The reason is chiefly just that irritating impatience which we exhibited in relation to the long talk about weaving and the revolution of the universe and the sophist's long talk about the existence of not-being. See Plat. theaet. 283, Plat. Theaet. 277, Plat. Soph. 261 We felt that they were too long, and we reproached ourselves for all of them,
+
The reason is chiefly just that irritating impatience which we exhibited in relation to the long talk about weaving and the revolution of the universe and the sophist’s long talk about the existence of not-being. See Plat. theaet. 283, Plat. Theaet. 277, Plat. Soph. 261 We felt that they were too long, and we reproached ourselves for all of them,
fearing that our talk was not only long, but irrelevant. Consider, therefore, that the reason for what has just been said is my wish to avoid any such impatience in the future.
Very well. Please go on with what you have to say.
Son of Cleinias, I think it must surprise you that I, the first of all your lovers, am the only one of them who has not given up his suit and thrown you over, and whereas they have all pestered you with their conversation I have not spoken one word to you for so many years. The cause of this has been nothing human, but a certain spiritual opposition, Socrates refers to the spiritual sign which occasionally warned him against an intended action: cf. Plat. Apol. 31c-d, Plat. Apol. 40a-b. of whose power you shall be informed at some later time. However, it now opposes me no longer, so I have accordingly come to you; and I am in good hopes that it will not oppose me again in the future. Now I have been observing you all this time, and have formed a pretty good notion of your behavior to your lovers: for although they were many and high-spirited, everyone of them has found your spirit too strong for him and has run away.
+
+
Son of Cleinias, I think it must surprise you that I, the first of all your lovers, am the only one of them who has not given up his suit and thrown you over, and whereas they have all pestered you with their conversation I have not spoken one word to you for so many years. The cause of this has been nothing human, but a certain spiritual opposition, Socrates refers to the spiritual sign which occasionally warned him against an intended action: cf. Plat. Apol. 31c-d, Plat. Apol. 40a-b. of whose power you shall be informed at some later time. However, it now opposes me no longer, so I have accordingly come to you; and I am in good hopes that it will not oppose me again in the future. Now I have been observing you all this time, and have formed a pretty good notion of your behavior to your lovers: for although they were many and high-spirited, everyone of them has found your spirit too strong for him and has run away.
-
-
Let me explain the reason of your spirit being too much for them. You say you have no need of any man in any matter; for your resources are so great, beginning with the body and ending with the soul, that you lack nothing. You think, in the first place, that you are foremost in beauty and stature—and you are not mistaken in this, as is plain for all to see—and in the second place, that you are of the most gallant family in your city, the greatest city in Greece, and that there you have, through your father, very many of the best people as your friends and kinsmen, who would assist you in case of need, and other connections also, through your mother, who are not a whit inferior to these, nor fewer. And you reckon upon a stronger power than all those that I have mentioned, in Pericles, son of Xanthippus, whom your father left as guardian of you and your brother when he died, and who is able to do whatever he likes not only in this city but all over Greece and among many great nations of the barbarians. And I will add besides the wealth of your house: but on this, I observe, you presume least of all. Well, you puff yourself up on all these advantages, and have overcome your lovers, while they in their inferiority have yielded to your might, and all this has not escaped you; so I am very sure that you wonder what on earth I mean by not getting rid of my passion, and what can be my hope in remaining when the rest have fled.
-
Perhaps also, Socrates, you are not aware that you have only just anticipated me. For I, in fact, had the intention of coming and asking you first that very same question—what is your aim and expectation in bothering me by making a particular point of always turning up wherever I may be. For I really do wonder what can be your object, and should be very glad if you would tell me.
+
+
Let me explain the reason of your spirit being too much for them. You say you have no need of any man in any matter; for your resources are so great, beginning with the body and ending with the soul, that you lack nothing. You think, in the first place, that you are foremost in beauty and stature—and you are not mistaken in this, as is plain for all to see—and in the second place, that you are of the most gallant family in your city, the greatest city in Greece, and that there you have, through your father, very many of the best people as your friends and kinsmen, who would assist you in case of need, and other connections also, through your mother, who are not a whit inferior to these, nor fewer. And you reckon upon a stronger power than all those that I have mentioned, in Pericles, son of Xanthippus, whom your father left as guardian of you and your brother when he died, and who is able to do whatever he likes not only in this city but all over Greece and among many great nations of the barbarians. And I will add besides the wealth of your house: but on this, I observe, you presume least of all. Well, you puff yourself up on all these advantages, and have overcome your lovers, while they in their inferiority have yielded to your might, and all this has not escaped you; so I am very sure that you wonder what on earth I mean by not getting rid of my passion, and what can be my hope in remaining when the rest have fled.
+
Perhaps also, Socrates, you are not aware that you have only just anticipated me. For I, in fact, had the intention of coming and asking you first that very same question—what is your aim and expectation in bothering me by making a particular point of always turning up wherever I may be. For I really do wonder what can be your object, and should be very glad if you would tell me.
Then you will listen to me, presumably, with keen attention if, as you say, you long to know what I mean, and I have in you a listener who will stay to hear me out.
Why, to be sure: only speak.
-
+
Look to it, then; for it would be no wonder if I should make as much difficulty about stopping as I have made about starting.
My good sir, speak; for I will listen.
-
Speak I must, I suppose. Now, although it is hard for a lover to parley with a man who does not yield to lovers, I must make bold nevertheless to put my meaning into words. For if I saw you, Alcibiades, content with the things I set forth just now, and minded to pass your life in enjoying them, I should long ago have put away my love, so at least I persuade myself: but as it is, I shall propound to your face quite another set of your thoughts, whereby you will understand that I have had you continually before my mind. For I believe, if some god should ask you: Alcibiades, do you prefer to live with your present possessions, or to die immediately if you are not to have the chance of acquiring greater things? I believe you would choose to die. But let me tell you what I imagine must be the present hope of your life. You think that if you come shortly before the Athenian Assembly—which you expect to occur in a very few days—you will stand forth and prove to the people that you are more worthy of honor than either Pericles or anyone else who has ever existed, and that having proved this you will have the greatest power in the state; and that if you are the greatest here, you will be the same among all the other Greeks, and not only Greeks, but all the barbarians who inhabit the same continent with us. And if that same god should say to you again, that you are to hold sway here in Europe, but are not to be allowed to cross over into Asia and to interfere with the affairs of that region, I believe you would be equally loth to live on those sole conditions either—if you are not to fill, one may say, the whole world with your name and your power; and I fancy that, except Cyrus and Xerxes, you think there has never existed a single man who was of any account. So then that this is your hope, I know well enough; I am not merely guessing. And I daresay you will reply, since you know that what I say is true: Well, Socrates, and what has that to do with your point? I am going to tell you, dear son of Cleinias and Deinomache. Without me it is impossible for all those designs of yours to be crowned with achievement; so great is the power I conceive myself to have over your affairs and over you, and it is for this very reason, I believe, that the god has so long prevented me from talking with you, and I was waiting to see when he would allow me. For as you have hopes of proving yourself in public to be invaluable to the state and, having proved it, of winning forthwith unlimited power, so do I hope to win supreme power over you by proving that I am invaluable to you, and that neither guardian nor kinsman nor anyone else is competent to transmit to you the power that you long for except me, with the god's help, however. In your younger days, to be sure, before you had built such high hopes, the god, as I believe, prevented me from talking with you, in order that I might not waste my words: but now he has set me on; for now you will listen to me.
+
Speak I must, I suppose. Now, although it is hard for a lover to parley with a man who does not yield to lovers, I must make bold nevertheless to put my meaning into words. For if I saw you, Alcibiades, content with the things I set forth just now, and minded to pass your life in enjoying them, I should long ago have put away my love, so at least I persuade myself: but as it is, I shall propound to your face quite another set of your thoughts, whereby you will understand that I have had you continually before my mind. For I believe, if some god should ask you: Alcibiades, do you prefer to live with your present possessions, or to die immediately if you are not to have the chance of acquiring greater things? I believe you would choose to die. But let me tell you what I imagine must be the present hope of your life. You think that if you come shortly before the Athenian Assembly—which you expect to occur in a very few days—you will stand forth and prove to the people that you are more worthy of honor than either Pericles or anyone else who has ever existed, and that having proved this you will have the greatest power in the state; and that if you are the greatest here, you will be the same among all the other Greeks, and not only Greeks, but all the barbarians who inhabit the same continent with us. And if that same god should say to you again, that you are to hold sway here in Europe, but are not to be allowed to cross over into Asia and to interfere with the affairs of that region, I believe you would be equally loth to live on those sole conditions either—if you are not to fill, one may say, the whole world with your name and your power; and I fancy that, except Cyrus and Xerxes, you think there has never existed a single man who was of any account. So then that this is your hope, I know well enough; I am not merely guessing. And I daresay you will reply, since you know that what I say is true: Well, Socrates, and what has that to do with your point? I am going to tell you, dear son of Cleinias and Deinomache. Without me it is impossible for all those designs of yours to be crowned with achievement; so great is the power I conceive myself to have over your affairs and over you, and it is for this very reason, I believe, that the god has so long prevented me from talking with you, and I was waiting to see when he would allow me. For as you have hopes of proving yourself in public to be invaluable to the state and, having proved it, of winning forthwith unlimited power, so do I hope to win supreme power over you by proving that I am invaluable to you, and that neither guardian nor kinsman nor anyone else is competent to transmit to you the power that you long for except me, with the god’s help, however. In your younger days, to be sure, before you had built such high hopes, the god, as I believe, prevented me from talking with you, in order that I might not waste my words: but now he has set me on; for now you will listen to me.
You seem to me far more extraordinary, Socrates, now that you have begun to speak, than before, when you followed me about in silence; though even then you looked strange enough. Well, as to my intending all this or not, you have apparently made your decision, and any denial of mine will not avail me to persuade you. Very good: but supposing I have intended ever so much what you say, how are you the sole means through which I can hope to attain it? Can you tell me?
-
+
Are you asking whether I can make a long speech, such as you are used to hearing? No, my gift is not of that sort. But I fancy I could prove to you that the case is so, if you will consent to do me just one little service.
Why, if you mean a service that is not troublesome, I consent.
Do you consider it troublesome to answer questions put to you?
No, I do not.
Then answer.
Ask.
-
Well, you have the intentions which I say you have, I suppose?
+
Well, you have the intentions which I say you have, I suppose?
Be it so, if you like, in order that I may know what you will say next.
Now then: you intend, as I say, to come forward as adviser to the Athenians in no great space of time; well, suppose I were to take hold of you as you were about to ascend the platform, and were to ask you: Alcibiades, on what subject do the Athenians propose to take advice, that you should stand up to advise them? Is it something about which you have better knowledge than they? What would be your reply?
-
+
I should say, I suppose, it was something about which I knew better than they.
Then you are a good adviser on things about which you actually know.
To be sure.
@@ -128,14 +128,14 @@
Well then, would you have been willing to inquire into or learn what you thought you knew?
No, indeed.
-
+
So there was a time when you did not think that you knew what you now actually know.
There must have been.
Well, but I know pretty nearly the things that you have learnt: tell me if anything has escaped me. You learnt, if I recollect, writing and harping and wrestling; as for fluting, you refused to learn it. These are the things that you know, unless perhaps there is something you have been learning unobserved by me; and this you were not, I believe, if you so much as stepped out of doors either by night or by day.
No, I have taken no other lessons than those.
-
+
Then tell me, will it be when the Athenians are taking advice how they are to do their writing correctly that you are to stand up and advise them?
Upon my word, not I.
Well, about strokes on the lyre?
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@
Then what will be the subject of the advice? For I presume it will not be about building.
No, indeed.
-
+
For a builder will give better advice than you in that matter.
Yes.
Nor yet will it be about divination?
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@
Of course.
For on each subject the advice comes from one who knows, not one who has riches.
Of course.
-
And whether their mentor be poor or rich will make no difference to the Athenians when they deliberate for the health of the citizens; all that they require of their counsellor is that he be a physician.
+
And whether their mentor be poor or rich will make no difference to the Athenians when they deliberate for the health of the citizens; all that they require of their counsellor is that he be a physician.
Naturally.
Then what will they have under consideration if you are to be right in standing up, when you do so, as their counsellor?
Their own affairs, Socrates.
@@ -165,26 +165,26 @@
Because, I imagine, you do not understand shipbuilding. Is that, and that alone, the reason?
That is just the reason.
-
+
Well, on what sort of affairs of their own do you mean that they will be deliberating?
-
On war, Socrates, or on peace, or on any other of the state's affairs.
+
On war, Socrates, or on peace, or on any other of the state’s affairs.
Do you mean that they will be deliberating with whom they ought to make peace, and on whom they ought to make war, and in what manner?
Yes.
And on whom it is better to do so, ought they not?
Yes.
-
+
And at such time as it is better?
Certainly.
And for so long as they had better?
Yes.
-
Now if the Athenians should deliberate with whom they should wrestle close, and with whom only at arm's length, and in what manner, would you or the wrestling-master be the better adviser?
+
Now if the Athenians should deliberate with whom they should wrestle close, and with whom only at arm’s length, and in what manner, would you or the wrestling-master be the better adviser?
The wrestling-master, I presume.
And can you tell me what the wrestling-master would have in view when he advised as to the persons with whom they ought or ought not to wrestle close, and when and in what manner? What I mean is something like this: ought they not to wrestle close with those with whom it is better to do so?
Yes.
-
+
And so far as is better, too?
So far.
And at such time also as is better?
@@ -195,37 +195,37 @@
Yes.
And so far as is better?
I agree.
-
Well now, since you applied the term better to the two cases of harping for accompaniment of a song and close wrestling, what do you call the better in the case of harping, to correspond with what in the case of wrestling I call gymnastic? What do you call the other?
+
Well now, since you applied the term better to the two cases of harping for accompaniment of a song and close wrestling, what do you call the better in the case of harping, to correspond with what in the case of wrestling I call gymnastic? What do you call the other?
I do not understand.
Well, try to copy me: for my answer gave you, I think, what is correct in every instance; and that is correct, I presume, which proceeds by rule of the art, is it not?
Yes.
And was not the art here gymnastic?
To be sure.
-
+
And I said that the better Socrates means by better or the better way the general method of attaining excellence in any art. in the case of wrestling was gymnastic.
You did.
And I was quite fair?
I think so.
-
Come then, in your turn—for it would befit you also, I fancy, to argue fairly Socrates here repeats καλῶς (which means handsomely as well as correctly) in allusion to Alcibiades' good looks. Cf. Plat. Alc.1 113b—tell me, first, what is the art which includes harping and singing and treading the measure correctly? What is it called as a whole? You cannot yet tell me?
+
Come then, in your turn—for it would befit you also, I fancy, to argue fairly Socrates here repeats καλῶς (which means handsomely as well as correctly) in allusion to Alcibiades’ good looks. Cf. Plat. Alc.1 113b—tell me, first, what is the art which includes harping and singing and treading the measure correctly? What is it called as a whole? You cannot yet tell me?
No, indeed.
Well, try another way: who are the goddesses that foster the art?
The Muses, you mean, Socrates?
-
+
I do. Now, just think, and say by what name the art is called after them.
Music, Music with the Greeks included poetry and dancing as well as our music. I suppose you mean.
Yes, I do. And what is that which proceeds correctly by its rule? As in the other case I was correct in mentioning to you gymnastic as that which goes by the art, so I ask you, accordingly, what you say in this case. What manner of proceeding is required?
A musical one, I suppose.
-
You are right. Come then, what is it that you term better, in respect of what is better in waging war and being at peace? Just as in our other instances you said that the better implied the more musical and again, in the parallel case, the more gymnastical, try now if you can tell me what is the better in this case.
+
You are right. Come then, what is it that you term better, in respect of what is better in waging war and being at peace? Just as in our other instances you said that the better implied the more musical and again, in the parallel case, the more gymnastical, try now if you can tell me what is the better in this case.
But I am quite unable.
-
But surely that is disgraceful; for if you should speak to somebody as his adviser on food, and say that one sort was better than another, at this time and in this quantity, and he then asked you—What do you mean by the better, Alcibiades?—in a matter like that you could tell him you meant the more wholesome, although you do not set up to be a physician; yet in a case where you set up to have knowledge and are ready to stand up and advise as though you knew, are you not ashamed to be unable, as appears, to answer a question upon it? Does it not seem disgraceful?
+
But surely that is disgraceful; for if you should speak to somebody as his adviser on food, and say that one sort was better than another, at this time and in this quantity, and he then asked you—What do you mean by the better, Alcibiades?—in a matter like that you could tell him you meant the more wholesome, although you do not set up to be a physician; yet in a case where you set up to have knowledge and are ready to stand up and advise as though you knew, are you not ashamed to be unable, as appears, to answer a question upon it? Does it not seem disgraceful?
Very.
Then consider and do your best to tell me the connection of better in being at peace or at war with those to whom we ought to be so disposed.
Well, I am considering, but I fail to perceive it.
-
But you must know what treatment it is that we allege against each other when we enter upon a war, and what name we give it when we do so?
+
But you must know what treatment it is that we allege against each other when we enter upon a war, and what name we give it when we do so?
I do: we say we are victims of deceit or violence or spoliation.
Enough: how do we suffer each of these things? Try and tell me what difference there is between one way and another.
Do you mean by that, Socrates, whether it is in a just way or an unjust way?
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@
Why, there you have all the difference in the world.
Well then, on which sort are you going to advise the Athenians to make war—those who are acting unjustly, or those who are doing what is just?
-
+
That is a hard question: for even if someone decides that he must go to war with those who are doing what is just, he would not admit that they were doing so.
For that would not be lawful, I suppose?
No, indeed; nor is it considered honorable either.
@@ -242,10 +242,10 @@
Then must not that better about which I was asking in reference to making or not making war, on those on whom we ought to or not, and when we ought to or not, be simply and solely the juster?
Apparently it is.
-
+
How now, friend Alcibiades? Have you overlooked your own ignorance of this matter, or have I overlooked Cf. above, Plat. Alc.1 106e. your learning it and taking lessons of a master who taught you to distinguish the more just and the more unjust? And who is he? Inform me in my turn, in order that you may introduce me to him as another pupil.
You are joking, Socrates.
-
No, I swear by our common God of Friendship, whose name I would by no means take in vain. Come, if you can, tell me who the man is.
+
No, I swear by our common God of Friendship, whose name I would by no means take in vain. Come, if you can, tell me who the man is.
But what if I cannot? Do you think I could not know about what is just and unjust in any other way?
Yes, you might, supposing you discovered it.
But do you not think I might discover it?
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@
And was there not a time when I held that view?
-
Well spoken. Then can you tell me at what time it was that you thought you did not know what is just and unjust? Pray, was it a year ago that you were inquiring, and thought you did not know? Or did you think you knew? Please answer truly, that our debates may not be futile.
+
Well spoken. Then can you tell me at what time it was that you thought you did not know what is just and unjust? Pray, was it a year ago that you were inquiring, and thought you did not know? Or did you think you knew? Please answer truly, that our debates may not be futile.
Well, I thought I knew.
And two years, and three years, and four years back, were you not of the same mind?
I was.
@@ -264,12 +264,12 @@
So I know well enough that then you thought you knew.
How do you know it so well?
-
-
Many a time I heard you, when as a child you were dicing or playing some other game at your teacher's or elsewhere, instead of showing hesitation about what was just and unjust, speak in very loud and confident tones about one or other of your playmates, saying he was a rascal and a cheat who played unfairly. Is not this a true account?
+
+
Many a time I heard you, when as a child you were dicing or playing some other game at your teacher’s or elsewhere, instead of showing hesitation about what was just and unjust, speak in very loud and confident tones about one or other of your playmates, saying he was a rascal and a cheat who played unfairly. Is not this a true account?
But what was I to do, Socrates, when somebody cheated me?
Yet if you were ignorant then whether you were being unfairly treated or not, how can you ask—What are you to do?
-
+
Well, but on my word, I was not ignorant: no, I clearly understood that I was being wronged.
So you thought you knew, even as a child, it seems, what was just and unjust.
I did; and I knew too.
@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@
Then when did you think you were ignorant? Consider; I believe you will fail to find such a time.
Upon my word, Socrates, I really cannot say.
-
+
So you do not know it by discovery.
Not at all, apparently.
But you said just now that you did not know it by learning either; and if you neither discovered nor learnt it, how do you come to know it, and whence?
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@
I learnt it, I suppose, in the same way as everyone else.
Back we come to the same argument. From whom? Please tell me.
-
+
From the many.
They are no very serious teachers with whom you take refuge, if you ascribe it to the many!
Why, are they not competent to teach?
@@ -298,7 +298,7 @@
What sort of things?
-
+
For instance, it was from them that I learnt to speak Greek, and I could not say who was my teacher, but can only ascribe it to the same people who, you say, are not serious teachers.
Ah, gallant sir, the many may be good teachers of that, and they can justly be praised for their teaching of such subjects.
And why?
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@
What do you mean by that?
You know that those who are going to teach anything should first know it themselves, do you not?
-
+
Of course.
And that those who know should agree with each other and not differ?
Yes.
@@ -314,19 +314,19 @@
No, indeed.
Then how can they be teachers of it?
By no means.
-
Well now, do you find that the many differ about the nature of stone or wood? If you ask one of them, do they not agree on the same answer, and make for the same things when they want to get a piece of stone or wood? It is just the same, too, with everything of the sort: for I am pretty nearly right in understanding you to mean just this by knowing how to speak Greek, am I not?
+
Well now, do you find that the many differ about the nature of stone or wood? If you ask one of them, do they not agree on the same answer, and make for the same things when they want to get a piece of stone or wood? It is just the same, too, with everything of the sort: for I am pretty nearly right in understanding you to mean just this by knowing how to speak Greek, am I not?
Yes.
And on these matters, as we stated, they not only agree with each other and with themselves in private, but states also use in public the same terms about them to each other, without any dispute?
They do.
-
+
Then naturally they will be good teachers of these matters.
Yes.
And if we should wish to provide anyone with knowledge of them, we should be right in sending him to be taught by the many that you speak of?
Certainly.
But what if we wished to know not only what men were like or what horses were like, but which of them were good runners or not? Would the many still suffice to teach us this?
No, indeed.
-
And you have ample proof that they do not know this, and are not proficient teachers of it, in their not agreeing about it at all with themselves?
+
And you have ample proof that they do not know this, and are not proficient teachers of it, in their not agreeing about it at all with themselves?
I have.
And what if we wished to know not only what men were like, but what healthy or diseased men were like? Would the many suffice to teach us?
No, indeed.
@@ -334,30 +334,30 @@
I should.
-
Well then, do you now find that the many agree with themselves or each other about just and unjust men or things?
+
Well then, do you now find that the many agree with themselves or each other about just and unjust men or things?
Far from it, on my word, Socrates.
In fact, they differ most especially on these points?
Very much so.
And I suppose you never yet saw or heard of people differing so sharply on questions of health or the opposite as to fight and kill one another in battle because of them.
No, indeed.
-
But on questions of justice or injustice I am sure you have; and if you have not seen them, at any rate you have heard of them from many people, especially Homer. For you have heard i.e., at the recitations of rhapsodes; cf. the Ion of Plato. the Odyssey and the Iliad?
+
But on questions of justice or injustice I am sure you have; and if you have not seen them, at any rate you have heard of them from many people, especially Homer. For you have heard i.e., at the recitations of rhapsodes; cf. the Ion of Plato. the Odyssey and the Iliad?
I certainly have, I suppose, Socrates.
And these poems are about a difference of just and unjust
Yes.
And from this difference arose the fights and deaths of the Achaeans, and of the Trojans as well, and of the suitors of Penelope in their strife with Odysseus.
-
+
That is true.
And I imagine that when the Athenians and Spartans and Boeotians lost their men at Tanagra, 457 B.C. and later at Coronea, 447 B.C. among whom your own father perished, the difference that caused their deaths and fights was solely on a question of just and unjust, was it not?
That is true.
-
Then are we to say that these people understand those questions, on which they differ so sharply that they are led by their mutual disputes to take these extreme measures against each other?
+
Then are we to say that these people understand those questions, on which they differ so sharply that they are led by their mutual disputes to take these extreme measures against each other?
Apparently not.
And you refer me to teachers of that sort, whom you admit yourself to be without knowledge?
It seems I do.
Then how is it likely that you should know what is just and unjust, when you are so bewildered about these matters and are shown to have neither learnt them from anyone nor discovered them for yourself?.
By what you say, it is not likely.
-
+
There again, Alcibiades, do you see how unfairly you speak?
In what ?
In stating that I say so.
@@ -376,7 +376,7 @@
Yes.
-
+
Then is it I, the questioner, or you the answerer, that are found to be speaking about these things?
I.
And what if I ask what are the letters in Socrates, and you tell me? Which will be the speaker?
@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@
Come then, tell me, as a principle, when we have question and answer, which is the speaker—the questioner, or the answerer?
The answerer, I should say, Socrates.
-
+
And throughout the argument so far, I was the questioner?
Yes.
And you the answerer?
@@ -393,21 +393,21 @@
Apparently, Socrates, from what we have admitted, it was I.
And it was said that Alcibiades, the fair son of Cleinias, did not know about just and unjust, but thought he did, and intended to go to the Assembly as adviser to the Athenians on what he knows nothing about; is not that so?
-
+
Apparently.
-
Then, to quote Euripides, Eur. Hipp. 352—σοῦ τάδ', οὐκ ἐμοῦ κλύεις. the result is, Alcibiades, that you may be said to have heard it from yourself, not me,Eur. Hipp. 352 and it is not I who say it, but you, and you tax me with it in vain. And indeed what you say is quite true. For it is a mad scheme this, that you meditate, my excellent friend—of teaching things that you do not know, since you have taken no care to learn them.
+
Then, to quote Euripides, Eur. Hipp. 352—σοῦ τάδ’, οὐκ ἐμοῦ κλύεις. the result is, Alcibiades, that you may be said to have heard it from yourself, not me,Eur. Hipp. 352 and it is not I who say it, but you, and you tax me with it in vain. And indeed what you say is quite true. For it is a mad scheme this, that you meditate, my excellent friend—of teaching things that you do not know, since you have taken no care to learn them.
-
+
I think, Socrates, that the Athenians and the rest of the Greeks rarely deliberate as to which is the more just or unjust course: for they regard questions of this sort as obvious; and so they pass them over and consider which course will prove more expedient in the result. For the just and the expedient, I take it, are not the same, but many people have profited by great wrongs that they have committed, whilst others, I imagine, have had no advantage from doing what was right.
-
What then? Granting that the just and the expedient are in fact as different as they can be, you surely do not still suppose you know what is expedient for mankind, and why it is so?
+
What then? Granting that the just and the expedient are in fact as different as they can be, you surely do not still suppose you know what is expedient for mankind, and why it is so?
Well, what is the obstacle, Socrates,—unless you are going to ask me again from whom I learnt it, or how I discovered it for myself?
-
What a way of going on! If your answer is incorrect, and a previous argument can be used to prove it so, you claim to be told something new, and a different line of proof, as though the previous one were like a poor worn-out coat which you refuse to wear any longer; you must be provided instead with something clean and unsoiled in the way of evidence. But I shall ignore your sallies in debate, and shall none the less ask you once more, where you learnt your knowledge of what is expedient, and who is your teacher, asking in one question all the things I asked before; and now you will clearly find yourself in the same plight, and will be unable to prove that you know the expedient either through discovery or through learning. But as you are dainty, and would dislike a repeated taste of the same argument, I pass over this question of whether you know or do not know what is expedient for the Athenians: but why have you not made it clear whether the just and the expedient are the same or different? If you like, question me as I did you, or if you prefer, argue out the matter in your own way.
+
What a way of going on! If your answer is incorrect, and a previous argument can be used to prove it so, you claim to be told something new, and a different line of proof, as though the previous one were like a poor worn-out coat which you refuse to wear any longer; you must be provided instead with something clean and unsoiled in the way of evidence. But I shall ignore your sallies in debate, and shall none the less ask you once more, where you learnt your knowledge of what is expedient, and who is your teacher, asking in one question all the things I asked before; and now you will clearly find yourself in the same plight, and will be unable to prove that you know the expedient either through discovery or through learning. But as you are dainty, and would dislike a repeated taste of the same argument, I pass over this question of whether you know or do not know what is expedient for the Athenians: but why have you not made it clear whether the just and the expedient are the same or different? If you like, question me as I did you, or if you prefer, argue out the matter in your own way.
But I am not sure I should be able, Socrates, to set it forth to you.
Well, my good sir, imagine I am the people in Assembly; even there, you know, you will have to persuade each man singly, will you not?
Yes.
-
And the same man may well persuade one person singly, and many together, about things that he knows, just as the schoolmaster, I suppose, persuades either one or many about letters?
+
And the same man may well persuade one person singly, and many together, about things that he knows, just as the schoolmaster, I suppose, persuades either one or many about letters?
Yes.
And again, will not the same man persuade either one or many about number?
Yes.
@@ -417,7 +417,7 @@
Presumably.
And these are clearly things that you know.
Yes.
-
And the only difference between the orator speaking before the people and one who speaks in a conversation like ours is that the former persuades men in a number together of the same things, and the latter persuades them one at a time?
+
And the only difference between the orator speaking before the people and one who speaks in a conversation like ours is that the former persuades men in a number together of the same things, and the latter persuades them one at a time?
It looks like it.
Come now, since we see that the same man may persuade either many or one, try your unpracticed hand on me, and endeavor to show that the just is sometimes not expedient.
You are insolent, Socrates!
@@ -425,7 +425,7 @@
Speak, then.
Just answer my questions.
-
+
No, you yourself must be the speaker.
What? Do you not wish above all things to be persuaded?
By all means, to be sure.
@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@
-
+
You are quite a prophet! Now tell me, do you consider some just things to be expedient, and others not?
Yes.
And again, some noble, and some not?
@@ -450,23 +450,23 @@
And some base things are good?
Yes.
-
+
Do you mean as in one of the many cases where men have gone to rescue a comrade or kinsman in battle, and have been either wounded or killed, while those who did not go to the rescue, as duty bade, have got off safe and sound?
Precisely.
-
And such a rescue you call noble, in respect of the endeavor to save those whom it was one's duty to save; and this is courage, is it not?
+
And such a rescue you call noble, in respect of the endeavor to save those whom it was one’s duty to save; and this is courage, is it not?
Yes.
But you call it evil, in respect of the deaths and wounds?
Yes.
-
+
And is not the courage one thing, and the death another?
Certainly.
-
Then it is not in the same respect that rescuing one's friends is noble and evil?
+
Then it is not in the same respect that rescuing one’s friends is noble and evil?
Apparently not.
Then see if, inasmuch as it is noble, it is also good; for in the present case you were admitting that the rescue was noble in respect of its courage: now consider this very thing, courage, and say whether it is good or bad. Consider it in this way: which would you choose to have, good things or evil?
Good.
-
+
And most of all, the greatest goods, and of such things you would least allow yourself to be deprived?
To be sure.
Then what do you say of courage? At what price would you allow yourself to be deprived of it?
@@ -478,28 +478,28 @@
And life and courage are the extreme opposites of death and cowardice?
Yes.
-
+
And you would most desire to have the former, and least the latter?
Yes.
Is that because you think the former best, and the latter worst?
To be sure.
So you reckon courage among the best things, and death among the worst.
I do.
-
Then the rescue of one's friends in battle, inasmuch as it is noble in respect of the working of good by courage, you have termed noble?
+
Then the rescue of one’s friends in battle, inasmuch as it is noble in respect of the working of good by courage, you have termed noble?
Apparently.
But evil, in respect of the working of evil by death?
Yes.
-
So we may fairly describe each of these workings as follows: as you call either of them evil because of the evil it produces, so you must call it good because of the good it produces.
+
So we may fairly describe each of these workings as follows: as you call either of them evil because of the evil it produces, so you must call it good because of the good it produces.
I believe that is so.
And again, are they noble inasmuch as they are good, and base inasmuch as they are evil?
Yes.
-
Then in saying that the rescue of one's friends in battle is noble and yet evil, you mean just the same as if you called the rescue good, but evil.
+
Then in saying that the rescue of one’s friends in battle is noble and yet evil, you mean just the same as if you called the rescue good, but evil.
I believe what you say is true, Socrates.
So nothing noble, in so far as it is noble, is evil, and nothing base, in so far as it is base, is good.
-
+
Apparently.
Now then, consider it again in this way: whoever does nobly, does well too, does he not?
Yes.
@@ -514,7 +514,7 @@
And welfare is noble?
Yes.
-
+
Hence we have seen again that noble and good are the same thing.
Apparently.
Then whatever we find to be noble we shall find also to be good, by this argument at least.
@@ -526,21 +526,21 @@
And that those who do noble things must do good things?
Yes.
-
+
And that good things are expedient?
Yes.
Hence just things, Alcibiades, are expedient.
So it seems.
Well now, are not you the speaker of all this, and I the questioner?
I seem to be, apparently.
-
So if anyone stands up to advise either the Athenians or the Peparethians, Peparethus is a small island off the coast of Thessaly. imagining that he understands what is just and unjust, and says that just things are sometimes evil, could you do other than laugh him to scorn, since you actually say yourself that just and expedient are the same?
+
So if anyone stands up to advise either the Athenians or the Peparethians, Peparethus is a small island off the coast of Thessaly. imagining that he understands what is just and unjust, and says that just things are sometimes evil, could you do other than laugh him to scorn, since you actually say yourself that just and expedient are the same?
But by Heaven, Socrates, I do not even know what I am saying, I feel altogether in such a strange state! For from moment to moment I change my view under your questioning.
And are you unaware, my friend, what this feeling is?
I am, quite.
Well, do you suppose that if someone should ask you whether you have two eyes or three, two hands or four, or anything else of that sort, you would answer differently from moment to moment, or always the same thing?
-
+
I begin to have misgivings about myself, but still I think I should make the same answer.
And the reason would be, because you know?
I think so.
@@ -548,7 +548,7 @@
Very likely.
And you say you are bewildered in answering about just and unjust, noble and base, evil and good, expedient and inexpedient? Now, is it not obvious that your bewilderment is caused by your ignorance of these things?
-
+
I agree.
Then is it the case that when a man does not know a thing he must needs be bewildered in spirit regarding that thing?
Yes, of course.
@@ -560,13 +560,13 @@
State it.
It is, my friend, that while not knowing the matter you do not suppose that you know it.
-
+
Here again, how do you mean?
Do your share, in seeing for yourself. Are you bewildered about the kind of thing that you do not know and are aware of not knowing? For instance, you know, I suppose, that you do not know about the preparation of a tasty dish?
Quite so.
Then do you think for yourself how you are to prepare it, and get bewildered, or do you entrust it to the person who knows?
I do the latter.
-
And what if you should be on a ship at sea? Would you think whether the tiller should be moved inwards or outwards, The tiller was the handle of an oar at the side of the stern, and was moved towards or away from the center of the ship. and in your ignorance bewilder yourself, or would you entrust it to the helmsman, and be quiet?
+
And what if you should be on a ship at sea? Would you think whether the tiller should be moved inwards or outwards, The tiller was the handle of an oar at the side of the stern, and was moved towards or away from the center of the ship. and in your ignorance bewilder yourself, or would you entrust it to the helmsman, and be quiet?
I would leave it to him.
So you are not bewildered about what you do not know, so long as you know that you do not know?
It seems I am not,
@@ -574,7 +574,7 @@
Here again, how do you mean?
We set about acting, I suppose, when we think we know what we are doing?
-
+
Yes.
But when people think they do not know, I suppose they hand it over to others?
To be sure.
@@ -584,7 +584,7 @@
No, indeed.
-
But since it is neither those who know, nor those of the ignorant who know that they do not know, the only people left, I think, are those who do not know, but think that they do?
+
But since it is neither those who know, nor those of the ignorant who know that they do not know, the only people left, I think, are those who do not know, but think that they do?
Yes, only those.
Then this ignorance is a cause of evils, and is the discreditable sort of stupidity?
Yes.
@@ -594,23 +594,23 @@
No, indeed.
And it is about these, you say, that you are bewildered?
Yes.
-
But if you are bewildered, is it not clear from what has gone before that you are not only ignorant of the greatest things, but while not knowing them you think that you do?
+
But if you are bewildered, is it not clear from what has gone before that you are not only ignorant of the greatest things, but while not knowing them you think that you do?
I am afraid so.
-
Alack then, Alcibiades, for the plight you are in! I shrink indeed from giving it a name, but still, as we are alone, let me speak out. You are wedded to stupidity, my fine friend, of the vilest kind; you are impeached of this by your own words, out of your own mouth; and this, it seems, is why you dash into politics before you have been educated. And you are not alone in this plight, but you share it with most of those who manage our city's affairs, except just a few, and perhaps your guardian, Pericles.
+
Alack then, Alcibiades, for the plight you are in! I shrink indeed from giving it a name, but still, as we are alone, let me speak out. You are wedded to stupidity, my fine friend, of the vilest kind; you are impeached of this by your own words, out of your own mouth; and this, it seems, is why you dash into politics before you have been educated. And you are not alone in this plight, but you share it with most of those who manage our city’s affairs, except just a few, and perhaps your guardian, Pericles.
Yes, you know, Socrates, they say he did not get his wisdom independently, but consorted with many wise men, such as Pythocleides A musician of Ceos (who was perhaps also a Pythagorean philosopher) who taught in Athens. and Anaxagoras An Ionian philosopher who lived in Athens c. 480-430 B.C.; and now, old as he is, he still confers with DamonAn Athenian musician and sophist. for that very purpose.
Well, but did you ever find a man who was wise in anything and yet unable to make another man wise in the same things as himself? For instance, the man who taught you letters was wise himself, and also made you wise, and anyone else he wished to, did he not?
Yes.
-
+
And you too, who learnt from him, will be able to make another man wise?
Yes.
And the same holds of the harper and the trainer?
Certainly.
-
For, I presume, it is a fine proof of one's knowing anything that one knows, when one is able to point to another man whom one has made to know it.
+
For, I presume, it is a fine proof of one’s knowing anything that one knows, when one is able to point to another man whom one has made to know it.
I agree.
Well then, can you tell me whom Pericles made wise? One of his sons, to begin with?
-
+
But what if the two sons of Pericles were simpletons, Socrates?
Well, Cleinias, your brother.
But why should you mention Cleinias, a madman?
@@ -619,15 +619,15 @@
-
+
But tell me of any other Athenian or foreigner, slave or freeman, who is accounted to have become wiser through converse with Pericles; as I can tell you that Pythodorus A friend of Zeno: cf. Plat. Parm. 126. son of Isolochus, and Callias, An Athenian general. son of Calliades, became through that of Zeno Of Elea, in S. Italy; a disciple of Parmenides who criticized the Pythagorean teaching.; each of them has paid Zeno a hundred minae, About 600-800 pounds, or the total expenses of two or three years at an English University. and has become both wise and distinguished.
Well, upon my word, I cannot.
Very good: then what is your intention regarding yourself? Will you remain as you are, or take some trouble?
-
-
We must put our heads together, Socrates. And indeed, as soon as you speak, I take the point and agree. For the men who manage the city's affairs, apart from a few, do strike me as uneducated.
+
+
We must put our heads together, Socrates. And indeed, as soon as you speak, I take the point and agree. For the men who manage the city’s affairs, apart from a few, do strike me as uneducated.
Then what does that mean?
-
That if they were educated, I suppose anyone who undertook to contend against them would have to get some knowledge and practice first, as he would for a match with athletes: but now, seeing that these men have gone in for politics as amateurs, what need is there for me to practise and have the trouble of learning? For I am sure that my natural powers alone will give me an easy victory over them.
+
That if they were educated, I suppose anyone who undertook to contend against them would have to get some knowledge and practice first, as he would for a match with athletes: but now, seeing that these men have gone in for politics as amateurs, what need is there for me to practise and have the trouble of learning? For I am sure that my natural powers alone will give me an easy victory over them.
Ho, ho, my good sir, what a thing to say! How unworthy of your looks and your other advantages!
What is your meaning now, Socrates? What is the connection?
I am grieved for you, and for my love.
@@ -636,24 +636,24 @@
Well, but with whom is it to be?
Is that a worthy question to be asked by a man who considers himself high-spirited?
-
+
How do you mean? Is not my contest with these men?
-
Well, suppose you were intending to steer a warship into action, would you be content to be the best hand among the crew at steering or, while regarding this skill as a necessary qualification, would you keep your eye on your actual opponents in the fight, and not, as now, on your fellow-fighters? These, I conceive, you ought so far to surpass that they would not feel fit to be your opponents, but only to be your despised fellow-fighters against the enemy, if you mean really to make your mark with some noble action that will be worthy both of yourself and of the city.
+
Well, suppose you were intending to steer a warship into action, would you be content to be the best hand among the crew at steering or, while regarding this skill as a necessary qualification, would you keep your eye on your actual opponents in the fight, and not, as now, on your fellow-fighters? These, I conceive, you ought so far to surpass that they would not feel fit to be your opponents, but only to be your despised fellow-fighters against the enemy, if you mean really to make your mark with some noble action that will be worthy both of yourself and of the city.
Why, I do mean to.
-
So you think it quite fitting for you to be satisfied if you are better than the soldiers, but neglect to keep your eye on the enemy's leaders with a view to showing yourself better than they are, or to plan and practise against them!
+
So you think it quite fitting for you to be satisfied if you are better than the soldiers, but neglect to keep your eye on the enemy’s leaders with a view to showing yourself better than they are, or to plan and practise against them!
-
+
Of whom are you speaking now, Socrates?
Do you not know that our city makes war occasionally on the Spartans and on the Great King?
That is true.
And if you are minded to be the head of our state, you would be right in thinking that your contest is with the kings of Sparta and of Persia?
That sounds like the truth.
-
No, my good friend; you ought rather to keep your eye on Meidias the quail-filliper Meidias is mentioned by Aristophanes (Aristoph. Birds 1297) for his skill in the game of filliping quails which were specially trained not to flinch. and others of his sort—who undertake to manage the city's affairs, while they still have the slavish hair Slaves in Athens were largely natives of western Asia. and had thick, close hair, very different from the wavy locks of the Greeks. (as the women would say) showing in their minds through their lack of culture, and have not yet got rid of it; who, moreover, have come with their outlandish speech to flatter the state, not to rule it—to these, I tell you, should your eyes be turned; and then you can disregard yourself, and need neither learn what is to be learnt for the great contest in which you are to be engaged, nor practise what requires practice, and so ensure that you are perfectly prepared before entering upon a political career.
+
No, my good friend; you ought rather to keep your eye on Meidias the quail-filliper Meidias is mentioned by Aristophanes (Aristoph. Birds 1297) for his skill in the game of filliping quails which were specially trained not to flinch. and others of his sort—who undertake to manage the city’s affairs, while they still have the slavish hair Slaves in Athens were largely natives of western Asia. and had thick, close hair, very different from the wavy locks of the Greeks. (as the women would say) showing in their minds through their lack of culture, and have not yet got rid of it; who, moreover, have come with their outlandish speech to flatter the state, not to rule it—to these, I tell you, should your eyes be turned; and then you can disregard yourself, and need neither learn what is to be learnt for the great contest in which you are to be engaged, nor practise what requires practice, and so ensure that you are perfectly prepared before entering upon a political career.
Why, Socrates, I believe you are right; though I think neither the Spartan generals nor the Persian king are at all different from other people.
But, my excellent friend, consider what this notion of yours means.
In regard to what?
-
First of all, do you think you would take more pains over yourself if you feared them and thought them terrible, or if you did not?
+
First of all, do you think you would take more pains over yourself if you feared them and thought them terrible, or if you did not?
Clearly, if I thought them terrible.
And do you think you will come to any harm by taking pains over yourself?
By no means; rather that I shall get much benefit.
@@ -661,33 +661,33 @@
True.
Then, in the second place, observe the probability that it is false.
How so?
-
Is it probable that noble races should produce better natures, or not?
+
Is it probable that noble races should produce better natures, or not?
Clearly, noble races would.
And will not the well-born, provided they are well brought up, probably be perfected in virtue?
That must be so.
Then let us consider, by comparing our lot with theirs, whether the Spartan and Persian kings appear to be of inferior birth. Do we not know that the former are descendants of Hercules and the latter of Achaemenes, and that the line of Hercules and the line of Achaemenes go back to Perseus, son of Zeus?
-
+
Yes, and mine, Socrates, to Eurysaces, and that of Eurysaces to Zeus!
-
Yes, and mine, noble Alcibiades, to Daedalus, Socrates' father, Sophroniscus, was a sculptor, and Daedalus was the legendary inventor of sculpture. and Daedalus to Hephaestus, son of Zeus! But take the lines of those people, i.e., the kings of Sparta and Persia. going back from them: you have a succession of kings reaching to Zeus—on the one hand, kings of Argos and Sparta; on the other, of Persia, which they have always ruled, and frequently Asia also, as at present; whereas we are private persons ourselves, and so were our fathers. And then, suppose that you had to make what show you could of your ancestors, and of Salamis as the native land of Eurysaces, or of Aegina as the home of the yet earlier Aeacus, to impress Artaxerxes, son of Xerxes, how you must expect to be laughed at! Why, I am afraid we are quite outdone by those persons in pride of birth and upbringing altogether. Or have you not observed how great are the advantages of the Spartan kings, and how their wives are kept under statutory ward of the ephors, in order that every possible precaution may be taken against the king being born of any but the Heracleidae? And the Persian king so far surpasses us that no one has a suspicion that he could have been born of anybody but the king before him; and hence the king's wife has nothing to guard her except fear. When the eldest son, the heir to the throne, is born, first of all the king's subjects who are in his palace have a feast, and then for ever after on that date the whole of Asia celebrates the king's birthday with sacrifice and feasting: but when we are born, as the comic poet The saying, which became proverbial, is thought to have occurred in one of the (now lost) plays of Plato, the Athenian comic poet, who lived c. 460-389 B.C. says, even the neighbors barely notice it,Plato Comicus? Alcibiades. After that comes the nurture of the child, not at the hands of a woman-nurse of little worth, but of the most highly approved eunuchs in the king's service, who are charged with the whole tendance of the new-born child, and especially with the business of making him as handsome as possible by moulding his limbs into a correct shape; and while doing this they are in high honor. When the boys are seven years old they are given horses and have riding lessons, and they begin to follow the chase. And when the boy reaches fourteen years he is taken over by the royal tutors, as they call them there: these are four men chosen as the most highly esteemed among the Persians of mature age, namely, the wisest one, the justest one, the most temperate one, and the bravest one.
+
Yes, and mine, noble Alcibiades, to Daedalus, Socrates’ father, Sophroniscus, was a sculptor, and Daedalus was the legendary inventor of sculpture. and Daedalus to Hephaestus, son of Zeus! But take the lines of those people, i.e., the kings of Sparta and Persia. going back from them: you have a succession of kings reaching to Zeus—on the one hand, kings of Argos and Sparta; on the other, of Persia, which they have always ruled, and frequently Asia also, as at present; whereas we are private persons ourselves, and so were our fathers. And then, suppose that you had to make what show you could of your ancestors, and of Salamis as the native land of Eurysaces, or of Aegina as the home of the yet earlier Aeacus, to impress Artaxerxes, son of Xerxes, how you must expect to be laughed at! Why, I am afraid we are quite outdone by those persons in pride of birth and upbringing altogether. Or have you not observed how great are the advantages of the Spartan kings, and how their wives are kept under statutory ward of the ephors, in order that every possible precaution may be taken against the king being born of any but the Heracleidae? And the Persian king so far surpasses us that no one has a suspicion that he could have been born of anybody but the king before him; and hence the king’s wife has nothing to guard her except fear. When the eldest son, the heir to the throne, is born, first of all the king’s subjects who are in his palace have a feast, and then for ever after on that date the whole of Asia celebrates the king’s birthday with sacrifice and feasting: but when we are born, as the comic poet The saying, which became proverbial, is thought to have occurred in one of the (now lost) plays of Plato, the Athenian comic poet, who lived c. 460-389 B.C. says, even the neighbors barely notice it,Plato Comicus? Alcibiades. After that comes the nurture of the child, not at the hands of a woman-nurse of little worth, but of the most highly approved eunuchs in the king’s service, who are charged with the whole tendance of the new-born child, and especially with the business of making him as handsome as possible by moulding his limbs into a correct shape; and while doing this they are in high honor. When the boys are seven years old they are given horses and have riding lessons, and they begin to follow the chase. And when the boy reaches fourteen years he is taken over by the royal tutors, as they call them there: these are four men chosen as the most highly esteemed among the Persians of mature age, namely, the wisest one, the justest one, the most temperate one, and the bravest one.
-
The first of these teaches him the magian lore of Zoroaster, Zoroaster was the reputed founder of the Persian religion, of which the ministers were the Magi or hereditary priests. son of Horomazes; and that is the worship of the gods: he teaches him also what pertains to a king. The justest teaches him to be truthful all his life long; the most temperate, not to be mastered by even a single pleasure, in order that he may be accustomed to be a free man and a veritable king, who is the master first of all that is in him, not the slave; while the bravest trains him to be fearless and undaunted, telling him that to be daunted is to be enslaved. But you, Alcibiades, had a tutor set over you by Pericles from amongst his servants,who was old as to be the most useless of them, Zopyrus the Thracian. I might describe to you at length the nurture and education of your competitors, were it not too much of a task; and besides, what I have said suffices to show the rest that follows thereon. But about your birth, Alcibiades, or nurture or education, or about those of any other Athenian, one may say that nobody cares, unless it be some lover whom you chance to have. And again, if you chose to glance at the wealth, the luxury, the robes with sweeping trains, the anointings with myrrh, the attendant troops of menials, and all the other refinements of the Persians, you would be ashamed at your own case, on perceiving its inferiority to theirs. Should you choose, again, to look at the temperance and orderliness, the facility and placidity, the magnanimity and discipline, the courage and endurance, and the toil-loving, success-loving, honor-loving spirit of the Spartans, you would count yourself but a child in all these things. If again you regard wealth, and think yourself something in that way, I must not keep silence on this point either, if you are to realize where you stand. For in this respect you have only to look at the wealth of the Spartans, and you will perceive that our riches here are far inferior to theirs. Think of all the land that they have both in their own and in the Messenian country: not one of our estates could compete with theirs in extent and excellence, nor again in ownership of slaves, and especially of those of the helot class, nor yet of horses, nor of all the flocks and herds that graze in Messene. However, I pass over all these things: but there is more gold and silver privately held in Lacedaemon than in the whole of Greece; for during many generations treasure has been passing in to them from every part of Greece, and often from the barbarians also, but not passing out to anyone; and just as in the fable of Aesop, where the fox remarked to the lion on the direction of the footmarks, the traces of the money going into Lacedaemon are clear enough, but nowhere are any to be seen of it coming out;
+
The first of these teaches him the magian lore of Zoroaster, Zoroaster was the reputed founder of the Persian religion, of which the ministers were the Magi or hereditary priests. son of Horomazes; and that is the worship of the gods: he teaches him also what pertains to a king. The justest teaches him to be truthful all his life long; the most temperate, not to be mastered by even a single pleasure, in order that he may be accustomed to be a free man and a veritable king, who is the master first of all that is in him, not the slave; while the bravest trains him to be fearless and undaunted, telling him that to be daunted is to be enslaved. But you, Alcibiades, had a tutor set over you by Pericles from amongst his servants,who was old as to be the most useless of them, Zopyrus the Thracian. I might describe to you at length the nurture and education of your competitors, were it not too much of a task; and besides, what I have said suffices to show the rest that follows thereon. But about your birth, Alcibiades, or nurture or education, or about those of any other Athenian, one may say that nobody cares, unless it be some lover whom you chance to have. And again, if you chose to glance at the wealth, the luxury, the robes with sweeping trains, the anointings with myrrh, the attendant troops of menials, and all the other refinements of the Persians, you would be ashamed at your own case, on perceiving its inferiority to theirs. Should you choose, again, to look at the temperance and orderliness, the facility and placidity, the magnanimity and discipline, the courage and endurance, and the toil-loving, success-loving, honor-loving spirit of the Spartans, you would count yourself but a child in all these things. If again you regard wealth, and think yourself something in that way, I must not keep silence on this point either, if you are to realize where you stand. For in this respect you have only to look at the wealth of the Spartans, and you will perceive that our riches here are far inferior to theirs. Think of all the land that they have both in their own and in the Messenian country: not one of our estates could compete with theirs in extent and excellence, nor again in ownership of slaves, and especially of those of the helot class, nor yet of horses, nor of all the flocks and herds that graze in Messene. However, I pass over all these things: but there is more gold and silver privately held in Lacedaemon than in the whole of Greece; for during many generations treasure has been passing in to them from every part of Greece, and often from the barbarians also, but not passing out to anyone; and just as in the fable of Aesop, where the fox remarked to the lion on the direction of the footmarks, the traces of the money going into Lacedaemon are clear enough, but nowhere are any to be seen of it coming out;
-
so that one can be pretty sure that those people are the richest of the Greeks in gold and silver, and that among themselves the richest is the king; for the largest and most numerous receipts of the kind are those of the kings, and besides there is the levy of the royal tribute in no slight amount, which the Spartans pay to their kings. Now, the Spartan fortunes, though great compared with the wealth of other Greeks, are nought beside that of the Persians and their king. For I myself was once told by a trustworthy person, who had been up to their court, that he traversed a very large tract of excellent land, nearly a day's journey, which the inhabitants called the girdle of the king's wife, and another which was similarly called her veil; and many other fine and fertile regions reserved for the adornment of the consort; and each of these regions was named after some part of her apparel. So I imagine, if someone should say to the king's mother Amestris, who was wife of Xerxes, The son of Deinomache The mother of Alcibiades. intends to challenge your son; the mother's dresses are worth perhaps fifty minae at the outside, while the son has under three hundred acres at Erchiae, In Attica, about fifteen miles east of Athens. she would wonder to what on earth this Alcibiades could be trusting, that he proposed to contend against Artaxerxes; and I expect she would remark—The only possible things that the man can be trusting to for his enterprise are industry and wisdom; for these are the only things of any account among the Greeks. Whereas if she were informed that this Alcibiades who is actually making such an attempt is, in the first place, as yet barely twenty years old, and secondly, altogether uneducated; and further, that when his lover tells him that he must first learn, and take pains over himself, and practise, before he enters on a contest with the king, he refuses, and says he will do very well as he is; I expect she would ask in surprise, On what, then, can the youngster rely? And if we told her, On beauty, stature, birth, wealth, and mental gifts, she would conclude we were mad, Alcibiades, when she compared the advantages of her own people in all these respects.
+
so that one can be pretty sure that those people are the richest of the Greeks in gold and silver, and that among themselves the richest is the king; for the largest and most numerous receipts of the kind are those of the kings, and besides there is the levy of the royal tribute in no slight amount, which the Spartans pay to their kings. Now, the Spartan fortunes, though great compared with the wealth of other Greeks, are nought beside that of the Persians and their king. For I myself was once told by a trustworthy person, who had been up to their court, that he traversed a very large tract of excellent land, nearly a day’s journey, which the inhabitants called the girdle of the king’s wife, and another which was similarly called her veil; and many other fine and fertile regions reserved for the adornment of the consort; and each of these regions was named after some part of her apparel. So I imagine, if someone should say to the king’s mother Amestris, who was wife of Xerxes, The son of Deinomache The mother of Alcibiades. intends to challenge your son; the mother’s dresses are worth perhaps fifty minae at the outside, while the son has under three hundred acres at Erchiae, In Attica, about fifteen miles east of Athens. she would wonder to what on earth this Alcibiades could be trusting, that he proposed to contend against Artaxerxes; and I expect she would remark—The only possible things that the man can be trusting to for his enterprise are industry and wisdom; for these are the only things of any account among the Greeks. Whereas if she were informed that this Alcibiades who is actually making such an attempt is, in the first place, as yet barely twenty years old, and secondly, altogether uneducated; and further, that when his lover tells him that he must first learn, and take pains over himself, and practise, before he enters on a contest with the king, he refuses, and says he will do very well as he is; I expect she would ask in surprise, On what, then, can the youngster rely? And if we told her, On beauty, stature, birth, wealth, and mental gifts, she would conclude we were mad, Alcibiades, when she compared the advantages of her own people in all these respects.
-
And I imagine that even Lampido, daughter of Leotychides and wife of Archidamus and mother of Agis, who have all been kings, would wonder in the same way, when she compared her people's resources, at your intention of having a contest with her son despite your bad upbringing. And yet, does it not strike you as disgraceful that our enemies' wives should have a better idea of the qualities that we need for an attempt against them than we have ourselves? Ah, my remarkable friend, listen to me and the Delphic motto, Know thyself; for these people are our competitors, not those whom you think; and there is nothing that will give us ascendancy over them save only pains and skill. If you are found wanting in these, you will be found wanting also in achievement of renown among Greeks and barbarians both; and of this I observe you to be more enamored than anyone else ever was of anything.
+
And I imagine that even Lampido, daughter of Leotychides and wife of Archidamus and mother of Agis, who have all been kings, would wonder in the same way, when she compared her people’s resources, at your intention of having a contest with her son despite your bad upbringing. And yet, does it not strike you as disgraceful that our enemies’ wives should have a better idea of the qualities that we need for an attempt against them than we have ourselves? Ah, my remarkable friend, listen to me and the Delphic motto, Know thyself; for these people are our competitors, not those whom you think; and there is nothing that will give us ascendancy over them save only pains and skill. If you are found wanting in these, you will be found wanting also in achievement of renown among Greeks and barbarians both; and of this I observe you to be more enamored than anyone else ever was of anything.
Well then, what are the pains that I must take, Socrates? Can you enlighten me? For I must say your words are remarkably like the truth.
-
Yes, I can: but we must put our heads together, Cf. above, Plat. Alc. 1.119b. you know, as to the way in which we can improve ourselves to the utmost. For observe that when I speak of the need of being educated I am not referring only to you, apart from myself; since my case is identical with yours except in one point.
+
Yes, I can: but we must put our heads together, Cf. above, Plat. Alc. 1.119b. you know, as to the way in which we can improve ourselves to the utmost. For observe that when I speak of the need of being educated I am not referring only to you, apart from myself; since my case is identical with yours except in one point.
What is that ?
My guardian is better and wiser than your one, Pericles.
Who is he, Socrates?
God, Alcibiades, who until this day would not let me converse with you; and trusting in him I say that through no other man but me will you attain to eminence.
-
+
You are jesting, Socrates.
Perhaps; I am right, however, in saying that we need to take pains—all men rather badly, but we two very badly indeed.
As to me, you are not wrong.
@@ -695,7 +695,7 @@
Then what can we do?
There must be no crying off or skulking, my good friend.
No, for that would indeed be unseemly, Socrates.
-
It would; so let us consider in common. Now tell me: we say, do we not, that we wish to be as good as possible?
+
It would; so let us consider in common. Now tell me: we say, do we not, that we wish to be as good as possible?
Yes.
In what excellence?
Clearly that which is the aim of good men.
@@ -713,7 +713,7 @@
Of Athenian gentlemen.
-
+
Do you mean by gentlemen the intelligent or the unintelligent?
The intelligent.
And everyone is good in that wherein he is intelligent?
@@ -727,7 +727,7 @@
Well now, is not the shoemaker unintelligent in the making of clothes?
Yes.
-
+
So he is bad in that?
Yes.
Then, on this showing, the same man is both bad and good.
@@ -747,7 +747,7 @@
Or harvesting?
No.
-
+
Doing nothing, or doing something?
Doing something, I say.
Doing what? Try and let me know.
@@ -756,40 +756,40 @@
Yes.
Over boatswains who make use of rowers?
No, no.
-
Because that is the pilot's distinction?
+
Because that is the pilot’s distinction?
Yes.
-
Well, do you mean ruling over men who are flute-players, and who lead the singing and make use of dancers?
+
Well, do you mean ruling over men who are flute-players, and who lead the singing and make use of dancers?
No, no.
-
Because, again, that is the chorus-teacher's function?
+
Because, again, that is the chorus-teacher’s function?
To be sure.
But whatever do you mean by being able to rule over men who make use of men?
I mean ruling over men in the city who share in it as fellow-citizens, and do business with each other.
Well, what art is this? Suppose I should ask you over again, as I did just now, what art makes men know how to rule over fellow-sailors?
-
The pilot's.
+
The pilot’s.
-
+
And what knowledge—to repeat what was said a moment ago—makes them rule over their fellow-singers?
-
That which you just mentioned, the chorus-teacher's.
-
Well now, what do you call the knowledge of one's fellow-citizens?
+
That which you just mentioned, the chorus-teacher’s.
+
Well now, what do you call the knowledge of one’s fellow-citizens?
Good counsel, I should say, Socrates.
-
Well, and is the pilot's knowledge evil counsel?
+
Well, and is the pilot’s knowledge evil counsel?
No, no.
Rather good counsel?
-
+
So I should think, for the preservation of his passengers.
Quite right. And now, for what is the good counsel of which you speak?
For the better management and preservation of the city.
And what is it that becomes present or absent when we get this better management and preservation? If, for example, you should ask me, What is it that becomes present or absent when the body is better managed and preserved?—I should reply, Health becomes present, and disease absent. Do not you think so too?
-
+
Yes.
And if, again, you asked me, What becomes present in a better condition of the eyes?—I should answer in just the same way, Sight becomes present, and blindness absent. So, in the case of the ears, deafness is caused to be absent, and hearing to be present, when they are improved and getting better treatment.
Correct.
Well then, what is it that becomes present or absent when a state is improved and has better treatment and management?
-
+
To my mind, Socrates, friendship with one another will be there, while hatred and faction will be absent.
Now, by friendship do you mean agreement or disagreement?
Agreement.
@@ -799,7 +799,7 @@
Yes.
And it makes each single person agree with himself?
Yes.
-
And what art makes each of us agree with himself as to which is the longer, a span or a cubit? Is it not mensuration?
+
And what art makes each of us agree with himself as to which is the longer, a span or a cubit? Is it not mensuration?
Of course.
And it makes both individuals and states agree with each other?
Yes.
@@ -807,18 +807,18 @@
It is.
Then what is that agreement of which you speak, and about what? And what art secures it? And is it the same in an individual as in a state, when one agrees with oneself and with another?
Most likely.
-
Well, what is it? Do not flag in your answers, but do your best to tell me.
+
Well, what is it? Do not flag in your answers, but do your best to tell me.
I suppose I mean the friendship and agreement that you find when a father and mother love their son, and between brother and brother, and husband and wife.
Then do you suppose, Alcibiades, that a husband can possibly agree with his wife about woolwork, when he does not understand it, and she does?
Oh, no.
-
Nor has he any need, since that is a woman's pursuit.
+
Nor has he any need, since that is a woman’s pursuit.
Yes.
-
+
Or again, could a woman agree with a man about soldiering, when she has not learnt it?
Oh, no.
-
Because, I expect you will say again, that is a man's affair.
+
Because, I expect you will say again, that is a man’s affair.
I would.
Then, by your account, there are some pursuits belonging to women, and some to men?
Of course.
@@ -828,7 +828,7 @@
Apparently not.
So women are not loved by men, in so far as they do their own work.
-
+
It seems not.
Nor are men by women, in so far as they do theirs.
No.
@@ -837,22 +837,22 @@
How can you say that? Without the presence of friendship, which we say must be there if states are well ordered, as otherwise they are not?
But it seems to me that friendship arises among them just on that account—that each of the two parties does its own business.
-
+
It was not so a moment since: but now, what do you mean this time? Does friendship arise where there is no agreement? And is it possible that agreement should arise where some know about the business, but others do not?
Impossible.
And are they doing what is just or unjust, when each man does his own business?
What is just, of course.
And when the citizens do what is just in the city, does not friendship arise among them?
Again I think that must be so, Socrates.
-
Then whatever do you mean by that friendship or agreement about which we must be wise and well-advised in order that we may be good men? For I am unable to learn either what it is, or in whom; since it appears that the same persons sometimes have it, and sometimes not, by your account.
+
Then whatever do you mean by that friendship or agreement about which we must be wise and well-advised in order that we may be good men? For I am unable to learn either what it is, or in whom; since it appears that the same persons sometimes have it, and sometimes not, by your account.
Well, by Heaven, Socrates, I do not even know what I mean myself, and I fear that for some time past I have lived unawares in a disgraceful condition.
-
But you must take heart. For had you perceived your plight at fifty, it would be hard for you to take pains with yourself; whereas here you are at the time of life when one ought to perceive it.
+
But you must take heart. For had you perceived your plight at fifty, it would be hard for you to take pains with yourself; whereas here you are at the time of life when one ought to perceive it.
Then what should one do on perceiving it, Socrates?
-
Answer the questions asked, Alcibiades: only do that, and with Heaven's favor—if we are to put any trust in my divination—you and I shall both be in better case.
+
Answer the questions asked, Alcibiades: only do that, and with Heaven’s favor—if we are to put any trust in my divination—you and I shall both be in better case.
That shall be, so far as my answering can avail.
-
Come then, what is taking pains over oneself— for we may perchance be taking, unawares, no pains over ourselves, though we think we are—and when does a man actually do it? Does he take pains over himself at the same time as over his own things?
+
Come then, what is taking pains over oneself— for we may perchance be taking, unawares, no pains over ourselves, though we think we are—and when does a man actually do it? Does he take pains over himself at the same time as over his own things?
I at least believe so.
Well now, when does a man take pains over his feet? Is it when he takes pains over what belongs to his feet?
I do not understand.
@@ -862,7 +862,7 @@
Yes.
And likewise clothes and coverlets belong to the whole body?
-
+
Yes.
Now when we take pains over our shoes, we take pains over our feet?
I do not quite understand, Socrates.
@@ -874,7 +874,7 @@
Shoe-making.
So by shoe-making we take pains over our shoes?
-
+
Yes.
And over our foot too by shoe-making? Or by that art whereby we make feet better?
By that art.
@@ -886,18 +886,18 @@
Quite so.
And by gymnastic over our hands, but by ring-engraving over what belongs to the hand?
Yes.
-
And by gymnastic over the body, but by weaving and the rest over what belongs to the body?
+
And by gymnastic over the body, but by weaving and the rest over what belongs to the body?
Absolutely so.
Then for taking pains over a thing itself and over what belongs to it we use different arts.
Apparently.
So when you take pains over your belongings you are not taking pains over yourself.
Not at all.
-
For the arts, it seems, that one used for taking pains over oneself and over one's belongings would not be the same.
+
For the arts, it seems, that one used for taking pains over oneself and over one’s belongings would not be the same.
Apparently not.
Come then, whatever kind of art can we use for taking pains over ourselves?
I cannot say.
-
+
Well, so much at least has been admitted, that it is not one which would help us to make a single one of our possessions better, but one which would help to make ourselves so?
That is true.
Now, should we ever have known what art makes a shoe better, if we had not known a shoe?
@@ -907,17 +907,17 @@
Well then, could we ever know what art makes the man himself better, if we were ignorant of what we are ourselves?
-
+
Impossible.
Well, and is it an easy thing to know oneself, and was it a mere scamp who inscribed these words on the temple at Delphi; or is it a hard thing, and not a task for anybody?
I have often thought, Socrates, that it was for anybody; but often, too, that it was very hard.
But, Alcibiades, whether it is easy or not, here is the fact for us all the same: if we have that knowledge, we are like to know what pains to take over ourselves; but if we have it not, we never can.
That is so.
-
+
Come then, in what way can the same-in-itself This seems to be a sudden adumbration of the Platonic idea or form which remains constant, and so the same, behind the shifting objects of sense related to it through its influences or impress. Cf. below, Plat. Alc. 1.130d. be discovered? For thus we may discover what we are ourselves; whereas if we remain in ignorance of it we must surely fail.
Rightly spoken.
-
Steady, then, in Heaven's name! To whom are you talking now? To me, are you not?
+
Steady, then, in Heaven’s name! To whom are you talking now? To me, are you not?
Yes.
And I in turn to you ?
Yes.
@@ -927,7 +927,7 @@
Yes.
And Socrates uses speech in talking?
-
+
Of course.
And you call talking and using speech the same thing, I suppose.
To be sure.
@@ -939,7 +939,7 @@
Of course.
And in the same way what the harper uses in harping will be different from the harper himself?
Yes.
-
Well then, that is what I was asking just now—whether the user and what he uses are always, in your opinion, two different things.
+
Well then, that is what I was asking just now—whether the user and what he uses are always, in your opinion, two different things.
They are.
Then what are we to say of the shoemaker? Does he cut with his tools only, or with his hands as well?
With his hands as well.
@@ -949,7 +949,7 @@
Yes.
And we admit that the user and what he uses are different things?
Yes.
-
Then the shoemaker and the harper are different from the hands and eyes that they use for their work?
+
Then the shoemaker and the harper are different from the hands and eyes that they use for their work?
Apparently.
And man uses his whole body too?
To be sure.
@@ -963,7 +963,7 @@
Yes.
-
+
And the user of it must be the soul?
It must.
And ruler?
@@ -976,7 +976,7 @@
Very well.
But yet we have admitted that what actually rules the body is man?
-
+
We have.
And does the body rule itself?
By no means.
@@ -989,31 +989,31 @@
The unlikeliest thing in the world: for if one of the two does not share in the rule, it is quite inconceivable that the combination of the two can be ruling.
You are right.
-
+
But since neither the body nor the combination of the two is man, we are reduced, I suppose, to this: either man is nothing at all, or if something, he turns out to be nothing else than soul.
Precisely so.
Well, do you require some yet clearer proof that the soul is man?
No, I assure you: I think it is amply proved.
-
And if it is tolerably, though not exactly, we are content; exact knowledge will be ours later, when we have discovered the thing that we passed over just now because it would involve much consideration.
+
And if it is tolerably, though not exactly, we are content; exact knowledge will be ours later, when we have discovered the thing that we passed over just now because it would involve much consideration.
What is that?
The point suggested in that remark a moment ago, Cf. Plat. Alc. 1.129b. that we should first consider the same-in-itself; but so far, instead of the same, we have been considering what each single thing is in itself. And perhaps we shall be satisfied with that: for surely we cannot say that anything has more absolute possession of ourselves than the soul.
No, indeed.
And it is proper to take the view that you and I are conversing with each other, while we make use of words, by intercourse of soul with soul?
Quite so.
-
+
Well, that is just what we suggested a little while ago—that Socrates, in using words to talk with Alcibiades, is holding speech, not with your face, it would seem, but with Alcibiades—that is, with his soul.
I believe so.
Then he who enjoins a knowledge of oneself bids us become acquainted with the soul.
-
+
So it seems.
And anyone who gets to know something belonging to the body knows the things that are his, but not himself.
That is so.
Then no physician, in so far as he is a physician, knows himself, nor does any trainer, in so far as he is a trainer.
It seems not.
-
And farmers, and craftsmen generally, are far from knowing themselves. For these people, it would seem, do not even know their own things, but only things still more remote than their own things, in respect of the arts which they follow; since they know but the things of the body, with which it is tended.
+
And farmers, and craftsmen generally, are far from knowing themselves. For these people, it would seem, do not even know their own things, but only things still more remote than their own things, in respect of the arts which they follow; since they know but the things of the body, with which it is tended.
That is true.
So if knowing oneself is temperance, none of these people is temperate in respect of his art.
None, I agree.
@@ -1021,72 +1021,72 @@
Quite so.
Then once again, whoever tends his body tends his own things, but not himself?
It looks rather like it.
-
But whoever tends his money tends neither himself nor his own things, but only things yet more remote than his own things?
+
But whoever tends his money tends neither himself nor his own things, but only things yet more remote than his own things?
I agree.
So that the money-maker has ceased to do his own business.
Correct.
-
And if anyone is found to be a lover of Alcibiades' body, he has fallen in love, not with Alcibiades, but with something belonging to Alcibiades?
+
And if anyone is found to be a lover of Alcibiades’ body, he has fallen in love, not with Alcibiades, but with something belonging to Alcibiades?
That is true.
Your lover is rather he who loves your soul?
He must be, apparently, by our argument.
And he who loves your body quits you, and is gone, as soon as its bloom is over?
Apparently.
-
+
Whereas he who loves your soul will not quit you so long as it makes for what is better?
So it seems.
-
And I am he who does not quit you, but remains with you when your body's prime is over, and the rest have departed.
+
And I am he who does not quit you, but remains with you when your body’s prime is over, and the rest have departed.
Yes, and I am glad of it, Socrates, and hope you will not go.
Then you must endeavor to be as handsome as you can.
Well, I shall endeavor.
-
You see how you stand: Alcibiades, the son of Cleinias, it seems, neither had nor has any lover except one only, and that a cherished one, Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus and Phaenarete.
+
You see how you stand: Alcibiades, the son of Cleinias, it seems, neither had nor has any lover except one only, and that a cherished one, Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus and Phaenarete.
True.
And you said that I only just anticipated you in coming to you, for otherwise you would have come to me first for the purpose of inquiring why I am the only one who does not leave you?
Yes, that was so.
-
Then the reason was that I was the only lover of you, whereas the rest were lovers of what is yours; and that is losing its charm, while you are beginning to bloom. So now, if you are not blighted and deformed by the Athenian people, I shall never forsake you. For my chiefest fear is of your being blighted by becoming a lover of the people, since many a good Athenian has come to that ere now. For fair of face is the people of great-hearted Erechtheus;Hom. Il. 2.547 but you should get a view of it stripped: so take the precaution that I recommend.
+
Then the reason was that I was the only lover of you, whereas the rest were lovers of what is yours; and that is losing its charm, while you are beginning to bloom. So now, if you are not blighted and deformed by the Athenian people, I shall never forsake you. For my chiefest fear is of your being blighted by becoming a lover of the people, since many a good Athenian has come to that ere now. For fair of face is the people of great-hearted Erechtheus;Hom. Il. 2.547 but you should get a view of it stripped: so take the precaution that I recommend.
What is it?
-
+
Exercise yourself first, my wonderful friend, in learning what you ought to know before entering on politics; you must wait till you have learnt, in order that you may be armed with an antidote and so come to no harm.
Your advice seems to me good, Socrates; but try to explain in what way we can take pains over ourselves.
Well, we have made one step in advance; for there is a pretty fair agreement now as to what we are, whereas we were afraid we might fail of this and take pains, without knowing it, over something other than ourselves.
That is so.
-
+
And the next step, we see, is to take care of the soul, and look to that.
Clearly.
While handing over to others the care of our bodies and our coffers.
Quite so.
-
Then how shall we obtain the most certain knowledge of it? For if we know that, it seems we shall know ourselves also. In Heaven's name, do we fail to comprehend the wise words of the Delphic inscription, which we mentioned just now?
+
Then how shall we obtain the most certain knowledge of it? For if we know that, it seems we shall know ourselves also. In Heaven’s name, do we fail to comprehend the wise words of the Delphic inscription, which we mentioned just now?
With what intent do you say that, Socrates?
-
+
I will tell you what I suspect to be the real advice which the inscription gives us. I rather think there are not many illustrations of it to be found, but only in the case of sight.
What do you mean by that?
Consider in your turn: suppose that, instead of speaking to a man, it said to the eye of one of us, as a piece of advice See thyself, how should we apprehend the meaning of the admonition? Would it not be, that the eye should look at that by looking at which it would see itself?
Clearly.
-
Then let us think what object there is anywhere, by looking at which we can see both it and ourselves.
+
Then let us think what object there is anywhere, by looking at which we can see both it and ourselves.
Why, clearly, Socrates, mirrors and things of that sort.
Quite right. And there is also something of that sort in the eye that we see with?
To be sure.
-
And have you observed that the face of the person who looks into another's eye is shown in the optic confronting him, as in a mirror, and we call this the pupil, The Greek κόρη and the Latin pupilla both mean little girl or doll, and were used to indicate the dark center of the eye in which a tiny image can be seen reflected. for in a sort it is an image of the person looking?
+
And have you observed that the face of the person who looks into another’s eye is shown in the optic confronting him, as in a mirror, and we call this the pupil, The Greek κόρη and the Latin pupilla both mean little girl or doll, and were used to indicate the dark center of the eye in which a tiny image can be seen reflected. for in a sort it is an image of the person looking?
-
+
That is true.
Then an eye viewing another eye, and looking at the most perfect part of it, the thing wherewith it sees, will thus see itself.
Apparently.
-
But if it looks at any other thing in man or at anything in nature but what resembles this, i.e. it must look at the pupil of a man's eye, or at what is comparable to that perfect part in other things. it will not see itself.
+
But if it looks at any other thing in man or at anything in nature but what resembles this, i.e. it must look at the pupil of a man’s eye, or at what is comparable to that perfect part in other things. it will not see itself.
That is true.
Then if an eye is to see itself, it must look at an eye, and at that region of the eye in which the virtue of an eye is found to occur; and this, I presume, is sight.
That is so.
And if the soul too, my dear Alcibiades, is to know herself, she must surely look at a soul, and especially at that region of it in which occurs the virtue of a soul—wisdom, and at any other part of a soul which resembles this?
I agree, Socrates.
-
+
And can we find any part of the soul that we can call more divine than this, which is the seat of knowledge and thought?
We cannot.
Then this part of her resembles God, and whoever looks at this, and comes to know all that is divine, will gain thereby the best knowledge of himself.
@@ -1096,25 +1096,25 @@
So if we have no knowledge of ourselves and no temperance, shall we be able to know our own belongings, good or evil?
How can that be, Socrates?
-
+
For I expect it seems impossible to you that without knowing Alcibiades you should know that the belongings of Alcibiades are in fact his.
Impossible indeed, upon my word.
Nor could we know that our belongings are ours if we did not even know ourselves?
How could we?
And so, if we did not so much as know our belongings, we could not know the belongings of our belongings either?
Apparently not.
-
Then we were not quite correct in admitting just now that there are people who, without knowing themselves, know their belongings, while others know their belongings' belongings. For it seems to be the function of one man and one art to discern all three— himself, his belongings, and the belongings of his belongings.
+
Then we were not quite correct in admitting just now that there are people who, without knowing themselves, know their belongings, while others know their belongings’ belongings. For it seems to be the function of one man and one art to discern all three— himself, his belongings, and the belongings of his belongings.
It looks like it.
And anyone who is ignorant of his belongings will be similarly ignorant, I suppose, of the belongings of others.
Quite so.
-
And if ignorant of others' affairs, he will be ignorant also of the affairs of states.
+
And if ignorant of others’ affairs, he will be ignorant also of the affairs of states.
He must be.
Then such a man can never be a statesman.
No, indeed.
No, nor an economist either.
-
+
No, indeed.
Nor will he know what he is doing.
No, I agree.
@@ -1129,17 +1129,17 @@
Then it is impossible to be happy if one is not temperate and good.
Impossible.
-
+
So it is the bad men who are wretched.
Yes, very.
And hence it is not he who has made himself rich that is relieved of wretchedness, but he who has made himself temperate.
Apparently.
So it is not walls or warships or arsenals that cities need, Alcibiades, if they are to be happy, nor numbers, nor size, without virtue.
No, indeed.
-
And if you are to manage the city's affairs properly and honorably, you must impart virtue to the citizens.
+
And if you are to manage the city’s affairs properly and honorably, you must impart virtue to the citizens.
Of course.
-
+
But could one possibly impart a thing that one had not?
How, indeed?
Then you or anyone else who is to be governor and curator, not merely of himself and his belongings in private, but of the state and its affairs, must first acquire virtue himself.
@@ -1147,7 +1147,7 @@
Hence it is not licence or authority for doing what one pleases that you have to secure to yourself or the state, but justice and temperance.
Apparently.
-
+
For you and the state, if you act justly and temperately, will act so as to please God.
Naturally.
And, as we were saying in what went before, you will act with your eyes turned on what is divine and bright.
@@ -1157,18 +1157,18 @@
And so you will act aright and well?
Yes.
-
+
Well now, if you act in this way, I am ready to warrant that you must be happy.
And I can rely on your warranty.
But if you act unjustly, with your eyes on the godless and dark, the probability is that your acts will resemble these through your ignorance of yourselves.
That is probable.
-
For if a man, my dear Alcibiades, is at liberty to do what he pleases, but is lacking in mind, what is the probable result to him personally, or to the state as well? For instance, if he is sick and at liberty to do what he pleases—without a medical mind, but with a despot's power which prevents anyone from even reproving him—what will be the result? Will not his health, in all likelihood, be shattered?
+
For if a man, my dear Alcibiades, is at liberty to do what he pleases, but is lacking in mind, what is the probable result to him personally, or to the state as well? For instance, if he is sick and at liberty to do what he pleases—without a medical mind, but with a despot’s power which prevents anyone from even reproving him—what will be the result? Will not his health, in all likelihood, be shattered?
That is true.
Again, in a ship, if a man were at liberty to do what he chose, but were devoid of mind and excellence in navigation, do you perceive what must happen to him and his fellow-sailors?
I do: they must all perish.
-
And in just the same way, if a state, or any office or authority, is lacking in excellence or virtue, it will be overtaken by failure?
+
And in just the same way, if a state, or any office or authority, is lacking in excellence or virtue, it will be overtaken by failure?
It must.
Then it is not despotic power, my admirable Alcibiades, that you ought to secure either to yourself or to the state, if you would be happy, but virtue.
That is true.
@@ -1179,7 +1179,7 @@
And the nobler more becoming?
Of course.
-
+
Then it becomes a bad man to be a slave, since it is better.
Yes.
So vice is a thing that becomes a slave.
@@ -1192,16 +1192,16 @@
I think I perceive only too clearly.
Then do you know how you may escape from the condition in which you now find yourself? Let us not give it a name, where a handsome person is concerned!
-
+
I do.
How?
If it be your wish, Socrates.
That is not well said, Alcibiades.
Well, what should I say?
-
If it be God's will.
+
If it be God’s will.
Then I say it. And yet I say this besides, that we are like to make a change in our parts, Socrates, so that I shall have yours and you mine. For from this day onward it must be the case that I am your attendant, and you have me always in attendance on you. παιδαγωγεῖν is used here simply in the sense of following about as personal attendant.
-
+
Ah, generous friend! So my love will be just like a stork; for after hatching a winged love in you it is to be cherished in return by its nestling. It was commonly believed that aged storks were fed by younger storks which they had previously hatched and reared.
Well, that is the position, and I shall begin here and now to take pains over justice.
I should like to think you will continue to do so; yet I am apprehensive, not from any distrust of your nature, but in view of the might of the state, lest it overcome both me and you.
Alcibiades, are you on your way to offer a prayer to the god?
@@ -104,14 +104,14 @@
I do, certainly.
-
Then you would agree that one should take great precautions against falling unawares into the error of praying for great evils in the belief that they are good, while the gods happen to be disposed to grant freely what one is praying for? Just as Oedipus, they say, suddenly prayed that his sons might divide their patrimony with the sword: it was open to him to pray that his present evils might by some means be averted, but he invoked others in addition to those which he had already. Wherefore not only were those words of his accomplished, but many other dread results therefrom, which I think there is no need to recount in detail.
+
Then you would agree that one should take great precautions against falling unawares into the error of praying for great evils in the belief that they are good, while the gods happen to be disposed to grant freely what one is praying for? Just as Oedipus, they say, suddenly prayed that his sons might divide their patrimony with the sword: it was open to him to pray that his present evils might by some means be averted, but he invoked others in addition to those which he had already. Wherefore not only were those words of his accomplished, but many other dread results therefrom, which I think there is no need to recount in detail.
But you have instanced a madman, Socrates: why, do you suppose that anyone could bring himself, while he was in a sound state, to utter such a prayer?
Do you regard madness as the opposite of wisdom?
Certainly I do.
-
+
And there are some men whom you regard as unwise, and others as wise?
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@
And others also who are in ill-health?
-
+
Quite so.
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@
How do you mean?
-
Tell me, do you think it is only possible to be either wise or unwise, or is there some third condition between these, which makes a man neither wise nor unwise?
+
Tell me, do you think it is only possible to be either wise or unwise, or is there some third condition between these, which makes a man neither wise nor unwise?
No, there is not.
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@
Yes, I admitted that.
-
Well now, can there possibly be two opposites of one thing?
+
Well now, can there possibly be two opposites of one thing?
By no means.
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@
So we shall be right, Alcibiades, in saying that all unwise persons are mad; for example, such of your contemporaries as happen to be unwise—some such there are—and of your elders, even: for tell me, in Heaven’s name, do you not think that in our city the wise people are but few, whereas the majority are unwise, and these you call mad?
I do.
-
Well, do you suppose we could safely live with so many madmen as our fellow-citizens, and should not long ago have paid the penalty for it in knocks and blows at their hands, and all the usual proceedings of madmen? Consider now, my wonderful friend, whether the case is not quite different?
+
Well, do you suppose we could safely live with so many madmen as our fellow-citizens, and should not long ago have paid the penalty for it in knocks and blows at their hands, and all the usual proceedings of madmen? Consider now, my wonderful friend, whether the case is not quite different?
Well, it must be, Socrates. For it looks as though it were not as I thought.
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@
Well, I will tell you. We conceive there are some who are sick, do we not?
-
We do, to be sure.
+
We do, to be sure.
And do you believe that a sick man must necessarily have the gout, or a fever, or ophthalmia? Do you not think that, although he may be afflicted in none of these ways, he may be suffering from some other disease? For surely there are many of them: these are not the only ones.
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@
No, I should think not: still, I am in doubt as to my meaning.
-
+
Well, if you will attend to me, two togetherCf. Hom. Il. 10.224σύν τε δύ’ ἐρχομένω, καί τε πρὸ ὃ τοῦ ἐνόησεν ὅππως κέρδος ἔῃ, if two go along together, then one marks before the other how advantage may be had. will be searching, and so mayhap we shall find what we seek.
@@ -209,21 +209,21 @@
We have.
-
And our admission seems to me quite right. For everyone in a fever is sick, but yet not everyone who is sick has a fever or the gout or ophthalmia, I take it; though everything of the sort is a disease, but differs—to quote those whom we call doctors— in its manifestation. ἀπεργασία here seems to be used for effect produced instead of its usual meaning, fully effecting, completion. For they are not all alike, nor of like effect, but each works according to its own faculty, and yet all are diseases. In the same way, we conceive of some men as artisans, do we not?
+
And our admission seems to me quite right. For everyone in a fever is sick, but yet not everyone who is sick has a fever or the gout or ophthalmia, I take it; though everything of the sort is a disease, but differs—to quote those whom we call doctors— in its manifestation. ἀπεργασία here seems to be used for effect produced instead of its usual meaning, fully effecting, completion. For they are not all alike, nor of like effect, but each works according to its own faculty, and yet all are diseases. In the same way, we conceive of some men as artisans, do we not?
Certainly.
-
That is, cobblers and carpenters and statuaries and a host of others, whom we need not mention in particular; but any way, they have their several departments of craft, and all of them are craftsmen; yet they are not all carpenters or cobblers or statuaries, though these taken together are craftsmen.
+
That is, cobblers and carpenters and statuaries and a host of others, whom we need not mention in particular; but any way, they have their several departments of craft, and all of them are craftsmen; yet they are not all carpenters or cobblers or statuaries, though these taken together are craftsmen.
No, indeed.
-
In the same way, then, have men divided unwisdom also among them, and those who have the largest share of it we call mad, and those who have a little less, dolts and idiots; though people who prefer to use the mildest language term them sometimes romantic,μεγαλόψυχος has here declined from high-souled or magnanimous to something like Quixotic. sometimes simpleminded,εὐήθης, even in Plato’s time, varied between good-hearted and silly. or again innocent,inexperienced, or obtuse; and many another name will you find if you look for more. But all these things are unwisdom, though they differ, as we observed that one art or one disease differs from another. Or how does it strike you?
+
In the same way, then, have men divided unwisdom also among them, and those who have the largest share of it we call mad, and those who have a little less, dolts and idiots; though people who prefer to use the mildest language term them sometimes romantic,μεγαλόψυχος has here declined from high-souled or magnanimous to something like Quixotic. sometimes simpleminded,εὐήθης, even in Plato’s time, varied between good-hearted and silly. or again innocent,inexperienced, or obtuse; and many another name will you find if you look for more. But all these things are unwisdom, though they differ, as we observed that one art or one disease differs from another. Or how does it strike you?
That is my view.
Then let us turn at this point and retrace our steps. For we said, you know, at the beginning that we must consider who the unwise can be, and who the wise: for we had admitted that there are such persons, had we not?
-
Yes, we have admitted it.
+
Yes, we have admitted it.
Then you conceive those to be wise who know what one ought to do and say?
@@ -238,9 +238,9 @@
Apparently.
-
Well, just such a person, as I was saying, Alcibiades, was Oedipus; and even in our time you will find many who do the same, not in a fit of anger, as he was: they think they pray not for something evil, but for something good. He neither prayed for that, nor thought he did, but there are others who are in the opposite case. For I imagine that if the god to whom you are now going should appear to you and first ask you, before you made any prayer, whether you would be content to become sovereign of the Athenian state and, on your accounting this as something poor and unimportant, should add and of all the Greeks also; and if he saw you were still unsatisfied unless he promised you besides the mastery of all Europe, and should not merely promise you that, but on the self-same day a recognition by all men, if you so desired, of Alcibiades, son of Cleinias, as their sovereign—I imagine you would actually depart in a transport of delight, as having secured the greatest of goods.
+
Well, just such a person, as I was saying, Alcibiades, was Oedipus; and even in our time you will find many who do the same, not in a fit of anger, as he was: they think they pray not for something evil, but for something good. He neither prayed for that, nor thought he did, but there are others who are in the opposite case. For I imagine that if the god to whom you are now going should appear to you and first ask you, before you made any prayer, whether you would be content to become sovereign of the Athenian state and, on your accounting this as something poor and unimportant, should add and of all the Greeks also; and if he saw you were still unsatisfied unless he promised you besides the mastery of all Europe, and should not merely promise you that, but on the self-same day a recognition by all men, if you so desired, of Alcibiades, son of Cleinias, as their sovereign—I imagine you would actually depart in a transport of delight, as having secured the greatest of goods.
-
So would anybody else, I imagine, Socrates, at such a stroke of luck!
+
So would anybody else, I imagine, Socrates, at such a stroke of luck!
But still you would not wish to sacrifice your life even for the territory and sovereignty of all the Greeks and barbarians together.
@@ -250,19 +250,19 @@
No, indeed.
-
So you see it is not safe either to accept casually what one is given, or to pray for one’s own advancement, if one is going to be injured in consequence, or deprived of one’s life altogether. Yet we could tell of many ere now who, having desired sovereignty, and endeavored to secure it, with the idea of working for their good, have lost their lives by plots which their sovereignty has provoked. And I expect you are not unacquainted with certain events of a day or two ago,Hom. Il. 2.303 when Archelaus, the monarch of Macedonia, was slain This assassination occurred in 399 B.C., the year of Socrates’ death. by his favorite, who was as much in love with the monarchy as Archelaus was with him, and who killed his lover with the expectation of being not only the monarch, but also a happy man: but after holding the monarchy for three or four days he was plotted against by others in his turn, and perished.
+
So you see it is not safe either to accept casually what one is given, or to pray for one’s own advancement, if one is going to be injured in consequence, or deprived of one’s life altogether. Yet we could tell of many ere now who, having desired sovereignty, and endeavored to secure it, with the idea of working for their good, have lost their lives by plots which their sovereignty has provoked. And I expect you are not unacquainted with certain events of a day or two ago,Hom. Il. 2.303 when Archelaus, the monarch of Macedonia, was slain This assassination occurred in 399 B.C., the year of Socrates’ death. by his favorite, who was as much in love with the monarchy as Archelaus was with him, and who killed his lover with the expectation of being not only the monarch, but also a happy man: but after holding the monarchy for three or four days he was plotted against by others in his turn, and perished.
-You have only to look at some of our own citizens—and these are examples that we know, not by hearsay, but by personal observation—who in their time have desired to hold military command and have obtained it, and see how some to this very day are exiles from our city, while others have lost their lives. And even those who are deemed to be faring best have not only gone through many dangers and terrors in holding their command, but on returning home have continued to be as sorely besieged by informers as they were by the enemy, so that some of them wished to heaven that they had been anything but commanders rather than have held such appointments. Of course, if these dangers and toils were conducive to our advantage, there would be some reason for them; but the case is quite the contrary. And you will find it is just the same in regard to children: some people have been known to pray that they might have them, and when they have got them have fallen into the greatest disasters and pains. For some have had children that were utterly bad, and have spent their whole lives in repining; while others, though they had good ones, were bereft of them by disasters that overtook them, and thus were cast into as great misfortune as the others, and wished that no children at all had been born to them. But nevertheless, with all this plain evidence, and a great deal more of a similar kind, before men’s eyes, it is rare to find anyone who has either declined what was offered to him or, when he was likely to gain something by prayer, refrained from praying. Most men would not decline the offer of either a monarchy or a generalship or any of the various other things which bring with them harm rather than benefit, but would even pray to be granted them in cases where they were lacking: but after a little while they often change their tune, and retract all their former prayers. I question therefore if men are not really wrong in blaming the gods as the authors of their ills, when they themselves by their own presumptionHom. Od. 1.32—or unwisdom, shall we say?— have gotten them more than destined sorrows.Hom. Od. 1.32 It would seem, at any rate, Alcibiades, that one old poet had some wisdom; for I conceive it was because he had some foolish friends, whom he saw working and praying for things that were not for their advantage, though supposed to be by them, that he made a common prayer on behalf of them all, in terms something like these: King Zeus, give unto us what is good, whether we pray or pray not;But what is grievous, even if we pray for it, do thou avert.Anth. Pal. 10.108.
+You have only to look at some of our own citizens—and these are examples that we know, not by hearsay, but by personal observation—who in their time have desired to hold military command and have obtained it, and see how some to this very day are exiles from our city, while others have lost their lives. And even those who are deemed to be faring best have not only gone through many dangers and terrors in holding their command, but on returning home have continued to be as sorely besieged by informers as they were by the enemy, so that some of them wished to heaven that they had been anything but commanders rather than have held such appointments. Of course, if these dangers and toils were conducive to our advantage, there would be some reason for them; but the case is quite the contrary. And you will find it is just the same in regard to children: some people have been known to pray that they might have them, and when they have got them have fallen into the greatest disasters and pains. For some have had children that were utterly bad, and have spent their whole lives in repining; while others, though they had good ones, were bereft of them by disasters that overtook them, and thus were cast into as great misfortune as the others, and wished that no children at all had been born to them. But nevertheless, with all this plain evidence, and a great deal more of a similar kind, before men’s eyes, it is rare to find anyone who has either declined what was offered to him or, when he was likely to gain something by prayer, refrained from praying. Most men would not decline the offer of either a monarchy or a generalship or any of the various other things which bring with them harm rather than benefit, but would even pray to be granted them in cases where they were lacking: but after a little while they often change their tune, and retract all their former prayers. I question therefore if men are not really wrong in blaming the gods as the authors of their ills, when they themselves by their own presumptionHom. Od. 1.32—or unwisdom, shall we say?— have gotten them more than destined sorrows.Hom. Od. 1.32 It would seem, at any rate, Alcibiades, that one old poet had some wisdom; for I conceive it was because he had some foolish friends, whom he saw working and praying for things that were not for their advantage, though supposed to be by them, that he made a common prayer on behalf of them all, in terms something like these: King Zeus, give unto us what is good, whether we pray or pray not;But what is grievous, even if we pray for it, do thou avert.Anth. Pal. 10.108.
So then, to my mind the poet spoke well and soundly; but if you have thought of an answer to his words, do not be silent.
-
It is difficult, Socrates, to gainsay what has been well spoken: one thing, however, I do observe —how many evils are caused to men by ignorance, when, as it seems, we are beguiled by her not only into doing, but—worst of all—into praying to be granted the greatest evils. Now that is a thing that no one would suppose of himself; each of us would rather suppose he was competent to pray for his own greatest good, not his greatest evil. Why, that would seem, in truth, more like some sort of curse than a prayer!
+
It is difficult, Socrates, to gainsay what has been well spoken: one thing, however, I do observe —how many evils are caused to men by ignorance, when, as it seems, we are beguiled by her not only into doing, but—worst of all—into praying to be granted the greatest evils. Now that is a thing that no one would suppose of himself; each of us would rather suppose he was competent to pray for his own greatest good, not his greatest evil. Why, that would seem, in truth, more like some sort of curse than a prayer!
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But perhaps, my excellent friend, some person who is wiser than either you or I may say we are wrong to be so free with our abuse of ignorance, unless we can add that it is ignorance of certain things, and is a good to certain persons in certain conditions, as to those others it is an evil.
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But perhaps, my excellent friend, some person who is wiser than either you or I may say we are wrong to be so free with our abuse of ignorance, unless we can add that it is ignorance of certain things, and is a good to certain persons in certain conditions, as to those others it is an evil.
How do you mean? Can there be anything of which it is better for anybody, in any condition whatsoever, to be ignorant than cognizant?
@@ -270,14 +270,14 @@ So then, to my mind the poet spoke well and soundly; but if you have thought of
No, indeed, upon my word.
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But surely I shall not have to tax you with an inclination to commit such an act against your own mother as Orestes and Alcmaeon, and any others who have followed their example, are said to have committed against theirs.
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But surely I shall not have to tax you with an inclination to commit such an act against your own mother as Orestes and Alcmaeon, and any others who have followed their example, are said to have committed against theirs.
No unlucky words, in Heaven’s name,
Socrates!
Why, it is not the person who says, Alcibiades, that you would not like to be guilty of such an act, whom you should bid avoid unlucky words, but much rather him who might say the contrary; since the act seems to you so very dreadful as to be unfit even for such casual mention. But do you think that Orestes, if he had had all his wits about him and had known what was best for him to do, would have brought himself to commit any act of the sort?
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No, indeed.
+
No, indeed.
Nor would anyone else, I imagine.
@@ -293,11 +293,11 @@ So then, to my mind the poet spoke well and soundly; but if you have thought of
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Then let us consider this further case. Suppose it should quite suddenly occur to your mind that you had better take a dagger and go to the door of Pericles, your own guardian and friend, and ask if he were at home, with the design of killing just him and no one else, and his servants said he was at home: now, I do not say you would be inclined to do any such thing, but I suppose, if you are under the impression which at some moment may well be present, surely, to the mind of a man who is ignorant of the best—that what is really the worst is best at some moment—or do you not agree?
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Then let us consider this further case. Suppose it should quite suddenly occur to your mind that you had better take a dagger and go to the door of Pericles, your own guardian and friend, and ask if he were at home, with the design of killing just him and no one else, and his servants said he was at home: now, I do not say you would be inclined to do any such thing, but I suppose, if you are under the impression which at some moment may well be present, surely, to the mind of a man who is ignorant of the best—that what is really the worst is best at some moment—or do you not agree?
Quite so.
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Well then, if you went indoors and saw Pericles himself, but did not know him, and thought he was somebody else, would you still venture to kill him?
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Well then, if you went indoors and saw Pericles himself, but did not know him, and thought he was somebody else, would you still venture to kill him?
No, upon my word, I should think not.
@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ So then, to my mind the poet spoke well and soundly; but if you have thought of
No, indeed.
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Well now, do you suppose that Orestes would ever have attacked his mother if he had similarly failed to know her?
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Well now, do you suppose that Orestes would ever have attacked his mother if he had similarly failed to know her?
I do not think he would.
@@ -323,18 +323,18 @@ So then, to my mind the poet spoke well and soundly; but if you have thought of
So you see that ignorance of certain things is for certain persons in certain states a good, not an evil, as you supposed just now.
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It seems to be.
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It seems to be.
Then if you care to consider the sequel of this, I daresay it will surprise you.
What may that be, Socrates?
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I mean that, generally speaking, it rather looks as though the possession of the sciences as a whole, if it does not include possession of the science of the best, will in a few instances help, but in most will harm, the owner. Consider it this way: must it not be the case, in your opinion, that when we are about to do or say anything, we first suppose that we know, or do really know, the thing we so confidently intend to say or do?
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I mean that, generally speaking, it rather looks as though the possession of the sciences as a whole, if it does not include possession of the science of the best, will in a few instances help, but in most will harm, the owner. Consider it this way: must it not be the case, in your opinion, that when we are about to do or say anything, we first suppose that we know, or do really know, the thing we so confidently intend to say or do?
I think so.
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Well, take the orators, for example: they either know, or think they know, how to advise us on various occasions—some about war and peace, and others about building walls or fitting up harbors; and in a word, whatever the city does to another city or within herself, all comes about by the advice of the orators.
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Well, take the orators, for example: they either know, or think they know, how to advise us on various occasions—some about war and peace, and others about building walls or fitting up harbors; and in a word, whatever the city does to another city or within herself, all comes about by the advice of the orators.
That is true.
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ So then, to my mind the poet spoke well and soundly; but if you have thought of
And in either case you name them in reference to something?
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Yes.
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Yes.
Then do you call a man wise who knows how to give advice, without knowing whether and when it is better to act upon it?
@@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ So then, to my mind the poet spoke well and soundly; but if you have thought of
Nor, again, a man who knows how to kill another, or seize his property, or make him an exile from his native land, without knowing when or to whom it is better so to behave?
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No, to be sure.
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No, to be sure.
Then it is a man who knows something of this sort, and is assisted by knowledge of what is best,—and this is surely the same as knowledge of the useful, is it not?
@@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ So then, to my mind the poet spoke well and soundly; but if you have thought of
I agree.
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And what of a man who knows how to ride or shoot, or else to box or wrestle or contend in any other sport, or do anything that we know by rule of art? What do you call him who knows what is better done by rule of that particular art? Do you not say that he who goes by the rules of riding is a good rider?
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And what of a man who knows how to ride or shoot, or else to box or wrestle or contend in any other sport, or do anything that we know by rule of art? What do you call him who knows what is better done by rule of that particular art? Do you not say that he who goes by the rules of riding is a good rider?
I do.
@@ -382,16 +382,16 @@ So then, to my mind the poet spoke well and soundly; but if you have thought of
No, it is as you say.
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Then do you think it inevitable that he who has some knowledge about these things should also be a wise man, or shall we say he comes far short of it?
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Then do you think it inevitable that he who has some knowledge about these things should also be a wise man, or shall we say he comes far short of it?
Far short of it, I declare.
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Then what sort of state do you suppose it would be, where the people were good bowmen and flute-players, together with athletes and artists in general, and mingled with these the men whom we have just mentioned as knowing war in itself and slaughter in itself, and orator-windbags too with their political bluster, but all of them lacked this knowledge of the best, and none knew when or upon whom it was better to employ their respective arts?
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Then what sort of state do you suppose it would be, where the people were good bowmen and flute-players, together with athletes and artists in general, and mingled with these the men whom we have just mentioned as knowing war in itself and slaughter in itself, and orator-windbags too with their political bluster, but all of them lacked this knowledge of the best, and none knew when or upon whom it was better to employ their respective arts?
A paltry one, I should call it, Socrates.
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Yes, you would, I expect, when you saw each one of them vying with the other and assigning the largest part in the conduct of the state to thatWherein himself is found most excellent,Eur. Antiope, Fr.Cf. Plat. Gorg. 484e. I mean, what is done best by rule of his particular art—while he is entirely off the track of what is best for the state and for himself, because, I conceive, he has put his trust in opinion apart from intelligence. In these circumstances, should we not be right in saying that such a state is one great mass of turmoil and lawlessness?
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Yes, you would, I expect, when you saw each one of them vying with the other and assigning the largest part in the conduct of the state to thatWherein himself is found most excellent,Eur. Antiope, Fr.Cf. Plat. Gorg. 484e. I mean, what is done best by rule of his particular art—while he is entirely off the track of what is best for the state and for himself, because, I conceive, he has put his trust in opinion apart from intelligence. In these circumstances, should we not be right in saying that such a state is one great mass of turmoil and lawlessness?
We should, upon my word.
@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ So then, to my mind the poet spoke well and soundly; but if you have thought of
We did.
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And if a man does what he knows or thinks he knows, and is assisted by knowing how to make it beneficial, we shall find him profitable both to the city and to himself?
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And if a man does what he knows or thinks he knows, and is assisted by knowing how to make it beneficial, we shall find him profitable both to the city and to himself?
Certainly.
@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ So then, to my mind the poet spoke well and soundly; but if you have thought of
I did.
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So now we repeat our statement that the many have missed getting the best because in most cases, I conceive, they have put their trust in opinion apart from intelligence.
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So now we repeat our statement that the many have missed getting the best because in most cases, I conceive, they have put their trust in opinion apart from intelligence.
Yes.
@@ -423,16 +423,16 @@ So then, to my mind the poet spoke well and soundly; but if you have thought of
That is very true.
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So you see that when I said it looked as though the possession of the sciences as a whole, where it did not include the science of the best, in a few cases helped, but in most harmed the owner, I was evidently right in very truth, was I not?
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So you see that when I said it looked as though the possession of the sciences as a whole, where it did not include the science of the best, in a few cases helped, but in most harmed the owner, I was evidently right in very truth, was I not?
Though I did not then, I think so now, Socrates.
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Hence the state or soul that is to live aright must hold fast to this knowledge, exactly as a sick man does to a doctor, or as he who would voyage safely does to a pilot. For without this, the more briskly it is wafted by fortune either to the acquisition of wealth or to bodily strength or aught else of the sort, the greater will be the mistakes in which these things, it would seem, must needs involve it. And he who has acquired the so-called mastery of learning and arts, but is destitute of this knowledge and impelled by this or that one among those others, is sure to meet with much rough weather, as he truly deserves; since, I imagine, he must continue without a pilot on the high seas, and has only the brief span of his life in which to run his course. So that his case aptly fits the saying of the poet, in which he complains of somebody or other that Full many crafts he knew: but stillHe knew them all so very ill.Margites, Fr.Quoted from the mock-epic Margites, of which only this and five other lines have survived. The hero, Margites, became the proverbial type of a blundering idiot, and the poem was generally attributed to Homer.
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Hence the state or soul that is to live aright must hold fast to this knowledge, exactly as a sick man does to a doctor, or as he who would voyage safely does to a pilot. For without this, the more briskly it is wafted by fortune either to the acquisition of wealth or to bodily strength or aught else of the sort, the greater will be the mistakes in which these things, it would seem, must needs involve it. And he who has acquired the so-called mastery of learning and arts, but is destitute of this knowledge and impelled by this or that one among those others, is sure to meet with much rough weather, as he truly deserves; since, I imagine, he must continue without a pilot on the high seas, and has only the brief span of his life in which to run his course. So that his case aptly fits the saying of the poet, in which he complains of somebody or other that Full many crafts he knew: but stillHe knew them all so very ill.Margites, Fr.Quoted from the mock-epic Margites, of which only this and five other lines have survived. The hero, Margites, became the proverbial type of a blundering idiot, and the poem was generally attributed to Homer.
Why, how on earth is the poet’s saying apposite, Socrates? For to my mind it has nothing to do with the point.
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It is very much to the point: but he, good sir, like almost every other poet, speaks in riddles. For poetry as a whole is by nature inclined to riddling, and it is not every man who can apprehend it. And furthermore, besides having this natural tendency, when it gets hold of a grudging person who wishes not to show forth to us his own wisdom but to conceal it as much as possible, we find it an extraordinarily difficult matter to make out whatever this or that one of them may mean. For surely you do not suppose that Homer, divinest and wisest of poets, did not know it was impossible to know ill; for it is he who says of Margites that he knew many things, but knew them all ill: but it is a riddle, I think, in which he has made ill stand for evil, and knew for to know. So if we put it together, letting the meter go, indeed, but grasping his meaning, we get this: Full many crafts he knew, but it was evil for him to know them all.This trick of twisting the words of a quotation into an unnatural meaning is quite characteristic of Socrates. Cf. Plat. Prot. 343-7. Then clearly, if it was evil for him to know many things, he was in fact a paltry fellow, assuming we are to believe what we have previously argued.
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It is very much to the point: but he, good sir, like almost every other poet, speaks in riddles. For poetry as a whole is by nature inclined to riddling, and it is not every man who can apprehend it. And furthermore, besides having this natural tendency, when it gets hold of a grudging person who wishes not to show forth to us his own wisdom but to conceal it as much as possible, we find it an extraordinarily difficult matter to make out whatever this or that one of them may mean. For surely you do not suppose that Homer, divinest and wisest of poets, did not know it was impossible to know ill; for it is he who says of Margites that he knew many things, but knew them all ill: but it is a riddle, I think, in which he has made ill stand for evil, and knew for to know. So if we put it together, letting the meter go, indeed, but grasping his meaning, we get this: Full many crafts he knew, but it was evil for him to know them all.This trick of twisting the words of a quotation into an unnatural meaning is quite characteristic of Socrates. Cf. Plat. Prot. 343-7. Then clearly, if it was evil for him to know many things, he was in fact a paltry fellow, assuming we are to believe what we have previously argued.
But I think we may, Socrates: at least, if I cannot believe those arguments of ours, I shall find it hard to trust any others.
@@ -441,40 +441,40 @@ So then, to my mind the poet spoke well and soundly; but if you have thought of
I repeat that I think so.
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But come now, in Heaven’s name—for I suppose you see how great and strange is our perplexity, in which you, as it seems to me, have your share; for you change about from this side to that without settling down for a moment, but as soon as you are firmly convinced of a thing you seem to slip out of it again and cease to hold the same view—well, if the god to whom you are going should even now appear to you and ask before you uttered any prayer, whether you would be content to obtain one of those things which were mentioned at the beginning, or whether he should leave you to pray as you were, how do you suppose you would make the best of your chance—by accepting his offer, or by praying for something on your own account?
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But come now, in Heaven’s name—for I suppose you see how great and strange is our perplexity, in which you, as it seems to me, have your share; for you change about from this side to that without settling down for a moment, but as soon as you are firmly convinced of a thing you seem to slip out of it again and cease to hold the same view—well, if the god to whom you are going should even now appear to you and ask before you uttered any prayer, whether you would be content to obtain one of those things which were mentioned at the beginning, or whether he should leave you to pray as you were, how do you suppose you would make the best of your chance—by accepting his offer, or by praying for something on your own account?
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Well, by the gods, I could not answer your question, Socrates, offhand. Why, I take it to be a fatuous request, i.e., that I should answer offhand. The pun in μάργον, alluding to the fatuous Margites, cannot be rendered in English. when it is really a case for great caution lest one pray unawares for what is evil while thinking it to be one’s good, and then after a little while, as you were saying, Plat. Alc. 2.142d. one change one’s tune and retract all one’s former prayers.
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Well, by the gods, I could not answer your question, Socrates, offhand. Why, I take it to be a fatuous request, i.e., that I should answer offhand. The pun in μάργον, alluding to the fatuous Margites, cannot be rendered in English. when it is really a case for great caution lest one pray unawares for what is evil while thinking it to be one’s good, and then after a little while, as you were saying, Plat. Alc. 2.142d. one change one’s tune and retract all one’s former prayers.
And did not the poet whom I quoted at the beginning of our discussion Plat. Alc. 2.143d. know more than we, when he bade us pray for the averting of what is grievous, even though we pray for it?
I think so.
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Then it is their admiration of this poet, Alcibiades, or perhaps the result of their own study, that causes the Spartans to offer a similar prayer whether the occasion be private or public—that the gods will give them for their own benefit the beautiful as well as the good: more than this no one can ever hear them pray for. The consequence is that to the present time This seems to be the meaning of the Greek, which is certainly not Platonic. In Aristot. Phys. 4.13.5ὁ παρήκων χρόνος means past time. they have been just as fortunate as any other people; and if it has befallen them to be not invariably fortunate, it was anyhow not owing to their prayer. It rests with the gods, I conceive, to give us either what we may pray for or the reverse. And I would like to give you an account of something else, which I once heard from some of my seniors. A quarrel having arisen between the Athenians and the Spartans, it befell our city to be always unsuccessful in every battle by land and sea, and she could never win a victory. So the Athenians, in their annoyance at this result, and at a loss for some means of finding a deliverance from the trouble they were in, took counsel together and decided that the best thing they could do was to send and inquire of Ammon An Ethiopian god whose cult spread over Egypt, and through Cyrene to various parts of Greece: he had temples at Thebes and Sparta, but the famous one in the Libyan desert is probably meant here.; and moreover, to ask also for what reason the gods granted victory to the Spartans rather than to themselves: for we—such was the message—offer up to them more and finer sacrifices than any of the Greeks, and have adorned their temples with votive emblems as no other people have done, and presented to the gods the costliest and stateliest processions year by year, and spent more money thus than all the rest of the Greeks together.
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Then it is their admiration of this poet, Alcibiades, or perhaps the result of their own study, that causes the Spartans to offer a similar prayer whether the occasion be private or public—that the gods will give them for their own benefit the beautiful as well as the good: more than this no one can ever hear them pray for. The consequence is that to the present time This seems to be the meaning of the Greek, which is certainly not Platonic. In Aristot. Phys. 4.13.5ὁ παρήκων χρόνος means past time. they have been just as fortunate as any other people; and if it has befallen them to be not invariably fortunate, it was anyhow not owing to their prayer. It rests with the gods, I conceive, to give us either what we may pray for or the reverse. And I would like to give you an account of something else, which I once heard from some of my seniors. A quarrel having arisen between the Athenians and the Spartans, it befell our city to be always unsuccessful in every battle by land and sea, and she could never win a victory. So the Athenians, in their annoyance at this result, and at a loss for some means of finding a deliverance from the trouble they were in, took counsel together and decided that the best thing they could do was to send and inquire of Ammon An Ethiopian god whose cult spread over Egypt, and through Cyrene to various parts of Greece: he had temples at Thebes and Sparta, but the famous one in the Libyan desert is probably meant here.; and moreover, to ask also for what reason the gods granted victory to the Spartans rather than to themselves: for we—such was the message—offer up to them more and finer sacrifices than any of the Greeks, and have adorned their temples with votive emblems as no other people have done, and presented to the gods the costliest and stateliest processions year by year, and spent more money thus than all the rest of the Greeks together.
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But the Spartans have never taken any such pains, and indeed are so neglectful in their behavior to the gods, that they make a practice of sacrificing defective victims, and generally are very much behind us in the honors that they pay, though the wealth they possess is quite equal to that of our city. When they had so spoken, and added the question, what they should do in order to find a deliverance from the trouble they were in, the prophet’s only answer The use of ἀποκριθῆναι for answered instead of the usual ἀποκρίνασθαι is evidence for placing the writer a good deal later than Plato.— evidently it was all that the god allowed—was to call them to him and say: Thus saith Ammon to the Athenians: I would rather have the reverent reserve εὐφημία means avoidance of speech that may offend—the opposite being βλασφημία. of the Spartans than all the ritual of the Greeks. So much he said, and not a word further. Now by reverent reserve I suppose the god could only mean their prayer, since in fact it differs greatly from those that are generally offered. For the Greeks in general either lead up bulls with gilded horns, or else present the gods with votive emblems, and pray for any odd thing, whether it be good or bad: so when the gods hear their irreverent speech they reject all these costly processions and sacrifices. Whereas I think we ought to be very cautious, and fully consider what is to be said and what is not. And in Homer too you will find other tales of a similar sort. For he relates how the Trojans, in making their bivouac,Sacrificed to the immortals perfect hecatombs,Hom. Il. 8.548 and how the winds bore the sweet savour from the plain into heaven:But the blessed gods partook not of it, nor would have it,For deep was their hate against holy Ilium,And Priam, and the folk of Priam of the good ashen spear.Hom. Il. 8.550-2The four lines directly quoted are not in our manuscripts of Homer, but have been inserted in modern texts as Hom. Il. 8.548, 550-2. So it was nothing to their purpose to sacrifice and pay tribute of gifts in vain, when they were hated by the gods. For it is not, I imagine, the way of the gods to be seduced with gifts, like a base insurer. And indeed it is but silly talk of ours, if we claim to surpass the Spartans on this score. For it would be a strange thing if the gods had regard to our gifts and sacrifices instead of our souls, and the piety and justice that may be found in any of us.
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But the Spartans have never taken any such pains, and indeed are so neglectful in their behavior to the gods, that they make a practice of sacrificing defective victims, and generally are very much behind us in the honors that they pay, though the wealth they possess is quite equal to that of our city. When they had so spoken, and added the question, what they should do in order to find a deliverance from the trouble they were in, the prophet’s only answer The use of ἀποκριθῆναι for answered instead of the usual ἀποκρίνασθαι is evidence for placing the writer a good deal later than Plato.— evidently it was all that the god allowed—was to call them to him and say: Thus saith Ammon to the Athenians: I would rather have the reverent reserve εὐφημία means avoidance of speech that may offend—the opposite being βλασφημία. of the Spartans than all the ritual of the Greeks. So much he said, and not a word further. Now by reverent reserve I suppose the god could only mean their prayer, since in fact it differs greatly from those that are generally offered. For the Greeks in general either lead up bulls with gilded horns, or else present the gods with votive emblems, and pray for any odd thing, whether it be good or bad: so when the gods hear their irreverent speech they reject all these costly processions and sacrifices. Whereas I think we ought to be very cautious, and fully consider what is to be said and what is not. And in Homer too you will find other tales of a similar sort. For he relates how the Trojans, in making their bivouac,Sacrificed to the immortals perfect hecatombs,Hom. Il. 8.548 and how the winds bore the sweet savour from the plain into heaven:But the blessed gods partook not of it, nor would have it,For deep was their hate against holy Ilium,And Priam, and the folk of Priam of the good ashen spear.Hom. Il. 8.550-2The four lines directly quoted are not in our manuscripts of Homer, but have been inserted in modern texts as Hom. Il. 8.548, 550-2. So it was nothing to their purpose to sacrifice and pay tribute of gifts in vain, when they were hated by the gods. For it is not, I imagine, the way of the gods to be seduced with gifts, like a base insurer. And indeed it is but silly talk of ours, if we claim to surpass the Spartans on this score. For it would be a strange thing if the gods had regard to our gifts and sacrifices instead of our souls, and the piety and justice that may be found in any of us.
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Far rather at these, I believe, do they look than at those costly processions and sacrifices which are offered, it well may be, by individual and state, year in, year out, though they may have offended greatly against the gods, or as greatly against their neighbors. But the gods are not to be won by bribes, and so they despise all these things, as Ammon and the holy prophet say. Certainly it would seem that justice and wisdom are held in especial honor both by the gods and by men of intelligence; and wise and just are they alone who know what acts and words to use towards gods and men. But I should like now to hear what may be your opinion on the subject.
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Far rather at these, I believe, do they look than at those costly processions and sacrifices which are offered, it well may be, by individual and state, year in, year out, though they may have offended greatly against the gods, or as greatly against their neighbors. But the gods are not to be won by bribes, and so they despise all these things, as Ammon and the holy prophet say. Certainly it would seem that justice and wisdom are held in especial honor both by the gods and by men of intelligence; and wise and just are they alone who know what acts and words to use towards gods and men. But I should like now to hear what may be your opinion on the subject.
Why, Socrates, it in no wise differs from yours and the god’s; for indeed it would not be fitting for me to record my vote against the god.
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And you remember you professed to be in great perplexity lest you should pray unawares for evil, while supposing it to be good?
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And you remember you professed to be in great perplexity lest you should pray unawares for evil, while supposing it to be good?
I do.
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You see, then, how unsafe it is for you to approach the god with your prayers, for it may chance that when he hears your irreverent speech he will reject your sacrifice altogether, and you may perhaps be accorded some other bad thing as well. In my opinion, therefore, it is best to hold your peace: for I expect you will not consent to use the Spartan’s prayer, you have such a romantic spirit—to give it the fairest of folly’s names. Cf. Plat. Alc. 2.140c.It is necessary, therefore, to bide one’s time until one can learn how one should behave towards gods and men.
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You see, then, how unsafe it is for you to approach the god with your prayers, for it may chance that when he hears your irreverent speech he will reject your sacrifice altogether, and you may perhaps be accorded some other bad thing as well. In my opinion, therefore, it is best to hold your peace: for I expect you will not consent to use the Spartan’s prayer, you have such a romantic spirit—to give it the fairest of folly’s names. Cf. Plat. Alc. 2.140c.It is necessary, therefore, to bide one’s time until one can learn how one should behave towards gods and men.
Well, when will that time arrive, Socrates, and who is to be my instructor? For I feel I should very much like to see who the man is,
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It is he who is concerned about you. But I think, as Homer relates how Athena removed the mist from the eyes of Diomede,That be might well discern both god and man,Hom. Il. 5.127.so you too must first have the mist removed which now enwraps your soul, and then you will be ready to receive the means whereby you will discern both evil and good. For at present I do not think you could do so.
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It is he who is concerned about you. But I think, as Homer relates how Athena removed the mist from the eyes of Diomede,That be might well discern both god and man,Hom. Il. 5.127.so you too must first have the mist removed which now enwraps your soul, and then you will be ready to receive the means whereby you will discern both evil and good. For at present I do not think you could do so.
Let him remove the mist or whatever else he likes to call it: for I am prepared to obey every one of his commands, without shirking, whoever the man may be, so long as I am to be the better for them.
-
+
I tell you, he on his part is prodigiously anxious to help you.
@@ -482,9 +482,9 @@ So then, to my mind the poet spoke well and soundly; but if you have thought of
And you are quite right: for that is safer than running so serious a risk.
-
But how say you, Socrates? Look now, I will crown you with this garland, as I consider you have given me such good advice; and to the gods we shall offer both garlands and all the other customary things when I see that day has come. And come it will ere long, if they are willing.
+
But how say you, Socrates? Look now, I will crown you with this garland, as I consider you have given me such good advice; and to the gods we shall offer both garlands and all the other customary things when I see that day has come. And come it will ere long, if they are willing.
-
Well, I accept this gift; and anything else besides, that you may give me, I shall be only too happy to accept. The Greek here is literally—I should gladly see myself to have accepted—which seems very unplatonic. And as Euripides has made Creon say when he sees Teiresias wearing his wreaths, and hears that he has obtained them, on account of his art, as first-fruits of the spoils of war: As omen good I take thy victor’s wreaths;For in the waves we labour, as you know,—Eur. Phoen. 858-9The blind prophet Teiresias has been crowned by the Athenians for the aid he has given them in a successful war. Eteocles, the young king of Thebes, has left the city in charge of his uncle Creon while he is fighting his brother Polynices for the possession of the throne. so do I take this opinion of yours as a good omen. For I consider I am no less wave-tossed than Creon, and would like to come off victorious over your lovers.
+
Well, I accept this gift; and anything else besides, that you may give me, I shall be only too happy to accept. The Greek here is literally—I should gladly see myself to have accepted—which seems very unplatonic. And as Euripides has made Creon say when he sees Teiresias wearing his wreaths, and hears that he has obtained them, on account of his art, as first-fruits of the spoils of war: As omen good I take thy victor’s wreaths;For in the waves we labour, as you know,—Eur. Phoen. 858-9The blind prophet Teiresias has been crowned by the Athenians for the aid he has given them in a successful war. Eteocles, the young king of Thebes, has left the city in charge of his uncle Creon while he is fighting his brother Polynices for the possession of the throne. so do I take this opinion of yours as a good omen. For I consider I am no less wave-tossed than Creon, and would like to come off victorious over your lovers.
diff --git a/data/tlg0059/tlg015/__cts__.xml b/data/tlg0059/tlg015/__cts__.xml
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/tlg0059/tlg015/__cts__.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+
+
+
+ Hipparchus
+
+
+ Hipparchus
+ Plato, creator. Platonis Opera Tomvs II Tetralogia I-II, Burnet, John, 1863- 1928, editor. Oxford University Press. 1910.
+
+
+
+ Hipparchus
+ Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 12 translated by W.R.M. Lamb. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1927.
+
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/tlg0059/tlg015/tlg0059.tlg015.perseus-eng1.xml b/data/tlg0059/tlg015/tlg0059.tlg015.perseus-eng1.xml
index cbae2c6a3..eff2918bd 100755
--- a/data/tlg0059/tlg015/tlg0059.tlg015.perseus-eng1.xml
+++ b/data/tlg0059/tlg015/tlg0059.tlg015.perseus-eng1.xml
@@ -66,42 +66,42 @@
SocratesFriend
-Socrates
And what is love of gain? What can it be, and who are the lovers of gain?
Friend
In my opinion, they are those who think it worth while to make gain out of things of no worth.
Socrates
Is it your opinion that they know those things to be of no worth, or do not know? For if they do not know, you mean that the lovers of gain are fools.
Friend
No, I do not mean they are fools, but rascals who wickedly yield to gain, because they know that the things out of which they dare to make their gain are worthless,
-and yet they dare to be lovers of gain from mere shamelessness.
Socrates
Well now, do you mean by the lover of gain such a man, for instance, as a farmer who plants something which he knows is a worthless herb, and thinks fit to make gain out of it when he has reared it up? Is that the sort of man you mean?
Friend
The lover of gain, as such, Socrates, thinks he ought to make gain from everything.
Socrates
Please do not speak so recklessly, as though you had been wronged by someone,
-but give me your attention and answer just as you would if I were beginning my questions over again. Do you not admit that the lover of gain has knowledge of the worth of the thing from which he thinks it worth while to make gain?
Friend
I do.
Socrates
Then who has knowledge of the worth of plants, and of the sort of season and soil in which they are worth planting—if we too may throw in one of those artful phrases The “artful phrase” here is the jingling W(/RA| KAI\ XW/RA|, characteristic of the rhetoric taught by Gorgias and his followers. which adroit pleaders use to trick out their speeches in the law courts?
-
Friend
For my part, I should say a farmer.
Socrates
And by “think it worth while to make gain” do you mean aught but “thinking one ought to make gain”?
Friend
I mean that.
Socrates
Then do not attempt to deceive me, who am now quite an elderly person,
-and you so young, by making, as you did just now, an answer that is not even your own thought; but tell me in all truth, do you suppose that any man who was taking up farming and who knew it was a worthless plant that he was planting, could think to make gain from it?
Friend
Upon my word, I do not.
Socrates
Or again, take a horseman who knows that he is providing worthless food for his horse; do you suppose he is unaware that he is destroying his horse?
Friend
I do not.
-
Socrates
So he does not think to make gain from that worthless food.
Friend
No.
Socrates
Or again, take a navigator who has furnished his ship with worthless spars and ropes; do you think he is unaware that he will suffer for it, and will be in danger of being lost himself, and of losing the ship and all her cargo?
Friend
I do not.
Socrates
So he does not think to make gain from
-that worthless tackle?
Friend
No, indeed.
Socrates
But does a general, who knows that his army has worthless arms, think to make gain, or think it worth while to make gain, from them?
Friend
By no means.
Socrates
Or does a flute-player who has worthless flutes, or a harper with a lyre, a bowman with a bow, or anyone else at all, in short, among ordinary craftsmen or sensible men in general, with any implement or other equipment of any sort that is worthless, think to make gain from it?
-
Friend
To all appearance, no.
Socrates
Then whoever can they be, your lovers of gain? For I presume they are not the people whom we have successively mentioned, but people who know their worthless things, and yet think they are to make gain from them. But in that case, by what you say, remarkable sir, no man alive is a lover of gain
Friend
Well, Socrates, I should like to call those lovers of gain who from insatiable greed consumedly long for things that are even quite petty and of little or no worth,
-and so love gain, in each case.
Socrates
Not knowing, of course, my excellent friend, that the things are worthless; for we have already convinced ourselves by our argument that this is impossible.
Friend
I agree.
Socrates
And if not knowing this, clearly they are ignorant of it, but think that those worthless things are worth a great deal.
Friend
Apparently.
Socrates
Now, of course lovers of gain must love gain?
Friend
Yes.
Socrates
And by gain you mean the opposite of loss?
-
Friend
I do.
Socrates
And is it a good thing for anyone to suffer loss?
Friend
For no one.
Socrates
Rather an evil?
Friend
Yes.
Socrates
So mankind are harmed by loss.
Friend
They are harmed.
Socrates
Then loss is an evil.
Friend
Yes.
Socrates
And gain is the opposite of loss.
Friend
The opposite.
Socrates
So that gain is a good.
Friend
Yes.
Socrates
Hence it is those who love the good that you call lovers of gain.
Friend
So it seems.
-
Socrates
At least there is nothing mad, my friend, about lovers of gain, as you describe them. But tell me, do you yourself love, or not love, whatever is good?
Friend
I love it.
Socrates
And is there anything good that you do not love, or must it then be evil?
Friend
Upon my word, nothing.
Socrates
In fact, I expect you love all good things.
Friend
Yes.
Socrates
Well now, ask me on my side whether I do not likewise: for I shall agree with you, for my part, that I love good things. But besides you and me, do you not think that all the rest of mankind
-love good things, and hate evil things?
Friend
It appears so to me.
Socrates
And we admitted that gain is good?
Friend
Yes.
Socrates
On this new showing, everyone appears to be a lover of gain; whereas, by our former way of arguing, no one was a lover of gain. So on which of the two arguments are we to rely, in order to avoid error?
Friend
What has to be done, I think, Socrates, is to conceive the lover of gain rightly. The right view of the lover of gain is that he is one who concerns himself with,
-and thinks fit to make gain from, things from which honest men do not dare to make gain.
Socrates
But you see, my sweet sir, we have just admitted that making gain is being benefited.
Friend
Well, what of that?
Socrates
There is the further point we have admitted in addition to this—that all men wish for good things always.
Friend
Yes.
Socrates
Then good men likewise wish to have all gains, if these are good things.
-
Friend
Not those gains from which they are bound, Socrates, to suffer harm.
Socrates
By “suffer harm” do you mean “suffer loss,” or something else?
Friend
No, I mean just “suffer loss.”
Socrates
Well, do men suffer loss from gain or from loss?
Friend
From both; for they suffer loss from loss and from wicked gain.
Socrates
Pray now, do you consider that any useful and good thing is wicked?
Friend
I do not.
-
Socrates
And we admitted a little while ago that gain is the opposite of loss, which is an evil.
Friend
I agree.
Socrates
And that, being the opposite of an evil, it is good?
Friend
That was our admission.
Socrates
So you see, you are attempting to deceive me, for you deliberately contradict what we agreed to just now.
Friend
No, on my honor, Socrates; on the contrary, it is you who are deceiving me, by twisting this way and that so perplexingly in your talk.
-
Socrates
Hush, hush! Why, surely it would be wrong of me not to obey a good and wise person.
Friend
Who is that? And to what are you referring now?
Socrates
I mean my and your fellow-citizen, Pisistratus's son Hipparchus, of Philaidae, who was the eldest and wisest of Pisistratus's sons, and who, among the many goodly proofs of wisdom that he showed, first brought the poems of Homer into this country of ours, and compelled the rhapsodes at the Panathenaea to recite them in relay, one man following on another, as
-they still do now. He dispatched a fifty-oared galley for Anacreon of Teos, and brought him into our city. Simonides of Ceos he always had about him, prevailing on him by plenteous fees and gifts. All this he did from a wish to educate the citizens, in order that he might have subjects of the highest excellence; for he thought it not right to grudge wisdom to any, so noble and good was he. And when his people in the city had been educated and were admiring him for his wisdom,
-he proceeded next, with the design of educating those of the countryside, to set up figures of Hermes for them along the roads in the midst of the city and every district town; and then, after selecting from his own wise lore, both learnt from others and discovered for himself, the things that he considered the wisest, he threw these into elegiac form and inscribed them on the figures as verses of his own and testimonies of his wisdom, so that in the first place
-his people should not admire those wise Delphic legends of “Know thyself” and “Nothing overmuch”, and the other sayings of the sort, but should rather regard as wise the utterances of Hipparchus; and that in the second place, through passing up and down and reading his words and acquiring a taste for his wisdom, they might resort hither from the country for the completion of their education. There are two such inscriptions of his: on the left side
-of each Hermes there is one in which the god says that he stands in the midst of the city or the township, while on the right side he says:The memorial of Hipparchus: walk with just intent.There are many other fine inscriptions from his poems on other figures of Hermes, and this one in particular, on the Steiria A town on the south-east coast of Attica. road, in which he says:
-The memorial of Hipparchus: deceive not a friend.I therefore should never dare, I am sure, to deceive you, who are my friend, or disobey the great Hipparchus, after whose death the Athenians were for three years under the despotic rule of his brother Hippias, and you might have heard anyone of the earlier period say that it was only in these years that there was despotism in Athens, On this point the writer agrees with Thuc. 6.59, who gives what is now the accepted story of Harmodius and Aristogeiton. and that at all other times the Athenians lived very much as in the reign of Cronos. And the subtler sort of people say
-that Hipparchus's death was due, not to the cause supposed by most—the disqualification of the assassin's sister from bearing the basket, In the Panathenaic procession. for that is a silly motive—but because Harmodius had become the favorite of Aristogeiton and had been educated by him. Thus Aristogeiton also prided himself on educating people, and he regarded Hipparchus as a dangerous rival. And at that time, it is said, Harmodius
-happened to be himself in love with one of the handsome and well-born youths of the day; they do tell his name, but I cannot remember it. Well, for a while this youth admired both Harmodius and Aristogeiton as wise men, but afterwards, when he associated with Hipparchus, he despised them, and they were so overcome with the pain of this “disqualification” that they slew Hipparchus. This curious version of the fall of the Pisistratid rulers (Hippias and Hipparchus) seeks to explain the conspiracy as due to a rivalry in a sort of pre-Socratic influence over young men which arose between the citizen Aristogiton and the ruler Hipparchus.
Friend
It would seem, then, Socrates, either that you do not regard me as your friend, or if you do, that you do not obey Hipparchus.
-For that you are not deceiving me—though I cannot tell how you contrive it—in your talk, is more than I can believe.
Socrates
Well now, as though we were playing draughts, I am willing to let you revoke, as you please, anything you have said in carrying on the discussion, in order that you may not think you are being deceived. So tell me, shall I revoke for you the statement that all men desire good things?
Friend
No, thank you.
Socrates
Well, that suffering loss, or loss, is an evil?
Friend
No, thank you.
Socrates
Well, that gain, or making gain, is the opposite of loss, or suffering loss?
-
Friend
Nor that either.
Socrates
Well, that making gain, as the opposite of evil, is a good?
Friend
Nothing of all this do I bid you revoke for me.
Socrates
You think, then, it seems, that some gain is good, and some evil.
Friend
I do.
Socrates
Well then, I revoke so much for you; so let us assume that some gain is good, and some other gain evil. But the good sort is no more gain than the evil sort, is it?
Friend
What do you mean by this question?
Socrates
I will explain. Is there both good and evil food?
-
Friend
Yes.
Socrates
And is the one sort more food than the other, or are they both similarly this same thing, food, and in this respect does the one differ no wise from the other, in being food, but only in the fact of the one being good and the other evil?
Friend
Yes.
Socrates
And so with drink and every other class of things that exist, when some things in any class come to be good, and others evil, one thing does not differ from another in that respect whereby they are the same? For instance,
-one man, I suppose, is virtuous, and another wicked.
Friend
Yes.
Socrates
But neither of them, I conceive, is more or less man than the other—neither the virtuous than the wicked, nor the wicked than the virtuous.
Friend
What you say is true.
Socrates
Then are we to take the same view of gain also, that both the wicked and the virtuous sort are similarly gain?
Friend
Necessarily.
Socrates
So he who has virtuous gain is no whit the more a gainer than he who has wicked gain: neither sort
-is found to be more gain, as we agree.
Friend
Yes.
Socrates
For neither of them has addition of either more or less.
Friend
No, indeed.
Socrates
And how could one do or suffer anything more or less with a thing of this sort, that had neither of these additions?
Friend
Impossible.
Socrates
Since, therefore, both of these are gains and gain-making affairs, we must now consider what it can be that leads you to call both of them gain:
-what is it that you see to be the same in both? Suppose you were to ask me, in those instances that I gave just now, what it is that leads me to call both good food and evil food alike food, I should tell you— for this reason, because both are a dry sustenance of the body. For that, I am sure you would agree, is what food is, would you not?
Friend
I would.
Socrates
And so too about drink the answer would be on the same lines, that the wet sustenance of the body,
-whether it be wholesome or pernicious, has this name of drink; and likewise with the rest. Try therefore on your part to imitate my method of answering. When you say that virtuous gain and wicked gain are both gain, what is it that you see to be the same in them, judging it to be the actual element of gain? And if again you are yourself unable to answer, just let me put it for your consideration, whether you describe as gain every acquisition that one has acquired either with no expense, or as a profit over and above one's expense.
-
Friend
I believe that is what I call gain.
Socrates
Do you include a case where, after enjoying a banquet at which one has had much good cheer without any expense, one acquires an illness?
Friend
Upon my word, not I.
Socrates
And if one acquired health from attending a banquet, would one acquire gain or loss?
Friend
Gain.
Socrates
Hence gain is not just acquiring any acquisition.
Friend
No, indeed.
Socrates
Do you mean, not if it is evil? Or will one acquire no gain even if one acquires something good?
Friend
Apparently one will, if it is good.
-
Socrates
And if it is evil, will not one acquire loss?
Friend
I think so.
Socrates
You see, then, how you are running round again to the same old point? Gain is found to be good, and loss evil.
Friend
For my part, I cannot tell what to say.
Socrates
And not without good reason, sir. Now answer this further question: you say that if one acquires more than the amount one has spent, it is gain?
Friend
I do not mean, when it is evil, but if one gets more gold or silver than one has spent.
Socrates
Now, I am just going to ask you about that. Tell me,
-if one spends half a pound of gold and gets double that weight in silver, has one got gain or loss?
Friend
Loss, I presume, Socrates for one's gold is reduced to twice, instead of twelve times, the value of silver.
Socrates
But you see, one has got more; or is double not more than half?
Friend
Not in worth, the one being silver and the other gold.
Socrates
So gain, it seems, must have this addition of worth. At least, you now say that silver, though more than gold, is not worth as much, and that gold, though less, is of equal worth.
-
Friend
Assuredly, for that is the case.
Socrates
Then the valuable is what produces gain, whether it be small or great, and the valueless produces no gain.
Friend
Yes.
Socrates
And by the valuable you mean simply, valuable to possess?
Friend
Yes, to possess.
Socrates
And again, by what is valuable to possess, do you mean the unprofitable or the profitable?
Friend
The profitable, I presume.
Socrates
And the profitable is good?
Friend
Yes.
-
Socrates
And so, most valiant of men, have we not here once more, for the third or fourth time, the admission that what produces gain is good?
Friend
So it seems.
Socrates
Then do you remember the point from which this discussion of ours arose?
Friend
I think I do.
Socrates
In case you do not, I will remind you. You maintained against me that good men do not wish to make all sorts of gain, but only those gains that are good, and not those that are wicked.
Friend
Yes.
-
Socrates
And now the argument has compelled us to acknowledge that all gains, both small and great, are good?
Friend
Yes, it has compelled me, at least, Socrates, rather than persuaded me.
Socrates
Well, later on, perhaps, it might also persuade you. Now, however, whether you are persuaded or whatever is your feeling, you at least agree with me that all gains are good, both small and great ones.
Friend
Yes, I do admit it.
Socrates
And you admit that virtuous men all wish for all good things, do you not?
Friend
I do.
-
Socrates
But, you know, you stated yourself that wicked men love both small and great gains.
Friend
I did.
Socrates
And so, by your account, all men will be lovers of gain, whether they be virtuous or wicked.
Friend
Apparently.
Socrates
Hence it is not right to reproach anybody with being a lover of gain: for he who makes this reproach is actually such an one himself.
+Socrates
And what is love of gain? What can it be, and who are the lovers of gain?
Friend
In my opinion, they are those who think it worth while to make gain out of things of no worth.
Socrates
Is it your opinion that they know those things to be of no worth, or do not know? For if they do not know, you mean that the lovers of gain are fools.
Friend
No, I do not mean they are fools, but rascals who wickedly yield to gain, because they know that the things out of which they dare to make their gain are worthless,
+and yet they dare to be lovers of gain from mere shamelessness.
Socrates
Well now, do you mean by the lover of gain such a man, for instance, as a farmer who plants something which he knows is a worthless herb, and thinks fit to make gain out of it when he has reared it up? Is that the sort of man you mean?
Friend
The lover of gain, as such, Socrates, thinks he ought to make gain from everything.
Socrates
Please do not speak so recklessly, as though you had been wronged by someone,
+but give me your attention and answer just as you would if I were beginning my questions over again. Do you not admit that the lover of gain has knowledge of the worth of the thing from which he thinks it worth while to make gain?
Friend
I do.
Socrates
Then who has knowledge of the worth of plants, and of the sort of season and soil in which they are worth planting—if we too may throw in one of those artful phrases The “artful phrase” here is the jingling W(/RA| KAI\ XW/RA|, characteristic of the rhetoric taught by Gorgias and his followers. which adroit pleaders use to trick out their speeches in the law courts?
+
Friend
For my part, I should say a farmer.
Socrates
And by “think it worth while to make gain” do you mean aught but “thinking one ought to make gain”?
Friend
I mean that.
Socrates
Then do not attempt to deceive me, who am now quite an elderly person,
+and you so young, by making, as you did just now, an answer that is not even your own thought; but tell me in all truth, do you suppose that any man who was taking up farming and who knew it was a worthless plant that he was planting, could think to make gain from it?
Friend
Upon my word, I do not.
Socrates
Or again, take a horseman who knows that he is providing worthless food for his horse; do you suppose he is unaware that he is destroying his horse?
Friend
I do not.
+
Socrates
So he does not think to make gain from that worthless food.
Friend
No.
Socrates
Or again, take a navigator who has furnished his ship with worthless spars and ropes; do you think he is unaware that he will suffer for it, and will be in danger of being lost himself, and of losing the ship and all her cargo?
Friend
I do not.
Socrates
So he does not think to make gain from
+that worthless tackle?
Friend
No, indeed.
Socrates
But does a general, who knows that his army has worthless arms, think to make gain, or think it worth while to make gain, from them?
Friend
By no means.
Socrates
Or does a flute-player who has worthless flutes, or a harper with a lyre, a bowman with a bow, or anyone else at all, in short, among ordinary craftsmen or sensible men in general, with any implement or other equipment of any sort that is worthless, think to make gain from it?
+
Friend
To all appearance, no.
Socrates
Then whoever can they be, your lovers of gain? For I presume they are not the people whom we have successively mentioned, but people who know their worthless things, and yet think they are to make gain from them. But in that case, by what you say, remarkable sir, no man alive is a lover of gain
Friend
Well, Socrates, I should like to call those lovers of gain who from insatiable greed consumedly long for things that are even quite petty and of little or no worth,
+and so love gain, in each case.
Socrates
Not knowing, of course, my excellent friend, that the things are worthless; for we have already convinced ourselves by our argument that this is impossible.
Friend
I agree.
Socrates
And if not knowing this, clearly they are ignorant of it, but think that those worthless things are worth a great deal.
Friend
Apparently.
Socrates
Now, of course lovers of gain must love gain?
Friend
Yes.
Socrates
And by gain you mean the opposite of loss?
+
Friend
I do.
Socrates
And is it a good thing for anyone to suffer loss?
Friend
For no one.
Socrates
Rather an evil?
Friend
Yes.
Socrates
So mankind are harmed by loss.
Friend
They are harmed.
Socrates
Then loss is an evil.
Friend
Yes.
Socrates
And gain is the opposite of loss.
Friend
The opposite.
Socrates
So that gain is a good.
Friend
Yes.
Socrates
Hence it is those who love the good that you call lovers of gain.
Friend
So it seems.
+
Socrates
At least there is nothing mad, my friend, about lovers of gain, as you describe them. But tell me, do you yourself love, or not love, whatever is good?
Friend
I love it.
Socrates
And is there anything good that you do not love, or must it then be evil?
Friend
Upon my word, nothing.
Socrates
In fact, I expect you love all good things.
Friend
Yes.
Socrates
Well now, ask me on my side whether I do not likewise: for I shall agree with you, for my part, that I love good things. But besides you and me, do you not think that all the rest of mankind
+love good things, and hate evil things?
Friend
It appears so to me.
Socrates
And we admitted that gain is good?
Friend
Yes.
Socrates
On this new showing, everyone appears to be a lover of gain; whereas, by our former way of arguing, no one was a lover of gain. So on which of the two arguments are we to rely, in order to avoid error?
Friend
What has to be done, I think, Socrates, is to conceive the lover of gain rightly. The right view of the lover of gain is that he is one who concerns himself with,
+and thinks fit to make gain from, things from which honest men do not dare to make gain.
Socrates
But you see, my sweet sir, we have just admitted that making gain is being benefited.
Friend
Well, what of that?
Socrates
There is the further point we have admitted in addition to this—that all men wish for good things always.
Friend
Yes.
Socrates
Then good men likewise wish to have all gains, if these are good things.
+
Friend
Not those gains from which they are bound, Socrates, to suffer harm.
Socrates
By “suffer harm” do you mean “suffer loss,” or something else?
Friend
No, I mean just “suffer loss.”
Socrates
Well, do men suffer loss from gain or from loss?
Friend
From both; for they suffer loss from loss and from wicked gain.
Socrates
Pray now, do you consider that any useful and good thing is wicked?
Friend
I do not.
+
Socrates
And we admitted a little while ago that gain is the opposite of loss, which is an evil.
Friend
I agree.
Socrates
And that, being the opposite of an evil, it is good?
Friend
That was our admission.
Socrates
So you see, you are attempting to deceive me, for you deliberately contradict what we agreed to just now.
Friend
No, on my honor, Socrates; on the contrary, it is you who are deceiving me, by twisting this way and that so perplexingly in your talk.
+
Socrates
Hush, hush! Why, surely it would be wrong of me not to obey a good and wise person.
Friend
Who is that? And to what are you referring now?
Socrates
I mean my and your fellow-citizen, Pisistratus’s son Hipparchus, of Philaidae, who was the eldest and wisest of Pisistratus’s sons, and who, among the many goodly proofs of wisdom that he showed, first brought the poems of Homer into this country of ours, and compelled the rhapsodes at the Panathenaea to recite them in relay, one man following on another, as
+they still do now. He dispatched a fifty-oared galley for Anacreon of Teos, and brought him into our city. Simonides of Ceos he always had about him, prevailing on him by plenteous fees and gifts. All this he did from a wish to educate the citizens, in order that he might have subjects of the highest excellence; for he thought it not right to grudge wisdom to any, so noble and good was he. And when his people in the city had been educated and were admiring him for his wisdom,
+he proceeded next, with the design of educating those of the countryside, to set up figures of Hermes for them along the roads in the midst of the city and every district town; and then, after selecting from his own wise lore, both learnt from others and discovered for himself, the things that he considered the wisest, he threw these into elegiac form and inscribed them on the figures as verses of his own and testimonies of his wisdom, so that in the first place
+his people should not admire those wise Delphic legends of “Know thyself” and “Nothing overmuch”, and the other sayings of the sort, but should rather regard as wise the utterances of Hipparchus; and that in the second place, through passing up and down and reading his words and acquiring a taste for his wisdom, they might resort hither from the country for the completion of their education. There are two such inscriptions of his: on the left side
+of each Hermes there is one in which the god says that he stands in the midst of the city or the township, while on the right side he says:The memorial of Hipparchus: walk with just intent.There are many other fine inscriptions from his poems on other figures of Hermes, and this one in particular, on the Steiria A town on the south-east coast of Attica. road, in which he says:
+The memorial of Hipparchus: deceive not a friend.I therefore should never dare, I am sure, to deceive you, who are my friend, or disobey the great Hipparchus, after whose death the Athenians were for three years under the despotic rule of his brother Hippias, and you might have heard anyone of the earlier period say that it was only in these years that there was despotism in Athens, On this point the writer agrees with Thuc. 6.59, who gives what is now the accepted story of Harmodius and Aristogeiton. and that at all other times the Athenians lived very much as in the reign of Cronos. And the subtler sort of people say
+that Hipparchus’s death was due, not to the cause supposed by most—the disqualification of the assassin’s sister from bearing the basket, In the Panathenaic procession. for that is a silly motive—but because Harmodius had become the favorite of Aristogeiton and had been educated by him. Thus Aristogeiton also prided himself on educating people, and he regarded Hipparchus as a dangerous rival. And at that time, it is said, Harmodius
+happened to be himself in love with one of the handsome and well-born youths of the day; they do tell his name, but I cannot remember it. Well, for a while this youth admired both Harmodius and Aristogeiton as wise men, but afterwards, when he associated with Hipparchus, he despised them, and they were so overcome with the pain of this “disqualification” that they slew Hipparchus. This curious version of the fall of the Pisistratid rulers (Hippias and Hipparchus) seeks to explain the conspiracy as due to a rivalry in a sort of pre-Socratic influence over young men which arose between the citizen Aristogiton and the ruler Hipparchus.
Friend
It would seem, then, Socrates, either that you do not regard me as your friend, or if you do, that you do not obey Hipparchus.
+For that you are not deceiving me—though I cannot tell how you contrive it—in your talk, is more than I can believe.
Socrates
Well now, as though we were playing draughts, I am willing to let you revoke, as you please, anything you have said in carrying on the discussion, in order that you may not think you are being deceived. So tell me, shall I revoke for you the statement that all men desire good things?
Friend
No, thank you.
Socrates
Well, that suffering loss, or loss, is an evil?
Friend
No, thank you.
Socrates
Well, that gain, or making gain, is the opposite of loss, or suffering loss?
+
Friend
Nor that either.
Socrates
Well, that making gain, as the opposite of evil, is a good?
Friend
Nothing of all this do I bid you revoke for me.
Socrates
You think, then, it seems, that some gain is good, and some evil.
Friend
I do.
Socrates
Well then, I revoke so much for you; so let us assume that some gain is good, and some other gain evil. But the good sort is no more gain than the evil sort, is it?
Friend
What do you mean by this question?
Socrates
I will explain. Is there both good and evil food?
+
Friend
Yes.
Socrates
And is the one sort more food than the other, or are they both similarly this same thing, food, and in this respect does the one differ no wise from the other, in being food, but only in the fact of the one being good and the other evil?
Friend
Yes.
Socrates
And so with drink and every other class of things that exist, when some things in any class come to be good, and others evil, one thing does not differ from another in that respect whereby they are the same? For instance,
+one man, I suppose, is virtuous, and another wicked.
Friend
Yes.
Socrates
But neither of them, I conceive, is more or less man than the other—neither the virtuous than the wicked, nor the wicked than the virtuous.
Friend
What you say is true.
Socrates
Then are we to take the same view of gain also, that both the wicked and the virtuous sort are similarly gain?
Friend
Necessarily.
Socrates
So he who has virtuous gain is no whit the more a gainer than he who has wicked gain: neither sort
+is found to be more gain, as we agree.
Friend
Yes.
Socrates
For neither of them has addition of either more or less.
Friend
No, indeed.
Socrates
And how could one do or suffer anything more or less with a thing of this sort, that had neither of these additions?
Friend
Impossible.
Socrates
Since, therefore, both of these are gains and gain-making affairs, we must now consider what it can be that leads you to call both of them gain:
+what is it that you see to be the same in both? Suppose you were to ask me, in those instances that I gave just now, what it is that leads me to call both good food and evil food alike food, I should tell you— for this reason, because both are a dry sustenance of the body. For that, I am sure you would agree, is what food is, would you not?
Friend
I would.
Socrates
And so too about drink the answer would be on the same lines, that the wet sustenance of the body,
+whether it be wholesome or pernicious, has this name of drink; and likewise with the rest. Try therefore on your part to imitate my method of answering. When you say that virtuous gain and wicked gain are both gain, what is it that you see to be the same in them, judging it to be the actual element of gain? And if again you are yourself unable to answer, just let me put it for your consideration, whether you describe as gain every acquisition that one has acquired either with no expense, or as a profit over and above one’s expense.
+
Friend
I believe that is what I call gain.
Socrates
Do you include a case where, after enjoying a banquet at which one has had much good cheer without any expense, one acquires an illness?
Friend
Upon my word, not I.
Socrates
And if one acquired health from attending a banquet, would one acquire gain or loss?
Friend
Gain.
Socrates
Hence gain is not just acquiring any acquisition.
Friend
No, indeed.
Socrates
Do you mean, not if it is evil? Or will one acquire no gain even if one acquires something good?
Friend
Apparently one will, if it is good.
+
Socrates
And if it is evil, will not one acquire loss?
Friend
I think so.
Socrates
You see, then, how you are running round again to the same old point? Gain is found to be good, and loss evil.
Friend
For my part, I cannot tell what to say.
Socrates
And not without good reason, sir. Now answer this further question: you say that if one acquires more than the amount one has spent, it is gain?
Friend
I do not mean, when it is evil, but if one gets more gold or silver than one has spent.
Socrates
Now, I am just going to ask you about that. Tell me,
+if one spends half a pound of gold and gets double that weight in silver, has one got gain or loss?
Friend
Loss, I presume, Socrates for one’s gold is reduced to twice, instead of twelve times, the value of silver.
Socrates
But you see, one has got more; or is double not more than half?
Friend
Not in worth, the one being silver and the other gold.
Socrates
So gain, it seems, must have this addition of worth. At least, you now say that silver, though more than gold, is not worth as much, and that gold, though less, is of equal worth.
+
Friend
Assuredly, for that is the case.
Socrates
Then the valuable is what produces gain, whether it be small or great, and the valueless produces no gain.
Friend
Yes.
Socrates
And by the valuable you mean simply, valuable to possess?
Friend
Yes, to possess.
Socrates
And again, by what is valuable to possess, do you mean the unprofitable or the profitable?
Friend
The profitable, I presume.
Socrates
And the profitable is good?
Friend
Yes.
+
Socrates
And so, most valiant of men, have we not here once more, for the third or fourth time, the admission that what produces gain is good?
Friend
So it seems.
Socrates
Then do you remember the point from which this discussion of ours arose?
Friend
I think I do.
Socrates
In case you do not, I will remind you. You maintained against me that good men do not wish to make all sorts of gain, but only those gains that are good, and not those that are wicked.
Friend
Yes.
+
Socrates
And now the argument has compelled us to acknowledge that all gains, both small and great, are good?
Friend
Yes, it has compelled me, at least, Socrates, rather than persuaded me.
Socrates
Well, later on, perhaps, it might also persuade you. Now, however, whether you are persuaded or whatever is your feeling, you at least agree with me that all gains are good, both small and great ones.
Friend
Yes, I do admit it.
Socrates
And you admit that virtuous men all wish for all good things, do you not?
Friend
I do.
+
Socrates
But, you know, you stated yourself that wicked men love both small and great gains.
Friend
I did.
Socrates
And so, by your account, all men will be lovers of gain, whether they be virtuous or wicked.
Friend
Apparently.
Socrates
Hence it is not right to reproach anybody with being a lover of gain: for he who makes this reproach is actually such an one himself.
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@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+
+
+
+ Lovers
+
+
+ Lovers
+ Plato, creator. Platonis Opera Tomvs II Tetralogia I-II, Burnet, John, 1863- 1928, editor. Oxford University Press. 1910.
+
+
+
+ Lovers
+ Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 12 translated by W.R.M. Lamb. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1927.
+
+
+
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diff --git a/data/tlg0059/tlg016/tlg0059.tlg016.perseus-eng1.xml b/data/tlg0059/tlg016/tlg0059.tlg016.perseus-eng1.xml
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+++ b/data/tlg0059/tlg016/tlg0059.tlg016.perseus-eng1.xml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
-Lovers
+LoversPlatoPerseus Project, Tufts UniversityGregory Crane
@@ -67,40 +67,40 @@
Socrates
-Socrates
I entered the grammar school of the teacher Dionysius, and saw there the young men who are accounted the most comely in form and of distinguished family, and their lovers. Now it chanced that two of the young people were disputing, but about what, I did not clearly overhear: it appeared, however, that they were disputing either about Anaxagoras The Ionian philosopher who lived in friendship with Pericles at Athens. or about Oenopides A philosopher of Chios, distinguished as a geometer and astronomer.; at any rate, they appeared to be drawing circles,
-and they were imitating certain inclinations i.e., the slopes of the contours of the earth, and of the apparent course of the sun(ecliptic). with their arms, bending to it and taking it most earnestly. Then I—for I was sitting beside the lover of one of the pair—nudged him with my elbow and asked him what on earth the two youngsters were so earnest about, and I said: Is it then something great and fine, in which they are so earnestly immersed?Great and fine, indeed! he replied: why, these fellows are prating about the heavenly bodies, and babbling philosophy.
-Then I, surprised at his answer, said: Young man, do you consider philosophizing to be shameful? Else, why do you speak so sharply?Then the other youth—for he chanced to be sitting near him, as his rival in love—when he heard my question and his rival's answer, said: You do yourself no good, Socrates, by pressing this fellow with a further question, as to whether he considers philosophizing to be shameful. Do you not know that he has spent the whole of his life in practising the neckhold, and stuffing himself, and sleeping? So why did you suppose he would make any other reply than that philosophy is shameful?
-Now this one of the two lovers had spent his time on humane studies, Literally, “on music,” which with the Greeks included poetry and general literature as well as music. whereas the other, whom he was abusing, had spent his on athletics. So I decided that I had best relinquish the other, whom I had been questioning, since he did not even himself set up to be experienced in words, but only in deeds; and that I should interrogate the one who set up to be wiser, in order that so far as I was able I might get some benefit from him. I said therefore: I addressed my question to both in common; but if you think you could answer more creditably than he, I put the same question to you as I did to him: do you consider philosophizing to be honorable or not?
-Then the two striplings, overhearing us speak somewhat like this, were silent, and ceasing from their own contention they became listeners to ours. What their lovers' sensations were, I do not know, but I myself, at any rate, was staggered; for every time I am staggered by handsome young people. It seemed to me, however, that my young friend too was in as great a flutter as myself; but nevertheless he answered me in a most ambitious spirit: Why, of course, Socrates, he said, if I should ever consider philosophizing to be shameful, I should not account myself so much as a man,
-nor anyone else either who was disposed to think so. Here he pointed to his rival lover, and spoke with a loud voice, in order that his favorite might hear every word.Then I remarked: So philosophizing seems to you to be honorable?Quite so, he said.Well now, I said; does it seem to you possible to know whether anything is honorable or shameful without knowing what it is fundamentally?No, he said.
-Then do you know, I went on, what philosophizing is?Certainly I do, said he.Then what is it? I asked.Why, just what Solon called it; you know it was Solon who said:And ever, as I older grow, I learn yet more and more;Solon Fr. 18—and I agree with him that a man who intends to philosophize should in this way be ever learning something or other, whether he be younger or older, in order that he may learn as many things as possible in his life. Now at first I felt there was something in his reply, but then, on second thoughts, I asked him whether he considered philosophy to be much learning.
-To which he answered: Certainly.And do you consider philosophy to be merely honorable, I asked, or good as well?Good as well, he said: very much so.Then do you observe this as peculiar to philosophy, or do you find it similarly in everything else? For example, do you consider the love of athletics to be not merely honorable, but good as well, or do you not?Whereupon he, most slily, gave a double answer: To him my statement must be “neither” ; but to you, Socrates, I acknowledge it to be both honorable and good:
-for I consider this the right view.Then I asked him: Well now, in athletics, do you consider that much exercise is love of athletics?To which he replied: Certainly, just as in philosophizing I consider much learning to be philosophy.Then I said: And do you then consider that the lovers of athletics desire anything else than that which will cause them to be in good bodily condition?Only that, he replied.And does much exercise, I asked, cause them to be in good bodily condition?
-Yes, for how, he replied, could one be in good bodily condition through little exercise?Here I felt it was time to stir up the lover of athletics, in order that he might give me the support of his athletic experience; so I proceeded to ask him: And you then, pray, why are you silent, excellent sir, while your friend here is speaking thus? Do you agree that men are in good bodily condition through much exercise, or is it rather through moderate exercise?For my part, Socrates, he said, I thought even a pig—
-as the saying is—would have known that moderate exercise causes them to be in good bodily condition, so why should not a fellow who is sleepless and unfed, with unchafed neck and slender, care-worn frame! And when he had said this the boys were delighted and laughed their approval, while the other lover blushed.Then I said to him: Well, do you now concede that it is neither much, nor little, but moderate exercise that causes men to be in good bodily condition? Or do you bid defiance to the two of us on this point?
-To which he answered: Against him I should be only too glad to fight it out, and I am certain I should prove able to support the theory I have put forward, even had I put forward a weaker one; for he is naught. But with you I do not aim at winning an unscrupulous success; and so I admit that not a great but a moderate amount of athletics causes good condition in men.And what of food? Moderate or much? I asked.The same applied to food, he admitted.
-Then I went on and tried to compel him also to admit that everything else connected with the body when most beneficial, was the moderate thing, not the much or the little; and he admitted that it was the moderate thing.And now, I said, as regards the soul; are moderate or immoderate things beneficial, as adjuncts of it?Moderate things, he replied.And are studies among the adjuncts of the soul?He admitted they were.So among these also it is the moderate that are beneficial, and not the much?He agreed.Then whom should we be justified in asking what sort of exercise or food is moderate for the body?The three of us agreed that it must be a doctor or a trainer.
-And whom should we ask about the moderate measure in the sowing of seed?In that matter, we agreed, it must be a farmer.And whom should we be justified in asking as to the moderate degree and kind, in regard to the sowing and planting of studies in the soul?At this point we all began to be full of perplexity;
-then I, mocking at them, asked: Do you mind, since we are in perplexity, if we ask these boys here? or perhaps we are ashamed, as Homer Od. xxi. 285 foll., where the suitors of Penelope are ashamed, after they have failed to string the great bow of Odysseus, to let its owner, disguised as a beggar, try his strength on it, and perhaps succeed. said the suitors were, and do not think it fit there should be someone else who will string the bow?Then, as it seemed to me that they were losing their zeal for the argument, I tried to pursue the inquiry in another way, and said: But what, as nearly as we can guess, are the kinds of learning which the philosopher should learn, since he is not to learn all things or many things?
-At this the wiser one interjected: The finest and most suitable kinds of learning are those which will bring him the most reputation for philosophy; and he will get most reputation if he appears well versed in all the arts, or if not in all, in as many of them, and those the most considerable, as he can, by learning so much of them as befits a free man to learn, that is, what belongs to the understanding rather than the handiwork of each.Well now, do you mean, I asked, in the same way as in carpentry? For there, you know, you can buy a carpenter for five
-or six minae, A mina(=100 drachmae)would be about 6-8 pounds in our money today. but a first-rate architect cannot be got for even ten thousand drachmae; few such, indeed, could be found throughout the whole of Greece. Is it something of this sort that you mean? When he heard me say this, he admitted that something like this was what he himself meant.I next asked him if it was not impossible for the same person to learn in this way merely two of the arts, not to speak of many or the principal ones; to which he replied: Do not conceive me, Socrates,
-to be stating that the philosopher must have accurate knowledge of each of the arts, like the actual adept in any of them; I mean only so far as may be expected of a free and educated man: that is, he should be able to follow the explanations of the craftsman more readily than the rest of the company, and to contribute an opinion of his own which will make him appear the cleverest and most accomplished of the company who may at any time be present at some verbal or practical exposition of the arts.Then, as I was still unsettled in my mind as to the drift of his words, I asked him: Do I quite grasp the sort of man whom you mean by the philosopher?
-For you seem to me to mean someone like the all-round athletes Literally, athletes trained for the contest of the five exercises of leaping, running, disc-flinging, javelin-throwing, and wrestling. in contest with the runners or the wrestlers: the former yield, you know, to the latter in their particular exercises, and are their inferiors in these, but are superior to the usual sort of athletes and beat them. I daresay it may be something of this sort that you would suggest as the effect produced by philosophy on those who make it their pursuit: they yield to those who are first-rate
-in an understanding of the arts, but in taking the second place they surpass the rest; and in this way the man who has studied philosophy comes just next to the top in everything. That is the kind of person whom you appear to me to indicate.You are quite right, it seems to me, Socrates, he said, in your conception of the philosopher's position, with your comparison of him to the all-round athlete. For it is precisely his nature not to be enslaved to any business, or to work out anything exactly, so as to let his application to that one matter make him deficient in the rest,
-as the craftsmen do, but to have a moderate contact with all of them.Well, after this answer I was eager to know clearly what he meant, so I inquired of him whether he conceived of good men as useful or useless.Useful, I should say, Socrates, he replied.Then if good men are useful, are wicked men useless?He agreed that they were.Again, do you consider that philosophers are useful persons or not?
-He agreed that they were useful; nay, more, that he considered they were most useful of all.Come now, let us make out, if what you say is true, where these second-best men are also useful to us: for clearly the philosopher is inferior to any particular adept in the arts.He agreed.Well now, I went on, if you yourself, or one of your friends for whom you feel great concern, should have fallen sick, would you fetch that second-best man into the house with a view to obtaining health, or would you summon a doctor?
-For my part, I should have both, he replied.Please do not say “both,” I said, but which of the two you would prefer and also summon first.No one, he replied,would make any question but that the doctor should be preferred and also summoned first.And again, if you were in a ship that was making rough weather, to which would you rather entrust yourself and yours, the pilot or the philosopher?I should choose the pilot.And so it will be in everything else: so long as there is some craftsman, the philosopher will not be useful?Apparently, he replied.
-So now we find that the philosopher is a useless person? For I suppose we always have craftsmen; and we have agreed that good men are useful, and bad ones useless.He was obliged to agree to this.Then what follows? Am I to ask you, or will it be too ill-mannered?Ask whatever you please.Well, my aim, I said, is merely to recall our agreements upon
-what has been stated. The matter stands somewhat like this. We agreed that philosophy is an honorable thing, and that philosophers are good; and that good men are useful, and wicked men useless: but then again we agreed that philosophers, so long as we have craftsmen, are useless, and that we always do have craftsmen. Has not all this been agreed?Yes, to be sure, he replied.Then we agreed, it seems, by your account—if philosophizing means having knowledge of the arts in the way you describe—that philosophers are wicked and useless so long as there are arts
-among mankind. But I expect they are not so really, my friend, and that philosophizing is not just having a concernment in the arts or spending one's life in meddlesome stooping and prying and accumulation of learning, but something else; because I imagined that this life was actually a disgrace, and that people who concerned themselves with the arts were called sordid. BA/NAUSOS expresses the peculiar contempt felt by Greek gentlemen for the work of artisans and even artists. Manual labor was the business of slaves and persons who were unfit for military and political life. But we shall know more definitely whether this statement of mine is true, if you will answer me this: What men know how to punish horses rightly?
-Is it those who make them into the best horses, or some other men?Those who make them into the best horses.Or again, is it not the men who know how to make dogs into the best dogs that know also how to punish them rightly?Yes.Then it is the same art that makes them into the best dogs and punishes them rightly?It appears so to me, he replied.Again, is the art that makes them into the best ones and punishes them rightly the same as that which knows the good and the bad ones, or is it some other?The same, he said.Then in the case of men also will you be prepared to agree that the art
-which makes them into the best men is that which punishes them rightly and distinguishes the good and the bad ones?Certainly, he said.And that which does this to one, does it also to many, and that which does it to many, does it also to one?Yes.And so it is also with horses and everything else?I agree.Then what is the knowledge which rightly punishes the licentious and law-breaking people in our cities? Is it not judicature?Yes.And is it any other art than this that you call justice?No, only this.
-And that whereby they punish rightly is that whereby they know the good and bad people?It is.And whoever knows one will know many also?Yes.And whoever does not know many will not know one?I agree.Then if one were a horse, and did not know the good and wicked horses, would one not know which sort one was oneself?I think not.And if one were an ox and did not know the wicked and good oxen, would one not know which sort one was oneself?That is so, he said.And so it would be, if one were a dog?He agreed.
-Well now, when one is a man, and does not know the good and bad men, one surely cannot know whether one is good or wicked oneself, since one is a man also oneself?He granted this.And is “not knowing oneself” being temperate, Cf. Charmides(Introduction and 164)for the connection in thought and language between temperance and self-knowledge. or not being temperate?Not being temperate.So “knowing oneself” is being temperate?I agree, he said.So this is the message, it seems, of the Delphic inscription—that one is to practise temperance and justice.It seems so.And it is by this same art that we know also how to punish rightly?Yes.Then that whereby we know how to punish rightly
-is justice, and that whereby we know how to distinguish our own and others' quality is temperance?It seems so, he said.Then justice and temperance are the same thing?Apparently.And further, it is thus, you know, that cities are well ordered—when the wrongdoers pay the penalty.That is true, he said.Hence this is also statecraft.He concurred.Again, when one man governs a city rightly, is he not called a despot and king?I agree.And he governs by a kingly and despotic art?That is so.And these arts are the same as the former?Apparently.
-Again, when a man singly governs a house aright, what is he called? Is he not a house-manager and master?Yes.Then would he also govern his house well by justice, or by some other art?By justice.Hence they are all the same, it seems,—king, despot, statesman, house-manager, master, and the temperate man and the just man; and it is all one art,—the kingly, the despotic, the statesman's, the master's, the house-manager's, and justice and temperance.It is so, apparently, he said.
-Then, if it is disgraceful in the philosopher to be unable, when a doctor speaks about the sick, either to follow his remarks or to contribute anything of his own to what is being said or done, and to be in the same case when any other of the craftsmen speaks, is it not disgraceful that he should be unable, when it is a judge or a king or some other of the persons whom we have just instanced, either to follow their words or contribute anything to their business?It must indeed be disgraceful, Socrates, to have nothing to contribute to subjects of such great importance!
-Are we then to say, I asked, that in these matters also he is to be an all-round athlete, a second-rate man, taking the second place in all the subjects of this art—he, the philosopher—and is to be useless so long as there is one of these persons; or that, first of all, he is to entrust his own house to nobody else and is not to take the second place in it, but is himself to judge and punish rightly, if his house is to be well managed?He granted me that it must be so.Secondly, I presume, whether his friends entrust him with an arbitration, or the state charges him to determine
-or judge any matter, it is disgraceful for him, my good friend, in such cases, to be found in the second or third place, and not to lead?I agree.Hence we see, my excellent sir, that philosophizing is very far from being much learning and that affair of busying oneself with the arts.On my saying this the cultivated youth was silent, feeling ashamed for what he had said before, while the unlearned one said it was as I stated; and the rest of the company praised the argument.
+Socrates
I entered the grammar school of the teacher Dionysius, and saw there the young men who are accounted the most comely in form and of distinguished family, and their lovers. Now it chanced that two of the young people were disputing, but about what, I did not clearly overhear: it appeared, however, that they were disputing either about Anaxagoras The Ionian philosopher who lived in friendship with Pericles at Athens. or about Oenopides A philosopher of Chios, distinguished as a geometer and astronomer.; at any rate, they appeared to be drawing circles,
+and they were imitating certain inclinations i.e., the slopes of the contours of the earth, and of the apparent course of the sun(ecliptic). with their arms, bending to it and taking it most earnestly. Then I—for I was sitting beside the lover of one of the pair—nudged him with my elbow and asked him what on earth the two youngsters were so earnest about, and I said: Is it then something great and fine, in which they are so earnestly immersed?Great and fine, indeed! he replied: why, these fellows are prating about the heavenly bodies, and babbling philosophy.
+Then I, surprised at his answer, said: Young man, do you consider philosophizing to be shameful? Else, why do you speak so sharply?Then the other youth—for he chanced to be sitting near him, as his rival in love—when he heard my question and his rival’s answer, said: You do yourself no good, Socrates, by pressing this fellow with a further question, as to whether he considers philosophizing to be shameful. Do you not know that he has spent the whole of his life in practising the neckhold, and stuffing himself, and sleeping? So why did you suppose he would make any other reply than that philosophy is shameful?
+Now this one of the two lovers had spent his time on humane studies, Literally, on music, which with the Greeks included poetry and general literature as well as music. whereas the other, whom he was abusing, had spent his on athletics. So I decided that I had best relinquish the other, whom I had been questioning, since he did not even himself set up to be experienced in words, but only in deeds; and that I should interrogate the one who set up to be wiser, in order that so far as I was able I might get some benefit from him. I said therefore: I addressed my question to both in common; but if you think you could answer more creditably than he, I put the same question to you as I did to him: do you consider philosophizing to be honorable or not?
+Then the two striplings, overhearing us speak somewhat like this, were silent, and ceasing from their own contention they became listeners to ours. What their lovers’ sensations were, I do not know, but I myself, at any rate, was staggered; for every time I am staggered by handsome young people. It seemed to me, however, that my young friend too was in as great a flutter as myself; but nevertheless he answered me in a most ambitious spirit: Why, of course, Socrates, he said, if I should ever consider philosophizing to be shameful, I should not account myself so much as a man,
+nor anyone else either who was disposed to think so. Here he pointed to his rival lover, and spoke with a loud voice, in order that his favorite might hear every word.Then I remarked: So philosophizing seems to you to be honorable?Quite so, he said.Well now, I said; does it seem to you possible to know whether anything is honorable or shameful without knowing what it is fundamentally?No, he said.
+Then do you know, I went on, what philosophizing is?Certainly I do, said he.Then what is it? I asked.Why, just what Solon called it; you know it was Solon who said:And ever, as I older grow, I learn yet more and more;Solon Fr. 18—and I agree with him that a man who intends to philosophize should in this way be ever learning something or other, whether he be younger or older, in order that he may learn as many things as possible in his life. Now at first I felt there was something in his reply, but then, on second thoughts, I asked him whether he considered philosophy to be much learning.
+To which he answered: Certainly.And do you consider philosophy to be merely honorable, I asked, or good as well?Good as well, he said: very much so.Then do you observe this as peculiar to philosophy, or do you find it similarly in everything else? For example, do you consider the love of athletics to be not merely honorable, but good as well, or do you not?Whereupon he, most slily, gave a double answer: To him my statement must be neither; but to you, Socrates, I acknowledge it to be both honorable and good:
+for I consider this the right view.Then I asked him: Well now, in athletics, do you consider that much exercise is love of athletics?To which he replied: Certainly, just as in philosophizing I consider much learning to be philosophy.Then I said: And do you then consider that the lovers of athletics desire anything else than that which will cause them to be in good bodily condition?Only that, he replied.And does much exercise, I asked, cause them to be in good bodily condition?
+Yes, for how, he replied, could one be in good bodily condition through little exercise?Here I felt it was time to stir up the lover of athletics, in order that he might give me the support of his athletic experience; so I proceeded to ask him: And you then, pray, why are you silent, excellent sir, while your friend here is speaking thus? Do you agree that men are in good bodily condition through much exercise, or is it rather through moderate exercise?For my part, Socrates, he said, I thought even a pig—
+as the saying is—would have known that moderate exercise causes them to be in good bodily condition, so why should not a fellow who is sleepless and unfed, with unchafed neck and slender, care-worn frame! And when he had said this the boys were delighted and laughed their approval, while the other lover blushed.Then I said to him: Well, do you now concede that it is neither much, nor little, but moderate exercise that causes men to be in good bodily condition? Or do you bid defiance to the two of us on this point?
+To which he answered: Against him I should be only too glad to fight it out, and I am certain I should prove able to support the theory I have put forward, even had I put forward a weaker one; for he is naught. But with you I do not aim at winning an unscrupulous success; and so I admit that not a great but a moderate amount of athletics causes good condition in men.And what of food? Moderate or much? I asked.The same applied to food, he admitted.
+Then I went on and tried to compel him also to admit that everything else connected with the body when most beneficial, was the moderate thing, not the much or the little; and he admitted that it was the moderate thing.And now, I said, as regards the soul; are moderate or immoderate things beneficial, as adjuncts of it?Moderate things, he replied.And are studies among the adjuncts of the soul?He admitted they were.So among these also it is the moderate that are beneficial, and not the much?He agreed.Then whom should we be justified in asking what sort of exercise or food is moderate for the body?The three of us agreed that it must be a doctor or a trainer.
+And whom should we ask about the moderate measure in the sowing of seed?In that matter, we agreed, it must be a farmer.And whom should we be justified in asking as to the moderate degree and kind, in regard to the sowing and planting of studies in the soul?At this point we all began to be full of perplexity;
+then I, mocking at them, asked: Do you mind, since we are in perplexity, if we ask these boys here? or perhaps we are ashamed, as Homer Od. xxi. 285 foll., where the suitors of Penelope are ashamed, after they have failed to string the great bow of Odysseus, to let its owner, disguised as a beggar, try his strength on it, and perhaps succeed. said the suitors were, and do not think it fit there should be someone else who will string the bow?Then, as it seemed to me that they were losing their zeal for the argument, I tried to pursue the inquiry in another way, and said: But what, as nearly as we can guess, are the kinds of learning which the philosopher should learn, since he is not to learn all things or many things?
+At this the wiser one interjected: The finest and most suitable kinds of learning are those which will bring him the most reputation for philosophy; and he will get most reputation if he appears well versed in all the arts, or if not in all, in as many of them, and those the most considerable, as he can, by learning so much of them as befits a free man to learn, that is, what belongs to the understanding rather than the handiwork of each.Well now, do you mean, I asked, in the same way as in carpentry? For there, you know, you can buy a carpenter for five
+or six minae, A mina(=100 drachmae)would be about 6-8 pounds in our money today. but a first-rate architect cannot be got for even ten thousand drachmae; few such, indeed, could be found throughout the whole of Greece. Is it something of this sort that you mean? When he heard me say this, he admitted that something like this was what he himself meant.I next asked him if it was not impossible for the same person to learn in this way merely two of the arts, not to speak of many or the principal ones; to which he replied: Do not conceive me, Socrates,
+to be stating that the philosopher must have accurate knowledge of each of the arts, like the actual adept in any of them; I mean only so far as may be expected of a free and educated man: that is, he should be able to follow the explanations of the craftsman more readily than the rest of the company, and to contribute an opinion of his own which will make him appear the cleverest and most accomplished of the company who may at any time be present at some verbal or practical exposition of the arts.Then, as I was still unsettled in my mind as to the drift of his words, I asked him: Do I quite grasp the sort of man whom you mean by the philosopher?
+For you seem to me to mean someone like the all-round athletes Literally, athletes trained for the contest of the five exercises of leaping, running, disc-flinging, javelin-throwing, and wrestling. in contest with the runners or the wrestlers: the former yield, you know, to the latter in their particular exercises, and are their inferiors in these, but are superior to the usual sort of athletes and beat them. I daresay it may be something of this sort that you would suggest as the effect produced by philosophy on those who make it their pursuit: they yield to those who are first-rate
+in an understanding of the arts, but in taking the second place they surpass the rest; and in this way the man who has studied philosophy comes just next to the top in everything. That is the kind of person whom you appear to me to indicate.You are quite right, it seems to me, Socrates, he said, in your conception of the philosopher’s position, with your comparison of him to the all-round athlete. For it is precisely his nature not to be enslaved to any business, or to work out anything exactly, so as to let his application to that one matter make him deficient in the rest,
+as the craftsmen do, but to have a moderate contact with all of them.Well, after this answer I was eager to know clearly what he meant, so I inquired of him whether he conceived of good men as useful or useless.Useful, I should say, Socrates, he replied.Then if good men are useful, are wicked men useless?He agreed that they were.Again, do you consider that philosophers are useful persons or not?
+He agreed that they were useful; nay, more, that he considered they were most useful of all.Come now, let us make out, if what you say is true, where these second-best men are also useful to us: for clearly the philosopher is inferior to any particular adept in the arts.He agreed.Well now, I went on, if you yourself, or one of your friends for whom you feel great concern, should have fallen sick, would you fetch that second-best man into the house with a view to obtaining health, or would you summon a doctor?
