,
And as to what he saith of riches, to wit:
here the reader may set in opposition divers other sayings of the same author. For example,
And Menander also somewhere magnifies a voluptuous life, and inflames the minds of vain persons with these amorous strains,
But yet elsewhere, on the other side, he fastens on us and pulls us back to the love of virtue, and checks the rage of lust, when he says thus,
But now, supposing that any of the poets themselves afford no such correcting passages to solve what they have said amiss, it will then be advisable to confront them with the contrary sayings of other famous men, and therewith to sway the scales of our judgment to the better side. As, when Alexis tempts to debauchery in these verses,
we must remember that Socrates said the contrary, to wit: Bad men live that they may eat and drink, whereas good men eat and drink that they may live. And against the man that wrote in this manner,
seeing he herein advises us to follow other vicious examples, that of Diogenes may well be returned, who being asked by what means a man might revenge himself upon his enemy, answered, By becoming himself a good and honest man. And the same Diogenes may be quoted also against Sophocles, who, writing thus of the sacred mysteries, caused great grief and despair to multitudes of men:
This passage being read to Diogenes, What then! says he, shall the condition of Pataecion, the notorious robber, after death be better than that of Epaminondas, merely for
+
How comes it to pass then, said he, Theognis, that thou thyself being so poor pratest and gratest our ears in this manner?
Nor are we to omit in our reading those hints which, from some other words or phrases bordering on those that offend us, may help to rectify our apprehensions. But as physicians use cantharides, believing that, though their bodies be deadly poison, yet their feet and wings are medicinal and can even kill the poison of the flies themselves, so must we deal with poems. If any noun or verb near at hand may assist to the correction of any such saying, and preserve us from putting a bad construction upon it, we should take hold of it and employ it to assist a more favorable interpretation. As some do in reference to those verses of Homer,—
For, they say, he says not of men simply, or of all men, that the Gods weave for them the fatal web of a sorrowful life; but he affirms it only of foolish and imprudent men, whom, because their vices make them such, he therefore calls wretched and miserable.
Another way whereby those passages which are suspicious in poets may be transferred to a better sense may
+evil death; for the Macedonians use the word
But of all things it is most necessary, and no less profitable if we design to receive profit and not hurt from the poets, that we understand how they make use of the names of Gods, as also of the terms of Evil and Good; and what they mean by Fortune and Fate; and whether these words be always taken by them in one and the same sense or rather in various senses, as also many other words are. For so the word material house, as, Into the high-roofed house; and sometimes
and elsewhere for boasting and rejoicing, as in
In like manner
or
It is elegant also when they a᾽dapt to the present matter, as grammarians teach, the use of words which are commonly of another signification. As here:—
+
For here
And the like distinction of words we ought to observe also in things more weighty and serious. To begin with the Gods, we should teach our youth that poets, when they use the names of Gods, sometimes mean properly the Divine Beings so called, but otherwhiles understand by those names certain powers of which the Gods are the donors and authors, they having first led us into the use of them by their own practice. As when Archilochus prays,
it is plain that he means the God himself whom he invokes. But when elsewhere he bewails the drowning of his sister’s husband, who had not obtained lawful burial, and says,
he gives the name of Vulcan to the fire and not to the Deity. Again, Euripides, when he says,
means the Gods themselves who bare those names. But when Sophocles saith,
Wherefore, in conformity to the instances given, we must conceive and bear in mind that by the names of Jupiter also sometimes they mean the God himself, sometimes Fortune, and oftentimes also Fate. For when they say,—
they understand Jupiter himself. But when they ascribe the event of all things done to Jupiter as the cause, saying of him,—
they mean by Jove no more but Fate. For the poet doth not conceive that God contrives mischief against mankind, but he soundly declares the mere necessity of the things themselves, to wit, that prosperity and victory are destined by Fate to cities and armies and commanders who govern themselves with sobriety, but if they give way to passions and commit errors, thereby dividing and crumbling themselves into factions, as those of whom the poet speaks did, they do unhandsome actions, and thereby create great disturbances, such as are attended with sad consequences.
But when Hesiod brings in Prometheus thus counselling his brother Epimetheus,
+
he useth the name of Jove to express Fortune; for he calls the good things which come by her (such as riches, and marriages, and empires, and indeed all external things the enjoyment whereof is unprofitable to them who know not how to use them well) the gifts of Jove. And therefore he adviseth Epimetheus (an ill man, and a fool withal) to stand in fear of and to guard himself from prosperity, as that which would be hurtful and destructive to him.
Again, where he saith,
he calls that which befalls men by Fortune God’s gift, and intimates that it is an unworthy thing to reproach any man for that poverty which he falls into by Fortune, whereas poverty is then only a matter of disgrace and reproach when it is attendant on sloth and idleness, or wantonness and prodigality. For, before the name of Fortune was used, they knew there was a powerful cause, which moved irregularly and unlimitedly and with such a force that no human reason could avoid it; and this cause they called by the names of Gods. So we are wont to call divers things and qualities and discourses, and even men themselves, divine. And thus may we rectify many such sayings concerning Jupiter as would otherwise seem very absurd. As these, for instance:—
And other words there are which the poets remove and translate from their proper sense by accommodation to various things, which deserve also our serious notice. Such a one, for instance, is virtue. For because virtue does not only render men prudent, just, and good, both in their words and deeds, but also oftentimes purchaseth to them honor and power, therefore they call likewise these by that name. So we are wont to call both the olive-tree and the fruit
let him presently conceive that these things are spoken of that most excellent and divine habit in us which we understand to be no other than right reason, or the highest attainment of the reasonable nature, and most agreeable
+
and this,
let him not sit down in an astonishing admiration of rich men, as if they were enabled by their wealth to purchase virtue, nor let him imagine that it is in the power of Fortune to increase or lessen his own wisdom; but let him conceive that the poet by virtue meant either glory or power or prosperity or something of like import. For poets use the same ambiguity also in the word
and sometimes some evil accident or misfortune, as when Homer says,
So also in the word
and Menander in this,—
except, as I said, we allow him the use of these words in a metaphorical and abusive sense. But enough hath been spoken of these matters.
Nevertheless, this principle is not once only but often to be inculcated and pressed on young men, that poetry, when it undertakes a fictitious argument by way of imitation, though it make use of such ornament and illustration as suit the actions and manners treated of, yet disclaims not all likelihood of truth, seeing the force of imitation, in order to the persuading of men, lies in probability. Wherefore such imitation as does not altogether shake hands with truth carries along with it certain signs of virtue and vice mixed together in the actions which it doth represent. And of this nature is Homer’s poetry, which totally bids adieu to Stoicism, the principles whereof will not admit any vice to come near where virtue is, nor virtue to have any thing to do where any vice lodgeth, but affirms that he that is not a wise man can do nothing well, and he that is so can do nothing amiss. Thus they determine in the schools. But in human actions and the affairs of common life the judgment of Euripides is verified, that
Next, it is to be observed that poetry, waiving the truth of things, does most labor to beautify its fictions with variety and multiplicity of contrivance. For variety bestows upon fable all that is pathetical, unusual, and surprising, and thereby makes it more taking and graceful; whereas what is void of variety is unsuitable to the nature of fable, and so raiseth no
+
These things therefore so standing, we should, when we enter a young man into the study of the poets, endeavor to free his mind from that degree of esteem of the good and great personages in them described as may incline him to think them to be mirrors of wisdom and justice, the chief of princes, and the exemplary measures of all virtue and goodness. For he will receive much prejudice, if he shall approve and admire all that comes from such persons as great, if he dislike nothing in them himself, nor will endure to hear others blame them, though for such words and actions as the following passages import:—
Our young man is to be taught not to commend such things as these, no, nor to show the nimbleness of his wit or subtlety in maintaining an argument by finding out plausible colors and pretences to varnish over a bad matter. But
+
in which speech he declares his low opinion or rather his contempt of his chief commander. And then, being farther provoked, he drew his weapon with a design to kill him, which attempt was neither good nor expedient. And therefore by and by he repented his rashness,—
wherein again he did rightly and worthily, in that, though he could not altogether quell his passion, yet he restrained and reduced it under the command of reason, before it brake forth into such an irreparable act of mischief. Again, even Agamemnon himself talks in that assembly ridiculously, but carries himself more gravely and more like a prince in the matter of Chryseis. For whereas Achilles, when his Briseis was taken away from him,
Agamemnon himself hands into the ship, delivers to her friends, and so sends from him, the woman concerning whom a little before he declared that he loved her better than his wife; and in that action did nothing unbecoming or savoring of fond affection. Also Phoenix, when his father bitterly cursed him for having to do with one that was his own harlot, says,
Now in these instances the difference is manifest. But where a like clear judgment cannot be passed, there we are to settle the young man’s mind thus, by way of distinction. If Nausicaa, having cast her eyes upon Ulysses, a stranger, and feeling the same passion for him as Calypso had before, did (as one that was ripe for a husband) out of wantonness talk with her maidens at this foolish rate,—
she is blameworthy for her impudence and incontinence. But if, perceiving the man’s breeding by his discourse, and admiring the prudence of his addresses, she rather wisheth to have such a one for a husband than a merchant or a dancing gallant of her fellow-citizens, she is to be commended. And when Ulysses is represented as rejoicing at Penelope’s jocular conversation with her wooers, and at their presenting her with rich garments and other ornaments,
if that joy were occasioned by greediness and covetous
+
But if through foresight he thought thereby to get them the more within his power, as being lulled asleep in security for the future by the hopes she gave them at present, this rejoicing, joined with confidence in his wife, was rational. Again, when he is brought in numbering the goods which the Phaeacians had set on shore together with himself and departed; if indeed, being himself left in such a solitude, so ignorant where he was, and having no security there for his own person, he is yet solicitous for his goods, lest
the covetousness of the man deserved in truth to be pitied, or rather abhorred. But if, as some say in his defence, being doubtful whether or no the place where he was landed were Ithaca, he made use of the just tale of his goods to infer thence the honesty of the Phaeacians,—because it was not likely they would expose him in a strange place and leave him there with his goods by him untouched, so as to get nothing by their dishonesty,—then he makes use of a very fit test for this purpose, and deserves commendation for his wisdom in that action. Some also there are who find fault with that passage of the putting him on shore when he was asleep, if it really so happened, and they tell us that the people of Tuscany have still a traditional story among them concerning Ulysses, that he was naturally sleepy, and therefore a man whom many men could not freely converse with. But if his sleep was but feigned, and he made use of this pretence only of a natural
+
Now, by showing young men these things, we shall preserve them from being carried away to any corruption in their manners. and dispose them to the election and imitation of those that are good, as being before instructed readily to disapprove those and commend these. But this ought with the most care to be done in the reading of tragedies wherein probable and subtle speeches are made use of in the most foul and wicked actions. For that is not always true which Sophocles saith, that From naughty acts good words can ne’er proceed.
For even he himself is wont to apply pleasant reasonings and plausible arguments to those manners and actions which are wicked or unbecoming. And in another of his fellow-tragedians, we may see even Phaedra herself represented as justifying her unlawful affection for Hippolytus by accusing Theseus of ill-carriage towards her. And in his Troades, he allows Helen the same liberty of speech against Hecuba, whom she judgeth to be more worthy of punishment than herself for her adultery, because she was the mother of Paris that tempted her thereto. A young man therefore must not be accustomed to think any thing of that nature handsomely or wittily spoken, nor to be pleased with such colorable inventions; but rather more to abhor such words as tend to the defence of wanton acts than the very acts themselves.
And lastly, it will be useful likewise to enquire into the cause why each thing is said. For so Cato, when he was a boy, though he was wont to be very observant of all his master’s commands, yet withal used to ask the cause
+
But to those of greater moment they give credence without examination, as to those that follow:
And yet such speeches relate to manners, and disquiet men’s lives by begetting in them evil opinions and unworthy sentiments, except they have learned to return answer to each of them thus: Wherefore is it necessary that a man who is crushed by adverse fate should have a dejected spirit? Yea, why rather should he not struggle against Fortune, and raise himself above the pressures of his low circumstances? Why, if I myself be a good and wise son of an evil and foolish father, does it not rather become me to bear myself confidently upon the account of my own virtue, than to be dejected and dispirited because of my father’s defects?
For he that can encounter such speeches and oppose them after this manner, not yielding himself up to be overset with the blast of every saying, but approving that speech of Heraclitus, that
+
will reject many such things as falsely and idly spoken.
These things therefore may be of use to preserve us from the hurt we might get by the study of poems. Now, as on a vine the fruit oftentimes lies shadowed and hidden under its large leaves and luxuriant branches, so in the poet’s phrases and fictions that encompass them there are also many profitable and useful things concealed from the view of young men. This, however, ought not to be suffered; nor should we be led away from things themselves thus, but rather adhere to such of them as tend to the promoting of virtue and the well forming of our manners. It will not be altogether useless therefore, to treat briefly in the next place of passages of that nature. Wherein I intend to touch only at some particulars, leaving all longer discourses, and the brimming up and furnishing them with a multitude of instances, to those who write more for show and ostentation.
+First, therefore, let our young man be taught to understand good and bad manners and persons, and from thence apply his mind to the words and deeds which the poet decently assigns to either of them. For example, Achilles, though in some wrath, speaks to Agamemnon thus decently:
whereas Thersites to the same person speaks reproachfully in this manner:—
but Thersites thus:— Whom I or some Greek else as captive bring.
Again, Diomedes, when Agamemnon taking a view of the army spoke reproachfully to him,
whereas Sthenelus, a man of small note, replies on him thus:—
Now the observation of such difference will teach the young man the decency of a modest and moderate temper, and the unbecoming nauseousness of the contrary vices of boasting and cracking of a man’s own worth. And it is worth while also to take notice of the demeanor of Agamemnon in the same passage. For he passeth by Sthenelus unspoken to; but perceiving Ulysses to be offended, he neglects not him, but applies himself to answer him:— Struck with his generous wrath, the king replies.
For to have apologized to every one had been too servile and misbecoming the dignity of his person; whereas equally to have neglected every one had been an act of insolence and imprudence. And very handsome it is that Diomedes, though in the heat of the battle he answers the king only with silence, yet after the battle was over useth more liberty towards him, speaking thus:— You called me coward, sir, before the Greeks.
It is expedient also to take notice of the different carriage of a wise man and of a soothsayer popularly courting the multitude. For Chalcas very unseasonably makes no scruple
+
which done, accordingly after supper he sends his ambassadors. Now this speech of Nestor tended to the rectifying of what he had before done amiss; but that of Chalcas, only to accuse and disparage him.
There is likewise consideration to be had of the different manners of nations, such as these. The Trojans enter into battle with loud outcries and great fierceness; but in the army of the Greeks,
For when soldiers are about to engage an enemy, the awe they stand in of their officers is an argument both of courage and obedience. For which purpose Plato teacheth us that we ought to inure ourselves to fear blame and disgrace more than labor and danger. And Cato was wont to say that he liked men that were apt to blush better than those that looked pale.
Moreover, there is a particular character to be noted of the men who undertake for any action. For Dolon thus promiseth:—
But Diomedes promiseth nothing, but only tells them he shall fear the less if they send a companion with him; whereby is intimated, that discreet foresight is Grecian and
+
It is a matter too of no unprofitable consideration, how the minds of the Trojans and of Hector too were affected when he and Ajax were about to engage in a single combat. For Aeschylus, when, upon one of the fighters at fisticuffs in the Isthmian games receiving a blow on the face, there was made a great outcry among the people, said: What a thing is practice! See how the lookers-on only cry out, but the man that received the stroke is silent.
But when the poet tells us, that the Greeks rejoiced when they saw Ajax in his glistering armor, but
who is there that wonders not at this difference,—when the heart of him that was to run the risk of the combat only beats inwardly, as if he were to undertake a mere wrestling or running match, but the very bodies of the spectators tremble and shake, out of the kindness and fear which they had for their king?
In the same poet also we may observe the difference betwixt the humor of a coward and a valiant man. For Thersites
but Ajax is always represented as friendly to Achilles; and particularly he speaks thus to Hector concerning him:—
wherein he insinuates the high commendation of that valiant man. And in what follows, he speaks like handsome things of his fellow-soldiers in general, thus:—
+
wherein he doth not boast himself to be the only or the best champion, but one of those, among many others, who were fit to undertake that combat.
What hath been said is sufficient upon the point of dissimilitudes; except we think fit to add this, that many of the Trojans came into the enemy’s power alive, but none of the Grecians; and that many of the Trojans supplicated to their enemies,—as (for instance) Adrastus, the sons of Antimachus, Lycaon,—and even Hector himself entreats Achilles for a sepulture; but not one of these doth so, as judging it barbarous to supplicate to a foe in the field, and more Greek-like either to conquer or die.
But as, in the same plant, the bee feeds on the flower, the goat on the bud, the hog on the root, and other living creatures on the seed and the fruit; so in reading of poems, one man singleth out the historical part, another dwells upon the elegancy and fit disposal of words, as Aristophanes says of Euripides,—
but others, to whom this part of my discourse is directed, mind only such things as are useful to the bettering of manners. And such we are to put in mind that it is an absurd thing, that those who delight in fables should not let any thing slip them of the vain and extravagant stories they find in poets, and that those who affect language should pass by nothing that is elegantly and floridly expressed; and that only the lovers of honor and virtue, who apply themselves to the study of poems not for delight but for instruction’s sake, should slightly and negligently observe what is spoken in them relating to valor, temperance, or justice. Of this nature is the following:—
+
For to see a man of the greatest wisdom in danger of being totally cut off with all those that take part with him, and yet affected less with fear of death than of shame and dishonor, must needs excite in a young man a passionate affection for virtue. And this,
teacheth us to infer that the Deity delights not in a rich or a proper or a strong man, but in one that is furnished with wisdom and justice. Again, when the same Goddess (Minerva) saith that the reason why she did not desert or neglect Ulysses was that he was Gentle, of ready wit, of prudent mind,
she therein tells us that, of all things pertaining to us, nothing is dear to the Gods and divine but our virtue, seeing like naturally delights in like.