+ For my part, I should have both, he replied.Please do not say both, I said, but which of the two you would prefer and also summon first.No one, he replied,would make any question but that the doctor should be preferred and also summoned first.And again, if you were in a ship that was making rough weather, to which would you rather entrust yourself and yours, the pilot or the philosopher?I should choose the pilot.And so it will be in everything else: so long as there is some craftsman, the philosopher will not be useful?Apparently, he replied.
+So now we find that the philosopher is a useless person? For I suppose we always have craftsmen; and we have agreed that good men are useful, and bad ones useless.He was obliged to agree to this.Then what follows? Am I to ask you, or will it be too ill-mannered?Ask whatever you please.Well, my aim, I said, is merely to recall our agreements upon
+what has been stated. The matter stands somewhat like this. We agreed that philosophy is an honorable thing, and that philosophers are good; and that good men are useful, and wicked men useless: but then again we agreed that philosophers, so long as we have craftsmen, are useless, and that we always do have craftsmen. Has not all this been agreed?Yes, to be sure, he replied.Then we agreed, it seems, by your account—if philosophizing means having knowledge of the arts in the way you describe—that philosophers are wicked and useless so long as there are arts
+among mankind. But I expect they are not so really, my friend, and that philosophizing is not just having a concernment in the arts or spending one’s life in meddlesome stooping and prying and accumulation of learning, but something else; because I imagined that this life was actually a disgrace, and that people who concerned themselves with the arts were called sordid. BA/NAUSOS expresses the peculiar contempt felt by Greek gentlemen for the work of artisans and even artists. Manual labor was the business of slaves and persons who were unfit for military and political life. But we shall know more definitely whether this statement of mine is true, if you will answer me this: What men know how to punish horses rightly?
+Is it those who make them into the best horses, or some other men?Those who make them into the best horses.Or again, is it not the men who know how to make dogs into the best dogs that know also how to punish them rightly?Yes.Then it is the same art that makes them into the best dogs and punishes them rightly?It appears so to me, he replied.Again, is the art that makes them into the best ones and punishes them rightly the same as that which knows the good and the bad ones, or is it some other?The same, he said.Then in the case of men also will you be prepared to agree that the art
+which makes them into the best men is that which punishes them rightly and distinguishes the good and the bad ones?Certainly, he said.And that which does this to one, does it also to many, and that which does it to many, does it also to one?Yes.And so it is also with horses and everything else?I agree.Then what is the knowledge which rightly punishes the licentious and law-breaking people in our cities? Is it not judicature?Yes.And is it any other art than this that you call justice?No, only this.
+And that whereby they punish rightly is that whereby they know the good and bad people?It is.And whoever knows one will know many also?Yes.And whoever does not know many will not know one?I agree.Then if one were a horse, and did not know the good and wicked horses, would one not know which sort one was oneself?I think not.And if one were an ox and did not know the wicked and good oxen, would one not know which sort one was oneself?That is so, he said.And so it would be, if one were a dog?He agreed.
+ Well now, when one is a man, and does not know the good and bad men, one surely cannot know whether one is good or wicked oneself, since one is a man also oneself?He granted this.And is not knowing oneself being temperate, Cf. Charmides(Introduction and 164)for the connection in thought and language between temperance and self-knowledge. or not being temperate?Not being temperate.So knowing oneself is being temperate?I agree, he said.So this is the message, it seems, of the Delphic inscription—that one is to practise temperance and justice.It seems so.And it is by this same art that we know also how to punish rightly?Yes.Then that whereby we know how to punish rightly
+is justice, and that whereby we know how to distinguish our own and others’ quality is temperance?It seems so, he said.Then justice and temperance are the same thing?Apparently.And further, it is thus, you know, that cities are well ordered—when the wrongdoers pay the penalty.That is true, he said.Hence this is also statecraft.He concurred.Again, when one man governs a city rightly, is he not called a despot and king?I agree.And he governs by a kingly and despotic art?That is so.And these arts are the same as the former?Apparently.
+Again, when a man singly governs a house aright, what is he called? Is he not a house-manager and master?Yes.Then would he also govern his house well by justice, or by some other art?By justice.Hence they are all the same, it seems,—king, despot, statesman, house-manager, master, and the temperate man and the just man; and it is all one art,—the kingly, the despotic, the statesman’s, the master’s, the house-manager’s, and justice and temperance.It is so, apparently, he said.
+Then, if it is disgraceful in the philosopher to be unable, when a doctor speaks about the sick, either to follow his remarks or to contribute anything of his own to what is being said or done, and to be in the same case when any other of the craftsmen speaks, is it not disgraceful that he should be unable, when it is a judge or a king or some other of the persons whom we have just instanced, either to follow their words or contribute anything to their business?It must indeed be disgraceful, Socrates, to have nothing to contribute to subjects of such great importance!
+Are we then to say, I asked, that in these matters also he is to be an all-round athlete, a second-rate man, taking the second place in all the subjects of this art—he, the philosopher—and is to be useless so long as there is one of these persons; or that, first of all, he is to entrust his own house to nobody else and is not to take the second place in it, but is himself to judge and punish rightly, if his house is to be well managed?He granted me that it must be so.Secondly, I presume, whether his friends entrust him with an arbitration, or the state charges him to determine
+or judge any matter, it is disgraceful for him, my good friend, in such cases, to be found in the second or third place, and not to lead?I agree.Hence we see, my excellent sir, that philosophizing is very far from being much learning and that affair of busying oneself with the arts.On my saying this the cultivated youth was silent, feeling ashamed for what he had said before, while the unlearned one said it was as I stated; and the rest of the company praised the argument.
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diff --git a/data/tlg0059/tlg016/tlg0059.tlg016.perseus-grc1.xml b/data/tlg0059/tlg016/tlg0059.tlg016.perseus-grc1.xml
index b9d4025c1..44ad4a21a 100755
--- a/data/tlg0059/tlg016/tlg0059.tlg016.perseus-grc1.xml
+++ b/data/tlg0059/tlg016/tlg0059.tlg016.perseus-grc1.xml
@@ -67,40 +67,40 @@
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/tlg0059/tlg017/tlg0059.tlg017.perseus-eng1.xml b/data/tlg0059/tlg017/tlg0059.tlg017.perseus-eng1.xml
index 415998880..2662f5642 100755
--- a/data/tlg0059/tlg017/tlg0059.tlg017.perseus-eng1.xml
+++ b/data/tlg0059/tlg017/tlg0059.tlg017.perseus-eng1.xml
@@ -67,55 +67,55 @@
DemodocusSocratesTheages
-Demodocus
Socrates, I was wanting to have some private talk with you, if you had time to spare; even if there is some demand, which is not particularly important, on your time, do spare some, nevertheless, for me.
Socrates
Why, in any case I happen to have time to spare, and for you, moreover, I have plenty. Well, you are free to say whatever you wish.
Demodocus
Then do you mind if we step aside here from the street into the portico of Zeus the Liberator This portico or colonnade was near that of the King Archon, close to the Agora?
Socrates
As you think best.
-
Demodocus
Let us go, then. Socrates, it would seem that all growths follow the same course, both those that grow from the earth, and the animals, including man. In regard to the plants, as you know, we who cultivate the earth find it the easiest part of our work to make all our preparations that are needed before planting, and to do the planting itself; but when the plant begins to grow, thenceforward we have a great deal of difficult and vexatious business in tending the new growth.
-Such, it seems, is also the case in regard to men: I take my own concerns as evidence for judging of the rest. For indeed I have found the planting, or the procreation—whichever one ought to call it—of this son of mine the easiest thing in the world; but his upbringing has been vexatious and a constant source of alarm, so great are my fears for him. Among the many instances that I could mention, the desire which occupies him at the moment is a thing that especially alarms me: for it is not an ill-bred desire, but a dangerous one, since here we have him, Socrates, as he says, desiring to become wise.
-My opinion is that some of his fellow-townsmen, about his own age, who pay visits to the city, excite him with accounts of certain discussions they have heard there; and in his envy of these he has long been pestering me with the demand that I should take due thought for his needs, and pay fees to some sophist or other who will make him wise. Now I do not mind so much about the fees, but I believe he is running into no slight danger
-where he is hastening. I did for a time restrain him with good advice; but since I am no longer able to do so, I believe my best course is to comply with his request, in order that he may not resort, perchance, behind my back to somebody who will corrupt him. So I have come now on this very business of placing this youth with one of these sophists, or purveyors of wisdom, as they are held to be. It is a happy chance, therefore, that has thrown you in our way, as I should be particularly glad, with this plan of action in my mind, to ask your advice. Come, if you have any advice to give
-on what you have heard from me, you not only may, but should, give it.
Socrates
Well, you know, Demodocus, they do say that advice is a holy thing. i.e. something above and apart from the adviser's personal interests, and looking only to what is best. And so, if ever it is to be accounted holy, it must be in this instance, in which you now seek it. For there is no more divine matter on which a mortal could take counsel than the education either
-of himself or of his relations. Now, first of all, let you and me come to an agreement as to what we suppose that this thing can be, on which we are taking counsel; for it may happen that I conceive it to be one thing, and you another, and then when we have proceeded some little way in our conference, we may perceive how ridiculous we are, I the adviser and you the advised, in having no common ground in our notions.
Demodocus
Why, I think you are right there, Socrates, and we should do as you suggest.
Socrates
Yes, I am right, but yet not entirely, because I have a slight change to make. For it occurs to me that
-this youngster may not be desiring the thing that we suppose him to desire, but something else, and there again we may be still more absurdly taking counsel on some other thing. Hence our most proper course, it seems to me, is to begin with the youth himself, and inquire of him what it actually is that he desires.
Demodocus
It does rather look, in fact, as though our best way would be thus, as you suggest.
Socrates
Then tell me, what is the young person's goodly name: how are we to address him?
Demodocus
Theages is his name, Socrates.
-
Socrates
Goodly is the name, Demodocus, and holy-sounding, “Theages” means “god-guided.” that you have bestowed on your son. Tell me, then, Theages, do you say you desire to become wise, and do you require your father here to find out a school of some man who is qualified to make you wise?
Theages
Yes.
Socrates
And which sort of man do you call wise, those who have knowledge of such and such a thing, whatever it may be, or those who have not?
Theages
Those who have knowledge, I say.
Socrates
Well now, has not your father taught and educated you in the subjects which form the education of everyone else here—all the sons of noble and honorable fathers—in letters, I mean, and harping and wrestling and the other sorts of contest?
-
Theages
Yes, he has.
Socrates
And you think you are still lacking in some knowledge which it behoves your father to provide for you?
Theages
I do
Socrates
What knowledge is it? Tell us on our side, that we may oblige you.
Theages
He knows it, as well as I, Socrates, since I have often told him; only he says this to you of set purpose, making as if he did not know what I desire. For he assails me too with other statements of the same sort, and refuses to place me with any instructor.
-
Socrates
Well, what you said to him before was spoken, as it were, without witnesses; but now you shall take me as a witness, and declare before me what is this wisdom that you desire. Come now; suppose you desired the wisdom whereby men steer a ship, and I happened to put this further question to you: Theages, what wisdom is it that you lack, when you blame your father for refusing to place you with people who would enable you to become wise? What answer would you have given me? What wisdom would you name? The steersman's art, would you not?
Theages
Yes.
-
Socrates
And if a desire to be wise in the wisdom whereby they steer chariots led you to blame your father, and I asked what wisdom this was, what would you name in reply? The charioteer's art, would you not?
Theages
Yes.
Socrates
And is that which you happen to be desiring now a nameless one, or has it a name?
Theages
I should say it has a name.
Socrates
Now do you know it, though not its name, or do you know its name as well?
Theages
I know its name as well.
Socrates
Then what is it? Tell me.
-
Theages
What other name, Socrates, can one give it but wisdom?
Socrates
And the driver's art too is wisdom? Or do you think it is ignorance?
Theages
I do not.
Socrates
You call it wisdom?
Theages
Yes.
Socrates
What use do we make of it? Is it not the art whereby we know how to govern a team of horses?
Theages
Yes.
Socrates
And the steersman's art too is wisdom?
Theages
I think so.
Socrates
Is not this the art whereby we know how to govern ships?
Theages
Yes, it is.
Socrates
And the wisdom that you so desire, what is it?
-That whereby we know how to govern whom?
Theages
To govern men, I imagine.
Socrates
Sick men, do you mean?
Theages
Oh, no.
Socrates
For that is medicine, is it not?
Theages
Yes.
Socrates
Well, that whereby we know how to govern the singers in a chorus?
Theages
No.
Socrates
For that is music?
Theages
To be sure.
Socrates
Well, that whereby we know how to govern men in gymnastic training?
Theages
No.
Socrates
For that is gymnastics?
Theages
Yes.
Socrates
Well, to govern people who do what? Endeavor your best to speak, as I did to you at the beginning.
-
Theages
To govern the people in the city, I imagine.
Socrates
And are the sick people also in the city?
Theages
Yes, but I mean not these only, but all the rest who are in the city besides.
Socrates
Do I understand what art it is that you mean? For you strike me as meaning, not that whereby we know how to govern reapers and harvesters and planters and sowers and threshers, for it is the farmer's art whereby we govern these, is it not?
Theages
Yes.
-
Socrates
Nor, I suppose, do you mean that whereby we know how to govern sawyers and borers and planers and turners, as a class together; for is not that carpentry?
Theages
Yes.
Socrates
But perhaps it is that whereby we govern, not only all these, but farmers themselves also, and carpenters, and all craftsmen and ordinary people, whether men or women: that, perhaps, is the wisdom you mean.
Theages
That, Socrates, is what I have been intending to mean all the time.
-
Socrates
Then can you tell me whether Aegisthus, who slew Agamemnon in Argos, governed all these people that you mean craftsmen and ordinary people, both men and women, or some other persons?
Theages
No, just those.
Socrates
Well now, did not Peleus, son of Aeacus, govern these same people in Phthia?
Theages
Yes.
Socrates
And have you ever heard of Periander, son of Cypselus, and how he governed at Corinth?
Theages
I have.
Socrates
Did he not govern these same people in his city?
-
Theages
Yes.
Socrates
Or again, do you not consider that Archelaus, son of Perdiccas, who governed recently in Macedonia, governed these same people?
Theages
I do.
Socrates
And who do you think were governed by Hippias, son of Peisistratus, who governed in this city? Were they not these people ?
Theages
To be sure they were.
Socrates
Now, can you tell me what appellation is given to Bacis and Sibyl and our native Amphilytus? In Aristophanes and Plato we find mention of only one “Sibyl” : later the name, like Bacis (an old Boeotian prophet), was applied to several oracular persons in different places. Amphilytus seems to have come from Acarnania to Athens in the time of Peisistratus.
Theages
Why, soothsayers, of course, Socrates.
-
Socrates
That is correct. But try to answer me in that way regarding those others—Hippias and Periander: what appellation is given them on account of their government?
Theages
Despots, I suppose; it must be that.
Socrates
And when a man desires to govern the whole of the people in his city, he desires the same government as those did—despotism, and to be a despot?
Theages
Apparently.
Socrates
And it is this that you say you desire?
Theages
It seems so, from what I have said.
-
Socrates
You scoundrel! So you were desiring to govern us, all the time that you were blaming your father for not sending you to some seminary of despots! And you, Demodocus, are you not ashamed of having known all the time what he is desiring, and though you could have sent him where you would have made him an expert in the wisdom which he desires, actually grudging it to him and refusing to send him? But now, look here, as he has declared against you in my presence, shall you and I consult together on the question of whose school we shall send him to, and whose classes will help him to become a wise despot?
-
Demodocus
Yes, in faith, Socrates, let us certainly consult, as I feel this is a matter on which no slight counsel is needed.
Socrates
By and by, my good sir. Let us first cross-examine him thoroughly.
Demodocus
Examine him then.
Socrates
Well now, what if we called in Euripides to our aid, Theages? For you know Euripides says:Despots are wise by converse with the wise. Soph. Fr. 14.1This line, also quoted and attributed to Euripides in Plat. Rep. 568a, appears to belong really to Sophocles' lost tragedy The Locrian Ajax. Now, if someone should ask Euripides: Euripides, in what
-are these men wise, by whose converse you say that despots are wise? I mean, suppose he had said:Farmers are wise by converse with the wise,and we had asked him,—Wise in what?—what answer would he have given us? Surely none other than,—In farming.
Theages
That, and none other.
Socrates
Or again, if he had said:Piemen are wise by converse with the wise,and we had asked him, Wise in what?—what answer would he have given us? He would have said,—In the pie-making business,—would he not?
Theages
Yes.
Socrates
Or again, if he had saidWrestlers are wise by converse with the wise,and we had asked him, Wise in what?—would he not reply,—
-In wrestling?
Theages
Yes.
Socrates
But as he said:Despots are wise by converse with the wise,? Soph. Fr. 14.1 and we ask him,—In what do you mean that the latter are wise, Euripides?—what will he reply? What sort of subjects will he mention here?
Theages
Why, upon my word, I for my part do not know.
Socrates
Well, do you mind if I tell you?
Theages
If you do not mind.
Socrates
They are the same subjects that Anacreon said Callicrite understood; or do you not know the ode? Nothing is known of this poem.
Theages
I do.
Socrates
Well then, do you desire to partake in some instruction of that sort from any man
-who is a fellow-craftsman of Callicrite, daughter of Cyane, and knows all about despotism as she did, according to the poet, in order that you may become a despot over us and our city?
Theages
You are joking all this time, Socrates, and making fun of me.
Socrates
Why, do you not say that you desire that wisdom which will enable you to govern all the citizens? And in doing that, will you be anything else but a despot ?
Theages
I should indeed pray, I imagine, that I might become a despot,
-if possible, over all men, and failing that, over as many as might be; so would you, I imagine, and everybody else besides: nay, even more, I daresay, that I might become a god; but I did not say I desired that.
Socrates
Well, what on earth then is it that you do desire? Do you not say you desire to govern the citizens?
Theages
Yes, but not by force, or as despots do, but with their consent, as is done by all the other men of importance in the state.
Socrates
Do you mean, as by Themistocles and Pericles and Cimon, and by all those who have shown themselves able statesmen?
Theages
Yes, in good earnest, I mean those people.
-
Socrates
Then what if you chanced to desire to become wise in horsemanship? To whom would you have had to resort before expecting to be a clever horseman? To whom else but the horse-masters?
Theages
To none else, I am sure.
Socrates
And moreover, you would go to the actual men who are clever at the business, and who have horses and constantly use them in great numbers, both their own and other people's?
Theages
Obviously I should.
Socrates
And what if you wished to become wise in javelin-throwing? Would you not expect to get this wisdom by having resorted to those javelin-masters who have javelins and who constantly use javelins,
-both other people's and their own, in great numbers?
Theages
I think so.
Socrates
Then pray tell me, since it is your wish to become wise in state-matters, do you expect to get your wisdom by resorting to any other persons than those statesmen, who not only have their own ability in state-matters, but have constant dealings with other cities besides their own, by their intercourse alike with Greek cities and with foreign peoples? Or do you think to get wisdom in their business by resorting to any other persons than these particular men?
-
Theages
Well, Socrates, I have heard of the argument that you are said to put forward—that the sons of those statesmen are no better men than the sons of shoemakers Cf. Alcib. I.118 E;Protag 320 A, B.; and in my opinion your words are very true, from what I am able to gather. Hence I should be an utter fool if I supposed that any of these men would impart his wisdom to me when he never was of any use to his own son, as he would have been, if he were able to be of use in this matter to anyone at all in the world.
Socrates
Then which way, most excellent sir, would you turn if, when you came to have a son, he should trouble you in the same manner,
-and tell you he desired to become a good painter, and should blame you, his father, for refusing to spend money on him for that very purpose, but at the same time should disregard the practitioners of that very thing, the painters, and decline to learn from them? Or the flute-players, when he wished to become a flute-player, or the harp-players? Would you know what to do with him, and where else you should send him if he refused to learn from these?
Theages
Upon my word, I should not.
-
Socrates
And do you now, when you are behaving in just the same way to your father, feel surprised and blame him for being at a loss what to do with you and where to send you? Why, we are ready to place you with any well-bred Athenian statesman you may choose, who will train you free of charge Cf. the passage in the Protagoras(320 A, B)which shows that young men of good family were often placed with older friends of standing and experience in order to prepare for public life. Cf. also Meno 94 D.; and so not only will you be at no expense of money, but will gain far greater commendation amongst the mass of men than if you studied with anyone else.
Theages
But then, Socrates, are not you too one of our well-bred gentlemen? Indeed, if you will agree to instruct me, I am content and seek no other.
-
Socrates
What do you mean by that, Theages?
Demodocus
Nay, Socrates, there is nothing amiss in what he says, and you will oblige me at the same time; for I should count it the greatest possible stroke of luck if he should welcome your instruction and you also should consent to instruct him. Nay, indeed, I am quite ashamed to say how keenly I wish it; but I entreat you both—you, to consent to teach Theages, and you, to seek the teaching of no one else than Socrates; you will thus relieve me
-of a harassing load of anxiety. For just now I am sorely afraid of his falling in with some other person who is likely to corrupt him.
Theages
Have no more fears for me now, father, so long as you are able to persuade him to receive me as his pupil.
Demodocus
Very rightly spoken. Socrates, from now onward we must address ourselves to you; for I am ready, in short, to place both myself and all that I hold dearest of what is mine in your hands—whatever you may require,
-absolutely—if you will open your arms to Theages here, and do him any service that you can.
Socrates
Demodocus, your zeal is no wonder to me, if you suppose that I especially could be of use to him; for I know of nothing for which a sensible man could be more zealous than for his own son's utmost improvement. But how you came to form this opinion, that I would be better able to be of use to your son in his aim of becoming a good citizen than you would yourself, and how he came to suppose that I rather than yourself would be of use to him—this does fill me with wonder. For you,
-in the first place, are my elder, and further, you have held in your time many of the highest offices in Athens, and are respected by the people of Anagyrus A deme or township of Attica. above all your fellow-townsmen, and by the whole state as much as any man, whereas neither of you can notice anything like this about me. And moreover, if Theages here does despise the instruction of our statesmen, and is looking for some other persons who profess to be able to educate young people, we have here Prodicus of Ceos, Gorgias of Leontini, Polus of Acragas,
-and many more, who are so wise that they go to our cities and persuade the noblest and wealthiest of our young men—who have the choice of learning from any citizen they choose, free of charge—they persuade them to abandon that instruction and learn from them, with a deposit, besides, of a large sum of money as their fee, and to feel thankful in addition. Some of these persons might naturally have been chosen both by your son and by yourself, in preference to me;
-for I have no knowledge of those fair and beatific subjects of study: I only wish that I had. But what I always say, you know, is that I am in the position of knowing practically nothing except one little subject, that of love-matters. In this subject, however, I claim to be skilled above anybody who has ever lived or is now living in the world.
Theages
Do you see, father? Socrates does not seem to me to be at all willing now to spend his time on me; for there is readiness enough on my part,
-if he is willing. But he is only jesting in what he has just told us. For I know of some of my equals in age, and some a little older, who were of no account before they learnt from him, but after beginning to learn from him have in a very short time proved themselves superior to all whose inferiors they were before.
Socrates
And do you know what the meaning of it is, son of Demodocus?
Theages
Yes, on my soul, I do—that, if it be your pleasure, I too shall be able to become such as those others are.
-
Socrates
No, good sir, the meaning of it escapes you; but I will tell it you. There is something spiritual which, by a divine dispensation, has accompanied me from my childhood up. It is a voice that, when it occurs, always indicates to me a prohibition of something I may be about to do, but never urges me on to anything; and if one of my friends consults me and the voice occurs, the same thing happens: it prohibits, and does not allow him to act. And I will produce witnesses to convince you of these facts. You know our Charmides here, who has grown so handsome, the son of Glaucon:
-he once happened to be consulting me on his intention of training for the Nemean races, and he had no sooner begun to say that he intended to train than the voice occurred, and I tried to prevent him, saying—“Just as you were speaking my spirit-voice has occurred: no, you must not train.” “Perhaps,” said he, “it indicates to you that I shall not win; but even if I am not to win, at any rate the exercise I shall get in the meantime will do me good.” So saying, he went and trained; and so you may as well inquire of him
-as to the results he got from his training. Or if you like, ask Cleitomachus, brother of Timarchus, what Timarchus said to him when he was going straight to the prison to meet his death, he and Euathlus the racing runner, who had harbored Timarchus as a fugitive; for he will tell you that the words he spoke to him were these:
Theages
What?
Socrates
“Cleitomachus,” he said, “I tell you I am going to my death now, because I would not take Socrates' advice.” Now, why on earth did Timarchus say that? I will tell you. When Timarchus and Philemon,
-son of Philemonides, got up from the wine-party to kill Nicias, son of Heroscamandrus, those two alone had knowledge of the plot; and Timarchus, as he got up, said to me: “What say you, Socrates? Go on drinking, all of you; I have to get up and go somewhere, but I will join you a little later, if I get the chance.” Then occurred that voice of mine, and I said to him: “No, no, do not get up; for my accustomed spiritual sign has occurred to me.”
-So he stopped. Then after an interval of time he again started to go, and said: “Well, I am going, Socrates.” Again the voice occurred, and so again I constrained him to stop. The third time, wishing to give me the slip, he got up without saying another word to me; he gave me the slip by watching until my attention was turned elsewhere. Thus it was that he went right off and committed the deed which was the cause of his going then to his death. And hence it was that he spoke those words to his brother which I quoted to you just now, that he was going to his death because he had not taken my advice.
-And moreover, in regard to the Sicilian business, The disastrous Sicilian expedition of 415-413 B.C. Cf. Thuc. vi. and vii. many will tell you what I said about the destruction of the army. As to bygones, you may hear from those who know: but there is an opportunity now of testing the worth of what the sign says. For as the handsome Sannio was setting out on campaign, the sign occurred to me, and he has gone now with Thrasyllus on an expedition bound for Ephesus and Ionia. 409 B.C., when Thrasyllus succeeded in recovering Colophon for Athens. He was one of the commanders put to death by the Athenians after the battle of Arginusae, 406 B.C. I accordingly expect him to be either killed or brought very near it, and I have great fears for our force as a whole.
-Now I have told you all this, because this spiritual power that attends me also exerts itself to the full in my intercourse with those who spend their time with me. To many, indeed, it is adverse, and it is not possible for these to get any good by conversing with me, and I am therefore unable to spend my time in conversing with them. And there are many with whom it does not prohibit my intercourse, yet the intercourse does them no good. But those who are assisted in their intercourse by that spiritual power are the persons whom you have noticed; for they make rapid progress there and then. And of these, again, who make progress some find the benefit
-both solid and enduring; while there are many who, for as long a time as they are with me, make wonderful progress, but when they are parted . 151 A, . son of Lysimachus, son of Aristeides. For by conversing with me he had made immense progress in a little time; and then he had to go on an expedition, and he went and sailed away. On his return he found that Thucydides, son of Melesias, son of Thucydides, had been conversing with me. Now Thucydides, the day before, had quarrelled with me
-over some arguments we had had. So when Aristeides saw me, after greeting me and talking of other affairs, he said: “But Thucydides, I hear, Socrates, is somewhat on his dignity with you, and is annoyed as though he were somebody. “Yes, that is so,” I replied. “Well, but does he not know,” he said, “what a sad slave he was, before he associated with you?” “It seems not,” I replied, “upon my soul.” “But indeed I myself also,” he said, “am in a ridiculous position,
-Socrates.” “How exactly?” I asked. “Because,” he replied, “before I sailed away, I was able to discuss things with anybody, and show myself inferior to none in argument, so that I even sought out the debates of the most accomplished people: but now, on the contrary, I shun them, wherever I notice there is anyone of education, so ashamed I am of my own ineptitude.” “Tell me,” I said, “did this power forsake you of a sudden, or little by little?” “Little by little,” he replied. “And when it was present with you,” I asked,
-“was it present through your having learnt something from me, or in some other way?” “I will tell you, Socrates,” he said, “what is incredible, upon my soul, yet true. For I never yet learnt anything from you, as you know yourself: but I made progress, whenever I was with you, if I was merely in the same house, without being in the same room, but more progress, when I was in the same room. And it seemed to me to be much more when I was in the same room and looked at you as you were speaking, than when
-I turned my eyes elsewhere: but my progress was far the greatest and most marked whenever I sat beside you and held and touched you. Now, however,” he said, “that condition has all oozed away.”Such then, Theages, is the intercourse you would have with me: if God so wills, you will make very great and rapid progress, but otherwise, you will not. Consider, therefore, if it is not safer for you to be educated by one of those persons who have command themselves of the benefit which they bestow on mankind, rather than follow the course on which you may chance with me.
-
Theages
Well then, I decide, Socrates, that our plan shall be to make trial of that spiritual sign by associating with each other. Thus, if it leaves us free, that will be best of all; if it does not, it will be time then for us to consider, at the moment, what we shall do—whether we shall associate with someone else, or try to conciliate the divine sign itself that occurs to you with prayers and sacrifices and anything else that the seers may indicate.
Demodocus
In view of this, Socrates, say no more in opposition to the lad; for Theages is right in what he says.
Socrates
Well, if you consider that this is what we ought to do, let us do it.
+Demodocus
Socrates, I was wanting to have some private talk with you, if you had time to spare; even if there is some demand, which is not particularly important, on your time, do spare some, nevertheless, for me.
Socrates
Why, in any case I happen to have time to spare, and for you, moreover, I have plenty. Well, you are free to say whatever you wish.
Demodocus
Then do you mind if we step aside here from the street into the portico of Zeus the Liberator This portico or colonnade was near that of the King Archon, close to the Agora?
Socrates
As you think best.
+
Demodocus
Let us go, then. Socrates, it would seem that all growths follow the same course, both those that grow from the earth, and the animals, including man. In regard to the plants, as you know, we who cultivate the earth find it the easiest part of our work to make all our preparations that are needed before planting, and to do the planting itself; but when the plant begins to grow, thenceforward we have a great deal of difficult and vexatious business in tending the new growth.
+Such, it seems, is also the case in regard to men: I take my own concerns as evidence for judging of the rest. For indeed I have found the planting, or the procreation—whichever one ought to call it—of this son of mine the easiest thing in the world; but his upbringing has been vexatious and a constant source of alarm, so great are my fears for him. Among the many instances that I could mention, the desire which occupies him at the moment is a thing that especially alarms me: for it is not an ill-bred desire, but a dangerous one, since here we have him, Socrates, as he says, desiring to become wise.
+My opinion is that some of his fellow-townsmen, about his own age, who pay visits to the city, excite him with accounts of certain discussions they have heard there; and in his envy of these he has long been pestering me with the demand that I should take due thought for his needs, and pay fees to some sophist or other who will make him wise. Now I do not mind so much about the fees, but I believe he is running into no slight danger
+where he is hastening. I did for a time restrain him with good advice; but since I am no longer able to do so, I believe my best course is to comply with his request, in order that he may not resort, perchance, behind my back to somebody who will corrupt him. So I have come now on this very business of placing this youth with one of these sophists, or purveyors of wisdom, as they are held to be. It is a happy chance, therefore, that has thrown you in our way, as I should be particularly glad, with this plan of action in my mind, to ask your advice. Come, if you have any advice to give
+on what you have heard from me, you not only may, but should, give it.
Socrates
Well, you know, Demodocus, they do say that advice is a holy thing. i.e. something above and apart from the adviser’s personal interests, and looking only to what is best. And so, if ever it is to be accounted holy, it must be in this instance, in which you now seek it. For there is no more divine matter on which a mortal could take counsel than the education either
+of himself or of his relations. Now, first of all, let you and me come to an agreement as to what we suppose that this thing can be, on which we are taking counsel; for it may happen that I conceive it to be one thing, and you another, and then when we have proceeded some little way in our conference, we may perceive how ridiculous we are, I the adviser and you the advised, in having no common ground in our notions.
Demodocus
Why, I think you are right there, Socrates, and we should do as you suggest.
Socrates
Yes, I am right, but yet not entirely, because I have a slight change to make. For it occurs to me that
+this youngster may not be desiring the thing that we suppose him to desire, but something else, and there again we may be still more absurdly taking counsel on some other thing. Hence our most proper course, it seems to me, is to begin with the youth himself, and inquire of him what it actually is that he desires.
Demodocus
It does rather look, in fact, as though our best way would be thus, as you suggest.
Socrates
Then tell me, what is the young person’s goodly name: how are we to address him?
Demodocus
Theages is his name, Socrates.
+
Socrates
Goodly is the name, Demodocus, and holy-sounding, Theages means god-guided. that you have bestowed on your son. Tell me, then, Theages, do you say you desire to become wise, and do you require your father here to find out a school of some man who is qualified to make you wise?
Theages
Yes.
Socrates
And which sort of man do you call wise, those who have knowledge of such and such a thing, whatever it may be, or those who have not?
Theages
Those who have knowledge, I say.
Socrates
Well now, has not your father taught and educated you in the subjects which form the education of everyone else here—all the sons of noble and honorable fathers—in letters, I mean, and harping and wrestling and the other sorts of contest?
+
Theages
Yes, he has.
Socrates
And you think you are still lacking in some knowledge which it behoves your father to provide for you?
Theages
I do
Socrates
What knowledge is it? Tell us on our side, that we may oblige you.
Theages
He knows it, as well as I, Socrates, since I have often told him; only he says this to you of set purpose, making as if he did not know what I desire. For he assails me too with other statements of the same sort, and refuses to place me with any instructor.
+
Socrates
Well, what you said to him before was spoken, as it were, without witnesses; but now you shall take me as a witness, and declare before me what is this wisdom that you desire. Come now; suppose you desired the wisdom whereby men steer a ship, and I happened to put this further question to you: Theages, what wisdom is it that you lack, when you blame your father for refusing to place you with people who would enable you to become wise? What answer would you have given me? What wisdom would you name? The steersman’s art, would you not?
Theages
Yes.
+
Socrates
And if a desire to be wise in the wisdom whereby they steer chariots led you to blame your father, and I asked what wisdom this was, what would you name in reply? The charioteer’s art, would you not?
Theages
Yes.
Socrates
And is that which you happen to be desiring now a nameless one, or has it a name?
Theages
I should say it has a name.
Socrates
Now do you know it, though not its name, or do you know its name as well?
Theages
I know its name as well.
Socrates
Then what is it? Tell me.
+
Theages
What other name, Socrates, can one give it but wisdom?
Socrates
And the driver’s art too is wisdom? Or do you think it is ignorance?
Theages
I do not.
Socrates
You call it wisdom?
Theages
Yes.
Socrates
What use do we make of it? Is it not the art whereby we know how to govern a team of horses?
Theages
Yes.
Socrates
And the steersman’s art too is wisdom?
Theages
I think so.
Socrates
Is not this the art whereby we know how to govern ships?
Theages
Yes, it is.
Socrates
And the wisdom that you so desire, what is it?
+That whereby we know how to govern whom?
Theages
To govern men, I imagine.
Socrates
Sick men, do you mean?
Theages
Oh, no.
Socrates
For that is medicine, is it not?
Theages
Yes.
Socrates
Well, that whereby we know how to govern the singers in a chorus?
Theages
No.
Socrates
For that is music?
Theages
To be sure.
Socrates
Well, that whereby we know how to govern men in gymnastic training?
Theages
No.
Socrates
For that is gymnastics?
Theages
Yes.
Socrates
Well, to govern people who do what? Endeavor your best to speak, as I did to you at the beginning.
+
Theages
To govern the people in the city, I imagine.
Socrates
And are the sick people also in the city?
Theages
Yes, but I mean not these only, but all the rest who are in the city besides.
Socrates
Do I understand what art it is that you mean? For you strike me as meaning, not that whereby we know how to govern reapers and harvesters and planters and sowers and threshers, for it is the farmer’s art whereby we govern these, is it not?
Theages
Yes.
+
Socrates
Nor, I suppose, do you mean that whereby we know how to govern sawyers and borers and planers and turners, as a class together; for is not that carpentry?
Theages
Yes.
Socrates
But perhaps it is that whereby we govern, not only all these, but farmers themselves also, and carpenters, and all craftsmen and ordinary people, whether men or women: that, perhaps, is the wisdom you mean.
Theages
That, Socrates, is what I have been intending to mean all the time.
+
Socrates
Then can you tell me whether Aegisthus, who slew Agamemnon in Argos, governed all these people that you mean craftsmen and ordinary people, both men and women, or some other persons?
Theages
No, just those.
Socrates
Well now, did not Peleus, son of Aeacus, govern these same people in Phthia?
Theages
Yes.
Socrates
And have you ever heard of Periander, son of Cypselus, and how he governed at Corinth?
Theages
I have.
Socrates
Did he not govern these same people in his city?
+
Theages
Yes.
Socrates
Or again, do you not consider that Archelaus, son of Perdiccas, who governed recently in Macedonia, governed these same people?
Theages
I do.
Socrates
And who do you think were governed by Hippias, son of Peisistratus, who governed in this city? Were they not these people ?
Theages
To be sure they were.
Socrates
Now, can you tell me what appellation is given to Bacis and Sibyl and our native Amphilytus? In Aristophanes and Plato we find mention of only one Sibyl: later the name, like Bacis (an old Boeotian prophet), was applied to several oracular persons in different places. Amphilytus seems to have come from Acarnania to Athens in the time of Peisistratus.
Theages
Why, soothsayers, of course, Socrates.
+
Socrates
That is correct. But try to answer me in that way regarding those others—Hippias and Periander: what appellation is given them on account of their government?
Theages
Despots, I suppose; it must be that.
Socrates
And when a man desires to govern the whole of the people in his city, he desires the same government as those did—despotism, and to be a despot?
Theages
Apparently.
Socrates
And it is this that you say you desire?
Theages
It seems so, from what I have said.
+
Socrates
You scoundrel! So you were desiring to govern us, all the time that you were blaming your father for not sending you to some seminary of despots! And you, Demodocus, are you not ashamed of having known all the time what he is desiring, and though you could have sent him where you would have made him an expert in the wisdom which he desires, actually grudging it to him and refusing to send him? But now, look here, as he has declared against you in my presence, shall you and I consult together on the question of whose school we shall send him to, and whose classes will help him to become a wise despot?
+
Demodocus
Yes, in faith, Socrates, let us certainly consult, as I feel this is a matter on which no slight counsel is needed.
Socrates
By and by, my good sir. Let us first cross-examine him thoroughly.
Demodocus
Examine him then.
Socrates
Well now, what if we called in Euripides to our aid, Theages? For you know Euripides says:Despots are wise by converse with the wise. Soph. Fr. 14.1This line, also quoted and attributed to Euripides in Plat. Rep. 568a, appears to belong really to Sophocles’ lost tragedy The Locrian Ajax. Now, if someone should ask Euripides: Euripides, in what
+are these men wise, by whose converse you say that despots are wise? I mean, suppose he had said:Farmers are wise by converse with the wise,and we had asked him,—Wise in what?—what answer would he have given us? Surely none other than,—In farming.
Theages
That, and none other.
Socrates
Or again, if he had said:Piemen are wise by converse with the wise,and we had asked him, Wise in what?—what answer would he have given us? He would have said,—In the pie-making business,—would he not?
Theages
Yes.
Socrates
Or again, if he had saidWrestlers are wise by converse with the wise,and we had asked him, Wise in what?—would he not reply,—
+In wrestling?
Theages
Yes.
Socrates
But as he said:Despots are wise by converse with the wise,? Soph. Fr. 14.1 and we ask him,—In what do you mean that the latter are wise, Euripides?—what will he reply? What sort of subjects will he mention here?
Theages
Why, upon my word, I for my part do not know.
Socrates
Well, do you mind if I tell you?
Theages
If you do not mind.
Socrates
They are the same subjects that Anacreon said Callicrite understood; or do you not know the ode? Nothing is known of this poem.
Theages
I do.
Socrates
Well then, do you desire to partake in some instruction of that sort from any man
+who is a fellow-craftsman of Callicrite, daughter of Cyane, and knows all about despotism as she did, according to the poet, in order that you may become a despot over us and our city?
Theages
You are joking all this time, Socrates, and making fun of me.
Socrates
Why, do you not say that you desire that wisdom which will enable you to govern all the citizens? And in doing that, will you be anything else but a despot ?
Theages
I should indeed pray, I imagine, that I might become a despot,
+if possible, over all men, and failing that, over as many as might be; so would you, I imagine, and everybody else besides: nay, even more, I daresay, that I might become a god; but I did not say I desired that.
Socrates
Well, what on earth then is it that you do desire? Do you not say you desire to govern the citizens?
Theages
Yes, but not by force, or as despots do, but with their consent, as is done by all the other men of importance in the state.
Socrates
Do you mean, as by Themistocles and Pericles and Cimon, and by all those who have shown themselves able statesmen?
Theages
Yes, in good earnest, I mean those people.
+
Socrates
Then what if you chanced to desire to become wise in horsemanship? To whom would you have had to resort before expecting to be a clever horseman? To whom else but the horse-masters?
Theages
To none else, I am sure.
Socrates
And moreover, you would go to the actual men who are clever at the business, and who have horses and constantly use them in great numbers, both their own and other people’s?
Theages
Obviously I should.
Socrates
And what if you wished to become wise in javelin-throwing? Would you not expect to get this wisdom by having resorted to those javelin-masters who have javelins and who constantly use javelins,
+both other people’s and their own, in great numbers?
Theages
I think so.
Socrates
Then pray tell me, since it is your wish to become wise in state-matters, do you expect to get your wisdom by resorting to any other persons than those statesmen, who not only have their own ability in state-matters, but have constant dealings with other cities besides their own, by their intercourse alike with Greek cities and with foreign peoples? Or do you think to get wisdom in their business by resorting to any other persons than these particular men?
+
Theages
Well, Socrates, I have heard of the argument that you are said to put forward—that the sons of those statesmen are no better men than the sons of shoemakers Cf. Alcib. I.118 E;Protag 320 A, B.; and in my opinion your words are very true, from what I am able to gather. Hence I should be an utter fool if I supposed that any of these men would impart his wisdom to me when he never was of any use to his own son, as he would have been, if he were able to be of use in this matter to anyone at all in the world.
Socrates
Then which way, most excellent sir, would you turn if, when you came to have a son, he should trouble you in the same manner,
+and tell you he desired to become a good painter, and should blame you, his father, for refusing to spend money on him for that very purpose, but at the same time should disregard the practitioners of that very thing, the painters, and decline to learn from them? Or the flute-players, when he wished to become a flute-player, or the harp-players? Would you know what to do with him, and where else you should send him if he refused to learn from these?
Theages
Upon my word, I should not.
+
Socrates
And do you now, when you are behaving in just the same way to your father, feel surprised and blame him for being at a loss what to do with you and where to send you? Why, we are ready to place you with any well-bred Athenian statesman you may choose, who will train you free of charge Cf. the passage in the Protagoras(320 A, B)which shows that young men of good family were often placed with older friends of standing and experience in order to prepare for public life. Cf. also Meno 94 D.; and so not only will you be at no expense of money, but will gain far greater commendation amongst the mass of men than if you studied with anyone else.
Theages
But then, Socrates, are not you too one of our well-bred gentlemen? Indeed, if you will agree to instruct me, I am content and seek no other.
+
Socrates
What do you mean by that, Theages?
Demodocus
Nay, Socrates, there is nothing amiss in what he says, and you will oblige me at the same time; for I should count it the greatest possible stroke of luck if he should welcome your instruction and you also should consent to instruct him. Nay, indeed, I am quite ashamed to say how keenly I wish it; but I entreat you both—you, to consent to teach Theages, and you, to seek the teaching of no one else than Socrates; you will thus relieve me
+of a harassing load of anxiety. For just now I am sorely afraid of his falling in with some other person who is likely to corrupt him.
Theages
Have no more fears for me now, father, so long as you are able to persuade him to receive me as his pupil.
Demodocus
Very rightly spoken. Socrates, from now onward we must address ourselves to you; for I am ready, in short, to place both myself and all that I hold dearest of what is mine in your hands—whatever you may require,
+absolutely—if you will open your arms to Theages here, and do him any service that you can.
Socrates
Demodocus, your zeal is no wonder to me, if you suppose that I especially could be of use to him; for I know of nothing for which a sensible man could be more zealous than for his own son’s utmost improvement. But how you came to form this opinion, that I would be better able to be of use to your son in his aim of becoming a good citizen than you would yourself, and how he came to suppose that I rather than yourself would be of use to him—this does fill me with wonder. For you,
+in the first place, are my elder, and further, you have held in your time many of the highest offices in Athens, and are respected by the people of Anagyrus A deme or township of Attica. above all your fellow-townsmen, and by the whole state as much as any man, whereas neither of you can notice anything like this about me. And moreover, if Theages here does despise the instruction of our statesmen, and is looking for some other persons who profess to be able to educate young people, we have here Prodicus of Ceos, Gorgias of Leontini, Polus of Acragas,
+and many more, who are so wise that they go to our cities and persuade the noblest and wealthiest of our young men—who have the choice of learning from any citizen they choose, free of charge—they persuade them to abandon that instruction and learn from them, with a deposit, besides, of a large sum of money as their fee, and to feel thankful in addition. Some of these persons might naturally have been chosen both by your son and by yourself, in preference to me;
+for I have no knowledge of those fair and beatific subjects of study: I only wish that I had. But what I always say, you know, is that I am in the position of knowing practically nothing except one little subject, that of love-matters. In this subject, however, I claim to be skilled above anybody who has ever lived or is now living in the world.
Theages
Do you see, father? Socrates does not seem to me to be at all willing now to spend his time on me; for there is readiness enough on my part,
+if he is willing. But he is only jesting in what he has just told us. For I know of some of my equals in age, and some a little older, who were of no account before they learnt from him, but after beginning to learn from him have in a very short time proved themselves superior to all whose inferiors they were before.
Socrates
And do you know what the meaning of it is, son of Demodocus?
Theages
Yes, on my soul, I do—that, if it be your pleasure, I too shall be able to become such as those others are.
+
Socrates
No, good sir, the meaning of it escapes you; but I will tell it you. There is something spiritual which, by a divine dispensation, has accompanied me from my childhood up. It is a voice that, when it occurs, always indicates to me a prohibition of something I may be about to do, but never urges me on to anything; and if one of my friends consults me and the voice occurs, the same thing happens: it prohibits, and does not allow him to act. And I will produce witnesses to convince you of these facts. You know our Charmides here, who has grown so handsome, the son of Glaucon:
+he once happened to be consulting me on his intention of training for the Nemean races, and he had no sooner begun to say that he intended to train than the voice occurred, and I tried to prevent him, saying—Just as you were speaking my spirit-voice has occurred: no, you must not train.Perhaps, said he, it indicates to you that I shall not win; but even if I am not to win, at any rate the exercise I shall get in the meantime will do me good. So saying, he went and trained; and so you may as well inquire of him
+as to the results he got from his training. Or if you like, ask Cleitomachus, brother of Timarchus, what Timarchus said to him when he was going straight to the prison to meet his death, he and Euathlus the racing runner, who had harbored Timarchus as a fugitive; for he will tell you that the words he spoke to him were these:
Theages
What?
Socrates
Cleitomachus, he said, I tell you I am going to my death now, because I would not take Socrates’ advice. Now, why on earth did Timarchus say that? I will tell you. When Timarchus and Philemon,
+son of Philemonides, got up from the wine-party to kill Nicias, son of Heroscamandrus, those two alone had knowledge of the plot; and Timarchus, as he got up, said to me: What say you, Socrates? Go on drinking, all of you; I have to get up and go somewhere, but I will join you a little later, if I get the chance. Then occurred that voice of mine, and I said to him: No, no, do not get up; for my accustomed spiritual sign has occurred to me.
+So he stopped. Then after an interval of time he again started to go, and said: Well, I am going, Socrates. Again the voice occurred, and so again I constrained him to stop. The third time, wishing to give me the slip, he got up without saying another word to me; he gave me the slip by watching until my attention was turned elsewhere. Thus it was that he went right off and committed the deed which was the cause of his going then to his death. And hence it was that he spoke those words to his brother which I quoted to you just now, that he was going to his death because he had not taken my advice.
+And moreover, in regard to the Sicilian business, The disastrous Sicilian expedition of 415-413 B.C. Cf. Thuc. vi. and vii. many will tell you what I said about the destruction of the army. As to bygones, you may hear from those who know: but there is an opportunity now of testing the worth of what the sign says. For as the handsome Sannio was setting out on campaign, the sign occurred to me, and he has gone now with Thrasyllus on an expedition bound for Ephesus and Ionia. 409 B.C., when Thrasyllus succeeded in recovering Colophon for Athens. He was one of the commanders put to death by the Athenians after the battle of Arginusae, 406 B.C. I accordingly expect him to be either killed or brought very near it, and I have great fears for our force as a whole.
+Now I have told you all this, because this spiritual power that attends me also exerts itself to the full in my intercourse with those who spend their time with me. To many, indeed, it is adverse, and it is not possible for these to get any good by conversing with me, and I am therefore unable to spend my time in conversing with them. And there are many with whom it does not prohibit my intercourse, yet the intercourse does them no good. But those who are assisted in their intercourse by that spiritual power are the persons whom you have noticed; for they make rapid progress there and then. And of these, again, who make progress some find the benefit
+both solid and enduring; while there are many who, for as long a time as they are with me, make wonderful progress, but when they are parted from me relapse, and are no different from anybody else. This once befell Aristeides, Cf. Theaet. 151 A, from which this passage is derived. The Aristeides and Thucydides mentioned here were the grandsons respectively of Aristeides, the Athenian statesman of the time of the Persian wars, and of Thucydides, the aristocratic opponent of Pericles. Their fathers Lysimachus and Melesias appear in the Laches. son of Lysimachus, son of Aristeides. For by conversing with me he had made immense progress in a little time; and then he had to go on an expedition, and he went and sailed away. On his return he found that Thucydides, son of Melesias, son of Thucydides, had been conversing with me. Now Thucydides, the day before, had quarrelled with me
+over some arguments we had had. So when Aristeides saw me, after greeting me and talking of other affairs, he said: But Thucydides, I hear, Socrates, is somewhat on his dignity with you, and is annoyed as though he were somebody.Yes, that is so, I replied. Well, but does he not know, he said, what a sad slave he was, before he associated with you?It seems not, I replied, upon my soul.But indeed I myself also, he said, am in a ridiculous position,
+ Socrates.How exactly? I asked. Because, he replied, before I sailed away, I was able to discuss things with anybody, and show myself inferior to none in argument, so that I even sought out the debates of the most accomplished people: but now, on the contrary, I shun them, wherever I notice there is anyone of education, so ashamed I am of my own ineptitude.“Tell me, I said, did this power forsake you of a sudden, or little by little?Little by little, he replied. And when it was present with you, I asked,
+“was it present through your having learnt something from me, or in some other way?I will tell you, Socrates, he said, what is incredible, upon my soul, yet true. For I never yet learnt anything from you, as you know yourself: but I made progress, whenever I was with you, if I was merely in the same house, without being in the same room, but more progress, when I was in the same room. And it seemed to me to be much more when I was in the same room and looked at you as you were speaking, than when
+ I turned my eyes elsewhere: but my progress was far the greatest and most marked whenever I sat beside you and held and touched you. Now, however, he said, that condition has all oozed away.Such then, Theages, is the intercourse you would have with me: if God so wills, you will make very great and rapid progress, but otherwise, you will not. Consider, therefore, if it is not safer for you to be educated by one of those persons who have command themselves of the benefit which they bestow on mankind, rather than follow the course on which you may chance with me.
+
Theages
Well then, I decide, Socrates, that our plan shall be to make trial of that spiritual sign by associating with each other. Thus, if it leaves us free, that will be best of all; if it does not, it will be time then for us to consider, at the moment, what we shall do—whether we shall associate with someone else, or try to conciliate the divine sign itself that occurs to you with prayers and sacrifices and anything else that the seers may indicate.
Demodocus
In view of this, Socrates, say no more in opposition to the lad; for Theages is right in what he says.
Socrates
Well, if you consider that this is what we ought to do, let us do it.
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diff --git a/data/tlg0059/tlg017/tlg0059.tlg017.perseus-grc1.xml b/data/tlg0059/tlg017/tlg0059.tlg017.perseus-grc1.xml
index 5ca92309e..18fa070d0 100755
--- a/data/tlg0059/tlg017/tlg0059.tlg017.perseus-grc1.xml
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@@ -67,55 +67,55 @@
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/tlg0059/tlg018/tlg0059.tlg018.perseus-eng1.xml b/data/tlg0059/tlg018/tlg0059.tlg018.perseus-eng1.xml
index 07292bfa9..83b1ff28d 100755
--- a/data/tlg0059/tlg018/tlg0059.tlg018.perseus-eng1.xml
+++ b/data/tlg0059/tlg018/tlg0059.tlg018.perseus-eng1.xml
@@ -67,123 +67,123 @@
SocratesChaerephonCritiasCharmides
-
We arrived yesterday evening ii. p. 203. and there I came upon quite a number of people, some of whom were unknown to me, but most of whom I knew. And as soon as they saw me
-appear thus unexpectedly, they hailed me from a distance on every side; but Chaerephon, like the mad creature that he is, jumped up from their midst and ran to me, and grasping me by the hand—Socrates, he said, how did you survive the battle? (Shortly before we came away there had been a battle at Potidaea, of which the people here had only just had news.)In the state in which you see me, I replied.It has been reported here, you know, said he, that the battle was very
-severe, and that many of our acquaintance have lost their lives in it.Then the report, I replied, is pretty near the truth.You were present, he asked, at the fighting?I was present.Then sit down here, he said, and give us a full account; for as yet we have had no clear report of it all. And with that he led me to a seat by Critias, son of Callaeschrus. So I sat down there and greeted Critias and the rest, and gave them all the news from the battlefield, in answer to their various questions; each had his inquiry to make.
-When we had had enough of such matters, I in my turn began to inquire about affairs at home, how philosophy was doing at present, and whether any of the rising young men had distinguished themselves for wisdom or beauty or both. Then Critias, looking towards the door,
-for he saw some young fellows who were coming in with some railing at each other, and a crowd of people following on behind them, said—Concerning the beauties, Socrates, I expect you will get your knowledge at once: for these who are coming in are in fact forerunners and lovers of the person who is held, for the moment at least, to be the greatest beauty; and he himself, I imagine, must by now be nearly upon us.Who is he, I asked, and whose son?You must know, he replied, but he was not yet grown up when you went away,—Charmides, son of
-our uncle Glaucon, and my cousin.I do know, to be sure, I said; for he was not to be despised even then, when he was still a child, and now, I suppose, he will be quite a youth by this time.You will know this moment, he said, both how much and to what purpose he has grown. And just as he spoke these words, Charmides entered.Now I, my good friend, am no measurer: I am a mere “white line” A white or chalked line was proverbially useless for marking off measurements on white stone or marble. in measuring beautiful people, for almost everyone who has just grown up appears beautiful to me. Nay and this time, moreover, the young man appeared to me
-a marvel of stature and beauty; and all the rest, to my thinking, were in love with him, such was their astonishment and confusion when he came in, and a number of other lovers were following in his train. On the part of men like us it was not so surprising; but when I came to observe the boys I noticed that none of them, not even the smallest, had eyes for anything else, but that
-they all gazed at him as if he were a statue. Then Chaerephon called me and said—How does the youth strike you, Socrates? Has he not a fine face?Immensely so, I replied.Yet if he would consent to strip, he said, you would think he had no face, he has such perfect beauty of form.And these words of Chaerephon were repeated by the rest. Then,—By Heracles! I said, what an irresistible person you make him out to be, if he has but one more thing—a little thing—besides.What? said Critias.
-If in his soul, I replied, he is of good grain. And I should think, Critias, he ought to be, since he is of your house.Ah, he said, he is right fair and good in that way also.Why then, I said, let us strip that very part of him and view it first, instead of his form; for anyhow, at that age, I am sure he is quite ready to have a discussion.Very much so, said Critias; for, I may say, he is in fact
-a philosopher, and also—as others besides himself consider—quite a poet.That, my dear Critias, I said, is a gift which your family has had a long while back, through your kinship with Solon. But why not call the young man here and show him to me? For surely, even if he were younger still, there could be no discredit in our having a talk with him before you, who are at once his guardian and his cousin.You are quite right he said, and we will call him.
-Thereupon he said to his attendant,—Boy, call Charmides; tell him I want him to see a doctor about the ailment with which he told me he was troubled yesterday. Then, turning to me,—You know, he has spoken lately of having a headache, said Critias, on getting up in the morning: now why should you not represent to him that you know a cure for headache?Why not? I said: only he must come.Oh, he will be here, he said.And so it was; for he came, and caused much laughter, because each of us who were seated
-made room for him by pushing hard at his neighbor so as to have him sitting beside himself, until at either end of the seat one had to stand up, and we tumbled the other off sideways; and he came and sat down between me and Critias. But here, my friend, I began to feel perplexed, and my former confidence in looking forward to a quite easy time in talking with him had been knocked out of me. And when, on Critias telling him that it was I who knew the cure,
-he gave me such a look with his eyes as passes description, and was just about to plunge into a question, and when all the people in the wrestling-school surged round about us on every side—then, ah then, my noble friend, I saw inside his cloak and caught fire, and could possess myself no longer; and I thought none was so wise in love-matters as Cydias, A poet classed with Mimnermus and Archilochus by Plutarch; cf. Bergk, Poet. Lyr.2 p. 960. who in speaking of a beautiful boy recommends someone to “beware of coming as a fawn before the lion, and being seized as his portion of flesh”; for I too felt
-I had fallen a prey to some such creature. However, when he had asked me if I knew the cure for headache, I somehow contrived to answer that I knew.Then what is it? he asked.So I told him that the thing itself was a certain leaf, but there was a charm to go with the remedy; and if one uttered the charm at the moment of its application, the remedy made one perfectly well; but without the charm there was no efficacy in the leaf.
-Then I will take down the charm, said he, from you in writing.Do you prefer, I asked, to get my consent first, or to do without it?This made him laugh, and he said: To get your consent, Socrates.Very well, I said; and are you certain of my name?Unless I misjudge, he replied; for there is no little talk of you. among the set of our age, and I remember as a mere child the sight of you in company with Critias here.That is a good thing, I said: for I shall speak more freely to you
-about the charm, and its real nature; just now I was at a loss for the way to apprise you of its power. For it is of such a nature, Charmides, that it cannot cure the head alone; I daresay you have yourself sometimes heard good doctors say, you know, when a patient comes to them with a pain in his eyes, that it is not possible for them to attempt a cure of his eyes alone, but that it is necessary to treat his head too at the same time,
-if he is to have his eyes in good order; and so again, that to expect ever to treat the head by itself, apart from the body as a whole, is utter folly. And on this principle they apply their regimen to the whole body, and attempt to treat and heal the part along with the whole; or have you not observed that this is what they say, and is done in fact?Certainly I have, he said.And you consider it well said, and accept the principle?Most assuredly, he said.
-Then I, on hearing his approval, regained my courage; and little by little I began to muster up my confidence again, and my spirit began to rekindle. So I said,—Such, then, Charmides, is the nature of this charm. I learnt it on campaign over there, from one of the Thracian physicians of Zalmoxis, A legendary hero of the Thracian race of the Getae; cf. Hdt. 4.94-6. who are said even to make one immortal. This Thracian said that the Greeks were right in advising as I told you just now: “but Zalmoxis,” he said,
-“our king, who is a god, says that as you ought not to attempt to cure eyes without head, or head without body, so you should not treat body without soul”; and this was the reason why most maladies evaded the physicians of Greece—that they neglected the whole, on which they ought to spend their pains, for if this were out of order it was impossible for the part to be in order. For all that was good and evil, he said, in the body and in man altogether was sprung from the soul, and flowed along from thence as it did
-from the head into the eyes. Wherefore that part was to be treated first and foremost, if all was to be well with the head and the rest of the body. And the treatment of the soul, so he said, my wonderful friend, is by means of certain charms, and these charms are words of the right sort: by the use of such words is temperance engendered in our souls, and as soon as it is engendered and present we may easily secure health to the head and to the rest of the body also.
-Now in teaching me the remedy and the charms he remarked,—” Let nobody persuade you to treat his head with this remedy, unless he has first submitted his soul for you to treat with the charm. For at present,” he said, “the cure of mankind is beset with the error of certain doctors who attempt to practise the one method without the other.” And he most particularly enjoined on me not to let anyone, however wealthy or noble or handsome,
-induce me to disobey him. So I, since I have given him my oath, and must obey him, will do as he bids; and if you agree to submit your soul first to the effect of the Thracian charms, according to the stranger's injunctions, I will apply the remedy to your head: otherwise we shall be at a loss what to do with you, my dear Charmides.Then Critias, when he heard me say this, remarked,—This affection of the head, Socrates, will turn out to be a stroke of luck for the young man, if he is to be compelled
-on account of his head to improve his understanding also. However, let me tell you, Charmides is considered to excel his comrades not only in appearance, but also in that very thing which you say is produced by your charm: temperance, you say it is, do you not?Certainly, I replied.Then be assured, he said, that he is considered to be far and away the most temperate person now alive, while in every other respect, for a youth of his age, he is second to none.Why, yes, I said, and it is only right, Charmides, that you should excel the rest in all these respects; for
-I do not suppose there is anyone else here who could readily point to a case of any two Athenian houses uniting together which would be likely to produce handsomer or nobler offspring than those from which you are sprung. For your father's house, which comes from Critias, son of Dropides, has been celebrated by Anacreon and Solon and many other poets, so that it is famed by tradition among us as preeminent in beauty and virtue
-and all else that is accounted happiness; and then, your mother's house is famous in the same way, for of Pyrilampes, your uncle, it is said that no one in all the continent was considered to be his superior in beauty or stature, whenever he came as envoy to the great king or anyone else in Asia, and his house as a whole is no whit inferior to the other. Sprung from such people, it is to be supposed that you would be first in all things. And indeed,
-as regards your visible form, dear son of Glaucon, I consider that nowhere have you fallen behind any of your ancestors. But if your nature is really rich in temperance and those other things, as our friend here says, blessed is the son, dear Charmides, I exclaimed, that your mother has borne in you! However, the case stands thus: if you already possess temperance, as Critias here declares, and you are sufficiently temperate, then you never had any need of the charms of Zalmoxis or of Abaris the Hyperborean, A fabulous hero of the far north, to whom oracles and charms were ascribed by the Greeks; cf. Hdt. 4.36.
-and might well be given at once the remedy for the head; but if you prove to be still lacking that virtue, we must apply the charm before the remedy. So tell me yourself whether you agree with our friend, and can say that you are already sufficiently provided with temperance, or are deficient in it?At this Charmides blushed and, for one thing, looked more beautiful then ever, for his modesty became his years; and then, too, he answered most ingenuously, saying it was no easy matter at the moment either to admit or to deny the words of the question. For if,
-he went on, I say I am not temperate, not only is it a strange thing to say against oneself, but I shall at the same time be taxing with untruth both Critias and many others who consider me to be temperate, as he gives out; while if, on the other hand, I say I am, and praise myself, it will probably be found distasteful; so that I cannot see what answer I am to give you.Then I said: Your answer is a natural one, in my opinion, Charmides; and I think, I went on, that we must join in inquiring whether you possess the thing I am asking after, or not, in order that
-neither you may be forced to say what you do not wish, nor I on my part may recklessly try my hand at medicine. So if it is agreeable to you, I am ready to inquire with you; but, if it is not, to let it alone.Why, nothing, he said, could be more agreeable to me : so far as that goes, therefore, inquire in whatever way you think we had better proceed.Then this is the way, I said, in which I consider that our inquiry into this matter had best be conducted. Now, it is clear that, if you
-have temperance with you, you can hold an opinion about it. For being in you, I presume it must, in that case, afford some perception from which you can form some opinion of what temperance is, and what kind of thing it is : do you not think so ?I do, he replied.And since you understand the Greek tongue, I said, you can tell me, I suppose, your view of this particular thought of yours?I daresay, he said.Then in order that we may make a guess whether it is in you or not, tell me, I said, what you say of temperance according to your opinion.
-He at first hung back, and was not at all willing to answer: but presently he said that, to his mind, temperance was doing everything orderly and quietly—walking in the streets, talking, and doing everything else of that kind; and in a word, he said, I think the thing about which you ask may be called quietness.Well, I said, are you right there? They do say, you know, Charmides, that quiet people are temperate : so let us see if there is anything in what they say. Tell me, is not temperance,
-however, among the honorable things?To be sure, he said.Well, which is most honorable at the writing master's, to write the same sort of letters quickly or quietly?Quickly.And in reading, to do it quickly or slowly?Quickly.And so, in the same way, to play the lyre quickly, or to wrestle nimbly, is far more honorable than to do it quietly and slowly?Yes.And what of boxing, alone or combined with wrestling? Is it not the same there too?To be sure.And in running and leaping and all activities
-of the body, are not nimble and quick movements accounted honorable, while sluggish and quiet ones are deemed disgraceful?Apparently.So we find, I said, that in the body, at least, it is not quietness, but the greatest quickness and nimbleness that is most honorable, do we not?Certainly.And temperance was an honorable thing?Yes.Then in the body, at least, it is not quietness but quickness that will be the more temperate thing, since temperance is honorable.So it seems, he said.
-Well now, I went on; in learning, is facility the more honorable, or difficulty?Facility.And facility in learning, I said, is learning quickly, and difficulty in learning is learning quietly and slowly?Yes.And is it not more honorable to teach another quickly and forcibly, rather than quietly and slowly?Yes.Well now, is it more honorable to be reminded and to remember quietly and slowly, or forcibly and quickly?Forcibly, he replied, and quickly.
-And is not readiness of mind a sort of nimbleness of the soul, not a quietness?True.And to apprehend what is said, whether at the writing-master's or the lyre-master's or anywhere else, not as quietly as possible, but as quickly, is most honorable?Yes.Well, and in the searchings of the soul, and in deliberation, it is not the quietest person, I imagine, or he who deliberates and discovers with difficulty, that is held worthy of praise, but he who does this most easily and quickly.
-That is so, he said.Then in all, I said, Charmides, that concerns either our soul or our body, actions of quickness and nimbleness are found to be more honorable than those of slowness and quietness?It looks like it, he said.So temperance cannot be a sort of quietness, nor can the temperate life be quiet, by this argument at least; since, being temperate, it must be honorable.
-For we have these two alternatives: either in no cases, or I should think in very few, can we find that the quiet actions in life are more honorable than the quick and vigorous ones; or at all events, my friend, if of the more honorable actions there are absolutely as many quiet ones as forcible and quick, not even so will temperance be acting quietly any more than acting forcibly and quickly, either in walking or in talking or in any other sphere; nor will the quiet life be more temperate than the unquiet; since
-in our argument we assumed that temperance is an honorable thing, and have found that quick things are just as honorable as quiet things.Your statement, he said, Socrates, seems to me to be correct.Once more then, I went on, Charmides, attend more closely and look into yourself; reflect on the quality that is given you by the presence of temperance, and what quality it must have to work this effect on you. Take stock of all this and tell me, like a good, brave fellow, what it appears to you to be.
-He paused a little, and after a quite manly effort of self-examination: Well, I think, he said, that temperance makes men ashamed or bashful, and that temperance is the same as modesty.Well now, I asked, did you not admit a moment ago that temperance is honorable?Certainly I did, he said.And temperate men are also good?Yes.Well, can that be good which does not produce good men?No, indeed.And we conclude that it is not only honorable, but good also.
- I think so.Well then, I said, are you not convinced that Homer is right in saying—Modesty, no good mate for a needy man?Hom. Od. 17.347I am, he said.Then it would seem that modesty is not good, and good.Apparently.But temperance is good, if its presence makes men good, and not bad.It certainly seems to me to be as you say.So temperance cannot be modesty, if it
-is in fact good, while modesty is no more good than evil.Why, I think, he said, Socrates, that is correctly stated; but there is another view of temperance on which I would like to have your opinion. I remembered just now what I once heard someone say, that temperance might be doing one's own business. I ask you, then, do you think he is right in saying this?You rascal, I said, you have heard it from Critias here,
-or some other of our wise men!Seemingly, said Critias, from some other; for indeed he did not from me.But what does it matter, Socrates, said Charmides, from whom I heard it?Not at all, I replied; for in any case we have not to consider who said it, but whether it is a true saying or no.Now you speak rightly, he said.Yes, on my word, I said: but I shall be surprised if we can find out how it stands; for it looks like a kind of riddle.Why so? he asked.Because, I replied, presumably the speaker of the words
-“temperance is doing one's own business” did not mean them quite as he spoke them. Or do you consider that the scribe does nothing when he writes or reads?I rather consider that he does something, he replied. And does the scribe, in your opinion, write and read his own name only, and teach you boys to do the same with yours? Or did you write your enemies' names just as much as your own and your friends'?Just as much.Well, were you meddlesome or intemperate
-in doing this?Not at all.And you know you were not doing your own business, if writing and reading are doing something.Why, so they are.And indeed medical work, my good friend, and building and weaving and producing anything whatever that is the work of any art, I presume is doing something.Certainly.Well then, I went on, do you think a state would be well conducted under a law which enjoined that everyone should weave and scour his own coat, and make his own shoes, and his own flask and scraper, The flask contained oil for anointing the body before exercise, and the scraper was for scraping it afterwards, or at the bath.
-and everything else on the same principle of not touching the affairs of others but performing and doing his own for himself?I think not, he replied.But still, I said, a state whose conduct is temperate will be well conducted.Of course, he said.Then doing one's own business in that sense and in that way will not be temperance.Apparently not.So that person was riddling, it seems, just as I said a moment ago, when he said that doing one's own business is temperance. For I take it he was not such a fool as all that: or was it some idiot
-that you heard saying this, Charmides?Far from it, he replied, for indeed he seemed to be very wise.Then it is perfectly certain, in my opinion, that he propounded it as a riddle, in view of the difficulty of understanding what “doing one's own business” can mean.I daresay, he said.Well, what can it mean, this “doing one's own business”? Can you tell me?I do not know, upon my word, he replied: but I daresay it may be that not even he who said it knew in the least what he meant. And as he said this he gave a sly laugh and glanced at Critias.
-Now Critias for some time had been plainly burning with anxiety to distinguish himself in the eyes of Charmides and the company, and having with difficulty restrained himself heretofore, he now could do so no longer; for I believe that what I had supposed was perfectly true—that Charmides had heard this answer about temperance from Critias. And so Charmides, wishing him to make answer
-instead of himself, sought to stir him up in particular, and pointed out that he himself had been refuted; but Critias rebelled against it, and seemed to me to have got angry with him, as a poet does with an actor who mishandles his verses on the stage: so he looked hard at him and said: Do you really suppose, Charmides, that if you do not know what can have been the meaning of the man who said that temperance was doing one's own business, he did not know either?Why, my excellent Critias, I said, no wonder if our friend, at his age, cannot understand; but you,
-I should think, may be expected to know, in view of your years and your studies. So if you concede that temperance is what he says, and you accept the statement, for my part I would greatly prefer to have you as partner in the inquiry as to whether this saying is true or not.Well, I quite concede it, he said, and accept it.That is good, then, I said. Now tell me, do you also concede what I was asking just now—that all craftsmen make something?I do.And do you consider that they make their own things only, or those of others also?
-Those of others also.And are they temperate in not making their own things only?Yes: what reason is there against it? he said.None for me, I replied; but there may be for him who, after assuming that temperance is doing one's own business, proceeds to say there is no reason against those also who do others' business being temperate.And have I, pray, he said, admitted that those who do others' business are temperate? Or was my admission of those who make The Greek word poiei=n (“make”) can also mean the same as pra/ttein (“do”). things?Tell me, I said, do you not call making and doing the same?
-No indeed, he replied, nor working and making the same either: this I learnt from Hesiod, who said, Work is no reproach.Hes. WD 309 Now, do you suppose that if he had given the names of working and doing to such works as you were mentioning just now, he would have said there was no reproach in shoe-making or pickle-selling or serving the stews? It is not to be thought, Socrates; he rather held,
-I conceive, that making was different from doing and working, and that while a thing made might be a reproach if it had no connection with the honorable, work could never be a reproach. For things honorably and usefully made he called works, and such makings he called workings and doings; and we must suppose that it was only such things as these that he called our proper concerns, but all that was harmful, the concerns of others. So that we must conclude that Hesiod, and anyone else of good sense, calls him temperate who does his own business.
-Ah, Critias, I said, you had hardly begun, when I grasped the purport of your speech—that you called one's proper and one's own things good, and that the makings of the good you called doings; for in fact I have heard Prodicus drawing innumerable distinctions between names. “Names” here includes any substantive words such as pra/ceis. Well, I will allow you any application of a name that you please; only make clear to what thing it is that you attach such-and-such a name. So begin now over again, and define more plainly.
-Do you say that this doing or making, or whatever is the term you prefer, of good things, is temperance?I do, he replied.Then not he who does evil, but he who does good, is temperate?And do not you, my excellent friend, he said, think so?Leave that aside, I said; for we have not to consider yet what I think, but what you say now.Well, all the same, I say, he replied, that he who does evil instead of good is not temperate, whereas he who does good instead of evil is temperate : for I give you “the doing of good things is temperance” as my plain definition.
-And there is no reason, I daresay, why your statement should not be right; but still I wonder, I went on, whether you judge that temperate men are ignorant of their temperance.No, I do not, he said.A little while ago, I said, were you not saying that there was no reason why craftsmen should not be temperate in making others' things as well?Yes, I was, he said, but what of it ?Nothing; only tell me whether you think that a doctor, in making someone healthy,
-makes a helpful result both for himself and for the person whom he cures.I do.And he who does this does his duty?Yes.Is not he who does his duty temperate?Indeed he is.Well, and must the doctor know when his medicine will be helpful, and when not? And must every craftsman know when he is likely to be benefited by the work he does, and when not?Probably not.Then sometimes, I went on, the doctor may have done what is helpful
-or harmful without knowing the effect of his own action; and yet, in doing what was helpful, by your statement, he has done temperately. Or did you not state that?I did.Then it would seem that in doing what is helpful he may sometimes do temperately and be temperate, but be ignorant of his own temperance?But that, he said, Socrates, could never be: if you think this in any way a necessary inference from my previous admissions,
-I would rather withdraw some of them, and not be ashamed to say my statements were wrong, than concede at any time that a man who is ignorant of himself is temperate. For I would almost say that this very thing, self-knowledge, is temperance, and I am at one with him who put up the inscription of those words at Delphi. For the purpose of that inscription on the temple, as it seems to me, is to serve as the god's salutation to those who enter it, instead of
-“Hail!”—this is a wrong form of greeting, and they should rather exhort one another with the words, “Be temperate!” And thus the god addresses those who are entering his temple in a mode which differs from that of men; such was the intention of the dedicator of the inscription in putting it up, I believe; and that he says to each man who enters, in reality, Be temperate ! But he says it in a rather riddling fashion, as a prophet would; for “Know thyself!” and “Be temperate!” are the same, as
-the inscription Throughout this passage there is allusion to the thought or wisdom implied in swfronei=n, and here Critias seeks to identify fro/nei (“think well,” “be wise”) with gnw=qi (“know,” “understand”) in the inscription gnw=qi sauto/n at Delphi. and I declare, though one is likely enough to think them different—an error into which I consider the dedicators of the later inscriptions fell when they put up Nothing overmuchMHDE\N A)/GANappears first in Theognis, 335. and A pledge, and thereupon perdition.*)eggu/a pa/ra d' a)/th, an old saying on the rashness of giving a pledge, is quoted in a fragment of Cratinus, the elder rival of Aristophanes. Cf. Proverbs xi. 15—”He that is surety for a stranger shall smart for it.” For they supposed that Know thyself! was a piece of advice, and not the god's salutation of those who were entering; and so, in order that their dedications too might equally give pieces of useful advice, they wrote these words and dedicated them. Now my object in saying all this, Socrates, is to abandon to you all the previous argument—
-for, though perhaps it was you who were more in the right, or perhaps it was I, yet nothing at all certain emerged from our statements—and to proceed instead to satisfy you of this truth, if you do not admit it, that temperance is knowing oneself.Why, Critias, I said, you treat me as though I professed to know the things on which I ask questions, and needed only the will to agree with you. But the fact of the matter is rather that I join you in the inquiry, each time that a proposition is made, because I myself do not know; I wish therefore to consider first,
-before I tell you whether I agree or not. Now, give me a moment to consider.Consider then, he said.Yes, and I am considering, I said. For if temperance is knowing anything, obviously it must be a kind of science, and a science of something, must it not?It is, he replied, and of itself.And medicine, I said, is a science of health?Certainly.Then if you should ask me, I said, wherein medicine, as a science of health, is useful to us, and what it produces,
-I should say it is of very great benefit, since it produces health; an excellent result, if you allow so much.I allow it.And so, if you should ask me what result I take to be produced by building, as the builder's science, I should say houses; and it would be the same with the other arts. Now it is for you, in your turn, to find an answer to a question regarding temperance—since you say it is a science of self, Critias—and to tell me what excellent result it produces for us,
-as science of self, and what it does that is worthy of its name. Come now, tell me.But, Socrates, he said, you are not inquiring rightly. For in its nature it is not like the other sciences, any more than any of them is like any other; whereas you are making your inquiry as though they were alike. For tell me, he said, what result is there of the arts of reckoning and geometry, in the way that a house is of building, or a coat of weaving, or other products of the sort that one might point to
-in various arts? Well, can you, for your part, point to any such product in those two cases? You cannot.To this I replied: What you say is true; but I can point out to you what is the peculiar subject of each of these sciences, distinct in each case from the science itself. Thus reckoning, I suppose, is concerned with the even and the odd in their numerical relations to themselves and to one another, is it not?Certainly, he said.And you grant that the odd and the even are different from the actual art of reckoning?Of course.
-And once more, weighing is concerned with the heavier and the lighter weight; but the heavy and the light are different from the actual art of weighing: you agree?I do.Then tell me, what is that of which temperance is the science, differing from temperance itself?There you are, Socrates, he said: you push your investigation up to the real question at issue—in what temperance differs from all the other sciences—but you then proceed to seek some resemblance between it
-and them; whereas there is no such thing, for while all the rest of the sciences have something other than themselves as their subject, this one alone is a science of the other sciences and of its own self. And of this you are far from being unconscious, since in fact, as I believe, you are doing the very thing you denied you were doing just now: for you are attempting to refute me, without troubling to follow the subject of our discussion.How can you think, I said, if my main effort is to refute you, that I do it with any other motive than that which
-would impel me to investigate the meaning of my own words—from a fear of carelessly supposing, at any moment, that I knew something while I knew it not? And so it is now: that is what I am doing, I tell you. I am examining the argument mainly for my own sake, but also, perhaps, for that of my other intimates. Or do you not think it is for the common good, almost, of all men, that the truth about everything there is should be discovered?Yes indeed, he replied, I do, Socrates.Then take heart, I said, my admirable friend, and answer the question put to you as you deem the case to be, without caring a jot
-whether it is Critias or Socrates who is being refuted: give the argument itself your attention, and observe what will become of it under the test of refutation.Well, he said, I will do so; for I think there is a good deal in what you say.Then tell me, I said, what you mean in regard to temperance.Why, I mean, he said, that it alone of all the sciences is the science both of itself and of the other sciences.So then, I said, it will be the science of the lack of science also, besides being the science of science? Science or exact knowledge must be able to measure not only the field of knowledge, but also that of its negation, ignorance.Certainly, he replied.
-Then only the temperate person will know himself, and be able to discern what he really knows and does not know, and have the power of judging what other people likewise know and think they know, in cases where they do know, and again, what they think they know, without knowing it; everyone else will be unable. And so this is being temperate, or temperance, and knowing oneself—that one should know what one knows and what one does not know. Is that what you mean?It is, he replied.Once more then, I said, as our third offering to the Saviour, It was the custom at banquets to dedicate a third and final wine-offering or toast to Zeus the Saviour. Cf. Pind. I. 5 init.
-let us consider afresh, in the first place, whether such a thing as this is possible or not—to know that one knows, and does not know, what one knows and what one does not know; and secondly, if this is perfectly possible, what benefit we get by knowing it.We must indeed consider, he said.Come then, I said, Critias, consider if you can show yourself any more resourceful than I am; for I am at a loss. Shall I explain to you in what way?By all means, he replied.Well, I said, what all this comes to, if your last statement was correct, is merely that there is one science which
-is precisely a science of itself and of the other sciences, and moreover is a science of the lack of science at the same time.Certainly.Then mark what a strange statement it is that we are attempting to make, my friend: for if you will consider it as applied to other cases, you will surely see—so I believe—its impossibility.How so? In what cases?In the following: ask yourself if you think there is a sort of vision which is not the vision of things that we see in the ordinary way, but a vision of itself and of the other sorts of vision,
-and of the lack of vision likewise; which, while being vision, sees no color, but only itself and the other sorts of vision. Do you think there is any such?Upon my word, I do not.And what do you say to a sort of hearing which hears not a single sound, but hears itself and the other sorts of hearing and lack of hearing?I reject that also.Then take all the senses together as a whole, and consider if you think there is any sense of the senses and of itself, but insensible of any of the things of which the other senses are sensible.I do not.
-Now, do you think there is any desire which is the desire, not of any pleasure, but of itself and of the other desires ?No, indeed.Nor, again, is there a wish, I imagine, that wishes no good, but wishes itself and the other wishes.Quite so; there is not.And would you say there is any love of such a sort that it is actually a love of no beauty, but of itself and of the other loves?Not I, he replied.And have you ever observed any fear which fears itself
-and the other fears, but has no fear of a single dreadful thing?No, I have not, he replied.Or an opinion which is an opinion of opinions and of itself, but without any opinion such as the other opinions have?By no means.But it is apparently a science of this kind that we are assuming—one that is a science of no branch of study, but a science of itself and of the other sciences.So we are.And it is a strange thing, if it really exists? For we should not affirm as yet that it does not exist, but should still consider whether it does exist.
-You are right.Well now, this science is a science of something, that is, it has a certain faculty whereby it can be a science of something, has it not?Certainly.For, you know, we say the greater has a certain faculty whereby it can be greater than something? At this point Socrates adduces the relation of greater to smaller (tino\s ei)=nai mei=zon) to suggest a difficulty in conceiving a science to be a science of itself: in so doing he draws a false analogy between two quite different uses of the genitive in Greek, represented in English by the comparative “than” and the objective “of.”Quite so.That is, than something smaller, if it is to be greater.Necessarily.So if we could find a greater which is greater than other greater things, and than itself, but not greater than the things
-beside which the others are greater, I take it there can be no doubt that it would be in the situation of being, if greater than itself, at the same time smaller than itself, would it not?Most inevitably, Socrates, he said.Or again, if there is a double of other doubles and of itself, both it and the others must of course be halves, if it is to be their double; for, you know, a double cannot be “of” anything else than its half.True.And what is more than itself will also be less, and the heavier will be lighter, and the older
-younger, and so on with everything else: whatever has its own faculty applied to itself will have also the natural quality to which its faculty was applicable, will it not? For instance, hearing is, as we say, just a hearing of sound, is it not?Yes.So if it is to hear itself, it will hear a sound of its own; for it would not hear otherwise.Most inevitably.And sight, I suppose, my excellent friend, if it is to see itself, must needs have a color; for sight
-can never see what is colorless.No more it can.Then do you perceive, Critias, in the various cases we have propounded, how some of them strike us as absolutely impossible, while others raise serious doubts as to the faculty of the thing being ever applicable to itself? For with magnitudes, numbers, and the like it is absolutely impossible, is it not?Certainly.But again, with hearing and sight, or in the further bases of motion moving itself and heat burning itself, and all other
-actions of the sort, the fact must appear incredible to some, but perhaps not to others. So what we want, my friend, is some great man who will determine to our satisfaction in every respect whether there is nothing in nature so constituted as to have its own faculty applicable to itself, and not only some other object, or whether there are some such, and others not such; and whether, again, if there are things that have such relation to themselves, they include a science which we assert to be temperance. For my part, I distrust my own competence to determine these questions, and hence I am neither able to affirm whether it is possible
-that there should be a science of science, nor willing, let it be ever so true, to acknowledge this to be temperance until I have made out whether such a thing as this would benefit us or not. For, you see, I have a presentiment that temperance is something beneficial and good; and you, therefore, son of Callaeschrus—since you lay it down that temperance is this very science of science, and moreover of the lack of science—shall first indicate the possibility, as I put it just now, and then the benefit added to the possibility, of such a thing;
-and perhaps you will then satisfy me that your definition of temperance is correct.Now when Critias heard this and saw me in a difficulty, he seemed to me—just as the sight of someone yawning opposite causes people to be affected in the same way—to be compelled by the sense of my difficulty to be caught in a difficulty himself. And so, since he usually contrived to distinguish himself, he was too ashamed to bring himself to admit to me before the company that he was unable to determine the questions
-with which I challenged him, and he made a very indistinct reply in order to conceal his difficulty. Then I, to forward the discussion, remarked: Well, if you prefer, Critias, let us concede for the moment that there may possibly be a science of science : some other time we shall consider whether such is the fact or not. Come then; suppose it is perfectly possible: how is one helped thereby to know what one knows and does not know? For this, you are aware, we said Plat. Charm. 167a. was the meaning of self-knowledge and temperance, did we not?Certainly, he said; and it must surely follow, Socrates;
-for if a man has a science which knows itself, he will be similar himself to that which he has. For instance, he who has swiftness will be swift, he who has beauty will be beautiful, and he who has knowledge will know; and when he has knowledge that is of itself, he will then, surely, be in the position of knowing himself.I do not dispute, I said, that when a man has that which knows itself he will know himself; but having that, how is he bound to know what he knows and what he does not know?
-Because, Socrates, the two things are the same.I daresay, I said; but I am afraid I am still my old self: I still do not see how knowing what one knows and does not know is the same as the other.How do you mean? he asked.In this way, I replied: will a science of science, if such exists, be able to do more than determine that one of two things is science, and the other is not science?No, only that.
-Now, is science or lack of science of health the same as science or lack of science of justice?By no means.For the one, I suppose, is medicine, and the other politics, while the thing in question is merely science.Yes, to be sure.And if a man has no added knowledge of health and justice, but knows only science, as having science of that alone, he will probably know that he has a certain piece of scientific knowledge about himself and about other people, will he not?Yes.
-But how will this science help him to know what he knows? For of course he knows health by means of medicine, not temperance, and harmony by means of music, not temperance, and building by means of the builder's art, not temperance; and so it will be in every case, will it not?Apparently.And how will temperance, supposing it is only a science of sciences, help him to know that he knows health, or that he knows building?By no means.Then he who is ignorant of all this will not know what he knows, but only that he knows.So it seems.
-Then being temperate, or temperance, will not be this knowledge of what one knows or does not know, but, it would seem, merely knowing that one knows or does not know.It looks like it.Then such a person will also be unable to examine another man's claim to some knowledge, and make out whether he knows or does not know what he says he knows: he will merely know, it would seem, that he has a certain knowledge; but of what it is, temperance will not cause him to know.Apparently not.
-So he will be able to distinguish neither the man who pretends to be a doctor, but is none, from the man who really is one, nor any other man who has knowledge from him who has none. But let us consider it another way: if the temperate man or anybody else would discriminate between the true doctor and the false, he will go to work thus, will he not? He will surely not talk to him about medicine; for, as we were saying, the doctor understands nothing else but health and disease. Is not that so?Yes, it is.But about science he knows nothing, for that, you know, we assigned to temperance alone.Yes.So the medical man knows nothing about medicine either, since
-medicine is, of course, a science.True.Then the temperate man will know, indeed, that the doctor has a certain science; but when he has to put its nature to the proof, must he not consider what its subjects are? Is not each science marked out, not merely as a science, but as a particular one, by the particular subjects it has?It is, to be sure.And medicine is marked out as different from the other sciences by being a science of health and disease.Yes.And so anyone who wishes to inquire into medicine
-must make those things, whatever they may be, with which it is concerned, the matter of his inquiry; not those foreign things, I presume, with which it is not?No, indeed.Then he who conducts his inquiry aright will consider the doctor, as a medical man, in connection with cases of health and disease.So it seems.And will inquire whether, in what is said or done in such cases, his words are truly spoken, and his acts rightly done?He must.Well now, could anyone follow up either of these points without the medical art?No, indeed.
-Nobody at all, it would seem, but a doctor; and so not the temperate man either: for he would have to be a doctor, in addition to his temperance.That is so.Then inevitably, if temperance is only a science of science and of lack of science, it will be equally unable to distinguish a doctor who knows the business of his art from one who does not know but pretends or thinks he does, and any other person who has knowledge of anything at all: one will only distinguish one's fellow-artist, as craftsmen usually can.Apparently, he said.
-Then what benefit, I asked, Critias, can we still look for from temperance, if it is like that? For if, as we began by assuming, the temperate man knew what he knew and what he did not know, and that he knows the one and does not know the other, and if he were able to observe this same condition in bother man, it would be vastly to our benefit, we agree, to be temperate; since we should pass all our lives, both we who had temperance and all the rest who were governed by us,
-without error. For neither should we ourselves attempt to do what we did not know, instead of finding out those who knew and placing the matter in their hands, nor should we permit others under our governance to do anything but what they were likely to do aright; and they would do that when they had knowledge of it; and so it would be that a house which was ordered, or a state which was administered, as temperance bade, and everything else
-that was ruled by temperance, could not but be well ordered; for with error abolished, and rightness leading, in their every action men would be bound to do honorably and well under such conditions, and those who did well would be happy. Did we not so speak of temperance, I said, Critias, when we remarked how great a boon it was to know what one knows and what one does not know?To be sure we did, he replied.Whereas now, I went on, you see that nowhere can any such science be found.I see, he said.
-Then may we say, I asked, that there is this good point in the knowledge of knowledge and of lack of knowledge, which we now find to be what temperance is, that he who has it will not only learn more easily whatever he learns, but will perceive everything more plainly, since besides the particular things that he learns he will behold the science; and hence he will probe more surely the state of other men respecting the things which he has learnt himself, while those who probe without such knowledge will do it more feebly and poorly? Are these, my friend, the kind of advantages that we shall gain
-from temperance? But are we really looking at something greater, and requiring it to be something greater than it really is?Probably, he replied, that is so.I daresay, I said; and I daresay also our inquiry has been worthless. And this I conclude, because I observe certain strange facts about temperance, if it is anything like that. For suppose, if you please, we concede that there may possibly be a science of science, and let us grant, and not withdraw, our original proposition that temperance is the knowledge of what one knows and does not know;
-granting all this, let us still more thoroughly inquire whether on these terms it will be of any profit to us. For our suggestion just now, that temperance of that sort, as our guide in ordering house or state, must be a great boon, was not, to my thinking, Critias, a proper admission.How so? he asked.Because, I replied, we too tightly admitted that it would be a great boon to mankind if each of us should do what he knows, but should place what he did not know in the hands of others who had the knowledge.
-Well, was that, he asked, not a proper admission?Not to my mind, I answered.In very truth, your words are strange! he said, Socrates.Yes, by the Dog, I said, and they strike me too in the same way; and it was in view of this, just now, that I spoke of strange results that I noticed, and said I feared we were not inquiring rightly. For in truth, let temperance be ever so much what we say it is, I see nothing
-to show what good effect it has on us.How so? he asked: tell us, in order that we on our side may know what you mean.I expect, I said, I am talking nonsense: but still one is bound to consider what occurs to one, and not idly ignore it, if one has even a little concern for oneself.And you are quite right, he said.Hear then, I said, my dream, whether it has come through horn or through ivory. Cf. Hom. Od. 19.562ff. Dreams are there described as issuing: dreams that come true are from the gate of horn; deceitful dreams are from the gate of ivory. Suppose that temperance were such as we now define her,
-and that she had entire control of us: must it not be that every act would be done according to the sciences, and no one professing to be a pilot when he was not would deceive us, nor would a doctor, nor a general, nor anyone else pretending to know something he did not know, go undetected; and would not these conditions result in our having greater bodily health than we have now, safety in perils of the sea and war, and skilful workmanship in all our utensils, our clothes,
-our shoes, nay, everything about us, and various things besides, because we should be employing genuine craftsmen? And if you liked, we might concede that prophecy, as the knowledge of what is to be, and temperance directing her, will deter the charlatans, and establish the true prophets as our prognosticators. Thus equipped, the human race would indeed act and live
-according to knowledge, I grant you (for temperance, on the watch, would not suffer ignorance to foist herself in and take a hand in our labors), but that by acting according to knowledge we should do well and be happy—this is a point which as yet we are unable to make out, my dear Critias.But still, he replied, you will have some difficulty in finding any other fulfillment of welfare if you reject the rule of knowledge.Then inform me further, I said, on one more little matter. Of what is this knowledge? Do you mean of shoe-making?
-Good heavens, not I!Well, of working in brass?By no means.Well, in wool, or in wood, or in something else of that sort?No, indeed.Then we no longer hold, I said, to the statement that he who lives according to knowledge is happy; for these workers, though they live according to knowledge, are not acknowledged by you to be happy: you rather delimit the happy man, it seems to me, as one who lives according to knowledge about certain things. And I daresay you are referring to my instance of a moment ago, the man who knows
-all that is to come, the prophet. Do you refer to him or to someone else?Yes, I refer to him, he said, and someone else too.Whom? I asked. Is it the sort of person who might know, besides what is to be, both everything that has been and now is, and might be ignorant of nothing? Let us suppose such a man exists: you are not going to tell me, I am sure, of anyone alive who is yet more knowing than he.No, indeed.Then there is still one more thing I would fain know: which of the sciences is it that makes him happy? Or does he owe it to all of them alike?
-By no means to all alike, he replied.But to which sort most? One that gives him knowledge of what thing, present, past or future? Is it that by which he knows draught-playing?Draught-playing indeed! he replied.Well, reckoning?By no means.Well, health?More likely, he said.And that science to which I refer as the most likely, I went on, gives him knowledge of what?Of good, he replied, and of evil.Vile creature! I said, you have all this time been dragging me round and round, while concealing the fact that the life according to knowledge does not make us do well and be happy, not even
-if it be knowledge of all the other knowledges together, but only if it is of this single one concerning good and evil. For, Critias, if you choose to take away this science from the whole number of them, will medicine any the less give us health, or shoemaking give us shoes, or weaving provide clothes, or will the pilot's art any the less prevent the loss of life at sea, or the general's in war?None the less, he replied.But, my dear Critias, to have any of these things well
-and beneficially done will be out of our reach if that science is lacking.That is true.And that science, it seems, is not temperance, but one whose business is to benefit us; for it is not a science of sciences and lack of sciences, but of good and evil: so that if this is beneficial, temperance must be something else to us.But why, he asked, should not it be beneficial? For if temperance is above all a science of the sciences,
-and presides too over the other sciences, surely she will govern this science of the good, and so benefit us.And give us health also? I asked: will she, and not medicine, do this? And will the several works of the other arts be hers, and not the particular works of each art? Have we not constantly protested that she is only knowledge of knowledge and of lack of knowledge, and of nothing else? Is not that so?Apparently it is.Then she will not be a producer of health?No, indeed.
-For health, we said, belongs to another art, did we not?We did.Nor of benefit, my good friend; for this work, again, we assigned to another art just now, did we not?Certainly.Then how will temperance be beneficial, if it produces no benefit?By no means, Socrates, as it seems.So do you see, Critias, how all the time I had good reason for my fear, and fair ground for the reproach I made against myself, that my inquiry regarding temperance was worthless? Cf. Plat. Charm. 172c. For I cannot think that what is admitted to be the noblest thing in the world
-would have appeared to us useless if I had been of any use for making a good search. But now, you see, we are worsted every way, and cannot discover what thing it can possibly be to which the lawgiver gave this name, temperance. And yet we have conceded many points which were not deducible from our argument. For you know we conceded that there was a science of science, when the argument was against it and would not agree; and we further conceded that
-this science could know the works also of the other sciences, when the argument was against this too, in order to make out that the temperate man had a knowledge of what he knew and did not know, so as to know that he knew the one and did not know the other. And we made this concession in a really magnificent manner, without considering the impossibility of a man knowing, in some sort of way, things that he does not know at all; for our admission says that he knows that he does not know them; and yet, in my opinion, there can be nothing more irrational than this. Nevertheless, although it has found us so simple-minded
-and tractable, the inquiry remains quite incapable of discovering the truth, but has utterly flouted it by most impudently showing us the inutility of that which we had been ever so long assuming, by our joint admissions and fictions, to be the meaning of temperance. Now, so far as I am concerned, I am not particularly distressed: but for your sake, I said, Charmides, I am seriously distressed to think that you, with your goodly form and
-most temperate soul besides, are to have no profit or advantage from the presence of that temperance in all your life. And I am still more distressed about the charm which I learnt from the Thracian, Cf. Plat. Charm. 156d. that I should have spent so much pains on a lesson which has had such a worthless effect. Now I really do not think that this can be the case, but rather that I am a poor hand at inquiring; for temperance I hold to be a great good, and you to be highly blessed,
-if you actually have it. See now whether you have it, and are in no need of the charm; for if it is yours, I should rather advise you to regard me as a babbler who is unable to argue out any subject of inquiry whatsoever, and yourself as advancing in happiness as you advance in temperance.Then Charmides said: Why, upon my word, Socrates, I do not know at all whether I have it or have it not. For how can I know, when even you two are unable
-to discover what this thing is?—so you say, but of this you do not at all convince me—and I quite believe, Socrates, that I do need the charm, and for my part I have no objection to being charmed by you every day of my life, until you say I have had enough of the treatment.Very well, said Critias: now, Charmides, if you do this, it will be a proof to me of your temperance—if you submit to be charmed by Socrates and do not forsake him through thick and thin.Count on me to follow, he said, and not forsake him;
-for it would ill become me to disobey you, my guardian, and refuse to do your bidding.Well now, he said, I bid you.Then I will do as you say, he replied, and will start this very day.There, there, I said, what are you two plotting to do?Nothing, replied Charmides; we have made our plot.So you will use force, I said, before even allowing me to make my affidavit?You must expect me to use force, he replied, since he gives me the command: take counsel, therefore, on your side, as to what you will do
-But that leaves no room, I said, for counsel; for if once you set about doing anything and use force, no man alive will be able to withstand you.Then do not you, he said, withstand me.Then I will not withstand you, I replied.
+
We arrived yesterday evening ii. p. 203. and there I came upon quite a number of people, some of whom were unknown to me, but most of whom I knew. And as soon as they saw me
+appear thus unexpectedly, they hailed me from a distance on every side; but Chaerephon, like the mad creature that he is, jumped up from their midst and ran to me, and grasping me by the hand—Socrates, he said, how did you survive the battle? (Shortly before we came away there had been a battle at Potidaea, of which the people here had only just had news.)In the state in which you see me, I replied.It has been reported here, you know, said he, that the battle was very
+severe, and that many of our acquaintance have lost their lives in it.Then the report, I replied, is pretty near the truth.You were present, he asked, at the fighting?I was present.Then sit down here, he said, and give us a full account; for as yet we have had no clear report of it all. And with that he led me to a seat by Critias, son of Callaeschrus. So I sat down there and greeted Critias and the rest, and gave them all the news from the battlefield, in answer to their various questions; each had his inquiry to make.
+When we had had enough of such matters, I in my turn began to inquire about affairs at home, how philosophy was doing at present, and whether any of the rising young men had distinguished themselves for wisdom or beauty or both. Then Critias, looking towards the door,
+for he saw some young fellows who were coming in with some railing at each other, and a crowd of people following on behind them, said—Concerning the beauties, Socrates, I expect you will get your knowledge at once: for these who are coming in are in fact forerunners and lovers of the person who is held, for the moment at least, to be the greatest beauty; and he himself, I imagine, must by now be nearly upon us.Who is he, I asked, and whose son?You must know, he replied, but he was not yet grown up when you went away,—Charmides, son of
+our uncle Glaucon, and my cousin.I do know, to be sure, I said; for he was not to be despised even then, when he was still a child, and now, I suppose, he will be quite a youth by this time.You will know this moment, he said, both how much and to what purpose he has grown. And just as he spoke these words, Charmides entered.Now I, my good friend, am no measurer: I am a mere “white line” A white or chalked line was proverbially useless for marking off measurements on white stone or marble. in measuring beautiful people, for almost everyone who has just grown up appears beautiful to me. Nay and this time, moreover, the young man appeared to me
+a marvel of stature and beauty; and all the rest, to my thinking, were in love with him, such was their astonishment and confusion when he came in, and a number of other lovers were following in his train. On the part of men like us it was not so surprising; but when I came to observe the boys I noticed that none of them, not even the smallest, had eyes for anything else, but that
+they all gazed at him as if he were a statue. Then Chaerephon called me and said—How does the youth strike you, Socrates? Has he not a fine face?Immensely so, I replied.Yet if he would consent to strip, he said, you would think he had no face, he has such perfect beauty of form.And these words of Chaerephon were repeated by the rest. Then,—By Heracles! I said, what an irresistible person you make him out to be, if he has but one more thing—a little thing—besides.What? said Critias.
+If in his soul, I replied, he is of good grain. And I should think, Critias, he ought to be, since he is of your house.Ah, he said, he is right fair and good in that way also.Why then, I said, let us strip that very part of him and view it first, instead of his form; for anyhow, at that age, I am sure he is quite ready to have a discussion.Very much so, said Critias; for, I may say, he is in fact
+a philosopher, and also—as others besides himself consider—quite a poet.That, my dear Critias, I said, is a gift which your family has had a long while back, through your kinship with Solon. But why not call the young man here and show him to me? For surely, even if he were younger still, there could be no discredit in our having a talk with him before you, who are at once his guardian and his cousin.You are quite right he said, and we will call him.
+Thereupon he said to his attendant,—Boy, call Charmides; tell him I want him to see a doctor about the ailment with which he told me he was troubled yesterday. Then, turning to me,—You know, he has spoken lately of having a headache, said Critias, on getting up in the morning: now why should you not represent to him that you know a cure for headache?Why not? I said: only he must come.Oh, he will be here, he said.And so it was; for he came, and caused much laughter, because each of us who were seated
+made room for him by pushing hard at his neighbor so as to have him sitting beside himself, until at either end of the seat one had to stand up, and we tumbled the other off sideways; and he came and sat down between me and Critias. But here, my friend, I began to feel perplexed, and my former confidence in looking forward to a quite easy time in talking with him had been knocked out of me. And when, on Critias telling him that it was I who knew the cure,
+he gave me such a look with his eyes as passes description, and was just about to plunge into a question, and when all the people in the wrestling-school surged round about us on every side—then, ah then, my noble friend, I saw inside his cloak and caught fire, and could possess myself no longer; and I thought none was so wise in love-matters as Cydias, A poet classed with Mimnermus and Archilochus by Plutarch; cf. Bergk, Poet. Lyr.2 p. 960. who in speaking of a beautiful boy recommends someone to “beware of coming as a fawn before the lion, and being seized as his portion of flesh”; for I too felt
+I had fallen a prey to some such creature. However, when he had asked me if I knew the cure for headache, I somehow contrived to answer that I knew.Then what is it? he asked.So I told him that the thing itself was a certain leaf, but there was a charm to go with the remedy; and if one uttered the charm at the moment of its application, the remedy made one perfectly well; but without the charm there was no efficacy in the leaf.
+Then I will take down the charm, said he, from you in writing.Do you prefer, I asked, to get my consent first, or to do without it?This made him laugh, and he said: To get your consent, Socrates.Very well, I said; and are you certain of my name?Unless I misjudge, he replied; for there is no little talk of you. among the set of our age, and I remember as a mere child the sight of you in company with Critias here.That is a good thing, I said: for I shall speak more freely to you
+about the charm, and its real nature; just now I was at a loss for the way to apprise you of its power. For it is of such a nature, Charmides, that it cannot cure the head alone; I daresay you have yourself sometimes heard good doctors say, you know, when a patient comes to them with a pain in his eyes, that it is not possible for them to attempt a cure of his eyes alone, but that it is necessary to treat his head too at the same time,
+if he is to have his eyes in good order; and so again, that to expect ever to treat the head by itself, apart from the body as a whole, is utter folly. And on this principle they apply their regimen to the whole body, and attempt to treat and heal the part along with the whole; or have you not observed that this is what they say, and is done in fact?Certainly I have, he said.And you consider it well said, and accept the principle?Most assuredly, he said.
+Then I, on hearing his approval, regained my courage; and little by little I began to muster up my confidence again, and my spirit began to rekindle. So I said,—Such, then, Charmides, is the nature of this charm. I learnt it on campaign over there, from one of the Thracian physicians of Zalmoxis, A legendary hero of the Thracian race of the Getae; cf. Hdt. 4.94-6. who are said even to make one immortal. This Thracian said that the Greeks were right in advising as I told you just now: “but Zalmoxis,” he said,
+“our king, who is a god, says that as you ought not to attempt to cure eyes without head, or head without body, so you should not treat body without soul”; and this was the reason why most maladies evaded the physicians of Greece—that they neglected the whole, on which they ought to spend their pains, for if this were out of order it was impossible for the part to be in order. For all that was good and evil, he said, in the body and in man altogether was sprung from the soul, and flowed along from thence as it did
+from the head into the eyes. Wherefore that part was to be treated first and foremost, if all was to be well with the head and the rest of the body. And the treatment of the soul, so he said, my wonderful friend, is by means of certain charms, and these charms are words of the right sort: by the use of such words is temperance engendered in our souls, and as soon as it is engendered and present we may easily secure health to the head and to the rest of the body also.
+Now in teaching me the remedy and the charms he remarked,—” Let nobody persuade you to treat his head with this remedy, unless he has first submitted his soul for you to treat with the charm. For at present,” he said, “the cure of mankind is beset with the error of certain doctors who attempt to practise the one method without the other.” And he most particularly enjoined on me not to let anyone, however wealthy or noble or handsome,
+induce me to disobey him. So I, since I have given him my oath, and must obey him, will do as he bids; and if you agree to submit your soul first to the effect of the Thracian charms, according to the stranger's injunctions, I will apply the remedy to your head: otherwise we shall be at a loss what to do with you, my dear Charmides.Then Critias, when he heard me say this, remarked,—This affection of the head, Socrates, will turn out to be a stroke of luck for the young man, if he is to be compelled
+on account of his head to improve his understanding also. However, let me tell you, Charmides is considered to excel his comrades not only in appearance, but also in that very thing which you say is produced by your charm: temperance, you say it is, do you not?Certainly, I replied.Then be assured, he said, that he is considered to be far and away the most temperate person now alive, while in every other respect, for a youth of his age, he is second to none.Why, yes, I said, and it is only right, Charmides, that you should excel the rest in all these respects; for
+I do not suppose there is anyone else here who could readily point to a case of any two Athenian houses uniting together which would be likely to produce handsomer or nobler offspring than those from which you are sprung. For your father's house, which comes from Critias, son of Dropides, has been celebrated by Anacreon and Solon and many other poets, so that it is famed by tradition among us as preeminent in beauty and virtue
+and all else that is accounted happiness; and then, your mother's house is famous in the same way, for of Pyrilampes, your uncle, it is said that no one in all the continent was considered to be his superior in beauty or stature, whenever he came as envoy to the great king or anyone else in Asia, and his house as a whole is no whit inferior to the other. Sprung from such people, it is to be supposed that you would be first in all things. And indeed,
+as regards your visible form, dear son of Glaucon, I consider that nowhere have you fallen behind any of your ancestors. But if your nature is really rich in temperance and those other things, as our friend here says, blessed is the son, dear Charmides, I exclaimed, that your mother has borne in you! However, the case stands thus: if you already possess temperance, as Critias here declares, and you are sufficiently temperate, then you never had any need of the charms of Zalmoxis or of Abaris the Hyperborean, A fabulous hero of the far north, to whom oracles and charms were ascribed by the Greeks; cf. Hdt. 4.36.
+and might well be given at once the remedy for the head; but if you prove to be still lacking that virtue, we must apply the charm before the remedy. So tell me yourself whether you agree with our friend, and can say that you are already sufficiently provided with temperance, or are deficient in it?At this Charmides blushed and, for one thing, looked more beautiful then ever, for his modesty became his years; and then, too, he answered most ingenuously, saying it was no easy matter at the moment either to admit or to deny the words of the question. For if,
+he went on, I say I am not temperate, not only is it a strange thing to say against oneself, but I shall at the same time be taxing with untruth both Critias and many others who consider me to be temperate, as he gives out; while if, on the other hand, I say I am, and praise myself, it will probably be found distasteful; so that I cannot see what answer I am to give you.Then I said: Your answer is a natural one, in my opinion, Charmides; and I think, I went on, that we must join in inquiring whether you possess the thing I am asking after, or not, in order that
+neither you may be forced to say what you do not wish, nor I on my part may recklessly try my hand at medicine. So if it is agreeable to you, I am ready to inquire with you; but, if it is not, to let it alone.Why, nothing, he said, could be more agreeable to me : so far as that goes, therefore, inquire in whatever way you think we had better proceed.Then this is the way, I said, in which I consider that our inquiry into this matter had best be conducted. Now, it is clear that, if you
+have temperance with you, you can hold an opinion about it. For being in you, I presume it must, in that case, afford some perception from which you can form some opinion of what temperance is, and what kind of thing it is : do you not think so ?I do, he replied.And since you understand the Greek tongue, I said, you can tell me, I suppose, your view of this particular thought of yours?I daresay, he said.Then in order that we may make a guess whether it is in you or not, tell me, I said, what you say of temperance according to your opinion.
+He at first hung back, and was not at all willing to answer: but presently he said that, to his mind, temperance was doing everything orderly and quietly—walking in the streets, talking, and doing everything else of that kind; and in a word, he said, I think the thing about which you ask may be called quietness.Well, I said, are you right there? They do say, you know, Charmides, that quiet people are temperate : so let us see if there is anything in what they say. Tell me, is not temperance,
+however, among the honorable things?To be sure, he said.Well, which is most honorable at the writing master's, to write the same sort of letters quickly or quietly?Quickly.And in reading, to do it quickly or slowly?Quickly.And so, in the same way, to play the lyre quickly, or to wrestle nimbly, is far more honorable than to do it quietly and slowly?Yes.And what of boxing, alone or combined with wrestling? Is it not the same there too?To be sure.And in running and leaping and all activities
+of the body, are not nimble and quick movements accounted honorable, while sluggish and quiet ones are deemed disgraceful?Apparently.So we find, I said, that in the body, at least, it is not quietness, but the greatest quickness and nimbleness that is most honorable, do we not?Certainly.And temperance was an honorable thing?Yes.Then in the body, at least, it is not quietness but quickness that will be the more temperate thing, since temperance is honorable.So it seems, he said.
+Well now, I went on; in learning, is facility the more honorable, or difficulty?Facility.And facility in learning, I said, is learning quickly, and difficulty in learning is learning quietly and slowly?Yes.And is it not more honorable to teach another quickly and forcibly, rather than quietly and slowly?Yes.Well now, is it more honorable to be reminded and to remember quietly and slowly, or forcibly and quickly?Forcibly, he replied, and quickly.
+And is not readiness of mind a sort of nimbleness of the soul, not a quietness?True.And to apprehend what is said, whether at the writing-master's or the lyre-master's or anywhere else, not as quietly as possible, but as quickly, is most honorable?Yes.Well, and in the searchings of the soul, and in deliberation, it is not the quietest person, I imagine, or he who deliberates and discovers with difficulty, that is held worthy of praise, but he who does this most easily and quickly.
+That is so, he said.Then in all, I said, Charmides, that concerns either our soul or our body, actions of quickness and nimbleness are found to be more honorable than those of slowness and quietness?It looks like it, he said.So temperance cannot be a sort of quietness, nor can the temperate life be quiet, by this argument at least; since, being temperate, it must be honorable.
+For we have these two alternatives: either in no cases, or I should think in very few, can we find that the quiet actions in life are more honorable than the quick and vigorous ones; or at all events, my friend, if of the more honorable actions there are absolutely as many quiet ones as forcible and quick, not even so will temperance be acting quietly any more than acting forcibly and quickly, either in walking or in talking or in any other sphere; nor will the quiet life be more temperate than the unquiet; since
+in our argument we assumed that temperance is an honorable thing, and have found that quick things are just as honorable as quiet things.Your statement, he said, Socrates, seems to me to be correct.Once more then, I went on, Charmides, attend more closely and look into yourself; reflect on the quality that is given you by the presence of temperance, and what quality it must have to work this effect on you. Take stock of all this and tell me, like a good, brave fellow, what it appears to you to be.
+He paused a little, and after a quite manly effort of self-examination: Well, I think, he said, that temperance makes men ashamed or bashful, and that temperance is the same as modesty.Well now, I asked, did you not admit a moment ago that temperance is honorable?Certainly I did, he said.And temperate men are also good?Yes.Well, can that be good which does not produce good men?No, indeed.And we conclude that it is not only honorable, but good also.
+ I think so.Well then, I said, are you not convinced that Homer is right in saying—Modesty, no good mate for a needy man?Hom. Od. 17.347I am, he said.Then it would seem that modesty is not good, and good.Apparently.But temperance is good, if its presence makes men good, and not bad.It certainly seems to me to be as you say.So temperance cannot be modesty, if it
+is in fact good, while modesty is no more good than evil.Why, I think, he said, Socrates, that is correctly stated; but there is another view of temperance on which I would like to have your opinion. I remembered just now what I once heard someone say, that temperance might be doing one's own business. I ask you, then, do you think he is right in saying this?You rascal, I said, you have heard it from Critias here,
+or some other of our wise men!Seemingly, said Critias, from some other; for indeed he did not from me.But what does it matter, Socrates, said Charmides, from whom I heard it?Not at all, I replied; for in any case we have not to consider who said it, but whether it is a true saying or no.Now you speak rightly, he said.Yes, on my word, I said: but I shall be surprised if we can find out how it stands; for it looks like a kind of riddle.Why so? he asked.Because, I replied, presumably the speaker of the words
+“temperance is doing one's own business” did not mean them quite as he spoke them. Or do you consider that the scribe does nothing when he writes or reads?I rather consider that he does something, he replied. And does the scribe, in your opinion, write and read his own name only, and teach you boys to do the same with yours? Or did you write your enemies' names just as much as your own and your friends'?Just as much.Well, were you meddlesome or intemperate
+in doing this?Not at all.And you know you were not doing your own business, if writing and reading are doing something.Why, so they are.And indeed medical work, my good friend, and building and weaving and producing anything whatever that is the work of any art, I presume is doing something.Certainly.Well then, I went on, do you think a state would be well conducted under a law which enjoined that everyone should weave and scour his own coat, and make his own shoes, and his own flask and scraper, The flask contained oil for anointing the body before exercise, and the scraper was for scraping it afterwards, or at the bath.
+and everything else on the same principle of not touching the affairs of others but performing and doing his own for himself?I think not, he replied.But still, I said, a state whose conduct is temperate will be well conducted.Of course, he said.Then doing one's own business in that sense and in that way will not be temperance.Apparently not.So that person was riddling, it seems, just as I said a moment ago, when he said that doing one's own business is temperance. For I take it he was not such a fool as all that: or was it some idiot
+that you heard saying this, Charmides?Far from it, he replied, for indeed he seemed to be very wise.Then it is perfectly certain, in my opinion, that he propounded it as a riddle, in view of the difficulty of understanding what “doing one's own business” can mean.I daresay, he said.Well, what can it mean, this “doing one's own business”? Can you tell me?I do not know, upon my word, he replied: but I daresay it may be that not even he who said it knew in the least what he meant. And as he said this he gave a sly laugh and glanced at Critias.
+Now Critias for some time had been plainly burning with anxiety to distinguish himself in the eyes of Charmides and the company, and having with difficulty restrained himself heretofore, he now could do so no longer; for I believe that what I had supposed was perfectly true—that Charmides had heard this answer about temperance from Critias. And so Charmides, wishing him to make answer
+instead of himself, sought to stir him up in particular, and pointed out that he himself had been refuted; but Critias rebelled against it, and seemed to me to have got angry with him, as a poet does with an actor who mishandles his verses on the stage: so he looked hard at him and said: Do you really suppose, Charmides, that if you do not know what can have been the meaning of the man who said that temperance was doing one's own business, he did not know either?Why, my excellent Critias, I said, no wonder if our friend, at his age, cannot understand; but you,
+I should think, may be expected to know, in view of your years and your studies. So if you concede that temperance is what he says, and you accept the statement, for my part I would greatly prefer to have you as partner in the inquiry as to whether this saying is true or not.Well, I quite concede it, he said, and accept it.That is good, then, I said. Now tell me, do you also concede what I was asking just now—that all craftsmen make something?I do.And do you consider that they make their own things only, or those of others also?
+Those of others also.And are they temperate in not making their own things only?Yes: what reason is there against it? he said.None for me, I replied; but there may be for him who, after assuming that temperance is doing one's own business, proceeds to say there is no reason against those also who do others' business being temperate.And have I, pray, he said, admitted that those who do others' business are temperate? Or was my admission of those who make The Greek word poiei=n (“make”) can also mean the same as pra/ttein (“do”). things?Tell me, I said, do you not call making and doing the same?
+No indeed, he replied, nor working and making the same either: this I learnt from Hesiod, who said, Work is no reproach.Hes. WD 309 Now, do you suppose that if he had given the names of working and doing to such works as you were mentioning just now, he would have said there was no reproach in shoe-making or pickle-selling or serving the stews? It is not to be thought, Socrates; he rather held,
+I conceive, that making was different from doing and working, and that while a thing made might be a reproach if it had no connection with the honorable, work could never be a reproach. For things honorably and usefully made he called works, and such makings he called workings and doings; and we must suppose that it was only such things as these that he called our proper concerns, but all that was harmful, the concerns of others. So that we must conclude that Hesiod, and anyone else of good sense, calls him temperate who does his own business.
+Ah, Critias, I said, you had hardly begun, when I grasped the purport of your speech—that you called one's proper and one's own things good, and that the makings of the good you called doings; for in fact I have heard Prodicus drawing innumerable distinctions between names. “Names” here includes any substantive words such as pra/ceis. Well, I will allow you any application of a name that you please; only make clear to what thing it is that you attach such-and-such a name. So begin now over again, and define more plainly.
+Do you say that this doing or making, or whatever is the term you prefer, of good things, is temperance?I do, he replied.Then not he who does evil, but he who does good, is temperate?And do not you, my excellent friend, he said, think so?Leave that aside, I said; for we have not to consider yet what I think, but what you say now.Well, all the same, I say, he replied, that he who does evil instead of good is not temperate, whereas he who does good instead of evil is temperate : for I give you “the doing of good things is temperance” as my plain definition.
+And there is no reason, I daresay, why your statement should not be right; but still I wonder, I went on, whether you judge that temperate men are ignorant of their temperance.No, I do not, he said.A little while ago, I said, were you not saying that there was no reason why craftsmen should not be temperate in making others' things as well?Yes, I was, he said, but what of it ?Nothing; only tell me whether you think that a doctor, in making someone healthy,
+makes a helpful result both for himself and for the person whom he cures.I do.And he who does this does his duty?Yes.Is not he who does his duty temperate?Indeed he is.Well, and must the doctor know when his medicine will be helpful, and when not? And must every craftsman know when he is likely to be benefited by the work he does, and when not?Probably not.Then sometimes, I went on, the doctor may have done what is helpful
+or harmful without knowing the effect of his own action; and yet, in doing what was helpful, by your statement, he has done temperately. Or did you not state that?I did.Then it would seem that in doing what is helpful he may sometimes do temperately and be temperate, but be ignorant of his own temperance?But that, he said, Socrates, could never be: if you think this in any way a necessary inference from my previous admissions,
+I would rather withdraw some of them, and not be ashamed to say my statements were wrong, than concede at any time that a man who is ignorant of himself is temperate. For I would almost say that this very thing, self-knowledge, is temperance, and I am at one with him who put up the inscription of those words at Delphi. For the purpose of that inscription on the temple, as it seems to me, is to serve as the god's salutation to those who enter it, instead of
+“Hail!”—this is a wrong form of greeting, and they should rather exhort one another with the words, “Be temperate!” And thus the god addresses those who are entering his temple in a mode which differs from that of men; such was the intention of the dedicator of the inscription in putting it up, I believe; and that he says to each man who enters, in reality, Be temperate ! But he says it in a rather riddling fashion, as a prophet would; for “Know thyself!” and “Be temperate!” are the same, as
+the inscription Throughout this passage there is allusion to the thought or wisdom implied in swfronei=n, and here Critias seeks to identify fro/nei (“think well,” “be wise”) with gnw=qi (“know,” “understand”) in the inscription gnw=qi sauto/n at Delphi. and I declare, though one is likely enough to think them different—an error into which I consider the dedicators of the later inscriptions fell when they put up Nothing overmuchMHDE\N A)/GANappears first in Theognis, 335. and A pledge, and thereupon perdition.*)eggu/a pa/ra d' a)/th, an old saying on the rashness of giving a pledge, is quoted in a fragment of Cratinus, the elder rival of Aristophanes. Cf. Proverbs xi. 15—”He that is surety for a stranger shall smart for it.” For they supposed that Know thyself! was a piece of advice, and not the god's salutation of those who were entering; and so, in order that their dedications too might equally give pieces of useful advice, they wrote these words and dedicated them. Now my object in saying all this, Socrates, is to abandon to you all the previous argument—
+for, though perhaps it was you who were more in the right, or perhaps it was I, yet nothing at all certain emerged from our statements—and to proceed instead to satisfy you of this truth, if you do not admit it, that temperance is knowing oneself.Why, Critias, I said, you treat me as though I professed to know the things on which I ask questions, and needed only the will to agree with you. But the fact of the matter is rather that I join you in the inquiry, each time that a proposition is made, because I myself do not know; I wish therefore to consider first,
+before I tell you whether I agree or not. Now, give me a moment to consider.Consider then, he said.Yes, and I am considering, I said. For if temperance is knowing anything, obviously it must be a kind of science, and a science of something, must it not?It is, he replied, and of itself.And medicine, I said, is a science of health?Certainly.Then if you should ask me, I said, wherein medicine, as a science of health, is useful to us, and what it produces,
+I should say it is of very great benefit, since it produces health; an excellent result, if you allow so much.I allow it.And so, if you should ask me what result I take to be produced by building, as the builder's science, I should say houses; and it would be the same with the other arts. Now it is for you, in your turn, to find an answer to a question regarding temperance—since you say it is a science of self, Critias—and to tell me what excellent result it produces for us,
+as science of self, and what it does that is worthy of its name. Come now, tell me.But, Socrates, he said, you are not inquiring rightly. For in its nature it is not like the other sciences, any more than any of them is like any other; whereas you are making your inquiry as though they were alike. For tell me, he said, what result is there of the arts of reckoning and geometry, in the way that a house is of building, or a coat of weaving, or other products of the sort that one might point to
+in various arts? Well, can you, for your part, point to any such product in those two cases? You cannot.To this I replied: What you say is true; but I can point out to you what is the peculiar subject of each of these sciences, distinct in each case from the science itself. Thus reckoning, I suppose, is concerned with the even and the odd in their numerical relations to themselves and to one another, is it not?Certainly, he said.And you grant that the odd and the even are different from the actual art of reckoning?Of course.
+And once more, weighing is concerned with the heavier and the lighter weight; but the heavy and the light are different from the actual art of weighing: you agree?I do.Then tell me, what is that of which temperance is the science, differing from temperance itself?There you are, Socrates, he said: you push your investigation up to the real question at issue—in what temperance differs from all the other sciences—but you then proceed to seek some resemblance between it
+and them; whereas there is no such thing, for while all the rest of the sciences have something other than themselves as their subject, this one alone is a science of the other sciences and of its own self. And of this you are far from being unconscious, since in fact, as I believe, you are doing the very thing you denied you were doing just now: for you are attempting to refute me, without troubling to follow the subject of our discussion.How can you think, I said, if my main effort is to refute you, that I do it with any other motive than that which
+would impel me to investigate the meaning of my own words—from a fear of carelessly supposing, at any moment, that I knew something while I knew it not? And so it is now: that is what I am doing, I tell you. I am examining the argument mainly for my own sake, but also, perhaps, for that of my other intimates. Or do you not think it is for the common good, almost, of all men, that the truth about everything there is should be discovered?Yes indeed, he replied, I do, Socrates.Then take heart, I said, my admirable friend, and answer the question put to you as you deem the case to be, without caring a jot
+whether it is Critias or Socrates who is being refuted: give the argument itself your attention, and observe what will become of it under the test of refutation.Well, he said, I will do so; for I think there is a good deal in what you say.Then tell me, I said, what you mean in regard to temperance.Why, I mean, he said, that it alone of all the sciences is the science both of itself and of the other sciences.So then, I said, it will be the science of the lack of science also, besides being the science of science? Science or exact knowledge must be able to measure not only the field of knowledge, but also that of its negation, ignorance.Certainly, he replied.
+Then only the temperate person will know himself, and be able to discern what he really knows and does not know, and have the power of judging what other people likewise know and think they know, in cases where they do know, and again, what they think they know, without knowing it; everyone else will be unable. And so this is being temperate, or temperance, and knowing oneself—that one should know what one knows and what one does not know. Is that what you mean?It is, he replied.Once more then, I said, as our third offering to the Saviour, It was the custom at banquets to dedicate a third and final wine-offering or toast to Zeus the Saviour. Cf. Pind. I. 5 init.
+let us consider afresh, in the first place, whether such a thing as this is possible or not—to know that one knows, and does not know, what one knows and what one does not know; and secondly, if this is perfectly possible, what benefit we get by knowing it.We must indeed consider, he said.Come then, I said, Critias, consider if you can show yourself any more resourceful than I am; for I am at a loss. Shall I explain to you in what way?By all means, he replied.Well, I said, what all this comes to, if your last statement was correct, is merely that there is one science which
+is precisely a science of itself and of the other sciences, and moreover is a science of the lack of science at the same time.Certainly.Then mark what a strange statement it is that we are attempting to make, my friend: for if you will consider it as applied to other cases, you will surely see—so I believe—its impossibility.How so? In what cases?In the following: ask yourself if you think there is a sort of vision which is not the vision of things that we see in the ordinary way, but a vision of itself and of the other sorts of vision,
+and of the lack of vision likewise; which, while being vision, sees no color, but only itself and the other sorts of vision. Do you think there is any such?Upon my word, I do not.And what do you say to a sort of hearing which hears not a single sound, but hears itself and the other sorts of hearing and lack of hearing?I reject that also.Then take all the senses together as a whole, and consider if you think there is any sense of the senses and of itself, but insensible of any of the things of which the other senses are sensible.I do not.
+Now, do you think there is any desire which is the desire, not of any pleasure, but of itself and of the other desires ?No, indeed.Nor, again, is there a wish, I imagine, that wishes no good, but wishes itself and the other wishes.Quite so; there is not.And would you say there is any love of such a sort that it is actually a love of no beauty, but of itself and of the other loves?Not I, he replied.And have you ever observed any fear which fears itself
+and the other fears, but has no fear of a single dreadful thing?No, I have not, he replied.Or an opinion which is an opinion of opinions and of itself, but without any opinion such as the other opinions have?By no means.But it is apparently a science of this kind that we are assuming—one that is a science of no branch of study, but a science of itself and of the other sciences.So we are.And it is a strange thing, if it really exists? For we should not affirm as yet that it does not exist, but should still consider whether it does exist.
+You are right.Well now, this science is a science of something, that is, it has a certain faculty whereby it can be a science of something, has it not?Certainly.For, you know, we say the greater has a certain faculty whereby it can be greater than something? At this point Socrates adduces the relation of greater to smaller (tino\s ei)=nai mei=zon) to suggest a difficulty in conceiving a science to be a science of itself: in so doing he draws a false analogy between two quite different uses of the genitive in Greek, represented in English by the comparative “than” and the objective “of.”Quite so.That is, than something smaller, if it is to be greater.Necessarily.So if we could find a greater which is greater than other greater things, and than itself, but not greater than the things
+beside which the others are greater, I take it there can be no doubt that it would be in the situation of being, if greater than itself, at the same time smaller than itself, would it not?Most inevitably, Socrates, he said.Or again, if there is a double of other doubles and of itself, both it and the others must of course be halves, if it is to be their double; for, you know, a double cannot be “of” anything else than its half.True.And what is more than itself will also be less, and the heavier will be lighter, and the older
+younger, and so on with everything else: whatever has its own faculty applied to itself will have also the natural quality to which its faculty was applicable, will it not? For instance, hearing is, as we say, just a hearing of sound, is it not?Yes.So if it is to hear itself, it will hear a sound of its own; for it would not hear otherwise.Most inevitably.And sight, I suppose, my excellent friend, if it is to see itself, must needs have a color; for sight
+can never see what is colorless.No more it can.Then do you perceive, Critias, in the various cases we have propounded, how some of them strike us as absolutely impossible, while others raise serious doubts as to the faculty of the thing being ever applicable to itself? For with magnitudes, numbers, and the like it is absolutely impossible, is it not?Certainly.But again, with hearing and sight, or in the further bases of motion moving itself and heat burning itself, and all other
+actions of the sort, the fact must appear incredible to some, but perhaps not to others. So what we want, my friend, is some great man who will determine to our satisfaction in every respect whether there is nothing in nature so constituted as to have its own faculty applicable to itself, and not only some other object, or whether there are some such, and others not such; and whether, again, if there are things that have such relation to themselves, they include a science which we assert to be temperance. For my part, I distrust my own competence to determine these questions, and hence I am neither able to affirm whether it is possible
+that there should be a science of science, nor willing, let it be ever so true, to acknowledge this to be temperance until I have made out whether such a thing as this would benefit us or not. For, you see, I have a presentiment that temperance is something beneficial and good; and you, therefore, son of Callaeschrus—since you lay it down that temperance is this very science of science, and moreover of the lack of science—shall first indicate the possibility, as I put it just now, and then the benefit added to the possibility, of such a thing;
+and perhaps you will then satisfy me that your definition of temperance is correct.Now when Critias heard this and saw me in a difficulty, he seemed to me—just as the sight of someone yawning opposite causes people to be affected in the same way—to be compelled by the sense of my difficulty to be caught in a difficulty himself. And so, since he usually contrived to distinguish himself, he was too ashamed to bring himself to admit to me before the company that he was unable to determine the questions
+with which I challenged him, and he made a very indistinct reply in order to conceal his difficulty. Then I, to forward the discussion, remarked: Well, if you prefer, Critias, let us concede for the moment that there may possibly be a science of science : some other time we shall consider whether such is the fact or not. Come then; suppose it is perfectly possible: how is one helped thereby to know what one knows and does not know? For this, you are aware, we said Plat. Charm. 167a. was the meaning of self-knowledge and temperance, did we not?Certainly, he said; and it must surely follow, Socrates;
+for if a man has a science which knows itself, he will be similar himself to that which he has. For instance, he who has swiftness will be swift, he who has beauty will be beautiful, and he who has knowledge will know; and when he has knowledge that is of itself, he will then, surely, be in the position of knowing himself.I do not dispute, I said, that when a man has that which knows itself he will know himself; but having that, how is he bound to know what he knows and what he does not know?
+Because, Socrates, the two things are the same.I daresay, I said; but I am afraid I am still my old self: I still do not see how knowing what one knows and does not know is the same as the other.How do you mean? he asked.In this way, I replied: will a science of science, if such exists, be able to do more than determine that one of two things is science, and the other is not science?No, only that.
+Now, is science or lack of science of health the same as science or lack of science of justice?By no means.For the one, I suppose, is medicine, and the other politics, while the thing in question is merely science.Yes, to be sure.And if a man has no added knowledge of health and justice, but knows only science, as having science of that alone, he will probably know that he has a certain piece of scientific knowledge about himself and about other people, will he not?Yes.
+But how will this science help him to know what he knows? For of course he knows health by means of medicine, not temperance, and harmony by means of music, not temperance, and building by means of the builder's art, not temperance; and so it will be in every case, will it not?Apparently.And how will temperance, supposing it is only a science of sciences, help him to know that he knows health, or that he knows building?By no means.Then he who is ignorant of all this will not know what he knows, but only that he knows.So it seems.
+Then being temperate, or temperance, will not be this knowledge of what one knows or does not know, but, it would seem, merely knowing that one knows or does not know.It looks like it.Then such a person will also be unable to examine another man's claim to some knowledge, and make out whether he knows or does not know what he says he knows: he will merely know, it would seem, that he has a certain knowledge; but of what it is, temperance will not cause him to know.Apparently not.
+So he will be able to distinguish neither the man who pretends to be a doctor, but is none, from the man who really is one, nor any other man who has knowledge from him who has none. But let us consider it another way: if the temperate man or anybody else would discriminate between the true doctor and the false, he will go to work thus, will he not? He will surely not talk to him about medicine; for, as we were saying, the doctor understands nothing else but health and disease. Is not that so?Yes, it is.But about science he knows nothing, for that, you know, we assigned to temperance alone.Yes.So the medical man knows nothing about medicine either, since
+medicine is, of course, a science.True.Then the temperate man will know, indeed, that the doctor has a certain science; but when he has to put its nature to the proof, must he not consider what its subjects are? Is not each science marked out, not merely as a science, but as a particular one, by the particular subjects it has?It is, to be sure.And medicine is marked out as different from the other sciences by being a science of health and disease.Yes.And so anyone who wishes to inquire into medicine
+must make those things, whatever they may be, with which it is concerned, the matter of his inquiry; not those foreign things, I presume, with which it is not?No, indeed.Then he who conducts his inquiry aright will consider the doctor, as a medical man, in connection with cases of health and disease.So it seems.And will inquire whether, in what is said or done in such cases, his words are truly spoken, and his acts rightly done?He must.Well now, could anyone follow up either of these points without the medical art?No, indeed.
+Nobody at all, it would seem, but a doctor; and so not the temperate man either: for he would have to be a doctor, in addition to his temperance.That is so.Then inevitably, if temperance is only a science of science and of lack of science, it will be equally unable to distinguish a doctor who knows the business of his art from one who does not know but pretends or thinks he does, and any other person who has knowledge of anything at all: one will only distinguish one's fellow-artist, as craftsmen usually can.Apparently, he said.
+Then what benefit, I asked, Critias, can we still look for from temperance, if it is like that? For if, as we began by assuming, the temperate man knew what he knew and what he did not know, and that he knows the one and does not know the other, and if he were able to observe this same condition in bother man, it would be vastly to our benefit, we agree, to be temperate; since we should pass all our lives, both we who had temperance and all the rest who were governed by us,
+without error. For neither should we ourselves attempt to do what we did not know, instead of finding out those who knew and placing the matter in their hands, nor should we permit others under our governance to do anything but what they were likely to do aright; and they would do that when they had knowledge of it; and so it would be that a house which was ordered, or a state which was administered, as temperance bade, and everything else
+that was ruled by temperance, could not but be well ordered; for with error abolished, and rightness leading, in their every action men would be bound to do honorably and well under such conditions, and those who did well would be happy. Did we not so speak of temperance, I said, Critias, when we remarked how great a boon it was to know what one knows and what one does not know?To be sure we did, he replied.Whereas now, I went on, you see that nowhere can any such science be found.I see, he said.
+Then may we say, I asked, that there is this good point in the knowledge of knowledge and of lack of knowledge, which we now find to be what temperance is, that he who has it will not only learn more easily whatever he learns, but will perceive everything more plainly, since besides the particular things that he learns he will behold the science; and hence he will probe more surely the state of other men respecting the things which he has learnt himself, while those who probe without such knowledge will do it more feebly and poorly? Are these, my friend, the kind of advantages that we shall gain
+from temperance? But are we really looking at something greater, and requiring it to be something greater than it really is?Probably, he replied, that is so.I daresay, I said; and I daresay also our inquiry has been worthless. And this I conclude, because I observe certain strange facts about temperance, if it is anything like that. For suppose, if you please, we concede that there may possibly be a science of science, and let us grant, and not withdraw, our original proposition that temperance is the knowledge of what one knows and does not know;
+granting all this, let us still more thoroughly inquire whether on these terms it will be of any profit to us. For our suggestion just now, that temperance of that sort, as our guide in ordering house or state, must be a great boon, was not, to my thinking, Critias, a proper admission.How so? he asked.Because, I replied, we too tightly admitted that it would be a great boon to mankind if each of us should do what he knows, but should place what he did not know in the hands of others who had the knowledge.
+Well, was that, he asked, not a proper admission?Not to my mind, I answered.In very truth, your words are strange! he said, Socrates.Yes, by the Dog, I said, and they strike me too in the same way; and it was in view of this, just now, that I spoke of strange results that I noticed, and said I feared we were not inquiring rightly. For in truth, let temperance be ever so much what we say it is, I see nothing
+to show what good effect it has on us.How so? he asked: tell us, in order that we on our side may know what you mean.I expect, I said, I am talking nonsense: but still one is bound to consider what occurs to one, and not idly ignore it, if one has even a little concern for oneself.And you are quite right, he said.Hear then, I said, my dream, whether it has come through horn or through ivory. Cf. Hom. Od. 19.562ff. Dreams are there described as issuing: dreams that come true are from the gate of horn; deceitful dreams are from the gate of ivory. Suppose that temperance were such as we now define her,
+and that she had entire control of us: must it not be that every act would be done according to the sciences, and no one professing to be a pilot when he was not would deceive us, nor would a doctor, nor a general, nor anyone else pretending to know something he did not know, go undetected; and would not these conditions result in our having greater bodily health than we have now, safety in perils of the sea and war, and skilful workmanship in all our utensils, our clothes,
+our shoes, nay, everything about us, and various things besides, because we should be employing genuine craftsmen? And if you liked, we might concede that prophecy, as the knowledge of what is to be, and temperance directing her, will deter the charlatans, and establish the true prophets as our prognosticators. Thus equipped, the human race would indeed act and live
+according to knowledge, I grant you (for temperance, on the watch, would not suffer ignorance to foist herself in and take a hand in our labors), but that by acting according to knowledge we should do well and be happy—this is a point which as yet we are unable to make out, my dear Critias.But still, he replied, you will have some difficulty in finding any other fulfillment of welfare if you reject the rule of knowledge.Then inform me further, I said, on one more little matter. Of what is this knowledge? Do you mean of shoe-making?
+Good heavens, not I!Well, of working in brass?By no means.Well, in wool, or in wood, or in something else of that sort?No, indeed.Then we no longer hold, I said, to the statement that he who lives according to knowledge is happy; for these workers, though they live according to knowledge, are not acknowledged by you to be happy: you rather delimit the happy man, it seems to me, as one who lives according to knowledge about certain things. And I daresay you are referring to my instance of a moment ago, the man who knows
+all that is to come, the prophet. Do you refer to him or to someone else?Yes, I refer to him, he said, and someone else too.Whom? I asked. Is it the sort of person who might know, besides what is to be, both everything that has been and now is, and might be ignorant of nothing? Let us suppose such a man exists: you are not going to tell me, I am sure, of anyone alive who is yet more knowing than he.No, indeed.Then there is still one more thing I would fain know: which of the sciences is it that makes him happy? Or does he owe it to all of them alike?
+By no means to all alike, he replied.But to which sort most? One that gives him knowledge of what thing, present, past or future? Is it that by which he knows draught-playing?Draught-playing indeed! he replied.Well, reckoning?By no means.Well, health?More likely, he said.And that science to which I refer as the most likely, I went on, gives him knowledge of what?Of good, he replied, and of evil.Vile creature! I said, you have all this time been dragging me round and round, while concealing the fact that the life according to knowledge does not make us do well and be happy, not even
+if it be knowledge of all the other knowledges together, but only if it is of this single one concerning good and evil. For, Critias, if you choose to take away this science from the whole number of them, will medicine any the less give us health, or shoemaking give us shoes, or weaving provide clothes, or will the pilot's art any the less prevent the loss of life at sea, or the general's in war?None the less, he replied.But, my dear Critias, to have any of these things well
+and beneficially done will be out of our reach if that science is lacking.That is true.And that science, it seems, is not temperance, but one whose business is to benefit us; for it is not a science of sciences and lack of sciences, but of good and evil: so that if this is beneficial, temperance must be something else to us.But why, he asked, should not it be beneficial? For if temperance is above all a science of the sciences,
+and presides too over the other sciences, surely she will govern this science of the good, and so benefit us.And give us health also? I asked: will she, and not medicine, do this? And will the several works of the other arts be hers, and not the particular works of each art? Have we not constantly protested that she is only knowledge of knowledge and of lack of knowledge, and of nothing else? Is not that so?Apparently it is.Then she will not be a producer of health?No, indeed.
+For health, we said, belongs to another art, did we not?We did.Nor of benefit, my good friend; for this work, again, we assigned to another art just now, did we not?Certainly.Then how will temperance be beneficial, if it produces no benefit?By no means, Socrates, as it seems.So do you see, Critias, how all the time I had good reason for my fear, and fair ground for the reproach I made against myself, that my inquiry regarding temperance was worthless? Cf. Plat. Charm. 172c. For I cannot think that what is admitted to be the noblest thing in the world
+would have appeared to us useless if I had been of any use for making a good search. But now, you see, we are worsted every way, and cannot discover what thing it can possibly be to which the lawgiver gave this name, temperance. And yet we have conceded many points which were not deducible from our argument. For you know we conceded that there was a science of science, when the argument was against it and would not agree; and we further conceded that
+this science could know the works also of the other sciences, when the argument was against this too, in order to make out that the temperate man had a knowledge of what he knew and did not know, so as to know that he knew the one and did not know the other. And we made this concession in a really magnificent manner, without considering the impossibility of a man knowing, in some sort of way, things that he does not know at all; for our admission says that he knows that he does not know them; and yet, in my opinion, there can be nothing more irrational than this. Nevertheless, although it has found us so simple-minded
+and tractable, the inquiry remains quite incapable of discovering the truth, but has utterly flouted it by most impudently showing us the inutility of that which we had been ever so long assuming, by our joint admissions and fictions, to be the meaning of temperance. Now, so far as I am concerned, I am not particularly distressed: but for your sake, I said, Charmides, I am seriously distressed to think that you, with your goodly form and
+most temperate soul besides, are to have no profit or advantage from the presence of that temperance in all your life. And I am still more distressed about the charm which I learnt from the Thracian, Cf. Plat. Charm. 156d. that I should have spent so much pains on a lesson which has had such a worthless effect. Now I really do not think that this can be the case, but rather that I am a poor hand at inquiring; for temperance I hold to be a great good, and you to be highly blessed,
+if you actually have it. See now whether you have it, and are in no need of the charm; for if it is yours, I should rather advise you to regard me as a babbler who is unable to argue out any subject of inquiry whatsoever, and yourself as advancing in happiness as you advance in temperance.Then Charmides said: Why, upon my word, Socrates, I do not know at all whether I have it or have it not. For how can I know, when even you two are unable
+to discover what this thing is?—so you say, but of this you do not at all convince me—and I quite believe, Socrates, that I do need the charm, and for my part I have no objection to being charmed by you every day of my life, until you say I have had enough of the treatment.Very well, said Critias: now, Charmides, if you do this, it will be a proof to me of your temperance—if you submit to be charmed by Socrates and do not forsake him through thick and thin.Count on me to follow, he said, and not forsake him;
+for it would ill become me to disobey you, my guardian, and refuse to do your bidding.Well now, he said, I bid you.Then I will do as you say, he replied, and will start this very day.There, there, I said, what are you two plotting to do?Nothing, replied Charmides; we have made our plot.So you will use force, I said, before even allowing me to make my affidavit?You must expect me to use force, he replied, since he gives me the command: take counsel, therefore, on your side, as to what you will do
+But that leaves no room, I said, for counsel; for if once you set about doing anything and use force, no man alive will be able to withstand you.Then do not you, he said, withstand me.Then I will not withstand you, I replied.
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--- a/data/tlg0059/tlg018/tlg0059.tlg018.perseus-grc1.xml
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--- a/data/tlg0059/tlg019/tlg0059.tlg019.perseus-eng1.xml
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@@ -68,120 +68,120 @@
LysimachusMelesiasNiciasLachesSons of Lysimachus and MelesiasSocrates
-Lysimachus
You have seen the performance of the man fighting in armour, Nicias and Laches; but my friend Melesias and I did not tell you at the time our reason for requesting you to come and see it with us. However, we will tell you now; for we think we should speak our minds freely to friends like you. Some people, of course, pour ridicule on such appeals, and when consulted for their advice will not say what they think,
-but something different, making the inquirer's wishes their aim, and speaking against their own judgement. But you, we consider, not merely have the necessary discernment but will give us the benefit of it in telling us just what is in your minds and hence we have enlisted your counsel on the question which we are about to lay before you. Now the matter about which I have made all this long preamble is this:
-we have two sons here, my friend that one, called Thucydides after his grandfather, and I this one; he also is named in the same way, after my father; we call him Aristeides. Well, we have resolved to give them our most constant care, and not—as most fathers do when their boys begin to be young men MEIRA/KIONapplied to youths from 15 to 21.—let them run loose as their fancy leads them, but begin forthwith taking
-every possible care of them. Now, knowing that you too have sons, we thought that you above all men must have concerned yourselves with the question of the kind of upbringing that would make the best of them; and if by any chance you have not given your attention to the subject, we would remind you that it ought not to be neglected, and we invite you to join us in arranging some way of taking care of our sons. How we formed this resolve, Nicias and Laches, is worth hearing, even though the story be somewhat long. My friend Melesias and I take our meals together,
-and our boys share our table. Now, as I said at the beginning of my remarks, we are going to speak quite freely to you. Each of us has many noble deeds of his own father to relate to these young fellows—their numerous achievements both in war and in peace, when they were managing the affairs either of the allies or of this city; but neither of us has any deeds of his own to tell. We cannot help feeling ashamed that our boys should observe this, and we blame our fathers
-for leaving us to indulge ourselves when we began to be young men, while they looked after other folks' affairs; and we point the moral of it all to these young people, telling them that if they are careless of themselves and will not take our advice they will win no reputation, but if they take due pains they may very likely come to be worthy of the names they bear. Now they, for their part, say they will do as we bid; so we are now considering what lessons or pursuits will lead them to the highest attainable excellence. Someone directed us to this particular accomplishment
-of fighting in armor, as being an admirable one for a young man to learn; and he praised that man whose performance you were just watching, and then urged us to go and see him. So we decided that it would be well to go and see the man ourselves, and to take you along with us not merely as companions at the show, but also as counsellors and copartners, if you will be so good, in the matter of looking after our sons.
-That is the question which we wanted to discuss with you. And we look to you now, on your part, to give us your advice, first as to whether you think this accomplishment should be learnt or not, and then as to any other such art or pursuit that you can recommend for a young man; and also, how you feel inclined as regards our partnership.
Nicias
For myself, Lysimachus and Melesias, I highly approve of your purpose, and am ready to lend a hand and I may say the same, I think, for Laches here.
-
Laches
Yes, you think truly, Nicias. For that remark which Lysimachus made just now about his father and the father of Melesias was very apposite, in my opinion, not only to them but to us and to all who deal with public affairs: it is practically the rule with them, as he says, to treat their private concerns, whether connected with children or any thing else, in a slighting, careless spirit. You are quite right in saying that, Lysimachus;
-but to invite us to be your advisers for the education of your boys, and not to invite Socrates here, is to me very strange, when, to begin with, he is of your district, and then he is always spending his time wherever there is any such excellent study or pursuit for young men as you are seeking.
Lysimachus
How do you mean, Laches? Has Socrates here given his attention to anything of this sort?
Laches
To be sure he has, Lysimachus.
Nicias
I too might perhaps be in as good a position as Laches to inform you about that; for quite recently he introduced to myself
-a music-teacher for my son—Damon, pupil of Agathocles, who is not only the most exquisitely skilled of musicians, but in every other way as profitable a companion as you could wish for young men of that age.
Lysimachus
It is not possible, Socrates, Nicias, and Laches, for men of my years to continue to know our juniors, because old age makes us spend most of our time at home; but if you, son of Sophroniscus, have any good advice for our friend, who belongs to your own district,
-you ought to let him have it. And it is only right that you should: for you happen to be our friend through your father he and I were constant companions and friends, and he died without ever having a single difference with me. And a certain recollection comes back to me on hearing what has just been said: for these boys, in talking with each other at home, frequently mention Socrates in terms of high praise; but I have never asked them whether they meant the son of Sophroniscus.
-Now tell me, my boys, is this the Socrates whose name you have mentioned so often?
Son
To be sure, father, it is he.
Lysimachus
On my soul, Socrates, it is good to know that you keep up your father's name, which was a most honorable one, both on general grounds and particularly because of the intimate relation in which you and we shall equally feel ourselves to be.
Laches
Indeed, Lysimachus, he is a person you must not lose hold of; for I have observed him elsewhere too keeping up not merely his father's
-but his country's name. He accompanied me in the retreat from Delium, On the coast just north of Attica, where the Athenians were severely defeated by the Boeotians in 424 B.C. and I assure you that if the rest had chosen to be like him, our city would be holding up her head and would not then have had such a terrible fall.
Lysimachus
Socrates, this is indeed splendid praise which you are now receiving from men whose word is of great weight, and for such conduct as wins their praise. So let me tell you that I rejoice to hear this and to know you have such a good reputation; and you in return must count me as one of your warmest well-wishers.
-You ought indeed, on your own part, to have visited us before, and treated us on intimate terms, as you have a right to do: now, however, that we have discovered each other, from to-day onwards you must make a point of sharing our thoughts and getting to know us and our young people also, that you and they may in your turn preserve the friendship of our houses. That, however, you will do yourself, and we will remind you of it another time: but what do you say of the matter on which we began to speak? What is your view? Is the accomplishment of fighting in armor a suitable one for our boys to learn or not?
-
Socrates
On that matter, Lysimachus, I will do my best to advise you, so far as I can, and also to do all the rest that you so kindly ask. It seems to me, however, most proper that I, being so much younger and less experienced than you and your friends, should first hear what they have to say, and learn of them; and then, if I have anything else to suggest as against their remarks, I might try to explain it and persuade you and them to take my view. Come, Nicias, let one or other of you speak.
Nicias
There is no difficulty about that, Socrates. For in my opinion
-this accomplishment is in many ways a useful thing for young men to possess. It is good for them, instead of spending their time on the ordinary things to which young men usually give their hours of leisure, to spend it on this, which not only has the necessary effect of improving their bodily health—
-since it is as good and strenuous as any physical exercise—but is also a form of exercise which, with riding, is particularly fitting for a free citizen; for only the men trained in the use of these warlike implements can claim to be trained in the contest whereof we are athletes and in the affairs wherein we are called upon to contend. i.e., in regular warfare. Further, this accomplishment will be of some benefit also in actual battle, when it comes to fighting in line with a number of other men; but its greatest advantage will be felt when the ranks are broken, and you find you must fight man to man, either in pursuing someone who is trying to beat off your attack,
-or in retreating yourself and beating off the attack of another. Whoever possessed this accomplishment could come to no harm so long as he had but one to deal with, nor yet, perhaps, if he had several; it would give him an advantage in any situation. Moreover, it is a thing which impels one to desire another noble accomplishment; for everyone who has learnt how to fight in armor will desire to learn the accomplishment which comes next, the management of troops; and when he has got that and once taken a pride in his work
-he will push on to attain the whole art of generalship. It is evident already that all accomplishments and pursuits in the military sphere are both honourable and valuable to a man, either in acquisition or in practice; and this particular one may well be an introduction to them. And we can make this addition—no slight one—to its claims, that this science will make any man individually a great deal bolder and braver in war. Nor let us disdain to mention, even though some may think it a rather slight matter, that it will give him a smarter appearance in the place
-where a man should look smartest, and where at the same time he will appear more terrible to the enemy because of his smartness. So my opinion is, Lysimachus, as I say, that we ought to teach this skill to our young men, and I have told you my reasons for so thinking. But if Laches has a different view to state, I shall be as glad as anyone to hear it.
Laches
Well, Nicias, I am loth to say of any sort of accomplishment that it ought not to be learnt; for it seems good to know all things. And besides,
-if this skill in arms is an accomplishment, as they say who teach it, and as Nicias terms it, it ought to be learnt; while if it is not an accomplishment, and those who promise to give it are deceiving us, or if it is an accomplishment, but not a very important one, what can be the good of learning it? I speak of it in this way from the following point of view: I conceive that if there were anything in it, it would not have been overlooked by the Lacedaemonians, whose only concern in life is to seek out and practise
-whatever study or pursuit will give them an advantage over others in war. And if they have overlooked it, at any rate these teachers of it cannot have overlooked the obvious fact that the Lacedaemonians are more intent on such matters than any of the Greeks, and that anybody who won honour among them for this art would amass great riches elsewhere, just as a tragic poet does who has won honor among us. And for this reason he who thinks himself a good writer of tragedy
-does not tour round with his show in a circuit of the outlying Attic towns, but makes a straight line for this place and exhibits to our people, as one might expect. But I notice that these fighters in armour regard Lacedaemon as holy ground where none may tread, and do not step on it even with the tips of their toes, but circle round it and prefer to exhibit to any other people, especially to those who would themselves admit that they were inferior to many in the arts of war. Furthermore, Lysimachus, I have come across more than a few of these persons
-in actual operations, and I can see their quality. Indeed, we can estimate it offhand: for, as though it were of set purpose, not one of these experts in arms has ever yet distinguished himself in war. And yet in all the other arts, the men who have made a name are to be found among those who have specially pursued one or other of them; while these persons, apparently, stand out from the rest in this particularly hapless fate of their profession. Why, this man Stesilaus, whom you watched with me in that great crowd as he gave his performance
-and spoke in those high terms of himself before us, I have watched elsewhere giving a finer entertainment in the form of a very real display that he made against his will. The ship on which he was serving struck a transport vessel, and he was using in the fight a combination of a scythe and a spear—a remarkable weapon that suited so remarkable a man. Well, the story of this fellow's doings is hardly of enough interest in the main, but you must hear the upshot of his device of a scythe fixed to a spear.
-As he was fighting, it stuck somehow in the other ship's rigging, and held fast; so Stesilaus pulled at it in the hope of getting it free, but he could not, and the ships were passing by each other. For the first moments he ran along in his ship holding on to his spear; but as the other ship sheered off from his and drew him after, still holding the spear, he let it slip through his hand
-until he gripped the butt-end of the shaft. From the crew of the transport there came laughter and clapping at his posture, and when someone aimed a stone at him which hit the deck near his feet, and he let go the spear, the troops on the warship in their turn could no longer restrain their laughter, as they saw the notable scythe-spear dangling from the transport. Now, there may perhaps be something in this art of theirs, as Nicias argues, but at any rate that is my impression of it, in the cases I have met with. Hence, as I said at the beginning,
-whether it be an accomplishment, and one of but little use, or not an accomplishment, but only supposed and pretended to be such, it is not worth the trouble of learning it. For indeed I hold that if a man who was a coward believed that he possessed it, his only gain would be in rashness, which would make his true nature the more conspicuous; while if he were brave, people would be on the look-out for even the slightest mistake on his part, and he would incur much grievous slander; for the pretension to such skill
-arouses jealousy, so that unless a man be prodigiously superior to the rest in valor he cannot by any means escape being made a laughing-stock through professing to be so skilled. Such is my opinion, Lysimachus, of the interest taken in this accomplishment; but do as I told you at the beginning; you are not to let our friend Socrates go, but must request him to advise us according to his judgement on the matter in hand.
Lysimachus
Well, I ask it of you, Socrates: for indeed our members of council, as it were, seem to me to need
-someone who will decide between them. Had these two agreed, we should not have required this help so much; but as it is—for Laches, you see, has voted on the opposite side to Nicias—it is as well that we should hear your view and see on which side you cast your vote.
Socrates
What, Lysimachus? Are you going to join the side which gets the approval of the majority of us?
Lysimachus
Why, what can one do, Socrates?
Socrates
And you too, Melesias, would do the same?
-Suppose you had a consultation as to what your son's exercise should be for a coming contest, would you be guided by the majority of us, or by the one who happened to have trained and exercised under a good master?
Melesias
By the latter, naturally, Socrates.
Socrates
Would you be guided by him alone rather than the four of us?
Melesias
Very likely.
Socrates
Yes, for a question must be decided by knowledge, and not by numbers, if it is to have a right decision.
Melesias
To be sure.
Socrates
Then in this case also we must first consider, in particular,
-whether anyone among us has expert skill in the subject of our consultation, or not; and if here is one who has, we must be guided by him, though he be but one, and pass over the rest; while if there is not, we must look for somebody else. Or do you think it a slight matter that you and Lysimachus have now at stake, and not that which is really your greatest possession? For I take it that according as the sons turn out well or the opposite will the whole life of their father's house be affected, depending for better or worse on their character.
Melesias
Truly spoken.
Socrates
So it demands much forethought from us.
Melesias
Certainly.
-
Socrates
How then—to take the case I suggested just now—should we set to work if we wanted to consider which of us was the most expert in regard to a contest? Should we not pick him who had learnt and practised, and had also had good teachers of this particular skill?
Melesias
I think so.
Socrates
And even before that, we should ask what was this skill of which we are looking for the teachers?
Melesias
How do you mean?
Socrates
Perhaps it will be more easily grasped in this form. I think we have not started with an agreement between us as to what the thing is about which we are consulting, in this question of who among us is an expert and to this end has resorted to teachers,
-and who not.
Nicias
Why, Socrates, is it not fighting in armor that we are considering, and whether it is a thing to be learnt by young men or not?
Socrates
Of course, Nicias; but when someone considers whether a medicine is to be used as an eyesalve or not, do you think that this consultation is about the medicine or about the eyes?
Nicias
About the eyes.
-
Socrates
And when one considers whether a horse is to be bridled or not, and at what time, I presume one takes counsel about the horse, and not about the bridle?
Nicias
True.
Socrates
And in a word, when one considers a thing for any purpose, the consulting is in fact about the end one had in view to start with, and not about the means to be used for such end.
Nicias
Necessarily.
Socrates
So we must consider our adviser too, and ask ourselves whether he is a skilled expert in the treatment required for the end which is the subject of our consideration.
Nicias
Certainly.
Socrates
And we say that our present subject is an accomplishment studied
-for the sake of young men's souls?
Nicias
Yes.
Socrates
So what we have to consider is whether one of us is skilled in treatment of the soul, and is able to treat it rightly, and which of us has had good teachers.
Laches
But I say, Socrates, have you never noticed how some people have become more skilled in certain things without teachers than others with them?
Socrates
Yes, I have, Laches; people, that is, whom you would not care to trust on their mere statement that they were good practitioners, unless they could put forward some example of their personal skill—some work well carried out—
-not in one only, but several cases.
Laches
That is truly spoken.
Socrates
We also, therefore, Laches and Nicias—since Lysimachus and Melesias have invited us to a consultation on their sons, whose souls they are anxious to have as good as possible—should bring to their notice what teachers we have had, if we say that we have any to mention, who being themselves good to begin with, and having treated the souls of many young people,
-taught us also in due course and are known to have done so. Or if any of ourselves says he has had no teacher, but has however some works of his own to speak of, and can point out to us what Athenians or strangers, either slaves or freemen, are acknowledged to owe their goodness to him, let him do so. But if there is nothing of the sort to be found amongst us, let us bid them look elsewhere; for we cannot run a risk with our good friends' children where we may ruin them, and so bring upon us the most grievous of accusations from our nearest and dearest. Now I, Lysimachus and Melesias, am the first to avow
-that I have had no teacher in this respect; and yet I have longed for such lessons from my youth up. But I have not the means to pay fees to the sophists, who were the only persons that professed to be able to make me a complete gentleman; and to this moment I remain powerless to discover the art myself. But I should not be surprised if Nicias or Laches has discovered or learnt it: for they have more means at their command to enable them to learn from others, and they are also older, and have had time to discover it. Indeed, I regard them as able to educate a man;
-for they would never declare their minds so freely on pursuits that are beneficial or harmful to a youth unless they felt confident that they had the requisite knowledge. And I have entire confidence in them myself, except that I wondered at their differing from each other. I therefore make this counter-request of you, Lysimachus: just as Laches urged you a moment ago not to release me but to ask me questions, so I now call upon you not to release Laches or Nicias, but to question them in these terms: “Socrates says
-that he has no understanding of the matter, and that he is not competent to decide which of your statements is true; that he has never been either a discoverer or a learner of anything of the sort. But you, Laches and Nicias, are each to tell us who is the cleverest person you have heard on the upbringing of youth; whether you have knowledge of it by learning from someone or by discovering it yourselves; and if you learnt it, who were your teachers respectively, and
-what other colleagues they had: in order that, if you are not at leisure through the demands of public business, we may go to them and induce them either with gifts or good turns or with both to undertake the care of our and your children together, and so prevent them from turning out knaves and disgracing their ancestors. But if you have made the grand discovery yourselves, give us an instance to show what other persons you have succeeded in changing, by your care of them, from knaves to honest gentlemen. For if you are now going to make your first attempt at educating,
-you must beware lest you try your experiment, not on a “corpus vile”, Lit. “on the Carian slave.” but on your sons and the children of your friends, and you prove to be a mere case, as the proverbial saying has it, of starting pottery on a wine-jar. i.e., on a large instead of small piece of work, in which a beginner's mistake would be less costly. Cf. Gorg. 514 E. So tell us what you claim, or do not claim, as your resources and acquirements in this kind.” There, Lysimachus, demand that from these good persons, and do not let them off.
-
Lysimachus
To my mind, good sirs, these remarks of Socrates are excellent: but it is for you, Nicias and Laches, to decide for yourselves whether it suits you to be questioned and offer some explanation on such points. For I and Melesias here would certainly be delighted if you would consent to expound in detail all that Socrates puts to you in his questions: as I began by saying at the outset, we invited you to consult with us just because we thought, very naturally, that you had given serious consideration to this kind of thing, especially as your boys,
-like ours, are almost of an age to be educated. Accordingly, if it is all the same to you, discuss it now by joint inquiry with Socrates, exchanging view's with him in turn: for it is a particularly good remark of his that we are consulting now about the greatest of all our concerns. Come, see if you consider that this is the proper course to take.
Nicias
Lysimachus, it looks to me, in very truth, as though you only knew Socrates at second hand—
-through his father—and had not conversed with him personally except in his childhood, when you may have chanced to meet him among the people of his district, accompanying his father at the temple or at some local gathering. But you have evidently not yet had to do with him since he has reached maturer years.
Lysimachus
How are you so sure of that, Nicias?
Nicias
You strike me as not being aware that, whoever comes into close contact with Socrates and has any talk with him face to face, is bound to be drawn round and round by him in the course of the argument—though it may have started at first on a quite different theme—and cannot stop until he is led into giving an account of himself, of the manner in which
-he now spends his days, and of the kind of life he has lived hitherto; and when once he has been led into that, Socrates will never let him go until he has thoroughly and properly put all his ways to the test. Now I am accustomed to him, and so I know that one is bound to be thus treated by him, and further, that I myself shall certainly get the same treatment also. For I delight, Lysimachus, in conversing with the man, and see no harm in our being reminded of
-any past or present misdoing: nay, one must needs take more careful thought for the rest of one's life, if one does not fly from his words but is willing, as Solon said,I grow old learning ever more and more;Solon Fr. 10GHRA/SKW D' AI)EI\ POLLA\ DIDASKO/MENOS. See below, 189a. and zealous to learn as long as one lives, and does not expect to get good sense by the mere arrival of old age. So to me there is nothing unusual, or unpleasant either, in being tried and tested by Socrates; in fact, I knew pretty well all the time that our argument would not be about the boys if Socrates were present, but about ourselves.
-Let me therefore repeat that there is no objection on my part to holding a debate with Socrates after the fashion that he likes; but you must see how Laches here feels on the matter.
Laches
I have but a single mind, Laches plays with the two meaning of A(PLOU=N—“I am single-minded (simple, straightforward) in such matters, that is, I should rather say, double-minded.” Nicias, in regard to discussions, or if you like, a double rather than a single one. For you might think me a lover, and yet also a hater, of discussions: for when I hear a man discussing virtue or any kind of wisdom, one who is truly a man and worthy of his argument, I am exceedingly delighted;
-I take the speaker and his speech together, and observe how they sort and harmonize with each other. Such a man is exactly what I understand by “musical,”—he has tuned himself with the fairest harmony, not that of a lyre or other entertaining instrument, but has made a true concord of his own life between his words and his deeds, not in the Ionian, no, nor in the Phrygian nor in the Lydian, but simply in the Dorian mode, The different modes or scales in Greek music were associated with different moral feelings. The Dorian was most favored, as having a manly, stately character: the Ionian was more passionate and contentious. The Phrygian and Lydian were foreign modes, on the character of which there were various opinions. Cf. Rep. 398-99 which is the sole Hellenic harmony. Such a man makes me rejoice
-with his utterance, and anyone would judge me then a lover of discussion, so eagerly do I take in what he says: but a man who shows the opposite character gives me pain, and the better he seems to speak, the more I am pained, with the result, in this case, that I am judged a hater of discussion. Now of Socrates' words I have no experience, but formerly, I fancy, I have made trial of his deeds; and there I found him living up to any fine words however freely spoken.
-So if he has that gift as well, his wish is mine, and I should be very glad to be cross-examined by such a man, and should not chafe at learning; but I too agree with Solon, while adding just one word to his saying: I should like, as I grow old, to learn more and more, but only from honest folk. Let him concede to me that my teacher is himself good—else I shall dislike my lessons and be judged a dunce—but if you say that my teacher is to be a younger man,
- or one who so far has no reputation, or anything of that sort, I care not a jot. I therefore invite you, Socrates, both to teach and to refute me as much as you please, and to learn too what I on my part know; such is the position you hold in my eyes since that day on which you came through the same danger with me, This instance of Socrates' intrepidity (at Delium cf. above, 181b) is more fully described by Alcibiades in Plat. Sym. 221. and gave a proof of your own valour which is to be expected of anyone who hopes to justify his good name. So say whatever you like, leaving out of account
-the difference of our ages.
Socrates
You two, it seems, will give us no bound for complaint on the score of your not being ready to join both in advising and in inquiring.
Lysimachus
No, but the matter now rests with us, Socrates; for I venture to count you as one of us. So take my place in inquiring on behalf of the young men make out what it is that we want our friends here to tell us, and be our adviser by discussing it with them. For I find that owing to my age I forget the questions I intend to put, and also the answers I receive; and if the discussion changes in the middle, my memory goes altogether. Do you therefore discuss and elucidate our problem
-among yourselves; and I will listen, and then with my friend Melesias I will act at once upon whatever may be your decision.
Socrates
Let us do, Nicias and Laches, as Lysimachus and Melesias bid us. Now the questions that we attempted to consider a while ago—“Who have been our teachers in this sort of training? What other persons have we made better?”—are perhaps of a kind on which we might well examine ourselves:
-but I believe this other way of inquiring leads to the same thing, and will probably also start more from the beginning. For if we happen to know of such and such a thing that by being joined to another thing it makes this thing better, and further, if we are able to get the one joined to the other, we obviously know the thing itself on which we might be consulting as to how it might be best and most easily acquired. Now I daresay you do not grasp my meaning. Well, you will grasp it more easily in this way. If we happen to know
-that sight joined to eyes makes those eyes the better for it, and further if we are able to get it joined to eyes, we obviously know what this faculty of sight is, on which we might be consulting as to how it might be best and most easily acquired. For if we did not know first of all what sight or hearing is, we should hardly prove ourselves consultants or physicians of credit in the matter of eyes or ears, and the best way
-of acquiring sight or hearing.
Laches
Truly spoken, Socrates.
Socrates
And you know, Laches, at this moment our two friends are inviting us to a consultation as to the way in which virtue may be joined to their sons' souls, and so make them better?
Laches
Yes, indeed,
Socrates
Then our first requisite is to know what virtue Here, and in what follows, “virtue” embraces the accomplishments and excellences of a good citizen. is? For surely, if we had no idea at all what virtue actually is, we could not possibly consult
-with anyone as to how he might best acquire it?
Laches
I certainly think not, Socrates.
Socrates
Then we say, Laches, that we know what it is.
Laches
I suppose we must.
Socrates
And of that which we know, I presume, we can also say what it is.
Laches
To be sure.
Socrates
Let us not, therefore, my good friend, inquire forthwith about the whole of virtue, since that may well be too much for us; but let us first see ifwe are sufficiently provided with knowledge about some part of it.
-In all likelihood this will make our inquiry easier.
Laches
Yes, let us do as you propose, Socrates.
Socrates
Then which of the parts of virtue shall we choose? Clearly, I think, that which the art of fighting in armor is supposed to promote; and that, of course, is generally supposed to be courage, is it not?
Laches
Yes, it generally is, to be sure.
Socrates
Then let our first endeavor be, Laches, to say what courage is: after that we can proceed to inquire in what way our young men may obtain it,
-in so far as it is to be obtained by means of pursuits and studies. Come, try and tell me, as I suggest, what is courage.
Laches
On my word, Socrates, that is nothing difficult: anyone who is willing to stay at his post and face the enemy, and does not run away, you may be sure, is courageous.
Socrates
Rightly spoken, Laches; but I fear I am to blame, by not putting it clearly, for your having answered not the intention of my question, but something else.
Laches
What do you mean by that, Socrates?
-
Socrates
I will explain, so far as I can: let us take that man to be courageous who, as you describe him yourself, stays at his post and fights the enemy.
Laches
I, for one, agree to that.
Socrates
Yes, and I do too. But what of this other kind of man, who fights the enemy while fleeing, and not staying?
Laches
How fleeing?
Socrates
Well, as the Scythians are said to fight, as much fleeing as pursuing; and as you know Homer says in praise of Aeneas' horses, that they knew “how to pursue and to flee in fright full swiftly this way and that way;”Hom. Il. 8.107-108
- and he glorifies Aeneas himself for this very knowledge of fright, calling him “prompter of fright.”Hom. Il. 8.107-108Socrates pretends to take the hero's epithet “prompter of fright” (in the enemy) as meaning that he prompted fright in himself and his side, and so know all about the feeling.
Laches
And very properly too, Socrates; for he was speaking of chariots; and so are you speaking of the mode of the Scythian horsemen. That is the way of cavalry fighting but with men-at-arms it is as I state it. i.e., they stand fast at their posts in the ranks (above, 191 A).
Socrates
Except, perhaps, Laches, in the case of the Spartans.
-For they say that at Plataea, when the Spartans came up to the men with wicker shields, they were not willing to stand and fight against these, but fled; when, however, the Persian ranks weree broken, the Spartans kept turning round and fighting like cavalry, and so won that great battle. In the final struggle at Plataea (479 B.C.) the Spartans at first hesitated before the barrier of wicker shields opposed to them by the Persians; but by a supreme effort they broke through and defeated the Persians by turning on them in man-to-man combat. Cf. Herod. ix. 61-2.
Laches
What you say is true.
Socrates
And so this is what I meant just now by sayng that I was to blame for your wrong answer, by putting my question wrongly.
-For I wanted to have your view not only of brave men-at-arms, but also of courage in cavalry and in the entire warrior class; and of the courageous not only in war but in the perils of the sea, and all who in disease and poverty, or again in public affairs, are courageous; and further, all who are not merely courageous against pain or fear, but doughty fighters against desires and pleasures,
-whether standing their ground or turning back upon the foe—for I take it, Laches, there are courageous people in all these kinds.
Laches
Very much so, Socrates.
Socrates
Then all these are courageous, only some have acquired courage in pleasures, some in pains, some in desires and some in fears, while others, I conceive, have acquired cowardice in these same things.
Laches
To be sure.
Socrates
What either of them i.e., courage and cowardice is—that is what I wanted to know. So try again, and tell me first what is this thing, courage, which is the same in all of these cases; or do you still not comprehend my meaning?
Laches
Not very well.
-
Socrates
I mean in this way: suppose, for instance, I were asking you what is quickness, as we find it in running and harping, in speaking and learning, and in many other activities, and as possessed by us practically in any action worth mentioning, whether of arms or legs, or mouth or voice, or mind: or do you not use the word so?
Laches
Yes, to be sure.
Socrates
Well then, suppose someone asked me: Socrates, what do you mean by this thing which in all cases you term quickness?
-My reply would be: The faculty that gets a great deal done in a little time is what I call quickness, whether in a voice or in a race or in any of the other instances.
Laches
Your statement would be quite correct.
Socrates
So now try and tell me on your part, Laches, about courage in the same way: what faculty is it, the same whether in pleasure or in pain or in any of the things in which we said just now it was to be found, that has been singled out by the name of courage?
Laches
Well then, I take it to be a certain endurance of the soul, if I am to speak of the natural quality that appears in them all.
-
Socrates
Why, of course we must, if we are each to answer the other's actual question. Now it appears to me that by no means all endurance, as I conceive it, can appear to you to be courage. And my grounds for thinking so are these: I am almost certain, Laches, that you rank courage among the nobler qualities.
Laches
Nay, among the noblest, you may be quite certain.
Socrates
And endurance joined with wisdom is noble and good?
Laches
Very much so.
-
Socrates
But what of it when joined with folly? Is it not, on the contrary, hurtful and mischievous?
Laches
Yes.
Socrates
And can you say that such a thing is noble, when it is both mischievous and hurtful?
Laches
Not with any justice, Socrates.
Socrates
Then you will not admit that such an endurance is courage, seeing that it is not noble, whereas courage is a noble quality.
Laches
That is true.
Socrates
So, by your account, wise endurance will be courage.
Laches
Apparently.
-
Socrates
Now let us see in what it is wise. In all things, whether great or small? For instance, if a man endures in spending money wisely, because he knows that by spending he will gain more, would you call him courageous?
Laches
On my word, not I.
Socrates
Or what do you call it in the case of a doctor who, when his son or anyone else is suffering from inflammation of the lungs and begs for something to drink or eat, inflexibly and enduringly refuses?
-
Laches
That is no case of it, in any sense, either.
Socrates
Well now, when a man endures in war, and is willing to fight, on a wise calculation whereby he knows that others will come to his aid, and that the forces against him will be fewer and feebler than those who are with him, and when he has besides the advantage of position,—would you say of this man, if he endures with such wisdom and preparation, that he, or a man in the opposing army who is willing to stand up against him and endure, is the more courageous?
-
Laches
The man opposed to him, I should say, Socrates.
Socrates
But yet his endurance is more foolish than that of the first man.
Laches
That is true.
Socrates
So you would say that he who in a cavalry fight endures with a knowledge of horsemanship is less courageous than he who endures without it.
Laches
Yes, I think so.
-
Socrates
And he who endures with a skill in slinging or shooting or other such art.
Laches
To be sure.
Socrates
And anyone who agrees to descend into a well, and to dive, and to endure in this or other such action, without being an adept in these things, you would say is more courageous than the adepts.
Laches
Yes, for what else can one say, Socrates?
Socrates
Nothing, provided one thinks so.
Laches
But I do think it.
Socrates
And you observe, I suppose, Laches, that persons of this sort are more foolish in their risks and endurances than those who do it with proper skill.
Laches
Evidently.
-
Socrates
Now, we found before that foolish boldness and endurance are base and hurtful?
Laches
Quite so.
Socrates
But courage was admitted to be something noble.
Laches
Yes, it was.
Socrates
Whereas now, on the contrary, we say that this base thing—foolish endurance—is courage.
Laches
Apparently.
Socrates
Then do you think our statement is correct?
Laches
On my word, Socrates, not I.
Socrates
Hence I presume that, on your showing, you and I, Laches,
-are not tuned to the Dorian harmony: for our deeds do not accord with our words. By our deeds, most likely, the world might judge us to have our share of courage, but not by our words, I fancy, if they should hear the way we are talking now.
Laches
That is very true.
Socrates
Well now, does it seem right that we should be in such a condition?
Laches
Not by any means.
Socrates
Then do you mind if we accept our statement to a certain point?
Laches
To what point do you mean, and what statement?
-
Socrates
That which enjoins endurance. And, if you please, let us too be steadfast and enduring in our inquiry, so as not to be ridiculed by courage herself for failing to be courageous in our search for her, when we might perchance find after all that this very endurance is courage.
Laches
For my part I am ready, Socrates, to continue without faltering; and yet I am unaccustomed to discussions of this sort. But a certain ambitious ardour has got hold of me at hearing what has been said,
-and I am truly vexed at finding myself unable to express offhand what I think. For I feel that I conceive in thought what courage is, but somehow or other she has given me the slip for the moment, so that I fail to lay hold of her in speech and state what she is.
Socrates
Well, my dear sir, the good huntsman must follow the hounds and not give up the chase.
Laches
Yes, indeed, by all means.
Socrates
Then do you agree to our inviting Nicias here to join in our hunt? He may be more resourceful than we are.
-
Laches
I agree, of course.
Socrates
Come now, Nicias, and use what powers you have to assist your friends, who are caught in a storm of argument and are quite perplexed. You see the perplexity of our case; you must now tell us what you think courage is, and so at once set us free from our perplexity and give your own thoughts the stability of speech.
Nicias
Well, for some time I have been thinking, Socrates, that you two are not defining courage in the right way; for you are not acting upon an admirable remark which I have formerly heard you make.
Socrates
What is that, Nicias?
-
Nicias
I have often heard you say that every man is good in that wherein he is wise, and bad in that wherein he is unlearned.
Socrates
Well, that is true, Nicias, I must say.
Nicias
And hence, if the brave man is good, clearly he must be wise.
Socrates
Do you hear him, Laches?
Laches
I do, without understanding very well what he says.
Socrates
But I think I understand it: our friend appears to me to mean that courage is a kind of wisdom.
Laches
What kind of wisdom, Socrates?
-
Socrates
Well, will you put that question to your friend here?
Laches
I do.
Socrates
Come now, tell him, Nicias, what kind of wisdom courage may be, by your account. Not that, I presume, of flute-playing.
Nicias
Not at all.
Socrates
Nor yet that of harping.
Nicias
Oh, no.
Socrates
But what is this knowledge then, or of what?
Laches
I must say you question him quite correctly, Socrates, so let him just tell us what he thinks it is.
Nicias
I say, Laches, that it is this—the knowledge of what is to be dreaded or dared,
-either in war or in anything else.
Laches
How strangely he talks, Socrates!
Socrates
What is it that makes you say that, Laches?
Laches
What is it? Why, surely wisdom is distinct from courage.
Socrates
Well, Nicias denies that.
Laches
He does indeed, to be sure: that is where he just babbles.
Socrates
Then let us instruct and not abuse him.
Nicias
No, it seems to me, Socrates, that Laches wants to have it proved that I am talking nonsense, because he was proved
-a moment ago to be in the same case himself.
Laches
Quite so, Nicias, and I will try to make it evident. You are talking nonsense: for instance, do not doctors know what is to be dreaded in disease? Or do you suppose that the courageous know this? Or do you call doctors courageous
Nicias
No, not at all.
Laches
Nor, I fancy, farmers either. And yet they, I presume, know what is to be dreaded in farming, and every other skilled worker knows what is to be dreaded and dared in his own craft; but they are none the more
-courageous for that.
Socrates
What is Laches saying, in your opinion, Nicias? There does seem to be something in it.
Nicias
Yes, there is something, only it is not true.
Socrates
How so?
Nicias
Because he thinks that doctors know something more, in treating sick persons, than how to tell what is healthy and what diseased. This, I imagine, is all that they know: but to tell whether health itself is to be dreaded by anyone rather than sickness, —do you suppose, Laches, that this is within a doctor's knowledge? Do you not think that for many it is better
-that they should never arise from their bed of sickness? Pray tell me, do you say that in every case it is better to live? Is it not often preferable to be dead?
Laches
I do think that is so.
Nicias
And do you think that the same things are to be dreaded by those who were better dead, as by those who had better live?
Laches
No, I do not.
Nicias
Well, do you attribute the judgement of this matter to doctors or to any other skilled worker except him who has knowledge of what is to be dreaded and what is not—the man whom I call courageous?
Socrates
Do you comprehend his meaning, Laches?
-
Laches
I do: it seems to be the seers whom he calls the courageous: for who else can know for which of us it is better to be alive than dead? And yet, Nicias, do you avow yourself to be a seer, or to be neither a seer nor courageous?
Nicias
What! Is it now a seer, think you, who has the gift of judging what is to be dreaded and what to be dared?
Laches
That is my view: who else could it be?
Nicias
Much rather the man of whom I speak, my dear sir: for the seer's business is to judge only the signs of what is yet to come—whether a man is to meet with death or disease or loss of property,
-or victory or defeat in war or some other contest; but what is better among these things for a man to suffer or avoid suffering, can surely be no more for a seer to decide than for anyone else in the world.
Laches
Well, I fail to follow him, Socrates, or to see what he is driving at; for he points out that neither a seer nor a doctor nor anybody else is the man he refers to as the courageous, unless perchance he means it is some god. Now it appears to me
-that Nicias is unwilling to admit honestly that he has no meaning at all, but dodges this way and that in the hope of concealing his own perplexity. Why, you and I could have dodged in the same way just now, if we wished to avoid the appearance of contradicting ourselves. Of course, if we were arguing in a law-court, there would be some reason for so doing; but here, in a meeting like this of ours, why waste time in adorning oneself with empty words?
Socrates
I agree that it is out of place, Laches: but let us see:
-perhaps Nicias thinks he does mean something, and is not talking just for the sake of talking. So let us ask him to explain more clearly what is in his mind; and if we find that he means something, we will agree with him; if not, we will instruct him.
Laches
Then, Socrates, if you would like to ask him, please do so: I daresay I have done enough asking.
Socrates
Well, I see no objection, since the question will be on behalf of us both.
Laches
Very well, then.
Socrates
Now tell me, Nicias, or rather, tell us—for Laches and I are sharing the argument between us—do you say that courage is knowledge
-of what is to be dreaded or dared?
Nicias
I do.
Socrates
And that it is not every man that knows it, since neither a doctor nor a seer can know it, and cannot be courageous unless he add this particular knowledge to his own? This was your statement, was it not?
Nicias
Yes, it was.
Socrates
And so in fact this is not a thing which, as the proverb says, “any pig would know”; and thus a pig cannot be courageous.
Nicias
I think not.
-
Socrates
Indeed it is obvious, Nicias, that you at least do not believe that even the Crommyonian sow The fierce moster slain by Theseus in the region between Corinth and Megara before he became the hero of Attica. could have been courageous. I say this not in jest, but because I conceive it is necessary for him who states this theory to refuse courage to any wild beast, or else to admit that a beast like a lion or a leopard or even a boar is so wise as to know what only a few men know because it is so hard to perceive. Why, he who subscribes to your account of courage must needs agree that a lion, a stag, a bull, and a monkey have all an equal share of courage in their nature.
-
Laches
Heavens, Socrates, how admirably you argue! Now answer us sincerely, Nicias, and say whether those animals, which we all admit to be courageous, are wiser than we are; or whether you dare, in contradiction of everyone else, describe them as not even courageous.
Nicias
No, Laches, I do not describe animals, or anything else that from thoughtlessness has no fear of the dreadful, as courageous, but rather as fearless and foolish. Or do you suppose I describe all children
-as courageous, that have no fear because they are thoughtless? I rather hold that the fearless and the courageous are not the same thing. In my opinion very few people are endowed with courage and forethought, while rashness, boldness, and fearlessness, with no forethought to guide it, are found in a great number of men, women, children, and animals. So you see, the acts that you and most people call courageous, I call rash, and it is the prudent acts
-which I speak of that are courageous.
Laches
Mark you, Socrates, how finely, as he fancies, my friend decks himself out with his words! And how he attempts to deprive of the distinction of courage those whom everyone admits to be courageous!
Nicias
I am not referring to you, Laches, so do not be fiightened: for I grant that you, and Lamachus also, are wise, since you are courageous, and I say the same of numerous other Athenians.
Laches
I will not say what I could say in answer to that, lest you call me a true son of Aexone. A deme or district of Attica, noted for the abusive wit of its people.
-
Socrates
No, say nothing, Laches: for in fact you seem to me to have failed to perceive that he has acquired his wisdom from Damon, our good friend; and Damon constantly associates with Prodicus, who is supposed to be the cleverest of the sophists at distinguishing terms like these.
Laches
Yes, for it is more suitable, Socrates, for a sophist to make a show of such refinements than for a man whom the State thinks worthy to govern her.
-
Socrates
Indeed it is suitable, I presume, my amiable friend, for a man in the highest seat of government to be gifted with the highest degree of wisdom. But it seems to me that Nicias is worthy of further attention, so that we may learn in what connexion he uses this word “courage.”
Laches
Then attend to him yourself, Socrates.
Socrates
That is what I propose to do, my good sir: still, you are not to think that I will release you from your due share of the argument. No, you must put your mind to it and join in weighing well what is said.
Laches
Well, so be it, if you think that I ought.
Socrates
Indeed I do. Now, Nicias, please go back to the beginning Cf. 190 c. and answer us:
-you know we started our discussion by considering courage as a part of virtue?
Nicias
Quite so.
Socrates
And you joined in this answer,—that it is a part, there being also other parts, which taken all together have received the name of virtue.
Nicias
Why, of course.
Socrates
Now, do you mean the same as I do by these? Besides courage, I refer to temperance, justice, and other similar qualities. And you also, do you not?
-
Nicias
Certainly I do.
Socrates
So much for that; thus far we agree: but let us pass on to what is to be dreaded and what to be dared, and make sure that you and we do not take two different views of these. Let me tell you our view of them, and if you do not agree with it, you shall instruct us. We hold that the dreadful are things that cause fear, and the safely ventured are those that do not; and fear is caused not by past or present, but by expected evils: for fear is expectation of coming evil. You are of the same mind with us in this, are you not, Laches?
-
Laches
Yes, entirely so, Socrates.
Socrates
So there you have our view, Nicias,—that coming evils are to be dreaded, and things not evil, or good things, that are to come are to be safely dared. Would you describe them in this way, or in some other?
Nicias
I would describe them in this way.
Socrates
And the knowledge of these things is what you term courage?
Nicias
Precisely.
Socrates
There is still a third point on which we must see if you are in agreement with us.
-
Nicias
What point is that?
Socrates
I will tell you. It seems to your friend and me that, to take the various subjects of knowledge, there is not one knowledge of how a thing has happened in the past, another of how things are happening in the present, and another of how a thing that has not yet happened might or will happen most favorably in the future, but it is the same knowledge throughout. For example, in the case of health, it is medicine always and alone that surveys present, past, and future processes alike;
-and farming is in the same position as regards the productions of the earth. And in matters of war; I am sure you yourselves will bear me out when I say that here generalship makes the best forecasts on the whole, and particularly of future results, and is the mistress rather than the servant of the seer's art, because it knows better what is happening or about to happen
-in the operations of war; whence the law ordains that the general shall give orders to the seer, and not the seer to the general. May we say this, Laches?
Laches
We may.
Socrates
Well now, do you agree with us, Nicias, that the same knowledge has comprehension of the same things, whether future, present, or past?
Nicias
I do, for that is my own opinion, Socrates.
Socrates
And courage, my good friend, is knowledge of
-what is to be dreaded and dared, as you say, do you not?
Nicias
Yes.
Socrates
And things to be dreaded and things to be dared have been admitted to be either future goods or future evils?
Nicias
Certainly.
Socrates
And the same knowledge is concerned with the same things, whether in the future or in any particular stage?
Nicias
That is so.
Socrates
Then courage is knowledge not merely of what is to be dreaded and what dared, for it comprehends goods and evils not merely in the future, but also in the present
-and the past and in any stage, like the other kinds of knowledge.
Nicias
Apparently.
Socrates
So the answer that you gave us, Nicias, covers only about a third part of courage; whereas our question was of what courage is as a whole. And now it appears, on your own showing, that courage is knowledge not merely of what is to be dreaded and what dared, but practically a knowledge concerning all goods and evils at every stage;
-such is your present account of what courage must be. What do you say to this new version, Nicias?
Nicias
I accept it, Socrates.
Socrates
Now do you think, my excellent friend, there could be anything wanting to the virtue of a man who knew all good things, and all about their production in the present, the future, and the past, and all about evil things likewise? Do you suppose that such a man could be lacking in temperance, or justice, and holiness, when he alone has the gift of taking due precaution, in his dealings with gods and men,
-as regards what is to be dreaded and what is not, and of procuring good things, owing to his knowledge of the right behaviour towards them?
Nicias
I think, Socrates, there is something in what you say.
Socrates
Hence what you now describe, Nicias, will be not a part but the whole of virtue.
Nicias
Apparently.
Socrates
But, you know, we said that courage is one of the parts of virtue.
Nicias
Yes, we did.
Socrates
And what we now describe is seen to be different.
Nicias
So it seems.
Socrates
Thus we have failed to discover, Nicias, what courage really is.
Nicias
Evidently.
Laches
And I, in fact, supposed, my dear Nicias, that you were going to discover it,
-when you showed such contempt for the answers I made to Socrates: indeed I had very great hopes that the wisdom you derived from Damon would avail you for the discovery.
Nicias
That is all very fine, Laches; you think you can now make light of the fact that you were yourself shown just now to know nothing about courage; when my turn comes to be shown up in the same light, that is all you care, and now it will not matter to you at all, it seems, if I share your ignorance of things whereof any self-respecting man ought to have knowledge. You really strike me, indeed,
-as following the average man's practice of keeping an eye on others rather than on oneself: but I fancy that for the present I have said as much as could be expected on the subject of our discussion, and that later on I must make good any defects in my statement upon it with the help of Damon—whom I know you choose to ridicule, and that without ever having seen the actual Damon—and with others' help besides. And when I have settled the matter I will enlighten you, in no grudging spirit:
-for I think you are in very great need of instruction.
Laches
You are a man of wisdom, I know, Nicias. But still I advise Lysimachus here and Melesias to dismiss you and me, and to retain our friend Socrates as I said at first, for the education of your boys: were my own sons old enough, I should do the same thing too.
Nicias
For my part I agree; if Socrates will consent to take charge of these young people, I will seek for no one else.
-I should be only too glad to entrust him with Niceratus, if he should consent: but when I begin to mention the matter to him, he always recommends other men to me and refuses himself. Just see, Lysimachus, if Socrates will give you a more favorable hearing.
Lysimachus
It is only right that he should, Nicias, for indeed I would be willing to do many things for him which I would not do for a great many others. Well, what do you say, Socrates? Will you comply, and lend your endeavours for the highest improvement of these boys?
-
Socrates
Why, how strange it would be, Lysimachus, to refuse to lend one's endeavours for the highest improvement of anybody! Now if in the debates that we have just held I had been found to know what our two friends did not know, it would be right to make a point of inviting me to take up this work: but as it is, we have all got into the same difficulty, so why should one of us be preferred to another? In my own opinion, none of us should; and this being so,
-perhaps you will allow me to give you a piece of advice. I tell you, gentlemen—and this is confidential—that we ought all alike to seek out the best teacher we can find, first for ourselves—for we need one—and then for our boys, sparing neither expense nor anything else we can do: but to leave ourselves as we now are, this I do not advise. And if anyone makes fun of us for seeing fit
- to go to school at our time of life, I think we should appeal to Homer, who said that “shame is no good mate for a needy man.”Hom. Od. 17.347 So let us not mind what anyone may say, but join together in arraging for our own and the boys' tuition.
Lysimachus
I gladly approve of your suggestions, Socrates; and as I am the oldest, so I am the most eager to have lessons with the young ones. Now this is what I ask you to do:
-come to my house tomorrow at daybreak; be sure not to fail, and then we shall consult on this very matter. For the present, let us break up our meeting.
Socrates
I will not fail, Lysimachus, to come to you tomorrow, God willing.
+Lysimachus
You have seen the performance of the man fighting in armour, Nicias and Laches; but my friend Melesias and I did not tell you at the time our reason for requesting you to come and see it with us. However, we will tell you now; for we think we should speak our minds freely to friends like you. Some people, of course, pour ridicule on such appeals, and when consulted for their advice will not say what they think,
+but something different, making the inquirer’s wishes their aim, and speaking against their own judgement. But you, we consider, not merely have the necessary discernment but will give us the benefit of it in telling us just what is in your minds and hence we have enlisted your counsel on the question which we are about to lay before you. Now the matter about which I have made all this long preamble is this:
+we have two sons here, my friend that one, called Thucydides after his grandfather, and I this one; he also is named in the same way, after my father; we call him Aristeides. Well, we have resolved to give them our most constant care, and not—as most fathers do when their boys begin to be young men MEIRA/KIONapplied to youths from 15 to 21.—let them run loose as their fancy leads them, but begin forthwith taking
+every possible care of them. Now, knowing that you too have sons, we thought that you above all men must have concerned yourselves with the question of the kind of upbringing that would make the best of them; and if by any chance you have not given your attention to the subject, we would remind you that it ought not to be neglected, and we invite you to join us in arranging some way of taking care of our sons. How we formed this resolve, Nicias and Laches, is worth hearing, even though the story be somewhat long. My friend Melesias and I take our meals together,
+and our boys share our table. Now, as I said at the beginning of my remarks, we are going to speak quite freely to you. Each of us has many noble deeds of his own father to relate to these young fellows—their numerous achievements both in war and in peace, when they were managing the affairs either of the allies or of this city; but neither of us has any deeds of his own to tell. We cannot help feeling ashamed that our boys should observe this, and we blame our fathers
+for leaving us to indulge ourselves when we began to be young men, while they looked after other folks’ affairs; and we point the moral of it all to these young people, telling them that if they are careless of themselves and will not take our advice they will win no reputation, but if they take due pains they may very likely come to be worthy of the names they bear. Now they, for their part, say they will do as we bid; so we are now considering what lessons or pursuits will lead them to the highest attainable excellence. Someone directed us to this particular accomplishment
+of fighting in armor, as being an admirable one for a young man to learn; and he praised that man whose performance you were just watching, and then urged us to go and see him. So we decided that it would be well to go and see the man ourselves, and to take you along with us not merely as companions at the show, but also as counsellors and copartners, if you will be so good, in the matter of looking after our sons.
+That is the question which we wanted to discuss with you. And we look to you now, on your part, to give us your advice, first as to whether you think this accomplishment should be learnt or not, and then as to any other such art or pursuit that you can recommend for a young man; and also, how you feel inclined as regards our partnership.
Nicias
For myself, Lysimachus and Melesias, I highly approve of your purpose, and am ready to lend a hand and I may say the same, I think, for Laches here.
+
Laches
Yes, you think truly, Nicias. For that remark which Lysimachus made just now about his father and the father of Melesias was very apposite, in my opinion, not only to them but to us and to all who deal with public affairs: it is practically the rule with them, as he says, to treat their private concerns, whether connected with children or any thing else, in a slighting, careless spirit. You are quite right in saying that, Lysimachus;
+but to invite us to be your advisers for the education of your boys, and not to invite Socrates here, is to me very strange, when, to begin with, he is of your district, and then he is always spending his time wherever there is any such excellent study or pursuit for young men as you are seeking.
Lysimachus
How do you mean, Laches? Has Socrates here given his attention to anything of this sort?
Laches
To be sure he has, Lysimachus.
Nicias
I too might perhaps be in as good a position as Laches to inform you about that; for quite recently he introduced to myself
+a music-teacher for my son—Damon, pupil of Agathocles, who is not only the most exquisitely skilled of musicians, but in every other way as profitable a companion as you could wish for young men of that age.
Lysimachus
It is not possible, Socrates, Nicias, and Laches, for men of my years to continue to know our juniors, because old age makes us spend most of our time at home; but if you, son of Sophroniscus, have any good advice for our friend, who belongs to your own district,
+you ought to let him have it. And it is only right that you should: for you happen to be our friend through your father he and I were constant companions and friends, and he died without ever having a single difference with me. And a certain recollection comes back to me on hearing what has just been said: for these boys, in talking with each other at home, frequently mention Socrates in terms of high praise; but I have never asked them whether they meant the son of Sophroniscus.
+Now tell me, my boys, is this the Socrates whose name you have mentioned so often?
Son
To be sure, father, it is he.
Lysimachus
On my soul, Socrates, it is good to know that you keep up your father’s name, which was a most honorable one, both on general grounds and particularly because of the intimate relation in which you and we shall equally feel ourselves to be.
Laches
Indeed, Lysimachus, he is a person you must not lose hold of; for I have observed him elsewhere too keeping up not merely his father’s
+but his country’s name. He accompanied me in the retreat from Delium, On the coast just north of Attica, where the Athenians were severely defeated by the Boeotians in 424 B.C. and I assure you that if the rest had chosen to be like him, our city would be holding up her head and would not then have had such a terrible fall.
Lysimachus
Socrates, this is indeed splendid praise which you are now receiving from men whose word is of great weight, and for such conduct as wins their praise. So let me tell you that I rejoice to hear this and to know you have such a good reputation; and you in return must count me as one of your warmest well-wishers.
+You ought indeed, on your own part, to have visited us before, and treated us on intimate terms, as you have a right to do: now, however, that we have discovered each other, from to-day onwards you must make a point of sharing our thoughts and getting to know us and our young people also, that you and they may in your turn preserve the friendship of our houses. That, however, you will do yourself, and we will remind you of it another time: but what do you say of the matter on which we began to speak? What is your view? Is the accomplishment of fighting in armor a suitable one for our boys to learn or not?
+
Socrates
On that matter, Lysimachus, I will do my best to advise you, so far as I can, and also to do all the rest that you so kindly ask. It seems to me, however, most proper that I, being so much younger and less experienced than you and your friends, should first hear what they have to say, and learn of them; and then, if I have anything else to suggest as against their remarks, I might try to explain it and persuade you and them to take my view. Come, Nicias, let one or other of you speak.
Nicias
There is no difficulty about that, Socrates. For in my opinion
+this accomplishment is in many ways a useful thing for young men to possess. It is good for them, instead of spending their time on the ordinary things to which young men usually give their hours of leisure, to spend it on this, which not only has the necessary effect of improving their bodily health—
+since it is as good and strenuous as any physical exercise—but is also a form of exercise which, with riding, is particularly fitting for a free citizen; for only the men trained in the use of these warlike implements can claim to be trained in the contest whereof we are athletes and in the affairs wherein we are called upon to contend. i.e., in regular warfare. Further, this accomplishment will be of some benefit also in actual battle, when it comes to fighting in line with a number of other men; but its greatest advantage will be felt when the ranks are broken, and you find you must fight man to man, either in pursuing someone who is trying to beat off your attack,
+or in retreating yourself and beating off the attack of another. Whoever possessed this accomplishment could come to no harm so long as he had but one to deal with, nor yet, perhaps, if he had several; it would give him an advantage in any situation. Moreover, it is a thing which impels one to desire another noble accomplishment; for everyone who has learnt how to fight in armor will desire to learn the accomplishment which comes next, the management of troops; and when he has got that and once taken a pride in his work
+he will push on to attain the whole art of generalship. It is evident already that all accomplishments and pursuits in the military sphere are both honourable and valuable to a man, either in acquisition or in practice; and this particular one may well be an introduction to them. And we can make this addition—no slight one—to its claims, that this science will make any man individually a great deal bolder and braver in war. Nor let us disdain to mention, even though some may think it a rather slight matter, that it will give him a smarter appearance in the place
+where a man should look smartest, and where at the same time he will appear more terrible to the enemy because of his smartness. So my opinion is, Lysimachus, as I say, that we ought to teach this skill to our young men, and I have told you my reasons for so thinking. But if Laches has a different view to state, I shall be as glad as anyone to hear it.
Laches
Well, Nicias, I am loth to say of any sort of accomplishment that it ought not to be learnt; for it seems good to know all things. And besides,
+if this skill in arms is an accomplishment, as they say who teach it, and as Nicias terms it, it ought to be learnt; while if it is not an accomplishment, and those who promise to give it are deceiving us, or if it is an accomplishment, but not a very important one, what can be the good of learning it? I speak of it in this way from the following point of view: I conceive that if there were anything in it, it would not have been overlooked by the Lacedaemonians, whose only concern in life is to seek out and practise
+whatever study or pursuit will give them an advantage over others in war. And if they have overlooked it, at any rate these teachers of it cannot have overlooked the obvious fact that the Lacedaemonians are more intent on such matters than any of the Greeks, and that anybody who won honour among them for this art would amass great riches elsewhere, just as a tragic poet does who has won honor among us. And for this reason he who thinks himself a good writer of tragedy
+does not tour round with his show in a circuit of the outlying Attic towns, but makes a straight line for this place and exhibits to our people, as one might expect. But I notice that these fighters in armour regard Lacedaemon as holy ground where none may tread, and do not step on it even with the tips of their toes, but circle round it and prefer to exhibit to any other people, especially to those who would themselves admit that they were inferior to many in the arts of war. Furthermore, Lysimachus, I have come across more than a few of these persons
+in actual operations, and I can see their quality. Indeed, we can estimate it offhand: for, as though it were of set purpose, not one of these experts in arms has ever yet distinguished himself in war. And yet in all the other arts, the men who have made a name are to be found among those who have specially pursued one or other of them; while these persons, apparently, stand out from the rest in this particularly hapless fate of their profession. Why, this man Stesilaus, whom you watched with me in that great crowd as he gave his performance
+and spoke in those high terms of himself before us, I have watched elsewhere giving a finer entertainment in the form of a very real display that he made against his will. The ship on which he was serving struck a transport vessel, and he was using in the fight a combination of a scythe and a spear—a remarkable weapon that suited so remarkable a man. Well, the story of this fellow’s doings is hardly of enough interest in the main, but you must hear the upshot of his device of a scythe fixed to a spear.
+As he was fighting, it stuck somehow in the other ship’s rigging, and held fast; so Stesilaus pulled at it in the hope of getting it free, but he could not, and the ships were passing by each other. For the first moments he ran along in his ship holding on to his spear; but as the other ship sheered off from his and drew him after, still holding the spear, he let it slip through his hand
+until he gripped the butt-end of the shaft. From the crew of the transport there came laughter and clapping at his posture, and when someone aimed a stone at him which hit the deck near his feet, and he let go the spear, the troops on the warship in their turn could no longer restrain their laughter, as they saw the notable scythe-spear dangling from the transport. Now, there may perhaps be something in this art of theirs, as Nicias argues, but at any rate that is my impression of it, in the cases I have met with. Hence, as I said at the beginning,
+whether it be an accomplishment, and one of but little use, or not an accomplishment, but only supposed and pretended to be such, it is not worth the trouble of learning it. For indeed I hold that if a man who was a coward believed that he possessed it, his only gain would be in rashness, which would make his true nature the more conspicuous; while if he were brave, people would be on the look-out for even the slightest mistake on his part, and he would incur much grievous slander; for the pretension to such skill
+arouses jealousy, so that unless a man be prodigiously superior to the rest in valor he cannot by any means escape being made a laughing-stock through professing to be so skilled. Such is my opinion, Lysimachus, of the interest taken in this accomplishment; but do as I told you at the beginning; you are not to let our friend Socrates go, but must request him to advise us according to his judgement on the matter in hand.
Lysimachus
Well, I ask it of you, Socrates: for indeed our members of council, as it were, seem to me to need
+someone who will decide between them. Had these two agreed, we should not have required this help so much; but as it is—for Laches, you see, has voted on the opposite side to Nicias—it is as well that we should hear your view and see on which side you cast your vote.
Socrates
What, Lysimachus? Are you going to join the side which gets the approval of the majority of us?
Lysimachus
Why, what can one do, Socrates?
Socrates
And you too, Melesias, would do the same?
+Suppose you had a consultation as to what your son’s exercise should be for a coming contest, would you be guided by the majority of us, or by the one who happened to have trained and exercised under a good master?
Melesias
By the latter, naturally, Socrates.
Socrates
Would you be guided by him alone rather than the four of us?
Melesias
Very likely.
Socrates
Yes, for a question must be decided by knowledge, and not by numbers, if it is to have a right decision.
Melesias
To be sure.
Socrates
Then in this case also we must first consider, in particular,
+whether anyone among us has expert skill in the subject of our consultation, or not; and if here is one who has, we must be guided by him, though he be but one, and pass over the rest; while if there is not, we must look for somebody else. Or do you think it a slight matter that you and Lysimachus have now at stake, and not that which is really your greatest possession? For I take it that according as the sons turn out well or the opposite will the whole life of their father’s house be affected, depending for better or worse on their character.
Melesias
Truly spoken.
Socrates
So it demands much forethought from us.
Melesias
Certainly.
+
Socrates
How then—to take the case I suggested just now—should we set to work if we wanted to consider which of us was the most expert in regard to a contest? Should we not pick him who had learnt and practised, and had also had good teachers of this particular skill?
Melesias
I think so.
Socrates
And even before that, we should ask what was this skill of which we are looking for the teachers?
Melesias
How do you mean?
Socrates
Perhaps it will be more easily grasped in this form. I think we have not started with an agreement between us as to what the thing is about which we are consulting, in this question of who among us is an expert and to this end has resorted to teachers,
+and who not.
Nicias
Why, Socrates, is it not fighting in armor that we are considering, and whether it is a thing to be learnt by young men or not?
Socrates
Of course, Nicias; but when someone considers whether a medicine is to be used as an eyesalve or not, do you think that this consultation is about the medicine or about the eyes?
Nicias
About the eyes.
+
Socrates
And when one considers whether a horse is to be bridled or not, and at what time, I presume one takes counsel about the horse, and not about the bridle?
Nicias
True.
Socrates
And in a word, when one considers a thing for any purpose, the consulting is in fact about the end one had in view to start with, and not about the means to be used for such end.
Nicias
Necessarily.
Socrates
So we must consider our adviser too, and ask ourselves whether he is a skilled expert in the treatment required for the end which is the subject of our consideration.
Nicias
Certainly.
Socrates
And we say that our present subject is an accomplishment studied
+for the sake of young men’s souls?
Nicias
Yes.
Socrates
So what we have to consider is whether one of us is skilled in treatment of the soul, and is able to treat it rightly, and which of us has had good teachers.
Laches
But I say, Socrates, have you never noticed how some people have become more skilled in certain things without teachers than others with them?
Socrates
Yes, I have, Laches; people, that is, whom you would not care to trust on their mere statement that they were good practitioners, unless they could put forward some example of their personal skill—some work well carried out—
+not in one only, but several cases.
Laches
That is truly spoken.
Socrates
We also, therefore, Laches and Nicias—since Lysimachus and Melesias have invited us to a consultation on their sons, whose souls they are anxious to have as good as possible—should bring to their notice what teachers we have had, if we say that we have any to mention, who being themselves good to begin with, and having treated the souls of many young people,
+taught us also in due course and are known to have done so. Or if any of ourselves says he has had no teacher, but has however some works of his own to speak of, and can point out to us what Athenians or strangers, either slaves or freemen, are acknowledged to owe their goodness to him, let him do so. But if there is nothing of the sort to be found amongst us, let us bid them look elsewhere; for we cannot run a risk with our good friends’ children where we may ruin them, and so bring upon us the most grievous of accusations from our nearest and dearest. Now I, Lysimachus and Melesias, am the first to avow
+that I have had no teacher in this respect; and yet I have longed for such lessons from my youth up. But I have not the means to pay fees to the sophists, who were the only persons that professed to be able to make me a complete gentleman; and to this moment I remain powerless to discover the art myself. But I should not be surprised if Nicias or Laches has discovered or learnt it: for they have more means at their command to enable them to learn from others, and they are also older, and have had time to discover it. Indeed, I regard them as able to educate a man;
+for they would never declare their minds so freely on pursuits that are beneficial or harmful to a youth unless they felt confident that they had the requisite knowledge. And I have entire confidence in them myself, except that I wondered at their differing from each other. I therefore make this counter-request of you, Lysimachus: just as Laches urged you a moment ago not to release me but to ask me questions, so I now call upon you not to release Laches or Nicias, but to question them in these terms: “Socrates says
+that he has no understanding of the matter, and that he is not competent to decide which of your statements is true; that he has never been either a discoverer or a learner of anything of the sort. But you, Laches and Nicias, are each to tell us who is the cleverest person you have heard on the upbringing of youth; whether you have knowledge of it by learning from someone or by discovering it yourselves; and if you learnt it, who were your teachers respectively, and
+what other colleagues they had: in order that, if you are not at leisure through the demands of public business, we may go to them and induce them either with gifts or good turns or with both to undertake the care of our and your children together, and so prevent them from turning out knaves and disgracing their ancestors. But if you have made the grand discovery yourselves, give us an instance to show what other persons you have succeeded in changing, by your care of them, from knaves to honest gentlemen. For if you are now going to make your first attempt at educating,
+you must beware lest you try your experiment, not on a “corpus vile”, Lit. “on the Carian slave.” but on your sons and the children of your friends, and you prove to be a mere case, as the proverbial saying has it, of starting pottery on a wine-jar. i.e., on a large instead of small piece of work, in which a beginner’s mistake would be less costly. Cf. Gorg. 514 E. So tell us what you claim, or do not claim, as your resources and acquirements in this kind.” There, Lysimachus, demand that from these good persons, and do not let them off.
+
Lysimachus
To my mind, good sirs, these remarks of Socrates are excellent: but it is for you, Nicias and Laches, to decide for yourselves whether it suits you to be questioned and offer some explanation on such points. For I and Melesias here would certainly be delighted if you would consent to expound in detail all that Socrates puts to you in his questions: as I began by saying at the outset, we invited you to consult with us just because we thought, very naturally, that you had given serious consideration to this kind of thing, especially as your boys,
+like ours, are almost of an age to be educated. Accordingly, if it is all the same to you, discuss it now by joint inquiry with Socrates, exchanging view’s with him in turn: for it is a particularly good remark of his that we are consulting now about the greatest of all our concerns. Come, see if you consider that this is the proper course to take.
Nicias
Lysimachus, it looks to me, in very truth, as though you only knew Socrates at second hand—
+through his father—and had not conversed with him personally except in his childhood, when you may have chanced to meet him among the people of his district, accompanying his father at the temple or at some local gathering. But you have evidently not yet had to do with him since he has reached maturer years.
Lysimachus
How are you so sure of that, Nicias?
Nicias
You strike me as not being aware that, whoever comes into close contact with Socrates and has any talk with him face to face, is bound to be drawn round and round by him in the course of the argument—though it may have started at first on a quite different theme—and cannot stop until he is led into giving an account of himself, of the manner in which
+he now spends his days, and of the kind of life he has lived hitherto; and when once he has been led into that, Socrates will never let him go until he has thoroughly and properly put all his ways to the test. Now I am accustomed to him, and so I know that one is bound to be thus treated by him, and further, that I myself shall certainly get the same treatment also. For I delight, Lysimachus, in conversing with the man, and see no harm in our being reminded of
+any past or present misdoing: nay, one must needs take more careful thought for the rest of one’s life, if one does not fly from his words but is willing, as Solon said,I grow old learning ever more and more;Solon Fr. 10GHRA/SKW D’ AI)EI\ POLLA\ DIDASKO/MENOS. See below, 189a. and zealous to learn as long as one lives, and does not expect to get good sense by the mere arrival of old age. So to me there is nothing unusual, or unpleasant either, in being tried and tested by Socrates; in fact, I knew pretty well all the time that our argument would not be about the boys if Socrates were present, but about ourselves.
+Let me therefore repeat that there is no objection on my part to holding a debate with Socrates after the fashion that he likes; but you must see how Laches here feels on the matter.
Laches
I have but a single mind, Laches plays with the two meaning of A(PLOU=N—“I am single-minded (simple, straightforward) in such matters, that is, I should rather say, double-minded.” Nicias, in regard to discussions, or if you like, a double rather than a single one. For you might think me a lover, and yet also a hater, of discussions: for when I hear a man discussing virtue or any kind of wisdom, one who is truly a man and worthy of his argument, I am exceedingly delighted;
+I take the speaker and his speech together, and observe how they sort and harmonize with each other. Such a man is exactly what I understand by “musical,”—he has tuned himself with the fairest harmony, not that of a lyre or other entertaining instrument, but has made a true concord of his own life between his words and his deeds, not in the Ionian, no, nor in the Phrygian nor in the Lydian, but simply in the Dorian mode, The different modes or scales in Greek music were associated with different moral feelings. The Dorian was most favored, as having a manly, stately character: the Ionian was more passionate and contentious. The Phrygian and Lydian were foreign modes, on the character of which there were various opinions. Cf. Rep. 398-99 which is the sole Hellenic harmony. Such a man makes me rejoice
+with his utterance, and anyone would judge me then a lover of discussion, so eagerly do I take in what he says: but a man who shows the opposite character gives me pain, and the better he seems to speak, the more I am pained, with the result, in this case, that I am judged a hater of discussion. Now of Socrates’ words I have no experience, but formerly, I fancy, I have made trial of his deeds; and there I found him living up to any fine words however freely spoken.
+So if he has that gift as well, his wish is mine, and I should be very glad to be cross-examined by such a man, and should not chafe at learning; but I too agree with Solon, while adding just one word to his saying: I should like, as I grow old, to learn more and more, but only from honest folk. Let him concede to me that my teacher is himself good—else I shall dislike my lessons and be judged a dunce—but if you say that my teacher is to be a younger man,
+ or one who so far has no reputation, or anything of that sort, I care not a jot. I therefore invite you, Socrates, both to teach and to refute me as much as you please, and to learn too what I on my part know; such is the position you hold in my eyes since that day on which you came through the same danger with me, This instance of Socrates’ intrepidity (at Delium cf. above, 181b) is more fully described by Alcibiades in Plat. Sym. 221. and gave a proof of your own valour which is to be expected of anyone who hopes to justify his good name. So say whatever you like, leaving out of account
+the difference of our ages.
Socrates
You two, it seems, will give us no bound for complaint on the score of your not being ready to join both in advising and in inquiring.
Lysimachus
No, but the matter now rests with us, Socrates; for I venture to count you as one of us. So take my place in inquiring on behalf of the young men make out what it is that we want our friends here to tell us, and be our adviser by discussing it with them. For I find that owing to my age I forget the questions I intend to put, and also the answers I receive; and if the discussion changes in the middle, my memory goes altogether. Do you therefore discuss and elucidate our problem
+among yourselves; and I will listen, and then with my friend Melesias I will act at once upon whatever may be your decision.
Socrates
Let us do, Nicias and Laches, as Lysimachus and Melesias bid us. Now the questions that we attempted to consider a while ago—“Who have been our teachers in this sort of training? What other persons have we made better?”—are perhaps of a kind on which we might well examine ourselves:
+but I believe this other way of inquiring leads to the same thing, and will probably also start more from the beginning. For if we happen to know of such and such a thing that by being joined to another thing it makes this thing better, and further, if we are able to get the one joined to the other, we obviously know the thing itself on which we might be consulting as to how it might be best and most easily acquired. Now I daresay you do not grasp my meaning. Well, you will grasp it more easily in this way. If we happen to know
+that sight joined to eyes makes those eyes the better for it, and further if we are able to get it joined to eyes, we obviously know what this faculty of sight is, on which we might be consulting as to how it might be best and most easily acquired. For if we did not know first of all what sight or hearing is, we should hardly prove ourselves consultants or physicians of credit in the matter of eyes or ears, and the best way
+of acquiring sight or hearing.
Laches
Truly spoken, Socrates.
Socrates
And you know, Laches, at this moment our two friends are inviting us to a consultation as to the way in which virtue may be joined to their sons’ souls, and so make them better?
Laches
Yes, indeed,
Socrates
Then our first requisite is to know what virtue Here, and in what follows, “virtue” embraces the accomplishments and excellences of a good citizen. is? For surely, if we had no idea at all what virtue actually is, we could not possibly consult
+with anyone as to how he might best acquire it?
Laches
I certainly think not, Socrates.
Socrates
Then we say, Laches, that we know what it is.
Laches
I suppose we must.
Socrates
And of that which we know, I presume, we can also say what it is.
Laches
To be sure.
Socrates
Let us not, therefore, my good friend, inquire forthwith about the whole of virtue, since that may well be too much for us; but let us first see ifwe are sufficiently provided with knowledge about some part of it.
+In all likelihood this will make our inquiry easier.
Laches
Yes, let us do as you propose, Socrates.
Socrates
Then which of the parts of virtue shall we choose? Clearly, I think, that which the art of fighting in armor is supposed to promote; and that, of course, is generally supposed to be courage, is it not?
Laches
Yes, it generally is, to be sure.
Socrates
Then let our first endeavor be, Laches, to say what courage is: after that we can proceed to inquire in what way our young men may obtain it,
+in so far as it is to be obtained by means of pursuits and studies. Come, try and tell me, as I suggest, what is courage.
Laches
On my word, Socrates, that is nothing difficult: anyone who is willing to stay at his post and face the enemy, and does not run away, you may be sure, is courageous.
Socrates
Rightly spoken, Laches; but I fear I am to blame, by not putting it clearly, for your having answered not the intention of my question, but something else.
Laches
What do you mean by that, Socrates?
+
Socrates
I will explain, so far as I can: let us take that man to be courageous who, as you describe him yourself, stays at his post and fights the enemy.
Laches
I, for one, agree to that.
Socrates
Yes, and I do too. But what of this other kind of man, who fights the enemy while fleeing, and not staying?
Laches
How fleeing?
Socrates
Well, as the Scythians are said to fight, as much fleeing as pursuing; and as you know Homer says in praise of Aeneas’ horses, that they knew “how to pursue and to flee in fright full swiftly this way and that way;”Hom. Il. 8.107-108
+ and he glorifies Aeneas himself for this very knowledge of fright, calling him “prompter of fright.”Hom. Il. 8.107-108Socrates pretends to take the hero’s epithet “prompter of fright” (in the enemy) as meaning that he prompted fright in himself and his side, and so know all about the feeling.
Laches
And very properly too, Socrates; for he was speaking of chariots; and so are you speaking of the mode of the Scythian horsemen. That is the way of cavalry fighting but with men-at-arms it is as I state it. i.e., they stand fast at their posts in the ranks (above, 191 A).
Socrates
Except, perhaps, Laches, in the case of the Spartans.
+For they say that at Plataea, when the Spartans came up to the men with wicker shields, they were not willing to stand and fight against these, but fled; when, however, the Persian ranks weree broken, the Spartans kept turning round and fighting like cavalry, and so won that great battle. In the final struggle at Plataea (479 B.C.) the Spartans at first hesitated before the barrier of wicker shields opposed to them by the Persians; but by a supreme effort they broke through and defeated the Persians by turning on them in man-to-man combat. Cf. Herod. ix. 61-2.
Laches
What you say is true.
Socrates
And so this is what I meant just now by sayng that I was to blame for your wrong answer, by putting my question wrongly.
+For I wanted to have your view not only of brave men-at-arms, but also of courage in cavalry and in the entire warrior class; and of the courageous not only in war but in the perils of the sea, and all who in disease and poverty, or again in public affairs, are courageous; and further, all who are not merely courageous against pain or fear, but doughty fighters against desires and pleasures,
+whether standing their ground or turning back upon the foe—for I take it, Laches, there are courageous people in all these kinds.
Laches
Very much so, Socrates.
Socrates
Then all these are courageous, only some have acquired courage in pleasures, some in pains, some in desires and some in fears, while others, I conceive, have acquired cowardice in these same things.
Laches
To be sure.
Socrates
What either of them i.e., courage and cowardice is—that is what I wanted to know. So try again, and tell me first what is this thing, courage, which is the same in all of these cases; or do you still not comprehend my meaning?
Laches
Not very well.
+
Socrates
I mean in this way: suppose, for instance, I were asking you what is quickness, as we find it in running and harping, in speaking and learning, and in many other activities, and as possessed by us practically in any action worth mentioning, whether of arms or legs, or mouth or voice, or mind: or do you not use the word so?
Laches
Yes, to be sure.
Socrates
Well then, suppose someone asked me: Socrates, what do you mean by this thing which in all cases you term quickness?
+My reply would be: The faculty that gets a great deal done in a little time is what I call quickness, whether in a voice or in a race or in any of the other instances.
Laches
Your statement would be quite correct.
Socrates
So now try and tell me on your part, Laches, about courage in the same way: what faculty is it, the same whether in pleasure or in pain or in any of the things in which we said just now it was to be found, that has been singled out by the name of courage?
Laches
Well then, I take it to be a certain endurance of the soul, if I am to speak of the natural quality that appears in them all.
+
Socrates
Why, of course we must, if we are each to answer the other’s actual question. Now it appears to me that by no means all endurance, as I conceive it, can appear to you to be courage. And my grounds for thinking so are these: I am almost certain, Laches, that you rank courage among the nobler qualities.
Laches
Nay, among the noblest, you may be quite certain.
Socrates
And endurance joined with wisdom is noble and good?
Laches
Very much so.
+
Socrates
But what of it when joined with folly? Is it not, on the contrary, hurtful and mischievous?
Laches
Yes.
Socrates
And can you say that such a thing is noble, when it is both mischievous and hurtful?
Laches
Not with any justice, Socrates.
Socrates
Then you will not admit that such an endurance is courage, seeing that it is not noble, whereas courage is a noble quality.
Laches
That is true.
Socrates
So, by your account, wise endurance will be courage.
Laches
Apparently.
+
Socrates
Now let us see in what it is wise. In all things, whether great or small? For instance, if a man endures in spending money wisely, because he knows that by spending he will gain more, would you call him courageous?
Laches
On my word, not I.
Socrates
Or what do you call it in the case of a doctor who, when his son or anyone else is suffering from inflammation of the lungs and begs for something to drink or eat, inflexibly and enduringly refuses?
+
Laches
That is no case of it, in any sense, either.
Socrates
Well now, when a man endures in war, and is willing to fight, on a wise calculation whereby he knows that others will come to his aid, and that the forces against him will be fewer and feebler than those who are with him, and when he has besides the advantage of position,—would you say of this man, if he endures with such wisdom and preparation, that he, or a man in the opposing army who is willing to stand up against him and endure, is the more courageous?
+
Laches
The man opposed to him, I should say, Socrates.
Socrates
But yet his endurance is more foolish than that of the first man.
Laches
That is true.
Socrates
So you would say that he who in a cavalry fight endures with a knowledge of horsemanship is less courageous than he who endures without it.
Laches
Yes, I think so.
+
Socrates
And he who endures with a skill in slinging or shooting or other such art.
Laches
To be sure.
Socrates
And anyone who agrees to descend into a well, and to dive, and to endure in this or other such action, without being an adept in these things, you would say is more courageous than the adepts.
Laches
Yes, for what else can one say, Socrates?
Socrates
Nothing, provided one thinks so.
Laches
But I do think it.
Socrates
And you observe, I suppose, Laches, that persons of this sort are more foolish in their risks and endurances than those who do it with proper skill.
Laches
Evidently.
+
Socrates
Now, we found before that foolish boldness and endurance are base and hurtful?
Laches
Quite so.
Socrates
But courage was admitted to be something noble.
Laches
Yes, it was.
Socrates
Whereas now, on the contrary, we say that this base thing—foolish endurance—is courage.
Laches
Apparently.
Socrates
Then do you think our statement is correct?
Laches
On my word, Socrates, not I.
Socrates
Hence I presume that, on your showing, you and I, Laches,
+are not tuned to the Dorian harmony: for our deeds do not accord with our words. By our deeds, most likely, the world might judge us to have our share of courage, but not by our words, I fancy, if they should hear the way we are talking now.
Laches
That is very true.
Socrates
Well now, does it seem right that we should be in such a condition?
Laches
Not by any means.
Socrates
Then do you mind if we accept our statement to a certain point?
Laches
To what point do you mean, and what statement?
+
Socrates
That which enjoins endurance. And, if you please, let us too be steadfast and enduring in our inquiry, so as not to be ridiculed by courage herself for failing to be courageous in our search for her, when we might perchance find after all that this very endurance is courage.
Laches
For my part I am ready, Socrates, to continue without faltering; and yet I am unaccustomed to discussions of this sort. But a certain ambitious ardour has got hold of me at hearing what has been said,
+and I am truly vexed at finding myself unable to express offhand what I think. For I feel that I conceive in thought what courage is, but somehow or other she has given me the slip for the moment, so that I fail to lay hold of her in speech and state what she is.
Socrates
Well, my dear sir, the good huntsman must follow the hounds and not give up the chase.
Laches
Yes, indeed, by all means.
Socrates
Then do you agree to our inviting Nicias here to join in our hunt? He may be more resourceful than we are.
+
Laches
I agree, of course.
Socrates
Come now, Nicias, and use what powers you have to assist your friends, who are caught in a storm of argument and are quite perplexed. You see the perplexity of our case; you must now tell us what you think courage is, and so at once set us free from our perplexity and give your own thoughts the stability of speech.
Nicias
Well, for some time I have been thinking, Socrates, that you two are not defining courage in the right way; for you are not acting upon an admirable remark which I have formerly heard you make.
Socrates
What is that, Nicias?
+
Nicias
I have often heard you say that every man is good in that wherein he is wise, and bad in that wherein he is unlearned.
Socrates
Well, that is true, Nicias, I must say.
Nicias
And hence, if the brave man is good, clearly he must be wise.
Socrates
Do you hear him, Laches?
Laches
I do, without understanding very well what he says.
Socrates
But I think I understand it: our friend appears to me to mean that courage is a kind of wisdom.
Laches
What kind of wisdom, Socrates?
+
Socrates
Well, will you put that question to your friend here?
Laches
I do.
Socrates
Come now, tell him, Nicias, what kind of wisdom courage may be, by your account. Not that, I presume, of flute-playing.
Nicias
Not at all.
Socrates
Nor yet that of harping.
Nicias
Oh, no.
Socrates
But what is this knowledge then, or of what?
Laches
I must say you question him quite correctly, Socrates, so let him just tell us what he thinks it is.
Nicias
I say, Laches, that it is this—the knowledge of what is to be dreaded or dared,
+either in war or in anything else.
Laches
How strangely he talks, Socrates!
Socrates
What is it that makes you say that, Laches?
Laches
What is it? Why, surely wisdom is distinct from courage.
Socrates
Well, Nicias denies that.
Laches
He does indeed, to be sure: that is where he just babbles.
Socrates
Then let us instruct and not abuse him.
Nicias
No, it seems to me, Socrates, that Laches wants to have it proved that I am talking nonsense, because he was proved
+a moment ago to be in the same case himself.
Laches
Quite so, Nicias, and I will try to make it evident. You are talking nonsense: for instance, do not doctors know what is to be dreaded in disease? Or do you suppose that the courageous know this? Or do you call doctors courageous
Nicias
No, not at all.
Laches
Nor, I fancy, farmers either. And yet they, I presume, know what is to be dreaded in farming, and every other skilled worker knows what is to be dreaded and dared in his own craft; but they are none the more
+courageous for that.
Socrates
What is Laches saying, in your opinion, Nicias? There does seem to be something in it.
Nicias
Yes, there is something, only it is not true.
Socrates
How so?
Nicias
Because he thinks that doctors know something more, in treating sick persons, than how to tell what is healthy and what diseased. This, I imagine, is all that they know: but to tell whether health itself is to be dreaded by anyone rather than sickness, —do you suppose, Laches, that this is within a doctor’s knowledge? Do you not think that for many it is better
+that they should never arise from their bed of sickness? Pray tell me, do you say that in every case it is better to live? Is it not often preferable to be dead?
Laches
I do think that is so.
Nicias
And do you think that the same things are to be dreaded by those who were better dead, as by those who had better live?
Laches
No, I do not.
Nicias
Well, do you attribute the judgement of this matter to doctors or to any other skilled worker except him who has knowledge of what is to be dreaded and what is not—the man whom I call courageous?
Socrates
Do you comprehend his meaning, Laches?
+
Laches
I do: it seems to be the seers whom he calls the courageous: for who else can know for which of us it is better to be alive than dead? And yet, Nicias, do you avow yourself to be a seer, or to be neither a seer nor courageous?
Nicias
What! Is it now a seer, think you, who has the gift of judging what is to be dreaded and what to be dared?
Laches
That is my view: who else could it be?
Nicias
Much rather the man of whom I speak, my dear sir: for the seer’s business is to judge only the signs of what is yet to come—whether a man is to meet with death or disease or loss of property,
+or victory or defeat in war or some other contest; but what is better among these things for a man to suffer or avoid suffering, can surely be no more for a seer to decide than for anyone else in the world.
Laches
Well, I fail to follow him, Socrates, or to see what he is driving at; for he points out that neither a seer nor a doctor nor anybody else is the man he refers to as the courageous, unless perchance he means it is some god. Now it appears to me
+that Nicias is unwilling to admit honestly that he has no meaning at all, but dodges this way and that in the hope of concealing his own perplexity. Why, you and I could have dodged in the same way just now, if we wished to avoid the appearance of contradicting ourselves. Of course, if we were arguing in a law-court, there would be some reason for so doing; but here, in a meeting like this of ours, why waste time in adorning oneself with empty words?
Socrates
I agree that it is out of place, Laches: but let us see:
+perhaps Nicias thinks he does mean something, and is not talking just for the sake of talking. So let us ask him to explain more clearly what is in his mind; and if we find that he means something, we will agree with him; if not, we will instruct him.
Laches
Then, Socrates, if you would like to ask him, please do so: I daresay I have done enough asking.
Socrates
Well, I see no objection, since the question will be on behalf of us both.
Laches
Very well, then.
Socrates
Now tell me, Nicias, or rather, tell us—for Laches and I are sharing the argument between us—do you say that courage is knowledge
+of what is to be dreaded or dared?
Nicias
I do.
Socrates
And that it is not every man that knows it, since neither a doctor nor a seer can know it, and cannot be courageous unless he add this particular knowledge to his own? This was your statement, was it not?
Nicias
Yes, it was.
Socrates
And so in fact this is not a thing which, as the proverb says, “any pig would know”; and thus a pig cannot be courageous.
Nicias
I think not.
+
Socrates
Indeed it is obvious, Nicias, that you at least do not believe that even the Crommyonian sow The fierce moster slain by Theseus in the region between Corinth and Megara before he became the hero of Attica. could have been courageous. I say this not in jest, but because I conceive it is necessary for him who states this theory to refuse courage to any wild beast, or else to admit that a beast like a lion or a leopard or even a boar is so wise as to know what only a few men know because it is so hard to perceive. Why, he who subscribes to your account of courage must needs agree that a lion, a stag, a bull, and a monkey have all an equal share of courage in their nature.
+
Laches
Heavens, Socrates, how admirably you argue! Now answer us sincerely, Nicias, and say whether those animals, which we all admit to be courageous, are wiser than we are; or whether you dare, in contradiction of everyone else, describe them as not even courageous.
Nicias
No, Laches, I do not describe animals, or anything else that from thoughtlessness has no fear of the dreadful, as courageous, but rather as fearless and foolish. Or do you suppose I describe all children
+as courageous, that have no fear because they are thoughtless? I rather hold that the fearless and the courageous are not the same thing. In my opinion very few people are endowed with courage and forethought, while rashness, boldness, and fearlessness, with no forethought to guide it, are found in a great number of men, women, children, and animals. So you see, the acts that you and most people call courageous, I call rash, and it is the prudent acts
+which I speak of that are courageous.
Laches
Mark you, Socrates, how finely, as he fancies, my friend decks himself out with his words! And how he attempts to deprive of the distinction of courage those whom everyone admits to be courageous!
Nicias
I am not referring to you, Laches, so do not be fiightened: for I grant that you, and Lamachus also, are wise, since you are courageous, and I say the same of numerous other Athenians.
Laches
I will not say what I could say in answer to that, lest you call me a true son of Aexone. A deme or district of Attica, noted for the abusive wit of its people.
+
Socrates
No, say nothing, Laches: for in fact you seem to me to have failed to perceive that he has acquired his wisdom from Damon, our good friend; and Damon constantly associates with Prodicus, who is supposed to be the cleverest of the sophists at distinguishing terms like these.
Laches
Yes, for it is more suitable, Socrates, for a sophist to make a show of such refinements than for a man whom the State thinks worthy to govern her.
+
Socrates
Indeed it is suitable, I presume, my amiable friend, for a man in the highest seat of government to be gifted with the highest degree of wisdom. But it seems to me that Nicias is worthy of further attention, so that we may learn in what connexion he uses this word “courage.”
Laches
Then attend to him yourself, Socrates.
Socrates
That is what I propose to do, my good sir: still, you are not to think that I will release you from your due share of the argument. No, you must put your mind to it and join in weighing well what is said.
Laches
Well, so be it, if you think that I ought.
Socrates
Indeed I do. Now, Nicias, please go back to the beginning Cf. 190 c. and answer us:
+you know we started our discussion by considering courage as a part of virtue?
Nicias
Quite so.
Socrates
And you joined in this answer,—that it is a part, there being also other parts, which taken all together have received the name of virtue.
Nicias
Why, of course.
Socrates
Now, do you mean the same as I do by these? Besides courage, I refer to temperance, justice, and other similar qualities. And you also, do you not?
+
Nicias
Certainly I do.
Socrates
So much for that; thus far we agree: but let us pass on to what is to be dreaded and what to be dared, and make sure that you and we do not take two different views of these. Let me tell you our view of them, and if you do not agree with it, you shall instruct us. We hold that the dreadful are things that cause fear, and the safely ventured are those that do not; and fear is caused not by past or present, but by expected evils: for fear is expectation of coming evil. You are of the same mind with us in this, are you not, Laches?
+
Laches
Yes, entirely so, Socrates.
Socrates
So there you have our view, Nicias,—that coming evils are to be dreaded, and things not evil, or good things, that are to come are to be safely dared. Would you describe them in this way, or in some other?
Nicias
I would describe them in this way.
Socrates
And the knowledge of these things is what you term courage?
Nicias
Precisely.
Socrates
There is still a third point on which we must see if you are in agreement with us.
+
Nicias
What point is that?
Socrates
I will tell you. It seems to your friend and me that, to take the various subjects of knowledge, there is not one knowledge of how a thing has happened in the past, another of how things are happening in the present, and another of how a thing that has not yet happened might or will happen most favorably in the future, but it is the same knowledge throughout. For example, in the case of health, it is medicine always and alone that surveys present, past, and future processes alike;
+and farming is in the same position as regards the productions of the earth. And in matters of war; I am sure you yourselves will bear me out when I say that here generalship makes the best forecasts on the whole, and particularly of future results, and is the mistress rather than the servant of the seer’s art, because it knows better what is happening or about to happen
+in the operations of war; whence the law ordains that the general shall give orders to the seer, and not the seer to the general. May we say this, Laches?
Laches
We may.
Socrates
Well now, do you agree with us, Nicias, that the same knowledge has comprehension of the same things, whether future, present, or past?
Nicias
I do, for that is my own opinion, Socrates.
Socrates
And courage, my good friend, is knowledge of
+what is to be dreaded and dared, as you say, do you not?
Nicias
Yes.
Socrates
And things to be dreaded and things to be dared have been admitted to be either future goods or future evils?
Nicias
Certainly.
Socrates
And the same knowledge is concerned with the same things, whether in the future or in any particular stage?
Nicias
That is so.
Socrates
Then courage is knowledge not merely of what is to be dreaded and what dared, for it comprehends goods and evils not merely in the future, but also in the present
+and the past and in any stage, like the other kinds of knowledge.
Nicias
Apparently.
Socrates
So the answer that you gave us, Nicias, covers only about a third part of courage; whereas our question was of what courage is as a whole. And now it appears, on your own showing, that courage is knowledge not merely of what is to be dreaded and what dared, but practically a knowledge concerning all goods and evils at every stage;
+such is your present account of what courage must be. What do you say to this new version, Nicias?
Nicias
I accept it, Socrates.
Socrates
Now do you think, my excellent friend, there could be anything wanting to the virtue of a man who knew all good things, and all about their production in the present, the future, and the past, and all about evil things likewise? Do you suppose that such a man could be lacking in temperance, or justice, and holiness, when he alone has the gift of taking due precaution, in his dealings with gods and men,
+as regards what is to be dreaded and what is not, and of procuring good things, owing to his knowledge of the right behaviour towards them?
Nicias
I think, Socrates, there is something in what you say.
Socrates
Hence what you now describe, Nicias, will be not a part but the whole of virtue.
Nicias
Apparently.
Socrates
But, you know, we said that courage is one of the parts of virtue.
Nicias
Yes, we did.
Socrates
And what we now describe is seen to be different.
Nicias
So it seems.
Socrates
Thus we have failed to discover, Nicias, what courage really is.
Nicias
Evidently.
Laches
And I, in fact, supposed, my dear Nicias, that you were going to discover it,
+when you showed such contempt for the answers I made to Socrates: indeed I had very great hopes that the wisdom you derived from Damon would avail you for the discovery.
Nicias
That is all very fine, Laches; you think you can now make light of the fact that you were yourself shown just now to know nothing about courage; when my turn comes to be shown up in the same light, that is all you care, and now it will not matter to you at all, it seems, if I share your ignorance of things whereof any self-respecting man ought to have knowledge. You really strike me, indeed,
+as following the average man’s practice of keeping an eye on others rather than on oneself: but I fancy that for the present I have said as much as could be expected on the subject of our discussion, and that later on I must make good any defects in my statement upon it with the help of Damon—whom I know you choose to ridicule, and that without ever having seen the actual Damon—and with others’ help besides. And when I have settled the matter I will enlighten you, in no grudging spirit:
+for I think you are in very great need of instruction.
Laches
You are a man of wisdom, I know, Nicias. But still I advise Lysimachus here and Melesias to dismiss you and me, and to retain our friend Socrates as I said at first, for the education of your boys: were my own sons old enough, I should do the same thing too.
Nicias
For my part I agree; if Socrates will consent to take charge of these young people, I will seek for no one else.
+I should be only too glad to entrust him with Niceratus, if he should consent: but when I begin to mention the matter to him, he always recommends other men to me and refuses himself. Just see, Lysimachus, if Socrates will give you a more favorable hearing.
Lysimachus
It is only right that he should, Nicias, for indeed I would be willing to do many things for him which I would not do for a great many others. Well, what do you say, Socrates? Will you comply, and lend your endeavours for the highest improvement of these boys?
+
Socrates
Why, how strange it would be, Lysimachus, to refuse to lend one’s endeavours for the highest improvement of anybody! Now if in the debates that we have just held I had been found to know what our two friends did not know, it would be right to make a point of inviting me to take up this work: but as it is, we have all got into the same difficulty, so why should one of us be preferred to another? In my own opinion, none of us should; and this being so,
+perhaps you will allow me to give you a piece of advice. I tell you, gentlemen—and this is confidential—that we ought all alike to seek out the best teacher we can find, first for ourselves—for we need one—and then for our boys, sparing neither expense nor anything else we can do: but to leave ourselves as we now are, this I do not advise. And if anyone makes fun of us for seeing fit
+ to go to school at our time of life, I think we should appeal to Homer, who said that “shame is no good mate for a needy man.”Hom. Od. 17.347 So let us not mind what anyone may say, but join together in arraging for our own and the boys’ tuition.
Lysimachus
I gladly approve of your suggestions, Socrates; and as I am the oldest, so I am the most eager to have lessons with the young ones. Now this is what I ask you to do:
+come to my house tomorrow at daybreak; be sure not to fail, and then we shall consult on this very matter. For the present, let us break up our meeting.
Socrates
I will not fail, Lysimachus, to come to you tomorrow, God willing.
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SocratesHippothalesCtesippusMenexenusLysis
-Socrates relates a conversation he had in a wrestling-school
I was making my way from the Academy straight to the Lyceum, by the road outside the town wall,—just under the wall; and when I reached the little gate that leads to the spring of Panops, i.e., of Hermes, the “all-seeing” I chanced there upon Hippothales, son of Hieronymus, and Ctesippus of Paeania, and some other youths with them, standing in a group together. Then Hippothales, as he saw me approaching, said: Socrates, whither away, and whence?
- From the Academy, I replied, on my way straight to the Lyceum.Come over here, he said, straight to us. You will not put in here? But you may as well.Where do you mean? I asked; and what is your company?Here, he said, showing me there, just opposite the wall, a sort of enclosure and a door standing open. We pass our time there, he went on; not only we ourselves, but others besides,—a great many, and handsome.
- And what, pray, is this place, and what your pastime?A wrestling school, he said, of recent construction; and our pastime chiefly consists of discussions, in which we should be happy to let you have a share.That is very good of you, I said; and who does the teaching there?Your own comrade, he replied, and supporter, Miccus.Upon my word, I said, he is no slight person, but a qualified professor.Then will you please come in with us, he said, so as to see for yourself the company we have there?
- I should be glad to hear first on what terms I am to enter, and which is the handsome one.Each of us, he replied, has a different fancy, Socrates.Well, and which is yours, Hippothales? Tell me that.At this question he blushed; so I said: Ah, Hippothales, son of Hieronymus, you need not trouble to tell me whether you are in love with somebody or not: for I know you are not only in love, but also far advanced already in your passion. In everything else I may be a poor useless creature,
-but there is one gift that I have somehow from heaven,—to be able to recognize quickly a lover or a beloved.When he heard this, he blushed much more than ever. Then Ctesippus remarked: Quite charming, the way you blush, Hippothales, and shrink from telling Socrates the name; yet, if he spends but a little time with you, he will find you a regular torment, as he hears you repeat it again and again. He has deafened our ears, I can tell you, Socrates, by cramming them with “Lysis”:
-let him be a trifle in liquor, and as likely as not we start out of our sleep fancying we hear the name of Lysis. The descriptions he gives us in conversation, though dreadful enough, are not so very bad: it is when he sets about inundating us with his poems and prose compositions. More dreadful than all, he actually sings about his favorite in an extraordinary voice, which we have the trial of hearing. And now, at a question from you, he blushes!Lysis apparently, I said, is somebody quite young:
-this I infer from the fact that I did not recognize the name when I heard it.That is because they do not usually call him by his name, he replied; he still goes by his paternal title, i.e., “son of Democrates” (see below) as his father is so very well known. You must, I am sure, be anything but ignorant of the boy's appearance: that alone would be enough to know him by.Let me hear, I said, whose son he is.The eldest son, he replied, of Democrates of Aexone.Ah well, I said, Hippothales, what an altogether noble and gallant love you have discovered there! Now please go on and give me a performance like those that you give your friends here,
-so that I may know whether you understand what a lover ought to say of his favorite to his face or to others.Do you attach any weight, Socrates, he asked, to anything you have heard this fellow say?Tell me, I said; do you deny being in love with the person he mentions?Not I, he replied; but I do deny that I make poems and compositions on my favorite.He is in a bad way, said Ctesippus; why, he raves like a madman!Then I remarked: Hippothales, I do not want to hear your verses,
-or any ode that you may have indited to the youth; I only ask for their purport, that I may know your manner of dealing with your favorite.I expect this fellow will tell you, he replied: he has an accurate knowledge and recollection of them, if there is any truth in what he says of my having dinned them so constantly in his ears.Quite so, on my soul, said Ctesippus; and a ridiculous story it is too, Socrates. To be a lover, and to be singularly intent on one's boy, yet to have nothing particular to tell him that a mere boy could not say, is surely ridiculous:
-but he only writes and relates things that the whole city sings of, recalling Democrates and the boy's grandfather Lysis and all his ancestors, with their wealth and the horses they kept, and their victories at Delphi, the Isthmus, and Nemea, The Pythian Games were held at Delphi, the Isthmian near Corinth, and the Nemean at Nemea, between Corinth and Argos. with chariot-teams and coursers, and, in addition, even hoarier antiquities than these. Only two days ago he was recounting to us in some poem of his the entertainment of Hercules,—how on account of his kinship with Hercules their forefather welcomed the hero,
-being himself the offspring of Zeus and of the daughter of their deme's founder; such old wives' tales, and many more of the sort, Socrates,—these are the things he tells and trolls, while compelling us to be his audience.When I heard this I said: Oh, you ridiculous Hippothales, do you compose and chant a triumph song on yourself, before you have won your victory?It is not on myself, Socrates, he replied, that I either compose or chant it.You think not, I said.Then what is the truth of it? he asked.
- Most certainly, I replied, it is you to whom these songs refer. For if you prevail on your favorite, and he is such as you describe, all that you have spoken and sung will be so much glory to you, and a veritable eulogy upon your triumph in having secured such a favorite as that: whereas if he eludes your grasp, the higher the terms of your eulogy of your favorite, the greater will seem to be the charms and virtues you have lost, and you will be ridiculed accordingly. Hence anyone who deals wisely in love-matters,
-my friend, does not praise his beloved until he prevails, for fear of what the future may have in store for him. And besides, these handsome boys, when so praised and extolled, become full of pride and haughtiness: do you not think so?I do, he said.And then, the haughtier they are, the harder grows the task of capturing them?Yes, apparently.And what do you think of a hunter who should scare away his quarry in hunting and make it harder to catch?Clearly he would be a poor one.
- And hence to use speech and song, not for charming but for driving wild, would be gross fatuity, would it not?I think so.Then take care, Hippothales, not to make yourself guilty of all these things by your verse-making; and yet I fancy you will not like to allow that a man who damages himself by poetry can be a good poet, so long as he is damaging to himself.On my soul, no, he said; of course it would be most absurd. But this is the very reason, Socrates, why I impart my feelings to you,
-and ask you for any useful advice you can give as to what conversation or conduct will help to endear one to one's favorite.That is not an easy thing to tell, I replied; but if you will agree to get him to have a talk with me, I daresay I could show you an example of the conversation you should hold with him, instead of those things that your friends say you speak and sing.There is no difficulty about that, he said. If you will go in with Ctesippus here, and take a seat and talk, I think he will come to you of his own accord; he is singularly fond of listening, Socrates,
-and besides, they are keeping the Hermaea, The festival of Hermes, who was specially honored in wrestling schools. so that the youths and boys are all mingled together. So he will come to you but if he does not, Ctesippus is intimate with him, as being a cousin of Menexenus; for Lysis has chosen Menexenus for his particular friend. So let Ctesippus call him if you find that he does not come of himself.That is what I must do, I said. Whereupon I took Ctesippus
-with me into the wrestling school, and the others came after us. When we got inside, we found that the boys had performed the sacrifice in the place and, as the ceremonial business was now almost over, they were all playing at knuckle-bones and wearing their finest attire. Most of them were playing in the court out-of-doors; but some were at a game of odd-and-even in a corner of the undressing room, with a great lot of knuckle-bones which they drew from little baskets; and there were others standing about them and looking on. Among these was Lysis: he stood among the boys
-and youths with a garland on his head, a distinguished figure, deserving not merely the name of well-favored, but also of well-made and well-bred. As for us, we went and sat apart on the opposite side—for it was quiet there—and started some talk amongst ourselves. The result was that Lysis ever and anon turned round to observe us, and was obviously eager to join us. For a while, however, he hesitated, being too shy to approach us alone;
-till Menexenus stepped in for a moment from his game in the court and, on seeing me and Ctesippus, came to take a seat beside us. When Lysis saw him, he came along too and sat down with Menexenus. Then all the others came to us also; and I must add that Hippothales, when he saw a good many of them standing there, stood so as to be screened by them, in a position where he thought Lysis would not catch sight of him, as he feared that he might irritate him; in this way he stood by and listened.Then I, looking at Menexenus, asked him: Son of Demophon, which is the elder of you two?It is a point in dispute between us, he replied.
- Then you must also be at variance, I said, as to which is the nobler.Yes, to be sure, he said.And moreover, which is the more beautiful, likewise.This made them both laugh.But of course I shall not ask, I said, which of you is the wealthier; for you are friends, are you not?Certainly we are, they replied.And, you know, friends are said to have everything in common, so that here at least there will be no difference between you, if what you say of your friendship is true.They agreed.
- After that I was proceeding to ask them which was the juster and wiser of the two, when I was interrupted by somebody who came and fetched away Menexenus, saying that the wrestling-master was calling him: I understood that he was taking some part in the rites. So he went off; and then I asked Lysis: I suppose, Lysis, your father and mother are exceedingly fond of you? Yes, to be sure, he replied. Then they would like you to be as happy as possible?
-Yes, of course. Do you consider that a man is happy when enslaved and restricted from doing everything he desires? Not I, on my word, he said. Then if your father and mother are fond of you, and desire to see you happy, it is perfectly plain that they are anxious to secure your happiness. They must be, of course, he said. Hence they allow you to do what you like, and never scold you, or hinder you from doing what you desire? Yes, they do, Socrates, I assure you: they stop me from doing a great many things. How do you mean? I said: they wish you
-to be happy, and yet hinder you from doing what you like? But answer me this: suppose you desire to ride in one of your father's chariots and hold the reins in some race; they will not allow you, but will prevent you? That is so, to be sure, he said; they will not allow me. But whom would they allow? There is a driver, in my father's pay. What do you say? A hireling, whom they trust rather than you, so that he can do whatever he pleases with the horses; and they pay him besides a salary for doing that!
-Why, of course, he said. Well, but they trust you with the control of the mule-cart, and if you wanted to take the whip and lash the team, they would let you? Nothing of the sort, he said. Why, I asked, is nobody allowed to lash them? Oh yes, he said, the muleteer. Is he a slave, or free? A slave, he replied. So it seems that they value a slave more highly than you, their son, and entrust him rather than you with their property,
-and allow him to do what he likes, while preventing you? And now there is one thing more you must tell me. Do they let you control your own self, or will they not trust you in that either? Of course they do not, he replied. But some one controls you? Yes, he said, my tutor The PAIDAGWGO/S was a trusted slave who was appointed to attend on a boy out of school hours and to have a general control over his conduct and industry. here. Is he a slave? Why, certainly; he belongs to us, he said. What a strange thing, I exclaimed; a free man controlled by a slave! But how does this tutor actually exert his control over you? By taking me to school, I suppose, he replied. And your schoolmasters, can it be that they also control you?
-I should think they do! Then quite a large number of masters and controllers are deliberately set over you by your father. But when you come home to your mother, she surely lets you do what you like, that she may make you happy, either with her wool or her loom, when she is weaving? I take it she does not prevent you from handling her batten, or her comb, or any other of her wool-work implements. At this he laughed and said: I promise you, Socrates, not only does she prevent me, but I should get a beating as well,
-if I laid hands on them. Good heavens! I said; can it be that you have done your father or mother some wrong? On my word, no, he replied.Well, what reason can they have for so strangely preventing you from being happy and doing what you like? Why do they maintain you all day long in constant servitude to somebody, so that, in a word, you do hardly a single thing that you desire? And thus, it would seem, you get no advantage from all your great possessions—
-nay, anyone else controls them rather than you—nor from your own person, though so well-born, which is also shepherded and managed by another; while you, Lysis, control nobody, and do nothing that you desire. It is because I am not yet of age, Socrates, he said. That can hardly be the hindrance, son of Democrates, since there is a certain amount, I imagine, that your father and mother entrust to you without waiting until you come of age. For when they want some reading or writing done for them, it is you,
-I conceive, whom they appoint to do it before any others of the household. Is it not so? Quite so, he replied. And you are free there to choose which letter you shall write first and which second, and you have a like choice in reading. And, I suppose, when you take your lyre, neither your father nor your mother prevents you from tightening or slackening what string you please, or from using your finger or your plectrum at will: or do they prevent you? Oh, no. Then whatever can be the reason, Lysis, why they do not prevent you here,
-while in the matters we were just mentioning they do? I suppose, he said, because I understand these things, but not those others. Very well, I said, my excellent friend: so it is not your coming of age that your father is waiting for, as the time for entrusting you with everything; but on the day when he considers you to have a better intelligence than himself, he will entrust you with himself and all that is his. Yes, I think so, he said. Very well, I went on, but tell me, does not your neighbor observe the same rule as your father towards you? Do you think he will entrust you with the management of his house, as soon as he considers you to have a better idea
-of its management than himself, or will he direct it himself? I should say he would entrust it to me. Well then, do you not think that the Athenians will entrust you with their affairs, when they perceive that you have sufficient intelligence? I do. Ah, do let me ask this, I went on: what, pray, of the Great King? Would he allow his eldest son, heir-apparent to the throne of Asia, to put what he chose into the royal stew,
-or would he prefer us to do it, supposing we came before him and convinced him that we had a better notion than his son of preparing a tasty dish? Clearly he would prefer us, he said. And he would not allow the prince to put in the smallest bit, whereas he would let us have our way even if we wanted to put in salt by the handful. Why, of course. Again, if his son has something the matter with his eyes, would he let him meddle with them himself, if he considered him to be no doctor,
-or would he prevent him? He would prevent him. But if he supposed us to have medical skill, he would not prevent us, I imagine, even though we wanted to pull the eyes open and sprinkle them with ashes, so long as he believed our judgement to be sound. That is true. So he would entrust us, rather than himself or his son, with all his other affairs besides, wherever he felt we were more skilled than they? Necessarily, he said, Socrates.The case then, my dear Lysis, I said, stands thus: with regard to matters
-in which we become intelligent, every one will entrust us with them, whether Greeks or foreigners, men or women and in such matters we shall do as we please, and nobody will care to obstruct us. Nay, not only shall we ourselves be free and have control of others in these affairs, but they will also belong to us, since we shall derive advantage from them; whereas in all those for which we have failed to acquire intelligence, so far will anyone be from permitting us to deal with them as we think fit, that everybody will do his utmost to obstruct us—
-not merely strangers, but father and mother and any more intimate person than they; and we on our part shall be subject to others in such matters, which will be no concern of ours, since we shall draw no advantage from them. Do you agree to this account of the case? I agree. Then will anyone count us his friends or have any affection for us in those matters for which we are useless? Surely not, he said. So now, you see, your father does not love you, nor does anyone love anyone else, so far as one is useless. Apparently not, he said. Then if you can become wise, my boy,
-everybody will be your friend, every one will be intimate with you, since you will be useful and good; otherwise, no one at all, not your father, nor your mother, nor your intimate connections, will be your friends. Now is it possible, Lysis, to have a high notion of yourself in matters of which you have as yet no notion? Why, how can I? he said. Then if you are in need of a teacher, you have as yet no notion of things? True. Nor can you have a great notion of yourself, if you are still notionless. Upon my word, Socrates, he said, I do not see how I can.
- On hearing him answer this, I glanced at Hippothales, and nearly made a blunder, for it came into my mind to say: This is the way, Hippothales, in which you should talk to your favorite, humbling and reducing him, instead of puffing him up and spoiling him, as you do now. Well, I noticed that he was in an agony of embarrassment at what we had been saying, and I remembered how, in standing near, he wished to hide himself from Lysis.
-So I checked myself and withheld this remark. In the meantime, Menexenus came back, and sat down by Lysis in the place he had left on going out. Then Lysis, in a most playful, affectionate manner, unobserved by Menexenus, said softly to me: Socrates, tell Menexenus what you have been saying to me.To which I replied: You shall tell it him yourself, Lysis; for you gave it your closest attention.I did, indeed, he said.Then try, I went on, to recollect it as well as you can,
-so that you tell him the whole of it clearly: but if you forget any of it, mind that you ask me for it again when next you meet me.I will do so, Socrates, he said, by all means, I assure you. But tell him something else, that I may hear it too, until it is time to go home.Well, I must do so, I said, since it is you who bid me. But be ready to come to my support, in case Menexenus attempts to refute me. You know what a keen disputant he is.Yes, on my word, very keen; that is why I want you to have a talk with him.
- So that I may make myself ridiculous? I said.No, no, indeed, he replied I want you to trounce him.How can I? I asked. It is not easy, when the fellow is so formidable—a pupil of Ctesippus. And here—do you not see?—is Ctesippus himself.Take no heed of anyone, Socrates, he said; just go on and have a talk with him.I must comply, I said.Now, as these words passed between us,—What is this feast, said Ctesippus, that you two are having by yourselves, without allowing us a share in your talk?
- Well, well, I replied, we must give you a share. My friend here fails to understand something that I have been saying, but tells me he thinks Menexenus knows, and he urges me to question him.Why not ask him then? said he.But I am going to, I replied. Now please answer, Menexenus, whatever question I may ask you. There is a certain possession that I have desired from my childhood, as every one does in his own way. One person wants to get possession of horses,
-another dogs, another money, and another distinctions: of these things I reck little, but for the possession of friends I have quite a passionate longing, and would rather obtain a good friend than the best quail or cock in the world; yes, and rather, I swear, than any horse or dog. I believe, indeed, by the Dog, that rather than all Darius's gold I would choose to gain a dear comrade—far sooner than I would Darius himself, so fond I am of my comrades.
-Accordingly, when I see you and Lysis together, I am quite beside myself, and congratulate you on being able, at such an early age, to gain this possession so quickly and easily; since you, Menexenus, have so quickly and surely acquired his friendship, and he likewise yours: whereas I am so far from acquiring such a thing, that I do not even know in what way one person becomes a friend of another, and am constrained to ask you about this very point, in view of your experience.Now tell me: when one person loves another, which of the two becomes friend of the other—
-the loving of the loved, or the loved of the loving? Or is there no difference? There is none, he replied, in my opinion. How is that? I said; do you mean that both become friends mutually, when there is only one loving the other? Yes, I think so, he replied. But I ask you, is it not possible for one loving not to be loved by him whom he loves? It is. But again, may he not be even hated while loving? This, I imagine, is the sort of thing that lovers do sometimes seem to incur with their favorites:
-they love them with all their might, yet they feel either that they are not loved in return, or that they are actually hated. Or do you not think this is true? Very true, he replied. Now in such a case, I went on, the one loves and the other is loved? Yes. Which of the two, then, is a friend of the other? Is the loving a friend of the loved, whether in fact he is loved in return or is even hated, or is the loved a friend of the loving? Or again, is neither of them in such a case friend of the other, if both do not love mutually?
-At any rate, he said, it looks as if this were so. So you see, we now hold a different view from what we held before. At first we said that if one of them loved, both were friends: but now, if both do not love, neither is a friend. It looks like it, he said. So there is no such thing as a friend for the lover who is not loved in return. Apparently not. And so we find no horse-lovers where the horses do not love in return, no quail-lovers, dog-lovers, wine-lovers, or sport-lovers on such terms, nor any lovers of wisdom if she returns not their love. Or does each person love these things,
-while yet failing to make friends of them, and was it a lying poet who said—Happy to have your children as friends, and your trampling horses,Scent-snuffing hounds, and a host when you travel abroad?Solon 21.2.I do not think so, he said. But do you think he spoke the truth? Yes. Then the loved object is a friend to the lover, it would seem, Menexenus, alike whether it loves or hates: for instance, new-born children,
-who have either not begun to love, or already hate, if punished by their mother or their father, are yet at that very moment, and in spite of their hate, especially and pre-eminently friends to their parents. I think, he said, that is the case. Then this argument shows that it is not the lover who is a friend, but the loved. Apparently. And it is the hated who is an enemy, not the hater. Evidently. Then people must often be loved by their enemies, and hated by their friends, and be friends to their enemies and enemies to their friends,
-if the loved object is a friend rather than the loving agent. And yet it is a gross absurdity, my dear friend—I should say rather, an impossibility—that one should be an enemy to one's friend and a friend to one's enemy. You appear to be right there, Socrates, he said. Then if that is impossible, it is the loving that must be a friend of the loved. Evidently. And so the hating, on the other hand, will be an enemy of the hated. Necessarily. Hence in the end we shall find ourselves compelled to agree
-to the same statement as we made before, that frequently a man is a friend of one who is no friend, and frequently even of an enemy, when he loves one who loves not, or even hates; while frequently a man may be an enemy of one who is no enemy or even a friend, when he hates one who hates not, or even loves. In this argument Socrates makes play, like one of the “eristic” sophists, with the ambiguous meaning of FI/LOS (“friend” or “dear”) and E)XQRO/S (“enemy” or “hateful”). Beneath his immediate purpose of puzzling the young man lies the intention of pointing out the obscurity of the very terms “friend” and “enemy.” It looks like it, he said. What then are we to make of it, I asked, if neither the loving are to be friends, nor the loved, nor both the loving and loved together? Socrates cannot be said to have disposed of this third proposition. For apart from these, are there any others left for us to cite as becoming friends to one another? For my part, Socrates, he said, I declare I can see no sort of shift.
-Can it be, Menexenus, I asked, that all through there has been something wrong with our inquiry? I think there has, Socrates, said Lysis, and blushed as soon as he said it; for it struck me that the words escaped him unintentionally, through his closely applying his mind to our talk—as he had noticeably done all the time he was listening.So then, as I wanted to give Menexenus a rest, and was delighted with the other's taste for philosophy, I took occasion to shift the discussion over to Lysis, and said:
-Lysis, I think your remark is true, that if we were inquiring correctly we could never have gone so sadly astray. Well, let us follow our present line no further, since our inquiry looks to me a rather hard sort of path: I think we had best make for the point where we turned off,
-and be guided by the poets; for they are our fathers, as it were, and conductors in wisdom. They, of course, express themselves in no mean sort on the subject of friends, where they happen to be found; even saying that God himself makes them friends by drawing them to each other. The way they put it, I believe, is something like this:Yea, ever like and like together God doth draw,Hom. Od. 17.218
- and so brings them acquainted; or have you not come across these verses? Yes, I have, he replied. And you have also come across those writings of eminent sages, which tell us this very thing—that like must needs be always friend to like? I refer, of course, to those who debate or write about nature and the universe. The attraction of like for like was an important force in the cosmology of Empedocles (c. 475-415 B.C.) Quite so, he said. Well now, I went on, are they right in what they say? Perhaps, he replied. Perhaps in one half of it, I said; perhaps in even the whole; only we do not comprehend it. We suppose that the nearer a wicked man
-approaches to a wicked man, and the more he consorts with him, the more hateful he becomes; for he injures him, and we consider it impossible that injurer and injured should be friends. Is it not so? Yes, he answered. On this showing, therefore, half of the saying cannot be true, if the wicked are like one another. Quite so. What I believe they mean is that the good are like one another, and are friends, while the bad—as is also said of them—are never like even their own selves,
-being so ill-balanced and unsteady; and when a thing is unlike itself and variable it can hardly become like or friend to anything else. You must surely agree to that? I do, he said. Hence I conclude there is a hidden meaning, dear friend, intended by those who say that like is friend to like, namely that the good alone is friend to the good alone, while the bad never enters into true friendship with either good or bad. Do you agree? He nodded assent.
-So now we can tell what friends are; since our argument discloses that they are any persons who may be good. I quite think so, said he.And I also, said I; and yet there is a point in it that makes me uneasy: so come, in Heaven's name, let us make out what it is that I suspect. like friend to like in so far as he is like, and is such an one useful to his fellow? Let me put it another way: when anything whatever is like anything else, what benefit can it offer, or what harm can it do, to its like, which it could not offer or do to itself? Or what could be done to it that could not be done to it by itself?
-How can such things be cherished by each other, when they can bring no mutual succor? Is it at all possible? No. And how can that be a friend, which is not cherished? By no means. But, granting that like is not friend to like, the good may still be friend to the good in so far as he is good, not as he is like? Perhaps. But again, will not the good, in so far as he is good, be in that measure sufficient for himself? Yes. And the sufficient has no need of anything,
-by virtue of his sufficiency. Socrates seems to pass unwarrantably from the limited to the unlimited meaning of “sufficient.” Of course. And if a man has no need of anything he will not cherish anything. Presumably not. And that which does not cherish will not love. I should think not. And one who loves not is no friend. Evidently. So how can we say that the good will be friends to the good at all, when neither in absence do they long for one another—for they are sufficient for themselves even when apart—nor in presence have they need of one another? How can it be contrived that such persons shall value each other highly? By no means, he said.
-And if they do not set a high value on each other, they cannot be friends. True.Now observe, Lysis, how we are missing the track. Can it be, indeed, that we are deceived in the whole matter? How so? he asked. Once on a time I heard somebody say, and I have just recollected it, that like was most hostile to like, and so were good men to good men; and what is more, he put forward Hesiod as witness, by quoting his words—See potter wroth with potter, bard with bard,
-Beggar with beggar,Hes. WD 25and in all other cases it was the same, he said; likest things must needs be filled with envy, contention, and hatred against each other, but the unlikest things with friendship: since the poor man must needs be friendly to the rich, and the weak to the strong, for the sake of assistance, and also the sick man to the doctor; and every ignorant person had to cherish the well-informed, and love him. And then the speaker pursued his theme to this further and more imposing point—that like could not in the slightest degree be friendly to like,
-but was in just the opposite case: for it was between things most opposed that friendship was chiefly to be found, since everything desired its opposite, not its like. Thus dry desired wet, cold hot, bitter sweet, sharp blunt, empty fullness, full emptiness, and likewise the rest on the same principle: for the opposite was food for its opposite, as the like
-could have no enjoyment of its like. And I must say, my good friend, his argument seemed a smart one, for he expressed it well. But you, I asked—how does it strike you? It sounds all right, said Menexenus, at least on the moment's hearing. Then are we to say that the opposite is most friendly to its opposite? Certainly. Well, I exclaimed, is it not monstrous, Menexenus? Why, at once these all-accomplished logic-choppers will delightedly pounce on us and ask whether hatred is not the most opposite thing to friendship.
-And what answer shall we give them? Shall we not be forced to admit that what they say is true? We shall. So then, they will demand, is a hating thing friend to the friendly thing, or the friendly to the hating? Neither, he replied. But is the just a friend to the unjust, or the temperate to the profligate, or the good to the bad? I do not think that could be so. But yet, I urged, if one thing is friend to another on this principle of opposition, these things too must needs be friends. They must. So neither is like friend to like, nor opposite friend to opposite. It seems not.
- But there is still this point to consider; for perhaps we are yet more mistaken, and the friendly has really nothing to do with all this: it may rather be something neither good nor bad that will prove after all to be what we call friend of the good. How do you mean? he asked. For the life of me, I said, I cannot tell: the fact is, I am quite dizzy myself with the puzzle of our argument, and am inclined to agree with the ancient proverb that the beautiful is friendly. The proverb, of course, used FI/LON in the sense of “dear.” It certainly resembles something soft and smooth and sleek;
-that is why, I daresay, it so easily slides and dives right into us, by virtue of those qualities. For I declare that the good is beautiful: do you not agree? I do. Then I will be a diviner for once, and state that what is neither good nor bad is friendly to what is beautiful and good; and what it is that prompts me to this divination, you must now hear. My view is that there are three separate kinds, as it were—the good, the bad, and what is neither good nor bad; and what is yours? Mine is the same, he replied.
-And that neither is the good friendly to the good, nor the bad to the bad, nor the good to the bad; so much our previous argument already forbids. One view then remains: if anything is friendly to anything, that which is neither good nor bad is friendly to either the good or what is of the same quality as itself. For I presume nothing could be found friendly to the bad. True. Nor, however, can like be friendly to like: this we stated just now, did we not? Yes. So what is neither good nor bad can have no friendship with the same sort of thing as itself. Apparently not. Then only what is neither good nor bad proves to be friendly to the good,
-and to that only. That must be so, it seems.Then can we rely further on this present statement, my boys, I said, as a sure guide? For instance, we have only to consider a body in health to see that it has no need of doctoring or assistance: it is well enough as it is, and so no one in health is friend to a doctor, on account of his health. You agree? Yes. But the sick man is, I imagine, on account of his disease. Certainly. Now disease is a bad thing, and medicine is beneficial and good. Yes. And a body, of course, taken as body, is neither good nor bad.
-That is so. But a body is compelled by disease to welcome and love medicine. I think so. Thus what is neither bad nor good becomes a friend of the good because of the presence of evil. So it seems. But clearly this must be before it is itself made evil by the evil which it has; for surely, when once it has been made evil, it can no longer have any desire or love for the good; since we agreed it was impossible
-for bad to be a friend of good. Yes, impossible. Now observe what I say. Some things are of the same sort as those that are present with them, and some are not. For example, if you chose to dye something a certain color, the substance of the dye is present, I presume, with the thing dyed. Certainly. Then is the thing dyed of the same sort, in point of color, as the substance that is added? I do not understand, he said.
-Well, try it this way, I went on: suppose some one tinged your golden locks with white lead, would they then be or appear to be white? Yes, they would so appear, he replied. And, in fact, whiteness would be present with them? Yes. But all the same they would not be any the more white as yet; for though whiteness be present, they are not at all white, any more than they are at all black. True. But when, my dear boy, old age has cast that same color upon them, they have then come to be of the same sort as
-that which is present—white through presence of white. To be sure. So this is the question I have been trying to put to you—whether a thing that has something present with it is to be held of the same sort as that present thing or only when that thing is present in a particular way, but otherwise not? More likely the latter, he said. So that what is neither bad nor good is sometimes, when bad is present, not bad as yet, and such cases have been known to occur. Certainly. When therefore it is not bad as yet, though bad is present, this presence makes it desire good; but the presence which makes it bad deprives it equally of its desire and its love for the good. For it is no longer
-neither bad nor good, but bad; and we found that bad was no friend to good. No, indeed. And consequently we may say that those who are already wise no longer love wisdom, whether they be gods or men; nor again can those be lovers of wisdom who are in such ignorance as to be bad: for we know that a bad and stupid man is no lover of wisdom. And now there remain those who, while possessing this bad thing, ignorance, are not yet made ignorant or stupid, but are still aware of not knowing the things
-they do not know. It follows, then, that those who are as yet neither good nor bad are lovers of wisdom, while all who are bad, and all the good, are not: for, as we found in our previous discussion, neither is opposite friend to opposite, nor like to like. You remember, do you not? To be sure we do, they both replied. So now, Lysis and Menexenus, I said, we can count on having discovered what is the friendly and what is not. For we say that, in the soul
-and the body and everywhere, just that which is neither bad nor good, but has the presence of bad, is thereby friend of the good. To this statement they said that they entirely agreed.And, beyond that, I was myself filled with delight, like a hunter, at the satisfaction of getting hold of what I was hunting; when somehow or other a most unaccountable suspicion came over me that the conclusion to which we had agreed was not true. So at once I exclaimed in vexation: Alack-a-day, Lysis and Menexenus! I fear our new-gotten riches are all a dream.
- How on earth is that? said Menexenus.I am afraid, I replied, that in our search for friendship we have struck up with arguments that are no better than a set of braggarts.How so ? he asked.Just consider a moment, I said. When a man is a friend, is he friend to some one or not? He needs be, he replied. Then is he so for the sake of nothing and because of nothing, or for the sake of something and because of something? For the sake of something, and because of something. Is it a friend—that thing for whose sake he is a friend to his friend—or is it neither friend nor foe? I do not quite follow, he said.
-Naturally enough, said I; but perhaps you will keep up if we try it another way, and I expect that I too will better understand what I am saying. The sick man, we said just now, is a friend to the doctor; is not that so? Yes. Then is it because of disease, for the sake of health, that he is a friend of the doctor? Yes. And disease is a bad thing? Of course. But what is health? I asked: a good thing, or a bad, or neither? A good thing, he said.
-And we were saying, I believe, that the body, being neither good nor bad, was a friend of medicine—that is, of a good thing—because of disease—that is, because of a bad thing; and it is for the sake of health that medicine has acquired this friendship, and health is a good thing. You agree? Yes. Is health a friend or not? A friend. And disease is a foe? Certainly. So what is neither bad nor good
-is a friend to the good because of what is bad and a foe for the sake of what is good and a friend. Apparently. Hence the friend is a friend of its friend for the sake of its friend and because of its foe. So it seems.Very well, I said: since we have reached this point, my boys, let us take good heed not to be deceived. I pass over without remark the fact that the friend has become a friend to the friend, and thus the like becomes a friend to the like, which we said was impossible. There is, however, a further point which we must examine,
-if we are not to find our present argument a mere deception. Medicine, we say, is a friend for the sake of health. Yes. Then is health a friend also? Certainly. And if it is a friend, it is so for the sake of something. Yes. And that something is a friend, if it is to conform to our previous agreement. Quite so. Then will that something be, on its part also, a friend for the sake of a friend? Yes. Now are we not bound to weary ourselves with going on in this way, unless we can arrive at some first principle which will not keep leading us on from one friend to another, but will reach the one original friend, for whose sake all the other things can be said
-to be friends? We must. So you see what I am afraid of—that all the other things, which we cited as friends for the sake of that one thing, may be deceiving us like so many phantoms of it, while that original thing may be the veritable friend. For suppose we view the matter thus: when a man highly values a thing, as in the common case of a father who prizes his son above all his possessions, will such a man, for the sake of placing his son before everything,
-value anything else highly at the same time? For instance, on learning that he had drunk some hemlock, would he value wine highly if he believed it would save his son's life? Why, of course, he said. And the vessel too which contained the wine? Certainly. Now does he make no distinction in value, at that moment, between a cup of earthenware and his own son, or between three pints of wine and his son? Or may we perhaps state it thus: all such concern is not entertained for the actual things which are applied for the sake of something, but for that something for whose sake all the rest are applied?
-I know that we often talk of setting great value on gold and silver: but surely we are no nearer the truth of the matter for that; what we rather value above everything is the thing—whatever it may prove to be—for whose sake gold and all the other commodities are applied. May we state it so? By all means. Then shall we not give the same account of a friend? In speaking of all the things that are friends to us
-for the sake of some other friend, we find ourselves uttering a mere phrase; whereas in reality “friend” appears to be simply and solely the thing in which all these so-called friendships terminate. So it appears, he said. Then the real friend is a friend for the sake of nothing else that is a friend? True.So we have got rid of this, and it is not for the sake of some friendly thing that the friend is friendly. But now, is the good a friend? I should say so. And further, it is because of the bad that the good is loved Socrates here strangely confuses the cause (TO\ DIA/ TI) with the object in view (TO\ E(/NEKA/ TOU), which he carefully distinguished in the case of medicine (219 A).;
-let me state the case as follows: there are three things of which we have just been speaking—good, bad, and what is neither good nor bad. If but two of these remained after evil had been cleared away, so that it had no contact with anything, whether body or soul or any of the other things that we count neither bad nor good in themselves, would the result be that good would be of no use to us, but would have become quite a useless thing? For if there were nothing left to harm us, we should feel no want
-of any assistance; and thus we should have to face the fact that it was because of the bad that we felt such a friendly affection for the good, since the good is a cure for the bad, while the bad is an ailment, and if there is no ailment there is no need for a cure. Is not this the nature of the good—to be loved because of the bad by us who are midway between the bad and the good, whereas separately and for its own sake it is of no use? Apparently so, he said. Then our “friend,” in which
-all the other things terminated—we called them “friends for the sake of some other friend ”—has no resemblance to these. For they are described as friends for the sake of a friend: but the real friend appears to have quite the opposite character; for we found if to be a friend for the sake of a foe, and if the foe should be removed we have no friend, it seems, any more. I should say not, he assented, to judge by our present argument. Tell me, I beg of you, I went on, if evil is abolished, will it be impossible any longer to feel hunger
-or thirst or other such conditions? Or will hunger exist, so long as men and animals exist, but without being hurtful? Thirst, too, and all other desires—will these exist without being bad, because the bad will have been abolished? Or is this a ridiculous question—as to what will exist or not exist in such a case? For who can tell? Yet this, at all events, we do know—that, as things are now, it is possible for a man to feel hunger as a hurt, and also to be benefited by it. You agree? Certainly. And so, when a man feels thirst or any other desire of the sort,
-he may have that desire sometimes with benefit, sometimes with harm, and sometimes with neither? Quite so. Now if evil things are abolished, is there any reason why the things that are not evil should be abolished along with the evil? None. So that those desires which are neither good nor bad will exist even when the bad things are abolished. Apparently. Now is it possible for a man, when he desires and loves, to have no friendly feeling towards that which he desires and loves? I think not. Thus certain things will continue to be friendly, it seems, when evil things are abolished. Yes.
-It cannot be that, if evil were the cause of a thing being friendly, one thing should be friendly to another when evil is abolished. For when a cause is abolished, that thing can no longer exist, I presume, which had this as its cause. You are right. Now we have agreed that the friend has a friendly feeling for something and because of something; and we supposed, just then, that it was because of evil that what was neither good nor bad loved the good.
-True. But now, it seems, we make out a different cause of loving and being loved. It seems so. Can it really be then, as we were saying just now, that desire is the cause of friendship, and the desiring thing is a friend to what which it desires, and is so at any time of desiring; while our earlier statement about friends was all mere drivel, like a poem strung out for mere length? It looks like it, he said. But still, I went on, the desiring thing desires
-that in which it is deficient, does it not? Yes. And the deficient is a friend to that in which it is deficient? I suppose so. And it becomes deficient in that of which it suffers a deprivation. To be sure. So it is one's own belongings, i.e. things that are proper or congenial to one. it seems, that are the objects of love and friendship and desire; so it appears, Menexenus and Lysis. They both agreed. Then if you two are friends to each other by some natural bond you belong to one another. Precisely, they said. And in a case where
-one person desires another, my boys, or loves him, he would never be desiring or loving or befriending him, unless he somehow belonged to his beloved either in soul, or in some disposition, demeanor or cast of soul. Yes, to be sure, said Menexenus; but Lysis was silent. Very well, said I: what belongs to us by nature has been shown to be something we needs must befriend. It seems so, he said. Then the genuine, not the pretended, lover must needs be befriended by his favorite.
-To this Lysis and Menexenus gave but a faint nod of assent; while Hippothales, in his delight, turned all manner of colors.So then, with the design of reviewing the argument, I proceeded: If there is any difference between what belongs and what is like, it seems to me, Lysis and Menexenus, that we might give some account of the meaning of “friend.” But if “like” and “belonging” are the same, it is not easy to get rid of our former statement, that the like is useless to the like in so far as they have likeness; and to admit that the useless is friendly
-would be a gross mistake. So how if we agree now, I said, since our argument has made us quite tipsy, to say that the belonging and the like are two different things? By all means. Then shall we maintain that the good itself belongs to every one, while the bad is alien? Or does the bad belong to the bad, the good to the good, and what is neither good nor bad to what is neither good nor bad? They agreed that the last three pairs belong together. So here again, boys,
-I said, we have dropped into the very statements regarding friendship which we rejected at first; for now the unjust will be as much a friend of the unjust, and the bad of the bad, as the good of the good. The word “belonging” seems to throw some light on “friend,” but even if we distinguish it from “like” it turns out to be just as indifferent to good and bad, and therefore just as remote from the moral significance of “friend.” So it seems, he said. And what is more, if we say that the good and the belonging are the same, we cannot avoid making the good a friend only to the good. To be sure. But this again, you know, is a view of which we thought we had disabused ourselves; you remember, do you not? We do.
- So what more can we do with our argument? Obviously, I think, nothing. I can only ask you, accordingly, like the professional pleaders in the law courts, to perpend the whole of what has been said. If neither the loved nor the loving, nor the like nor the unlike, nor the good nor the belonging, nor all the rest that we have tried in turn—they are so many that I, for one, fail to remember any more—well, if none of these is a friend, I am at a loss for anything further to say.
- Having thus spoken, I was minded to stir up somebody else among the older people there; when, like spirits from another world, there came upon us the tutors of Menexenus and Lysis: they were bringing along the boys' brothers, and called out to them the order to go home; for it was getting late. At first we tried, with the help of the group around us, to drive the tutors off; but they took no notice of us at all, and went on angrily calling, as before, in their foreign accent. We decided that
-they had taken a drop too much at the festival and might be awkward customers; so we gave in to them, and broke up our party. However, just as they were moving off, I remarked: Today, Lysis and Menexenus, we have made ourselves ridiculous—I, an old man, as well as you. For these others will go away and tell how we believe we are friends of one another—for I count myself in with you—but what a “friend” is, we have not yet succeeded in discovering.
+Socrates relates a conversation he had in a wrestling-school
I was making my way from the Academy straight to the Lyceum, by the road outside the town wall,—just under the wall; and when I reached the little gate that leads to the spring of Panops, i.e., of Hermes, the “all-seeing” I chanced there upon Hippothales, son of Hieronymus, and Ctesippus of Paeania, and some other youths with them, standing in a group together. Then Hippothales, as he saw me approaching, said: Socrates, whither away, and whence?
+ From the Academy, I replied, on my way straight to the Lyceum.Come over here, he said, straight to us. You will not put in here? But you may as well.Where do you mean? I asked; and what is your company?Here, he said, showing me there, just opposite the wall, a sort of enclosure and a door standing open. We pass our time there, he went on; not only we ourselves, but others besides,—a great many, and handsome.
+ And what, pray, is this place, and what your pastime?A wrestling school, he said, of recent construction; and our pastime chiefly consists of discussions, in which we should be happy to let you have a share.That is very good of you, I said; and who does the teaching there?Your own comrade, he replied, and supporter, Miccus.Upon my word, I said, he is no slight person, but a qualified professor.Then will you please come in with us, he said, so as to see for yourself the company we have there?
+ I should be glad to hear first on what terms I am to enter, and which is the handsome one.Each of us, he replied, has a different fancy, Socrates.Well, and which is yours, Hippothales? Tell me that.At this question he blushed; so I said: Ah, Hippothales, son of Hieronymus, you need not trouble to tell me whether you are in love with somebody or not: for I know you are not only in love, but also far advanced already in your passion. In everything else I may be a poor useless creature,
+but there is one gift that I have somehow from heaven,—to be able to recognize quickly a lover or a beloved.When he heard this, he blushed much more than ever. Then Ctesippus remarked: Quite charming, the way you blush, Hippothales, and shrink from telling Socrates the name; yet, if he spends but a little time with you, he will find you a regular torment, as he hears you repeat it again and again. He has deafened our ears, I can tell you, Socrates, by cramming them with “Lysis”:
+let him be a trifle in liquor, and as likely as not we start out of our sleep fancying we hear the name of Lysis. The descriptions he gives us in conversation, though dreadful enough, are not so very bad: it is when he sets about inundating us with his poems and prose compositions. More dreadful than all, he actually sings about his favorite in an extraordinary voice, which we have the trial of hearing. And now, at a question from you, he blushes!Lysis apparently, I said, is somebody quite young:
+this I infer from the fact that I did not recognize the name when I heard it.That is because they do not usually call him by his name, he replied; he still goes by his paternal title, i.e., “son of Democrates” (see below) as his father is so very well known. You must, I am sure, be anything but ignorant of the boy's appearance: that alone would be enough to know him by.Let me hear, I said, whose son he is.The eldest son, he replied, of Democrates of Aexone.Ah well, I said, Hippothales, what an altogether noble and gallant love you have discovered there! Now please go on and give me a performance like those that you give your friends here,
+so that I may know whether you understand what a lover ought to say of his favorite to his face or to others.Do you attach any weight, Socrates, he asked, to anything you have heard this fellow say?Tell me, I said; do you deny being in love with the person he mentions?Not I, he replied; but I do deny that I make poems and compositions on my favorite.He is in a bad way, said Ctesippus; why, he raves like a madman!Then I remarked: Hippothales, I do not want to hear your verses,
+or any ode that you may have indited to the youth; I only ask for their purport, that I may know your manner of dealing with your favorite.I expect this fellow will tell you, he replied: he has an accurate knowledge and recollection of them, if there is any truth in what he says of my having dinned them so constantly in his ears.Quite so, on my soul, said Ctesippus; and a ridiculous story it is too, Socrates. To be a lover, and to be singularly intent on one's boy, yet to have nothing particular to tell him that a mere boy could not say, is surely ridiculous:
+but he only writes and relates things that the whole city sings of, recalling Democrates and the boy's grandfather Lysis and all his ancestors, with their wealth and the horses they kept, and their victories at Delphi, the Isthmus, and Nemea, The Pythian Games were held at Delphi, the Isthmian near Corinth, and the Nemean at Nemea, between Corinth and Argos. with chariot-teams and coursers, and, in addition, even hoarier antiquities than these. Only two days ago he was recounting to us in some poem of his the entertainment of Hercules,—how on account of his kinship with Hercules their forefather welcomed the hero,
+being himself the offspring of Zeus and of the daughter of their deme's founder; such old wives' tales, and many more of the sort, Socrates,—these are the things he tells and trolls, while compelling us to be his audience.When I heard this I said: Oh, you ridiculous Hippothales, do you compose and chant a triumph song on yourself, before you have won your victory?It is not on myself, Socrates, he replied, that I either compose or chant it.You think not, I said.Then what is the truth of it? he asked.
+ Most certainly, I replied, it is you to whom these songs refer. For if you prevail on your favorite, and he is such as you describe, all that you have spoken and sung will be so much glory to you, and a veritable eulogy upon your triumph in having secured such a favorite as that: whereas if he eludes your grasp, the higher the terms of your eulogy of your favorite, the greater will seem to be the charms and virtues you have lost, and you will be ridiculed accordingly. Hence anyone who deals wisely in love-matters,
+my friend, does not praise his beloved until he prevails, for fear of what the future may have in store for him. And besides, these handsome boys, when so praised and extolled, become full of pride and haughtiness: do you not think so?I do, he said.And then, the haughtier they are, the harder grows the task of capturing them?Yes, apparently.And what do you think of a hunter who should scare away his quarry in hunting and make it harder to catch?Clearly he would be a poor one.
+ And hence to use speech and song, not for charming but for driving wild, would be gross fatuity, would it not?I think so.Then take care, Hippothales, not to make yourself guilty of all these things by your verse-making; and yet I fancy you will not like to allow that a man who damages himself by poetry can be a good poet, so long as he is damaging to himself.On my soul, no, he said; of course it would be most absurd. But this is the very reason, Socrates, why I impart my feelings to you,
+and ask you for any useful advice you can give as to what conversation or conduct will help to endear one to one's favorite.That is not an easy thing to tell, I replied; but if you will agree to get him to have a talk with me, I daresay I could show you an example of the conversation you should hold with him, instead of those things that your friends say you speak and sing.There is no difficulty about that, he said. If you will go in with Ctesippus here, and take a seat and talk, I think he will come to you of his own accord; he is singularly fond of listening, Socrates,
+and besides, they are keeping the Hermaea, The festival of Hermes, who was specially honored in wrestling schools. so that the youths and boys are all mingled together. So he will come to you but if he does not, Ctesippus is intimate with him, as being a cousin of Menexenus; for Lysis has chosen Menexenus for his particular friend. So let Ctesippus call him if you find that he does not come of himself.That is what I must do, I said. Whereupon I took Ctesippus
+with me into the wrestling school, and the others came after us. When we got inside, we found that the boys had performed the sacrifice in the place and, as the ceremonial business was now almost over, they were all playing at knuckle-bones and wearing their finest attire. Most of them were playing in the court out-of-doors; but some were at a game of odd-and-even in a corner of the undressing room, with a great lot of knuckle-bones which they drew from little baskets; and there were others standing about them and looking on. Among these was Lysis: he stood among the boys
+and youths with a garland on his head, a distinguished figure, deserving not merely the name of well-favored, but also of well-made and well-bred. As for us, we went and sat apart on the opposite side—for it was quiet there—and started some talk amongst ourselves. The result was that Lysis ever and anon turned round to observe us, and was obviously eager to join us. For a while, however, he hesitated, being too shy to approach us alone;
+till Menexenus stepped in for a moment from his game in the court and, on seeing me and Ctesippus, came to take a seat beside us. When Lysis saw him, he came along too and sat down with Menexenus. Then all the others came to us also; and I must add that Hippothales, when he saw a good many of them standing there, stood so as to be screened by them, in a position where he thought Lysis would not catch sight of him, as he feared that he might irritate him; in this way he stood by and listened.Then I, looking at Menexenus, asked him: Son of Demophon, which is the elder of you two?It is a point in dispute between us, he replied.
+ Then you must also be at variance, I said, as to which is the nobler.Yes, to be sure, he said.And moreover, which is the more beautiful, likewise.This made them both laugh.But of course I shall not ask, I said, which of you is the wealthier; for you are friends, are you not?Certainly we are, they replied.And, you know, friends are said to have everything in common, so that here at least there will be no difference between you, if what you say of your friendship is true.They agreed.
+ After that I was proceeding to ask them which was the juster and wiser of the two, when I was interrupted by somebody who came and fetched away Menexenus, saying that the wrestling-master was calling him: I understood that he was taking some part in the rites. So he went off; and then I asked Lysis: I suppose, Lysis, your father and mother are exceedingly fond of you? Yes, to be sure, he replied. Then they would like you to be as happy as possible?
+Yes, of course. Do you consider that a man is happy when enslaved and restricted from doing everything he desires? Not I, on my word, he said. Then if your father and mother are fond of you, and desire to see you happy, it is perfectly plain that they are anxious to secure your happiness. They must be, of course, he said. Hence they allow you to do what you like, and never scold you, or hinder you from doing what you desire? Yes, they do, Socrates, I assure you: they stop me from doing a great many things. How do you mean? I said: they wish you
+to be happy, and yet hinder you from doing what you like? But answer me this: suppose you desire to ride in one of your father's chariots and hold the reins in some race; they will not allow you, but will prevent you? That is so, to be sure, he said; they will not allow me. But whom would they allow? There is a driver, in my father's pay. What do you say? A hireling, whom they trust rather than you, so that he can do whatever he pleases with the horses; and they pay him besides a salary for doing that!
+Why, of course, he said. Well, but they trust you with the control of the mule-cart, and if you wanted to take the whip and lash the team, they would let you? Nothing of the sort, he said. Why, I asked, is nobody allowed to lash them? Oh yes, he said, the muleteer. Is he a slave, or free? A slave, he replied. So it seems that they value a slave more highly than you, their son, and entrust him rather than you with their property,
+and allow him to do what he likes, while preventing you? And now there is one thing more you must tell me. Do they let you control your own self, or will they not trust you in that either? Of course they do not, he replied. But some one controls you? Yes, he said, my tutor The PAIDAGWGO/S was a trusted slave who was appointed to attend on a boy out of school hours and to have a general control over his conduct and industry. here. Is he a slave? Why, certainly; he belongs to us, he said. What a strange thing, I exclaimed; a free man controlled by a slave! But how does this tutor actually exert his control over you? By taking me to school, I suppose, he replied. And your schoolmasters, can it be that they also control you?
+I should think they do! Then quite a large number of masters and controllers are deliberately set over you by your father. But when you come home to your mother, she surely lets you do what you like, that she may make you happy, either with her wool or her loom, when she is weaving? I take it she does not prevent you from handling her batten, or her comb, or any other of her wool-work implements. At this he laughed and said: I promise you, Socrates, not only does she prevent me, but I should get a beating as well,
+if I laid hands on them. Good heavens! I said; can it be that you have done your father or mother some wrong? On my word, no, he replied.Well, what reason can they have for so strangely preventing you from being happy and doing what you like? Why do they maintain you all day long in constant servitude to somebody, so that, in a word, you do hardly a single thing that you desire? And thus, it would seem, you get no advantage from all your great possessions—
+nay, anyone else controls them rather than you—nor from your own person, though so well-born, which is also shepherded and managed by another; while you, Lysis, control nobody, and do nothing that you desire. It is because I am not yet of age, Socrates, he said. That can hardly be the hindrance, son of Democrates, since there is a certain amount, I imagine, that your father and mother entrust to you without waiting until you come of age. For when they want some reading or writing done for them, it is you,
+I conceive, whom they appoint to do it before any others of the household. Is it not so? Quite so, he replied. And you are free there to choose which letter you shall write first and which second, and you have a like choice in reading. And, I suppose, when you take your lyre, neither your father nor your mother prevents you from tightening or slackening what string you please, or from using your finger or your plectrum at will: or do they prevent you? Oh, no. Then whatever can be the reason, Lysis, why they do not prevent you here,
+while in the matters we were just mentioning they do? I suppose, he said, because I understand these things, but not those others. Very well, I said, my excellent friend: so it is not your coming of age that your father is waiting for, as the time for entrusting you with everything; but on the day when he considers you to have a better intelligence than himself, he will entrust you with himself and all that is his. Yes, I think so, he said. Very well, I went on, but tell me, does not your neighbor observe the same rule as your father towards you? Do you think he will entrust you with the management of his house, as soon as he considers you to have a better idea
+of its management than himself, or will he direct it himself? I should say he would entrust it to me. Well then, do you not think that the Athenians will entrust you with their affairs, when they perceive that you have sufficient intelligence? I do. Ah, do let me ask this, I went on: what, pray, of the Great King? Would he allow his eldest son, heir-apparent to the throne of Asia, to put what he chose into the royal stew,
+or would he prefer us to do it, supposing we came before him and convinced him that we had a better notion than his son of preparing a tasty dish? Clearly he would prefer us, he said. And he would not allow the prince to put in the smallest bit, whereas he would let us have our way even if we wanted to put in salt by the handful. Why, of course. Again, if his son has something the matter with his eyes, would he let him meddle with them himself, if he considered him to be no doctor,
+or would he prevent him? He would prevent him. But if he supposed us to have medical skill, he would not prevent us, I imagine, even though we wanted to pull the eyes open and sprinkle them with ashes, so long as he believed our judgement to be sound. That is true. So he would entrust us, rather than himself or his son, with all his other affairs besides, wherever he felt we were more skilled than they? Necessarily, he said, Socrates.The case then, my dear Lysis, I said, stands thus: with regard to matters
+in which we become intelligent, every one will entrust us with them, whether Greeks or foreigners, men or women and in such matters we shall do as we please, and nobody will care to obstruct us. Nay, not only shall we ourselves be free and have control of others in these affairs, but they will also belong to us, since we shall derive advantage from them; whereas in all those for which we have failed to acquire intelligence, so far will anyone be from permitting us to deal with them as we think fit, that everybody will do his utmost to obstruct us—
+not merely strangers, but father and mother and any more intimate person than they; and we on our part shall be subject to others in such matters, which will be no concern of ours, since we shall draw no advantage from them. Do you agree to this account of the case? I agree. Then will anyone count us his friends or have any affection for us in those matters for which we are useless? Surely not, he said. So now, you see, your father does not love you, nor does anyone love anyone else, so far as one is useless. Apparently not, he said. Then if you can become wise, my boy,
+everybody will be your friend, every one will be intimate with you, since you will be useful and good; otherwise, no one at all, not your father, nor your mother, nor your intimate connections, will be your friends. Now is it possible, Lysis, to have a high notion of yourself in matters of which you have as yet no notion? Why, how can I? he said. Then if you are in need of a teacher, you have as yet no notion of things? True. Nor can you have a great notion of yourself, if you are still notionless. Upon my word, Socrates, he said, I do not see how I can.
+ On hearing him answer this, I glanced at Hippothales, and nearly made a blunder, for it came into my mind to say: This is the way, Hippothales, in which you should talk to your favorite, humbling and reducing him, instead of puffing him up and spoiling him, as you do now. Well, I noticed that he was in an agony of embarrassment at what we had been saying, and I remembered how, in standing near, he wished to hide himself from Lysis.
+So I checked myself and withheld this remark. In the meantime, Menexenus came back, and sat down by Lysis in the place he had left on going out. Then Lysis, in a most playful, affectionate manner, unobserved by Menexenus, said softly to me: Socrates, tell Menexenus what you have been saying to me.To which I replied: You shall tell it him yourself, Lysis; for you gave it your closest attention.I did, indeed, he said.Then try, I went on, to recollect it as well as you can,
+so that you tell him the whole of it clearly: but if you forget any of it, mind that you ask me for it again when next you meet me.I will do so, Socrates, he said, by all means, I assure you. But tell him something else, that I may hear it too, until it is time to go home.Well, I must do so, I said, since it is you who bid me. But be ready to come to my support, in case Menexenus attempts to refute me. You know what a keen disputant he is.Yes, on my word, very keen; that is why I want you to have a talk with him.
+ So that I may make myself ridiculous? I said.No, no, indeed, he replied I want you to trounce him.How can I? I asked. It is not easy, when the fellow is so formidable—a pupil of Ctesippus. And here—do you not see?—is Ctesippus himself.Take no heed of anyone, Socrates, he said; just go on and have a talk with him.I must comply, I said.Now, as these words passed between us,—What is this feast, said Ctesippus, that you two are having by yourselves, without allowing us a share in your talk?
+ Well, well, I replied, we must give you a share. My friend here fails to understand something that I have been saying, but tells me he thinks Menexenus knows, and he urges me to question him.Why not ask him then? said he.But I am going to, I replied. Now please answer, Menexenus, whatever question I may ask you. There is a certain possession that I have desired from my childhood, as every one does in his own way. One person wants to get possession of horses,
+another dogs, another money, and another distinctions: of these things I reck little, but for the possession of friends I have quite a passionate longing, and would rather obtain a good friend than the best quail or cock in the world; yes, and rather, I swear, than any horse or dog. I believe, indeed, by the Dog, that rather than all Darius's gold I would choose to gain a dear comrade—far sooner than I would Darius himself, so fond I am of my comrades.
+Accordingly, when I see you and Lysis together, I am quite beside myself, and congratulate you on being able, at such an early age, to gain this possession so quickly and easily; since you, Menexenus, have so quickly and surely acquired his friendship, and he likewise yours: whereas I am so far from acquiring such a thing, that I do not even know in what way one person becomes a friend of another, and am constrained to ask you about this very point, in view of your experience.Now tell me: when one person loves another, which of the two becomes friend of the other—
+the loving of the loved, or the loved of the loving? Or is there no difference? There is none, he replied, in my opinion. How is that? I said; do you mean that both become friends mutually, when there is only one loving the other? Yes, I think so, he replied. But I ask you, is it not possible for one loving not to be loved by him whom he loves? It is. But again, may he not be even hated while loving? This, I imagine, is the sort of thing that lovers do sometimes seem to incur with their favorites:
+they love them with all their might, yet they feel either that they are not loved in return, or that they are actually hated. Or do you not think this is true? Very true, he replied. Now in such a case, I went on, the one loves and the other is loved? Yes. Which of the two, then, is a friend of the other? Is the loving a friend of the loved, whether in fact he is loved in return or is even hated, or is the loved a friend of the loving? Or again, is neither of them in such a case friend of the other, if both do not love mutually?
+At any rate, he said, it looks as if this were so. So you see, we now hold a different view from what we held before. At first we said that if one of them loved, both were friends: but now, if both do not love, neither is a friend. It looks like it, he said. So there is no such thing as a friend for the lover who is not loved in return. Apparently not. And so we find no horse-lovers where the horses do not love in return, no quail-lovers, dog-lovers, wine-lovers, or sport-lovers on such terms, nor any lovers of wisdom if she returns not their love. Or does each person love these things,
+while yet failing to make friends of them, and was it a lying poet who said—Happy to have your children as friends, and your trampling horses,Scent-snuffing hounds, and a host when you travel abroad?Solon 21.2.I do not think so, he said. But do you think he spoke the truth? Yes. Then the loved object is a friend to the lover, it would seem, Menexenus, alike whether it loves or hates: for instance, new-born children,
+who have either not begun to love, or already hate, if punished by their mother or their father, are yet at that very moment, and in spite of their hate, especially and pre-eminently friends to their parents. I think, he said, that is the case. Then this argument shows that it is not the lover who is a friend, but the loved. Apparently. And it is the hated who is an enemy, not the hater. Evidently. Then people must often be loved by their enemies, and hated by their friends, and be friends to their enemies and enemies to their friends,
+if the loved object is a friend rather than the loving agent. And yet it is a gross absurdity, my dear friend—I should say rather, an impossibility—that one should be an enemy to one's friend and a friend to one's enemy. You appear to be right there, Socrates, he said. Then if that is impossible, it is the loving that must be a friend of the loved. Evidently. And so the hating, on the other hand, will be an enemy of the hated. Necessarily. Hence in the end we shall find ourselves compelled to agree
+to the same statement as we made before, that frequently a man is a friend of one who is no friend, and frequently even of an enemy, when he loves one who loves not, or even hates; while frequently a man may be an enemy of one who is no enemy or even a friend, when he hates one who hates not, or even loves. In this argument Socrates makes play, like one of the “eristic” sophists, with the ambiguous meaning of FI/LOS (“friend” or “dear”) and E)XQRO/S (“enemy” or “hateful”). Beneath his immediate purpose of puzzling the young man lies the intention of pointing out the obscurity of the very terms “friend” and “enemy.” It looks like it, he said. What then are we to make of it, I asked, if neither the loving are to be friends, nor the loved, nor both the loving and loved together? Socrates cannot be said to have disposed of this third proposition. For apart from these, are there any others left for us to cite as becoming friends to one another? For my part, Socrates, he said, I declare I can see no sort of shift.
+Can it be, Menexenus, I asked, that all through there has been something wrong with our inquiry? I think there has, Socrates, said Lysis, and blushed as soon as he said it; for it struck me that the words escaped him unintentionally, through his closely applying his mind to our talk—as he had noticeably done all the time he was listening.So then, as I wanted to give Menexenus a rest, and was delighted with the other's taste for philosophy, I took occasion to shift the discussion over to Lysis, and said:
+Lysis, I think your remark is true, that if we were inquiring correctly we could never have gone so sadly astray. Well, let us follow our present line no further, since our inquiry looks to me a rather hard sort of path: I think we had best make for the point where we turned off,
+and be guided by the poets; for they are our fathers, as it were, and conductors in wisdom. They, of course, express themselves in no mean sort on the subject of friends, where they happen to be found; even saying that God himself makes them friends by drawing them to each other. The way they put it, I believe, is something like this:Yea, ever like and like together God doth draw,Hom. Od. 17.218
+ and so brings them acquainted; or have you not come across these verses? Yes, I have, he replied. And you have also come across those writings of eminent sages, which tell us this very thing—that like must needs be always friend to like? I refer, of course, to those who debate or write about nature and the universe. The attraction of like for like was an important force in the cosmology of Empedocles (c. 475-415 B.C.) Quite so, he said. Well now, I went on, are they right in what they say? Perhaps, he replied. Perhaps in one half of it, I said; perhaps in even the whole; only we do not comprehend it. We suppose that the nearer a wicked man
+approaches to a wicked man, and the more he consorts with him, the more hateful he becomes; for he injures him, and we consider it impossible that injurer and injured should be friends. Is it not so? Yes, he answered. On this showing, therefore, half of the saying cannot be true, if the wicked are like one another. Quite so. What I believe they mean is that the good are like one another, and are friends, while the bad—as is also said of them—are never like even their own selves,
+being so ill-balanced and unsteady; and when a thing is unlike itself and variable it can hardly become like or friend to anything else. You must surely agree to that? I do, he said. Hence I conclude there is a hidden meaning, dear friend, intended by those who say that like is friend to like, namely that the good alone is friend to the good alone, while the bad never enters into true friendship with either good or bad. Do you agree? He nodded assent.
+So now we can tell what friends are; since our argument discloses that they are any persons who may be good. I quite think so, said he.And I also, said I; and yet there is a point in it that makes me uneasy: so come, in Heaven's name, let us make out what it is that I suspect. like friend to like in so far as he is like, and is such an one useful to his fellow? Let me put it another way: when anything whatever is like anything else, what benefit can it offer, or what harm can it do, to its like, which it could not offer or do to itself? Or what could be done to it that could not be done to it by itself?
+How can such things be cherished by each other, when they can bring no mutual succor? Is it at all possible? No. And how can that be a friend, which is not cherished? By no means. But, granting that like is not friend to like, the good may still be friend to the good in so far as he is good, not as he is like? Perhaps. But again, will not the good, in so far as he is good, be in that measure sufficient for himself? Yes. And the sufficient has no need of anything,
+by virtue of his sufficiency. Socrates seems to pass unwarrantably from the limited to the unlimited meaning of “sufficient.” Of course. And if a man has no need of anything he will not cherish anything. Presumably not. And that which does not cherish will not love. I should think not. And one who loves not is no friend. Evidently. So how can we say that the good will be friends to the good at all, when neither in absence do they long for one another—for they are sufficient for themselves even when apart—nor in presence have they need of one another? How can it be contrived that such persons shall value each other highly? By no means, he said.
+And if they do not set a high value on each other, they cannot be friends. True.Now observe, Lysis, how we are missing the track. Can it be, indeed, that we are deceived in the whole matter? How so? he asked. Once on a time I heard somebody say, and I have just recollected it, that like was most hostile to like, and so were good men to good men; and what is more, he put forward Hesiod as witness, by quoting his words—See potter wroth with potter, bard with bard,
+Beggar with beggar,Hes. WD 25and in all other cases it was the same, he said; likest things must needs be filled with envy, contention, and hatred against each other, but the unlikest things with friendship: since the poor man must needs be friendly to the rich, and the weak to the strong, for the sake of assistance, and also the sick man to the doctor; and every ignorant person had to cherish the well-informed, and love him. And then the speaker pursued his theme to this further and more imposing point—that like could not in the slightest degree be friendly to like,
+but was in just the opposite case: for it was between things most opposed that friendship was chiefly to be found, since everything desired its opposite, not its like. Thus dry desired wet, cold hot, bitter sweet, sharp blunt, empty fullness, full emptiness, and likewise the rest on the same principle: for the opposite was food for its opposite, as the like
+could have no enjoyment of its like. And I must say, my good friend, his argument seemed a smart one, for he expressed it well. But you, I asked—how does it strike you? It sounds all right, said Menexenus, at least on the moment's hearing. Then are we to say that the opposite is most friendly to its opposite? Certainly. Well, I exclaimed, is it not monstrous, Menexenus? Why, at once these all-accomplished logic-choppers will delightedly pounce on us and ask whether hatred is not the most opposite thing to friendship.
+And what answer shall we give them? Shall we not be forced to admit that what they say is true? We shall. So then, they will demand, is a hating thing friend to the friendly thing, or the friendly to the hating? Neither, he replied. But is the just a friend to the unjust, or the temperate to the profligate, or the good to the bad? I do not think that could be so. But yet, I urged, if one thing is friend to another on this principle of opposition, these things too must needs be friends. They must. So neither is like friend to like, nor opposite friend to opposite. It seems not.
+ But there is still this point to consider; for perhaps we are yet more mistaken, and the friendly has really nothing to do with all this: it may rather be something neither good nor bad that will prove after all to be what we call friend of the good. How do you mean? he asked. For the life of me, I said, I cannot tell: the fact is, I am quite dizzy myself with the puzzle of our argument, and am inclined to agree with the ancient proverb that the beautiful is friendly. The proverb, of course, used FI/LON in the sense of “dear.” It certainly resembles something soft and smooth and sleek;
+that is why, I daresay, it so easily slides and dives right into us, by virtue of those qualities. For I declare that the good is beautiful: do you not agree? I do. Then I will be a diviner for once, and state that what is neither good nor bad is friendly to what is beautiful and good; and what it is that prompts me to this divination, you must now hear. My view is that there are three separate kinds, as it were—the good, the bad, and what is neither good nor bad; and what is yours? Mine is the same, he replied.
+And that neither is the good friendly to the good, nor the bad to the bad, nor the good to the bad; so much our previous argument already forbids. One view then remains: if anything is friendly to anything, that which is neither good nor bad is friendly to either the good or what is of the same quality as itself. For I presume nothing could be found friendly to the bad. True. Nor, however, can like be friendly to like: this we stated just now, did we not? Yes. So what is neither good nor bad can have no friendship with the same sort of thing as itself. Apparently not. Then only what is neither good nor bad proves to be friendly to the good,
+and to that only. That must be so, it seems.Then can we rely further on this present statement, my boys, I said, as a sure guide? For instance, we have only to consider a body in health to see that it has no need of doctoring or assistance: it is well enough as it is, and so no one in health is friend to a doctor, on account of his health. You agree? Yes. But the sick man is, I imagine, on account of his disease. Certainly. Now disease is a bad thing, and medicine is beneficial and good. Yes. And a body, of course, taken as body, is neither good nor bad.
+That is so. But a body is compelled by disease to welcome and love medicine. I think so. Thus what is neither bad nor good becomes a friend of the good because of the presence of evil. So it seems. But clearly this must be before it is itself made evil by the evil which it has; for surely, when once it has been made evil, it can no longer have any desire or love for the good; since we agreed it was impossible
+for bad to be a friend of good. Yes, impossible. Now observe what I say. Some things are of the same sort as those that are present with them, and some are not. For example, if you chose to dye something a certain color, the substance of the dye is present, I presume, with the thing dyed. Certainly. Then is the thing dyed of the same sort, in point of color, as the substance that is added? I do not understand, he said.
+Well, try it this way, I went on: suppose some one tinged your golden locks with white lead, would they then be or appear to be white? Yes, they would so appear, he replied. And, in fact, whiteness would be present with them? Yes. But all the same they would not be any the more white as yet; for though whiteness be present, they are not at all white, any more than they are at all black. True. But when, my dear boy, old age has cast that same color upon them, they have then come to be of the same sort as
+that which is present—white through presence of white. To be sure. So this is the question I have been trying to put to you—whether a thing that has something present with it is to be held of the same sort as that present thing or only when that thing is present in a particular way, but otherwise not? More likely the latter, he said. So that what is neither bad nor good is sometimes, when bad is present, not bad as yet, and such cases have been known to occur. Certainly. When therefore it is not bad as yet, though bad is present, this presence makes it desire good; but the presence which makes it bad deprives it equally of its desire and its love for the good. For it is no longer
+neither bad nor good, but bad; and we found that bad was no friend to good. No, indeed. And consequently we may say that those who are already wise no longer love wisdom, whether they be gods or men; nor again can those be lovers of wisdom who are in such ignorance as to be bad: for we know that a bad and stupid man is no lover of wisdom. And now there remain those who, while possessing this bad thing, ignorance, are not yet made ignorant or stupid, but are still aware of not knowing the things
+they do not know. It follows, then, that those who are as yet neither good nor bad are lovers of wisdom, while all who are bad, and all the good, are not: for, as we found in our previous discussion, neither is opposite friend to opposite, nor like to like. You remember, do you not? To be sure we do, they both replied. So now, Lysis and Menexenus, I said, we can count on having discovered what is the friendly and what is not. For we say that, in the soul
+and the body and everywhere, just that which is neither bad nor good, but has the presence of bad, is thereby friend of the good. To this statement they said that they entirely agreed.And, beyond that, I was myself filled with delight, like a hunter, at the satisfaction of getting hold of what I was hunting; when somehow or other a most unaccountable suspicion came over me that the conclusion to which we had agreed was not true. So at once I exclaimed in vexation: Alack-a-day, Lysis and Menexenus! I fear our new-gotten riches are all a dream.
+ How on earth is that? said Menexenus.I am afraid, I replied, that in our search for friendship we have struck up with arguments that are no better than a set of braggarts.How so ? he asked.Just consider a moment, I said. When a man is a friend, is he friend to some one or not? He needs be, he replied. Then is he so for the sake of nothing and because of nothing, or for the sake of something and because of something? For the sake of something, and because of something. Is it a friend—that thing for whose sake he is a friend to his friend—or is it neither friend nor foe? I do not quite follow, he said.
+Naturally enough, said I; but perhaps you will keep up if we try it another way, and I expect that I too will better understand what I am saying. The sick man, we said just now, is a friend to the doctor; is not that so? Yes. Then is it because of disease, for the sake of health, that he is a friend of the doctor? Yes. And disease is a bad thing? Of course. But what is health? I asked: a good thing, or a bad, or neither? A good thing, he said.
+And we were saying, I believe, that the body, being neither good nor bad, was a friend of medicine—that is, of a good thing—because of disease—that is, because of a bad thing; and it is for the sake of health that medicine has acquired this friendship, and health is a good thing. You agree? Yes. Is health a friend or not? A friend. And disease is a foe? Certainly. So what is neither bad nor good
+is a friend to the good because of what is bad and a foe for the sake of what is good and a friend. Apparently. Hence the friend is a friend of its friend for the sake of its friend and because of its foe. So it seems.Very well, I said: since we have reached this point, my boys, let us take good heed not to be deceived. I pass over without remark the fact that the friend has become a friend to the friend, and thus the like becomes a friend to the like, which we said was impossible. There is, however, a further point which we must examine,
+if we are not to find our present argument a mere deception. Medicine, we say, is a friend for the sake of health. Yes. Then is health a friend also? Certainly. And if it is a friend, it is so for the sake of something. Yes. And that something is a friend, if it is to conform to our previous agreement. Quite so. Then will that something be, on its part also, a friend for the sake of a friend? Yes. Now are we not bound to weary ourselves with going on in this way, unless we can arrive at some first principle which will not keep leading us on from one friend to another, but will reach the one original friend, for whose sake all the other things can be said
+to be friends? We must. So you see what I am afraid of—that all the other things, which we cited as friends for the sake of that one thing, may be deceiving us like so many phantoms of it, while that original thing may be the veritable friend. For suppose we view the matter thus: when a man highly values a thing, as in the common case of a father who prizes his son above all his possessions, will such a man, for the sake of placing his son before everything,
+value anything else highly at the same time? For instance, on learning that he had drunk some hemlock, would he value wine highly if he believed it would save his son's life? Why, of course, he said. And the vessel too which contained the wine? Certainly. Now does he make no distinction in value, at that moment, between a cup of earthenware and his own son, or between three pints of wine and his son? Or may we perhaps state it thus: all such concern is not entertained for the actual things which are applied for the sake of something, but for that something for whose sake all the rest are applied?
+I know that we often talk of setting great value on gold and silver: but surely we are no nearer the truth of the matter for that; what we rather value above everything is the thing—whatever it may prove to be—for whose sake gold and all the other commodities are applied. May we state it so? By all means. Then shall we not give the same account of a friend? In speaking of all the things that are friends to us
+for the sake of some other friend, we find ourselves uttering a mere phrase; whereas in reality “friend” appears to be simply and solely the thing in which all these so-called friendships terminate. So it appears, he said. Then the real friend is a friend for the sake of nothing else that is a friend? True.So we have got rid of this, and it is not for the sake of some friendly thing that the friend is friendly. But now, is the good a friend? I should say so. And further, it is because of the bad that the good is loved Socrates here strangely confuses the cause (TO\ DIA/ TI) with the object in view (TO\ E(/NEKA/ TOU), which he carefully distinguished in the case of medicine (219 A).;
+let me state the case as follows: there are three things of which we have just been speaking—good, bad, and what is neither good nor bad. If but two of these remained after evil had been cleared away, so that it had no contact with anything, whether body or soul or any of the other things that we count neither bad nor good in themselves, would the result be that good would be of no use to us, but would have become quite a useless thing? For if there were nothing left to harm us, we should feel no want
+of any assistance; and thus we should have to face the fact that it was because of the bad that we felt such a friendly affection for the good, since the good is a cure for the bad, while the bad is an ailment, and if there is no ailment there is no need for a cure. Is not this the nature of the good—to be loved because of the bad by us who are midway between the bad and the good, whereas separately and for its own sake it is of no use? Apparently so, he said. Then our “friend,” in which
+all the other things terminated—we called them “friends for the sake of some other friend ”—has no resemblance to these. For they are described as friends for the sake of a friend: but the real friend appears to have quite the opposite character; for we found if to be a friend for the sake of a foe, and if the foe should be removed we have no friend, it seems, any more. I should say not, he assented, to judge by our present argument. Tell me, I beg of you, I went on, if evil is abolished, will it be impossible any longer to feel hunger
+or thirst or other such conditions? Or will hunger exist, so long as men and animals exist, but without being hurtful? Thirst, too, and all other desires—will these exist without being bad, because the bad will have been abolished? Or is this a ridiculous question—as to what will exist or not exist in such a case? For who can tell? Yet this, at all events, we do know—that, as things are now, it is possible for a man to feel hunger as a hurt, and also to be benefited by it. You agree? Certainly. And so, when a man feels thirst or any other desire of the sort,
+he may have that desire sometimes with benefit, sometimes with harm, and sometimes with neither? Quite so. Now if evil things are abolished, is there any reason why the things that are not evil should be abolished along with the evil? None. So that those desires which are neither good nor bad will exist even when the bad things are abolished. Apparently. Now is it possible for a man, when he desires and loves, to have no friendly feeling towards that which he desires and loves? I think not. Thus certain things will continue to be friendly, it seems, when evil things are abolished. Yes.
+It cannot be that, if evil were the cause of a thing being friendly, one thing should be friendly to another when evil is abolished. For when a cause is abolished, that thing can no longer exist, I presume, which had this as its cause. You are right. Now we have agreed that the friend has a friendly feeling for something and because of something; and we supposed, just then, that it was because of evil that what was neither good nor bad loved the good.
+True. But now, it seems, we make out a different cause of loving and being loved. It seems so. Can it really be then, as we were saying just now, that desire is the cause of friendship, and the desiring thing is a friend to what which it desires, and is so at any time of desiring; while our earlier statement about friends was all mere drivel, like a poem strung out for mere length? It looks like it, he said. But still, I went on, the desiring thing desires
+that in which it is deficient, does it not? Yes. And the deficient is a friend to that in which it is deficient? I suppose so. And it becomes deficient in that of which it suffers a deprivation. To be sure. So it is one's own belongings, i.e. things that are proper or congenial to one. it seems, that are the objects of love and friendship and desire; so it appears, Menexenus and Lysis. They both agreed. Then if you two are friends to each other by some natural bond you belong to one another. Precisely, they said. And in a case where
+one person desires another, my boys, or loves him, he would never be desiring or loving or befriending him, unless he somehow belonged to his beloved either in soul, or in some disposition, demeanor or cast of soul. Yes, to be sure, said Menexenus; but Lysis was silent. Very well, said I: what belongs to us by nature has been shown to be something we needs must befriend. It seems so, he said. Then the genuine, not the pretended, lover must needs be befriended by his favorite.
+To this Lysis and Menexenus gave but a faint nod of assent; while Hippothales, in his delight, turned all manner of colors.So then, with the design of reviewing the argument, I proceeded: If there is any difference between what belongs and what is like, it seems to me, Lysis and Menexenus, that we might give some account of the meaning of “friend.” But if “like” and “belonging” are the same, it is not easy to get rid of our former statement, that the like is useless to the like in so far as they have likeness; and to admit that the useless is friendly
+would be a gross mistake. So how if we agree now, I said, since our argument has made us quite tipsy, to say that the belonging and the like are two different things? By all means. Then shall we maintain that the good itself belongs to every one, while the bad is alien? Or does the bad belong to the bad, the good to the good, and what is neither good nor bad to what is neither good nor bad? They agreed that the last three pairs belong together. So here again, boys,
+I said, we have dropped into the very statements regarding friendship which we rejected at first; for now the unjust will be as much a friend of the unjust, and the bad of the bad, as the good of the good. The word “belonging” seems to throw some light on “friend,” but even if we distinguish it from “like” it turns out to be just as indifferent to good and bad, and therefore just as remote from the moral significance of “friend.” So it seems, he said. And what is more, if we say that the good and the belonging are the same, we cannot avoid making the good a friend only to the good. To be sure. But this again, you know, is a view of which we thought we had disabused ourselves; you remember, do you not? We do.
+ So what more can we do with our argument? Obviously, I think, nothing. I can only ask you, accordingly, like the professional pleaders in the law courts, to perpend the whole of what has been said. If neither the loved nor the loving, nor the like nor the unlike, nor the good nor the belonging, nor all the rest that we have tried in turn—they are so many that I, for one, fail to remember any more—well, if none of these is a friend, I am at a loss for anything further to say.
+ Having thus spoken, I was minded to stir up somebody else among the older people there; when, like spirits from another world, there came upon us the tutors of Menexenus and Lysis: they were bringing along the boys' brothers, and called out to them the order to go home; for it was getting late. At first we tried, with the help of the group around us, to drive the tutors off; but they took no notice of us at all, and went on angrily calling, as before, in their foreign accent. We decided that
+they had taken a drop too much at the festival and might be awkward customers; so we gave in to them, and broke up our party. However, just as they were moving off, I remarked: Today, Lysis and Menexenus, we have made ourselves ridiculous—I, an old man, as well as you. For these others will go away and tell how we believe we are friends of one another—for I count myself in with you—but what a “friend” is, we have not yet succeeded in discovering.
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diff --git a/data/tlg0059/tlg020/tlg0059.tlg020.perseus-grc1.xml b/data/tlg0059/tlg020/tlg0059.tlg020.perseus-grc1.xml
index 67b219edd..b1e57dd47 100755
--- a/data/tlg0059/tlg020/tlg0059.tlg020.perseus-grc1.xml
+++ b/data/tlg0059/tlg020/tlg0059.tlg020.perseus-grc1.xml
@@ -68,104 +68,104 @@
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/tlg0059/tlg021/tlg0059.tlg021.perseus-eng1.xml b/data/tlg0059/tlg021/tlg0059.tlg021.perseus-eng1.xml
index cf79ccff5..bb48daca7 100755
--- a/data/tlg0059/tlg021/tlg0059.tlg021.perseus-eng1.xml
+++ b/data/tlg0059/tlg021/tlg0059.tlg021.perseus-eng1.xml
@@ -68,14 +68,14 @@
CritoSocratesEuthydemusDionysodorusCleiniasCtesippusCrito
Who was it, Socrates, that you were talking with yesterday at the Lyceum? Why, there was such a crowd standing about you that when I came up in the hope of listening I could hear nothing distinctly: still, by craning over I got a glimpse, and it appeared to me that it was a stranger with whom you were talking. Who was he?
Socrates
About which are you asking, Crito? There were two of them, not one.
Crito
The man whom I mean was sitting next but one to you, on your right:
-between you was Axiochus' boy; and he, Socrates, seemed to me to have grown a great deal, so as to look almost the same age as my Critobulus, who is rather puny whereas this boy has come on finely, and has a noble air about him.
Socrates
Euthydemus is the person to whom you refer, Crito, and the one sitting on my left was his brother, Dionysodorus. He too takes part in our discussions.
Crito
Neither of them is known to me, Socrates. A pair of fresh additions,
+between you was Axiochus’ boy; and he, Socrates, seemed to me to have grown a great deal, so as to look almost the same age as my Critobulus, who is rather puny whereas this boy has come on finely, and has a noble air about him.
Socrates
Euthydemus is the person to whom you refer, Crito, and the one sitting on my left was his brother, Dionysodorus. He too takes part in our discussions.
Crito
Neither of them is known to me, Socrates. A pair of fresh additions,
I suppose, to our sophists. Where do they hail from, and what science do they profess?
Socrates
By birth I believe they belong to these parts, that is to say, Chios; they went out as colonists to Thurii, but have been exiled thence and have spent a good many years now in various parts of this country. As to what you ask of their profession, it is a wonderful one, Crito. These two men are absolutely omniscient: I never knew before what “all-round sportsmen”The phrase refers especially to a very vigorous sport which combined wrestling and boxing. were. They are a pair of regular all-round fighters—not in the style of the famous all-round athletes, the two brothers of Acamania;
they could fight with their bodies only. But these two, in the first place, are most formidable in body and in fight against all comers—for they are not only well skilled themselves in fighting under arms,
but are able to impart that skill, for a fee, to another; and further, they are most competent also to fight the battle of the law-courts and teach others how to speak, or to have composed for them, such speeches as may win their suits. Formerly they had merely some ability for this; but now they have put the finishing touch to their skill as all-round sportsmen. The one feat of fighting yet unperformed by them they have now accomplished, so that nobody dares stand up to them for a moment; such a faculty they have acquired for wielding words as their weapons and confuting any argument as readily
-if it be true as if it be false. And so I, Crito, am minded to place myself in these two gentlemen's hands; for they say it would take them but a little while to make anyone else clever in just the same way.
Crito
What, Socrates! Are you not afraid, at your time of life, that you may be too old for that now?
Socrates
Not at all, Crito: I have enough proof and reassurance to the contrary. These same two persons were little less than old men at the time of their taking up this science, which I desire to have, of disputation.
-Last year, or the year before, they were as yet without their science. The only thing I am afraid of is that I may bring the same disgrace upon our two visitors as upon Connus, son of Metrobius, the harper, who is still trying to teach me the harp; so that the boys who go to his lessons with me make fun of me and call Connus “the gaffers' master.” This makes me fear that someone may make the same reproach to the two strangers; and, for aught I know, their dread of this very thing may make them unwilling to accept me. So, Crito, just as in the other case I have persuaded some elderly men to come and have lessons with me,
+if it be true as if it be false. And so I, Crito, am minded to place myself in these two gentlemen’s hands; for they say it would take them but a little while to make anyone else clever in just the same way.
Crito
What, Socrates! Are you not afraid, at your time of life, that you may be too old for that now?
Socrates
Not at all, Crito: I have enough proof and reassurance to the contrary. These same two persons were little less than old men at the time of their taking up this science, which I desire to have, of disputation.
+Last year, or the year before, they were as yet without their science. The only thing I am afraid of is that I may bring the same disgrace upon our two visitors as upon Connus, son of Metrobius, the harper, who is still trying to teach me the harp; so that the boys who go to his lessons with me make fun of me and call Connus “the gaffers’ master.” This makes me fear that someone may make the same reproach to the two strangers; and, for aught I know, their dread of this very thing may make them unwilling to accept me. So, Crito, just as in the other case I have persuaded some elderly men to come and have lessons with me,
in this affair I am going to try and persuade another set. Now you, I am sure, will come with me to school; and we will take your sons as a bait to entice them, for I have no doubt that the attraction of these young fellows will make them include us also in the class.
Crito
I have no objection, Socrates, if you think fit to do so. But first you must explain to me what is the science these men profess, that I may know what it is we are going to learn.
Socrates
You shall be told at once; for I cannot plead that I did not give them my attention, since I not only attended closely but remember and will try
-to expound the whole thing from the beginning. By some providence I chanced to be sitting in the place where you saw me, in the undressing-room,This gymnasium (the Lyceum) was a public one, open to persons of all ages, and was a common resort of Socrates and the sophists. alone, and was just intending to get up and go; but the moment I did so, there came my wonted spiritual sign.Socrates believed that his conduct was occasionally guided by a spiritual voice or sign peculiar to himself. By Plato's account it was always negative, but the present instance shows how Xenophon might have some reason for saying that it was sometimes positive. So I sat down again,
+to expound the whole thing from the beginning. By some providence I chanced to be sitting in the place where you saw me, in the undressing-room,This gymnasium (the Lyceum) was a public one, open to persons of all ages, and was a common resort of Socrates and the sophists. alone, and was just intending to get up and go; but the moment I did so, there came my wonted spiritual sign.Socrates believed that his conduct was occasionally guided by a spiritual voice or sign peculiar to himself. By Plato’s account it was always negative, but the present instance shows how Xenophon might have some reason for saying that it was sometimes positive. So I sat down again,
and after a little while these two persons entered—Euthydemus and Dionysodorus—and accompanying them, quite a number, as it seemed to me, of their pupils: the two men came in and began walking round inside the cloister.The cloister ran round the central open court, and was reached by passing through the undressing-room. Hardly had they taken two or three turns, when in stepped Cleinias, who you say has come on so much, and you are right: behind him was a whole troop of lovers, and among them Ctesippus, a young fellow from Paeania, of gentle birth and breeding, except for a certain insolence of youth.
So when Cleinias as he entered caught sight of me sitting there alone, he came straight across and sat beside me on my right, just as you say. Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, when they saw him, stood at first talking with each other, and casting an occasional glance at us—for my attention was fixed on them—but then one of them, Euthydemus, took a seat by the youth, and the other next to me on my left; the rest, where each happened to find one.
So I greeted the two brothers, as not having seen them for some time; after that I said to Cleinias: My dear Cleinias, these two men, you know, are skilled not in little things, but in great. For they understand all about war, that is, as much as is needful for him who is to be a good general; both the tactics and the strategy of armies, and all the teaching of troops under arms; and they can also enable one to get redress in the law courts for a wrong that one may have suffered.When I had said this,
@@ -83,10 +83,10 @@
Good heavens, I exclaimed, a mighty affair indeed! Where did you have the luck to pick it up? I was still considering you, as I remarked just now, to be chiefly skilled in fighting under arms, and so spoke of you in those terms: for when you visited, our city before, this, I recollect, was the profession you made. But if you now in truth possess this other knowledge, have mercy—you see I address you just as though you were a couple of gods, beseeching you to forgive my former remarks.
But make sure, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, that you spoke the truth: for the vastness of your promise gives me some excuse for disbelieving.You may be sure, Socrates, they replied, it is as we say.Then I congratulate you on your acquisition far more than I do the great king on his empire: only tell me whether you intend to exhibit this science of yours, or what you have determined to do.We are here for the very purpose, Socrates, of exhibiting
and expounding it to anyone who wishes to learn.Well, I guarantee that all who do not possess it will wish to—myself to begin with, then Cleinias here and, besides us, Ctesippus and all these others, I said, showing him the lovers of Cleinias, who were by this time standing about us. For Ctesippus, as it happened, was sitting some way from Cleinias, I noticed; and by chance, as Euthydemus leant forward
-in talking to me he obscured Ctesipus' view of Cleinias, who was between us. Then Ctesippus, desiring to gaze on his favorite and being also an eager listener, led the way by jumping up and placing himself opposite us; and this made the others, on seeing what he did, stand around us, both Cleinias' lovers and the followers of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. Pointing to these, I told Euthydemus that they were all ready to learn; to which Ctesippus assented with great eagerness,
+in talking to me he obscured Ctesipus’ view of Cleinias, who was between us. Then Ctesippus, desiring to gaze on his favorite and being also an eager listener, led the way by jumping up and placing himself opposite us; and this made the others, on seeing what he did, stand around us, both Cleinias’ lovers and the followers of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. Pointing to these, I told Euthydemus that they were all ready to learn; to which Ctesippus assented with great eagerness,
and so did the rest; and they all joined in urging the two men to exhibit the power of their wisdom.On this I remarked: My good Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, you must do your very best to gratify my friends and, for my sake also, to give us an exhibition. To do it in full, of course, would obviously be a lengthy performance: but tell me one thing—will you be able to make a good man of him only who is already convinced that he should learn of you,
or of him also who is not yet so convinced, owing to an absolute disbelief that virtue is a thing that can be learnt or that you are teachers of it? Come now, is it the business of this same art to persuade such a man that virtue is teachable and that you are the men of whom one may best learn it, or does this need some other art?No, this same one can do it, Socrates, said Dionysodorus.Then you two, Dionysodorus, I said, would be the best persons now on earth to incite one to the pursuit of knowledge
-and the practice of virtue?We think so, at least, Socrates.Well then, please defer the display of all the rest to some other occasion, I said, and exhibit this one thing. You are to persuade this young fellow here that he ought to ensue wisdom and practise virtue, and so you will oblige both me and all these present. This youth happens to be in just the sort of condition I speak of; and I and all of us here are at this moment anxious for him to become as good as possible. He is the son of Axiochus, son of the former Alcibiades,i.e. the famous Alcibiades, who died in 404 B.C. at the age of 44. The supposed time of this discussion must be a year or two before Socrates' death (399 B.C.).
+and the practice of virtue?We think so, at least, Socrates.Well then, please defer the display of all the rest to some other occasion, I said, and exhibit this one thing. You are to persuade this young fellow here that he ought to ensue wisdom and practise virtue, and so you will oblige both me and all these present. This youth happens to be in just the sort of condition I speak of; and I and all of us here are at this moment anxious for him to become as good as possible. He is the son of Axiochus, son of the former Alcibiades,i.e. the famous Alcibiades, who died in 404 B.C. at the age of 44. The supposed time of this discussion must be a year or two before Socrates’ death (399 B.C.). and is own cousin to the Alcibiades that now is: his name is Cleinias. He is young; and so we have fears for him, as well one may for a young man, lest someone forestall us and turn his inclination to some other course of life, and so corrupt him. Hence your arrival now is most happy. Come now, if it is all the same to you, make trial of the lad and talk with him in our presence.When I had thus spoken, in almost these very words, Euthydemus answered in a tone both manly and dashing: Oh, it is all the same to us,
Socrates, provided the youth is willing to answer us.Why, in fact, I said, that is just what he is used to: these people here are constantly coming to him and asking him a number of questions and debating with him, so he is a fairly fearless answerer.What ensued, Crito, how am I to relate in proper style? For no slight matter it is to be able to recall in description such enormous knowledge as theirs.
Consequently, like the poets, I must needs begin my narrative with an invocation of the Muses and Memory. Well, Euthydemus set to work, so far as I remember, in terms very much the same as these: Cleinias, which sort of men are the learners, the wise or the foolish?At this the young man, feeling the embarrassment of the question, blushed and glanced at me in his helplessness. So I, perceiving his confusion, said: Have no fear, Cleinias; answer bravely,
@@ -94,20 +94,20 @@
the boy to be wary: he replied that it was the wise who were the learners.Then Euthydemus asked: And are there persons whom you call teachers, or not?He agreed that there were.And the teachers of the learners are teachers in the same way as your lute-master and your writing-master, I suppose, were teachers of you and the other boys, while you were pupils?He assented.Now, of course, when you were learning, you did not yet know the things you were learning?
No, he said.So were you wise, when you did not know those things?No, to be sure, he said.Then if not wise, foolish?Certainly.So when you learnt what you did not know, you learnt while being foolish.To this the lad nodded assent.Hence it is the foolish who learn, Cleinias, and not the wise, as you suppose.When he had thus spoken, all those followers of Dionysodorus
and Euthydemus raised a cheer and a laugh, like a chorus at the signal of their director; and before the boy could fairly and fully recover his breath Dionysodorus took up the cudgels and said: Well now, Cleinias, whenever your writing-master dictated from memory, which of the boys learnt the piece recited, the wise or the foolish?The wise, said Cleinias.So it is the wise who learn, and not the foolish: hence the answer you gave just now to Euthydemus was a bad one.
- Thereupon arose a great deal of laughter and loud applause from the pair's adorers, in admiration of their cleverness; while we on our side were dismayed and held our peace. Then Euthydemus, observing our dismay, and seeking to astonish us still further, would not let the boy go, but went on questioning him and, like a skilful dancer, gave a twofold twist to his questions on the same point: Now, do the learners learn what they know, he asked, or what they do not?Then Dionysodorus whispered to me again softly:
+ Thereupon arose a great deal of laughter and loud applause from the pair’s adorers, in admiration of their cleverness; while we on our side were dismayed and held our peace. Then Euthydemus, observing our dismay, and seeking to astonish us still further, would not let the boy go, but went on questioning him and, like a skilful dancer, gave a twofold twist to his questions on the same point: Now, do the learners learn what they know, he asked, or what they do not?Then Dionysodorus whispered to me again softly:
Here comes a second one, Socrates, just like the first.Heavens! I replied: surely the first question served you well enough.All our questions, Socrates, he said, are like that; they leave no escape.And consequently, as it seems to me, I remarked, you have this high repute among your disciples.Meanwhile Cleinias answered Euthydemus, that learners learnt what they did not know; so he had to meet the same course of questions as before:
Well then, asked the other, do you not know your letters?Yes, he said.All of them?He admitted it.Now when anyone dictates some piece or other, does he not dictate letters?He admitted it.And he dictates things of which you know something, since you know all of them?He admitted this too.Well now, said the other, surely you do not learn whatever such a person dictates; it is rather he who does not know his letters that learns?No, he replied; I learn.Then you learn what you know, since you know all your letters.
- He agreed.So your answer was not correct, he said.The last word was hardly out of Euthydemus' mouth when Dionysodorus caught, as it were, the ball of the argument and, aiming at the boy again, said: Euthydemus is deceiving you, Cleinias. Tell me, is not learning the reception of knowledge of that which one learns?Cleinias agreed.And is not knowing, he went on, just having knowledge at the time?He assented.So that not knowing
+ He agreed.So your answer was not correct, he said.The last word was hardly out of Euthydemus’ mouth when Dionysodorus caught, as it were, the ball of the argument and, aiming at the boy again, said: Euthydemus is deceiving you, Cleinias. Tell me, is not learning the reception of knowledge of that which one learns?Cleinias agreed.And is not knowing, he went on, just having knowledge at the time?He assented.So that not knowing
is not yet having knowledge?He agreed with him.Then are those who receive anything those who have it already, or those who have it not?Those who have it not.And you have admitted that those who do not know belong also to this class of those who have it not?He nodded assent.And the learners belong to the class of the receiving and not to that of the having?He agreed.Hence it is those who do not know that learn, Cleinias, and not those who know.Euthydemus was proceeding to press the youth for the third fall, when I,
perceiving the lad was going under, and wishing to give him some breathing-space lest he should shame us by losing heart, encouraged him with these words: Cleinias, do not be surprised that these arguments seem strange to you; for perhaps you do not discern what our two visitors are doing to you. They are acting just like the celebrants of the Corybantic rites, when they perform the enthronement of the person whom they are about to initiate. There, as you know, if you have been through it, they have dancing and merrymaking: so here these two
are merely dancing about you and performing their sportive gambols with a view to your subsequent initiation. You must now, accordingly, suppose you are listening to the first part of the professorial mysteries. First of all, as Prodicus says, you have to learn about the correct use of words—the very point that our two visitors are making plain to you, namely, that you were unaware that learning is the name which people apply on the one hand to the case of a man who, having originally no knowledge about some matter, in course of time receives such knowledge;
and on the other hand the same word is applied when, having the knowledge already, he uses that knowledge for the investigation of the same matter whether occurring in action or in speech. It is true that they tend rather to call it “understanding” than “learning”, but occasionally they call it learning too; and this point, as our friends are demonstrating, has escaped your notice—how the same word is used for people who are in the opposite conditions of knowing and not knowing. A similar point underlay the second question, where they asked you
whether people learn what they know, or what they do not. Such things are the sport of the sciences—and that is why I tell you these men are making game of you; I call it sport because, although one were to learn many or even all of such tricks, one would be not a whit the wiser as to the true state of the matters in hand, but only able to make game of people, thanks to the difference in the sense of the words, by tripping them up and overturning them; just as those who slyly pull stools away from persons who are about to sit down
-make merry and laugh when they see one sprawling on one's back. So far, then, you are to regard these gentlemen's treatment of you as mere play: but after this they will doubtless display to you their own serious object, while I shall keep them on the track and see that they fulfil the promise they gave me. They said they would exhibit their skill in exhortation; but instead, I conceive, they thought fit to make sport with you first. So now, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus,
+make merry and laugh when they see one sprawling on one’s back. So far, then, you are to regard these gentlemen’s treatment of you as mere play: but after this they will doubtless display to you their own serious object, while I shall keep them on the track and see that they fulfil the promise they gave me. They said they would exhibit their skill in exhortation; but instead, I conceive, they thought fit to make sport with you first. So now, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus,
let us have done with your sport: I daresay you have had as much as you want. What you have next to do is to give us a display of exhorting this youth as to how he should devote himself to wisdom and virtue. But first I shall explain to you how I regard this matter and how I desire to hear it dealt with. If I strike you as treating it in a crude and ridiculous manner, do not laugh me to scorn; for in my eagerness
to listen to your wisdom I shall venture to improvise in your presence. So both you and your disciples must restrain yourselves and listen without laughing; and you, son of Axiochus, answer me this:Do all we human beings wish to prosper? Or is this question one of the absurdities I was afraid of just now? For I suppose it is stupid merely to ask such things, since every man must wish to prosper.
Everyone in the world, said Cleinias.Well then, I asked, as to the next step, since we wish to prosper, how can we prosper? Will it be if we have many good things? Or is this an even sillier question than the other? For surely this too must obviously be so.He agreed.Come now, of things that are, what sort do we hold to be really good ? Or does it appear to be no difficult matter, and no problem for an important person, to find here too a ready answer? Anyone will tell us that to be rich is good, surely?Quite true, he said.Then it is the same with being healthy and handsome, and having the other bodily endowments
-in plenty?He agreed.Again, it is surely clear that good birth and talents and distinctions in one's own country are good things.He admitted it.Then what have we still remaining, I asked, in the class of goods? What of being temperate, and just, and brave? I bay you tell me, Cleinias, do you think we shall be right in ranking these as goods, or in rejecting them? For it may be that someone will dispute it. How does it strike you?They are goods; said Cleinias.Very well, I went on,
+in plenty?He agreed.Again, it is surely clear that good birth and talents and distinctions in one’s own country are good things.He admitted it.Then what have we still remaining, I asked, in the class of goods? What of being temperate, and just, and brave? I bay you tell me, Cleinias, do you think we shall be right in ranking these as goods, or in rejecting them? For it may be that someone will dispute it. How does it strike you?They are goods; said Cleinias.Very well, I went on,
and where in the troupe shall we station wisdom? Among the goods, or how?Among the goods.Then take heed that we do not pass over any of the goods that may deserve mention.I do not think we are leaving any out, said Cleinias.Hereupon I recollected one and said: Yes, by Heaven, we are on the verge of omitting the greatest of the goods.What is that? he asked.Good fortune, Cleinias: a thing which all men, even the worst fools, refer to as the greatest of goods.You are right, he said.Once again I reconsidered and said:
We have almost made ourselves laughing-stocks, you and I, son of Axiochus, for our visitors.What is wrong now? he asked.Why, after putting good fortune in our former list, we have just been discussing the same thing again.What is the point?Surely it is ridiculous, when a thing has been before us all the time, to set it forth again and go over the same ground twice.To what are you referring? he asked.Wisdom, I replied, is presumably good fortune: even a child could see that.He wondered at this—he is still so young and simple-minded: then I, perceiving his surprise, went on: Can you be unaware,
Cleinias, that for success in flute-music it is the flute-players that have the best fortune?He agreed to this.Then in writing and reading letters it will be the schoolmasters.GRAMMATISTAI/ were the schoolmasters who taught reading and writing and explained the difficulties of Homer in primary education.Certainly.Well now, for the dangers of a sea-voyage, do you consider any pilots to he more fortunate, as a general rule, than the wise ones?No, to be sure.Well, then, suppose you were on a campaign, with which kind of general would you prefer to share both the peril and the luck—a wise one, or an ignorant?With a wise one.Well then, supposing you were sick, with which kind of doctor would you like to venture yourself a wise one, or an ignorant?With a wise one.
@@ -117,20 +117,20 @@
by what he had got?By no means, he said.Well now, suppose a man had got wealth and all the goods that we mentioned just now, but made no use of them; would he be happy because of his possessing these goods?Surely not, Socrates.So it seems one must not merely have acquired such goods if one is to be happy, but use them too; else there is no benefit gained from their possession.True.Then have we here enough means,
Cleinias, for making a man happy—in the possession of these goods and using them?I think so.Shall we say, I asked, if he uses them rightly, or just as much if he does not?If rightly.Well answered, I said; for I suppose there is more mischief when a man uses anything wrongly than when he lets it alone. In the one case there is evil; in the other there is neither evil
nor good. May we not state it so?He agreed.To proceed then: in the working and use connected with wood, is there anything else that effects the right use than the knowledge of carpentry? Surely not, he said.Further, I presume that in the working connected with furniture it is knowledge that effects the right work.Yes, he said.Then similarly, I went on, in the use of the goods we mentioned at first—wealth and health and beauty—was it knowledge that showed the way to the right use of all those advantages
-and rectified their conduct, or was it something else?Knowledge, he replied.So that knowledge, it would seem, supplies mankind not only with good luck, but with welfare, in all that he either possesses or conducts.He agreed.Then can we, in Heaven's name, get any benefit from all the other possessions without understanding and wisdom? Shall we say that a man will profit more by possessing much and doing much when he has no sense, than he will if he does and possesses little? Consider it this way:
+and rectified their conduct, or was it something else?Knowledge, he replied.So that knowledge, it would seem, supplies mankind not only with good luck, but with welfare, in all that he either possesses or conducts.He agreed.Then can we, in Heaven’s name, get any benefit from all the other possessions without understanding and wisdom? Shall we say that a man will profit more by possessing much and doing much when he has no sense, than he will if he does and possesses little? Consider it this way:
would he not err less if he did less; and so, erring less, do less ill; and hence, doing less ill, be less miserable?Certainly, he said.In which of the two cases, when one is poor or when one is rich, will one be more likely to do less?When one is poor, he said.And when one is weak, or when one is strong?Weak.And when one has high position, or has none?None.When one is brave and self-controlled, will one do less, or when one is a coward?A coward.So too, when idle rather than busy?He agreed.And slow rather than quick,
and dim of sight and hearing rather than sharp?We agreed with each other as to these and all such cases.To sum up then, Cleinias, I proceeded, it seems that, as regards the whole lot of things which at first we termed goods, the discussion they demand is not on the question of how they are in themselves and by nature goods, but rather, I conceive, as follows: if they are guided by ignorance, they are greater evils than their opposites, according as they are more capable of ministering to their evil guide; whereas if understanding and wisdom guide them,
they are greater goods; but in themselves neither sort is of any worth.I think the case appears, he replied, to be as you suggest.Now what result do we get from our statements? Is it not precisely that, of all the other things, not one is either good or bad, but of these two, wisdom is good and ignorance bad?
He agreed.Let us consider then, I said, the further conclusion that lies before us. Since we are all eager to be happy, and since we were found to become so by not only using things but using them aright, while knowledge, we saw, was that which provided the rightness and good fortune, it seems that every man must prepare himself by all available means so that he may be as wise as possible. Is it not so?Yes, he said.And if a man thinks, as well he may,
-that he ought to get this endowment from his father much more than money, and also from his guardians and his ordinary friends, and from those who profess to be his lovers, whether strangers or fellow-citizens—praying and beseeching them to give him his share of wisdom; there is no disgrace, Cleinias, or reprobation in making this a reason for serving and being a slave to either one's lover or any man, and being ready to perform any service that is honorable in one's eagerness to become wise. Is not this your view? I asked.I think you are
+that he ought to get this endowment from his father much more than money, and also from his guardians and his ordinary friends, and from those who profess to be his lovers, whether strangers or fellow-citizens—praying and beseeching them to give him his share of wisdom; there is no disgrace, Cleinias, or reprobation in making this a reason for serving and being a slave to either one’s lover or any man, and being ready to perform any service that is honorable in one’s eagerness to become wise. Is not this your view? I asked.I think you are
perfectly right, he replied.Yes, Cleinias, I went on, if wisdom is teachable, and does not present itself to mankind of its own accord—for this is a question that we have still to consider as not yet agreed on by you and me.For my part, Socrates, he said, I think it is teachable.At this I was glad, and said: Well spoken indeed, my excellent friend! How good of you to relieve me of a long inquiry into this very point, whether wisdom is teachable or not teachable! So now, since you think it is both teachable and
-the only thing in the world that makes man happy and fortunate, can you help saying that it is necessary to pursue wisdom or intending to pursue it yourself?Why, said he, I do say so, Socrates, with all my might.So I, delighted to hear this, said: There, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, is my illustration of what I desire a hortatory argument to be—rough and ready, perhaps, and expressed at laborious length: now let either of you who wishes to do so give us an example of an artist's handling of this same matter. If you do not wish to do that,
+the only thing in the world that makes man happy and fortunate, can you help saying that it is necessary to pursue wisdom or intending to pursue it yourself?Why, said he, I do say so, Socrates, with all my might.So I, delighted to hear this, said: There, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, is my illustration of what I desire a hortatory argument to be—rough and ready, perhaps, and expressed at laborious length: now let either of you who wishes to do so give us an example of an artist’s handling of this same matter. If you do not wish to do that,
let your display begin where I left off, and show the lad whether he ought to acquire every kind of knowledge, or whether there is a single sort of it which one must obtain if one is to be both happy and a good man, and what it is. For as I was saying at the outset, it really is a matter of great moment to us that this youth should become
wise and good.These were my words, Crito; and I set about giving the closest attention to what should follow, and observing in what fashion they would deal with the question, and how they would start exhorting the youth to practise wisdom and virtue. So then the elder of them, Dionysodorus, entered first upon the discussion, and we all turned our eyes on him expecting to hear, there and then, some wonderful arguments. And this result we certainly got;
for wondrous, in a way, Crito, was the argument that the man then ushered forth, which is worth your hearing as a notable incitement to virtue.Tell me, Socrates, he said, and all you others who say you desire this youth to become wise, whether you say this in jest or truly and earnestly desire it.At this I reflected that previously, as it seemed, they took us to be jesting, when we urged them to converse with the youth, and hence they made a jest of it
and did not take it seriously. This reflection therefore made me insist all the more that we were in deadly earnest.Then Dionysodorus said: Yet be careful, Socrates, that you do not have to deny what you say now.I know what I am about, I said: I know I shall never deny it.Well now, he proceeded; you tell me you wish him to become wise?Certainly.And at present, be asked, is Cleinias wise or not?He says he is not yet so—he is no vain pretender.And you, he went on,
wish him to become wise, and not to be ignorant?We agreed.So you wish him to become what he is not, and to be no longer what he now is.When I heard this I was confused; and he, striking in on my confusion, said: Of course then, since you wish him to be no longer what he now is, you wish him, apparently, to be dead. And yet what valuable friends and lovers they must be, who would give anything to know their darling was dead and gone!
- Ctesippus, on hearing this, was annoyed on his favorite's account, and said: Stranger of Thurii, were it not rather a rude thing to say, I should tell you, ill betide your design of speaking so falsely of me and my friends as to make out—what to me is almost too profane even to repeat—that I could wish this boy to be dead and gone!Why, Ctesippus, said Euthydemus, do you think it possible to lie?To be sure, I do, he replied: I should be mad otherwise.Do you mean, when one tells the thing about which
+ Ctesippus, on hearing this, was annoyed on his favorite’s account, and said: Stranger of Thurii, were it not rather a rude thing to say, I should tell you, ill betide your design of speaking so falsely of me and my friends as to make out—what to me is almost too profane even to repeat—that I could wish this boy to be dead and gone!Why, Ctesippus, said Euthydemus, do you think it possible to lie?To be sure, I do, he replied: I should be mad otherwise.Do you mean, when one tells the thing about which
one is telling, or when one does not?When one tells it, he said.Then if you tell it, you tell just that thing which you tell, of all that are, and nothing else whatever?Of course, said Ctesippus.Now the thing that you tell is a single one, distinct from all the others there are.Certainly.Then the person who tells that thing tells that which is?Yes.But yet, surely he who tells what is, and things that are, tells the truth: so that Dionysodorus, if he tells things that are, tells the truth and speaks no lie about you.Yes, said Ctesippus;
but he who speaks as he did, Euthydemus, does not say things that are.Then Euthydemus asked him: And the things which are not, surely are not?They are not.Then nowhere can the things that are not be?Nowhere.Then is it possible for anyone whatever so to deal with these things that are not as to make them be when they are nowhere?I think not, said Ctesippus.Well now, when orators speak before the people, do they do nothing?No, they do something, he replied.Then if they do,
they also make?Yes.Now, is speaking doing and making?He agreed that it is.No one, I suppose, speaks what is not—for thereby he would be making something; and you have agreed that one cannot so much as make what is not—so that, by your account, no one speaks what is false, while if Dionysodorus speaks, he speaks what is true and is.Yes, in faith, Euthydemus, said Ctesippus; but somehow or other he speaks what is, only not as it is.The quibbling throughout this passage is a willful confusion of the two very different uses of the verb “to be” (EI)=NAI), (a) in predication, where it has nothing to do with existence, and (b) by itself, as stating existence.How do you mean, Ctesippus? said Dionysodorus.
@@ -139,20 +139,20 @@
that I wish these my most highly valued friends to be dead and gone.So then I, observing that they were getting rather savage with each other, began to poke fun. at Ctesippus, saying: Ctesippus, my feeling is that we ought to accept from our visitors what they tell us, if they are so good as to give it, and should not quarrel over a word. For if they understand how to do away with people in such sort as to change them from wicked and witless to honest and intelligent, and that too whether they have discovered for themselves
or learnt from somebody else this peculiar kind of destruction or undoing, which enables them to destroy a man in his wickedness and set him up again in honesty; if they understand this—and obviously they do; you know they said that their newly discovered art was to turn wicked men into good—let us then accord them this power; let them destroy the lad for us, and make him sensible, and all the rest of us likewise. If you young fellows are afraid, let the experiment be made on me
as a “corpus vile”Lit. “a Carian slave.”; for I, being an elderly person, am ready to take the risk and put myself in the hands of Dionysodorus here, as if he were the famous Medea of Colchis. Let him destroy me, and if he likes let him boil me down, or do to me whatever he pleases: only he must make me good.Then Ctesippus said: I too, Socrates, am ready to offer myself to be skinned by the strangers even more, if they choose, than they are doing now, if my hide
-is not to end by being made into a wine-skin, like that of Marsyas,This satyr was fabled to have challenged Apollo to a musical contest, and on his fluting being judged inferior to Apollo's harping he was flayed alive by the god for his presumption, and his skin was hung up like a bag or bottle in a cave; cf. Herod. vii. 26. but into the shape of virtue. And yet Dionysodorus here believes I am vexed with him. I am not vexed at all; I only contradict the remarks which I think he has improperly aimed at me. Come now, my generous Dionysodorus, do not call contradiction abuse: abuse is quite another thing.On this Dionysodorus said: As though there were such a thing as contradiction! Is that the way you argue, Ctesippus?Yes, to be sure, he replied, indeed I do; and do you, Dionysodorus,
+is not to end by being made into a wine-skin, like that of Marsyas,This satyr was fabled to have challenged Apollo to a musical contest, and on his fluting being judged inferior to Apollo’s harping he was flayed alive by the god for his presumption, and his skin was hung up like a bag or bottle in a cave; cf. Herod. vii. 26. but into the shape of virtue. And yet Dionysodorus here believes I am vexed with him. I am not vexed at all; I only contradict the remarks which I think he has improperly aimed at me. Come now, my generous Dionysodorus, do not call contradiction abuse: abuse is quite another thing.On this Dionysodorus said: As though there were such a thing as contradiction! Is that the way you argue, Ctesippus?Yes, to be sure, he replied, indeed I do; and do you, Dionysodorus,
hold that there is not?Well, you at any rate, he said, could not prove that you had ever heard a single person contradicting another.Is that so? he replied: well, let us hear now whether I can prove a case of it—Ctesippus contradicting Dionysodorus.Now, will you make that good?Certainly, he said.Well then, proceeded the other, each thing that is has its own description?Certainly.Then do you mean,
as each is, or as it is not?As it is.Yes, he said, for if you recollect, Ctesippus, we showed just now that no one speaks of a thing as it is not; since we saw that no one speaks what is not.Well, what of that? asked Ctesippus: are you and I contradicting any the less?Now tell me, he said, could we contradict if we both spoke the description of the same thing? In this case should we not surely speak the same words?He agreed.But when neither of us speaks the description of the thing, he asked,
then we should contradict? Or in this case shall we say that neither of us touched on the matter at all?This also he admitted.Well now, when I for my part speak the description of the thing, while you give another of another thing, do we contradict then? Or do I describe the thing, while you do not describe it at all? How can he who does not describe contradict him who does?The argument is that, if we cannot speak what is not, or falsely, of a thing (this assumption being based on the old confusion of being with existence), there can be only one description of a thing in any given relation, and so there is no room for contradiction. This argument is commonly ascribed to Anthisthenes, the founder of the Cynic sect and opponent of Plato. It is not clear who exactly are meant by “the followers of Protagoras” or the “others before his time.”At this Ctesippus was silent; but I, wondering at the argument, said: How do you mean, Dionysodorus?
For, to be plain with you, this argument, though I have heard it from many people on various occasions, never fails to set me wondering—you know the followers of Protagoras made great use of it, as did others even before his time, but to me it always seems to have a wonderful way of upsetting not merely other views but itself also—and I believe I shall learn the truth of it from you far better than from anyone else. There is no such thing as speaking false—that is the substance of your statement, is it not? Either one must speak and speak the truth, or else not speak?He agreed.
Then shall we say that speaking false “is not,” but thinking false “is”?No, it is the same with thinking, he said.So neither is there any false opinion, I said, at all.No, he said.Nor ignorance, nor ignorant men; or must not ignorance occur, if it ever can, when we put things falsely?Certainly, he said.But there is no such thing as this, I said.No, he said.Is it merely to save your statement, Dionysodorus, that you state it so—just to say something startling—or is it really and truly your view that there is no such thing as an ignorant man?
But you, he replied, are to refute me.Well, does your argument allow of such a thing as refutation, if there is nobody to speak false?There is no such thing, said Euthydemus.So neither did Dionysodorus just now bid me refute him? I asked.No, for how can one bid something that is not? Do you bid such a thing?Well, Euthydemus, I said, it is because I do not at all understand these clever devices and palpable hits: I am only a dull sort of thinker. And so I may perhaps be going to say something rather clownish; but you must forgive me. Here it is:
-if there is no such thing as speaking false or thinking false or being stupid, surely there can be no making a mistake either, when one does something. For in doing it there is no mistaking the thing that is done. You will state it so, will you not?Certainly, he said.My clownish question, I went on, is now already before you. If we make no mistake either in doing or saying or intending, I ask you what in Heaven's name, on that assumption, is the subject you two set up to teach. Or did you not say just now that your speciality was to put any man who wished
+if there is no such thing as speaking false or thinking false or being stupid, surely there can be no making a mistake either, when one does something. For in doing it there is no mistaking the thing that is done. You will state it so, will you not?Certainly, he said.My clownish question, I went on, is now already before you. If we make no mistake either in doing or saying or intending, I ask you what in Heaven’s name, on that assumption, is the subject you two set up to teach. Or did you not say just now that your speciality was to put any man who wished
in the way of learning virtue?Now really, Socrates, interposed Dionysodorus, are you such an old dotard as to recollect now what we said at first, and will you now recollect what I may have said last year, and yet be at a loss how to deal with the arguments urged at the moment?Well, you see, I replied, they are so very hard, and naturally so; for they fall from the lips of wise men; and this is further shown by the extreme difficulty of dealing with this last one you put forward. For what on earth do you mean, Dionysodorus, by saying I am at a loss how to deal with it? Or is it clear that
you mean I am at a loss how to refute it? You must tell me what else your phrase can intend, “at a loss how to deal with the arguments.”But it is not so very hard to deal with that phrasei.e. NOEI=, “intend.” of yours, he said. Just answer me.Before you answer me, Dionysodorus? I protested.You refuse to answer? he said.Is it fair?Oh yes, it is fair enough, he repliedOn what principle? I asked: or is it plainly on this one—that you present yourself to us at this moment as universally skilled in discussion, and thus can tell when an answer is to be given, and when not? So now you will not answer a word,
because you discern that you ought not to.What nonsense you talk, he said, instead of answering as you should. Come, good sir, do as I bid you and answer, since you confess to my wisdom.Well then, I must obey, I said, and of necessity, it seems; for you are the master here. Now for your question.Then tell me, do things that “intend” have life when they intend, or do lifeless things do it too?Only those that have life.Now do you know any phrase that has life?Upon my soul, I do not.