And seeing, moreover, that it both seemeth and really is a great thing to be able to moderate a man’s anger, but a greater by far to guard a man’s self beforehand by prudence, that he fall not into it nor be surprised by it, therefore also such passages as tend that way are not slightly to be represented to the readers; for example, that Achilles himself—who was a man of no great forbearance, nor inclined to such meekness—yet warns Priam to be calm and not to provoke him, thus,
For it is a piece of admirable prudence for a man so prone to anger, as being by nature hasty and furious, to understand himself so well as to set a guard upon his own inclinations, and by avoiding provocations to keep his passion at due distance by the use of reason, lest he should be unawares surprised by it. And after the same manner must the man that is apt to be drunken forearm himself against that vice; and he that is given to wantonness, against lust, as Agesilaus refused to receive a kiss from a beautiful person addressing to him, and Cyrus would not so much as endure to see Panthea. Whereas, on the contrary, those that are not virtuously bred are wont to gather fuel to inflame their passions, and voluntarily to abandon themselves to those temptations to which of themselves they are endangered. But Ulysses does not only restrain his own anger, but (perceiving by the discourse of his son Telemachus, that through indignation conceived against such evil men he was greatly provoked) he blunts his passion too beforehand, and composeth him to calmness and patience, thus:—
For as men are not wont to put bridles on their horses when they are running in full speed, but bring them bridled beforehand to the race; so do they use to preoccupy and predispose the minds of those persons with rational considerations to enable them to encounter passion, whom they
+
Furthermore, the young man is not altogether to neglect names themselves when he meets with them; though he is not obliged to give much heed to such idle descants as those of Cleanthes, who, while he professeth himself an interpreter, plays the trifler, as in these passages of Homer:
But such things as these are fitter to be left to the examination of grammarians; and we are rather to insist upon such passages as are both profitable and persuasive. Such, for instance, as these:—
For while the author tells us that fortitude may be taught, and that an obliging and graceful way of conversing with others is to be gotten by art and the use of reason, he exhorts us not to neglect the improvement of ourselves, but by observing our teachers’ instructions to learn a becoming carriage, as knowing that clownishness and cowardice argue ill-breeding and ignorance. And very suitable to what hath been said is that which is said of Jupiter and Neptune:—
+
For the poet therein pronounceth wisdom to be the most divine and royal quality of all; as placing therein the greatest excellency of Jupiter himself, and judging all virtues else to be necessarily consequent thereunto. We are also to accustom a young man attentively to hear such things as these:—
These speeches teach us that it is beneath wise men to lie or to deal otherwise than fairly, even in games, or to blame other men without just cause. And when the poet attributes Pindarus’s violation of the truce to his folly, he withal declares his judgment that a wise man will not be guilty of an unjust action. The like may we also infer concerning continence, taking our ground for it from these passages:—
in which speeches the poet assigns wisdom to be the cause of continence. And when in exhortations made to encourage soldiers to fight, he speaks in this manner:—
+
he seems to intimate that continent men are valiant men; because they fear the shame of base actions, and can trample on pleasures and stand their ground in the greatest hazards. Whence Timotheus, in the play called Persae, takes occasion handsomely to exhort the Grecians thus:—
And Aeschylus also makes it a point of wisdom not to be blown up with pride when a man is honored, nor to be moved or elevated with the acclamations of a multitude, writing thus of Amphiaraus:—
For it is the part of a wise man to value himself upon the consciousness of his own true worth and excellency.
Whereas, therefore, all inward perfections are reducible to wisdom, it appears that all sorts of virtue and learning are included in it.
Again, boys may be instructed, by reading the poets as they ought, to draw something that is useful and profitable even from those passages that are most suspected as wicked and absurd; as the bee is taught by Nature to gather the sweetest and most pleasant honey from the harshest flowers and sharpest thorns. It does indeed at the first blush cast a shrewd suspicion on Agamemnon of taking a bribe, when Homer tells us that he discharged that rich man from the wars who presented him with his fleet mare Aethe:—
+
Yet, as saith Aristotle, it was well done of him to prefer a good beast before such a man. For, the truth is, a dog or ass is of more value than a timorous and cowardly man that wallows in wealth and luxury. Again, Thetis seems to do indecently, when she exhorts her son to follow his pleasures and minds him of companying with women. But even here, on the other side, the continency of Achilles is worthy to be considered; who, though he dearly loved Briseis—newly returned to him too,—yet, when he knew his life to be near its end, does not hasten to the fruition of pleasures, nor, when he mourns for his friend Patroclus, does he (as most men are wont) shut himself up from all business and neglect his duty, but only bars himself from recreations for his sorrow’s sake, while yet he gives himself up to action and military employments. And Archilochus is not praiseworthy either, who, in the midst of his mourning for his sister’s husband drowned in the sea, contrives to dispel his grief by drinking and merriment. And yet he gives this plausible reason to justify that practice of his,
For, if he judged himself to do nothing amiss when he followed sports and banquets, sure, we shall not do worse, if in whatever circumstances we follow the study of philosophy, or manage public affairs, or go to the market or to the Academy, or follow our husbandry. Wherefore those corrections also are not to be rejected which Cleanthes and Antisthenes have made use of. For Antisthenes, seeing the Athenians all in a tumult in the theatre, and justly, upon the pronunciation of this verse,—
+Except what men think base, there’s nothing ill,
presently subjoined this corrective, What’s base is base,—believe men what they will.
And Cleanthes, hearing this passage concerning wealth:
presently altered it thus:
And Zeno corrected that of Sophocles,
after this manner:
meaning by a free man one that is undaunted and magnanimous, and one of a spirit too great to stoop beneath itself. And why may not we also, by some such acclamations as those, call off young men to the better side, by using some things spoken by poets after the same manner? For example, it is said,
To which we may reply thus:
For it is an unhappy thing and not to be wished, for a man to obtain and be master of what he desires if it be inexpedient. Again this saying,
Again it is said,
Yea, rather, say we, it is a brutish and irrational and wretched fault of ours, that when we understand better things, we are carried away to the pursuit of those which are worse, through our intemperance and effeminacy. Again, one says, ’Tis not the teacher’s speech but practice moves.
Yea, rather, say we, both the speech and practice,—or the practice by the means of speech,—as the horse is managed with the bridle, and the ship with the helm. For virtue hath no instrument so suitable and agreeable to human nature to work on men withal, as that of rational discourse. Again, we meet with this character of some person: A. Is he more prone to male or female loves ? B. He’s flexible both ways, where beauty moves.
But it had been better said thus: He’s flexible to both, where virtue moves.
For it is no commendation of a man’s dexterity to be tossed up and down as pleasure and beauty move him, but an argument rather of a weak and unstable disposition. Once more, this speech,
is by no means to be allowed; but rather the contrary,
There is yet another way of improving poems, taught us well by Chrysippus; which is, by accommodation of any saying, to transfer that which is useful and serviceable in it to divers things of the same kind. For whereas Hesiod saith,
the same may be applied to a man’s dog or ass or any other beast of his which is liable to the like mischance. Again, Euripides saith,
the like whereof may be said of hard labor or painful sickness. For as physicians, finding by experience the force of any medicine in the cure of some one disease, make use of it by accommodation, proportionably to every other disease of affinity thereto, so are we to deal with such speeches as are of a common import and apt to communicate their value to other things; we must not confine them to that one thing only to which they were at first adapted, but transfer them to all other of like nature, and accustom young men by many parallel instances to see the communicableness of them, and exercise the promptness of their wits in such applications. So that when Meander says, Happy is he who wealth and wisdom hath,
they may be able to judge that the same is fitly applicable to glory and authority and eloquence also. And the reproof
+
may be as well given to the prodigal, to him that undertakes any dishonest way of living, yea, to the slothful and unlearned person, thus:
or dost thou spend thy time in dicing, or quail-striking,
they may be able to infer, therefore, as little regard is to be had to glory and bodily beauty and princely robes and priestly garlands, all which also we see to be the enjoyments of very bad men. Again, when they read this passage,
they may in truth apply the same to intemperance, to superstition, to envy, and all other diseases of men’s minds. Again, whereas it is handsomely said of Homer, Unhappy Paris, fairest to behold !
and Hector, of noble form,
for herein he shows that a man who hath no greater excellency than that of beauty to commend him deserves to
+O thou richest of men,
and O thou that excellest in feasting, in multitudes of attendants, in herds of cattle, yea, and in eloquent speaking itself,
to be (as they are indeed) expressions that import reproach and infamy. For, in truth, a man that designs to excel ought to endeavor it in those things that are in themselves most excellent, and to become chief in the chiefest, and great in the greatest things. Whereas glory that ariseth from things in themselves small and inconsiderable is inglorious and contemptible. To mind us whereof we shall never be at a loss for instances, if, in reading Homer especially, we observe how he applieth the expressions that import praise or disgrace; wherein we have clear proof that he makes small account of the good things either of the body or Fortune. And first of all, in meetings and salutations, men do not call others fair or rich or strong, but use such terms of commendation as these:
And moreover, when they speak disgracefully of any person, they touch not at bodily defects, but direct all their reproaches to vicious actions; as for instance:
Lastly, when Ulysses reproacheth Thersites, he objecteth not to him his lameness nor his baldness nor his hunched back, but the vicious quality of indiscreet babbling. On the other side, when Juno means to express a dalliance or motherly fondness to her son Vulcan, she courts him with an epithet taken from his halting, thus, Rouse thee, my limping son!