Why then did you ask just now what my phrase intended?Of course I made a great mistake, I said: I am such a dullard. Or perhaps it was not a mistake, and I was right in saying what I did, that phrases intend. Do you say I was mistaken or not? If I was not, then you will not refute me, with all your skill, and you are at a loss how to deal with the argument; while if I was mistaken, you are in the wrong there, too,
for you assert that there is no such thing as making a mistake; and what I say is not aimed at what you said last year. But it seems, I went on, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, that our argument remains just where it was, and still suffers from the old trouble of knocking others down and then falling itself, and even your art has not yet discovered a way of avoiding this failure—in spite, too, of the wonderful show it makes of accurate reasoning.Here Ctesippus exclaimed: Yes, your way of discussion is marvellous,
-you men of Thurii or ChiosCf. above, Plat. Euthyd. 271c. or wherever or however it is you are pleased to get your names; for you have no scruple about babbling like fools.At this I was afraid we might hear some abuse, so I soothed Ctesippus down once more, saying: Ctesippus, I repeat to you what I said to Cleinias just now, that you do not perceive the wonderful nature of our visitors' skill. Only they are unwilling to give us a display of it in real earnest, but treat us to jugglers' tricks in the style of ProteusCf. Hom. Od. 4.385 ff. Proteus was an ancient seer of the sea who, if one could catch him as he slept on the shore and hold him fast while he transformed himself into a variety of creatures, would tell one the intentions of the gods, the fate of absent friends, etc. the Egyptian adept.
+you men of Thurii or ChiosCf. above, Plat. Euthyd. 271c. or wherever or however it is you are pleased to get your names; for you have no scruple about babbling like fools.At this I was afraid we might hear some abuse, so I soothed Ctesippus down once more, saying: Ctesippus, I repeat to you what I said to Cleinias just now, that you do not perceive the wonderful nature of our visitors’ skill. Only they are unwilling to give us a display of it in real earnest, but treat us to jugglers’ tricks in the style of ProteusCf. Hom. Od. 4.385 ff. Proteus was an ancient seer of the sea who, if one could catch him as he slept on the shore and hold him fast while he transformed himself into a variety of creatures, would tell one the intentions of the gods, the fate of absent friends, etc. the Egyptian adept.
So let us take our cue from Menelaus,Cf. Hom. Od. 4.456. and not leave hold of these gentlemen till they give us a sight of their own serious business. I believe something very fine will be found in them as soon as they begin to be serious. Come, let us beg and exhort and beseech them to let their light shine. For my part, then, I am minded to take the lead once more in showing what sort of persons I pray may be revealed in them:
starting from where I left off before, I shall try, as best I can, to describe what follows on from that, to see if I can rouse them to action and make them, in merciful commensuration of my earnest endeavor, be earnest themselves.Will you, Cleinias, I asked, please remind me of the point at which we left off? Now, as far as I can tell, it was something like this: we ended by agreeing that one ought to pursue wisdom, did we not?Cf. Plat. Euthyd. 282d.Yes, he said.And this pursuit—called philosophy—is an acquiring of knowledge. Is it not so? I asked.Yes, he said.Then what knowledge should we acquire if we acquired it rightly?
Is it not absolutely clear that it must be that knowledge which will profit us?Certainly, he said.Now will it profit us at all, if we know how to tell, as we go about, where the earth has most gold buried in it?Perhaps, he said.But yet, I went on, we refuted that former proposition, agreeing that even if without any trouble or digging the earth we got all the gold in the world, we should gain nothing, so that not if we knew how
@@ -160,26 +160,26 @@
enabling one to make men immortal, does this, if we lack the knowledge how to use immortality, seem to bring any advantage either, if we are to infer anything from our previous admissions.On all these points we agreed.Then the sort of knowledge we require, fair youth, I said, is that in which there happens to be a union of making and knowing how to use the thing made.Apparently, he said.So we ought, it seems, to aim at something far other than being lyre-makers
or possessing that kind of knowledge. For in this case the art that makes and the art that uses are quite distinct, dealing in separation with the same thing; since there is a wide difference between the art of making lyres and that of harp-playing. Is it not so?He agreed.Nor again, obviously, do we require an art of flute-making; for this is another of the same kind.He assented.Now in good earnest, I asked, if we were to learn the art of speech-making, can that be the art we should acquire if we would be happy?I for one think not, said Cleinias, interposing.
On what proof do you rely? I asked.I see, he said, certain speech-writers who do not know how to use the special arguments composed by themselves, just as lyre-makers in regard to their lyres: in the former case also there are other persons able to use what the makers produced, while being themselves unable to make the written speech. Hence it is clear that in speech likewise there are two distinct arts, one of making and one of using.I think you give sufficient proof, I said, that this art of the speech-writers cannot be that whose acquisition would make one happy. And yet I fancied that somewhere about this point would appear the knowledge which we have been seeking all this while.
-For not only do these speech-writers themselves, when I am in their company, impress me as prodigiously clever, Cleinias, but their art itself seems so exalted as to be almost inspired. However, this is not surprising; for it is a part of the sorcerer's art,
-and only slightly inferior to that. The sorcerer's art is the charming of snakes and tarantulas and scorpions and other beasts and diseases, while the other is just the charming and soothing of juries, assemblies, crowds, and so forth. Or does it strike you differently? I asked.No, it appears to me, he replied, to be as you say.Which way then, said I, shall we turn now? What kind of art shall we try?For my part, he said, I have no suggestion.Why, I think I have found it myself, I said.What is it? said Cleinias.
+For not only do these speech-writers themselves, when I am in their company, impress me as prodigiously clever, Cleinias, but their art itself seems so exalted as to be almost inspired. However, this is not surprising; for it is a part of the sorcerer’s art,
+and only slightly inferior to that. The sorcerer’s art is the charming of snakes and tarantulas and scorpions and other beasts and diseases, while the other is just the charming and soothing of juries, assemblies, crowds, and so forth. Or does it strike you differently? I asked.No, it appears to me, he replied, to be as you say.Which way then, said I, shall we turn now? What kind of art shall we try?For my part, he said, I have no suggestion.Why, I think I have found it myself, I said.What is it? said Cleinias.
Generalship, I replied, strikes me as the art whose acquisition above all others would make one happy.I do not think so.Why not? I asked.In a sense, this is an art of hunting men.What then? I said.No part of actual hunting, he replied, covers more than the province of chasing and overcoming; and when they have overcome the creature they are chasing, they are unable to use it: the huntsmen or the fishermen hand it over to the caterers, and so it is too with the geometers, astronomers, and calculators—
for these also are hunters in their way, since they are not in each case diagram-makers, but discover the realities of thingsi.e. geometers etc. are not to be regarded as mere makers of diagrams, these being only the necessary and common machinery for their real business, the discovery of mathematical and other abstract truths.—and so, not knowing how to use their prey, but only how to hunt, I take it they hand over their discoveries to the dialecticians to use properly, those of them, at least, who are not utter blockheads.Very good, I said, most handsome and ingenious Cleinias; and is this really so?To be sure it is; and so, in the same way, with the generals. When they have hunted either a city or
an army, they hand it over to the politicians—since they themselves do not know how to use what they have hunted—just as quail-hunters, I suppose, hand over their birds to the quail-keepers. If, therefore, he went on, we are looking for that art which itself shall know how to use what it has acquired either in making or chasing, and if this is the sort that will make us blest, we must reject generalship, he said, and seek out some other.
Crito
What is this, Socrates? Such a pronouncement from that stripling!
Socrates
You do not believe it is his, Crito?
Crito
I should rather think not. For I am sure, if he spoke thus, he has no need of education from Euthydemus or anyone else.
Socrates
But then, Heaven help me! I wonder if it was Ctesippus who said it, and my memory fails me.
Crito
Very like Ctesippus!
Socrates
Well, of this at any rate I am certain, that it was neither Euthydemus nor Dionysodorus who said it. Tell me, mysterious Crito, was it some superior power that was there to speak it? For that speech I heard, I am sure.
Crito
Yes, I promise you, Socrates: I fancy it was indeed some superior power—very much so. But after that, did you go on looking for a suitable art? Did you find the one which you had as the object of your search, or not?
Socrates
Find it, my good fellow! No, we were in a most ridiculous state; like children who run after crested larks, we kept on believing each moment we were just going to catch this or that one of the knowledges, while they as often slipped from our grasp. What need to tell you the story at length? When we reached the kingly art, and were examining it to see if we had here what provides and produces happiness, at this point we were involved in a labyrinth: when we supposed we had arrived at the end, we twisted about again
-and found ourselves practically at the beginning of our search, and just as sorely in want as when we first started on it.
Crito
How did this happen to you, Socrates?
Socrates
I will tell you. We took the view that the statesman's and the monarch's arts were one and the same.
Crito
Well, what then?
Socrates
To this art, we thought, generalship and the other arts handed over the management of the productions of their own trades, as this one alone knew how to use them. So it seemed clear to us that this was the one we were seeking,
-and was the cause of right conduct in the state, and precisely as Aeschylus' lineCf. Aesch. Seven 2 “Whoso at helm of the state keeps watch upon affairs, guiding the tiller without resting his eyelids in sleep.” expresses it, is seated alone at the helm of the city, steering the whole, commanding the whole, and making the whole useful.
Crito
And surely your notion was a good one, Socrates?
Socrates
You shall judge of that, Crito, if you care to hear what befell us thereafter. For later on we reconsidered it somewhat in this manner: Look now, does the monarch's art, that rules over all, produce any effect
+and found ourselves practically at the beginning of our search, and just as sorely in want as when we first started on it.
Crito
How did this happen to you, Socrates?
Socrates
I will tell you. We took the view that the statesman’s and the monarch’s arts were one and the same.
Crito
Well, what then?
Socrates
To this art, we thought, generalship and the other arts handed over the management of the productions of their own trades, as this one alone knew how to use them. So it seemed clear to us that this was the one we were seeking,
+and was the cause of right conduct in the state, and precisely as Aeschylus’ lineCf. Aesch. Seven 2 “Whoso at helm of the state keeps watch upon affairs, guiding the tiller without resting his eyelids in sleep.” expresses it, is seated alone at the helm of the city, steering the whole, commanding the whole, and making the whole useful.
Crito
And surely your notion was a good one, Socrates?
Socrates
You shall judge of that, Crito, if you care to hear what befell us thereafter. For later on we reconsidered it somewhat in this manner: Look now, does the monarch’s art, that rules over all, produce any effect
or not? Certainly it does, of course, we said to one another. Would you not say so too, Crito?
Crito
I would.
Socrates
Then what would you say is its effect? For instance, if I were to ask you whether medicine, in ruling over all that comes under its rule, has any effect to show; would you not say: Yes, health?
Crito
I would.
Socrates
And what about your art of agriculture? In ruling over all
-that comes under its rule, what effect does it produce? Would you not say that it supplies us with food from the earth?
Crito
I would.
Socrates
And what of the monarch's art? In ruling over all that comes under its rule, what does it produce? Perhaps you are not quite ready with the answer.
Crito
I am not indeed, Socrates.
Socrates
Nor were we, Crito; yet so much you know, that if this is really the one we are seeking, it must be beneficial.
Crito
Certainly.
Socrates
Then surely it must purvey something good?
Crito
Necessarily, Socrates.
+that comes under its rule, what effect does it produce? Would you not say that it supplies us with food from the earth?
Crito
I would.
Socrates
And what of the monarch’s art? In ruling over all that comes under its rule, what does it produce? Perhaps you are not quite ready with the answer.
Crito
I am not indeed, Socrates.
Socrates
Nor were we, Crito; yet so much you know, that if this is really the one we are seeking, it must be beneficial.
Crito
Certainly.
Socrates
Then surely it must purvey something good?
Crito
Necessarily, Socrates.
Socrates
And you know we agreed with each other, Cleinias and I, that nothing can be good but some sort of knowledge.
Crito
Yes, so you told me.
Socrates
And it was found that all effects in general that you may ascribe to statesmanship—and a great many of them there must be, presumably, if the citizens are to be made wealthy and free and immune from faction—all these things were neither bad nor good, while this art must make us wise and impart knowledge, if it really was to be the one which benefited us
and made us happy.
Crito
True: so at all events you agreed then, by your account of the discussion.
Socrates
Then do you think that kingship makes men wise and good?
Crito
Why not, Socrates?
Socrates
But does it make all men good, and in all things? And is this the art that confers every sort of knowledge—shoe-making and carpentry and so forth?
Crito
No, I think not, Socrates.
Socrates
Well, what knowledge does it give ? What use can we make of it? It is not to be a producer of any of the effects which are neither bad nor good, while it is to confer no other knowledge but itself. Shall we try and say what it is, and what use we shall make of it? Do you mind if we describe it, Crito, as that whereby we shall make other men good?
Crito
I quite agree.
Socrates
And in what respect are we going to have these men good, and in what useful? Or shall we venture to say they are to make others so, and these again others? In what respect they can possibly be good is nowhere evident to us,
since we have discredited all the business commonly called politics, and it is merely a case of the proverbial “Corinthus Divine”Cf. Pind. N. 7. Megara, a colony of Corinth, revolted, and when the Corinthians appealed to the sentiment attaching to Corinthus, the mythical founder of Megara, the Megarians drove them off taunting them with using a “vain repetition.”; and, as I was saying, we are equally or even worse at fault as to what that knowledge can be which is to make us happy.
Crito
Upon my word, Socrates, you got yourselves there, it seems, into a pretty fix.
Socrates
So then I myself, Crito, finding
I had fallen into this perplexity, began to exclaim at the top of my voice, beseeching the two strangers as though I were calling upon the Heavenly Twins to save us, the lad and myself, from the mighty waveLit. “the big wave that comes in every three.” of the argument, and to give us the best of their efforts, and this done, to make plain to us what that knowledge can be of which we must get hold if we are to spend the remainder of our lives in a proper way
Crito
Well, did Euthydemus consent to propound anything for you?
Socrates
Why, certainly; and he began his discourse, my good friend, in this very lofty-minded fashion:
- Would you rather, Socrates, that I instructed you as to this knowledge which has baffled you all this while, or propound that you have it?0 gifted sir, I exclaimed, and have you the power to do this?Certainly I have, he replied.Then for Heaven's sake, I cried, propound that I have it! This will be much easier than learning foraman of my age.Come then, answer me this, he said: Do you know anything?Yes, indeed, I replied. and many things, though trifles.That is enough, he said; now do you think it possible that anything that is should not be just that which it actually is?On my soul, not I.
+ Would you rather, Socrates, that I instructed you as to this knowledge which has baffled you all this while, or propound that you have it?0 gifted sir, I exclaimed, and have you the power to do this?Certainly I have, he replied.Then for Heaven’s sake, I cried, propound that I have it! This will be much easier than learning foraman of my age.Come then, answer me this, he said: Do you know anything?Yes, indeed, I replied. and many things, though trifles.That is enough, he said; now do you think it possible that anything that is should not be just that which it actually is?On my soul, not I.
Now you, he said, know something?I do.Then you are knowing, if you really know?Certainly, in just that something.That makes no difference; you are not under a necessity of knowing everything, if you are knowing?No, to be sure, I replied; for there are many other things which I do not know.Then if you do not know something, you are not knowing?Not in that thing, my dear sir, I replied.Are you therefore any the less unknowing? Just now you said you were knowing;
-so here you are, actually the very man that you are, and again, not that man, in regard to the same matter and at the same time!Admitted, Euthydemus, I said: as the saying goes, “well said whate'er you say.” How therefore do I know that knowledge which we were seeking? Since forsooth it is impossible for the same thing to be so and not be so; by knowing one thing I know all;—for I could not be at once both knowing and unknowing;—and as I know everything I have that knowledge to boot: is that your line of argument? Is this your wisdom?
+so here you are, actually the very man that you are, and again, not that man, in regard to the same matter and at the same time!Admitted, Euthydemus, I said: as the saying goes, “well said whate’er you say.” How therefore do I know that knowledge which we were seeking? Since forsooth it is impossible for the same thing to be so and not be so; by knowing one thing I know all;—for I could not be at once both knowing and unknowing;—and as I know everything I have that knowledge to boot: is that your line of argument? Is this your wisdom?
Yes, you see, Socrates, he said, your own words refute you.Well, but, Euthydemus, I continued, are you not in the same plight? I assure you, so long as I had you and this dear fellow Dionysodorus to share my lot, however hard, I should have nothing to complain of. Tell me, you both know some existent things, of course, and others you do not?By no means, Socrates, said Dionysodorus.How do you mean? I asked: do you then not know anything?Oh yes, we do, he said.
So you know everything, I asked, since you know anything?Everything, he replied; yes, and you too, if you know one thing, know all.Good Heavens, I cried, what a wonderful statement! What a great blessing to boast of! And the rest of mankind, do they know everything or nothing?Surely, he said, they cannot know some things and not others, and so be at once knowing and unknowing.But what then? I asked.All men, he replied, know all things, if they know one.In the name of goodness,
Dionysodorus, I said—for now I can see both of you are serious; before, I could hardly prevail on you to be so—do you yourselves really know everything? Carpentry, for instance, and shoe-making?Certainly, he said.And you are good hands at leather-stitching?Why yes, in faith, and cobbling, he said.And are you good also at such things as counting the stars, and the sand?Certainly, he said: can you think we would not admit that also?Here Ctesippus broke in: Be so good,
@@ -199,37 +199,37 @@
tell me, where did I learn that the good are unjust?Nowhere, said Dionysodorus.Then I do not know this, I said.You are spoiling the argument, said Euthydemus to Dionysodorus, and we shall find that this fellow does not know, and is at once both knowing and unknowing.At this Dionysodorus reddened. But you, I said, what do you mean, Euthydemus.
Do you find that your brother, who knows everything, has not spoken aright?I a brother of Euthydemus? quickly interposed Dionysodorus.Whereupon I said: Let me alone, good sir, till Euthydemus has taught me that I know that good men are unjust, and do not grudge me this lesson.You are running away, Socrates, said Dionysodorus; you refuse to answer.Yes, and with good reason, I said: for I am weaker than
either one of you, so I have no scruple about running away from the two together. You see, I am sadly inferior to Hercules, who was no match for the hydra—that she-professor who was so clever that she sent forth many heads of debate in place of each one that was cut off; nor for another sort of, crab-professor from the sea— freshly, I fancy, arrived on shore; and, when the hero was so bothered with its leftward barks and bites, he summoned his nephew Iolaus to the rescue,
-and he brought him effective relief. But if my Iolaus were to come, he would do more harm than good.i.e. any kinsman or helper I might summon would only add to the number of your victims.Well, answer this, said Dionysodorus, now you have done your descanting: Was Iolaus more Hercules' nephew than yours?I see I had best answer you, Dionysodorus, I said. For you will never cease putting questions—I think I may say I am sure of this—in a grudging, obstructing spirit, so that Euthydemus may not teach me that bit of cleverness.Then answer, he said.Well, I answer, I said, that Iolaus was Hercules' nephew, but not mine,
-so far as I can see, in any way whatever. For Patrocles, my brother, was not his father; only Hercules' brother Iphicles had a name somewhat similar to his.And Patrocles, he said, is your brother?Certainly, I said: that is, by the same mother, but not by the same father.Then he is your brother and not your brother.Not by the same father, worthy sir, I replied. His father was Chaeredemus, mine Sophroniscus.So Sophroniscus and Chaeredemus, he said, were “father”?Certainly, I said: the former mine,
+and he brought him effective relief. But if my Iolaus were to come, he would do more harm than good.i.e. any kinsman or helper I might summon would only add to the number of your victims.Well, answer this, said Dionysodorus, now you have done your descanting: Was Iolaus more Hercules’ nephew than yours?I see I had best answer you, Dionysodorus, I said. For you will never cease putting questions—I think I may say I am sure of this—in a grudging, obstructing spirit, so that Euthydemus may not teach me that bit of cleverness.Then answer, he said.Well, I answer, I said, that Iolaus was Hercules’ nephew, but not mine,
+so far as I can see, in any way whatever. For Patrocles, my brother, was not his father; only Hercules’ brother Iphicles had a name somewhat similar to his.And Patrocles, he said, is your brother?Certainly, I said: that is, by the same mother, but not by the same father.Then he is your brother and not your brother.Not by the same father, worthy sir, I replied. His father was Chaeredemus, mine Sophroniscus.So Sophroniscus and Chaeredemus, he said, were “father”?Certainly, I said: the former mine,
the latter his. Then surely, he went on, Chaeredemus was other than “father”?Than mine, at any rate, I said.Why then, he was father while being other than father. Or are you the same as “the stone”?Cf. Plat. Gorg. 494a, where “the life of a stone” is given as a proverbial example of a life without pleasure or pain.I fear you may prove that of me, I said, though I do not feel like it.Then are you other than the stone?Other, I must say.Then of course, he went on, if you are other than stone, you are not stone? And if you are other than gold, you are not gold?Quite so.Hence Chaeredemus, he said, being other than father,
cannot be “father.”It seems, I said, that he is not a father.No, for I presume, interposed Euthydemus, that if Chaeredemus is a father Sophroniscus in his turn, being other than a father, is not a father; so that you, Socrates, are fatherless.Here Ctesippus took it up, observing: And your father too, is he not in just the same plight? Is he other than my father?Not in the slightest, said Euthydemus.What, asked the other, is he the same?The same, to be sure.I should not like to think he was: but tell me, Euthydemus,
-is he my father only, or everybody else's too?Everybody else's too, he replied; or do you suppose that the same man, being a father, can be no father?I did suppose so, said Ctesippus.Well, said the other, and that a thing being gold could be not gold? Or being a man, not man?Perhaps, Euthydemus, said Ctesippus, you are knotting flax with cotton,i.e. treating two different things as the same. as they say: for it is a strange result that you state, if your father is father of all.He is, though, was the reply.Of all men, do you mean? asked Ctesippus, or of horses too,
+is he my father only, or everybody else’s too?Everybody else’s too, he replied; or do you suppose that the same man, being a father, can be no father?I did suppose so, said Ctesippus.Well, said the other, and that a thing being gold could be not gold? Or being a man, not man?Perhaps, Euthydemus, said Ctesippus, you are knotting flax with cotton,i.e. treating two different things as the same. as they say: for it is a strange result that you state, if your father is father of all.He is, though, was the reply.Of all men, do you mean? asked Ctesippus, or of horses too,
and all other animals?Of all, he said.And is your mother a mother in the same way?My mother too.And is your mother a mother of sea-urchins?Yes, and yours is also, he replied.So then you are a brother of the gudgeons and whelps and porkers.Yes, and so are you, he said.Then your father is a boar and a dog.And so is yours, he said.Yes, said Dionysodorus, and it will take you but a moment, if you will answer me, Ctesippus, to acknowledge all this. Just tell me, have you a dog?Yes, a real rogue, said Ctesippus.
Has he got puppies?Yes, a set of rogues like him.Then is the dog their father?Yes, indeed; I saw him with my own eyes covering the bitch.Well now, is not the dog yours?Certainly, he said.Thus he is a father, and yours, and accordingly the dog turns out to be your father, and you a brother of whelps.Hereupon Dionysodorus struck in again quickly, lest Ctesippus should get a word in before him: Answer me just one more little point: do you beat this dog?Ctesippus laughed and said: My word, yes; since I cannot beat you!So you beat your own father?
-he said.There would be much more justice, though, he replied, in my beating yours, for being so ill-advised as to beget clever sons like you. Yet I doubt, Ctesippus went on, if your father, Euthydemus—the puppies' father—has derived much good from this wisdom of yours.Why, he has no need of much good, Ctesippus, neither he nor you.And have you no need either, yourself, Euthydemus? he asked.No, nor has any other man. Just tell me, Ctesippus,
+he said.There would be much more justice, though, he replied, in my beating yours, for being so ill-advised as to beget clever sons like you. Yet I doubt, Ctesippus went on, if your father, Euthydemus—the puppies’ father—has derived much good from this wisdom of yours.Why, he has no need of much good, Ctesippus, neither he nor you.And have you no need either, yourself, Euthydemus? he asked.No, nor has any other man. Just tell me, Ctesippus,
whether you think it good for a sick man to drink physic when he wants it, or whether you consider it not good; or for a man to go to the wars with arms rather than without them.With them, I think, he replied: and yet I believe you are about to utter one of your pleasantries.You will gather that well enough, he said: only answer me. Since you admit that physic is good for a man to drink when necessary, surely one ought to drink this good thing as much as possible; and in such a case it will be well to pound and infuse in it a cart-load of hellebore?To this Ctesippus replied: Quite so,
to be sure, Euthydemus, at any rate if the drinker is as big as the Delphian statue.Then, further, since in war, he proceeded, it is good to have arms, one ought to have as many spears and shields as possible, if we agree that it is a good thing?Yes, I suppose, said Ctesippus and you, Euthydemus, do you take the other view, that it should be one shield and one spear?Yes, I do.What, he said, and would you arm Geryon also and BriareusTwo fabulous giants (Geryon had three, Briareus fifty, pairs of arms). in this way? I thought you more of an expert than that, considering you are a man-at-arms, and your comrade here too!At this Euthydemus was silent; then Dionysodorus
-asked some questions on Ctesippus' previous answers, saying: Well now, gold is in your opinion a good thing to have?Certainly, and—here I agree—plenty of it too, said Ctesippus.Well then, do you not think it right to have good things always and everywhere?Assuredly, he said.Then do you admit that gold is also a good?Why, I have admitted it, he replied.Then we ought always to have it, and everywhere, and above all, in oneself?
-And one will be happiest if one has three talents of gold in one's belly, a talent in one's skull, and a stater of gold in each eye?Well, Euthydemus, replied Ctesippus, they say that among the Scythians those are the happiest and best men who have a lot of gold in their own skulls—somewhat as you were saying a moment ago that “dog” is “father”; and a still more marvellous thing is told, how they drink out of their skulls when gilded, and gaze inside them, holding their own headpiece in their hands.Tell me, said Euthydemus,
+asked some questions on Ctesippus’ previous answers, saying: Well now, gold is in your opinion a good thing to have?Certainly, and—here I agree—plenty of it too, said Ctesippus.Well then, do you not think it right to have good things always and everywhere?Assuredly, he said.Then do you admit that gold is also a good?Why, I have admitted it, he replied.Then we ought always to have it, and everywhere, and above all, in oneself?
+And one will be happiest if one has three talents of gold in one’s belly, a talent in one’s skull, and a stater of gold in each eye?Well, Euthydemus, replied Ctesippus, they say that among the Scythians those are the happiest and best men who have a lot of gold in their own skulls—somewhat as you were saying a moment ago that “dog” is “father”; and a still more marvellous thing is told, how they drink out of their skulls when gilded, and gaze inside them, holding their own headpiece in their hands.Tell me, said Euthydemus,
do the Scythians and men in general see things possible of sight, or things impossible?Possible, I presume.And you do so too?I too.Then you see our cloaks?Yes.And have they power of sight?The quibble is on the double meaning of DUNATA\ O(RA=N—(a)“possible,” and (b)“able to see.” So in what follows, SIGW=NTA LE/GEIN may mean both “the speaking of a silent person,” or “speaking of silent things.”Quite extraordinarily, said Ctesippus.What do they see? he asked.Nothing. Perhaps you do not think they see—you are such a sweet innocent. I should say, Euthydemus, that you have fallen asleep with your eyes open and, if it be possible to speak and at the same time say nothing,
that this is what you are doing.Why, asked Dionysodorus, may there not be a speaking of the silent?By no means whatever, replied Ctesippus.Nor a silence of speaking?Still less, he said.Now, when you speak of stones and timbers and irons, are you not speaking of the silent?Not if I walk by a smithy, for there, as they say, the irons speak and cry aloud, when they are touched; so here your wisdom has seduced you into nonsense. But come, you have still to propound me your second point,
-how on the other hand there may be a silence of speaking. (It struck me that Ctesippus was specially excited on account of his young friend's presence.)When you are silent, said Euthydemus, are you not making a silence of all things?Yes, he replied.Then it is a silence of speaking things also, if the speaking are among all things.What, said Ctesippus, are not all things silent?I presume not, said Euthydemus.But then, my good sir, do all things speak?Yes, I suppose, at least those that speak.But that is not what I ask, he said: are all things silent or do they speak?Neither and both,
+how on the other hand there may be a silence of speaking. (It struck me that Ctesippus was specially excited on account of his young friend’s presence.)When you are silent, said Euthydemus, are you not making a silence of all things?Yes, he replied.Then it is a silence of speaking things also, if the speaking are among all things.What, said Ctesippus, are not all things silent?I presume not, said Euthydemus.But then, my good sir, do all things speak?Yes, I suppose, at least those that speak.But that is not what I ask, he said: are all things silent or do they speak?Neither and both,
said Dionysodorus, snatching the word from him: I am quite sure that is an answer that will baffle you!At this Ctesippus, as his manner was, gave a mighty guffaw, and said: Ah, Euthydemus, your brother has made the argument ambiguous with his “both,” and is worsted and done for.Then Cleinias was greatly delighted and laughed, so that Ctesippus felt his strength was as the strength of ten: but I fancy Ctesippus—he is such a rogue—had picked up these very words by overhearing the men themselves, since in nobody else of the present age is such wisdom to be found.
So I remarked: Why are you laughing, Cleinias, at such serious and beautiful things?What, have you, Socrates, ever yet seen a beautiful thing? asked Dionysodorus.Yes, I have, I replied, and many of them, Dionysodorus.Did you find them different from the beautiful, he said,
or the same as the beautiful?Here I was desperately perplexed, and felt that I had my deserts for the grunt I had made: however, I replied that they were different from the beautiful itself, though each of them had some beauty present with it.So if an ox is present with you, he said, you are an ox, and since I am now present with you, you are Dionysodorus.Heavens, do not say that! I cried.But in what way can one thing, by having a different thing present with it, be itself different?
Are you at a loss there? I asked: already I was attempting to imitate the cleverness of these men, I was so eager to get it.Can I help being at a loss, he said, I and likewise everybody else in the world, in face of what cannot be?What is that you say, Dionysodorus? I asked: is not the beautiful beautiful, and the ugly ugly?Yes, if it seems so to me, he replied.Then does it seem so?Certainly, he said.Then the same also is the same, and the different different? For I presume the different cannot be the same; nay, I thought
-not even a child would doubt that the different is different. But, Dionysodorus, you have deliberately passed over this one point; though, on the whole, I feel that, like craftsmen finishing off each his special piece of work, you two are carrying out your disputation in excellent style.Well, he asked, do you know what is each craftsman's special piece of work? First of all, whose proper task is it to forge brass? Can you tell?I can: a brazier's.Well, again, whose to make pots?A potter's.Once more, whose to slaughter and skin,
-and after cutting up the joints to stew and roast?A caterer's, I said.Now, if one does one's proper work, he said, one will do rightly?Yes, to be sure.And is it, as you say, the caterer's proper work to cut up and skin? Did you admit this or not?I did so, I replied, but pray forgive me.It is clear then, he proceeded, that if someone slaughters the caterer and cuts him up, and then stews or roasts him, he will be doing his proper work; and if he hammers the brazier himself, and moulds the potter, he will be doing his business likewise.
+not even a child would doubt that the different is different. But, Dionysodorus, you have deliberately passed over this one point; though, on the whole, I feel that, like craftsmen finishing off each his special piece of work, you two are carrying out your disputation in excellent style.Well, he asked, do you know what is each craftsman’s special piece of work? First of all, whose proper task is it to forge brass? Can you tell?I can: a brazier’s.Well, again, whose to make pots?A potter’s.Once more, whose to slaughter and skin,
+and after cutting up the joints to stew and roast?A caterer’s, I said.Now, if one does one’s proper work, he said, one will do rightly?Yes, to be sure.And is it, as you say, the caterer’s proper work to cut up and skin? Did you admit this or not?I did so, I replied, but pray forgive me.It is clear then, he proceeded, that if someone slaughters the caterer and cuts him up, and then stews or roasts him, he will be doing his proper work; and if he hammers the brazier himself, and moulds the potter, he will be doing his business likewise.
Poseidon! I exclaimed, there you give the finishing touch to your wisdom. I wonder if this skill could ever come to me in such manner as to be my very own.Would you recognize it, Socrates, he asked, if it came to be your own?Yes, if only you are agreeable, I replied, without a doubt.Why, he went on, do you imagine you perceive what is yours?Yes, if I take your meaning aright: for all my hopes arise from you, and end In Euthydemus here.The Greek works follow a usual form of prayer or hymn to the gods.Then tell me, he asked, do you count those things yours which you control and are free to use as you please?
For instance, an ox or a sheep,would you count these as yours, if you were free to sell or bestow them, or sacrifice them to any god you chose? And things which you could not treat thus are not yours?Hereupon, since I knew that some brilliant result was sure to bob up from the mere turn of the questions, and as I also wanted to hear it as quickly as possible, I said: It is precisely as you say; only such things are mine.Well now, he went on: you call those things animals which have life?
Yes, I said.And you admit that only those animals are yours which you are at liberty to deal with in those various ways that I mentioned just now?I admit that.Then—after a very ironical pause, as though he were pondering some great matter—he proceeded: Tell me, Socrates, have you an ancestral ZeusZeus was the ancestral or tutelary god of the Dorians?Here I suspected the discussion was approaching the point at which it eventually ended, and so I tried what desperate wriggle I could to escape from the net in which I now felt myself entangled. My answer was: I have not, Dionysodorus.What a miserable fellow you must be,
-he said, and no Athenian at all, if you have neither ancestral gods, nor shrines, nor anything else that denotes a gentleman!Enough, Dionysodorus; speak fair words, and don't browbeat your pupil! For I have altars and shrines, domestic and ancestral, and everything else of the sort that other Athenians have.Then have not other Athenians, he asked, their ancestral Zeus?None of the Ionians, I replied, give him this title, neither we nor those who have left this city to settle abroad: they have an ancestral Apollo,
-because of Ion's parentage.Cf. Eur. Ion 64-75. Apollo begot Ion upon Creusa, daughter of Erechtheus. Among us the name “ancestral” is not given to Zeus, but that of “houseward” and “tribal,” and we have a tribal Athena.That will do, said Dionysodorus; you have, it seems, Apollo and Zeus and Athena.Certainly, I said.Then these must be your gods? he said.My ancestors, I said, and lords.Well, at least, you have them, he said: or have you not admitted they are yours?I have admitted it, I replied: what else could I do?And are not these gods animals? he asked: you know you have admitted
+he said, and no Athenian at all, if you have neither ancestral gods, nor shrines, nor anything else that denotes a gentleman!Enough, Dionysodorus; speak fair words, and don’t browbeat your pupil! For I have altars and shrines, domestic and ancestral, and everything else of the sort that other Athenians have.Then have not other Athenians, he asked, their ancestral Zeus?None of the Ionians, I replied, give him this title, neither we nor those who have left this city to settle abroad: they have an ancestral Apollo,
+because of Ion’s parentage.Cf. Eur. Ion 64-75. Apollo begot Ion upon Creusa, daughter of Erechtheus. Among us the name “ancestral” is not given to Zeus, but that of “houseward” and “tribal,” and we have a tribal Athena.That will do, said Dionysodorus; you have, it seems, Apollo and Zeus and Athena.Certainly, I said.Then these must be your gods? he said.My ancestors, I said, and lords.Well, at least, you have them, he said: or have you not admitted they are yours?I have admitted it, I replied: what else could I do?And are not these gods animals? he asked: you know you have admitted
that whatever has life is an animal. Or have these gods no life?They have, I replied.Then are they not animals?Yes, animals, I said.And those animals, he went on, you have admitted to be yours, which you are free to bestow and sell and sacrifice to any god you please.I have admitted it, I replied; there is no escape for me, Euthydemus.Come then, tell me straight off, he said; since you admit that Zeus and the other gods are yours, are you free to sell or
bestow them or treat them just as you please, like the other animals?Well, Crito, here I must say I was knocked out, as it were, by the argument, and lay speechless; then Ctesippus rushed to the rescue and—Bravo, Hercules! he cried, a fine argument!Whereat Dionysodorus asked: Now, do you mean that Hercules is a bravo, or that bravo is Hercules?Ctesippus replied: Poseidon, what a frightful use of words! I give up the fight: these two are invincible.
Hereupon I confess, my dear Crito, that everyone present without exception wildly applauded the argument and the two men, till they all nearly died of laughing and clapping and rejoicing. For their previous successes had been highly acclaimed one by one, but only by the devotees of Euthydemus; whereas now almost the very pillars of the Lyceum took part in the joyful acclamations in honor of the pair. For myself, I was quite disposed to admit that never had I set eyes
on such clever people, and I was so utterly enthralled by their skill that I betook myself to praising and congratulating them, and said: Ah, happy pair! What amazing genius, to acquire such a great accomplishment so quickly and in so short a time! Among the many fine points in your arguments, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, there is one that stands out in particular magnificence—that you care not a jot for the multitude, or for any would-be important or famous people, but only for those of your own sort. And I am perfectly sure that there are but a few persons
-like yourselves who would be satisfied with these arguments: the rest of the world regard them only as arguments with which, I assure you, they would feel it a greater disgrace to refute others than to be refuted themselves. And further, there is at the same time a popular and kindly feature in your talk: when you say there is nothing either beautiful, or good, or white, and so on, and no difference of things at all, in truth you simply stitch up men's mouths,
+like yourselves who would be satisfied with these arguments: the rest of the world regard them only as arguments with which, I assure you, they would feel it a greater disgrace to refute others than to be refuted themselves. And further, there is at the same time a popular and kindly feature in your talk: when you say there is nothing either beautiful, or good, or white, and so on, and no difference of things at all, in truth you simply stitch up men’s mouths,
as you expressly say you do; while as to your apparent power of stitching up your own mouths as well, this is a piece of agreeable manners that takes off any offence from your talk. But the greatest thing of all is, that this faculty of yours is such, and is so skilfully contrived, that anyone in the world may learn it of you in a very short time; this fact I perceived myself by watching Ctesippus and observing how quickly he was able to imitate you on the spot. Now, in so far as your accomplishment can be quickly imparted,
it is excellent; but for public discussions it is not suitable: if I may advise you, beware of talking before a number of people, lest they learn the whole thing in a trice and give you no credit for it. The best thing for you is to talk to each other by yourselves, in private; failing that, if a third person is present, it must be someone who will pay you a good fee. And if you are prudent
you will give this same counsel to your pupils also—that they are never to converse with anybody except you and each other. For it is the rare, Euthydemus, that is precious, while water is cheapest, though best, as PindarCf. Pind. O. 1., which begins—*)/ARISTON ME\N U(/DWR. said. But come, I said, see if you can admit both me and Cleinias here to your class.This, Crito, was our conversation, and after exchanging a few more words we went off. Now you must arrange to join us in taking lessons from the pair;
@@ -242,10 +242,10 @@
they feel that none but the followers of philosophy stand in the way of their universal renown. Hence they believe that, if they can reduce the latter to a status of no esteem, the prize of victory will by common consent be awarded to them, without dispute or delay, and their claim to wisdom will be won. For they consider themselves to be in very truth the wisest, but find that, when caught in private conversation, they are cut off short by Euthydemus and his set. This conceit of their wisdom is very natural, since they regard themselves as moderately versed in philosophy, and moderately too in politics, on quite reasonable grounds:
for they have dipped into both as far as they needed, and, evading all risk and struggle, are content to gather the fruits of wisdom.
Crito
Well, now, do you consider, Socrates, that there is anything in what they say? It is not to be denied that these men have some color for their statements.
Socrates
Yes, that is so, Crito; color rather than truth.
It is no easy matter to persuade them that either people or things, which are between two other things and have a certain share of both, if compounded of bad and good are found to be better than the one and worse than the other; but if compounded of two good things which have not the same object, they are worse than either of their components in relation to the object to which each of them is adapted; while if they are compounded of two bad things which have not the same object, and stand between them, this is the only case
-where they are better than either of the two things of which they have a share. Now if philosophy and the statesman's business are both good things, and each of them has a different object, and if these persons, partaking of both, are between them, their claims are nought; for they are inferior to both: if one is good and the other bad, they are better than the one and worse than the other: while if both are bad, in this case there would be some truth in their statement, but in any other case there is none. Now I do not think they will admit
+where they are better than either of the two things of which they have a share. Now if philosophy and the statesman’s business are both good things, and each of them has a different object, and if these persons, partaking of both, are between them, their claims are nought; for they are inferior to both: if one is good and the other bad, they are better than the one and worse than the other: while if both are bad, in this case there would be some truth in their statement, but in any other case there is none. Now I do not think they will admit
either that both these things are bad, or that one is bad and the other good: the truth is that these people, partaking of both, are inferior to both in respect of the objects for which statesmanship and philosophy are important; and while they are really in the third place they seek to be accorded the first. However, we ought to be indulgent towards their ambition and not feel annoyed, while still judging them to be what they actually are. For we should be glad of anyone, whoever he may be, who says anything that verges on good sense, and labours steadily
and manfully in its pursuit.
Crito
Now I myself, Socrates, as I so often tell you, am in doubt about my sons, as to what I am to do with them. The younger is as yet quite small; but Critobulus is already grown up, and needs someone who will be of service to him. When I am in your company, the effect on me is such as to make me feel it is mere madness to have taken ever so much pains in various directions for the good of my children—
-first in so marrying that they should be of very good blood on their mother's side; then in making money so that they might be as well off as possible; while I have neglected the training of the boys themselves. But when I glance at one of the persons who profess to educate people, I am dismayed, and feel that each one of them, when I consider them, is wholly unsuitable—
+first in so marrying that they should be of very good blood on their mother’s side; then in making money so that they might be as well off as possible; while I have neglected the training of the boys themselves. But when I glance at one of the persons who profess to educate people, I am dismayed, and feel that each one of them, when I consider them, is wholly unsuitable—
to tell you the truth between ourselves. So that I cannot see how I am to incline the lad towards philosophy.
Socrates
My dear Crito are you not aware that in every trade the duffers are many and worthless, whereas the good workers are few and worth any price? Why, do you not hold athletics, and money-making, and rhetoric, and generalship, to be fine things?
Crito
Certainly I do, of course.
Socrates
Well then, in each of these, do you not see most men making a ridiculous show at their respective tasks?
Crito
Yes, I know: what you say is perfectly true.
Socrates
Then will you yourself on this account eschew all these pursuits, and not let your son have anything to do with them?
Crito
No, there would be no good reason for that, Socrates.
Socrates
Then avoid at least what is wrong, Crito: let those who practise philosophy have their way,
whether they are helpful or mischievous; and when you have tested the matter itself, well and truly, if you find it to be a poor affair, turn everyone you can away from it, not only your sons: but if you find it to be such as I think it is, pursue and ply it without fear, both you, as they say, and yours.
Yes, and a great deal I said to him, and he to me.Then do let us hear your account of the conversation at once, if you are
- disengaged take my boy's place,The friend had
+ disengaged take my boy’s place,The friend had
an attendant who was sitting by him. and sit here.Very good indeed, I shall be obliged to you, if you will listen.And we also to you, I assure you, if you will tell us.
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@
But as soon as I had slept off my
- fatigue I got up at once and made my way straight here. Then I, noting the man's
+ fatigue I got up at once and made my way straight here. Then I, noting the man’s
gallant spirit and the flutter he was in, remarked: Well, what is that to you?
Has Protagoras wronged you? At this he laughed and, Yes, by the gods! he said,
by being the only wise man, and not making me one. But, by Zeus! I said, if you
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@
and I,
- to test Hippocrates' grit, began examining him with a few questions. Tell me,
+ to test Hippocrates’ grit, began examining him with a few questions. Tell me,
Hippocrates, I said, in your present design of going to Protagoras and paying
him money as a fee for his services to yourself, to whom do you consider you are
resorting, and what is it that you are to become? Suppose, for example, you had
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@
prepared to pay
him money as your fee,from our own means if they are adequate for the purpose of
- prevailing on him, but if not, then drawing on our friends' resources to make up
+ prevailing on him, but if not, then drawing on our friends’ resources to make up
the sum. Now if anyone, observing our extreme earnestness in the matter, should
ask us,—Pray, Socrates and Hippocrates, what is it that you take
Protagoras to be, when you purpose to pay him money? What should we reply to
@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@
to Protagoras ?To this he replied with a
blush—for by then there was a glimmer of daylight by which I could see him
quite clearly—If it is like the previous cases, obviously, to become a
- sophist.In Heaven's name, I said, would you
+ sophist.In Heaven’s name, I said, would you
not be ashamed to present yourself before the Greeks as a sophist?Yes, on my soul I should, Socrates, if I am to speak my
real thoughts.Yet after all, Hippocrates, perhaps
it is not this sort of learning that you expect to get from Protagoras, but
@@ -350,7 +350,7 @@
good or bad for the soul; and in just the same case
- are the people who buy from them, unless one happens to have a doctor's
+ are the people who buy from them, unless one happens to have a doctor’s
knowledge here also, but of the soul. So then, if you are well informed as to
what is good or bad among these wares, it will be safe for you to buy doctrines
from Protagoras or from anyone else you please: but if not, take care, my dear
@@ -406,14 +406,14 @@
entered, we came upon Protagoras as he was walking round in the cloister,The passage from the front door led into a
cloister which surrounded an open court and gave access to the various rooms
of the house: and close behind him two companies were walking round
- also; on the one side Callias, son of Hipponicus and his brother on the mother's
+ also; on the one side Callias, son of Hipponicus and his brother on the mother’s
side,
Paralus, son of Pericles, and Charmides, son of Glaucon, while the other troop
- consisted of Pericles' other son Xanthippus, Philippides, son of Philomelus, and
- Antimoerus of Mende, who is the most highly reputed of Protagoras' disciples and
+ consisted of Pericles’ other son Xanthippus, Philippides, son of Philomelus, and
+ Antimoerus of Mende, who is the most highly reputed of Protagoras’ disciples and
is taking the course professionally with a view to becoming a sophist. The
persons who followed in their rear, listening to what they could of the talk,
seemed to be mostly strangers, brought by the great Protagoras from the several
@@ -460,7 +460,7 @@
and at all events a very good-looking
person. I fancied I heard his name was Agathon, and I should not be surprised to
- find he is Pausanias' favorite. Besides this youth there were the two
+ find he is Pausanias’ favorite. Besides this youth there were the two
Adeimantuses, sons of Cepis and Leucolophidas, and there seemed to be some
others. The subjects of their conversation I was unable to gather from outside,
despite my longing to hear Prodicus; for I regard the man as all-wise and
@@ -496,7 +496,7 @@
so thoughtful on my behalf. For when one goes as a stranger into great cities,
and there tries to persuade the best of the young men to drop their other
connexions, either with their own folk or with foreigners, both old and young,
- and to join one's own circle, with the promise of improving them by this
+ and to join one’s own circle, with the promise of improving them by this
connexion with oneself,
@@ -560,10 +560,10 @@
bringing with them Prodicus, whom they had induced to rise
- from his couch, and Prodicus' circle also.When we
+ from his couch, and Prodicus’ circle also.When we
had all taken our seats,—So now, Socrates, said Protagoras, since these
gentlemen are also present, be so good as to tell what you were mentioning to me
- a little while before on the young man's behalf.To which I replied:
+ a little while before on the young man’s behalf.To which I replied:
@@ -582,7 +582,7 @@
Protagoras, what you say is not at all surprising, but quite likely, since even
you, though so old and so wise, would be made better if someone taught you what
you happen not to know. But let me put it another way: suppose Hippocrates here
- should change his desire all at once, and become desirous of this young fellow's
+ should change his desire all at once, and become desirous of this young fellow’s
lessons who has just recently come to town, Zeuxippus of Heraclea, and should approach him, as he now
does you,
@@ -591,7 +591,7 @@
thing from him as from you,—how on each day that he spent with him he
would be better and make constant progress; and suppose he were to question him
on this and ask: In what shall I become better as you say, and to what will my
- progress be? Zeuxippus's reply would be, to painting. Then suppose he came to
+ progress be? Zeuxippus’s reply would be, to painting. Then suppose he came to
the lessons of Orthagoras the Theban, and heard the same thing from him as from
you, and then inquired of him for what he would be better each day through
attending his classes, the answer would be, for fluting. In the same way you
@@ -668,11 +668,11 @@
he neither trains them personally nor commits them
- to another's guidance, and so they go about grazing at will like sacred oxen, on
+ to another’s guidance, and so they go about grazing at will like sacred oxen, on
the chance of their picking up excellence here or there for themselves. Or, if
you like, there is Cleinias, the younger brother of Alcibiades here, whom this
same Pericles, acting as his guardian, and fearing lie might be corrupted, I
- suppose, by Alcibiades, carried off from his brother and placed in Ariphron's
+ suppose, by Alcibiades, carried off from his brother and placed in Ariphron’s
family to be educated: but before six months had passed he handed him back to
Alcibiades,
@@ -758,13 +758,13 @@
for the pursuit of their arts, and stealing
- Hephaestus's fiery art and all Athena's also he gave them to man, and hence it
+ Hephaestus’s fiery art and all Athena’s also he gave them to man, and hence it
is
that man
- gets facility for his livelihood, but Prometheus, through Epimetheus' fault,
+ gets facility for his livelihood, but Prometheus, through Epimetheus’ fault,
later on (the story goes) stood his trial for theft.And now that man was partaker of a divine portion,i.e., of arts originally apportioned to gods
alone. he, in the first place, by his nearness of kin to deity, was
the only creature that worshipped gods, and set himself to establish altars and
@@ -881,7 +881,7 @@
this is especially the case with the Athenians, your fellow-citizens, so that by
our argument the Athenians also share the view that virtue is procured and
taught. Thus I have shown that your fellow-citizens have good reason for
- admitting a smith's or cobbler's counsel in public affairs, and that they hold
+ admitting a smith’s or cobbler’s counsel in public affairs, and that they hold
virtue to be taught and procured:
@@ -889,7 +889,7 @@
have given you satisfactory demonstration, Socrates, as it appears to
me.I have yet to deal with your remaining
problem about good men, why it is that these good men have their sons taught the
- subjects in the regular teachers' courses, and so far make them wise, but do not
+ subjects in the regular teachers’ courses, and so far make them wise, but do not
make them excel in that virtue wherein consists their own goodness. On this
point, Socrates, I shall give you argument instead of fable. Now consider: is
there,
@@ -898,13 +898,13 @@
or is there not, some one thing
whereof all the citizens must needs partake, if there is to be a city? Here, and
nowhere if not here, is the solution of this problem of yours. For if there is
- such a thing, and that one thing, instead of being the joiner's or smith's or
- potter's art, is rather justice and temperance and holiness—
+ such a thing, and that one thing, instead of being the joiner’s or smith’s or
+ potter’s art, is rather justice and temperance and holiness—
in short, what I
- may put together and call a man's virtue; and if it is this whereof all should
+ may put together and call a man’s virtue; and if it is this whereof all should
partake and wherewith everyone should proceed to any further knowledge or
action, but should not if he lacks it; if we should instruct and punish such as
do not partake of it, whether child or husband or wife, until the punishment of
@@ -938,7 +938,7 @@
unholy, and that he is to do this, and not do that. If he readily
obeys,—so; but if not, they treat him as a bent and twisted piece of wood
and straighten him with threats and blows. After this they send them to school
- and charge the master to take far more pains over their children's good behavior
+ and charge the master to take far more pains over their children’s good behavior
than over their letters
@@ -959,9 +959,9 @@
the song-makers, while the master accompanies them
- on the harp; and they insist on familiarizing the boys' souls with the rhythms
+ on the harp; and they insist on familiarizing the boys’ souls with the rhythms
and scales, that they may gain in gentleness, and by advancing in rhythmic and
- harmonic grace may be efficient in speech and action; for the whole of man's
+ harmonic grace may be efficient in speech and action; for the whole of man’s
life requires the graces of rhythm and harmony. Again, over and above all this,
people send their sons to a trainer, that having improved their bodies they may
perform the orders of their minds,
@@ -1009,7 +1009,7 @@
or reserving
his skill in what is just and lawful as he does in other expert knowledge; for
- our neighbors' justice and virtue, I take it, is to our advantage, and
+ our neighbors’ justice and virtue, I take it, is to our advantage, and
consequently we all tell and teach one another what is just and
lawful—well, if we made the same zealous and ungrudging efforts to
instruct each other in flute-playing, do you think, Socrates, that the good
@@ -1029,7 +1029,7 @@
a craftsman of justice, if he had to stand comparison with
people who lacked education and law courts and laws and any constant compulsion
to the pursuit of virtue, but were a kind of wild folk such as Pherecrates the
- poet brought on the scene at last year's Lenaeum.A dramatic festival, chiefly for comedies, held about the end
+ poet brought on the scene at last year’s Lenaeum.A dramatic festival, chiefly for comedies, held about the end
of January. Sure enough, if you found yourself among such people, as
did the misanthropes among his chorus, you would be very glad to meet with
Eurybatus and Phrynondas,Two notorious
@@ -1070,7 +1070,7 @@
virtue is teachable and is so deemed by the Athenians, and that it is no wonder
that bad sons are born of good fathers and good of bad, since even the sons of
Polycleitus, companions of Paralus and Xanthippus here, are not to be compared
- with their father, and the same is the case in other craftsmen's families. As
+ with their father, and the same is the case in other craftsmen’s families. As
for these two, it is not fair to make this complaint of them yet;
@@ -1355,13 +1355,13 @@
ruin all. And oil too is utterly bad for all plants, and most deadly for the
hair of all animals save that of man, while to the hair of man it is helpful, as
also to the rest of his body. The good is such an elusive and diverse thing that
- in this instance it is good for the outward parts of man's body,
+ in this instance it is good for the outward parts of man’s body,
but at the same time as bad as can be for the
inward; and for this reason all doctors forbid the sick to take oil, except the
smallest possible quantity, in what one is going to eat—just enough to
- quench the loathing that arises in the sensations of one's nostrils from food
+ quench the loathing that arises in the sensations of one’s nostrils from food
and its dressings.Probably such oil had a
specially appetizing flavor or scent.When he had thus spoken, the company acclaimed it as an excellent answer; and
@@ -1468,7 +1468,7 @@
until most of his hearers have
forgotten the point at issue. For Socrates, I warrant you, will not forget,
- despite his jesting way of calling himself forgetful. Now I think Socrates'
+ despite his jesting way of calling himself forgetful. Now I think Socrates’
proposal is the more equitable—for each of us should declare his personal
opinion.After Alcibiades, the next, I
believe, to speak was Critias: Prodicus and Hippias, he said, it seems to me
@@ -1496,7 +1496,7 @@
whereas wrangling is between those who are at variance and enmity with one
another. In this way our meeting will have highest success, since you the
speakers will thus earn the greatest measure of good repute, not praise, from us
- who hear you. For good repute is present in the hearers' souls without
+ who hear you. For good repute is present in the hearers’ souls without
deception, but praise is too often in the words of liars who hide what they
really think.
@@ -1536,7 +1536,7 @@
choose an umpire or supervisor or chairman
- who will keep watch for you over the due measure of either's
+ who will keep watch for you over the due measure of either’s
speeches.His proposal was approved by the
company, and they all applauded it: Callias said he would not let me go, and
they requested me to choose a supervisor. To this I replied that it would be a
@@ -1575,7 +1575,7 @@
- of a man's education is to be skilled
+ of a man’s education is to be skilled
in the matter of verses; that is, to be able to apprehend, in the utterances of
the poets, what has been rightly and what wrongly composed, and to know how to
distinguish them and account for them when questioned. Accordingly my question
@@ -1615,7 +1615,7 @@
despaired of rilling well on the ground here
stated.
- And yet 'twas a sage who spake—Hard,
+ And yet ’twas a sage who spake—Hard,
quoth he, to be good.Simonides Fr. 37.1.11
@@ -1641,9 +1641,9 @@
first I felt as though I had been struck by a skilful boxer, and was quite blind
and dizzy with the effect of his words and the noise of their applause.
Then—to tell you the honest truth—in order to gain time for
- considering the poet's meaning, I turned to Prodicus and calling
+ considering the poet’s meaning, I turned to Prodicus and calling
him—Prodicus, I said, surely Simonides was your townsman: it behoves you
- to come to the man's rescue. Accordingly I allow myself to call for your
+ to come to the man’s rescue. Accordingly I allow myself to call for your
assistance—
@@ -1680,7 +1680,7 @@
and
many others might say with Hesiod that to become good is hard, “for Heaven hath set hard travail on the way
- to virtue; and when one reacheth the summit thereof, 'tis an easy thing to
+ to virtue; and when one reacheth the summit thereof, ’tis an easy thing to
possess, though hard before.”Hes. WD
289
@@ -1695,7 +1695,7 @@
ignorance of the poet, if he calls it such a slight matter to possess virtue,
which is the hardest thing in the world, as all men agree.Then I remarked: Upon my word, how opportunely it has happened
that Prodicus is here to join in our discussion! For it is very likely,
- Protagoras, that Prodicus' wisdom is a gift of long ago from heaven,
+ Protagoras, that Prodicus’ wisdom is a gift of long ago from heaven,
@@ -1734,7 +1734,7 @@
otherwise, Prodicus: I am quite sure that Simonides meant by “hard”
the same as we generally do—not “bad,” but whatever is not
easy and involves a great amount of trouble.Ah, I
- agree with you, Protagoras, I said, that this is Simonides' meaning, and that
+ agree with you, Protagoras, I said, that this is Simonides’ meaning, and that
our friend Prodicus knows it, but is joking and chooses to experiment on you to
see if you will be able to support your own statement. For that Simonides does
not mean
@@ -1750,7 +1750,7 @@
Surely he cannot mean that it is bad to be good, if he proceeds here to
say that God alone can have this thing, and attributes this privilege to God
only; otherwise Prodicus would call Simonides a rake, and no true Cean. But I
- should like to tell you what I take to be Simonides' intention in this ode, if
+ should like to tell you what I take to be Simonides’ intention in this ode, if
you care to test my powers,
@@ -1769,7 +1769,7 @@
people there deny it and make pretence of ignorance, in order to prevent the
discovery that it is by wisdom that they have ascendancy over the rest of the
Greeks, like those sophists of whom Protagoras was speakingcf. Plat. Prot. 316d. This
- whole passage is a mocking answer to Protagoras' eulogy of
+ whole passage is a mocking answer to Protagoras’ eulogy of
sophistry.; they prefer it to be thought that they owe their superiority
to fighting and valor, conceiving that the revelation of its real cause would
lead everyone to practise this wisdom. So well have they kept their secret that
@@ -1804,7 +1804,7 @@
his interlocutor seem like a helpless child. Hence this very truth has been
observed by certain persons both in our day and in former times—that the
Spartan cult is much more the pursuit of wisdom than of athletics; for they know
- that a man's ability
+ that a man’s ability
@@ -1871,7 +1871,7 @@
which might be instanced to show its fine composition, for
it is a work of very elegant and elaborate art; but it would take too long to
detail all its beauties. However, let us go over its general outline and
- intention, which is assuredly to refute Pittacus' saying, throughout the
+ intention, which is assuredly to refute Pittacus’ saying, throughout the
ode.Proceeding a little way on from our
passage, just as though he were making a speech, he says to become, indeed, a
good man is truly hard (not but what it is possible for a certain space of
@@ -1912,7 +1912,7 @@
good, he cannot but be bad; and you say, Pittacus, that it is hard to be
good—that is, to become good, indeed, is hard, though possible, but to be
good is impossible: for—The quotation of
- Simonides' poem is resumed (from Plat. Prot.
+ Simonides’ poem is resumed (from Plat. Prot.
344c).
@@ -1951,7 +1951,7 @@
this has been said with reference to Pittacus, as is made still plainer by the
ensuing verses, in which he says—Therefore never shall I, in quest of what cannot come to
- pass, vainly cast my life's lot upon a hope impracticable—of
+ pass, vainly cast my life’s lot upon a hope impracticable—of
finding a man wholly blameless amongst us who partake of the fruit of
the broad-based earth. If I light upon him, be sure I will report
it—
@@ -1982,7 +1982,7 @@
to become a friend
and approver of some person, as when a man chances to have an uncongenial mother
or father or country or other such connexion. Now when this sort of thing
- befalls the wicked, they seem glad to see their parents' or country's faults,
+ befalls the wicked, they seem glad to see their parents’ or country’s faults,
and complainingly point them out and inveigh against them, in order that their
own neglect of them may not be denounced by their neighbors, who might otherwise
reproach them for being so neglectful; and hence they multiply
@@ -2020,7 +2020,7 @@
shall never find anyone to praise. No, I am content if a man be average and do
nothing evil, since I love and praise all”—and there he has used a
Mytilenaean word,The form of the word ἐπαίνημι is pedantically adduced to emphasize
- the poet's censure of Pittacus. for his
+ the poet’s censure of Pittacus. for his
“I praise and love all willingly” is addressed
@@ -2034,7 +2034,7 @@
But as it is, since you lie so
grievously about the greatest matters with an air of speaking the truth, on this
score I reproach you.”Such is my view,
- Prodicus and Protagoras, I said, of Simonides' intention in composing this
+ Prodicus and Protagoras, I said, of Simonides’ intention in composing this
ode.Then Hippias remarked: It certainly seems
to me, Socrates, that you have given a good exposition of the poem: but I also
have an elegant discourse upon it,
@@ -2047,7 +2047,7 @@
Socrates to answer any questions that Protagoras may still wish to put to him,
but if he prefers to answer Socrates, then it will be for Socrates to
ask.On this I remarked: For my part I place
- it in Protagoras's hands to do whichever he likes best.
+ it in Protagoras’s hands to do whichever he likes best.
But if he does not mind, let us talk no more of poems and
@@ -2284,7 +2284,7 @@
I
proceeded, will the following example give us the light we need? Just as, in
- estimating a man's health or bodily efficiency by his appearance, one might look
+ estimating a man’s health or bodily efficiency by his appearance, one might look
at his face and the lower part of his arms and say: Come now, uncover your chest
too and your back and show them, that I may examine you thoroughly—so the
same sort of desire comes over me in regard to our inquiry. Observing your
diff --git a/data/tlg0059/tlg023/tlg0059.tlg023.perseus-eng1.xml b/data/tlg0059/tlg023/tlg0059.tlg023.perseus-eng1.xml
index b1bc55ac4..7484c16b4 100755
--- a/data/tlg0059/tlg023/tlg0059.tlg023.perseus-eng1.xml
+++ b/data/tlg0059/tlg023/tlg0059.tlg023.perseus-eng1.xml
@@ -71,20 +71,20 @@
Callicles
To join in a fight or a fray, as the saying is, Socrates, you have chosen your time well enough.
Socrates
Do you mean, according to the proverb, we have come too late for a feast?
Callicles
Yes, a most elegant feast; for Gorgias gave us a fine and varied display but a moment ago.
Socrates
But indeed, Callicles, it is Chaerephon here who must take the blame for this;
he forced us to spend our time in the market-place.
Chaerephon
No matter, Socrates I will take the curing of it too for Gorgias is a friend of mine, so that he will give us a display now, if you think fit, or if you prefer, on another occasion.
Callicles
What, Chaerephon? Has Socrates a desire to hear Gorgias?
Chaerephon
Yes, it is for that very purpose we are here.
Callicles
Then whenever you have a mind to pay me a call—Gorgias is staying with me, and he will give you a display.
Socrates
Thank you, Callicles: but would he consent
to discuss with us? For I want to find out from the man what is the function of his art, and what it is that he professes and teaches. As for the rest of his performance, he must give it us, as you suggest, on another occasion.
Callicles
The best way is to ask our friend himself, Socrates: for indeed that was one of the features of his performance. Why, only this moment he was pressing for whatever questions anyone in the house might like to ask, and saying he would answer them all.
Socrates
What a good idea! Ask him, Chaerephon.
Chaerephon
What am I to ask?
Socrates
What he is.
Chaerephon
How do you mean?
-
Socrates
Just as, if he chanced to be in the shoe-making business, his answer would have been, I presume, “a shoemaker.” Now, don't you see my meaning?
Chaerephon
I see, and will ask him. Tell me, Gorgias, is Callicles here correct in saying that you profess to answer any questions one may ask you?
+
Socrates
Just as, if he chanced to be in the shoe-making business, his answer would have been, I presume, “a shoemaker.” Now, don’t you see my meaning?
Chaerephon
I see, and will ask him. Tell me, Gorgias, is Callicles here correct in saying that you profess to answer any questions one may ask you?
Gorgias
He is, Chaerephon; indeed, I was just now making this very profession, and I may add that nobody has asked me anything new for many years now.
Chaerephon
So I presume you will easily answer, Gorgias.
Gorgias
You are free to make trial of that, Chaerephon.
Polus
Yes, to be sure; and, if you like, Chaerephon, of me. For I think Gorgias must be quite tired out, after the long discourse he has just delivered.
Chaerephon
Why, Polus, do you suppose you could answer more excellently than Gorgias?
Polus
And what does that matter, if I should satisfy you?
Chaerephon
Not at all; since it is your wish, answer.
Polus
Ask.
Chaerephon
Then I ask you, if Gorgias chanced to be skilled in the same art as his brother Herodicus, what should we be justified in calling him? What we call his brother, should we not?
Polus
Certainly.
Chaerephon
Then we should make a right statement if we described him as a doctor.
Polus
Yes.
Chaerephon
And if he were expert in the same art as Aristophon, son of Aglaophon, or his brother,Polygnotus, the famous painter who decorated public buildings in Athens from about 470 B.C. what name should we rightly give him?
Polus
Obviously that of painter.
Chaerephon
But as it is, we would like to know in what art he is skilled, and hence by what name we should rightly call him.
Polus
Chaerephon, there are many arts amongst mankind that have been discovered experimentally, as the result of experiences: for experience conducts the course of our life according to art, but inexperience according to chance. Of these several arts various men partake in various ways, and the best men of the best. Gorgias here is one of these, and he is a partner in the finest art of all.
Socrates
Fine, at any rate, Gorgias, is the equipment for discourse that Polus seems to have got: but still he is not performing his promise to Chaerephon.
Gorgias
How exactly, Socrates ?
Socrates
He does not seem to me to be quite answering what he is asked.
Gorgias
Well, will you please ask him?
Socrates
No, if you yourself will be so good as to answer, why, I would far rather ask you. For I see plainly,
from what he has said, that Polus has had more practice in what is called rhetoric than in discussion.
Polus
How so, Socrates ?
Socrates
Because, Polus, when Chaerephon has asked in what art Gorgias is skilled, you merely eulogize his art as though it were under some censure, instead of replying what it is.
Polus
Why, did I not reply that it was the finest?
Socrates
You certainly did: but nobody asked what was the quality of his art, only what it was, and by what name we ought to call Gorgias. Just as Chaerephon laid out the lines
-for you at first, and you answered him properly in brief words, in the same way you must now state what is that art, and what we ought to call Gorgias; or rather, Gorgias, do you tell us yourself in what art it is you are skilled, and hence, what we ought to call you.
Gorgias
Rhetoric, Socrates.
Socrates
So we are to call you a rhetorician ?
Gorgias
Yes, and a good one, if you would call me what—to use Homer's phrase—“I vaunt myself to be.”The regular phrase of a Homeric hero in boasting of his valor, parentage, etc.; cf. Hom. Il. 6.211, Hom. Il. 14.113.
Socrates
Well, I shall be pleased to do so.
Gorgias
Then call me such.
+for you at first, and you answered him properly in brief words, in the same way you must now state what is that art, and what we ought to call Gorgias; or rather, Gorgias, do you tell us yourself in what art it is you are skilled, and hence, what we ought to call you.
Gorgias
Rhetoric, Socrates.
Socrates
So we are to call you a rhetorician ?
Gorgias
Yes, and a good one, if you would call me what—to use Homer’s phrase—“I vaunt myself to be.”The regular phrase of a Homeric hero in boasting of his valor, parentage, etc.; cf. Hom. Il. 6.211, Hom. Il. 14.113.
Socrates
Well, I shall be pleased to do so.
Gorgias
Then call me such.
Socrates
And are we to say that you are able to make others like yourself?
Gorgias
Yes, that is what I profess to do, not only here, but elsewhere also.
Socrates
Then would you be willing, Gorgias, to continue this present way of discussion, by alternate question and answer, and defer to some other time that lengthy style of speech in which Polus made a beginning? Come, be true to your promise, and consent to answer each question briefly.
Gorgias
There are some answers, Socrates, that necessitate a lengthy expression:
however, I will try to be as brief as possible; for indeed it is one of my claims that no one could express the same thing in briefer terms than myself.
Socrates
That is just what I want, Gorgias: give me a display of this very skill—in brevity of speech; your lengthy style will do another time.
Gorgias
Well, I will do that, and you will admit that you never heard anyone speak more briefly.
Socrates
Come then; since you claim to be skilled in rhetorical art,
and to be able to make anyone else a rhetorician, tell me with what particular thing rhetoric is concerned: as, for example, weaving is concerned with the manufacture of clothes, is it not?
Gorgias
Yes.
Socrates
And music, likewise, with the making of tunes?
Gorgias
Yes.
Socrates
Upon my word, Gorgias, I do admire your answers! You make them as brief as they well can be.
Gorgias
Yes, Socrates, I consider myself a very fair hand at that.
Socrates
You are right there. Come now, answer me in the same way about rhetoric: with what particular thing is its skill concerned?
Gorgias
With speech.
Socrates
What kind of speech, Gorgias? Do you mean that which shows sick people by what regimen they could get well?
Gorgias
No.
Socrates
Then rhetoric is not concerned with all kinds of speech.
Gorgias
No, I say.
Socrates
Yet it does make men able to speak.
Gorgias
Yes.
Socrates
And to understand also the things about which they speak.
Gorgias
Of course.
Socrates
Now, does the medical art, which we mentioned just now, make men able to understand and speak about the sick?
Gorgias
It must.
Socrates
Hence the medical art also, it seems, is concerned with speech.
Gorgias
Yes.
Socrates
That is, speech about diseases?
Gorgias
Certainly.
Socrates
Now, is gymnastic also concerned with speech about the good and bad condition of our bodies?
Gorgias
Quite so.
Socrates
And moreover it is the same, Gorgias, with all the other arts;
each of them is concerned with that kind of speech which deals with the subject matter of that particular art.
Gorgias
Apparently.
Socrates
Then why, pray, do you not give the name “rhetorical” to those other arts, when they are concerned with speech, if you call that “rhetoric” which has to do with speech?
Gorgias
Because, Socrates, the skill in those other arts is almost wholly concerned with manual work and similar activities, whereas in rhetoric there is no such manual working, but its whole activity
-and efficacy is by means of speech. For this reason I claim for the rhetorical art that it is concerned with speech, and it is a correct description, I maintain.
Socrates
Now, do I understand what sort of art you choose to call it? Perhaps, however, I shall get to know this more clearly. But answer me this: we have arts, have we not?
Gorgias
Yes.
Socrates
Then amongst the various arts some, I take it, consist mainly of work, and so require but brief speech; while others require none, for the art's object may be achieved actually in silence,
+and efficacy is by means of speech. For this reason I claim for the rhetorical art that it is concerned with speech, and it is a correct description, I maintain.
Socrates
Now, do I understand what sort of art you choose to call it? Perhaps, however, I shall get to know this more clearly. But answer me this: we have arts, have we not?
Gorgias
Yes.
Socrates
Then amongst the various arts some, I take it, consist mainly of work, and so require but brief speech; while others require none, for the art’s object may be achieved actually in silence,
as with painting, sculpture, and many other arts. It is to such as these that I understand you to refer when you say rhetoric has no concern with them; is not that so?
Gorgias
Your supposition is quite correct, Socrates.
Socrates
But there is another class of arts which achieve their whole purpose through speech and—to put it roughly—require either no action to aid them, or very little; for example, numeration, calculation, geometry, draught-playing, and many other arts: some of these have the speech in about equal proportion to the action, but most have it as the larger part, or absolutely the whole of their operation and effect is by means of speech. It is one of this class of arts
that I think you refer to as rhetoric.
Gorgias
You are right.
Socrates
But, mind you, I do not think it is any one of these that you mean to call rhetoric; though, so far as your expression went, you did say that the art which has its effect through speech is rhetoric, and one might retort, if one cared to strain at mere words: So, Gorgias, you call numeration rhetoric! But I do not believe it is either numeration or geometry that you call rhetoric.
Gorgias
Your belief is correct, Socrates, and your supposition just.
Socrates
Come now, and do your part in finishing off the answer to my question. Since rhetoric is in fact one of these arts which depend mainly on speech, and there are likewise other arts of the same nature, try if you can tell me with what this rhetoric, which has its effect in speech, is concerned. For instance, suppose some one asked me about one or other of the arts which I was mentioning just now: Socrates, what is the art of numeration? I should tell him,
@@ -92,9 +92,9 @@
in the manner of those who draft amendments in the Assembly—that in most respects calculation is in the same case as numeration, for both are concerned with the same thing, the odd and the even; but that they differ to this extent, that calculation considers the numerical values of odd and even numbers not merely in themselves but in relation to each other. And suppose, on my saying that astronomy also achieves its whole effect by speech, he were to ask me: And the speech of astronomy, with what is it concerned? I should say: With the courses of the stars and sun and moon, and their relative speeds.
Gorgias
And you would be right, Socrates.
Socrates
Come then and do your part, Gorgias: rhetoric is one of those arts, is it not, which carry out their work and achieve their effect by speech.
Gorgias
That is so.
Socrates
Then tell me what they deal with: what subject is it, of all in the world, that is dealt with by this speech employed by rhetoric?
Gorgias
The greatest of human affairs, Socrates, and the best.
Socrates
But that also, Gorgias, is ambiguous,
and still by no means clear. I expect you have heard people singing over their cups the old catch, in which the singers enumerate the best things in life,—“first health, then beauty, and thirdly,” as the maker of the catch puts it, “wealth got without guile.”Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Gr. viii., gives four lines of the (anonymous) song: u(giai/nein me\n a)/riston a)ndri\ qnatw=|, deu/teron de\ fua\n kalo\n gene/sqai, to\ tri/ton de\ ploutei=n a)do/lws, kai\ to\ te/tarton h(ba=n meta\ tw=n fi/lwn.
Gorgias
Yes, I have heard it; but what is the point of your quotation?
-
Socrates
I mean that, supposing the producers of those blessings which the maker of the catch commends—namely, the doctor, the trainer, and the money-getter—were to stand before you this moment, and the doctor first should say: “Gorgias is deceiving you, Socrates for it is not his art, but mine, that deals with man's greatest good.” Then supposing I were to ask him: “And who are you, to say so?” He would probably reply: “A doctor.” “Well, what do you mean? That the work of your art is the greatest good?” “What else, Socrates,” I expect he would reply, “is health? What greater good
-is there for men than health?” And supposing the trainer came next and said: “I also should be surprised indeed, Socrates, if Gorgias could show you a greater good in his art than I can in mine.” Again I should say to him in his turn: “And who are you, sir? What is your work?” “A trainer,” he would reply, “and my work is making men's bodies beautiful and strong.” After the trainer would come the money-getter, saying—
-with, I fancy, a fine contempt for every one: “Pray consider, Socrates, if you can find a good that is greater than wealth, either in Gorgias' view or in that of anyone else at all.” “Why then,” we should say to him, “are you a producer of that?” “Yes,” he would say. “And who are you?” “A money-getter.” “Well then,” we shall say to him, “do you judge wealth to be the greatest good for men?” “Of course,” he will reply. “But look here,” we should say; “our friend Gorgias contends that his own art is a cause of greater good than yours.” Then doubtless his next question would be:
+
Socrates
I mean that, supposing the producers of those blessings which the maker of the catch commends—namely, the doctor, the trainer, and the money-getter—were to stand before you this moment, and the doctor first should say: “Gorgias is deceiving you, Socrates for it is not his art, but mine, that deals with man’s greatest good.” Then supposing I were to ask him: “And who are you, to say so?” He would probably reply: “A doctor.” “Well, what do you mean? That the work of your art is the greatest good?” “What else, Socrates,” I expect he would reply, “is health? What greater good
+is there for men than health?” And supposing the trainer came next and said: “I also should be surprised indeed, Socrates, if Gorgias could show you a greater good in his art than I can in mine.” Again I should say to him in his turn: “And who are you, sir? What is your work?” “A trainer,” he would reply, “and my work is making men’s bodies beautiful and strong.” After the trainer would come the money-getter, saying—
+with, I fancy, a fine contempt for every one: “Pray consider, Socrates, if you can find a good that is greater than wealth, either in Gorgias’ view or in that of anyone else at all.” “Why then,” we should say to him, “are you a producer of that?” “Yes,” he would say. “And who are you?” “A money-getter.” “Well then,” we shall say to him, “do you judge wealth to be the greatest good for men?” “Of course,” he will reply. “But look here,” we should say; “our friend Gorgias contends that his own art is a cause of greater good than yours.” Then doubtless his next question would be:
“And what is that good? Let Gorgias answer.” Now come, Gorgias; imagine yourself being questioned by those persons and by me, and tell us what is this thing that you say is the greatest good for men, and that you claim to produce.
Gorgias
A thing, Socrates, which in truth is the greatest good, and a cause not merely of freedom to mankind at large, but also of dominion to single persons in their several cities.
Socrates
Well, and what do you call it?
Gorgias
I call it the ability to persuade with speeches either judges in the law courts or statesmen in the council-chamber or the commons in the Assembly or an audience at any other meeting that may be held on public affairs. And I tell you that by virtue of this power you will have the doctor as your slave, and the trainer as your slave; your money-getter will turn out to be making money not for himself, but for another,—in fact for you, who are able to speak and persuade the multitude.
Socrates
I think now, Gorgias, you have come very near to showing us
the art of rhetoric as you conceive it, and if I at all take your meaning, you say that rhetoric is a producer of persuasion, and has therein its whole business and main consummation. Or can you tell us of any other function it can have beyond that of effecting persuasion in the minds of an audience?
Gorgias
None at all, Socrates; your definition seems to me satisfactory; that is the main substance of the art.
Socrates
Then listen, Gorgias: I, let me assure you,
@@ -104,18 +104,18 @@
Socrates
Then let us repeat our question with reference to the same arts that we spoke of just now: does not numeration, or the person skilled in numeration, teach us all that pertains to number?
Gorgias
Certainly.
Socrates
And persuades also?
Gorgias
Yes.
Socrates
So that numeration also is a producer of persuasion?
Gorgias
Apparently.
Socrates
Then if we are asked what kind of persuasion, and dealing with what, we shall reply, I suppose: The instructive kind, which deals with the amount of an odd or an even number;
and we shall be able to demonstrate that all the other arts which we mentioned just now are producers of persuasion, and what kind it is, and what it deals with, shall we not?
Gorgias
Yes.
Socrates
Hence rhetoric is not the only producer of persuasion.
Gorgias
You are right.
Socrates
Since then it is not the only one that achieves this effect, but others can also, we should be justified in putting this further question to the speaker, as we did concerning the painter: Then of what kind of persuasion, and of persuasion dealing with what, is rhetoric the art?
Or do you not consider that such a further question would be justified?
Gorgias
Yes, I do.
Socrates
Then answer me, Gorgias, since you agree with me on that.
Gorgias
Well then, I mean that kind of persuasion, Socrates, which you find in the law-courts and in any public gatherings, as in fact I said just now; and it deals with what is just and unjust.
Socrates
I, too, I may tell you, had a suspicion that it was this persuasion that you meant, and as dealing with those things, Gorgias; but you must not be surprised if I ask you by-and-by some such question as may seem to be obvious, though I persist in it;
-for, as I say, I ask my questions with a view to an orderly completion of our argument—I am not aiming at you, but only anxious that we do not fall into a habit of snatching at each other's words with a hasty guess, and that you may complete your own statement in your own way, as the premises may allow.
Gorgias
And I think you are quite right in doing so, Socrates.
Socrates
Come then, let us consider another point. Is there something that you call “having learnt.”
Gorgias
There is.
Socrates
And again, “having believed”?
Gorgias
Yes.
+for, as I say, I ask my questions with a view to an orderly completion of our argument—I am not aiming at you, but only anxious that we do not fall into a habit of snatching at each other’s words with a hasty guess, and that you may complete your own statement in your own way, as the premises may allow.
Gorgias
And I think you are quite right in doing so, Socrates.
Socrates
Come then, let us consider another point. Is there something that you call “having learnt.”
Gorgias
There is.
Socrates
And again, “having believed”?
Gorgias
Yes.
Socrates
Then do you think that having learnt and having believed, or learning and belief, are the same thing, or different?
Gorgias
In my opinion, Socrates, they are different.
Socrates
And your opinion is right, as you can prove in this way: if some one asked you—Is there, Gorgias, a false and a true belief?—you would say, Yes, I imagine.
Gorgias
I should.
Socrates
But now, is there a false and a true knowledge?
Gorgias
Surely not.
Socrates
So it is evident again that theyi.e. knowledge and belief. are not the same.
Gorgias
You are right.
Socrates
But yet those who have learnt have been persuaded, as well as those who have believed.
Gorgias
That is so.
Socrates
Then would you have us assume two forms of persuasion—one providing belief without knowledge, and the other sure knowledge?
Gorgias
Certainly.
Socrates
Now which kind of persuasion is it that rhetoric creates in law courts or any public meeting on matters of right and wrong? The kind from which we get belief without knowledge, or that from which we get knowledge?
Gorgias
Obviously, I presume, Socrates, that from which we get belief.
-
Socrates
Thus rhetoric, it seems, is a producer of persuasion for belief, not for instruction in the matter of right and wrong.
Gorgias
Yes.
Socrates
And so the rhetorician's business is not to instruct a law court or a public meeting in matters of right and wrong, but only to make them believe; since, I take it, he could not in a short while instruct such a mass of people in matters so important.
Gorgias
No, to be sure.
Socrates
Come then, let us see what actually is our account of rhetoric:
+
Socrates
Thus rhetoric, it seems, is a producer of persuasion for belief, not for instruction in the matter of right and wrong.
Gorgias
Yes.
Socrates
And so the rhetorician’s business is not to instruct a law court or a public meeting in matters of right and wrong, but only to make them believe; since, I take it, he could not in a short while instruct such a mass of people in matters so important.
Gorgias
No, to be sure.
Socrates
Come then, let us see what actually is our account of rhetoric:
for I confess I am not yet able to distinguish what my own account of it is. When the city holds a meeting to appoint doctors or shipbuilders or any other set of craftsmen, there is no question then, is there, of the rhetorician giving advice? And clearly this is because in each appointment we have to elect the most skilful person. Again, in a case of building walls or constructing harbors or arsenals, our only advisers are the master-builders; or in consulting on the appointment of generals, or on a manoeuvre against the enemy,
or on a military occupation, it is the general staff who will then advise us, and not the rhetoricians. Or what do you say, Gorgias, to these instances? For as you claim to be an orator yourself and to make orators of others, it is proper to inquire of you concerning your own craft. And here you must regard me as furthering your own interest: for it is quite likely that some one within these walls has a wish to become your pupil—indeed I fancy I perceive more than one, yes, a number of them, who, perhaps,
would be ashamed to press you with questions. So, when you are being pressed with mine, consider that you are being questioned by them as well: “What shall we get, Gorgias, by coming to hear you? On what matters shall we be enabled to give advice to the state? Will it be only on right and wrong, or on those things besides which Socrates was mentioning just now? So try to give them an answer.
Gorgias
Well, I will try, Socrates, to reveal to you clearly the whole power of rhetoric: and in fact you have correctly shown the way to it yourself. You know, I suppose,
that these great arsenals and walls of Athens, and the construction of your harbors, are due to the advice of Themistocles, and in part to that of Pericles, not to your craftsmen.
Socrates
So we are told, Gorgias, of Themistocles; and as to Pericles, I heard him myself when he was advising us about the middle wall.Built about 440 B.C. between the two walls built in 456 B.C., one connecting the Piraeus, and the other Phalerum, with Athens. The “middle wall” ran parallel to the former, and secured from hostile attack a narrow strip of land between Athens and the Piraeus. Socrates was born in 469 B.C.
Gorgias
So whenever there is an election of such persons as you were referring to, Socrates, you see it is the orators who give the advice and get resolutions carried in these matters.
Socrates
That is just what surprises me, Gorgias, and has made me ask you all this time what in the world the power of rhetoric can be. For, viewed in this light, its greatness comes over me as something supernatural.
Gorgias
Ah yes, if you knew all, Socrates,—how it comprises in itself practically all powers at once!
-And I will tell you a striking proof of this: many and many a time have I gone with my brother or other doctors to visit one of their patients, and found him unwilling either to take medicine or submit to the surgeon's knife or cautery; and when the doctor failed to persuade him I succeeded, by no other art than that of rhetoric. And I further declare that, if a rhetorician and a doctor were to enter any city you please, and there had to contend in speech before the Assembly or some other meeting as to which of the two should be appointed physician, you would find the physician was nowhere,
+And I will tell you a striking proof of this: many and many a time have I gone with my brother or other doctors to visit one of their patients, and found him unwilling either to take medicine or submit to the surgeon’s knife or cautery; and when the doctor failed to persuade him I succeeded, by no other art than that of rhetoric. And I further declare that, if a rhetorician and a doctor were to enter any city you please, and there had to contend in speech before the Assembly or some other meeting as to which of the two should be appointed physician, you would find the physician was nowhere,
while the master of speech would be appointed if he wished. And if he had to contend with a member of any other profession whatsoever, the rhetorician would persuade the meeting to appoint him before anyone else in the place: for there is no subject on which the rhetorician could not speak more persuasively than a member of any other profession whatsoever, before a multitude. So great, so strange, is the power of this art. At the same time, Socrates, our use of rhetoric should be like our use of any other sort of exercise.
-For other exercises are not to be used against all and sundry, just because one has learnt boxing or wrestling or fighting in armour so well as to vanquish friend and foe alike: this gives one no right to strike one's friends, or stab them to death. Nor, in all conscience, if a man took lessons at a wrestling-school, and having got himself into good condition and learnt boxing he proceeded to strike his father and mother, or some other of his relations or friends, should that be a reason for
+For other exercises are not to be used against all and sundry, just because one has learnt boxing or wrestling or fighting in armour so well as to vanquish friend and foe alike: this gives one no right to strike one’s friends, or stab them to death. Nor, in all conscience, if a man took lessons at a wrestling-school, and having got himself into good condition and learnt boxing he proceeded to strike his father and mother, or some other of his relations or friends, should that be a reason for
hating athletic trainers and teachers of fighting in armour, and expelling them from our cities. For they imparted their skill with a view to its rightful use against enemies and wrongdoers,
in self-defence, not provocation; whereas the others have perverted their strength and art to an improper use. So it is not the teachers who are wicked, nor is the art either guilty or wicked on this account, but rather, to my thinking, those who do not use it properly. Now the same argument applies also to rhetoric: for the orator is able, indeed, to speak against every one and on every question in such a way as to win over the votes of the multitude, practically in any matter he may choose to take up:
but he is no whit the more entitled to deprive the doctors of their credit, just because he could do so, or other professionals of theirs; he must use his rhetoric fairly, as in the case of athletic exercise. And, in my opinion, if a man becomes a rhetorician and then uses this power and this art unfairly, we ought not to hate his teacher and cast him out of our cities. For he imparted
@@ -125,20 +125,20 @@
I therefore, if you are a person of the same sort as myself, should be glad to continue questioning you: if not, I can let it drop. Of what sort am I? One of those who would be glad to be refuted if I say anything untrue, and glad to refute anyone else who might speak untruly; but just as glad, mind you, to be refuted as to refute, since I regard the former as the greater benefit, in proportion as it is a greater benefit for oneself to be delivered from the greatest evil than to deliver some one else. For I consider that a man cannot suffer any evil so great as a false opinion on the subjects of our actual argument.
Now if you say that you too are of that sort, let us go on with the conversation; but if you think we had better drop it, let us have done with it at once and make an end of the discussion.
Gorgias
Nay, I too, Socrates, claim to be of the sort you indicate; though perhaps we should have taken thought also for the wishes of our company. For, let me tell you, some time before you and your friend arrived, I gave the company a performance of some length; and if we now have this conversation I expect we shall seriously protract our sitting.
We ought, therefore, to consider their wishes as well, in case we are detaining any of them who may want to do something else.
Chaerephon
You hear for yourselves, Gorgias and Socrates, the applause by which these gentlemen show their desire to hear anything you may say; for my own part, however, Heaven forbid that I should ever be so busy as to give up a discussion so interesting and so conducted, because I found it more important to attend to something else.
-
Callicles
Yes, by all that's holy, Chaerephon; and let me say, moreover, for myself that among the many discussions which I have attended in my time I doubt if there was one that gave me such delight as this present one. So, for my part, I shall count it a favor even if you choose to continue it all day long.
Socrates
Why, Callicles, I assure you there is no hindrance on my side, if Gorgias is willing.
Gorgias
After that, Socrates, it would be shameful indeed if I were unwilling, when it was I who challenged everybody to ask what questions they pleased.
+
Callicles
Yes, by all that’s holy, Chaerephon; and let me say, moreover, for myself that among the many discussions which I have attended in my time I doubt if there was one that gave me such delight as this present one. So, for my part, I shall count it a favor even if you choose to continue it all day long.
Socrates
Why, Callicles, I assure you there is no hindrance on my side, if Gorgias is willing.
Gorgias
After that, Socrates, it would be shameful indeed if I were unwilling, when it was I who challenged everybody to ask what questions they pleased.
But if our friends here are so minded, go on with the conversation and ask me anything you like.
Socrates
Hark you then, Gorgias, to what surprises me in your statements: to be sure, you may possibly be right, and I may take your meaning wrongly. You say you are able to make a rhetorician of any man who chooses to learn from you?
Gorgias
Yes.
Socrates
Now, do you mean, to make him carry conviction to the crowd on all subjects, not by teaching them, but by persuading?
Gorgias
Certainly I do.
Socrates
You were saying just now, you know, that even in the matter of health the orator will be more convincing than the doctor.
Gorgias
Yes, indeed, I was—meaning, to the crowd.
Socrates
And “to the crowd” means “to the ignorant?” For surely, to those who know, he will not be more convincing than the doctor.
Gorgias
You are right.
Socrates
And if he is to be more convincing than the doctor, he thus becomes more convincing than he who knows?
Gorgias
Certainly.
Socrates
Though not himself a doctor, you agree?
Gorgias
Yes.
Socrates
But he who is not a doctor is surely without knowledge of that whereof the doctor has knowledge.
Gorgias
Clearly.
Socrates
So he who does not know will be more convincing to those who do not know than he who knows, supposing the orator to be more convincing than the doctor. Is that, or something else, the consequence?
Gorgias
In this case it does follow.
Socrates
Then the case is the same in all the other arts for the orator and his rhetoric: there is no need to know
the truth of the actual matters, but one merely needs to have discovered some device of persuasion which will make one appear to those who do not know to know better than those who know.
Gorgias
Well, and is it not a great convenience, Socrates, to make oneself a match for the professionals by learning just this single art and omitting all the others?
Socrates
Whether the orator is or is not a match for the rest of them by reason of that skill, is a question we shall look into presently, if our argument so requires: for the moment let us consider first whether the rhetorician is in the same relation to what is just and unjust,
base and noble, good and bad, as to what is healthful, and to the various objects of all the other arts; he does not know what is really good or bad, noble or base, just or unjust, but he has devised a persuasion to deal with these matters so as to appear to those who, like himself, do not know to know better than he who knows. Or is it necessary to know,
and must anyone who intends to learn rhetoric have a previous knowledge of these things when he comes to you? Or if not, are you, as the teacher of rhetoric, to teach the person who comes to you nothing about them—for it is not your business—but only to make him appear in the eyes of the multitude to know things of this sort when he does not know, and to appear to be good when he is not? Or will you be utterly unable to teach him rhetoric unless he previously knows the truth about these matters? Or what is the real state of the case,
-Gorgias? For Heaven's sake, as you proposed just now, draw aside the veil and tell us what really is the function of rhetoric.
Gorgias
Why, I suppose, Socrates, if he happens not to know these things he will learn them too from me.
Socrates
Stop there: I am glad of that statement. If you make a man a rhetorician he must needs know what is just and unjust either previously or by learning afterwards from you.
Gorgias
Quite so.
+Gorgias? For Heaven’s sake, as you proposed just now, draw aside the veil and tell us what really is the function of rhetoric.
Gorgias
Why, I suppose, Socrates, if he happens not to know these things he will learn them too from me.
Socrates
Stop there: I am glad of that statement. If you make a man a rhetorician he must needs know what is just and unjust either previously or by learning afterwards from you.
Gorgias
Quite so.
Socrates
Well now, a man who has learnt building is a builder, is he not?
Gorgias
Yes.
Socrates
And he who has learnt music, a musician?
Gorgias
Yes.
Socrates
Then he who has learnt medicine is a medical man, and so on with the rest on the same principle; anyone who has learnt a certain art has the qualification acquired by his particular knowledge?
Gorgias
Certainly.
Socrates
And so, on this principle, he who has learnt what is just is just?
Gorgias
Absolutely, I presume.
Socrates
And the just man, I suppose, does what is just.
Gorgias
Yes.
Socrates
Now the just man must wish to do what is just?
Gorgias
Apparently.
Socrates
Hence the just man will never wish to act unjustly?
Gorgias
That must needs be so.
Socrates
But it follows from our statementsi.e. that he must know what is just, and that he who knows this must be just (see ¤¤ A and B above). that the rhetorician must be just.
Gorgias
Yes.
Socrates
Hence the rhetorician will never wish to do wrong.
Gorgias
Apparently not.
Socrates
Then do you remember saying a little while ago that
we ought not to complain against the trainers or expel them from our cities, if a boxer makes not merely use, but an unfair use, of his boxing? So in just the same way, if an orator uses his rhetoric unfairly, we should not complain against his teacher or banish him from our city, but the man who does the wrong and misuses his rhetoric. Was that said or not?
Gorgias
It was.
Socrates
But now we find that this very person, the rhetorician, could never be guilty of wrongdoing, do we not?
Gorgias
We do.
Socrates
And in our first statements, Gorgias, we said that rhetoric dealt with speech, not on even and odd, but on the just and unjust, did we not?
Gorgias
Yes.
Socrates
Well then, I supposed at the time when you were saying this that rhetoric could never be an unjust thing, since the speeches it made were always about justice but when a little later you told us that the orator
might make even an unjust use of his rhetoric, that indeed surprised me, and thinking the two statements were not in accord I made those proposals,—that if, like myself, you counted it a gain to be refuted, it was worth while to have the discussion, but if not, we had better have done with it. And now that we have come to examine the matter, you see for yourself that we agree once more that it is impossible for the rhetorician to use his rhetoric unjustly or consent to do wrong. Now, to distinguish properly which way the truth of the matter lies will require,
-by the Dog,This favorite oath of Socrates was derived from Egypt, where the god Anubis was represented with a dog's head; cf. Plat. Gorg. 482b. Gorgias, no short sitting.
Polus
How is this, Socrates? Is that really your opinion of rhetoric, as you now express it? Or, think you, because Gorgias was ashamed not to admit your point that the rhetorician knows what is just and noble and good, and will himself teach these to anyone who comes to him without knowing them; and then from this admission
+by the Dog,This favorite oath of Socrates was derived from Egypt, where the god Anubis was represented with a dog’s head; cf. Plat. Gorg. 482b. Gorgias, no short sitting.
Polus
How is this, Socrates? Is that really your opinion of rhetoric, as you now express it? Or, think you, because Gorgias was ashamed not to admit your point that the rhetorician knows what is just and noble and good, and will himself teach these to anyone who comes to him without knowing them; and then from this admission
I daresay there followed some inconsistency in the statements made—the result that you are so fond of—when it was yourself who led him into that set of questions!The defective construction of this sentence is probably intended to mark the agitated manner of Polus in making his protest. For who do you think will deny that he has a knowledge of what is just and can also teach it to others? I call it very bad taste to lead the discussion in such a direction.
Socrates
Ah, sweet Polus, of course it is for this very purpose we possess ourselves of companions and sons, that when the advance of years begins to make us stumble, you younger ones may be at hand to set our lives upright again in words as well as deeds. So now if Gorgias and I
are stumbling in our words, you are to stand by and set us up again—it is only your duty; and for my part I am willing to revoke at your pleasure anything that you think has been wrongly admitted, if you will kindly observe one condition.
Polus
What do you mean by that?
Socrates
That you keep a check on that lengthy way of speaking, Polus, which you tried to employ at first.
Polus
Why, shall I not be at liberty to say as much as I like?
Socrates
It would indeed be a hard fate for you, my excellent friend, if having come to Athens, where there is more freedom of speech than anywhere in Greece, you should be the one person there who could not enjoy it. But as a set-off to that, I ask you if it would not be just as hard on me, while you spoke at length and refused to answer my questions,
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@
Socrates
So now, take whichever course you like: either put questions, or answer them.
Polus
Well, I will do as you say. So answer me this, Socrates: since you think that Gorgias is at a loss about rhetoric, what is your own account of it?
Socrates
Are you asking what art I call it?
Polus
Yes.
Socrates
None at all, I consider, Polus, if you would have the honest truth.
Polus
But what do you consider rhetoric to be?
Socrates
A thing which you say—in the treatise which I read of late—“made art.”
Polus
What thing do you mean?
Socrates
I mean a certain habitude.
Polus
Then do you take rhetoric to be a habitude?
Socrates
I do, if you have no other suggestion.
Polus
Habitude of what?
Socrates
Of producing a kind of gratification and pleasure.
Polus
Then you take rhetoric to be something fine—an ability to gratify people?
Socrates
How now, Polus? Have you as yet heard me tell you
what I say it is, that you ask what should follow that—whether I do not take it to be fine?
Polus
Why, did I not hear you call it a certain habitude?
Socrates
Then please—since you value “gratification”—be so good as gratify me in a small matter.
Polus
I will.
Socrates
Ask me now what art I take cookery to be.
Polus
Then I ask you, what art is cookery ?
Socrates
None at all, Polus.
Polus
Well, what is it ? Tell me.
-
Socrates
Then I reply, a certain habitude.
Polus
Of what? Tell me.
Socrates
Then I reply, of production of gratification and pleasure, Polus.
Polus
So cookery and rhetoric are the same thing?
Socrates
Not at all, only parts of the same practice.
Polus
What practice do you mean?
Socrates
I fear it may be too rude to tell the truth; for I shrink from saying it on Gorgias' account, lest he suppose I am making satirical fun of his own profession. Yet indeed I do not know
+
Socrates
Then I reply, a certain habitude.
Polus
Of what? Tell me.
Socrates
Then I reply, of production of gratification and pleasure, Polus.
Polus
So cookery and rhetoric are the same thing?
Socrates
Not at all, only parts of the same practice.
Polus
What practice do you mean?
Socrates
I fear it may be too rude to tell the truth; for I shrink from saying it on Gorgias’ account, lest he suppose I am making satirical fun of his own profession. Yet indeed I do not know
whether this is the rhetoric which Gorgias practices, for from our argument just now we got no very clear view as to how he conceives it; but what I call rhetoric is a part of a certain business which has nothing fine about it.
Gorgias
What is that, Socrates? Tell us, without scruple on my account.
Socrates
It seems to me then, Gorgias, to be a pursuit that is not a matter of art, but showing a shrewd, gallant spirit which has a natural bent for clever dealing with mankind, and I sum up its substance in the name flattery.
This practice, as I view it, has many branches, and one of them is cookery; which appears indeed to be an art but, by my account of it, is not an art but a habitude or knack. I call rhetoric another branch of it, as also personal adornment and sophistry—four branches of it for four kinds of affairs. So if Polus would inquire, let him inquire: he has not yet been informed to what sort of branch of flattery
I assign rhetoric; but without noticing that I have not yet answered that, he proceeds to ask whether I do not consider it a fine thing. But I am not going to reply to the question whether I consider rhetoric a fine or a base thing, until I have first answered what it is; for it would not be fair, Polus: but if you want the information, ask me what sort of branch of flattery I assert rhetoric to be.
Polus
I ask you then; so answer, what sort of branch it is.
Socrates
Now, will you understand when I answer? Rhetoric,
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@
that they wish to do, practically speaking, though they do whatever they think to be best.
Polus
Well, and is not that a great power to have?
Socrates
No, judging at least by what Polus says.
Polus
I say no! Pardon me, I say yes.
Socrates
No, by the ————, you do not; for you said that great power is a good to him who has it.
Polus
Yes, and I maintain it.
Socrates
Then do you regard it as a good, when a man does what he thinks to be best, without having intelligence? Is that what you call having a great power?
Polus
No, I do not.
Socrates
Then will you prove that the orators have intelligence, and that rhetoric is an art, not a flattery, and so refute me ?
Else, if you are going to leave me unrefuted, the orators who do what they think fit in their cities, and the despots, will find they have got no good in doing that, if indeed power is, as you say, a good, but doing what one thinks fit without intelligence is—as you yourself admit, do you not?—an evil.
Polus
Yes, I do.
Socrates
How then can the orators or the despots have great power in their cities, unless Socrates is refuted by Polus, and admits that they do what they wish?
Polus
Hark at the man————!
Socrates
I deny that they do what they wish: there, refute me.
Polus
Did you not admit just now that they do what they think best?
Socrates
Yes, and I admit it now.
Polus
Then do they not do what they wish?
Socrates
I say no.
Polus
When they do what they think fit?
Socrates
Yes.
Polus
What shocking, nay, monstrous answers, Socrates!
-
Socrates
Spare your invective, peerless Polus—if I may address you in your own style:The assonance in w)= lw=|ste *pw=le is a mocking allusion to the nicely balanced clauses and jingling phrases which Polus imitated from his master Gorgias. Something of this style appears in Polus's speech above, 448c. but if you have a question to ask me, expose my error otherwise, make answer yourself.
Polus
Well, I am ready to answer, in order that I may know what you mean.
Socrates
Then is it your view that people wish merely that which they do each time, or that which is the object of their doing what they do? For instance, do those who take medicine by doctor's orders wish, in your opinion, merely what they do,—to take the medicine and suffer the pain of it,—or rather to be healthy, which is the object of their taking it?
+
Socrates
Spare your invective, peerless Polus—if I may address you in your own style:The assonance in w)= lw=|ste *pw=le is a mocking allusion to the nicely balanced clauses and jingling phrases which Polus imitated from his master Gorgias. Something of this style appears in Polus’s speech above, 448c. but if you have a question to ask me, expose my error otherwise, make answer yourself.
Polus
Well, I am ready to answer, in order that I may know what you mean.
Socrates
Then is it your view that people wish merely that which they do each time, or that which is the object of their doing what they do? For instance, do those who take medicine by doctor’s orders wish, in your opinion, merely what they do,—to take the medicine and suffer the pain of it,—or rather to be healthy, which is the object of their taking it?
Polus
To be healthy, without a doubt.
Socrates
And so with seafarers and such as pursue profit generally in trade; what they wish is not what they are doing at each moment—for who wishes to go on a voyage, and incur all its danger and trouble? It is rather, I conceive, the object of their voyage—to get wealth; since it is for wealth that they go on it.
Polus
Certainly.
Socrates
And is it not just the same in every case? If a man does something for an object, he does not wish the thing that he does, but the thing for which he does it.
Polus
Yes.
Socrates
Now is there any existent thing that is not either good or bad or between these—neither good nor bad?
Polus
Most assuredly nothing, Socrates.
Socrates
Well, do you call wisdom and health and wealth and everything else of that kind good, and their opposites bad?
Polus
I do.
Socrates
And by things neither good nor bad do you mean such things
as sometimes partake of the good, sometimes of the bad, and sometimes of neither—for example, sitting, walking, running, and sailing, or again, stones and sticks and anything else of that sort? These are what you mean, are they not? Or are there other things that you describe as neither good nor bad?
Polus
No, these are what I mean.
Socrates
Then do people do these intermediate things, when they do them, for the sake of the good things, or the good things for the intermediate?
Polus
The intermediate, I presume, for the good.
@@ -179,15 +179,15 @@
Socrates
Can such a man then be said to have great power in that city, if to have great power is something good, according to your admission?
Polus
He cannot.
Socrates
Then I spoke the truth when I said that it is possible for a man to do what he thinks fit in a city and yet not to have great power nor to do what he wishes.
Polus
As if you, Socrates, would not accept the liberty of doing what you think fit in your city rather than not, and would not envy a man whom you observed to have put some one to death as he thought fit, or deprived him of his property or sent him to prison!
Socrates
Justly, do you mean, or unjustly?
Polus
Whichever way he does it, is it not enviable in either case?
Socrates
Hush, Polus!
Polus
Why?
Socrates
Because we ought not to envy either the unenviable or the wretched, but pity them.
Polus
What! Is that the state in which you consider those people, of whom I speak, to be?
Socrates
Yes, for so I must.
Polus
Then do you consider that a man who puts another to death as he thinks fit, and justly puts him to death, is wretched and pitiable?
Socrates
Not I; but not enviable either.
Polus
Did you not say just now that he was wretched?
Socrates
Only he who unjustly put some one to death, my friend, and I called him pitiable as well: if he acted justly, then he is unenviable.
Polus
I suppose, at any rate, the man who is put to death unjustly is both pitiable and wretched.
Socrates
Less so than he who puts him to death, Polus, and less so than he who is put to death justly.
Polus
In what way can that be, Socrates ?
Socrates
In this, that to do wrong is the greatest of evils.
Polus
What, is this the greatest? Is not to suffer wrong a greater?
Socrates
By no means.
Polus
Then would you wish rather to suffer wrong than to do it?
-
Socrates
I should wish neither, for my own part; but if it were necessary either to do wrong or to suffer it, I should choose to suffer rather than do it.
Polus
Then you would not accept a despot's power?
Socrates
No, if you mean by a despot's power the same as I do.
Polus
Why, what I mean is, as I did just now, the liberty of doing anything one thinks fit in one's city—putting people to death and expelling them and doing everything at one's own discretion.
Socrates
My gifted friend, let me speak, and you shall take me to task in your turn.
+
Socrates
I should wish neither, for my own part; but if it were necessary either to do wrong or to suffer it, I should choose to suffer rather than do it.
Polus
Then you would not accept a despot’s power?
Socrates
No, if you mean by a despot’s power the same as I do.
Polus
Why, what I mean is, as I did just now, the liberty of doing anything one thinks fit in one’s city—putting people to death and expelling them and doing everything at one’s own discretion.
Socrates
My gifted friend, let me speak, and you shall take me to task in your turn.
Suppose that in a crowded market I should hide a dagger under my arm and then say to you: “Polus, I have just acquired, by a wonderful chance, the power of a despot; for if I should think fit that one of those people whom you see there should die this very instant, a dead man he will be, just as I think fit; or if I think fit that one of them shall have his head broken, broken it will be immediately; or to have his cloak torn in pieces,
torn it will be: so great is my power in this city.” Then suppose that on your disbelieving this I showed you my dagger; I expect when you saw it you would say: “Socrates, at this rate every one would have great power, for any house you thought fit might be set ablaze on these methods, and the Athenian arsenals also, and the men-of-war and all the rest of the shipping, both public and private.” But surely this is not what it is to have great power—merely doing what one thinks fit. Or do you think it is?
Polus
Oh no, not in that way.
Socrates
Then can you tell me why you disapprove of this kind of power?
Polus
I can.
Socrates
Why, then? Tell me.
Polus
Because it is inevitable that he who acts thus will be punished.
Socrates
And is it not a bad thing to be punished?
Polus
Certainly.
Socrates
So, my remarkable friend, you have come round again to the view that if doing what one thinks fit is attended by advantage in doing it, this is not merely a good thing but at the same time, it seems, the possession of great power; otherwise
it is a bad thing and means little power. And let us consider another point besides; do we not admit that sometimes it is better to do those things that we were mentioning just now—to put people to death and banish them and deprive them of property—while sometimes it is not?
Polus
To be sure.
Socrates
Then here is a point, it seems, that is admitted both on your side and on mine.
Polus
Yes.
Socrates
Then when do you say it is better to do these things? Tell me where you draw the line.
Polus
Nay, I would rather that you, Socrates, answered that.
Socrates
Well then I say, Polus, if you prefer to hear it from me, that it is better when these things are done justly, and worse when unjustly.
Polus
So hard to refute you, Socrates! Nay, a mere child could do it, could he not, and prove your words are untrue?
Socrates
Then I shall be most grateful to the child, and equally to you, if you refute me and rid me of foolery. Come, do not grow weary in well-doing towards your friend, but refute me.
-
Polus
Well, to be sure, Socrates, there is no need to refute you with ancient instances; for those happenings of but a day or two ago are enough to refute you, and prove that many a wrongdoer is happy.
Socrates
What sort of thing do you mean?
Polus
I suppose you see that Archelaus, son of Perdiccas, is ruler of Macedonia?Archelaus usurped the throne of Macedonia in 413 B.C., and ruled till his death in 399 B.C. Euripides, Agathon, and other distinguished Athenians were guests at his court; Socrates was also invited, but declined to visit him (Aristot. Rhet. ii. 23. 8), and this is probably the point of Socrates' next remark.
Socrates
Well, if I do not, at any rate I hear it.
Polus
Do you consider him happy or wretched?
Socrates
I do not know, Polus; I have never met the man.
+
Polus
Well, to be sure, Socrates, there is no need to refute you with ancient instances; for those happenings of but a day or two ago are enough to refute you, and prove that many a wrongdoer is happy.
Socrates
What sort of thing do you mean?
Polus
I suppose you see that Archelaus, son of Perdiccas, is ruler of Macedonia?Archelaus usurped the throne of Macedonia in 413 B.C., and ruled till his death in 399 B.C. Euripides, Agathon, and other distinguished Athenians were guests at his court; Socrates was also invited, but declined to visit him (Aristot. Rhet. ii. 23. 8), and this is probably the point of Socrates’ next remark.
Socrates
Well, if I do not, at any rate I hear it.
Polus
Do you consider him happy or wretched?
Socrates
I do not know, Polus; I have never met the man.
Polus
What? Could you find out by meeting him, and cannot otherwise tell, straight off, that he is happy?
Socrates
No, indeed, upon my word.
Polus
Then doubtless you will say, Socrates, that you do not know that even the Great King is happy.
Socrates
Yes, and I shall be speaking the truth; for I do not know how he stands in point of education and justice.
Polus
Why, does happiness entirely consist in that?
Socrates
Yes, by my account, Polus; for a good and honorable man or woman, I say, is happy, and an unjust and wicked one is wretched.
-
Polus
Then this Archelaus, on your statement, is wretched?
Socrates
Yes, my friend, supposing he is unjust.
Polus
Well, but how can he be other than unjust? He had no claim to the throne which he now occupies, being the son of a woman who was a slave of Perdiccas' brother Alcetas, and in mere justice he was Alcetas' slave; and if he wished to do what is just, he would be serving Alcetas and would be happy, by your account; but, as it is, he has become a prodigy of wretchedness,
+
Polus
Then this Archelaus, on your statement, is wretched?
Socrates
Yes, my friend, supposing he is unjust.
Polus
Well, but how can he be other than unjust? He had no claim to the throne which he now occupies, being the son of a woman who was a slave of Perdiccas’ brother Alcetas, and in mere justice he was Alcetas’ slave; and if he wished to do what is just, he would be serving Alcetas and would be happy, by your account; but, as it is, he has become a prodigy of wretchedness,
since he has done the most enormous wrong. First of all he invited this very master and uncle of his to his court, as if he were going to restore to him the kingdom of which Perdiccas had deprived him; and after entertaining him and his son Alexander—his own cousin, about the same age as himself—and making them drunk, he packed them into a carriage, drove them away by night, and murdered and made away with them both. And after all these iniquities he failed to observe that he had become a most wretched person and had no repentance, but a while later
he refused to make himself happy by bringing up, as he was justly bound, his brother, the legitimate son of Perdiccas, a boy about seven years old who had a just title to the throne, and restoring the kingdom to him; but he cast him into a well and drowned him, and then told his mother Cleopatra that he had fallen in and lost his life while chasing a goose. So now, you see, as the greatest wrongdoer in Macedonia, he is the most wretched of all the Macedonians, not the happiest; and I daresay some Athenians could be found who would join you
in preferring to change places with any other Macedonian of them all, rather than with Archelaus!
Socrates
At the beginning of our discussion, Polus, I complimented you on having had, as I consider, a good training in rhetoric, while you seem to have neglected disputation; and now, accordingly, this is the argument, is it, with which any child could refute me? By this statement, you think, I now stand refuted at your hands, when I assert that the wrongdoer is not happy? How so, my good friend? Why, I tell you I do not admit a single point in what you say.
@@ -218,22 +218,22 @@
the cut made in the thing cut is such as the cutter cuts it?
Polus
Apparently.
Socrates
Then putting it all in a word, see if you agree that what I was just saying applies to all cases—that the patient receives an effect of the same kind as the agentÕs action.
Polus
I do agree.
Socrates
Then this being admitted, is paying the penalty suffering something, or doing it?
Polus
Suffering it must be, Socrates.
Socrates
And at the hands of an agent?
Polus
Yes, of course; at the hands of the punisher.
Socrates
And he who punishes aright punishes justly?
Polus
Yes.
Socrates
Doing what is just, or not?
Polus
What is just.
Socrates
And he who pays the penalty by being punished suffers what is just?
Polus
Apparently.
Socrates
And what is just, I think we have agreed, is fair?
Polus
Certainly.
Socrates
Then of these two, the one does what is fair and the other, he who is punished, suffers it.
Polus
Yes.
Socrates
And so, if fair, good? For that is either pleasant or beneficial.As was agreed above, Plat. Gorg. 474d, Plat. Gorg. 474e.
Polus
It must be so.
Socrates
So he who pays the penalty suffers what is good?
Polus
It seems so.
Socrates
Then he is benefited?
Polus
Yes.
Socrates
Is it the benefit I imagine—that he becomes better in soul if he is justly punished?
Polus
Quite likely.
Socrates
Then is he who pays the penalty relieved from badness of soul?
Polus
Yes.
Socrates
And so relieved from the greatest evil?
-Look at it this way; in a man's pecuniary resources do you perceive any other badness than poverty?
Polus
No, only poverty.
Socrates
And what in his bodily resources? You would say that badness there is weakness or disease or ugliness or the like?
Polus
I would.
Socrates
And in soul too you believe there is a certain wickedness?
Polus
Of course.
Socrates
And do you not call this injustice, ignorance, cowardice, and so forth?
Polus
Certainly I do.
+Look at it this way; in a man’s pecuniary resources do you perceive any other badness than poverty?
Polus
No, only poverty.
Socrates
And what in his bodily resources? You would say that badness there is weakness or disease or ugliness or the like?
Polus
I would.
Socrates
And in soul too you believe there is a certain wickedness?
Polus
Of course.
Socrates
And do you not call this injustice, ignorance, cowardice, and so forth?
Polus
Certainly I do.
Socrates
So now in property, body, and soul, these three, you have mentioned three vices—poverty, disease, and injustice?
Polus
Yes.
Socrates
Then which of these vices is the foulest? Is it not injustice—in short, the vice of the soul?
Polus
Far the foulest.
Socrates
And if foulest, then also most evil?
Polus
How do you mean, Socrates?
Socrates
Just this: the foulest is foulest in each case because it produces the greatest pain or harm or both; this follows from our previous admissions.
Polus
Quite so.
Socrates
And foulest of all, we have just agreed, is injustice and,
-in general, vice of soul?
Polus
Yes, we have.
Socrates
So then either it is most painful, that is, foulest of these vices by an excess of painfulness, or else of harmfulness, or in both ways?
Polus
Necessarily.
Socrates
Then do you think that being unjust, licentious, cowardly, and ignorant is more painful than being poor and sick?
Polus
No, I do not, Socrates, from what we have said.
Socrates
Portentous then must be the extent of harm, and astonishing the evil, by which the soul's vice exceeds all the others
+in general, vice of soul?
Polus
Yes, we have.
Socrates
So then either it is most painful, that is, foulest of these vices by an excess of painfulness, or else of harmfulness, or in both ways?
Polus
Necessarily.
Socrates
Then do you think that being unjust, licentious, cowardly, and ignorant is more painful than being poor and sick?
Polus
No, I do not, Socrates, from what we have said.
Socrates
Portentous then must be the extent of harm, and astonishing the evil, by which the soul’s vice exceeds all the others
so as to be foulest of all, since it is not by pain, on your view of the matter.
Polus
Apparently.
Socrates
But further, I suppose, whatever has an excess of harm in the greatest measure, must be the greatest evil in the world.
Polus
Yes.
Socrates
So injustice, licentiousness, and in general, vice of soul, are the greatest evils in the world?
Polus
Apparently.
Socrates
Now what is the art that relieves from poverty? Is it not money-making?
Polus
Yes.
Socrates
And what from disease? Is it not medicine?
Polus
It must be.
Socrates
And what from wickedness and injustice? If you are not ready for that offhand, consider it thus: whither and to whom do we take those who are in bodily sickness?
Polus
To the doctor, Socrates.
Socrates
And whither the wrongdoers and libertines?
Polus
To the law-court, do you mean?
Socrates
Yes, and to pay the penalty?
Polus
I agree.
Socrates
Then is it not by employing a kind of justice that those punish who punish aright?
Polus
Clearly so.
Socrates
Then money-making relieves us from poverty,
medicine from disease, and justice from licentiousness and injustice.
Polus
Apparently.
Socrates
Which then is the fairest of these things?
Polus
Of what things, pray?
Socrates
Moneymaking, medicine, justice.
Polus
Justice, Socrates, is far above the others.
Socrates
Now again, if it is fairest, it causes either most pleasure or benefit or both.
Polus
Yes.
Socrates
Well then, is it pleasant to be medically treated, and do those who undergo such treatment enjoy it?
Polus
I do not think so.
Socrates
But it is beneficial, is it not?
Polus
Yes.
Socrates
Because one is relieved of a great evil, and hence it is worth while to endure the pain and be well.
Polus
Of course.
Socrates
Is this then the happiest state of body for a man to be in—that of being medically treated—or that of never being ill at all?
Polus
Clearly, never being ill.
Socrates
Yes, for what we regarded as happiness, it seems, was not this relief from evil, but its non-acquisition at any time.
Polus
That is so.
Socrates
Well now, which is the more wretched of two persons who have something evil either in body or in soul, he who is medically treated and is relieved of the evil, or he who is not treated and keeps it?
Polus
To my thinking, he who is not treated.
Socrates
And we found that paying the penalty is a relief from the greatest evil, wickedness?
Polus
We did.
Socrates
Because, I suppose, the justice of the court reforms us and makes us juster, and acts as a medicine for wickedness.
Polus
Yes.
Socrates
Happiest therefore is he who has no vice in his soul, since we found this to be the greatest of evils.
Polus
Clearly so.
Socrates
Next after him, I take it, is he who is relieved of it.
Polus
So it seems.
Socrates
And that was the man who is reproved, reprimanded, and made to pay the penalty.
Polus
Yes.
Socrates
Hence the worst life is led by him who has the vice and is not relieved of it.
Polus
Apparently.
Socrates
And this is the man who in committing the greatest wrongs and practicing the greatest injustice has contrived to escape reproof and chastisement and penalty alike,
-as you say Archelaus has succeeded in doing, and the rest of the despots and orators and overlords?
Polus
So it seems.
Socrates
Because, I conceive, my excellent friend, what these persons have contrived for themselves is very much as though a man who was the victim of the worst diseases should contrive not to submit to the doctor's penalty for his bodily transgressions and take the prescribed treatment, from a childish fear of cautery or incision, as being so painful.
+as you say Archelaus has succeeded in doing, and the rest of the despots and orators and overlords?
Polus
So it seems.
Socrates
Because, I conceive, my excellent friend, what these persons have contrived for themselves is very much as though a man who was the victim of the worst diseases should contrive not to submit to the doctor’s penalty for his bodily transgressions and take the prescribed treatment, from a childish fear of cautery or incision, as being so painful.
Or do you not agree to this view of it?
Polus
I do.
Socrates
Since he was ignorant, it would seem, of the virtue of bodily health and fitness. For it is very probable, from what we have just agreed, that something like this is done also by those who evade their due penalty, Polus; they perceive its painfulness, but are blind to its benefits, and are unaware how much more wretched than lack of health in the body it is to dwell with a soul that is not healthy, but corrupt, unjust, and unholy;
and hence it is that they do all they can to avoid paying the penalty and being relieved of the greatest of evils, by providing themselves with money and friends and the ability to excel in persuasive speech. But if what we have agreed is true, Polus, do you observe the consequences of our argument? Or, if you like, shall we reckon them up together?
Polus
Yes, if you do not mind.
Socrates
Then does it result that injustice and wrongdoing is the greatest evil?
Polus
Yes, apparently.
Socrates
And further, it appeared that paying the penalty is a relief from this evil?
Polus
It looks like it.
Socrates
Whereas not paying it is a retention of the evil in us?
Polus
Yes.
Socrates
Thus wrongdoing is second of evils in greatness; but to do wrong and not pay the penalty is the greatest and takes the first place among all evils.
Polus
It seems so.
Socrates
Well now, my friend, was this the point at issue between us, that you counted Archelaus,
who did the greatest wrong, happy because he paid no penalty, whilst I on the contrary thought that anyone—whether Archelaus or any other person you please—who pays no penalty for the wrong he has done, is peculiarly and pre-eminently wretched among men, and that it is always the wrongdoer who is more wretched than the wronged, and the unpunished than the punished? Is not this what I stated?
Polus
Yes.
Socrates
Then has it not been proved that this was a true statement?
Polus
Apparently.
Socrates
Very well: so if this is true, Polus, what is the great use of rhetoric? For you see by what we have just agreed that a man must keep a close watch over himself so as to avoid wrongdoing, since it would bring a great deal of evil upon him; must he not?
Polus
Certainly.
Socrates
But if he is guilty of wrongdoing, either himself or anyone else he may care for, he must go of his own freewill where he may soonest pay the penalty, to the judge
-as if to his doctor, with the earnest intent that the disease of his injustice shall not become chronic and cause a deep incurable ulcer in his soul. Or what are we to say, Polus, if our former conclusions stand? Must not our later ones accord with them in this way, and in this only?
Polus
Yes, what else, indeed, are we to say, Socrates?
Socrates
Then for pleading in defence of injustice, whether it is oneself or one's parents or friends or children or country that has done the wrong, rhetoric is of no use to us at all, Polus; except one were to suppose, perchance, to the contrary,
+as if to his doctor, with the earnest intent that the disease of his injustice shall not become chronic and cause a deep incurable ulcer in his soul. Or what are we to say, Polus, if our former conclusions stand? Must not our later ones accord with them in this way, and in this only?
Polus
Yes, what else, indeed, are we to say, Socrates?
Socrates
Then for pleading in defence of injustice, whether it is oneself or one’s parents or friends or children or country that has done the wrong, rhetoric is of no use to us at all, Polus; except one were to suppose, perchance, to the contrary,
that a man ought to accuse himself first of all, and in the second place his relations or anyone else of his friends who may from time to time be guilty of wrong; and, instead of concealing the iniquity, to bring it to light in order that he may pay the penalty and be made healthy; and, moreover, to compel both himself and his neighbors not to cower away but to submit with closed eyes and good courage, as it were, to the cutting and burning of the surgeon, in pursuit of what is good and fair, and without reckoning in the smart: if his crimes have deserved a flogging,
he must submit to the rod; if fetters, to their grip; if a fine, to its payment; if banishment, to be banished; or if death, to die; himself to be the first accuser either of himself or of his relations, and to employ his rhetoric for the purpose of so exposing their iniquities that they may be relieved of that greatest evil, injustice. Shall this be our statement or not, Polus?
Polus
An extraordinary one, Socrates, it seems to me, though perhaps you do find it agrees with what went before.
Socrates
Well, either that must be upset, or this necessarily follows.
Polus
Yes, that certainly is so.
Socrates
And so again conversely, supposing it is our duty to injure somebody, whether an enemy or anyone else—provided only that it is not against oneself that wrong has been done by such enemy, for this we must take care to avoidThe parenthesis humorously anticipates an objection that might be made, in a particular case, to this theory of what a really thorough enmity would be: if our enemy has robbed us of gold, of course we cannot, as is presently urged, take care that “he shall not refund it.”—but supposing our enemy has wronged some one else,
@@ -248,18 +248,18 @@
Gorgias showed some shame and said he would, because of the habit of mind in people which would make them indignant if refused—and so, because of this admission, he was forced to contradict himself, and that was just what suited you—and Polus was right, to my thinking, in mocking at you as he did then; but this time he has got into the very same plight himself. For my own part, where I am not satisfied with Polus is just that concession he made to you—that doing wrong
is fouler than suffering it; for owing to this admission he too in his turn got entangled in your argument and had his mouth stopped, being ashamed to say what he thought. For you, Socrates, really turn the talk into such low, popular clap-trap, while you give out that you are pursuing the truth—into stuff that is “fair,” not by nature, but by convention.The distinction between “natural,” or absolute, and “conventional,” or legal, right, first made by the Ionian Archelaus who taught Socrates in his youth, is developed at length in the Republic (Plat. Rep. 1.388 ff.), and was a constant subject of discussion among the sophists of PlatoÕs time. Yet for the most part these two—nature and convention—are opposed to each other, so that if a man is ashamed and dares not say what he thinks, he is forced
-to contradict himself. And this, look you, is the clever trick you have devised for our undoing in your discussions: when a man states anything according to convention you slip “according to nature” into your questions; and again, if he means nature, you imply convention. In the present case, for instance, of doing and suffering wrong, when Polus was speaking of what is conventionally fouler, you followed it up in the sense of what is naturally so. For by nature everything is fouler that is more evil, such as suffering wrong: doing it is fouler only by convention. Indeed this endurance of wrong done is not a man's part at all, but a poor slave's,
+to contradict himself. And this, look you, is the clever trick you have devised for our undoing in your discussions: when a man states anything according to convention you slip “according to nature” into your questions; and again, if he means nature, you imply convention. In the present case, for instance, of doing and suffering wrong, when Polus was speaking of what is conventionally fouler, you followed it up in the sense of what is naturally so. For by nature everything is fouler that is more evil, such as suffering wrong: doing it is fouler only by convention. Indeed this endurance of wrong done is not a man’s part at all, but a poor slave’s,
for whom it is better to be dead than alive, as it is for anybody who, when wronged or insulted, is unable to protect himself or anyone else for whom he cares. But I suppose the makers of the laws are the weaker sort of men, and the more numerous. So it is with a view to themselves and their own interest that they make their laws and distribute their praises and censures;
-and to terrorize the stronger sort of folk who are able to get an advantage, and to prevent them from getting one over them, they tell them, that such aggrandizement is foul and unjust, and that wrongdoing is just this endeavor to get the advantage of one's neighbors: for I expect they are well content to see themselves on an equality, when they are so inferior. So this is why by convention it is termed unjust and foul to aim at an advantage over the majority,
+and to terrorize the stronger sort of folk who are able to get an advantage, and to prevent them from getting one over them, they tell them, that such aggrandizement is foul and unjust, and that wrongdoing is just this endeavor to get the advantage of one’s neighbors: for I expect they are well content to see themselves on an equality, when they are so inferior. So this is why by convention it is termed unjust and foul to aim at an advantage over the majority,
and why they call it wrongdoing: but nature, in my opinion, herself proclaims the fact that it is right for the better to have advantage of the worse, and the abler of the feebler. It is obvious in many cases that this is so, not only in the animal world, but in the states and races, collectively, of men—that right has been decided to consist in the sway and advantage of the stronger over the weaker. For by what manner of right did Xerxes
march against Greece, or his father against Scythia? Or take the countless other cases of the sort that one might mention. Why, surely these men follow nature—the nature of right—in acting thus; yes, on my soul, and follow the lawCallicles boldly applies the word no/mos, which so far has been used in the sense of man-made law or convention, in its widest sense of “general rule” or “principle.” of nature—though not that, I dare say, which is made by us; we mold the best and strongest amongst us, taking them from their infancy like young lions, and utterly enthral them by our spells
and witchcraft, telling them the while that they must have but their equal share, and that this is what is fair and just. But, I fancy, when some man arises with a nature of sufficient force, he shakes off all that we have taught him, bursts his bonds, and breaks free; he tramples underfoot our codes and juggleries, our charms and “laws,” which are all against nature; our slave rises in revolt and shows himself our master, and there
dawns the full light of natural justice. And it seems to me that Pindar adds his evidence to what I say, in the ode where he says—Law the sovereign of all,Mortals and immortals,Pind. Fr. 169 (Bergk)which, so he continues,—Carries all with highest hand,Justifying the utmost force: in proof I takeThe deeds of Hercules, for unpurchasedPind. Fr. 169 (Bergk)—the words are something like that—I do not know the poem well—but it tells how he drove off the cows
as neither a purchase nor a gift from Geryones; taking it as a natural right that cows ar any other possessions of the inferior and weaker should all belong to the superior and stronger. Well, that is the truth of the matter; and you will grasp it if you will now put philosophy aside and pass to greater things. For philosophy, you know, Socrates, is a charming thing, if a man has to do with it moderately in his younger days; but if he continues to spend his time on it too long, it is ruin to any man. However well endowed one may be, if one philosophizes far on into life, one must needs find oneself
-ignorant of everything that ought to be familiar to the man who would be a thorough gentleman and make a good figure in the world. For such people are shown to be ignorant of the laws of their city, and of the terms which have to be used in negotiating agreements with their fellows in private or in public affairs, and of human pleasures and desires; and, in short, to be utterly inexperienced in men's characters. So when they enter upon any private or public business they make themselves ridiculous, just as on the other hand, I suppose, when public men
+ignorant of everything that ought to be familiar to the man who would be a thorough gentleman and make a good figure in the world. For such people are shown to be ignorant of the laws of their city, and of the terms which have to be used in negotiating agreements with their fellows in private or in public affairs, and of human pleasures and desires; and, in short, to be utterly inexperienced in men’s characters. So when they enter upon any private or public business they make themselves ridiculous, just as on the other hand, I suppose, when public men
engage in your studies and discussions, they are quite ridiculous. The fact is, as Euripides has it—Each shines in that, to that end presses on,Allotting there the chiefest part of the day,Wherein he haply can surpass himself—Eur. Antiope Fr.Zethus and Amphion, twins born to Zeus by Antiope, were left by her on Mt. Cithaeron, where Zethus grew up as a man of the field, and Amphion as a musician. Here probably Amphion is speaking in defence of the quieter life; further on, in the quotations given in Plat. Gorg. 489b, Plat. Gorg. 489c, Zethus reproaches him with his effeminacy.whereas that in which he is weak he shuns and vilifies; but the other he praises, in kindness to himself, thinking in this way to praise himself also. But the most proper course, I consider, is to take a share of both. It is a fine thing to partake of philosophy just for the sake of education, and it is no disgrace for a lad to follow it: but when a man already advancing in years continues in its pursuit, the affair, Socrates, becomes ridiculous; and for my part I have much the same feeling
-towards students af philosophy as towards those who lisp or play tricks. For when I see a little child, to whom it is still natural to talk in that way, lisping or playing some trick, I enjoy it, and it strikes me as pretty and ingenuous and suitable to the infant's age; whereas if I hear a small child talk distinctly, I find it a disagreeable thing, and it offends my ears and seems to me more befitting a slave. But when one hears a grown man lisp,
+towards students af philosophy as towards those who lisp or play tricks. For when I see a little child, to whom it is still natural to talk in that way, lisping or playing some trick, I enjoy it, and it strikes me as pretty and ingenuous and suitable to the infant’s age; whereas if I hear a small child talk distinctly, I find it a disagreeable thing, and it offends my ears and seems to me more befitting a slave. But when one hears a grown man lisp,
or sees him play tricks, it strikes one as something ridiculous and unmanly, that deserves a whipping. Just the same, then, is my feeling towards the followers of philosophy. For when I see philosophy in a young lad I approve of it; I consider it suitable, and I regard him as a person of liberal mind: whereas one who does not follow it I account illiberal and never likely to expect of himself any fine or generous action.
But when I see an elderly man still going on with philosophy and not getting rid of it, that is the gentleman, Socrates, whom I think in need of a whipping. For as I said just now, this person, however well endowed he may be, is bound to become unmanly through shunning the centers and marts of the city, in which, as the poetHom. Il. 9.441. said, “men get them note and glory”; he must cower down and spend the rest of his days whispering in a corner with three or four lads, and never utter anything free or high or spirited.
Now I, Socrates, am quite fairly friendly to you, and so I feel very much at this moment as Zethus did, whom I have mentioned, towards Amphion in Euripides. Indeed I am prompted to address you in the same sort of words as he did his brother: “You neglect, Socrates, what you ought to mind; you distort with a kind of boyish travesty a soul of such noble nature;
@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@
I know, Callicles, that four of you have formed a partnership in wisdom—you, Tisander of Aphidnae, Andron, son of Androtion, and Nausicydes of Cholarges;Andron is one of the wise men who meet in the house of Callias, Plat. Prot. 315; Nausicydes may be the wealthy meal-merchant mentioned in Aristoph. Eccl. 426, and Xen. Mem. 2.7.6. Of Tisander nothing is known. and I once overheard you debating how far the cultivation of wisdom should be carried, and I know you were deciding in favor of some such view as this—that one should not be carried away into the minuter points of philosophy, but you exhorted one another
to beware of making yourselves overwise, lest you should unwittingly work your own ruin. So when I hear you giving me the same advice as you gave your own most intimate friends, I have proof enough that you really are well disposed to me. And further, as to your ability to speak out frankly and not be bashful, you not only claim this yourself, but you are borne out too by the speech that you made a short while ago. Well, this is clearly the position of our question at present:
if you can bear me out in any point arising in our argument, that point can at once be taken as having been amply tested by both you and me, and there will be no more need of referring it to a further test; for no defect of wisdom or access of modesty could ever have been your motive in making this concession, nor again could you make it to deceive me: for you are my friend, as you say yourself. Hence any agreement between you and me must really have attained the perfection of truth. And on no themes could one make more honorable inquiry, Callicles, than on those which you have reproached me with—what character one should have,
-and what should be one's pursuits and up to what point, in later as in earlier years. For I assure you that if there is any fault of conduct to be found in my own life it is not an intentional error, but due to my ignorance: so I ask you not to break off in the middle of your task of admonishing me, but to make fully clear to me what it is that I ought to pursue and by what means I may attain it; and if you find me in agreement with you now, and afterwards failing to do what I agreed to,
+and what should be one’s pursuits and up to what point, in later as in earlier years. For I assure you that if there is any fault of conduct to be found in my own life it is not an intentional error, but due to my ignorance: so I ask you not to break off in the middle of your task of admonishing me, but to make fully clear to me what it is that I ought to pursue and by what means I may attain it; and if you find me in agreement with you now, and afterwards failing to do what I agreed to,
regard me as a regular dunce and never trouble any more to admonish me again—a mere good-for-nothing. Now, go right back and repeat to me what you and Pindar hold natural justice to consist in: is it that the superior should forcibly despoil the inferior, the better rule the worse, and the nobler have more than the meaner? Have you some other account to give of justice, or do I remember aright?
Callicles
Why, that is what I said then, and I say it now also.
Socrates
Is it the same person that you call “better” and “superior”?
For I must say I was no more able then to understand what your meaning might be. Is it the stronger folk that you call superior, and are the weaker ones bound to hearken to the stronger one—as for instance I think you were also pointing out then, that the great states attack the little ones in accordance with natural right, because they are superior and stronger, on the ground that the superior and the stronger and the better are all the same thing; or is it possible to be better and yet inferior and weaker, and to be superior and yet more wicked? Or is the definition
of the better and the superior the same? This is just what I bid you declare in definite terms—whether the superior and the better and the stronger are the same or different.
Callicles
Well, I tell you plainly, they are all the same.
Socrates
Now, are the many superior by nature to the one? I mean those who make the laws to keep a check on the one, as you were saying yourself just now.
Callicles
Of course.
Socrates
Then the ordinances of the many are those of the superior.
Callicles
Certainly.
@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@
Callicles
I believe, on my soul, you absolutely cannot ever stop talking of cobblers and fullers, cooks and doctors, as though our discussion had to do with them.
Socrates
Then will you tell me in what things the superior and wiser man has a right to the advantage of a larger share? Or will you neither put up with a suggestion from me nor make one yourself?
Callicles
Why, I have been making mine for sometime past. First of all,
by “the superior” I mean, not shoemakers or cooks, but those who are wise as regards public affairs and the proper way of conducting them, and not only wise but manly, with ability to carry out their purpose to the full; and who will not falter through softness of soul.
Socrates
Do you perceive, my excellent Callicles, that your count against me is not the same as mine against you? For you say I am ever repeating the same things, and reproach me with it, whereas I charge you, on the contrary, with never saying the same thing on the same subject;
but at one moment you defined the better and superior as the stronger, and at another as the wiser, and now you turn up again with something else: “the manlier” is what you now tell us is meant by the superior and better. No, my good friend, you had best say, and get it over, whom you do mean by the better and superior, and in what sphere.
Callicles
But I have told you already: men of wisdom and manliness in public affairs.
-These are the persons who ought to rule our cities, and justice means this—that these should have more than other people, the rulers than the ruled.
Socrates
How so? Than themselves, my friend?
Callicles
What do you mean?
Socrates
I mean that every man is his own ruler; or is there no need of one's ruling oneself, but only of ruling others?
Callicles
What do you mean by one who rules himself?
Socrates
Nothing recondite; merely what most people mean—one who is temperate and self-mastering, ruler of the pleasures and desires
+These are the persons who ought to rule our cities, and justice means this—that these should have more than other people, the rulers than the ruled.
Socrates
How so? Than themselves, my friend?
Callicles
What do you mean?
Socrates
I mean that every man is his own ruler; or is there no need of one’s ruling oneself, but only of ruling others?
Callicles
What do you mean by one who rules himself?
Socrates
Nothing recondite; merely what most people mean—one who is temperate and self-mastering, ruler of the pleasures and desires
that are in himself.
Callicles
You will have your pleasantry! You mean “the simpletons” by “the temperate.”
Socrates
How so? Nobody can fail to see that I do not mean that.
Callicles
Oh, you most certainly do, Socrates. For how can a man be happy if he is a slave to anybody at all? No, natural fairness and justice, I tell you now quite frankly, is this—that he who would live rightly should let his desires be
as strong as possible and not chasten them, and should be able to minister to them when they are at their height by reason of his manliness and intelligence, and satisfy each appetite in turn with what it desires. But this, I suppose, is not possible for the many; whence it comes that they decry such persons out of shame, to disguise their own impotence, and are so good as to tell us that licentiousness is disgraceful, thus enslaving—as I remarked before—the better type of mankind; and being unable themselves to procure
achievement of their pleasures they praise temperance and justice by reason of their own unmanliness. For to those who started with the advantage of being either kingsÕ sons or able by their own parts to procure some authority or monarchy or absolute power, what in truth could be fouler or worse than temperance and justice in such cases? Finding themselves free to enjoy good things, with no obstacle in the way, they would be merely imposing on themselves a master in the shape of the law, the talk and the rebuke of the multitude. Or how could they fail to be sunk in wretchedness
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@
Now, am I at all prevailing upon you to change over to the view that the orderly people are happier than the licentious or will no amount of similar fables that I might tell you have any effect in changing your mind?
Callicles
The latter is more like the truth, Socrates.
Socrates
Come now, let me tell you another parable from the same schoolProbably of Pythagoras. as that I have just told. Consider if each of the two lives, the temperate and the licentious, might be described by imagining that each of two men had a number of jars,
and those of one man were sound and full, one of wine, another of honey, a third of milk, and various others of various things, and that the sources of each of these supplies were scanty and difficult and only available through much hard toil: well, one man, when he has taken his fill, neither draws off any more nor troubles himself a jot, but remains at ease on that score; whilst the other finds, like his fellow, that the sources are possible indeed, though difficult, but his vessels are leaky and decayed,
and he is compelled to fill them constantly, all night and day, or else suffer extreme distress. If such is the nature of each of the two lives, do you say that the licentious man has a happier one than the orderly? Do I, with this story of mine, induce you at all to concede that the orderly life is better than the licentious, or do I fail?
Callicles
You fail, Socrates. For that man who has taken his fill can have no pleasure any more; in fact it is what I just now called living like a stone, when one has filled up and no longer feels any joy or pain.
-But a pleasant life consists rather in the largest possible amount of inflow.
Socrates
Well then, if the inflow be large, must not that which runs away be of large amount also, and must not the holes for such outflow be of great size?
Callicles
Certainly.
Socrates
Then it is a plover's lifeReferring to this birdÕs habit of drinking water and then ejecting it. you are describing this time, not that of a corpse or a stone. Now tell me, is the life you mean something like feeling hunger and eating when hungry?
Callicles
Yes, it is.
+But a pleasant life consists rather in the largest possible amount of inflow.
Socrates
Well then, if the inflow be large, must not that which runs away be of large amount also, and must not the holes for such outflow be of great size?
Callicles
Certainly.
Socrates
Then it is a plover’s lifeReferring to this birdÕs habit of drinking water and then ejecting it. you are describing this time, not that of a corpse or a stone. Now tell me, is the life you mean something like feeling hunger and eating when hungry?
Callicles
Yes, it is.
Socrates
And feeling thirst and drinking when thirsty?
Callicles
Yes, and having all the other desires, and being able to satisfy them, and so with these enjoyments leading a happy life.
Socrates
Bravo, my fine fellow! Do go on as you have begun, and mind you show no bashfulness about it. I too, it seems, must try not to be too bashful. First of all, tell me whether a man who has an itch and wants to scratch, and may scratch in all freedom, can pass his life happily in continual scratching.
Callicles
What an odd person you are, Socrates—a regular stump-orator!
Socrates
Why, of course, Callicles, that is how I upset Polus and Gorgias, and struck them with bashfulness; but you, I know, will never be upset or abashed; you are such a manly fellow. Come, just answer that.
Callicles
Then I say that the man also who scratches himself will thus spend a pleasant life.
Socrates
And if a pleasant one, a happy one also?
Callicles
Certainly.
Socrates
Is it so if he only wants to scratch his head? Or what more am I to ask you? See, Callicles, what your answer will be, if you are asked everything in succession that links on to that statement; and the culmination of the case, as stated—the life of catamites—is not that awful, shameful, and wretched? Or will you dare to assert that these are happy if they can freely indulge their wants?
Callicles
Are you not ashamed, Socrates, to lead the discussion into such topics?
Socrates
What, is it I who am leading it there, noble sir, or the person who says outright that those who enjoy themselves,
@@ -332,7 +332,7 @@
Socrates
And it is by the presence of bad things, you say, that the bad are bad? Or do you no longer say so?
Callicles
I do say so.
Socrates
Then whoever enjoys is good, and whoever is pained, bad?
Callicles
Certainly.
Socrates
You mean, those more so who feel these things more, and those less who feel less, and those about equally who feel about equally?
Callicles
Yes.
Socrates
Now you say that the wise and the foolish, the cowardly and the brave, feel enjoyment and pain about equally, or the cowards even more?
Callicles
I do.
Socrates
Then just help me to reckon up the results we get from our admissions for you know they say: “That which seemeth well, Ôtis well twice and also thrice to tell,”The saying—KAI\ DI\S GA\R O(\ DEI= KALO/N E)STIN E)NISPEI=N—was attributed by some to Empedocles. and to examine too.
We say that the wise and brave man is good, do we not?
Callicles
Yes.
Socrates
And that the foolish and cowardly is bad?
Callicles
Certainly.
Socrates
And again, that he who enjoys is good?
Callicles
Yes.
Socrates
And that he who feels pain is bad?
Callicles
Necessarily.
Socrates
And that the good and the bad feel enjoyment and pain in a like manner, or perhaps the bad rather more?
Callicles
Yes.
Socrates
Then is the bad man made bad or good in a like manner to the good man,
or even good in a greater measure? Does not this follow, along with those former statements, from the assumption that pleasant things and good things are the same? Must not this be so, Callicles?
Callicles
Let me tell you, Socrates, all the time that I have been listening to you and yielding you agreement, I have been remarking the puerile delight with which you cling to any concession one may make to you, even in jest. So you suppose that I or anybody else in the world does not regard some pleasures as better, and others worse!
Socrates
Oh ho, Callicles, what a rascal you are,
-treating me thus like a child—now asserting that the same things are one way, now another, to deceive me! And yet I started with the notion that I should not have to fear any intentional deception on your part, you being my friend; but now I find I was mistaken, and it seems I must, as the old saying goes, e'en make the best of what I have got,The proverb usually has TI/QESQAI instead of POIEI=N; cf. Lucian, Necyom. 21. and accept just anything you offer. Well then, what you now state, it seems, is that there are certain pleasures, some good, and some bad; is not that so?
Callicles
Yes.
+treating me thus like a child—now asserting that the same things are one way, now another, to deceive me! And yet I started with the notion that I should not have to fear any intentional deception on your part, you being my friend; but now I find I was mistaken, and it seems I must, as the old saying goes, e’en make the best of what I have got,The proverb usually has TI/QESQAI instead of POIEI=N; cf. Lucian, Necyom. 21. and accept just anything you offer. Well then, what you now state, it seems, is that there are certain pleasures, some good, and some bad; is not that so?
Callicles
Yes.
Socrates
Then are the beneficial ones good, and the harmful ones bad?
Callicles
Certainly.
Socrates
And are those beneficial which do some good, and those evil which do some evil?
Callicles
I agree.
Socrates
Now are these the sort you mean—for instance, in the body, the pleasures of eating and drinking that we mentioned a moment ago? Then the pleasures of this sort which produce health in the body, or strength, or any other bodily excellence,—are these good, and those which have the opposite effects, bad?
Callicles
Certainly.
Socrates
And similarly in the case of pains, are some worthy and some base?
Callicles
Of course.
Socrates
So it is the worthy pleasures and pains that we ought to choose in all our doings?
Callicles
Certainly.
Socrates
And the base ones not?
Callicles
Clearly so.
Socrates
Because, you know, Polus and I, if you recollect, decidedCf. Plat. Gorg. 468c. that everything we do should be for the sake of what is good. Do you agree with us in this view—that the good is the end of all our actions, and it is for its sake that all other things should be done, and not it for theirs?
Do you add your vote to ours, and make a third?
Callicles
I do.
Socrates
Then it is for the sake of what is good that we should do everything, including what is pleasant, not the good for the sake of the pleasant.
Callicles
Certainly.
Socrates
Now is it in every manÕs power to pick out which sort of pleasant things are good and which bad, or is professional skill required in each case?
Callicles
Professional skill.
Socrates
Then let us recall those former points I was putting to Polus and Gorgias.Cf. Plat. Gorg. 464-5. I said, if you remember,
@@ -341,7 +341,7 @@
to do what I attempted a while ago, and distinguish them; and then, when we have distinguished them and come to an agreement with each other as to these lives being really two, we must consider what is the difference between them and which of them is the one we ought to live. Now I daresay you do not yet grasp my meaning.
Callicles
No, I do not.
Socrates
Well, I will put it to you more plainly. Seeing that we have agreed, you and I, that there is such a thing as “good,” and such a thing as “pleasant,” and that the pleasant is other than the good, and that for the acquisition of either there is a certain practice or preparation—the quest of the pleasant in the one case, and that of the good in the other—but first you must either assent or object to this statement of mine:
do you assent?
Callicles
I am with you entirely.
Socrates
Then try and come to a definite agreement with me on what I was saying to our friends here, and see if you now find that what I then said was true. I was saying, I think, that cookery seems to me
not an art but a habitude, unlike medicine, which, I argued, has investigated the nature of the person whom she treats and the cause of her proceedings, and has some account to give of each of these things; so much for medicine: whereas the other, in respect of the pleasure to which her whole ministration is given, goes to work there in an utterly inartistic manner, without having investigated at all either the nature or the cause of pleasure, and altogether irrationally—with no thought, one may say, of differentiation, relying on routine and habitude for merely preserving a memory of what is wont to result; and that is how she is enabled to provide her pleasures.
-Now consider first whether you think that this account is satisfactory, and that there are certain other such occupations likewise, having to do with the soul; some artistic, with forethought for what is to the soul's best advantage, and others making light of this, but again, as in the former case, considering merely the soul's pleasure and how it may be contrived for her, neither inquiring which of the pleasures is a better or a worse one, nor caring for aught but mere gratification,
+Now consider first whether you think that this account is satisfactory, and that there are certain other such occupations likewise, having to do with the soul; some artistic, with forethought for what is to the soul’s best advantage, and others making light of this, but again, as in the former case, considering merely the soul’s pleasure and how it may be contrived for her, neither inquiring which of the pleasures is a better or a worse one, nor caring for aught but mere gratification,
whether for better or worse. For I, Callicles, hold that there are such, and for my part I call this sort of thing flattery, whether in relation to the body or to the soul or to anything else, whenever anyone ministers to its pleasure without regard for the better and the worse; and you now, do you support us with the same opinion on this matter, or do you gainsay us?
Callicles
Not I; I agree with you, in order that your argument may reach a conclusion, and that I may gratify Gorgias here.
Socrates
And is this the case with only one soul, and not with two or many?
Callicles
No, it is also the case with two or many.
Socrates
Then is it possible also to gratify them all at once, collectively, with no consideration of what is best?
Callicles
I should think it is.
Socrates
Then can you say what are the pursuits which effect this? Or rather, if you like, when I ask you, and one of them seems to you to be of this class, say yes, and when one does not, say no. And first let us consider flute-playing. Does it not seem to you one of this sort,
Callicles, aiming only at our pleasure, and caring for naught else ?
Callicles
It does seem so to me.
Socrates
And so too with all similar pursuits, such as harp-playing in the contests?
Callicles
Yes.
Socrates
And what of choral productions and dithyrambic compositions? Are they not manifestly, in your view, of the same kind? Or do you suppose Cinesias,A dithyrambic poet whose extravagant style was ridiculed by Aristophanes (Aristoph. Frogs 153; Aristoph. Cl. 333; Aristoph. Birds 1379). son of Meles, cares a jot about trying to say things of a sort that might be improving to his audience,
@@ -350,9 +350,9 @@
she is bent rather upon pleasure and the gratification of the spectators.
Socrates
Well now, that kind of thing, Callicles, did we say just now, is flattery ?
Callicles
Certainly.
Socrates
Pray then, if we strip any kind of poetry of its melody, its rhythm and its meter, we get mere speeches as the residue, do we not?
Callicles
That must be so.
Socrates
And those speeches are spoken to a great crowd of people?
Callicles
Yes.
Socrates
Hence poetry is a kind of public speaking.
Callicles
Apparently.
Socrates
Then it must be a rhetorical public speaking or do you not think that the poets use rhetoric in the theaters?
Callicles
Yes, I do.
Socrates
So now we have found a kind of rhetoric addressed to such a public as is compounded of children and women and men, and slaves as well as free; an art that we do not quite approve of, since we call it a flattering one.
Callicles
To be sure.
Socrates
Very well; but now, the rhetoric addressed to the Athenian people,
or to the other assemblies of freemen in the various cities—what can we make of that? Do the orators strike you as speaking always with a view to what is best, with the single aim of making the citizens as good as possible by their speeches, or are they, like the poets, set on gratifying the citizens, and do they, sacrificing the common weal to their own personal interest, behave to these assemblies as to children, trying merely to gratify them, nor care a jot whether they will be better or worse in consequence?
-
Callicles
This question of yours is not quite so simple; for there are some who have a regard for the citizens in the words that they utter, while there are also others of the sort that you mention.
Socrates
That is enough for me. For if this thing also is twofold, one part of it, I presume, will be flattery and a base mob-oratory, while the other is noble—the endeavor, that is, to make the citizens' souls as good as possible, and the persistent effort to say what is best, whether it prove more or less pleasant to one's hearers.
+
Callicles
This question of yours is not quite so simple; for there are some who have a regard for the citizens in the words that they utter, while there are also others of the sort that you mention.
Socrates
That is enough for me. For if this thing also is twofold, one part of it, I presume, will be flattery and a base mob-oratory, while the other is noble—the endeavor, that is, to make the citizens’ souls as good as possible, and the persistent effort to say what is best, whether it prove more or less pleasant to one’s hearers.
But this is a rhetoric you never yet saw; or if you have any orator of this kind that you can mention, without more ado let me know who he is!
Callicles
No, upon my word, I cannot tell you of anyone, at least among the orators of today.
Socrates
Well then, can you mention one among those of older times whom the Athenians have to thank for any betterment that started at the time of his first harangues, as a change from the worse state in which he originally found them? For my part, I have no idea who the man is.
-
Callicles
Why, do you hear no mention of Themistocles and what a good man he was, and Cimon and Miltiades and the great Pericles, who has died recently,429 B.C. We saw at Plat. Gorg. 473e that the supposed date of the discussion is 405 B.C., so that “recently” here is hardly accurate. and whom you have listened to yourself?
Socrates
Yes, Callicles, if that which you spoke of just now is true virtue—the satisfaction of one's own and other men's desires; but if that is not so, and the truth is—as we were compelled to admit in the subsequent discussion—that only those desires
+
Callicles
Why, do you hear no mention of Themistocles and what a good man he was, and Cimon and Miltiades and the great Pericles, who has died recently,429 B.C. We saw at Plat. Gorg. 473e that the supposed date of the discussion is 405 B.C., so that “recently” here is hardly accurate. and whom you have listened to yourself?
Socrates
Yes, Callicles, if that which you spoke of just now is true virtue—the satisfaction of one’s own and other men’s desires; but if that is not so, and the truth is—as we were compelled to admit in the subsequent discussion—that only those desires
which make man better by their satisfaction should be fulfilled, but those which make him worse should not, and that this is a special art, then I for one cannot tell you of any man so skilled having appeared among them.
Callicles
Ah, but if you search properly you will find one.
Socrates
Then let us just consider the matter calmly, and see if any of them has appeared with that skill. Come now: the good man, who is intent on the best when he speaks, will surely not speak at random in whatever he says, but with a view to some object?
He is just like any other craftsman, who having his own particular work in view selects the things he applies to that work of his, not at random, but with the purpose of giving a certain form to whatever he is working upon. You have only to look, for example, at the painters, the builders, the shipwrights, or any of the other craftsmen, whichever you like, to see how each of them arranges everything according to a certain order, and forces one part to suit and fit with another, until he has combined
the whole into a regular and well-ordered production; and so of course with all the other craftsmen, and the people we mentioned just now, who have to do with the body—trainers and doctors; they too, I suppose, bring order and system into the body. Do we admit this to be the case, or not?
Callicles
Let it be as you say.
Socrates
Then if regularity and order are found in a house, it will be a good one, and if irregularity, a bad one?
Callicles
I agree.
Socrates
And it will be just the same with a ship?
@@ -360,45 +360,45 @@
Socrates
I do. And what, again, to the effect produced in the soul by regularity and order? Try to find the name here, and tell it me as before.
Callicles
Why not name it yourself, Socrates ?
Socrates
Well, if you prefer it, I will; and do you, if I seem to you to name it rightly, say so; if not, you must refute me and not let me have my way. For it seems to me that any regularity of the body is called healthiness, and this leads to health being produced in it, and general bodily excellence. Is that so or not?
Callicles
It is.
Socrates
And the regular and orderly states of the soul are called lawfulness and law, whereby men are similarly made law-abiding and orderly; and these states are justice and temperance. Do you agree or not?
Callicles
Be it so.
Socrates
Then it is this that our orator, the man of art and virtue, will have in view, when he applies to our souls the words that he speaks, and also in all his actions, and in giving any gift he will give it, and in taking anything away he will take it, with this thought always before his mind—
how justice may be engendered in the souls of his fellow-citizens, and how injustice may be removed; how temperance may be bred in them and licentiousness cut off; and how virtue as a whole may be produced and vice expelled. Do you agree to this or not?
Callicles
I agree.
Socrates
For what advantage is there, Callicles, in giving to a sick and ill-conditioned body a quantity of even the most agreeable things to eat and drink, or anything else whatever, if it is not going to profit thereby any more, let us say, than by the opposite treatment, on any fair reckoning, and may profit less? Is this so?
-
Callicles
Be it so.
Socrates
Because, I imagine, it is no gain for a man to live in a depraved state of body, since in this case his life must be a depraved one also. Or is not that the case?
Callicles
Yes.
Socrates
And so the satisfaction of one's desires—if one is hungry, eating as much as one likes, or if thirsty, drinking—is generally allowed by doctors when one is in health; but they practically never allow one in sickness to take one's fill of things that one desires: do you agree with me in this?
Callicles
I do.
+
Callicles
Be it so.
Socrates
Because, I imagine, it is no gain for a man to live in a depraved state of body, since in this case his life must be a depraved one also. Or is not that the case?
Callicles
Yes.
Socrates
And so the satisfaction of one’s desires—if one is hungry, eating as much as one likes, or if thirsty, drinking—is generally allowed by doctors when one is in health; but they practically never allow one in sickness to take one’s fill of things that one desires: do you agree with me in this?
Callicles
I do.
Socrates
And does not the same rule, my excellent friend, apply to the soul? So long as it is in a bad state—thoughtless, licentious, unjust and unholy—we must restrain its desires and not permit it to do anything except what will help it to be better: do you grant this, or not?
Callicles
I do.
Socrates
For thus, I take it, the soul itself is better off?
Callicles
To be sure.
Socrates
And is restraining a person from what he desires correcting him?
Callicles
Yes.
Socrates
Then correction is better for the soul than uncorrected licence, as you were thinking just now.
Callicles
I have no notion what you are referring to, Socrates; do ask some one else.
Socrates
Here is a fellow who cannot endure a kindness done him, or the experience in himself of what our talk is about—a correction!
Callicles
Well, and not a jot do I care, either, for anything you say; I only gave you those answers to oblige Gorgias.
Socrates
Very good. So now, what shall we do? Break off our argument midway?
Callicles
You must decide that for yourself.
Socrates
Why, they say one does wrong to leave off even stories in the middle; one should set a head on the thing, that it may not go about headless. So proceed with the rest of your answers, that our argument may pick up a head.
Callicles
How overbearing you are, Socrates! Take my advice, and let this argument drop, or find some one else to argue with.
Socrates
Then who else is willing? Surely we must not leave the argument there, unfinished?
Callicles
Could you not get through it yourself, either talking on by yourself or answering your own questions?
-
Socrates
So that, in Epicharmus's phrase,Epicharmus of Cos produced philosophic comedies in Sicily during the first part of the fifth century. The saying is quoted in full by Athenaeus, vii. 308 TA\ PRO\ TOU= DU/' A)/NDRES E)/LEGON EI)=S E)GW\N A)POXRE/W.“what two men spake erewhile” I may prove I can manage single-handed. And indeed it looks as though it must of sheer necessity be so. Still, if we are to do this, for my part I think we ought all to vie with each other in attempting a knowledge of what is true and what false in the matter of our argument; for it is a benefit to all alike that it be revealed. Now I am going to pursue the argument
+
Socrates
So that, in Epicharmus’s phrase,Epicharmus of Cos produced philosophic comedies in Sicily during the first part of the fifth century. The saying is quoted in full by Athenaeus, vii. 308 TA\ PRO\ TOU= DU/’ A)/NDRES E)/LEGON EI)=S E)GW\N A)POXRE/W.“what two men spake erewhile” I may prove I can manage single-handed. And indeed it looks as though it must of sheer necessity be so. Still, if we are to do this, for my part I think we ought all to vie with each other in attempting a knowledge of what is true and what false in the matter of our argument; for it is a benefit to all alike that it be revealed. Now I am going to pursue the argument
as my view of it may suggest; but if any of you think the admissions I am making to myself are not the truth, you must seize upon them and refute me. For I assure you I myself do not say what I say as knowing it, but as joining in the search with you; so that if anyone who disputes my statements is found to be on the right track, I shall be the first to agree with him. This, however, I say on the assumption that you think the argument should be carried through to a conclusion; but if you would rather it were not, let us have done with it now and go our ways.
Gorgias
Well, my opinion is, Socrates,
-that we ought not to go away yet, but that you should go through with the argument; and I fancy the rest of them think the same. For I myself, in fact, desire to hear you going through the remainder by yourself.
Socrates
Why, to be sure, Gorgias, I myself should have liked to continue discussing with Callicles here until I had paid him an Amphion's speech in return for his of Zethus.Cf. Plat. Gorg. 485 above. But since you, Callicles, are unwilling to join me in finishing off the argument, you must at any rate pull me up, as you listen, if it seems to you that my statements are wrong.
+that we ought not to go away yet, but that you should go through with the argument; and I fancy the rest of them think the same. For I myself, in fact, desire to hear you going through the remainder by yourself.
Socrates
Why, to be sure, Gorgias, I myself should have liked to continue discussing with Callicles here until I had paid him an Amphion’s speech in return for his of Zethus.Cf. Plat. Gorg. 485 above. But since you, Callicles, are unwilling to join me in finishing off the argument, you must at any rate pull me up, as you listen, if it seems to you that my statements are wrong.
And if you refute me, I shall not be vexed with you as you were with me; you will only be recorded in my mind as my greatest benefactor.
Callicles
Proceed, good sir, by yourself, and finish it off.
Socrates
Give ear, then; but first I will resume our argument from the beginning. Are the pleasant and the good the same thing? Not the same, as Callicles and I agreed. Is the pleasant thing to be done for the sake of the good, or the good for the sake of the pleasant? The pleasant for the sake of the good.
And is that thing pleasant by whose advent we are pleased, and that thing good by whose presence we are good? Certainly. But further, both we and everything else that is good, are good by the advent of some virtue? In my view this must be so, Callicles. But surely the virtue of each thing, whether of an implement or of a body, or again of a soul or any live creature, does not arrive most properly by accident, but by an order or rightness or art that is apportioned to each. Is that so? I certainly agree.
Then the virtue of each thing is a matter of regular and orderly arrangement? I at least should say so. Hence it is a certain order proper to each existent thing that by its advent in each makes it good? That is my view. So then a soul which has its own proper order is better than one which is unordered? Necessarily. But further, one that has order is orderly? Of course it will be.
And the orderly one is temperate? Most necessarily. So the temperate soul is good. For my part, I can find nothing to say in objection to this, my dear Callicles; but if you can, do instruct me.
Callicles
Proceed, good sir.
Socrates
I say, then, that if the temperate soul is good, one that is in the opposite state to this sensibleThe argument here makes use of a more literal meaning of SW/FRWN—“sound-minded” (verging on “conscientious,” as in what immediately follows). one is bad; and that was the senseless and dissolute one. Certainly. And further, the sensible man will do what is fitting as regards both gods and men; for he could not be sensible if he did what was unfitting. That must needs be so. And again, when he does what is fitting
-as regards men, his actions will be just, and as regards the gods, pious; and he who does what is just and pious must needs be a just and pious man. That is so. And surely he must be brave also: for you know a sound or temperate mind is shown, not by pursuing and shunning what one ought not, but by shunning and pursuing what one ought, whether they be things or people or pleasures or pains, and by steadfastly persevering in one's duty; so that it follows of strict necessity,
+as regards men, his actions will be just, and as regards the gods, pious; and he who does what is just and pious must needs be a just and pious man. That is so. And surely he must be brave also: for you know a sound or temperate mind is shown, not by pursuing and shunning what one ought not, but by shunning and pursuing what one ought, whether they be things or people or pleasures or pains, and by steadfastly persevering in one’s duty; so that it follows of strict necessity,
Callicles, that the temperate man, as shown in our exposition, being just and brave and pious, is the perfection of a good man; and that the good man does well and fairly whatever he does and that he who does well is blessed and happy,As the various meanings of SWFROSUN/NH have been brought out to suggest that one side of virtues involves the others, so here the apparent quibble of EU)= PRA/TTEIN (“act well” and “fare well”) is intended to suggest a real dependence of happiness upon virtue. while the wicked man or evil-doer is wretched. And this must be the man who is in an opposite case to the temperate,—the licentious man whom you were commending.So there is my account of the matter, and I say that this is the truth; and that, if this is true, anyone, as it seems,
-who desires to be happy must ensue and practice temperance, and flee from licentiousness, each of us as fast as his feet will carry him, and must contrive, if possible, to need no correction; but if he have need of it, either himself or anyone belonging to him, either an individual or a city, then right must be applied and they must be corrected, if they are to be happy. This, in my opinion, is the mark on which a man should fix his eyes throughout life; he should concentrate all his own and his city's efforts on this one business of providing
-a man who would be blessed with the needful justice and temperance; not letting one's desires go unrestrained and in one's attempts to satisfy them—an interminable trouble—leading the life of a robber. For neither to any of his fellow-men can such a one be dear, nor to God; since he cannot commune with any, and where there is no communion, there can be no friendship. And wise men tell us, Callicles, that heaven and earth
+who desires to be happy must ensue and practice temperance, and flee from licentiousness, each of us as fast as his feet will carry him, and must contrive, if possible, to need no correction; but if he have need of it, either himself or anyone belonging to him, either an individual or a city, then right must be applied and they must be corrected, if they are to be happy. This, in my opinion, is the mark on which a man should fix his eyes throughout life; he should concentrate all his own and his city’s efforts on this one business of providing
+a man who would be blessed with the needful justice and temperance; not letting one’s desires go unrestrained and in one’s attempts to satisfy them—an interminable trouble—leading the life of a robber. For neither to any of his fellow-men can such a one be dear, nor to God; since he cannot commune with any, and where there is no communion, there can be no friendship. And wise men tell us, Callicles, that heaven and earth
and gods and men are held together by communion and friendship, by orderliness, temperance, and justice; and that is the reason, my friend, why they call the whole of this world by the name of order,*ko/smos (“order”) was the name first given to the universe by the Pythagoreans. not of disorder or dissoluteness. Now you, as it seems to me, do not give proper attention to this, for all your cleverness, but have failed to observe the great power of geometrical equality amongst both gods and men: you hold that self-advantage is what one ought to practice, because you neglect geometry. Very well: either we must refute this statement, that it is by the possession
of justice and temperance that the happy are happy and by that of vice the wretched are wretched; or if this is true, we must investigate its consequences. Those former results, Callicles, must all follow, on which you asked me if I was speaking in earnest when I said that a man must accuse himself or his son or his comrade if he do any wrong, and that this is what rhetoric must be used for; and what you supposed Polus to be conceding from shame is after all true—
that to do wrong is worse, in the same degree as it is baser, than to suffer it, and that whoever means to be the right sort of rhetorician must really be just and well-informed of the ways of justice, which again Polus said that Gorgias was only shamed into admitting.This being the case, let us consider what weight, if any, there is in the reproaches you cast upon me:Socrates proceeds to recall the reproaches of Callicles, above, Plat. Gorg. 486. is it fairly alleged or not that I am unable to stand up for myself or any of my friends and relations, or to deliver them from the sorest perils, but am exposed like an outcast to the whim of anyone who chooses to give me—
the dashing phrase is yours—a box on the ear; or strip me of my substance or expel me from the city; or, worst of all, put me to death; and that to be in such a case is the lowest depth of shame, as your account has it? But mine—though it has been frequently stated already, there can be no objection to my stating it once again—is this: I deny, Callicles, that to be wrongfully boxed on the ear
is the deepest disgrace, or to have either my person cut or my purse; I hold that to strike or cut me or mine wrongfully is yet more of a disgrace and an evil, and likewise stealing and kidnapping and housebreaking, and in short any wrong whatsoever done to me or mine, are both worse and more shameful to the wrongdoer than to me the wronged. All this, which has been made evident in the form I have stated some way back in our foregoing discussion,
is held firm and fastened—if I may put it rather bluntly—with reasons of steel and adamant (so it would seem, at least, on the face of it) which you or somebody more gallant than yourself must undo, or else accept this present statement of mine as the only possible one. For my story is ever the same, that I cannot tell how the matter stands, and yet of all whom I have encountered, before as now, no one has been able to state it otherwise without making himself ridiculous. Well now, once more I assume it to be so;
-but if it is so, and injustice is the greatest of evils to the wrongdoer, and still greater than this greatest, if such can be, when the wrongdoer pays no penalty, what rescue is it that a man must be able to effect for himself if he is not to be ridiculous in very truth? Is it not one which will avert from us the greatest harm? Nay, rescue must needs be at its shamefullest, if one is unable to rescue either oneself or one's own friends and relations,
+but if it is so, and injustice is the greatest of evils to the wrongdoer, and still greater than this greatest, if such can be, when the wrongdoer pays no penalty, what rescue is it that a man must be able to effect for himself if he is not to be ridiculous in very truth? Is it not one which will avert from us the greatest harm? Nay, rescue must needs be at its shamefullest, if one is unable to rescue either oneself or one’s own friends and relations,
and second to it is inability in face of the second sort of evil, and third in face of the third, and so on with the rest; according to the gravity attaching to each evil is either the glory of being able to effect a rescue from each sort, or the shame of being unable. Is it so or otherwise, Callicles?
Callicles
Not otherwise.
Socrates
Then of these two, doing and suffering wrong, we declare doing wrong to be the greater evil, and suffering it the less. Now with what should a man provide himself in order to come to his own rescue, and so have both of the benefits that arise from doing no wrong on the one hand,
and suffering none on the other? Is it power or will? What I mean is, will a man avoid being wronged by merely wishing not to be wronged, or will he avoid it by providing himself with power to avert it?
Callicles
The answer to that is obvious: by means of power.
Socrates
But what about doing wrong? Will the mere not wishing to do it suffice—since, in that case, he will not do it—or does it require that he also provide himself with some power or art,
since unless he has got such learning or training he will do wrong? I really must have your answer on this particular point, Callicles—whether you think that Polus and I were correct or not in finding ourselves forced to admit, as we did in the preceding argument, that no one does wrong of his own wish, but that all who do wrong do it against their will.
-
Callicles
Let it be as you would have it, Socrates, in order that you may come to a conclusion of your argument.
Socrates
Then for this purpose also, of not doing wrong, it seems we must provide ourselves with a certain power or art.
Callicles
To be sure.
Socrates
Now what can be the art of providing so that we suffer no wrong, or as little as possible? Consider if you take the same view of it as I do. For in my view it is this: one must either be a ruler, or even a despot, in one's city, or else an associate of the existing government.
+
Callicles
Let it be as you would have it, Socrates, in order that you may come to a conclusion of your argument.
Socrates
Then for this purpose also, of not doing wrong, it seems we must provide ourselves with a certain power or art.
Callicles
To be sure.
Socrates
Now what can be the art of providing so that we suffer no wrong, or as little as possible? Consider if you take the same view of it as I do. For in my view it is this: one must either be a ruler, or even a despot, in one’s city, or else an associate of the existing government.
Callicles
Do you note, Socrates, how ready I am to praise, when you say a good thing? This seems to me excellently spoken.
Socrates
Then see if this next statement of mine strikes you as a good one too. It seems to me that the closest possible friendship between man and man is that mentioned by the sages of old time as “like to like.” Do you not agree?
Callicles
I do.
Socrates
So where you have a savage, uneducated ruler as despot, if there were some one in the city far better than he, I suppose the despot would be afraid of him
and could never become a friend to him with all his heart?
Callicles
That is so.
Socrates
Nor a friend to anyone who was much inferior to him either; for the despot would despise him and never show him the attention due to a friend.
Callicles
That is true also.
Socrates
Then the only friend of any account that remains for such a person is a man of his own temper, who blames and praises the same things, and is thus willing to be governed by him and to be subject to his rule. He is a man who will have great power in that state;
him none will wrong with impunity. Is it not so?
Callicles
Yes.
Socrates
Hence if one of the young men in that city should reflect: In what way can I have great power, and no one may do me wrong?—this, it would seem, is the path he must take, to accustom himself from his earliest youth to be delighted and annoyed by the same things as his master, and contrive to be as like the other as possible. Is it not so?
Callicles
Yes.
Socrates
And so this man will have attained to a condition of suffering no wrong and having great power—as your party maintain—in the city.
Callicles
Certainly.
Socrates
And of doing no wrong likewise? Or is it quite the contrary, if he is to be like his unjust ruler, and have great influence with him? Well, for my part, I think his efforts will be all the opposite way, that is, towards enabling himself to do as much wrong as possible and to pay no penalty for the wrong he does; will they not?
Callicles
Apparently.
Socrates
And thus he will find himself possessed of the greatest evil, that of having his soul depraved and maimed as a result of his imitation of his master and the power he has got.
Callicles
You have a strange way of twisting your arguments, at each point, this way or that, Socrates! Surely you know that this imitator will put to death anyone who does not imitate his master, if he pleases, and will strip him of his property.
-
Socrates
I know that, my good Callicles, if I am not deaf, as I have heard it so often of late from you and Polus, and from almost every one else in the town; but you in return must hear what I say—that he will put a man to death if he pleases, but it will be a villain slaying a good man and true.
Callicles
And is not this the very thing that makes one indignant?Cf. Callicles' warning (Plat. Gorg. 486b) against the danger of being put to death on the false accusation of some paltry rascal.
Socrates
Not if one is a man of sense, as our argument indicates. Or do you suppose that the object of a man's efforts should be to live as long a time as possible, and to cultivate those arts which preserve us from every danger;
+
Socrates
I know that, my good Callicles, if I am not deaf, as I have heard it so often of late from you and Polus, and from almost every one else in the town; but you in return must hear what I say—that he will put a man to death if he pleases, but it will be a villain slaying a good man and true.
Callicles
And is not this the very thing that makes one indignant?Cf. Callicles’ warning (Plat. Gorg. 486b) against the danger of being put to death on the false accusation of some paltry rascal.
Socrates
Not if one is a man of sense, as our argument indicates. Or do you suppose that the object of a man’s efforts should be to live as long a time as possible, and to cultivate those arts which preserve us from every danger;
such as that which you bid me cultivate—rhetoric, the art that preserves us in the law courts?
Callicles
Yes, on my word I do, and sound advice it is that I give you.
Socrates
But now, my excellent friend, do you think there is anything grand in the accomplishment of swimming?
Callicles
No, in truth, not I.
Socrates
Yet, you know, that too saves men from death, when they have got into a plight of the kind in which that accomplishment is needed. But if this seems to you too small a thing, I will tell you of a more important one,
the art of piloting, which saves not only our lives but also our bodies and our goods from extreme perils, as rhetoric does. And at the same time it is plain-fashioned and orderly, not giving itself grand airs in a pretence of performing some transcendent feat; but in return for performing the same as the forensic art—bringing one safely over, it may be, from Aegina—it charges a fee, I believe, of two obolsAbout fourpence.; or if it be from Egypt or the Pontus, at the very most—for this great service
-of bringing safe home, as I said just now, oneself and children and goods and womenfolk—on landing charges a couple of drachmaeAbout two shillings; the actual possessor of the art, after performing all this, goes ashore and strolls on the quay by his vessel's side, with an unobtrusive demeanor. For he knows, I expect, how to estimate the uncertainty as to which of his passengers he has benefited by not letting them be lost at sea, and which he has injured, being aware that he has put them ashore not a whit better than when they came aboard,
+of bringing safe home, as I said just now, oneself and children and goods and womenfolk—on landing charges a couple of drachmaeAbout two shillings; the actual possessor of the art, after performing all this, goes ashore and strolls on the quay by his vessel’s side, with an unobtrusive demeanor. For he knows, I expect, how to estimate the uncertainty as to which of his passengers he has benefited by not letting them be lost at sea, and which he has injured, being aware that he has put them ashore not a whit better than when they came aboard,
either in body or in soul. And so he reckons out how wrong it is that, whereas a victim of severe and incurable diseases of the body who has escaped drowning is miserable in not having died, and has got no benefit at his hands, yet, if a man has many incurable diseases in that part of him so much more precious than the body, his soul, that such a person is to live, and that he will be doing him the service of saving him either from the sea or from a law court or from any other peril whatsoever: no,
he knows it cannot be better for a man who is vicious to live, since he must needs live ill.This is why it is not the custom for the pilot to give himself grand airs, though he does save our lives; nor for the engineer either, my admirable friend, who sometimes has the power of saving lives in no less degree than a general—to say nothing of a pilot—or anyone else: for at times he saves whole cities. Can you regard him as comparable with the lawyer? And yet, if he chose to speak as you people do, Callicles, magnifying his business, he would bury you in a heap of words,
pleading and urging the duty of becoming engineers, as the only thing; for he would find reasons in plenty. But you none the less despise him and his special art, and you would call him “engineer” in a taunting sense, and would refuse either to bestow your daughter on his son or let your own son marry his daughter. And yet after the praises you sing of your own pursuits what fair ground have you for despising the engineer and the others whom I was mentioning just now? I know
-you would claim to be a better man and of better birth. But if “better” has not the meaning I give it, but virtue means just saving oneself and one's belongings, whatever one's character may be, you are merely ridiculous in cavilling at the engineer and the doctor and every other art that has been produced for our safety. No, my gifted friend, just see if the noble and the good are not something different from saving and being saved. For as to living any particular length of time, this is surely a thing that any true man
+you would claim to be a better man and of better birth. But if “better” has not the meaning I give it, but virtue means just saving oneself and one’s belongings, whatever one’s character may be, you are merely ridiculous in cavilling at the engineer and the doctor and every other art that has been produced for our safety. No, my gifted friend, just see if the noble and the good are not something different from saving and being saved. For as to living any particular length of time, this is surely a thing that any true man
should ignore, and not set his heart on mere life; but having resigned all this to Heaven and believing what the women say—that not one of us can escape his destiny—he should then proceed to consider in what way he will best live out his allotted span of life; whether in assimilating himself to the constitution of the state in which he may be dwelling—
and so therefore now, whether it is your duty to make yourself as like as possible to the Athenian people, if you intend to win its affection and have great influence in the city: see if this is to your advantage and mine, so that we may not suffer, my distinguished friend, the fate that they say befalls the creatures who would draw down the moon—the hags of Thessaly;Socrates alludes to the popular theory that the practice of witchcraft is a serious danger or utter destruction to the practicer. that our choice of this power in the city may not cost us all that we hold most dear. But if you suppose that anyone in the world can transmit to you such an art as will cause you
to have great power in this state without conforming to its government either for better or for worse, in my opinion you are ill-advised, Callicles; for you must be no mere imitator, but essentially like them, if you mean to achieve any genuine sort of friendship with Demus the Athenian people, ay, and I dare swear, with Demus son of PyrilampesCf. above, Plat. Gorg. 481d. as well. So whoever can render you most like them is the person to make you a statesman in the way that you desire to be a statesman, and a rhetorician;
@@ -407,17 +407,17 @@
Callicles
Be it so, if you like.
Socrates
And the aim of the other is to make that which we are tending, whether it be body or soul, as good as may be.
Callicles
To be sure.
Socrates
Then ought we not to make it our endeavor, in tending our city and its citizens, to make those citizens as good as possible? For without this, you see, as we found in our former argument, there is no use in offering any other service, unless the intentions
of those who are going to acquire either great wealth or special authority or any other sort of power be fair and honorable. Are we to grant that?
Callicles
Certainly, if you so prefer.
Socrates
Then if you and I, Callicles, in setting about some piece of public business for the state, were to invite one another to see to the building part of it, say the most important erections either of walls or arsenals or temples, would it be our duty to consider and examine ourselves,
first as to whether we understood the art of building or not, and from whom we had learnt it? Would we have to do this, or not?
Callicles
Certainly.
Socrates
And so again, in the second place, whether we had ever erected any building privately for one of our friends or for ourselves, and whether such building was handsome or ugly? And if we found on consideration that we had been under good and reputable masters,
-and that there were many handsome buildings that had been erected by us with our masters' guidance, and many also by ourselves alone, after we had dispensed with our masters, it might, in those circumstances, be open to men of sense to enter upon public works: but if we had neither a master of ourselves to point to, nor any buildings at all, or only a number of worthless ones, in that case surely it would be senseless to attempt public works or invite one another to take them in hand. Shall we agree to
-the correctness of this statement or not?
Callicles
Yes, to be sure.
Socrates
And so too with all the rest: suppose, for instance, we had undertaken the duties of state-physicians, and were to invite one another to the work as qualified doctors, we should, I presume, have first inquired of each other, I of you and you of me: Let us see now, in Heaven's name; how does Socrates himself stand as regards his body's health? Or has anyone else, slave or free, ever had Socrates to thank for ridding him of a disease? And I also, I fancy, should make the same sort of inquiry about you; and then, if we found we had never been the cause
+and that there were many handsome buildings that had been erected by us with our masters’ guidance, and many also by ourselves alone, after we had dispensed with our masters, it might, in those circumstances, be open to men of sense to enter upon public works: but if we had neither a master of ourselves to point to, nor any buildings at all, or only a number of worthless ones, in that case surely it would be senseless to attempt public works or invite one another to take them in hand. Shall we agree to
+the correctness of this statement or not?
Callicles
Yes, to be sure.
Socrates
And so too with all the rest: suppose, for instance, we had undertaken the duties of state-physicians, and were to invite one another to the work as qualified doctors, we should, I presume, have first inquired of each other, I of you and you of me: Let us see now, in Heaven’s name; how does Socrates himself stand as regards his body’s health? Or has anyone else, slave or free, ever had Socrates to thank for ridding him of a disease? And I also, I fancy, should make the same sort of inquiry about you; and then, if we found we had never been the cause
of an improvement in the bodily condition of anyone, stranger or citizen, man or woman,—by Heaven, Callicles, would it not in truth be ridiculous that men should descend to such folly that, before having plenty of private practice, sometimes with indifferent results, sometimes with success, and so getting adequate training in the art, they should, as the saying is, try to learn pottery by starting on a wine-jar,That is, instead of a small pot involving little waste in case of failure. and start public practice themselves and invite others of their like to do so? Do you not think it would be mere folly to act thus?
Callicles
I do.
Socrates
And now, most excellent sir, since you are yourself just entering upon a public career, and are inviting me to do the same, and reproaching me for not doing it, shall we not inquire of one another: Let us see, has Callicles ever made any of the citizens better? Is there one who was previously wicked, unjust, licentious, and senseless, and has to thank Callicles for making him an upright, honorable man, whether stranger or citizen, bond or free? Tell me,
if anyone examines you in these terms, Callicles, what will you say? What human being will you claim to have made better by your intercourse? Do you shrink from answering, if there really is some work of yours in private life that can serve as a step to your public practice?
Callicles
You are contentious, Socrates!
Socrates
No, it is not from contentiousness that I ask you this, but from a real wish to know in what manner you can imagine you ought to conduct yourself as one of our public men. Or can it be, then, that you will let us see you concerning yourself
-with anything else in your management of the city's affairs than making us, the citizens, as good as possible? Have we not more than once already admitted that this is what the statesman ought to do? Have we admitted it or not? Answer. We have: I will answer for you. Then if this is what the good man ought to accomplish for his country, recall now those men whom you mentioned a little while ago, and tell me if you still consider that they showed themselves good citizens—
+with anything else in your management of the city’s affairs than making us, the citizens, as good as possible? Have we not more than once already admitted that this is what the statesman ought to do? Have we admitted it or not? Answer. We have: I will answer for you. Then if this is what the good man ought to accomplish for his country, recall now those men whom you mentioned a little while ago, and tell me if you still consider that they showed themselves good citizens—
Pericles and Cimon and Miltiades and Themistocles.
Callicles
Yes, I do.
Socrates
Then if they were good, clearly each of them was changing the citizens from worse to better. Was this so, or not?
Callicles
Yes.
Socrates
So when Pericles began to speak before the people, the Athenians were worse than when he made his last speeches?
Callicles
Perhaps.
Socrates
Not “perhaps,” as you say, excellent sir; it follows of necessity from what we have admitted,
on the assumption that he was a good citizen.
Callicles
Well, what then?
Socrates
Nothing: but tell me one thing in addition,—whether the Athenians are said to have become better because of Pericles, or quite the contrary, to have been corrupted by him. What I, for my part, hear is that Pericles has made the Athenians idle, cowardly, talkative, and avaricious, by starting the system of public fees.This refers especially to the payment of dicasts or jurors, introduced by Pericles in 462-1 B.C.
Callicles
You hear that from the folk with battered ears,i.e. people who show their Spartan sympathies by an addiction to boxing; cf. Plat. Prot. 342b. Socrates.
Socrates
Ah, but what is no longer a matter of hearsay, but rather of certain knowledge, for you as well as for me, is that Pericles was popular at first, and the Athenians passed no degrading sentence upon him so long as they were “worse”; but as soon as they had been made upright and honorable by him,
-at the end of our Pericles' life they convicted him of embezzlement, and all but condemned him to death, clearly because they thought him a rogue.
Callicles
What then? Was Pericles a bad man on that account?
Socrates
Well, at any rate a herdsman in charge of asses or horses or oxen would be considered a bad one for being like that—if he took over animals that did not kick him or butt or bite, and in the result they were found to be doing all these things out of sheer wildness. Or do you not consider any keeper
+at the end of our Pericles’ life they convicted him of embezzlement, and all but condemned him to death, clearly because they thought him a rogue.
Callicles
What then? Was Pericles a bad man on that account?
Socrates
Well, at any rate a herdsman in charge of asses or horses or oxen would be considered a bad one for being like that—if he took over animals that did not kick him or butt or bite, and in the result they were found to be doing all these things out of sheer wildness. Or do you not consider any keeper
of any animal whatever a bad one, if he turns out the creature he received tame so much wilder than he found it? Do you, or do you not?
Callicles
Certainly I do, to oblige you.
Socrates
Then oblige me still further by answering this: is man also one of the animals, or not?
Callicles
Of course he is.
Socrates
And Pericles had charge of men?
Callicles
Yes.
Socrates
Well now, ought they not, as we admitted this moment, to have been made by him more just instead of more unjust,
-if he was a good statesman while he had charge of them?
Callicles
Certainly.
Socrates
And the just are gentle, as Homer said.Our text of Homer contains no such saying. The nearest is that in Hom. Od. 6.120, and Hom. Od. 9.175—h)/ r(' o(i/g' u(bristai/ te kai\ a)/grioi, ou)de\ di/kaioi, “Wanton and wild are they, not just.” But what say you? Is it not so?
Callicles
Yes.
Socrates
But, however, he turned them out wilder than when he took them in hand, and that against himself, the last person he would have wished them to attack.
Callicles
You wish me to agree with you?
Socrates
Yes, if you consider I am speaking the truth.
+if he was a good statesman while he had charge of them?
Callicles
Certainly.
Socrates
And the just are gentle, as Homer said.Our text of Homer contains no such saying. The nearest is that in Hom. Od. 6.120, and Hom. Od. 9.175—h)/ r(’ o(i/g’ u(bristai/ te kai\ a)/grioi, ou)de\ di/kaioi, “Wanton and wild are they, not just.” But what say you? Is it not so?
Callicles
Yes.
Socrates
But, however, he turned them out wilder than when he took them in hand, and that against himself, the last person he would have wished them to attack.
Callicles
You wish me to agree with you?
Socrates
Yes, if you consider I am speaking the truth.
Callicles
Then be it so.
Socrates
And if wilder, more unjust and worse?
Callicles
Be it so.
Socrates
Then Pericles was not a good statesman, by this argument.
Callicles
You at least say not.
Socrates
And you too, I declare, by what you admitted. And now about Cimon once more, tell me, did not the people whom he tended ostracize him in order that they might not hear his voice for ten years? And Themistocles, did they not treat him in just the same way, and add the punishment of exile?
And Miltiades, the hero of Marathon, they sentenced to be flung into the pit, and had it not been for the president, in he would have gone. And yet these men, had they been good in the way that you describe them, would never have met with such a fate. Good drivers, at any rate, do not keep their seat in the chariot at their first race to be thrown out later on, when they have trained their teams and acquired more skill in driving! This never occurs either in charioteering or in any other business; or do you think it does?
Callicles
No, I do not.
Socrates
So what we said before, it seems, was true,
that we know of nobody who has shown himself a good statesman in this city of ours. You admitted there was nobody among those of the present day, but thought there were some amongst those of former times, and you gave these men the preference. But these we have found to be on a par with ours of the present day and so, if they were orators, they employed neither the genuine art of rhetoric—else they would not have been thrown out—nor the flattering form of it.
Callicles
But still there can be no suggestion, Socrates, that any of the present-day men has ever achieved anything like
@@ -427,7 +427,7 @@
or weaver or shoemaker or tanner—it is no wonder that a man in such capacity should appear to himself and his neighbors to be a minister of the body; to every one, in fact, who is not aware that there is besides all these an art of gymnastics and medicine which really is, of course, ministration to the body, and which actually has a proper claim to rule over all those arts and to make use of their works, because it knows what is wholesome or harmful in meat and drink
to bodily excellence, whereas all those others know it not; and hence it is that, while those other arts are slavish and menial and illiberal in dealing with the body, gymnastics and medicine can fairly claim to be their mistresses. Now, that the very same is the case as regards the soul you appear to me at one time to understand to be my meaning, and you admit it as though you knew what I meant; but a little later you come and tell me that men have shown themselves upright and honorable citizens in our city, and when I ask you
who, you seem to me to be putting forward men of exactly the same sort in public affairs; as if, on my asking you who in gymnastics have ever been or now are good trainers of the body, you were to tell me, in all seriousness, Thearion, the baker, Mithaecus, the author of the book on Sicilian cookery, Sarambus, the vintner—these have shown themselves wonderful ministers of the body;
-the first providing admirable loaves, the second tasty dishes, and the third wine.” Now perhaps you would be indignant should I then say to you: “Sir, you know nothing about gymnastics; servants you tell me of, and caterers to appetites, fellows who have no proper and respectable knowledge of them, and who peradventure will first stuff and fatten men's bodies to the tune of their praises, and then cause them to lose even the flesh they had to start with;
+the first providing admirable loaves, the second tasty dishes, and the third wine.” Now perhaps you would be indignant should I then say to you: “Sir, you know nothing about gymnastics; servants you tell me of, and caterers to appetites, fellows who have no proper and respectable knowledge of them, and who peradventure will first stuff and fatten men’s bodies to the tune of their praises, and then cause them to lose even the flesh they had to start with;
and these in their turn will be too ignorant to cast the blame of their maladies and of their loss of original weight upon their regalers, but any people who chance to be by at the time and offer them some advice—just when the previous stuffing has brought, after the lapse of some time, its train of disease, since it was done without regard to what is wholesome—these are the people they will accuse and chide and harm as far as they can, while they will sing the praises of that former crew who caused the mischief.
And you now, Callicles, are doing something very similar to this: you belaud men who have regaled the citizens with all the good cheer they desired. People do say they have made the city great; but that it is with the swelling of an imposthume, due to those men of the former time, this they do not perceive.
For with no regard for temperance and justice they have stuffed the city with harbors and arsenals and walls and tribute and suchlike trash; and so whenever that access of debility comes they will lay the blame on the advisers who are with them at the time, and belaud Themistocles and Cimon and Pericles, who caused all the trouble; and belike they will lay hold of you, if you are not on your guard, and my good friend Alcibiades, when they are losing what they had originally
@@ -437,11 +437,11 @@
Socrates
Apparently I can. Just now, at any rate, I am rather extending my speeches, since you will not answer me. But in the name of friendship, my good fellow, tell me if you do not think it unreasonable for a man, while professing to have made another good, to blame him for being wicked in spite of having been made good by him and still being so?
Callicles
Yes, I do.
Socrates
Well, and you hear such things said by those who profess to give men education in virtue?
Callicles
I do; but what is one to say of such worthless people?
Socrates
And what is one to say of those who, professing to govern the state and take every care that she be as good as possible, turn upon her and accuse her, any time it suits them, of being utterly wicked? Do you see any difference between these men and the others? Sophist and orator, my estimable friend, are the same thing, or very much of a piece, as I was telling Polus; but you in your ignorance think the one thing,
rhetoric, a very fine affair, and despise the other. Yet in reality sophistic is a finer thing than rhetoric by so much as legislation is finer than judicature, and gymnastic than medicine: in fact, for my own part, I always regarded public speakers and sophists as the only people who have no call to complain of the thing that they themselves educate, for its wickedness towards them; as otherwise they must in the same words be also charging themselves with having been of no use to those whom they say they benefit. Is it not so?
-
Callicles
Certainly.
Socrates
And they alone, I presume, could most likely afford to give away their services without fee, if their words were true. For when a man has received any other service, for example, if he has acquired a fast pace from a trainer's lessons, he might possibly cheat him of his due if the trainer freely offered himself and did not stipulate for a fee to be paid down by the other as nearly as possible at the moment when he imparted to him the fast pace he required;
+
Callicles
Certainly.
Socrates
And they alone, I presume, could most likely afford to give away their services without fee, if their words were true. For when a man has received any other service, for example, if he has acquired a fast pace from a trainer’s lessons, he might possibly cheat him of his due if the trainer freely offered himself and did not stipulate for a fee to be paid down by the other as nearly as possible at the moment when he imparted to him the fast pace he required;
for it is not through a slow pace, I conceive, that men act unjustly, but through injustice; is it not?
Callicles
Yes.
Socrates
And so whoever removes this particular thing, injustice, need never have a fear of being unjustly treated; this benefit alone may be freely bestowed without risk, granted that one really had the power of making people good. Is it not so?
Callicles
I agree.
Socrates
Then this, it seems, is the reason why there is no disgrace in taking money for giving every other kind of advice, as about building or the rest of the arts.
-
Callicles
It does seem so.
Socrates
But about this business of finding the way to be as good as possible, and of managing one's own household or city for the best, it is recognized to be a disgrace for one to decline to give advice except for a payment in cash, is it not?
Callicles
Yes.
Socrates
The reason evidently being that this is the only sort of service that makes the person so served desire to do one in return and hence it is felt to be a good sign when this service that one has done is repaid to one in kind; but when this is not so, the contrary is felt. Is the case as I say?
+
Callicles
It does seem so.
Socrates
But about this business of finding the way to be as good as possible, and of managing one’s own household or city for the best, it is recognized to be a disgrace for one to decline to give advice except for a payment in cash, is it not?
Callicles
Yes.
Socrates
The reason evidently being that this is the only sort of service that makes the person so served desire to do one in return and hence it is felt to be a good sign when this service that one has done is repaid to one in kind; but when this is not so, the contrary is felt. Is the case as I say?
Callicles
It is.
Socrates
Then please specify to which of these two ministrations to the state you are inviting me—that of struggling hard, like a doctor, with the Athenians to make them as good as possible, or that of seeking to serve their wants and humor them at every turn? Tell me the truth, Callicles; for it is only right that, as you began by speaking to me frankly, you should continue to tell me what you think. So now speak out like a good, generous man.
Callicles
I say then, the way of seeking to serve them.
-
Socrates
So it is to a flatterer's work, most noble sir, that you invite me?
Callicles
Work for a mean Mysian,The Mysians, like the Carians (cf. Euthydemus 285 C), were regarded as the lowest of the low. Callicles heatedly taunts Socrates with putting the matter in its worst light. if you prefer the name, Socrates; for unless you do as I say—
Socrates
Do not tell me, what you have so often repeated, that anyone who pleases will put me to death, lest I on my side should have to tell you that it will be a villain killing a good man; nor that anyone may strip me of whatever I have,
+
Socrates
So it is to a flatterer’s work, most noble sir, that you invite me?
Callicles
Work for a mean Mysian,The Mysians, like the Carians (cf. Euthydemus 285 C), were regarded as the lowest of the low. Callicles heatedly taunts Socrates with putting the matter in its worst light. if you prefer the name, Socrates; for unless you do as I say—
Socrates
Do not tell me, what you have so often repeated, that anyone who pleases will put me to death, lest I on my side should have to tell you that it will be a villain killing a good man; nor that anyone may strip me of whatever I have,
lest I should have to say in my turn: Well, but when he has stripped me, he will not know what use to make of his spoil, but as he stripped me unjustly so will he use his spoil unjustly, and if unjustly, foully, and if foully, ill.
Callicles
It quite strikes me, Socrates, that you believe not one of these troubles could befall you, as though you dwelt out of the way, and could never be dragged into a law court by some perhaps utterly paltry rascal.
Socrates
Then I am a fool, Callicles, in truth, if I do not suppose that in this city anyone, whoever he was, might find himself, as luck should have it, in any sort of plight. Of one thing, however, I am sure—that if ever I am brought before the court and stand in any such danger as you mention, it will be some villain who brings me there,
for no honest man would prosecute a person who had done no wrong; and it would be no marvel if I were put to death. Would you like me to tell you my reason for expecting this?
Callicles
Do, by all means.
Socrates
I think I am one of few, not to say the only one, in Athens who attempts the true art of statesmanship, and the only man of the present time who manages affairs of state: hence, as the speeches that I make from time to time are not aimed at gratification, but at what is best instead of what is most pleasant, and as I do not care to deal in “these pretty toys”Socrates retorts the phrase of Euripides, which Callicles applied (above, Plat. Gorg. 486c) to philosophic debate, upon the practical pursuits which Callicles recommended. that you recommend,
I shall have not a word to say at the bar. The same case that I made out to Polus will apply to me; for I shall be like a doctor tried by a bench of children on a charge brought by a cook.Cf. Plat. Gorg. 464d. Just consider what defence a person like that would make at such a pass, if the prosecutor should speak against him thus: “Children, this fellow has done you all a great deal of personal mischief, and he destroys even the youngest of you by cutting and burning,
@@ -449,16 +449,16 @@
what to say?
Callicles
Quite so.
Socrates
Such, however, I am sure would be my own fate if I were brought before the court. For not only shall I have no pleasures to plead as having been provided by me—which they regard as services and benefits, whereas I envy neither those who provide them nor those for whom they are provided—but if anyone alleges that I either corrupt the younger men by reducing them to perplexity, or revile the older with bitter expressions whether in private or in public, I shall be unable either to tell the truth and say—“It is on just ground that I say all this, and
it is your interest that I serve thereby, gentlemen of the jury”—or to say anything else; and so I daresay any sort of thing, as luck may have it, will befall me.
Callicles
Then do you think, Socrates, that a man in such a case and with no power of standing up for himself makes a fine figure in a city?
Socrates
Yes, if he had that one resource, Callicles, which you have repeatedly admitted; if he had stood up for himself
by avoiding any unjust word or deed in regard either to men or to gods. For this has been repeatedly admitted by us to be the most valuable kind of self-protection. Now if I were convicted of inability to extend this sort of protection to either myself or another, I should be ashamed, whether my conviction took place before many or few, or as between man and man; and if that inability should bring about my death, I should be sorely vexed: but if I came to my end through a lack of flattering rhetoric, I am quite sure you would see me
-take my death easily. For no man fears the mere act of dying, except he be utterly irrational and unmanly; doing wrong is what one fears: for to arrive in the nether world having one's soul full fraught with a heap of misdeeds is the uttermost of all evils. And now, if you do not mind, I would like to tell you a tale to show you that the case is so.
Callicles
Well, as you have completed the rest of the business, go on and complete this also.
-
Socrates
Give ear then, as they say, to a right fine story, which you will regard as a fable, I fancy, but I as an actual account; for what I am about to tell you I mean to offer as the truth. By Homer's account,Hom. Il. 15.187 ff. Zeus, Poseidon, and Pluto divided the sovereignty amongst them when they took it over from their father. Now in the time of Cronos there was a law concerning mankind, and it holds to this very day amongst the gods, that every man who has passed a just and holy life departs after his decease
-to the Isles of the Blest, and dwells in all happiness apart from ill; but whoever has lived unjustly and impiously goes to the dungeon of requital and penance which, you know, they call Tartarus. Of these men there were judges in Cronos' time, and still of late in the reign of Zeus—living men to judge the living upon the day when each was to breathe his last; and thus the cases were being decided amiss. So Pluto and the overseers from the Isles of the Blest came before Zeus with the report that they found men passing over to either abode undeserving.
+take my death easily. For no man fears the mere act of dying, except he be utterly irrational and unmanly; doing wrong is what one fears: for to arrive in the nether world having one’s soul full fraught with a heap of misdeeds is the uttermost of all evils. And now, if you do not mind, I would like to tell you a tale to show you that the case is so.
Callicles
Well, as you have completed the rest of the business, go on and complete this also.
+
Socrates
Give ear then, as they say, to a right fine story, which you will regard as a fable, I fancy, but I as an actual account; for what I am about to tell you I mean to offer as the truth. By Homer’s account,Hom. Il. 15.187 ff. Zeus, Poseidon, and Pluto divided the sovereignty amongst them when they took it over from their father. Now in the time of Cronos there was a law concerning mankind, and it holds to this very day amongst the gods, that every man who has passed a just and holy life departs after his decease
+to the Isles of the Blest, and dwells in all happiness apart from ill; but whoever has lived unjustly and impiously goes to the dungeon of requital and penance which, you know, they call Tartarus. Of these men there were judges in Cronos’ time, and still of late in the reign of Zeus—living men to judge the living upon the day when each was to breathe his last; and thus the cases were being decided amiss. So Pluto and the overseers from the Isles of the Blest came before Zeus with the report that they found men passing over to either abode undeserving.
Then spake Zeus: “Nay,” said he, “I will put a stop to these proceedings. The cases are now indeed judged ill and it is because they who are on trial are tried in their clothing, for they are tried alive. Now many,” said he, “who have wicked souls are clad in fair bodies and ancestry and wealth, and at their judgement appear many witnesses to testify that their lives have been just. Now, the judges are confounded not only by their evidence
but at the same time by being clothed themselves while they sit in judgement, having their own soul muffled in the veil of eyes and ears and the whole body. Thus all these are a hindrance to them, their own habiliments no less than those of the judged. Well, first of all,” he said, “we must put a stop to their foreknowledge of their death; for this they at present foreknow. However, Prometheus has already been given the word
to stop this in them. Next they must be stripped bare of all those things before they are tried; for they must stand their trial dead. Their judge also must be naked, dead, beholding with very soul the very soul of each immediately upon his death, bereft of all his kin and having left behind on earth all that fine array, to the end that the judgement may be just. Now I, knowing all this before you, have appointed sons of my own to be judges; two from Asia, Minos and Rhadamanthus,
and one from Europe, Aeacus. These, when their life is ended, shall give judgement in the meadow at the dividing of the road, whence are the two ways leading, one to the Isles of the Blest, and the other to Tartarus. And those who come from Asia shall Rhadamanthus try, and those from Europe, Aeacus; and to Minos I will give the privilege of the final decision, if the other two be in any doubt; that the judgement upon this journey of mankind may be supremely just.“This, Callicles, is what I have heard and believe to be true;
and from these stories, on my reckoning, we must draw some such moral as this: death, as it seems to me, is actually nothing but the disconnection of two things, the soul and the body, from each other. And so when they are disconnected from one another, each of them keeps its own condition very much as it was when the man was alive, the body having its own nature, with its treatments and experiences all manifest upon it. For instance,
-if anyone's body was large by nature or by feeding or by both when he was alive, his corpse will be large also when he is dead; and if he was fat, it will be fat too after his death, and so on for the rest; or again, if he used to follow the fashion of long hair, long-haired also will be his corpse. Again, if anyone had been a sturdy rogue, and bore traces of his stripes in scars on his body, either from the whip or from other wounds, while yet alive, then after death too his body has these marks visible upon it; or if anyone's limbs were broken or distorted in life, these same effects are manifest in death.
-In a word, whatever sort of bodily appearance a man had acquired in life, that is manifest also after his death either wholly or in the main for some time. And so it seems to me that the same is the case with the soul too, Callicles: when a man's soul is stripped bare of the body, all its natural gifts, and the experiences added to that soul as the result of his various pursuits, are manifest in it. So when they have arrived
+if anyone’s body was large by nature or by feeding or by both when he was alive, his corpse will be large also when he is dead; and if he was fat, it will be fat too after his death, and so on for the rest; or again, if he used to follow the fashion of long hair, long-haired also will be his corpse. Again, if anyone had been a sturdy rogue, and bore traces of his stripes in scars on his body, either from the whip or from other wounds, while yet alive, then after death too his body has these marks visible upon it; or if anyone’s limbs were broken or distorted in life, these same effects are manifest in death.
+In a word, whatever sort of bodily appearance a man had acquired in life, that is manifest also after his death either wholly or in the main for some time. And so it seems to me that the same is the case with the soul too, Callicles: when a man’s soul is stripped bare of the body, all its natural gifts, and the experiences added to that soul as the result of his various pursuits, are manifest in it. So when they have arrived
in presence of their judge, they of Asia before Rhadamanthus, these Rhadamanthus sets before him and surveys the soul of each, not knowing whose it is; nay, often when he has laid hold of the Great King or some other prince or potentate, he perceives the utter unhealthiness of his soul, striped all over with the scourge, and a mass of wounds, the work of perjuries and injustice;
where every act has left its smirch upon his soul, where all is awry through falsehood and imposture, and nothing straight because of a nurture that knew not truth: or, as the result of an unbridled course of fastidiousness, insolence, and incontinence, he finds the soul full fraught with disproportion and ugliness. Beholding this he sends it away in dishonor straight to the place of custody, where on its arrival it is to endure the sufferings that are fitting.
And it is fitting that every one under punishment rightly inflicted on him by another should either be made better and profit thereby, or serve as an example to the rest, that others seeing the sufferings he endures may in fear amend themselves. Those who are benefited by the punishment they get from gods and men are they who have committed remediable offences; but still it is through bitter throes of pain that they receive their benefit both here and in the nether world;
@@ -467,12 +467,12 @@
as those who are punished everlastingly in the nether world—Tantalus and Sisyphus and Tityus; but Thersites, or any other private person who was wicked, has been portrayed by none as incurable and therefore subjected to heavy punishment; no doubt because he had not a free hand, and therefore was in fact happier than those who had. For in fact, Callicles, it is among the powerful
that we find the specially wicked men. Still there is nothing to prevent good men being found even among these, and it deserves our special admiration when they are; for it is hard, Callicles, and deserving of no slight praise, when a man with a perfectly free hand for injustice lives always a just life. The men of this sort are but few; for indeed there have been, and I expect there yet will be, both here and elsewhere, men of honor and excellence
in this virtue of administering justly what is committed to their charge. One in fact there has been whose fame stands high among us and throughout the rest of Greece, Aristeides, son of Lysimachus; but most of those in power, my excellent friend, prove to be bad. So, as I was saying, whenever the judge Rhadamanthus has to deal with such a one, he knows nothing else of him at all, neither who he is nor of what descent, but only that he is a wicked person and on perceiving this he sends him away to Tartarus, first setting a mark on him to show whether he deems it a curable or an incurable case;
-and when the man arrives there he suffers what is fitting. Sometimes, when he discerns another soul that has lived a holy life in company with truth, a private man's or any others—especially, as I claim, Callicles, a philosopher's who has minded his own business and not been a busybody in his lifetime—he is struck with admiration and sends it off to the Isles of the Blest. And exactly the same is the procedure of Aeacus: each of these two holds a rod in his hand as he gives judgement; but Minor sits as supervisor, distinguished by the golden scepter that he holds,
+and when the man arrives there he suffers what is fitting. Sometimes, when he discerns another soul that has lived a holy life in company with truth, a private man’s or any others—especially, as I claim, Callicles, a philosopher’s who has minded his own business and not been a busybody in his lifetime—he is struck with admiration and sends it off to the Isles of the Blest. And exactly the same is the procedure of Aeacus: each of these two holds a rod in his hand as he gives judgement; but Minor sits as supervisor, distinguished by the golden scepter that he holds,
as Odysseus in Homer tells how he saw him—Holding a golden scepter,speaking dooms to the dead.Hom. Od. 11.569Now for my part, Callicles, I am convinced by these accounts, and I consider how I may be able to show my judge that my soul is in the best of health. So giving the go-by to the honors that most men seek I shall try, by inquiry into the truth, to be really good in as high a degree as I am able, both in my life and, when I come to die, in my death.
-And I invite all other men likewise, to the best of my power, and you particularly I invite in return,i.e. in return for Callicles' invitation to him to pursue the life of rhetoric and politics, Plat. Gorg. 521a. to this life and this contest, which I say is worth all other contests on this earth; and I make it a reproach to you, that you will not be able to deliver yourself when your trial comes and the judgement of which I told you just now; but when you go before your judge, the son of Aegina,Aegina, daughter of the river-god Asopus, was the mother of Aeacus by Zeus.
-and he grips you and drags you up, you will gape and feel dizzy there no less than I do here, and some one perhaps will give you, yes, a degrading box on the ear, and will treat you with every kind of contumely.Possibly, however, you regard this as an old wife's tale, and despise it; and there would be no wonder in our despising it if with all our searching we could somewhere find anything better and truer than this: but as it is, you observe that you three, who are the wisest of the Greeks in our day—you and Polus and Gorgias—
+And I invite all other men likewise, to the best of my power, and you particularly I invite in return,i.e. in return for Callicles’ invitation to him to pursue the life of rhetoric and politics, Plat. Gorg. 521a. to this life and this contest, which I say is worth all other contests on this earth; and I make it a reproach to you, that you will not be able to deliver yourself when your trial comes and the judgement of which I told you just now; but when you go before your judge, the son of Aegina,Aegina, daughter of the river-god Asopus, was the mother of Aeacus by Zeus.
+and he grips you and drags you up, you will gape and feel dizzy there no less than I do here, and some one perhaps will give you, yes, a degrading box on the ear, and will treat you with every kind of contumely.Possibly, however, you regard this as an old wife’s tale, and despise it; and there would be no wonder in our despising it if with all our searching we could somewhere find anything better and truer than this: but as it is, you observe that you three, who are the wisest of the Greeks in our day—you and Polus and Gorgias—
are unable to prove that we ought to live any other life than this, which is evidently advantageous also in the other world. But among the many statements we have made, while all the rest are refuted this one alone is unshaken—that doing wrong is to be more carefully shunned than suffering it; that above all things a man should study not to seem but to be good both in private and in public; that if one becomes bad in any respect one must be corrected; that this is good in the second place,—
-next to being just, to become so and to be corrected by paying the penalty; and that every kind of flattery, with regard either to oneself or to others, to few or to many, must be avoided; and that rhetoric is to be used for this one purpose always, of pointing to what is just, and so in every other activity. Take my advice, therefore, and follow me where, if you once arrive, you will be happy both in life and after life's end, as this account declares. And allow anyone to contemn you as a fool and foully maltreat you if he chooses; yes, by Heaven,
+next to being just, to become so and to be corrected by paying the penalty; and that every kind of flattery, with regard either to oneself or to others, to few or to many, must be avoided; and that rhetoric is to be used for this one purpose always, of pointing to what is just, and so in every other activity. Take my advice, therefore, and follow me where, if you once arrive, you will be happy both in life and after life’s end, as this account declares. And allow anyone to contemn you as a fool and foully maltreat you if he chooses; yes, by Heaven,
and suffer undaunted the shock of that ignominious cuff; for you will come to no harm if you be really a good and upright man, practicing virtue. And afterwards, having practiced it together, we shall in due course, if we deem it right, embark on politics, or proceed to consult on whatever we may think fit, being then better equipped for such counsel than we are now. For it is disgraceful that men in such a condition as we now appear to be in should put on a swaggering, important air when we never continue to be of the same mind upon the same questions,
and those the greatest of all—we are so sadly uneducated. Let us therefore take as our guide the doctrine now disclosed, which indicates to us that this way of life is best—to live and die in the practice alike of justice and of all other virtue. This then let us follow, and to this invite every one else; not that to which you trust yourself and invite me, for it is nothing worth, Callicles.
Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue can be taught, or is acquired by practice, not teaching? Or if neither by practice nor by learning, whether it comes to mankind by nature or in some other way?
Socrates
Meno, of old the Thessalians were famous and admired among the Greeks for their riding and
-their riches; but now they have a name, I believe, for wisdom also, especially your friend Aristippus's people, the Larisaeans. For this you have to thank Gorgias: for when he came to that city he made the leading men of the Aleuadae—among them your lover Aristippus—and the Thessalians generally enamored of wisdom. Nay more, he has given you the regular habit of answering any chance question in a fearless, magnificent manner, as befits those who know:
+their riches; but now they have a name, I believe, for wisdom also, especially your friend Aristippus’s people, the Larisaeans. For this you have to thank Gorgias: for when he came to that city he made the leading men of the Aleuadae—among them your lover Aristippus—and the Thessalians generally enamored of wisdom. Nay more, he has given you the regular habit of answering any chance question in a fearless, magnificent manner, as befits those who know:
for he sets the example of offering himself to be questioned by any Greek who chooses, and on any point one likes, and he has an answer for everybody. Now in this place, my dear Meno, we have a contrary state of things:
a drought of wisdom, as it were, has come on; and it seems as though wisdom had deserted our borders in favour of yours. You have only to ask one of our people a question such as that, and he will be sure to laugh and say: Stranger, you must think me a specially favoured mortal, to be able to tell whether virtue can be taught, or in what way it comes to one: so far am I from knowing whether it can be taught or not, that I actually do not even know what the thing itself, virtue, is at all.
-And I myself, Meno, am in the same case; I share my townsmen's poverty in this matter: I have to reproach myself with an utter ignorance about virtue; and if I do not know what a thing is, how can I know what its nature may be? Or do you imagine it possible, if one has no cognizance at all of Meno, that one could know whether he is handsome or rich or noble, or the reverse of these? Do you suppose that one could?
Meno
Not I. But is it true, Socrates,
-that you do not even know what virtue is? Are we to return home with this report of you?
Socrates
Not only this, my friend, but also that I never yet came across anybody who did know, in my opinion.
Meno
What? You did not meet Gorgias when he was here?
Socrates
I did.
Meno
And you didn't consider that he knew?
Socrates
I have not a very good memory, Meno, so I cannot tell at the moment how he struck me then. It may be that he did know, and that you know what he said:
-remind me therefore how he expressed it; or if you like, make your own statement, for I expect you share his views.
Meno
I do.
Socrates
Then let us pass him over, since in fact he is not present, and do you tell me, in heaven's name, what is your own account of virtue. Speak out frankly, that I may find myself the victim of a most fortunate falsehood, if you and Gorgias prove to have knowledge of it, while I have said that I never yet came across anyone who had.
-
Meno
Why, there is no difficulty, Socrates, in telling. First of all, if you take the virtue of a man, it is easily stated that a man's virtue is this—that he be competent to manage the affairs of his city, and to manage them so as to benefit his friends and harm his enemies, and to take care to avoid suffering harm himself. Or take a woman's virtue: there is no difficulty in describing it as the duty of ordering the house well, looking after the property indoors, and obeying her husband. And the child has another virtue—one for the female, and one for the male; and there is another for elderly men—one, if you like, for freemen,
+And I myself, Meno, am in the same case; I share my townsmen’s poverty in this matter: I have to reproach myself with an utter ignorance about virtue; and if I do not know what a thing is, how can I know what its nature may be? Or do you imagine it possible, if one has no cognizance at all of Meno, that one could know whether he is handsome or rich or noble, or the reverse of these? Do you suppose that one could?
Meno
Not I. But is it true, Socrates,
+that you do not even know what virtue is? Are we to return home with this report of you?
Socrates
Not only this, my friend, but also that I never yet came across anybody who did know, in my opinion.
Meno
What? You did not meet Gorgias when he was here?
Socrates
I did.
Meno
And you didn’t consider that he knew?
Socrates
I have not a very good memory, Meno, so I cannot tell at the moment how he struck me then. It may be that he did know, and that you know what he said:
+remind me therefore how he expressed it; or if you like, make your own statement, for I expect you share his views.
Meno
I do.
Socrates
Then let us pass him over, since in fact he is not present, and do you tell me, in heaven’s name, what is your own account of virtue. Speak out frankly, that I may find myself the victim of a most fortunate falsehood, if you and Gorgias prove to have knowledge of it, while I have said that I never yet came across anyone who had.
+
Meno
Why, there is no difficulty, Socrates, in telling. First of all, if you take the virtue of a man, it is easily stated that a man’s virtue is this—that he be competent to manage the affairs of his city, and to manage them so as to benefit his friends and harm his enemies, and to take care to avoid suffering harm himself. Or take a woman’s virtue: there is no difficulty in describing it as the duty of ordering the house well, looking after the property indoors, and obeying her husband. And the child has another virtue—one for the female, and one for the male; and there is another for elderly men—one, if you like, for freemen,
and yet another for slaves. And there are very many other virtues besides, so that one cannot be at a loss to explain what virtue is; for it is according to each activity and age that every one of us, in whatever we do, has his virtue; and the same, I take it, Socrates, will hold also of vice.
Socrates
I seem to be in a most lucky way, Meno; for in seeking one virtue I have discovered a whole swarm of virtues there in your keeping. Now, Meno, to follow this figure of a swarm,
suppose I should ask you what is the real nature of the bee, and you replied that there are many different kinds of bees, and I rejoined: Do you say it is by being bees that they are of many and various kinds and differ from each other, or does their difference lie not in that, but in something else—for example, in their beauty or size or some other quality? Tell me, what would be your answer to this question?
Meno
Why, this—that they do not differ, as bees, the one from the other.
Socrates
And if I went on to say: Well now, there is this that I want you to tell me, Meno: what do you call the quality by which they do not differ, but are all alike? You could find me an answer, I presume?
Meno
I could.
Socrates
And likewise also with the virtues, however many and various they may be, they all have one common character whereby they are virtues, and on which one would of course be wise to keep an eye when one is giving a definitive answer to the question of what virtue really is.
You take my meaning, do you not?
Meno
My impression is that I do; but still I do not yet grasp the meaning of the question as I could wish.
Socrates
Is it only in the case of virtue, do you think, Meno, that one can say there is one kind belonging to a man, another to a woman, and so on with the rest, or is it just the same, too, in the case of health and size and strength? Do you consider that there is one health for a man, and another for a woman? Or, wherever we find health, is it of the same character universally,
in a man or in anyone else?
Meno
I think that health is the same, both in man and in woman.
Socrates
Then is it not so with size and strength also? If a woman is strong, she will be strong by reason of the same form and the same strength; by “the same” I mean that strength does not differ as strength, whether it be in a man or in a woman. Or do you think there is any difference?
Meno
I do not.
-
Socrates
And will virtue, as virtue, differ at all whether it be in a child or in an elderly person, in a woman or in a man?
Meno
I feel somehow, Socrates, that here we cease to be on the same ground as in those other cases.
Socrates
Why? Were you not saying that a man's virtue is to manage a state well, and a woman's a house?
Meno
I was.
Socrates
And is it possible to manage a state well, or a house, or anything at all, if you do not manage it temperately and justly?
+
Socrates
And will virtue, as virtue, differ at all whether it be in a child or in an elderly person, in a woman or in a man?
Meno
I feel somehow, Socrates, that here we cease to be on the same ground as in those other cases.
Socrates
Why? Were you not saying that a man’s virtue is to manage a state well, and a woman’s a house?
Meno
I was.
Socrates
And is it possible to manage a state well, or a house, or anything at all, if you do not manage it temperately and justly?
Meno
Surely not.
Socrates
Then whoever manages temperately and justly will manage with temperance and justice?
Meno
That must be.
Socrates
Then both the woman and the man require the same qualities of justice and temperance, if they are to be good.
Meno
Evidently.
Socrates
And what of a child or an old man? Can they ever hope to be good if they are intemperate and unjust?
Meno
Surely not.
Socrates
Only if they are temperate and just?
Meno
Yes.
Socrates
So all mankind are good in the same way; for they become good when they acquire the same qualities.
Meno
So it seems.
Socrates
And I presume, if they had not the same virtue, they would not be good in the same way.
Meno
No, indeed.
Socrates
Seeing then that it is the same virtue in all cases, try and tell me, if you can recollect, what Gorgias—and you in agreement with him—say it is.
Meno
Simply that it is the power of governing mankind—
if you want some single description to cover all cases.
Socrates
That is just what I am after. But is virtue the same in a child, Meno, and in a slave—an ability to govern each his master? And do you think he who governed would still be a slave?
Meno
I should say certainly not, Socrates.
Socrates
No, indeed, it would be unlikely, my excellent friend. And again, consider this further point: you say it is “to be able to govern”; shall we not add to that—“justly, not unjustly”?
Meno
Yes, I think so; for justice, Socrates, is virtue.
@@ -92,18 +92,18 @@
Socrates
And for this reason—that there are other figures as well?
Meno
Yes.
Socrates
And if he went on to ask you of what sort they were, you would tell him?
Meno
I would.
Socrates
And if he asked likewise what color is, and on your answering “white” your questioner then rejoined: Is “white” color or a color? your reply would be: A color; because there are other colors besides.
Meno
It would.
Socrates
And if he bade you mention other colors,
you would tell him of others that are colors just as much as white?
Meno
Yes.
Socrates
Now suppose that, like me, he pursued the argument and said: We are always arriving at a variety of things, but let me have no more of that: since you call these many things by one single name, and say they are figures, every one of them, even when they are opposed to one another, tell me what is that which comprises round and straight alike, and which you call figure—
including straight equally with round under that term. For that is your statement, is it not?
Meno
It is.
Socrates
And in making it, do you mean to say that round is no more round than straight, or straight no more straight than round?
Meno
No, to be sure, Socrates.
Socrates
What you mean is that the round shape is no more a figure than the straight, or the straight than the round.
Meno
Quite right.
Socrates
Then what can this thing be, which bears the name of figure? Try and tell me. Suppose that, on being asked this question by someone,
-either about figure or about color, you had replied: Why, I don't so much as understand what you want, sir, or even know what you are saying: he might well have shown surprise, and said: Do you not understand that I am looking for that which is the same common element in all these things? Or would you still be unable to reply, Meno, if you were approached on other terms, and were asked: What is it that is common to the round and the straight and everything else that you call figures—the same in all? Try and tell me it will be good practice for your answer about virtue.
+either about figure or about color, you had replied: Why, I don’t so much as understand what you want, sir, or even know what you are saying: he might well have shown surprise, and said: Do you not understand that I am looking for that which is the same common element in all these things? Or would you still be unable to reply, Meno, if you were approached on other terms, and were asked: What is it that is common to the round and the straight and everything else that you call figures—the same in all? Try and tell me it will be good practice for your answer about virtue.
Meno
No, it is you who must answer, Socrates.
Socrates
You wish me to do you the favour?
Meno
By all means.
Socrates
And then you will agree to take your turn and answer me on virtue?
Meno
I will.
Socrates
Well then, I must make the effort, for it is worth our while.
Meno
Certainly.
Socrates
Come now, let me try and tell you what figure is. Just consider if you accept this description of it: figure, let us say, is the only existing thing that is found always following color. Are you satisfied, or are you looking for something different? I am sure I should be content with a similar account of virtue from you.
Meno
But it is such a silly one, Socrates.
Socrates
How do you mean?
Meno
Well, figure, as I understand by your account, is what always follows color. Very good; but if some one said he did not know color, and was in the same difficulty about it as about figure, what answer do you suppose would have come from you?
Socrates
The truth, from me; and if my questioner were a professor of the eristic and contentious sort, I should say to him:
I have made my statement; if it is wrong, your business is to examine and refute it. But if, like you and me on this occasion, we were friends and chose to have a discussion together, I should have to reply in some milder tone more suited to dialectic. The more dialectical way, I suppose, is not merely to answer what is true, but also to make use of those points which the questioned person acknowledges he knows. And this is the way in which I shall now try to argue with you. Tell me, is there something you call an end? Such a thing, I mean,
as a limit, or extremity—I use all these terms in the same sense, though I daresay ProdicusCf. Plat. Prot. 337a. might quarrel with us. But you, I am sure, refer to a thing as terminated or ended: something of that sort is what I mean—nothing complicated.
Meno
Yes, I do, and I think I grasp your meaning.
Socrates
Well then, you speak of a surface, and also of a solid—the terms employed in geometrical problems?
Meno
I do.
Socrates
So now you are able to comprehend from all this what I mean by figure. In every instance of figure I call that figure in which the solid ends; and I may put that more succinctly by saying that figure is “limit of solid.”
Meno
And what do you say of color, Socrates?
Socrates
How overbearing of you, Meno, to press an old man with demands for answers, when you will not trouble yourself
to recollect and tell me what account Gorgias gives of virtue!
Meno
When you have answered my question, Socrates, I will answer yours.
Socrates
One might tell even blindfolded, Meno, by the way you discuss, that you are handsome and still have lovers.
Meno
Why so?
Socrates
Because you invariably speak in a peremptory tone, after the fashion of spoilt beauties, holding as they do a despotic power so long as their bloom is on them. You have also, I daresay,
-made a note of my weakness for handsome people. So I will indulge you, and answer.
Meno
You must certainly indulge me.
Socrates
Then would you like me to answer you in the manner of Gorgias,There is something of Gorgias' stately style in the definition that follows; but the implication seems mainly to be that the substance of it will be familiar to Meno because he was a pupil of Gorgias, who had learnt his science from Empedocles. which you would find easiest to follow?
Meno
I should like that, of course.
Socrates
Do not both of you say there are certain effluencesEmpedocles taught that material objects are known to us by means of effluences or films given off by them and suited in various ways to our sense-organs. of existent things, as Empedocles held?
Meno
Certainly.
Socrates
And passages into which and through which the effluences pass?
Meno
To be sure.
Socrates
And some of the effluences fit into various passages,
+made a note of my weakness for handsome people. So I will indulge you, and answer.
Meno
You must certainly indulge me.
Socrates
Then would you like me to answer you in the manner of Gorgias,There is something of Gorgias’ stately style in the definition that follows; but the implication seems mainly to be that the substance of it will be familiar to Meno because he was a pupil of Gorgias, who had learnt his science from Empedocles. which you would find easiest to follow?
Meno
I should like that, of course.
Socrates
Do not both of you say there are certain effluencesEmpedocles taught that material objects are known to us by means of effluences or films given off by them and suited in various ways to our sense-organs. of existent things, as Empedocles held?
Meno
Certainly.
Socrates
And passages into which and through which the effluences pass?
Meno
To be sure.
Socrates
And some of the effluences fit into various passages,
while some are too small or too large?
Meno
That is so.
Socrates
And further, there is what you call sight?
Meno
Yes.
Socrates
So now “conceive my meaning,” as PindarFr. 82 (Bergk); cf. Aristoph. Birds 939. says: color is an effluence of figures, commensurate with sight and sensible.
Meno
Your answer, Socrates, seems to me excellently put.
Socrates
Yes, for I expect you find its terms familiar; and at the same time I fancy you observe that it enables you to tell what sound and smell are, and numerous other
things of the kind.
Meno
Certainly.
Socrates
It is an answer in the high poetic style, Meno, and so more agreeable to you than that about figure.
Meno
Yes, it is.
Socrates
But yet, son of Alexidemus, I am inclined to think the other was the better of the two; and I believe you also would prefer it, if you were not compelled, as you were saying yesterday, to go away before the mysteries, and could stay awhile and be initiated.
Meno
But I should stay, Socrates, if you would give me many such answers.
Socrates
Well then, I will spare no endeavor, both for your sake and for my own, to continue in that style; but I fear I may not succeed in keeping for long on that level. But come now, you in your turn must try and fulfil your promise by telling me what virtue is in a general way; and you must stop producing a plural from the singular, as the wags say whenever one breaks something, but leave virtue
-whole and sound, and tell me what it is. The pattern you have now got from me.
Meno
Well, in my view, Socrates, virtue is, in the poet's words, “to rejoice in things honorable and be able for them”Perhaps from Simonides.; and that, I say, is virtue—to desire what is honorable and be able to procure it.
Socrates
Do you say that he who desires the honorable is desirous of the good?
Meno
Certainly.
Socrates
Implying that there are some who desire the evil, and others the good? Do not all men,
+whole and sound, and tell me what it is. The pattern you have now got from me.
Meno
Well, in my view, Socrates, virtue is, in the poet’s words, “to rejoice in things honorable and be able for them”Perhaps from Simonides.; and that, I say, is virtue—to desire what is honorable and be able to procure it.
Socrates
Do you say that he who desires the honorable is desirous of the good?
Meno
Certainly.
Socrates
Implying that there are some who desire the evil, and others the good? Do not all men,
in your opinion, my dear sir, desire the good?
Meno
I think not.
Socrates
There are some who desire the evil?
Meno
Yes.
Socrates
Thinking the evil to be good, do you mean, or actually recognizing it to be evil, and desiring it nevertheless?
Meno
Both, I believe.
Socrates
Do you really believe, Meno, that a man knows the evil to be evil, and still desires it?
Meno
Certainly.
Socrates
What do you mean by “desires”? Desires the possession of it?
Meno
Yes; what else could it be?
Socrates
And does he think the evil benefits him who gets it, or does he know that it harms him who has it?
Meno
There are some who think the evil is a benefit, and others who know that it does harm.
Socrates
And, in your opinion, do those who think the evil a benefit know that it is evil?
Meno
I do not think that at all.
Socrates
Obviously those who are ignorant of the evil do not desire it, but only what they supposed
to be good, though it is really evil; so that those who are ignorant of it and think it good are really desiring the good. Is not that so?
Meno
It would seem to be so in their case.
Socrates
Well now, I presume those who, as you say, desire the evil, and consider that the evil harms him who gets it, know that they will be harmed by it?
Meno
They needs must.
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@
I cause doubt in others. So now, for my part, I have no idea what virtue is, whilst you, though perhaps you may have known before you came in touch with me, are now as good as ignorant of it also. But none the less I am willing to join you in examining it and inquiring into its nature.
Meno
Why, on what lines will you look, Socrates, for a thing of whose nature you know nothing at all? Pray, what sort of thing, amongst those that you know not, will you treat us to as the object of your search? Or even supposing, at the best, that you hit upon it, how will you know it is the thing you did not know?
Socrates
I understand the point you would make, Meno.
Do you see what a captious argument you are introducing—that, forsooth, a man cannot inquire either about what he knows or about whit he does not know? For he cannot inquire about what he knows, because he knows it, and in that case is in no need of inquiry; nor again can lie inquire about what he does not know, since he does not know about what he is to inquire.
Meno
Now does it seem to you to be a good argument, Socrates?
Socrates
It does not.
Meno
Can you explain how not?
Socrates
I can; for I have heard from wise men and women who told of things divine that—
Meno
What was it they said ?
Socrates
Something true, as I thought, and admirable.
Meno
What was it? And who were the speakers?
Socrates
They were certain priests and priestesses who have studied so as to be able to give a reasoned account of their ministry; and Pindar also
- and many another poet of heavenly gifts. As to their words, they are these: mark now, if you judge them to be true. They say that the soul of man is immortal, and at one time comes to an end, which is called dying, and at another is born again, but never perishes. Consequently one ought to live all one's life in the utmost holiness.For from whomsoever Persephone shall accept requital for ancient wrong,pe/nqos ("affliction") in mystic language means something like "fall" or "sin." These lines are probably from one of Pindar's Dirges (Bergk, fr. 133). the souls of these she restores in the ninth year to the upper sun again; from them arise
+ and many another poet of heavenly gifts. As to their words, they are these: mark now, if you judge them to be true. They say that the soul of man is immortal, and at one time comes to an end, which is called dying, and at another is born again, but never perishes. Consequently one ought to live all one’s life in the utmost holiness.For from whomsoever Persephone shall accept requital for ancient wrong,pe/nqos ("affliction") in mystic language means something like "fall" or "sin." These lines are probably from one of Pindar’s Dirges (Bergk, fr. 133). the souls of these she restores in the ninth year to the upper sun again; from them ariseglorious kings and men of splendid might and surpassing wisdom, and for all remaining time are they called holy heroes amongst mankind.Pind. Fr. 133 BergkSeeing then that the soul is immortal and has been born many times, and has beheld all things both in this world and in the nether realms, she has acquired knowledge of all and everything; so that it is no wonder that she should be able to recollect all that she knew before about virtue and other things. For as
all nature is akin, and the soul has learned all things, there is no reason why we should not, by remembering but one single thing—an act which men call learning—discover everything else, if we have courage and faint not in the search; since, it would seem, research and learning are wholly recollection. So we must not hearken to that captious argument: it would make us idle, and is pleasing only to the indolent ear, whereas the other makes us energetic
@@ -139,12 +139,12 @@
and half the size of this other?
Boy
Yes.
Socrates
Will it not be made from a line longer than the one of these, and shorter than the other?
Boy
I think so.
Socrates
Excellent: always answer just what you think. Now tell me, did we not draw this line two feet, and that four?
Boy
Yes.
Socrates
Then the line on the side of the eight-foot figure should be more than this of two feet, and less than the other of four?
Boy
It should.
Socrates
Try and tell me how much you would say it is.
Boy
Three feet.
Socrates
Then if it is to be three feet, we shall add on a half to this one, and so make it three feet? For here we have two, and here one more, and so again on that side there are two, and another one; and that makes the figure of which you speak.
Boy
Yes.
Socrates
Now if it be three this way and three that way, the whole space will be thrice three feet, will it not?
Boy
So it seems.
Socrates
And thrice three feet are how many?
Boy
Nine.
Socrates
And how many feet was that double one to be?
Boy
Eight.
Socrates
So we fail to get our eight-foot figure from this three-foot line.
Boy
Yes, indeed.
Socrates
But from what line shall we get it? Try and tell us exactly;
and if you would rather not reckon it out, just show what line it is.
Boy
Well, on my word, Socrates, I for one do not know.
Socrates
There now, Meno, do you observe who progress he has already made in his recollection? At first he did not know what is the line that forms the figure of eight feet, and he does not know even now: but at any rate he thought he knew then, and confidently answered as though he knew, and was aware of no difficulty; whereas now he feels the difficulty he is in, and besides not knowing does not think
-he knows.
Meno
That is true.
Socrates
And is he not better off in respect of the matter which he did not know?
Meno
I think that too is so.
Socrates
Now, by causing him to doubt and giving him the torpedo's shock, have we done him any harm?
Meno
I think not.
Socrates
And we have certainly given him some assistance, it would seem, towards finding out the truth of the matter: for now he will push on in the search gladly, as lacking knowledge; whereas then he would have been only too ready to suppose he was right in saying, before any number of people any number of times,
-that the double space must have a line of double the length for its side.
Meno
It seems so.
Socrates
Now do you imagine he would have attempted to inquire or learn what he thought he knew, when he did not know it, until he had been reduced to the perplexity of realizing that he did not know, and had felt a craving to know?
Meno
I think not, Socrates.
Socrates
Then the torpedo's shock was of advantage to him?
Meno
I think so.
Socrates
Now you should note how, as a result of this perplexity, he will go on and discover something by joint inquiry with me, while I merely ask questions
+he knows.
Meno
That is true.
Socrates
And is he not better off in respect of the matter which he did not know?
Meno
I think that too is so.
Socrates
Now, by causing him to doubt and giving him the torpedo’s shock, have we done him any harm?
Meno
I think not.
Socrates
And we have certainly given him some assistance, it would seem, towards finding out the truth of the matter: for now he will push on in the search gladly, as lacking knowledge; whereas then he would have been only too ready to suppose he was right in saying, before any number of people any number of times,
+that the double space must have a line of double the length for its side.
Meno
It seems so.
Socrates
Now do you imagine he would have attempted to inquire or learn what he thought he knew, when he did not know it, until he had been reduced to the perplexity of realizing that he did not know, and had felt a craving to know?
Meno
I think not, Socrates.
Socrates
Then the torpedo’s shock was of advantage to him?
Meno
I think so.
Socrates
Now you should note how, as a result of this perplexity, he will go on and discover something by joint inquiry with me, while I merely ask questions
and do not teach him; and be on the watch to see if at any point you find me teaching him or expounding to him, instead of questioning him on his opinions. Tell me, boy: here we have a square of four feet,ABCD. have we not? You understand?
Boy
Yes.
Socrates
And here we add another squareDCFE. equal to it?
Boy
Yes.
Socrates
And here a third,CHGF. equal to either of them?
Boy
Yes.
Socrates
Now shall we fill up this vacant spaceBIHC. in the corner?
Boy
By all means.
Socrates
So here we must have four equal spaces?
BOY. Yes.
Socrates
Well now, how many times larger is this whole space than this other?
Boy
Four times.
Socrates
But it was to have been only twice, you remember?
Boy
To be sure.
Socrates
And does this line,BD. drawn from corner to corner,
cut in two each of these spaces?
Boy
Yes.
Socrates
And have we here four equal linesBD, DF, FH, HB. containing this spaceBDFH.?
Boy
We have.
Socrates
Now consider how large this spaceBDFH. is.
Boy
I do not understand.
Socrates
Has not each of the inside lines cut off half of each of these four spaces?
Boy
Yes.
Socrates
And how many spaces of that size are there in this part?
Boy
Four.
Socrates
And how many in thisABCD.?
Boy
Two.
Socrates
And four is how many times two?
Boy
Twice.
-
Socrates
And how many feet is this spaceBDFH.?
Boy
Eight feet.
Socrates
From what line do we get this figure?
Boy
From this.
Socrates
From the line drawn corner-wise across the (our-foot figure?
Boy
Yes.
Socrates
The professors call it the diagonal: so if the diagonal is its name, then according to you, Meno's boy, the double space is the square of the diagonal.
Boy
Yes, certainly it is, Socrates.
Socrates
What do you think, Meno? Was there any opinion that he did not give as an answer of his own thought?
+
Socrates
And how many feet is this spaceBDFH.?
Boy
Eight feet.
Socrates
From what line do we get this figure?
Boy
From this.
Socrates
From the line drawn corner-wise across the (our-foot figure?
Boy
Yes.
Socrates
The professors call it the diagonal: so if the diagonal is its name, then according to you, Meno’s boy, the double space is the square of the diagonal.
Boy
Yes, certainly it is, Socrates.
Socrates
What do you think, Meno? Was there any opinion that he did not give as an answer of his own thought?
Meno
No, they were all his own.
Socrates
But you see, he did not know, as we were saying a while since.
Meno
That is true.
Socrates
Yet he had in him these opinions, had he not?
Meno
Yes.
Socrates
So that he who does not know about any matters, whatever they be, may have true opinions on such matters, about which he knows nothing?
Meno
Apparently.
Socrates
And at this moment those opinions have just been stirred up in him, like a dream; but if he were repeatedly asked these same questions in a variety of forms, you know he will have in the end as exact an understanding
of them as anyone.
Meno
So it seems.
Socrates
Without anyone having taught him, and only through questions put to him, he will understand, recovering the knowledge out of himself?
Meno
Yes.
Socrates
And is not this recovery of knowledge, in himself and by himself, recollection?
Meno
Certainly.
Socrates
And must he not have either once acquired or always had the knowledge he now has?
Meno
Yes.
Socrates
Now if he always had it, he was always in a state of knowing; and if he acquired it all some time, he could not have acquired it in this life.
Or has someone taught him geometry? You see, he can do the same as this with all geometry and every branch of knowledge. Now, can anyone have taught him all this? You ought surely to know, especially as he was born and bred in your house.
Meno
Well, I know that no one has ever taught him.
Socrates
And has he these opinions, or has he not?
Meno
He must have them, Socrates, evidently.
Socrates
And if he did not acquire them in this present life, is it not obvious at once
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@
to refuse to send him to the professed teachers of the art, who charge a regular fee, and to bother with requests for instruction other people who neither set up to be teachers nor have a single pupil in that sort of study which we expect him, when sent, to pursue! Do you not consider this would be grossly unreasonable?
Anytus
Yes, on my word, I do, and stupid to boot.
Socrates
Quite right. And now there is an opportunity of your
joining me in a consultation on my friend Meno here. He has been declaring to me ever so long, Anytus, that he desires to have that wisdom and virtue whereby men keep their house or their city in good order, and honor their parents, and know when to welcome and when to speed citizens and strangers as befits a good man.
Now tell me, to whom ought we properly to send him for lessons in this virtue? Or is it clear enough, from our argument just now, that he should go to these men who profess to be teachers of virtue and advertise themselves as the common teachers of the Greeks, and are ready to instruct anyone who chooses in return for fees charged on a fixed scale?
Anytus
To whom are you referring, Socrates?
Socrates
Surely you know as well as anyone; they are the men whom people call sophists.
-
Anytus
For heaven's sake hold your tongue, Socrates! May no kinsman or friend of mine, whether of this city or another, be seized with such madness as to let himself be infected with the company of those men; for they are a manifest plague and corruption to those who frequent them.Anytus' vehemence expresses the hostility of the ordinary practical democrat, after the restoration of 403 B.C., towards any novel movement in the state.
Socrates
What is this, Anytus? Of all the people who set up to understand how to do us good, do you mean to single out these as conveying not merely no benefit, such as the rest can give, but actually corruption
+
Anytus
For heaven’s sake hold your tongue, Socrates! May no kinsman or friend of mine, whether of this city or another, be seized with such madness as to let himself be infected with the company of those men; for they are a manifest plague and corruption to those who frequent them.Anytus’ vehemence expresses the hostility of the ordinary practical democrat, after the restoration of 403 B.C., towards any novel movement in the state.
Socrates
What is this, Anytus? Of all the people who set up to understand how to do us good, do you mean to single out these as conveying not merely no benefit, such as the rest can give, but actually corruption
to anyone placed in their hands? And is it for doing this that they openly claim the payment of fees? For my part I cannot bring myself to believe you; for I know of one man, Protagoras, who amassed more money by his craft than Pheidias—so famous for the noble works he produced—or any ten other sculptors. And yet how surprising that menders of old shoes and furbishers of clothes should not be able to go undetected
thirty days if they should return the clothes or shoes in worse condition than they received them, and that such doings on their part would quickly starve them to death, while for more than forty years all Greece failed to notice that Protagoras was corrupting his classes and sending his pupils away in a worse state than when he took charge of them! For I believe he died about seventy years old, forty of which he spent in the practice of his art; and he retains undiminished to this day the high reputation he has enjoyed all that time—and not only Protagoras,
but a multitude of others too: some who lived before him, and others still living. Now are we to take it, according to you, that they wittingly deceived and corrupted the youth, or that they were themselves unconscious of it? Are we to conclude those who are frequently termed the wisest of mankind to have been so demented as that?
Anytus
Demented! Not they, Socrates: far rather the young men who pay them money, and still more the relations
@@ -186,14 +186,14 @@
what they did not learn themselves?
Anytus
I expect they must have learnt in their turn from the older generation, who were gentlemen: or does it not seem to you that we have had many good men in this city?
Socrates
Yes, I agree, Anytus; we have also many who are good at politics, and have had them in the past as well as now. But I want to know whether they have proved good teachers besides of their own virtue: that is the question with which our discussion is actually concerned; not whether there are, or formerly have been,
good men here amongst us or not, but whether virtue is teachable; this has been our problem all the time. And our inquiry into this problem resolves itself into the question: Did the good men of our own and of former times know how to transmit to another man the virtue in respect of which they were good, or is it something not to be transmitted or taken over from one human being to another? That is the question I and Meno have been discussing all this time. Well, just consider it in your own way of speaking:
would you not say that Themistocles was a good man?
Anytus
I would, particularly so.
Socrates
And if any man ever was a teacher of his own virtue, he especially was a good teacher of his?
Anytus
In my opinion, yes, assuming that he wished to be so.
Socrates
But can you suppose he would not have wished that other people should become good, honorable men—above all, I presume, his own son? Or do you think he was jealous of him, and deliberately refused to impart the virtue
-of his own goodness to him? Have you never heard how Themistocles had his son Cleophantus taught to be a good horseman? Why, he could keep his balance standing upright on horseback, and hurl the javelin while so standing, and perform many other wonderful feats in which his father had had him trained, so as to make him skilled in all that could be learnt from good masters. Surely you must have heard all this from your elders?
Anytus
I have.
Socrates
Then there could be no complaints of badness in his son's nature?
+of his own goodness to him? Have you never heard how Themistocles had his son Cleophantus taught to be a good horseman? Why, he could keep his balance standing upright on horseback, and hurl the javelin while so standing, and perform many other wonderful feats in which his father had had him trained, so as to make him skilled in all that could be learnt from good masters. Surely you must have heard all this from your elders?
Anytus
I have.
Socrates
Then there could be no complaints of badness in his son’s nature?
Anytus
I daresay not.
Socrates
But I ask you—did you ever hear anybody, old or young, say that Cleophantus, son of Themistocles, had the same goodness and accomplishments as his father?
Anytus
Certainly not.
Socrates
And can we believe that his father chose to train his own son in those feats, and yet made him no better than his neighbors in his own particular accomplishments—if virtue, as alleged, was to be taught?
Anytus
On my word, I think not.
Socrates
Well, there you have a fine teacher of virtue who, you admit, was one of the best men of past times.
Let us take another, Aristeides, son of Lysimachus: do you not admit that he was a good man?
Anytus
I do, absolutely, of course.
Socrates
Well, did he not train his son Lysimachus better than any other Athenian in all that masters could teach him? And in the result, do you consider he has turned out better than anyone else? You have been in his company, I know, and you see what he is like. Or take another example—
the splendidly accomplished Pericles: he, as you are aware, brought up two sons, Paralus and Xanthippus.
Anytus
Yes.
Socrates
And, you know as well as I, he taught them to be the foremost horsemen of Athens, and trained them to excel in music and gymnastics and all else that comes under the head of the arts; and with all that, had he no desire to make them good men? He wished to, I imagine, but presumably it is not a thing one can be taught. And that you may not suppose it was only a few of the meanest sort of Athenians who failed in this matter,
-let me remind you that Thucydides'Thucydides (son of Melesias, and no relation of the historian) was an aristocrat of high principle and conservative views who opposed the plans of Pericles for enriching and adorning Athens. also brought up two sons, Melesias and Stephanus, and that besides giving them a good general education he made them the best wrestlers in Athens: one he placed with Xanthias, and the other with Eudorus—masters who, I should think, had the name of being the best exponents of the art. You remember them, do you not?
Anytus
Yes, by hearsay.
Socrates
Well, is it not obvious that this father would never have spent his money on having his children taught all those things,
+let me remind you that Thucydides’Thucydides (son of Melesias, and no relation of the historian) was an aristocrat of high principle and conservative views who opposed the plans of Pericles for enriching and adorning Athens. also brought up two sons, Melesias and Stephanus, and that besides giving them a good general education he made them the best wrestlers in Athens: one he placed with Xanthias, and the other with Eudorus—masters who, I should think, had the name of being the best exponents of the art. You remember them, do you not?
Anytus
Yes, by hearsay.
Socrates
Well, is it not obvious that this father would never have spent his money on having his children taught all those things,
and then have omitted to teach them at no expense the others that would have made them good men, if virtue was to be taught? Will you say that perhaps Thucydides was one of the meaner sort, and had no great number of friends among the Athenians and allies? He, who was of a great house and had much influence in our city and all over Greece, so that if virtue were to be taught he would have found out the man who was likely to make his sons good, whether one of our own people
or a foreigner, were he himself too busy owing to the cares of state! Ah no, my dear Anytus, it looks as though virtue were not a teachable thing.
Anytus
Socrates, I consider you are too apt to speak ill of people. I, for one, if you will take my advice, would warn you to be careful: in most cities it is probably easier to do people harm than good, and particularly in this one;
-I think you know that yourself.Anytus goes away. His parting words show that (in Plato's view) he regarded Socrates as an enemy of the restored democracy which, he hints, has popular juries only too ready to condemn such an awkward critic.
Socrates
Meno, I think Anytus is angry, and I am not at all surprised: for he conceives, in the first place, that I am speaking ill of these gentlemen; and in the second place, he considers he is one of them himself. Yet, should the day come when he knows what “speaking ill” means, his anger will cease; at present he does not know.This is probably not a reference to a prosecution of Anytus himself, but a suggestion that what he needs is a Socratic discussion on “speaking ill,” for “ill” may mean “maliciously,” “untruthfully.” “ignorantly,” etc. Now you must answer me: are there not good and honorable men among your people also?
Meno
Certainly.
+I think you know that yourself.Anytus goes away. His parting words show that (in Plato’s view) he regarded Socrates as an enemy of the restored democracy which, he hints, has popular juries only too ready to condemn such an awkward critic.
Socrates
Meno, I think Anytus is angry, and I am not at all surprised: for he conceives, in the first place, that I am speaking ill of these gentlemen; and in the second place, he considers he is one of them himself. Yet, should the day come when he knows what “speaking ill” means, his anger will cease; at present he does not know.This is probably not a reference to a prosecution of Anytus himself, but a suggestion that what he needs is a Socratic discussion on “speaking ill,” for “ill” may mean “maliciously,” “untruthfully.” “ignorantly,” etc. Now you must answer me: are there not good and honorable men among your people also?
Meno
Certainly.
Socrates
Well then, are they willing to put themselves forward as teachers of the young, and avow that they are teachers and that virtue is to be taught?
Meno
No, no, Socrates, I assure you: sometimes you may hear them refer to it as teachable, but sometimes as not.
Socrates
Then are we to call those persons teachers of this thing, when they do not even agree on that great question?
Meno
I should say not, Socrates.
Socrates
Well, and what of the sophists? Do you consider these, its only professors,
to be teachers of virtue?
Meno
That is a point, Socrates, for which I admire Gorgias: you will never hear him promising this, and he ridicules the others when he hears them promise it. Skill in speaking is what he takes it to be their business to produce.
Socrates
Then you do not think the sophists are teachers of virtue?
Meno
I cannot say, Socrates. I am in the same plight as the rest of the world: sometimes I think that they are, sometimes that they are not.
Socrates
And are you aware that not only you and other political folk
are in two minds as to whether virtue is to be taught, but Theognis the poet also says, you remember, the very same thing?
Meno
In which part of his poems?
Socrates
In those elegiac lines where he says—Eat and drink with these men; sit with them, and he pleasing unto them, who wield great power; for from the good wilt thou win thee lessons in the good; but mingle with the bad,
diff --git a/data/tlg0059/tlg024/tlg0059.tlg024.perseus-grc1.xml b/data/tlg0059/tlg024/tlg0059.tlg024.perseus-grc1.xml
index 08037e31e..22efd8571 100755
--- a/data/tlg0059/tlg024/tlg0059.tlg024.perseus-grc1.xml
+++ b/data/tlg0059/tlg024/tlg0059.tlg024.perseus-grc1.xml
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ when="1992-07-01" who="DAS">Tagged in conformance with Prose.e dtd.
ἀγαθὰ ἐργάζονται· πολὺν δὲ χρόνον οὐκ ἐθέλουσι παραμένειν, ἀλλὰ δραπετεύουσιν ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὥστε οὐ πολλοῦ ἄξιαί εἰσιν, ἕως ἄν τις αὐτὰς δήσῃ αἰτίας λογισμῷ. τοῦτο δʼ ἐστίν, ὦ Μένων ἑταῖρε, ἀνάμνησις, ὡς ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἡμῖν ὡμολόγηται. ἐπειδὰν δὲ δεθῶσιν, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστῆμαι γίγνονται, ἔπειτα μόνιμοι· καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ τιμιώτερον ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης ἐστίν, καὶ διαφέρει δεσμῷ ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης.
Hippias, beautiful and wise, what a long time it is since you have put in at the port of Athens!
Hippias
I am too busy, Socrates. For whenever Elis needs to have any business transacted with any of the states, she always comes to me first of her citizens and chooses me as envoy, thinking that I am the ablest judge and messenger of the words that are spoken by the several states.
-So I have often gone as envoy to other states, but most often and concerning the most numerous and important matters to Lacedaemon. For that reason, then, since you ask me, I do not often come to this neighborhood.
Socrates
That's what it is, Hippias, to be a truly wise and perfect man! For you are both in your private capacity able to earn much money from the young
+So I have often gone as envoy to other states, but most often and concerning the most numerous and important matters to Lacedaemon. For that reason, then, since you ask me, I do not often come to this neighborhood.
Socrates
That’s what it is, Hippias, to be a truly wise and perfect man! For you are both in your private capacity able to earn much money from the young
and to confer upon them still greater benefits than you receive, and in public affairs you are able to benefit your own state, as a man must who is to be not despised but held in high repute among the many. And yet, Hippias, what in the world is the reason why those men of old whose names are called great in respect to wisdom—Pittacus, and Bias, and the Milesian Thales Pittacus of Mitylene, Bias of Priene, and Thales of Miletus were among the traditional seven wise men. with his followers and also the later ones, down to Anaxagoras, are all,
-or most of them, found to refrain from affairs of state?
Hippias
What else do you suppose, Socrates, than that they were not able to compass by their wisdom both public and private matters?
Socrates
Then for Heaven's sake, just as the other arts have progressed, and the ancients are of no account in comparison with the artisans of today, shall we say that your art also has progressed and those of the ancients who were concerned with wisdom are of no account in comparison with you?
Hippias
Yes, you are quite right.
Socrates
Then, Hippias, if Bias were to come to life again now,
+or most of them, found to refrain from affairs of state?
Hippias
What else do you suppose, Socrates, than that they were not able to compass by their wisdom both public and private matters?
Socrates
Then for Heaven’s sake, just as the other arts have progressed, and the ancients are of no account in comparison with the artisans of today, shall we say that your art also has progressed and those of the ancients who were concerned with wisdom are of no account in comparison with you?
Hippias
Yes, you are quite right.
Socrates
Then, Hippias, if Bias were to come to life again now,
he would be a laughing-stock in comparison with you, just as the sculptors say that Daedalus, Daedalus, the traditional inventor of sculpture. if he were to be born now and were to create such works as those from which he got his reputation, would be ridiculous.
Hippias
That, Socrates, is exactly as you say. I, however, am in the habit of praising the ancients and our predecessors rather than the men of the present day, and more greatly, as a precaution against the envy of the living and through fear of the wrath of those who are dead.
-
Socrates
Yours, Hippias, is a most excellent way, at any rate, of speaking about them and of thinking, it seems to me and I can bear you witness that you speak the truth, and that your art really has progressed in the direction of ability to carry on public together with private affairs. For this man The word ou)=tos does not indicate that Gorgias was among those present at the moment, but only that he was at the time much talked of at Athens. The imaginary, or dramatic, date of this dialogue, would, then, be shortly after the time of Gorgias' activity at Athens. Gorgias, the sophist from Leontini, came here from home in the public capacity of envoy, as being best able of all the citizens of Leontini to attend to the interests of the community, and it was the general opinion that he spoke excellently in the public assembly, and in his private capacity, by giving exhibitions and associating with the young, he earned and received a great deal of money from this city;
+
Socrates
Yours, Hippias, is a most excellent way, at any rate, of speaking about them and of thinking, it seems to me and I can bear you witness that you speak the truth, and that your art really has progressed in the direction of ability to carry on public together with private affairs. For this man The word ou)=tos does not indicate that Gorgias was among those present at the moment, but only that he was at the time much talked of at Athens. The imaginary, or dramatic, date of this dialogue, would, then, be shortly after the time of Gorgias’ activity at Athens. Gorgias, the sophist from Leontini, came here from home in the public capacity of envoy, as being best able of all the citizens of Leontini to attend to the interests of the community, and it was the general opinion that he spoke excellently in the public assembly, and in his private capacity, by giving exhibitions and associating with the young, he earned and received a great deal of money from this city;
or, if you like, our friend here, Prodicus, often went to other places in a public capacity, and the last time, just lately, when he came here in a public capacity from Ceos, he gained great reputation by his speaking before the Council, and in his private capacity, by giving exhibitions and associating with the young, he received a marvellous sum of money; but none of those ancients ever thought fit to exact the money as payment for his wisdom or to give exhibitions among people of various places;
-so simple-minded were they, and so unconscious of the fact that money is of the greatest value. But either of these two has earned more money from his wisdom than any artisan from his art. And even before these Protagoras did so.
Hippias
Why, Socrates, you know nothing of the beauties of this. For if you were to know how much money I have made, you would be amazed. I won't mention the rest, but once, when I went to Sicily,
-although Protagoras was staying there and had a great reputation and was the older, I, who was much younger, made in a very short time more than one hundred and fifty minas, and in one very small place, Inycus, more than twenty minas; and when I came home, I took this and gave it to my father, so that he and the other citizens were overwhelmed with amazement. And I pretty well think I have made more money than any other two sophists together.
Socrates
That's a fine thing you say, Hippias, and strong testimony to your wisdom
+so simple-minded were they, and so unconscious of the fact that money is of the greatest value. But either of these two has earned more money from his wisdom than any artisan from his art. And even before these Protagoras did so.
Hippias
Why, Socrates, you know nothing of the beauties of this. For if you were to know how much money I have made, you would be amazed. I won’t mention the rest, but once, when I went to Sicily,
+although Protagoras was staying there and had a great reputation and was the older, I, who was much younger, made in a very short time more than one hundred and fifty minas, and in one very small place, Inycus, more than twenty minas; and when I came home, I took this and gave it to my father, so that he and the other citizens were overwhelmed with amazement. And I pretty well think I have made more money than any other two sophists together.
Socrates
That’s a fine thing you say, Hippias, and strong testimony to your wisdom
and that of the men of today and to their great superiority to the ancients. For the earlier sophists of the school of Anaxagoras must have been very ignorant to judge from what is said, according to your view; for they say that what happened to Anaxagoras was the opposite of what happens to you; for though much money was left him, he neglected it and lost it all so senseless was his wisdom. And they tell similar tales about others among the ancients. So this seems to me fine testimony that you adduce for the wisdom of the men of today as compared with the earlier men,
-and many people agree with me that the wise man must be wise for himself especially Apparently a proverbial expression like “physician, heal thyself” or “look out for number one.”; and the test of this is, who makes the most money. Well, so much for that. But tell me this: at which of the cities that you go to did you make the most money? Or are we to take it that it was at Lacedaemon, where your visits have been most frequent?
Hippias
No, by Zeus, it was not, Socrates.
Socrates
What's that you say? But did you make least there?
+and many people agree with me that the wise man must be wise for himself especially Apparently a proverbial expression like “physician, heal thyself” or “look out for number one.”; and the test of this is, who makes the most money. Well, so much for that. But tell me this: at which of the cities that you go to did you make the most money? Or are we to take it that it was at Lacedaemon, where your visits have been most frequent?
Hippias
No, by Zeus, it was not, Socrates.
Socrates
What’s that you say? But did you make least there?
Hippias
Why, I never made anything at all.
Socrates
That is a prodigious marvel that you tell, Hippias; and say now: is not your wisdom such as to make those who are in contact with it and learn it, better men in respect to virtue?
Hippias
Yes, much better, Socrates.
Socrates
But you were able to make the sons of the Inycenes better, and had no power to improve the sons of the Spartans?
Hippias
That is far from true.
Socrates
Well, then, the Siceliotes desire to become better, and the Lacedaemonians do not?
Hippias
No certainly, Socrates, the Lacedaemonians also desire it.
Socrates
Then it was for lack of money that they avoided intercourse with you?
Hippias
Not at all, since they have plenty of money.
Socrates
What, then, could be the reason, that when they desired it and had money, and you had power to confer upon them the greatest benefits, they did not send you away loaded with money? But I see; perhaps the Lacedaemonians might educate their own children better than you? Shall we state it so, and do you agree?
Hippias
Not in the least.
Socrates
Then were you not able to persuade the young men at Lacedaemon that they would make more progress towards virtue by associating with you than with their own people, or were you powerless to persuade their fathers that they ought rather to hand them over to you than to care for them themselves, if they are at all concerned for their sons? For surely they did not begrudge it to their children to become as good as possible.
Hippias
I do not think they begrudged it.
Socrates
But certainly Lacedaemon is well governed.
Hippias
Of course it is.
Socrates
And in well-governed states virtue is most highly honored.
Hippias
Certainly.
Socrates
And you know best of all men how to transmit that to another.
Hippias
Much best, Socrates.
Socrates
Well, he who knows best how to transmit horsemanship would be most honored in Thessaly of all parts of Greece and would receive most money—and anywhere else where horsemanship is a serious interest, would he not?
Hippias
Very likely.
Socrates
Then will not he who is able to transmit the doctrines that are of most value
for the acquisition of virtue be most highly honored in Lacedaemon and make most money, if he so wishes, and in any other of the Greek states that is well governed? But do you, my friend, think he will fare better in Sicily and at Inycus? Are we to believe that, Hippias? For if you tell us to do so, we must believe it.
Hippias
Yes, for it is not the inherited usage of the Lacedaemonians to change their laws or to educate their children differently from what is customary.
Socrates
What? For the Lacedaemonians is it the hereditary usage not to act rightly,
-but to commit errors?
Hippias
I wouldn't say so, Socrates.
Socrates
Would they, then, not act rightly in educating the young men better, but not in educating them worse?
Hippias
Yes, they would; but it is not lawful for them to give them a foreign education; for you may be sure that if anybody had ever received money there in payment for education, I should have received by far the most; they certainly enjoy hearing me and they applaud me; but, as I say, it is not the law.
Socrates
But, Hippias, do you say that law is an injury to the state,
+but to commit errors?
Hippias
I wouldn’t say so, Socrates.
Socrates
Would they, then, not act rightly in educating the young men better, but not in educating them worse?
Hippias
Yes, they would; but it is not lawful for them to give them a foreign education; for you may be sure that if anybody had ever received money there in payment for education, I should have received by far the most; they certainly enjoy hearing me and they applaud me; but, as I say, it is not the law.
Socrates
But, Hippias, do you say that law is an injury to the state,
or a benefit?
Hippias
It is made, I think, with benefit in view, but sometimes, if the law is badly made, it is injurious.
Socrates
Well, then, is it not true that those who make the law make it as the greatest good to the state, and that without this it is impossible to enjoy good government?
Hippias
What you say is true.
Socrates
Then, when those who make the laws miss the good, they have missed the lawful and the law; or what do you say?
Hippias
Speaking accurately, Socrates, that is true; however, men are not accustomed to think so.
Socrates
The men who know, Hippias, or those who do not know?
Hippias
The many.
Socrates
Are these, the many, those who know the truth?
Hippias
Certainly not.
Socrates
But surely those who know, think that in truth for all men that which is more beneficial is more lawful than that which is less beneficial; or do you not agree?
Hippias
Yes, I agree that they think it is so in truth.
Socrates
Well, it actually is as those who know think it is, is it not?
Hippias
Certainly.
Socrates
But or the Lacedaemonians, as you say,
it is more beneficial to be educated in your education, which is foreign, than in the local education.
Hippias
Yes, and what I say is true.
Socrates
And do you say this also, Hippias, that beneficial things are more lawful?
Hippias
Yes, I said so.
Socrates
Then, according to what you say, it is more lawful for the sons of the Lacedaemonians to be educated by Hippias and less lawful for them to be educated by their fathers, if in reality they will be more benefited by you.
Hippias
But certainly they will be benefited, Socrates.
-
Socrates
Then the Lacedaemonians in not giving you money and entrusting their sons to you , act contrary to law.
Hippias
I agree to that; for you seem to be making your argument in my favour, and there is no need of my opposing it.
Socrates
Then my friends, we find that the Lacedaemonians are law-breakers, and that too in the most important affairs—they who are regarded as the most law-abiding of men. But then, for Heaven's sake, Hippias, what sort of discourses are those for which they applaud you and which they enjoy hearing?
-Or are they evidently those which you understand most admirably, those about the stars and the phenomena of the heavens?
Hippias
Not in the least; they won't even endure those.
Socrates
But they enjoy hearing about geometry?
Hippias
Not at all, since one might say that many of them do not even know how to count.
Socrates
Then they are far from enduring a lecture by you on the processes of thought.
Hippias
Far from it indeed, by Zeus.
Socrates
Well, then, those matters which you of all men know best how to discuss,
+
Socrates
Then the Lacedaemonians in not giving you money and entrusting their sons to you , act contrary to law.
Hippias
I agree to that; for you seem to be making your argument in my favour, and there is no need of my opposing it.
Socrates
Then my friends, we find that the Lacedaemonians are law-breakers, and that too in the most important affairs—they who are regarded as the most law-abiding of men. But then, for Heaven’s sake, Hippias, what sort of discourses are those for which they applaud you and which they enjoy hearing?
+Or are they evidently those which you understand most admirably, those about the stars and the phenomena of the heavens?
Hippias
Not in the least; they won’t even endure those.
Socrates
But they enjoy hearing about geometry?
Hippias
Not at all, since one might say that many of them do not even know how to count.
Socrates
Then they are far from enduring a lecture by you on the processes of thought.
Hippias
Far from it indeed, by Zeus.
Socrates
Well, then, those matters which you of all men know best how to discuss,
concerning the value of letters and syllables and rhythms and harmonies?
Hippias
Harmonies indeed, my good fellow, and letters!
Socrates
But then what are the things about which they like to listen to you and which they applaud? Tell me yourself, for I cannot discover them.
Hippias
They are very fond of hearing about the genealogies of heroes and men, Socrates, and the foundations of cities in ancient times and, in short, about antiquity in general, so that for their sake I have been obliged to learn all that sort of thing by heart
-and practise it thoroughly.
Socrates
By Zeus, Hippias, it is lucky for you that the Lacedaemonians do not enjoy hearing one recite the list of our archons from Solon's time; if they did, you would have trouble in learning it by heart.
Hippias
How so, Socrates? After hearing them once, I can remember fifty names.
Socrates
True, but I did not understand that you possess the science of memory; and so I understand that the Lacedaemonians naturally enjoy you as one who knows many things, and they make use of you
+and practise it thoroughly.
Socrates
By Zeus, Hippias, it is lucky for you that the Lacedaemonians do not enjoy hearing one recite the list of our archons from Solon’s time; if they did, you would have trouble in learning it by heart.
Hippias
How so, Socrates? After hearing them once, I can remember fifty names.
Socrates
True, but I did not understand that you possess the science of memory; and so I understand that the Lacedaemonians naturally enjoy you as one who knows many things, and they make use of you
as children make use of old women, to tell stories agreeably.
Hippias
And by Zeus, Socrates, I have just lately gained reputation there by telling about noble or beautiful pursuits, recounting what those of a young man should be. For I have a very beautiful discourse composed about them, well arranged in its words and also in other respects. And the plan of the discourse, and its beginning, is something like this: After the fall of Troy, the story goes that Neoptolemus asked Nestor
-what the noble and beautiful pursuits were, by following which a young man would become most famous; so after that we have Nestor speaking and suggesting to him very many lawful and most beautiful pursuits. That discourse, then, I delivered there and intend to deliver here the day after tomorrow in Pheidostratus's schoolroom, with many other things worth hearing; for Eudicus, the son of Apemantus, asked me to do so. Now be sure to be there yourself and to bring others
+what the noble and beautiful pursuits were, by following which a young man would become most famous; so after that we have Nestor speaking and suggesting to him very many lawful and most beautiful pursuits. That discourse, then, I delivered there and intend to deliver here the day after tomorrow in Pheidostratus’s schoolroom, with many other things worth hearing; for Eudicus, the son of Apemantus, asked me to do so. Now be sure to be there yourself and to bring others
who are able to judge of discourses that they hear.
Socrates
Well, that shall be done, God willing, Hippias. Now, however, give me a brief answer to a question about your discourse, for you reminded me of the beautiful just at the right moment. For recently, my most excellent friend, as I was finding fault with some things in certain speeches as ugly and praising other things as beautiful, a man threw me into confusion by questioning me very insolently somewhat after this fashion: “How, if you please, do you know, Socrates,” said he,
“what sort of things are beautiful and ugly? For, come now, could you tell me what the beautiful is?” And I, being of no account, was at a loss and could not answer him properly; and so, as I was going away from the company, I was angry with myself and reproached myself, and threatened that the first time I met one of you wise men, I would hear and learn and practise and then go back to the man who questioned me to renew the wordy strife. So now, as I say, you have come at the right moment;
just teach me satisfactorily what the absolute beautiful is, and try in replying to speak as accurately as possible, that I may not be confuted a second time and be made ridiculous again. For you doubtless know clearly, and this would doubtless be but a small example of your wide learning.
Hippias
Yes, surely, by Zeus, a small one, Socrates, and, I may say, of no value.
Socrates
Then I shall learn it easily, and nobody will confute me any more.
Hippias
Nobody, surely; for in that case my profession would be
worthless and ordinary.
Socrates
That is good, by Hera, Hippias, if we are to worst the fellow. But may I without hindering you imitate him, and when you answer, take exception to what you say, in order that you may give me as much practice as possible? For I am more or less experienced in taking exceptions. So, if it is all the same to you, I wish to take exceptions, that I may learn more vigorously.
Hippias
Oh yes, take exceptions. For, as I said just now,
-the question is no great matter, but I could teach you to answer much harder ones than this, so that nobody in the world could confute you.
Socrates
Oh how good that is! But come, since you tell me to do so, now let me try to play that man's part, so far as possible, and ask you questions. For if you were to deliver for him this discourse that you mention, the one about beautiful pursuits, when he had heard it, after you had stopped speaking, the very first thing he would ask about would be the beautiful;
+the question is no great matter, but I could teach you to answer much harder ones than this, so that nobody in the world could confute you.
Socrates
Oh how good that is! But come, since you tell me to do so, now let me try to play that man’s part, so far as possible, and ask you questions. For if you were to deliver for him this discourse that you mention, the one about beautiful pursuits, when he had heard it, after you had stopped speaking, the very first thing he would ask about would be the beautiful;
for he has that sort of habit, and he would say, “Stranger from Elis, is it not by justice that the just are just?” So answer, Hippias, as though he were asking the question.
Hippias
I shall answer that it is by justice.
Socrates
“Then this—I mean justice—is something?”
Hippias
Certainly.
Socrates
“Then, too, by wisdom the wise are wise and by the good all things are good, are they not?”
Hippias
Of course.
Socrates
“And justice, wisdom, and so forth are something; for the just, wise, and so forth would not be such by them, if they were not something.”
Hippias
To be sure, they are something.
Socrates
“Then are not all beautiful things beautiful by the beautiful?”
Hippias
Yes, by the beautiful.
Socrates
“By the beautiful, which is something?”
Hippias
Yes, for what alternative is there?
Socrates
“Tell me, then, stranger,” he will say, “what is this, the beautiful?”
Hippias
Well, Socrates, does he who asks this question want to find out anything else than what is beautiful?
Socrates
I do not think that is what he wants to find out,
but what the beautiful is.
Hippias
And what difference is there between the two?
Socrates
Do you think there is none?
Hippias
Yes, for there is no difference.
Socrates
Well, surely it is plain that you know best; but still, my good friend, consider; for he asked you, not what is beautiful, but what the beautiful is.
Hippias
I understand, my good friend, and I will answer and tell him what the beautiful is, and I shall never be confuted. For be assured, Socrates, if I must speak the truth, a beautiful maiden is beautiful.
Socrates
Beautifully answered, Hippias, by the dog, and notably! Then if I give this answer, I shall have answered the question that was asked, and shall have answered it correctly,
and shall never be confuted?
Hippias
Yes, for how could you, Socrates, be confuted, when you say what everybody thinks, and when all who hear it will bear witness that what you say is correct?
Socrates
Very well; certainly. Come, then, Hippias, let me rehearse to myself what you say. The man will question me in some such fashion as this: “Come Socrates, answer me. All these things which you say are beautiful, if the absolute beautiful is anything, would be beautiful?” And I shall say that if a beautiful maiden is beautiful, there is something by reason of which these things would be beautiful.
-
Hippias
Do you think, then, that he will still attempt to refute you and to show that what you say is not beautiful, or, if he does attempt it, that he will not be ridiculous?
Socrates
That he will attempt it, my admirable friend, I am sure but whether the attempt will make him ridiculous, the event will show. However, I should like to tell you what he will ask.
Hippias
Do so.
Socrates
“How charming you are, Socrates!” he will say. “But is not a beautiful mare beautiful, which even the god praised in his oracle?” Heindorf and other commentators connect this reference with an oracle quoted by a scholiast on Theocritus, Idyl xiv. 48. The Megarians, being filled with pride, asked the god who were better then they. The first lines of the reply they received are:*gai/hs me/n pa/shs to\ *pelasgiko\n *)/argos a)/meinon,i(/ppoi *qrhi/+kiai, *lakedaimo/niai de\ gunai=kes“Better than all other land is the land of Pelasgian Argos,Thracian mares are the best, and the Lacedaemonian women.”To be sure, nothing is said about the beauty of the mares, and the reference to Elis contained in par' h(mi=n just below is hard to reconcile with the Thracian mares of the oracle.
+
Hippias
Do you think, then, that he will still attempt to refute you and to show that what you say is not beautiful, or, if he does attempt it, that he will not be ridiculous?
Socrates
That he will attempt it, my admirable friend, I am sure but whether the attempt will make him ridiculous, the event will show. However, I should like to tell you what he will ask.
Hippias
Do so.
Socrates
“How charming you are, Socrates!” he will say. “But is not a beautiful mare beautiful, which even the god praised in his oracle?” Heindorf and other commentators connect this reference with an oracle quoted by a scholiast on Theocritus, Idyl xiv. 48. The Megarians, being filled with pride, asked the god who were better then they. The first lines of the reply they received are:*gai/hs me/n pa/shs to\ *pelasgiko\n *)/argos a)/meinon,i(/ppoi *qrhi/+kiai, *lakedaimo/niai de\ gunai=kes“Better than all other land is the land of Pelasgian Argos,Thracian mares are the best, and the Lacedaemonian women.”To be sure, nothing is said about the beauty of the mares, and the reference to Elis contained in par’ h(mi=n just below is hard to reconcile with the Thracian mares of the oracle.What shall we say, Hippias? Shall we not say that the mare is beautiful, I mean the beautiful mare? For how could we dare to deny that the beautiful thing is beautiful?
Hippias
Quite true, Socrates for what the god said is quite correct, too; for very beautiful mares are bred in our country.
Socrates
“Very well,” he will say, “and how about a beautiful lyre? Is it not beautiful?” Shall we agree, Hippias?
Hippias
Yes.
Socrates
After this, then, the man will ask, I am sure, judging by his character: “You most excellent man, how about a beautiful pot? Is it, then, not beautiful?”
-
Hippias
Socrates, who is the fellow? What an uncultivated person, who has the face to mention such worthless things in a dignified discussion!
Socrates
That's the kind of person he is, Hippias, not elegant, but vulgar, thinking of nothing but the truth. But nevertheless the man must be answered, and I will declare my opinion beforehand: if the pot were made by a good potter, were smooth and round and well fired, as are some of the two-handled pots, those that hold six choes, The xou=s was 5.76 pints. very beautiful ones—
+
Hippias
Socrates, who is the fellow? What an uncultivated person, who has the face to mention such worthless things in a dignified discussion!
Socrates
That’s the kind of person he is, Hippias, not elegant, but vulgar, thinking of nothing but the truth. But nevertheless the man must be answered, and I will declare my opinion beforehand: if the pot were made by a good potter, were smooth and round and well fired, as are some of the two-handled pots, those that hold six choes, The xou=s was 5.76 pints. very beautiful ones—
if that were the kind of pot he asked about, we must agree that it is beautiful; for how could we say that being beautiful it is not beautiful?
Hippias
We could not at all, Socrates.
Socrates
“Then,” he will say, “a beautiful pot also is beautiful, is it not?” Answer.
Hippias
Well, Socrates, it is like this, I think. This utensil, when well wrought, is beautiful, but absolutely considered it does not deserve to be regarded as beautiful in comparison with a mare and a maiden and all the beautiful things.
Socrates
Very well I understand, Hippias, that the proper reply to him who asks these questions is this: “Sir, you are not aware that the saying of Heracleitus is good, that Ôthe most beautiful of monkeys is ugly compared with the race of man,Õ and the most beautiful of pots is ugly compared with the race of maidens, as Hippias the wise man says.” Is it not so, Hippias?
Hippias
Certainly, Socrates; you replied rightly.
Socrates
Listen then. For I am sure that after this he will say: “Yes, but, Socrates, if we compare maidens with gods,
will not the same thing happen to them that happened to pots when compared with maidens? Will not the most beautiful maiden appear ugly? Or does not Heracleitus, whom you cite, mean just this, that the wisest of men, if compared with a god, will appear a monkey, both in wisdom and in beauty and in everything else?” Shall we agree, Hippias, that the most beautiful maiden is ugly if compared with the gods?
Hippias
Yes, for who would deny that, Socrates?
Socrates
If, then, we agree to that, he will laugh and say: “Socrates, do you remember the question you were asked?” “I do,” I shall say, “the question was what the absolute beautiful is.” “Then,” he will say, “when you were asked for the beautiful, do you give as your reply what is, as you yourself say, no more beautiful than ugly?” “So it seems,” I shall say; or what do you, my friend, advise me to say?
Hippias
That is what I advise; for, of course, in saying that the human race is not beautiful in comparison with gods, you will be speaking the truth.
Socrates
“But if I had asked you,” he will say, “in the beginning what is beautiful and ugly,
if you had replied as you now do, would you not have replied correctly? But do you still think that the absolute beautiful, by the addition of which all other things are adorned and made to appear beautiful, when its form is added to any of them—do you think that is a maiden or a mare or a lyre?”
Hippias
Well, certainly, Socrates, if that is what he is looking for, nothing is easier than to answer and tell him what the beautiful is, by which all other things are adorned and by the addition of which they are made to appear beautiful.
-So the fellow is very simple-minded and knows nothing about beautiful possessions. For if you reply to him: “This that you ask about, the beautiful, is nothing else but gold,” he will be thrown into confusion and will not attempt to confute you. For we all know, I fancy, that wherever this is added, even what before appears ugly will appear beautiful when adorned with gold.
Socrates
You don't know the man, Hippias, what a wretch he is, and how certain not to accept anything easily.
Hippias
What of that, then, Socrates? For he must perforce accept what is correct,
+So the fellow is very simple-minded and knows nothing about beautiful possessions. For if you reply to him: “This that you ask about, the beautiful, is nothing else but gold,” he will be thrown into confusion and will not attempt to confute you. For we all know, I fancy, that wherever this is added, even what before appears ugly will appear beautiful when adorned with gold.
Socrates
You don’t know the man, Hippias, what a wretch he is, and how certain not to accept anything easily.
Hippias
What of that, then, Socrates? For he must perforce accept what is correct,
or if he does not accept it, be ridiculous.
Socrates
This reply, my most excellent friend, he not only will certainly not accept, but he will even jeer at me grossly and will say: “You lunatic, do you think Pheidias is a bad craftsman?” And I shall say, “Not in the least.”
Hippias
And you will be right, Socrates.
Socrates
Yes, to be sure. Consequently when I agree that Pheidias is a good craftsman,
“Well, then,” he will say, “do you imagine that Pheidias did not know this beautiful that you speak of?” “Why do you ask that?” I shall say. “Because,” he will say, “he did not make the eyes of his Athena of gold, nor the rest of her face, nor her hands and feet, if, that is, they were sure to appear most beautiful provided only they were made of gold, but he made them of ivory; evidently he made this mistake through ignorance, not knowing that it is gold which makes everything beautiful to which it is added.” When he says that, what reply shall we make to him, Hippias?
Hippias
That is easy; for we shall say that Pheidias did right; for ivory, I think, is beautiful.
Socrates
“Why, then,” he will say, “did he not make the middle parts of the eyes also of ivory, but of stone, procuring stone as similar as possible to the ivory? Or is beautiful stone also beautiful?” Shall we say that it is, Hippias?
Hippias
Surely we shall say so, that is, where it is appropriate.
Socrates
“But ugly when not appropriate?” Shall I agree, or not?
Hippias
Agree, that is, when it is not appropriate.
Socrates
“What then? Do not gold and ivory,” he will say, “when they are appropriate, make things beautiful, and when they are not appropriate, ugly?” Shall we deny that, or agree that what he says is correct?
Hippias
We shall agree to this, at any rate, that whatever is appropriate to any particular thing makes that thing beautiful.
Socrates
“Well, then,” he will say, “when some one has boiled the pot of which we were speaking just now, the beautiful one, full of beautiful soup, is a golden ladle appropriate to it, or one made of fig wood?”
Hippias
Heracles! What a fellow this is that you speak of!
-Won't you tell me who he is?
Socrates
You would not know him if I should tell you his name.
Hippias
But even now I know that he is an ignoramus.
Socrates
He is a great nuisance, Hippias but yet, what shall we say? Which of the two ladles shall we say is appropriate to the soup and the pot? Is it not evidently the one of fig wood? For it is likely to make the soup smell better, and besides, my friend, it would not break the pot, thereby spilling the soup, putting out the fire, and making those who are to be entertained go without their splendid soup; whereas the golden ladle would do all those things,
-so that it seems to me that we must say that the wooden ladle is more appropriate than the golden one, unless you disagree.
Hippias
No, for it is more appropriate, Socrates; however, I, for my part, would not talk with the fellow when he asks such questions.
Socrates
Quite right, my friend; for it would not be appropriate for you to be filled up with such words, you who are so beautifully clad, so beautifully shod, and so famous for your wisdom among all the Greeks; but for me it doesn't matter if I do associate with the fellow;
+Won’t you tell me who he is?
Socrates
You would not know him if I should tell you his name.
Hippias
But even now I know that he is an ignoramus.
Socrates
He is a great nuisance, Hippias but yet, what shall we say? Which of the two ladles shall we say is appropriate to the soup and the pot? Is it not evidently the one of fig wood? For it is likely to make the soup smell better, and besides, my friend, it would not break the pot, thereby spilling the soup, putting out the fire, and making those who are to be entertained go without their splendid soup; whereas the golden ladle would do all those things,
+so that it seems to me that we must say that the wooden ladle is more appropriate than the golden one, unless you disagree.
Hippias
No, for it is more appropriate, Socrates; however, I, for my part, would not talk with the fellow when he asks such questions.
Socrates
Quite right, my friend; for it would not be appropriate for you to be filled up with such words, you who are so beautifully clad, so beautifully shod, and so famous for your wisdom among all the Greeks; but for me it doesn’t matter if I do associate with the fellow;
so instruct me and for my sake answer him. “For if the wooden one is more appropriate than the golden one,” the fellow will say, “would it not be more beautiful, since you agreed, Socrates, that the appropriate is more beautiful than that which is not appropriate?” Shall we not agree, Hippias, that the wooden one is more beautiful than the golden?
Hippias
Do you wish me to tell you, Socrates, what definition of the beautiful will enable you to free yourself from long discussion?
Socrates
Certainly; but not until after you have told me which of the two ladles I just spoke of I shall reply is appropriate and more beautiful.
Hippias
Well, if you like, reply to him that it is the one made of fig wood.
Socrates
Now, then, say what you were just now going to say. For by this reply, if I say that the beautiful is gold, it seems to me that gold will be shown to be no more beautiful than fig wood; but what do you now, once more, say that the beautiful is?
-
Hippias
I will tell you; for you seem to me to be seeking to reply that the beautiful is something of such sort that it will never appear ugly anywhere to anybody.
Socrates
Certainly, Hippias; now you understand beautifully.
Hippias
Listen, then; for, mind you, if anyone has anything to say against this, you may say I know nothing at all.
Socrates
Then for Heaven's sake, speak as quickly as you can.
Hippias
I say, then, that for every man and everywhere it is most beautiful to be rich and healthy, and honored by the Greeks, to reach old age, and, after providing a beautiful funeral for his deceased parents,
+
Hippias
I will tell you; for you seem to me to be seeking to reply that the beautiful is something of such sort that it will never appear ugly anywhere to anybody.
Socrates
Certainly, Hippias; now you understand beautifully.
Hippias
Listen, then; for, mind you, if anyone has anything to say against this, you may say I know nothing at all.
Socrates
Then for Heaven’s sake, speak as quickly as you can.
Hippias
I say, then, that for every man and everywhere it is most beautiful to be rich and healthy, and honored by the Greeks, to reach old age, and, after providing a beautiful funeral for his deceased parents,
to be beautifully and splendidly buried by his own offspring.
Socrates
Bravo, bravo, Hippias! You have spoken in a way that is wonderful and great and worthy of you; and now, by Hera, I thank you, because you are kindly coming to my assistance to the best of your ability. But our shots are not hitting the man; no, he will laugh at us now more than ever, be sure of that.
Hippias
A wretched laugh, Socrates; for when he has nothing to say to this, but laughs, he will be laughing at himself
and will himself be laughed at by those present.
Socrates
Perhaps that is so perhaps, however, after this reply, he will, I foresee, be likely to do more than laugh at me.
Hippias
Why do you say that, pray?
Socrates
Because, if he happens to have a stick, unless I get away in a hurry, he will try to fetch me a good one.
Hippias
What? Is the fellow some sort of master of yours, and if he does that, will he not be arrested and have to pay for it? Or does your city disregard justice
and allow the citizens to beat one another unjustly?
Socrates
Oh no that is not allowed at all.
Hippias
Then he will have to pay a penalty for beating you unjustly.
Socrates
I do not think so, Hippias. No, if I were to make that reply, the beating would be just, I think.
Hippias
Then I think so, too, Socrates, since that is your own belief.
Socrates
Shall I, then, not tell you why it is my own belief that the beating would be just, if I made that reply? Or will you also beat me without trial? Or will you listen to what I have to say?
Hippias
It would be shocking if I would not listen; but what have you to say?
Socrates
I will tell you, imitating him in the same way as a while ago, that I may not use to you such harsh and uncouth words as he uses to me. For you may be sure, “Tell me, Socrates,” he will say, “do you think it would be unjust if you got a beating for singing such a long dithyramb so unmusically and so far from the question?” “How so?” I shall say. “How so?” he will say; “are you not able to remember that I asked for the absolute beautiful,
by which everything to which it is added has the property of being beautiful, both stone and stick and man and god and every act and every acquisition of knowledge? For what I am asking is this, man: what is absolute beauty? and I cannot make you hear what I say any more than if you were a stone sitting beside me, and a millstone at that, having neither ears nor brain.” Would you, then, not be angry, Hippias,if I should be frightened and should reply in this way? “Well, but Hippias said that this was the beautiful;
and yet I asked him, just as you asked me, what is beautiful to all and always.” What do you say? Will you not be angry if I say that?
Hippias
I know very well, Socrates, that this which I said was beautiful is beautiful to all and will seem so.
Socrates
And will it be so, too he will say for the beautiful is always beautiful, is it not?
Hippias
Certainly.
Socrates
“Then was it so, too?” he will say.
Hippias
It was so, too.
Socrates
“And,” he will say, “did the stranger from Elis say also that for Achilles it was beautiful to be buried later than his parents, and for his grandfather Aeacus, and all the others who were born of gods,
-and for the gods themselves?”
Hippias
What's that? Confound it! These questions of the fellow's are not even respectful to religion.
Socrates
Well, then, when another asks the question, perhaps it is not quite disrespectful to religion to say that these things are so?
Hippias
Perhaps.
Socrates
“Perhaps, then, you are the man,” he will say, “who says that it is beautiful for every one and always to be buried by one's offspring, and to bury one's parents; or was not Heracles included in 'every one,' he and all those whom we just now mentioned?”
Hippias
But I did not say it was so for the gods.
Socrates
“Nor for the heroes either, apparently.”
-
Hippias
Not those who were children of gods.
Socrates
“But those who were not?”
Hippias
Certainly.
Socrates
“Then again, according to your statement, among the heroes it is terrible and impious and disgraceful for Tantalus and Dardanus and Zethus, but beautiful for Pelops Pelops as the son of a mortal (Tantalus); the others mentioned were sons of gods. and the others who were born as he was?”
Hippias
I think so.
Socrates
“You think, then, what you did not say just now, that to bury one's parents and be buried by one's offspring is sometimes and for some persons disgraceful;
+and for the gods themselves?”
Hippias
What’s that? Confound it! These questions of the fellow’s are not even respectful to religion.
Socrates
Well, then, when another asks the question, perhaps it is not quite disrespectful to religion to say that these things are so?
Hippias
Perhaps.
Socrates
“Perhaps, then, you are the man,” he will say, “who says that it is beautiful for every one and always to be buried by one’s offspring, and to bury one’s parents; or was not Heracles included in ’every one,’ he and all those whom we just now mentioned?”
Hippias
But I did not say it was so for the gods.
Socrates
“Nor for the heroes either, apparently.”
+
Hippias
Not those who were children of gods.
Socrates
“But those who were not?”
Hippias
Certainly.
Socrates
“Then again, according to your statement, among the heroes it is terrible and impious and disgraceful for Tantalus and Dardanus and Zethus, but beautiful for Pelops Pelops as the son of a mortal (Tantalus); the others mentioned were sons of gods. and the others who were born as he was?”
Hippias
I think so.
Socrates
“You think, then, what you did not say just now, that to bury one’s parents and be buried by one’s offspring is sometimes and for some persons disgraceful;
and it is still more impossible, as it seems, for this to become and to be beautiful for all, so that the same thing has happened to this as to the things we mentioned before, the maiden and the pot, in a still more ridiculous way than to them; it is beautiful for some and not beautiful for others. And you are not able yet, even today, Socrates,” he will say, “to answer what is asked about the beautiful, namely what it is.” With these words and the like he will rebuke me, if I reply to him in this way.
For the most part, Hippias, he talks with me in some such way as that but sometimes, as if in pity for my inexperience and lack of training, he himself volunteers a question, and asks whether I think the beautiful is so and so or whatever else it is which happens to be the subject of our questions and our discussion.
Hippias
What do you mean by that, Socrates?
Socrates
I will tell you. “Oh, my dear Socrates,” he says, “stop making replies of this sort and in this way—for they are too silly and easy to refute; but see if something like this does not seem to you to be beautiful,
-which we got hold of just now in our reply, when we said that gold was beautiful for those things for which it was appropriate, but not for those for which it was not, and that all the other things were beautiful to which this quality pertains; so examine this very thing, the appropriate, and see if it is perchance the beautiful.” Now I am accustomed to agree to such things every time for I don't know what to say; but now does it seem to you that the appropriate is the beautiful?
Hippias
Yes, certainly, Socrates.
Socrates
Let us consider, lest we make a mistake somehow.
Hippias
Yes, we must consider.
Socrates
See, then; do we say that the appropriate is that which,
+which we got hold of just now in our reply, when we said that gold was beautiful for those things for which it was appropriate, but not for those for which it was not, and that all the other things were beautiful to which this quality pertains; so examine this very thing, the appropriate, and see if it is perchance the beautiful.” Now I am accustomed to agree to such things every time for I don’t know what to say; but now does it seem to you that the appropriate is the beautiful?
Hippias
Yes, certainly, Socrates.
Socrates
Let us consider, lest we make a mistake somehow.
Hippias
Yes, we must consider.
Socrates
See, then; do we say that the appropriate is that which,
when it is added, makes each of those things to which it is added appear beautiful, or which makes them be beautiful, or neither of these?
Hippias
I think so.
Socrates
Which?
Hippias
That which makes them appear beautiful; as when a man takes clothes or shoes that fit, even if he be ridiculous, he appears more beautiful.
Socrates
Then if the appropriate makes him appear more beautiful than he is, the appropriate would be a sort of deceit in respect to the beautiful, and would not be that which we are looking for, would it, Hippias?
For we were rather looking for that by which all beautiful things are beautiful—like that by which all great things are great, that is, excess; for it is by this that all great things are great; for even if they do not appear great, but exceed, they are of necessity great; so, then, we say, what would the beautiful be, by which all things are beautiful, whether they appear so or not? For it could not be the appropriate, since that, by your statement, makes things appear more beautiful than they are, but does not let them appear such as they are.
But we must try to say what that is which makes things be beautiful, as I said just now, whether they appear so or not; for that is what we are looking for, since we are looking for the beautiful.
Hippias
But the appropriate, Socrates, makes things both be and appear beautiful by its presence.
Socrates
Is it impossible, then, for things which are really beautiful not to appear to be beautiful, at any rate when that is present which makes them appear so?
Hippias
It is impossible.
Socrates
Shall we, then, agree to this, Hippias, that all things which are really beautiful, both uses and pursuits, are always believed to be beautiful by all, and appear so to them,
or, quite the contrary, that people are ignorant about them, and that there is more strife and contention about them than about anything else, both in private between individuals and in public between states?
Hippias
The latter rather, Socrates; that people are ignorant about them.
Socrates
They would not be so, if the appearance of beauty were added to them; and it would be added, if the appropriate were beautiful and made things not only to be beautiful, but also to appear so. So that the appropriate, if it is that which makes things be beautiful, would be the beautiful which we are looking for, but would not be that which makes things appear beautiful; but if, on the other hand, the appropriate is that which makes things appear beautiful,
it would not be the beautiful for which we are looking. For that makes things be beautiful, but the same element could not make things both appear and be beautiful, nor could it make them both appear and be anything else whatsoever. Let us choose, then, whether we think that the appropriate is that which makes things appear or be beautiful.
Hippias
That which makes them appear so, in my opinion, Socrates.
Socrates
Whew! Our perception of what the beautiful is has fled away and gone, Hippias, since the appropriate has been found to be something other than the beautiful.
Hippias
Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, and to me that is very queer.
-
Socrates
However, my friend, let us not yet give it up, for I still have hopes that what the beautiful is will be made clear.
Hippias
Certainly, to be sure, Socrates, for it is not hard to find. Now I know that if I should go away into solitude and meditate alone by myself, I could tell it to you with the most perfect accuracy.
Socrates
Ah, don't boast, Hippias. You see how much trouble it has caused us already; I'm afraid it may get angry and run away more than ever.
-And yet that is nonsense; for you, I think, will easily find it when you go away by yourself. But for Heaven's sake, find it in my presence, or, if you please, join me, as you are now doing, in looking for it. And if we find it, that will be splendid, but if we do not, I shall, I suppose, accept my lot, and you will go away and find it easily. And if we find it now, I shall certainly not be a nuisance to you by asking what that was which you found by yourself;
+
Socrates
However, my friend, let us not yet give it up, for I still have hopes that what the beautiful is will be made clear.
Hippias
Certainly, to be sure, Socrates, for it is not hard to find. Now I know that if I should go away into solitude and meditate alone by myself, I could tell it to you with the most perfect accuracy.
Socrates
Ah, don’t boast, Hippias. You see how much trouble it has caused us already; I’m afraid it may get angry and run away more than ever.
+And yet that is nonsense; for you, I think, will easily find it when you go away by yourself. But for Heaven’s sake, find it in my presence, or, if you please, join me, as you are now doing, in looking for it. And if we find it, that will be splendid, but if we do not, I shall, I suppose, accept my lot, and you will go away and find it easily. And if we find it now, I shall certainly not be a nuisance to you by asking what that was which you found by yourself;
but now once more see if this is in your opinion the beautiful : I say, then, that it is—but consider, paying close attention to me, that I may not talk nonsense—for I say, then, whatever is useful shall be for us beautiful. But I said it with this reason for my thought; beautiful eyes, we say, are not such as seem to be so, which are unable to see, but those which are able and useful for seeing. Is that right?
Hippias
Yes.
Socrates
Then, too, in the same way we say that the whole body is beautiful, part of it for running, part for wrestling;
and again all the animals, a beautiful horse or cock or quail and all utensils and land vehicles, and on the sea freight-ships and ships of war; and all instruments in music and in the other arts, and, if you like, customs and laws also—pretty well all these we call beautiful in the same way looking at each of them—how it is formed by nature, how it is wrought, how it has been enacted—the useful we call beautiful, and beautiful in the way in which it is useful, and for the purpose for which it is useful, and at the time when it is useful;
and that which is in all these aspects useless we say is ugly. Now is not this your opinion also, Hippias?
Hippias
It is.Soc, Then are we right in saying that the useful rather than everything else is beautiful?
Hippias
We are right, surely, Socrates.
Socrates
Now that which has power to accomplish anything is useful for that for which it has power, but that which is powerless is useless, is it not?
Hippias
Certainly.
Socrates
Power, then, is beautiful, and want of power is disgraceful or ugly.
Hippias
Decidedly. Now other things, Socrates,
-testify for us that this is so, but especially political affairs; for in political affairs and in one's own state to be powerful is the most beautiful of all things, but to be powerless is the most disgraceful of all.
Socrates
Good! Then, for Heaven's sake, Hippias, is wisdom also for this reason the most beautiful of all things and ignorance the most disgraceful of all things?
Hippias
Well, what do you suppose, Socrates?
Socrates
Just keep quiet, my dear friend; I am so afraid and wondering what in the world we are saying again.
+testify for us that this is so, but especially political affairs; for in political affairs and in one’s own state to be powerful is the most beautiful of all things, but to be powerless is the most disgraceful of all.
Socrates
Good! Then, for Heaven’s sake, Hippias, is wisdom also for this reason the most beautiful of all things and ignorance the most disgraceful of all things?
Hippias
Well, what do you suppose, Socrates?
Socrates
Just keep quiet, my dear friend; I am so afraid and wondering what in the world we are saying again.
Hippias
What are you afraid of again, Socrates, since now your discussion has gone ahead most beautifully?
Socrates
I wish that might be the case; but consider this point with me: could a person do what he did not know how and was utterly powerless to do?
Hippias
By no means; for how could he do what he was powerless to do?
Socrates
Then those who commit errors and accomplish and do bad things involuntarily, if they were powerless to do those things, would not do them?
Hippias
Evidently not.
Socrates
But yet it is by power that those are powerful who are powerful for surely it is not by powerlessness.
Hippias
Certainly not.
Socrates
And all who do, have power to do what they do?
Hippias
Yes.
Socrates
Men do many more bad things than good, from childhood up, and commit many errors involuntarily.
Hippias
That is true.
Socrates
Well, then, this power and these useful things, which are useful for accomplishing something bad—shall we say that they are beautiful, or far from it?
Hippias
Far from it, in my opinion, Socrates.
Socrates
Then, Hippias, the powerful and the useful are not, as it seems, our beautiful.
Hippias
They are, Socrates, if they are powerful and useful for good.
Socrates
Then that assertion, that the powerful and useful are beautiful without qualification, is gone; but was this, Hippias, what our soul wished to say, that the useful and the powerful for doing something good is the beautiful?
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@
Hippias
To be sure it is well said.
Socrates
And neither is the cause that which comes into being, nor is that which comes into being the cause.
Hippias
True.
Socrates
By Zeus, my good friend, then neither is the beautiful good, nor the good beautiful; or does it seem to you possible, after what has been said?
Hippias
No, by Zeus, it does not appear so to me.
Socrates
Does it please us, and should we be willing to say that the beautiful is not good, and the good not beautiful?
Hippias
No, by Zeus, it does not please me at all.
Socrates
Right, by Zeus, Hippias!
And it pleases me least of all the things we have said.
Hippias
Yes, that is likely.
Socrates
Then there is a good chance that the statement that the beneficial and the useful and the powerful to create something good are beautiful, is not, as it appeared to be, the most beautiful of of statements, but, if that be possible, is even more ridiculous than those first ones in which we thought the maiden was the beautiful, and each of the various other things we spoke of before.
Hippias
That is likely.
Socrates
And Hippias, I no longer know where to turn; I am at a loss; but have you anything to say?
Hippias
Not at the moment, but, as I said just now, I am sure I shall find it after meditation.
Socrates
But it seems to me that I am so eager to know that I cannot wait for you while you delay; for I believe I have just now found a way out. Just see; how would it help us towards our goal if we were to say that that is beautiful which makes us feel joy; I do not mean all pleasures, but that which makes us feel joy through hearing and sight?
-For surely beautiful human beings, Hippias, and all decorations and paintings and works of sculpture which are beautiful, delight us when we see them; and beautiful sounds and music in general and speeches and stories do the same thing, so that if we were to reply to that impudent fellow, “My excellent man, the beautiful is that which is pleasing through hearing and sight,” don't you think that we should put a stop to his impudence?
Hippias
To me, at any rate, Socrates, it seems
+For surely beautiful human beings, Hippias, and all decorations and paintings and works of sculpture which are beautiful, delight us when we see them; and beautiful sounds and music in general and speeches and stories do the same thing, so that if we were to reply to that impudent fellow, “My excellent man, the beautiful is that which is pleasing through hearing and sight,” don’t you think that we should put a stop to his impudence?
Hippias
To me, at any rate, Socrates, it seems
that the nature of the beautiful is now well stated.
Socrates
But what then? Shall we say, Hippias, that beautiful customs and laws are beautiful because they are pleasing through hearing and sight, or that they have some other form of beauty?
Hippias
Perhaps, Socrates, these things might slip past the man unnoticed.
Socrates
No, by dog, Hippias—not past the man before whom I should be most ashamed of talking nonsense
and pretending that I was talking sense when I was not.
Hippias
What man is that?
Socrates
Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus, who would no more permit me to say these things carelessly without investigation than to say that I know what I do not know.
Hippias
But certainly I also, now that you have mentioned it, think that this about the laws is something different.
Socrates
Not too fast, Hippias; for very likely we have fallen into the same perplexity about the beautiful in which we were a while ago, although we think we have found another way out.
Hippias
What do you mean by that, Socrates?
Socrates
I will tell you what presents itself to me, if perhaps there may be some sense in it.
For perhaps these matters of laws and customs might be shown to be not outside of the perception which we have through hearing and sight; but let us stick to the statement that that which is pleasing through the senses is beautiful, without interjecting the matter of the laws. But if this man of whom I speak, or anyone else whosoever, should ask us: “Hippias and Socrates, did you make the distinction that in the category of the pleasing that which is pleasing in the way you mention is beautiful, whereas you say that that which is pleasing according to the other senses
@@ -162,12 +162,12 @@
—it was because you saw some quality in both, since they have something different from the others, in view of which you say that they are beautiful? For the reason why that which is pleasant through sight is beautiful, is not, I imagine, because it is through sight; for if that were the cause of its being beautiful, the other pleasure, that through hearing, would not be beautiful; it certainly is not pleasure through sight.” Shall we say “What you say is true?”
Hippias
Yes, we shall.
Socrates
“Nor, again, is the pleasure through hearing beautiful for the reason that it is through hearing; for in that case, again, the pleasure through sight would not be beautiful; it certainly is not pleasure through hearing.” Shall we say, Hippias, that the man who says that speaks the truth?
Hippias
Yes, he speaks the truth.
Socrates
“But yet both are beautiful, as you say.” We do say that, do we not?
Hippias
We do.
Socrates
“They have, then, something identical which makes them to be beautiful, this common quality which pertains to both of them in common and to each individually;
for otherwise they would not both collectively and each individually be beautiful.” Answer me, as if you were answering him.
Hippias
I answer, and I think it is as you say.
Socrates
If, then, these pleasures are both affected in any way collectively, but each individually is not so affected, it is not by this affection that they would be beautiful.
Hippias
And how could that be, Socrates, when neither of them individually is affected by some affection or other, that then both are affected by that affection by which neither is affected?
-
Socrates
You think it cannot be?
Hippias
I should have to be very inexperienced both in the nature of these things and in the language of our present discussion.
Socrates
Very pretty, Hippias. But there is a chance that I think I see a case of that kind which you say is impossible, but do not really see it.
Hippias
There's no chance about it, Socrates, but you quite purposely see wrongly.
Socrates
And certainly many such cases appear before my mind, but I mistrust them because they do not appear to you,
+
Socrates
You think it cannot be?
Hippias
I should have to be very inexperienced both in the nature of these things and in the language of our present discussion.
Socrates
Very pretty, Hippias. But there is a chance that I think I see a case of that kind which you say is impossible, but do not really see it.
Hippias
There’s no chance about it, Socrates, but you quite purposely see wrongly.
Socrates
And certainly many such cases appear before my mind, but I mistrust them because they do not appear to you,
a man who has made more money by wisdom than anyone now living, but to me who never made any money at all; and the thought disturbs me that you are playing with me and purposely deceiving me, they appear to me in such numbers and with such force.
Hippias
Nobody, Socrates, will know better than you whether I am playing with you or not, if you proceed to tell these things that appear to you; for it will be apparent to you that you are talking nonsense. For you will never find that you and I are both affected by an affection by which neither of us is affected.
Socrates
What are you saying, Hippias? Perhaps you are talking sense, and I fail to understand; but let me tell more clearly what I wish to say. For it appears to me that it is possible for us both to be so affected as to be something which I am not so affected as to be, and which I am not and you are not either; and again for neither of us to be so affected as to be other things which we both are.
Hippias
Your reply, Socrates, seems to involve miracles again even greater than those of your previous reply. For consider: if we are both just,
would not each of us be just also, and if each is unjust, would not both again also be unjust, or if both are healthy, each of us also? Or if each of us were to be tired or wounded or struck or affected in any other way whatsoever, should we not both of us be affected in the same way? Then, too, if we were to be golden or of silver or of ivory, or, if you please, noble or wise or honored or old or young or whatever else you like of all that flesh is heir to, is it not quite inevitable that each of us be that also?
Socrates
Absolutely.
Hippias
But you see, Socrates, you do not consider the entirety of things, nor do they with whom you are in the habit of conversing, but you all test the beautiful and each individual entity by taking them separately and cutting them to pieces. For this reason you fail to observe that embodiments of reality are by nature so great and undivided. And now you have failed to observe to such a degree that you think there is some affection or reality which pertains to both of these together,
-but not to each individually, or again to each, but not to both; so unreasoning and undiscerning and foolish and unreflecting is your state of mind.
Socrates
Human affairs, Hippias, are not what a man wishes, but what he can, Suidas gives the proverb in the form: zw=men ga\r ou)x w(s qe/lomen, a)ll' w(s duna/meqa. “Man proposes, but God disposes” would be an English equivalent. as the proverb goes which people are constantly citing; but you are always aiding us with admonitions. For now too, until we were admonished by you of our foolish state of mind—shall I continue to speak and make you a still further exhibition of our thoughts on the subject, or shall I not speak?
+but not to each individually, or again to each, but not to both; so unreasoning and undiscerning and foolish and unreflecting is your state of mind.
Socrates
Human affairs, Hippias, are not what a man wishes, but what he can, Suidas gives the proverb in the form: zw=men ga\r ou)x w(s qe/lomen, a)ll’ w(s duna/meqa. “Man proposes, but God disposes” would be an English equivalent. as the proverb goes which people are constantly citing; but you are always aiding us with admonitions. For now too, until we were admonished by you of our foolish state of mind—shall I continue to speak and make you a still further exhibition of our thoughts on the subject, or shall I not speak?
Hippias
You will speak to one who knows, Socrates, for I know the state of mind of all who are concerned with discussions; but nevertheless, if you prefer, speak.
Socrates
Well, I do prefer. For we, my friend, were so stupid, before you spoke, as to have an opinion concerning you and me, that each of us was one, but that we were not both that which each of us was—for we are not one, but two
—so foolish were we. But now we have been taught by you that if we are both two, then each of us is inevitably two, and if each is one, then both are inevitably one; for it is impossible, by the continuous doctrine of reality according to Hippias, that it be otherwise, but what we both are, that each is, and what each is, both are. So now I have been convinced by you, and I hold this position. But first, Hippias, refresh my memory: Are you and I one, or are you two and I two?
Hippias
What do you mean, Socrates?
Socrates
Just what I say; for I am afraid to speak plainly to you, because you are vexed with me, when you think you are talking sensibly;
however, tell me further: Is not each of us one and affected in such a way as to be one?
Hippias
Certainly.
Socrates
Then each of us, if one, would be an odd number; or do you not consider one an odd number?
Hippias
I do.
Socrates
Then are we both an odd number, being two?
Hippias
That could not be, Socrates.
Socrates
But we are both an even number, are we not?
Hippias
Certainly.
Socrates
Then because we are both even, is each of us on that account even?
Hippias
No, surely not.
@@ -179,10 +179,10 @@
Socrates
To which group, then, Hippias, does the beautiful seem to you to belong? To the group of those that you mentioned? If I am strong and you also, are we both collectively strong, and if I am just and you also, are we both collectively just, and if both collectively, then each individually so, too, if I am beautiful and you also, are we both collectively beautiful, and if both collectively, then each individually? Or is there nothing to prevent this, as in the case that when given things are both collectively even, they may perhaps individually be odd, or perhaps even, and again, when things are individually irrational quantities they may perhaps both collectively be rational, or perhaps irrational,
and countless other cases which, you know, I said appeared before my mind? See 300 C. To which group do you assign the beautiful? Or have you the same view about it as I? For to me it seems great foolishness that we collectively are beautiful, but each of us is not so, or that each of us is so, but both are not, or anything else of that sort. Do you choose in this way, as I do, or in some other way?
Hippias
In this way, Socrates.
Socrates
You choose well, Hippias, that we may be free from the need of further search;
for if the beautiful is in this group, that which is pleasing through sight and hearing would no longer be the beautiful. For the expression through sight and hearing makes both collectively beautiful, but not each individually; and this was impossible, as you and I agree.
Hippias
Yes, we agree.
Socrates
It is, then, impossible that the pleasant through sight and hearing be the beautiful, since in becoming beautiful it offers an impossibility.
Hippias
That is true.
Socrates
“Then tell us again,” he will say, “from the beginning,
-since you failed this time; what do you say that this 'beautiful,' belonging to both the pleasures, is, on account of which you honored them before the rest and called them beautiful?” It seems to me, Hippias, inevitable that we say that these are the most harmless and the best of pleasures, both of them collectively and each of them individually; or have you anything else to suggest, by which they excel the rest?
Hippias
Not at all; for really they are the best.
Socrates
“This, then,” he will say, “you say is the beautiful, beneficial pleasure?” “It seems that we do,” I shall say; and you?
Hippias
I also.
Socrates
“Well, then,” he will say, “beneficial is that which creates the good, but that which creates and that which is created were just now seen to be different, and our argument has come round to the earlier argument, has it not? For neither could the good be beautiful nor the beautiful good,
+since you failed this time; what do you say that this ’beautiful,’ belonging to both the pleasures, is, on account of which you honored them before the rest and called them beautiful?” It seems to me, Hippias, inevitable that we say that these are the most harmless and the best of pleasures, both of them collectively and each of them individually; or have you anything else to suggest, by which they excel the rest?
Hippias
Not at all; for really they are the best.
Socrates
“This, then,” he will say, “you say is the beautiful, beneficial pleasure?” “It seems that we do,” I shall say; and you?
Hippias
I also.
Socrates
“Well, then,” he will say, “beneficial is that which creates the good, but that which creates and that which is created were just now seen to be different, and our argument has come round to the earlier argument, has it not? For neither could the good be beautiful nor the beautiful good,
if each of them is different from the other.” “Absolutely true,” we shall say, if we are reasonable; for it is inadmissible to disagree with him who says what is right.
Hippias
But now, Socrates, what do you think all this amounts to? It is mere scrapings and shavings of discourse, as I said a while ago, See 301 B. divided into bits; but that other ability is beautiful and of great worth, the ability to produce a discourse well and beautifully in a court of law or a council-house or before any other public body before which the discourse may be delivered,
-to convince the audience and to carry off, not the smallest, but the greatest of prizes, the salvation of oneself, one's property, and one's friends. For these things, therefore, one must strive, renouncing these petty arguments, that one may not, by busying oneself, as at present, with mere talk and nonsense, appear to be a fool.
Socrates
My dear Hippias, you are blessed because you know the things a man ought to practise, and have, as you say, practised them satisfactorily. But I, as it seems, am possessed by some accursed fortune,
-so that I am always wandering and perplexed, and, exhibiting my perplexity to you wise men, am in turn reviled by you in speech whenever I exhibit it. For you say of me, what you are now saying, that I busy myself with silly little matters of no account; but when in turn I am convinced by you and say what you say, that it is by far the best thing to be able to produce a discourse well and beautifully and gain one's end in a court of law or in any other assemblage,
+to convince the audience and to carry off, not the smallest, but the greatest of prizes, the salvation of oneself, one’s property, and one’s friends. For these things, therefore, one must strive, renouncing these petty arguments, that one may not, by busying oneself, as at present, with mere talk and nonsense, appear to be a fool.
Socrates
My dear Hippias, you are blessed because you know the things a man ought to practise, and have, as you say, practised them satisfactorily. But I, as it seems, am possessed by some accursed fortune,
+so that I am always wandering and perplexed, and, exhibiting my perplexity to you wise men, am in turn reviled by you in speech whenever I exhibit it. For you say of me, what you are now saying, that I busy myself with silly little matters of no account; but when in turn I am convinced by you and say what you say, that it is by far the best thing to be able to produce a discourse well and beautifully and gain one’s end in a court of law or in any other assemblage,
I am called everything that is bad by some other men here and especially by that man who is continually refuting me; for he is a very near relative of mine and lives in the same house. So whenever I go home to my own house, and he hears me saying these things, he asks me if I am not ashamed that I have the face to talk about beautiful practices, when it is so plainly shown, to my confusion, that I do not even know what the beautiful itself is. “And yet how are you to know,” he will say, “either who produced a discourse,
or anything else whatsoever, beautifully, or not, when you are ignorant of the beautiful? And when you are in such a condition, do you think it is better for you to be alive than dead?” So it has come about, as I say, that I am abused and reviled by you and by him. But perhaps it is necessary to endure all this, for it is quite reasonable that I might be benefited by it. So I think, Hippias, that I have been benefited by conversation with both of you; for I think I know the meaning of the proverb “beautiful things are difficult.”
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/tlg0059/tlg026/tlg0059.tlg026.perseus-eng1.xml b/data/tlg0059/tlg026/tlg0059.tlg026.perseus-eng1.xml
index 31b34a824..a685ced29 100755
--- a/data/tlg0059/tlg026/tlg0059.tlg026.perseus-eng1.xml
+++ b/data/tlg0059/tlg026/tlg0059.tlg026.perseus-eng1.xml
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@
EudicusSocratesHippiasEudicus
Why, then, are you silent, Socrates, when Hippias has been delivering such a fine display? Why do you not join us in praising some part of his speech, or else, if he seems to you to have been wrong in any point, refute him—especially now that we who might best claim to have a share in philosophical discussion have been left to ourselves?
Socrates
Indeed, Eudicus, there are some points in what Hippias was just now saying of Homer,
-about which I should like to question him. For I used to hear your father Apemantus say that Homer's
Iliad was a finer poem than the Odyssey, and just as much finer as Achilles was finer than Odysseus for he said that one of these poems was made with Odysseus; the other with Achilles as its subject. So that is a point about which, if it is agreeable to Hippias, I should like to ask—what he thinks about these two men, which of them he says is the better;
+about which I should like to question him. For I used to hear your father Apemantus say that Homer’s Iliad was a finer poem than the Odyssey, and just as much finer as Achilles was finer than Odysseus for he said that one of these poems was made with Odysseus; the other with Achilles as its subject. So that is a point about which, if it is agreeable to Hippias, I should like to ask—what he thinks about these two men, which of them he says is the better;
for he has told us in his exhibition many other things of sorts about Homer and other poets.Eudicus
It is plain enough that Hippias will not object answering if you ask him a question. Oh, Hippias, if Socrates asks you a question, will you answer? or what will you do?
Hippias
Why, Eudicus, it would be strange conduct on my part, if I, who always go up to Olympia to the festival of the Greeks from my home at Elis, and entering the sacred precinct, offer to speak on anything that anyone chooses of those subjects
which I prepared for exhibition, and to answer any questions that anyone asks—should now avoid being questioned by Socrates.
Socrates
You are in a state of blessedness, Hippias, if at every Olympiad you come to the sanctuary with fair hopes concerning your soul and its wisdom; and I should be surprised if any of the physical athletes when he goes to that same place to take part in the contests, has such fearless confidence in his body as you have in your intellect.
Hippias
Naturally, Socrates, I am in this state: for since I began to contend at the Olympic games, I never yet met anyone better than myself in anything.
Socrates
That is splendid, Hippias! Your reputation will be a monument of wisdom for the city of Elis and your parents.
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@
what you said about these two men; how did you distinguish them?
Hippias
Why I am glad, Socrates, to explain to you still more clearly what I say about these and others also. For I say that Homer made Achilles the bravest man of those who went to Troy, and Nestor the wisest, and Odysseus the wiliest.
Socrates
Oh dear, Hippias! Would you do me the favour not to laugh at me if I find it hard to understand what you say, and keep asking questions over and over?
Please try to answer me gently and courteously.
Hippias
Of course; for it would be a disgrace, Socrates, if I, who teach others good manners and charge them money for it, should not myself, when questioned by you, be considerate and reply gently.
Socrates
That is excellent. For when you said that the poet made Achilles the bravest of men, and Nestor the wisest, I thought I understood what you meant;
but when you said that he made Odysseus the wiliest, to tell you the truth, I do not in the least know what you mean by that. Now tell me, and perhaps it may result in my understanding better. Has not Homer made Achilles wily?
Hippias
Not at all, Socrates; he made him most simple; for in “The Prayers,” when he depicts them talking with one another, he makes Achilles say to Odysseus: The division into twenty-four books was made in Alexandrian times. Before that division was made (and even after) references were made to parts of the Iliad and Odyssey by descriptive titles, “The Prayers,” “The Catalogue of Ships,” and the like.
-Zeus-born son of Laertes, wily Odysseus, I must speak out the word without refraining, as I shall act and think will be accomplished [and pray do not mutter in discord sitting here beside me]. For hateful to me as the gates of Hades
+Zeus-born son of Laertes, wily Odysseus, I must speak out the word without refraining, as I shall act and think will be accomplished and pray do not mutter in discord sitting here beside me. For hateful to me as the gates of Hadesis he who hides one thing in his heart and says another. But I shall speak that which shall be accomplished.Hom. Il. 308 ff.In these lines he makes plain the character of each of the men, that Achilles is true and simple, and Odysseus wily and false for he represents Achilles as saying these lines to Odysseus.
Socrates
Now at last, Hippias, I think I understand what you mean; you mean that the wily man is false, apparently.
Hippias
Certainly, Socrates; for Homer represents Odysseus as that sort of a man in many passages of both
Iliad and Odyssey.Socrates
Homer, then, as it seems, thought that a true man was one man and a false man another, but not the same.
Hippias
Of course he did, Socrates.
Socrates
And do you think so yourself, Hippias?
Hippias
Most assuredly; for it would be strange if I did not.
Socrates
Then let us drop Homer,
since it is impossible to ask him what he meant when he made those verses; but since you come forward to take up his cause, and agree in this which you say is his meaning, do you answer for Homer and yourself in common.
Hippias
Very well; ask briefly whatever you like.
Socrates
Do you say that the false are, like the sick, without power to do anything, or that they have power to do something?
Hippias
I say that they have great power to do many things, and especially to deceive people.
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@
and heap up wealth and riches for you.Hom. Il. 1.169 ff.After he has said these things, at one time in the presence of the whole army and at another before his own comrades, he is nowhere found to have either prepared or attempted to drag down his ships to sail home, but he shows quite superb disregard of truthspeaking. Now I, Hippias, asked my question in the first place because I was perplexed as to which of the two men is represented as better by the poet,
and because I thought both were very good, and it was hard to decide which was better, both in regard to falsehood and truth and to virtue in general; for both are similar in this matter.
Hippias
That is because you do not look at it aright, Socrates. For the falsehoods that Achilles utters, he utters evidently not by design, but against his will, since he is forced by the misfortune of the army to remain and give assistance; but Odysseus utters his falsehoods voluntarily and by design.
Socrates
You are deceiving me, beloved Hippias, and are yourself imitating Odysseus.
Hippias
Not at all, Socrates. What do you mean and to what do you refer?
Socrates
That you say Achilles did not speak falsely by design, he who was not only a deceiver, but was also such a cheat and plotter, as Homer has represented him, that he is seen to be so much more clever than Odysseus in deceiving him unnoticed without difficulty, that he dared to contradict himself in his presence, and Odysseus did not notice it; at any rate Odysseus does not appear
-to have said anything to him which indicates that he noticed his falsehood.
Hippias
What is this that you say, Socrates?
Socrates
Don't you know that after he said to Odysseus that he was going to sail away at daybreak, in speaking to Ajax he does not repeat that he is going to sail away, but says something different?
Hippias
Where, pray?
Socrates
Where he says:For I shall not be mindful of bloody war until warlike Priam's son,
+to have said anything to him which indicates that he noticed his falsehood.
Hippias
What is this that you say, Socrates?
Socrates
Don’t you know that after he said to Odysseus that he was going to sail away at daybreak, in speaking to Ajax he does not repeat that he is going to sail away, but says something different?
Hippias
Where, pray?
Socrates
Where he says:For I shall not be mindful of bloody war until warlike Priam’s son,the glorious Hector, shall reach the tents and ships of the Myrmidons through slaughter of Argives and shall burn the ships with fire. But at my tent and my black ship I think Hector, though eager for battle, will come to a halt.Hom. Il. 9.360 ff.Now, Hippias, do you think the son of Thetis and pupil of the most wise Cheiron was so forgetful, that, although a little earlier he had reviled deceivers in the most extreme terms, he himself immediately said to Odysseus that he was going to sail away and to Ajax that he was going to stay, and was not acting by design and in the belief that Odysseus was behind the times and that he himself would get the better of him in just this matter of contrivance and falsehood?
Hippias
No, I do not agree, Socrates;
but in this case also Achilles was induced by the goodness of his heart to say to Ajax something different from what he had said to Odysseus; whereas Odysseus, when he speaks the truth always speaks with design, and when he speaks falsehood likewise.
Socrates
Then Odysseus, as it seems, is better than Achilles.
Hippias
Not in the least, Socrates.
Socrates
How is that? Were not those who utter falsehoods voluntarily found to be better than those who do so involuntarily?
Hippias
And how, Socrates, could those who voluntarily do wrong
@@ -120,13 +120,13 @@
Eudicus
And do not refuse, Hippias; but for our sake, and also because of your previous announcements, answer any questions Socrates asks you.
Hippias
Well, I will answer since you request it. Ask whatever questions you like.
Socrates
I certainly have a great desire, Hippias, to investigate what we are just at present talking about, namely which are better, those who err voluntarily or those who err involuntarily. Now I think the best way to go at the investigation is this. Just answer. Do you call some one a good runner?
Hippias
I do.
Socrates
And a bad one?
Hippias
Yes.
Socrates
Now, he who runs well is a good runner, and he who runs badly a bad one; is it not so?
Hippias
Yes.
Socrates
Then does not he who runs slowly run badly, and he who runs fast run well?
Hippias
Yes.
Socrates
In a race, then, and in running, rapidity is a good thing, and slowness an evil.
Hippias
Why, of course.
Socrates
Which, then, is the better runner, he who runs slowly voluntarily or he who does so involuntarily?
Hippias
He who does it voluntarily.
Socrates
Well, then, is not running doing something?
Hippias
Yes, it is doing.
Socrates
And if doing, is it not also performing some act?
Hippias
Yes.
Socrates
Then he who runs badly performs a bad and disgraceful act in a race?
Hippias
Yes, a bad act of course.
Socrates
But he runs badly who runs slowly?
Hippias
Yes.
Socrates
Then the good runner performs this bad and disgraceful act voluntarily, and the bad runner involuntarily?
Hippias
So it seems.
Socrates
In running, then, he who does bad acts involuntarily is worse than he who does them voluntarily?
Hippias
Yes, in running.
-
Socrates
And how is it in wrestling? Which is the better wrestler, he who is thrown voluntarily, or involuntarily?
Hippias
He who is thrown voluntarily, as it seems.
Socrates
But is it worse and more disgraceful in a wrestling match to be thrown or to throw one's opponent?
Hippias
To be thrown.
Socrates
In wrestling also, then, he who performs bad and disgraceful acts voluntarily is a better wrestler than he who performs them involuntarily.
Hippias
So it seems.
Socrates
And how is it in every other bodily exercise? Is not he who is the better man in respect to his body able to perform both kinds of acts, the strong and the weak, the disgraceful and the fine,
+
Socrates
And how is it in wrestling? Which is the better wrestler, he who is thrown voluntarily, or involuntarily?
Hippias
He who is thrown voluntarily, as it seems.
Socrates
But is it worse and more disgraceful in a wrestling match to be thrown or to throw one’s opponent?
Hippias
To be thrown.
Socrates
In wrestling also, then, he who performs bad and disgraceful acts voluntarily is a better wrestler than he who performs them involuntarily.
Hippias
So it seems.
Socrates
And how is it in every other bodily exercise? Is not he who is the better man in respect to his body able to perform both kinds of acts, the strong and the weak, the disgraceful and the fine,
so that whenever he performs bad acts of a bodily kind, he who is the better man in respect to his body does them voluntarily, but he who is worse does them involuntarily?
Hippias
That seems to be the case in matters of strength also.
Socrates
And how about grace, Hippias? Does not the better body take ugly and bad postures voluntarily, and the worse body involuntarily? Or what is your opinion?
Hippias
That is my opinion.
Socrates
Then ungracefulness when voluntary is associated with excellence of the body,
but when involuntary with faultiness.
Hippias
Apparently.
Socrates
And what do you say about the voice? Which do you say is the better? That which sings out of tune voluntarily, or involuntarily?
Hippias
That which does it voluntarily.
Socrates
And that which does it involuntarily is the worse?
Hippias
Yes.
Socrates
Would you choose to possess good or bad things?
Hippias
Good ones.
Socrates
Would you, then, choose to possess feet that limp voluntarily, or involuntarily?
Hippias
Voluntarily.
Socrates
But is not a limp faultiness and ungracefulness of the feet?
Hippias
Yes.
Socrates
Well, is not dimness of sight faultiness of the eyes?
Hippias
Yes.
Socrates
Which eyes, then, would you choose to possess and live with? Those with which one would see dimly and incorrectly voluntarily, or involuntarily?
Hippias
Those with which one would do so voluntarily.
Socrates
Those parts, then, of yourself which voluntarily act badly you consider better than those which do so involuntarily?
Hippias
Yes; that is, in matters of that sort.
Socrates
Well, then, one statement embraces all alike, such as ears and nose and mouth and all the senses
—that those which act badly involuntarily are undesirable because they are bad, and those which do so voluntarily are desirable because they are good.
Hippias
I think so.
Socrates
Well now, which instruments are better to have to do with, those with which a man does bad work voluntarily, or involuntarily? For instance, is a rudder better with which a man will involuntarily steer badly, or one with which he will do so voluntarily?
Hippias
One with which he will do so voluntarily.
Socrates
And is not the same true of a bow and a lyre and flutes and all the rest?
Hippias
Quite true.
Socrates
Well now, would you choose to possess a horse of such spirit that you would ride him badly voluntarily, or involuntarily?
Hippias
Voluntarily.
Socrates
Then that spirit is better.
Hippias
Yes.
Socrates
Then with the horse of better spirit one would do voluntarily the bad acts of that spirit, but with the one of worse spirit involuntarily?
Hippias
Certainly.
Socrates
And is not that true of a dog, and all other animals?
Hippias
Yes.
Socrates
Well now, then, in the case of an archer is it better to possess the mind which voluntarily misses the mark,
-or that which does so involuntarily?
Hippias
That which does so voluntarily.
Socrates
Then that is the better mind for the purpose of archery?
Hippias
Yes.
Socrates
Is, then, the mind also which errs involuntarily worse than that which errs voluntarily?
Hippias
Yes, in the case of archery.
Socrates
And how is it in the art of medicine? Is not the mind which does harm to the patients' bodies voluntarily the more scientific?
Hippias
Yes.
Socrates
In this art, then, this mind is better than the other.
Hippias
It is better.
Socrates
Well now, the more musical, whether with lyre or with flute,
+or that which does so involuntarily?
Hippias
That which does so voluntarily.
Socrates
Then that is the better mind for the purpose of archery?
Hippias
Yes.
Socrates
Is, then, the mind also which errs involuntarily worse than that which errs voluntarily?
Hippias
Yes, in the case of archery.
Socrates
And how is it in the art of medicine? Is not the mind which does harm to the patients’ bodies voluntarily the more scientific?
Hippias
Yes.
Socrates
In this art, then, this mind is better than the other.
Hippias
It is better.
Socrates
Well now, the more musical, whether with lyre or with flute,
and in everything else that concerns all the other arts and sciences—is not that mind better which voluntarily does bad and disgraceful things and commits errors, whereas that which does so involuntarily is worse?
Hippias
Apparently.
Socrates
And surely we should prefer to possess slaves of such minds that they voluntarily commit errors and do mischief, rather than such as do so involuntarily; we should think them better fitted for their duties.
Hippias
Yes.
Socrates
Well now, should we not wish to possess our own mind in the best possible condition?
Hippias
Yes.
Socrates
Will it, then, be better if it does evil and errs voluntarily, or involuntarily?
Hippias
But it would be a terrible thing, Socrates, if those who do wrong voluntarily are to be better than those who do so involuntarily.
Socrates
But surely they appear, at least, to be so, from what has been said.
Hippias
Not to me.
Socrates
I thought, Hippias, they appeared to be so to you also. But now once more answer me: Is not justice either a sort of power or knowledge, or both? Or must not justice inevitably be one or other of these
Hippias
Yes.
Socrates
Then injustice is a power of the soul, the more powerful soul is the more just, is it not? For we found, my friend, that such a soul was better.
Hippias
Yes, we did.
Socrates
And what if it be knowledge? Is not the wiser soul more just, and the more ignorant more unjust?
Hippias
Yes.
Socrates
And what if it be both? Is not the soul which has both, power and knowledge, more just, and the more ignorant more unjust? Is that not inevitably the case?
Hippias
It appears to be.
Socrates
This more powerful and wiser soul, then, was found to be better and to have more power to do both good and disgraceful acts in every kind of action was it not?
diff --git a/data/tlg0059/tlg026/tlg0059.tlg026.perseus-grc1.xml b/data/tlg0059/tlg026/tlg0059.tlg026.perseus-grc1.xml
index 98281cae0..f6ce501be 100755
--- a/data/tlg0059/tlg026/tlg0059.tlg026.perseus-grc1.xml
+++ b/data/tlg0059/tlg026/tlg0059.tlg026.perseus-grc1.xml
@@ -68,72 +68,72 @@
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/tlg0059/tlg027/tlg0059.tlg027.perseus-eng1.xml b/data/tlg0059/tlg027/tlg0059.tlg027.perseus-eng1.xml
index 99758513a..00b742b4d 100644
--- a/data/tlg0059/tlg027/tlg0059.tlg027.perseus-eng1.xml
+++ b/data/tlg0059/tlg027/tlg0059.tlg027.perseus-eng1.xml
@@ -116,14 +116,14 @@
- his thought and not merely learning off his words, is a matter for envy; since a man can never be a good rhapsode without understanding what the poet says. For the rhapsode ought to make himself an interpreter of the poet's thought to his audience; and to do this properly without knowing what the poet means is impossible. So one cannot but envy all this.
+ his thought and not merely learning off his words, is a matter for envy; since a man can never be a good rhapsode without understanding what the poet says. For the rhapsode ought to make himself an interpreter of the poet’s thought to his audience; and to do this properly without knowing what the poet means is impossible. So one cannot but envy all this.What you say is true, Socrates: I at any rate have found this the most laborious part of my art; and I consider I speak about Homer better than anybody, for neither
Metrodorus A friend of the philosopher Anaxagoras who wrote allegorical interpretations of Homer in the first part of the fifth century B.C. of Lampsacus, nor Stesimbrotus A rhapsode, interpreter of Homer, and historian who lived in the time of Cimon and Pericles. of Thasos, nor Glaucon, Perhaps the Homeric commentator mentioned by Aristotle, Poet. 25. 16. nor any one that the world has ever seen, had so many and such fine comments to offer on Homer as I have.That is good news, Ion; for obviously you will not grudge me an exhibition of them.
- And indeed it is worth hearing, Socrates, how well I have embellished Homer; so that I think I deserve to be crowned with a golden crown by the Homeridae. There was a society or clan in Chios called Homeridae (“sons of Homer”), but the name seems to be used here and elsewhere in Plato for any persons specially devoted to Homer's poetry. See Jebb, Homer, p. 78.
+ And indeed it is worth hearing, Socrates, how well I have embellished Homer; so that I think I deserve to be crowned with a golden crown by the Homeridae. There was a society or clan in Chios called Homeridae (“sons of Homer”), but the name seems to be used here and elsewhere in Plato for any persons specially devoted to Homer’s poetry. See Jebb, Homer, p. 78.Yes, and I must find myself leisure some time to listen to you;
@@ -139,9 +139,9 @@
- But what of those where they do not say the same? For example, about the seer's art, on which both Homer and Hesiod say something.
+ But what of those where they do not say the same? For example, about the seer’s art, on which both Homer and Hesiod say something.Quite so.
- Well then, would you, or one of the good seers, expound better what these two poets say, not only alike but differently, about the seer's art?
+ Well then, would you, or one of the good seers, expound better what these two poets say, not only alike but differently, about the seer’s art?One of the seers.And if you were a seer, would you not, with an ability to expound what they say in agreement, know also how to expound the points on which they differ?Of course.
@@ -153,10 +153,10 @@
- Are not these the subjects of Homer's poetry?
+ Are not these the subjects of Homer’s poetry?What you say is true, Socrates.And what of the other poets? Do they not treat of the same things?
- Yes; but, Socrates, not on Homer's level.
+ Yes; but, Socrates, not on Homer’s level.What, in a worse way?Far worse.And Homer in a better?
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@
- what I take it to mean. For, as I was saying just now, this is not an art in you, whereby you speak well on Homer, but a divine power, which moves you like that in the stone which Euripides named a magnet, Probably referring to Magnesia in Caria, south of which was one of the many places called Heraclea. *MAGNH=TIS LI/QOS occurs in a fragment of Euripides' Oeneus.
+ what I take it to mean. For, as I was saying just now, this is not an art in you, whereby you speak well on Homer, but a divine power, which moves you like that in the stone which Euripides named a magnet, Probably referring to Magnesia in Caria, south of which was one of the many places called Heraclea. *MAGNH=TIS LI/QOS occurs in a fragment of Euripides’ Oeneus. but most people call “Heraclea stone.” For this stone not only attracts iron rings, but also imparts to them a power whereby they in turn are able to do the very same thing as the stone,
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@
- in certain gardens and glades of the Muses—like the bees, and winging the air as these do. A beginning of this comparison appears in Aristophanes' praise of the early tragedian Phrynichus—“he sipped the fruits of ambrosial lays, ever bringing away sweet song.” Aristoph. Birds 750f. And what they tell is true. For a poet is a light and winged and sacred thing, and is unable ever to indite until he has been inspired and put out of his senses, and his mind is no longer in him: every man, whilst he retains possession of that, is powerless to indite a verse or chant an oracle. Seeing then that it is not by art that they compose and utter so many fine things about the deeds of men—
+ in certain gardens and glades of the Muses—like the bees, and winging the air as these do. A beginning of this comparison appears in Aristophanes’ praise of the early tragedian Phrynichus—“he sipped the fruits of ambrosial lays, ever bringing away sweet song.” Aristoph. Birds 750f. And what they tell is true. For a poet is a light and winged and sacred thing, and is unable ever to indite until he has been inspired and put out of his senses, and his mind is no longer in him: every man, whilst he retains possession of that, is powerless to indite a verse or chant an oracle. Seeing then that it is not by art that they compose and utter so many fine things about the deeds of men—
@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@
- in order that we who hear them may know that it is not they who utter these words of great price, when they are out of their wits, but that it is God himself who speaks and addresses us through them. A convincing proof of what I say is the case of Tynnichus, Nothing else is known of this poet. the Chalcidian, who had never composed a single poem in his life that could deserve any mention, and then produced the paean A hymn in honor of a god, usually Apollo. which is in everyone's mouth, almost the finest song we have, simply—as he says himself—“an invention of the Muses.” For the god, as it seems to me,
+ in order that we who hear them may know that it is not they who utter these words of great price, when they are out of their wits, but that it is God himself who speaks and addresses us through them. A convincing proof of what I say is the case of Tynnichus, Nothing else is known of this poet. the Chalcidian, who had never composed a single poem in his life that could deserve any mention, and then produced the paean A hymn in honor of a god, usually Apollo. which is in everyone’s mouth, almost the finest song we have, simply—as he says himself—“an invention of the Muses.” For the god, as it seems to me,
@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@
- you have first answered me this: on what thing in Homer's story do you speak well? Not on all of them, I presume.
+ you have first answered me this: on what thing in Homer’s story do you speak well? Not on all of them, I presume.I assure you, Socrates, on all without a single exception.Not, of course, including those things of which you have in fact no knowledge, but which Homer tells.And what sort of things are they, which Homer tells, but of which I have no knowledge?
@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@
A charioteer.Because, I suppose, you are a rhapsode and not a charioteer.Yes.
- And the rhapsode's art is different from the charioteer's?
+ And the rhapsode’s art is different from the charioteer’s?Yes.Then if it is different, it is also a knowledge of different things.Yes.
@@ -392,12 +392,12 @@
- Nestor's concubine, gives the wounded Machaon a posset? His words are something like this:
- Of Pramneian wine it was, and therein she grated cheese of goat's milk with a grater of bronze; and thereby an onion as a relish for drink.
+ Nestor’s concubine, gives the wounded Machaon a posset? His words are something like this:
+ Of Pramneian wine it was, and therein she grated cheese of goat’s milk with a grater of bronze; and thereby an onion as a relish for drink.Hom. Il. 11.639-40
- The quotation, as Plato indicates, is not accurate. Machaon was the son of Asclepius and physician to the Greeks at Troy. Nothing is known of “Pramneian wine,” except that it was “thick and nutritious” (Athen. 1.10b). Is it for the doctor's or the rhapsode's art to discern aright whether Homer speaks correctly here or not?
- For the doctor's.
+ The quotation, as Plato indicates, is not accurate. Machaon was the son of Asclepius and physician to the Greeks at Troy. Nothing is known of “Pramneian wine,” except that it was “thick and nutritious” (Athen. 1.10b). Is it for the doctor’s or the rhapsode’s art to discern aright whether Homer speaks correctly here or not?
+ For the doctor’s.Well now, when Homer says:
@@ -405,20 +405,20 @@
And she passed to the bottom like a plummet which, set on a horn
- 977) supports Aristotle's view that the horn acted as a sheath to protect the line from being bitten through by the fish. are we to say it is for the fisherman's or for the rhapsode's art to decide what he means by this, and whether it is rightly or wrongly spoken?
- Clearly, Socrates, for the fisherman's art.
+ 977) supports Aristotle’s view that the horn acted as a sheath to protect the line from being bitten through by the fish. are we to say it is for the fisherman’s or for the rhapsode’s art to decide what he means by this, and whether it is rightly or wrongly spoken?
+ Clearly, Socrates, for the fisherman’s art.Then please observe: suppose you were questioning me and should ask:
- “Since therefore, Socrates, you find it is for these several arts to appraise the passages of Homer that belong to each, be so good as to make out those also that are for the seer and the seer's art, and show me the sort of passages that come under his ability to distinguish whether they are well or ill done”; observe how easily and truly I shall answer you. For he has many passages, both in the Odyssey, as for instance the words of Theoclymenus, the seer of the line of Melampus, to the suitors:
+ “Since therefore, Socrates, you find it is for these several arts to appraise the passages of Homer that belong to each, be so good as to make out those also that are for the seer and the seer’s art, and show me the sort of passages that come under his ability to distinguish whether they are well or ill done”; observe how easily and truly I shall answer you. For he has many passages, both in the Odyssey, as for instance the words of Theoclymenus, the seer of the line of Melampus, to the suitors:
- Hapless men, what bane is this afflicts you? Your heads and faces and limbs below are shrouded in night, and wailing is enkindled, and cheeks are wet with tears: of ghosts the porch is full, and the court full of them also, hastening hell-wards 'neath the gloom: and the sun is perished out of heaven, and an evil mist is spread abroad;
+ Hapless men, what bane is this afflicts you? Your heads and faces and limbs below are shrouded in night, and wailing is enkindled, and cheeks are wet with tears: of ghosts the porch is full, and the court full of them also, hastening hell-wards ’neath the gloom: and the sun is perished out of heaven, and an evil mist is spread abroad;Hom. Od. 20.351-57Melampus, the ancestor of Theoclymenus (cf. Hom. Od. 15.225-56), was supposed to have been the first mortal who possessed the gift of prophecy.
@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@
- the doctor, and the fisherman, you have now to pick out for me—since you are so much more versed in Homer than I—the kinds which belong to the rhapsode, Ion, and the rhapsode's art, and which he should be able to consider and distinguish beyond the rest of mankind.
+ the doctor, and the fisherman, you have now to pick out for me—since you are so much more versed in Homer than I—the kinds which belong to the rhapsode, Ion, and the rhapsode’s art, and which he should be able to consider and distinguish beyond the rest of mankind.What I say, Socrates, is—“all passages.”Surely you do not say “all,” Ion! Can you be so forgetful? And yet forgetfulness would ill become a rhapsode.
@@ -462,7 +462,7 @@
I remember.And you also admitted that, being different, it would know different things?Yes.
- Then by your own account the rhapsode's art cannot know everything, nor the rhapsode either.
+ Then by your own account the rhapsode’s art cannot know everything, nor the rhapsode either.Let us say, everything except those instances, Socrates.
@@ -519,7 +519,7 @@
Far the best, Socrates.Are you also, Ion, the best general in Greece?Be sure of it, Socrates and that I owe to my study of Homer.
- Then how, in Heaven's name, can it be, Ion, that you, who are both the best general and the best rhapsode in Greece, go about performing as a rhapsode to the Greeks, but not as a general?
+ Then how, in Heaven’s name, can it be, Ion, that you, who are both the best general and the best rhapsode in Greece, go about performing as a rhapsode to the Greeks, but not as a general?
@@ -532,7 +532,7 @@
- and Phanosthenes Captured the Thurian admiral Dorieus, 407 B. C. of Andros, and Heracleides Nothing else is known of this general. of Clazomenae, whom my city invests with the high command and other offices although they are foreigners, because they have proved themselves to be competent. And will she not choose Ion of Ephesus as her general, and honor him, if he shows himself competent? Why, you Ephesians are by origin Athenians, Androclus of Attica founded Ephesus as the Ionian city known to the Greeks of Plato's time. are you not, and Ephesus is inferior to no city?
+ and Phanosthenes Captured the Thurian admiral Dorieus, 407 B. C. of Andros, and Heracleides Nothing else is known of this general. of Clazomenae, whom my city invests with the high command and other offices although they are foreigners, because they have proved themselves to be competent. And will she not choose Ion of Ephesus as her general, and honor him, if he shows himself competent? Why, you Ephesians are by origin Athenians, Androclus of Attica founded Ephesus as the Ionian city known to the Greeks of Plato’s time. are you not, and Ephesus is inferior to no city?
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/tlg0059/tlg029/tlg0059.tlg029.perseus-eng1.xml b/data/tlg0059/tlg029/tlg0059.tlg029.perseus-eng1.xml
index bea2a309a..bf5443c8b 100755
--- a/data/tlg0059/tlg029/tlg0059.tlg029.perseus-eng1.xml
+++ b/data/tlg0059/tlg029/tlg0059.tlg029.perseus-eng1.xml
@@ -72,18 +72,18 @@
which ye, forsooth, regard as a complete education in virtue—are in consequence none the less vicious in respect of wealth, how is it that ye do not contemn this present mode of education nor search for teachers who will put an end to this your lack of culture? Yet truly it is because of this dissonance and sloth, and not because of failure to keep in step with the lyre that brother with brother and city with city clash together without measure or harmony
and are at strife, and in their warring perpetrate and suffer the uttermost horrors. But ye assert that the unjust are unjust not because of their lack of education and lack of knowledge but voluntarily, while on the other hand ye have the face to affirm that injustice is a foul thing, and hateful to Heaven. Then how, pray, could any man voluntarily choose an evil of such a kind? Any man, you reply, who is mastered by his pleasures. But is not this condition also involuntary, if the act of mastering be voluntary? Thus in every way the argument proves that unjust action is involuntary, and that every man privately
and all the cities publicly ought to pay more attention than they do now to this matter.”So then, Socrates, when I hear you constantly making these speeches I admire you immensely and praise you to the skies. So too when you state the next point in your argument, that those who train their bodies but neglect their souls are guilty of another action of the same sort—neglecting the part that should rule, and attending to that which should be ruled. Also when you declare that whatsoever object a man knows not how to make use of, it is better for him to refrain from making use thereof; thus, suppose a man knows not how to use his eyes or his ears or the whole of his body, it is better for such a man not to hear nor to see nor to employ his body for any other use rather than to use it in any way whatsoever.
-So too, likewise, with respect to art: it is surely plain that a man who does not know how to use his own lyre does not know either how to use his neighbor's, and that one who does not know how to use the lyre of others does not know how to use his own either,—nor yet any other instrument or chattel. Moreover, the conclusion of this argument of yours is a fine one,—how that for every man who knows not how to make use of his soul it is better to have his soul at rest and not to live, than to live acting according to his own caprice; but if it is necessary for him to live,
+So too, likewise, with respect to art: it is surely plain that a man who does not know how to use his own lyre does not know either how to use his neighbor’s, and that one who does not know how to use the lyre of others does not know how to use his own either,—nor yet any other instrument or chattel. Moreover, the conclusion of this argument of yours is a fine one,—how that for every man who knows not how to make use of his soul it is better to have his soul at rest and not to live, than to live acting according to his own caprice; but if it is necessary for him to live,
it is better after all for such an one to spend his life as a slave rather than a free man, handing over the rudder of his will, as it were of a ship, to another man who has learnt the art of steering men—which is the name that you, Socrates, frequently give to politics, when you declare that this very same art is that of judging and justice.Against these arguments and others of a like kind, exceedingly numerous and couched in exceedingly noble language, showing that virtue can be taught and that a man should care above all else for himself, I have hardly uttered a word up till now, nor do I suppose that I ever shall utter a word against them
in the future, for I regard them as most valuable admonitions and most useful, literally capable of waking us up, as it were, out of our slumber. So I gave my attention with a view to hear what was to follow next, although I did not at first question you yourself, Socrates, but some of your contemporaries and fellow-students or companions—or whatever name one ought to give to the relation in which they stand towards you. Of these I questioned first those who are specially held in regard by yourself,
asking them what was your next argument, and propounding the matter to them somewhat after your own fashion: “I ask you, my very good Sirs, in what sense do we now accept the exhortation to virtue which Socrates has given us. Are we to regard it as all there is, and suppose it to be impossible to pursue the object further and grasp it fully; and is this to be our lifelong task, just to exhort those who have not as yet been exhorted, and that they in turn should exhort others? Or, when we have agreed that this is exactly what a man should do, ought we to ask Socrates, and one another,
-the further question—“What is the next step?” What do we say is the way in which we ought to begin the study of justice? Just as if a man were exhorting us to devote care to our bodies, observing that we like children had as yet no notion of the existence of the arts of gymnastics and medicine; and were then to reproach us and say that it is disgraceful to spend all one's care on wheat and barley and vines and all the goods which we labor to acquire for the sake of the body, and yet make no effort to discover some art or device for securing that the body itself shall be in the best possible condition—and that in spite of the fact that such an art exists. Suppose then that we had put to the man who was thus exhorting us this further question—
+the further question—“What is the next step?” What do we say is the way in which we ought to begin the study of justice? Just as if a man were exhorting us to devote care to our bodies, observing that we like children had as yet no notion of the existence of the arts of gymnastics and medicine; and were then to reproach us and say that it is disgraceful to spend all one’s care on wheat and barley and vines and all the goods which we labor to acquire for the sake of the body, and yet make no effort to discover some art or device for securing that the body itself shall be in the best possible condition—and that in spite of the fact that such an art exists. Suppose then that we had put to the man who was thus exhorting us this further question—
“What arts do you say these are?” His answer, no doubt, would be—“Gymnastics and medicine.” So now, in the case before us, what do we say is the art which deals with the virtue of the soul? Let it be stated.” Then he who was reputed to be their most powerful exponent of these matters answered me and said that this art is precisely that which, said he, you hear Socrates describing,—nothing else than justice. I then replied—“Do not explain to me merely its name, but like this:—There is an art called medicine; and of this the effects are two-fold, the one being
-to produce constantly new doctors in addition to those already existing, and the other to produce health. And of these the latter result is no longer in itself an art but an effect of that art which both teaches and is taught, which effect we term ‘health.’ So likewise the operations of the joiner's art are a house and joinery, of which the one is an effect, the other a doctrine. In like manner let it be granted that the one effect of justice is to produce just men, as of the other arts their several artists; but as to the other, the operation which the just man is capable of performing for us, what do we say that is? Tell us.”
+to produce constantly new doctors in addition to those already existing, and the other to produce health. And of these the latter result is no longer in itself an art but an effect of that art which both teaches and is taught, which effect we term ‘health.’ So likewise the operations of the joiner’s art are a house and joinery, of which the one is an effect, the other a doctrine. In like manner let it be granted that the one effect of justice is to produce just men, as of the other arts their several artists; but as to the other, the operation which the just man is capable of performing for us, what do we say that is? Tell us.”
The reply of your exponent was, I think, “The beneficial”; while another said “The right”; a third “The useful”; and yet another “The profitable.” So I resumed my inquiry and said: “In the former case also we find these names in each one of the arts—doing ‘the right,’ ‘the profitable,’ ‘the useful,’ and the rest of such terms; but as regards the object at which all these operations aim, each art will declare that which is peculiar to itself; for example, the art of joinery will assert that the result of good, beautiful, and right action is the production of wooden vessels, which in themselves are not an art. So let the operation of justice
be stated in the same way.” Finally, Socrates, one of your companions, who was reputed to be a most accomplished speaker, made answer that the peculiar effect of justice, which was effected by no other art, was to produce friendship in States. Cf. Plat. Rep. 351d. And he, in turn, when questioned declared that friendship is a good thing and never an evil; while as to the friendships of children and those of wild beasts, which we call by this name, he refused to admit—when questioned upon the point—that they were friendships; since, as a result of the argument, he was forced to say that such relations were for the most part harmful
-rather than good. So to avoid such an admission he denied that such relations were friendships at all, and said that those who give them this name name them falsely; and real and true friendship, he said, is most exactly described as “unanimity.” And when asked about “unanimity,” whether he declared it to be unity of opinion Cf. Plat. Rep. 433c. or “knowledge,” he rejected the expression “unity of opinion,” for of necessity many cases of “unity of opinion” occurred amongst men that were harmful, whereas he had agreed that friendship was wholly a good thing and an effect of justice; consequently he affirmed that unanimity was the same, and was not opinion, but knowledge.Now when we were at this point in the argument and at our wits' end,
+rather than good. So to avoid such an admission he denied that such relations were friendships at all, and said that those who give them this name name them falsely; and real and true friendship, he said, is most exactly described as “unanimity.” And when asked about “unanimity,” whether he declared it to be unity of opinion Cf. Plat. Rep. 433c. or “knowledge,” he rejected the expression “unity of opinion,” for of necessity many cases of “unity of opinion” occurred amongst men that were harmful, whereas he had agreed that friendship was wholly a good thing and an effect of justice; consequently he affirmed that unanimity was the same, and was not opinion, but knowledge.Now when we were at this point in the argument and at our wits’ end,
the bystanders were ready to fall upon the man and to cry that the argument had circled round to the same point as at first; and they declared that: “Medicine also is a kind of ‘unanimity,’ as are all the arts, and they are able to explain what it is they deal with; but as for the ‘justice’ or ‘unanimity’ which you talk of, it has no comprehension of what its own aim is, and what the effect of it is remains quite obscure.”Finally, Socrates, I put these questions to you yourself also, and you told me that it belonged to justice
-to injure one's enemies and to do well to one's friends. But later on it appeared that the just man never injures anyone, for in all his acts he aims at benefiting all. So after repeated questionings—not once only or twice but spending quite a long time at it—I gave it up, concluding that though you were better than any man at the task of exhorting men to devote themselves to virtue, yet of these two alternatives one must be true: either you are capable of effecting thus much only and nothing more,—a thing which might happen also in respect of any other art whatsoever, as for example a man who was no steersman might practice composing an eulogy of that art
+to injure one’s enemies and to do well to one’s friends. But later on it appeared that the just man never injures anyone, for in all his acts he aims at benefiting all. So after repeated questionings—not once only or twice but spending quite a long time at it—I gave it up, concluding that though you were better than any man at the task of exhorting men to devote themselves to virtue, yet of these two alternatives one must be true: either you are capable of effecting thus much only and nothing more,—a thing which might happen also in respect of any other art whatsoever, as for example a man who was no steersman might practice composing an eulogy of that art
as one of high value to mankind, and so too with all the other arts; so against you too one might perhaps bring the same charge in regard to justice, that you are none the more an expert about justice because you eulogize it finely. Not that this is the complaint I make myself; but it must be one or other of these two alternatives,—either you do not possess the knowledge or else you refuse to let me share it. Consequently, methinks I will betake myself, in my perplexity, to Thrasymachus and to everyone else I can. However, if you are really willing
to refrain at last from addressing to me these hortatory discourses, and just as you would have followed up the hortatory discourse, suppose you had been exhorting me in respect of gymnastics that I should not neglect my body, by explaining the nature of the body and the nature of the treatment it requires—so let the same course be followed in the present case. Assume that Cleitophon agrees that it is ridiculous to expend care on everything else and to neglect the soul, for the sake of which all the other labour is incurred;
and suppose also that I have made all the other subsequent statements which I rehearsed just now. And I entreat you, as I speak, by no means to act otherwise, lest I should do, as I do now, praise you in part to Lysias and to the others, and also in part blame you. For I shall maintain, Socrates, that while you are of untold value to a man who has not been exhorted, to him who has been exhorted you are almost an actual hindrance in the way of his attaining the goal of virtue and becoming a happy man.
diff --git a/data/tlg0059/tlg029/tlg0059.tlg029.perseus-grc1.xml b/data/tlg0059/tlg029/tlg0059.tlg029.perseus-grc1.xml
index 8394c75ff..af178544c 100755
--- a/data/tlg0059/tlg029/tlg0059.tlg029.perseus-grc1.xml
+++ b/data/tlg0059/tlg029/tlg0059.tlg029.perseus-grc1.xml
@@ -68,26 +68,26 @@
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/tlg0059/tlg030/tlg0059.tlg030.perseus-eng2.xml b/data/tlg0059/tlg030/tlg0059.tlg030.perseus-eng2.xml
index 1211254f2..d716b7b3f 100644
--- a/data/tlg0059/tlg030/tlg0059.tlg030.perseus-eng2.xml
+++ b/data/tlg0059/tlg030/tlg0059.tlg030.perseus-eng2.xml
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@
Introduction p. vii, Hirzel, Der Dialog, i. p. 84.
Demetrius, On Style, 205, cites this sentence as an
example of “trimeter members.” Editors give references for the
- anecdote that it was found in Plato's tablets with many variations. For Plato's
+ anecdote that it was found in Plato’s tablets with many variations. For Plato’s
description of such painstaking Cf. Phaedrus 278 D.
Cicero De sen.. 5. 13 “scribens est mortuus.”
went down yesterday to the PeiraeusCf. 439 E; about a five-mile walk. with
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@
PO/LEWS. Athanasius,
<placeName key="tgn,2111313">Contra</placeName> gentes, 9,
censures Plato for thus adoring an Artemis made with hands, and the
- fathers and medieval writers frequently cite the passage for Plato's
+ fathers and medieval writers frequently cite the passage for Plato’s
regrettable concessions to polytheism—“persuasio civilis” as
Minucius Felix styles it. Cf. Eusebius Praep. Evang.
xiii. 13. 66. to the Goddess,Presumably Bendis (354 A), though,
@@ -180,13 +180,13 @@
the characteristic Socratic contrast between force and persuasion
cf. 411 D, and the anecdote in Diogenes Laertius vii. 24. you
that you ought to let us go?” “But could you persuade us,” said he, “if
- we refused to listen?” “Nohow,” said Glaucon. “Well, we won't listen,
+ we refused to listen?” “Nohow,” said Glaucon. “Well, we won’t listen,
and you might as well make up your minds to it.” “Do you mean to say,”
interposed Adeimantus,
- “that you haven't heard that there is to be a
+ “that you haven’t heard that there is to be a
torchlight raceSee
Sterrett in
AJP xxii. p. 393. “The torch was passed down the
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@
ii. 79. this evening on horseback in honor of the Goddess?”
“On horseback?” said I. “That is a new idea. Will they carry torches and
pass them along to one another as they race with the horses, or how do
- you mean?” “That's the way of it,” said Polemarchus, “and, besides,
+ you mean?” “That’s the way of it,” said Polemarchus, “and, besides,
there is to be a night festival which will be worth seeing. For after
dinner we will get upRise from the table. This is forgotten.
and go out and see the sights and meet a lot of the lads there and have
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@
and do as we ask.”In “American,” the colloquial Greek means “be a
sport.”“It looks as if we should have to stay,” said Glaucon.
- “Well,” said I, “if it so be, so be it.”So we went with them to Polemarchus's house, and there we found Lysias
+ “Well,” said I, “if it so be, so be it.”So we went with them to Polemarchus’s house, and there we found Lysias
and Euthydemus, the brothers of Polemarchus, yes, andThe particles single
out Thrasymachus for ironical emphasis. Proclus in
Tim. 3 E preserves them in his enumeration of the
@@ -229,9 +229,9 @@
GE ME\N OU)/TI QAMI/ZEIS,
<placeName key="tgn,2061426">Iliad</placeName>
xviii. 386, Odyssey v. 88, Jebb on
- O.C. 672. Cephalus' friendly urgency to Socrates
+ O.C. 672. Cephalus’ friendly urgency to Socrates
is in the tone of Laches 181 C. visitor,
- Socrates. You don't often come down to the Peiraeus to see us. That is
+ Socrates. You don’t often come down to the Peiraeus to see us. That is
not right. For if I were still able to make the journey up to town
easily there would be no need of your resorting hither,
@@ -243,9 +243,9 @@
with the enduring joys of the mind. Phaedrus 258 E.
Anaximenes imitates and expands the passage, Stobaeus, 117. 5.
Pleasures are not strictly speaking “of” the body, but “in” or
- “relating to” it. See my Unity of Plato's Thought, p.
+ “relating to” it. See my Unity of Plato’s Thought, p.
45. in the same measure my desire for the pleasures of good
- talk and my delight in them increase. Don't refuse then, but be yourself
+ talk and my delight in them increase. Don’t refuse then, but be yourself
a companion to these lads and make our house your resort and regard us
as your very good friends and intimates.” “Why, yes, Cephalus,” said I,
“and I enjoy talking with the very aged.
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@
TE/RPEI
Phaedrus 240 C, or, as in
Lysis 214 A, Protagoras 337 D,
- Symposium 195 B, the reference may be to Homer's
+ Symposium 195 B, the reference may be to Homer’s
W(S AI)EI\ TO\N O(MOI=ON A)/GEI QEO\S
W(S TO\N O(MOI=ON, Odyssey xvii. 218.