In this instance, Homer does (as it were) deride those who are ashamed of their lameness or blindness, as not thinking any thing a disgrace that is not in itself disgraceful, nor any person liable to a reproach for that which is not imputable to himself but to Fortune. These two great advantages may be made by those who frequently study poets;—the learning moderation, to keep them from unseasonable and foolish reproaching others with their misfortunes, when they themselves enjoy a constant current of prosperity; and magnanimity, that under variety of accidents they be not dejected nor disturbed, but meekly bear the being scoffed at, reproached, and drolled upon. Especially, let them have that saying of Philemon ready at hand in such cases:
And yet, if one that so rails do himself deserve reprehension, thou mayst take occasion to retort upon him his own vices and inordinate passions; as when Adrastus in the tragedy is assaulted thus by Alcmaeon, Thy sister’s one that did her husband kill,
But thou thyself thy mother’s blood did spill.
For as they who scourge a man’s garments do not touch the body, so those that turn other men’s evil fortunes or mean births to matter of reproach do only with vanity and folly enough lash their external circumstances, but touch not their internal part, the soul, nor those things which truly need correction and reproof.
Moreover, as we have above taught you to abate and lessen the credit of evil and hurtful poems by setting in opposition to them the famous speeches and sentences of such worthy men as have managed public affairs, so will it be useful to us, where we find any things in them of civil and profitable import, to improve and strengthen them by testimonies and proofs taken from philosophers, withal giving these the credit of being the first inventors of them. For this is both just and profitable to be done, seeing by this means such sayings receive an additional strength and esteem, when it appears that what is spoken on the stage or sung to the harp or occurs in a scholar’s lesson is agreeable to the doctrines of Pythagoras and Plato, and that the sentences of Chilo and Bias tend to the same issue with those that are found in the authors which children read. Therefore must we industriously show them that these poetical sentences,
differ not in substance but bear plainly the same sense with that philosophical sentence, Know thyself. And these,
+
are of near kin to what we find in the determination of Plato, in his books entitled Gorgias and Concerning the Commonwealth, to wit, that it is worse to do than to suffer injury, and that a man more endamageth himself when he hurts another, than he would be damnified if he were the sufferer. And that of Aeschylus,
we must inform them, is but the same famous sentence which is so much admired in Epicurus, that great griefs are but short, and those that are of long continuance are but small. The former clause whereof is that which Aeschylus here saith expressly, and the latter but the consequent of that. For if a great and intense sorrow do not last, then that which doth last is not great nor hard to be borne. And those words of Thespis,
wherein differ they from what Plato says, that the divine nature is seated far from both joy and grief? And that saying of Bacchylides,
and those of Euripides much of the same import,
Now thus to accommodate and reconcile poetry to the doctrines of philosophy strips it of its fabulous and personated parts, and makes those things which it delivers usefully to acquire also the reputation of gravity; and over and above, it inclines the soul of a young man to receive the impressions of philosophical precepts. For he will hereby be enabled to come to them not altogether destitute of some sort of relish of them, not as to things that he has heard nothing of before, nor with an head confusedly full of the false notions which he hath sucked in from the daily tattle of his mother and nurse,—yea, sometimes too of his father and pedant,—who have been wont to speak of rich men as the happy men and mention them always with honor, and to express themselves concerning death and pain with horror, and to look on virtue without riches and glory as a thing of nought and not to be desired. Whence it comes to pass, that when such youths first do hear things of a quite contrary nature from philosophers, they are surprised with a kind of amazement, trouble, and stupid astonishment, which makes them afraid to entertain or endure them, except they be dealt with as those who come out of very great darkness into the light of the bright sun, that is, be first accustomed for a while to behold those doctrines in fabulous authors, as in a kind of false light, which hath but a moderate brightness and is easy to be looked on and borne without disturbance to the weak sight. For having before heard or read from poets such things as these are,—
they are the less disturbed and offended when they hear from philosophers that no man ought to be much concerned about death; that the riches of nature are defined and limited; that the happiness of man’s life doth not consist in the abundance of wealth or vastness of employments or height of authority and power, but in freedom from sorrow, in moderation of passions, and in such a temper of mind as measures all things by the use of Nature.
Wherefore, upon all these accounts, as well as for all the reasons before mentioned, youth stands in need of good government to manage it in the reading of poetry, that being free from all prejudicate opinions, and rather instructed beforehand in conformity thereunto, it may with more calmness, friendliness, and familiarity pass from thence to the study of philosophy.
-
ὅτι βρωθῆναι μέν ἐστιν ἥδιστος, δυσόνειρον δʼ
-
-
τοῖς χρωμένοις ἀναδίδωσιν.
-