Milton, Doctrine
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@
cf. Sophocles <title>O.C. 1235. of all the miseries for which they blame old
age. But in my opinion, Socrates, they do not put the blame on the real
cause.This
- suggests Aristotle's fallacy of the false cause, Soph.
+ suggests Aristotle’s fallacy of the false cause, <title>Soph.
El. 167 b 21. Cf. Philebus 28 A and
Isocrates xv. 230. For if it were the cause I too should have
had the same experience so far as old age is concerned, and so would all
@@ -316,10 +316,10 @@
asked,
- 'How about your service of Aphrodite, Sophocles—is your
- natural force still unabated?' And he replied, 'Hush, man, most gladly
+ ’How about your service of Aphrodite, Sophocles—is your
+ natural force still unabated?’ And he replied, ’Hush, man, most gladly
have I escaped this thing you talk of, as if I had run away from a
- raging and savage beast of a master.'Allusions to the passage are frequent. Theon,
+ raging and savage beast of a master.’Allusions to the passage are frequent. Theon,
Progymn. ii. 66 (Spengel), turns to the anecdote
in an edifying XREI/A. Ammianus
Marcellinus xxv. 4. 2 tells us that the chastity of the emperor
@@ -362,7 +362,7 @@
Anaxandrides in Stobaeus Florileg. 68. 1 is almost a
paraphrase of this passage. Thucydides ii. 44 says that honour, not
money, is the consolation of old age.“You are right,” he
- said. “They don't accept my view and there is something in their
+ said. “They don’t accept my view and there is something in their
objection, though not so much as they suppose. But the retort of
Themistocles comes in pat here, who, when a man from the little island
of SeriphusLit.
@@ -404,7 +404,7 @@
poets feel complacency about their own poems and fathers about their own
sons,Cf.
Theaetetus 160 E, Symposium 209 C,
- Phaedrus 274 E, with Epaminondas' saying, that
+ Phaedrus 274 E, with Epaminondas’ saying, that
Leuctra and Mantineia were
his children. so men who have made money take this money
seriously as their own creation and they also value it for its uses as
@@ -418,10 +418,10 @@
you regard as the greatest benefit you have enjoyed from the possession
of property?” “Something,” he said, “which I might not easily bring many
to believe if I told them.Perhaps the earliest positive expression of
- faith in future life and judgement for sin is Pindar's Second
- Olympian. See Rohde's Psyche and Adam in
+ faith in future life and judgement for sin is Pindar’s Second
+ Olympian. See Rohde’s Psyche and Adam in
Cambridge Praelections. The Epicureans and
- sometimes the Stoics unfairly reprobated Plato's appeal here to this
+ sometimes the Stoics unfairly reprobated Plato’s appeal here to this
motive, which he disregards in his main argument and returns to only
in the tenth book. Cf. 363 C-D, 386 B, 613 E ff., also 496 E, 498 D,
608 D. For let me tell you, Socrates,” he said, “that when a
@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@
of his life shows an account of many evil deeds starts upPolyb. v. 52. 13,
and for the thought Iamblichus, Protrepticus 127 A,
Job iv. 13-14. Tennyson, Vastness
- ix.—“Pain, that has crawl'd from the corpse of Pleasure, a worm
+ ix.—“Pain, that has crawl’d from the corpse of Pleasure, a worm
which writhes all day, and at night/ Stirs up again in the heart of
the sleeper, and stings him back to the curse of the light.”
even from his dreams like children again and again in affright and his
@@ -500,9 +500,9 @@
Cic. De offic.
3.25. For the argument cf. Xen. Mem. 4.2.18, Cic. De offic. 3.25.
For the proverb, “a knife to a child” or a madman cf. Athen. 5.52, Iambl.
- Protrep. 18k, Jebb's
+ Protrep. 18k, Jebb’s <title>
<placeName key="tgn,7010699">Bentley</placeName>
- , p. 69, where Jebb misses Bentley's allusion to it. that it is
+ , p. 69, where Jebb misses Bentley’s allusion to it. that it is
truth-telling and paying back what one has received from anyone, or may
these very actions sometimes be just and sometimes unjust? I mean, for
example, as everyone I presume would admit, if one took over weapons
@@ -538,7 +538,7 @@
inheritor of the argument, what it is that you affirm that Simonides
says and rightly says about justice.” “That it is just,” he replied, “to
render to each his due.The defintion is not found in the fragments of
- Simonides. Cf. 433 E, and the Roman Jurists' “Iustitia est constans
+ Simonides. Cf. 433 E, and the Roman Jurists’ “Iustitia est constans
et perpetua voluntas suum cuique tribuens.” For the various meanings
of the Greek word cf. my Articles “Righteousness” and “Theognis” in
Hastings,
@@ -566,7 +566,7 @@
leg. 4. 67. Salt was a symbol of justice because it
preserves A(\ PARALAMBA/NEI:
Diogenes Laertius viii. 35. Earth is “iustissima tellus” because she
- returns the seed with interest. Socrates' distinction between the
+ returns the seed with interest. Socrates’ distinction between the
fact of returning a deposit, and returning it rightly is expressed
in Stoic terminology: “ut si iuste depositum reddere in recte factis
sit, in officiis ponatur depositum reddere,” Cicero De
@@ -589,7 +589,7 @@
</div>
<div n="332b" type="textpart" subtype="section">
<said who="Socrates">if this return and the acceptance prove harmful and the
- returner and the recipient are friends. Isn't that what you say
+ returner and the recipient are friends. Isn’t that what you say
Simonides means?” “Quite so.” “But how about this—should one not render
to enemies what is their due?” “By all means,” he said, “what is
due<note anchored="true" resp="Loeb" place="unspecified">In the
@@ -606,19 +606,19 @@
</div>
<div n="332c" type="textpart" subtype="section">
<said who="Socrates">it seems, was that justice is rendering to each what
- befits him, the name that he gave to this was the due.'” “What else do
- you suppose?” said he. “In heaven's name!” said I, “suppose<note anchored="true" resp="Loeb" place="unspecified">Socrates often
+ befits him, the name that he gave to this was the due.’” “What else do
+ you suppose?” said he. “In heaven’s name!” said I, “suppose<note anchored="true" resp="Loeb" place="unspecified">Socrates often
presents an argument in this polite form. Cf. 337 A-B, 341 E,
<title>Gorgias 451 B, Hippias Major 287 B
ff., Thompson on
<placeName key="tgn,2083598">Meno</placeName>
- 72 B. someone had questioned him thus: 'Tell me,
+ 72 B. someone had questioned him thus: ’Tell me,
Simonides, the art that renders what that is due and befitting to what
- is called the art of medicine.'Socrates tests ambitious general definitions by
+ is called the art of medicine.’Socrates tests ambitious general definitions by
the analogy of the arts and their more specific functions. Cf.
Gorgias 451 A, Protagoras 311 B,
318 B. The idiomatic double question must be retained in the
- translation. The English reader, if puzzled, may compare Calverly's
+ translation. The English reader, if puzzled, may compare Calverly’s
Pickwick examination: “Who thinks that in which pocket of what
garment and where he has left what entreating him to return to whom
and how many what and all how big? What do you take it would
@@ -632,7 +632,7 @@
the art that renders what to whom would be denominated justice.” “If we
are to follow the previous examples,Similarly Protagoras 312
A. Socrates, it is that which renders benefits and harms to
- friends and enemies.” “To do good to friends and evil to enemies,Simonides' defintion
+ friends and enemies.” “To do good to friends and evil to enemies,Simonides’ defintion
is reduced to the formula of traditional Greek morality which Plato
was the first to transcend not only in the Republic
infra, 335 D-336 A, but in the Crito 49
@@ -661,9 +661,9 @@
- “Yes, it is useful.” “But so is agriculture, isn't it?”
+ “Yes, it is useful.” “But so is agriculture, isn’t it?”
“Yes.” “Namely, for the getting of a harvest?” “Yes.” “But likewise the
- cobbler's art?” “Yes.” “Namely, I presume you would say, for the getting
+ cobbler’s art?” “Yes.” “Namely, I presume you would say, for the getting
of shoes.” “Certainly.” “Then tell me, for the service and getting of
what would you say that justice is useful in time of peace?” “In
engagements and dealings, Socrates.” “And by dealings do you mean
@@ -679,7 +679,7 @@
special arts, yet of universal scope. This twofold requirement no
definition of a virtue in the minor dialogues is ever able to
satisfy. It is met only by the theory worked out in the
- Republic. Cf. Unity of Plato's
+ <title>Republic. Cf. Unity of Plato’s
Thought, p. 14. in which the just man is a better
partner than the harpist as an harpist is better than the just man for
striking the chords?” “For money-dealings,Justice is more nearly defined as
@@ -690,7 +690,7 @@
or sell a horse. Then, I take it, the man who knows
- horses, isn't it so?” “Apparently.” “And again, if it is a vessel, the
+ horses, isn’t it so?” “Apparently.” “And again, if it is a vessel, the
shipwright or the pilot.” “It would seem so.” “What then is the use of
money in common for which a just man is the better partner?” “When it is
to be deposited and kept safe, Socrates.” “You mean when it is to be put
@@ -702,7 +702,7 @@
“It looks that way.” “And similarly when a scythe is to
be kept safe, then justice is useful both in public and private. But
- when it is to be used, the vinedresser's art is useful?” “Apparently.”
+ when it is to be used, the vinedresser’s art is useful?” “Apparently.”
“And so you will have to say that when a shield and a lyre are to be
kept and put to no use, justice is useful, but when they are to be made
use of, the military art and music.” “Necessarily.” “And so in all other
@@ -715,7 +715,7 @@
justice cannot be a thing of much worthA virtue is presumably a good. A defintion that
makes justice useless is ipso facto refuted. This line of argument
is a standardized procedure in the minor dialogues. Cf. my
- Unity of Plato's Thought, n. 78. The argument
+ Unity of Plato’s Thought, n. 78. The argument
continues: The arts are faculties of opposites. The fallacy is
intentional, as in Hippias Minor 365, where it is
argued that the voluntary lie is better than the involuntary. This
@@ -723,7 +723,7 @@
and faculty (E(/CIS and DU/NAMIS). Cf Topics,
vi. 12. 6, Eth. Nic. v. 1. 4, vi. 5. 7,
Met. 1046 b,
- Unity of Plato's Thought, n. 38. if it is
+ Unity of Plato’s Thought, n. 38. if it is
useful only for things out of use and useless. But let us consider this
point. Is not the man who is most skilful to strike or inflict a blow in
a fight, whether as a boxer or elsewhere, also the most wary to guard
@@ -737,14 +737,14 @@
the very same man is a good guardian of an army who is
- good at stealing a marchThe play on the Greek word recalls Shakespeare's
+ good at stealing a marchThe play on the Greek word recalls Shakespeare’s
“If you do take a thief . . . let him show himself what he is and
steal out of your company,”Much Ado, III. iii.
upon the enemy in respect of their designs and proceedings generally.”
“Certainly.” “Of whatsoever, then, anyone is a skilful guardian, of that
he is also a skilful thief?” “It seems so.” “If then the just man is an
expert in guarding money he is an expert in stealing it.” “The argument
- certainly points that way.”The qualified assent here marks the speaker's
+ certainly points that way.”The qualified assent here marks the speaker’s
perception that something is wrong. But often it expresses modesty
or is a mere mannerism. Cf. 399 D, 401 D, 409 C, 410 A, 553 E,
etc.“A kind of thief then the just man it seems has turned
@@ -752,10 +752,10 @@
follows the fashion of tracing all modern wisdom to Homer. Cf.
Theaetetus 152 E. For he regards with
complacency Autolycus,“A snapper-up of unconsidered trifles”
- (Winter's Tale, IV. iii. 26), whom Homer
+ (Winter’s Tale, IV. iii. 26), whom Homer
celebrates (Hom. Od.
- 19.395). The naivete of Homer's “amoral” standpoint (Cf.
- Odyssey xiii. 290 ff.) tickles Plato's sense of
+ 19.395). The naivete of Homer’s “amoral” standpoint (Cf.
+ Odyssey xiii. 290 ff.) tickles Plato’s sense of
humor, and he amuses himself by showing that the popular rule “help
friends and harm enemies” is on the same ethical plane. So in the
Euthyphro, popular piety is gravely reduced to a
@@ -770,10 +770,10 @@
Hom.
Od. 19.395 So justice, according to you and Homer and
Simonides, seems to be a kind of stealing, with the qualification that
- it is for the benefit of friends and the harm of enemies. Isn't that
+ it is for the benefit of friends and the harm of enemies. Isn’t that
what you meant?” “No, by Zeus,” he replied. “I no longer know what I did
mean.For
- humorous bewildermentof Socrates' interlocutors cf. Xenophon
+ humorous bewildermentof Socrates’ interlocutors cf. Xenophon
Memorabilia iv. 2. 19, Lysis 216
C, Alc. I. 127 D,
<placeName key="tgn,2083598">Meno</placeName>
@@ -802,7 +802,7 @@
<said who="Socrates">and injure the good?” “It would seem so.” “But again
the good are just and incapable of injustice.” “True.” “On your
reasoning then it is just to wrong those who do no injustice.” “Nay,
- nay, Socrates,” he said, “the reasoning can't be right.”<note anchored="true" resp="Loeb" place="unspecified">Or, “that is an
+ nay, Socrates,” he said, “the reasoning can’t be right.”<note anchored="true" resp="Loeb" place="unspecified">Or, “that is an
immoral conclusion.”</note>“Then,” said I, “it is just to harm the
unjust and benefit the just.” “That seems a better conclusion than the
other.” “It will work out, then, for many, Polemarchus, who have
@@ -919,7 +919,7 @@
Introduction.</note> even while we were conversing, had been trying
several times to break in and lay hold of the discussion but he was
restrained by those who sat by him who wished to hear the argument out.
- But when we came to a pause after I had said this, he couldn't any
+ But when we came to a pause after I had said this, he couldn’t any
longer hold his peace. But gathering himself up like a wild beast he
hurled himself upon us as if he would tear us to pieces. And Polemarchus
and I were frightened and fluttered apart, and he bawled out into our
@@ -928,7 +928,7 @@
<div n="336c" type="textpart" subtype="section">
<said who="Socrates">“What balderdash is this that you have been talking,
and why do you Simple Simons truckle and give way to one another? But if
- you really wish, Socrates, to know what the just is, don't merely ask
+ you really wish, Socrates, to know what the just is, don’t merely ask
questions or plume yourself upon controverting any answer that anyone
gives—since your acumen has perceived that it is easier to ask questions
than to answer them,<note anchored="true" resp="Loeb" place="unspecified">Cf. <title>Gorgias 483 A, Aristotle
@@ -939,14 +939,14 @@
passim. but do you yourself answer and tell
- what you say the just is. And don't you be telling
+ what you say the just is. And don’t you be telling
meThrasymachus
objects to definition by substitution of synonyms (Cf.
Clitophon 409 C). He demands an analysis of the
underlying facts (338 D-E), such as is given in the later
books. that it is that which ought to be, or the beneficial
or the profitable or the gainful or the advantageous, but express
- clearly and precisely whatever you say. For I won't take from you any
+ clearly and precisely whatever you say. For I won’t take from you any
such drivel as that!” And I, when I heard him, was dismayed, and looking
upon him was filled with fear, and I believe that if I had not looked at
him before he did at me I should have lost my voice.For the fancy that
@@ -959,7 +959,7 @@
I glanced at him first, so that I became capable of
- answering him and said with a light tremor: “Thrasymachus, don't be
+ answering him and said with a light tremor: “Thrasymachus, don’t be
harshFor
similar irony Cf. Gorgias 461 C-D, 489 D. with
us. If I and my friend have made mistakes in the consideration of the
@@ -971,7 +971,7 @@
Meno
91 E. if our quest were for goldCf. Heracleitus fr.
22 Diels, and Ruskin,
- King's Treasuries“The physical type of wisdom,
+ King’s Treasuries“The physical type of wisdom,
gold,”Psalms xix. 10. we would never
willingly truckle to one another and make concessions in the search and
so spoil our chances of finding it, yet that when we are searching for
@@ -990,29 +990,29 @@
Thinkers iii. p. 277. of Socrates, and I knew it
and predicted that when it came to replying you would refuse and
dissemble and do anything rather than answer any question that anyone
- asked you.” “That's because you are wise, Thrasymachus, and so you knew
+ asked you.” “That’s because you are wise, Thrasymachus, and so you knew
very well that if you asked a man how many are twelve,
- and in putting the question warned him: don't you be
+ and in putting the question warned him: don’t you be
telling me, fellow, that twelve is twice six or three times four or six
- times two or four times three, for I won't accept any such drivel as
+ times two or four times three, for I won’t accept any such drivel as
that from you as an answer—it was obvious I fancy to you that no one
could give an answer to a question framed in that fashion. Suppose he
- had said to you, 'Thrasymachus, what do you mean? Am I not to give any
+ had said to you, ’Thrasymachus, what do you mean? Am I not to give any
of the prohibited answers, not even, do you mean to say, if the thing
really is one of these, but must I say something different from the
truth,
- or what do you mean?' What would have been your answer
+ or what do you mean?’ What would have been your answer
to him?” “Humph!” said he, “how very like the two cases are!” “There is
nothing to prevent,” said I; “yet even granted that they are not alike,
yet if it appears to the person asked the question that they are alike,
do you suppose that he will any the less answer what appears to him,
- whether we forbid him or whether we don't?” “Is that, then,” said he,
+ whether we forbid him or whether we don’t?” “Is that, then,” said he,
“what you are going to do? Are you going to give one of the forbidden
- answers?” “I shouldn't be surprised,” I said, “if on reflection that
+ answers?” “I shouldn’t be surprised,” I said, “if on reflection that
would be my view.” “What then,”
@@ -1021,7 +1021,7 @@
deserve?” “Why, what else,” said I, “than that which it befits anyone
who is ignorant to suffer? It befits him, I presume, to learn from the
one who does know. That then is what I propose that I should suffer.” “I
- like your simplicity,”In “American,” “nerve.” Socrates' statement that
+ like your simplicity,”In “American,” “nerve.” Socrates’ statement that
PAQEI=N“due him” is MAQEI=N(gratis) affects Thrasymachus as
the dicasts were affected by the proposal in the
Apology that his punishment should be—to dine at
@@ -1029,7 +1029,7 @@
rendered: “In addition to the recovery of your wits, you must pay a
fine.” Plato constantly harps on the taking of pay by the Sophists,
but Thrasymachus is trying to jest, too. said he; “but in
- addition to 'learning' you must pay a fine of money.” “Well, I will when
+ addition to ’learning’ you must pay a fine of money.” “Well, I will when
I have got it,” I said. “It is there,” said Glaucon: “if money is all
that stands in the way, Thrasymachus, go on with your speech. We will
all contribute for Socrates.” “Oh yes, of course,”
@@ -1040,14 +1040,14 @@
refute his replies.” “Why, how,” I said, “my dear fellow, could anybody
answer if in the first place he did not know and did not even profess to
know, and secondly even if he had some notion of the matter, he had been
- told by a man of weight that he mustn't give any of his suppositions as
+ told by a man of weight that he mustn’t give any of his suppositions as
an answer?
Nay, it is more reasonable that you should be the
- speaker. For you do affirm that you know and are able to tell. Don't be
- obstinate, but do me the favor to reply and don't be chary“Grudging.” Cf.
+ speaker. For you do affirm that you know and are able to tell. Don’t be
+ obstinate, but do me the favor to reply and don’t be chary“Grudging.” Cf.
Laches 200 B. of your wisdom, and instruct
Glaucon here and the rest of us.”When I
had spoken thus Glaucon and the others urged him not to be obstinate. It
@@ -1063,7 +1063,7 @@
Cratylus 391 B. therefor.” “That I learn
from others,” I said, “you said truly, Thrasymachus. But in saying that
I do not pay thanks you are mistaken. I pay as much as I am able. And I
- am able only to bestow praise. For money I lack.Socrates' poverty
+ am able only to bestow praise. For money I lack.Socrates’ poverty
(Apology 38 A-B) was denied by some later writers
who disliked to have him classed with the Cynics. But that I
praise right willingly those who appear to speak well you will well know
@@ -1084,24 +1084,24 @@
the advantage of the superior” means, as explained in
Laws 714, that the ruling class legislates in its
own interest, that is, to keep itself in power. This interpretation
- is here drawn out of Thrasymachus by Socrates' affected
+ is here drawn out of Thrasymachus by Socrates’ affected
misapprehensions (cf. further Pascal, Pensees iv. 4, “la commodite
- du souverain.” Leibniz approves Thrasymachus's definition: “justum
+ du souverain.” Leibniz approves Thrasymachus’s definition: “justum
potentiori utile . . . nam Deus ceteris potentior!”).
- WeIl, why don't you applaud?
- Nay, you'll do anything but that.” “Provided only I first understand
- your meaning,” said I; “for I don't yet apprehend it. The advantage of
+ WeIl, why don’t you applaud?
+ Nay, you’ll do anything but that.” “Provided only I first understand
+ your meaning,” said I; “for I don’t yet apprehend it. The advantage of
the stronger is what you affirm the just to be. But what in the world do
- you mean by this? I presume you don't intend to affirm this, that if
+ you mean by this? I presume you don’t intend to affirm this, that if
Polydamas the pancratiast is stronger than we are and the flesh of
beevesThe
unwholesomeness of this diet for the ordinary man proves nothing for
- Plato's alleged vegetarianism. The Athenians ate but little
+ Plato’s alleged vegetarianism. The Athenians ate but little
meat. is advantageous for him,
for his body, this viand is also for us who are weaker
- than he both advantageous and just.” “You're a buffoon,The Greek is
+ than he both advantageous and just.” “You’re a buffoon,The Greek is
stronger—a beastly cad. A common term of abuse in the orators. Cf.
Aristophanes Frogs 465,
Theophrast.Char. xvii. (Jebb). Socrates,
@@ -1122,12 +1122,12 @@
interpretation on his words. Similarly in Gorgias 451
E, 453 B, 489 D, 490 C, Laws 714 C. To the
misunderstanding of such dramatic passages is due the impression of
- hasty readers that Plato is a sophist.“Don't you know then,”
+ hasty readers that Plato is a sophist.“Don’t you know then,”
said he, “that some cities are governed by tyrants, in others democracy
rules, in others aristocracy?”These three forms of government are mentioned by
Pindar, Pyth. ii. 86, Aeschines In
Ctes. 6. See 445 D, Whibley, Greek
- Oligarchies, and Unity of Plato's
+ Oligarchies, and Unity of Plato’s
Thought, p. 62.“Assuredly.” “And is not this the
thing that is strong and has the masteryKRATEI= with emphasis to suggest KREI/TTWN. Cf. Menexenus
@@ -1144,11 +1144,11 @@
view to its own advantage, a democracy democratic laws and tyranny
autocratic and the others likewise, and by so legislating they proclaim
that the just for their subjects is that which is for their—the
- rulers'—advantage and the man who deviatesOn this view justice is simply
+ rulers’—advantage and the man who deviatesOn this view justice is simply
TO\ NO/MIMON(Xenophon
Memorabilia iv. 4. 12; Cf. Gorgias
504 D). This is the doctrine of the “Old Oligarch,”
- [Xenophon]Rep. Ath. 2. Against this conception of
+ [Xenophon] Rep. Ath. 2. Against this conception of
class domination as political justice, Plato (Laws
713 ff.) and Aristotle Politics iii. 7) protest. Cf.
Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, chap. ii.: “We only
@@ -1185,16 +1185,16 @@
C, Lysis 203 B, Sophocles O.T.
327. For since I too admit that the just is something that is
of advantageFor
- Plato's so-called
- utilitarianism or eudaemonism see 457 B, Unity of Plato's
+ <placeName key="tgn,1023926">Plato</placeName>’s so-called
+ utilitarianism or eudaemonism see 457 B, <title>Unity of Plato’s
Thought, pp. 21-22, Gomperz, ii. p. 262. He would have
- nearly accepted Bentham's statement that while the proper end of
+ nearly accepted Bentham’s statement that while the proper end of
government is the greatest happiness of the greatest number, the
actual end of every government is the greatest happiness of the
governors. Cf. Leslie Stephen, English
Utilitarianism, i. p. 282, ii. p. 89.—but you are for
making an addition and affirm it to be the advantage of the stronger,
- while I don't profess to know,This profession of ignorance may have been a
+ while I don’t profess to know,This profession of ignorance may have been a
trait of the real Socrates, but in Plato it is a dramatic device for
the evolution of the argument. we must pursue the inquiry.”
“Inquire away,” he said.“I will do so,”
@@ -1217,7 +1217,7 @@
“Then on your theory it is just not only to do what is
the advantage of the stronger but also the opposite, what is not to his
- advantage.” “What's that you're saying?”
+ advantage.” “What’s that you’re saying?”*TI/ LE/GEIS
SU/; is rude. See Blaydes on Aristophanes
Clouds
@@ -1277,12 +1277,12 @@
no more be the advantage of the stronger than the contrary.” “O well,”
said Cleitophon, “by the advantage of the superior he meant what the
superior supposed to be for his advantage. This was what the inferior
- had to do, and that this is the just was his position.” “That isn't what
+ had to do, and that this is the just was his position.” “That isn’t what
he said,”
replied Polemarchus. “Never mind, Polemarchus,” said I,
- “but if that is Thrasymachus's present meaning, let us take it from
+ “but if that is Thrasymachus’s present meaning, let us take it from
himSocrates
always allows his interlocutors to amend their statements. Cf.
Gorgias 491 B, 499 B, Protagoras
@@ -1292,7 +1292,7 @@
superior as it appears to the superior whether it really is or not? Are
we to say this was your meaning?” “Not in the least,” he said.Thrasymachus rejects
the aid of an interpretation which Socrates would apply not only to
- the politician's miscalculation but to his total misapprehension of
+ the politician’s miscalculation but to his total misapprehension of
his true ideal interests. He resorts to the subtlety that the ruler
qua ruler is infallible, which Socrates meets by the fair retort
that the ruler qua ruler, the artist qua artist has no “sinister” or
@@ -1309,9 +1309,9 @@
you call one who is mistaken about the sick a physician in respect of
his mistake or one who goes wrong in a calculation a calculator when he
goes wrong and in respect of this error? Yet that is what we say
- literally—we say that the physicianFor the idea cf. Rousseau's Emile, i.: “On me dira .
+ literally—we say that the physicianFor the idea cf. Rousseau’s Emile, i.: “On me dira .
. . que les fautes sont du medecin, mais que la medicine en
- elle-meme est infaillible. A al bonne heure; mais qu'elle vienne
+ elle-meme est infaillible. A al bonne heure; mais qu’elle vienne
donc sans le medecin.” Lucian, De Parasito 54, parodies
this reasoning. erred and the calculator and the
schoolmaster. But the truth, I take it, is, that each of these
@@ -1342,13 +1342,13 @@
then, Thrasymachus,” said I, “my manner of argument seems to you
pettifogging?” “It does,” he said. “You think, do you, that it was with
malice aforethought and trying to get the better of you unfairly that I
- asked that question?” “I don't think it, I know it,” he said, “and you
- won't make anything by it, for you won't get the better of me by stealth
+ asked that question?” “I don’t think it, I know it,” he said, “and you
+ won’t make anything by it, for you won’t get the better of me by stealth
and
, failing stealth, you are not of the forceCf. 365 D. to
- beat me in debate.” “Bless your soul,” said I, “I wouldn't even attempt
+ beat me in debate.” “Bless your soul,” said I, “I wouldn’t even attempt
such a thing. But that nothing of the sort may spring up between us
again, define in which sense you take the ruler and stronger. Do you
mean the so-called ruleri.e., the one who in vulgar parlance is so; cf.
@@ -1357,10 +1357,10 @@
were just now telling us, and for whose advantage as being the superior
it will be just for the inferior to act?” “I mean the ruler in the very
most precise sense of the word,” he said. “Now bring on against this
- your cavils and your shyster's tricks if you are able.
+ your cavils and your shyster’s tricks if you are able.
- I ask no quarter. But you'll find yourself unable.”
+ I ask no quarter. But you’ll find yourself unable.”
“Why, do you suppose,” I said, “that I am so mad to try to try to beard
a lionA rare but
obvious proverb. Cf. Schol. ad loc. and Aristides, Orat.
@@ -1382,7 +1382,7 @@
pilot rightly so called—is he a ruler of sailors or a sailor?” </said>
</div>
<div n="341d" type="textpart" subtype="section">
- <said who="Socrates">“A ruler of sailors.” “We don't, I fancy, have to take
+ <said who="Socrates">“A ruler of sailors.” “We don’t, I fancy, have to take
into account the fact that he actually sails in the ship, nor is he to
be denominated a sailor. For it is not in respect of his sailing that he
is called a pilot but in respect of his art and his ruling of the
@@ -1394,7 +1394,7 @@
exists for this, to discover and provide for each his advantage?” “Yes,
for this.” “Is there, then, for each of the arts any other advantage
than to be perfect as possible<note anchored="true" resp="Loeb" place="unspecified">Pater, <title>Plato and Platonism, p.
- 242, fancifully cites this for “art for art's sake.” See Zeller, p.
+ 242, fancifully cites this for “art for art’s sake.” See Zeller, p.
605. Thrasymachus does not understand what is meant by saying that
the art (=the artist qua artist) has no interest save the perfection
of its (his) own function. Socrates explains that the body by its
@@ -1411,11 +1411,11 @@
“What do you mean by that question?” “Just as if,” I
said, “you should ask me whether it is enough for the body to be the
- body or whether it stands in need of something else, I would reply, 'By
+ body or whether it stands in need of something else, I would reply, ’By
all means it stands in need. That is the reason why the art of medicine
has now been invented, because the body is defective and such defect is
unsatisfactory. To provide for this, then, what is advantageous, that is
- the end for which the art was devised.' Do you think that would be a
+ the end for which the art was devised.’ Do you think that would be a
correct answer, or not?”
@@ -1452,7 +1452,7 @@
A)/RXOUSI to which
Thrasymachus assents reluctantly; and Socrates develops and repeats
the thought for half a page. Art is virtually science, as contrasted
- with empiric rule of thumb, and Thrasymachus's infallible rulers are
+ with empiric rule of thumb, and Thrasymachus’s infallible rulers are
of course scientific. “Ruler” is added lest we forget the analogy
between political rule and that of the arts. Cf. Newman,
Introduction Aristotle Politics 244,
@@ -1468,9 +1468,9 @@
to admit though he tried to contest it. But when he had agreed—“Can we
deny, then,” said I, “that neither does any physician in so far as he is
a physician seek or enjoin the advantage of the physician but that of
- the patient? For we have agreed that the physician, 'precisely'
+ the patient? For we have agreed that the physician, ’precisely’
speaking, is a ruler and governor of bodies and not a moneymaker. Did we
- agree on that?” He assented. “And so the 'precise' pilot is a ruler of
+ agree on that?” He assented. “And so the ’precise’ pilot is a ruler of
sailors,
@@ -1491,30 +1491,30 @@
formula of justice had suffered a reversal of form, Thrasymachus,
instead of replying,Thrasymachus first vents his irritation by
calling Socrates a snivelling innocent, and then, like Protagoras
- (Protagoras 334), when pressed by Socrates'
+ (Protagoras 334), when pressed by Socrates’
dialectic makes a speech. He abandons the abstract (ideal) ruler,
whom he assumed to be infallible and Socrates proved to be
disinterested, for the actual ruler or shepherd of the people, who
tends the flock only that he might shear it. All political
experience and the career of successful tyrants, whom all men count
happy, he thinks confirms this view, which is that of Callicles in
- the Gorgias. Justice is another's good which only the
+ the Gorgias. Justice is another’s good which only the
naive and innocent pursue. It is better to inflict than to suffer
wrong. The main problem of the Republic is clearly
indicated, but we are not yet ready to debate it seriously.
said, “Tell me, Socrates, have you got a nurse?” “What do you mean?”
- said I. “Why didn't you answer me instead of asking such a question?”
- “Because,” he said, “she lets her little 'snotty' run about
+ said I. “Why didn’t you answer me instead of asking such a question?”
+ “Because,” he said, “she lets her little ’snotty’ run about
drivellingKORUZW=NTAL. and S., also
s.v. KO/UZA. Lucian, Lexiphanes
18, treats the expression as an affectation, but elsewhere employs
it. The philosophers used this and similar terms (1) of stupidity,
(2) as a type of the minor ills of the flesh. Horace, Satire i.
- 4. 8, ii. 2. 76, Epictet. i. 6. 30A)LL' AI(
- MU/CAI MOU R(E/OUSI. and doesn't wipe your face
- clean, though you need it badly, if she can't get you to knowLiterally, “if you
- don't know for her.” For the ethical dative cf. Shakespeare
+ 4. 8, ii. 2. 76, Epictet. i. 6. 30A)LL’ AI(
+ MU/CAI MOU R(E/OUSI. and doesn’t wipe your face
+ clean, though you need it badly, if she can’t get you to knowLiterally, “if you
+ don’t know for her.” For the ethical dative cf. ShakespeareTaming of the Shrew, I. ii. 8 “Knock me here
soundly.” Not to know the shepherd from the sheep seems to be
proverbial. “Shepherd of the people,” like “survival of the
@@ -1532,14 +1532,14 @@
sheep and the cattle and fatten and tend them with anything else in view
than the good of their masters and themselves; and by the same token you
seem to suppose that the rulers in our cities, I mean the real
- rulers,Thrasymachus's real rulers are the bosses and tyrsnts. Socrates'
+ rulers,Thrasymachus’s real rulers are the bosses and tyrsnts. Socrates’
true rulers are the true kings of the Stoics and Ruskin, the true shepherds of
Ruskin and Milton. differ at all in
- their thoughts of the governed from a man's attitude towards his
+ their thoughts of the governed from a man’s attitude towards his
sheepCf.
Aristophanes Clouds1203
- PRO/BAT'
+ PRO/BAT’
A)/LLWS, Herrick, “Kings ought to shear, not skin their
sheep.” or that they think of anything else night and day
than
@@ -1550,7 +1550,7 @@
possible) sense rather than the ironical, “so far advanced,” better
accords with A)GNOEI=S and with
the direct brutality of Thrasymachus. concerning the just and
- justice and the unjust and injustice that you don't know that justice
+ justice and the unjust and injustice that you don’t know that justice
and the just are literallyTW=| O)/NTI
like W(S A)LHQW=S, A)TEXNW=S,
@@ -1559,7 +1559,7 @@
D, 442 A, 419 A, 432 A, Laches 187 B,
Philebus 64 E. Similarly E)TH/TUMON of a proverb, Archil. fr. 35 (87). The
origin of the usage appears in Aristophanes Birds
- 507TOU=T' A)/R' E)KEI=N H)=N TOU)/POS
+ 507TOU=T’ A)/R’ E)KEI=N H)=N TOU)/POS
A)LHQW=S, etc. Cf. Anth. Pal. v. 6. 3.
With EU)HQIKW=N, however,W(S A)LHQW=S does not verify the
etymology but ironically emphasizes the contradiction between the
@@ -1567,18 +1567,18 @@
thinks truly fits those to whom Socrates would apply the full
etymological meaning “of good character.” Cf. 348 C, 400 E,
Laws 679 C, Thucydides iii. 83. Cf. in English
- the connexion of “silly” with “selig”, and in Italian, Leopardi's
+ the connexion of “silly” with “selig”, and in Italian, Leopardi’s
bitter comment on “dabbenaggine” (Pensieri
- xxvi.). the other fellow's goodJustice not being primarily a
- self-regarding virtue, like prudence, is of course another's good.
+ xxvi.). the other fellow’s goodJustice not being primarily a
+ self-regarding virtue, like prudence, is of course another’s good.
Cf. Aristotle Eth. Nic. 1130
a 3; 1134 b 5. Thrasymachus ironically
accepts the formula, adding the cynical or pessimistic comment, “but
- one's own harm,” for which see 392 B, Euripides
- Heracleid. 1-5, and Isocrates' protest (viii.
+ one’s own harm,” for which see 392 B, Euripides
+ Heracleid. 1-5, and Isocrates’ protest (viii.
32). Bion (Diogenes Laertius iv. 7. 48) wittily defined beauty as
- “the other fellow's good”; which recalls Woodrow Wilson's favourite
- limerick, and the definition of business as “l'argent des
+ “the other fellow’s good”; which recalls Woodrow Wilson’s favourite
+ limerick, and the definition of business as “l’argent des
autres.”—the advantage of the stronger and the ruler, but a
detriment that is all his own of the subject who obeys and serves; while
injustice is the contrary and rules those who are simple in every sense
@@ -1633,7 +1633,7 @@
both by stealth and by force takes away what belongs to others, both
sacred and profane, both private and public, not little by little but at
one swoop.The
- order of the words dramatically expressses Thrasymachus's excitement
+ order of the words dramatically expressses Thrasymachus’s excitement
and the sweeping success of the tyrant.
@@ -1647,7 +1647,7 @@
names they are pronounced happy and blessedThe European estimate of Louis
Napoleon before 1870 is a good
illustration. Cf. Theopompus on Philip, Polybius viii. 11.
- Euripides'Bellerophon(fr. 288) uses the happiness
+ Euripides’Bellerophon(fr. 288) uses the happiness
of the tyrant as an argument against the moral government of the
world. not only by their fellow-citizens
@@ -1662,7 +1662,7 @@
Socrates, injustice on a sufficiently large scale is a stronger, freer,
and a more masterful thing than justice, and, as I said in the
beginning, it is the advantage of the stronger that is the just, while
- the unjust is what profits man's self and is for his advantage.”
+ the unjust is what profits man’s self and is for his advantage.”
@@ -1689,7 +1689,7 @@
and not the entire conduct of life that for each of us
would make living most worth while?” “Well, do I deny it?”Plainly a protesting
question, “Why, do I think otherwise?” Cf. 339 D. said
- Thrasymachus. “You seem to,” said I, “or elseFor the impossibility of J. and C.'s
+ Thrasymachus. “You seem to,” said I, “or elseFor the impossibility of J. and C.’s
“or rather” see my note in A.J.P. vol. xiii. p. 234. to care
nothing for us and so feel no concern whether we are going to live worse
or better lives in our ignorance of what you affirm that you know. Nay,
@@ -1704,7 +1704,7 @@
perit.” for you—any benefit that you bestow on such company
as this. For I tell you for my part that I am not convinced, neither do
I think that injustice is more profitableIsocrates viii. 31 and elsewhere
- seems to be copying Plato's idea that injustice can never be
+ seems to be copying Plato’s idea that injustice can never be
profitable in the higher sense of the word. Cf. also the proof in
the Hipparchus that all true KE/RDOS is A)GAQO/N. than justice, not even if one gives it
free scope and does not hinder it of its will.Plato neglects for the present the
@@ -1729,11 +1729,11 @@
baby, Aristophanes Eccl. 716, is rude. Cf.
Shakespeare, “He crams these words into my ears against the stomach
of my sense.” it into your head?” “Heaven forbid!” I said,
- “don't do that. But in the first place when you have said a thing stand
+ “don’t do that. But in the first place when you have said a thing stand
by it,Cf.
- Socrates' complaint of Callicles' shifts, Gorgias 499
+ Socrates’ complaint of Callicles’ shifts, Gorgias 499
B-C, but Cf. 334 E, 340 B-C. or if you shift your ground
- change openly and don't try to deceive us.
+ change openly and don’t try to deceive us.
But, as it is, you see, Thrasymachus—let us return to
@@ -1754,8 +1754,8 @@
is concerned with nothing else than how to provide what is best for that
over which is set, since its own affairs, its own best estate, are
entirely sufficiently provided for so long as it in nowise fails of
- being the shepherd's art. And in like manner I supposed that we just now
- were constrained to acknowledge that every form of ruleAristotle's despotic
+ being the shepherd’s art. And in like manner I supposed that we just now
+ were constrained to acknowledge that every form of ruleAristotle’s despotic
rule over slaves would seem to be an exception (Newman, Introduction Aristotle
Politics p. 245.). But that too should be for the
good of the slave;590 D. in so far as it is rule considers
@@ -1769,7 +1769,7 @@
8. The new point that good rulers are reluctant to take office is
discussed to 347 E, and recalled later, 520 D. See Newman, l.c. pp.
244-245, Dio Cass. xxxvi. 27. 1.—willingly hold office and
- rule?” “I don't think,” he said, “I know right well they do.”“But what of other forms of rule, Thrasymachus?
+ rule?” “I don’t think,” he said, “I know right well they do.”“But what of other forms of rule, Thrasymachus?
Do you not perceive that no one chooses of his own will to hold the
office of rule, but they demand pay, which implies that not to them will
benefit accrue from their holding office but to those whom they rule?
@@ -1780,7 +1780,7 @@
For tell me this: we ordinarily say, do we not, that
each of the arts is different from others because its power or function
is different? And, my dear fellow, in order that we may reach some
- result, don't answer counter to your real belief.Cf. Gorgias 495 A.
+ result, don’t answer counter to your real belief.Cf. Gorgias 495 A.
But elsewhere Socrates admits that the “argument” may be discussed
regardless of the belief of the respondent (349 A). Cf. Thompson on
<placeName key="tgn,2083598">Meno</placeName>
@@ -1795,20 +1795,20 @@
of view wage-earning, which is common to many arts, cannot be the
specific service of any of them, but must pertain to the special art
<foreign xml:lang="grc">MISQWTIKH/</foreign>. This refinement is
- justified by Thrasymachus' original abstraction of the infallible
+ justified by Thrasymachus’ original abstraction of the infallible
craftsman as such. It also has this much moral truth, that the good
workman, as <placeName key="tgn,1013727">Ruskin</placeName> says,
rarely thinks first of his pay, and that the knack of getting well
paid does not always go with the ability to do the work well. See
Aristolte on <foreign xml:lang="grc">XRHMATISTIKH/</foreign>,
<title>Politics i. 3 (1253 b
- 14). as for example medicine health, the pilot's art safety
+ 14). as for example medicine health, the pilot’s art safety
at sea, and the other arts similarly?” “Assuredly.” “And does not the
- wage-earner's art yield wage? For that is its function.
+ wage-earner’s art yield wage? For that is its function.
- Would you identify medicine and the pilot's art? Or if
- you please to discriminate 'precisely' as you proposed, none the more if
+ Would you identify medicine and the pilot’s art? Or if
+ you please to discriminate ’precisely’ as you proposed, none the more if
a pilot regains his health because a sea voyage is good for him, no whit
the more, I say, for this reason do you call his art medicine, do you?”
“Of course not,” he said. “Neither, I take it, do you call wage-earning
@@ -1827,7 +1827,7 @@
the receiving of wages does not accrue to each from his
- own art. But if we are to consider it 'precisely' medicine produces
+ own art. But if we are to consider it ’precisely’ medicine produces
health but the fee-earning art the pay, and architecture a house but the
fee-earning art accompanying it the fee, and so with all the others,
each performs its own task and benefits that over which it is set, but
@@ -1836,13 +1836,13 @@
bestow no benefit either
- when he works for nothing?” “I'll say he does.” “Then,
+ when he works for nothing?” “I’ll say he does.” “Then,
Thrasymachus, is not this immediately apparent, that no art or office
provides what is beneficial for itself—but as we said long ago it
provides and enjoins what is beneficial to its subject, considering the
advantage of that, the weaker, and not the advantage the stronger? That
was why, friend Thrasymachus, I was just now saying that no one of his
- own will chooses to hold rule and office and take other people's
+ own will chooses to hold rule and office and take other people’s
troublesKAKA/=troubles, “miseres”,
517 D. For the thought cf. 343 E, 345 E, Xen. Mem. 2.1.8, Hdt. 1.97. in hand to straighten
@@ -1857,14 +1857,14 @@
be provided for those who are to consent to rule, either in form of
money or honor or a penalty if they refuse.”“What do you mean by that, Socrates?” said Glaucon.
“The two wages I recognize, but the penalty you speak of and described
- as a form of wage I don't understand.Plato habitually explains metaphors,
+ as a form of wage I don’t understand.Plato habitually explains metaphors,
abstractions, and complicated defintions in this dramatic fashion.
Cf. 352 E, 377 A, 413 A, 429 C, 438 B, 510 B.” “Then,” said
- I, “you don't understand the wages of the best men
+ I, “you don’t understand the wages of the best men
for the sake of which the finest spirits hold office
- and rule when they consent to do so. Don't you know that to be covetous
+ and rule when they consent to do so. Don’t you know that to be covetous
of honor and covetous of money is said to be and is a reproach?” “I do,”
he said. “Well, then,” said I, “that is why the good are not willing to
rule either for the sake of money or of honor. They do not wish to
@@ -1901,8 +1901,8 @@
strongly than
<placeName key="tgn,2083598">Meno</placeName>
100 A, 89 B. only, immunity from office-holding
- would be as eagerly contended for as office is now,The paradox suggests Spencer's altruistic competition
- and Archibald Marshall's Upsidonia. Cf. 521 A, 586 C, Isocrates vii.
+ would be as eagerly contended for as office is now,The paradox suggests Spencer’s altruistic competition
+ and Archibald Marshall’s Upsidonia. Cf. 521 A, 586 C, Isocrates vii.
24, xii. 145; Mill, On Representative Government, p.
56: “The good despot . . . can hardly be imagined as conseting to
undertake it unless as a refuge from intolerable evils;” ibid. p.
@@ -1919,11 +1919,11 @@
the advantage of the superior. But that we will reserve for another
occasion.EI)SAU=QIS lays the matter on
- the table. Cf. 430 C. The suggestiveness of Thrasymachus' defintion
+ the table. Cf. 430 C. The suggestiveness of Thrasymachus’ defintion
is exhausted, and Socrates turns to the larger question and main
theme of the Republic raised by the contention that
the unjust life is happier and more profitable than the just.
- A far weightier matter seems to me Thrasymachus's present statement, his
+ A far weightier matter seems to me Thrasymachus’s present statement, his
assertion that the life of the unjust man is better than that of the
just. Which now do you choose, Glaucon?” said I, “and which seems to you
to be the truer statement?” “That the life of the just man is more
@@ -1964,16 +1964,16 @@
“Tell me then how you would express yourself on this point about them.
You call one of them, I presume, a virtue and the other a vice?” “Of
course.” “Justice the virtue and injustice the vice?” “It is
- likely,Thrasymachus's “Umwertung aller Werte” reverses the normal
+ likely,Thrasymachus’s “Umwertung aller Werte” reverses the normal
application of the words, as Callicles does in
Gorgias 491 E. you innocent, when I say
- that injustice pays and justice doesn't pay.” “But what then, pray?”
+ that injustice pays and justice doesn’t pay.” “But what then, pray?”
“The opposite,” he replied. “What! justice vice?” “No, but a most noble
- simplicityThrasymachus recoils from the extreme position. Socrates' inference
+ simplicityThrasymachus recoils from the extreme position. Socrates’ inference
from the etymology of EU)H/QEIA(cf. 343 C) is repudiated. Injustice is not
turpitude (bad character) but—discretion.EU)BOULI/A in a higher sense is what Protagoras
teaches (Protagoras 318 E) and in the highest sense
- is the wisdom of Plato's guardians (428 B). or goodness of
+ is the wisdom of Plato’s guardians (428 B). or goodness of
heart.” “Then do you call injustice badness of heart?”
@@ -2016,19 +2016,19 @@
- that we were assigning to the just, since you don't
+ that we were assigning to the just, since you don’t
shrink from putting it in the category of virtue and wisdom.” “You are a
- most veritable prophet,” he replied. “Well,” said I, “I mustn't flinch
+ most veritable prophet,” he replied. “Well,” said I, “I mustn’t flinch
from following out the logic of the inquiry, so long as I conceive you
to be saying what you think.Cf. on 346 A. For now, Thrasymachus, I
- absolutely believe that you are not 'mocking' us but telling us your
+ absolutely believe that you are not ’mocking’ us but telling us your
real opinions about the truth.PERI\ TH=S
A)LHQEI/AS suggests the dogmatic titles of sophistic
and pre-Socratic books. Cf. Antiphon, p. 553 Diels, Campbell on
Theaetetus 161 C, and Aristotle Met.
passim.” “What difference does it make to you,”
- he said, “whether I believe it or not?” “Why don't you test the
+ he said, “whether I believe it or not?” “Why don’t you test the
argument?”
@@ -2037,7 +2037,7 @@
man would want to overreachIn pursuance of the analogy between the virtues
and the arts the moral idea PLEONECI/A(overreaching, getting more than your
share; see on 359 C) is generalized to include doing more than or
- differently from. English can hardly reproduce this. Jowett's
+ differently from. English can hardly reproduce this. Jowett’s
Shakespearian quotation (King JohnIV. ii. 28), “When
workmen strive to do better than well,/ They do confound their skill
in covetousness,” though apt, only illustrates the thought in
@@ -2046,7 +2046,7 @@
would he exceed or overreach or go beyond the just action?” “Not that
either,” he replied. “But how would he treat the unjust man—would he
deem it proper and just to outdo, overreach, or go beyond him or would
- he not?” “He would,” he said, “but he wouldn't be able to.” “That is not
+ he not?” “He would,” he said, “but he wouldn’t be able to.” “That is not
my question,” I said,
@@ -2067,7 +2067,7 @@
like the intelligent and good and the just man is not?” “Of course,” he
said, “being such he will be like to such and the other not.”
“Excellent. Then each is suchThe assumption that a thing is what it is like
- is put as an inference from Thrasymachus's ready admission that the
+ is put as an inference from Thrasymachus’s ready admission that the
unjust man is wise and good and is like the wise and good. Jevons
says in “Substitution of Similars”; “Whatever is true of a thing is
true of its like.” But practical logic requires the qualification
@@ -2123,7 +2123,7 @@
the knower and the ignorant?” “It may be.” “But the one
- who knows is wise?” “I'll say so.” “And the wise is good?” “I'll say
+ who knows is wise?” “I’ll say so.” “And the wise is good?” “I’ll say
so.” “Then he who is good and wise will not wish to overreach his like
but his unlike and opposite.” “It seems so,” he said. “But the bad man
and the ignoramus will overreach both like and unlike?” “So it appears.”
@@ -2152,8 +2152,8 @@
to share in the discussion but finally nods an ironical assent to
everything that Socrates says. So Callicles in
Gorgias 510 A. But we were also affirming
- that injustice is a strong and potent thing. Don't you remember,
- Thrasymachus?” “I remember,” he said; “but I don't agree with what you
+ that injustice is a strong and potent thing. Don’t you remember,
+ Thrasymachus?” “I remember,” he said; “but I don’t agree with what you
are now saying either and I have an answer to it,
@@ -2167,9 +2167,9 @@
or, if you prefer to ask questions, go on questioning and I, as we do
for old wivesCf.
Gorgias 527 A. telling their tales, will
- say 'Very good' and will nod assent and dissent.” “No, no,” said I, “not
+ say ’Very good’ and will nod assent and dissent.” “No, no,” said I, “not
counter to your own belief.” “Yes, to please you,” he said, “since you
- don't allow me freedom of speech. And yet what more do you want?”
+ don’t allow me freedom of speech. And yet what more do you want?”
“Nothing, indeed,” said I; “but if this is what you propose to do, do it
and I will ask the questions.” “Ask on, then.” “This, then, is the
question I ask, the same as before, so that our inquiry may proceed in
@@ -2217,7 +2217,7 @@
Ethics, Chapter. VIII. 31: “It (the loyalty of a thief
to his gang) is rather a spurious or class morality,” etc.;
Carlyle: “Neither James
- Boswell's good book, nor any other good thinng . . . is or can be
+ Boswell’s good book, nor any other good thinng . . . is or can be
performed by any man in virtue of his badness, but always solely in
spite thereof.” Proclus, In Rempub. Kroll i. 20 expands this idea.
Dante
@@ -2234,7 +2234,7 @@
anything if they wronged one another?”
- “Certainly not,” said he. “But if they didn't, wouldn't
+ “Certainly not,” said he. “But if they didn’t, wouldn’t
they be more likely to?” “Assuredly.” “For factions, Thrasymachus, are
the outcome of injustice, and hatreds and internecine conflicts, but
justice brings oneness of mind and love. Is it not so?” “So be it,” he
@@ -2273,7 +2273,7 @@
Aritotle, Eth. Nic. v. 11, inquires whether a man can
wrong himself, and Chrysippus (Plutarch, Stoic.
Repug. xvi.) pronounces the expression absurd. and to
- its opposite in every case, the just? Isn't that so?” “By all means.”
+ its opposite in every case, the just? Isn’t that so?” “By all means.”
“Then in the individual too, I presume, its presence will operate all
these effects which it is its nature to produce. It will in the first
place make him incapable of accomplishing anything because of inner
@@ -2355,7 +2355,7 @@
90 E, Plato, Laws 896 D,
Phaedrus 246 B. or function?” “I would.”
“Would you be willing to define the work of a horse or of anything else
- to be that which one can do only with it or best with it?” “I don't
+ to be that which one can do only with it or best with it?” “I don’t
understand,” he replied. “Well, take it this way: is there anything else
with which you can see except the eyes?” “Certainly not.” “Again, could
you hear with anything but ears?” “By no means.” “Would you not rightly
@@ -2398,7 +2398,7 @@
the same principle to all things?” “I think so.” “Then
- next consider this. The soul, has it a work which you couldn't
+ next consider this. The soul, has it a work which you couldn’t
accomplish with anything else in the world, as for example, management,
rule, deliberation, and the like, is there anything else than soul to
which you could rightly assign these and say that they were its peculiar
@@ -2461,7 +2461,7 @@
the close of a Socratic dialogue Cf. Charmides 175
A-B, Lysis 222 D-E, Protagoras 361
A-B, Xenophon Memorabilia iv. 2. 39. Cf. also
- Introduction p. x. For if I don't know what the just is,Knowledge of the
+ Introduction p. x. For if I don’t know what the just is,Knowledge of the
essence or definition must precede discussion of qualities and
relations. Cf
<placeName key="tgn,2505769">Meno</placeName>
@@ -2479,7 +2479,7 @@
supposed that I was done with the subject, but it all turned out to be
only a prelude. For Glaucon, who is always an intrepid enterprising
spirit in everything, would not on this occasion acquiesce in
- Thrasymachus's abandonment<note anchored="true" resp="Loeb" place="unspecified">So in <title>Philebus 11 C, Philebus
+ Thrasymachus’s abandonmentSo in Philebus 11 C, Philebus
cries off or throws up the sponge in the argument. of his
case, but said, “Socrates, is it your desire to seem to have persuaded
us
@@ -2502,7 +2502,7 @@
to possess, not from desire for its after effects, but welcoming it for
its own sake? As, for example, joy and such pleasures are harmlessPlato here speaks of
harmless pleasures, from the point of view of common sense and
- prudential morality. Cf. Tim. 59 DA)METAME/LHTON H(DONH/N, Milton's
+ prudential morality. Cf. Tim. 59 DA)METAME/LHTON H(DONH/N, Milton’s
“Mirth that after no repenting draws.” But the
Republic(583 D) like the
Gorgias(493 E-494 C) knows the more technical
@@ -2517,7 +2517,7 @@
this distinction, as well as Aristotle. such as
understanding,Some philosophers, as Aristippus (Diogenes Laertius x. 1. 138),
said that intelligence is a good only for its consequences, but the
- opening sentences of Aritotle's Metaphysics treat all
+ opening sentences of Aritotle’s Metaphysics treat all
forms of knowledge as goods in themselves. sight, and
health?Plutarch (1040 C) says that Chrysippus
censured Plato for recognizing health as a good, but elsewhere Plato
@@ -2550,7 +2550,7 @@
he said, “hear what I too have to say and see if you
agree with me. For Thrasymachus seems to me to have given up to you too
- soon, as if he were a serpentFor Plato's fondness for the idea of KHLEI=N Cf. The Unity of Plato's
+ soon, as if he were a serpent<note anchored="true" resp="Loeb" place="unspecified">For Plato’s fondness for the idea of <foreign xml:lang="grc">KHLEI=N</foreign> Cf. <title>The Unity of Plato’s
Thought, note 500. that you had charmed, but I am
not yet satisfied with the proof that has been offered about justice and
injustice. For what I desire is to hear what each of them is and what
@@ -2564,7 +2564,7 @@
practise it do so reluctantly, regarding it as something necessaryCf. 347 C-D.
and not as a good; and thirdly, that they have plausible grounds for
thus acting, since forsooth the life of the unjust man is far better
- than that of the just man—as they say; though I, Socrates, don't believe
+ than that of the just man—as they say; though I, Socrates, don’t believe
it. Yet I am disconcerted when my ears are dinned by the arguments of
Thrasymachus and innumerable others.Cf. Philebus 66 E. Plato affirms
that the immoralism of Thrasymachus and Callicles was widespread in
@@ -2614,13 +2614,13 @@
the lawful and the just, and that this is the genesis and essential
nature of justice—a compromise between the best, which is to do wrong
with impunity, and the worst, which is to be wronged and be impotent to
- get one's revenge. Justice, they tell us, being mid-way between the two,
+ get one’s revenge. Justice, they tell us, being mid-way between the two,
is accepted and approved,
not as a real good, but as a thing honored in the lack
of vigor to do injustice, since anyone who had the power to do it and
- was in reality 'a man' would never make a compact with anybody either to
+ was in reality ’a man’ would never make a compact with anybody either to
wrong nor to be wronged; for he would be mad. The nature, then, of
justice is this and such as this, Socrates, and such are the conditions
in which it originates, according to the theory.“But as for the second point, that those who practise
@@ -2650,7 +2650,7 @@
Greek sophists as distinctly partisans of NO/MOS or FU/SIS.
It cannot be done. Cf. my unsigned review of Alfred Benn in the
New York Nation, July 20, 1899, p. 57. it is forcibly diverted to paying
- honor to 'equality.'Cf. Gorgias 508 A. The
+ honor to ’equality.’Cf. Gorgias 508 A. The
licence that I mean would be most nearly such as would result from
supposing them to have the power
@@ -2658,11 +2658,11 @@
which men say once came to the ancestor of Gyges the
Lydian.So
manuscripts and Proclus. There are many emendations which the
- curious will find in Adam's first appendix to the book. Herodotus i.
+ curious will find in Adam’s first appendix to the book. Herodotus i.
8-13 tells a similar but not identical story of Gyges himself, in
- which the magic ring and many other points of Plato's tale are
+ which the magic ring and many other points of Plato’s tale are
lacking. On the whole legend cf. the study of Kirby Flower Smith,
- A.J.P. vol. xxiii. pp. 261-282, 361-387, and Frazer's Paus. iii.
+ A.J.P. vol. xxiii. pp. 261-282, 361-387, and Frazer’s Paus. iii.
p. 417. They relate that he was a shepherd in the service of
the ruler at that time of Lydia, and that after a great deluge of rain and an
earthquake the ground opened and a chasm appeared in the place where he
@@ -2678,7 +2678,7 @@
the flocks, he also attended wearing the ring. So as he sat there it
chanced that he turned the collet of the ring towards himself, towards
the inner part of his hand, and when this took place they say that he
- became invisibleMr. H.G. Wells'The Invisible Man rests on a similar
+ became invisibleMr. H.G. Wells’The Invisible Man rests on a similar
fancy. Cf. also the lawless fancies of Aristophanes
Birds 785 ff.
@@ -2695,7 +2695,7 @@
who went up to the king, and on coming there he seduced
- the king's wife and with her aid set upon the king and slew him and
+ the king’s wife and with her aid set upon the king and slew him and
possessed his kingdom. If now there should be two such rings, and the
just man should put on one and the unjust the other, no one could be
found, it would seem, of such adamantineThe word is used of the firmness of
@@ -2710,9 +2710,9 @@
slay and loose from bonds whomsoever he would, and in all other things
conduct himself among mankind as the equal of a god.I)SO/QEOS. The word is a leit-motif
- anticipating Plato's rebuke of the tragedians for their praises of
+ anticipating Plato’s rebuke of the tragedians for their praises of
the tyraant. Cf. 568 A-B. It does not, as Adam suggests, foreshadow
- Plato's attack on the popular theology. And in so acting he
+ Plato’s attack on the popular theology. And in so acting he
would do no differently from the other man, but both would pursue the
same course. And yet this is a great proof, one might argue, that no one
is just of his own will but only from constraint, in the belief that
@@ -2724,7 +2724,7 @@
injustice than in justice is what every man believes, and believes
truly, as the proponent of this theory will maintain. For if anyone who
had got such a licence within his grasp should refuse to do any wrong or
- lay his hands on others' possessions, he would be regarded as most
+ lay his hands on others’ possessions, he would be regarded as most
pitiableCf.
344 A, Gorgias 492 B. and a great fool by all
who took note of it,
@@ -2737,7 +2737,7 @@
EI)DO/SIN. though they would praise himCf.
Gorgias 483 B, 492 A, Protagoras
327 B, Aristotle Rhet. ii. 23. before one
- another's faces, deceiving one another because of their fear of
+ another’s faces, deceiving one another because of their fear of
suffering injustice. So much for this point.
@@ -2789,7 +2789,7 @@
he will have honors and gifts because of that esteem.
- We cannot be sure in that case whether he is just for justice' sake or
+ We cannot be sure in that case whether he is just for justice’ sake or
for the sake of the gifts and the honors. So we must strip him bare of
everything but justice and make his state the opposite of his imagined
counterpart.For the thought cf. Euripides Helen 270-271.
@@ -2823,7 +2823,7 @@
the branding-iron in his eyes, and finally, after every
extremity of suffering, he will be crucified,Or strictly “impaled.” Cf. Cicero
De Rep. iii. 27. Writers on Plato and
- Christianity have often compared the fate of Plato's just man with
+ Christianity have often compared the fate of Plato’s just man with
the crucifixion. and so will learn his lesson that not to be
but to seem just is what we ought to desire. And the saying of
Aeschylus
@@ -2874,10 +2874,10 @@
to make some reply thereto, but his brother Adeimantus
- said, “You surely don't suppose, Socrates, that the statement of the
+ said, “You surely don’t suppose, Socrates, that the statement of the
case is complete?” “Why, what else?” I said. “The very most essential
point,” said he, “has not been mentioned.” “Then,” said I, “as the
- proverb has it, 'Let a brother help a man'
+ proverb has it, ’Let a brother help a man’A)DELFO\S
A)NDRI\ PAREI/H. The rhythm perhaps indicates a
proverb of which the scholiast found the source in
@@ -2890,7 +2890,7 @@
“Nonsense,” he said, “but listen to this further point. We must set
forth the reasoning and the language of the opposite party, of those who
commend justice and dispraise injustice, if what I conceive to be
- Glaucon's meaning is to be made more clear. Fathers, when they address
+ Glaucon’s meaning is to be made more clear. Fathers, when they address
exhortations to their sons, and all those who have others in their
charge,Who, in
Quaker language, have a concern for, who have charge of souls. Cf.
@@ -2958,7 +2958,7 @@
them to the house of Hades in their tale and arrange a symposium of the
saints,SUMPO/SION TW=N O(SI/WN.
- Jowett's notion that this is a jingle is due to the English
+ Jowett’s notion that this is a jingle is due to the English
pronunciation of Greek. where, reclined on couches crowned
with wreaths,
@@ -2966,7 +2966,7 @@
they entertain the time henceforth with wine, as if the
fairest meed of virtue were an everlasting drunk. And others extend
still further the rewards of virtue from the gods. For they say that the
- children's childrenKern, ibid., quotes Servius ad
+ children’s childrenKern, ibid., quotes Servius adVirgil, Aeneid iii.
98 “et nati natorum” and opines that Homer took
<placeName key="tgn,2061426">Iliad</placeName>
@@ -3015,9 +3015,9 @@
justice.</note> and virtue, how so it is that the gods themselves
assign to many good men misfortunes and an evil life but to their
opposites a contrary lot; and begging priests<note anchored="true" resp="Loeb" place="unspecified">There is a striking analogy between
- Plato's language here and the description by Protestant historians
- of the sale of indulgences by Tetzel in <placeName key="tgn,7000084">Germany</placeName>. Rich men's doors is proverbial. Cf. 489
- B.</note> and soothsayers go to rich men's doors and make them
+ Plato’s language here and the description by Protestant historians
+ of the sale of indulgences by Tetzel in <placeName key="tgn,7000084">Germany</placeName>. Rich men’s doors is proverbial. Cf. 489
+ B.</note> and soothsayers go to rich men’s doors and make them
believe that they by means of sacrifices and incantations have
accumulated a treasure of power from the gods<note anchored="true" resp="Loeb" place="unspecified">Cf. Mill, “Utility of
Religion,”<title>Three Essays on Religion, p. 90: “All
@@ -3099,7 +3099,7 @@
all the character and the path whereby a man would lead
- the best life? Such a youthCf. Unity of <placeName key="tgn,1023926">Plato</placeName>'s Thought, p. 25: “His (Plato's)
+ the best life? Such a youthCf. Unity of <placeName key="tgn,1023926">Plato</placeName>’s Thought, p. 25: “His (Plato’s)
imagination was beset by the picture of some brilliant young
Alcibiades standing at the crossways of life and debating in his
mind whether the best chance for happiness lay in accepting the
@@ -3107,7 +3107,7 @@
rein to the instincts and appetites of his own stronger nature. To
confute the one, to convince the other, became to him the main
problem of moral philosophy.” Cf. Introduction x-xi; also “The Idea
- of Good in Plato's Republic,” p. 214. would
+ of Good in Plato’s Republic,” p. 214. would
most likely put to himself the question Pindar asks, ‘Is it by justice or by crooked deceit that
I the higher tower shall scale and so live my life out in fenced and
guarded security?’
@@ -3133,8 +3133,8 @@
R.KEPDALE/AN is a standing
epithet of Reynard. Cf.
Gildersleeve on Pindar Pyth. ii. 78. shifty
- and bent on gain. Nay, 'tis objected, it is not easy for a wrong-doer
- always to lie hid.Cf. my review of Jebb's “Bacchylides,”Class. <placeName key="tgn,2578490">Phil</placeName>
+ and bent on gain. Nay, ’tis objected, it is not easy for a wrong-doer
+ always to lie hid.<note anchored="true" resp="Loeb" place="unspecified">Cf. my review of Jebb’s “Bacchylides,”<title>Class. <placeName key="tgn,2578490">Phil</placeName>
., 1907, vol. ii. p. 235. Neither is any
other big thing facile,
@@ -3167,8 +3167,8 @@
- from fruits of our wrongdoing.Cf. Verres' distribution of his
- three years' spoliation of Sicily, Cicero In C. Verrem actio
+ <said who="Socrates">from fruits of our wrongdoing.<note anchored="true" resp="Loeb" place="unspecified">Cf. Verres’ distribution of his
+ three years’ spoliation of <placeName key="tgn,7003122">Sicily</placeName>, Cicero <title>In C. Verrem actio
prima 14 (40), and Plato Laws 906 C-D,
Lysias xxvii. 6. For if we are just, we shall, it is true, be
unscathed by the gods, but we shall be putting away from us the profits
@@ -3176,11 +3176,11 @@
the importunity of our prayers, when we transgress and sin, we shall
persuade them and escape scot-free. Yes, it will be objected, but we
shall be brought to judgement in the world below for our unjust deeds
- here, we or our children's children. 'Nay, my dear sir,' our calculating
+ here, we or our children’s children. ’Nay, my dear sir,’ our calculating
friendHis
morality is the hedonistic calculus of the Protagoras
or the commercial religion of “other-wordliness.” will say,
- 'here again the rites for the deadFor these TELETAI/ cf. 365 A. have much efficacy, and
+ ’here again the rites for the deadFor these TELETAI/ cf. 365 A. have much efficacy, and
the absolving divinities,
@@ -3189,7 +3189,7 @@
who reveal that this is the truth.“On
what further ground, then, could we prefer justice to supreme injustice?
If we combine this with a counterfeit decorum, we shall prosper to our
- heart's desire, with gods and men in life and death, as the words of the
+ heart’s desire, with gods and men in life and death, as the words of the
multitude and of men of the highest authority declare. In consequence,
then, of all that has been said, what possibility is there, Socrates,
that any man
@@ -3231,7 +3231,7 @@
For if you had all spoken in this way from the
beginning and from our youth up had sought to convince us, we should not
- now be guarding against one another's injustice, but each would be his
+ now be guarding against one another’s injustice, but each would be his
own best guardian, for fear lest by working injustice he should dwell in
communion with the greatest of evils.Cf. 363 E. This, Socrates, and perhaps
even more than this, Thrasymachus and haply another might say in pleas
@@ -3253,7 +3253,7 @@
nor injustice that you censure, but the seeming, and
that you really are exhorting us to be unjust but conceal it, and that
you are at one with Thrasymachus in the opinion that justice is other
- man's good,Cf. 343
+ man’s good,Cf. 343
C. the advantage of the other, and that injustice is
advantageous and profitible to oneself but disadvantageous to the
inferior. Since, then, you have admitted that justice belongs to the
@@ -3262,7 +3262,7 @@
intelligence, yes and health too,
- and all other goods that are productiveAdam's note on
+ and all other goods that are productiveAdam’s note on
GO/NIMA: i.q.GNH/SIA is, I think, wrong. by
their very nature and not by opinion, this is what I would have you
praise about justice—the benefit which it and the harm which injustice
@@ -3298,12 +3298,12 @@
admirerPossibly Critias. of Glaucon wrote when you distinguished
yourselves in the battle of MegaraProbably the battle of 409 B.C., reported in Diodor. Sic. xiii. 65. Cf.
- Introduction p. viii.—'Sons of Ariston,The implied pun on the name is made
+ Introduction p. viii.—’Sons of Ariston,The implied pun on the name is made
explicit in 580 C-D. Some have held that Glaucon and Adeimantus were
uncles of Plato, but Zeller decides for the usual view that they wre
brothers. Cf. Ph. d. Gr. ii. 1, 4th ed. 1889, p. 392, and Abhandl. d. Berl.
Akad., 1873, Hist.-Phil Kl. pp.
- 86 ff. whose race from a glorious sire is god-like.' This, my
+ 86 ff. whose race from a glorious sire is god-like.’ This, my
friends, I think, was well said. For there must indeed be a touch of the
god-like in your disposition if you are not convinced that injustice is
preferable to justice though you can plead its case in such fashion.
@@ -3363,7 +3363,7 @@
“Much more.” “Shall we try it, then, and go through
with it? I fancy it is no slight task. Reflect, then.” “We have
- reflected,“C'est tout reflechi.”” said Adeimantus; “proceed and don't
+ reflected,“C’est tout reflechi.”” said Adeimantus; “proceed and don’t
refuse.”“The origin of the city,
then,” said I, “in my opinion, is to be found in the fact that we do not
severally suffice for our own needs,Often imitated, as e.g. Hooker,
@@ -3393,8 +3393,8 @@
“Now the first and chief of our needs is the provision
of food for existence and life.”Aristotle says that the city comes into being
for the sake of life, but exists for the sake of the good life,
- which, of course, is also Plato's view of the true raison
- d'etre of the state. Cf. Laws 828 D and
+ which, of course, is also Plato’s view of the true raison
+ d’etre of the state. Cf. Laws 828 D and
Crito 48 B.“Assuredly.” “The second is
housing and the third is raiment and that sort of thing.” “That is so.”
“Tell me, then,” said I, “how our city will suffice for the provision of
@@ -3417,7 +3417,7 @@
and employ the other three-quarters, the one in the provision of a
house, the other of a garment, the other of shoes, and not have the
bother of associating with other people, but, himself for himself, mind
- his own affairs?”It is characteristic of Plato's drama of ideas to give this kind of
+ his own affairs?”It is characteristic of Plato’s drama of ideas to give this kind of
rhetorical advantage to the expression of the view that he intends
to reject. In what follows Plato anticipates the advantages of the
division of labor as set forth in Adam Smith, with the
@@ -3429,7 +3429,7 @@
all alike but different. One man is naturally fitted
- for one task, and another for another. Don't you think so?” “I do.”
+ for one task, and another for another. Don’t you think so?” “I do.”
“Again, would one man do better working at many tasks or one at one?”
“One at one,” he said. “And, furthermore, this, I fancy, is obvious—that
if one lets slip the right season, the favorable moment in any task, the
@@ -3451,15 +3451,15 @@
will the builder, who also needs many; and similarly the weaver and
cobbler.” “True.” “Carpenters, then, and smiths and many similar
craftsmen, associating themselves with our hamlet, will enlarge it
- considerably.” “Certainly.” “Yet it still wouldn't be very large even if
+ considerably.” “Certainly.” “Yet it still wouldn’t be very large even if
we should add to them neat-herds and shepherds and other herders,
so that the farmers might have cattle for
- ploughing,Butcher's meat and pork appear first in the luxurious city, 373 C.
+ ploughing,Butcher’s meat and pork appear first in the luxurious city, 373 C.
We cannot infer that Plato was a vegetarian. and the builders
oxen to use with the farmers for transportation, and the weavers and
- cobblers hides and fleeces for their use.” “It wouldn't be a small city,
+ cobblers hides and fleeces for their use.” “It wouldn’t be a small city,
either, if it had all these.” “But further,” said I, “it is practically
impossible to establish the city in a region where it will not need
imports.” “It is.” “There will be a further need, then, of those who
@@ -3577,7 +3577,7 @@
and dine from tables and have made dishes and
sweetmeats such as are now in use.” “Good,” said I, “I understand. It is
not merely the origin of a city, it seems, that we are considering but
- the origin of a luxurious city. Perhaps that isn't such a bad
+ the origin of a luxurious city. Perhaps that isn’t such a bad
suggestion, either. For by observation of such a city it may be we could
discern the origin of justice and injustice in states. The true state I
believe to be the one we have described—the healthy state, as it were.
@@ -3614,7 +3614,7 @@
the entire class of huntsmen, and the imitators,QHREUTAI/ and MIMHTAI/ are generalized Platonic categories,
including much not ordinarily signified by the words. For a list of
- such Platonic generalizations Cf. Unity of Plato's
+ such Platonic generalizations Cf. <title>Unity of Plato’s
Thought, note 500. many of them occupied with
figures and colors and many with music—the poets and their assistants,
rhapsodists, actors, chorus-dancers, contractorsContractors generally, and
@@ -3622,8 +3622,8 @@
the manufacturers of all kinds of articles, especially
- those that have to do with women's adornment. And so we shall also want
- more servitors. Don't you think that we shall need tutors, nurses
+ those that have to do with women’s adornment. And so we shall also want
+ more servitors. Don’t you think that we shall need tutors, nurses
wetThe mothers
of the idyllic state nursed their own children, but in the ideal
state the wives of the guardians are relieved of this burden by
@@ -3649,7 +3649,7 @@
territory, I presume, that was then sufficient to feed the then
population, from being adequate will become too small. Is that so or
not?” “It is.” “Then we shall have to cut out a cantleCf. Isocrates iii.
- 34. of our neighbor's land if we are to have enough for
+ 34. of our neighbor’s land if we are to have enough for
pasture and ploughing, and they in turn of ours if they too abandon
themselves to the unlimitedCf. 591 D. Natural desires are limited. Luxury
and unnatural forms of wealth are limitless, as the Greek moralists
@@ -3702,16 +3702,16 @@
said. “Well, then,” said I,
- “don't you think that the business of fighting is an
+ “don’t you think that the business of fighting is an
art and a profession?” “It is indeed,” he said. “Should our concern be
- greater, then, for the cobbler's art than for the art of war?” “By no
+ greater, then, for the cobbler’s art than for the art of war?” “By no
means.” “Can we suppose,For the thought of this a
fortiori or ex contrario argument cf. 421
A. then, that while we were at pains to prevent the cobbler
from attempting to be at the same time a farmer, a weaver, or a builder
instead of just a cobbler, to the end thatI(/NA
- DH/ ironical. we might have the cobbler's
+ DH/ ironical. we might have the cobbler’s
business well done, and similarly assigned to each and every one man one
occupation, for which he was fit and naturally adapted and at which he
was to work all his days,
@@ -3736,7 +3736,7 @@
artist or an athlete by his taking it in hand, nor will it be of any
service to those who have neither acquired the scienceFor the three
requisites, science, practice, and natural ability Cf. Unity
- of Plato's Thought, note 596, and my paper on *FU/SIS, *MELE/TH, *)EPISTH/MH,
+ of Plato’s Thought, note 596, and my paper on *FU/SIS, *MELE/TH, *)EPISTH/MH,
Tr. A. Ph. A. vol. xl., 1910. of it nor sufficiently practised themselves
in its use?” “Great indeed,” he said, “would be the value of tools in
that case.Cf.
@@ -3755,9 +3755,9 @@
- so far as our strength allows.” “No, we mustn't.” “Do
+ so far as our strength allows.” “No, we mustn’t.” “Do
you think,” said I, “that there is any difference between the nature of
- a well-bred hound for this watch-dog's work and of a well-born lad?”
+ a well-bred hound for this watch-dog’s work and of a well-born lad?”
“What point have you in mind?” “I mean that each of them must be keen of
perception, quick in pursuit of what it has apprehended,AI)SQANO/MENON: present. There is no
@@ -3771,7 +3771,7 @@
anything else? Have you never observed what an
- irresistible and invincible thing is spirit,Anger (or the heart's desire?) buys
+ irresistible and invincible thing is spirit,Anger (or the heart’s desire?) buys
its will at the price of life, as Heracleitus says (fr. 105
Bywater). Cf. Aristotle Eth. Nic. 1105 a 9, 1116 b 23. the
presence of which makes every soul in the face of everything fearless
@@ -3794,7 +3794,7 @@
discover a disposition that is at once gentle and great-spirited? For
there appears to be an oppositionThe contrast of the strenuous and gentle
temperamnets is a chief point in Platonic ethics and education. Cf.
- Unity of Plato's Thought, nn. 59, 70, 481.
+ Unity of Plato’s Thought, nn. 59, 70, 481.
between the spirited type and the gentle nature.” “There does.” “But yet
if one lacks either of these qualities, a good guardian he never can be.
But these requirements resemble impossibilities, and so
@@ -3818,7 +3818,7 @@
then,” said I, “and it is not an unnatural requirement that we are
looking for in our guardian.” “It seems not.”“And does it seem to you that our guardian-to-be will
also need, in addition to the being high-spirited, the further quality
- of having the love of wisdom in his nature?” “How so?” he said; “I don't
+ of having the love of wisdom in his nature?” “How so?” he said; “I don’t
apprehend your meaning.”
@@ -3838,12 +3838,12 @@
here, as W(S A)LHQW=S indicates.
“Your dog now is your only philosopher,” says Plato, not more
seriously than Rabelais (Prologue): “Mais vistes vous oncques chien
- rencontrant quelque os medullaire: c'est comme dit Platon, lib. ii.
+ rencontrant quelque os medullaire: c’est comme dit Platon, lib. ii.
de Rep., la beste du monde plus philosophe.” Cf. Huxley,
<placeName key="tgn,2011827">Hume</placeName>
, p. 104: “The dog who barks furiously at a beggar will let
a well-dressed man pass him without opposition. Has he not a
- 'general idea' of rags and dirt associated with the idea of
+ ’general idea’ of rags and dirt associated with the idea of
aversion?” Dummler and others assume that Plato is satirizing the Cynics,
but who were the Cynics in 380-370 B.C.?” “In what respect, pray?” “In respect,”
said I, “that he distinguishes a friendly from a hostile aspect by
@@ -3872,7 +3872,7 @@
in any way towards discerning what is the object of our
entire inquiry—the origin of justice and injustice in a state—our aim
must be to omit nothing of a sufficient discussion, and yet not to draw
- it out to tiresome length?” And Glaucon's brother replied, “Certainly, I
+ it out to tiresome length?” And Glaucon’s brother replied, “Certainly, I
expect that this inquiry will bring us nearer to that end.” “Certainly,
then, my dear Adeimantus,” said I, “we must not abandon it even if it
prove to be rather long.” “No, we must not.” “Come, then, just as if we
@@ -3889,8 +3889,8 @@
its errors. A higher philosophic education will prepare a selected
few for the office of guardians par excellence or
rulers. Quite unwarranted is the supposition that the higher
- education was not in Plato's mind when he described the lower. Cf.
- 412 A, 429 D-430 C, 497 C-D, Unity of Plato's
+ education was not in Plato’s mind when he described the lower. Cf.
+ 412 A, 429 D-430 C, 497 C-D, <title>Unity of Plato’s
Thought, n. 650. Or is it hard to find a better than
that which long time has discovered?For this conservative argument Cf.
Politicus 300 B, Laws 844
@@ -3905,8 +3905,8 @@
- of both, but first of the false?” “I don't understand
- your meaning.” “Don't you understand,” I said, “that we begin by telling
+ of both, but first of the false?” “I don’t understand
+ your meaning.” “Don’t you understand,” I said, “that we begin by telling
children fables, and the fable is, taken as a whole, false, but there is
truth in it also? And we make use of fable with children before
gymnastics.” “That is so.” “That, then, is what I meant by saying that
@@ -3916,8 +3916,8 @@
Laws 753 E, 765 E, Antiphon, fr. 134
Blass. especially for any creature that is young and
tenderCf.
- Laws 664 B, and Shelley's “Specious names,/
- Learned in soft childhood's unsuspecting hour,” perhaps derived from
+ Laws 664 B, and Shelley’s “Specious names,/
+ Learned in soft childhood’s unsuspecting hour,” perhaps derived from
the educational philosophy of Rousseau.?
@@ -3925,10 +3925,10 @@
impressionThe
image became a commonplace. Cf. Theaetetus 191 D,
Horace
- Epistles ii. 32. 8, the Stoic TU/PWSIS E)N YUXH=|, and Byron's “Wax to receive and
+ Epistles ii. 32. 8, the Stoic TU/PWSIS E)N YUXH=|, and Byron’s “Wax to receive and
marble to retain.” that one wishes to stamp upon it.” “Quite
so.” “Shall we, then, thus lightly sufferCf. the censorship proposed in
- Laws 656 C. Plato's criticism of the mythology is
+ Laws 656 C. Plato’s criticism of the mythology is
anticipated in part by Euripides, Xenophanes, Heracleitus, and
Pythagoras. Cf. Decharme, Euripides and the Spirit of his
Dramas, translated by James Loeb, chap. ii. Many of the
@@ -3950,8 +3950,8 @@
greater and the less
- must have a like tendency. Don't you think so?” “I do,”
- he said; “but I don't apprehend which you mean by the greater, either.”
+ must have a like tendency. Don’t you think so?” “I do,”
+ he said; “but I don’t apprehend which you mean by the greater, either.”
“Those,” I said, “that HesiodTheogony 154-181. and
Homer and the other poets related. These, methinks, composed false
@@ -3991,7 +3991,7 @@
Adeimantus, in our city, nor is it to be said in the
hearing of a young man, that in doing the utmost wrong he would do
- nothing to surprise anybody, nor again in punishing his father'sPlato does not
+ nothing to surprise anybody, nor again in punishing his father’sPlato does not
sympathize with the Samuel Butlers of his day. wrong-doings
to the limit, but would only be following the example of the first and
greatest of the gods.The argument, whether used in jest or earnest,
@@ -4032,7 +4032,7 @@
that is the sort of thing that ought rather to be said
by their elders, men and women, to children from the beginning and as
they grow older, and we must compel the poets to keep close to this in
- their compositions. But Hera's fetteringsThe title of a play by Epicharmus.
+ their compositions. But Hera’s fetteringsThe title of a play by Epicharmus.
The hurling of Hephaestus,
<placeName key="tgn,2061426">Iliad</placeName>
i. 586-594. by her son and the hurling out of heaven
@@ -4040,12 +4040,12 @@
beating, and the battles of the gods
<placeName key="tgn,2061426">Iliad</placeName>
- xx. 1-74; xxi. 385-513. in Homer's verse are things
+ xx. 1-74; xxi. 385-513. in Homer’s verse are things
that we must not admit into our city either wrought in allegoryU(PO/NOIA: the older word for allegory;
Plutarch, De Aud. Poet. 19 E. For the allegorical
- interpretation of Homer in Plato's time cf. Jebb, Homer, p. 89,
- and Mrs. Anne Bates Hersman's Chicago Dissertation:Studies in
+ interpretation of Homer in <placeName key="tgn,2055256">Plato</placeName>’s time cf. Jebb, <title>Homer, p. 89,
+ and Mrs. Anne Bates Hersman’s Chicago Dissertation:Studies in
Greek Allegorical Interpretation. or without
allegory. For the young are not able to distinguish what is and what is
not allegory, but whatever opinions are taken into the mind at that age
@@ -4080,10 +4080,10 @@
and always to be spoken ofIt is charcteristic of Plato to distinguish the fact and
the desirability of proclaiming it. The argument proceeds by the
- minute links which tempt to parody. Below TO\ A)GAQO/N, followed by OU)D' A)/RA . . . O( QEO/S, is in itself a refutation
+ minute links which tempt to parody. Below TO\ A)GAQO/N, followed by OU)D’ A)/RA . . . O( QEO/S, is in itself a refutation
of the ontological identification in Plato of God and the Idea of
Good. But the essential goodness of God is a commonplace of liberal
- and philosophical theology, from the Stoics to Whittier's hymn, “The Eternal
+ and philosophical theology, from the Stoics to Whittier’s hymn, “The Eternal
Goodness.” as such?” “Certainly.” “But further, no good thing
is harmful, is it?” “I think not.” “Can what is not harmful harm?” “By
no means.” “Can that which does not harm do any evil?” “Not that
@@ -4099,10 +4099,10 @@
mankind he is the cause of few things, but of many things not the
cause.Anticipates the proclamtion of the prophet in the final myth, 617
E:AI)TI/A E(LOME/NOU: QEO\S
- A)NAI/TIOS. The idea, elaborated in Cleanthes' hymn to
+ A)NAI/TIOS. The idea, elaborated in Cleanthes’ hymn to
Zeus, may be traced back to the speech of the Homeric Zeus in
Odyssey i. 33E)C H(MEW=N
- GA/P FASI KA/K' E)/MMENAI. St. Thomas distinguishes:
+ GA/P FASI KA/K’ E)/MMENAI. St. Thomas distinguishes:
“Deus est auctor mali quod est poena, non autem mali quod est
culpa.” For good things are far fewerA pessimistic commoplace more
emphasized in the Laws than in the
@@ -4175,7 +4175,7 @@
perdere dementat prius,” cf. Theognis 405, Schmidt, Ethik d.
Griechen, i. pp. 235 and 247, and Jebb on Sophocles
Antigone 620-624. but if any poets compose
- a 'Sorrows of Niobe,' the poem that contains these iambics, or a tale of
+ a ’Sorrows of Niobe,’ the poem that contains these iambics, or a tale of
the Pelopidae or of Troy, or
anything else of the kind, we must either forbid them to say that these
woes are the work of God, or they must devise some such interpretation
@@ -4184,7 +4184,7 @@
did was righteous and good, and they were
benefited
- Plato's doctrine that
+ Plato’s doctrine that
punishment is remedial must apply to punishments inflicted by the
gods. Cf. Protagoras 324 B, Gorgias
478 E, 480 A, 505 B, 525 B, 590 A-B. Yet there are some incurables.
@@ -4204,7 +4204,7 @@
they are said, be holy, nor would they be profitable to us or concordant
with themselves.” “I cast my vote with yours for this law,” he said,
“and am well pleased with it.” “This, then,” said I, “will be one of the
- laws and patterns concerning the godsMinucius Felix says of Plato's theology,
+ laws and patterns concerning the godsMinucius Felix says of Plato’s theology,
Octav. chap. xix: “Platoni apertior de deo et
rebus ipsis et nominibus oratio est et quae tota esset caelestis
nisi persuasionis civilis nonnunquam admixtione sordesceret.”
@@ -4226,7 +4226,7 @@
Tim.50 B, Cratylus 439 E.
Aristotle, H. A. i. 1. 32, applies it to
biology:TO\ GENNAI=O/N E)STI TO\ MH\
- E)CISTA/MENON E)K TH=S AU(TOU= FU/SEWS. Plato's proof
+ E)CISTA/MENON E)K TH=S AU(TOU= FU/SEWS. Plato’s proof
from the idea of perfection that God is changeless has little in
common with the Eleatic argument that pure being cannot
change. its own form, would it not be displaced and changed,
@@ -4236,7 +4236,7 @@
or by something else?” “Necessarily.” “Is it not true
that to be altered and movedThe Theaetetus explicitly
distinguishes two kinds of motion, qualitative change and motion
- proper (181 C-D), but the distinction is in Plato's mind here and in
+ proper (181 C-D), but the distinction is in Plato’s mind here and in
Cratylus 439 E. by something else happens
least to things that are in the best condition, as, for example, a body
by food and drink and toil, and plantsCf. Laws 765 E. by the
@@ -4321,13 +4321,13 @@
said I; “would a god wish to deceive, or lie, by
- presenting in either word or action what is only appearance?” “I don't
- know,” said he. “Don't you know,” said I, “that the veritable lie, if
+ presenting in either word or action what is only appearance?” “I don’t
+ know,” said he. “Don’t you know,” said I, “that the veritable lie, if
the expression is permissible, is a thing that all gods and men abhor?”
“What do you mean?” he said. “This,” said I, “that falsehood in the most
vital part of themselves, and about their most vital concerns, is
something that no one willingly accepts, but it is there above all that
- everyone fears it.” “I don't understand yet either.” “That is because
+ everyone fears it.” “I don’t understand yet either.” “That is because
you suspect me of some grand meaning,”
@@ -4361,7 +4361,7 @@
about antiquity, we liken the false to the true as far as we may and so
make it edifying.Cf. Phaedrus 245 AMURI/A
TW=N PALAIW=N E)/RGA KOSMOU=SA TOU\S E)PIGIGNOME/NOUS
- PAIDEU/EI, Isocrates xii. 149 and Livy's Preface. For
+ PAIDEU/EI, Isocrates xii. 149 and Livy’s Preface. For
XRH/SIMON Cf.
Politicus 274 E. We must not infer that Plato is
trying to sophisticate away the moral virtue of
@@ -4406,9 +4406,9 @@
2.1—Their days prolonged, from pain and sickness
free,
- And rounding out the tale of heaven's blessings,
+ And rounding out the tale of heaven’s blessings, Raised the proud paean, making glad my heart.
- And I believed that Phoebus' mouth divine,
+ And I believed that Phoebus’ mouth divine,Filled with the breath of prophecy, could not lie.But he himself, the singer, himself who satAt meat with us, himself who promised all,
@@ -4435,7 +4435,7 @@
allow them to hear from childhood up, if they are to honor the godsWe may, if we
choose, see here a reference to the virtue of piety, which some
critics fancifully suppose was eliminated by the
- Euthyphro. Cf. Unity of Plato's
+ <title>Euthyphro. Cf. Unity of Plato’s
Thought, note 58. and their fathers and mothers,
and not to hold their friendship with one another in light esteem.”
“That was our view and I believe it right.” “What then of this? If they
@@ -4490,7 +4490,7 @@
DEI/SAS MH\ precedes.
and:
- Ah me! so it is true that e'en in the dwellings of
+ Ah me! so it is true that e’en in the dwellings of
HadesSpirit there is and wraith, but within there is no
understanding,
@@ -4556,8 +4556,8 @@
boys and men who are destined to be free and to be more afraid of
slavery than of death.” “By all means.”“Then we must further taboo in these matters the entire vocabulary of
terror and fear, Cocytus
- Milton's words, which I have borrowed, are the best
- expression of Plato's thought.
+ Milton’s words, which I have borrowed, are the best
+ expression of Plato’s thought.
@@ -4590,7 +4590,7 @@
214 C, Xenophon Memorabilia ii. 6. 9, 20. will
not think that for a good man, whose friend he also is, death is a
terrible thing.” “Yes, we say that.” “Then it would not be for his
- friend'sCf.
+ friend’sCf.
Phaedo 117 C “I wept for myself, for surely not
for him.” sake as if he had suffered something dreadful that
he would make lament.” “Certainly not.” “But we also say this, that such
@@ -4636,8 +4636,8 @@
supinus.” and then rising up and ‘Drifting distraught on the shore of the
waste unharvested ocean,’Hom. Il. 24.10-12
- Our text of Homer reads dineu/esk' a)lu/wn para\ qi/n' a)lo/s, ou)de/ min
- h)w/s. Plato's text may be intentional burlesque or it
+ Our text of Homer reads dineu/esk’ a)lu/wn para\ qi/n’ a)lo/s, ou)de/ min
+ h)w/s. Plato’s text may be intentional burlesque or it
may be corrupt.
@@ -4645,7 +4645,7 @@
nor “clutching with both
hands the sooty dust and strewing it over his head,”When he heard of
- Patroclus's death. nor as weeping and lamenting in the
+ Patroclus’s death. nor as weeping and lamenting in the
measure and manner attributed to him by the poet; nor yet Priam,Hom. Il.
22.414-415. near kinsman of the gods, making
@@ -4685,13 +4685,13 @@
- Fated to fall by the hands of Patroclus, Menoitius'
+ Fated to fall by the hands of Patroclus, Menoitius’
offspring.Hom. Il. 16.433-434 Cf.
- Virgil's imitation, Aeneid 10.465 ff., Cicero,
+ Virgil’s imitation, Aeneid 10.465 ff., Cicero,
De Div. ii. ch. 10.“For if, dear Adeimantus, our young men should
seriously incline to listen to such tales and not laugh at them as
@@ -4714,7 +4714,7 @@
Encheirid. xxxiii. 4, Dio
Chrys.Or. 33. 703 R. Diogenes Laertius iii. 26,
reports that Plato never laughed excessively in his youth.
- Aristotle's great-souled man would presumably have eschewed laughter
+ Aristotle’s great-souled man would presumably have eschewed laughter
(Eth. iv. 8, Rhet. 1389 b 10), as Lord Chesterfield advises his
son to do. For ordinarily when one abandons himself to
violent laughter his condition provokes a violent reaction.In 563 E Plato
@@ -4750,10 +4750,10 @@
physicians and laymen should have nothing to do with it.” “Obviously,”
he replied. “The rulers then of the city may, if anybody, fitly lie on
account of enemies or citizens for the benefitCf. 334 B, 459 D. A cynic might
- compare Cleon's plea in Aristophanes Knights
+ compare Cleon’s plea in Aristophanes Knights1226
- E)GW\ D'
- E)/KLEPTON E)P' A)GAQW=| GE TH=| PO/LEI. Cf. Xenophon
+ E)GW\ D’
+ E)/KLEPTON E)P’ A)GAQW=| GE TH=| PO/LEI. Cf. Xenophon
Memorabilia ii. 6. 37, Bolingbroke, Letters to
<placeName key="tgn,2001059">Pope</placeName>
, p.
@@ -4787,8 +4787,8 @@
imitation in Epistles 357 AEI)/PER E)/RGA E)PI\ NO=| E)GI/GNETO.” “Again,
will our lads not need the virtue of self-control?” “Of course.” “And
for the multitudeFor the mass of men, as distinguished from the higher philosophical
- virtue. Often misunderstood. For the meanings of SWGROSU/NH cf. my review of Jowett's
- Plato, A.J.P. vol. xiii. (1892) p. 361. Cf. Unity of Plato's
+ virtue. Often misunderstood. For the meanings of <foreign xml:lang="grc">SWGROSU/NH</foreign> cf. my review of Jowett’s
+ <title>Plato, A.J.P. vol. xiii. (1892) p. 361. Cf. Unity of Plato’s
Thought, p. 15 and n. 77. are not the main points
of self-control these—to be obedient to their rulers and themselves to
be rulersIn
@@ -4799,7 +4799,7 @@
over the bodily appetites and pleasures of food, drink,
and the rest?” “I think so.” “Then, I take it, we will think well said
- such sayings as that of Homer's Diomede:
+ such sayings as that of Homer’s Diomede:Friend, sit down and be silent and hark to the
word of my bidding,
@@ -4851,14 +4851,14 @@
Odysseus.
For PARAPLEI=AI the Homeric text
- has PARA\ DE\ PLH/QWSI. Plato's
+ has PARA\ DE\ PLH/QWSI. Plato’s
treatment of the quotation is hardly fair to Homer. Aristotle,
Politics1338 a 28, cites it more fairly to
illustrate the use of music for entertainment (DIAGWGH/). The passage, however, was
liable to abuse. See the use made of it by Lucian, Parasite
10.—do you think the hearing of that sort of thing will
- conduce to a young man's temperance or self-control? or this:
+ conduce to a young man’s temperance or self-control? or this:Hunger is the most piteous death that a mortal may
suffer.
@@ -4877,12 +4877,12 @@
with her there on the ground and says that he is possessed by a fiercer
desire than when they first consorted with one another, ‘Deceiving their dear parents.’Hom. Il. 14.296 Nor will
- it profit them to hear of Hephaestus's fettering Ares and Aphrodite
+ it profit them to hear of Hephaestus’s fettering Ares and AphroditeOdyssey viii. 266 ff. for a like motive.”
“No, by Zeus,” he said,
- “I don't think it will.” “But any words or deeds of
+ “I don’t think it will.” “But any words or deeds of
endurance in the face of all oddsMay include on Platonic principles the
temptations of pleasure. Cf. Laws 191 D-E.
attributed to famous men are suitable for our youth to see represented
@@ -4904,7 +4904,7 @@
unknownSuidas s.v.DW=RA says that some attributed the line to Hesiod.
Cf. Euripides Medea 964, Ovid, Ars Am. iii. 653, Otto, Sprichw. d.
- Rom. 233. Nor should we approve Achilles'
+ Rom. 233. Nor should we approve Achilles’
attendant PhoenixSee his speech,
<placeName key="tgn,2061426">Iliad</placeName>
ix. 515 ff. as speaking fairly when he counselled
@@ -4924,7 +4924,7 @@
but otherwise to refuse.” “It is not right,” he said,
- “to commend such conduct.” “But, for Homer's sake,” said I, “I hesitate
+ “to commend such conduct.” “But, for Homer’s sake,” said I, “I hesitate
to say that it is positively impiousCf. 368 B. to affirm such things of
Achilles and to believe them when told by others; or again to believe
that he said to Apollo
@@ -4952,12 +4952,12 @@
Cf. Proclus, p. 146
Kroll. Plato
exaggerates to make his case. The locks were vowed to Spercheius on
- the condition of Achilles' return. In their context the words are
+ the condition of Achilles’ return. In their context the words are
innocent enough. who was a dead body, and that he did so we
must believe. And again the trailings
<placeName key="tgn,2061426">Iliad</placeName>
- xxiv. 14 ff. of Hector's body round the grave of Patroclus and the
+ xxiv. 14 ff. of Hector’s body round the grave of Patroclus and the
slaughter
<placeName key="tgn,2061426">Iliad</placeName>
@@ -5003,7 +5003,7 @@
his own misdeeds if he is convinced that such are and were the actions
of<quote type="verse">
<l met="iambic">The near-sown seed of gods,</l>
- <l>Close kin to Zeus, for whom on Ida's top</l>
+ <l>Close kin to Zeus, for whom on Ida’s top</l>
<l>Ancestral altars flame to highest heaven,</l>
<l>Nor in their life-blood fails<note anchored="true" resp="Loeb" place="unspecified">Plato was probably thinking of this
passage when he wrote the last paragraph of the
@@ -5033,9 +5033,9 @@
of greatest moment, saying that there are many examples of men who,
though unjust, are happy, and of just men who are wretched, and that
there is profit in injustice if it be concealed, and that justice is the
- other man's good and your own loss; and I presume that we shall forbid
+ other man’s good and your own loss; and I presume that we shall forbid
them to say this sort of thing and command them to sing and fable the
- opposite. Don't you think so?” “Nay, I well know it,” he said. “Then, if
+ opposite. Don’t you think so?” “Nay, I well know it,” he said. “Then, if
you admit that I am right, I will say that you have conceded the
original point of our inquiry?”</said>
</div>
@@ -5051,7 +5051,7 @@
the manner, as Socrates explains when Adeimantus fails to
understand.</note> That of diction, I take it, is to be considered
next. So we shall have completely examined both the matter and the
- manner of speech.” And Adeimantus said, “I don't understand what </said>
+ manner of speech.” And Adeimantus said, “I don’t understand what </said>
</div>
<div n="392d" type="textpart" subtype="section">
<said who="Socrates">you mean by this.” “Well,” said I, “we must have you
@@ -5069,7 +5069,7 @@
imitative of the arts. But Plato here complicates the matter further
by sometimes using imitation in the narrower sense of dramatic
dialogue as opposed to narration. An attentive reader will easily
- observe these distinctions. Aristotle's <title>Poetics makes
+ observe these distinctions. Aristotle’s Poetics makes
much use of the ideas and the terminology of the following
pages. or by both?” “This too,” he said, “I still need to
have made plainer.” “I seem to be a ridiculous and obscure teacher,Socratic urbanity
@@ -5079,9 +5079,9 @@
themselves
- I won't try to speak in wholesPlato and Aristotle often contrast
+ I won’t try to speak in wholesPlato and Aristotle often contrast
the universal and the particular as whole and part. Cf. Unity
- of Plato's Thought, p. 52. Though a good style is
+ of Plato’s Thought, p. 52. Though a good style is
concrete, it is a mark of linguistic helplessness not to be able to
state an idea in general terms. Cf. Locke, Human
Understanding, ii. 10. 27: “This man is hindered in his
@@ -5099,7 +5099,7 @@
Achaeans in his prayers to the god?” “I do.” “You know then that as far
as these verses,And prayed unto all the Achaeans,
- Chiefly to Atreus' sons, twin leaders who marshalled the
+ Chiefly to Atreus’ sons, twin leaders who marshalled the
people,Hom. Il. 1.15the
@@ -5120,8 +5120,8 @@
as if he were someone else, shall we not say that he
then assimilates thereby his own diction is far as possible to that of
the person whom he announces as about to speak?” “We shall obviously.”
- “And is not likening one's self to another speech or bodily bearing an
- imitation of him to whom one likens one's self?” “Surely.” “In such case
+ “And is not likening one’s self to another speech or bodily bearing an
+ imitation of him to whom one likens one’s self?” “Surely.” “In such case
then it appears he and the other poets effect their narration through
imitation.” “Certainly.” “But if the poet should conceal himself
nowhere, then his entire poetizing and narration would have been
@@ -5129,7 +5129,7 @@
- And lest you may say again that you don't understand, I
+ And lest you may say again that you don’t understand, I
will explain to you how this would be done. If Homer, after telling us
that Chryses came with the ransom of his daughter and as a suppliant of
the Achaeans but chiefly of the kings, had gone on speaking not as if
@@ -5166,7 +5166,7 @@
him of and asking requital for any of his gifts that had found favor
whether in the building of temples or the sacrifice of victims. In
return for these things he prayed that the Achaeans should suffer for
- his tears by the god's shafts. It is in this way, my dear fellow,” I
+ his tears by the god’s shafts. It is in this way, my dear fellow,” I
said, “that
@@ -5191,8 +5191,8 @@
any dialogue.; and there is again that which employs both, in
epic poetry and in many other places, if you apprehend me.” “I
understand now,” he said, “what you then meant.” “Recall then also the
- preceding statement that we were done with the 'what' of speech and
- still had to consider the 'how.'” “I remember.”
+ preceding statement that we were done with the ’what’ of speech and
+ still had to consider the ’how.’” “I remember.”
“What I meant then was just this, that we must reach a
@@ -5206,8 +5206,8 @@
question of the moral effect of poetry and art. For I
certainly do not yet know myself, but whithersoever the wind, as it
were, of the argument blows,Cf. Theaetetus 172 D. But it is
- very naive to suppose that the sequence of Plato's argument is not
- carefully planned in his own mind. Cf. Unity of Plato's
+ very naive to suppose that the sequence of Plato’s argument is not
+ carefully planned in his own mind. Cf. <title>Unity of Plato’s
Thought, p. 5. there lies our course.”
@@ -5256,7 +5256,7 @@
are to be expert craftsmen of civic liberty,Cf. the fine passage
in Laws 817 BH(MEI=S E)SMEN
TRAGWDI/AS AU)TOI\ POIHTAI/,
- [Pindar]apudPlut. 807 CDHMIOURGO\S EU)NOMI/AS KAI\ DI/KHS. and pursue
+ [Pindar] apudPlut. 807 CDHMIOURGO\S EU)NOMI/AS KAI\ DI/KHS. and pursue
nothing else that does not conduce to this, it would not be fitting for
these to do nor yet to imitate anything else. But if they imitate they
should from childhood upCf. 386 A. imitate what is appropriate to
@@ -5273,8 +5273,8 @@
B, 669 B-C, and Burke,
Sublime and Beautiful iv. 4, anticipating James,
Psychology ii. pp. 449, 451, and anticipated by
- Shakespeare's
- (Cor. III. ii. 123) “By my body's action teach my
+ Shakespeare’s
+ (Cor. III. ii. 123) “By my body’s action teach my
mind/ A most inherent baseness.” Or have you not observed
that imitations, if continued from youth far into life, settle down into
habits and (second) natureCf. my paper on *FU/SIS,
@@ -5310,14 +5310,14 @@
it will be forbidden them even to pay any attention to such things?”
“Well, then, neighing horsesFor this rejection of violent realism Cf.
Laws 669 C-D. Plato describes exactly what
- Verhaeren's admirers approve: “often in his rhythm can be heard the
+ Verhaeren’s admirers approve: “often in his rhythm can be heard the
beat of hammers, the hard, edged, regular whizzing of wheels, the
whirring of looms, the hissing of locomotives; often the wild,
restless tumult of the streets, the humming and rumbling of dense
masses of people.” (Stefan Zweig). So another modern critic
celebrates “the cry of a baby in a Strauss symphony, the sneers and snarls of his
critics in his Helden Leben, the contortions of the
- Dragon in Wagner's
+ Dragon in <placeName key="tgn,2746922">Wagner</placeName>’s <title>
<placeName key="tgn,2091372">Siegfried</placeName>
.” and lowing bulls, and the noise of rivers and the
roar of the sea and the thunder and everything of that kind—will they
@@ -5435,11 +5435,11 @@
there is no man of that kind among us in our city, nor is it lawful for
such a man to arise among us, and we should send him away to another
city, after pouring myrrh down over his head and crowning him with
- fillets of wool, but we ourselves, for our souls' good, should continue
+ fillets of wool, but we ourselves, for our souls’ good, should continue
to employ
- the more austereCf. from a different point of view Arnold's The Austerity of
+ <said who="Socrates">the more austere<note anchored="true" resp="Loeb" place="unspecified">Cf. from a different point of view <placeName key="tgn,2137533">Arnold</placeName>’s <title>The Austerity of
Poetry. and less delightful poet and tale-teller,
who would imitate the diction of the good man and would tell his tale in
the patterns which we prescribed in the beginning,Cf. 379 A ff. when we set out
@@ -5455,12 +5455,12 @@
I, “comes the manner of song and tunes?” “Obviously.” “And having gone
thus far, could not everybody discover what we must say of their
character in order to conform to what has already been said?” “I am
- afraid that 'everybody' does not include me,” laughed GlauconHe laughs at his own
+ afraid that ’everybody’ does not include me,” laughed GlauconHe laughs at his own
mild joke, which Professor Wilamowitz (Platon ii. p.
192) does not understand. Cf. Laws 859 E,
Hippias Major 293 AH)\
OU)X EI(=S TW=N A(PA/NTWN KAI\ *(HRAKLH=S H)=N; and in
- a recent novel, “'I am afraid everybody does not include me,' she
+ a recent novel, “’I am afraid everybody does not include me,’ she
smiled.”; “I cannot sufficiently divine off-hand what we
ought to say, though I have a suspicion.” “You certainly, I presume,”
said I,
@@ -5486,13 +5486,13 @@
are the dirge-like modes of music? Tell me, for you are
a musician.” “The mixed Lydian,The modes of Greek music are known to the
- English reader only from Milton's allusions, his “Lap me in soft Lydian
+ English reader only from Milton’s allusions, his “Lap me in soft Lydian
airs” and, P.L. i. 549 f., his “Anon they move/ in
perfect phalanx to the Dorian mood/ Of flutes and soft recorders; such as
rasied/ To highth of noblest temper heroes old.” The adaptation of
particualr modes, harmonies, or scales to the expression of
particular feelings is something that we are obliged to accept on
- faith. Plato's statements here were challenged by some later
+ faith. Plato’s statements here were challenged by some later
critics, but the majority believed that there was a connection
between modes of music and modes of feeling, as Ruskin and many others have in our
day. The hard-headed Epicureans and sceptics denied it, as well as
@@ -5509,18 +5509,18 @@
that are called lax.” “Will you make any use of them
for warriors?” “None at all,” he said; “but it would seem that you have
left the Dorian and the
- Phrygian.” “I don't knowPlato, like a lawyer or popular essayist,
+ Phrygian.” “I don’t knowPlato, like a lawyer or popular essayist,
affects ignorance of the technical details; or perhaps rather he
- wishes to disengage his main principle from the specialists'
+ wishes to disengage his main principle from the specialists’
controversy about particular modes of music and their names.
the musical modes,” I said, “but leave us that modeE)KEI/NHN may mean, but does not say, Dorian, which the
Laches(188 D) pronounces the only true Greek
harmony. This long anacoluthic sentence sums up the whole matter
with impressive repetition and explicit enumeration of all types of
- conduct in peace and war, and implied reference to Plato's doctrine of the two
+ conduct in peace and war, and implied reference to Plato’s doctrine of the two
fundamental temperaments, the swift and the slow, the energetic and
- the mild. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, nn. 59, 70,
+ the mild. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, nn. 59, 70,
481. that would fittingly imitate the utterances and the
accents of a brave man who is engaged in warfare or in any enforced
business, and who, when he has failed, either meeting wounds or death or
@@ -5554,7 +5554,7 @@
Ol. vii. 12, can vie with the most complex and
many-stringed lyre of musical innovation. instruments.”
“Apparently not.” “Well, will you admit to the city flute-makers and
- flute-players? Or is not the flute the most 'many-stringed' of
+ flute-players? Or is not the flute the most ’many-stringed’ of
instruments and do not the pan-harmonicsCf. 404 D, the only other occurrence
of the word in Plato. themselves imitate it?” “Clearly,” he
said. “You have left,” said I, “the lyre and the cither. These are
@@ -5579,9 +5579,9 @@
purged the city which a little while ago we said was wanton.Cf. 372 E. Dummler,
Proleg. p. 62, strangely affirms that this is an
express retraction of the A)LHQINH\
- PO/LIS. This is to misapprehend Plato's method. He
+ PO/LIS. This is to misapprehend Plato’s method. He
starts with the indispensable minimum of a simple society, develops
- it by Herbert Spencer's multiplication of effects into an ordinary
+ it by Herbert Spencer’s multiplication of effects into an ordinary
Greek city, then reforms it by a reform of education and finally
transforms it into his ideal state by the rule of the philosopher
kings. Cf. Introduction p. xiv.” “In that we show our good
@@ -5595,7 +5595,7 @@
require the foot and the air to conform to that kind of
- man's speech and not the speech to the foot and the tune. What those
+ man’s speech and not the speech to the foot and the tune. What those
rhythms would be, it is for you to tell us as you did the musical
modes.” “Nay, in faith,” he said, “I cannot tell. For that there are
some three formsAccording to the ancient musicians these are the equal as e.g. in
@@ -5623,7 +5623,7 @@
is a hint of satire in this disclaimer of expert knowledge. Cf. 399
A. There is no agreement among modern experts with regard to the
precise form of the so-called enoplios. Cf. my review of
- Herkenrath's “Der Enoplios,”Class. <placeName key="tgn,2578490">Phil</placeName>
+ Herkenrath’s “Der Enoplios,”<title>Class. <placeName key="tgn,2578490">Phil</placeName>
. vol. iii. p.
360, Goodell,
Chapters on Greek Metric, pp. 185 and 189,
@@ -5648,7 +5648,7 @@
and he added the quantities long and short. And in some
of these, I believe, he censured and commended the tempo of the foot no
less than the rhythm itself, or else some combination of the two; I
- can't say. But, as I said, let this matter be postponed for Damon's consideration. For to
+ can’t say. But, as I said, let this matter be postponed for Damon’s consideration. For to
determine the truth of these would require no little discourse. Do you
think otherwise?” “No, by heaven, I do not.” “But this you are able to
determine—that seemliness and unseemliness are attendant upon the good
@@ -5677,7 +5677,7 @@
youth pursue these everywhereThe Ruskinian and Wordsworthian generalization
is extended from music to all the fine arts, including, by the way,
architecture (OI)KODOMI/A), which
- Butcher (Aristotle's Theory of Poetry, p. 138) says
+ Butcher (Aristotle’s Theory of Poetry, p. 138) says
is ignored by Plato and Aristotle. if they are to do what it
is truly theirs to doTheir special task is to cultivate true EU)H/QEIA in their souls. For TO\ AU(TW=N PRA/TTEIN here cf. 443
C-D.?” “They must indeed.” “And there is surely much of these
@@ -5685,10 +5685,10 @@
- and in all similar craftsmanshipThe following page is Plato's most
- eloquent statement of Wordsworth's, Ruskin's, and Tennyson's gospel of beauty for the education of
+ and in all similar craftsmanshipThe following page is Plato’s most
+ eloquent statement of Wordsworth’s, Ruskin’s, and Tennyson’s gospel of beauty for the education of
the young. He repeats it in Laws 668 B. Cf. my paper
- on “Some Ideals of Education in Plato's Republic,”Educational
+ on “Some Ideals of Education in <placeName key="tgn,1023926">Plato</placeName>’s <title>Republic,”Educational
Bi-monthly, vol. ii. (1907-1908) pp. 215 ff.—weaving is full of them
and embroidery and architecture and likewise the manufacture of
household furnishings and thereto the natural bodies of animals and
@@ -5737,7 +5737,7 @@
and otherwise the contrary? And further, because
omissions and the failure of beauty in things badly made or grown would
be most quickly perceived by one who was properly educated in music, and
- so, feeling distasteCf. 362 B, 366 C, 388 A, 391 E, and Ruskin's paradox that taste is the
+ so, feeling distasteCf. 362 B, 366 C, 388 A, 391 E, and Ruskin’s paradox that taste is the
only morality. rightly, he would praise beautiful things and
take delight in them and receive them into his soul to foster its growth
and become himself beautiful and good.
@@ -5778,13 +5778,13 @@
other hand there is not the slightest reason to assume that the
doctrine and its terminology were not familiar to Plato at the time
when this part of the Republic was written. Cf.
- Unity of Plato's Thought, pp. 31 ff., 35.
+ Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 31 ff., 35.
Statistics of the use of EI)=DOS
- and I)DE/A(Peiper's
+ and I)DE/A(Peiper’s
Ontologica Platonica, Taylor, Varia
Socratica, Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. pp.
249-253), whatever their philological interest, contribute nothing
- to the interpretation of Plato's thought. Cf. my De Platonis
+ to the interpretation of Plato’s thought. Cf. my <title>De Platonis
Idearum Doctrina, pp. 1, 30, and Class <placeName key="tgn,2578490">Phil</placeName>
. vol. vi. pp.
363-364. There is for common sense no contradiction or problem in
@@ -5805,7 +5805,7 @@
neither we nor the guardians that we have undertaken to
educate—until we are able to recognize the forms of soberness, courage,
liberality,Liberality and high-mindedness, or rather, perhaps, magnificence,
- are among the virtues defined in Aristotle's list (Eth. Nic. 1107 b 17), but are not among the four
+ are among the virtues defined in Aristotle’s list (Eth. Nic. 1107 b 17), but are not among the four
cardinal virtues which the Republic will use in Book
IV. in the comparison of the indivdual with the state. and
high-mindedness and all their kindred and their opposites, too, in all
@@ -5823,7 +5823,7 @@
the fairest spectacle for one who is capable of its contemplationMusic and beauty
lead to the philosophy of love, more fully set forth in the
Phaedrus and Symposium, and here
- dismissed in a page. Plato's practical conclusion here may be summed
+ dismissed in a page. Plato’s practical conclusion here may be summed
up in the Virgilian line (Aeneid v. 344): “Gratior et
pulchro veniens in corpore virtus.”?” “Far the fairest.” “And
surely the fairest is the most lovable.” “Of course.” “The true
@@ -5846,7 +5846,7 @@
no less than pain?” “Or between it and virtue
generally?” “By no means.” “But is there between pleasure and insolence
and licence?” “Most assuredly.” “Do you know of greater or keener
- pleasure than that associated with Aphrodite?” “I don't,” he said, “nor
+ pleasure than that associated with Aphrodite?” “I don’t,” he said, “nor
yet of any more insane.” “But is not the right love a sober and
harmonious love of the orderly and the beautiful?” “It is indeed,” said
he. “Then nothing of madness, nothing akin to licence, must be allowed
@@ -5910,7 +5910,7 @@
“Perhaps.” “Nay,” said I, “that is a drowsy habit and
- precarious for health. Don't you observe that they sleep away their
+ precarious for health. Don’t you observe that they sleep away their
lives,Cf.*)ERA/STAI132 CKAQEU/DWN PA/NTA TO\N BI/ON.
Xenophanes, Euripides, Aristotle, and the medical writers, like
Plato, protest against the exaggerated honor paid to athletes and
@@ -5922,8 +5922,8 @@
sleepless hounds, and have the keenest possible perceptions of sight and
hearing, and in their campaigns undergo many changesLaws
- 797 D. Cf. 380 E. Aristotle's comment on METABOLH/, Eth. Nic. 1154 b 28 ff., is curiously reminiscent of Plato,
- includiong the phrase A(PLH= OU)D'
+ 797 D. Cf. 380 E. Aristotle’s comment on METABOLH/, Eth. Nic. 1154 b 28 ff., is curiously reminiscent of Plato,
+ includiong the phrase A(PLH= OU)D’
E)PIEIKH/S.
@@ -5936,14 +5936,14 @@
translate E)PIEIKH/S by its later
meaning, that is, not over-precise or rigid in conformity to rule.
Adam is mistaken in saying that E)PIEIKH/S is practically synonymous with A)GAQH/. It sometimes is, but not here.
- Cf. Plutarch, De san. 13A)KRIBH\S . . . KAI\ DI' O)/NUXOS. gymnastic,
+ Cf. Plutarch, De san. 13A)KRIBH\S . . . KAI\ DI’ O)/NUXOS. gymnastic,
and especially so in the training for war.” “In what way?” “One could
learn that,” said I, “even from Homer.So Laws 706 D. The KAI/ is perhaps merely idiomatic in
quotation. For you are aware that in the banqueting of the
heroes on campaign he does not
- feast them on fish,Homer's ignoring of fish diet, except in stress
+ feast them on fish,Homer’s ignoring of fish diet, except in stress
of starvation, has been much and idly discussed both in antiquity
and by modern scholars. Modern pseudo-science has even inferred from
this passage that Plato placed a “taboo” on fish, though they are at
@@ -5968,7 +5968,7 @@
my friend, if you think this is the right way, you apparently do not
approve of a Syracusan tableProverbial, like the “Corinthian maid” and the
“Attic pastry.” Cf. Otto, Sprichw. d. Rom. p. 321,
- Newman, Introduction to Aristotle's Politics, p. 302.
+ Newman, Introduction to Aristotle’s Politics, p. 302.
Cf. also Phaedrus 240 B. and Sicilian variety
of made dishes.” “I think not.” “You would frown, then, on a little
Corinthian maid as the chère amie of
@@ -6014,11 +6014,11 @@
insensitiveness to the KALO/N of
the banausic, the nouveau riche and the
Philistine. is led to plume himself on this very thing, as
- being a smart fellow to 'put over' an unjust act
+ being a smart fellow to ’put over’ an unjust act
and cunningly to try every dodge and practice,The phrasing of this
- passage recalls passages of Aristophanes'Clouds, and
+ passage recalls passages of Aristophanes’Clouds, and
the description of the pettifogging lawyer and politician in the
Theaetetus 172 E. Cf. 519, also
Euthydemus 302 B, and Porphyry, De
@@ -6037,12 +6037,12 @@
</div>
<div n="405d" type="textpart" subtype="section">
<said who="Socrates">but, because of sloth and such a regimen as we
- described, to fill one's body up with winds and humors like a marsh and
+ described, to fill one’s body up with winds and humors like a marsh and
compel the ingenious sons of Aesculapius to invent for diseases such
- names as fluxes and flatulences—don't you think that disgraceful?<note anchored="true" resp="Loeb" place="unspecified">Plato ridicules the
+ names as fluxes and flatulences—don’t you think that disgraceful?<note anchored="true" resp="Loeb" place="unspecified">Plato ridicules the
unsavory metaphors required to describe the effects of
auto-intoxication. There is a similar bit of somewhat heavier satire
- in <placeName key="tgn,2000843">Spencer</placeName>'s <title>Social
+ in <placeName key="tgn,2000843">Spencer</placeName>’s <title>Social
Statics, 1868, p. 32:
“Carbuncled noses, cadaverous faces, foetid breaths, and plethoric
bodies meet us at every turn; and our condolences are prepetually
@@ -6092,7 +6092,7 @@
tortures of the damned if he departed a whit from his fixed regimen, and
struggling against death by reason of his science he won the prize of a
doting old age.Cf.
- Macaulay on Mitford's
+ Macaulay on Mitford’s
History of <placeName key="tgn,1000074">Greece</placeName>
: “It (oligarchical government)
has a sort of valetudinarian longevity; it lives in the balance of
@@ -6106,8 +6106,8 @@
Euripides Supp. 1109-1113; Seneca on early medicine, Epistles
xv. 3 (95) 14 ff., overdoes both Spencer and Macaulay. Cf. Rousseau,
Emile, Book I.: “Je ne sais point apprendre a
- vivre a qui ne songe qu'a s'empecher de mourir;” La Rochefoucauld
- (Max. 282): “C'est une ennuyeuse maladie que de
+ vivre a qui ne songe qu’a s’empecher de mourir;” La Rochefoucauld
+ (Max. 282): “C’est une ennuyeuse maladie que de
conserver sa sante par un trop grand regime.”” “A noble
prizeThe pun
GH/RAS and GE/RAS is hardly translatable. Cf.
@@ -6126,10 +6126,10 @@
assigned to each man in the city which he must perform, and no one has
leisure to be sickCf. Plutarch, De sanitate tuenda 23, Sophocles, fr.
88. 11 (?), Lucian,
- Nigrinus 22, differently; Hotspur's, “Zounds! how
+ Nigrinus 22, differently; Hotspur’s, “Zounds! how
has he the leisure to be sick?” and doctor himself all his
days. And this we absurdly enough perceive in the case of a craftsman,
- but don't see in the case of the rich and so-called fortunate.” “How
+ but don’t see in the case of the rich and so-called fortunate.” “How
so?” he said.
@@ -6143,14 +6143,14 @@
Blaydes on Aristophanes Acharnians 439. about
the head and their accompaniments, he hastily says that he has no
leisure to be sick and that such a life of preoccupation with his illess
- and neglect of the work that lies before him isn't worth living. And
+ and neglect of the work that lies before him isn’t worth living. And
thereupon he bids farewell to that kind of physician,
enters upon his customary way of life, regains his
health, and lives attending to his affairs—or, if his body is not equal
to strain, he dies and is freed from all his troubles.This alone marks the
- humor of the whole passage, which Macaulay's Essay on
+ humor of the whole passage, which Macaulay’s <title>Essay on
Bacon seems to miss. Cf. Aristophanes
Acharnians 757;Apology 41
D.” “For such a man,” he said, “that appears to be the right
@@ -6158,18 +6158,18 @@
- “that he had a task and that life wasn't worth
+ “that he had a task and that life wasn’t worth
acceptance on condition of not doing his work?” “Obviously,” he said.
“But the rich man, we say, has no such appointed task, the necessity of
- abstaining from which renders life intolerable.” “I haven't heard of
- any.” “Why, haven't you heard that saying of Phocylides,The line of
+ abstaining from which renders life intolerable.” “I haven’t heard of
+ any.” “Why, haven’t you heard that saying of Phocylides,The line of
Phocylides is toyed with merely to vary the expression of the
thought. Bergk restores it DI/ZHSQAI
- BIOTH/N, A)RETH\N D' O(/TAN H)=| BI/OS H)/DH, which is
- Horace's
+ BIOTH/N, A)RETH\N D’ O(/TAN H)=| BI/OS H)/DH, which is
+ Horace’s
(Epistles i. 1. 53 f.): “Quaerenda pecunia primum
- est;/ Virtus post nummos!” that after a man has 'made his
- pile' he ought to practice virtue?” “Before, too, I fancy,” he said.
+ est;/ Virtus post nummos!” that after a man has ’made his
+ pile’ he ought to practice virtue?” “Before, too, I fancy,” he said.
“Let us not quarrel with him on that point,” I said, “but inform
ourselves whether this virtue is something for the rich man to
practise,
@@ -6179,7 +6179,7 @@
and life is intolerable
if he does not, or whether we are to suppose that while
valetudinarianism is a hindrance to single-minded attention to carpentry
- and the other arts, it is no obstacle to the fulfilment of Phocylides'
+ and the other arts, it is no obstacle to the fulfilment of Phocylides’
exhortation.” “Yes, indeed,” he said, “this excessive care for the body
that goes beyond simple gymnasticsIn the Gorgias(464 B)I)ATRIKH/ is recognized as co-ordinate
in the care of the body with GUMNASTIKH/. Here, whatever goes beyond the training
@@ -6192,7 +6192,7 @@
forever imagining headachesAs Macaulay, Essay on “Bacon,” puts
it: “That a valetudinarian . . . who enjoyed a hearty laugh over the
- Queen of Navarre's tales
+ Queen of Navarre’s tales
should be treated as a caput lupinum because he could
not read the Timaeus without a headache, was a notion
which the humane spirit of the English schools of wisdom altogether
@@ -6203,12 +6203,12 @@
mental and other labors. And for the meaning of virtue cf. the
Elizabethan: “Virtue is ever sowing of her seeds.” and tested
it is in every way a hindrance.There is a suggestion of Stoic terminology in
- Plato's use of E)MPO/DIOS and
+ Plato’s use of E)MPO/DIOS and
similar words. Cf. Xenophon Memorabilia i. 2. 4. On
- the whole passage cf. again Macaulay's Essay on “Bacon,” Maximus of
+ the whole passage cf. again Macaulay’s Essay on “Bacon,” Maximus of
Tyre (Duebn.) 10, and
the diatribe on modern medicine and valetudinarianism in Edward
- Carpenter's Civilization, Its Cause and Cure.
+ Carpenter’s Civilization, Its Cause and Cure.
For it makes the man always fancy himself sick and never cease from
anguishing about his body.” “Naturally,” he said. “Then, shall we not
say that it was because Asclepius knew this—that for those who were by
@@ -6229,18 +6229,18 @@
roundCf.
Thucydides i. 130. and order of life, he did not think it
worth while to treat him, since such a fellow is of no use either to
- himself or to the state.” “A most politic Asclepius you're telling us
+ himself or to the state.” “A most politic Asclepius you’re telling us
of,There is a
touch of comedy in the Greek. Cf. Eupolis, fr. 94 KockTAXU\N LE/GEIS ME/N.” he
said. “Obviously,” said I, “that was his character. And his sons too,
- don't you in see that at Troy
+ don’t you in see that at Troy
they approved
themselves good fighting-men and practised medicine as
- I described it? Don't you rememberCf. the Homeric H)= OU)
+ I described it? Don’t you rememberCf. the Homeric H)= OU)
ME/MNH|; that in the case of Menelaus too from
the wound that Pandarus inflicted ‘They
@@ -6248,8 +6248,8 @@
Hom. Il. 4.218Plato is quoting
loosely or adapting Hom.
- Il. 4.218.AI(=M' E)KMUZH/SAS E)P'
- A)/R' H)/PIA FA/RMAKA EI)DW\S PA/SSE is said of
+ Il. 4.218.AI(=M’ E)KMUZH/SAS E)P’
+ A)/R’ H)/PIA FA/RMAKA EI)DW\S PA/SSE is said of
Machaon, not of Menelaus. But what he was to eat or drink
thereafter they no more prescribed than for Eurypylus, taking it for
granted that the remedies sufficed to heal men who before their wounds
@@ -6262,7 +6262,7 @@
medicine should not be for such nor should they be given treatment even
if they were richer than Midas.Proverbial and suggests Tyrtaeus. Cf.
Laws 660 E.” “Very ingenious fellows,” he
- said, “you make out these sons of Asclepius to be.”“'Tis fitting,” said I; “and yet in disregard of our
+ said, “you make out these sons of Asclepius to be.”“’Tis fitting,” said I; “and yet in disregard of our
principles the tragedians and PindarCf. Aeschylus Agamemnon 1022 ff.,
Euripides Alcestis 3-4, Pindar, Pyth.
iii. 53. affirm that Asclepius, though he was the son of
@@ -6282,7 +6282,7 @@
and so good judges would be those who had associated
with all sorts and conditions of men.” “Most assuredly I want them
- good,” I said; “but do you know whom I regard as such?” “I'll know if
+ good,” I said; “but do you know whom I regard as such?” “I’ll know if
you tell,Slight
colloquial jest. Cf. Aristophanes Eq. 1158, Pax1061.” he said. “Well, I will try,”
@@ -6337,7 +6337,7 @@
raise suspicions on the good on account of the behavior of ill men,
are of the party of the latter;” Stobaeus ii. p. 46*BI/AS E)/FH, OI( A)GAQOI\
EU)APA/THTOI, Menander, fr. 845 Kock
- XRHSTOU= PAR' A)NDRO\S MHDE\N U(PONO/EI
+ XRHSTOU= PAR’ A)NDRO\S MHDE\N U(PONO/EI
KAKO/N. and who has himself done many unjust
acts and who thinks himself a smart trickster, when he associates with
his like does appear to be clever, being on his guard and fixing his
@@ -6365,7 +6365,7 @@
proves to be wise and not the bad man.Cf. Theaetetus 176 D “It is far
best not to concede to the unjust that they are
clever knaves, for they glory in the taunt.” Cf.
- Unity of Plato's Thought, n. 21.” “And I
+ Unity of Plato’s Thought, n. 21.” “And I
concur,” he said. “Then will you not establish by law in your city such
an art of medicine as we have described in conjunction with this kind of
justice? And these arts will care for the bodies and souls of such of
@@ -6416,10 +6416,10 @@
had not the purpose in view that some attribute to them
in so instituting, namely to treat the body by one and the soul by the
other?” “But what?” he said. “It seems likely,” I said, “that they
- ordained both chiefly for the soul's sake.” “How so?” “Have you not
+ ordained both chiefly for the soul’s sake.” “How so?” “Have you not
observed,” said I, “the effect on the disposition of the mind
itselfFor the
- thought cf. Euripides Suppl. 882 f. and Polybius's
+ thought cf. Euripides Suppl. 882 f. and Polybius’s
account of the effect of the neglect of music on the Arcadians (iv.
20). of lifelong devotion to gymnastics with total neglect of
music? Or the disposition of those of the opposite habit?” “In what
@@ -6440,10 +6440,10 @@
This if relaxed too far would be softer than is desirable but if rightly
trained gentle and orderly?” “That is so.” “But our requirement, we
say,Cf. 375 C.
- With Plato's doctrine of the two temperaments cf. the distinction of
- quick-wits and hard-wits in Ascham's Schoolmaster.
+ With Plato’s doctrine of the two temperaments cf. the distinction of
+ quick-wits and hard-wits in Ascham’s Schoolmaster.
Ascham is thinking of Plato, for he says: “Galen saith much music
- marreth men's manners; and Plato hath a notable place of the same
+ marreth men’s manners; and Plato hath a notable place of the same
thing in his book De rep., well marked also and
excellently translated by Tully himself. is that the guardians should
possess both natures.” “It is.” “And must they not be harmoniously
@@ -6458,7 +6458,7 @@
following sentence as an example of the more vivid expression
following the less vivid. For the image cf. Blaydes on Aristophanes
Thesm. 18, Aeschylus Choeph. 451,
- Shakespeare, CymbelineIII. ii. 59 “Love's counsellor
+ Shakespeare, CymbelineIII. ii. 59 “Love’s counsellor
should fill the bores of hearing.” into his soul as it were
through the funnel of his ears those sweet, soft, and dirge-like airs of
which we were just nowCf. 398 D-E, where the QRHNW/DEIS A(RMONI/AI are rejected altogether, while
@@ -6478,13 +6478,13 @@
1121. the practice without remission
and is spellbound, the effect begins to be that he melts and
liquefiesCf.
- Tennyson's “Molten down in mere uxoriousness” (Geraint and
+ Tennyson’s “Molten down in mere uxoriousness” (<title>Geraint and
<placeName key="tgn,2088228">Enid</placeName>
). till he completely dissolves away
his spirit, cuts out as it were the very sinews of his soul and makes of
- himself a 'feeble warrior.'A familiar Homeric reminiscence
+ himself a ’feeble warrior.’A familiar Homeric reminiscence
(Iliad xvii. 588) quoted also in
- Symposium 174 C. Cf. Froissart's “un mol
+ Symposium 174 C. Cf. Froissart’s “un mol
chevalier.”” “Assuredly,” he said. “And if,” said I, “he has
to begin with a spiritlessEtymologically A)/QUMOS="deficient in QUMO/S.” nature he reaches this result
quickly, but if high-spirited, by weakening the spirit he makes it
@@ -6533,7 +6533,7 @@
man whom we should most rightly pronounce to be the most perfect and
harmonious musician, far rather than the one who brings the strings into
unison with one another.For virtue as “music” Cf.
- Phaedo61 A, Laches 188 D, and Iago's
+ Phaedo61 A, Laches 188 D, and Iago’s
“There is a daily music in his life.” The “perfect musician” is the
professor of the royal art of Politicus 306-308 ff.
which harmonizes the two temperaments, not merely by education, but
@@ -6544,7 +6544,7 @@
it will control education. It is rather an anticipation of the
philosophic rulers, as appears from 497 C-D, and corresponds to the
nocturnal council of Laws 950 B ff. Cf. Unity
- of Plato's Thought, p. 86, note 650. of this kind
+ of Plato’s Thought, p. 86, note 650. of this kind
if its constitution is to be preserved?”
@@ -6597,7 +6597,7 @@
brought to expelCf. Crito 46 B, Xenophon Memorabilia
iii. 12. 7. from their souls unawares this conviction that
they must do what is best for the state.” “What do you mean by the
- 'expelling'?” he said. “I will tell you, said I; “it seems to me that
+ ’expelling’?” he said. “I will tell you, said I; “it seems to me that
the exit of a belief from the mind is either voluntary or involuntary.
@@ -6606,15 +6606,15 @@
Voluntary is the departure of the false belief from one
who learns better, involuntary that of every true belief.” “The
voluntary,” he said, “I understand, but I need instruction about the
- involuntary.” “How now,” said I, “don't you agree with me in thinking
+ involuntary.” “How now,” said I, “don’t you agree with me in thinking
that men are unwillingly deprived of good things but willingly of evil?
Or is it not an evil to be deceived in respect of the truth and a good
- to possess truth? And don't you think that to opine the things that are
+ to possess truth? And don’t you think that to opine the things that are
is to possess the truth?” “Why, yes,” said he, “you are right, and I
agree that men are unwillingly deprived of true opinions.Cf. on 382 A and
Sophist. 228 C, Marcus Aurelius vii. 63.”
- “And doesn't this happen to them by theft, by the spells of sorcery or
- by force?” “I don't understand now either,” he said. “I must be talking
+ “And doesn’t this happen to them by theft, by the spells of sorcery or
+ by force?” “I don’t understand now either,” he said. “I must be talking
in high tragic style,The preceding metaphors are in the high-flown,
obscure style of tragedy. Cf. Thompson on
<placeName key="tgn,2505769">Meno</placeName>
@@ -6686,7 +6686,7 @@
think so,” he replied.<milestone ed="P" unit="para"/>“How, then,” said
I, “might we contrive<note anchored="true" resp="Loeb" place="unspecified">The concept <foreign xml:lang="grc">MHXANH/</foreign> or ingenious device employed by a superior
intelligence to circumvent necessity or play providence with the
- vulgar holds a prominent place in <placeName key="tgn,1023926">Plato</placeName>'s physics, and is for Rousseau-minded readers
+ vulgar holds a prominent place in <placeName key="tgn,1023926">Plato</placeName>’s physics, and is for Rousseau-minded readers
one of the dangerous features of his political and educational
philosophy. Cf. 415 C, <title>Laws 664 A, 752 C, 769 E, 798
B, 640 B. one of those opportune falsehoodsCf. 389 B. of
@@ -6697,10 +6697,10 @@
rulers themselves, but failing that the rest of the city?” “What kind of
a fiction do you mean?” said he. “Nothing unprecedented,” said I, “but a
sort of Phoenician tale,As was the Cadmus legend of the men who sprang from the
- dragon's teeth, which the Greks believed OU(/TWS A)PI/QANON O)/N, Laws 663 E.
+ dragon’s teeth, which the Greks believed OU(/TWS A)PI/QANON O)/N, Laws 663 E.
Pater, who translates the passage (Plato and
Platonism, p. 223), fancifully suggests that it is a
- “miners' story.” Others read into it an allusion to Egyptian castes.
+ “miners’ story.” Others read into it an allusion to Egyptian castes.
The proverb YEU=SMA
*FOINIKIKO/N(Strabo 259 B) probably goes back to the
Phoenician tales of the Odyssey. something
@@ -6713,21 +6713,21 @@
persuasion to make it believable.” “You act like one who shrinks from
telling his thought,” he said. “You will think that I have right good
reason
- KAI\ MA/L' here as often adds a touch
+ KAI\ MA/L’ here as often adds a touch
of humorous colloquial emphasis, which our conception of the dignity
of Plato does not allow a translator to reproduce. for
shrinking when I have told,” I said.
- “Say on,” said he, “and don't be afraid.” “Very well, I
+ “Say on,” said he, “and don’t be afraid.” “Very well, I
will. And yet I hardly know how to find the audacity or the words to
speak and undertake to persuade first the rulers themselves and the
soldiers and then the rest of the city, that in good soothPerhaps “that so it
is that” would be better.W(S A)/RA
- as often disclaims responsibility for the tale. Plato's fancy of men
- reared beneath the earth is the basis of Bulwer-Lytton's Utopia,
+ as often disclaims responsibility for the tale. Plato’s fancy of men
+ reared beneath the earth is the basis of Bulwer-Lytton’s Utopia,
The Coming Race, as his use of the ring of Gyges
- (359 D-360 B) is of H. G. Wells'Invisible Man.
+ (359 D-360 B) is of H. G. Wells’Invisible Man.
all our training and educating of them were things that they imagined
and that happened to them as it were in a dream; but that in reality at
that time they were down within the earth being molded and fostered
@@ -6737,7 +6737,7 @@
their weapons and the rest of their equipment were
being fashioned. And when they were quite finished the earth as being
their motherThe
- symbolism expresses the Athenian boast of autochthony and Plato's
+ symbolism expresses the Athenian boast of autochthony and Plato’s
patriotic application of it, Menexenus 237 E-238 A.
Cf. Burgess, “Epideictic Literature,”University of Chicago
Studies in Classical Philology, vol. iii. pp.
@@ -6760,9 +6760,9 @@
While all of you in the city are brothers, we will say in our tale, yet
God in fashioning those of you who are fitted to hold rule mingled gold
in their generation,Cf. 468 E, 547 A, and
- “already”Cratylus 394 D, 398 A. Hesiod's four
+ “already”Cratylus 394 D, 398 A. Hesiod’s four
metals, Works and Days 109-201, symbolize four
- succcessive ages. Plato's myth cannot of course be interpreted
+ succcessive ages. Plato’s myth cannot of course be interpreted
literally or made to express the whole of his apparently
undemocratic theory, of which the biologist Huxley in his essay on
Administrative Nihilism says: “The lapse of more than 2000 years has
@@ -6780,9 +6780,9 @@
sire and that the rest would in like manner be born of one another. So
that the first and chief injunction that the god lays upon the rulers is
that of nothing elseThe phrasing of this injunction recalls
- Shakespeare's
- Merchant of <placeName key="tgn,7013511">Venice</placeName>, in fine: “I'll fear no other
- thing/ So sore as keeping safe Nerissa's ring.” The securing of
+ Shakespeare’s
+ Merchant of <placeName key="tgn,7013511">Venice</placeName>, in fine: “I’ll fear no other
+ thing/ So sore as keeping safe Nerissa’s ring.” The securing of
disinterested capacity in the rulers is the pons
asinorum of political theory. Plato constructs his whole
state for this end. Cf. Introduction p. xv. Aristotle,
@@ -6807,8 +6807,8 @@
these there is born a son with unexpected gold or silver in his
composition they shall honor such and bid them go up higher, some to the
office of guardian, some to the assistanceship, alleging that there is
- an oraclePlato's
- oracle aptly copies the ambiguity of the bronze men's answer to
+ an oraclePlato’s
+ oracle aptly copies the ambiguity of the bronze men’s answer to
Psammetik (Herodotus ii. 152), and admits of both a moral and a
literal physical interpretation, like the “lame reign” against which
Sparta was warned. Cf.
@@ -6858,11 +6858,11 @@
shameful thing in the world for shepherds to breed the dogs who are to
help them with their flocks in such wise and of such a nature that from
indiscipline or hunger or some other evil condition the dogs themselves
- shall attack the sheep and injure them and be likened to wolvesAristotle's
+ shall attack the sheep and injure them and be likened to wolvesAristotle’s
objection (Politics1264 a 24) that the Platonic state will
break up into two hostile camps, is plagiarized in expression from
- Plato's similar censure of existing Greek cities (422 E) and assumes
+ Plato’s similar censure of existing Greek cities (422 E) and assumes
that the enforced disinterestedness, the higher education, and other
precautions of the Platonic Republic will not suffice to conjure
away the danger to which Plato first calls attention. instead
@@ -6895,7 +6895,7 @@
“He will rightly affirm that.” “Consider then,” said I,
“whether, if that is to be their character, their habitations and ways
of life must not be something after this fashion. In the first place,
- none must possess any private propertyPlato's communism is primarily a device to
+ none must possess any private propertyPlato’s communism is primarily a device to
secure disinterestedness in the ruling class, though he sometimes
treats it as a counsel of perfection for all men and states. Cf.
Introduction p. xv note a. save the indispensable. Secondly,
@@ -6913,10 +6913,10 @@
is one of social service, not of selfish enjoyment of wealth and
power. from the other citizens as the wages of their
guardianship, so measured that there shall be neither superfluity at the
- end of the year nor any lack.This is precisely Aristophanes' distinction
+ end of the year nor any lack.This is precisely Aristophanes’ distinction
between beggary and honorable poverty, Plutus
552-553. And resorting to a common messAs at Sparta. Cf. 458 C, Newman, Introduction to
- Aristotle's Politics, p. 334. like soldiers on
+ Aristotle’s Politics, p. 334. like soldiers on
campaign they will live together. Gold and silver, we will tell them,
they have of the divine quality from the gods always in their souls, and
they have no need of the metal of men nor does holiness suffer them to
@@ -6952,7 +6952,7 @@
then laying the courseThe image is that of a ship nearing the fatal
reef. Cf. Aeschylus, Eumenides 562. The sentiment and
the heightened rhetorical tone of the whole passage recalls the last
- page of the Critias, with Ruskin's translation and comment
+ page of the Critias, with Ruskin’s translation and comment
in A Crown of Wild Olive. of near shipwreck
for themselves and the state. For all these reasons,” said I, “let us
declare that such must be the provision for our guardians in lodging and
@@ -6966,15 +6966,15 @@
And Adeimantus broke in
and said, “What will be your defence, Socrates, if anyone objects that
- you are not making these men very happy,Adeimantus's criticism is made from
+ you are not making these men very happy,Adeimantus’s criticism is made from
the point of view of a Thrasymachus (343 A, 345 B) or a Callicles
- (Gorgias 492 B-C or of Solon's critics (cf. my
- note on Solon's Trochaics to Phokos, Class. <placeName key="tgn,2578489">Phil</placeName>
+ (<title>Gorgias 492 B-C or of Solon’s critics (cf. my
+ note on Solon’s Trochaics to Phokos, Class. <placeName key="tgn,2578489">Phil</placeName>
. vol. vi. pp. 216
ff.). The captious objection is repeated by Aristotle,
Politics 1264 b 15 ff., though he later (1325 a
- 9-10) himself uses Plato's answer to it, and by moderns, as Herbert
- Spencer, Grote, Newman to some extent (Introduction to Aristotle's
+ 9-10) himself uses Plato’s answer to it, and by moderns, as Herbert
+ Spencer, Grote, Newman to some extent (Introduction to Aristotle’s
Politics, p. 69.), and Zeller
(Aristotle, ii. p. 224) who has the audacity to
say that “Plato demanded the abolition of all private
@@ -7055,7 +7055,7 @@
we should think it a reasonable justification to reply,
- ‘Don't expect us, quaint friend, to paint the eyes so fine that they
+ ‘Don’t expect us, quaint friend, to paint the eyes so fine that they
will not be like eyes at all, nor the other parts. But observe whether
by assigning what is proper to each we render the whole beautiful.For this principle
of aesthetics Cf. Phaedrus 264 C, Aristotle
@@ -7076,7 +7076,7 @@
pleasure, and we could make the potters recline on couches from left to
righti.e. so
that the guest on the right hand occupied a lower place and the wine
- circulated in the same direction. Many write E)PI\ DECIA/, but AE)PIDE/CIA. “Forever, 'tis a single word. Our rude
+ circulated in the same direction. Many write E)PI\ DECIA/, but AE)PIDE/CIA. “Forever, ’tis a single word. Our rude
forefathers thought it two.” before the fire drinking toasts
and feasting with their wheel alongside to potter with when they are so
disposed, and we can make all the others happy in the same fashion, so
@@ -7092,7 +7092,7 @@
the “ab urbe condita” construction. For the thought cf. 374 B.
Zeller and many who follow him are not justified in inferring that
Plato would not educate the masses. (Cf. Newman, Introduction to
- Aristotle's Politics, i. p. 160.) It might as well be
+ Aristotle’s Politics, i. p. 160.) It might as well be
argued that the high schools of the United States are not intended for the masses
because some people sometimes emphasize their function of “fitting
for college.” In the RepublicPlato describes
@@ -7110,7 +7110,7 @@
and keepers of our liberties, men least likely to harm
the commonwealth, but the proponent of the other ideal is thinking of
- farmers and 'happy' feasters as it were in a festival and not in a civic
+ farmers and ’happy’ feasters as it were in a festival and not in a civic
community, he would have something else in mindThe expression is loose, but the
meaning is plain. The principle “one man, one task” makes the
guardians real guardians. The assumption that their happiness is the
@@ -7176,7 +7176,7 @@
but easier to fight two.Apparent paradox to stimulate
attention. Cf. 377 A, 334 A, 382 A, 414 B-C, 544 C,
Laws 919 B. For images from boxing cf. Aristotle
- Met. 985 a 14, and Demosthenes' statement
+ Met. 985 a 14, and Demosthenes’ statement
(Philip. i. 40-41) that the Athnians fight Philip
as the barbarians box. The Greeks felt that “lesser breeds without
the law” were inferior in this manly art of self-defense. Cf. the
@@ -7197,8 +7197,8 @@
and then turn and strike the one who came up first, and
if he repeated the procedure many times under a burning and stifling
sun? Would not such a fighter down even a number of such opponents?”
- “Doubtless,” he said; “it wouldn't be surprising if he did.” “Well,
- don't you think that the rich have more of the skill and practiceTwo elements of the
+ “Doubtless,” he said; “it wouldn’t be surprising if he did.” “Well,
+ don’t you think that the rich have more of the skill and practiceTwo elements of the
triad FU/SIS, MELE/TH, E)PISTH/MH.
Cf. 374 D. of boxing than of the art of war?” “I do,” he
said. “It will be easy, then, for our athletes in all probability to
@@ -7227,7 +7227,7 @@
goes in the game.“As they say in the game” or “in the jest.” The general meaning is
plain. We do not know enough about the game called PO/LEIS(cf. scholiast, Suidas,
Hesychius, and Photius) to be more specific. Cf. for conjectures and
- deatils Adam's note, and for the phrase Thompson on
+ deatils Adam’s note, and for the phrase <placeName key="tgn,7021303">Thompson</placeName> on <title>
<placeName key="tgn,2083598">Meno</placeName>
77 A. There are two at the least at enmity with one
another, the city of the rich
@@ -7264,14 +7264,14 @@
is rather “and” than “even.” “So large a city that is really one you
will not easily find, but the semblance (of one big city) you will
find in cities many and many times the size of this.” Cf. also 462
- A-B, and my paper “Plato's Laws and the Unity of
- Plato's Thought,”Class. <placeName key="tgn,2578489">Phil</placeName>
+ A-B, and my paper “Plato’s <title>Laws and the Unity of
+ Plato’s Thought,”Class. <placeName key="tgn,2578489">Phil</placeName>
. 1914, p.
- 358. For Aristotle's comment Cf. Politics
+ 358. For Aristotle’s comment Cf. Politics1261 a 15. you will not easily
discover either among Greeks or barbarians—but of those that seem so you
will find many and many times the size of this. Or do you think
- otherwise?” “No, indeed I don't,” said he.“Would not this, then, be the best rule and measure for our governors
+ otherwise?” “No, indeed I don’t,” said he.“Would not this, then, be the best rule and measure for our governors
of the proper size of the city and of the territory that they should
mark off for a city of that size and seek no more?” “What is the
measure?” “I think,” said I, “that they should let it grow so long as in
@@ -7279,7 +7279,7 @@
citizens know one another. They would not have called Babylon, London, or Chicago cities. Cf. Introduction
p. xxviii, Fowler, Greek City State, passim, Newman,
Aristotle Politics vol. i. Introduction pp. 314-315,
- and Isocrates' complaint that Athens was too large, Antidosis
+ and Isocrates’ complaint that Athens was too large, Antidosis
171-172. to remain a unity,
@@ -7303,7 +7303,7 @@
fitted, one man to one work, in order that each of them fulfilling his
own function may be not many men, but one, and so the entire city may
come to be not a multiplicity but a unity.It is a natural growth, not an
- artificial contrivance. For Aristotle's criticism Cf.
+ artificial contrivance. For Aristotle’s criticism Cf.
Politics1261 A.” “Why yes,” he said, “this
is even more trifling than that.” “These are not, my good Adeimantus, as
@@ -7312,8 +7312,8 @@
we are imposing upon them, but they are all easy,
provided they guard, as the saying is, the one great thingThe proverbial one
- great thing (one thing needful). The proverb perhaps is:PO/LL' OI)=D' A)LW/PHC A)LL' E)XI=NOS E(\N
- ME/GA(Suidas). Cf. Archil. fr. 61E(\N D' E)PI/STAMAI ME/GA,
+ great thing (one thing needful). The proverb perhaps is:PO/LL’ OI)=D’ A)LW/PHC A)LL’ E)XI=NOS E(\N
+ ME/GA(Suidas). Cf. Archil. fr. 61E(\N D’ E)PI/STAMAI ME/GA,
Politicus 297 AME/XRIPER
A)\N E(\N ME/GA FULA/TTWSI.—or instead of great
let us call it sufficient.
@@ -7334,16 +7334,16 @@
and the procreation of children and all that sort of
thing should be made as far as possible the proverbial goods of friends
that are common.The indirect introduction of the proverb is characteristicof
- Plato's style. Cf. on 449 C, where the paradox thus lightly
+ Plato’s style. Cf. on 449 C, where the paradox thus lightly
introduced is taken up for serious discussion. Quite fantastic is
the hypothesis on which much ink has been wasted, that the
Ecclesiazusae of Aristophanes was suggested by
this sentence and is answered by the fifth book. Cf. introduction
pp. xxv and xxxiv. It ought not to be necessary to repeat that
- Plato's communism applies only to the guardians, and that its main
+ Plato’s communism applies only to the guardians, and that its main
purpose is to enforce their disinterestedness. Cf. Introduction pp.
- xv and note a, xxxiv, xlii, xliv, and “Plato's Laws
- and the Unity of Plato's Thought,” p. 358. Aristotle's criticism is
+ xv and note a, xxxiv, xlii, xliv, and “Plato’s Laws
+ and the Unity of Plato’s Thought,” p. 358. Aristotle’s criticism is
that the possessions of friends ought to be common in use but not in
ownership. Cf. Politics1263 a 30, and Euripides
@@ -7371,11 +7371,11 @@
gymnastics counter to the established order, and to the best of their
power guard against them, fearing when anyone says thatThat song is most regarded among men
- Which hovers newest on the singer's lips,
+ Which hovers newest on the singer’s lips,Hom. Od.
1.351
- Our text has E)PIKLEI/OUS' and
+ Our text has E)PIKLEI/OUS’ and
A)KOUO/NTESSI. For the variant
cf. Howes in Harvard Studies, vi. p. 205. For the
commonplace that new songs are best cf. Pindar, Ol.
@@ -7388,7 +7388,7 @@
supposed that the poet means not new songs but a new way of songThe meaning of the
similar phrase in Pindar, Ol. iii. 4 is
different. and is commending this. But we must not praise
- that sort of thing nor conceive it to be the poet's meaning. For a
+ that sort of thing nor conceive it to be the poet’s meaning. For a
change to a new type of music is something to beware of as a hazard of
all our fortunes. For the modes of musicMOUSIKH=S
@@ -7409,7 +7409,7 @@
guard-houseThe
etymological force of the word makes the metaphor less harsh than
the English translation “guard-house.” Cf. Laws 962
- C, where Bury renders “safeguard.” Cf. Pindar's A)KO/NAS LIGURA=S, the sharpening
+ C, where Bury renders “safeguard.” Cf. Pindar’s A)KO/NAS LIGURA=S, the sharpening
thing, that is, the whetstone, Ol. vi. 82. and
post of watch.” “It is certain,” he said, “that this is the kind of
lawlessness
@@ -7420,15 +7420,15 @@
Politics1307 b 33. itself unobserved.”
“Yes,” said I, “because it is supposed to be only a form of playCf. the warning
- aagainst innovation in children's games, Laws 797
+ aagainst innovation in children’s games, Laws 797
A-B. But music is PAIDEI/A as well
- as PAIDIA/. Cf. Aristotle's three
+ as PAIDIA/. Cf. Aristotle’s three
uses of music, for play, education, and the entertainment of leisure
(Politics1339 a 16). and to work no harm.”
“Nor does it work any,” he said, “except that by gradual infiltration it
softly overflowsCf. Demosthenes xix. 228. The image is that of a stream overflowing
- and spreading. Cf. Euripides fr. 499 N. and Cicero's use of
+ and spreading. Cf. Euripides fr. 499 N. and Cicero’s use of
“serpit,”Cat. iv. 3, and
passim. upon the characters and pursuits of
men and from these issues forth grown greater to attack their business
@@ -7469,13 +7469,13 @@
Aristophanes Wasps1069. and the garments and the
fashion of the foot-gear, and in general the deportment of the body and
- everything of the kind. Don't you think so?” “I do.” “Yet to enact them
+ everything of the kind. Don’t you think so?” “I do.” “Yet to enact them
into laws would, I think, be silly.Cf. on 412 B, Isocrates
Areopagiticus 41, and Laws 788 B,
where the further, still pertinent consideration is added that the
multiplication of minor enactments tends to bring fundamental laws
- into contempt. Cf. “Plato's Laws and the Unity of
- Plato's Thought,” p. 353, n. 2. For such laws are not obeyed
+ into contempt. Cf. “Plato’s Laws and the Unity of
+ Plato’s Thought,” p. 353, n. 2. For such laws are not obeyed
nor would they last, being enacted only in words and on paper.” “How
could they?” “At any rate, Adeimantus,” I said, “the direction of the
education from whence one starts is likely to determine
@@ -7494,7 +7494,7 @@
Republic, and so Plato omits it here. Much of it
is given in the Laws, but even there details are left
to the citizens and their rulers. Cf. on 412 B.” “With good
- reason,” said he. “But what, in heaven's name,” said I, “about business
+ reason,” said he. “But what, in heaven’s name,” said I, “about business
matters, the dealsCf. Laws 922 A, Aristotle Politics1263 b 21. All legal relations of contract,
impied contract and tort. that men make with one another in
@@ -7533,13 +7533,13 @@
intemperance are unwilling to abandonCf. Emerson, “Experience”: “They wish to be
saved from the mischiefs of their vices but not from their vices.
Charity would be wasted on this poor waiting on the symptoms. A wise
- and hardy physician will say, 'Come out of that' as the first
+ and hardy physician will say, ’Come out of that’ as the first
condition of advice.” their unwholesome regimen.”
“By all means.” And truly,” said I, “these latter go on
- in a most charmingIronical. Quite fanciful is Dümmler's supposition (Kleine
+ in a most charming<note anchored="true" resp="Loeb" place="unspecified">Ironical. Quite fanciful is Dümmler’s supposition (<title>Kleine
Schriften, i, p. 99) that this passage was meant as
destructive criticism of Isocrates Panegyricus and
that Antidosis 62 is a reply. Plato is obviously
@@ -7550,26 +7550,26 @@
GE etc., is loosely elliptical, but emendations are
superfluous. they are always hoping that some one will
recommend a panacea that will restore their health.” “A perfect
- description,” he said, “of the state of such invalids.” “And isn't this
+ description,” he said, “of the state of such invalids.” “And isn’t this
a charming trait in them, that they hate most in all the world him who
tells them the truth that until a man stops drinking and gorging and
wenching
and idling, neither drugsFor the list cf. Pindar,
- Pyth. iii. 50-54.OU)D'
+ Pyth. iii. 50-54.OU)D’
AU)= emphasizes the transition to superstitious
- remedies in which Plato doesn't really believe. Cf. his
+ remedies in which Plato doesn’t really believe. Cf. his
rationalizing interpretations of E)PW|DAI/, Charmides 157 A,
Theaetetus 149 C.Laws 933 A-B is
- to be interpreted in the spirit of the observation in Selden's
+ to be interpreted in the spirit of the observation in Selden’s
Table Talk: “The law against witches does not
prove that there be any but it punishes the malice,” etc.
[Demosthenes] xxv. 80 is sceptical. nor cautery nor the
knife, no, nor spells nor periaptsCf. any lexicon, Shakespeare 1 Henry
VI. v. iii. 2 “Now help, ye charming spells and
- periapts,” and Plutarch's story of the women who hung them on
- Pericles' neck on his death-bed. will be of any avail?” “Not
+ periapts,” and Plutarch’s story of the women who hung them on
+ Pericles’ neck on his death-bed. will be of any avail?” “Not
altogether charming,” he said, “for there is no grace or charm in being
angryCf. 480
A, 354 A. with him who speaks well.” “You do not seem to be
@@ -7580,7 +7580,7 @@
entire city,We
return from the illustration to its application to the state.
as we were just now saying, acts in this way, will it have your
- approval, or don't you think that the way of such invalids is precisely
+ approval, or don’t you think that the way of such invalids is precisely
that of those cities
@@ -7590,7 +7590,7 @@
1301 b 11. Cf. the obvious imitation in the
(probably spurious)Epistle vii. 330 E. For the
thought, from the point of view of an enemy of democracy, cf. the
- statement in [Xenophon]Rep. Ath. 3. 9, that the
+ statement in [Xenophon] Rep. Ath. 3. 9, that the
faults of Athens cannot
be corrected while she remains a democracy. The Athenians naturally
guarded their constitution and viewed with equal suspicion the
@@ -7599,21 +7599,21 @@
attempts that—while whoever most agreeably servesCf. , p. 65 note d, and
Laws 923 B. The phraseology here recalls
Gorgias 517 B, Aristophanes
- Knights 46-63. Cf. “Plato's Laws
- and the Unity of Plato's Thought,”Class Phil. vol.
+ Knights 46-63. Cf. “Plato’s Laws
+ and the Unity of Plato’s Thought,”Class Phil. vol.
ix. (Oct. 1914) p. 363, n. 3. them
governed as they are and who curries favor with them by fawning upon
them and anticipating their desires and by his cleverness in gratifying
them, him they will account the good man, the man wise in worthwhile
things,Almost
technical. Cf. 538 B. the man they will delight to honor?”
- “Yes,” he said, “I think their conduct is identical, and I don't approve
+ “Yes,” he said, “I think their conduct is identical, and I don’t approve
it in the very least.”
“And what again of those who are willing and eager to
serveHere
- “serve,” not “flatter.” such states? Don't you admire their
+ “serve,” not “flatter.” such states? Don’t you admire their
valiance and light-hearted irresponsibilityThis word EU)XE/REIA is often misunderstood by lexicons and
commentators. It is of course not “dexterity” (L. and S.) nor yet
probably “complaisance,” nor yet “humanitas” or “Gutmütigkeit” as
@@ -7621,17 +7621,17 @@
with which such politicians rush in where wiser men fear to tread,
which is akin to the lightness with which men plunge into crime. Cf.
Laws 690 DTW=N E)PI\
- NO/MWN QE/SIN I)O/NTWN R(A|DI/WS and 969A)NDREIO/TATOS. Plato's political
+ NO/MWN QE/SIN I)O/NTWN R(A|DI/WS and 969A)NDREIO/TATOS. Plato’s political
physician makes “come out of that” a precondition of his treatment.
Cf. Laws 736-737, Politicus 299 A-B,
501 A, 540 E, Epistle vii. 330 C-D, and the story in
- Aelian. V.H. ii. 42. of Plato's refusal to legislate for the
+ Aelian. V.H. ii. 42. of Plato’s refusal to legislate for the
Arcadians because they would not accept an equalization of
property.?” “I do,” he said, “except those who are actually
deluded and suppose themselves to be in truth statesmenCf.
Euthyphro 2 C-D, Gorgias 513 B,
Politicus 275 C and 292 D. because they
- are praised by the many.” “What do you mean? “Can't you make
+ are praised by the many.” “What do you mean? “Can’t you make
allowancesPlato often condescendingly and half ironically pardons
psychologically inevitable errors. Cf. 366 C,
Phaedrus 269 B, Euthydemus 306
@@ -7650,12 +7650,12 @@
marks dissent on one point. This dissent is challenged, and is
withdrawn by OU)K AU)= . . . TOU=TO
GE(OI)=MAI).”
- he said, “I don't think that.” “Then don't be harsh with them. For
+ he said, “I don’t think that.” “Then don’t be harsh with them. For
surely such fellows are the most charming spectacle in the world when
they enact and amend such laws as we just now described and are
perpetually expecting to find a way of putting an end to frauds in
business and in the other matters of which I was speaking because they
- can't see that they are in very truth
+ can’t see that they are in very truthTW=| O)/NTI
points the application of the proverbial U(/DRAN TE/MNEIN, which appears in this now trite
metaphorical use for the first time here and in
@@ -7668,7 +7668,7 @@
MEGI/STHN, Theophrastus apudStobaeus
Flor. xxxvii. 21O)LI/GWN
OI( A)GAQOI\ NO/MWN DE/ONTAI. trying to cut off
- a Hydra's head.”
+ a Hydra’s head.”
@@ -7721,7 +7721,7 @@
is in such matters for all mankind the interpreter of the religion of
their fathers who from his seat in the middle and at the very navelThis “navel” stone,
supposed to mark the center of the earth, has now been found. Cf.
- Poulsen's
+ Poulsen’s <title>
<placeName key="perseus,Delphi">Delphi</placeName>
, pp. 19, 29, 157, and Frazer on Pausanias x. 16. of
the earth delivers his interpretation.” “Excellently said,” he replied;
@@ -7737,7 +7737,7 @@
the four cardinal virtues and defines each provisionally and
sufficiently for the present purpose, and solves the problems
dramatically presented in the minor dialogues, Charmides,
- Laches, etc. Cf. Unity of Plato's
+ Laches, etc. Cf. Unity of Plato’s
Thought, pp. 15-18, nn. 81-102, and the introduction to the
second volume of this translation. may be considered as
established. The next thing is to procure a sufficient light somewhere
@@ -7773,7 +7773,7 @@
original question in controversy with Thrasymachus, by the
assumption that justice and the other moral virtues are goods. Cf.
Gorgias 507 C. See The Idea of Good in
- Plato's Republic, p. 205. For the cardinal virtues cf.
+ Plato’s Republic, p. 205. For the cardinal virtues cf.
Schmidt, Ethik
der Griechen, i. p. 304, Pearson, Fragments of
Zeno and Cleanthes, pp. 173 f., and commentators on
@@ -7786,10 +7786,10 @@
confess the arbitrariness of his Seven Lamps of
Architecture.” “Necessarily,” he said. “Clearly, then, it will be
wise, brave, sober, and just.” “Clearly.” “Then if we find any of these
- qualities in it, the remainderIt is pedantry to identify this with Mill's
+ qualities in it, the remainderIt is pedantry to identify this with Mill’s
method of residues and then comment on the primitive naïveté of such
an application of logic to ethics. One might as well speak of
- Andocides' employment of the method (De myst. 109) or
+ Andocides’ employment of the method (De myst. 109) or
of its use by Gorgias in the disjunctive dilemma of the Palamedes 11
and passim, or say that the dog of the anecdote
employs it when he sniffs up one trail and immediately runs up the
@@ -7818,11 +7818,11 @@
SOFI/A is wisdom par
excellence. Aristotle, Met. i., traces
the history of the idea from Homer to its identification in
- Aristotle's mind with first philosophy for metaphysics. For Plato,
+ Aristotle’s mind with first philosophy for metaphysics. For Plato,
the moralist, it is virtue and the fear of the Lord; for his
political theory it is the “political or royal art” which the
dramatic dialogues fail to distinguish from the special sciences and
- arts. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 17, n. 97,
+ arts. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 17, n. 97,
Protagoras 319 A, Euthydemus 282
E, 291 C, Gorgias 501 A-B, etc. In the unreformed
Greek state its counterfeit counterpart is the art of the
@@ -7836,12 +7836,12 @@
“And surely this very thing, good counsel,Protagoras, like Isocrates,
professed to teach EU)BOULI/A(Protagoras 318 E), which
Socrates identifies at once with the political art. Plato would
- accept Protagoras's discrimination of this for the special arts
+ accept Protagoras’s discrimination of this for the special arts
(ibid. 318 ff.), but he does not believe that
such as Protagoras can teach it. His political art is a very
- different thing from Protagoras's EU)BOULI/A and is apprehended by a very different
- education from that offered by Protagoras. Cf. “Plato's
- Laws and the Unity of Plato's Thought,” p. 348,
+ different thing from Protagoras’s EU)BOULI/A and is apprehended by a very different
+ education from that offered by Protagoras. Cf. “Plato’s
+ Laws and the Unity of Plato’s Thought,” p. 348,
n. 5, Euthydemus 291 B-C, Charmides
170 B, Protagoras 319 A, Gorgias 501
A-B, 503 D, Politicus 289 C, 293 D, 309 C. is
@@ -7854,9 +7854,9 @@
a city is to be called wise and well advised?” “By no
means for that, but rather mistress of the arts of building.” “Then a
city is not to be styled wise because of the deliberations
- BOULEUOME/NH: Heindorf's BOULEUOME/NHN is perhaps supported by
+ BOULEUOME/NH: Heindorf’s BOULEUOME/NHN is perhaps supported by
H(=| . . . BOULEU/ETAI below,
- but in view of Plato's colloquial anacloluthic style is
+ but in view of Plato’s colloquial anacloluthic style is
unnecessary. of the science of wooden utensils for their best
production?” “No, I grant you.” “Is it, then, because of that of brass
implements or any other of that kind?” “None whatsoever,” he said. “Nor
@@ -7923,9 +7923,9 @@
that things to be feared are precisely those which and
such as the lawgiverCf. 442 C, Aristotle Eth. Nic.
- 1129 b 19PROSTA/TTEI D' O( NO/MOS KAI\ TA\ TOU= A)NDREI/OU E)/RGA
+ 1129 b 19PROSTA/TTEI D’ O( NO/MOS KAI\ TA\ TOU= A)NDREI/OU E)/RGA
POIEI=N. inculcated in their education. Is not
- that what you call bravery?” “I don't altogether understandCf. on 347 A.
+ that what you call bravery?” “I don’t altogether understandCf. on 347 A.
what you said,” he replied; “but say it again.” “A kind of
conservation,” I said, “is what I mean by bravery.” “What sort of a
conservation
@@ -7953,7 +7953,7 @@
virtuously art, and let not the ocean wash away thy tincture.” The
idea that the underlying subsatnce must be of neutral quality may
have been suggested to Plato by Anaxagoras. It occurs in the
- Timaeus 50 D-E, whence it passed to Aristotle's
+ Timaeus 50 D-E, whence it passed to Aristotle’s
psychology and Lucretius. Cf. my paper on “Plato, Epicurus, and
Lucretius,”Harvard Studies, vol. xii. p.
204. if you please.” “I do.” “You are aware that dyers when
@@ -7963,7 +7963,7 @@
best way, and after the treatment,For the technique cf. Blummer,
Technologie, vol. i. pp. 227 ff. The QERA/PEUSIS seems to be virtually
identical with the PROPARASKEUH/,
- so that the aorist seems appropriate, unless with Adam's earlier
+ so that the aorist seems appropriate, unless with Adam’s earlier
edition we transpose it immediately before OU(/TW DH/. then and then only, dip it in the
dye.
@@ -7995,7 +7995,7 @@
of the fitness of their nature and nurture, and that so their dyes might
not be washed out by those lyes that have such dreadDEINA/: it is not fanciful to feel the
- unity of Plato's imagination as well as of his thought in the
+ unity of Plato’s imagination as well as of his thought in the
recurrence of this word in the DEINA\ KAI\
A)NAGKAI=A of the mortal soul in
Timaeus 69 C. power to scour our faiths
@@ -8012,7 +8012,7 @@
defined, (3) casual civic bravery in ordinary states, (4) animal
instinct, which hardly deserves the name. Cf. Laches
196 E, Mill, Nature, p. 47 “Consistent courage is
- always the effect of cultivation,” etc., Unity of Plato's
+ always the effect of cultivation,” etc., <title>Unity of Plato’s
Thought, nn. 46 and 77. about things to be and
not to be feared is what I call and would assume to be courage, unless
you have something different to say.” “No, nothing,” said he; “for I
@@ -8022,7 +8022,7 @@
Phaedo 69 B. to have little or nothing to
do with lawNO/MIMON of the Mss. yields
- quite as good a meaning as Stobaeus's MO/NIMON. The virtuous habit that is inculcated by
+ quite as good a meaning as Stobaeus’s MO/NIMON. The virtuous habit that is inculcated by
law is more abiding than accidental virtue. and that you
would call it by another name than courage.”
@@ -8041,7 +8041,7 @@
mercenaries. that it is the courage of a citizen. Some other
time,This
dismissal of the subject is sometimes fancifully taken as a promise
- of the Laches. Cf. Unity of Plato's
+ of the <title>Laches. Cf. Unity of Plato’s
Thought, nn. 77 and 603. if it please you, we
will discuss it more fully. At present we were not seeking this but
justice; and for the purpose of that inquiry I believe we have done
@@ -8050,7 +8050,7 @@
“Two things still
- remain,” said I, “to make out in our city, sobernessMatthew Arnold's
+ remain,” said I, “to make out in our city, sobernessMatthew Arnold’s
word. But cf. on 398 D and 430 E—“sobriety,” “temperance,”
“Besonnenheit.” and the object of the whole inquiry,
justice.” “Quite so.” “If there were only some way to discover justice
@@ -8073,12 +8073,12 @@
the standpoint of the spaeker. Cf. Protagoras 333
B-C. Its two chief meanings in Greek usage are given in 389 D-E:
subordination to due authority, and control of appetite, both raised
- to higher significance in Plato's definition. As in the case of
+ to higher significance in Plato’s definition. As in the case of
bravery, Plato distinguishes the temperamental, the bourgeois, the
disciplined, and the philosophical virtue. But he affects to feel
something paradoxical in the very idea of self-control, as perhaps
there is. Cf. Laws 626 E ff., 863 D, A.J.P. vol.
- xiii. pp. 361 f., Unity of Plato's Thought, nn. 77
+ xiii. pp. 361 f., Unity of Plato’s Thought, nn. 77
and 78. and a continence of certain pleasures and appetites,
as they say, using the phrase ‘master of himself’ I know not how; and
there are other similar expressions that as it were point us to the same
@@ -8119,11 +8119,11 @@
chiefly in childrenPAISI/: so Wolf, for
Ms.PA=SI, a frequent error.
- Cf. 494 B. Plato, like Shakespeare's Rosalind, brackets boys and
+ Cf. 494 B. Plato, like Shakespeare’s Rosalind, brackets boys and
women as creatures who have for every passion something and for no
passion truly anything. and women and slaves and in the base
rabble of those who are freemen in name.Cf. on 336 A. The ordinary man who
- is passion's slave is not truly free. The Stoics and Cynics preached
+ is passion’s slave is not truly free. The Stoics and Cynics preached
many sermons on this text. See Persius, Sat. v. 73.
and 124, Epictetus
<placeName key="tgn,1029055">Diss</placeName>
@@ -8148,7 +8148,7 @@
</div>
<div n="431e" type="textpart" subtype="section">
<said who="Socrates">the rulers and the ruled are of one mind as to who
- ought to rule, that condition will be found in this. Don't you think
+ ought to rule, that condition will be found in this. Don’t you think
so?” “I most emphatically do,” he said. “In which class of the citizens,
then, will you say that the virtue of soberness has its seat when this
is their condition? In the rulers or in the ruled?” “In both, I
@@ -8174,7 +8174,7 @@
<said who="Socrates">respectively made the city, the one wise and the other
brave. That is not the way of soberness, but it extends literally
through the entire gamut<note anchored="true" resp="Loeb" place="unspecified">
- <foreign xml:lang="grc">DI' O(/LHS</foreign>:
+ <foreign xml:lang="grc">DI’ O(/LHS</foreign>:
sc.<foreign xml:lang="grc">TH=S PO/LEWS</foreign>, but as
<foreign xml:lang="grc">A)TEXNW=S</foreign> shows (Cf. on 419 E)
it already suggets the musical metaphor of the entire octave
@@ -8195,12 +8195,12 @@
similar criterion. So that we should be quite right in affirming this
unanimity<note anchored="true" resp="Loeb" place="unspecified">The
final statement of the definition, which, however, has little
- significance for Plato's thought, when isolated from its explanatory
+ significance for Plato’s thought, when isolated from its explanatory
context. Cf. <title>Def. Plat. 413 E, Unity of
- Plato's Thought, pp. 15. f., n. 82. Quite idle is the
+ Plato’s Thought, pp. 15. f., n. 82. Quite idle is the
discussion whether SWFROSU/NH is
otiose, and whether it can be absolutely distinguished from DIKAIOSU/NH. They are sufficiently
- distinguished for Plato's purpose in the imagery and analogies of
+ distinguished for Plato’s purpose in the imagery and analogies of
the Republic. to be soberness, the concord of
the naturally superior and inferior
@@ -8210,15 +8210,15 @@
on 351 E.” “I entirely concur,” he said. “Very well,” said I.
“We have made out these three forms in our city to the best of our
present judgement.Cf. Demosthenes 18 and 430 EW(/S GE
- E)NTEU=QEN I)DEI=N. Plato's definitions and analyses
+ E)NTEU=QEN I)DEI=N. Plato’s definitions and analyses
are never presented as final. They are always sufficient for the
- purpose in hand. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 13,
+ purpose in hand. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 13,
nn. 63-67 and 519. What can be the remaining form that
- DI' O(/: cf. my paper on the Origin of
+ DI’ O(/: cf. my paper on the Origin of
the Syllogism, Class. <placeName key="tgn,2578490">Phil</placeName>
. vol. xix. pp. 7 ff. This is an
example of the terminology of the theory of ideas “already” in the
- first four books. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, p.
+ first four books. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p.
35, n. 238, p. 38. would give the city still another virtue?
For it is obvious that the remainder is justice.” “Obvious.” “Now
then,
@@ -8232,7 +8232,7 @@
96 E, Huxley,
<placeName key="tgn,2028417">Hume</placeName>
, p. 139 “There cannot be two passions more nearly
- resembling each other than hunting and philosophy.” Cf. also Hardy's
+ resembling each other than hunting and philosophy.” Cf. also Hardy’s
“He never could beat the covert of conversation without starting the
game.” The elaboration of the image here is partly to mark the
importance of DIKAIOSU/NH and
@@ -8248,7 +8248,7 @@
and discern what you point out to him you will be making a very
fairIt is not
necessary, though plausible, to emend METRI/WS to METRI/W|. The latter is slightly more idiomatical.
- Cf. Terence's “benigno me utetur patre.” use of me.”
+ Cf. Terence’s “benigno me utetur patre.” use of me.”
“PrayPrayer is
the proper preface of any act. Cf. Timaeus 27 C,
Laws 712 B. for success then,” said I,
@@ -8259,14 +8259,14 @@
not easy to beat up.” “But all the same on we must go.”
“Yes, on.” And I caught view and gave a hulloa and said, “Glaucon, I
- think we have found its trail and I don't believe it will get away from
+ think we have found its trail and I don’t believe it will get away from
us.” “I am glad to hear that,” said he. “Truly,” said I, “we were
slackersTO\ PA/QOS: for the
periphrasis cf. 376 A. indeed.” “How so?” “Why, all the time,
bless your heart, the thing apparently was tumbling about our feetCf.
Theaetetus 201 A. from the start and yet
- we couldn't see it, but were most ludicrous, like
+ we couldn’t see it, but were most ludicrous, like
people who sometimes hunt for what they hold in their
@@ -8301,14 +8301,14 @@
some form of this, is justice. And what we did lay down, and often said,
you recall, was that each one man must perform one social service in the
state for which his nature is best adapted.” “Yes, we said that.” “And
- again that to do one's own business and not to be a busybody is
+ again that to do one’s own business and not to be a busybody is
justice,
is a saying that we have heard from many and have often
repeated ourselves.This need not refer to any specific passage in the dialogues. Cf.
- Unity of Plato's Thought, n. 236. A Greek could
- at any time say that minding one's own business and not being a
+ Unity of Plato’s Thought, n. 236. A Greek could
+ at any time say that minding one’s own business and not being a
busybody is SW=FRON or DI/KAION or both.” “We have.”
“This, then,” I said, “my friend, if taken in a certain sense appears to
be justice,
@@ -8317,7 +8317,7 @@
this.” Cf. 432 E, 516 C, Lysis 217 E,
Laws 910 B, 495 A, 596 D, Goodwin, Moods and
Tenses, 830. Yet, Cf. Politicus 291
- D. this principle of doing one's own business. Do you know
+ D. this principle of doing one’s own business. Do you know
whence I infer this?” “No, but tell me,” he said. “I think that this is
the remaining virtue in the state after our consideration of soberness,
courage, and intelligence, a quality which made it possible for them all
@@ -8362,7 +8362,7 @@
the formula in a fashion (PH|),
for legal justice “est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique
tribuens.” Cf. 331 E and Aristotle Rhet. 1366 b 9E)/STI DE\
- DIKAIOSU/NH ME\N A)RETH\ DI' H(\N TA\ AU(TW=N E(/KASTA E)/XOUSI,
+ DIKAIOSU/NH ME\N A)RETH\ DI’ H(\N TA\ AU(TW=N E(/KASTA E)/XOUSI,
KAI\ W(S O( NO/MOS. if so you will be
convinced. Will you not assign the conduct of lawsuits in your state to
the rulers?” “Of course.” “Will not this be the chief aim of their
@@ -8370,7 +8370,7 @@
TA)LLO/TRIA: the article is normal;
Stallb. on Phaedrus 230 A. For the ambiguity of
TA)LLO/TRIA cf. 443 D. So
- OI)KEI/OU is one's own in
+ OI)KEI/OU is one’s own in
either literal or the ideal sense of the Stoics and Emerson, and E(AUTOU= is similarly ambiguous. Cf. on
443 D. or be deprived of his own? Nothing else but this.” “On
the assumption that this is just?” “Yes.” “From this point of view too,
@@ -8382,11 +8382,11 @@
- of one's own and what belongs to oneself would
+ of one’s own and what belongs to oneself would
admittedly be justice.” “That is so.” “Consider nowA further confirmation. For what
follows cf. 421 A. whether you agree with me. A carpenter
undertaking to do the work of a cobbler or a cobbler of a carpenter or
- their interchange of one another's tools or honors or even the attempt
+ their interchange of one another’s tools or honors or even the attempt
of the same man to do both—the confounding of all other functions would
not, think you, greatly injure a state, would it?” “Not much,” he said.
“But when I fancy one who is by nature an artisan or some kind of
@@ -8400,14 +8400,14 @@
and their honors or when the same man undertakes all these functions at
once, then, I take it, you too believe that this kind of substitution
and meddlesomeness is the ruin of a state.” “By all means.” “The
- interference with one another's business, then, of three existent
+ interference with one another’s business, then, of three existent
classes and the substitution of the one for the other
is the greatest injury to a state and would most
rightly be designated as the thing which chieflyMA/LISTA with KAKOURGI/A. works it harm.” “Precisely so.”
- “And the thing that works the greatest harm to one's own state, will you
+ “And the thing that works the greatest harm to one’s own state, will you
not pronounce to be injustice?” “Of course.” “This, then, is
injustice.”“Again,PA/LIN, “again,” here means conversely.
@@ -8437,7 +8437,7 @@
1062 b 15.” I said, “but if this
formThe
doctrine of the transcendental ideas was undoubtedly familiar to
- Plato at this time. Cf. on 402 B, and Unity of Plato's
+ Plato at this time. Cf. on 402 B, and <title>Unity of Plato’s
Thought, p. 31, n. 194, p. 35. But we need not evoke the
theory of PAROUSI/A here to
account for this slight personification of the form, idea, or
@@ -8445,7 +8445,7 @@
Suppl. 562 and of I)O/N in Philebus 52 E. Plato, in
short, is merely saying vivaciously what Aristotle technically says
in the words DEI= DE\ TOU=TO MH\ MO/NON
- KAQO/LOU LE/GESQAI, A)LLA\ KAI\ TOI=S KAQ' E(/KASTA
+ KAQO/LOU LE/GESQAI, A)LLA\ KAI\ TOI=S KAQ’ E(/KASTA
E)FARMO/TTEIN, Eth. Nic. 1107 a 28. when applied to the
individual man, accepted there also as a definition of justice, we will
then concede the point—for what else will there be to say? But if not,
@@ -8454,14 +8454,14 @@
368 E. For the loose internal accusative H(/N cf. 443 B, Laws 666 B,
Phaedrus 249 D, Sophist 264 B, my
paper on Illogical Idiom, T.A.P.A., 1916,
- vol. xlvii. p. 213, and the school-girl's “This is the play that the
+ vol. xlvii. p. 213, and the school-girl’s “This is the play that the
reward is offered for the best name suggested for it.” we
supposed that, if we found some larger thing that contained justice and
viewed it there,E)KEI= though redundant need
not offend in this intentionally ancoluthic and resumptive sentence.
Some inferior Mss. read E)KEI=NO.
- Burnet's <H)\>is impossible. we should
+ Burnet’s H)\ is impossible. we should
more easily discover its nature in the individual man.
@@ -8478,7 +8478,7 @@
to the state and test it there and it may be that, by
- examining them side by sideCf. Sophist 230 BTIQE/ASI PAR' A)LLH/LAS, Isocrates
+ examining them side by sideCf. Sophist 230 BTIQE/ASI PAR’ A)LLH/LAS, Isocrates
Areopagiticus 79, Nic. 17.
and rubbing them against one another, as it were from the
fire-sticksCf.
@@ -8498,13 +8498,13 @@
O(/ GE TAU)TO/N: there are several
reasons for the seeming over-elaboration of the logic in the next
few pages. The analogy between the three classes in the state and
- the tripartite soul is an important point in Plato's ethical theory
+ the tripartite soul is an important point in Plato’s ethical theory
and an essential feature in the structure of the
Republic. Very nice distinctions are involved in
the attempt to prove the validity of the analogy for the present
argument without too flagrant contradiction of the faith elsewhere
expressed in the essential unity of the soul. Cf. Unity of
- Plato's Thought, p. 42. These distinctions in the
+ Plato’s Thought, p. 42. These distinctions in the
infancy of logic Plato is obliged to set forth and explain as he
proceeds. Moreover, he is interested in logical method for its own
sake (cf.. Introduction p. xiv), and is here stating for the first
@@ -8549,7 +8549,7 @@
423 C. inquiry into which we have plunged, the question
whether the soul really contains these three forms in itself or not.”
“It does not seem to me at all trifling,” he said, “for perhaps,
- Socrates, the saying is true that 'fine things are difficult.'A proverb often
+ Socrates, the saying is true that ’fine things are difficult.’A proverb often
cited by Plato with variations. Cf. 497 D-E.” “Apparently,”
said I;
@@ -8570,10 +8570,10 @@
the higher education which will enable his philosophical rulers to
do that. We may then disregard all idle guesses about a “new logic”
hinted at in the longer way, and all fantastic hypotheses about the
- evolution of Plato's thought and the composition of the
+ evolution of Plato’s thought and the composition of the
Republic based on supposed contradictions between
this passage and the later books. Cf. Introduction p. xvi, “Idea of
- Good,” p. 190, Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 16, n.
+ Good,” p. 190, Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 16, n.
90; followed by Professor Wilamowitz, ii. p. 218, who, however, does
not understand the connection of it all with the idea of good. Plato
the logician never commits himself to more than is required by the
@@ -8586,7 +8586,7 @@
that conducts to this. Yet we may perhaps discuss it on the level of
previous statements and inquiries.” “May we acquiesce in that?” he said.
“I for my part should be quite satisfied with that for the present.”
- “And I surely should be more than satisfied,” I replied. “Don't you
+ “And I surely should be more than satisfied,” I replied. “Don’t you
weary then,” he said, “but go on with the inquiry.” “Is it not, then,”
@@ -8601,7 +8601,7 @@
organization is determined by the nature of its units.” Plato
illustrates the commonplace in a slight digression on national
characteristics, with a hint of the thought partially anticipated by
- Hippocrates and now identified with Buckle's name, that they are
+ Hippocrates and now identified with Buckle’s name, that they are
determined by climate and environment. Cf. Newman, Introduction to
Aristotle Politics pp. 318-320. this much,
that the same forms and qualities are to be found in each one of us that
@@ -8647,13 +8647,13 @@
day is still a matter of rhetoric, poetry, and point of view rather
than of strict science. For some purposes we must treat the
“faculties” of the mind as distinct entities, for others we must
- revert to the essential unity of the soul. Cf. Arnold's “Lines on
- Butler's Sermons” and my remarks in The Assault on
+ revert to the essential unity of the soul. Cf. Arnold’s “Lines on
+ Butler’s Sermons” and my remarks in <title>The Assault on
Humanism. Plato himself is well aware of this, and in
different dialogues emphasizes the aspect that suits his purpose.
There is no contradiction between this passage and
Phaedo 68 C, 82 C, and Republic x.
- 611-12. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, pp.
+ 611-12. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp.
42-43. that we function in each case when we once begin. That
is what is really hard to determine properly.” “I think so too,” he
said. “Let us then attempt to define the boundary and decide whether
@@ -8669,7 +8669,7 @@
Rhet. ii. 24. Plato invokes the principle against
Heraclitism and other philosophies of relativity and the sophistries
that grew out of them or played with their formulas. Cf.
- Unity of Plato's Thought, pp. 50 ff., 53, 58, 68.
+ Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 50 ff., 53, 58, 68.
Aristotle follows Plato in this, pronouncing it PASW=N BEBAIOTA/TH A)RXH/. in
the same respectKATA\ TAU)TO/N=in the same
@@ -8705,7 +8705,7 @@
that tops at any rateThe argumentative GE is controversial. For the illustration of the top
cf. Spencer, First
Principle, 170, who analyzes “certain oscillations
- described by the expressive though inelegant word 'wobbling'” and
+ described by the expressive though inelegant word ’wobbling’” and
their final dissipation when the top appears stationary in the
equilibrium mobile. stand still as a whole
at the same time that they are in motion when with the peg fixed in one
@@ -8753,10 +8753,10 @@
XALEPO/N. and convince ourselves that they are
false, let us proceed on the hypothesisIt is almost a Platonic method thus to emphasize
the dependence of one conclusion on another already accepted. Cf.
- Unity of Plato's Thought, n. 471,
+ Unity of Plato’s Thought, n. 471,
Politicus 284 D, Phaedo 77 A, 92
D, Timaeus 51 D, Parmenides 149 A. It
- may be used to cut short discussion (Unity of Plato's
+ may be used to cut short discussion (<title>Unity of Plato’s
Thought, n. 471) or divert it into another channel.
Here, however, he is aware, as Aristotle is, that the maximum of
contradiction can be proved only controversially against an
@@ -8783,7 +8783,7 @@
E)QE/LEIN in Plato normally means to be willing, and
BOU/LESQAI to wish or desire.
But unlike Prodicus, Plato emphasizes distinctions of synonyms only
- when relevant to his purpose. Cf. Unity of Plato's
+ when relevant to his purpose. Cf. <title>Unity of Plato’s
Thought, p. 47 and n. 339, Philebus 60
D.PROSA/GESQAI below relates
to E)PIQUMI/A and E)PINEU/EIN to E)QE/LEIN . . . BOU/LESQAI. and willing, would
@@ -8798,21 +8798,21 @@
anima 434 a 9. The Platonic doctrine that
opinion,DO/CA, is discussion
of the soul with herself, or the judgement in which such discussion
- terminates (Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 47) is
+ terminates (Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 47) is
here applied to the specific case of the practical reason issuing in
an affirmation of the will. striving towards its attainment?”
“I would say so,” he said. “But what of not-willingA)BOULEI=N recalls the French coinage “nolonté,” and
- the southern mule's “won't-power.” Cf. Epistle vii.
+ the southern mule’s “won’t-power.” Cf. Epistle vii.
347 A, Demosthenes Epistle ii. 17. and not
- consenting nor yet desiring, shall we not put these under the soul's
+ consenting nor yet desiring, shall we not put these under the soul’s
rejectionCf.
- Aristotle's A)NQE/LKEIN, De
+ Aristotle’s <foreign xml:lang="grc">A)NQE/LKEIN</foreign>, <title>De
anima 433 b 8. “All willing is either pushing or
pulling,” Jastrow, Fact and Fable in Psychology, p.
- 336. Cf. the argument in Spencer's First Principles 80, that
+ 336. Cf. the argument in Spencer’s First Principles 80, that
the phrase “impelled by desires” is not a metaphor but a physical
- fact. Plato's generalization of the concepts “attraction” and
+ fact. Plato’s generalization of the concepts “attraction” and
“repulsion” brings about a curious coincidence with the language of
a materialistic, physiological psychology (cf. Lange, History of
Materialism, passim), just as his rejection in the
@@ -8853,7 +8853,7 @@
PA/SXEI. If we assume that Plato is here speaking from
the point of view of common sense (Cf. Lysis 215
ETO\ DE\ YUXRO\N QERMOU=),
- there is no need of Hermann's transposition of YUXROU= and QERMOU=, even though we do thereby get a more exact
+ there is no need of Hermann’s transposition of YUXROU= and QERMOU=, even though we do thereby get a more exact
symmetry with PLH/QOUS PAROUSI/AN . . . TOU=
POLLOU= below.
@@ -8898,7 +8898,7 @@
“that of relative terms those that are somehow
qualified are related to a qualified correlate, those that are severally
just themselves to a correlate that is just itself.
- O(/SA G'
+ O(/SA G’
E)STI\ TOIAU=TA etc.: a palmary example of the
concrete simplicity of Greek idiom in the expression of abstract
ideas.O(/SA etc. (that is,
@@ -8911,8 +8911,8 @@
the first general abstract statement, which he therefore interprets
and repeats. I have varied the translation in the repetition in
order to bring out the full meaning, and some of the differences
- between Greek and English idiom.” “I don't understand,” he
- said. “Don't you understand,” said I, “that the greaterThe notion of
+ between Greek and English idiom.” “I don’t understand,” he
+ said. “Don’t you understand,” said I, “that the greaterThe notion of
relative terms is familiar. Cf. Charmides 167 E,
Theaetetus 160 A, Symposium 199
D-E, Parmenides 133 C ff., Sophist 255
@@ -8921,7 +8921,7 @@
point that the qualifications of either term of the relation are
relative to each other. In the Politicus 283 f. Plato
adds that the great and small are measured not only in relation to
- each other, but by absolute standards. Cf. Unity of Plato's
+ each other, but by absolute standards. Cf. <title>Unity of Plato’s
Thought, pp. 61, 62, and 531 A. is such as to be
greater than something?” “Certainly.” “Is it not than the less?” “Yes.”
“But the much greater than the much less. Is that not so?” “Yes.” “And
@@ -8967,7 +8967,7 @@
but things of a certain kind are of things of a kind.
- And I don't at all meanCf. Cratylus 393 B,
+ And I don’t at all meanCf. Cratylus 393 B,
Phaedo 81 D, and for the thought Aristotle
Met. 1030 b 2 ff. The
“added determinants” need not be the same. The study of useful
@@ -9008,12 +9008,12 @@
(2)TW=N TINO/S as predicates.
This is perhaps no harsher than TO\ DOKEI=N
EI)=NAI in Aeschylus Agamemnon 788. Cf.
- Tennyson's “How sweet are the looks that ladies bend/ On whom their
- favors fall,” and Pope's “And virgins smiled at what they blushed
+ Tennyson’s “How sweet are the looks that ladies bend/ On whom their
+ favors fall,” and Pope’s “And virgins smiled at what they blushed
before.” Possibly QH/SEIS TW=N
TINO/S is incomplete in itself (cf. 437 B) and
EI)=NAI TOU=TO etc. is a loose
- epexegesis. The only emendation worth notice is Adam's insertion of
+ epexegesis. The only emendation worth notice is Adam’s insertion of
KAI\ TINO\S between TINO\S and EI)=NAI, which yields a smooth, but painfully
explicit, construction. that are of something and say that it
is what it isCf.
@@ -9042,21 +9042,21 @@
it overpowers. Cf. Aristotle Eth. Nic. 1102 b 24, Laws 863 E.
when thirsty it must be something different in it from that which
thirsts and drives it like a beastCf. 589, Epistle 335 B. Cf.
- Descartes, Les Passions de l'âme, article xlvii: “En
- quoi consistent les combats qu'on a coutume d'imaginer entre la
- partie inférieure et la supérieure de l'âme.” He says in effect that
+ Descartes, Les Passions de l’âme, article xlvii: “En
+ quoi consistent les combats qu’on a coutume d’imaginer entre la
+ partie inférieure et la supérieure de l’âme.” He says in effect that
the soul is a unit and the “lower soul” is the body. Cf.
ibid. lxviii, where he rejects the
“concupiscible” and the “irascible.” to drink. For it cannot
be, we say, that the same thing with the same part of itself at the same
time acts in opposite ways about the same thing.” “We must admit that it
does not.” “So I fancy it is not well said of the archerCf. Unity of
- Plato's Thought, p. 68: “Plato . . . delights to prick
+ Plato’s Thought, p. 68: “Plato . . . delights to prick
the bubbles of imagery, rhetoric, and antithesis blown by his
predecessors. Heraclitus means well when he says that the one is
united by disunion (Symposium 187 A) or that the
hands at once draw and repel the bow. But the epigram vanishes under
- logical analysis.” For the conceit cf. Samuel Butler's lines: “He
+ logical analysis.” For the conceit cf. Samuel Butler’s lines: “He
that will win his dame must do/ As love does when he bends his bow,/
With one hand thrust his lady from/ And with the other pull her
home.” that his hands at the same time thrust away the bow
@@ -9089,7 +9089,7 @@
and diseases?” “Apparently.” “Not unreasonably,” said I, “shall we claim
that they are two and different from one another, naming that in the
soul whereby it reckons and reasons the rational
- LOGISTIKO/N is one of Plato's many synonyms for the
+ LOGISTIKO/N is one of Plato’s many synonyms for the
intellectual principle. Cf. 441 C, 571 C, 587 D, 605 B. It
emphasizes the moral calculation of consequences, as opposed to
blind passion. Cf. Crito 46 B (one of the passages
@@ -9101,7 +9101,7 @@
differently. and that with which it loves, hungers, thirsts,
and feels the flutterE)PTO/HTAI:
- almost technical, as in Sappho's ode, for the flutter of
+ almost technical, as in Sappho’s ode, for the flutter of
desire.A)LO/GISTON, though
applied here to the E)PIQUMHTIKO/N
only, suggests the bipartite division of Aristotle, Eth.
@@ -9131,7 +9131,7 @@
still divided on the point. Cf. Bagehot, <title>Lord
Brougham: “Another faculty of Brougham . . . is the
faculty of easy anger. The supine placidity of civilization is not
- favorable to animosity [Bacon's word for QUMO/S].” Leslie Stephen, Science of
+ favorable to animosity [Bacon’s word for <foreign xml:lang="grc">QUMO/S</foreign>].” Leslie Stephen, <title>Science of
Ethics, pp. 60 ff. and p. 62, seems to contradict Plato:
“The supposed conflict between reason and passion is, as I hold,
meaningless if it is taken to imply that the reason is a faculty
@@ -9142,7 +9142,7 @@
one of these, the appetitive.” “But,” I said, “I once heard a storySocrates has heard
and trusts a, to us, obscure anecdote which shows how emotion may
act as a distinct principle rebuking the lower appetites or
- curiosities. Leontius is unknown, except for Bergk's guess
+ curiosities. Leontius is unknown, except for Bergk’s guess
identifying him with the Leotrophides of a corrupt fragment of
Theopompus Comicus, fr. 1 Kock, p. 739. which I believe, that
Leontius the son of Aglaion, on his way up from the Peiraeus under the
@@ -9165,8 +9165,8 @@
and veiled his head, but overpowered in despite of all by his desire,
with wide staring eyes he rushed up to the corpses and cried, ‘There, ye
wretches,He
- apostrophizes his eyes, in a different style from Romeo's, “Eyes, look your
- last.” take your fill of the fine spectacle!'” “I too,” he
+ apostrophizes his eyes, in a different style from Romeo’s, “Eyes, look your
+ last.” take your fill of the fine spectacle!’” “I too,” he
said, “have heard the story.” “Yet, surely, this anecdote,” I said,
“signifies that the principle of anger sometimes fights against desires
as an alien thing against an alien.” “Yes, it does,” he said.“And do we not,” said I, “on many other
@@ -9187,9 +9187,9 @@
on 434 C.OU)K A)\N . . . POTE/ is
to literal understanding an exaggeration. But Plato is speaking of
the normal action of uncorrupted QUMO/S. Plato would not accept the psychology of
- Euripides'Medea(1079-1080):KAI\ MANQA/NW ME\N
+ Euripides’Medea(1079-1080):KAI\ MANQA/NW ME\N
OI(=A DRA=N ME/LLW KAKA/, QUMO\S DE\ KREI/SSW TW=N E)MW=N
- BOULEUMA/TWN. Cf. Dr. Loeb's translation of Décharme,
+ BOULEUMA/TWN. Cf. Dr. Loeb’s translation of Décharme,
p. 340. with the desires against the reason when reason
whispers lowAI(ROU=NTOS: cf. 604 C, and
@@ -9203,7 +9203,7 @@
Rhet. 1380 b 17OU) GI/GNETAI GA\R H( O)RGH\ PRO\S TO\
DI/KAION, and Eth. Nic. 1135 b 28E)PI\
FAINOME/NH| GA\R A)DIKI/A| H( O)RGH/ E)STIN. This is
- true only with Plato's
+ true only with Plato’s
reservation GENNAIO/TEROS. The
baser type is angry when in the wrong. is it not true that
the nobler he is the less is he capable of anger though suffering hunger
@@ -9234,7 +9234,7 @@
TW=N
GENNAI/WN: i.e. the QUMO/S of the noble, repeating O(/SW| A)\N GENNAIO/TEROS H)=| above.
The interpretation “does not desist from his noble (acts)” destroys
- this symmetry and has no warrant in Plato's use of GENNAI=OS. Cf. 375 E, 459 A. The only
+ this symmetry and has no warrant in Plato’s use of GENNAI=OS. Cf. 375 E, 459 A. The only
argument against the view here taken is that “QUMO/S is not the subject of LH/GEI,” which it plainly is. The shift
from QUMO/S to the man in what
follows is no difficulty and is required only by TELEUTH/SH|, which may well be a gloss.
@@ -9277,7 +9277,7 @@
E, to prove that the soul, regarded there as a unit, is distinct
from the passions, there treated as belonging to the body, like the
mortal soul of the Timaeus. See Unity of
- Plato's Thought, pp. 42-43. it shall have been
+ Plato’s Thought, pp. 42-43. it shall have been
shown to be something different from the rational, as it has been shown
to be other than the appetitive.” “That is not hard to be shown,” he
said; “for that much one can see in children, that they are from their
@@ -9319,7 +9319,7 @@
presume we shall say a man is in the same way in which a city was just.”
“That too is quite inevitable.” “But we surely cannot have forgotten
this, that the state was just by reason of each of the three classes
- found in it fulfilling its own function.” “I don't think we have
+ found in it fulfilling its own function.” “I don’t think we have
forgotten,” he said. “We must remember, then, that each of us also in
whomO(/TOU: cf. 431 BOU(=, and 573 DW(=N. the several parts within him
@@ -9346,12 +9346,12 @@
nature of wealth. They will keep watch upon it, lest, by being filled
and infected with the so-called pleasures associated with the bodyStrictly speaking,
pleasure is in the mind, not in the body. Cf. Unity of
- <placeName key="tgn,1023926">Plato</placeName>'s
+ <placeName key="tgn,1023926">Plato</placeName>’s
Thought, n. 330.KALOUME/NWN implies the doctrine of the
Gorgias 493 E, 494 C, Philebus 42
C, Phaedrus 258 E, and 583 B-584 A, that the
pleasures of appetite are not pure or real. Cf. Unity of
- Plato's Thought, n. 152. Cf. on LEGOME/NWN431 C. and so waxing big and strong,
+ Plato’s Thought, n. 152. Cf. on LEGOME/NWN431 C. and so waxing big and strong,
it may not keep toCf. on 426 E, 606 B. its own work
@@ -9369,7 +9369,7 @@
Isocrates xii. 138AU(/TH GA/R E)STIN H(
BOULEUOME/NH PERI\ A(PA/NTWN. the other giving
battle, attending upon the ruler, and by its courage executing the
- ruler's designs?” “That is so.” “Brave, too, then, I take it, we call
+ ruler’s designs?” “That is so.” “Brave, too, then, I take it, we call
@@ -9379,7 +9379,7 @@
429 C-D the rule handed down by the reason as to what is or
is not to be feared.” “Right,” he said. “But wise by that small part
thatCf.
- Goodwin's Greek Grammar, 1027. ruled in him and handed down these
+ Goodwin’s Greek Grammar, 1027. ruled in him and handed down these
commands, by its possessionE)/XON:
anacoluthic epexegesis, corresponding to O(/TAN . . . DIASW/ZH|. AU)= probably marks the
@@ -9411,7 +9411,7 @@
our own conviction thus, if anything in our minds still disputes our
definition—by applying commonplace and vulgarThe transcendental or philosophical
definition is confirmed by vulgar tests. The man who is just in
- Plato's sense will not steal or betray or fail in ordinary duties.
+ Plato’s sense will not steal or betray or fail in ordinary duties.
Cf. Aristotle Eth. Nic. 1178
b 16H)\ FORTIKO\S O( E)/PAINOS. .
. to say that the gods are SW/FRONES. Similarly Plato feels that there is a
@@ -9485,9 +9485,9 @@
that justice is indeed something of this kind, yet not
- in regard to the doing of one's own business externally, but with regard
- to that which is within and in the true sense concerns one's self, and
- the things of one's self—it means that
+ in regard to the doing of one’s own business externally, but with regard
+ to that which is within and in the true sense concerns one’s self, and
+ the things of one’s self—it means thatMH\ E)A/SANTA . . .
DO/XAN444 A: Cf. Gorgias 459 C, 462 C.
A series of participles in implied indirect discourse expand the
@@ -9520,7 +9520,7 @@
scholiast tries to make two octaves (DI\S
DIA\ PASW=N) of it. The technical musical details have
at the most an antiquarian interest, and in no way affect the
- thought, which is that of Shakespeare's “For government, though high
+ thought, which is that of Shakespeare’s “For government, though high
and low and lower,/ Put into parts, doth keep one in concent,/
Congreeing in a full and natural close/ Like music.” (Henry
V. I. ii. 179) Cf. Cicero, De rep. ii.
@@ -9535,9 +9535,9 @@
and all others there may be between them, and having
linked and bound all three together and made of himself a unit,Cf.
Epin. 992 B. The idea was claimed for the
- Pythagoreans; cf. Zeller I. i. p. 463, Guyau, Esquisse d'une
- Morale, p. 109 “La moralité n'est autre chose que
- l'unité de l'être.” “The key to effective life is unity of life,”
+ Pythagoreans; cf. Zeller I. i. p. 463, Guyau, Esquisse d’une
+ Morale, p. 109 “La moralité n’est autre chose que
+ l’unité de l’être.” “The key to effective life is unity of life,”
says another modern rationalist. one man instead of many,
self-controlled and in unison, he should then and then only turn to
practice if he find aught to do either in the getting of wealth or the
@@ -9545,7 +9545,7 @@
business, in all such doings believing and namingO)NOMA/ZONTA betrays a consciousness that the
ordinary meaning of words is somewhat forced for edification. Cf.
- Laws 864 A-B and Unity of Plato's
+ <title>Laws 864 A-B and Unity of Plato’s
Thought, p. 9, n. 21. Aristotle (Eth.
Nic. 1138 b 6) would regard all
this as mere metaphor. the just and honorable action to be
@@ -9561,7 +9561,7 @@
fundamental distinction, not explicitly mentioned before in the
Republic. Cf.
<placeName key="tgn,2505769">Meno</placeName>
- 97 B ff. and Unity of Plato's Thought, pp.
+ 97 B ff. and Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp.
47-49. It is used here rhetorically to exalt justice and disparage
injustice.A)MAQI/A is a very
strong word, possibly used here already in the special Platonic
@@ -9585,7 +9585,7 @@
as mere metaphor. of these three principles, their
meddlesomenessPOLUPRAGMOSU/NHN:434 B and
- Isocrates viii. 59. and interference with one another's
+ Isocrates viii. 59. and interference with one another’s
functions, and the revolt of one part against the whole of the soul that
it may hold therein a rule which does not belong to it, since its nature
is such that it befits it to serve as a slave to the ruling principle?
@@ -9609,7 +9609,7 @@
“Healthful things surely engender healthThe common-sense point of view, “fit
fabricando faber.” Cf. Aristotle Eth. Nic. 1103 a 32. In Gorgias 460 B,
Socrates argues the paradox that he who knows justice does it. Cf.
- Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 11, n. 42.
+ Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 11, n. 42.
and diseaseful disease.” “Yes.” “Then does not doing just acts engender
justice
@@ -9618,7 +9618,7 @@
health is to establish the elements in a body in the natural relation of
dominating and being dominatedCf. the generalization of E)/RWS to include medicine and music in
Symposium 186-187, and Timaeus 82
- A, Laws 906 C, Unity of Plato's
+ A, <title>Laws 906 C, Unity of Plato’s
Thought, n. 500. by one another, while to cause
disease is to bring it about that one rules or is ruled by the other
contrary to nature.” “Yes, that is so.” “And is it not likewise the
@@ -9662,7 +9662,7 @@
even though accompanied by all the food and drink and wealth and power
in the world, we are yet to be asked to suppose that, when the very
nature and constitution of that whereby we liveCf. on 353 D and Aristotle De
- anima 414 a 12 ff. Cf. Unity of Plato's
+ anima 414 a 12 ff. Cf. Unity of Plato’s
Thought, p. 41. is disordered
@@ -9689,12 +9689,12 @@
Timaeus 83 C, Politicus 285 B, and
544 A, C-D. By the strict theory of ideas any distinction may mark a
class, and so constitute an idea. (Cf. De Platonis Idearum
- Doctrina, pp. 22-25.) But Plato's logical practice
+ Doctrina, pp. 22-25.) But Plato’s logical practice
recognizes that only typical or relevant “Ideas” are worth naming or
considering. The Republic does not raise the
metaphysical question how a true idea is to be distinguished from a
part or from a partial or casual concept. Cf. Unity of
- Plato's Thought, pp. 52-53, n. 381,
+ Plato’s Thought, pp. 52-53, n. 381,
Politicus 263 A-B.” “I am with you,” he
said; “only do you say on.” “And truly,” said I, “now that we have come
to this heightCf.
@@ -9712,7 +9712,7 @@
remembrance of the line E)SQLOI\ ME\N GA\R
A(PLW=S, PANTODAPW=S DE\ KAKOI/, quoted by Aristotle
Eth. Nic. 1106 b 35. It
- suggests Plato's principle of the unity of virtue, as A)/PEIRA below suggests the logical
+ suggests Plato’s principle of the unity of virtue, as A)/PEIRA below suggests the logical
doctrine of the Philebus 16 and
Parmenides 145 A, 158 B-C that the other of the
definite idea is the indefinite and infinite. of excellence,
@@ -9811,17 +9811,17 @@
Epicurus in Diogenes Laertius x. 11, Aristotle
Politics1263 a 30 ff., Euripides
- Andromache 270.” “Well, isn't that right,
+ Andromache 270.” “Well, isn’t that right,
Adeimantus?” I said. “Yes,” said he, “but this word ‘right,’Cf. 459 D,
Laws 668 D, Aristotle Politics1269 b 13, Shakespeare
- Tro. and Cre. I. i. 23 “But here's yet in the word
+ Tro. and Cre. I. i. 23 “But here’s yet in the word
hereafter the kneading, the making of the cake,”
etc. like other things, requires definingCf.
Laws 665 B 7. as to the wayCf. Aristotle
Politics1264 a 12. and manner of such a
- community. There might be many ways. Don't, then, pass over the one
+ community. There might be many ways. Don’t, then, pass over the one
@@ -9856,7 +9856,7 @@
accepted
- as I then set it forth! You don't realize what a
+ as I then set it forth! You don’t realize what a
swarmFor the
metaphor cf. Euripides Bacchae 710 and SMH=NOS, Republic 574 D,
Cratylus 401 C,
@@ -9880,7 +9880,7 @@
<placeName key="tgn,2578489">Phil</placeName>
. xiv.
pp. 165-174). of listening to such discussions is the whole
- of life for reasonable men. So don't consider us, and do not you
+ of life for reasonable men. So don’t consider us, and do not you
yourself grow weary
@@ -9909,7 +9909,7 @@
‘wish-thought,’Cf. Introduction xxxi-xxxii, 456 C, 499 C, 540 D,
Laws 736 D, Aristotle Politics1260 b 29, 1265 a
- 17DEI= ME\N OU)=N U(POTI/QESQAI KAT'
+ 17DEI= ME\N OU)=N U(POTI/QESQAI KAT’
EU)XHN, MHDE\N ME/NTOI A)DU/NATON. my dear
friend.” “Do not shrink,” he said, “for your hearers will not be
inconsiderate
@@ -9983,7 +9983,7 @@
But maybe this way is right, that after the completion
- of the male drama we should in turn go through with the female,Sophron's Mimes are
+ of the male drama we should in turn go through with the female,Sophron’s Mimes are
said to have been so classified. For DRA=MA cf. also Theaetetus 150
A. especially since you are so urgent.”“For men, then, born and bred as we described there is
in my opinion no other right possession and use of children and women
@@ -9992,7 +9992,7 @@
a flockFor the use
of analogies drawn from animals cf. 375-376, 422 D, 466 D, 467 B,
491 D-E, 537 A, 546 A-B, 564 A. Plato is only pretending to deduce
- his conclusions from his imagery. Aristotle's literal-minded
+ his conclusions from his imagery. Aristotle’s literal-minded
criticism objects that animals have no
“economy,”Politics1264 b 4-6.?” “Yes.”
@@ -10033,7 +10033,7 @@
Loeb translation, iii.
22. There was a literature for and against custom (sometimes called
SUNH/QEIA) of which there are
- echoes in Cicero's use of
+ echoes in Cicero’s use of
consuetudo, Acad. ii. 75, De off.
i. 148, De nat. deor. i. 83. would make much
in our proposals look ridiculous if our words
@@ -10047,7 +10047,7 @@
together with the men, not only the young, but even the
older, like old men in gymnasiums,Cf. Theaetetus 162 B, and the
O)YIMAQH/S or late learner in
- Theophrastus'Characters xxvii. 14 Loeb. Euripides
+ Theophrastus’Characters xxvii. 14 Loeb. Euripides
Andromache 596 ff. denounces the light attire of
Spartan women when exercising. when, though wrinkled and
unpleasant to look at, they still persist in exercising?” “Yes, on my
@@ -10059,7 +10059,7 @@
and culture, and most of all about the bearing of arms
- and the bestriding of horses.” “You're right,” he said. “But since we
+ and the bestriding of horses.” “You’re right,” he said. “But since we
have begun we must go forward to the rough part of our law,For a variation of
this image cf. 568 D. after begging these fellows not to mind
their own businessPlato plays on his own favorite phrase. The proper business of the
@@ -10076,7 +10076,7 @@
and then with the Lacedaemonians, it was open to the
- wits of that time to make fun of these practices, don't you think so?”
+ wits of that time to make fun of these practices, don’t you think so?”
“I do.” “But when, I take it, experience showed that it is better to
strip than to veil all things of this sort, then the laughter of the
eyesLit. “what
@@ -10111,12 +10111,12 @@
Laws 775 E, Sophocles, fr. 831 (Pearson), Antiphon the Sophist,
fr. 60 (Diels).?” “Far the best,” he said. “Shall we then
conduct the debate with ourselves in behalf of those othersThis pleading the
- opponent's case for him is common in Plato. Cf. especially the plea for Protagoras in
+ opponent’s case for him is common in Plato. Cf. especially the plea for Protagoras in
Theaetetus 166-167. so that the case of
the other side may not be taken defenceless and go by defaultApparently a mixture
of military and legal phraseology. Cf.E)KPE/RSH| in Protagoras 340 A,
<placeName key="tgn,2061426">Iliad</placeName>
- v. 140TA\ D' E)RH=MA
+ v. 140TA\ D’ E)RH=MA
FOBEI=TAI, and the legal phrase E)RH/MHN KATADIAITA=N or OFLEI=N.?”
@@ -10130,7 +10130,7 @@
in this book is of little significance. Cf. Laws,
passsim. that each one ought to mind as his own
business the one thing for which he was fitted by nature?’ ‘We did so
- agree, I think; certainly!' ‘Can it be denied then that there is by
+ agree, I think; certainly!’ ‘Can it be denied then that there is by
nature a great difference between men and women?’ ‘Surely there is.’ ‘Is
it not fitting, then, that a different function should be
appointed
@@ -10183,7 +10183,7 @@
Thompson, The <placeName key="tgn,2083598">Meno</placeName>
of <placeName key="tgn,1023926">Plato</placeName>
,
- Excursus V., pp. 272 ff. and the introduction to E.H. Gifford's
+ Excursus V., pp. 272 ff. and the introduction to E.H. Gifford’s
Euthydemus, p. 42. Among the marks of eristic are
the pusuit of merely verbal oppositions as here and
Euthydemus 278 A, 301 B,
@@ -10217,7 +10217,7 @@
292 C describes in different language the correct method. of
nature we had in mind and with reference to what we were trying to
define it when we assigned different pursuits to different natures and
- the same to the same.” “No, we didn't consider that,” he said.
+ the same to the same.” “No, we didn’t consider that,” he said.
“Wherefore, by the same token,” I said, “we might ask
@@ -10225,7 +10225,7 @@
Mill, Rep. Gov. chap. viii. p. 190: “I have taken no
account of difference of sex. I consider it to be as entirely
irrelevant to political rights as difference in height, or in the
- color of the hair;” and Mill's disciple Leslie Stephen, The
+ color of the hair;” and Mill’s disciple Leslie Stephen, <title>The
English Utilitarians, i. 291: “We may at least grant
that the burden of proof should be upon those who would disfranchise
all red-haired men.” and long-haired men are the same and
@@ -10241,12 +10241,12 @@
DEI)S O(\ TEI/NEIN DOKEI=,
Protagoras 345 B. to the pursuits
themselves?” “We meant, for example, that a man and a woman who have a
- physician'sAdam makes difficulties, but Cf. Laws 963 ANOU=N . . . KUBERNHTIKO\N ME\N KAI\ I)ATRIKO\N
+ physician’sAdam makes difficulties, but Cf. Laws 963 ANOU=N . . . KUBERNHTIKO\N ME\N KAI\ I)ATRIKO\N
KAI\ STRATHGIKO/N. The translation follows Hermann despite the objection that
this reading forestalls the next sentence. Cf. Campbell ad
loc. and Apelt, Woch. für klass. <placeName key="tgn,2578490">Phil</placeName>
., 1903, p. 344. mind have the same
- nature. Don't you think so?” “I do.” “But that a man physician and a man
+ nature. Don’t you think so?” “I do.” “But that a man physician and a man
carpenter have different natures?” “Certainly, I suppose.”“Similarly, then,” said I, “if it appears that
the male and the female sex have distinct qualifications for any arts or
pursuits, we shall affirm that they ought to be assigned respectively to
@@ -10263,7 +10263,7 @@
precisely for what art or pursuit concerned with the
- conduct of a state the woman's nature differs from the man's?” “That
+ conduct of a state the woman’s nature differs from the man’s?” “That
would be at any rate fair.” “Perhaps, then, someone else, too, might say
what you were saying a while ago, that it is not easy to find a
satisfactory answer on a sudden,Plato anticipates the objection that the
@@ -10297,10 +10297,10 @@
“will be able to name any others.” “Do you know, then, of anything
practised by mankind in which the masculine sex does not surpass the
female on all these points?On the alleged superiority of men even in
- women's occupations cf. the amusing diatribe of the old bachelor in
- George Eliot's Adam Bede, chap. xxi.: “I tell you
- there isn't a thing under the sun that needs to be done at all but
- what a man can do better than women, unless it's bearing children,
+ women’s occupations cf. the amusing diatribe of the old bachelor in
+ George Eliot’s Adam Bede, chap. xxi.: “I tell you
+ there isn’t a thing under the sun that needs to be done at all but
+ what a man can do better than women, unless it’s bearing children,
and they do that in a poor makeshift way,” and the remarks on women
as cooks of the bachelor Nietzsche, Beyond Good and
Evil, 234. But Xenophon Memorabilia iii.
@@ -10400,7 +10400,7 @@
the institution we proposed is not only possible but the best for the
state.” “That is so.” “The women of the guardians, then, must strip,
since they will be clothed with virtue as a garment,Cf. Rousseau,
- Lettre à d'Alembert, “Couvertes de l'honnêteté
+ Lettre à d’Alembert, “Couvertes de l’honnêteté
publique.” and must take their part with the men in war and
the other duties of civic guardianship and have no other occupation. But
in these very duties lighter tasks must be assigned to the women than to
@@ -10442,33 +10442,33 @@
fr. 53, p. 21, Rousseau,
Emile, v: “je ne parle point de cette prétendue
communauté de femmes dont le reproche tant répété prouve que ceux
- qui le lui font ne l'ont jamais lu.” But Rousseau dissents violently from
+ qui le lui font ne l’ont jamais lu.” But Rousseau dissents violently from
what he calls “cette promiscuité civile qui confond partout les deux
sexes dans les mêmes emplois.” Cf. further the denunciations of the
Christian fathers
- passim, who are outdone by De Quincey's
+ passim, who are outdone by De Quincey’s
“Otaheitian carnival of licentious appetite, connected with a
contempt of human life which is excessive even for paganism.” Most
- of the obvious parallels between Plato and Aristophanes'Ecclesiazusae
+ of the obvious parallels between Plato and Aristophanes’Ecclesiazusae
follow as a matter of course from the very notion of communal
marriage and supply no evidfence for the dating of a supposed
earlier edition of the whole or a part of the
Republic. In any case the ideas of the
Republic might have come to Aristophanes in
conversation before publication; and the Greeks knew enough of the
- facts collected in such books as Westermarck's
+ facts collected in such books as Westermarck’s
Marriage, not to be taken altogether by surprise
- by Plato's speculations. Cf. Herodotus iv. 104, and Aristotle
+ by Plato’s speculations. Cf. Herodotus iv. 104, and AristotlePolitics
- 1262 a 20. Cf. further Adam's exhaustive
+ 1262 a 20. Cf. further Adam’s exhaustive
discussion in the appendix to this book, Grube, “The Marriage Laws
- in Plato's Republic,”Classical
+ in Plato’s <title>Republic,”Classical
Quarterly, 1927, pp. 95 ff.,
Teichmüller, Literarische Fehden, i. p. 19 n., and
the more recent literature collected in Praechter-Ueberweg, 12th ed.
i. p. 207, Pöhlmann, Geschichte der Sozialenfrage und des
Sozialsmus in der antiken Welt, ii. p. 578, Pohlenz,
- Aus Platon's Werdezeit, pp. 225-228, C. Robert,
+ Aus Platon’s Werdezeit, pp. 225-228, C. Robert,
Hermes lvii. pp. 351 ff. to all the men,
@@ -10479,7 +10479,7 @@
the other, and provokes more distrust as to its possibility and its
utility.A
distinct suggestion of the topics of the “useful” and the “possible”
- in Aristotle's Rhetoric.” “I presume,” said I,
+ in Aristotle’s Rhetoric.” “I presume,” said I,
“that there would be no debate about its utility, no denial that the
community of women and children would be the greatest good, supposing it
possible. But I take it that its possibility or the contrary
@@ -10500,10 +10500,10 @@
are wont to feast themselves on their own thoughts when they walk
alone.Cf.
Isocrates ii. 47, on “those who in solitude do not deliberate but
- imagine what they wish,” and Chesterton's saying, “All feeble spirits live in
+ imagine what they wish,” and Chesterton’s saying, “All feeble spirits live in
the future, because it is a soft job”; cf. further on day-dreams,
Schmidt, Ethik
- der Griechen, ii. p. 71, and Lucian's *PLOI=ON H)\ EU)XAI/. Plato's description anticipates
+ der Griechen, ii. p. 71, and Lucian’s *PLOI=ON H)\ EU)XAI/. Plato’s description anticipates
the most recent psychology in everything except the term “autistic
thinking.” Such persons, without waiting to discover how
their desires may be realized, dismiss that topic to save themselves the
@@ -10549,7 +10549,7 @@
Politicus, 310 A (Cf. Laws 773
A-B) that the mating should blend opposite temperaments. Those
elements are already mixed in the selection of the guardians. Cf.
- 375 B-C, 410 D-E and Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 62,
+ 375 B-C, 410 D-E and Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 62,
n. 481. And they, having houses and meals in common, and no
private possessions of that kind,
@@ -10613,13 +10613,13 @@
for the benefitCf. 389 B, 414 C, and Laws 663
- DE)P' A)GAQW=|
+ DE)P’ A)GAQW=|
YEU/DESQAI of their subjects. We said, I believe,
that the use of that sort of thing was in the category of medicine.”
“And that was right,” he said. “In our marriages, then, and the
procreation of children, it seems there will be no slight need of this
- kind of ‘right.'” “How so?” “It follows from our former admissions,” I
+ kind of ‘right.’” “How so?” “It follows from our former admissions,” I
said, “that the best men must cohabit with the best women in as many
cases as possible and the worst with the worst in the fewest,
@@ -10670,11 +10670,11 @@
sort who are born defective, they will properly dispose of in
secret,Opinions differ whether this is euphemism for exposure. On the
frequency or infrequency of this practice cf. Professor La Rue Van
- Hook's article in T.A.P.A. vol. li, and that of H. Bolkestein,
+ Hook’s article in T.A.P.A. vol. li, and that of H. Bolkestein,
Class. <placeName key="tgn,2578489">Phil</placeName>
. vol. xvii. (1922) pp. 222-239. so that no one will know what
has become of them.” “That is the condition,” he said, “of preserving
- the purity of the guardians' breed.” “They will also supervise the
+ the purity of the guardians’ breed.” “They will also supervise the
nursing of the children, conducting the mothers to the pen when their
breasts are full, but employing every deviceCf. on 414 B and Aristotle
Politics
@@ -10701,15 +10701,15 @@
“How do you reckon it?”Cf. on 458 C. he said. “The women,” I
said, “beginning at the age of twenty, shall bear for the stateHalf humorous legal
language. Cf. Aristotle Politics
- 1335 b 28LEITOURGEI=N . . . PRO\S TEKNOPOII/AN, and Lucan's
+ 1335 b 28LEITOURGEI=N . . . PRO\S TEKNOPOII/AN, and Lucan’s
“urbi pater est, urbique maritus” (Phars. ii. 388).
The dates for marriage are given a little differently in the
Laws, 785 B, 833 C-D, men 30-35, women 16-20. On
- the whole question and Aristotle's opinion cf. Newman, Introduction
+ the whole question and Aristotle’s opinion cf. Newman, Introduction
to Aristotle Politics p. 183; cf. also Grube,
Class. Quarterly1927, pp. 95 ff., “The Marriage Laws in
- Plato's
+ Plato’s
Republic.” to the age of forty, and the
man shall beget for the state from the time he passes his prime in
swiftness in running to the age of fifty-five.”
@@ -10745,11 +10745,11 @@
187. anything whatever thus conceived, but if they are unable
to prevent a birth to dispose of it on the understanding that we cannot
rear such an offspring.” “All that sounds reasonable,” he said; “but how
- are they to distinguish one another's fathers and daughters,
+ are they to distinguish one another’s fathers and daughters,
and the other degrees of kin that you have just
- mentioned?” “They won't,” said I, “except that a man will call all male
+ mentioned?” “They won’t,” said I, “except that a man will call all male
offspring born in the tenth and in the seventh month after he became a
bridegroom his sons, and all female, daughters, and they will call him
father.Cf.
@@ -10803,8 +10803,8 @@
words as ‘mine’ and ‘not mine,’ and similarly with regard to the word
‘alien’?”Cf.
423 B, Aristotle Politics
- 1261 b 16 ff., “Plato's Laws
- and the Unity of Plato's Thought,”Class. <placeName key="tgn,2063071">Phil</placeName>
+ <date when="1261">1261</date> b 16 ff., “Plato’s <title>Laws
+ and the Unity of Plato’s Thought,”Class. <placeName key="tgn,2063071">Phil</placeName>
. ix. (1914) p. 358, Laws 664 A, 739
C-E, Julian (Teubner) ii.
459, Teichmüller, Lit. Fehden, vol. i. p. 19, Mill,
@@ -10816,9 +10816,9 @@
they are not included;” Spinoza, paraphrased by Hoffding,
Hist. of Mod. Phil. i. p. 325: “It would be best,
since they seek a common good, if all could be like one mind and one
- body.” Rabelais I. lvii. parodies Plato: “Si quelqu'un ou quelqu'une
- disoit 'beuvons,' tous beuvoient” etc. Aristotle's criticism, though
- using some of Plato's phrases, does not mention his name at this
+ body.” Rabelais I. lvii. parodies Plato: “Si quelqu’un ou quelqu’une
+ disoit ’beuvons,’ tous beuvoient” etc. Aristotle’s criticism, though
+ using some of Plato’s phrases, does not mention his name at this
point but speaks of TI/NES,
Politics1261 b 7.“Precisely so.” “That city,
@@ -10830,7 +10830,7 @@
one of us is wounded, the entire community of bodily connections
stretching to the soul for ‘integration’I so translate to bring out the
analogy between Plato and e.g. Sherrington. For “to the soul” Cf.
- Unity of Plato's Thought, n. 328,
+ Unity of Plato’s Thought, n. 328,
Laws 673 A, Timaeus 45 D, 584 C,
Philebus 33, 34, 43 B-C. Poschenrieder,
Die Platonischen Dialoge in ihrem Verhältnisse zu den
@@ -10875,7 +10875,7 @@
tell me whether any of the rulers in other states would speak of some of
their co-rulers as ‘belonging’ and others as outsiders?” “Yes, many
would.” “And such a one thinks and speaks of the one that ‘belongs’ as
- his own, doesn't he, and of the outsider as not his own?” “That is so.”
+ his own, doesn’t he, and of the outsider as not his own?” “That is so.”
“But what of your guardians. Could any of them think or speak of </said>
</div>
<div n="463c" type="textpart" subtype="section">
@@ -10889,7 +10889,7 @@
<said who="Socrates">will it be merely the names<note anchored="true" resp="Loeb" place="unspecified">
<foreign xml:lang="grc">TA\
O)NO/MATA MO/NON</foreign> may be thought to anticipate
- Aristotle's objections.</note> of this kinship that you have
+ Aristotle’s objections.</note> of this kinship that you have
prescribed for them or must all their actions conform to the names in
all customary observance toward fathers and in awe and care and
obedience for parents, if they look for the favor<note anchored="true" resp="Loeb" place="unspecified">Cf. 554 D<foreign xml:lang="grc">O(/TI OU)K A)/MEINON</foreign>.</note> of either gods or men,
@@ -10910,7 +10910,7 @@
of kinship without the deeds.” “Then, in this city more than in any
other, when one citizen fares well or ill, men will pronounce in unison
the word of which we spoke: ‘It is mine that does well; it is mine that
- does ill.'” “That is most true,” he said. <milestone unit="page" resp="Stephanus" n="464"/>
+ does ill.’” “That is most true,” he said. <milestone unit="page" resp="Stephanus" n="464"/>
</said>
</div>
<div n="464a" type="textpart" subtype="section">
@@ -10997,7 +10997,7 @@
cases the laws will leave these men to dwell in peace together.” “Great
peace.” “And if these are free from dissensions among themselves, there
is no fear that<note anchored="true" resp="Loeb" place="unspecified">One
- of the profoundest of Plato's political aphorisms. Cf. on 545 D,
+ of the profoundest of Plato’s political aphorisms. Cf. on 545 D,
<title>Laws 683 E, and Aristotle Politics1305 a 39. the rest of the city will
ever start faction against them or with one another.” “No, there is
@@ -11219,13 +11219,13 @@
- as they please?” “Quite so.” “And don't you agree that
+ as they please?” “Quite so.” “And don’t you agree that
the one who wins the prize of valor and distinguishes himself shall
first be crowned by his fellows in the campaign, by the lads and boys
each in turn?” “I do.” “And be greeted with the right hand?” “That,
- too.” “But I presume you wouldn't go as far as this?” “What?” “That he
+ too.” “But I presume you wouldn’t go as far as this?” “What?” “That he
should kiss and be kissed by everyoneThe deplorable facetiousness of the following
- recalls the vulgarity of Xenophon's guard-house conversations. It is
+ recalls the vulgarity of Xenophon’s guard-house conversations. It is
almost the only passage in Plato that one would wish to blot. Helvetius,
otherwise anything but a Platonist, characteristically adopts it,
Lange, History
@@ -11264,7 +11264,7 @@
<bibl n="Hom. Il. 8.162" default="false">Hom. Il. 8.162</bibl>, so as to combine physical
training with honor for the good, both men and women.” “Nothing could be
better,” he said. “Very well; and of those who die on campaign, if
- anyone's death has been especially glorious, shall we not, to begin
+ anyone’s death has been especially glorious, shall we not, to begin
with, affirm that he belongs to the golden race?”<note anchored="true" resp="Loeb" place="unspecified">Cf. 415 A.</note> “By all means.”
“And shall we not believe Hesiod<note anchored="true" resp="Loeb" place="unspecified">Cf. Stewart, <title>Myths of Plato, p.
437. who tells us that when anyone of this race dies, so it
@@ -11323,14 +11323,14 @@
KUPTA/ZWSI:
cf. Blaydes on Aristophanes Nubes 509. about
the dead? Has not this snatching at the spoils ere new destroyed many an
- army?” “Yes, indeed.” “And don't you think it illiberal and greedy to
+ army?” “Yes, indeed.” “And don’t you think it illiberal and greedy to
plunder a corpse, and is it not the mark of a womanish and pettyCf. Juvenal,
Satire xiii. 189-191. spirit to deem the
body of the dead an enemy when the real foeman has flown awayA)POPTAME/NOU: both Homer and Sappho so
speak of the soul as flitting away. and left behind only the
instrumentThe
- body is only the instrument of the soul. Cf. Socrates' answer to the
+ body is only the instrument of the soul. Cf. Socrates’ answer to the
question,“How shall we bury you?”Phaedo 115 C ff. and
the elaboration of the idea in Alc. I. 129 E, whence
it passed in to European literature. with which he fought?
@@ -11345,11 +11345,11 @@
Otto,
Sprichwörter der Römer, p. 70, cites Pliny, N.H. xxix. 102, and Pacuv.
v. 38, Ribb.Trag. Cf. Montaigne i. 4, “Ainsin emporte
- les bestes leur rage à s'attaquer à la pierre et au fer qui les a
- blecées.” who snarl at the stones that hit them but don't
+ les bestes leur rage à s’attaquer à la pierre et au fer qui les a
+ blecées.” who snarl at the stones that hit them but don’t
touch the thrower?” “Not the slightest.” “We must abandon, then, the
plundering of corpses and the refusal to permit their burial.Plato as a boy may
- have heard of the Thebans' refusal to allow the Athenians to bury
+ have heard of the Thebans’ refusal to allow the Athenians to bury
their dead after Delium.
Cf. Thucydides iv. 97-101, and Euripides
Supplices.” “By heaven, we certainly must,” he
@@ -11380,7 +11380,7 @@
there are also two things, distinguished by two differentiae.I have so translated
in order to imply that the Plato of the Republic is
already acquainted with the terminology of the
- Sophist. Cf. Unity of Plato's
+ <title>Sophist. Cf. Unity of Plato’s
Thought, notes 375 and 377, followed by Wilamowitz,
Platon, i. p. 504. But most editors take DIAFORA/ here as dissension, and
construe “applied to the disagreements of two things,” which may be
@@ -11430,7 +11430,7 @@
always to wage war.” “That way of feeling,” he said, “is far less savage
than the other.” “Well, then,” said I, “is not the city that you are
founding to be a Greek city?” “It must be,” he said. “Will they then not
- be good and gentle?” “Indeed they will.” “And won't they be
+ be good and gentle?” “Indeed they will.” “And won’t they be
philhellenes,Cf. Epistles 354 A, Herodotus ii. 178, Isocrates
Phil. 122, Panegyricus 96,
Evagoras 40, Panath. 241. The word
@@ -11456,7 +11456,7 @@
was frequently used in the recent World War, but the practice was
sometimes less civilized than that which Plato recommends. Hobhouse
(Mind in Evolution, p. 384), writing earlier,
- said, “Plato's conclusions (Republic 469-471) show
+ said, “Plato’s conclusions (Republic 469-471) show
how narrow was the conception of humanitarian duties in the fourth
century.” It is, I think, only modern fancy that sees irony in the
conclusion: “treating barbarians as Greeks now treat Greeks.”
@@ -11482,7 +11482,7 @@
possibility of such a polity coming into existence, and the way in which
it could be brought to pass. I too am ready to admit that if it could be
realized everything would be lovely
- PA/NT' . . .
+ PA/NT’ . . .
A)GAQA/: idiomatically colloquial. Cf.
Politicus 284 B, Laws 711 D, 757
D, 780 D, Aristophanes Acharnians 978, 982,
@@ -11502,7 +11502,7 @@
these and countless other advantages, consequent on the
- realization of this polity, don't labor that point further; but let us
+ realization of this polity, don’t labor that point further; but let us
at once proceed to try to convince ourselves of just this, that it is
possible and how it is possible,
@@ -11515,7 +11515,7 @@
Tim. 135 TINA
KATADROMH/N. indeed,” said I, “that you have
made on my theory, without any regard for my natural hesitation. Perhaps
- you don't realize that when I have hardly escaped the first two waves,
+ you don’t realize that when I have hardly escaped the first two waves,
you are now rolling up against me the ‘great third waveCf. Introduction p.
xvii. The third wave, sometimes the ninth, was proverbially the
greatest. Cf. Euthydemus 293 A, Lucan v. 672 “decimus
@@ -11542,10 +11542,10 @@
OU)DE/N: idiomatic, like the English of the
translation. Cf. Charmides 164 A,
Gorgias 498 A, 515 E. The emphatic statement that
- follows of the value of ideals as ideals is Plato's warning hint
+ follows of the value of ideals as ideals is Plato’s warning hint
that he does not expect the literal realization of his Utopia,
though it would be disillusionizing to say so too explicitly. Cf.
- introduction p. xxxi-xxxii, and my paper on Plato's Laws,
+ introduction p. xxxi-xxxii, and my paper on Plato’s <title>Laws,
Class. Phil. ix. (1914) pp. 351
and 353. This is one of the chief ideas that Cicero derived from
Plato. He applies it to his picture of the ideal orator, and the
@@ -11613,12 +11613,12 @@
the deed. Cf. Apology 32 A, Sophist
234 E, Euripides frag.AlcmeneLO/GOS GA\R TOU)/RGON OU) NIKA=| POTE, and perhaps
- Democritus's LO/GOS E)/RGOU SKIH/.
+ Democritus’s LO/GOS E)/RGOU SKIH/.
Cf. A.J.P. xiii. p. 64. The word is the expression of the thought.
It is more plastic (588 D, Laws 736 B) and, as
Goethe says, “von einem
Wort lässt sich kein Iota rauben.”? Do you admit it or not?”
- “I do,” he said. “Then don't insist,” said I, “that I must exhibit as
+ “I do,” he said. “Then don’t insist,” said I, “that I must exhibit as
realized in action precisely what we expounded in words. But if we can
discover how a state might be constituted most nearly answering to our
description, you must say that we have discovered that possibility of
@@ -11664,10 +11664,10 @@
was a standardized topic of compliment to princes in Themistius,
Julian, the
Panegyrici Latini, and many modern imitators.
- Among the rulers who have been thus compared with Plato's
+ Among the rulers who have been thus compared with Plato’s
philosophic king are Marcus Aurelius, Constantine, Arcadius, James I., Frederick the
Great, and Napoleon. There
- is a partial history of the commonplace in T. Sinko's Program,
+ is a partial history of the commonplace in T. Sinko’s Program,
Sententiae Platonicae de philophis regnantibus fata quae
fuerint, Krakow, 1904, in the
supplementary article of Karl Praechter, Byzantinische
@@ -11690,7 +11690,7 @@
<said who="Socrates">ever be put into practice within the limits of
possibility and see the light of the sun. But this is the thing that has
made me so long shrink from speaking out, because I saw that it would be
- a very paradoxical saying. For it is not easy<note anchored="true" resp="Loeb" place="unspecified">Plato's condescension to the
+ a very paradoxical saying. For it is not easy<note anchored="true" resp="Loeb" place="unspecified">Plato’s condescension to the
ordinary mind that cannot be expected to understand often finds
expression in this form. Cf. 366 C, 489 C, <title>Theaetetus
176 C, and Republic 495 EA)NA/GKH. to see that there is no other way of
@@ -11709,13 +11709,13 @@
and strip and, snatching the first weapon that comes to
hand, rush at you with might and main, prepared to doCf.
Apology 35 A, Theaetetus 151
- A. dreadful deeds. And if you don't find words to defend
+ A. dreadful deeds. And if you don’t find words to defend
yourself against them, and escape their assault, then to be scorned and
flouted will in very truthTW=| O)/NTI
verifies the strong word TWQAZO/MENOS. be the penalty you will have to
- pay.” “And isn't it you,” said I, “that have brought this upon me and
- are to blame?” “And a good thing, too,” said he; “but I won't let you
+ pay.” “And isn’t it you,” said I, “that have brought this upon me and
+ are to blame?” “And a good thing, too,” said he; “but I won’t let you
down, and will defend you with what I can. I can do so with my good will
and my encouragement, and perhaps I might answer your questions more
suitablyCf.
@@ -11744,11 +11744,11 @@
that some of it he likes and someTO\ DE\ MH/:
for the idiom Cf. Philebus 22 A, Laws
- 797 E, 923 C, Demodocus's epigram on the Chians, Aeschylus
+ 797 E, 923 C, Demodocus’s epigram on the Chians, Aeschylus
Persae 802, Sophocles O.C. 1671. does not.”“I think you will have to remind me,” he said,
- “for I don't apprehend at all.” “That reply, Glaucon,”
+ “for I don’t apprehend at all.” “That reply, Glaucon,”
said I, “befits another rather than you. It does not become a lover to
forget that all adolescents in some sort sting and stir the amorous
lover of youth and appear to him deserving of his attention and
@@ -11779,18 +11779,18 @@
of this trait in lovers, I admit it for the sake of the argument.”
“Again,” said I, “do you not observe the same thing in the lovers of
wine?Cf.
- Aristotle Eth. i. 8. 10E(KA/STW| D' E)STI\N H(DU\ PRO\S O(\ LE/GETAI
+ Aristotle Eth. i. 8. 10E(KA/STW| D’ E)STI\N H(DU\ PRO\S O(\ LE/GETAI
FILOTOIOU=TOS. Cf. the old Latin hexameters—“si bene
quid memini causae suant quinque bibendi:/ Hospitis adventus,
praesens sitis atque futura,/ Aut vini bonitas, aut quaelibet altera
causa.” They welcome every wine on any pretext.” “They do,
indeed.” And so I take it you have observed that men who are covetous of
honor,Cf.
- Theophrastus, Char. 21 (Loeb)MIKROFILOTIMI/AS, petty pride. if they can't
+ Theophrastus, Char. 21 (Loeb)MIKROFILOTIMI/AS, petty pride. if they can’t
get themselves elected generals, are captains of a company.TRITTUARXOU=SI, “command the soldiers
of a trittys” or third of one of the ten tribes. And if they
- can't be honored
+ can’t be honored
by great men and dignitaries, are satisfied with honor
@@ -11822,18 +11822,18 @@
“You will then be giving the name to a numerous and
strange band, for all the lovers of spectaclesCf. the argument in the first
- sentence of Aristotle's Metaphysics that men's
+ sentence of Aristotle’s Metaphysics that men’s
pleasure in sense-perception is a form of their love of
knowledge. are what they are, I fancy, by virtue of their
delight in learning something. And those who always want to hear some
new thingFILH/KOOI: the word, like
- curiosity in Ruskin's interpretation, may have a higher and
+ curiosity in Ruskin’s interpretation, may have a higher and
lower meaning. It is used half technically of intellectual interests
generally. Cf. Euthydemus 304 B. The abstract
FILHKOI/+A became a virtual
synonym of culture and reading. are a very queer lot to be
- reckoned among philosophers. You couldn't induce them to attend a
+ reckoned among philosophers. You couldn’t induce them to attend a
serious debate or any such entertainment,Cf. on 498 A, and in
Parmenides 126 E, Antiphon, who studied Eleatic
dialectic in his youth, but now gives his time to horses. The word
@@ -11853,7 +11853,7 @@
philosophers?” “Not at all,” I said; “but they do bear a certain
likenessCf.
Theaetetus 201 B 3, Sophist 240
- BOU)DAMW=S A)LHQINO/N GE, A)LL' E)OIKO\S
+ BOU)DAMW=S A)LHQINO/N GE, A)LL’ E)OIKO\S
ME/N. to philosophers.”“Whom do you mean, then, by the true philosophers?”
“Those for whom the truth is the spectacle of which they are
enamored,Cf.
@@ -11877,7 +11877,7 @@
252 ff. that the metaphysical isolation of the Ideas precludes their
combination and intermingling in human thought and speech. For the
many attempts to evade A)LLH/LWN
- KOINWNI/A Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought,
+ KOINWNI/A Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought,
n. 244, and add now Wilamowitz, Platon, i. p. 567,
who, completely missing the point, refers to 505 A, which is also
misunderstood. He adds “mit den Problemen des
@@ -11930,7 +11930,7 @@
Can we find any way of soothing him and gentlyH)RE/MA: Cf. Symposium
- 221 B. Plato's humorous use of this word is the source of Emerson's
+ 221 B. Plato’s humorous use of this word is the source of Emerson’s
humorous use of “gently.” winning him over, without telling
him too plainly that he is not in his right mind?” “We must try,” he
said. “Come, then, consider what we are to say to him, or would you have
@@ -11944,18 +11944,18 @@
to assume that Plato is not talking nonsense; (2) to make allowance
for the necessity that he is under of combating contemporary
fallacies and sophisms which may seem trivial to us (Cf.
- Unity of Plato's Thought, pp. 50 ff.); (3) to
+ Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 50 ff.); (3) to
remember the greater richness of the Greek language in forms of the
verb “to be”; and the misunderstandings introduced by the
indiscriminate use of the abstract verbal noun “being” in English—a
difficulty which I have tried to meet by varying the terms of the
- translation; (4) to recognize that apart from metaphysics Plato's
+ translation; (4) to recognize that apart from metaphysics Plato’s
main purpose is to insist on the ability to think abstractly as a
prerequisite of the higher education; (5) to observe the
qualifications and turns of phrase which indicate that Plato himself
was not confused by the double meaning of “is not,” but was already
aware of the distinctions explicitly explained in the
- Sophist. (Cf. Unity of Plato's
+ <title>Sophist. (Cf. Unity of Plato’s
Thought, pp. 53 ff. nn. 389 ff.)?” “That is. How
could
@@ -11972,7 +11972,7 @@
quoted to prove that Plato was “yet” naively unaware of the
distinction between is-not-at-all (does not exist) and
is-not-this-or-that.‘is’ is entirely knowable, and that which
- in no way 'is' is in every way unknowable.” “Most sufficiently.” “Good.
+ in no way ’is’ is in every way unknowable.” “Most sufficiently.” “Good.
If a thing, then, is so conditioned as both to be and not to be, would
it not lie between that which absolutely and unqualifiedly is and that
which in no way is?” “Between.” “Then if knowledge pertains to that
@@ -11996,7 +11996,7 @@
it. And since knowledge in the highest sense is for Plato knowledge
of abstract and general ideas, both in his and in our sense of the
word idea, knowledge is said to be of that which is. It is
- uncritical to ignore Plato's terminology and purpose and to talk
+ uncritical to ignore Plato’s terminology and purpose and to talk
condescendingly of his confusing subjective with objective certainty
in what follows. to know that and how that which is is? But
rather, before we proceed, I think we must draw the following
@@ -12046,7 +12046,7 @@
Eth. 1145 b 24.
faculties.” “And opinion—shall we assign it to some other class than
faculty.” “By no means,” he said, “for that by which we are able to
- opine is nothing else than the faculty of opinion.For the various meanings of DO/CA Cf. Unity of Plato's
+ opine is nothing else than the faculty of opinion.<note anchored="true" resp="Loeb" place="unspecified">For the various meanings of <foreign xml:lang="grc">DO/CA</foreign> Cf. <title>Unity of Plato’s
Thought, p. 47 “ the word DO/CA may be used in this neutral, psychological
sense; it may be taken unfavorably to denote mere opinion as opposed
to knowledge, or favorably when true opinions and beliefs are set in
@@ -12061,7 +12061,7 @@
Timaeus 51 E, where, however,NOU=S is used, not E)PISTH/MH. Of course where
distinctions are irrelevant Plato may use many of the terms that
denote mental processes as virtual synonyms. Cf. Unity of
- Plato's Thought pp. 47-49. thing from scientific
+ Plato’s Thought pp. 47-49. thing from scientific
knowledge.” “Yes, different.” “Each of them, then, since it has a
different power, is related to a different object.” “Of necessity.”
“Science, I presume, to that which is, to know the condition of that
@@ -12084,11 +12084,11 @@
attributes to the Sophists and to Protagoras
(Theaetetus 167 A), and ridicules in the
Cratylus 188 D and Euthydemus 286
- C. Cf. Unity of Platos' Thought, pp. 53, 54. As
+ C. Cf. Unity of Platos’ Thought, pp. 53, 54. As
Aristotle explicitly puts it, De interpr. 11.
11TO\ DE\ MH\ O)\N O(/TI DOCASTO\N OU)K
A)LHQE\S EI)PEI=N O)/N TI: DO/CA GA\R AU)TOU= E)STIN, OU)X O(/TI
- E)/STIN A)LL' O(/TI OU)K E)/STI. or is it
+ E)/STIN A)LL’ O(/TI OU)K E)/STI. or is it
impossible even to opine that which is not? Reflect: Does not he who
opines bring his opinion to bear upon something or shall we reverse
ourselves and say that it is possible to opine, yet opine nothing?”
@@ -12162,7 +12162,7 @@
the fact that in Timaeus 37 E, where Plato must have
had in mind the conclusions of the Sophist, he still
avails himself of this ambiguity to suggest an absolute being behind
- phenomena. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, pp. 55, 56,
+ phenomena. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 55, 56,
60, De Platonis Idearum Doctrina pp. 48, 49.?
And of the just things, that will not seem unjust? And of the pious
things, that will not seem impious?” “No, it is inevitable,” he said,
@@ -12179,7 +12179,7 @@
of, both.” “Then is each of these multiples rather than it is not that
which one affirms it to be?” “They are like those jesters who palter
with us in a double sense at banquets,” he replied, “and resemble the
- children's riddleThe scholiast (Hermann vi.
+ children’s riddleThe scholiast (Hermann vi.
34) quotes the riddle in two forms. It might run in English—“A tale
there is, a man not yet a man,/ Seeing, saw not, a bird and not a
bird,/ Perching upon a bough and not a bough,/ And hit it—not, with
@@ -12187,7 +12187,7 @@
bat, reed, pumice-stone. Cf. also Athenaeus 448 E, 452 E, Gifford on
Euthydemus 300 D. It was used in the Stoic
schools of logic, and Epicurus is said to have used it to disprove
- Plato's statement that
+ Plato’s statement that
either the negative or the affirmative of a proposition must be true
or false. Cf. Usener, Epicurea, p. 348.
@@ -12226,7 +12226,7 @@
truth of this distinction is unaffected by our metaphysics. Plato is
speaking of what he elsewhere calls the EI)/DWLA of justice, beauty and the like. Cf. 517 D,
532 D, Theaetetus 150 B, and “The Idea of Good in
- Plato's Republic,”University of Chicago
+ Plato’s <title>Republic,”University of Chicago
Studies in Classical Philology, i. p. 238. of the
many about the fair and honorable and other things are tumbled about
inCf.
@@ -12242,7 +12242,7 @@
but do not see the beautiful itself and are unable to
- follow another's guidanceCf. Aristotle Metaphysics 989 a
+ follow another’s guidanceCf. Aristotle Metaphysics 989 a
33TOI=S E)PA/GOUSIN
AU)TO/N. to it, and many just things, but not
justice itself, and so in all cases—we shall say that such men have
@@ -12375,7 +12375,7 @@
Symp. 200 A. that he who is by nature
enamored of anything should cherish all that is akin and pertaining to
the object of his love.” “Right,” he said. “Could you find anything more
- akin to wisdom than truthThis and many other passages prove Plato's high
+ akin to wisdom than truthThis and many other passages prove Plato’s high
regard for the truth. Cf Laws 730 C, 861 D,
Crat. 428 D, 382 A. In 389 B he only permits
falsehood to the rulers as a drastic remedy to be used with care for
@@ -12396,14 +12396,14 @@
PAREKTRE/PONTES
O)XETO/N, Empedocles, Diels1 195LO/GOU LO/GON E)COXETEU/WNLucretius ii.
365 “derivare queunt animum”; and for the idea cf. also
- Laws 643 C-D. “Surely.” “So, when a man's
+ Laws 643 C-D. “Surely.” “So, when a man’s
desires have been taught to flow in the channel of learning and all that
sort of thing, they will be concerned, I presume, with the pleasures of
the soul in itself, and will be indifferent to those of which the body
- is the instrument,Cf. my Unity of Plato's Thought, pp. 45-46, esp. n.
+ is the instrument,Cf. my Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 45-46, esp. n.
330, followed by Apelt, Republic, pp. 490-491. Cf.
also Friedlander, Platon, ii. pp. 579-580,
- 584. if the man is a true and not a shamFor PEPLASME/NWS Cf. Soph. 216 CMH\ PLASTW=S A)LL' O)/NTWS
+ 584. if the man is a true and not a shamFor PEPLASME/NWS Cf. Soph. 216 CMH\ PLASTW=S A)LL’ O)/NTWS
FILO/SOFOI. philosopher.”
@@ -12420,7 +12420,7 @@
Theaet. 144 DXRHMA/TWN
E)LEUQERIO/THTA. For nothing can be more
contrary than such pettiness to the quality of a soul that is ever to
- seek integrity and wholenessCf. Goethe's “Im Ganzen, Guten, Schönen resolut
+ seek integrity and wholenessCf. Goethe’s “Im Ganzen, Guten, Schönen resolut
zu leben.” in all things human and divine.” “Most true,” he
said. “Do you think that a mind habituated to thoughts of grandeur and
the contemplation of all time and all existenceCf. Theaet. 174 E, of
@@ -12433,7 +12433,7 @@
Apol. 40 E, Tim. 36 E, 47 B, 90 D.
Cf. Isoc. i. 11, Pindar, Pyth. i. 46. can deem
this life of man a thing of great concernCf. Aristot.Eth. Nic.
- 1123 b 32, the great-souled man,W)=| G' OU)DE\N ME/GA, Diog. Laert.
+ 1123 b 32, the great-souled man,W)=| G’ OU)DE\N ME/GA, Diog. Laert.
vii. 128PA/NTWN U(PERA/NW,
Cic.De fin. iii. 8 “infra se omnia humana
ducens.” Cf. on 500 B-C. For similar pessimistic utterances about
@@ -12447,7 +12447,7 @@
Vol. I. pp. 200 f. on 386 B-C; Laws 727 D, 828 D, 881
A, Gorg. 522 E, Phaedo 77 E,
Crito 43 B, Apol. 35 A, 40 C. Cf.
- Spinoza's “There is nothing of which the free man thinks so little
+ Spinoza’s “There is nothing of which the free man thinks so little
as death.”” “Least of all.” “Then a cowardly and illiberal
spirit, it seems, could have no part in genuine philosophy.” “I think
not.” “What then? Could a man of orderly spirit, not a lover of money,
@@ -12468,7 +12468,7 @@
could not be.” “And if he could not keep what he learned, being steeped
in oblivion,Cf.
Theaet. 144 BLH/QHS
- GE/MONTES. Cf. Cleopatra's “Oh, my oblivion is a very
+ GE/MONTES. Cf. Cleopatra’s “Oh, my oblivion is a very
Antony” (Ant. and <placeName key="tgn,2332173">Cleo</placeName>.I. iii. 90). could he fail
to be void of knowledge?” “How could he?” “And so, having all his labor
for naught, will he not finally be constrained to loathe himself and
@@ -12513,11 +12513,11 @@
Cic.Tusc. v. 24, with Renaissance literature on
education. gracious, friendly and akin to truth, justice,
bravery and sobriety?” “MomusThe god of censure, who finds fault with the
- gods in Lucian's dialogues.
+ gods in Lucian’s dialogues.
Cf. Overbeck, Schriftquellen, p. 208, n. 1091, Otto, p. 227, s. v. Momus. Cf. Callimachus, fr. 70;
and Anth. Pal. xvi. 262. 3-4:AU)TO\S O( *MW=MOS FQE/GCETAI, *)/AKRHTOS, *ZEU= PA/TER, H(
SOFI/H, “Momus himself will cry out ‘Father Zeus, this
- was perfect skill.'” (L.C.L. translation.) Stallbaum refers to
+ was perfect skill.’” (L.C.L. translation.) Stallbaum refers to
Erasmus,
Chiliad, i. 5. 75 and interpreters on
Aristaenet.Epist. i. I, p. 239, ed.
@@ -12529,14 +12529,14 @@
would be able to controvert these statements of yours.
- But, all the same, those who occasionally hear youCf. Unity of <placeName key="tgn,1023926">Plato</placeName>'s Thought, p. 35
+ But, all the same, those who occasionally hear youCf. Unity of <placeName key="tgn,1023926">Plato</placeName>’s Thought, p. 35
n. 236, and What Plato Said, p. 488 on
Crito 48 B. A speaker in Plato may thus refer to
- any fundamental Platonic doctrine. Wilamowitz' suggested emendation
+ any fundamental Platonic doctrine. Wilamowitz’ suggested emendation
(Platon, ii. p. 205)A(\
A)\N LE/GH|S is due to a misunderstanding of
this. argue thus feel in this wayAlocus classicus for
- Plato's anticipation of objections. Cf. 475 B,
+ Plato’s anticipation of objections. Cf. 475 B,
Theaet. 166 A-B, Rep. 609 C,
438-439, and Apelt, Republic, p. 492. Plato does it
more tactfully than Isocrates, e.g.Demon. 44.:
@@ -12577,10 +12577,10 @@
constrains rather than persuades. In the Ion, 533 C,
Ion says he cannot A)NTILE/GEIN,
but the fact remains that he knows Homer but not other poets. Cf.
- also 536 D. The passage virtually anticipates Bacon's Novum
+ also 536 D. The passage virtually anticipates Bacon’s <title>Novum
Organum,App. XIII. “(syllogismus) . . . assensum itaque
constringit, non res.” Cf. Cic.De fin. iv. 3,
- Tusc. i. 8. 16, and the proverbial OU) GA\R PEI/SEIS, OU)D' H)\N
+ Tusc. i. 8. 16, and the proverbial OU) GA\R PEI/SEIS, OU)D’ H)\N
PEI/SH|S,, Aristoph.Plutus 600. I
say this with reference to the present case, for in this instance one
might say that he is unable in words to contend against you at each
@@ -12619,7 +12619,7 @@
E)PITH/DEUMA and PRA=GMA
which you commend.” And
I, on hearing this, said, “Do you think that they are mistaken in saying
- so?” “I don't know,” said he,
+ so?” “I don’t know,” said he,
“but I would gladly hear your opinion.” “You may hear,
@@ -12629,7 +12629,7 @@
become their rulers?” “Your question,” I said, “requires an answer
expressed in a comparison or parable.Cf. Gory. 517 D,
Laws 644 C, Symp. 215 A with
- Bury's note. Cf. the parable of the great beast 493, and of the
+ Bury’s note. Cf. the parable of the great beast 493, and of the
many-headed beast, 588-589.” “And you,” he said, “of course,
are not accustomed to speak in comparisons!”“So,” said I, “you are making fun of me after driving
me into such an impasse of argument. But, all the same, hear my
@@ -12661,7 +12661,7 @@
Review, xx. (1906) p. 247.
Huxley commends the
Allegory, Methods and Results, p. 313. Cf. also
- Carlyle's famous
+ Carlyle’s famous
metaphor of the ship doubling Cape
Horn by ballot. Cf. Class. <placeName key="tgn,2063071">Phil</placeName>. ix. (1914) p. 362. Conceive this sort of
thing happening either on many ships or on one: Picture a
@@ -12673,7 +12673,7 @@
EI)S TO\N DH=MON, O(/TI O(/MOIOS NAUKLH/RW| I)SXURW=| ME\N
U(POKW/FW| DE/, Polyb.vi. 44A)EI\ GA/R POTE TO\N TW=N *)AQHNAI/WN DH=MON PARAPLH/SION
EI)=NAI TOI=S A)DESPO/TOIS SKA/FESI, etc. Cf. the old
- sailor in Joseph Conrad's Chance, chi i. “No ship
+ sailor in Joseph Conrad’s Chance, chi i. “No ship
navigated . . . in the happy-go-lucky manner . . . would ever arrive
into port.” For the figure of the ship of state Cf.
Polit. 302 A ff., 299 B, Euthydem.
@@ -12685,7 +12685,7 @@
Tide, xiii: “That the governing authority should be in
the hands of a true and trained pilot is as clear and as constant.
In none of these conditions is there any difference between a nation
- and a boat's company.” Cf. Longfellow's The Building of the
+ and a boat’s company.” Cf. Longfellow’s <title>The Building of the
Ship, in fine. Cf. Laws 758 A, 945 C. For
the criticism of democracy by a figure cf. also
Polit. 297 E ff. in height and strength
@@ -12695,7 +12695,7 @@
but who is slightly deafCf. Aristoph.Knights
42-44. and of similarly impaired vision, and whose knowledge
of navigation is on a par withCf. 390 C, 426 D, 498 B,
- Theaetet. 167 B, and Milton's “unknown and like esteemed,”
+ <title>Theaetet. 167 B, and Milton’s “unknown and like esteemed,”
<placeName key="tgn,2046757">Comus</placeName>
630. his sight and hearing. Conceive the sailors to
be wrangling with one another for control of the helm, each claiming
@@ -12707,7 +12707,7 @@
taught at all,Plato of course believed that virtue or the political art can be
taught in a reformed state, but practically was not taught at
Athens. Cf.
- Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 14, on 518 D,
+ Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 14, on 518 D,
What Plato Said, pp. 70 and 511, Newman, Introd.
Aristot.Pol. p. 397, Thompson on
<placeName key="tgn,2505769">Meno</placeName>
@@ -12766,7 +12766,7 @@
probable anacoluthon in this sentence, the meaning is that the
unruly sailors (the mob) have no true conception of the state of
mind of the real pilot (the philosophic statesman), and that it is
- he (adopting Sidgwick's <foreign xml:lang="grc">OI)OME/NW|</foreign>
+ he (adopting Sidgwick’s <foreign xml:lang="grc">OI)OME/NW|</foreign>
for the MS.<foreign xml:lang="grc">OI)O/MENOI</foreign> in E) who
does not believe that the trick of getting possession of the helm is
an art, or that, if it were, he could afford time to practise it.
@@ -12778,7 +12778,7 @@
the true pilot (statesman), which may be represented by the words of
<placeName key="tgn,2068271">Burke</placeName> to his
constituents, “I could hardly serve you as I have done and court you
- too.” Cf. Sidgwick, “On a Passage in <placeName key="tgn,1023926">Plato</placeName>'s <title>Republic,“Journal of
+ too.” Cf. Sidgwick, “On a Passage in <placeName key="tgn,1023926">Plato</placeName>’s <title>Republic,“Journal of
Philology, v. pp. 274-276, and my notes in
A.J.P. xiii. p. 364 and xvi. p. 234. that
the true pilot must give his attentionFor the force of the article cf. Thucyd. ii.
@@ -12800,7 +12800,7 @@
meaning. Cf. 518 D, and the examples collected in my emendation of
Gorgias 503 D in Class. <placeName key="tgn,2578490">Phil</placeName>. x. (1915) 325-326. The contrast between subjects
which do and those which do not admit of constitution as an art and
- science is ever present to Plato's mind, as appears from the
+ science is ever present to Plato’s mind, as appears from the
Sophist, Politicus, Gorgias, and
Phaedrus. And he would normally express the idea
by a genitive with TE/XNH. Cf.
@@ -12844,18 +12844,18 @@
if they were honored.” “I will teach him,”This passage
- illustrates one of the most interesting characteristics of Plato's
+ illustrates one of the most interesting characteristics of Plato’s
style, namely the representation of thought as adventure or action.
This procedure is, or was, familiar to modern readers in Matthew
- Arnold's account in God and the Bible of his quest
- for the meaning of god, which in turn is imitated in Mr. Updegraff's
+ Arnold’s account in God and the Bible of his quest
+ for the meaning of god, which in turn is imitated in Mr. Updegraff’s
<placeName key="tgn,2539818">New
World</placeName>. It lends vivacity and interest to
- Pascal's
+ Pascal’s
Provinciales and many other examples of it can be
found in modern literature. The classical instance of it in
- Plato is Socrates'
+ Plato is Socrates’
narrative in the Phaedo of his search for a
satisfactory explanation of natural phenomena, 96 A ff. In the
Sophist the argument is represented as an effort
@@ -12896,8 +12896,8 @@
IV iii. 17 “The
learned pate ducks to the golden fool.” The author of that
epigramFor
- Plato's attitude toward the epigrams of the Pre-Socratics Cf.
- Unity of Plato's Thought, pp. 68-69. was a
+ Plato’s attitude toward the epigrams of the Pre-Socratics Cf.
+ Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 68-69. was a
liar. But the true nature of things is that whether the sick man be rich
or poor he must needs go to the door of the physician,
@@ -13027,7 +13027,7 @@
entering upon a way of life which is too highFor the Greek double use of A)/CIOS and A)NA/CIOS Cf. Laws 943 E,
Aesch.Ag.1527. Cf. “How worthily he died who died
- unworthily” and Wyatt's
+ unworthily” and Wyatt’s
line “Disdain me not without desert.” for them and exceeds
their powers, by the many discords and disharmonies of their conduct
everywhere and among all men bring upon philosophy the repute of which
@@ -13037,14 +13037,14 @@
for the perfect philosopher is a rare growth among men
- and is found in only a few. Don't you think so?” “Most emphatically.”
+ and is found in only a few. Don’t you think so?” “Most emphatically.”
“Observe, then, the number and magnitude of the things that operate to
destroy these few.” “What are they?” “The most surprising fact of all is
that each of the gifts of nature which we praise tends to corrupt the
soul of its possessor and divert it from philosophy. I am speaking of
bravery, sobriety, and the entire list.Cf. Burton, Anatomy, i. 1 “This
St. Austin acknowledgeth of himself in his humble confessions,
- promptness of wit, memory, eloquence, they were God's good gifts,
+ promptness of wit, memory, eloquence, they were God’s good gifts,
but he did not use them to his glory.” Cf.
<placeName key="tgn,2505769">Meno</placeName>
88 A-C, and Seneca, Ep. v. 7 “multa bona nostra
@@ -13072,10 +13072,10 @@
growth, whether vegetable or animal, that the more vigorous it is the
more it falls short of its proper perfection when deprived of the food,
the season, the place that suits it. For evil is more opposed to the
- good than to the not-good.This is for Plato's purpose a sufficiently clear
+ good than to the not-good.This is for Plato’s purpose a sufficiently clear
statement of the distinction between contradictory and contrary
opposition. Plato never drew out an Aristotelian or modern
- logician's table of the opposition of propositions. But it is a
+ logician’s table of the opposition of propositions. But it is a
misunderstanding of Greek idiom or of his style to say that he never
got clear on the matter. He always understood it. Cf.
Symp. 202 A-B, and on 437 A-B, What Plato
@@ -13095,7 +13095,7 @@
suppose that great crimes and unmixed wickedness spring from a slight
nature<note anchored="true" resp="Loeb" place="unspecified">Cf. 495
B; La Rochefoucauld, <title>Max. 130 “Ia faiblesse est le
- seul défaut qu'on ne saurait corriger” and 467 “Ia faiblesse est
+ seul défaut qu’on ne saurait corriger” and 467 “Ia faiblesse est
plus opposée à Ia vertu que le vice.” and not from a vigorous
one corrupted by its nurture, while a weak nature will never be the
cause of anything great, either for good or evil?” “No,” he said, “that
@@ -13117,7 +13117,7 @@
and on
<placeName key="tgn,2505769">Meno</placeName>
93-94. Plato again anticipates many of his modern critics.
- Cf. Grote's defence of the sophists passim, and Mill, Unity
+ Cf. Grote’s defence of the sophists passim, and Mill, <title>Unity
of Religion(Three essays on Religion, pp.
78, 84 ff.). and that there are sophists in private lifeI)DIWTIKOU/S refers to individual
@@ -13135,7 +13135,7 @@
who are the chief sophists and educate most effectively
- and mould to their own heart's desire young and old, men and women?”
+ and mould to their own heart’s desire young and old, men and women?”
“When?” said he. “Why, when,” I said, “the multitude are seated
togetherCf.
Gorg. 490 B, Emerson, Self-Reliance: “It is easy
@@ -13149,7 +13149,7 @@
the public as the great sophist cf. Brimley, Essays, p. 224 (The Angel
in the House): “The miserable view of life and its purposes which
society instils into its youth of both sexes, being still, as in
- Plato's time, the
+ Plato’s time, the
sophist par excellence of which all individual talking and writing
sophists are but feeble copies.” Cf. Zeller, Ph. d.
Gr. 4 II. 1. 601 “Die sophistische Ethik ist seiner
@@ -13157,7 +13157,7 @@
denied by some recent critics. The question is a logomachy. Of
course there is more than one sophistic ethics. Cf. Mill,
Dissertations and Discussions, iv. pp. 247 ff.,
- 263 ff., 275. For Plato's attitude toward the sophists see also
+ 263 ff., 275. For Plato’s attitude toward the sophists see also
Polit. 303 C, Phaedr, 260 C,
What Plato Said, pp. 14-15, 158. in
assemblies or in court-rooms or theaters or camps or any other public
@@ -13174,7 +13174,7 @@
KI/ONES,276 B and D, Shorey on Horace, Odes i.20.7 “datus in
theatro cum tibi plausus,” and also the account of the moulding
process in Protag. 323-326. In such case how
- do you think the young man's heart, as the saying is, is moved within
+ do you think the young man’s heart, as the saying is, is moved within
him?What would
be his plight, his state of mind; how would he feel? Cf. Shorey in
Class. <placeName key="tgn,2578489">Phil</placeName>. v. (1910)
@@ -13184,7 +13184,7 @@
QUMO\N E)/XWN;Symp. 219 D 3TI/NA OI)/ESQE/ ME DIA/NOIAN E)/XEIN;
Eurip.I.A.1173
- TI/N' E)N
+ TI/N’ E)N
DO/MOIS ME KARDI/AN E(/CEIN DOKEI=S; What
private teaching do you think will hold out and not rather be swept away
by the torrent of censure and applause, and borne off on its current, so
@@ -13199,7 +13199,7 @@
“That is quite inevitable, Socrates,” he said.“And, moreover,” I said, “we have not yet mentioned the
chief necessity and compulsion.” “What is it?” said he. “That which
these ‘educators’ and sophists impose by action when their words fail to
- convince. Don't you know that they chastise the recalcitrant with loss
+ convince. Don’t you know that they chastise the recalcitrant with loss
of civic rights and fines and death?” “They most emphatically do,” he
said. “What other sophist, then, or what private teaching do you think
@@ -13250,13 +13250,13 @@
objects of hatred I do contemn and laugh at, it is that great enemy
of reason, virtue, and religion, the multitude . . . one great beast
and a monstrosity more prodigious than Hydra,” Horace, Epist. i.
- 1. 76 “belua multorum es capitum.” Also Hamilton's “Sir, your people
+ 1. 76 “belua multorum es capitum.” Also Hamilton’s “Sir, your people
is a great beast,” Sidney,
<placeName key="tgn,2136397">Arcadia</placeName>, bk. ii. “Many-headed
multitude,” Wallas, Human Nature in Politics, p. 172
- “ . . . like Plato's sophist is learning what the public is and is
+ “ . . . like Plato’s sophist is learning what the public is and is
beginning to understand ‘the passions and desires’ of that ‘huge and
- powerful brute,'” Shakes.Coriolanus iv. i. 2 “The
+ powerful brute,’” Shakes.Coriolanus iv. i. 2 “The
beast with many heads Butts me away,”ibid. ii. iii.
18 “The many-headed multitude.” For the idea cf. also
Gorg. 501 B-C ff., Phaedr. 260 C
@@ -13285,7 +13285,7 @@
75 D), What Plato Said, p. 616 on Tim.
47 E, Aristot.Eth.1120 b 1OU)X W(S
- KALO\N A)LL' W(S A)NAGKAI=ON, Emerson,
+ KALO\N A)LL’ W(S A)NAGKAI=ON, Emerson,
Circle,“Accept the actual for the necessary,” Eurip,
I. A. 724KALW=S
A)NAGKAI/WS TE. Mill iv. 299 and Grote iv. 221 miss
@@ -13312,9 +13312,9 @@
371 C, Gorg. 517 B, 518 B. and grants the mob
authority over himself more than is unavoidable,Plato likes to qualify sweeping
statements and allow something to necessity and the weakness of
- human nature. Cf. Phaedo 64 EKAQ' O(/SON MH\ POLLH\ A)NA/GKH, 558 D-E, 500 D, 383
+ human nature. Cf. Phaedo 64 EKAQ’ O(/SON MH\ POLLH\ A)NA/GKH, 558 D-E, 500 D, 383
C. the proverbial necessity of DiomedeThe scholiast derives this
- expression from Diomedes' binding Odysseus and driving him back to
+ expression from Diomedes’ binding Odysseus and driving him back to
camp after the latter had attempted to kill him. The schol. on
Aristoph.Eccl.1029 gives a more ingenious explanation.
@@ -13348,12 +13348,12 @@
is impossible for the multitude.A commonplace of Plato and all
intellectual idealists. Cf. 503 B, Polit. 292 E, 297
- B, 300 E. Novotny, Plato's Epistles, p. 87, uses this
+ B, 300 E. Novotny, Plato’s Epistles, p. 87, uses this
to support his view that Plato had a secret doctrine. Adam quotes
Gorg. 474 ATOI=S DE\
POLLOI=S OU)DE\ DIALE/GOMAI, which is not quite
- relevant. Cf. Renan, Etudes d'histoire relig. p. 403
- “La philosophie sera toujours le fait d'une imperceptible minorité,”
+ relevant. Cf. Renan, Etudes d’histoire relig. p. 403
+ “La philosophie sera toujours le fait d’une imperceptible minorité,”
etc.” “Impossible.” “It is inevitable,It is psychologically necessary. Cf.
supra, Vol. 1. on 473 E. Cf. 527 A, Laws 655 E, 658
E, 681 C, 687 C, Phaedr. 239 C, 271 B,
@@ -13436,8 +13436,8 @@
the philosophical nature do, in fact, become, when the environment and
nurture are bad, in some sort the cause of its backsliding,For E)KPESEI=N cf. 496 C. and so do
the so-called goods—Cf. on 591 C. p. 32, note a. riches and
- all such instrumentalitiesCf. Lysis 220 A; Arnold's
- “machinery,” Aristotle's XORHGI/A
+ all such instrumentalitiesCf. Lysis 220 A; Arnold’s
+ “machinery,” Aristotle’s XORHGI/A?” “No,” he replied, “it was rightly
said.” “Such, my good friend, and so great as regards the noblest
pursuit,
@@ -13460,8 +13460,8 @@
live an unreal and alien life, while other unworthy wooersCf. on 489 D, and
Theaet. 173 C. rush in and defile her as
an orphan bereft of her kin,Cf. Taine, à Sainte-Beuve, Aug. 14, 1865: “Comme Claude Bernard, il dépasse sa
- spécialité et c'est ches des spécialistes comme ceux-là que la
- malheureuse philosophie livée aux mains gantées et parfumées d'eau
+ spécialité et c’est ches des spécialistes comme ceux-là que la
+ malheureuse philosophie livée aux mains gantées et parfumées d’eau
bénite va trouver des maris capables de lui faire encore des
enfants.” cf. Epictet. iii. 21. 21. The passage is imitated by
Lucian 3. 2. 287, 294,
@@ -13516,7 +13516,7 @@
e.g.Mercator 639. who has made money and
just been freed from bonds and had a bath and is wearing a new garment
and has got himself up like a bridegroom and is about to marry his
- master's daughter
+ master’s daughter
@@ -13574,13 +13574,13 @@
there is nothing, if I may say so, sound or right in any present
politics,The
irremediable degeneracy of existing governments is the
- starting-point of Plato's political and social speculations. Cf. 597
+ starting-point of Plato’s political and social speculations. Cf. 597
B, Laws 832 C f., Epist. vii. 326 A;
Byron,
apudArnold, Essays in Crit. ii. p.
195 “I have simplified my politics into an utter detestation of all
existing governments.” This passage, Apol. 31 E ff.
- and Gorg. 521-522 may be considered Plato's apology
+ and Gorg. 521-522 may be considered Plato’s apology
for not engaging in politics Cf. J. V. Novak, Platon u. d.
Rhetorik, p. 495 (Schleiermacher, Einl. z.
Gorg. pp. 15 f.), Wilamowitz, Platon, i.
@@ -13588,13 +13588,13 @@
There is no probability that, as an eminent scholar has maintained,
the Republic itself was intended as a programme of
practical politics for Athens, and that its failure to win popular opinion
- is the chief cause of the disappointed tone of Plato's later
- writings. Cf. Erwin Wolff in Jaeger's Neue Phil.
+ is the chief cause of the disappointed tone of Plato’s later
+ writings. Cf. Erwin Wolff in <placeName key="tgn,2418518">Jaeger</placeName>’s <title>Neue Phil.
Untersuchungen,Heft 6, Platos Apologie, pp.
31-33, who argues that abstinence from politics is proclaimed in the
Apology before the Gorgias and
that the same doctrine in the seventh Epistle
- absolutely proves that the Apology is Plato's own.
+ absolutely proves that the Apology is Plato’s own.
Cf. also Theaet. 173 C ff., Hipp. Maj.
281 C, Euthydem. 306 B,Xen.Mem. i. 6.
15. and that there is no ally
@@ -13610,7 +13610,7 @@
Laws 906 D, etc. More in the
Utopia(Morley, Ideal Commonwealths, p. 84)
paraphrases loosely from memory what he calls “no ill simile by
- which Plato set forth the unreasonableness of a philosopher's
+ which Plato set forth the unreasonableness of a philosopher’s
meddling with government” unwilling to share their
misdeedsCf.
Democrates fr. 38, Diels ii.3 p. 73KALO\N
@@ -13637,7 +13637,7 @@
through this life and take his departure with fair hope,Cf. Vol. I on 331 A,
621 C-D, Marc. Aurel. xii.
36 and vi. 30in fine. See my article “Hope” in
- Hasting's Encyclopaedia of Religion and
+ Hasting’s <title>Encyclopaedia of Religion and
Ethics. serene and well content when the end comes.”
“Well,” he said, “that is no very slight thing
@@ -13663,7 +13663,7 @@
his own preserve the common weal.“The
causes and the injustice of the calumniation of philosophy, I think,
have been fairly set forth, unless you have something to add.An instance of
- Socrates' Attic courtesy. Cf 430 B, Cratyl. 427 D,
+ Socrates’ Attic courtesy. Cf 430 B, Cratyl. 427 D,
Theaet. 183 C, Gorg. 513 C,
Phaedr. 235 A. But in Gorg. 462 C
it is ironical and perhaps in Hipp. Maj. 291
@@ -13692,7 +13692,7 @@
it finds the best polity as it itself is the best, then
will it be apparentFor the idiom cf.AU)TO\
DEI/CEI
- Phileb. 20 C, with Stallbaum's
+ Phileb. 20 C, with Stallbaum’s
note, Theaet. 200 E,
<placeName key="tgn,2084327">Hipp</placeName>. Maj. 288 B,
Aristoph.Wasps 994, Frogs
@@ -13730,7 +13730,7 @@
he said, “our exposition must be completed by making
this plain.” “It will be no lack of will,” I said, “but if
anything,For
- the idiomatic A)LL' EI)/PER Cf.
+ the idiomatic A)LL’ EI)/PER Cf.
Parmen. 150 B, Euthydem. 296 B,
Thompson on
<placeName key="tgn,2083598">Meno</placeName>,Excursus 2, pp. 258-264,
@@ -13747,7 +13747,7 @@
fashion.What
Plato here deprecates Callicles in the Gorgias
recommends, 484 C-D. For the danger of premature study of dialectic
- cf. 537 D-E ff. Cf. my Idea of Education in Plato's
+ cf. 537 D-E ff. Cf. my <title>Idea of Education in Plato’s
Republic, p. 11. Milton develops the thought with characteristic
exuberance, Of Education: “They present their young
unmatriculated novices at first coming with the most intellective
@@ -13769,12 +13769,12 @@
philosophy. By the most difficult part I mean discussion. In later life
they think they have done much if, when invited, they deign to
listenCf. 475
- D, Isoc. xii. 270A)LL' OU)D' A)/LLOU
+ D, Isoc. xii. 270A)LL’ OU)D’ A)/LLOU
DEIKNU/ONTOS KAI\ PONH/SANTOS H)QE/LHSEN A)KROATH\S
GENE/SQAI“would not even be willing to listen to one
worked out and submitted by another” (tr. Norlin in L.C.L.).
to the philosophic discussions of others. That sort of thing they think
- should be by-work. And towards old age,Cf. Antiphon's devotion to horsemanship in the
+ should be by-work. And towards old age,Cf. Antiphon’s devotion to horsemanship in the
Parmenides, 126 C. For PRO\S TO\ GH=RAS cf. 552 D, Laws 653
A. with few exceptions, their light is quenched more
completely
@@ -13801,7 +13801,7 @@
Critias 119 D. and do nothing but
philosophize,Cf. 540 A-B, Newman, Aristot.Pol. i. pp. 329-330.
Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. 207-208, fancies that 498 C
- to 502 A is a digression expressing Plato's personal desire to be
+ to 502 A is a digression expressing Plato’s personal desire to be
the philosopher in Athenian politics. except incidentally, if
they are to live happily, and, when the end has come, crown the life
they have lived with a consonant destiny in that other world.”“You really seem to be very much in earnest,
@@ -13843,16 +13843,16 @@
surprising. For of the thing here spoken they have never beheld a
token,GENO/MENON . . . LEGO/MENON. It is not
- translating to make no attempt to reproduce Plato's parody of
+ translating to make no attempt to reproduce Plato’s parody of
“polyphonic prose.” The allusion here to Isocrates and the Gorgian
figure of PARI/SWSIS and PAROMOI/WSIS is unmistakable. The
- subtlety of Plato's style treats the “accidental” occurrence of a
+ subtlety of Plato’s style treats the “accidental” occurrence of a
Gorgian between the artificial style and insincerity of the sophists
and the serious truth of his own ideals. Cf. Isoc. x. 18LEGO/MENOS . . . GENO/MENOSWhat
Plato Said, p. 544 on Symp. 185 C, F.
Reinhardt, De Isocratis aemulis, p. 39, Lucilius, bk.
- v. init. “hoc ‘nolueris et debueris’ te si minu' delectat, quod
+ v. init. “hoc ‘nolueris et debueris’ te si minu’ delectat, quod
TEXNI/ONIsocrateium est,”
etc.
@@ -13860,7 +13860,7 @@
but only the forced and artificial chiming of word and
phrase, not spontaneous and accidental as has happened here. But the
- figure of a man ‘equilibrated’ and ‘assimilated’ to virtue's self
+ figure of a man ‘equilibrated’ and ‘assimilated’ to virtue’s self
perfectly, so far as may be, in word and deed, and holding rule in a
city of like quality, that is a thing they have never seen
@@ -13875,13 +13875,13 @@
rhetorician, the lawyer (Theaet. 172 D-E) and the
eristic (Euthydem. 272 B,
<placeName key="tgn,2084327">Hipp</placeName>. Maj. 288
- D). at any cost for knowledge's sake, and which dwell apart
+ D). at any cost for knowledge’s sake, and which dwell apart
and salute from afarCf. Eurip.Hippol. 102,
Psalm cxxxviii. 6 “the proud he knoweth afar
off.” all the subtleties and cavils that lead to naught but
opinionCf.
Phaedrus 253 D with Theaetet. 187
- C, and Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 48. and
+ C, and Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 48. and
strife in court-room and in private talk.” “They have not,” he
said.
@@ -13947,7 +13947,7 @@
emphasis, and expression that are broadly human and that no writer
can avoid. Any thinker may at one moment and for one purpose defy
popular opinion and for another conciliate it; at one time affirm
- that it doesn't matter what the ignorant people think or say, and at
+ that it doesn’t matter what the ignorant people think or say, and at
another urge that prudence bids us be discreet. So St. Paul who says
(Gal. i. 10) “Do I seek to please men? for if I
yet please men I should not be the servant of Christ,” says also
@@ -13997,7 +13997,7 @@
QRASU\S KAI\ FILAPEXQH/MWNDemosth, xxiv, 6. and
always talking about persons,i.e. gossip. cf. Aristot.Eth.
Nic.
- 1125 a 5OU)D'
+ 1125 a 5OU)D’
A)NQRWPOLO/GOS, Epictetus iii. 16. 4. Cf. also
Phileb. 59 b, Theaet. 173 D, 174
C. a thing least befitting philosophy?” “Least of all,
@@ -14011,11 +14011,11 @@
KATA\ TAU)TA\ A)EI\ E)/XONTA
in C would on Platonic principles be true only of the ideas.
Nevertheless poets and imitators have rightly felt that the
- dominating thought of the passage is the effect on the philosopher's
+ dominating thought of the passage is the effect on the philosopher’s
mind of the contemplation of the heavens. This confusion or
assimilation is, of course, still more natural to Aristotle, who
thought the stars unchanging. Cf. Met.
- 1063 a 16TAU)TA\ D'
+ 1063 a 16TAU)TA\ D’
AI)EI\ KAI\ METABOLH=S OU)DEMIA=S KOINWNOU=NTA. Cf.
also Sophocles, Ajax 669 ff., and Shorey in Sneath, Evolution
of Ethics, pp. 261-263, Dio Chrys. xl. (Teubner ii. p.
@@ -14044,7 +14044,7 @@
associating with the divine order will himself become
orderly and divine in the measure permitted to man.Cf. on 493 D, and for the idea 383
C. But calumnyCf. HamletIII. i. 141 “thou shalt
- not escape calumny,” Bacchylides 12 (13). 202-203BROTW=N DE\ MW=MOS PA/NTESSI ME/N E)STIN E)P'
+ not escape calumny,” Bacchylides 12 (13). 202-203BROTW=N DE\ MW=MOS PA/NTESSI ME/N E)STIN E)P’
E)/GOIS. is plentiful everywhere.” “Yes,
truly.” “If, then,” I said, “some compulsionThe philosopher unwillingly holds
office. Cf. on 345 E. is laid upon him to practise stamping
@@ -14061,13 +14061,13 @@
“social tissue” here exactly as he apples it to the making of a tool
in the Cratylus 389 C. In both cases there is a
workman, the ideal pattern and the material in which it is more or
- less perfectly embodied. Such passages are the source of Aristotle's
+ less perfectly embodied. Such passages are the source of Aristotle’s
doctrine f matter and form. Cf. Met.1044 a 25De part. an. 630 b
25-27, 640 b 24 f., 642 a 10 ff., De an. 403 b 3,
Seller, Aristot.(Eng.) i. p. 356. Cf. also
Gorg. 503 D-E, Polit. 306 C, 309 D
- and Unity of Plato's Thought, pp. 31-32. Cf.
+ and Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 31-32. Cf.
Alcinous,*EI)SAGWGH/ ii.
(Teubner vi. p. 153)A(\ KATA\ TO\N
QEWRHTIKO\N BI/ON O(RA=TAI, MELETH=SAI EI)S A)NQRW/PWN
@@ -14124,7 +14124,7 @@
glanceThe
theory of ideas frequently employs this image of the artist looking
off to his model and back again to his work. Cf. on 484 C, and
- What Plato Said, p. 458, Unity of Plato's
+ <title>What Plato Said, p. 458, Unity of Plato’s
Thought, p. 37. frequently in either direction,
at justice, beauty, sobriety and the like as they are in the nature of
things,i.e.
@@ -14200,8 +14200,8 @@
not one of all could be saved,Cf. 494 A. will anyone
maintain that?” “How could he?” “But surely,” said I, “the occurrence of
- one such is enough,Cf. Epist. vii. 328 C and Novotny, Plato's
- Epistles, p. 170 Plato's apparent radicalism again. Cf.
+ one such is enough,Cf. Epist. vii. 328 C and Novotny, Plato’s
+ Epistles, p. 170 Plato’s apparent radicalism again. Cf.
on 501 A. Cf. also Laws 709 E, but note the
qualification in 875 C, 713 E-714 A. 691 C-D. Wilamowitz,
Platon, ii. pp. 381-383 seems to say that the
@@ -14225,7 +14225,7 @@
are best, if possible, has already, I take it, been sufficiently shown.”
“Yes, sufficiently.” “Our present opinion, then, about this legislation
is that our plan would be best if it could be realized and that this
- realization is difficultCf. 502 A, Campbell's not on Theaet. 144 A, and
+ realization is difficultCf. 502 A, Campbell’s not on Theaet. 144 A, and
Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 208. yet not
impossible.” “That is the conclusion,” he said.“This difficulty disposed of, we have next
@@ -14314,16 +14314,16 @@
orderly, quiet, and stable lives;The translation is correct. In the Greek the
anacoluthon is for right emphasis, and the separation of NEANIKOI/ TE KAI\ MEGALOPREPEI=S from
the other members of the list is also an intentional feature of
- Plato's style to avoid the monotony of too long an enumeration. The
- two things that rarely combine are Plato's two temperaments. The
+ Plato’s style to avoid the monotony of too long an enumeration. The
+ two things that rarely combine are Plato’s two temperaments. The
description of the orderly temperament begins with OI(=OI and OI(
TOIOU=TOI refers to the preceding description of the
active temperament. The MSS. have KAI\ before NEANIKOI/; Heindorf, followed by Wilamowitz, and
- Adam's minor edition, put it before oi(=oi. Burnet follows the MSS. Adam's larger edition puts
+ Adam’s minor edition, put it before oi(=oi. Burnet follows the MSS. Adam’s larger edition puts
KAI\ NEANIKOI\ TE after
E(/PETAI. The right meaning
can be got from any of the texts in a good viva voce reading.
- Plato's contrast of the two temperaments disregards the possible
+ Plato’s contrast of the two temperaments disregards the possible
objection of a psychologist that the adventurous temperament is not
necessarily intellectual. Cf. on 375 C, and What Plato
Said, p. 573 on Theaet. 144 A-B,
@@ -14363,7 +14363,7 @@
at it,” he said. “But what do you understand by the greatest
studies?”“You remember, I presume,”
said I, “that after distinguishing three kindsFor the tripartite soul cf. Vol. I.
- on 435 A and 436 B, Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 42,
+ on 435 A and 436 B, Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 42,
What Plato Said, p. 526 on Phaedo
68 C, p. 552 on Phaedr. 246 B, and p. 563 on
Rep. 435 B-C. in the soul, we established
@@ -14378,7 +14378,7 @@
I. on 435 C, Phaedr. 274 A, Friedländer,
Platon, ii. pp. 376-377, Jowett and Campbell, p. 300 Frutiger,
Mythes de Platon, pp. 81 ff., and my Idea
- of Good in Plato's Republic(Univ. of Chicago
+ of Good in Plato’s Republic(Univ. of Chicago
Studies in class. <placeName key="tgn,2578489">Phil</placeName>. vol. i. p. 190). There is no
mysticism and no obscurity. The longer way is the higher education,
which will enable the philosopher not only like ordinary citizens to
@@ -14408,7 +14408,7 @@
measure of anything,Cf. Cic.De fin. i. 1 “nec modus
est ullus investigandi veri nisi inveneris.” Note not only the
edifying tone and the unction of the style but the definite
- suggestion of Plato's distaste for relativity and imperfection which
+ suggestion of Plato’s distaste for relativity and imperfection which
finds expression in the criticism of the homo mensura
in the Theaetetus, in the statement of the
Laws 716 C, that God is the measure of all things
@@ -14449,7 +14449,7 @@
to the utmost precision and clarity of knowledge about
other things of trifling moment and not to demand the greatest precision
for the greatestSuch juxtaposition of forms of the same word is one of the most
- common features of Plato's style. Cf. 453 BE(NA E(/N, 466 DPA/NTA
+ common features of Plato’s style. Cf. 453 BE(NA E(/N, 466 DPA/NTA
PA/NTH|, 467 DPOLLA\
POLLOI=S, 496 COU)DEI\S
OU)DE/N, Laws 835 CMO/NW| MO/NOS, 958 BE(KO/NTA E(KW/N. Cf. also
@@ -14481,7 +14481,7 @@
99 A. Plato is unwilling to confine his idea of good to a formula
and so seems to speak of it as a mystery. It was so regarded
throughout antiquity (cf. Diog. Laert. iii. 27), and by a majority
- of modern scholars. Cf. my Idea of Good in Plato's
+ of modern scholars. Cf. my <title>Idea of Good in Plato’s
Republic, pp. 188-189, What Plato Said,
pp. 72, 230-231, Introd. Vol. I. pp. xl-xli, and Vol. II. pp. xxvii,
xxxiv. by reference to whichLit. “the use of which,” i.e. a theory of the
@@ -14515,7 +14515,7 @@
too, that the multitude believe pleasureSo Polus and Callicles in the
Gorgias and later the Epicureans and Cyrenaics.
Cf. also What Plato Said, p. 131;
- Eurip.Hippol. 382OI( D'
+ Eurip.Hippol. 382OI( D’
H(DONH\N PROQE/NTES A)NTI\ TOU= KALOU=, and on 329
A-B. There is no contradiction here with the
Philebus. Plato does not himself say that either
@@ -14535,7 +14535,7 @@
point out what knowledgeCf. Euthyd. 281 D,
Theaet. 288 D f., Laws 961
EO( PERI\ TI/ NOU=S. See
- Unity of Plato's Thought, n. 650. The demand for
+ Unity of Plato’s Thought, n. 650. The demand for
specification is frequent in the dialogues. Cf.
Euthyph. 13 D, Laches 192 E,
Gorg. 451 A, Charm. 165 C-E,
@@ -14554,7 +14554,7 @@
FQE/GCWNTAI
logically of mere physical utterance (Cf. Theaet. 157
B), not, I think, as Adam says, of high-sounding oracular
- utterance. the word ‘good.'” “Most true,” he said. “Well, are
+ utterance. the word ‘good.’” “Most true,” he said. “Well, are
those who define the good as pleasure infected with any less
confusionLit.
“wandering,” the mark of error. Cf. 484 B, Lysis 213
@@ -14567,11 +14567,11 @@
generally and ends specifically. Plato does not care, since the
meaning is clear. Cf. Protag. 336 C,
Gorg. 456 C-D, Phaedo 62 A.
- compelled to admit that there are bad pleasuresA distinct reference to Callicles'
+ compelled to admit that there are bad pleasuresA distinct reference to Callicles’
admission in Gorgias 499 BTA\S ME\N BELTI/OUS H(DONA/S, TA\S DE\ XEI/ROUS cf.
499 C, Rep. 561 C, and Phileb. 13
CPA/SAS O(MOI/AS EI)=NAI.
- Stenzel's notion (Studien zur Entw. d. <placeName key="tgn,2122133">Plat</placeName>. Dialektik, p.
+ Stenzel’s notion (Studien zur Entw. d. <placeName key="tgn,2122133">Plat</placeName>. Dialektik, p.
98) that in the PhilebusPlato “ist von dem Standpunkt
des Staates 503 C weit entfernt” is uncritical. the
Republic merely refers to the
@@ -14610,7 +14610,7 @@
Aristot. i. pp. 344-345, 379, Boethius iii. 10,
Dante,
Purg. xvii. 127-129. and for its sake does
- all that it does, with an intuitionCf. Phileb. 64 AMANTEUTE/ON. Cf. Arnold's phrase,
+ all that it does, with an intuitionCf. Phileb. 64 AMANTEUTE/ON. Cf. Arnold’s phrase,
God and the Bible, chap. i. p. 23 “approximate
language thrown out as it were at certain great objects which the
human mind augurs and feels after.” of its reality, but yet
@@ -14621,7 +14621,7 @@
language of Platonic metaphysics, it is the PAROUSI/A TOU= A)GAQOU= that makes them good; but for
the practical purpose of ethical theory, because they need the
sanction. Cf. Introd. p. xxvii, and Montaigne i. 24 “Toute aultre
- science est dommageable à celuy qui n'a Ia science de la
+ science est dommageable à celuy qui n’a Ia science de la
bonté.” and for that reason failing of any possible benefit
from other things,—
@@ -14659,7 +14659,7 @@
Charm. 162 C, etc. long ago that you would
not be satisfied with what others think about it.” “Why, it does not
seem right to me either, Socrates,” he said, “to be ready to state the
- opinions of others but not one's own when one has occupied himself with
+ opinions of others but not one’s own when one has occupied himself with
the matter so long.Cf. 367 D-E.”
@@ -14671,7 +14671,7 @@
Meno
97 B, Theaet. 201 B-C and
Phileb. 62 A-B, but simply a different context
- and emphasis. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 47,
+ and emphasis. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 47,
nn. 338 and 339. are ugly things? The best of them are
blind.Cf. on
484 C, Phaedr. 270 E. Or do you think that
@@ -14687,7 +14687,7 @@
fantastic to see in it a reference to what Cicero calls the
lumina orationis of Isocratean style. The
rhetoric and synonyms of this passage are not to be pressed.
- and fair?” “Nay, in heaven's name, Socrates,” said Glaucon, “do not draw
+ and fair?” “Nay, in heaven’s name, Socrates,” said Glaucon, “do not draw
back, as it were, at the very goal.Cf. Phileb. 64 CE)PI\ ME\N TOI=S TOU= A)GAQOU= H)/DH
PROQU/ROIS, “we are now in the vestibule of the
good.” For it will content us if you explain the good even as
@@ -14718,7 +14718,7 @@
that seems a pitch above the impulse that wings my flight today.This is not
superstitious mysticism but a deliberate refusal to confine in a
formula what requires either a volume or a symbol. See Introd. p.
- xxvii, and my Idea of Good in Plato's Republic, p.
+ xxvii, and my Idea of Good in Plato’s Republic, p.
212. ta\ nu=n repeats to\ nu=n ei)=nai(Cf.
Tim. 48 C), as the evasive phrase EI)SAU=QIS below sometimes lays the
topic on the table, never to be taken up again. Cf. 347 E and 430
@@ -14740,7 +14740,7 @@
267 A, Aristoph.Clouds 34, Thesm. 845,
Pindar, Ol. x. 12. the equivocation, which in other
languages became a metaphor, has played a great part in the history
- of opinion about usury. Cf. the article “Usury” in Hastings's Encyclopaedia of
+ of opinion about usury. Cf. the article “Usury” in <placeName key="tgn,1014818">Hastings</placeName>’s <title>Encyclopaedia of
Relig. and Ethics. and the offspring of the good.
Have a care, however, lest I deceive you unintentionally with a false
@@ -14827,7 +14827,7 @@
cause of this, whose light makes our vision see best and visible things
to be seen?” “Why, the one that you too and other people mean,” he said;
“for your question evidently refers to the sun.Cf. my Idea of good in
- Plato's Republic pp. 223-225, Reinhardt,
+ Plato’s Republic pp. 223-225, Reinhardt,
<placeName key="tgn,2442104">Kosmos</placeName> und
Sympathie, pp. 374-384. Mediaeval writers have much to
@@ -14859,7 +14859,7 @@
reserved for poetical or mythical development in the
Timaeus. It is idle to construct a systematic
metaphysical theology for Plato by identification of TA)GAQO/N here either with god or with
- the ideas as a whole. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, p
+ the ideas as a whole. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p
512. which the good
@@ -14880,8 +14880,8 @@
they see clearly, and vision appears to reside in these same eyes.”
“Certainly.” “Apply this comparison to the soul also in this way. When
it is firmly fixed on the domain where truth and reality shine
- resplendentPlato's rhetoric is not to be pressed. Truth, being the good, are
- virtual synonyms. Still, for Plato's ethical and political
+ resplendentPlato’s rhetoric is not to be pressed. Truth, being the good, are
+ virtual synonyms. Still, for Plato’s ethical and political
philosophy the light that makes things intelligible is the idea of
good, i.e. the “sanction,” and not, as some commentators insist, the
truth. it apprehends and knows them and appears to possess
@@ -14897,7 +14897,7 @@
EI)=DOS and I)DE/A in Plato. But I)DE/A may be used o carry the notion
of “apprehended aspect” which I think is more pertinent here than
the metaphysical entity of the idea, though of course Plato would
- affirm that. Cf. 379 A, Unity of Plato's Thought, p.
+ affirm that. Cf. 379 A, Unity of Plato’s Thought, p.
35, What Plato Said, p. 585, Class. <placeName key="tgn,2578489">Phil</placeName>. xx. (1925) p. 347. of good, and you must
conceive it as being the cause of knowledge, and of truth in so far as
known.The
@@ -14911,7 +14911,7 @@
climax beyond the climax. Cf. 405 BAI)/SXISTON . . . AI)/SXION, 578 B,
Symp. 180 A-B and Bury ad loc. The same
characteristic can be observed in his method, e.g. in the
- Symposium where Agathon's speech, which seems the
+ Symposium where Agathon’s speech, which seems the
climax, is surpassed by that of Socrates: similarly in the
Gorgias and the tenth book of the
Republic, Cf. Friedländer, Platon,
@@ -14963,12 +14963,12 @@
the similitude of it still further in this way.i.e. not only do we
understand a thing when we know its purpose, but a purpose in some
- mind is the chief cause of its existence, God's mind for the
- universe, man's mind for political institutions. this, being the
+ mind is the chief cause of its existence, God’s mind for the
+ universe, man’s mind for political institutions. this, being the
only interpretation that makes sense o the passage, is presumably
- more or less consciously Plato's meaning. Cf. Introd. pp.
- xxxv-xxxvi. Quite irrelevant are Plato's supposed identification of
- the A)GAQO/N with the E(/N, one, and Aristotle's statement,
+ more or less consciously Plato’s meaning. Cf. Introd. pp.
+ xxxv-xxxvi. Quite irrelevant are Plato’s supposed identification of
+ the A)GAQO/N with the E(/N, one, and Aristotle’s statement,
Met. 988 a, that the ideas are the cause of other
things and the one is the cause of the ideas. the remainder of the
paragraph belongs to transcendental rhetoric. It has been endlessly
@@ -14981,7 +14981,7 @@
only receive from the presence of the good their being known, but their
very existence and essence is derived to them from it, though the good
itself is not essence but still transcends essenceIt is an error to oppose Plato here
- to the Alexandrians who sometimes said E)PE/KEINA TOU= O)/NTOS. Plato's sentence would have
+ to the Alexandrians who sometimes said E)PE/KEINA TOU= O)/NTOS. Plato’s sentence would have
made O)/NTOS very inconvenient
here. But EI)=NAI shows that
OU)SI/AS is not distinguished
@@ -14996,12 +14996,12 @@
And Glaucon very
ludicrouslyHe
- is amused at Socrates'
- emphasis. Fanciful is Wilamowitz' notion (Platon, i.
- p. 209)that the laughable thing is Glaucon's losing control of
+ is amused at Socrates’
+ emphasis. Fanciful is Wilamowitz’ notion (Platon, i.
+ p. 209)that the laughable thing is Glaucon’s losing control of
himself, for which he compares Aristoph.Birds 61. Cf.
the extraordinary comment of Proclus, p. 265. The dramatic humor of
- Glaucon's surprise is Plato's way of smiling at himself, as he
+ Glaucon’s surprise is Plato’s way of smiling at himself, as he
frequently does in the dialogues. Cf. 536 B, 540 B,
Lysis 223 B, Protag. 340 E,
Charm. 175 E, Cratyl. 426 B,
@@ -15010,16 +15010,16 @@
Phaedo. said, “Heaven save us, hyperbole“What a
comble!” would be nearer the tone of the Greek.
- There is no good English equivalent for U(PERBOLH=S. Cf. Sir Thomas Browne's remark that
+ There is no good English equivalent for U(PERBOLH=S. Cf. Sir Thomas Browne’s remark that
“nothing can be said hyperbolically of God.” The banter here
- relieves the strain, as is Plato's manner. can no further
+ relieves the strain, as is Plato’s manner. can no further
go.” “The fault is yours,” I said, “for compelling me to utter my
- thoughts about it.” “And don't desist,” he said, “but at leastCf. 502 A,
+ thoughts about it.” “And don’t desist,” he said, “but at leastCf. 502 A,
Symp. 222 E,
<placeName key="tgn,2083598">Meno</placeName>
86 E. expound the similitude of the sun, if there is
anything that you are omitting.” “Why, certainly,” I said, “I am
- omitting a great deal.” “Well, don't omit the least bit,” he said. “I
+ omitting a great deal.” “Well, don’t omit the least bit,” he said. “I
fancy,” I said, “that I shall have to pass over much, but nevertheless
so far as it is at present practicable I shall not willingly leave
anything out.” “Do not,”
@@ -15037,7 +15037,7 @@
Too many commentators lose the meaning in their study of the
imagery. Cf. the notes of Adam, Jowett, Campbell, and Apelt. See Introd. p. xxi for my
interpretation of the passage. into two unequalSome modern and
- ancient critics prefer A)N' I)/SA.
+ ancient critics prefer A)N’ I)/SA.
It is a little more plausible to make the sections unequal. But
again there is doubt which shall be longer, the higher as the more
honorable or the lower as the more multitudinous. Cf.
@@ -15076,7 +15076,7 @@
to a conclusion, while there is another section in which it advances
from its assumption to a beginning or principle that transcends
assumption,Cf.
- my Idea of good in <placeName key="tgn,1023926">Plato</placeName>'s republic, pp. 230-234, for the
+ my Idea of good in <placeName key="tgn,1023926">Plato</placeName>’s republic, pp. 230-234, for the
A)NUPO/QETON. Ultimately, the
A)NUPO/QETON is the Idea of
Good so far as we assume that idea to be attainable either in ethics
@@ -15091,7 +15091,7 @@
and in which it makes no use of the images employed by the other
section, relying on ideasThe practical meaning of this is independent of
the disputed metaphysics. Cf. Introd. pp. xvi-xviii. only and
- progressing systematically through ideas.” “I don't fully
+ progressing systematically through ideas.” “I don’t fully
understandCf.
Vol. I. p. 79, note c on 347 A and p. 47, not f on 338 D;
What Plato Said, p. 503 on Gorg.
@@ -15106,7 +15106,7 @@
in each branch of science, regard them as known, and, treating them as
absolute assumptions, do not deign to render any further account of
themAristot.top. 100 b 2-3OU) DEI= GA\R E)N TAI=S E)PISTHMONIKAI=S A)RXAI=S
- E)PIZHTEI=SQAI TO\ DIA\ TI/, exactly expresses Plato's
+ E)PIZHTEI=SQAI TO\ DIA\ TI/, exactly expresses Plato’s
thought and the truth, though Aristotle may have meant it mainly for
the principle of non-contradiction and other first principles of
logic. Cf. the mediaeval “contra principium negantem non est
@@ -15153,7 +15153,7 @@
likenesses the very objects that are themselves copied and adumbrated by
the class below them, and that in comparison with these latterThe loosely appended
dative E)KEI/NOIS is virtually a
- dative absolute. Cf. Phaedo 105 A. Wilamowitz'
+ dative absolute. Cf. Phaedo 105 A. Wilamowitz’
emendation (Platon, ii. p. 384) to PRO\S E)KEI=NA, KAI\ E)KEI/NOIS rests
on a misunderstanding of the passage. are esteemed as clear
and held in honor.The translation of this sentence is correct. But cf. Adam ad
@@ -15273,16 +15273,16 @@
the proportion, Plato here goes below and invents a fire and shadows
cast from it on the walls of a cave to correspond to the sun and the
“real” objects of sense. In such a proportion our “real” world
- becomes the symbol of Plato's ideal world. Modern fancy may read
+ becomes the symbol of Plato’s ideal world. Modern fancy may read
what meanings it pleases into the Platonic antithesis of the “real”
and the “ideal.” It has even been treated as an anticipation of the
fourth dimension. But Plato never leaves an attentive and critical
reader in doubt as to his own intended meaning. there may be at the
most a little uncertainty as to which are merely indispensable parts
- of the picture. The source and first suggestion of Plato's imagery
+ of the picture. The source and first suggestion of Plato’s imagery
is an interesting speculation, but it is of no significance for the
interpretation of the thought. Cf. John Henry Wright, “The Origin of
- Plato's Cave” in Harvard Studies in Class. <placeName key="tgn,2578489">Phil</placeName>. xvii. (1906) pp. 130-142. Burnet, Early Greek
+ Plato’s Cave” in <title>Harvard Studies in Class. <placeName key="tgn,2578489">Phil</placeName>. xvii. (1906) pp. 130-142. Burnet, Early Greek
Philosophy, pp. 89-90, thinks the allegory Orphic. Cf.
also Wright, loc. cit. pp.
134-135. Empedocles likens our world to a cave, Diels i.3 269. Cf.
@@ -15291,11 +15291,11 @@
Plato had in mind rather the puppet and marionette shows to which he
refers. Cf. Diès in Bulletin Budé,No. 14 (1927) pp. 8 f. The suggestiveness of the
image has been endless. The most eloquent and frequently quoted
- passage of Aristotle's early writings is derived from it,
+ passage of Aristotle’s early writings is derived from it,
Cic.De nat.deor. ii. 37. It is the source of
- Bacon's “idols of the den.” Sir Thomas Browne writes in
- Urne-Buriall: “We yet discourse in Plato's den
- and are but embryo philosophers.” Huxley's allegory of “Jack and the
+ Bacon’s “idols of the den.” Sir Thomas Browne writes in
+ Urne-Buriall: “We yet discourse in Plato’s den
+ and are but embryo philosophers.” Huxley’s allegory of “Jack and the
Beanstalk” in Evolution and Ethics, pp. 47 ff. is a
variation on it. Berkeley recurs to it, Siris, 263.
The Freudians would have still more fantastic interpretations. Cf.
@@ -15408,7 +15408,7 @@
also What Plato Said, p. 5123 on Meno
80 A, Eurip.Hippol. 247TO\
GA\R O)RQOU=SQAI GNW/MAN O)DUNA=|, “it is painful to
- have one's opinions set right,” and 517 A, 494 D. and that he
+ have one’s opinions set right,” and 517 A, 494 D. and that he
would regard what he formerly saw as more real than the things now
pointed out to him?” “Far more real,” he said.“And if he were compelled to look at the light itself,
@@ -15420,7 +15420,7 @@
“It is so,” he said. “And if,” said I, “someone should drag him thence
by force up the ascentCf. Theaet. 175 B, Boethius,
Cons. iii. 12 “quicunque in superum diem mentem
- ducere quaeritis”; 529 A, 521 C, and the Neoplatonists' use of
+ ducere quaeritis”; 529 A, 521 C, and the Neoplatonists’ use of
A)NA/GEIN and their
“anagogical” virtue and interpretation. Cf. Leibniz, ed. Gerhardt,
vii. 270. which is rough and steep, and not let him go before
@@ -15446,10 +15446,10 @@
of the stars and the moon, than by day the sun and the
- sun's light.It is
+ sun’s light.It is
probably a mistake to look for a definite symbolism in all the
details of this description. There are more stages of progress than
- the proportion of four things calls for. all that Plato's thought
+ the proportion of four things calls for. all that Plato’s thought
requires is the general contrast between an unreal and a real world,
and the goal of the rise from one to the other in the contemplation
of the sun, or the idea of good, Cf. 517 B-C.” “Of course.”
@@ -15480,7 +15480,7 @@
and best able to remember their customary precedences,
- sequences and co-existences,Another of Plato's anticipations of
+ sequences and co-existences,Another of Plato’s anticipations of
modern thought. This is precisely the Humian, Comtian, positivist,
pragmatist view of causation. Cf. Gorg. 501 ATRIBH=| KAI\ E)MPEIRI/A| MNH/MHN MO/NON SWZOME/NH
TOU= EI)QO/TOS GI/GNESQAI“relying on routine and
@@ -15508,7 +15508,7 @@
- in 'evaluating' these shadows while his vision was
+ in ’evaluating’ these shadows while his vision was
still dim and before his eyes were accustomed to the dark—and this time
required for habituation would not be very short—would he not provoke
laughter,Like
@@ -15522,11 +15522,11 @@
and lead them up, would they not kill himAn obvious allusion to the fate of
Socrates. For other stinging allusions to this Cf.
Gorg. 486 B, 521 C, Meno 100 B-C.
- Cf. Hamlet's “Wormwood, wormwood” (III. ii. 191). The text is
+ Cf. Hamlet’s “Wormwood, wormwood” (III. ii. 191). The text is
disputed. See crit. note. A. Drachmann, “Zu Platons
Staat,”Hermes,1926, p. 110, thinks that an OI)/EI or something like it must be
- understood as having preceded, at least in Plato's thought, and that
+ understood as having preceded, at least in Plato’s thought, and that
A)POKTEI/NEIN can be taken as
a gloss or variant of A)POKTEINU/NAI and the correct reading must be
LABEI=N, KAI\ A)POKTEINU/NAI
@@ -15538,11 +15538,11 @@
likening the region revealed through sight to the
habitation of the prison, and the light of the fire in it to the power
of the sun. And if you assume that the ascent and the contemplation of
- the things above is the soul's ascension to the intelligible
+ the things above is the soul’s ascension to the intelligible
region,Cf. 508
B-C, where Arnou (Le Désir de dieu dans la philos. de
Plotin, p. 48 and Robin (La Théorie plat. de
- l'amour, pp. 83-84) make TO/POS
+ l’amour, pp. 83-84) make TO/POS
NOHTO/S refer to le ciel astronomique
as opposed to the U(PEROURA/NIOS
TO/POS of the Phaedrus 247 A-E, 248 B,
@@ -15589,7 +15589,7 @@
he is compelled in courtroomsFor the contrast between the philosophical and
the pettifogging soul Cf. Theaet. 173 C-175 E. Cf.
also on 517 A, p 128, note b. or elsewhere to contend about
- the shadows of justice or the imagesFor A)GALMA/TWN cf. my Idea of Good in Plato's
+ the shadows of justice or the images<note anchored="true" resp="Loeb" place="unspecified">For <foreign xml:lang="grc">A)GALMA/TWN</foreign> cf. my <title>Idea of Good in Plato’s
Republic, p. 237, Soph. 234 C,
Polit. 303 C. that cast the shadows and to
wrangle in debate
@@ -15645,7 +15645,7 @@
MAQHMA/TWN, A)LLA\ A)NAMNH/SEWS. Cf. also St.
Augustine: “Nolite putare quemquam hominem aliquid discere ab
homine. Admonere possumus per strepitum vocis nostrae;” and
- Emerson's “strictly speaking, it is not instruction but provocation
+ Emerson’s “strictly speaking, it is not instruction but provocation
that I can receive from another soul.” vision into blind
eyes.” “They do indeed,” he said. “But our present argument indicates,”
said I, “that the true analogy for this indwelling power in the soul and
@@ -15667,7 +15667,7 @@
And this, we say, is the good,Hard-headed distaste for the unction
- or seeming mysticism of Plato's language should not blind us to the
+ or seeming mysticism of Plato’s language should not blind us to the
plain meaning. Unlike Schopenhauer, who affirms the moral will to be
unchangeable, Plato says that men may be preached and drilled into
ordinary morality, but that the degree of their intelligence is an
@@ -15682,10 +15682,10 @@
vision in it, but on the assumption that it possesses vision but does
not rightly direct it and does not look where it should, an art of
bringing this about.” “Yes, that seems likely,” he said. “Then the other
- so-called virtuesThis then is Plato's answer (intended from the first) to the
+ so-called virtuesThis then is Plato’s answer (intended from the first) to the
question whether virtue can be taught, debated in the
Protagoras and Meno. The
- intellectual virtues (to use Aristotle's term), broadly speaking,
+ intellectual virtues (to use Aristotle’s term), broadly speaking,
cannot be taught; they are a gift. And the highest moral virtue is
inseparable from rightly directed intellectual virtue. Ordinary
moral virtue is not rightly taught in democratic Athens, but comes
@@ -15721,17 +15721,17 @@
819 A. how keen is the vision of the little soul,Cf.
Theaet. 195 A, ibid. 173 ASMIKROI\ . . . TA\S YUXA/S, Marcus
Aurelius’YUXA/RION EI)= BASTA/ZWN
- NEKRO/N, Swinburne's “A little soul for a little bears
+ NEKRO/N, Swinburne’s “A little soul for a little bears
up this corpse which is man” (“Hymn to Proserpine,” in fine),
- Tennyson's “If half the little soul is dirt.” how quick it is
+ Tennyson’s “If half the little soul is dirt.” how quick it is
to discern the things that interest it,Lit. “Toward which it is turned.” a proof
that it is not a poor vision which it has, but one forcibly enlisted in
the service of evil, so that the sharper its sight the more mischief it
accomplishes?” “I certainly have,” he said. “Observe then,” said I,
“that this part of such a soul, if it had been hammered from childhood,
and had thus been struck freeThe meaning is plain, the precise nature of the
- image that carries it is doubtful. Jowett's “circumcision” was
- suggested by Stallbaum's “purgata ac circumcisa,” but carries alien
+ image that carries it is doubtful. Jowett’s “circumcision” was
+ suggested by Stallbaum’s “purgata ac circumcisa,” but carries alien
associations. The whole may be compared with the incrustation of the
soul, 611 C-D, and with Phaedo 81 B f. of the leaden weights,
so to speak, of our birth
@@ -15766,14 +15766,14 @@
SKOPO/N: this
is what distinguishes the philosophic statesman from the opportunist
politician. Cf. 452 E, Laws 962 A-B, D, Unity
- of Plato's Thought, p. 18 n. 102. and purpose in
+ of Plato’s Thought, p. 18 n. 102. and purpose in
life to which all their actions, public and private, must be directed,
and the others, because they will not voluntarily engage in action,
believing that while still living they have been transported to the
Islands of the Blest. Cf. 540 B, Gorg. 526 C, 520
DE)N TW=| KAQARW=| and
Phaedo 114 C, 109 B. Because they will still
- suppose that they are “building Jerusalem in England's green and
+ suppose that they are “building Jerusalem in England’s green and
pleasant land” (Blake).” “True,” he said. “It is the duty of
us, the founders, then,” said I, “to compel the best natures to attain
the knowledge which we pronounced the greatest, and to win to the vision
@@ -15867,7 +15867,7 @@
others and accustom yourselves to the observation of the obscure things
there. For once habituated you will discern them infinitelyFor MURI/W| cf.
Eurip.Androm. 701. better than the
- dwellers there, and you will know what each of the ‘idols’i.e. images, Bacon's
+ dwellers there, and you will know what each of the ‘idols’i.e. images, Bacon’s
“idols of the den.” is and whereof it is a semblance, because
you have seen the reality of the beautiful, the just and the good. So
our city will be governed by us and you with waking minds, and not, as
@@ -15952,11 +15952,11 @@
groups. A shell or potsherd, black on one side and white on the
other, was thrown, and according to the face on which it fell one
group fled and the other pursued. Cf. also commentators on
- Aristoph.Knights 855. in the children's
+ Aristoph.Knights 855. in the children’s
game, but a conversion and turning about of the soul from a day whose
light is darkness to the veritable day—that ascensionMuch quoted by
Neoplatonists and Christian Fathers. Cf. Stallbaum ad loc. Again we
- need to remember that Plato's main and explicitly reiterated purpose
+ need to remember that Plato’s main and explicitly reiterated purpose
is to describe a course of study that will develop the power of
consecutive consistent abstract thinking. All metaphysical and
mystical suggestions of the imagery which conveys this idea are
@@ -16023,7 +16023,7 @@
you are now seeking.” “Your recollection is most
- exact,” I said; “for in fact it had nothing of the kind. But in heaven's
+ exact,” I said; “for in fact it had nothing of the kind. But in heaven’s
name, Glaucon, what study could there be of that kind? For all the arts
were in our opinion base and mechanical.Cf. supra, p. 49 note e on 495 E.
This idea is the source of much modern prejudice against
@@ -16040,7 +16040,7 @@
of 511 D-E. and all sciences employ, and which is among the
first things that everybody must learn.” “What?” he said. “This trifling
matter,A
- playful introduction to Plato's serious treatment of the psychology
+ playful introduction to Plato’s serious treatment of the psychology
of number and the value of the study of mathematics.” I said,
“of distinguishing one and two and three. I mean, in sum, number and
calculation. Is it not true of them that every art and science must
@@ -16060,7 +16060,7 @@
invention of number he marshalled the troops in the army at Troy in
ranks and companies and enumerated the ships and everything else as if
before that they had not been counted, and Agamemnon apparently did not
- know how many feet he had if he couldn't count? And yet what sort of a
+ know how many feet he had if he couldn’t count? And yet what sort of a
General do you think he would be in that case?” “A very queer one in my
opinion,” he said, “if that was true.”
@@ -16077,7 +16077,7 @@
that it is one of those studies which we are seeking
that naturally conduce to the awakening of thought, but that no one
- makes the right usePlato's point of view here, as he will explain, is precisely the
+ makes the right usePlato’s point of view here, as he will explain, is precisely the
opposite of that of modern educators who would teach mathematics
concretely and not puzzle the children with abstract logic. But in
the Laws where he is speaking of primary and
@@ -16096,7 +16096,7 @@
do not provoke thought to reconsideration because the
judgementCf.
- Phileb. 38 C.Unity of Plato's
+ <title>Phileb. 38 C.Unity of Plato’s
Thought, n. 337. of them by sensation seems
adequate,I(KANW=S is not to be pressed
@@ -16110,7 +16110,7 @@
most obvious cause of errors of judgement. Cf. Laws
663 B. appearances,” he said, “and shadow-painting.Cf. Vol. I. p. 137
on 365 C.” “You have quite missed my meaning,The dramatic
- misapprehension by the interlocutor is one of Plato's methods for
+ misapprehension by the interlocutor is one of Plato’s methods for
enforcing his meaning. Cf. on 529 A, p. 180, note a,
Laws 792 B-C.” said I. “What do you mean?”
he said. “The experiences that do not provoke thought are those that do
@@ -16125,8 +16125,8 @@
so to speak, taken by the world for the attainment of this end is
that of presenting itself in the form of contradictory experience?”
AI)/SQHSIS is not to be
- pressed. Adam's condescending apology for the primitive character of
- Plato's psychology here is as uncalled-for as all such apologies.
+ pressed. Adam’s condescending apology for the primitive character of
+ Plato’s psychology here is as uncalled-for as all such apologies.
Plato varies the expression, but his meaning is clear. Cf. 524 D. No
modern psychologists are able to use “sensation,” “perception,”
“judgement,” and similar terms with perfect consistency.
@@ -16138,7 +16138,7 @@
561 C, Laws 791 C, 632 A, 637 A,
Phileb. 21 C; also “accidere” in Lucretius, e.g.
iv. 882, ii. 1024-1025, iv. 236
- and iii. 841, and Goethe's “Das Blenden der Erscheinung, die sich an
+ and iii. 841, and Goethe’s “Das Blenden der Erscheinung, die sich an
unsere Sinne drängt.” comes from nearby or afar. An
illustration will make my meaning plain. Here, we say, are three
fingers, the little finger, the second and the middle.” “Quite so,” he
@@ -16147,7 +16147,7 @@
- equally a finger,This anticipates Aristotle's doctrine that
+ equally a finger,This anticipates Aristotle’s doctrine that
“substances” do not, as qualities do, admit of more or less.
and in this respect it makes no difference whether it is observed as
intermediate or at either extreme, whether it is white or black, thick
@@ -16163,7 +16163,7 @@
reflection and thought.” “It is.” “But now, what about
- the bigness and the smallness of these objects? Is our vision's view of
+ the bigness and the smallness of these objects? Is our vision’s view of
them adequate, and does it make no difference to it whether one of them
is situatedKEI=SQAI perhaps anticipates
@@ -16178,7 +16178,7 @@
In the first place, the sensation that is set over the
hard is of necessity related also to the soft,Cf. Theaet. 186 ff.,
Tim. 62 B, Taylor, Timaeus, p. 233
- on 63 D-E, Unity of Plato's Thought, nn. 222 and 225,
+ on 63 D-E, Unity of Plato’s Thought, nn. 222 and 225,
Diels, Dialex. 5 (ii.3 p. 341).
Protag. 331 D anticipates this thought, but
Protagoras cannot follow it out. Cf. also Phileb. 13
@@ -16195,10 +16195,10 @@
12 “we may recapitulate by saying that the origin of thinking is
some perplexity, confusion, or doubt”; also ibid, p.
62. Meyerson, Déduction relativiste p. 142, says
- “Mais Platon . . . n'avait-il pas dit qu'il était impossible de
- raisonner si ce n'est en partant d'une perception?” citing
+ “Mais Platon . . . n’avait-il pas dit qu’il était impossible de
+ raisonner si ce n’est en partant d’une perception?” citing
Rep. 523-524, and Rodier, Aristot. De
- anima, i. p. 191. But that is not Plato's point here.
+ anima, i. p. 191. But that is not Plato’s point here.
Zeller, Aristot. i. p. 166 (Eng.), also misses the
point when he says “Even as to the passage from the former to the
latter he had only the negative doctrine that the contradictions of
@@ -16221,7 +16221,7 @@
Hipp. Major 301 D-E, and, for the dialectic here,
Parmen. 143 D.” “Of course.” “And if it
appears to be two, each of the two is a distinct unit.Or, as the Greek
- puts it, “both ‘one’ and ‘other.'” Cf. Vol. 1. p. 516, note f on 416
+ puts it, “both ‘one’ and ‘other.’” Cf. Vol. 1. p. 516, note f on 416
A. For E(/TERON Cf. What
Plato Said, pp. 522, 580, 587-588.” “Yes.” “If,
then, each is one and both two, the very meaning
@@ -16237,7 +16237,7 @@
it would not have been thinking of two, but of one.”
“Right.” “Sight too saw the great and the small, we say, not separated
- but confounded.Plato's aim is the opposite of that of the modern theorists who say
+ but confounded.Plato’s aim is the opposite of that of the modern theorists who say
that teaching should deal integrally with the total experience and
not with the artificial division of abstraction. “Is not that
so?” “Yes.” “And forThe final use of DIA/ became more frequent in later Greek. Cf.
@@ -16255,8 +16255,8 @@
ideas. My suggestion that this passage is the probable source of the
notion which still infests the history of philosophy, that the
great-and-the-small was a metaphysical entity or principle in
- Plato's later philosophy, to be identified with indeterminate dyad,
- has been disregarded. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought,
+ Plato’s later philosophy, to be identified with indeterminate dyad,
+ has been disregarded. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought,
84. But it is the only plausible explanation that has ever been
proposed of the attribution of that “clotted nonsense” to Plato
himself. For it is fallacious to identify MA=LLON KAI\ H)=TTON in Philebus 24 C,
@@ -16346,7 +16346,7 @@
made in the Timaeus 53 B, and which is not relevant
here, that God used numbers and forms to make a cosmos out of a
chaos. by pure thought, not for the purpose of buying and
- selling,Instead of remarking on Plato's scorn for the realities of
+ selling,Instead of remarking on Plato’s scorn for the realities of
experience we should note that he is marking the distinctive quality
of the mind of the Greeks in contrast with the Egyptians and
orientals from whom they learned and the Romans whom they taught.
@@ -16384,7 +16384,7 @@
of the sources of the silly notion that mathematical numbers are
intermediate between ideal and concrete numbers, cf. my De
Platonis Idearum Doctrina, p. 33, Unity of
- Plato's Thought, pp. 83-84, Class. Phil.
+ Plato’s Thought, pp. 83-84, Class. Phil.
xxii. (1927) pp. 213-218. never
acquiescing if anyone proffers to it in the discussion numbers attached
to visible and tangible bodies. For you are doubtless aware
@@ -16393,7 +16393,7 @@
that experts in this study, if anyone attempts to cut
up the ‘one’ in argument, laugh at him and refuse to allow it; but if
you mince it up,Cf. Meno 79 CKATAKERMATI/ZH|S, Aristot.Met.
- 1041 a 19A)DIAI/RETON PRO\S AU(TO\ E(/KASTON: TOU=TO D' H)=N TO\ E(NI\
+ 1041 a 19A)DIAI/RETON PRO\S AU(TO\ E(/KASTON: TOU=TO D’ H)=N TO\ E(NI\
EI)=NAI, Met.1052 b a ff., 15 ff. and 1053 a 1TH\N GA\R MONA/DA
TIQE/ASI PA/NTH| A)DIAI/RETON. KERMATI/ZEIN is also
@@ -16404,13 +16404,13 @@
Parmenides that thought has to postulate unities
which sensation (sense perception) and also dialectics are
constantly disintegrating into pluralities. Cf. my Ideas of
- Good in Plato's Republic, p. 222. Stenzel,
+ Good in Plato’s Republic, p. 222. Stenzel,
Dialektik, p. 32, says this dismisses the problem
of the one and the many “das ihn (Plato) später so lebhaft
beschäftigen sollte.” But that is refuted by Parmen.
159 COU)DE\ MH\N MO/RIA/ GE E)/XEIN FAME\N
TO\ W(S A)LHQW=S E(/N. The “problem” was always in
- Plato's mind. He played with it when it suited his purpose and
+ Plato’s mind. He played with it when it suited his purpose and
dismissed it when he wished to go on to something else. Cf. on 525
A, Phaedr. 266 B, Meno 12 C,
Laws 964 A, Soph. 251.”
@@ -16427,7 +16427,7 @@
figures are only less simple mathematical ones.” Cf. on 525 D. Plato
here and elsewhere simply means that the educator may distinguish
two kinds of numbers—five apples, and the number five as an abstract
- idea. Cf. Theaet. 19 E: We couldn't err about eleven
+ idea. Cf. Theaet. 19 E: We couldn’t err about eleven
which we only think, i.e. the abstract number eleven. Cf. also
Berkeley, Siris, 288. are these you are
talking about, in which the one is such as you postulate, each unity
@@ -16445,7 +16445,7 @@
reckoners are by nature quick in virtually all their studies? And the
slow, if they are trained and drilled in this, even if no other benefit
results, all improve and become quicker than they wereCf.
- Isoc.Antid. 267AU)TOI\ D'
+ Isoc.Antid. 267AU)TOI\ D’
AU(TW=N EU)MAQE/STEROI. For the idiom AU)TOI\ AU(TW=N cf. also 411 C. 421 D,
571 D, Prot. 350 A and D, Laws 671 B,
Parmen. 141 A, Laches 182 C.
@@ -16487,8 +16487,8 @@
troops into column and line and all the other formations of an army in
actual battle and on the march, an officer who had studied geometry
would be a very different person from what he would be if he had not.”
- “But still,” I said, “for such purposes a slight modicumThis was Xenophon's
- view, Mem. vi. 7. 2. Whether it was Socrates' nobody
+ “But still,” I said, “for such purposes a slight modicumThis was Xenophon’s
+ view, Mem. vi. 7. 2. Whether it was Socrates’ nobody
knows. Cf. pp. 162-163 on 525 C, Epin. 977 E,
Aristoph.Clouds 202. of geometry and
calculation would suffice. What we have to consider is
@@ -16501,7 +16501,7 @@
is to be found in all studies that force the soul to turn its vision
round to the region where dwells the most blessed part of reality,Cf. 518 C. Once more
we should remember that for the practical and educational
- application of Plato's main thought this and all similar expressions
+ application of Plato’s main thought this and all similar expressions
are rhetorical surplusage or “unction,” which should not be pressed,
nor used e.g. to identify the idea of good with god. Cf. Introd. p.
xxv. which it is imperative that it should behold.” “You are
@@ -16521,7 +16521,7 @@
adepts.Geometry (and mathematics) is inevitably less abstract than
dialectics. But the special purpose of the Platonic education values
mathematics chiefly as a discipline in abstraction. Cf. on 523 A, p.
- 152, note b; and Titchener, A Beginner's Psychology,
+ 152, note b; and Titchener, A Beginner’s Psychology,
pp. 265-266: “There are probably a good many of us whose abstract
idea of ‘triangle’ is simply a mental picture of the little
equilateral triangle that stands for the word in text-books of
@@ -16535,14 +16535,14 @@
Republic(cf. e.g. 511 and 533 B-D) which, naturally
interpreted, merely affirm the general inferiority of the
mathematical method and the intermediate position for education of
- mathematics as a propaedeutic to dialectics. Plato's purpose
+ mathematics as a propaedeutic to dialectics. Plato’s purpose
throughout is not to exhort mathematicians as such to question their
initiatory postulates, but to mark definitely the boundaries between
the mathematical and other sciences and pure dialectics or
philosophy. The distinction is a true and useful one today.
Aristotle often refers to it with no hint that it could not be
abolished by a new and different kind of mathematics. And it is
- uncritical to read that intention into Plato's words. He may have
+ uncritical to read that intention into Plato’s words. He may have
contributed, and doubtless did contribute, in other ways to the
improvement and precision of mathematical logic. But he had no idea
of doing away with the fundamental difference that made dialectics
@@ -16582,10 +16582,10 @@
the real object of the entire study is pure
knowledge.Cf.
- Meyerson, De l'explication dans les sciences, p. 33:
+ Meyerson, De l’explication dans les sciences, p. 33:
“En effet, Platon déjà fait ressortir que Ia géométrie, en dépit de
- l'apparence, ne poursuit aucun but pratique et n'a tout entière
- d'autre objet que Ia connaissance.” “That is absolutely
+ l’apparence, ne poursuit aucun but pratique et n’a tout entière
+ d’autre objet que Ia connaissance.” “That is absolutely
true,” he said. “And must we not agree on a further point?” “What?”
“That it is the knowledge of that which always is,i.e. mathematical ideas are
(Platonic) ideas like other concepts. Cf. on 525 D, p. 164, note
@@ -16646,7 +16646,7 @@
by such studies when it has been destroyed and blinded
by our ordinary pursuits, a faculty whose preservation outweighs ten
- thousand eyesAnother instance of Plato's “unction.” Cf. Tim. 47
+ thousand eyesAnother instance of Plato’s “unction.” Cf. Tim. 47
A-B, Eurip.Orest. 806MURI/WN
KREI/SSWN, and Stallbaum ad loc. for imitations of
this passage in antiquity.; for by it only is reality beheld.
@@ -16744,7 +16744,7 @@
interpretation is, I think, correct. For the construction of this
sentence cf. Isoc. xv. 84. The text is disputed; see crit.
note. as to the true reasons for pursuing them,Lit. “in what
- respect they are useful.” Plato is fond of the half legal KAQ' O(/ TI. Cf. Lysis
+ respect they are useful.” Plato is fond of the half legal KAQ’ O(/ TI. Cf. Lysis
210 C, Polit. 298 C. they nevertheless in the
face of all these obstacles force their way by their inherent charmAn eminent modern
psychologist innocently writes: “The problem of why geometry gives
@@ -16777,12 +16777,12 @@
“hâtez-vous lentement” (Boileau, Art poétique, i.
171), “Chi va piano va sano e va lontano” (Goldoni, I
volponi,I. ii.), “Eile mit Weile” and similar
- expressions; Franklin's “Great haste makes great waste,” etc.
+ expressions; Franklin’s “Great haste makes great waste,” etc.
For, while the next thing in order is the studyME/QODON: this word, like PRAGMATEI/A came to mean “treatise.” of the
third dimension or solids, I passed it over because of our absurd
neglectThis is
- the meaning. Neither Stallbaum's explanation, “quia ita est
+ the meaning. Neither Stallbaum’s explanation, “quia ita est
comparata, ut de ea quaerere ridiculum sit,” nor that accepted by
Adam, “quia ridicule tractatur,” is correct, and 529 E and 521 A are
not in point. Cf. 528 B p. 176, note a. to investigate it,
@@ -16797,7 +16797,7 @@
passed over, is available,i.e. “assuming this to exist,” “vorhanden sein,”
which is the usual meaning of U(PA/RXEIN in classical Greek. The science, of
course, is solid geometry, which is still undeveloped, but in
- Plato's state will be constituted as a regular science through
+ Plato’s state will be constituted as a regular science through
endowed research. provided, that is, that the state pursues
it.” “That is likely,” said he; “and instead of the vulgar
utilitarianCf.
@@ -16816,17 +16816,17 @@
possible understanding by the reader. Cf. on 523 B. The
misapprehension is typical of modern misunderstandings. Glaucon is
here the prototype of all sentimental Platonists or anti-Platonists.
- The meaning of “higher” things in Plato's allegory is obvious. But
+ The meaning of “higher” things in Plato’s allegory is obvious. But
Glaucon takes it literally. Similarly, modern critics, taking
- Plato's imagery literally and pressing single expressions apart from
+ Plato’s imagery literally and pressing single expressions apart from
the total context, have inferred that Plato would be hostile to all
the applications of modern science to experience. They refuse to
make allowance for his special and avowed educational purpose, and
overlook the fact that he is prophesying the mathematical astronomy
and science of the future. The half-serious exaggeration of his
rhetoric can easily be matched by similar utterances of modern
- thinkers of the most various schools, from Rousseau's “écarter tous
- les faits” to Judd's “Once we acquire the power to neglect all the
+ thinkers of the most various schools, from Rousseau’s “écarter tous
+ les faits” to Judd’s “Once we acquire the power to neglect all the
concrete facts . . . we are free from the incumbrances that come
through attention to the concrete facts.” Cf. also on 529 B, 530 B
and 534 A. and leads it away from things here to those higher
@@ -16837,7 +16837,7 @@
but the meaning here is those who use astronomy as a part of the
higher education. FILOSOFI/A is
used in the looser sense of Isocrates. Cf. A.J.P.
- xvi. p. 237. I think that it turns the soul's gaze very much
+ xvi. p. 237. I think that it turns the soul’s gaze very much
downward.” “What do you mean?” he said. “You seem to me in your thought
to put a most liberalFor OU)K
A)GENNW=S
@@ -16852,7 +16852,7 @@
should learn something by staring at decorations on a ceiling, you would
regard him as contemplating them with the higher reason and not with the
eyes.The
- humorous exaggeration of the language reflects Plato's exasperation
+ humorous exaggeration of the language reflects Plato’s exasperation
at the sentimentalists who prefer star-gazing to mathematical
science. Cf. Tim. 91 D on the evolution of birds from
innocents who supposed that sight furnished the surest proof in such
@@ -16860,7 +16860,7 @@
the following pages are the chief support of the charge that Plato
is hostile to science. Cf. on 530 B, p. 187, note c. Perhaps
you are right and I am a simpleton. For I, for my part, am unable to
- suppose that any other study turns the soul's gaze upwardCf.
+ suppose that any other study turns the soul’s gaze upwardCf.
Theaet. 174 AA)/NW
BLE/PONTA. than that which deals with being and
the invisible. But if anyone tries to learn about the things of sense,
@@ -16875,7 +16875,7 @@
even though he study floating on his backCf.
Phaedr. 264 A, and Adam in Class.
Rev. xiii. p. 11. on sea or land.”“A fair retort,Or rather, “serves me right,” or, in the
- American language, “I’ve got what's coming to me.” The expression is
+ American language, “I’ve got what’s coming to me.” The expression is
colloquial. Cf. Epist. iii. 319 E, Antiphon cxxiv.
45. But DI/KHN E)/XEI in 520 B =
“it is just.”” he said; “your rebuke is deserved. But how,
@@ -16888,7 +16888,7 @@
1096A)STE/RWN
POIKI/LMATA, Critias, Sisyphus,Diels
- ii.3 p. 321, lines 33-34TO/ T' A)STERWPO\N
+ ii.3 p. 321, lines 33-34TO/ T’ A)STERWPO\N
OU)RANOU= DE/MAS XRO/NOU KALO\N POI/KILMA TE/KTONOS
SOFOU=. Cf. also Gorg. 508 A, Lucretius
v. 1205 “stellis micantibus aethera fixum,” ii. 1031 ff.,
@@ -16913,7 +16913,7 @@
speaking Plato, it is true, disregards the apparent difficulty that
the movement of the visible stars then ought to be mathematically
perfect. But this interpretation is, I think, more probable for
- Plato than Adam's attempt to secure rigid consistency by taking
+ Plato than Adam’s attempt to secure rigid consistency by taking
TO\ O)\N TA/XOS etc., to
represent invisible and ideal planets, and TA\ E)NO/NTA to be the perfect mathematical
realities, which are in them. E)NO/NTA would hardly retain the metaphysical meaning
@@ -16974,7 +16974,7 @@
Timaeus he is saying that astronomy or science
took its beginning from the sight and observation of the heavenly
bodies and the changing seasons. In the
- RepublicPlato's purpose is to predict and encourage a
+ RepublicPlato’s purpose is to predict and encourage a
purely mathematical astronomy and the indicate its place in the type
of education which he wishes to give his guardians. There is not the
slightest contradiction or change of opinion in the three passages
@@ -16993,7 +16993,7 @@
Republic. Their subject is the real astronomer
who, using the stars only as “diagrams” or patterns (529 D), seeks
to learn a higher exacter mathematical truth than mere observation
- could yield. Madvig's ZHTH/SEI
+ could yield. Madvig’s ZHTH/SEI
implies a like view of the meaning but smooths out the construction.
But my interpretation of the passage as a whole does not depend on
this construction. If we make ZHTEI=N depend on A)/TOPON(neuter)H(GH/SETAI, the meaning will be that he thinks it
@@ -17005,13 +17005,13 @@
you.” “It is by means of problems,That is just what the mathematical astronomy of
today does, and it is a POLLAPLA/SION
E)/RGON compared with the merely observational
- astronomy of Plato's day. Cf. the interesting remarks of Sir James
+ astronomy of Plato’s day. Cf. the interesting remarks of Sir James
Jeans, apudS. J. Woolf, Drawn from
- Life, p. 74: “The day is gone when the astronomer's work
+ Life, p. 74: “The day is gone when the astronomer’s work
is carried on only at the eyepiece of a telescope. Naturally,
observations must be made, but these must be recorded by men who are
- trained for that purpose, and I am not one of them,” etc. Adam's
- quotation of Browning's “Abt Vogler” in connection with this passage
+ trained for that purpose, and I am not one of them,” etc. Adam’s
+ quotation of Browning’s “Abt Vogler” in connection with this passage
will only confirm the opinion of those who regard Plato as a
sentimental enemy of science. then,” said I, “as in the study
of geometry, that we will pursue astronomy too, and
@@ -17024,7 +17024,7 @@
boutade has given great scandal. The Platonist,
we are told ad nauseam, deduces the world from his
inner consciousness. This is of course not true (Cf. Unity of
- Plato's Thought, p. 45). But Plato, like some lesser
+ Plato’s Thought, p. 45). But Plato, like some lesser
writers, loves to emphasize his thought by paradox and surprise, and
his postulation and of a mathematical astronomy required emphasis.
Cf. my Platonism and the History of Science, pp.
@@ -17041,7 +17041,7 @@
also Benn, Greek Philosophers, vol. i. pp. 173 and
327, Herrick, The Thinking Machine, p. 335, f. C. s.
Schiller, Plato and he Predecessors, p. 81: “ . . .
- that Plato's anti-empirical bias renders him profoundly
+ that Plato’s anti-empirical bias renders him profoundly
anti-scientific, and that his influence has always, openly or
subtly, counteracted and thwarted the scientific impulse, or at
least diverted it into unprofitable channels.” Dampier-Whetham,
@@ -17049,7 +17049,7 @@
great philosopher but in the history of experimental science he must
be counted a disaster.” Such statements disregard the entire context
of the Platonic passages they exploit, and take no account of
- Plato's purpose or of other passages which counteract his seemingly
+ Plato’s purpose or of other passages which counteract his seemingly
unscientific remarks. Equally unfair is the practice of comparing
Plato unfavorably with Aristotle in this respect, as Grote e.g.
frequently does (Cf. Aristotle, p. 233). Plato was an
@@ -17082,7 +17082,7 @@
little is known of him. “Pythagoreans” in later usage sometimes
means mystics, sometimes mathematical physicists, sometimes both.
Plato makes use of both traditions but is dominated by neither. For
- Erich Frank's recent book, Plato und die sogenannten
+ Erich Frank’s recent book, <title>Plato und die sogenannten
Pythagoreer, cf. my article in Class.
Phil. vol. xxiii. (1928) pp.
347 ff. The student of Plato will do well to turn the page when he
@@ -17114,7 +17114,7 @@
Or do you not know that they repeat the same procedure
in the case of harmoniesThis passage is often taken as another example
- of Plato's hostility to science and the experimental method. It is
+ of Plato’s hostility to science and the experimental method. It is
of course not that, but the precise interpretation is difficult.
Glaucon at first misapprehends (cf. p. 180, note a, on 529 A) and
gives an amusing description of the mere empiricist in music. But
@@ -17129,7 +17129,7 @@
loc., and E. Frank, Platon u. d. sog.
Pyth.,Anhang, on the history of Greek music. He
expresses surprise (p. 199) that Glaucon knows nothing of
- Pythagorean theories of music. Others use this to prove Socrates'
+ Pythagorean theories of music. Others use this to prove Socrates’
ignorance of music.? They transfer it to hearing and measure
audible concords and sounds against one another,This hints at the distinction
developed in the Politicus between relative
@@ -17167,7 +17167,7 @@
both preferring their ears to their minds.So Malebranche,
Entretiens sur la métaphysique, 3, x.: “Je pense
- que nous vous moquez de moi. C’est la raison et non les sens qu'il
+ que nous vous moquez de moi. C’est la raison et non les sens qu’il
faut consulter.”” “You,” said I, “are speaking of the
worthiesFor
XRHSTO/S in this ironical
@@ -17182,13 +17182,13 @@
PRA/GMATA PARE/XETE XORDAI=S;
on the pegs;
but—not to draw out the comparison with strokes of the plectrum and the
- musician's complaints of too responsive and too reluctant stringsThis also may
+ musician’s complaints of too responsive and too reluctant stringsThis also may
suggest a reluctant and a too willing witness.—I drop the
figure,Cf. on
489 A, p. 23, note d. and tell you that I do not mean these
people, but those othersHe distinguishes from the pure empirics just
satirized those who apply their mathematics only to the data of
- observation. This is perhaps one of Plato's rare errors. For though
+ observation. This is perhaps one of Plato’s rare errors. For though
there may be in some sense a Kantian a priori
mechanics of astronomy, there can hardly be a purely a
priori mathematics of acoustics. What numbers are
@@ -17239,7 +17239,7 @@
Euthyd. 290 C. Though mathematics quicken the
mind of the student, it is, apart from metaphysics, a matter of
common experience that mathematicians are not necessarily good
- reasoners on other subjects. Jowett's wicked jest, “I have hardly
+ reasoners on other subjects. Jowett’s wicked jest, “I have hardly
ever known a mathematician who could reason,” misled an eminent
professor of education who infers that Plato disbelieved in “mental
discipline” (Yale Review,July 1917). Cf. also Taylor, Note in Reply to Mr. A. W. Benn,
@@ -17248,7 +17248,7 @@
“ . . . a training in the mathematics may produce exactness of
thought . . . provided that the training is of such a kind as to
inculcate an ideal which the pupil values and strives to attain.
- Failing this, Glaucon's observation that he had ‘hardly ever known a
+ Failing this, Glaucon’s observation that he had ‘hardly ever known a
mathematician who was capable of reasoning’ is likely to be
repeated.” On the text cf. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii.
pp. 384-385, and Adam ad loc.? “ “No, by Zeus,” he said,
@@ -17314,7 +17314,7 @@
he said. “What, then, will you not call this progress of thought
dialectic?” “Surely.” “And the release from bonds,” I said, “and the
conversion from the shadows to the images
- EI)/DWLA: cf. my Idea of Good in Plato's
+ <foreign xml:lang="grc">EI)/DWLA</foreign>: cf. my <title>Idea of Good in Plato’s
Republic, p. 238; also 516 A, Theaet. 150
C, Soph. 240 A, 241 E, 234 C, 266 B with 267 C, and
Rep. 517 DA)GALMA/TWN. that cast them and to the light
@@ -17325,11 +17325,11 @@
world illumined by the sun, not by the fire in the cave. and
there the persisting inabilitySee crit. note. The text of Iamblichus is the
only reasonable one. The reading of the manuscripts is impossible.
- For the adverb modifying a noun cf. 558 BOU)D' O(PWSTIOU=N SMIKROLOGI/A, Laws
+ For the adverb modifying a noun cf. 558 BOU)D’ O(PWSTIOU=N SMIKROLOGI/A, Laws
638 BSFO/DRA GUNAIKW=N, with
- England's note, Theaet. 183 EPA/NU PRESBU/THS, Laws 791 CPANTELW=S PAI/DWN, 698 CSFO/DRA FILI/A, Rep. 564
+ England’s note, Theaet. 183 EPA/NU PRESBU/THS, Laws 791 CPANTELW=S PAI/DWN, 698 CSFO/DRA FILI/A, Rep. 564
AA)/GAN DOULEI/AN, with
- Stallbaum's note. to look directly at animals and plants and
+ Stallbaum’s note. to look directly at animals and plants and
the light of the sun,
@@ -17353,8 +17353,8 @@
in the corporeal and visible region.” “I accept this,”
he said, “as the truth; and yet it appears to me very hard to accept,
and again, from another point of view, hard to reject.This sentence is
- fundamental for the understanding of Plato's metaphysical philosophy
- generally. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 30, n.
+ fundamental for the understanding of Plato’s metaphysical philosophy
+ generally. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 30, n.
192, What Plato Said, p. 268 and 586 on
Parmen. 135 C. So Tennyson says it is hard to
believe in God and hard not to believe. Nevertheless, since
@@ -17383,7 +17383,7 @@
in a page or a chapter. They can only be suggested to the
intelligent, whose own experience will help them to understand. As
the Republic and Laws entire explain
- Plato's idea of social good, so all the arguments in the dialogues
+ Plato’s idea of social good, so all the arguments in the dialogues
illustrate his conception of fair and unfair argument. Cf.
What Plato Said,Index
s.v.Dialectics, and note f below. though on my
@@ -17395,11 +17395,11 @@
would show you, no longer an image and symbol of my meaning, but the
very truth, as it appears to me—though whether rightly or not I may not
properly affirm.On
- Plato's freedom from the dogmatism often attributed to him Cf.
+ Plato’s freedom from the dogmatism often attributed to him Cf.
What Plato Said, p. 515 on Meno 86
B. But that something like this is what we have to see, I
must affirm.On
- Plato's freedom from the dogmatism often attributed to him Cf.
+ Plato’s freedom from the dogmatism often attributed to him Cf.
What Plato Said, p. 515 on Meno 86
B. Is not that so?” “Surely.” “And may we not also declare
that nothing less than the power of dialectics could revealThe mystical
@@ -17429,12 +17429,12 @@
an intelligent interlocutor at every step, and the habit of noting
all relevant distinctions, divisions, and ambiguities, in ideas and
terms. When the interlocutor is used merely to relieve the strain on
- the leader's voice or the reader's attention, as in some of the
+ the leader’s voice or the reader’s attention, as in some of the
later dialogues, dialectic becomes merely a literary
form.:
- that there is any other way of inquiryCicero's “via et
+ that there is any other way of inquiryCicero’s “via et
ratione.”PERI\ PANTO/S is
virtually identical with AU)TOU= GE
E(KA/STOU PE/RI. It is true that the scientific
@@ -17467,7 +17467,7 @@
really known,The
touch of humor is the expression may be illustrated by Lucian,
Hermotimus 74, where it is used to justify
- Lucian's skepticism even of mathematics, and by Hazlitt's remark on
+ Lucian’s skepticism even of mathematics, and by Hazlitt’s remark on
Coleridge, “Excellent talker if you allow him to start from no
premises and come to no conclusion.” what possibility is
there that assentOr “admission.” Plato thinks of even geometrical reasoning as a
@@ -17496,17 +17496,17 @@
in the barbaric sloughOrphism pictured the impious souls as buried in
- mud in the world below; cf. 363 D. Again we should not press Plato's
+ mud in the world below; cf. 363 D. Again we should not press Plato’s
rhetoric and imagery either as sentimental Platonists or hostile
critics. See Newman, Introd. Aristot.Pol. p. 463, n.
3. of the Orphic myth, dialectic gently draws it forth and
leads it up, employing as helpers and co-operators in this conversion
the studies and sciences which we enumerated, which we called sciences
often from habit,All writers and philosophers are compelled to “speak with the
- vulgar.” Cf. e.g. Meyerson, De l'explication dans les
+ vulgar.” Cf. e.g. Meyerson, <title>De l’explication dans les
sciences, i. p. 329: “Tout en sachant que la couleur
- n'est pas réellement une qualité de l'object, à se servir cependant,
- dans la vie de tous les jours, d'une locution qui l'affirme.”
+ n’est pas réellement une qualité de l’object, à se servir cependant,
+ dans la vie de tous les jours, d’une locution qui l’affirme.”
though they really need some other designation, connoting more clearness
than opinion and more obscurity than science. ‘Understanding,’Cf. on 511 D, pp.
116-117, note c. I believe, was the term we employed. But I
@@ -17542,18 +17542,18 @@
states) are set, or to which they apply.” and the division
into two parts of each of these, the opinable, namely, and the
intelligible, let us dismiss,There are two probable reasons for this: (1) The
- objective classification is nothing to Plato's present purpose; (2)
+ objective classification is nothing to Plato’s present purpose; (2)
The second member of the proportion is lacking in the objective
correlates. Numbers are distinguished from ideas not in themselves
but only by the difference of method in dialectics and in
- mathematics. Cf. on 525 D, 526 A, Unity of Plato's
+ mathematics. Cf. on 525 D, 526 A, <title>Unity of Plato’s
Thought, pp. 83-84, and Class. Phil.
xxii. (1927) pp. 213-218. The explicit
qualifications of my arguments there have been neglected and the
arguments misquoted but not answered. They can be answered only by
assuming the point at issue and affirming that Plato did assign an
intermediate place to mathematical conceptions, for which there is
- no evidence in Plato's own writings. Glaucon, lest it involve
+ no evidence in Plato’s own writings. Glaucon, lest it involve
us in discussion many times as long as the preceding.”
@@ -17583,7 +17583,7 @@
to proceed Socrates sometimes continues the argument himself by
supplying both question and answer, e.g.Gorg. 506 C
ff. Cf. further Phaedrus 278 C,
- Parman. 136 D-E, Unity of Plato's
+ <title>Parman. 136 D-E, Unity of Plato’s
Thought, p. 17. of all tests, and striving to
examine everything by essential reality and not by opinion, hold on his
way through all this without trippingCf. Theaet. 160 D,
@@ -17709,7 +17709,7 @@
Phil. xii. (1917) pp. 308-310.
Cf. too the proverbial U(=S
GNOI/H, Laches 196 D and
- Rivals 134 A; and Apelt's emendation of
+ Rivals 134 A; and Apelt’s emendation of
Cratyl. 393 C, Progr. Jena,1905, p. 19.”
@@ -17754,7 +17754,7 @@
“I forgot,” said I, “that we were jesting,Jest and earnest are
- never far apart in Plato. Fabling about justice is an old man's
+ never far apart in Plato. Fabling about justice is an old man’s
game, Laws 685 A, 769 A. Life itself is best treated
as play, Laws 803 C. Science in Tim.
59 D is PAIDIA/, like literature
@@ -17767,15 +17767,15 @@
Aristoph.Clouds 969. For, while speaking,
I turned my eyes upon philosophy,Cf. Isoc.Busiris 49. Whatever the
difficulties of the chronology it is hard to believe that this is
- not one of Isocrates' many endeavors to imitate Platonic
+ not one of Isocrates’ many endeavors to imitate Platonic
effects. and when I saw how she is undeservedly reviled, I
was revolted, and, as if in anger, spoke too earnestly to those who are
in fault.” “No, by Zeus, not too earnestly for meCf. Soph. 226 C,
Sophocles, Ajax 397. as a hearer.” “But too
much so for me as a speaker,” I said. “But this we must not forget, that
in our former selection we chose old men, but in this one that will not
- do. For we must not take Solon's
- GHRA/SKW D' A)EI\ POLLA\
+ do. For we must not take Solon’s
+ GHRA/SKW D’ A)EI\ POLLA\
DIDASKO/MENOS, “I grow old ever learning many things.”
Cf. Laches 188 A-B; Otto, p. 317. word for it
@@ -17862,7 +17862,7 @@
puts it, the metaphysician is a ‘synoptical’ man.” Cf. also
Aristot.Soph. El. 167 a 38DIA\ TO\ MH\ DU/NASQAI SUNORA=N TO\ TAU)TO\N KAI\ TO\
E(/TERON. Stenzel, Dialektik, misuses
- the passage to support the view that Plato's dialectic still looks
+ the passage to support the view that Plato’s dialectic still looks
for unity and not for divisions and distinctions, as in the
Sophist. Cf. also ibid.
p.72. of their affinities with one another and with the
@@ -17899,7 +17899,7 @@
discussions. In fact, the still later Sophist, 230
B-C-D, is more friendly to youthful dialectics. Whatever the effect
of the practice of Socrates or the Sophists, Plato himself
- anticipates Grote's criticism in the Republic by
+ anticipates Grote’s criticism in the Republic by
representing Socrates as discoursing with ingenuous youth in a more
simple and edifying style. Cf. Lysis 207 D ff.,
Euthydem. 278 E-282 C, 288 D-290 D. Yet again the
@@ -17957,8 +17957,8 @@
the truth of poetry from the facts of history. But what is
the pertinency of this comparison to the novices of dialecticThat is the meaning.
Lit. “those who lay hold on discourse.”?” “It is this. We
- have, I take it, certain convictionsPlato's warning apples to our day no less than
- to his own. Like the proponents of ethical nihilism in Plato's
+ have, I take it, certain convictionsPlato’s warning apples to our day no less than
+ to his own. Like the proponents of ethical nihilism in Plato’s
Athens, much of our present-day literature and teaching questions
all standards of morality and aesthetics, and confuses justice and
injustice, beauty and ugliness. Cf. also on 537 D, p. 220, note
@@ -18048,10 +18048,10 @@
consents to examine truth dialectically than the one who makes a
jestCf.
Gorg. 500 B-C. Yet the prevailing seriousness of
- Plato's own thought does not exclude touches of humor and irony, and
+ Plato’s own thought does not exclude touches of humor and irony, and
he vainly warns the modern reader to distinguish between jest and
earnest in the drama of disputation in his dialogues. Many
- misinterpretations of Plato's thought are due to the failure to heed
+ misinterpretations of Plato’s thought are due to the failure to heed
this warning. Cf. e.g .Gorgias 474 A (What
Plato Said, p. 504), which Robin, L’Année
Philos. xxi. p. 29, and others miss, Rep.