οὐ γὰρ ἅπτεται τὸ ἀπατηλὸν αὐτῆς ἀβελτέρων κομιδῇ
-
-
ὑγιαίνοντα νοῦν εἶχεν, ὅτι πολλῶν μεθυσκομένων καὶ
- παροινούντων τὰς ἀμπέλους περιιὼν ἐξέκοπτεν ἀντὶ τοῦ τὰς κρήνας
- ἐγγυτέρω προσαγαγεῖν καὶ
-
-
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἰσάγειν εἰς τὰ ποιήματα δεῖ τὸν νέον μηδὲν οὕτω
- μεμελετημένον ἔχοντα καὶ
-
τί παίζουσα τὰς ὀφρῦς συνάγεις, τί δʼ ἐξαπατῶσα
-
-
παύσεται δὲ τὸν φθιτὸν Ἀχιλλέα καὶ τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα τὸν καθʼ
- Ἅιδου δακρύων, ἀδυνάτους καὶ
-
-
-
-
τραγῳδίαν ὁ Αἰσχύλος
-
καὶ τὸ
-
ταῦτα δʼ ἢδη κατὰ δόξαν εἴρηται καὶ πίστιν αὐτῶν,
-
-
καὶ
-
-
καί
-
ὅσοι μέντοι τὸν θάνατον ὡς οἰκτρὸν ἢ τὴν ἀταφίαν ·- πο
-
-
-
-
καί
-
-
-
καὶ τὰ Ξενοφάνους
-
καὶ νὴ Δία τὰ Σωκράτους ἐξομνυμένου παρὰ Πλάτωνι
ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἐπιστήσομεν αὐτὸν ἅμα τῷ προσάγειν τοῖς ποιήμασιν
- ὑπογράφοντες τὴν ποιητικὴν ὅτι μιμητικὴ τέχνη καὶ δύναμίς ἐστιν
- ἀντίστροφος τῇ ζῳγραφίᾳ. καὶ μὴ μόνον ἐκεῖνο τὸ θρυλούμενον
- ἀκηκοὼς ἔστω, ζῳγραφίαν μὲν εἶναι
-
-
-
-
καὶ
-
μοχθηροὶ μέν εἰσι λόγοι καὶ ψευδεῖς, Ἐτεοκλεῖ δὲ
-
ἐν δὲ τούτοις εὖ μάλα προσεκτέον εἴ τινας ὁ ποιητὴς αὐτὸς ἐμφάσεις
- δίδωσι κατὰ τῶν λεγομένων ὡς δυσχεραινομένων ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ. καθάπερ ὁ
-
-
-
-
καὶ
-
-
ἐν δὲ τῷ προδιαβάλλειν μονονοὺ μαρτύρεται καὶ διαγορεύει μήτε
- χρῆσθαι μήτε προσέχειν ὡς οὖσιν ἀτόποις καὶ φαύλοις. οἷον τὸν τʼ
- Ἀγαμέμνονα μέλλων διηγεῖσθαι τῷ ἱερεῖ χρώμενον ἀπηνῶς; προείρηκεν
-
-
-
-
τὴν αὑτοῦ κρίσιν ὑπειπὼν
-
-
καλὸν γὰρ εἰκὸς οὐδὲν εἶναι μετʼ ὀργῆς καὶ αὐστηρῶς
- λεγόμενον. ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων
-
εὖ δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἐπιρρήσεσι χρῆται, καθάπερ τινὰ ψῆφον ἰδίαν
- ἐπιφέρων τοῖς· πραττομένοις ἢ λεγομένοις, ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς μοιχείας τοῦ
- Ἄρεος τοὺς θεοὺς ποιῶν λέγοντας
-
-
, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς τοῦ Ἕκτορος ὑπερφροσύνης καὶ μεγαλαυχίας
-
, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς Πανδάρου τοξείας
-
-
-
-
. διὸ καὶ τὸν Ὀδυσσέα τῷ κιθαρῳδῷ προστάττοντα πεποίηκεν
-
-
καλῶς ὑφηγούμενος τὸ παρὰ τῶν φρονίμων καὶ νοῦν
-
-
ἡ γὰρ τῶν φαύλων διάθεσις ἔργων καὶ μίμησις ἂν προσαποδῷ
- τὴν συμβαίνουσαν αἰσχύνην καὶ βλάβην
-
-
καὶ πάλιν
-
καὶ
-
τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα τὰς λύσεις ἔχει προδήλους, ἄν, ὥσπερ
- εἴρηται, πρὸς τὰ βελτίονα τῇ κρίσει τοὺς νέους κατευθύνωμεν. ὅσα δʼ
- εἴρηται μὲν ἀτόπως
-
-
καὶ νοεῖς νὴ Δία καὶ λέγεις κρεῖττον ἀλλαχόθι καὶ βέλτιον τὰ
- τοιαῦτα
-
-
-
καί
-
-
-
-
-
-
, βέλτιον εἰρημένον ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ. καὶ τοῦ Πινδάρου σφόδρα πικρῶς
- καὶ παροξυντικῶς εἰρηκότος
-
,
-
-
, καὶ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους
-
,
-
-
-
-
ἀντιπαραθήσει πολλὰ τῶν Σοφοκλέους, ὧν καὶ ταῦτʼ ἐστὶ
-
-
-
καί
-
-
ὁ δὲ Μένανδρος ἐπῆρε μὲν ἀμέλει τὴν φιληδονίαν καὶ
- ὑπεχαύνωσε τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς καὶ διαπύροις ἐκείνοις
-
-
πάλιν δʼ ἐπέστρεψε καὶ περιέσπασε πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ἡμᾶς καὶ τὴν
- θρασύτητα τῆς ἀκολασίας ἐξέκοψεν εἰπὼν
-
-
-
-
-
-
, ὑπομνηστέον ὅτι Σωκράτης τοὐναντίον ἔλεγε, τοὺς μὲν φαύλους
- ζῆν τοῦ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν ἕνεκα, τοὺς
-
-
Διογένης δʼ ἀκούσας τι τοιοῦτο “τί λέγεις; ʼ” ἔφη. “κρείττονα μοῖραν ἕξει Παταικίων ὁ κλέπτης ἀποθανὼν
-
-
-
δεῖ δὲ μηδὲ τὰς ἐκ τῶν παρακειμένων ἢ συμφραζομένων παραλιπεῖν
- ἀφορμὰς πρὸς τὴν ἐπανόρθωσιν,
-
-
καὶ
-
-
-
ἄλλος τοίνυν τρόπος ἐστὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασιν ὑποψίας πρὸς τὸ
- βέλτιον ἐκ τοῦ χείρονος μεθιστὰς ὁ διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων τῆς συνηθείας,
- περὶ ὃν δεῖ τὸν νέον γεγυμνάσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ τὰς
-
-
-
-
, καὶ
-
ποτὲ δὲ τὰ χρήματα
-
, καὶ τῷ “ἀλύειν” ποτὲ μὲν ἀντὶ τοῦ δάκνεσθαι καὶ
-
-
ποτὲ δʼ ἀντὶ τοῦ γαυριᾶν καὶ χαίρειν
-
-
-
ἢ τὸ καθέζεσθαι καὶ θαάσσειν, ὡς Σοφοκλῆς
-
-
-
-
-
-
, αὐτὸν τὸν θεὸν ἐπικαλούμενος δῆλός ἐστιν· ὅταν
-
τὸ πῦρ οὕτως, οὐ τὸν θεὸν προσηγόρευσε. πάλιν δʼ ὁ μὲν
- Εὐριπίδης
-
αὐτοὺς τοὺς θεοὺς ὠνόμασε· τοῦ δὲ Σοφοκλέους
-
-
τὸν πόλεμον ἔστιν ὑπακοῦσαι, καθάπερ αὖ τὸν χαλκὸν Ὁμήρου
-
πολλῶν οὖν οὕτω λεγομένων εἰδέναι δεῖ καὶ μνημονεύειν ὅτι
- καὶ τῷ τοῦ Διὸς καὶ Ζηνὸς ὀνόματι
-
-
καὶ
-
-
τὸν θεὸν αὐτὸν λέγουσιν· ὅταν δὲ ταῖς αἰτίαις
-
,
-
-
καὶ μὴν ὁ Ἡσίοδος τὸν Προμηθέα ποιῶν τῷ Ἐπιμηθεῖ
- παρακελευόμενον
-
-
-
, θεόσδοτον νῦν τὸ τυχηρὸν εἴρηκεν, ὡς οὐκ ἄξιον ἐγκαλεῖν
- τοῖς διὰ τὴν τύχην πενομένοις, ἀλλὰ τὴν
-
-
καί
-
καί
-
, ὡς περὶ τῆς τύχης ἢ τῆς εἱμαρμένης λεγομένων, ἐν
-
-
καί
-
Σφόδρα δὲ δεῖ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὀνόμασι προσέχειν,
-
-
καὶ
-
καὶ
-
,
-
-
καὶ τὸ
-
, μὴ “καθήσθω” τοὺς πλουσίους ἐκπεπληγμένος καὶ “τεθηπὼσ” καθάπερ ὤνιον εὐθὺς ἀργυρίου τὴν ἀρετὴν
-
-
, ποτὲ δʼ ἄλλην τινὰ κάκωσιν ἢ δυστυχίαν, ὡς Ὅμηρος
-
ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐξαπατηθείη τις ἂν οὕτω
-
-
-
-
, Εὐριπίδης δὲ πολλὴν ἐργάζεται ταραχὴν καὶ σύγχυσιν
-
-
καί
-
-
ἐκεῖνο δʼ οὐχ ἅπαξ ἀλλὰ πολλάκις ὑπομνηστέον ἐστὶ τοὺς νέους·,
- ἐνδεικνυμένους αὐτοῖς ὅτι
-
-
ἄνευ δὲ, τοῦ ἀληθοῦς μάλιστα μὲν ἡ ποιητικὴ τῷ ποικίλῳ
- χρῆται καὶ πολυτρόπῳ. τὸ γὰρ ἐμπαθὲς
-
οὕτως οὖν τούτων ἐχόντων ἐπάγωμεν τοῖς ποιήμασι τὸν νέον μὴ
- τοιαύτας ἔχοντα δόξας περὶ τῶν καλῶν ἐκείνων καὶ μεγάλων ὀνομάτων,
- ὡς ἄρα σοφοὶ καὶ δίκαιοι οἱ ἄνδρες ἦσαν, ἄκροι τε βασιλεῖς καὶ
- κανόνες ἀρετῆς ἁπάσης καὶ ὀρθότητος. ἐπεὶ
-
-
καὶ
-
καὶ
-
-
καί
-
-
-
-
-
, ἐνδεικνύμενος ὀλιγωρίαν καὶ περιφρόνησιν τοῦ ἄρχοντος.
-
-
, ὀρθῶς πάλιν καὶ καλῶς, ὅτι τὸν θυμὸν ἐκκόψαι παντάπασι μὴ
- δυνηθεὶς , ὅμως πρὶν ἀνήκεστόν τι
-
, οὗτος δʼ αὐτὸς εἰς τὴν ναῦν ἐμβιβάζων καὶ παραδιδοὺς
-
-
ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἀρίσταρχος ἐξεῖλε ταῦτα τὰ ἔπη φοβηθείς·
-
-
, ψεκτέον τὸ θράσος αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν ἀκολασίαν εἰ δὲ τοῖς λόγοις
- τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τὸ ἦθος ἐνιδοῦσα καὶ θαυμάσασα
-
-
εἰ μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ δωροδοκίᾳ καὶ πλεονεξίᾳ χαίρει, τὸν
- κωμῳδούμενον ὑπερβάλλει μαστροπείᾳ Πολίαγρον
-
-
εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον οἰόμενος ὑποχειρίους ἕξειν διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα
- θαρροῦντας
-
,
-
-
καὶ γὰρ οὗτος b p. 113
ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοίνυν καὶ τὸ τὴν αἰτίαν ἑκάστου
-
-
-
-
τῶν δὲ μειζόνων ἀβασανίστως δέχονται τὴν πίστιν,
-
-
, καὶ
-
-
ἐπεὶ δʼ ὥσπερ ἐν ἀμπέλου φύλλοις καὶ κλήμασιν εὐθαλοῦσι πολλάκις ὁ
- καρπὸς ἀποκρύπτεται
-
ὁ δὲ Θερσίτης τῷ αὐτῷ λοιδορούμενος λέγει
-
, καὶ πάλιν ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς
-
ὁ δὲ Θερσίτης
-
-
πάλιν τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος ἐν τῇ ἐπιπωλήσει τὸν Διομήδην
- λοιδορήσαντος ὁ μὲν οὐδὲν ἀντεῖπεν
-
, ὁ δὲ Σθένελος, οὗ μηδεὶς λόγος,
-
ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη διαφορὰ μὴ παρορωμένη διδάξει τὸν νέον ἀστεῖον
- ἡγεῖσθαι τὴν ἀτυφίαν καὶ μετριότητα, τὴν δὲ μεγαλαυχίαν καὶ
- περιαυτολογίαν ὡς φαῦλον
-
-
-
-
εὖ δʼ ἔχει καὶ φρονίμου διαφορὰν ἀνδρὸς καὶ μάντεως
- πανηγυρικοῦ μὴ παραλιπεῖν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κάλχας οὐ συνεῖδε τὸν καιρόν,
- ἀλλʼ ἐν πλήθει παρʼ οὐδὲν ἐποιήσατο κατηγορῆσαι τοῦ βασιλέως ὡς τὸν
-
-
καὶ μετὰ τὸ δεῖπνον ἐξαποστέλλει τοὺς πρέσβεις· τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν
- ἐπανόρθωσις ἁμαρτίας, ἐκεῖνο δὲ κατηγορία καὶ προπηλακισμός Ἔτι δὲ
- καὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς γένεσι διαφορὰς σκεπτέον,
-
-
-
-
ιορωμαι ὁ δὲ Διομήδης ἐπαγγέλλεται μὲν οὐδέν, ἧττον δʼ ἄν
-
-
, τίς οὐκ ἂν ἀγάσαιτο τὴν διαφοράν; τοῦ μὲν κινδυνεύοντος ἡ
- καρδία πηδᾷ μόνον, ὥσπερ παλαίειν νὴ Δίʼ ἢ σταδιοδρομεῖν μέλλοντος,
- τῶν δὲ θεωμένων τρέμει καὶ πάλλεται τὸ σῶμα διʼ εὔνοιαν καὶ φόβον
-
-
,
-
-
καὶ τοῦτο μὲν Ἀχιλλέως τὸ ἐγκώμιόν ἐστι, τὰ δʼ
-
-
,
-
-
-
τὸ γὰρ ἐν κινδύνῳ τοῦ διαφθαρῆναι καὶ ἀπολέσθαι μετὰ πάντων
- ὄντα τὸν φρονιμώτατον ὁρᾶν τὸ αἰσχρὸν
-
-
-
-
ἐνδείκνυται μόνον εἶναι τῶν ἡμετέρων θεοφιλὲς καὶ θεῖον
- ἀρετήν, εἴγε δὴ τὰ ὅμοια χαίρειν τοῖς ὁμοίοις
-
-
-
-
τὸ γὰρ ἐπισφαλῶς πρὸς ὀργὴν ἔχοντα καὶ φύσει τραχὺν ὄντα
- καὶ θυμοειδῆ μὴ λανθάνειν ἑαυτὸν ἀλλʼ ἐξευλαβεῖσθαι καὶ φυλάττεσθαι
- τὰς αἰτίας καὶ
-
-
-
-
ὥσπερ γὰρ τοὺς ἵππους οὐκ ἐν τοῖς δρόμοις χαλινοῦσιν
-
-
καὶ τὸ
-
-
-
καὶ
-
-
-
θειότατον γὰρ ἀποφαίνει τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ βασιλικώτατον, ἐν ᾗ
- τίθεται τὴν μεγίστην ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ Διός, ἅτε δὴ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας
- ἀρετὰς ἕπεσθαι ταύτῃ νομίζων. ἐθιστέον δʼ ἅμα καὶ τούτων
- ἐγρηγορότως
-
-
καί
-
-
-
, ὡς οὔτε ψευδομένων τῶν φρονίμων οὔτε κακομαχούντων
-
-
-
-
-
-
καὶ
-
-
-
Αἰσχύλος
-
τὸ γὰρ ἐφʼ ἑαυτῷ καὶ τῇ διαθέσει τῇ περὶ αὑτὸν
-
ἡ μὲν οὖν μέλιττα φυσικῶς ἐν τοῖς δριμυτάτοις
-
-
ῦὁ ὀρθῶς δὲ γʼ ἐποίησεν, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης φησίν, ἵππον
- ἀγαθὴν ἀνθρώπου τοιούτου προτιμήσας· οὐδὲ γὰρ κυνὸς ἀντάξιος οὐδʼ
- ὄνου μὰ Δία δειλὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ ἄναλκις, ὑπὸ πλούτου καὶ μαλακίας
- διερρυηκώς
-
-
εἰ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος οὐδὲν ἐνόμιζεν ποιήσειν κάκιον τερπωλὰς
-
-
παραβάλλων εὐθὺς
-
-
-
-
-
καὶ ὁ Ζήνων ἐπανορθούμενος τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους
-
-
μετέγραφεν
-
τῷ ἐλευθέρῳ νῦν συνεκφαίνων τὸν ἀδεᾶ καὶ μεγαλόφρονα
-
-
-
-
τὸ γὰρ· ἃ μὴ δεῖ βουλόμενον λαμβάνειν καὶ τυγχάνειν οἰκτρόν
- ἐστι καὶ ἄζηλον. καὶ
-
μὰ Δία, φήσομεν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ σε χαίρειν, μὴ λυπεῖσθαι τυγχάνοντα
- μετρίων
-
-
-
θηριῶδες μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλογον καὶ οἰκτρὸν εἰδότα τὸ βέλτιον
- ὑπὸ τοῦ χείρονος ἐξ ἀκρασίας καὶ μαλακίας
-
-
καὶ τρόπος
-
ἦν δὲ βέλτιον εἰπεῖν
-
-
-
καὶ μὴν οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ
-
φόβος δὲ τοῖς ἄφροσι καὶ ἀνοήτοις καὶ ἀχαρίστοις
-
τὴν δʼ ἐπὶ πλέον τῶν λεγομένων χρῆσιν ὑπέδειξεν ὀρθῶς ὁ Χρύσιππος,
- ὅτι δεῖ μετάγειν
-
καὶ περὶ κυνὸς ταὐτὸ καὶ περὶ ὄνου λέγει καὶ περὶ
-
-
-
-
-
-
καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἄσωτον οἴωνται
-
ἢ κυβεύεις ἢ ὀρτυγοκοπεῖς ἢ καπηλεύεις ἢ τοκογλυφεῖς, μηδὲν
- μέγα φρονῶν μηδʼ ἄξιον τῆς εὐγενείας;
-
οὐκοῦν μηδὲ δόξαν εἴπῃς μηδὲ σώματος εὐμορφίαν μηδὲ
- στρατηγικὴν χλαμύδα μηδʼ ἱερατικὸν στέφανον, ὧν καὶ τοὺς κακίστους
- ὁρῶμεν τυγχάνοντας.
-
-
-
καὶ τὸ
-
-
ψόγου γὰρ ἀποφαίνει καὶ λοιδορίας ἄξιον ᾧ μηδέν ἐστιν
- ἀγαθὸν εὐμορφίας κάλλιον ἐφαρμοστέον τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς ὁμοίοις,
- κολούοντα τοὺς μεγαλοφρονοῦντας ἐπὶ τοῖς μηδενὸς ἀξίοις, καὶ διδάσκοντα
- τοὺς
-
-
-
-
πο καὶ
-
καὶ
-
ἔπειτα λοιδοροῦσιν οὐδὲν ἐφαπτόμενοι τῶν σωματικῶν,
-
-
καί
-
-
-
-
καὶ
-
-
-
οὕτως Ὅμηρος καταγελᾷ τῶν αἰσχυνομένων ἐπὶ χωλότησιν
-
-
ἂν δὲ φαίνηταί τις ἐπιλήψεως δεόμενος, τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων καὶ
- τῶν παθῶν ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι , ὥσπερ ὁ τραγικὸς Ἄδραστος, τοῦ Ἀλκμέωνος
- εἰπόντος πρὸς
-
-
ἀπεκρίνατο
-
καθάπερ γὰρ οἱ τὰ ἱμάτια μαστιγοῦντες οὐχ ἅπτονται
-
καὶ μὴν ὥσπερ ἐπάνω πρὸς τὰ φαῦλα καὶ
-
-
καὶ τὸ
-
-
-
καὶ τὸ
-
-
-
ὅτι τοῦτʼ ἐστὶ τὸ παρʼ Ἐπικούρου θρυλούμενον ἀεὶ
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
καὶ
-
καὶ
-
-
-
ἧττον ταράττονται καὶ δυσκολαίνουσι παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις
- ἀκούοντες ὡς “ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς
-
+
ὅτι βρωθῆναι μέν ἐστιν ἥδιστος, δυσόνειρον δʼ
+
τοῖς χρωμένοις ἀναδίδωσιν.
οὐ γὰρ ἅπτεται τὸ ἀπατηλὸν αὐτῆς ἀβελτέρων κομιδῇ
+
ὑγιαίνοντα νοῦν εἶχεν, ὅτι πολλῶν μεθυσκομένων καὶ παροινούντων τὰς ἀμπέλους περιιὼν ἐξέκοπτεν ἀντὶ τοῦ τὰς κρήνας ἐγγυτέρω προσαγαγεῖν καὶ
+
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἰσάγειν εἰς τὰ ποιήματα δεῖ τὸν νέον μηδὲν οὕτω μεμελετημένον ἔχοντα καὶ
τί παίζουσα τὰς ὀφρῦς συνάγεις, τί δʼ ἐξαπατῶσα
+
παύσεται δὲ τὸν φθιτὸν Ἀχιλλέα καὶ τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα τὸν καθʼ Ἅιδου δακρύων, ἀδυνάτους καὶ
+
+
τραγῳδίαν ὁ Αἰσχύλος
καὶ τὸ
ταῦτα δʼ ἢδη κατὰ δόξαν εἴρηται καὶ πίστιν αὐτῶν,
+
καὶ
+
καί
ὅσοι μέντοι τὸν θάνατον ὡς οἰκτρὸν ἢ τὴν ἀταφίαν ·- πο
+
+
καί
+
καὶ τὰ Ξενοφάνους
καὶ νὴ Δία τὰ Σωκράτους ἐξομνυμένου παρὰ Πλάτωνι
ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἐπιστήσομεν αὐτὸν ἅμα τῷ προσάγειν τοῖς ποιήμασιν ὑπογράφοντες τὴν ποιητικὴν ὅτι μιμητικὴ τέχνη καὶ δύναμίς ἐστιν ἀντίστροφος τῇ ζῳγραφίᾳ. καὶ μὴ μόνον ἐκεῖνο τὸ θρυλούμενον ἀκηκοὼς ἔστω, ζῳγραφίαν μὲν εἶναι
+
+
καὶ
μοχθηροὶ μέν εἰσι λόγοι καὶ ψευδεῖς, Ἐτεοκλεῖ δὲ
+
ἐν δὲ τούτοις εὖ μάλα προσεκτέον εἴ τινας ὁ ποιητὴς αὐτὸς ἐμφάσεις δίδωσι κατὰ τῶν λεγομένων ὡς δυσχεραινομένων ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ. καθάπερ ὁ
+
+
καὶ
+
ἐν δὲ τῷ προδιαβάλλειν μονονοὺ μαρτύρεται καὶ διαγορεύει μήτε χρῆσθαι μήτε προσέχειν ὡς οὖσιν ἀτόποις καὶ φαύλοις. οἷον τὸν τʼ Ἀγαμέμνονα μέλλων διηγεῖσθαι τῷ ἱερεῖ χρώμενον ἀπηνῶς; προείρηκεν
+
τὴν αὑτοῦ κρίσιν ὑπειπὼν
+
καλὸν γὰρ εἰκὸς οὐδὲν εἶναι μετʼ ὀργῆς καὶ αὐστηρῶς λεγόμενον. ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων
εὖ δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἐπιρρήσεσι χρῆται, καθάπερ τινὰ ψῆφον ἰδίαν ἐπιφέρων τοῖς· πραττομένοις ἢ λεγομένοις, ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς μοιχείας τοῦ Ἄρεος τοὺς θεοὺς ποιῶν λέγοντας
+
, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς τοῦ Ἕκτορος ὑπερφροσύνης καὶ μεγαλαυχίας
, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς Πανδάρου τοξείας
+
+
. διὸ καὶ τὸν Ὀδυσσέα τῷ κιθαρῳδῷ προστάττοντα πεποίηκεν
καλῶς ὑφηγούμενος τὸ παρὰ τῶν φρονίμων καὶ νοῦν
+
ἡ γὰρ τῶν φαύλων διάθεσις ἔργων καὶ μίμησις ἂν προσαποδῷ τὴν συμβαίνουσαν αἰσχύνην καὶ βλάβην
+
καὶ πάλιν
καὶ
τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα τὰς λύσεις ἔχει προδήλους, ἄν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, πρὸς τὰ βελτίονα τῇ κρίσει τοὺς νέους κατευθύνωμεν. ὅσα δʼ εἴρηται μὲν ἀτόπως
+
καὶ νοεῖς νὴ Δία καὶ λέγεις κρεῖττον ἀλλαχόθι καὶ βέλτιον τὰ τοιαῦτα
+
καί
+
+
+
, βέλτιον εἰρημένον ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ. καὶ τοῦ Πινδάρου σφόδρα πικρῶς καὶ παροξυντικῶς εἰρηκότος
,
+
, καὶ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους
,
+
+
ἀντιπαραθήσει πολλὰ τῶν Σοφοκλέους, ὧν καὶ ταῦτʼ ἐστὶ
καί
+
ὁ δὲ Μένανδρος ἐπῆρε μὲν ἀμέλει τὴν φιληδονίαν καὶ ὑπεχαύνωσε τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς καὶ διαπύροις ἐκείνοις
+
πάλιν δʼ ἐπέστρεψε καὶ περιέσπασε πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ἡμᾶς καὶ τὴν θρασύτητα τῆς ἀκολασίας ἐξέκοψεν εἰπὼν
+
+
, ὑπομνηστέον ὅτι Σωκράτης τοὐναντίον ἔλεγε, τοὺς μὲν φαύλους ζῆν τοῦ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν ἕνεκα, τοὺς
+
Διογένης δʼ ἀκούσας τι τοιοῦτο “τί λέγεις; ʼ” ἔφη. “κρείττονα μοῖραν ἕξει Παταικίων ὁ κλέπτης ἀποθανὼν
+
δεῖ δὲ μηδὲ τὰς ἐκ τῶν παρακειμένων ἢ συμφραζομένων παραλιπεῖν ἀφορμὰς πρὸς τὴν ἐπανόρθωσιν,
+
καὶ
+
+
ἄλλος τοίνυν τρόπος ἐστὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασιν ὑποψίας πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἐκ τοῦ χείρονος μεθιστὰς ὁ διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων τῆς συνηθείας, περὶ ὃν δεῖ τὸν νέον γεγυμνάσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ τὰς
+
+
, καὶ
ποτὲ δὲ τὰ χρήματα
, καὶ τῷ “ἀλύειν” ποτὲ μὲν ἀντὶ τοῦ δάκνεσθαι καὶ
+
ποτὲ δʼ ἀντὶ τοῦ γαυριᾶν καὶ χαίρειν
+
ἢ τὸ καθέζεσθαι καὶ θαάσσειν, ὡς Σοφοκλῆς
+
+
+
, αὐτὸν τὸν θεὸν ἐπικαλούμενος δῆλός ἐστιν· ὅταν
τὸ πῦρ οὕτως, οὐ τὸν θεὸν προσηγόρευσε. πάλιν δʼ ὁ μὲν Εὐριπίδης
αὐτοὺς τοὺς θεοὺς ὠνόμασε· τοῦ δὲ Σοφοκλέους
+
τὸν πόλεμον ἔστιν ὑπακοῦσαι, καθάπερ αὖ τὸν χαλκὸν Ὁμήρου
πολλῶν οὖν οὕτω λεγομένων εἰδέναι δεῖ καὶ μνημονεύειν ὅτι καὶ τῷ τοῦ Διὸς καὶ Ζηνὸς ὀνόματι
+
καὶ
+
τὸν θεὸν αὐτὸν λέγουσιν· ὅταν δὲ ταῖς αἰτίαις
,
+
καὶ μὴν ὁ Ἡσίοδος τὸν Προμηθέα ποιῶν τῷ Ἐπιμηθεῖ παρακελευόμενον
+
, θεόσδοτον νῦν τὸ τυχηρὸν εἴρηκεν, ὡς οὐκ ἄξιον ἐγκαλεῖν τοῖς διὰ τὴν τύχην πενομένοις, ἀλλὰ τὴν
+
καί
καί
, ὡς περὶ τῆς τύχης ἢ τῆς εἱμαρμένης λεγομένων, ἐν
+
+
καί
Σφόδρα δὲ δεῖ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὀνόμασι προσέχειν,
+
καὶ
καὶ
,
+
καὶ τὸ
, μὴ “καθήσθω” τοὺς πλουσίους ἐκπεπληγμένος καὶ “τεθηπὼσ” καθάπερ ὤνιον εὐθὺς ἀργυρίου τὴν ἀρετὴν
+
, ποτὲ δʼ ἄλλην τινὰ κάκωσιν ἢ δυστυχίαν, ὡς Ὅμηρος
ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐξαπατηθείη τις ἂν οὕτω
+
, Εὐριπίδης δὲ πολλὴν ἐργάζεται ταραχὴν καὶ σύγχυσιν
+
καί
+
ἐκεῖνο δʼ οὐχ ἅπαξ ἀλλὰ πολλάκις ὑπομνηστέον ἐστὶ τοὺς νέους·, ἐνδεικνυμένους αὐτοῖς ὅτι
+
ἄνευ δὲ, τοῦ ἀληθοῦς μάλιστα μὲν ἡ ποιητικὴ τῷ ποικίλῳ χρῆται καὶ πολυτρόπῳ. τὸ γὰρ ἐμπαθὲς
+
οὕτως οὖν τούτων ἐχόντων ἐπάγωμεν τοῖς ποιήμασι τὸν νέον μὴ τοιαύτας ἔχοντα δόξας περὶ τῶν καλῶν ἐκείνων καὶ μεγάλων ὀνομάτων, ὡς ἄρα σοφοὶ καὶ δίκαιοι οἱ ἄνδρες ἦσαν, ἄκροι τε βασιλεῖς καὶ κανόνες ἀρετῆς ἁπάσης καὶ ὀρθότητος. ἐπεὶ
+
καὶ
καὶ
+
καί
+
+
, ἐνδεικνύμενος ὀλιγωρίαν καὶ περιφρόνησιν τοῦ ἄρχοντος.
+
, ὀρθῶς πάλιν καὶ καλῶς, ὅτι τὸν θυμὸν ἐκκόψαι παντάπασι μὴ δυνηθεὶς , ὅμως πρὶν ἀνήκεστόν τι
, οὗτος δʼ αὐτὸς εἰς τὴν ναῦν ἐμβιβάζων καὶ παραδιδοὺς
+
ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἀρίσταρχος ἐξεῖλε ταῦτα τὰ ἔπη φοβηθείς·
+
, ψεκτέον τὸ θράσος αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν ἀκολασίαν εἰ δὲ τοῖς λόγοις τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τὸ ἦθος ἐνιδοῦσα καὶ θαυμάσασα
+
εἰ μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ δωροδοκίᾳ καὶ πλεονεξίᾳ χαίρει, τὸν κωμῳδούμενον ὑπερβάλλει μαστροπείᾳ Πολίαγρον
+
εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον οἰόμενος ὑποχειρίους ἕξειν διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα θαρροῦντας
,
+
καὶ γὰρ οὗτος b p. 113
ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοίνυν καὶ τὸ τὴν αἰτίαν ἑκάστου
+
τῶν δὲ μειζόνων ἀβασανίστως δέχονται τὴν πίστιν,
+
, καὶ
+
ἐπεὶ δʼ ὥσπερ ἐν ἀμπέλου φύλλοις καὶ κλήμασιν εὐθαλοῦσι πολλάκις ὁ καρπὸς ἀποκρύπτεται
ὁ δὲ Θερσίτης τῷ αὐτῷ λοιδορούμενος λέγει
, καὶ πάλιν ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς
ὁ δὲ Θερσίτης
+
πάλιν τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος ἐν τῇ ἐπιπωλήσει τὸν Διομήδην λοιδορήσαντος ὁ μὲν οὐδὲν ἀντεῖπεν
, ὁ δὲ Σθένελος, οὗ μηδεὶς λόγος,
ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη διαφορὰ μὴ παρορωμένη διδάξει τὸν νέον ἀστεῖον ἡγεῖσθαι τὴν ἀτυφίαν καὶ μετριότητα, τὴν δὲ μεγαλαυχίαν καὶ περιαυτολογίαν ὡς φαῦλον
+
+
εὖ δʼ ἔχει καὶ φρονίμου διαφορὰν ἀνδρὸς καὶ μάντεως πανηγυρικοῦ μὴ παραλιπεῖν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κάλχας οὐ συνεῖδε τὸν καιρόν, ἀλλʼ ἐν πλήθει παρʼ οὐδὲν ἐποιήσατο κατηγορῆσαι τοῦ βασιλέως ὡς τὸν
+
καὶ μετὰ τὸ δεῖπνον ἐξαποστέλλει τοὺς πρέσβεις· τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν ἐπανόρθωσις ἁμαρτίας, ἐκεῖνο δὲ κατηγορία καὶ προπηλακισμός Ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς γένεσι διαφορὰς σκεπτέον,
+
+
ιορωμαι ὁ δὲ Διομήδης ἐπαγγέλλεται μὲν οὐδέν, ἧττον δʼ ἄν
+
, τίς οὐκ ἂν ἀγάσαιτο τὴν διαφοράν; τοῦ μὲν κινδυνεύοντος ἡ καρδία πηδᾷ μόνον, ὥσπερ παλαίειν νὴ Δίʼ ἢ σταδιοδρομεῖν μέλλοντος, τῶν δὲ θεωμένων τρέμει καὶ πάλλεται τὸ σῶμα διʼ εὔνοιαν καὶ φόβον
+
,
+
καὶ τοῦτο μὲν Ἀχιλλέως τὸ ἐγκώμιόν ἐστι, τὰ δʼ
+
,
+
+
τὸ γὰρ ἐν κινδύνῳ τοῦ διαφθαρῆναι καὶ ἀπολέσθαι μετὰ πάντων ὄντα τὸν φρονιμώτατον ὁρᾶν τὸ αἰσχρὸν
+
+
ἐνδείκνυται μόνον εἶναι τῶν ἡμετέρων θεοφιλὲς καὶ θεῖον ἀρετήν, εἴγε δὴ τὰ ὅμοια χαίρειν τοῖς ὁμοίοις
+
+
τὸ γὰρ ἐπισφαλῶς πρὸς ὀργὴν ἔχοντα καὶ φύσει τραχὺν ὄντα καὶ θυμοειδῆ μὴ λανθάνειν ἑαυτὸν ἀλλʼ ἐξευλαβεῖσθαι καὶ φυλάττεσθαι τὰς αἰτίας καὶ
+
ὥσπερ γὰρ τοὺς ἵππους οὐκ ἐν τοῖς δρόμοις χαλινοῦσιν
+
καὶ τὸ
+
καὶ
θειότατον γὰρ ἀποφαίνει τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ βασιλικώτατον, ἐν ᾗ τίθεται τὴν μεγίστην ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ Διός, ἅτε δὴ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς ἕπεσθαι ταύτῃ νομίζων. ἐθιστέον δʼ ἅμα καὶ τούτων ἐγρηγορότως
+
καί
+
, ὡς οὔτε ψευδομένων τῶν φρονίμων οὔτε κακομαχούντων
+
+
καὶ
+
Αἰσχύλος
τὸ γὰρ ἐφʼ ἑαυτῷ καὶ τῇ διαθέσει τῇ περὶ αὑτὸν
+
ἡ μὲν οὖν μέλιττα φυσικῶς ἐν τοῖς δριμυτάτοις
+
ῦὁ ὀρθῶς δὲ γʼ ἐποίησεν, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης φησίν, ἵππον ἀγαθὴν ἀνθρώπου τοιούτου προτιμήσας· οὐδὲ γὰρ κυνὸς ἀντάξιος οὐδʼ ὄνου μὰ Δία δειλὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ ἄναλκις, ὑπὸ πλούτου καὶ μαλακίας διερρυηκώς
+
εἰ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος οὐδὲν ἐνόμιζεν ποιήσειν κάκιον τερπωλὰς
+
παραβάλλων εὐθὺς
+
καὶ ὁ Ζήνων ἐπανορθούμενος τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους
+
μετέγραφεν
τῷ ἐλευθέρῳ νῦν συνεκφαίνων τὸν ἀδεᾶ καὶ μεγαλόφρονα
+
+
τὸ γὰρ· ἃ μὴ δεῖ βουλόμενον λαμβάνειν καὶ τυγχάνειν οἰκτρόν ἐστι καὶ ἄζηλον. καὶ
μὰ Δία, φήσομεν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ σε χαίρειν, μὴ λυπεῖσθαι τυγχάνοντα μετρίων
θηριῶδες μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλογον καὶ οἰκτρὸν εἰδότα τὸ βέλτιον ὑπὸ τοῦ χείρονος ἐξ ἀκρασίας καὶ μαλακίας
+
καὶ τρόπος
ἦν δὲ βέλτιον εἰπεῖν
+
καὶ μὴν οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ
φόβος δὲ τοῖς ἄφροσι καὶ ἀνοήτοις καὶ ἀχαρίστοις
+
τὴν δʼ ἐπὶ πλέον τῶν λεγομένων χρῆσιν ὑπέδειξεν ὀρθῶς ὁ Χρύσιππος, ὅτι δεῖ μετάγειν
καὶ περὶ κυνὸς ταὐτὸ καὶ περὶ ὄνου λέγει καὶ περὶ
+
+
+
καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἄσωτον οἴωνται
ἢ κυβεύεις ἢ ὀρτυγοκοπεῖς ἢ καπηλεύεις ἢ τοκογλυφεῖς, μηδὲν μέγα φρονῶν μηδʼ ἄξιον τῆς εὐγενείας;
οὐκοῦν μηδὲ δόξαν εἴπῃς μηδὲ σώματος εὐμορφίαν μηδὲ στρατηγικὴν χλαμύδα μηδʼ ἱερατικὸν στέφανον, ὧν καὶ τοὺς κακίστους ὁρῶμεν τυγχάνοντας.
+
καὶ τὸ
+
ψόγου γὰρ ἀποφαίνει καὶ λοιδορίας ἄξιον ᾧ μηδέν ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν εὐμορφίας κάλλιον ἐφαρμοστέον τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς ὁμοίοις, κολούοντα τοὺς μεγαλοφρονοῦντας ἐπὶ τοῖς μηδενὸς ἀξίοις, καὶ διδάσκοντα τοὺς
+
+
πο καὶ
καὶ
ἔπειτα λοιδοροῦσιν οὐδὲν ἐφαπτόμενοι τῶν σωματικῶν,
+
καί
+
+
καὶ
+
οὕτως Ὅμηρος καταγελᾷ τῶν αἰσχυνομένων ἐπὶ χωλότησιν
+
ἂν δὲ φαίνηταί τις ἐπιλήψεως δεόμενος, τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων καὶ τῶν παθῶν ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι , ὥσπερ ὁ τραγικὸς Ἄδραστος, τοῦ Ἀλκμέωνος εἰπόντος πρὸς
+
ἀπεκρίνατο
καθάπερ γὰρ οἱ τὰ ἱμάτια μαστιγοῦντες οὐχ ἅπτονται
+
καὶ μὴν ὥσπερ ἐπάνω πρὸς τὰ φαῦλα καὶ
+
καὶ τὸ
+
καὶ τὸ
+
ὅτι τοῦτʼ ἐστὶ τὸ παρʼ Ἐπικούρου θρυλούμενον ἀεὶ
+
+
+
+
καὶ
καὶ
+
ἧττον ταράττονται καὶ δυσκολαίνουσι παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἀκούοντες ὡς “ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς
+