@@ -18102,7 +18102,7 @@
- or whether they will flinch and swerve.Cf.U(POKINH/SANT',
+ or whether they will flinch and swerve.Cf.U(POKINH/SANT’,
Aristoph.Frogs 643.” “How much time do you
allow for that?” he said. “Fifteen years,” said I, “and at the age of
fiftyAn
@@ -18127,9 +18127,9 @@
turn,Cf. 520
D. devoting the greater part of their time to the study of
philosophy, but when the turn comes for each, toiling in the service of
- the state and holding office for the city's sake, regarding the task not
+ the state and holding office for the city’s sake, regarding the task not
as a fine thing but a necessityCf. 347 C-D, 520 E.; and so, when each
- generation has educated othersPlato's guardians, unlike Athenian statesmen,
+ generation has educated othersPlato’s guardians, unlike Athenian statesmen,
could train their successors. Cf. Protag. 319 E-320
B, Meno 99 B. Also A)/LLOUS
POIEI=N
@@ -18310,7 +18310,7 @@
corresponding types of men, in order that when we had seen them all and
come to an agreement about the best and the worst man, we might
determine whether the best is the happiest and the worst most wretched
- or whether it is otherwise.Plato's main point again. Cf. 545 A, 484 A-B and
+ or whether it is otherwise.Plato’s main point again. Cf. 545 A, 484 A-B and
Vol. I. p.xii, note d. And when I was asking what were
@@ -18340,7 +18340,7 @@
1265 b 32, Xen.Mem. iii. 5.
15. yourH( . . . AU)/TH, “ista.” Cf.
- Midsummer Night's Dream,I. ii.ad
+ <title>Midsummer Night’s Dream,I. ii.ad
fin. and Gorg. 502 B, 452 E.
Cretan and Spartan constitution; and the second in place and in honor,
that which is called oligarchy, a constitution teeming with many ills,
@@ -18443,17 +18443,17 @@
Social Science,” edited by Stuart A. Rice, p. 289: “ . . . there was
a widely spread belief in an earlier ‘golden age’ of simplicity,
which had been followed by a degeneration and decay of the human
- race. Plato's theory of degradation set forth a gradual
+ race. Plato’s theory of degradation set forth a gradual
deterioration through the successive stages of timocracy, oligarchy,
democracy and despotism. The Greek theory of ‘cycles,’ with its
endless, monotonous iteration, excluded the possibility of permanent
- advance or ‘progress.'” Kurt Singer, Platon der
+ advance or ‘progress.’” Kurt Singer, <title>Platon der
Gründer, p. 141, says that the timocratic state reminds
one of late Sparta, the democratic of Athens after Pericles, the
oligarchic is related to Corinth, and the tyrannical has some
Syracusan features. Cicero, De div. ii., uses this
book of the Republic to console himself for the
- revolutions in the Roman state, and Polybius's theory of the natural
+ revolutions in the Roman state, and Polybius’s theory of the natural
succession of governments is derived from it, with modifications
(Polyb. vi. 4. 6 ff. Cf. vi. 9. 10 AU(/TH
POLITEIW=N A)NAKU/KLWSIS). Aristotle objects that in a
@@ -18497,13 +18497,13 @@
10O(MONOOU=SA DE\ O)LIGARXI/A OU)K
EU)DIA/FQOROS E)C AU(TH=S, 1302 a 10 Polybius, Teubner, vol. ii. p. 298 (vi. 57).
Newman, Aristot.Pol. i. p. 521, says that Aristotle
- “does not remark on Plato's observation . . . though he cannot have
+ “does not remark on Plato’s observation . . . though he cannot have
agreed with it.” Cf. Halévy, Notes et souvenirs, p.
- 153 “l'histoire est là pour démontrer clairement que, depuis un
- siècle, not gouvernements n'ont jamais été renversés que par
+ 153 “l’histoire est là pour démontrer clairement que, depuis un
+ siècle, not gouvernements n’ont jamais été renversés que par
eux-mêmes”; Bergson, Les Deux Sources de la morale et de la
- religion, p. 303: “Mais l'instinct résiste. Il ne
- commence à céder que lorsque Ia classe supérieure elle-même l'y
+ religion, p. 303: “Mais l’instinct résiste. Il ne
+ commence à céder que lorsque Ia classe supérieure elle-même l’y
invite.” when dissension arises in that, but so long as it is
at one with itself, however small it be, innovation is impossible?”
“Yes, that is so.” “How, then, Glaucon,” I said, “will disturbance arise
@@ -18546,7 +18546,7 @@
the men you have bred to be your rulers will not for
all their wisdom ascertain by reasoning combined with sensation,Cf.
- Tim. 28 ADO/CH| MET'
+ Tim. 28 ADO/CH| MET’
AI)SQH/SEWS. but they will escape them, and
there will be a time when they will beget children out of season. Now
for divine begettings there is a period comprehended by a perfect
@@ -18583,7 +18583,7 @@
note in Class. Phil. xxiii. (1928) pp. 285-287. into the powers of their
fathers, will first as guardians begin to neglect us, paying too little
heed to musicThis
- does not indicate a change in Plato's attitude toward music, as has
+ does not indicate a change in Plato’s attitude toward music, as has
been alleged. and then to gymnastics, so that our young men
will deteriorate in their culture; and the rulers selected from
them
@@ -18594,7 +18594,7 @@
- Hesiod's and our races of gold, silver, bronze and
+ Hesiod’s and our races of gold, silver, bronze and
iron.Cf. 415
A-B. And this intermixture of the iron with the silver and
the bronze with the gold will engender unlikenessCf. Theaet. 159
@@ -18654,7 +18654,7 @@
to admit clever men to office, since the men it has of
- this kind are no longer simpleCf. 397 E, Isoc. ii. 46A(PLOU=S D' H(GOU=NTAI TOU\S NOU=N OU)K E)/XONTAS.
+ this kind are no longer simpleCf. 397 E, Isoc. ii. 46A(PLOU=S D’ H(GOU=NTAI TOU\S NOU=N OU)K E)/XONTAS.
Cf. the psychology of Thucyd. iii. 83. and strenuous but of
mixed strain, and in its inclining rather to the more high-spirited and
simple-minded type, who are better suited for war
@@ -18674,7 +18674,7 @@
treasuries where they may hide them away, and also the enclosuresCf.
Laws 681 A, Theaet. 174 E.
of their homes, literal private love-nests
- NEOTTIA/S suggests Horace's ‘tu nidum servas” (Epist.
+ NEOTTIA/S suggests Horace’s ‘tu nidum servas” (Epist.
i. 10.6). Cf also Laws 776 A. in which they
can lavish their wealth on their womenCf. Laws 806 A-C, 637 B-C,
Aristot.Pol.
@@ -18686,9 +18686,9 @@
and any others they please with great expenditure.”
“Most true,” he said. “And will they not be stingy about money, since
they prize it and are not allowed to possess it openly, prodigal of
- others' wealth
+ others’ wealthFILANALWTAI/, though
- different, suggests Sallust's “alieni appetens sui profusus”
+ different, suggests Sallust’s “alieni appetens sui profusus”
(Cat. 5). Cf. Cat. 52 “publice
egestatem, privatim opulentiam.” because of their appetites,
enjoyingCf.
@@ -18696,7 +18696,7 @@
Phaedr. 251 E. their pleasures stealthily,
and running away from the law as boys from a father,Cf.
Aristot.Pol.
- 1270 b 34 with Newman's note; and
+ 1270 b 34 with Newman’s note; and
Euthyphro 2 C “tell his mother the state.”
since they have not been educated by persuasionCf. Laws 720 D-E.
This is not inconsistent with Polit. 293 A, where the
@@ -18716,7 +18716,7 @@
MO/NON, misunderstood and emended by ApeIt, is colored
by an idea of Anaxagoras expressed by Lucretius i. 877-878: “illud
Apparere unum cuius sint plurima mixta. Anaxag. Fr.
- 12. Diels 1.3, p. 405A)LL' O(/TWN PLEI=STA
+ 12. Diels 1.3, p. 405A)LL’ O(/TWN PLEI=STA
E)/NI, TAU=TA E)NDHLO/TATA E(\N E(/KASTON E)STI KAI\
H)=N. Cf. Phaedr. 238 A,
Cratyl. 393 misunderstood by Dümmler and emended
@@ -18795,8 +18795,8 @@
said I, “blended with culture,The Greek words LO/GOS and MOUSIKH/
are untranslatable. Cf. also 560 B. For MOUSIKH/ cf. 546 D. Newman i. p. 414 fancies that his
is a return to the position of Book IV. from the disparagement of
- music in 522 A. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 4 on
- this supposed ABA development of Plato's opinions. which is
+ music in 522 A. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 4 on
+ this supposed ABA development of Plato’s opinions. which is
the only indwelling preserver of virtue throughout life in the soul that
possesses it.” “Well said,” he replied. “This is the character,” I said,
“of the timocratic youth, resembling the city that bears his name.” “By
@@ -18804,7 +18804,7 @@
“His origin
- DE/ G' marks
+ DE/ G’ marks
the transition from the description of the type to its origin. Cf.
547 E, 553 C, 556 B, 557 B, 560 D, 561 E, 563 B, 566 E. Ritter, pp.
69-70, comments on its frequency in this book, but does not note the
@@ -18816,7 +18816,7 @@
TIMA=SQAI, Isoc.Antid. 227A)PRAGMONESTA/TOUS ME\N O)/NTAS E)N TH=|
PO/LEI. Cf.POLUPRAGMOSU/NH444 B, 434 B,
Isoc.Antid. 48, Peace 108,30, and
- 26, with Norlin's note (Loeb). Cf. also
+ 26, with Norlin’s note (Loeb). Cf. also
Aristoph.Knights 261. and is willing to
forbear something of his rightsE)LATTOU=SQAI
@@ -18862,12 +18862,12 @@
- with which womenCf. Phaedo 60 A. For Plato's
+ with which womenCf. Phaedo 60 A. For Plato’s
attitude towards women Cf. What Plato Said, p. 632,
on Laws 631 D. nagU(MNEI=N. Cf. Euthydem. 296 D,
Soph.Ajax 292. Commentators have been troubled by
- the looseness of Plato's style in this sentence. Cf. Wilamowitz,
+ the looseness of Plato’s style in this sentence. Cf. Wilamowitz,
Platon, ii. p. 385. in such cases.” “Many
indeed,” said Adeimantus, “and after their kind.Cf. Aristoph.Thesm.
167O(/MOIA GA\R POIEI=N A)NA/GKH TH=|
@@ -18888,11 +18888,11 @@
affairsCf.
What Plato Said, p. 480, on Charm.
161 B. in the city are spoken of as simpletons and are held
- in slight esteem, while meddlers who mind other people's affairs are
+ in slight esteem, while meddlers who mind other people’s affairs are
honored and praised. Then it isTO/TE DH/ cf.
551 A, 566 C, 330 E, 573 A, 591 A, Phaedo 85 A, 96 B
- and D, Polit. 272 E. Cf. also TO/T' H)/DH, on 565 C. that the youth, hearing
+ and D, Polit. 272 E. Cf. also TO/T’ H)/DH, on 565 C. that the youth, hearing
and seeing such things, and on the other hand listening to the words of
his father, and with a near view of his pursuits contrasted with those
of other men, is solicited by both, his father
@@ -18904,12 +18904,12 @@
the appetitive and the passionateFor these three principles of the soul cf. on
435 A ff., 439 D-E ff., 441 A.; and as he is not by nature of
a bad disposition but has fallen into evil communications,Cf. the fragment of
- Menander,FQEI/ROUSIN H)/QH XRH/SQ'
+ Menander,FQEI/ROUSIN H)/QH XRH/SQ’
O(MILI/AI KAKAI/, quoted in 1Cor. xv.
33 (Kock, C.A.F. iii. No. 218). Cf. also
Phaedr. 250 AU(PO/ TINWN
O(MILIW=N, Aesch.Seven Against Thebes
- 599E)/SQ' O(MILI/AS KAKH=S KA/KION
+ 599E)/SQ’ O(MILI/AS KAKH=S KA/KION
OU)DE/N. under these two solicitations he comes
to a compromiseCf.
p. 249, note f. and turns over the government in his
@@ -18928,7 +18928,7 @@
of another champion before another gate,’
Aesch. Seven 451
- le/g' a)/llon a)/llais e)n pu/lais
+ le/g’ a)/llon a)/llais e)n pu/lais
ei)lhxo/ta. or rather, in accordance with our
plan,Cf.
Laws 743 C, and Class. Phil. ix.
@@ -19022,7 +19022,7 @@
Euthydem. 291 D. of ships in this way, by
property qualification, and not allowStallbaum says that E)PITRE/POI is used absolutely as in 575 D,
Symp. 213 E, Lysis 210 B, etc.
- Similarly Latin permitto. Cf. Shorey on Jowett's
+ Similarly Latin permitto. Cf. Shorey on Jowett’s
translation of Meno 92 A-B, A. J. P.
xiii. p. 367. See too Diog. L. i. 65. a poor man to navigate,
even if he were a better pilot.” “A sorry voyage they would make of it,”
@@ -19160,7 +19160,7 @@
this wise?” “How?” “When a son born to the timocratic man at first
emulates his father, and follows in his footstepsCf. 410 B, Homer Od.
xix. 436I)/XNH E)REUNW=NTOS, ii.
- 406, iii. 30, v. 193, vii. 38MET' I)/XNIA
+ 406, iii. 30, v. 193, vii. 38MET’ I)/XNIA
BAI=NE. and then sees him
@@ -19182,7 +19182,7 @@
“And the son, my friend, after seeing and suffering these things, and
losing his property, grows timid, I fancy, and forthwith thrusts
headlongCf.
- Herod. vii. 136. from his bosom's throneCf. Aesch.Ag. 983.
+ Herod. vii. 136. from his bosom’s throneCf. Aesch.Ag. 983.
Cf. 550 B.
@@ -19192,7 +19192,7 @@
greedilyFor
GLI/SXRWS cf. on 488 A,
Class. Phil. iv. p. 86 on Diog. L. iv. 59,
- Aelian, Epist. Rust. 18GLI/SXRWS TE KAI\ KAT' O)LI/GON. and stingily
+ Aelian, Epist. Rust. 18GLI/SXRWS TE KAI\ KAT’ O)LI/GON. and stingily
and little by little by thrift and hard work collects property. Do you
not suppose that such a one will then establish on that throne the
principle of appetite and avarice, and set it up as the great king in
@@ -19215,7 +19215,7 @@
Christian Ethics, p. 220: “The Times obituary
notice of Holloway (of the pills) will suffice. ‘Money-making is an
art by itself; it demands for success the devotion of the whole
- man,'” etc. For the phrase SKOPEI=N
+ man,’” etc. For the phrase SKOPEI=N
O(PO/QEN cf. Isoc.Areop. 83,
Panegyr. 133-134SKOPEI=N
E)C W(=N. and the other to admire and honor
@@ -19424,7 +19424,7 @@
Laws 742 C, 849 E, 915 E, and Newman ii. p. 254
on Aristot.Pol.1263 b 21. should be at the
- contractor's risk,
+ contractor’s risk,
the pursuit of wealth would be less shameless in the
@@ -19476,7 +19476,7 @@
one will pass the word to another ‘our men are good for
nothing’?” “Nay, I know very well that they do,” said he. “And just as
an unhealthy body requires but a slight impulseCf. Soph.O. T.
- 961SMIKRA\ PALAI=A SW/MAT' EU)NA/ZEI
+ 961SMIKRA\ PALAI=A SW/MAT’ EU)NA/ZEI
R(OPH/” a slight impulse puts aged bodies to sleep,”
Demosth.Olynth. ii. 9 and 21. Cf. 544 E.
from outside to fall into sickness, and sometimes, even without that,
@@ -19531,7 +19531,7 @@
and is not the city chock-full of liberty and freedom of speech? and has
not every man licenceE)COUSI/A: cf.
- Isoc. xii. 131TH\N D' E)COUSI/AN O(/ TI
+ Isoc. xii. 131TH\N D’ E)COUSI/AN O(/ TI
BOU/LETAI TIS POIEI=N EU)DAIMONI/AN. Cf. Arnold,
Culture and Anarchy, chap. ii. Doing as One
Likes. to do as he likes?” “So it is said,” he replied. “And
@@ -19552,7 +19552,7 @@
BARBA/RWN; and Laws 681 D. Libby,
Introduction to History of Science, p. 273, says
“Arnold failed in his analysis of American civilization to confirm
- Plato's judgement concerning the variety of natures to be found in
+ Plato’s judgement concerning the variety of natures to be found in
the democratic state.” De Tocqueville also, and many English
observers, have commented on the monotony and standardization of
American life. and conditions of men,
@@ -19564,7 +19564,7 @@
hues, so this, decked and diversified with every type of character,
would appear the most beautiful. And perhaps,” I said, “many would judge
it to be the most beautiful, like boys and womenFor the idea that women and children
- like many colors cf. Sappho's admiration for Jason's mantle mingled
+ like many colors cf. Sappho’s admiration for Jason’s mantle mingled
with all manner of colors (Lyr. Graec. i. 196). For
the classing together of women and boys Cf. Laws 658
D, Shakes.As You Like It,III. ii. 435 “As boys and
@@ -19642,7 +19642,7 @@
democracy,
- its superiorityFor OU)D' O(PWSTIOU=N
+ its superiorityFor OU)D’ O(PWSTIOU=N
SMIKROLOGI/A cf. on 532 BE)/TI
A)DUNAMI/A. to all our meticulous requirements,
its disdain or our solemn
@@ -19650,7 +19650,7 @@
here has an ironical or colloquial tone—“high-brow,”
“top-lofty.” pronouncementsCf. 401 B-C, 374 C and on 467 A,
Laws 643 B, Delacroix, Psychologie de
- l'art, p. 46. made when we were founding our
+ l’art, p. 46. made when we were founding our
city, that except in the case of transcendentFor U(PERBEBLHME/NH Cf. Laws 719 D,
Eurip.Alcest. 153. natural gifts no one
could ever become a good man unless from childhood his play and all his
@@ -19696,7 +19696,7 @@
oligarchical man
- would have a son bred in his father's ways.” “Why not?”
+ would have a son bred in his father’s ways.” “Why not?”
“And he, too, would control by force all his appetites for pleasure that
are wasters and not winners of wealth, those which are denominated
unnecessary.” “Obviously.” “And in order not to argue in the dark, shall
@@ -19742,7 +19742,7 @@
KOLAZOME/NH cf. 571 B,
Gorg. 505 B, 491 E, 507 D. For the thought cf.
also 519 A-B. and training from youth up can be got rid of in
- most cases and is harmful to the body and a hindrance to the soul's
+ most cases and is harmful to the body and a hindrance to the soul’s
attainment of
@@ -19804,17 +19804,17 @@
C. Cf. also Protag. 330 A, Gorg. 450
C, Laws 626 E, Eurip.Hec.1185-1186. expelled, and a
- sense of awe and reverence grows up in the young man's soul and order is
+ sense of awe and reverence grows up in the young man’s soul and order is
restored.” “That sometimes happens,” he said. “And sometimes, again,
another brood of desires akin to those expelled
are stealthily nurtured to take their place, owing to
- the father's ignorance of true education, and wax numerous and strong.”
+ the father’s ignorance of true education, and wax numerous and strong.”
“Yes, that is wont to be the way of it.” “And they tug and pull back to
the same associations and in secret intercourse engender a multitude.”
“Yes indeed.” “And in the end, I suppose, they seize the citadelCf.
- Tim. 90 A. of the young man's soul,
+ Tim. 90 A. of the young man’s soul,
finding it empty and unoccupied by studies and honorable pursuits and
true discourses, which are the best watchmen
@@ -19906,7 +19906,7 @@
DH/ cf. 562 D, 563 B, 563 D,
374 B, 420 E and on 562 E, p. 307, note h. and so lives
turning over the guard-houseCf. Phaedr. 241 AMETABALW\N A)/LLON A)/RXONTA E)N
- AU(TW=|. For this type of youth Cf. Thackeray's Barnes
+ AU(TW=|. For this type of youth Cf. Thackeray’s Barnes
Newcome. For the lot Cf. supra, p. 285, note d, on
557 A. of his soul to each as it happens along until it is
sated, as if it had drawn the lot for that office, and then in turn to
@@ -19937,7 +19937,7 @@
Eur.I. T. 367. Cf. also Philetaerus,
Philaulus, fr. 18, Kock ii. p. 235,
Eur.fr. 187. 3MOLPAI=SI
- D' H(SQEI\S TOU=T' A)EI\ QHREU/ETAI. For the type cf.
+ D’ H(SQEI\S TOU=T’ A)EI\ QHREU/ETAI. For the type cf.
Theophrastus, Char. 11, Aristoph.Wasps
1475 ff. and again drinking only water and dieting;
@@ -20022,7 +20022,7 @@
and for this reason that is the only city in which a
man of free spirit will care to live.Aristot.Pol.1263 b 29 says life would be impossible in
- Plato's Republic.
+ Plato’s Republic.” “Why, yes,” he replied,
“you hear that saying everywhere.” “Then, as I was about to
observe,
@@ -20118,7 +20118,7 @@
authoritative.” “By all means,” he said. “And the climax of popular
liberty, my friend,” I said, “is attained in such a city when the
purchased slaves, male and female, are no less freeCf. Xen.Rep. Ath. 1.
- 10.TW=N DOU/LWN D' AU)= KAI\ TW=N
+ 10.TW=N DOU/LWN D’ AU)= KAI\ TW=N
METOI/KWN PLEI/STH E)STI\N *)AQH/NHSIN A)KOLASI/A,
Aristoph.Clouds init., and on slavery
Laws 777 E, p. 249, note g on 547 C and 549
@@ -20135,7 +20135,7 @@
I said, “so I will. Without experience of it no one would believe how
much freer the very beastsCf. 562 E, Julian, Misopogon, 355
B . . .ME/XRI TW=N O)/NWN E)STI\N
- E)LEUQERI/A PAR' AU)TOI=S KAI\ TW=N KAMH/LWN; A)/GOUSI/ TOI KAI\
+ E)LEUQERI/A PAR’ AU)TOI=S KAI\ TW=N KAMH/LWN; A)/GOUSI/ TOI KAI\
TAU/TAS OI( MISQWTOI\ DIA\ TW=N STOW=N W(/SPER TA\S
NU/MFAS” . . . what great independence exists among
the citizens, even down to the very asses and camels? The men who
@@ -20156,7 +20156,7 @@
Epist. viii. 354 D, Gorg. 461 E;
Isoc.Areop. 20, Panath. 131,
Eurip.Cyclops 120A)KOU/EI
- D' OU)DE\N OU)DEI\S OU)DENO/S,
+ D’ OU)DE\N OU)DEI\S OU)DENO/S,
Aristot.Pol.1295 b 15 f. Plato, by reaction against the
excesses of the ultimate democracy, always satirizes the shibboleth
@@ -20168,7 +20168,7 @@
unwilling tribute of a hostile critic. In Gorg. 484 A
Callicles sneers at equality from the point of view of the superman.
Cf. also on 558 C, p. 291, note f; Hobbes, Leviathan
- xxi. and Theopompus's account of democracy in Byzantium,
+ xxi. and Theopompus’s account of democracy in <title>Byzantium,
fr. 65. Similar phenomena may be observed in an American
city street or Pullman club car.”
@@ -20271,7 +20271,7 @@
does not grow vigorous. But in a democracy this is the dominating class,
with rare exceptions, and the fiercest part of it makes speeches and
transacts business, and the remainder swarms and settles about the
- speaker's stand and keeps up a buzzingCf. 573 A. and
+ speaker’s stand and keeps up a buzzingCf. 573 A. and
tolerates
@@ -20331,7 +20331,7 @@
62, xviii. 20-21, Isoc.Areop. 32 ff.,
Peace 131, Dem.De cor. 105 ff., on
his triarchic law; and also Eurip.Herc. Fur.
- 588-592. to keep the lion's share for themselvesCf.
+ 588-592. to keep the lion’s share for themselvesCf.
Aristoph.Knights 717-718, 1219-1223, and Achilles in Il.
ix. 363.?” “Why, yes,” he said, “it shares
@@ -20343,20 +20343,20 @@
revolutionary designs, that they are plotting against the people, and it
is said that they are oligarchs.i.e. reactionaries. Cf. on 562 D, p. 306, note
b, Aeschines iii. 168, and 566 CMISO/DHMOS. The whole passage perhaps illustrates the
- “disharmony” between Plato's upperclass sympathies and his liberal
+ “disharmony” between Plato’s upperclass sympathies and his liberal
philosophy.” “Surely.” “And then finally, when they see the
people, not of its own willSo the Attic orators frequently say that a
popular jury was deceived. Cf. also Aristoph.Acharn.
515-516. but through misapprehension,Aristotle, Eth. Nic.1110 a 1, in his discussion of voluntary
and involuntary acts, says things done under compulsion or through
- misapprehension (DI' A)/GNOIAN)
+ misapprehension (DI’ A)/GNOIAN)
are involuntary. and being misled
by the calumniators, attempting to wrong them, why
then,For
- TO/T' H)\DH cf. 569 A,
+ TO/T’ H)\DH cf. 569 A,
Phaedo 87 E, Gorg. 527 D,
Laches 181 D, 184 A, and on 550 A, p. 259, note
i. whether they wish it or not,So Aristot.Pol.
@@ -20386,11 +20386,11 @@
1304 b 20 ff. and from nothing
else.” “Very plain.” “What, then, is the starting-point of the
transformation of a protector into a tyrant? Is it not obviously when
- the protector's acts begin to reproduce the legend that is told of the
+ the protector’s acts begin to reproduce the legend that is told of the
shrine of Lycaean Zeus in ArcadiaCf. Frazer on Pausanias viii. 2 (vol. iv. p.
- 189) and Cook's Zeus, vol. i. p. 70. The archaic
+ 189) and Cook’s Zeus, vol. i. p. 70. The archaic
religious rhetoric of what follows testifies to the intensity of
- Plato's feeling. Cf. the language of the Laws on
+ Plato’s feeling. Cf. the language of the Laws on
homicide, 865 ff.?” “What is that?” he said. “The story goes
that he who tastes of the one bit of human entrails minced up with those
of other victims
@@ -20420,7 +20420,7 @@
Les Idées politiques d’Isocrate, p. 150, who
refers to Andoc.De myst. 88, Plato,
Laws 684, Demosth.Against Timocr.
- 149 (heliastic oath), Michel, Recueil d'inscriptions
+ 149 (heliastic oath), Michel, <title>Recueil d’inscriptions
grecques,1317, the oath at Itanos.—is it not
the inevitable consequence and a decree of fateCf. 619 C. that such a one be
@@ -20464,7 +20464,7 @@
lie prostrate, ‘mighty with far-flung
limbs,’Hom. Il.
- 16.776 in Homeric overthrow,In Hom. Il. 16.776 Cebriones, Hector's charioteer, slain by
+ 16.776 in Homeric overthrow,In Hom. Il. 16.776 Cebriones, Hector’s charioteer, slain by
Patroclus,KEI=TO ME/GAS
MEGALWSTI/, “mighty in his mightiness.” (A. T. Murray,
Loeb tr.) but
@@ -20613,7 +20613,7 @@
citizen. Throughout the passage he is plainly thinking of
Plato.’ He meant evidently that these associates of the
tyrant are the wise.” “Yes, he and the other poets,” he said, “call the
- tyrant's power ‘likest God's’Cf. Vol. I. p. 119, note c,
+ tyrant’s power ‘likest God’s’Cf. Vol. I. p. 119, note c,
Eurip.Tro.1169, Isoc. ii. 5. and praise it in
many other ways.” “Wherefore,” said I, “being wise as they are, the
@@ -20650,7 +20650,7 @@
“But what when these resources failCf. 574 D, Diels1 p.
- 578, Anon. Iambl. 3.?” “Clearly,” he said, “his father's
+ 578, Anon. Iambl. 3.?” “Clearly,” he said, “his father’s
estate will have to support him and his wassailers, his fellows and his
she-fellows.” “I understand,” I said, “that the people which begot the
tyrantCf.
@@ -20694,7 +20694,7 @@
into the fireAs we say, “Out of the frying-pan into the
- fire.” Cf. Anth. Pal. ix. 17. 5E)K PURO\S W(S AI)=NOS 'PESES E)S
+ fire.” Cf. Anth. Pal. ix. 17. 5E)K PURO\S W(S AI)=NOS ’PESES E)S
FLO/GA, Theodoret, Therap. iii. p.
773KAI\ TO\N KAPNO\N KATA\ TH\N
PAROIMI/AN, W(S E)/OIKE, FU/GONTES, EI)S AU)TO\ DH\ TO\ PU=R
@@ -20752,22 +20752,22 @@
while in others the remnant is stronger and more
numerous.” “What desires do you mean?” he said. “Those,” said I, “that
are awakened in sleepCf. Aristot.Eth. Nic. 102 b 5
- ff.O( D' A)GAQO\S KAI\ KAKO\S H(/KISTA
- DIA/DHLOI KAQ' U(/PNON, etc.; also his
+ ff.O( D’ A)GAQO\S KAI\ KAKO\S H(/KISTA
+ DIA/DHLOI KAQ’ U(/PNON, etc.; also his
Problem. 957 a 21 ff. Cic.De
divin. i. 29 translates this passage. Cf. further Herod.
vi. 107, Soph.O.T. 981-982. Hazlitt writes “We are
not hypocrites in our sleep,” a modern novelist, “In sleep all
- barriers are down.” The Freudians have at last discovered Plato's
+ barriers are down.” The Freudians have at last discovered Plato’s
anticipation of their main thesis. Cf. Trotter, Instincts of
the Herd in Peace and War. p. 74: “It has been perhaps
- Freud's most remarkable thesis that dreams are manifestations of
+ Freud’s most remarkable thesis that dreams are manifestations of
this emergence of desires and memories from the unconscious into the
conscious field.” “The barriers of the Freudian unconscious are less
tightly closed during sleep” sententiously observes an eminent
modern psychologist. Cf. Valentine, The New Psychology of the
Unconscious, p. xiii. and ibid. p. 93:
- “Freud refers to Plato's view that the virtuous man does in actual
+ “Freud refers to Plato’s view that the virtuous man does in actual
life, but I believe he nowhere shows a knowledge of the following
passage in the Republic. . . . ” Cf.
ibid. p. 95: “The germ of several aspects of the
@@ -20786,7 +20786,7 @@
(Sandys, Loeb tr.) Cf. Pausan. ix. 23, Cic.De div. i.
30, Sir Thomas Browne, Religio Medici, pp. 105-107
(ed. J. A. Symonds). Plato did not share these superstitions. Cf.
- the irony of Tim. 71 D-E, and my review of Stewart's
+ the irony of Tim. 71 D-E, and my review of Stewart’s
“Myths of Plato,”Journal of Philos. Psychol. and Scientific
Methods, vol. iii., 1906, pp.
495-498. when the rest of the soul, the rational, gentle and
@@ -20806,14 +20806,14 @@
word, falls short of no extreme of follyFor the idiom OU)DE\N E)LLEI/PEI cf.
Soph.Trach. 90, Demosth. liv. 34. Cf. also 602 D
and on 593 A, p. 200, note b. and shamelessness.” “Most
- true,” he said. “But when, I suppose, a man's condition is healthy and
+ true,” he said. “But when, I suppose, a man’s condition is healthy and
sober, and he goes to sleep after arousing his rational part and
entertaining it with fair words and thoughts, and attaining to clear
self-consciousness, while he has neither starved
nor indulged to repletion his appetitive part, so that
- it may be lulled to sleepCf. Browning, Bishop Blougram's
+ it may be lulled to sleep<note anchored="true" resp="Loeb" place="unspecified">Cf. Browning, <title>Bishop Blougram’s
Apology, “And body gets its sop and holds its noise.”
Plato was no ascetic, as some have inferred from passages in the
Republic, Laws, Gorgias, and
@@ -20845,10 +20845,10 @@
the visions of his dreams are least likely to be
lawless.”This
- sentence contains 129 words. George Moore says, “Pater's complaint
- that Plato's sentences are long may be regarded as Pater's single
+ sentence contains 129 words. George Moore says, “Pater’s complaint
+ that Plato’s sentences are long may be regarded as Pater’s single
excursion into humor.” But Pater is in fact justifying his own long
- sentences by Plato's example. He calls this passage Plato's evening
+ sentences by Plato’s example. He calls this passage Plato’s evening
prayer. “I certainly think so,” he said. “This description
has carried us too far,Plato always returns to the point after a
digression. Cf. 543 C, 471 C, 544 B, 568 D, 588 B,
@@ -20859,7 +20859,7 @@
Lysias ii. 61A)LLA\
TAU=TA ME\N E)CH/XQHN, Demosth.De cor.
211, Aristot.De an. 403 b 16, also p. 193, note i,
- and Plato's carefulness in keeping to the point under discussion in
+ and Plato’s carefulness in keeping to the point under discussion in
353 C, Theaet. 182 C, 206 C, Meno 93
A-B, Gorg. 479 D-E, 459 C-D, etc. but the
point that we have to notice is this, that in fact there exists in every
@@ -20878,7 +20878,7 @@
display. Is not that so?” “Yes.” “And by association with more
sophisticated men, teeming with the appetites we have just described, he
is impelled towards every form of insolence and outrage, and to the
- adoption of their way of life by his hatred of his father's
+ adoption of their way of life by his hatred of his father’s
niggardliness. But since his nature is better than that of his
corrupters,
@@ -20924,7 +20924,7 @@
and Horace, Odes i. 31. 17 “frui paratis.”
appetites, a monstrous wingedCf. Alc. I. 135 EE)/RWTA U(PO/PTERON and the fragment of
Eubulus (fr. 41, Kock ii. p. 178): TI/S H)=N
- O( GRA/YAS PRW=TOS A)NQRW/PWN A)/RA H)\ KHROPLASTH/SAS *)/ERWQ'
+ O( GRA/YAS PRW=TOS A)NQRW/PWN A)/RA H)\ KHROPLASTH/SAS *)/ERWQ’
U(PO/PTERON drone. Or do you think the spirit
of desire in such men is aught else?” “Nothing but that,” he said. “And
@@ -21014,7 +21014,7 @@
his soul and robbed them, so he himself, though younger, will claim the
right to get the betterCf. Vol. I. 349 B f. of his father and
mother, and, after spending his own share, to seize and convert to his
- own use a portion of his father's estate.” “Of course,” he said, “what
+ own use a portion of his father’s estate.” “Of course,” he said, “what
else?” “And if they resist him,
@@ -21024,7 +21024,7 @@
sir, if the old man and the old woman clung to it and resisted him,
would he be careful to refrain from the acts of a tyrant?” “I am not
without my fears,” he said, “for the parents of such a one.” “Nay,
- Adeimantus, in heaven's name, do you suppose that, for the sake of a
+ Adeimantus, in heaven’s name, do you suppose that, for the sake of a
newly found belle amie bound to him by no necessary tie, such a one
would strike the dear mother,
@@ -21035,7 +21035,7 @@
his birth? Or for the sake of a blooming new-found bel ami, not
necessary to his life, he would rain blowsFor the idiom PLHGAI=S . . . DOU=NAI Cf.
Phaedr. 254 EO)DU/NAIS
- E)/DWKEN with Thompson's note. Cf. 566 CQANA/TW| DE/DOTAI. For striking his
+ E)/DWKEN with Thompson’s note. Cf. 566 CQANA/TW| DE/DOTAI. For striking his
father cf. 569 B, Laws 880 E ff.,
Aristoph.Clouds 1375 ff., 1421 ff. upon
the aged father past his prime, closest of his kin and oldest of his
@@ -21056,7 +21056,7 @@
(Aristoph.Frogs 772-773, Birds
497, Clouds1327). Cf. 575 B, Laws 831
- E. of someone's house or the cloak of someone who walks late
+ E. of someone’s house or the cloak of someone who walks late
at night, and thereafter he will make a clean sweepNEWKORH/SEI is an ironical litotes. So E)FA/YETAI in the preceding
line. of some temple, and in all these actions the beliefs
@@ -21085,7 +21085,7 @@
Phaedr. 239 C, Laws 837 B,
Soph.Antig. 790 and also Rep. 610
C and E. to dare anything and everything in order to find
- support for himself and the hubbub of his henchmen,For the tyrant's companions cf.
+ support for himself and the hubbub of his henchmen,For the tyrant’s companions cf.
Newman, i. p. 274, note 1. in part introduced from outside by
evil associations, and in part released and liberated within by the same
habits of life as his. Is not this the life of such a one?” “It is
@@ -21110,10 +21110,10 @@
matter.” he said, “if the men of this sort are few.” “Why,
yes,” I said, “for small evils are relatively small compared with great,
and in respect of the corruption and misery of a state all of them
- together, as the saying goes, don't come within hail
- OU)D' I)/KTAR BA/LLEI was proverbial,
- “doesn't strike near,” “doesn't come within range.” Cf. Aelian,
- N.A. xv. 29. Cf. also OU)D' E)GGU/S, Symp. 198 B, 221 D,
+ together, as the saying goes, don’t come within hail
+ OU)D’ I)/KTAR BA/LLEI was proverbial,
+ “doesn’t strike near,” “doesn’t come within range.” Cf. Aelian,
+ N.A. xv. 29. Cf. also OU)D’ E)GGU/S, Symp. 198 B, 221 D,
Herod. ii. 121, Demosth.De cor. 97. of the
mischief done by a tyrant. For when men of this sort and their followers
become numerous in a state and realize their numbers, then it is they
@@ -21135,9 +21135,9 @@
PATRI\S KAI\ MHTRI\S W(S *KRH=TES KALOU=SI. Vol. I. p.
303, note e, on 414 E, Menex. 239 A.—as the
Cretans name her—and fatherland. And this would be the end of such a
- man's desire.Cf.
- the accidental coincidence of Swinburne's refrain, “This is the end
- of every man's desire” (Ballad of Burdens).”
+ man’s desire.Cf.
+ the accidental coincidence of Swinburne’s refrain, “This is the end
+ of every man’s desire” (Ballad of Burdens).”
@@ -21193,8 +21193,8 @@
Phaedr. 277 EOU)DE\ A)\N
O( PA=S O)/XLOS AU)TO\ E)PAINE/SH|, and
Phileb. 67 B, also Gorg. 473 E
- “you say what nobody else would say,” and perhaps 500 DDIABOLH\ D' E)N PA=SI POLLH/. Cf.
- Schopenhauer's “The public has a great many bees in its
+ “you say what nobody else would say,” and perhaps 500 DDIABOLH\ D’ E)N PA=SI POLLH/. Cf.
+ Schopenhauer’s “The public has a great many bees in its
bonnet.”” “That much, certainly,” he said, “must needs be
true.” “Does not the tyrannical man,” said I, “correspond to the
tyrannical state in similitude,Cf. Tim. 75 D,
@@ -21239,7 +21239,7 @@
“to ask you to accept as the only proper judge of the
two men the one who is able in thought to enter with understanding into
the very soul and temper of a man, and who is not like a child viewing
- him from outside, overawed by the tyrants' great attendance,The word PROSTA/SEWS is frequent in Polybius.
+ him from outside, overawed by the tyrants’ great attendance,The word PROSTA/SEWS is frequent in Polybius.
Cf. also Boethius iv. chap. 2. Cf. 1Maccabees xv. 32,
“When he saw the glory of Simon, and the cupboard of gold and silver
plate, and his great attendance [PARA/STASIN].” Cf. also Isoc. ii. 32O)/YIN, and Shakes.Measure for
@@ -21264,7 +21264,7 @@
he would best be seen stripped<note anchored="true" resp="Loeb" place="unspecified">Cf. Thackeray on Ludovicus and Ludovicus rex,
Hazlitt, “Strip it of its externals and what is it but a jest?” also
<title>Gory. 523 E, Xen.Hiero 2. 4,
- Lucian, Somnium seu Gallus 24H)\N DE\ U(POKU/YAS I)/DH|S TA\ G' E)/NDON . . . ,
+ Lucian, Somnium seu Gallus 24H)\N DE\ U(POKU/YAS I)/DH|S TA\ G’ E)/NDON . . . ,
Boethius, Cons. iii. chap. 8 (Loeb, p. 255), and for
the thought Herod. i. 99. of his vesture of tragedy,Cf. Longinus,
On the Sublime 7TO\
@@ -21388,7 +21388,7 @@
For I think we must get a notion of the matter from
these examples.” “From which?” “From individual wealthy private citizens
in our states who possess many slaves. For these resemble the tyrant in
- being rulers over many, only the tyrant's numbers are greater.Cf.
+ being rulers over many, only the tyrant’s numbers are greater.Cf.
Polit. 259 B. But Plato is not concerned with the
question of size or numbers here.” “Yes, they are.” “You are
aware, then, that they are unafraid and do not fear their slaves?” “What
@@ -21398,13 +21398,13 @@
is ready to defend each citizen.” “You are right,” I
said. “But now suppose some god should catch up a man who has fifty or
- more slavesPlato's
+ more slavesPlato’s
imaginary illustration is one of his many anticipations of later
history, and suggests to an American many analogies. and waft
him with his wife and children away from the city and set him down with
his other possessions and his slaves in a solitude where no freeman
could come to his rescue. What and how great would be his fear,Cf. Critias,
- fr. 37 Diels ii.3 p. 324, on Sparta's fear of her
+ fr. 37 Diels ii.3 p. 324, on Sparta’s fear of her
slaves. do you suppose, lest he and his wife and children be
destroyed by the slaves?” “The greatest in the world,For E)N PANTI/ cf. 579 B,
Symp. 194 AE)N PANTI\
@@ -21430,8 +21430,8 @@
pp. 140 ff., Philemon, fr. 95 (Kock ii. p.
508)KA)\N DOU=LOS E)STI/, SA/RKA TH\N
AU)TH\N E)/XEI, FU/SEI GA\R OU)DEI\S DOU=LOS E)GENH/QH POTE/. H(
- D' AU)= TU/XH TO\ SW=MA KATEDOULW/SATO, and
- Anth. Pal. vii. 553 with Mackail's note, p.
+ D’ AU)= TU/XH TO\ SW=MA KATEDOULW/SATO, and
+ Anth. Pal. vii. 553 with Mackail’s note, p.
415. but would inflict the utmost penalties on any such
person on whom they could lay their hands.” “I think,” he said,
@@ -21440,7 +21440,7 @@
encompassed by nothing but enemies.” “And is not that the sort of
prison-house in which the tyrant is pent, being of a nature such as we
have described and filled with multitudinous and manifold terrors and
- appetites? Yet greedyCf. p. 360, note a. For the tyrant's terrors cf.
+ appetites? Yet greedyCf. p. 360, note a. For the tyrant’s terrors cf.
Menander,*)ASPI/S(fr. 74, Kock iii p. 24),
Tacitus, Ann. vi. 6, 579 E and
Xen.Hiero 6.8. The tyrant sees enemies
@@ -21479,7 +21479,7 @@
CO(/MOIO/N TE KAI\
A)LHQE/S. Socrates,” he said. “Is not that then,
dear Glaucon,” said I, “a most unhappy experience in every way? And is
- not the tyrant's life still worse than that which was judged by you to
+ not the tyrant’s life still worse than that which was judged by you to
be the worst?” “Precisely so,” he said. “Then it is the truth, though
some may deny it,Cf. on 576 C, p. 354, note b. that the real tyrant is really
enslaved
@@ -21507,7 +21507,7 @@
all-receptive grampus” (Rogers). of all iniquity, and so in
consequence be himself most unhappyOn the wretched lot of the tyrant cf.
Xen.Hiero passim, e.g. 4. 11, 6. 4, 8, 15. the
- Hiero is Xenophon's rendering of the
+ Hiero is Xenophon’s rendering of the
Socratico-Platonic conception of the unhappy tyrant. Cf. 1. 2-3. See
too Gerhard Heintzeler, Das Bild des Tyrannen bei
Platon, esp. pp. 43 ff. and 76 f.; Cic.De
@@ -21517,7 +21517,7 @@
tyranny “is the greatest and noblest and most coveted of all good
things, both human and divine.” In <title>Epist. 6. 11. ff.
he agrees with Plato that the life of a private citizen is better
- than the tyrant's But in 2. 4 he treats this as a thesis which many
+ than the tyrant’s But in 2. 4 he treats this as a thesis which many
maintain. Cf. further Gorg. 473 E, Alc.
I. 135 B, Phaedr. 248 E,
Symp. 182 C, Eurip.Ion 621 ff.,
@@ -21547,9 +21547,9 @@
Phileb. 66 AU(PO/ TE
A)GGE/LWN PE/MPWN, etc., Eurip.Alc.
737KHRU/KWN U(/PO. Grote and
- other liberals are offended by the intensity of Plato's moral
+ other liberals are offended by the intensity of Plato’s moral
conviction. See What Plato Said, p. 364,
- Laws 662-663, Unity of Plato's
+ <title>Laws 662-663, Unity of Plato’s
Thought, p.25. then,” said I, “or shall I myself
make proclamation that the son of Ariston pronounced the best manPlato puns on the
name Ariston. For other such puns Cf. Gorg. 463 E,
@@ -21596,7 +21596,7 @@
Aristot.Eth. Nic.1130 b 2E(NI\
O)NO/MATI PERILABEI=N, and EI)S E(\N KEFA/LAION A)PEREIDOI/MEQA, 581 A,
- Schleiermacher's interpretation of which, “so würden wir uns in der
+ Schleiermacher’s interpretation of which, “so würden wir uns in der
Erklärung doch auf ein Hauptstück stützen,” approved by Stallbaum,
misses the point. For the point that there is no one name for it Cf.
What Plato Said, p. 596, on Soph.
@@ -21617,7 +21617,7 @@
for gain or profit, should we not thus best bring it together under one
headSince
there is no one specific name for the manifold forms of this part
- (580 D-E), a makeshift term is to be used for convenience' sake. See
+ (580 D-E), a makeshift term is to be used for convenience’ sake. See
also p. 371, note e. in our discourse so as to understand
each other when we speak of this part of the soul, and justify our
calling it the money-loving and gain-loving part?” “I, at any rate,
@@ -21644,7 +21644,7 @@
said,
- “that the ruling principleCf. 338 D, 342 C. of men's
+ “that the ruling principleCf. 338 D, 342 C. of men’s
souls is in some cases this faculty and in others one of the other two,
as it may happen?” “That is so,” he said. “And that is why we say that
the primary classesCf. my review of Jowett in A.J.P. xiii. p. 366,
@@ -21683,10 +21683,10 @@
E(/NEKA(Theaet. 191 C—dicis
causa);PA/NTA
TA)GAQA/(Laws 631 B) has no connection
- with the idiomatic PA/NT'
+ with the idiomatic PA/NT’
A)GAQA/(Rep. 471 C, Cf. supra ad
- loc.); nor Pindar's PO/LL' A)/NW
- TA\ D' AU)= KA/TW(Ol. xii. 6) with
+ loc.); nor Pindar’s PO/LL’ A)/NW
+ TA\ D’ AU)= KA/TW(Ol. xii. 6) with
A)/NW KA/TW as used in
Phaedo 96 B, Gorg. 481 D, etc. Cf.
also E)N
@@ -21721,7 +21721,7 @@
Aristot.Eth. Nic.1095 b 16, and on 528 E. and low,
and again that of learning, save in so far as the knowledge confers
- honor, mere fumeCf. Blaydes on Aristoph.Clouds 920, and Turgeniev's
+ honor, mere fumeCf. Blaydes on Aristoph.Clouds 920, and Turgeniev’s
novel, Smoke. and moonshine?” “It is so,” he
said. “And what,” said I, “are we to suppose the philosopher thinks of
@@ -21733,9 +21733,9 @@
reality, and being always occupied with that while he learns? Will he
not think them far removed from true pleasure,Cf. 598 B, Epist.
iii. 315 C, Marc. Aurel. viii. 1PO/RRW
- FILOSOFI/AS. Hermann's text or something like it is
+ FILOSOFI/AS. Hermann’s text or something like it is
the only idiomatic one, and TH=S H(DONH=S
- OU) PA/NU PO/RRW must express the philosopher's
+ OU) PA/NU PO/RRW must express the philosopher’s
opinion of the pleasurableness of the lower pleasures as compared
with the higher. Cf. A.J.P. xiii. p. 366. and
callFor the
@@ -21758,7 +21758,7 @@
how could we determine which of them speaks most
truly?” “In faith, I cannot tell,” he said. “Well, consider it thus: By
what are things to be judged, if they are to be judgedi.e. what is the
- criterion? Cf. 582 DDI' OU(=,
+ criterion? Cf. 582 DDI’ OU(=,
Sext. Empir. Bekker, p. 60 (Pyrrh. Hypotyp. ii.
13-14) and p. 197 (Adv. Math. vii. 335). Cf. Diog.
L.Prologue 21, and Laches 184 E.
@@ -21850,20 +21850,20 @@
334 D, 340 A. Cf. Hesychius s.v.TRI/TOS KRATH/R. Brochard, La
Morale de Platon, missing the point, says, “Voici enfin
- un troisième argument qui paraît à Platon le plus décisif puisqu'il
- l'appelle une vicoire vraiment olympique.” For the idea of a contest
+ un troisième argument qui paraît à Platon le plus décisif puisqu’il
+ l’appelle une vicoire vraiment olympique.” For the idea of a contest
Cf. Phileb. passim. and to Olympian
Zeus—observe that other pleasure than that of the intelligence is not
altogether even realCf. Phileb. 36 C, 44 DH(DONAI\ A)LHQEI=S. For the unreality
of the lower pleasures Cf. Phileb. 36 A ff. and esp.
- 44 C-D, Unity of Plato's Thought, pp. 23-25,
+ 44 C-D, Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 23-25,
What Plato Said, pp. 322-323 and 609-610, Introd.
pp. lvi-lix, Rodier, Remarques sur le Philèbe, p.
281. or pure,Cf. Phileb. 52 CKAQARA\S H(DONA/S, and 53 CKAQARA\ LU/PHS. but is a kind of
scene-painting,Cf. Laws 663 C, Phaedo 69 B, 365 C,
523 B, 602 D, 586 B, Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p.
- 266. as I seem to have heard from some wise manOne of Plato's
+ 266. as I seem to have heard from some wise manOne of Plato’s
evasions. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 513, on
Meno 81 A, Phileb. 44 B.
Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 266 misses the point and
@@ -21908,7 +21908,7 @@
acceptable—peace.”
- “And so,” I said, “when a man's delight comes to an
+ “And so,” I said, “when a man’s delight comes to an
end, the cessation of pleasure will be painful.” “It may be so,” he
said. “What, then,we just now described as the intermediate state
between the two—this quietude—will sometimes be both pain and pleasure.”
@@ -22046,7 +22046,7 @@
knowledge and reason,Different kinds of intelligence are treated as
synonyms because for the present purpose their distinctions are
- irrelevant. Cf. 511 A, C, and DDIA/NOIA. Cf. Unity of Plato's
+ irrelevant. Cf. 511 A, C, and D<foreign xml:lang="grc">DIA/NOIA</foreign>. Cf. <title>Unity of Plato’s
Thought, p. 43 and p. 47, n. 339. Plato does not
distinguish synonyms nor virtual synonyms for their own sake as
Prodicus did. Cf. Protag. 358 A-B. and, in
@@ -22100,12 +22100,12 @@
cf. Dio Chrys.Or. xiii., Teubner, vol. i. p.
240. stable and pure pleasure, but with eyes ever bent upon
the earthCf.
- Milton, Comus,“Ne'er looks to heaven amid its
+ Milton, Comus,“Ne’er looks to heaven amid its
gorgeous feast,” Rossetti, “Nineveh,”in fine,“That
set gaze never on the sky,” etc. Cf. S. O. Dickermann, De
Argumentis quibusdam ap. Xenophontem, Platonem, Aristotelem
obviis e structura hominis et animalium petitis,Halle,
- 1909, who lists Plato's
+ 1909, who lists Plato’s
Symp. 190 A, Rep. 586 A,
Cratyl. 396 B, 409 C, Tim. 90 A,
91 E, and many other passages. and heads bowed down over
@@ -22201,7 +22201,7 @@
effectWhat
follows (587 B-588 A) is not to be taken too seriously. It
illustrates the method of procedure by minute links, the
- satisfaction of Plato's feelings by confirmations and analogies, and
+ satisfaction of Plato’s feelings by confirmations and analogies, and
his willingness to play with mathematical symbolism. Cf. 546 B f.
and William Temple, Plato and Christianity, p. 55:
“Finally the whole thing is a satire on the humbug of mystical
@@ -22215,11 +22215,11 @@
“And least so the royal and orderly?” “Yes.” “Then the
- tyrant's place, I think, will be fixed at the furthest removeCf.
+ tyrant’s place, I think, will be fixed at the furthest removeCf.
Polit. 257 BA)FESTA=SIN from true and proper pleasure, and
- the king's at the least.” “Necessarily.” “Then the tyrant's life will be
- least pleasurable and the king's most.” “There is every necessity of
+ the king’s at the least.” “Necessarily.” “Then the tyrant’s life will be
+ least pleasurable and the king’s most.” “There is every necessity of
that.” “Do you know, then,” said I, “how much less pleasurably the
tyrant lives than the king?” “I’ll know if you tell me,Cf. Vil. I. p. 282,
note a, on 408 D and p. 344, note b, on 573 D.” he said.
@@ -22247,7 +22247,7 @@
interval that separates the tyrant from true pleasure.” “Apparently.”
“The phantomCf.
Phaedo 66 CEI)DW/LWN, where Olympiodorus (Norvin, p. 36) takes
- it of the unreality of the lower pleasures. of the tyrant's
+ it of the unreality of the lower pleasures. of the tyrant’s
pleasure is then by longitudinal mensuration a plane number.” “Quite
so.” “But by squaring and cubing it is clear what the interval of this
separation becomes.” “It is clear,” he said, “to a reckoner.” “Then
@@ -22257,7 +22257,7 @@
if one tries to express the extent of the interval
between the king and the tyrant in respect of true pleasure he will find
on completion of the multiplication that he lives 729 times as happily
- and that the tyrant's life is more painful by the same distance.Cf. Spencer,
+ and that the tyrant’s life is more painful by the same distance.Cf. Spencer,
Data of Ethics, p. 14 “Hence estimating life by
multiplying its length into its breadth.” For the mathematical jest
Cf. Polit. 257 A-B.” “An overwhelmingHumorous as in 509
@@ -22363,7 +22363,7 @@
beast—like a farmerCf. Theaet. 167 B-C, and What Plato
Said, p. 456, on Euthyphro 2 D.
who cherishes and trains the cultivated plants but checks the growth of
- the wild—and he will make an allyCf. 441 A. of the lion's nature, and
+ the wild—and he will make an allyCf. 441 A. of the lion’s nature, and
caring for all the beasts alike will first make them friendly to one
another and to himself, and so foster their growth.” “Yes, that in turn
is precisely the meaning of the man who commends justice.” “From every
@@ -22415,7 +22415,7 @@
Nem. ix. 37 ff, and Pausan. x. 29. 7. did
when she received the necklace as the priceFor E)PI/ in this sense cf. Thompson on
Meno 90 D. Cf. Apol. 41 AE)PI\ PO/SW|, Demosth. xlv. 66.
- of her husband's life?” “Far more,” said Glaucon, “for I will answer you
+ of her husband’s life?” “Far more,” said Glaucon, “for I will answer you
in his behalf.”“And do you not think that
the reason for the old objection to licentiousness is similarly because
that sort of thing emancipates that dread,See Adam ad loc. on the
@@ -22460,14 +22460,14 @@
Air, p. 210 (Brantwood ed., 1891): “The first duty of
every man in the world is to find his true master, and, for his own
good, submit to him; and to find his true inferior, and, for that
- inferior's good, conquer him.” Inge, Christian
+ inferior’s good, conquer him.” Inge, <title>Christian
Ethics, p. 252: “It is ordained in the eternal
constitution of things, that men of intemperate minds cannot be
free.” Carlyle (apud M. Barton and O. Sitwell,
Victoriana): “Surely of all the rights of man the
right of the ignorant man to be guided by the wiser, to be gently or
forcibly held in the true course by him, is the indisputablest.”
- Plato's idea is perhaps a source of Aristotle's theory of slavery,
+ Plato’s idea is perhaps a source of Aristotle’s theory of slavery,
though differently expressed. Cf. Aristot.Pol.1254 b 16 f., Newman i. pp. 109-110, 144
f., 378-379, ii. p. 107. Cf. also Polit. 309 A f.,
@@ -22543,7 +22543,7 @@
fact, for Plato as for modern “scientific” ethics, health in the
higher sense—the health of the soul—may be said to be the ultimate
sanction. Cf. Vol. I. Introd. pp. xvi and xxi, Unity of
- Plato's Thought, p. 26, Idea of Good in Plato's
+ Plato’s Thought, p. 26, Idea of Good in Plato’s
Republic, pp. 192-194 f. But an idealistic ethics
sometimes expresses itself in the paradox that “not even health,”
highest of earthly goods, is of any value compared with the true
@@ -22574,7 +22574,7 @@
harmonizing of his possessions? He will not let himself be dazzledCf. p. 355, note d,
on 576 D. by the felicitations of the multitude and pile up
the mass
- O)/GKON: cf. Horace's use of
+ O)/GKON: cf. Horace’s use of
acervus,Shorey on Odes ii. 2.
24. of his wealth without measure,Cf. Vol. I. p. 163, note g, Newman
i. p. 136. For the evils of wealth Cf. Laws 831 C
@@ -22601,7 +22601,7 @@
He will gladly take part in and enjoy those which he
thinks will make him a better man, but in public and private life he
- will shun those that may overthrow the established habitAlmost Aristotle's
+ will shun those that may overthrow the established habitAlmost Aristotle’s
use of E(/CIS. of his
soul.” “Then, if that is his chief concern,” he said, “he will not
willingly take part in politics.Cf. pp. 52-55 on 496 D-E. The later schools
@@ -22618,16 +22618,16 @@
sapienti rempublicam ipso dignam dedimus, id est mundum, non est
extra rempublicam, etiamsi recesserit;ibid. iii. p.
157. 40 ff.E(PO/MENON DE\ TOU/TOIS
- U(PA/RXEIN KAI\ TO\ POLITEU/ESQAI TO\N SOFO\N KAI\ MA/LIST' E)N
+ U(PA/RXEIN KAI\ TO\ POLITEU/ESQAI TO\N SOFO\N KAI\ MA/LIST’ E)N
TAI=S TOIAU/TAIS POLITEI/AIS TAI=S E)MFAINOU/SAIS TINA\
PROKOPH\N PRO\S TA\S TELEI/AS POLITEI/AS
ibid. p. 172. 18 f.DEU/TERON DE\
TO\N A)PO\ TH=S POLITEI/AS, POLITEU/ESQAI GA\R KATA\ TO\N
PROHGOU/MENON LO/GON. . . ;ibid. 173.
- 19 ff.E)/FAMEN D' O(/TI KAI\ POLITEU/ESQAI
+ 19 ff.E)/FAMEN D’ O(/TI KAI\ POLITEU/ESQAI
KATA\ TO\N PROHGOU/MENON LO/GON OI(=ON E)STI. MH\ POLITEU/ESQAI
- DE\ E)A/N TI <KWLU/H|> KAI\ MA/LIST' <A)\N> MHDE\N
+ DE\ E)A/N TI KWLU/H| KAI\ MA/LIST’ A)\N MHDE\N
W)FFELEI=N ME/LLH TH\N PATRI/DA, KINDU/NOUS DE\ PARAKOLOUQEI=N
U(POLAMBA/NH| MEGA/LOUS KAI\ XALEPOU\S E)K TH=S
POLITEI/AS; ibid. p. 175. 3 f.POLITEU/ESQAI FASI\ TO\N SOFO\N A)\N MH/ TI KWLU/H, W(/S FHSI
@@ -22651,8 +22651,8 @@
is in the ideal;Lit. “in words.” This is one of the most famous passages in Plato,
and a source of the idea of the City of God among both Stoics and
Christians. Cf. Marc. Aurel. ix. 29MHDE\
- TH\N *PLA/TWNOS POLITEI/AN E)/LPIZE, Justin Martyr's
- EPI\ GH=S DIATRI/BOUSIN A)LL' E)N
+ TH\N *PLA/TWNOS POLITEI/AN E)/LPIZE, Justin Martyr’s
+ EPI\ GH=S DIATRI/BOUSIN A)LL’ E)N
OU)RANW=| POLITEU/ONTAI, which recalls
Philippians iii. 20H(MW=N
DE\ TO\ POLI/TEUMA E)N OU)RANOI=S U(PA/RXEI and also
@@ -22663,8 +22663,8 @@
Luke xvii. 21 “the kingdom of God is within you.”
Cf. also John xviii. 36. Havet, Le
Christianisme et ses origines, p. 207, says, “Platon dit
- de sa République précisément ce qu'on a dit plus tard du royaume de
- Dieu, qu'elle n'est pas de ce monde.” Cf. also Caird,
+ de sa République précisément ce qu’on a dit plus tard du royaume de
+ Dieu, qu’elle n’est pas de ce monde.” Cf. also Caird,
Evolution of Theology in Greek Philosophy, ii. p.
170, Harnack, Hist. of Dogma(tr. Buchanan), vol. i.
p. 332, ii. pp. 73-74 and 338, Proclus, Comm. 352
@@ -22723,12 +22723,12 @@
III. On the whole question see Introd. Max. Tyr.
Diss. 23*EI) KALW=S
*PLA/TWN *(/OMHRON TH=S *POLITEI/AS PARH|TH/SATO, and
- 32E)/STI KAQ' *(/OMHRON
+ 32E)/STI KAQ’ *(/OMHRON
AI(/RESIS. Strabo i. 2 3. Athenaeus v. 12. 187 says
that Plato himself in the Symposium wrote worse
things than the poets whom he banishes. Friedländer,
Platon, i. p. 138, thinks that the return to the
- poets in Book X. is intended to justify the poetry of Plato's
+ poets in Book X. is intended to justify the poetry of Plato’s
dialogues. On the banishment of the poets and Homer cf. also
Minucius Felix (Halm), pp. 32-33, Tertullian (Oehler), lib. ii. c.
7, Olympiodorus, Hermann vi. p. 367, Augustine, De civ.
@@ -22741,7 +22741,7 @@
<div n="595b" type="textpart" subtype="section">
<said who="Socrates">still more plainly apparent now that we have
distinguished the several parts<note anchored="true" resp="Loeb" place="unspecified">Lit. “species.” Cf. 435 B ff., 445 C, 580 D, 588
- B ff., <title>Phaedr. 271 D, Unity of Plato's
+ B ff., <title>Phaedr. 271 D, Unity of Plato’s
Thought, p. 42. of the soul.” “What do you mean?”
“Why, between ourselvesCf. Gorg. 462 B,
Protag. 309 A, 339 E.—for you will not
@@ -22750,7 +22750,7 @@
Laws 890 B. of the mind of all listeners
who do not possess, as an antidoteFA/RMAKON:
- this passage is the source of Plutarch's view of literature in
+ this passage is the source of Plutarch’s view of literature in
education; see Quomodo adolescens poetas audire
debeat 15 C. a knowledge of its real nature.”
“What is your idea in saying this?” he said. “I must speak out,” I said,
@@ -22775,8 +22775,8 @@
A)LH/QEIAN, Henri-Pierre Cazac, Polémique
d’Aristote contre la théorie platonicienne des Idées, p.
11, n.: “Platon lui-même, critiquant Homère, . . . fait une semblabe
- réflexion, ‘On doit plus d’égards à la vérité qu'à un homme.’ Cousin
- croit, après Camérarius, que c'est là l'origine du mot célèbre
+ réflexion, ‘On doit plus d’égards à la vérité qu’à un homme.’ Cousin
+ croit, après Camérarius, que c’est là l’origine du mot célèbre
d’Aristote.” Cf. St. Augustine, De civ. Dei. x. 30
“homini praeposuit veritatem.” but, as I say, speak our
minds.” “By all means,” he said. “Listen, then, or rather, answer my
@@ -22803,11 +22803,11 @@
Phaedo 76 D, 100 B, Phileb. 16 D,
479 E, Thompson on Meno 72 D. See Zeller,
Phil. d. Gr. ii. 1. p. 660. The intentional
- simplicity of Plato's positing of the concept here (cf. 597 A), and
+ simplicity of Plato’s positing of the concept here (cf. 597 A), and
his transition from the concept to the “idea,” has been mistaken for
a primitive aspect of his thought by many interpreters. It is quite
uncritical to use Aristot.Met. 991 b 6 ff. to prove
- that Plato's “later” theory of ideas did not recognize ideas of
+ that Plato’s “later” theory of ideas did not recognize ideas of
artefacts, and therefore that this passage represents an earlier
phase of the theory. He deliberately expresses the theory as simply
as possible, and a manufactured object suits his purpose here as it
@@ -22839,7 +22839,7 @@
lifetime, and resemble a mirror carried through the streets ready to
render an image of every created thing.” (Cf. 596 D-EKA/TOPTRON PERIFE/REIN and Julian,
Or. v. 163 D.) Empedocles, fr. 23
- (Diels i.3 pp. 234-235): W(S D' O(PO/TAN
+ (Diels i.3 pp. 234-235): W(S D’ O(PO/TAN
GRAFE/ES . . . DE/NDREA/ TE KTI/ZONTE KAI\ A)NE/RAS H)DE\
GUNAI=KAS . . .
that all handicraftsmen
@@ -22854,7 +22854,7 @@
True Intel. System of the Universe, vol. ii. p.
70: “Lastly, he is called O(\S PA/NTA TA/ TE
A)/LLA E)RGA/ZETAI, KAI\ E(AUTO/N, ‘he that causeth or
- produceth both all other things, and even himself.'” But the
+ produceth both all other things, and even himself.’” But the
producer of everything, including himself, is the imitator
generalized and then exemplified by the painter and the poet. Cf.
Soph. 234 A-B. and thereto earth and
@@ -22885,23 +22885,24 @@
producers, does he not?” “Of course.” “But you will say, I suppose, that
his creations are not real and true. And yet, after a fashion, the
painterArt is
- deception. Diels ii.3 p. 339, Dialex. 3 (10)E)N GA\R TRAGWIDOPOII/A| KAI\ ZWGRAFI/A| O(/STIS <KE>
+ deception. Diels ii.3 p. 339, Dialex. 3 (10)
+ E)N GA\R TRAGWIDOPOII/A| KAI\ ZWGRAFI/A| O(/STIS KE
PLEI=STA E)CAPATH=| O(/MOIA TOI=S A)LHQINOI=S POIE/WN, OU(=TOS
A)/RISTOS, Xen.Mem. iii. 10. 1GRAFIKH/ E)STIN EI)KASI/A TW=N
O(RWME/NWN. Cf. Plut.Quomodo adolescens
17 F-18 A on painting and poetry. There are many specious
- resemblances between Plato's ideas on art and morality and those of
+ resemblances between Plato’s ideas on art and morality and those of
the “lunatic fringe” of Platonism. Cf. Jane Harrison, Ancient
Art and Ritual, pp. 21-22, Charles F. Andrews,
- Mahatma Gandhi's Ideas, p. 332. William Temple,
+ Mahatma Gandhi’s Ideas, p. 332. William Temple,
Plato and Christianity, p. 89: “In the tenth book
of the Republic he says that, whereas the artificer
in making any material object imitates the eternal idea, an artist
only imitates the imitation (595 A-598 D); but in Book V he said
that we do not blame an artist who depicts a face more beautiful
than any actual human face either is or ever could be (472 D).” But
- this does not affect Plato's main point here, that the artist
- imitates the “real” world, not the world of ideas. The artist's
+ this does not affect Plato’s main point here, that the artist
+ imitates the “real” world, not the world of ideas. The artist’s
imitation may fall short of or better its model. But the model is
not the (Platonic) idea. too makes a couch, does he not?”
“Yes,” he said, “the appearance of one, he too.”
@@ -22941,7 +22942,7 @@
Plato artifactorum Ideas statuerit, p. 12). Cf. Zeller,
Phil. d. Gr. ii. 1, p. 666, who interprets the
passage correctly; A. E. Taylor, in Mind, xii. p. 5
- “Plato's meaning has been supposed to be adequately indicted by such
+ “Plato’s meaning has been supposed to be adequately indicted by such
half-jocular instances as that of the idea of a bed or table in
RepublicX.,” etc. or who else?” “No one, I
think.” “And then there was one which the carpenter made.” “Yes,” he
@@ -22979,7 +22980,7 @@
Eccles. Pol. i. 3. 4 “those things which Nature
is said to do are by divine art preformed, using nature as an
instrument,” Browne, apudJ. Texte, Etudes de
- littérature européenne, p. 65 “la nature est l'art de
+ littérature européenne, p. 65 “la nature est l’art de
Dieu,” Cic.De nat. deor. ii. 13 “deoque tribuenda, id
est mundo,”De leg. i. 7. 21, Seneca, De
benef. iv. 7 “quid enim aliud est natura quam deus?”
@@ -23059,7 +23060,7 @@
his allegories, what a new and ample scene of wonder may this
consideration afford us.” Cf. Xen.Symp. 4. 6.
Brunetière, Epoques, p. 105, says: “Corneille . . .
- se piquait de connaître à fond l'art de la politique et celui de la
+ se piquait de connaître à fond l’art de la politique et celui de la
guerre.” For the impossibility of universal knowledge Cf.
Soph. 233 A, Charm. 170 B,
Friedländer, Platon, ii. p. 146 on Hipp.
@@ -23126,11 +23127,11 @@
“But, I take it, if he had genuine knowledge of the things he imitates
he would far rather devote himself to real things<note anchored="true" resp="Loeb" place="unspecified">Cf. Petit de Julleville,
<title>Hist. lit. francaise vii. p. 233, on the poet
- Lamartine's desire to be a practical statesman, and
- ibid.: “Quand on m'apprendrait que le divin
+ Lamartine’s desire to be a practical statesman, and
+ ibid.: “Quand on m’apprendrait que le divin
Homère a refusé les charges municipales de Smyrne ou de Colophon, je
- ne croirais jamais qu'il eût pu mieux mériter de la Grèce en
- administrant son bourg natal qu'en composant l’Iliade
+ ne croirais jamais qu’il eût pu mieux mériter de la Grèce en
+ administrant son bourg natal qu’en composant l’Iliade
et l’Odyssée.“ than to the imitation of them,
and would endeavor to leave after him many noble deedsBut Cf.
Symp. 209 D. and works as memorials of
@@ -23143,7 +23144,7 @@
or any other of the poets on other matters by asking
them, if any one of them was a physician and not merely an imitator of a
- physician's talk, what men any poet, old or new, is reported to have
+ physician’s talk, what men any poet, old or new, is reported to have
restored to health as Asclepius did, or what disciples of the medical
art he left after him as Asclepius did his descendants; and let us
dismiss the other arts and not question them about them; but concerning
@@ -23185,7 +23186,7 @@
- is there any tradition of a war in Homer's time that
+ is there any tradition of a war in Homer’s time that
was well conducted by his command or counsel?” “None.” “Well, then, as
might be expected of a man wise in practical affairs, are many and
ingenious inventionsOn the literature of “inventions,” EU(RH/MATA, see Newman ii. p. 382 on
@@ -23195,7 +23196,7 @@
Symp. 209 A. for the arts and business of
life reported of Homer as they are of ThalesDiog. Laert. i. 23-27. the
Milesian and AnacharsisDiog. Laert. i. 105 says he was reported to be
- the inventor of the anchor and the potter's wheel. the
+ the inventor of the anchor and the potter’s wheel. the
Scythian?” “Nothing whatever of the sort.” “Well, then, if no public
service is credited to him, is Homer reported while he lived to have
been a guide in education to men who took pleasure in associating with
@@ -23206,7 +23207,7 @@
lifeIn the
(spurious?) seventh epistle, 328 A, Plato speaks of the life and
LO/GOS advocated by himself.
- Cf. Novotny, Plato's Epistles, p. 168. just as
+ Cf. Novotny, Plato’s Epistles, p. 168. just as
PythagorasDiels i3 pp. 27 f. was himself especially honored for this,
and his successors, even to this day, denominating a certain way of life
the Pythagorean,Cf.O)RFIKOI\ . . .
@@ -23214,7 +23215,7 @@
Laws 782 C. are
distinguished among their contemporaries?” “No, nothing of this sort
either is reported; for Creophylos,“Of the beef-clan.” The scholiast says he was a
- Chian and an epic poet. See Callimachus's epigram
+ Chian and an epic poet. See Callimachus’s epigram
apudSext. Empir., Bekker, p. 609 (Adv.
Math. i. 48), and Suidas s.v.KREW/FULOS
@@ -23253,7 +23254,7 @@
FANTASI/AN MO/NON OU)K E)PI\ TAI=S KEFALAI=S
PERIFE/ROMEN, Erasmus, Chiliad iv.
Cent. 7 n. 98 p. 794, and the German idiom “einen auf den Händen
- tragen.” yet, forsooth, that Homer's contemporaries, if he
+ tragen.” yet, forsooth, that Homer’s contemporaries, if he
had been able to help men to achieve excellence,Cf. Protag. 328
B. would have suffered him or Hesiod to roam about
rhapsodizing and would not have clung to them far rather than to their
@@ -23280,11 +23281,11 @@
- himself knowing nothing of the cobbler's art, what
+ himself knowing nothing of the cobbler’s art, what
appears to be a cobbler to him and likewise to those who know nothing
but judge only by forms and colorsFor the association of XRW/MATA and SXH/MATA Cf. Phileb. 12 E. 47 A, 51 B,
Laws 669 A, Soph. 251 A,
- Meno 75 A with Apelt's note,
+ Meno 75 A with Apelt’s note,
Cratyl. 431 C, Gorg. 465 B,
Phaedo 100 D, Aristot.Poet.1447 a 18-19.?” “Certainly.” “And
@@ -23295,7 +23296,7 @@
peculiar to Soph. 262. But Cf. Cratyl.
431 B, 425 A, Theaet. 206 D. And in
Soph. 257 BR(H/MATI is used generally. See Unity of
- Plato's Thought, pp. 56-57. Cf. Euthydem.
+ Plato’s Thought, pp. 56-57. Cf. Euthydem.
304 E with Symp. 187 A, Phaedr. 228 D,
271 C and my note in Class. Phil. xvii. (1922) p. 262. the colors of the
several arts in such fashion that others equally ignorant, who see
@@ -23319,7 +23320,7 @@
11TO\ DE\ ME/TRON DIALU/SH|
with Horace, Sat. i. 4. 62 “invenias etiam disiecti
membra poetae,” Aristot.Rhet.
- 1404 a 24E)PEI\ D'
+ 1404 a 24E)PEI\ D’
OI( POIHTAI\ LE/GONTES EU)H/QH DIA\ TH\N LE/CIN E)DO/KOUN
PORI/SASQAI TH/NDE TH\N DO/CAN. Sext. Empir., Bekker,
pp. 665-666 (Adv. Math. ii. 288), says that the ideas
@@ -23332,7 +23333,7 @@
faces of adolescents, young but not really beautiful, when the bloom of
youth abandons them?Aristot.Rhet.1406 b 36 f. refers to this. Cf. Tyrtaeus 8
- (6). 28O)/FR' E)RATH=S H(/BHS A)GLAO\N
+ (6). 28O)/FR’ E)RATH=S H(/BHS A)GLAO\N
A)/NQOS E)/XH|, Mimnermus i. 4 H(/BHS A)/NQH GI/GNETAI A(RPALE/A; Theognis 1305: PAIDEI/AS
PLOUHRA/TOU A)/NQOS W)KU/TERON STADI/OU
Xen.Symp. 8. 14TO\ ME\N
@@ -23359,7 +23360,7 @@
that the same holds true of everything?” “What do you
mean?” “That there are some three arts concerned with everything, the
- user's art,For the
+ user’s art,For the
idea that the user knows best see Cratyl. 390 B,
Euthydem. 289 B, Phaedr. 274 E.
Zeller, Aristotle(Eng.) ii. p. 247, attributes this
@@ -23371,7 +23372,7 @@
Talk: “In general those who do things for others know
more about them than those for whom they are done. A groom knows
more about horses than his master.” But Hazlitt disagrees with
- Plato's view. the maker's, and the imitator's.” “Yes.” “Now
+ Plato’s view. the maker’s, and the imitator’s.” “Yes.” “Now
do not the excellence, the beauty, the rightnessSo in Laws 669 A-B,
Plato says that the competent judge of a work of art must know three
things, first, what it is, second, that it is true and right, and
@@ -23437,7 +23438,7 @@
- “In heaven's name, then,
+ “In heaven’s name, then,
this business of imitation is concerned with the third remove from
truth, is it not?” “Yes.” “And now again, to what elementThe antithesis of
PERI/ and PRO/S marks the transition. in
@@ -23460,7 +23461,7 @@
And so scene-painting in its exploitationE)PIQEME/NH helps to personify SKIAGRAFI/A. Cf. Gorg.
464 C. of this weakness of our nature falls nothing short of
- witchcraft,Adam's “leaves no magic art untried” is misleading. A)POLEI/PEIN is here used as in 504 C.
+ witchcraft,Adam’s “leaves no magic art untried” is misleading. A)POLEI/PEIN is here used as in 504 C.
For the idiomatic OU)DE\N
A)POLEI/PEI see p. 200, note b, on 533 A. and
so do jugglery and many other such contrivances.” “True.” “And have not
@@ -23601,7 +23602,7 @@
Laws 803 B and Class. Phil. ix. p.
353, n. 3, Friedländer, Platon, i. p. 143. and
our grieving checksHöffding, Outlines of Psychology, p. 99, refers to
- Saxo's tale of the different effect which the news of the murder of
+ Saxo’s tale of the different effect which the news of the murder of
Regner Lodbrog produced on his sons: he in whom the emotion was the
weakest had the greatest energy for action. the very thing we
need to come to our aid as quickly as possible in such case.” “What
@@ -23615,8 +23616,8 @@
5. 3. See also Stallbaum ad loc. to determine the movements
of our affairs with reference to the numbers that turn up, in the way
that reason indicatesCf. 440 B, 607 B, Herod. i. 132. would be
- the best, and, instead of stumbling like children, clapping one's hands
- to the stricken spotCf. Demosthenes' description of how barbarians
+ the best, and, instead of stumbling like children, clapping one’s hands
+ to the stricken spotCf. Demosthenes’ description of how barbarians
box iv. 40 (51),A)EI\ TH=S PLHGH=S
E)/XETAI. and wasting the time in
wailing,
@@ -23640,7 +23641,7 @@
the fretful part of us presentE)/XEI in the sense of “involves,” “admits of,” as
- frequently in Aristotle's Metaphysics.
+ frequently in Aristotle’s Metaphysics. many
and varied occasions for imitation, while the intelligent and temperate
disposition, always remaining approximately the same, is neither easy to
@@ -23717,7 +23718,7 @@
application. was forcibly restrained, and that has hungered
for tears and a good cryThis contains a hint of one possible meaning of
the Aristotelian doctrine of KA/QARSIS, Poet.
- 1449 b 27-28. Cf.KOUFI/ZESQAI MEQ' H(DONH=S
+ 1449 b 27-28. Cf.KOUFI/ZESQAI MEQ’ H(DONH=SPol.1342 a 14, and my review of Finsler,
“Platon u. d. Aristot. Poetik,”Class. Phil. iii. p.
@@ -23738,7 +23739,7 @@
inasmuch as this is contemplating the woes of others
and it is no shame to it to praise and pity another who, claiming to be
a good man, abandons himself to excess in his grief; but it thinks this
- vicarious pleasure is so much clear gain,Cf.TH=| D'
+ vicarious pleasure is so much clear gain,Cf.TH=| D’
A)SFALEI/A| KERDANEI=SEurip.Herc. Fur.
604, which is frequently misinterpreted; Herod. viii. 60. 3.
and would not consent to forfeit it by disdaining the poem altogether.
@@ -23752,9 +23753,9 @@
“Most true,” he said. “Does not the same principle
apply to the laughable,Cf. Vol. I. p. 211, note f, La Bruyère,
- Des Ouvrages de l'esprit(Oeuvres, ed. M. G.
- Servois, i. p. 137): “D’où vient que l'on rit si librement au
- théâtre, et que l'on a honte d'y pleurer?” namely,that if in
+ Des Ouvrages de l’esprit(Oeuvres, ed. M. G.
+ Servois, i. p. 137): “D’où vient que l’on rit si librement au
+ théâtre, et que l’on a honte d’y pleurer?” namely,that if in
comic representations,In the Laws 816 D-E Plato says
that the citizens must witness such performances since the serious
cannot be learned without the laughable, nor anything without its
@@ -23795,7 +23796,7 @@
Panegyr. 159, says Homer was given a place in
education because he celebrated those who fought against the
barbarians. Cf. also Aristoph.Frogs 1034 ff.
- and that for the conduct and refinementThe same conjunction is implied in Protagoras's
+ and that for the conduct and refinementThe same conjunction is implied in Protagoras’s
teaching, Protag. 318 E and 317 B. of human
life he is worthy of our study and devotion, and that we should order
our entire lives by the guidance of this poet,
@@ -23884,10 +23885,10 @@
Aristoph.Clouds1363MO/LIS ME\N
- A)LL' O(/MWS, Eurip.Phoen.
+ A)LL’ O(/MWS, Eurip.Phoen.1421MO/LIS ME/N,
- E)CE/TEINE D', and also Soph.Antig.
+ E)CE/TEINE D’, and also Soph.Antig.1105, O.T. 998,
Eurip.Bacch.1027, Hec. 843,
@@ -23934,8 +23935,8 @@
Apol. 41 C, Charm. 155 D.
magnitude,” he replied, “if there are other things greater than those of
which we have spoken.Clement, Strom. iv. p. 496
- BO(QOU/NEK' A)RETH\ TW=N E)N A)NQRW/POIS
- MO/NH OU)K E)K QURAI/WN TA)PI/XEIRA LAMBA/NEI, AU)TH\ D'
+ BO(QOU/NEK’ A)RETH\ TW=N E)N A)NQRW/POIS
+ MO/NH OU)K E)K QURAI/WN TA)PI/XEIRA LAMBA/NEI, AU)TH\ D’
E(AUTH\N A)=QLA TW=N PO/NWN E)/XEI. ? For
surely the whole time from the boy to the old man would be small
compared with all time.Cf. on 496 A, p. 9, mote f and 498 D.”
@@ -23986,7 +23987,7 @@
iron, and, as I say, for practically everything its congenital evil and
diseaseRuskin,
Time and Tide 52 (Brantwood ed. p. 68): “Every
- faculty of man's soul, and every instinct of it by which he is meant
+ faculty of man’s soul, and every instinct of it by which he is meant
to live, is exposed to its own special form of corruption”;
Boethius, Cons. iii. 11 (L.C.L. trans. p. 283),
things are destroyed by what is hostile; Aristot.Top.
@@ -24036,7 +24037,7 @@
Gorg. 477 B-C, and supra,Introd.
p. lxvii. But Dean Inge, “Platonism and Human Immortality”
(Aristot. Soc.,
- 1919, p. 288) says: “Plato's argument, in
+ 1919, p. 288) says: “Plato’s argument, in
the tenth book of the Republic, for the immortality
of the soul, has found a place in scholastic theology, but is
supposed to have been discredited by Kant. I venture to think that
@@ -24071,7 +24072,7 @@
that is by an alien evil that has not produced in it the evil that
belongs to it by nature.” “You are entirely right,” he
replied.“On the same principle,” said
- I, “if the badness of the body does not produce in the soul the soul's
+ I, “if the badness of the body does not produce in the soul the soul’s
badness we shall never expect the soul to be destroyed by an alien evil
apart from its own defect—one thing, that is, by the evil of another.”
“That is reasonable,” he said. “Either, then, we must refute this
@@ -24098,7 +24099,7 @@
with the argumentOr “to take the bull by the horns.” For O(MO/SE I)E/NAI see What Plato Said,
p. 457, on Euthyph. 3 C. Cf.E)GGU\S I)O/NTESPhaedo 95 B.
- and say, in order to avoid being forced to admit the soul's immortality,
+ and say, in order to avoid being forced to admit the soul’s immortality,
that a dying man does become more wicked and unjust,Herbert Spencer
nearly does this: “Death by starvation from inability to catch prey
shows a falling short of conduct from its ideal.” It recalls the
@@ -24250,7 +24251,7 @@
661 C. And then one might see whether in its real natureCf.
Phaedo 246 A. In Tim. 72 D Plato
says that only God knows the truth about the soul. See
- Laws 641 D, and Unity of Plato's
+ <title>Laws 641 D, and Unity of Plato’s
Thought, p. 42. it is manifoldCf.
Phaedr. 271 A. or single in its
simplicity, or what is the truth about it and how.
@@ -24280,9 +24281,9 @@
passage inconsistent with the idealism of 592 and with
Laws 899 D ff. and 905 B. Cf. Renan,
Averroes, pp. 156-157, Guyau, Esquisse
- d'une morale, pp. 140-141. See Unity of Plato's
+ d’une morale, pp. 140-141. See Unity of Plato’s
Thought, p. 80 and n. 612, Idea of Justice in
- Plato's Republic, pp. 197-198. Gomperz, ignoring this
+ Plato’s Republic, pp. 197-198. Gomperz, ignoring this
passage and interpreting the Republic wholly from 367
E, strangely argues that Phaedo 107 C proves that the
Phaedo must have been composed at a time when
@@ -24292,10 +24293,10 @@
elsewhere remark that, as a rule, the righteous is not forsaken even
in this world. Cf. Psalm 37.25 ff.,
Prov. 10.3 and passim. See Renan,
- Hist. du Peuple d'Israel, p. 376: “Il en est de
+ Hist. du Peuple d’Israel, p. 376: “Il en est de
ces passages comme de tant de préceptes de l’Evangile, insensés si
- on en fait des articles de code, excellents si on n'y voit, que
- l'expression hyperbolique de hauts sentiments moraux.” can
+ on en fait des articles de code, excellents si on n’y voit, que
+ l’expression hyperbolique de hauts sentiments moraux.” can
there, to our assigning to justice and
@@ -24416,7 +24417,7 @@
They are lashed and suffer all thingsHe turns the tables
here as in Gorg. 527 A. The late punishment of the
- wicked became an ethical commonplace. Cf. Plutarch's De sera
+ wicked became an ethical commonplace. Cf. Plutarch’s <title>De sera
numinis vindicta 1, also Job and
Psalms passim. which you truly said are
@@ -24442,7 +24443,7 @@
gladly listen.” “It is not, let me tell you,” said I, “the taleSee Proclus,
In Remp.,Kroll ii. 96 ff., Macrob. in
Somnium Scip. i. 2. The Epicurean Colotes highly
- disapproved of Plato's method of putting his beliefs in this form.
+ disapproved of Plato’s method of putting his beliefs in this form.
See Chassang, Histoire du roman, p. 15. See also
Dieterich, Nekyia, pp. 114 ff., and Adam ad
loc. to Alcinous told
@@ -24450,7 +24451,7 @@
became proverbial for a lengthy tale. See K. Tümpel, *)ALKI/NOU A)PO/LOGOS,
Philologus 52. 523 ff. that I shall
unfold, but the tale of a warrior bold,Plato puns on the name Alcinous. For other puns
- on proper names see on 580 B. See Arthur Platt, “Plato's Republic,
+ on proper names see on 580 B. See Arthur Platt, “Plato’s Republic,
614 B,” CIass. Review,1911, pp. 13-14. For the A)LLA\ ME/N without a corresponding
DE/ he compares
@@ -24463,7 +24464,7 @@
slain in battle, and when the corpses were taken up on the tenth day
already decayed, was found intact, and having been brought home, at the
moment of his funeral, on the twelfth dayThomas Browne, Urn
- Burial, ch. iii., “Plato's historian of the other world
+ Burial, ch. iii., “Plato’s historian of the other world
lies twelve days incorrupted, while his soul was viewing the large
stations of the dead,” See also Rohde, Psyche ii.6
pp. 92-93. as he lay upon the pyre, revived,Stories of persons
@@ -24477,7 +24478,7 @@
their adventures. Cf. also Luke xvi. 31 “If they hear
not Moses and the prophets neither will they be persuaded through
one rose from the dead.” But in that very parable Lazarus is shown
- in Abraham's bosom and the rich man in torment. See further,
+ in Abraham’s bosom and the rich man in torment. See further,
Proclus, In Remp. ii. pp. 113-116, Rohde,
Psyche ii.6 p. 191. and after coming to
life related what, he said, he had seen in the world beyond. He said
@@ -24493,13 +24494,13 @@
Bréhier, La Philos. de Plot. pp. 28-29: “Voyez, par
exemple, la manière dont Numénius . . . interprète le mythe du Xe
livre de Ia République, et comment il précise, avec
- Ia lourdeur d'un théologien, les traits que la poésie de Platon
- avait abandonnés à l'imagination du lecteur. Le lieu du jugement
+ Ia lourdeur d’un théologien, les traits que la poésie de Platon
+ avait abandonnés à l’imagination du lecteur. Le lieu du jugement
devient le centre du monde; le ciel platonicien devient Ia sphère
des fixes; le ‘lieu sonterrain’ où sont punies les âmes, ce sont les
planètes; la ‘bouche du ciel,’ par laquelle les âmes descendront à
- la naissance, est le tropique du Cancer; et c'est par le Capricorne
- qu'elles remontent.” where there were two openings side by
+ la naissance, est le tropique du Cancer; et c’est par le Capricorne
+ qu’elles remontent.” where there were two openings side by
side in the earth, and above and over against them in the heaven two
others, and that judges were sittingCf. Gorg. 523 E f., 524 E-525 B,
526 B-C. between these, and that after every judgement they
@@ -24514,7 +24515,7 @@
of all that had befallen them, and that when he himself
- drew near they told him that he must be the messengerCf. the rich man's
+ drew near they told him that he must be the messengerCf. the rich man’s
request that a messenger be sent to his brethren,
Luke xvi. 27-31. to mankind to tell them
of that other world,
@@ -24635,7 +24636,7 @@
Tartarus.Il. viii. 13 f., Hesiod, Theog.
682, 721, etc., Pind.Pyth. i. 15 f.,
- Eurip.Orest. 265ME/SON M'
+ Eurip.Orest. 265ME/SON M’
O)XMA/ZEIS W(S BA/LH|S EI)S *TA/RTARON. And
then, though many and manifold dread things had befallen them, this fear
exceeded all—lest each one should hear the voice when he tried to go up,
@@ -24651,7 +24652,7 @@
the rainbow, but brighter and purer. To this they came
- after going forward a day's journey, and they saw there
+ after going forward a day’s journey, and they saw there
at the middle of the light the extremities of its fastenings stretched
from heaven; for this light was the girdle of the heavens like the
undergirdersCf. Blaydes on Aristoph.Knights 279, Acts xxvii.
@@ -24666,13 +24667,13 @@
la naissance,” etc. St. Paulinus Nolanus calls it a
deliramentum. Tannery, Science
hellène, p. 238, thinks it alludes to the system of
- Parmenides. “Le fuseau central de la Nécessité l'indique
+ Parmenides. “Le fuseau central de la Nécessité l’indique
suffisamment; si la présence des sirènes est une marque de
pythagorisme, elle pent seulement signifier soit les relations de
- Parménide avec l’école soit plutôt l'origine des déterminations
+ Parménide avec l’école soit plutôt l’origine des déterminations
particulières que donne Platon et qui évidemment ne remontent pas à
l’Eléate.” Cf. ibid. p. 246. For various details of
- the picture cf. Milton, the Genius's speech in “Arcades” (quoted and
+ the picture cf. Milton, the Genius’s speech in “Arcades” (quoted and
commented on in E.M.W. Tillyard, Milton, p.
376). through which all the orbits turned. Its staff and its
hook were made of adamant, and the whorl of these and other kinds was
@@ -24683,7 +24684,7 @@
description we must conceive it to be as if in one great whorl, hollow
and scooped out, there lay enclosed, right through, another like it but
smaller, fitting into it as boxes that fit into one another,Cf. Burnet,
- Early Greek Philos. pp. 216-217 “In Plato's Myth
+ Early Greek Philos. pp. 216-217 “In Plato’s Myth
of Er, which is certainly Pythagorean in its general character, we
do not hear of spheres but of the ‘lips’ of concentric whorls fitted
into one another like a nest of boxes . . . “ With 616-617 Cf.
@@ -24716,7 +24717,7 @@
is attributed by Aetios ii. 16. 3 to Alkmaion (96), which certainly
implies that Pythagoras did not hold it. As we shall see (152) it is
far from clear that any of the Pythagoreans did. It seems rather to
- be Plato's discovery.” Cf. ibid. p. 352. and
+ be Plato’s discovery.” Cf. ibid. p. 352. and
of these seven the eighth moved most swiftly,
@@ -24733,7 +24734,7 @@
26, Mayor, vol. iii. p. 86, Macrob. on Somn. Scip.
ii. 3, Ritter-Preller (9th ed.), pp. 69-70 ( 81-82), K. Gronau,
Poseidonios und die jüdisch-christliche
- Genesisexegese, pp. 59-61. Aristotle's comment,
+ Genesisexegese, pp. 59-61. Aristotle’s comment,
De caelo 290 b 12 ff., is that the notion of a
music of the spheres is pretty and ingenious, but not true. He
reports the (Pythagorean?) explanation that we do not hear it
@@ -24743,7 +24744,7 @@
who sat round about at equal intervals, each one on her
- throne, the Fates,Pictured in Michelangelo's Le Parche. Cf. Catullus
+ throne, the Fates,Pictured in Michelangelo’s Le Parche. Cf. Catullus
64. 306 ff.; Lowell, “Villa Franca”: “Spin, Clotho, spin, Lachesis
twist and Atropos sever.” daughters of Necessity, clad in
white vestments with filleted heads, Lachesis, and Clotho, and Atropos,
@@ -24787,7 +24788,7 @@
Christ offers us redemption but does not force it upon us.
shall cast lots for you, but you shall choose your own deity. Let him to
whom falls the first lot first select a life to which he shall cleave of
- necessity. But virtue has no master over her,Cf. Milton's “Love Virtue; she alone
+ necessity. But virtue has no master over her,Cf. Milton’s “Love Virtue; she alone
is free” (Comus). and each shall have more or
less of her as he honors her or does her despite. The blame is his who
chooses: God is blameless.Justin Martyr.Apol. xliv. 8,
@@ -24864,7 +24865,7 @@
office and strength and weakness and quickness of apprehension and
dullness and all similar natural and acquired habits of the soul, when
blended and combined with one another,The singular verb is used after plural subjects,
- because the subjects are united in the writer's mind into one
+ because the subjects are united in the writer’s mind into one
general idea. Cf. Rep. 363 A, Laws 925
E, Symp. 188 B. so that with consideration of
all these things he will be able to make a reasoned choice between the
@@ -24880,7 +24881,7 @@
both for life and death. And a man must take with him
- to the house of death an adamantineSee Unity of Plato's Thought, p.
+ to the house of death an adamantineSee Unity of Plato’s Thought, p.
25, Laws 661-662, and for the word 360 B,
Gorg. 509 A. faith in this, that even
there he may be undazzledCf. 576 D. by riches and similar
@@ -24973,7 +24974,7 @@
eagle.Cf.
Aesch.Ag. 114 ff. Drawing one of the
middle lots the soul of Atalanta caught sight of the great honors
- attached to an athlete's life and could not pass them by but snatched at
+ attached to an athlete’s life and could not pass them by but snatched at
them.
@@ -25019,7 +25020,7 @@
Laws 957 E, Theaet. 169 C, and the
Platonic epigram on Dion, Anth. Pal. vii. 99*MOI=RAI E)PE/KLWSAN,
Od. i. 17, iii. 208, etc.,
- Aesch.Eumen. 335, Callinus i. 9*MOI=RAI E)PIKLW/SWS'.
+ Aesch.Eumen. 335, Callinus i. 9*MOI=RAI E)PIKLW/SWS’.
irreversible, and then without a backward look it passed beneath the
throne of Necessity.
@@ -25042,7 +25043,7 @@
and they were suddenly wafted thence, one this way, one that, upward to
their birth like shooting stars.In Tim. 41 D-E each soul is given
a star as its vehicle. Cf. Aristoph.Peace 833
- f.W(S A)STE/RES GIGNO/MEQ' O(TAN TIS
+ f.W(S A)STE/RES GIGNO/MEQ’ O(TAN TIS
A)POQA/NH| . . . with the Platonic epigram to *)/ASTHR: . . NU=N DE\ QANW\N LA/MPEIS *(/ESPEROS E)N
FQIME/NOISThere is an old superstition in European
folklore to the effect that when a star falls a soul goes up to God.
@@ -25067,7 +25068,7 @@
and we shall safely cross the River of Lethe, and keep our soul
unspotted from the world.Cf. James i. 27,
Phaedo 81 B, 2Peter iii. 14, and
- the Emperor Julian's last speech “animum . . . immaculatum
+ the Emperor Julian’s last speech “animum . . . immaculatum
conservavi.” Cf. Marius the Epicurean, pp. 15-16: “A
white bird, she told him once, looking at him gravely, a bird which
he must carry in his bosom across a crowded public place his own
@@ -25078,16 +25079,16 @@
ourselvesCf.
Laws 693 BE(AUTH=|
FI/LHN, Rep. 589 B, Horace,
- Epist. i. 3. 29 “si nobis vivere cari.” Jowett's
+ Epist. i. 3. 29 “si nobis vivere cari.” Jowett’s
“dear to one another” misses the point. Cf. my review of Lemercier,
Les Pensées de Marc-Aurèle, in Class.
Phil. vii. p. 115: “In iii. 4, in fine, the words
OI(/GE OU)DE\ AU)TOI\ E(AUTOI=S
A)RE/SKONTAI are omitted because ‘le gens que méprise
Marc-Aurèle sont loin de mépriser eux-mêmes.’ That is to forget that
- Seneca's ‘omnis stultitia fastidio laborat sui’ is good Stoic
+ Seneca’s ‘omnis stultitia fastidio laborat sui’ is good Stoic
doctrine, and that the idea that only the wise and good man can be
- dear to himself is found in the last sentence of Plato's
+ dear to himself is found in the last sentence of Plato’s
Republic.” Cf. also Soph. OC 309TI/S GA\R E)SQLO\S OU)X AU(TW=|
FI/LOS;. and to the gods both during our
diff --git a/data/tlg0059/tlg030/tlg0059.tlg030.perseus-grc1.xml b/data/tlg0059/tlg030/tlg0059.tlg030.perseus-grc1.xml
index 81a281d1b..426da9d1f 100644
--- a/data/tlg0059/tlg030/tlg0059.tlg030.perseus-grc1.xml
+++ b/data/tlg0059/tlg030/tlg0059.tlg030.perseus-grc1.xml
@@ -2681,7 +2681,7 @@
καὶ ἀλίβαντας, καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα τούτου τοῦ τύπου ὀνομαζόμενα φρίττειν δὴ ποιεῖ ὡς
- οἴεται†
+ οἴεται πάντας τοὺς ἀκούοντας. καὶ ἴσως εὖ ἔχει πρὸς ἄλλο τι· ἡμεῖς δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν
φυλάκων φοβούμεθα μὴ ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης φρίκης θερμότεροι καὶ μαλακώτεροι τοῦ
δέοντος γένωνται ἡμῖν.καὶ ὀρθῶς γʼ, ἔφη,
@@ -2717,7 +2717,7 @@
Hom. Il. 24.10-12
- τοτὲ δʼ ὀρθὸν ἀναστάντα πλωΐζοντʼ† ἀλύοντʼ
+ τοτὲ δʼ ὀρθὸν ἀναστάντα πλωΐζοντʼ ἀλύοντʼ
ἐπὶ
as their actual kinsmen—as brothers and sisters, if of a
suitable age; as parents and grandparents, if more advanced in age; and as
- children and children's children, if junior in age.Cf Rep. 457 ff.,461 D.
+ children and children’s children, if junior in age.Cf Rep. 457 ff.,461 D.Yes, this also, as you say, is easy to recollect.And in order that, to the best of our power, they might at
@@ -389,7 +389,7 @@
greatest are by fire and water, and lesser ones by countless other means. For in
truth the story that is told in your country as well as ours, how once upon a
time Phaethon, son of Helios,For the legend pf Phaethon see Ovid,Met.
- i. 751 ff. yoked his father's chariot, and, because he was unable to
+ i. 751 ff. yoked his father’s chariot, and, because he was unable to
drive it along the course taken by his father, burnt up all that was upon the
earth and himself perished by a thunderbolt,—that story, as it is told, has the
fashion of a legend, but the truth of it lies in
@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@
that you become young as ever, with no knowledge of all that happened in old
times in this land or in your own. Certainly the genealogies which you related
just now, Solon, concerning the people of your country, are little better than
- children's tales; for, in the first place, you remember but one deluge, though
+ children’s tales; for, in the first place, you remember but one deluge, though
many had occurred previously; and next, you are ignorant of the fact that the
noblest and most perfect race amongst men were born in the land where you now
dwell, and from them both you yourself are sprung and the whole
@@ -511,7 +511,7 @@
which, starting from a distant point in the Atlantic ocean, was insolently
advancing to attack the whole of Europe, and Asia to boot.
For the ocean there was at that time navigable; for in front of the mouth which
- you Greeks call, as you say, 'the pillars of Heracles,'i.e., the Straits of Gibraltar. there lay an island
+ you Greeks call, as you say, ’the pillars of Heracles,’i.e., the Straits of Gibraltar. there lay an island
which was larger than Libyai.e., Africa. and Asia together; and it was possible for the
travellers of that time to cross from it to the other islands, and from the
@@ -558,7 +558,7 @@
and when you were speaking yesterday about the State and the
citizens you were describing, I marvelled as I called to mind the facts I am now
relating, reflecting what a strange piece of fortune it was that your
- description coincided so exactly for the most part with Solon's account. I was
+ description coincided so exactly for the most part with Solon’s account. I was
loth, however,
@@ -575,7 +575,7 @@
and after I parted from them I pondered it over during the
night and recovered, as I may say, the whole story. Marvellous, indeed, is the
- way in which the lessons of one's childhood “grip the mind,” as the saying is.
+ way in which the lessons of one’s childhood “grip the mind,” as the saying is.
For myself, I know not whether I could recall to mind all that I heard
yesterday; but as to the account I heard such a great time ago, I should be
immensely surprised if a single detail of it has escaped me. I had then the
@@ -1086,7 +1086,7 @@
that what is become is become, and what is becoming is
becoming, and what is about to become is about to become, and what is
- non-existent is< non-existent; but none of these expressions is
+ non-existent is non-existent; but none of these expressions is
accurate.i.e.it is
incorrect to use the term “is” (ἐστί) both
as a mere copula and in the sense of “exists.” But the present is
@@ -1293,7 +1293,7 @@
order, therefore, that they may be mortal and that this World-all may be truly
All, do ye turn yourselves, as Nature directs, to the work of fashioning these
living creatures, imitating the power showed by me in my generating of you. Now
- so much of them as it is proper to designate 'immortal,' the part we call divine
+ so much of them as it is proper to designate ’immortal,’ the part we call divine
which rules supreme in those who are fain to follow justice always and
yourselves, that part I will deliver unto you when I have sown it and given it
origin.
@@ -1333,7 +1333,7 @@
these they will live justly, but if they are mastered, unjustly. And he that has
lived his appointed time well shall return again to his abode in his native
star, and shall gain a life that is blessed and congenial but whoso has failed
- therein shall be changed into woman's nature at the second birth;Cf. 90 E. and if, in
+ therein shall be changed into woman’s nature at the second birth;Cf. 90 E. and if, in
that shape, he still refraineth not from wickedness
@@ -1359,7 +1359,7 @@
way possible, to the utmost of their power, except in so far as it might itself
become the cause of its own evils.So He, then,
having given all these commands, was abiding in His own proper and wonted state.
- And as He thus abode, His children gave heed to their Father's command and
+ And as He thus abode, His children gave heed to their Father’s command and
obeyed it. They took the immortal principle of the mortal living creature, and
imitating their own Maker, they borrowed from the Cosmos portions of fire and
earth and water and air,
@@ -1467,12 +1467,12 @@
which has all manner of heights and hollows, and be at a loss how to climb over
the one and climb out of the other, they bestowed upon it the body as a vehicle
and means of transport. And for this reason the body acquired length, and, by
- God's contriving, shot forth four limbs, extensible and flexible,
+ God’s contriving, shot forth four limbs, extensible and flexible,
to serve as instruments of transport, so that grasping with
- these and' supported thereon it was enabled to travel through all places,
+ these and’ supported thereon it was enabled to travel through all places,
bearing aloft the chamber of our most divine and holy part. In this wise and for
these reasons were legs and hands attached to all men; and inasmuch as they
demand the forepart superior to the hinder part in honor and dignity, the Gods
@@ -1499,7 +1499,7 @@
principle that “like is known by like”: a fire-stream issuing from the eye
meets a fire-stream coming from the object of vision ( Cf. the view of
Empedocles). and coalescing therewith it forms one kindred substance
- along the path of the eyes' vision, wheresoever the fire which streams from
+ along the path of the eyes’ vision, wheresoever the fire which streams from
within collides with an obstructing object without. And this substance, having
all become similar in its properties because of its similar nature,
@@ -1688,7 +1688,7 @@
- and the second as the model's Copy, subject to becoming and
+ and the second as the model’s Copy, subject to becoming and
visible. A third kind we did not at that time distinguish, considering that
those two were sufficient; but now the argument seems to compel us to try to
reveal by words a Form that is baffling and obscure. What essential property,
@@ -2718,7 +2718,7 @@
which is midway between thesei.e., between the kinds of fire which produce
“blackness” and “brightness.” reaches to the liquid of the eyes and
is mingled therewith, it is not brilliant but, owing to the blending of the
- fire's ray through the moisture, it gives off a sanguine color, and we give it
+ fire’s ray through the moisture, it gives off a sanguine color, and we give it
the name of “red.” And “bright” color when blended with red and white becomes
“yellow.” But in what proportions the colors are blended it were foolish to
declare, even if one knew, seeing that in such matters one could not properly
@@ -2738,7 +2738,7 @@
what are the mixtures with which we ought to identify them if
we would preserve probability in our account. But should any inquirer make an
experimental test of these facts, he would evince his ignorance of the
- difference between man's nature and Gods—how that, whereas God is sufficiently
+ difference between man’s nature and Gods—how that, whereas God is sufficiently
wise and powerful to blend the many into one and to dissolve again the one into
many, there exists not now, nor ever will exist hereafter, a child of man
sufficient for either of these tasks.
@@ -2864,14 +2864,14 @@
share in the perception of reasons, it would have no natural instinct to pay
heed to any of them but would be bewitched for the most part both day and night
by images and phantasms,—to guard against this God devised and constructed the
- form of the liver and placed it in that part's abode;
+ form of the liver and placed it in that part’s abode;
and He fashioned it dense and smooth and bright and sweet, yet
containing bitterness, that the power of thoughts which proceed from the mind,
moving in the liver as in a mirror which receives impressions and provides
visible images, should frighten this part of the soul; for when the mental power
- bears down upon it with stern threats, it uses a kindred portion of the liver's
+ bears down upon it with stern threats, it uses a kindred portion of the liver’s
bitternessi.e.,
gall. and makes it swiftly suffuse the whole liver, so that it
exhibits bilious colors, and by contraction makes it
@@ -2900,7 +2900,7 @@
as good as they possibly could, rectified the vile part of us
by thus establishing therein the organ of divination, that it might in some
- degree lay hold on truth. And that God gave unto man's foolishness the gift of
+ degree lay hold on truth. And that God gave unto man’s foolishness the gift of
divinationCf.
Rep. 346 B,Laws772
D,Phaedo. 244 A ff. a sufficient token is this: no man
@@ -2917,7 +2917,7 @@
good in the future, the past, or the present. But it is not the task of him who
has been in a state of frenzy, and still continues therein, to judge the
apparitions and voices seen or uttered by himself; for it was well said of old
- that to do and to know one's own and oneself belongs only to him who is sound of
+ that to do and to know one’s own and oneself belongs only to him who is sound of
mind. Wherefore also it is customary to set the tribe of prophetsCf. Laws871 C,
Eurip.Ion413 ff. to pass judgement
@@ -3131,7 +3131,7 @@
moisture round the brain and spreading, formed a vesture round about the head;
and this was damped by the moisture ascending under the seams and closed down
over the crown, being drawn together as it were in a knot; and the seams had all
- kinds of shapes owing to the force of the soul's revolutions and of her food,
+ kinds of shapes owing to the force of the soul’s revolutions and of her food,
being more in number when these are more in conflict with one another, and less
when they are less in conflict.
@@ -3151,7 +3151,7 @@
constriction of the cold, whereby each hair as it separated off from the skin
was chilled and constricted. Making use, then, of the causes mentioned our Maker
fashioned the head shaggy with hair, purposing that, in place of flesh, the hair
- should serve as a light roofing for the part about the brain for safety's sake,
+ should serve as a light roofing for the part about the brain for safety’s sake,
@@ -3208,7 +3208,7 @@
of the skin and flesh they cut for hidden channels two
veinsi.e., the aorta
and the vena cava. The distinction between veins and arteries was unknown in
- Plato's time. along the
+ Plato’s time. along the
back, seeing that the body was in fact double, with right side and left; and
these they drew down along by the spine, keeping between them the spermatic
marrow, in order that this might thrive as much as possible, and that the stream
@@ -3312,7 +3312,7 @@
were a fount of fire residing within it; and this region we have, in fact,
likened to the envelope of the fish-weel, saying that all that was extended at
its middle was woven of fire, whereas all the other and outward parts were of
- air. Now we must agree that heat, by Nature's law, goes out into its own region
+ air. Now we must agree that heat, by Nature’s law, goes out into its own region
to its kindred substance; and inasmuch as there are two outlets, the one out by
way of the body,
@@ -3549,7 +3549,7 @@
and all other such humors as pour forth in the daily purgings
of the body. And all these are factors in disease, whenever the blood is not
replenished naturally from meats and drinks but receives its mass from opposite
- substances contrary to Nature's laws.Now, when
+ substances contrary to Nature’s laws.Now, when
the flesh in any part is being decomposed by disease, but the bases thereof
still remain firm, the force of the attack is reduced by half, for it still
admits of easy recovery;
@@ -3686,14 +3686,14 @@
one of which is madness, the other ignorance. Whatever affection a man suffers
from, if it involves either of these conditions it must be termed “disease”; and
we must maintain that pleasures and pains in excess are the greatest of the
- soul's diseases. For when a man is overjoyed or contrariwise suffering
+ soul’s diseases. For when a man is overjoyed or contrariwise suffering
excessively
from pain, being in haste to seize on the one and avoid the
other beyond measure, he is unable either to see or to hear anything correctly,
and he is at such a time distraught and wholly incapable of exercising reason.
- And whenever a man's seed grows to abundant volume in his marrow,Cf. 73 C, 91 C. as it
+ And whenever a man’s seed grows to abundant volume in his marrow,Cf. 73 C, 91 C. as it
were a tree that is overladen beyond measure with fruit, he brings on himself
time after time many pangs and many pleasures owing to his desires and the issue
thereof, and comes to be in a state of madness
@@ -3785,7 +3785,7 @@
and weak intellect, inasmuch as two desires naturally exist
- amongst men, —the desire of food for the body's sake, and the desire of wisdom
+ amongst men, —the desire of food for the body’s sake, and the desire of wisdom
for the sake of the most divine part we have,—the motions of the stronger part
prevail and augment their own power, but they make that of the soul obtuse and
dull of wit and forgetful, and thereby they produce within it that greatest of
@@ -3814,7 +3814,7 @@
man imitates that which we have called the nurturer and nurse of the
Universe,Cf. 49 A, 52
D. and never, if possible, allows the body to be at rest but keeps it
- moving, and by continually producing internal vibrations defends it in nature's
+ moving, and by continually producing internal vibrations defends it in nature’s
way against the inward and outward motions, and by means of moderate vibrations
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/tlg0059/tlg032/tlg0059.tlg032.perseus-grc1.xml b/data/tlg0059/tlg032/tlg0059.tlg032.perseus-grc1.xml
index 965a7797a..903a719d5 100755
--- a/data/tlg0059/tlg032/tlg0059.tlg032.perseus-grc1.xml
+++ b/data/tlg0059/tlg032/tlg0059.tlg032.perseus-grc1.xml
@@ -68,81 +68,81 @@
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/tlg0059/tlg033/tlg0059.tlg033.perseus-grc1.xml b/data/tlg0059/tlg033/tlg0059.tlg033.perseus-grc1.xml
index adb7767ab..7d2055d98 100755
--- a/data/tlg0059/tlg033/tlg0059.tlg033.perseus-grc1.xml
+++ b/data/tlg0059/tlg033/tlg0059.tlg033.perseus-grc1.xml
@@ -68,47 +68,47 @@
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/tlg0059/tlg034/tlg0059.tlg034.perseus-grc1.xml b/data/tlg0059/tlg034/tlg0059.tlg034.perseus-grc1.xml
index 9ba688ab6..88058bd71 100644
--- a/data/tlg0059/tlg034/tlg0059.tlg034.perseus-grc1.xml
+++ b/data/tlg0059/tlg034/tlg0059.tlg034.perseus-grc1.xml
@@ -4436,7 +4436,7 @@
Ἀθηναῖος
+
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
From 14d5b604460754f51561ea968d8006724461c294 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: lcerrato
Date: Wed, 17 May 2017 10:43:12 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 4/9] (tlg0059.tlg015_016) first pass on conversion 015 eng2
#414
---
.../tlg015/tlg0059.tlg015.perseus-eng2.xml | 299 ++++++++++++++++++
.../tlg015/tlg0059.tlg015.perseus-grc2.xml | 2 +-
2 files changed, 300 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100755 data/tlg0059/tlg015/tlg0059.tlg015.perseus-eng2.xml
diff --git a/data/tlg0059/tlg015/tlg0059.tlg015.perseus-eng2.xml b/data/tlg0059/tlg015/tlg0059.tlg015.perseus-eng2.xml
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..ed2efc7f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/tlg0059/tlg015/tlg0059.tlg015.perseus-eng2.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Hipparchus
+Plato
+Perseus Project, Tufts University
+Gregory Crane
+
+Prepared under the supervision of
+Lisa Cerrato
+William Merrill
+Elli Mylonas
+David Smith
+
+The Annenberg CPB/Project
+
+
+
+About 98Kb
+
+ Trustees of Tufts University
+ Medford, MA
+ Perseus Project
+
+
+
+
+ Text was scanned at St. Olaf Spring, 1992.
+
+
+
+ PlatoPlato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 8 translated by W.R.M. Lamb.
+
+ Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd.1955
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
This pointer pattern extracts section
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+English
+Greek
+
+
+ Socrates
+ Friend
+
+
+
+ EpiDoc and CTS conversion.
+ split composite text and converted to unicode
+ Tagged in conformance with Prose.e dtd.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
And what is love of gain? What can it be, and who are the lovers of gain?
+
In my opinion, they are those who think it worth while to make gain out of things of no worth.
+
Is it your opinion that they know those things to be of no worth, or do not know? For if they do not know, you mean that the lovers of gain are fools.
+
No, I do not mean they are fools, but rascals who wickedly yield to gain, because they know that the things out of which they dare to make their gain are worthless, and yet they dare to be lovers of gain from mere shamelessness.
+
Well now, do you mean by the lover of gain such a man, for instance, as a farmer who plants something which he knows is a worthless herb, and thinks fit to make gain out of it when he has reared it up? Is that the sort of man you mean?
+
The lover of gain, as such, Socrates, thinks he ought to make gain from everything.
+
Please do not speak so recklessly, as though you had been wronged by someone, but give me your attention and answer just as you would if I were beginning my questions over again. Do you not admit that the lover of gain has knowledge of the worth of the thing from which he thinks it worth while to make gain?
+
I do.
+
Then who has knowledge of the worth of plants, and of the sort of season and soil in which they are worth planting—if we too may throw in one of those artful phrases The “artful phrase” here is the jingling ὥρᾳ καὶ χώρᾳ, characteristic of the rhetoric taught by Gorgias and his followers. which adroit pleaders use to trick out their speeches in the law courts?
+
+
For my part, I should say a farmer.
+
And by “think it worth while to make gain” do you mean aught but “thinking one ought to make gain”?
+
I mean that.
+
+
+
Then do not attempt to deceive me, who am now quite an elderly person,
+ and you so young, by making, as you did just now, an answer that is not even your own thought; but tell me in all truth, do you suppose that any man who was taking up farming and who knew it was a worthless plant that he was planting, could think to make gain from it?
+
Upon my word, I do not.
+
Or again, take a horseman who knows that he is providing worthless food for his horse; do you suppose he is unaware that he is destroying his horse?
+
I do not.
+
+
So he does not think to make gain from that worthless food.
+
No.
+
Or again, take a navigator who has furnished his ship with worthless spars and ropes; do you think he is unaware that he will suffer for it, and will be in danger of being lost himself, and of losing the ship and all her cargo?
+
I do not.
+
So he does not think to make gain from
+ that worthless tackle?
+
No, indeed.
+
But does a general, who knows that his army has worthless arms, think to make gain, or think it worth while to make gain, from them?
+
By no means.
+
Or does a flute-player who has worthless flutes, or a harper with a lyre, a bowman with a bow, or anyone else at all, in short, among ordinary craftsmen or sensible men in general, with any implement or other equipment of any sort that is worthless, think to make gain from it?
+
+
To all appearance, no.
+
Then whoever can they be, your lovers of gain? For I presume they are not the people whom we have successively mentioned, but people who know their worthless things, and yet think they are to make gain from them. But in that case, by what you say, remarkable sir, no man alive is a lover of gain
+
Well, Socrates, I should like to call those lovers of gain who from insatiable greed consumedly long for things that are even quite petty and of little or no worth,
+ and so love gain, in each case.
+
Not knowing, of course, my excellent friend, that the things are worthless; for we have already convinced ourselves by our argument that this is impossible.
+
I agree.
+
And if not knowing this, clearly they are ignorant of it, but think that those worthless things are worth a great deal.
+
Apparently.
+
Now, of course lovers of gain must love gain?
+
Yes.
+
And by gain you mean the opposite of loss?
+
+
+
+
I do.
+
And is it a good thing for anyone to suffer loss?
+
For no one.
+
Rather an evil?
+
Yes.
+
So mankind are harmed by loss.
+
They are harmed.
+
Then loss is an evil.
+
Yes.
+
And gain is the opposite of loss.
+
The opposite.
+
So that gain is a good.
+
Yes.
+
Hence it is those who love the good that you call lovers of gain.
+
So it seems.
+
+
At least there is nothing mad, my friend, about lovers of gain, as you describe them. But tell me, do you yourself love, or not love, whatever is good?
+
I love it.
+
And is there anything good that you do not love, or must it then be evil?
+
Upon my word, nothing.
+
In fact, I expect you love all good things.
+
Yes.
+
Well now, ask me on my side whether I do not likewise: for I shall agree with you, for my part, that I love good things. But besides you and me, do you not think that all the rest of mankind
+ love good things, and hate evil things?
+
It appears so to me.
+
And we admitted that gain is good?
+
Yes.
+
On this new showing, everyone appears to be a lover of gain; whereas, by our former way of arguing, no one was a lover of gain. So on which of the two arguments are we to rely, in order to avoid error?
+
What has to be done, I think, Socrates, is to conceive the lover of gain rightly. The right view of the lover of gain is that he is one who concerns himself with,
+ and thinks fit to make gain from, things from which honest men do not dare to make gain.
+
But you see, my sweet sir, we have just admitted that making gain is being benefited.
+
Well, what of that?
+
There is the further point we have admitted in addition to this—that all men wish for good things always.
+
Yes.
+
Then good men likewise wish to have all gains, if these are good things.
+
+
Not those gains from which they are bound, Socrates, to suffer harm.
+
By “suffer harm” do you mean “suffer loss,” or something else?
+
No, I mean just “suffer loss.”
+
Well, do men suffer loss from gain or from loss?
+
From both; for they suffer loss from loss and from wicked gain.
+
Pray now, do you consider that any useful and good thing is wicked?
+
I do not.
+
+
+
+
And we admitted a little while ago that gain is the opposite of loss, which is an evil.
+
I agree.
+
And that, being the opposite of an evil, it is good?
+
That was our admission.
+
So you see, you are attempting to deceive me, for you deliberately contradict what we agreed to just now.
+
No, on my honor, Socrates; on the contrary, it is you who are deceiving me, by twisting this way and that so perplexingly in your talk.
+
+
Hush, hush! Why, surely it would be wrong of me not to obey a good and wise person.
+
Who is that? And to what are you referring now?
+
I mean my and your fellow-citizen, Pisistratus’s son Hipparchus, of Philaidae, who was the eldest and wisest of Pisistratus’s sons, and who, among the many goodly proofs of wisdom that he showed, first brought the poems of Homer into this country of ours, and compelled the rhapsodes at the Panathenaea to recite them in relay, one man following on another, as
+ they still do now. He dispatched a fifty-oared galley for Anacreon of Teos, and brought him into our city. Simonides of Ceos he always had about him, prevailing on him by plenteous fees and gifts. All this he did from a wish to educate the citizens, in order that he might have subjects of the highest excellence; for he thought it not right to grudge wisdom to any, so noble and good was he. And when his people in the city had been educated and were admiring him for his wisdom,
+ he proceeded next, with the design of educating those of the countryside, to set up figures of Hermes for them along the roads in the midst of the city and every district town; and then, after selecting from his own wise lore, both learnt from others and discovered for himself, the things that he considered the wisest, he threw these into elegiac form and inscribed them on the figures as verses of his own and testimonies of his wisdom, so that in the first place
+ his people should not admire those wise Delphic legends of “Know thyself” and “Nothing overmuch”, and the other sayings of the sort, but should rather regard as wise the utterances of Hipparchus; and that in the second place, through passing up and down and reading his words and acquiring a taste for his wisdom, they might resort hither from the country for the completion of their education.
+
+
+
There are two such inscriptions of his: on the left side
+ of each Hermes there is one in which the god says that he stands in the midst of the city or the township, while on the right side he says:The memorial of Hipparchus: walk with just intent.There are many other fine inscriptions from his poems on other figures of Hermes, and this one in particular, on the Steiria A town on the south-east coast of Attica. road, in which he says:
+The memorial of Hipparchus: deceive not a friend.I therefore should never dare, I am sure, to deceive you, who are my friend, or disobey the great Hipparchus, after whose death the Athenians were for three years under the despotic rule of his brother Hippias, and you might have heard anyone of the earlier period say that it was only in these years that there was despotism in Athens, On this point the writer agrees with Thuc. 6.59, who gives what is now the accepted story of Harmodius and Aristogeiton. and that at all other times the Athenians lived very much as in the reign of Cronos. And the subtler sort of people say
+ that Hipparchus’s death was due, not to the cause supposed by most—the disqualification of the assassin’s sister from bearing the basket, In the Panathenaic procession. for that is a silly motive—but because Harmodius had become the favorite of Aristogeiton and had been educated by him. Thus Aristogeiton also prided himself on educating people, and he regarded Hipparchus as a dangerous rival. And at that time, it is said, Harmodius
+ happened to be himself in love with one of the handsome and well-born youths of the day; they do tell his name, but I cannot remember it. Well, for a while this youth admired both Harmodius and Aristogeiton as wise men, but afterwards, when he associated with Hipparchus, he despised them, and they were so overcome with the pain of this “disqualification” that they slew Hipparchus. This curious version of the fall of the Pisistratid rulers (Hippias and Hipparchus) seeks to explain the conspiracy as due to a rivalry in a sort of pre-Socratic influence over young men which arose between the citizen Aristogiton and the ruler Hipparchus.
+
It would seem, then, Socrates, either that you do not regard me as your friend, or if you do, that you do not obey Hipparchus.
+ For that you are not deceiving me—though I cannot tell how you contrive it—in your talk, is more than I can believe.
+
Well now, as though we were playing draughts, I am willing to let you revoke, as you please, anything you have said in carrying on the discussion, in order that you may not think you are being deceived. So tell me, shall I revoke for you the statement that all men desire good things?
+
No, thank you.
+
Well, that suffering loss, or loss, is an evil?
+
No, thank you.
+
Well, that gain, or making gain, is the opposite of loss, or suffering loss?
+
+
+
+
Nor that either.
+
Well, that making gain, as the opposite of evil, is a good?
+
Nothing of all this do I bid you revoke for me.
+
You think, then, it seems, that some gain is good, and some evil.
+
I do.
+
Well then, I revoke so much for you; so let us assume that some gain is good, and some other gain evil. But the good sort is no more gain than the evil sort, is it?
+
What do you mean by this question?
+
I will explain. Is there both good and evil food?
+
+
Yes.
+
And is the one sort more food than the other, or are they both similarly this same thing, food, and in this respect does the one differ no wise from the other, in being food, but only in the fact of the one being good and the other evil?
+
Yes.
+
And so with drink and every other class of things that exist, when some things in any class come to be good, and others evil, one thing does not differ from another in that respect whereby they are the same? For instance,
+ one man, I suppose, is virtuous, and another wicked.
+
Yes.
+
But neither of them, I conceive, is more or less man than the other—neither the virtuous than the wicked, nor the wicked than the virtuous.
+
What you say is true.
+
Then are we to take the same view of gain also, that both the wicked and the virtuous sort are similarly gain?
+
Necessarily.
+
So he who has virtuous gain is no whit the more a gainer than he who has wicked gain: neither sort
+ is found to be more gain, as we agree.
+
Yes.
+
For neither of them has addition of either more or less.
+
No, indeed.
+
And how could one do or suffer anything more or less with a thing of this sort, that had neither of these additions?
+
Impossible.
+
Since, therefore, both of these are gains and gain-making affairs, we must now consider what it can be that leads you to call both of them gain:
+ what is it that you see to be the same in both? Suppose you were to ask me, in those instances that I gave just now, what it is that leads me to call both good food and evil food alike food, I should tell you— for this reason, because both are a dry sustenance of the body. For that, I am sure you would agree, is what food is, would you not?
+
I would.
+
+
+
And so too about drink the answer would be on the same lines, that the wet sustenance of the body,
+ whether it be wholesome or pernicious, has this name of drink; and likewise with the rest. Try therefore on your part to imitate my method of answering. When you say that virtuous gain and wicked gain are both gain, what is it that you see to be the same in them, judging it to be the actual element of gain? And if again you are yourself unable to answer, just let me put it for your consideration, whether you describe as gain every acquisition that one has acquired either with no expense, or as a profit over and above one’s expense.
+
+
I believe that is what I call gain.
+
Do you include a case where, after enjoying a banquet at which one has had much good cheer without any expense, one acquires an illness?
+
Upon my word, not I.
+
And if one acquired health from attending a banquet, would one acquire gain or loss?
+
Gain.
+
Hence gain is not just acquiring any acquisition.
+
No, indeed.
+
Do you mean, not if it is evil? Or will one acquire no gain even if one acquires something good?
+
Apparently one will, if it is good.
+
+
And if it is evil, will not one acquire loss?
+
I think so.
+
You see, then, how you are running round again to the same old point? Gain is found to be good, and loss evil.
+
For my part, I cannot tell what to say.
+
And not without good reason, sir. Now answer this further question: you say that if one acquires more than the amount one has spent, it is gain?
+
I do not mean, when it is evil, but if one gets more gold or silver than one has spent.
+
Now, I am just going to ask you about that. Tell me,
+ if one spends half a pound of gold and gets double that weight in silver, has one got gain or loss?
+
Loss, I presume, Socrates for one’s gold is reduced to twice, instead of twelve times, the value of silver.
+
But you see, one has got more; or is double not more than half?
+
Not in worth, the one being silver and the other gold.
+
So gain, it seems, must have this addition of worth. At least, you now say that silver, though more than gold, is not worth as much, and that gold, though less, is of equal worth.
+
+
Assuredly, for that is the case.
+
Then the valuable is what produces gain, whether it be small or great, and the valueless produces no gain.
+
Yes.
+
And by the valuable you mean simply, valuable to possess?
+
Yes, to possess.
+
And again, by what is valuable to possess, do you mean the unprofitable or the profitable?
+
The profitable, I presume.
+
And the profitable is good?
+
Yes.
+
+
+
+
And so, most valiant of men, have we not here once more, for the third or fourth time, the admission that what produces gain is good?
+
So it seems.
+
Then do you remember the point from which this discussion of ours arose?
+
I think I do.
+
In case you do not, I will remind you. You maintained against me that good men do not wish to make all sorts of gain, but only those gains that are good, and not those that are wicked.
+
Yes.
+
+
And now the argument has compelled us to acknowledge that all gains, both small and great, are good?
+
Yes, it has compelled me, at least, Socrates, rather than persuaded me.
+
Well, later on, perhaps, it might also persuade you. Now, however, whether you are persuaded or whatever is your feeling, you at least agree with me that all gains are good, both small and great ones.
+
Yes, I do admit it.
+
And you admit that virtuous men all wish for all good things, do you not?
+
I do.
+
+
But, you know, you stated yourself that wicked men love both small and great gains.
+
I did.
+
And so, by your account, all men will be lovers of gain, whether they be virtuous or wicked.
+
Apparently.
+
Hence it is not right to reproach anybody with being a lover of gain: for he who makes this reproach is actually such an one himself.
+
+
+
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From 0a1a81aab27d4e62272399570dd614fc5b8f2112 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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Date: Wed, 17 May 2017 11:29:22 -0400
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+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Lovers
+Plato
+Perseus Project, Tufts University
+Gregory Crane
+
+Prepared under the supervision of
+Lisa Cerrato
+William Merrill
+Elli Mylonas
+David Smith
+
+The Annenberg CPB/Project
+
+
+
+About 98Kb
+
+
+ Trustees of Tufts University
+ Medford, MA
+ Perseus Project
+
+
+Text was scanned at St. Olaf Spring, 1992.
+
+
+
+ PlatoPlatonis Opera, ed. John Burnet
+
+ Oxford University Press1903
+
+
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+
This pointer pattern extracts section
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+Greek
+English
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+ Σωκράτης
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+ EpiDoc and CTS conversion.
+ split composite text and converted to unicode
+ Tagged in conformance with Prose.e dtd.
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From a54cfc09c5b332a4093c407bd7efc2225a53a637 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: lcerrato
Date: Wed, 17 May 2017 12:10:14 -0400
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+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Lovers
+Plato
+Perseus Project, Tufts University
+Gregory Crane
+
+Prepared under the supervision of
+Lisa Cerrato
+William Merrill
+Elli Mylonas
+David Smith
+
+The Annenberg CPB/Project
+
+
+
+About 98Kb
+
+
+ Trustees of Tufts University
+ Medford, MA
+ Perseus Project
+
+
+Text was scanned at St. Olaf Spring, 1992.
+
+
+
+ PlatoPlato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 8 translated by W.R.M. Lamb.
+
+ Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd.1955
+
+
+
+
+
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+
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+
This pointer pattern extracts section
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+English
+Greek
+
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+ Socrates
+
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+
+ EpiDoc and CTS conversion.
+ split composite text and converted to unicode
+ Tagged in conformance with Prose.e dtd.
+
+
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+
+
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+
+
I entered the grammar school of the teacher Dionysius, and saw there the young men who are accounted the most comely in form and of distinguished family, and their lovers. Now it chanced that two of the young people were disputing, but about what, I did not clearly overhear: it appeared, however, that they were disputing either about Anaxagoras The Ionian philosopher who lived in friendship with Pericles at Athens. or about Oenopides A philosopher of Chios, distinguished as a geometer and astronomer.; at any rate, they appeared to be drawing circles,
+ and they were imitating certain inclinations i.e., the slopes of the contours of the earth, and of the apparent course of the sun(ecliptic). with their arms, bending to it and taking it most earnestly. Then I—for I was sitting beside the lover of one of the pair—nudged him with my elbow and asked him what on earth the two youngsters were so earnest about, and I said: Is it then something great and fine, in which they are so earnestly immersed?
+
+
Great and fine, indeed! he replied: why, these fellows are prating about the heavenly bodies, and babbling philosophy. Then I, surprised at his answer, said: Young man, do you consider philosophizing to be shameful? Else, why do you speak so sharply?
+
+
Then the other youth—for he chanced to be sitting near him, as his rival in love—when he heard my question and his rival’s answer, said: You do yourself no good, Socrates, by pressing this fellow with a further question, as to whether he considers philosophizing to be shameful. Do you not know that he has spent the whole of his life in practising the neckhold, and stuffing himself, and sleeping? So why did you suppose he would make any other reply than that philosophy is shameful? Now this one of the two lovers had spent his time on humane studies, Literally, on music, which with the Greeks included poetry and general literature as well as music. whereas the other, whom he was abusing, had spent his on athletics. So I decided that I had best relinquish the other, whom I had been questioning, since he did not even himself set up to be experienced in words, but only in deeds; and that I should interrogate the one who set up to be wiser, in order that so far as I was able I might get some benefit from him. I said therefore: I addressed my question to both in common; but if you think you could answer more creditably than he, I put the same question to you as I did to him: do you consider philosophizing to be honorable or not?
+
+
+
+
Then the two striplings, overhearing us speak somewhat like this, were silent, and ceasing from their own contention they became listeners to ours. What their lovers’ sensations were, I do not know, but I myself, at any rate, was staggered; for every time I am staggered by handsome young people. It seemed to me, however, that my young friend too was in as great a flutter as myself; but nevertheless he answered me in a most ambitious spirit: Why, of course, Socrates, he said, if I should ever consider philosophizing to be shameful, I should not account myself so much as a man,
+nor anyone else either who was disposed to think so. Here he pointed to his rival lover, and spoke with a loud voice, in order that his favorite might hear every word.
+
+
Then I remarked: So philosophizing seems to you to be honorable?
+
+
Quite so, he said.
+
+
Well now, I said; does it seem to you possible to know whether anything is honorable or shameful without knowing what it is fundamentally?
+
+
No, he said.
+Then do you know, I went on, what philosophizing is?
+
+
Certainly I do, said he.
+
+
Then what is it? I asked.
+
+
Why, just what Solon called it; you know it was Solon who said:And ever, as I older grow, I learn yet more and more;Solon Fr. 18—and I agree with him that a man who intends to philosophize should in this way be ever learning something or other, whether he be younger or older, in order that he may learn as many things as possible in his life. Now at first I felt there was something in his reply, but then, on second thoughts, I asked him whether he considered philosophy to be much learning.
+To which he answered: Certainly.
+
+
And do you consider philosophy to be merely honorable, I asked, or good as well?
+
+
Good as well, he said: very much so.
+
+
Then do you observe this as peculiar to philosophy, or do you find it similarly in everything else? For example, do you consider the love of athletics to be not merely honorable, but good as well, or do you not?
+
+
Whereupon he, most slily, gave a double answer: To him my statement must be neither; but to you, Socrates, I acknowledge it to be both honorable and good:
+for I consider this the right view.
+
+
Then I asked him: Well now, in athletics, do you consider that much exercise is love of athletics?
+
+
To which he replied: Certainly, just as in philosophizing I consider much learning to be philosophy.
+
+
Then I said: And do you then consider that the lovers of athletics desire anything else than that which will cause them to be in good bodily condition?
+
+
Only that, he replied.
+
+
And does much exercise, I asked, cause them to be in good bodily condition?
+
+
+
+
Yes, for how, he replied, could one be in good bodily condition through little exercise?
+
+
Here I felt it was time to stir up the lover of athletics, in order that he might give me the support of his athletic experience; so I proceeded to ask him: And you then, pray, why are you silent, excellent sir, while your friend here is speaking thus? Do you agree that men are in good bodily condition through much exercise, or is it rather through moderate exercise?
+
+
For my part, Socrates, he said, I thought even a pig—
+as the saying is—would have known that moderate exercise causes them to be in good bodily condition, so why should not a fellow who is sleepless and unfed, with unchafed neck and slender, care-worn frame! And when he had said this the boys were delighted and laughed their approval, while the other lover blushed.
+
+
Then I said to him: Well, do you now concede that it is neither much, nor little, but moderate exercise that causes men to be in good bodily condition? Or do you bid defiance to the two of us on this point? To which he answered: Against him I should be only too glad to fight it out, and I am certain I should prove able to support the theory I have put forward, even had I put forward a weaker one; for he is naught. But with you I do not aim at winning an unscrupulous success; and so I admit that not a great but a moderate amount of athletics causes good condition in men.
+
+
And what of food? Moderate or much? I asked.
+
+
The same applied to food, he admitted. Then I went on and tried to compel him also to admit that everything else connected with the body when most beneficial, was the moderate thing, not the much or the little; and he admitted that it was the moderate thing.
+
+
And now, I said, as regards the soul; are moderate or immoderate things beneficial, as adjuncts of it?
+
+
Moderate things, he replied.
+
+
And are studies among the adjuncts of the soul?
+
+
He admitted they were.
+
+
So among these also it is the moderate that are beneficial, and not the much?
+
+
He agreed.
+
+
Then whom should we be justified in asking what sort of exercise or food is moderate for the body?
+
+
The three of us agreed that it must be a doctor or a trainer. And whom should we ask about the moderate measure in the sowing of seed?
+
+
In that matter, we agreed, it must be a farmer.
+
+
And whom should we be justified in asking as to the moderate degree and kind, in regard to the sowing and planting of studies in the soul?
+
+
+
At this point we all began to be full of perplexity;
+then I, mocking at them, asked: Do you mind, since we are in perplexity, if we ask these boys here? or perhaps we are ashamed, as Homer Od. xxi. 285 foll., where the suitors of Penelope are ashamed, after they have failed to string the great bow of Odysseus, to let its owner, disguised as a beggar, try his strength on it, and perhaps succeed. said the suitors were, and do not think it fit there should be someone else who will string the bow?
+
+
Then, as it seemed to me that they were losing their zeal for the argument, I tried to pursue the inquiry in another way, and said: But what, as nearly as we can guess, are the kinds of learning which the philosopher should learn, since he is not to learn all things or many things? At this the wiser one interjected: The finest and most suitable kinds of learning are those which will bring him the most reputation for philosophy; and he will get most reputation if he appears well versed in all the arts, or if not in all, in as many of them, and those the most considerable, as he can, by learning so much of them as befits a free man to learn, that is, what belongs to the understanding rather than the handiwork of each.
+
+
Well now, do you mean, I asked, in the same way as in carpentry? For there, you know, you can buy a carpenter for five or six minae, A mina(=100 drachmae)would be about 6-8 pounds in our money today. but a first-rate architect cannot be got for even ten thousand drachmae; few such, indeed, could be found throughout the whole of Greece. Is it something of this sort that you mean? When he heard me say this, he admitted that something like this was what he himself meant.
+
+
I next asked him if it was not impossible for the same person to learn in this way merely two of the arts, not to speak of many or the principal ones; to which he replied: Do not conceive me, Socrates, to be stating that the philosopher must have accurate knowledge of each of the arts, like the actual adept in any of them; I mean only so far as may be expected of a free and educated man: that is, he should be able to follow the explanations of the craftsman more readily than the rest of the company, and to contribute an opinion of his own which will make him appear the cleverest and most accomplished of the company who may at any time be present at some verbal or practical exposition of the arts.
+
+
Then, as I was still unsettled in my mind as to the drift of his words, I asked him: Do I quite grasp the sort of man whom you mean by the philosopher? For you seem to me to mean someone like the all-round athletes Literally, athletes trained for the contest of the five exercises of leaping, running, disc-flinging, javelin-throwing, and wrestling. in contest with the runners or the wrestlers: the former yield, you know, to the latter in their particular exercises, and are their inferiors in these, but are superior to the usual sort of athletes and beat them.
+
+
+
I daresay it may be something of this sort that you would suggest as the effect produced by philosophy on those who make it their pursuit: they yield to those who are first-rate in an understanding of the arts, but in taking the second place they surpass the rest; and in this way the man who has studied philosophy comes just next to the top in everything. That is the kind of person whom you appear to me to indicate.
+
+
You are quite right, it seems to me, Socrates, he said, in your conception of the philosopher’s position, with your comparison of him to the all-round athlete. For it is precisely his nature not to be enslaved to any business, or to work out anything exactly, so as to let his application to that one matter make him deficient in the rest, as the craftsmen do, but to have a moderate contact with all of them.
+
+
Well, after this answer I was eager to know clearly what he meant, so I inquired of him whether he conceived of good men as useful or useless.
+
+
Useful, I should say, Socrates, he replied.
+
+
Then if good men are useful, are wicked men useless?
+
+
He agreed that they were.
+
+
Again, do you consider that philosophers are useful persons or not? He agreed that they were useful; nay, more, that he considered they were most useful of all.
+
+
Come now, let us make out, if what you say is true, where these second-best men are also useful to us: for clearly the philosopher is inferior to any particular adept in the arts.
+
+
He agreed.
+
+
Well now, I went on, if you yourself, or one of your friends for whom you feel great concern, should have fallen sick, would you fetch that second-best man into the house with a view to obtaining health, or would you summon a doctor? For my part, I should have both, he replied.
+
+
Please do not say both, I said, but which of the two you would prefer and also summon first.
+
+
No one, he replied,would make any question but that the doctor should be preferred and also summoned first.
+
+
And again, if you were in a ship that was making rough weather, to which would you rather entrust yourself and yours, the pilot or the philosopher?
+
+
I should choose the pilot.
+
+
And so it will be in everything else: so long as there is some craftsman, the philosopher will not be useful?
+
+
Apparently, he replied. So now we find that the philosopher is a useless person? For I suppose we always have craftsmen; and we have agreed that good men are useful, and bad ones useless.
+
+
He was obliged to agree to this.
+
+
Then what follows? Am I to ask you, or will it be too ill-mannered?
+
+
Ask whatever you please.
+
+
+
Well, my aim, I said, is merely to recall our agreements upon what has been stated. The matter stands somewhat like this. We agreed that philosophy is an honorable thing, and that philosophers are good; and that good men are useful, and wicked men useless: but then again we agreed that philosophers, so long as we have craftsmen, are useless, and that we always do have craftsmen. Has not all this been agreed?
+
+
Yes, to be sure, he replied.
+
+
Then we agreed, it seems, by your account—if philosophizing means having knowledge of the arts in the way you describe—that philosophers are wicked and useless so long as there are arts among mankind. But I expect they are not so really, my friend, and that philosophizing is not just having a concernment in the arts or spending one’s life in meddlesome stooping and prying and accumulation of learning, but something else; because I imagined that this life was actually a disgrace, and that people who concerned themselves with the arts were called sordid. βάναυσος expresses the peculiar contempt felt by Greek gentlemen for the work of artisans and even artists. Manual labor was the business of slaves and persons who were unfit for military and political life. But we shall know more definitely whether this statement of mine is true, if you will answer me this: What men know how to punish horses rightly?
+ Is it those who make them into the best horses, or some other men?
+
+
Those who make them into the best horses.
+
+
Or again, is it not the men who know how to make dogs into the best dogs that know also how to punish them rightly?
+
+
Yes.
+
+
Then it is the same art that makes them into the best dogs and punishes them rightly?
+
+
It appears so to me, he replied.
+
+
Again, is the art that makes them into the best ones and punishes them rightly the same as that which knows the good and the bad ones, or is it some other?
+
+
The same, he said.
+
+
Then in the case of men also will you be prepared to agree that the art which makes them into the best men is that which punishes them rightly and distinguishes the good and the bad ones?
+
+
Certainly, he said.
+
+
And that which does this to one, does it also to many, and that which does it to many, does it also to one?
+
+
Yes.
+
+
And so it is also with horses and everything else?
+
+
I agree.
+
+
Then what is the knowledge which rightly punishes the licentious and law-breaking people in our cities? Is it not judicature?
+
+
Yes.
+
+
And is it any other art than this that you call justice?
+
+
No, only this. And that whereby they punish rightly is that whereby they know the good and bad people?
+
+
It is.
+
+
And whoever knows one will know many also?
+
+
Yes.
+
+
And whoever does not know many will not know one?
+
+
I agree.
+
+
Then if one were a horse, and did not know the good and wicked horses, would one not know which sort one was oneself?
+
+
I think not.
+
+
And if one were an ox and did not know the wicked and good oxen, would one not know which sort one was oneself?
+
+
That is so, he said.
+
+
And so it would be, if one were a dog?
+
+
He agreed.
+
+
+
+
Well now, when one is a man, and does not know the good and bad men, one surely cannot know whether one is good or wicked oneself, since one is a man also oneself?
+
+
He granted this.
+
+
And is not knowing oneself being temperate, Cf. Charmides (Introduction and 164) for the connection in thought and language between temperance and self-knowledge. or not being temperate?
+
+
Not being temperate.
+
+
So knowing oneself is being temperate?
+
+
I agree, he said.
+
+
So this is the message, it seems, of the Delphic inscription—that one is to practise temperance and justice.
+
+
It seems so.
+
+
And it is by this same art that we know also how to punish rightly?
+
+
Yes.
+
+
Then that whereby we know how to punish rightly
+is justice, and that whereby we know how to distinguish our own and others’ quality is temperance?
+
+
It seems so, he said.
+
+
Then justice and temperance are the same thing?
+
+
Apparently.
+
+
And further, it is thus, you know, that cities are well ordered—when the wrongdoers pay the penalty.
+
+
That is true, he said.
+
+
Hence this is also statecraft.
+
+
He concurred.
+
+
Again, when one man governs a city rightly, is he not called a despot and king?
+
+
I agree.
+
+
And he governs by a kingly and despotic art?
+
+
That is so.
+
+
And these arts are the same as the former?
+
+
Apparently. Again, when a man singly governs a house aright, what is he called? Is he not a house-manager and master?
+
+
Yes.
+
+
Then would he also govern his house well by justice, or by some other art?
+
+
By justice.
+
+
Hence they are all the same, it seems,—king, despot, statesman, house-manager, master, and the temperate man and the just man; and it is all one art,—the kingly, the despotic, the statesman’s, the master’s, the house-manager’s, and justice and temperance.
+
+
It is so, apparently, he said. Then, if it is disgraceful in the philosopher to be unable, when a doctor speaks about the sick, either to follow his remarks or to contribute anything of his own to what is being said or done, and to be in the same case when any other of the craftsmen speaks, is it not disgraceful that he should be unable, when it is a judge or a king or some other of the persons whom we have just instanced, either to follow their words or contribute anything to their business?
+
+
It must indeed be disgraceful, Socrates, to have nothing to contribute to subjects of such great importance! Are we then to say, I asked, that in these matters also he is to be an all-round athlete, a second-rate man, taking the second place in all the subjects of this art—he, the philosopher—and is to be useless so long as there is one of these persons; or that, first of all, he is to entrust his own house to nobody else and is not to take the second place in it, but is himself to judge and punish rightly, if his house is to be well managed?
+
+
He granted me that it must be so.
+
+
+
Secondly, I presume, whether his friends entrust him with an arbitration, or the state charges him to determine or judge any matter, it is disgraceful for him, my good friend, in such cases, to be found in the second or third place, and not to lead?
+
+
I agree.
+
+
Hence we see, my excellent sir, that philosophizing is very far from being much learning and that affair of busying oneself with the arts.
+
+
On my saying this the cultivated youth was silent, feeling ashamed for what he had said before, while the unlearned one said it was as I stated; and the rest of the company praised the argument.
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From e731338bafdc3d1022fb4077a1212f6be9eb26e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: lcerrato
Date: Wed, 17 May 2017 12:32:45 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 7/9] (tlg0059.tlg015_016) fixed missing end div tag 016 eng2
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data/tlg0059/tlg016/tlg0059.tlg016.perseus-eng2.xml | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/data/tlg0059/tlg016/tlg0059.tlg016.perseus-eng2.xml b/data/tlg0059/tlg016/tlg0059.tlg016.perseus-eng2.xml
index 626c26fab..4069410c4 100755
--- a/data/tlg0059/tlg016/tlg0059.tlg016.perseus-eng2.xml
+++ b/data/tlg0059/tlg016/tlg0059.tlg016.perseus-eng2.xml
@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@
And what is love of gain? What can it be, and who are the lovers of gain?
Friend
In my opinion, they are those who think it worth while to make gain out of things of no worth.
Socrates
Is it your opinion that they know those things to be of no worth, or do not know? For if they do not know, you mean that the lovers of gain are fools.
Friend
No, I do not mean they are fools, but rascals who wickedly yield to gain, because they know that the things out of which they dare to make their gain are worthless,
-and yet they dare to be lovers of gain from mere shamelessness.
Socrates
Well now, do you mean by the lover of gain such a man, for instance, as a farmer who plants something which he knows is a worthless herb, and thinks fit to make gain out of it when he has reared it up? Is that the sort of man you mean?
Friend
The lover of gain, as such, Socrates, thinks he ought to make gain from everything.
Socrates
Please do not speak so recklessly, as though you had been wronged by someone,
-but give me your attention and answer just as you would if I were beginning my questions over again. Do you not admit that the lover of gain has knowledge of the worth of the thing from which he thinks it worth while to make gain?
Friend
I do.
Socrates
Then who has knowledge of the worth of plants, and of the sort of season and soil in which they are worth planting—if we too may throw in one of those artful phrases The “artful phrase” here is the jingling W(/RA| KAI\ XW/RA|, characteristic of the rhetoric taught by Gorgias and his followers. which adroit pleaders use to trick out their speeches in the law courts?
-
Friend
For my part, I should say a farmer.
Socrates
And by “think it worth while to make gain” do you mean aught but “thinking one ought to make gain”?
Friend
I mean that.
Socrates
Then do not attempt to deceive me, who am now quite an elderly person,
-and you so young, by making, as you did just now, an answer that is not even your own thought; but tell me in all truth, do you suppose that any man who was taking up farming and who knew it was a worthless plant that he was planting, could think to make gain from it?
Friend
Upon my word, I do not.
Socrates
Or again, take a horseman who knows that he is providing worthless food for his horse; do you suppose he is unaware that he is destroying his horse?
Friend
I do not.
-
Socrates
So he does not think to make gain from that worthless food.
Friend
No.
Socrates
Or again, take a navigator who has furnished his ship with worthless spars and ropes; do you think he is unaware that he will suffer for it, and will be in danger of being lost himself, and of losing the ship and all her cargo?
Friend
I do not.
Socrates
So he does not think to make gain from
-that worthless tackle?
Friend
No, indeed.
Socrates
But does a general, who knows that his army has worthless arms, think to make gain, or think it worth while to make gain, from them?
Friend
By no means.
Socrates
Or does a flute-player who has worthless flutes, or a harper with a lyre, a bowman with a bow, or anyone else at all, in short, among ordinary craftsmen or sensible men in general, with any implement or other equipment of any sort that is worthless, think to make gain from it?
-
Friend
To all appearance, no.
Socrates
Then whoever can they be, your lovers of gain? For I presume they are not the people whom we have successively mentioned, but people who know their worthless things, and yet think they are to make gain from them. But in that case, by what you say, remarkable sir, no man alive is a lover of gain
Friend
Well, Socrates, I should like to call those lovers of gain who from insatiable greed consumedly long for things that are even quite petty and of little or no worth,
-and so love gain, in each case.
Socrates
Not knowing, of course, my excellent friend, that the things are worthless; for we have already convinced ourselves by our argument that this is impossible.
Friend
I agree.
Socrates
And if not knowing this, clearly they are ignorant of it, but think that those worthless things are worth a great deal.
Friend
Apparently.
Socrates
Now, of course lovers of gain must love gain?
Friend
Yes.
Socrates
And by gain you mean the opposite of loss?
-
Friend
I do.
Socrates
And is it a good thing for anyone to suffer loss?
Friend
For no one.
Socrates
Rather an evil?
Friend
Yes.
Socrates
So mankind are harmed by loss.
Friend
They are harmed.
Socrates
Then loss is an evil.
Friend
Yes.
Socrates
And gain is the opposite of loss.
Friend
The opposite.
Socrates
So that gain is a good.
Friend
Yes.
Socrates
Hence it is those who love the good that you call lovers of gain.
Friend
So it seems.
-
Socrates
At least there is nothing mad, my friend, about lovers of gain, as you describe them. But tell me, do you yourself love, or not love, whatever is good?
Friend
I love it.
Socrates
And is there anything good that you do not love, or must it then be evil?
Friend
Upon my word, nothing.
Socrates
In fact, I expect you love all good things.
Friend
Yes.
Socrates
Well now, ask me on my side whether I do not likewise: for I shall agree with you, for my part, that I love good things. But besides you and me, do you not think that all the rest of mankind
-love good things, and hate evil things?
Friend
It appears so to me.
Socrates
And we admitted that gain is good?
Friend
Yes.
Socrates
On this new showing, everyone appears to be a lover of gain; whereas, by our former way of arguing, no one was a lover of gain. So on which of the two arguments are we to rely, in order to avoid error?
Friend
What has to be done, I think, Socrates, is to conceive the lover of gain rightly. The right view of the lover of gain is that he is one who concerns himself with,
-and thinks fit to make gain from, things from which honest men do not dare to make gain.
Socrates
But you see, my sweet sir, we have just admitted that making gain is being benefited.
Friend
Well, what of that?
Socrates
There is the further point we have admitted in addition to this—that all men wish for good things always.
Friend
Yes.
Socrates
Then good men likewise wish to have all gains, if these are good things.
-
Friend
Not those gains from which they are bound, Socrates, to suffer harm.
Socrates
By “suffer harm” do you mean “suffer loss,” or something else?
Friend
No, I mean just “suffer loss.”
Socrates
Well, do men suffer loss from gain or from loss?
Friend
From both; for they suffer loss from loss and from wicked gain.
Socrates
Pray now, do you consider that any useful and good thing is wicked?
Friend
I do not.
-
Socrates
And we admitted a little while ago that gain is the opposite of loss, which is an evil.
Friend
I agree.
Socrates
And that, being the opposite of an evil, it is good?
Friend
That was our admission.
Socrates
So you see, you are attempting to deceive me, for you deliberately contradict what we agreed to just now.
Friend
No, on my honor, Socrates; on the contrary, it is you who are deceiving me, by twisting this way and that so perplexingly in your talk.
-
Socrates
Hush, hush! Why, surely it would be wrong of me not to obey a good and wise person.
Friend
Who is that? And to what are you referring now?
Socrates
I mean my and your fellow-citizen, Pisistratus’s son Hipparchus, of Philaidae, who was the eldest and wisest of Pisistratus’s sons, and who, among the many goodly proofs of wisdom that he showed, first brought the poems of Homer into this country of ours, and compelled the rhapsodes at the Panathenaea to recite them in relay, one man following on another, as
-they still do now. He dispatched a fifty-oared galley for Anacreon of Teos, and brought him into our city. Simonides of Ceos he always had about him, prevailing on him by plenteous fees and gifts. All this he did from a wish to educate the citizens, in order that he might have subjects of the highest excellence; for he thought it not right to grudge wisdom to any, so noble and good was he. And when his people in the city had been educated and were admiring him for his wisdom,
-he proceeded next, with the design of educating those of the countryside, to set up figures of Hermes for them along the roads in the midst of the city and every district town; and then, after selecting from his own wise lore, both learnt from others and discovered for himself, the things that he considered the wisest, he threw these into elegiac form and inscribed them on the figures as verses of his own and testimonies of his wisdom, so that in the first place
-his people should not admire those wise Delphic legends of “Know thyself” and “Nothing overmuch”, and the other sayings of the sort, but should rather regard as wise the utterances of Hipparchus; and that in the second place, through passing up and down and reading his words and acquiring a taste for his wisdom, they might resort hither from the country for the completion of their education. There are two such inscriptions of his: on the left side
-of each Hermes there is one in which the god says that he stands in the midst of the city or the township, while on the right side he says:The memorial of Hipparchus: walk with just intent.There are many other fine inscriptions from his poems on other figures of Hermes, and this one in particular, on the Steiria A town on the south-east coast of Attica. road, in which he says:
-The memorial of Hipparchus: deceive not a friend.I therefore should never dare, I am sure, to deceive you, who are my friend, or disobey the great Hipparchus, after whose death the Athenians were for three years under the despotic rule of his brother Hippias, and you might have heard anyone of the earlier period say that it was only in these years that there was despotism in Athens, On this point the writer agrees with Thuc. 6.59, who gives what is now the accepted story of Harmodius and Aristogeiton. and that at all other times the Athenians lived very much as in the reign of Cronos. And the subtler sort of people say
-that Hipparchus’s death was due, not to the cause supposed by most—the disqualification of the assassin’s sister from bearing the basket, In the Panathenaic procession. for that is a silly motive—but because Harmodius had become the favorite of Aristogeiton and had been educated by him. Thus Aristogeiton also prided himself on educating people, and he regarded Hipparchus as a dangerous rival. And at that time, it is said, Harmodius
-happened to be himself in love with one of the handsome and well-born youths of the day; they do tell his name, but I cannot remember it. Well, for a while this youth admired both Harmodius and Aristogeiton as wise men, but afterwards, when he associated with Hipparchus, he despised them, and they were so overcome with the pain of this “disqualification” that they slew Hipparchus. This curious version of the fall of the Pisistratid rulers (Hippias and Hipparchus) seeks to explain the conspiracy as due to a rivalry in a sort of pre-Socratic influence over young men which arose between the citizen Aristogiton and the ruler Hipparchus.
Friend
It would seem, then, Socrates, either that you do not regard me as your friend, or if you do, that you do not obey Hipparchus.
-For that you are not deceiving me—though I cannot tell how you contrive it—in your talk, is more than I can believe.
Socrates
Well now, as though we were playing draughts, I am willing to let you revoke, as you please, anything you have said in carrying on the discussion, in order that you may not think you are being deceived. So tell me, shall I revoke for you the statement that all men desire good things?
Friend
No, thank you.
Socrates
Well, that suffering loss, or loss, is an evil?
Friend
No, thank you.
Socrates
Well, that gain, or making gain, is the opposite of loss, or suffering loss?
-
Friend
Nor that either.
Socrates
Well, that making gain, as the opposite of evil, is a good?
Friend
Nothing of all this do I bid you revoke for me.
Socrates
You think, then, it seems, that some gain is good, and some evil.
Friend
I do.
Socrates
Well then, I revoke so much for you; so let us assume that some gain is good, and some other gain evil. But the good sort is no more gain than the evil sort, is it?
Friend
What do you mean by this question?
Socrates
I will explain. Is there both good and evil food?
-
Friend
Yes.
Socrates
And is the one sort more food than the other, or are they both similarly this same thing, food, and in this respect does the one differ no wise from the other, in being food, but only in the fact of the one being good and the other evil?
Friend
Yes.
Socrates
And so with drink and every other class of things that exist, when some things in any class come to be good, and others evil, one thing does not differ from another in that respect whereby they are the same? For instance,
-one man, I suppose, is virtuous, and another wicked.
Friend
Yes.
Socrates
But neither of them, I conceive, is more or less man than the other—neither the virtuous than the wicked, nor the wicked than the virtuous.
Friend
What you say is true.
Socrates
Then are we to take the same view of gain also, that both the wicked and the virtuous sort are similarly gain?
Friend
Necessarily.
Socrates
So he who has virtuous gain is no whit the more a gainer than he who has wicked gain: neither sort
-is found to be more gain, as we agree.
Friend
Yes.
Socrates
For neither of them has addition of either more or less.
Friend
No, indeed.
Socrates
And how could one do or suffer anything more or less with a thing of this sort, that had neither of these additions?
Friend
Impossible.
Socrates
Since, therefore, both of these are gains and gain-making affairs, we must now consider what it can be that leads you to call both of them gain:
-what is it that you see to be the same in both? Suppose you were to ask me, in those instances that I gave just now, what it is that leads me to call both good food and evil food alike food, I should tell you— for this reason, because both are a dry sustenance of the body. For that, I am sure you would agree, is what food is, would you not?
Friend
I would.
Socrates
And so too about drink the answer would be on the same lines, that the wet sustenance of the body,
-whether it be wholesome or pernicious, has this name of drink; and likewise with the rest. Try therefore on your part to imitate my method of answering. When you say that virtuous gain and wicked gain are both gain, what is it that you see to be the same in them, judging it to be the actual element of gain? And if again you are yourself unable to answer, just let me put it for your consideration, whether you describe as gain every acquisition that one has acquired either with no expense, or as a profit over and above one’s expense.
-
Friend
I believe that is what I call gain.
Socrates
Do you include a case where, after enjoying a banquet at which one has had much good cheer without any expense, one acquires an illness?
Friend
Upon my word, not I.
Socrates
And if one acquired health from attending a banquet, would one acquire gain or loss?
Friend
Gain.
Socrates
Hence gain is not just acquiring any acquisition.
Friend
No, indeed.
Socrates
Do you mean, not if it is evil? Or will one acquire no gain even if one acquires something good?
Friend
Apparently one will, if it is good.
-
Socrates
And if it is evil, will not one acquire loss?
Friend
I think so.
Socrates
You see, then, how you are running round again to the same old point? Gain is found to be good, and loss evil.
Friend
For my part, I cannot tell what to say.
Socrates
And not without good reason, sir. Now answer this further question: you say that if one acquires more than the amount one has spent, it is gain?
Friend
I do not mean, when it is evil, but if one gets more gold or silver than one has spent.
Socrates
Now, I am just going to ask you about that. Tell me,
-if one spends half a pound of gold and gets double that weight in silver, has one got gain or loss?
Friend
Loss, I presume, Socrates for one’s gold is reduced to twice, instead of twelve times, the value of silver.
Socrates
But you see, one has got more; or is double not more than half?
Friend
Not in worth, the one being silver and the other gold.
Socrates
So gain, it seems, must have this addition of worth. At least, you now say that silver, though more than gold, is not worth as much, and that gold, though less, is of equal worth.
-
Friend
Assuredly, for that is the case.
Socrates
Then the valuable is what produces gain, whether it be small or great, and the valueless produces no gain.
Friend
Yes.
Socrates
And by the valuable you mean simply, valuable to possess?
Friend
Yes, to possess.
Socrates
And again, by what is valuable to possess, do you mean the unprofitable or the profitable?
Friend
The profitable, I presume.
Socrates
And the profitable is good?
Friend
Yes.
-
Socrates
And so, most valiant of men, have we not here once more, for the third or fourth time, the admission that what produces gain is good?
Friend
So it seems.
Socrates
Then do you remember the point from which this discussion of ours arose?
Friend
I think I do.
Socrates
In case you do not, I will remind you. You maintained against me that good men do not wish to make all sorts of gain, but only those gains that are good, and not those that are wicked.
Friend
Yes.
-
Socrates
And now the argument has compelled us to acknowledge that all gains, both small and great, are good?
Friend
Yes, it has compelled me, at least, Socrates, rather than persuaded me.
Socrates
Well, later on, perhaps, it might also persuade you. Now, however, whether you are persuaded or whatever is your feeling, you at least agree with me that all gains are good, both small and great ones.
Friend
Yes, I do admit it.
Socrates
And you admit that virtuous men all wish for all good things, do you not?
Friend
I do.
-
Socrates
But, you know, you stated yourself that wicked men love both small and great gains.
Friend
I did.
Socrates
And so, by your account, all men will be lovers of gain, whether they be virtuous or wicked.
Friend
Apparently.
Socrates
Hence it is not right to reproach anybody with being a lover of gain: for he who makes this reproach is actually such an one himself.
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diff --git a/data/tlg0059/tlg015/tlg0059.tlg015.perseus-grc1.tracking.json b/data/tlg0059/tlg015/tlg0059.tlg015.perseus-grc1.tracking.json
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diff --git a/data/tlg0059/tlg015/tlg0059.tlg015.perseus-grc1.xml b/data/tlg0059/tlg015/tlg0059.tlg015.perseus-grc1.xml
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-
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-Hipparchus
-Plato
-Perseus Project, Tufts University
-Gregory Crane
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-Prepared under the supervision of
-Lisa Cerrato
-William Merrill
-Elli Mylonas
-David Smith
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-The Annenberg CPB/Project
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-About 98Kb
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-Text was scanned at St. Olaf Spring, 1992.
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- PlatoPlatonis Opera, ed. John Burnet
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- Oxford University Press1903
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-Tagged in conformance with Prose.e dtd.
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\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/tlg0059/tlg016/tlg0059.tlg016.perseus-eng1.tracking.json b/data/tlg0059/tlg016/tlg0059.tlg016.perseus-eng1.tracking.json
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diff --git a/data/tlg0059/tlg016/tlg0059.tlg016.perseus-eng1.xml b/data/tlg0059/tlg016/tlg0059.tlg016.perseus-eng1.xml
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-
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-Lovers
-Plato
-Perseus Project, Tufts University
-Gregory Crane
-
-Prepared under the supervision of
-Lisa Cerrato
-William Merrill
-Elli Mylonas
-David Smith
-
-The Annenberg CPB/Project
-
-
-
-About 98Kb
-
-
-
-Text was scanned at St. Olaf Spring, 1992.
-
-
-
- PlatoPlato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 8 translated by W.R.M. Lamb.
-
- Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd.1955
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-Socrates
-Socrates
I entered the grammar school of the teacher Dionysius, and saw there the young men who are accounted the most comely in form and of distinguished family, and their lovers. Now it chanced that two of the young people were disputing, but about what, I did not clearly overhear: it appeared, however, that they were disputing either about Anaxagoras The Ionian philosopher who lived in friendship with Pericles at Athens. or about Oenopides A philosopher of Chios, distinguished as a geometer and astronomer.; at any rate, they appeared to be drawing circles,
-and they were imitating certain inclinations i.e., the slopes of the contours of the earth, and of the apparent course of the sun(ecliptic). with their arms, bending to it and taking it most earnestly. Then I—for I was sitting beside the lover of one of the pair—nudged him with my elbow and asked him what on earth the two youngsters were so earnest about, and I said: Is it then something great and fine, in which they are so earnestly immersed?Great and fine, indeed! he replied: why, these fellows are prating about the heavenly bodies, and babbling philosophy.
-Then I, surprised at his answer, said: Young man, do you consider philosophizing to be shameful? Else, why do you speak so sharply?Then the other youth—for he chanced to be sitting near him, as his rival in love—when he heard my question and his rival’s answer, said: You do yourself no good, Socrates, by pressing this fellow with a further question, as to whether he considers philosophizing to be shameful. Do you not know that he has spent the whole of his life in practising the neckhold, and stuffing himself, and sleeping? So why did you suppose he would make any other reply than that philosophy is shameful?
-Now this one of the two lovers had spent his time on humane studies, Literally, on music, which with the Greeks included poetry and general literature as well as music. whereas the other, whom he was abusing, had spent his on athletics. So I decided that I had best relinquish the other, whom I had been questioning, since he did not even himself set up to be experienced in words, but only in deeds; and that I should interrogate the one who set up to be wiser, in order that so far as I was able I might get some benefit from him. I said therefore: I addressed my question to both in common; but if you think you could answer more creditably than he, I put the same question to you as I did to him: do you consider philosophizing to be honorable or not?
-Then the two striplings, overhearing us speak somewhat like this, were silent, and ceasing from their own contention they became listeners to ours. What their lovers’ sensations were, I do not know, but I myself, at any rate, was staggered; for every time I am staggered by handsome young people. It seemed to me, however, that my young friend too was in as great a flutter as myself; but nevertheless he answered me in a most ambitious spirit: Why, of course, Socrates, he said, if I should ever consider philosophizing to be shameful, I should not account myself so much as a man,
-nor anyone else either who was disposed to think so. Here he pointed to his rival lover, and spoke with a loud voice, in order that his favorite might hear every word.Then I remarked: So philosophizing seems to you to be honorable?Quite so, he said.Well now, I said; does it seem to you possible to know whether anything is honorable or shameful without knowing what it is fundamentally?No, he said.
-Then do you know, I went on, what philosophizing is?Certainly I do, said he.Then what is it? I asked.Why, just what Solon called it; you know it was Solon who said:And ever, as I older grow, I learn yet more and more;Solon Fr. 18—and I agree with him that a man who intends to philosophize should in this way be ever learning something or other, whether he be younger or older, in order that he may learn as many things as possible in his life. Now at first I felt there was something in his reply, but then, on second thoughts, I asked him whether he considered philosophy to be much learning.
-To which he answered: Certainly.And do you consider philosophy to be merely honorable, I asked, or good as well?Good as well, he said: very much so.Then do you observe this as peculiar to philosophy, or do you find it similarly in everything else? For example, do you consider the love of athletics to be not merely honorable, but good as well, or do you not?Whereupon he, most slily, gave a double answer: To him my statement must be neither; but to you, Socrates, I acknowledge it to be both honorable and good:
-for I consider this the right view.Then I asked him: Well now, in athletics, do you consider that much exercise is love of athletics?To which he replied: Certainly, just as in philosophizing I consider much learning to be philosophy.Then I said: And do you then consider that the lovers of athletics desire anything else than that which will cause them to be in good bodily condition?Only that, he replied.And does much exercise, I asked, cause them to be in good bodily condition?
-Yes, for how, he replied, could one be in good bodily condition through little exercise?Here I felt it was time to stir up the lover of athletics, in order that he might give me the support of his athletic experience; so I proceeded to ask him: And you then, pray, why are you silent, excellent sir, while your friend here is speaking thus? Do you agree that men are in good bodily condition through much exercise, or is it rather through moderate exercise?For my part, Socrates, he said, I thought even a pig—
-as the saying is—would have known that moderate exercise causes them to be in good bodily condition, so why should not a fellow who is sleepless and unfed, with unchafed neck and slender, care-worn frame! And when he had said this the boys were delighted and laughed their approval, while the other lover blushed.Then I said to him: Well, do you now concede that it is neither much, nor little, but moderate exercise that causes men to be in good bodily condition? Or do you bid defiance to the two of us on this point?
-To which he answered: Against him I should be only too glad to fight it out, and I am certain I should prove able to support the theory I have put forward, even had I put forward a weaker one; for he is naught. But with you I do not aim at winning an unscrupulous success; and so I admit that not a great but a moderate amount of athletics causes good condition in men.And what of food? Moderate or much? I asked.The same applied to food, he admitted.
-Then I went on and tried to compel him also to admit that everything else connected with the body when most beneficial, was the moderate thing, not the much or the little; and he admitted that it was the moderate thing.And now, I said, as regards the soul; are moderate or immoderate things beneficial, as adjuncts of it?Moderate things, he replied.And are studies among the adjuncts of the soul?He admitted they were.So among these also it is the moderate that are beneficial, and not the much?He agreed.Then whom should we be justified in asking what sort of exercise or food is moderate for the body?The three of us agreed that it must be a doctor or a trainer.
-And whom should we ask about the moderate measure in the sowing of seed?In that matter, we agreed, it must be a farmer.And whom should we be justified in asking as to the moderate degree and kind, in regard to the sowing and planting of studies in the soul?At this point we all began to be full of perplexity;
-then I, mocking at them, asked: Do you mind, since we are in perplexity, if we ask these boys here? or perhaps we are ashamed, as Homer Od. xxi. 285 foll., where the suitors of Penelope are ashamed, after they have failed to string the great bow of Odysseus, to let its owner, disguised as a beggar, try his strength on it, and perhaps succeed. said the suitors were, and do not think it fit there should be someone else who will string the bow?Then, as it seemed to me that they were losing their zeal for the argument, I tried to pursue the inquiry in another way, and said: But what, as nearly as we can guess, are the kinds of learning which the philosopher should learn, since he is not to learn all things or many things?
-At this the wiser one interjected: The finest and most suitable kinds of learning are those which will bring him the most reputation for philosophy; and he will get most reputation if he appears well versed in all the arts, or if not in all, in as many of them, and those the most considerable, as he can, by learning so much of them as befits a free man to learn, that is, what belongs to the understanding rather than the handiwork of each.Well now, do you mean, I asked, in the same way as in carpentry? For there, you know, you can buy a carpenter for five
-or six minae, A mina(=100 drachmae)would be about 6-8 pounds in our money today. but a first-rate architect cannot be got for even ten thousand drachmae; few such, indeed, could be found throughout the whole of Greece. Is it something of this sort that you mean? When he heard me say this, he admitted that something like this was what he himself meant.I next asked him if it was not impossible for the same person to learn in this way merely two of the arts, not to speak of many or the principal ones; to which he replied: Do not conceive me, Socrates,
-to be stating that the philosopher must have accurate knowledge of each of the arts, like the actual adept in any of them; I mean only so far as may be expected of a free and educated man: that is, he should be able to follow the explanations of the craftsman more readily than the rest of the company, and to contribute an opinion of his own which will make him appear the cleverest and most accomplished of the company who may at any time be present at some verbal or practical exposition of the arts.Then, as I was still unsettled in my mind as to the drift of his words, I asked him: Do I quite grasp the sort of man whom you mean by the philosopher?
-For you seem to me to mean someone like the all-round athletes Literally, athletes trained for the contest of the five exercises of leaping, running, disc-flinging, javelin-throwing, and wrestling. in contest with the runners or the wrestlers: the former yield, you know, to the latter in their particular exercises, and are their inferiors in these, but are superior to the usual sort of athletes and beat them. I daresay it may be something of this sort that you would suggest as the effect produced by philosophy on those who make it their pursuit: they yield to those who are first-rate
-in an understanding of the arts, but in taking the second place they surpass the rest; and in this way the man who has studied philosophy comes just next to the top in everything. That is the kind of person whom you appear to me to indicate.You are quite right, it seems to me, Socrates, he said, in your conception of the philosopher’s position, with your comparison of him to the all-round athlete. For it is precisely his nature not to be enslaved to any business, or to work out anything exactly, so as to let his application to that one matter make him deficient in the rest,
-as the craftsmen do, but to have a moderate contact with all of them.Well, after this answer I was eager to know clearly what he meant, so I inquired of him whether he conceived of good men as useful or useless.Useful, I should say, Socrates, he replied.Then if good men are useful, are wicked men useless?He agreed that they were.Again, do you consider that philosophers are useful persons or not?
-He agreed that they were useful; nay, more, that he considered they were most useful of all.Come now, let us make out, if what you say is true, where these second-best men are also useful to us: for clearly the philosopher is inferior to any particular adept in the arts.He agreed.Well now, I went on, if you yourself, or one of your friends for whom you feel great concern, should have fallen sick, would you fetch that second-best man into the house with a view to obtaining health, or would you summon a doctor?
- For my part, I should have both, he replied.Please do not say both, I said, but which of the two you would prefer and also summon first.No one, he replied,would make any question but that the doctor should be preferred and also summoned first.And again, if you were in a ship that was making rough weather, to which would you rather entrust yourself and yours, the pilot or the philosopher?I should choose the pilot.And so it will be in everything else: so long as there is some craftsman, the philosopher will not be useful?Apparently, he replied.
-So now we find that the philosopher is a useless person? For I suppose we always have craftsmen; and we have agreed that good men are useful, and bad ones useless.He was obliged to agree to this.Then what follows? Am I to ask you, or will it be too ill-mannered?Ask whatever you please.Well, my aim, I said, is merely to recall our agreements upon
-what has been stated. The matter stands somewhat like this. We agreed that philosophy is an honorable thing, and that philosophers are good; and that good men are useful, and wicked men useless: but then again we agreed that philosophers, so long as we have craftsmen, are useless, and that we always do have craftsmen. Has not all this been agreed?Yes, to be sure, he replied.Then we agreed, it seems, by your account—if philosophizing means having knowledge of the arts in the way you describe—that philosophers are wicked and useless so long as there are arts
-among mankind. But I expect they are not so really, my friend, and that philosophizing is not just having a concernment in the arts or spending one’s life in meddlesome stooping and prying and accumulation of learning, but something else; because I imagined that this life was actually a disgrace, and that people who concerned themselves with the arts were called sordid. BA/NAUSOS expresses the peculiar contempt felt by Greek gentlemen for the work of artisans and even artists. Manual labor was the business of slaves and persons who were unfit for military and political life. But we shall know more definitely whether this statement of mine is true, if you will answer me this: What men know how to punish horses rightly?
-Is it those who make them into the best horses, or some other men?Those who make them into the best horses.Or again, is it not the men who know how to make dogs into the best dogs that know also how to punish them rightly?Yes.Then it is the same art that makes them into the best dogs and punishes them rightly?It appears so to me, he replied.Again, is the art that makes them into the best ones and punishes them rightly the same as that which knows the good and the bad ones, or is it some other?The same, he said.Then in the case of men also will you be prepared to agree that the art
-which makes them into the best men is that which punishes them rightly and distinguishes the good and the bad ones?Certainly, he said.And that which does this to one, does it also to many, and that which does it to many, does it also to one?Yes.And so it is also with horses and everything else?I agree.Then what is the knowledge which rightly punishes the licentious and law-breaking people in our cities? Is it not judicature?Yes.And is it any other art than this that you call justice?No, only this.
-And that whereby they punish rightly is that whereby they know the good and bad people?It is.And whoever knows one will know many also?Yes.And whoever does not know many will not know one?I agree.Then if one were a horse, and did not know the good and wicked horses, would one not know which sort one was oneself?I think not.And if one were an ox and did not know the wicked and good oxen, would one not know which sort one was oneself?That is so, he said.And so it would be, if one were a dog?He agreed.
- Well now, when one is a man, and does not know the good and bad men, one surely cannot know whether one is good or wicked oneself, since one is a man also oneself?He granted this.And is not knowing oneself being temperate, Cf. Charmides(Introduction and 164)for the connection in thought and language between temperance and self-knowledge. or not being temperate?Not being temperate.So knowing oneself is being temperate?I agree, he said.So this is the message, it seems, of the Delphic inscription—that one is to practise temperance and justice.It seems so.And it is by this same art that we know also how to punish rightly?Yes.Then that whereby we know how to punish rightly
-is justice, and that whereby we know how to distinguish our own and others’ quality is temperance?It seems so, he said.Then justice and temperance are the same thing?Apparently.And further, it is thus, you know, that cities are well ordered—when the wrongdoers pay the penalty.That is true, he said.Hence this is also statecraft.He concurred.Again, when one man governs a city rightly, is he not called a despot and king?I agree.And he governs by a kingly and despotic art?That is so.And these arts are the same as the former?Apparently.
-Again, when a man singly governs a house aright, what is he called? Is he not a house-manager and master?Yes.Then would he also govern his house well by justice, or by some other art?By justice.Hence they are all the same, it seems,—king, despot, statesman, house-manager, master, and the temperate man and the just man; and it is all one art,—the kingly, the despotic, the statesman’s, the master’s, the house-manager’s, and justice and temperance.It is so, apparently, he said.
-Then, if it is disgraceful in the philosopher to be unable, when a doctor speaks about the sick, either to follow his remarks or to contribute anything of his own to what is being said or done, and to be in the same case when any other of the craftsmen speaks, is it not disgraceful that he should be unable, when it is a judge or a king or some other of the persons whom we have just instanced, either to follow their words or contribute anything to their business?It must indeed be disgraceful, Socrates, to have nothing to contribute to subjects of such great importance!
-Are we then to say, I asked, that in these matters also he is to be an all-round athlete, a second-rate man, taking the second place in all the subjects of this art—he, the philosopher—and is to be useless so long as there is one of these persons; or that, first of all, he is to entrust his own house to nobody else and is not to take the second place in it, but is himself to judge and punish rightly, if his house is to be well managed?He granted me that it must be so.Secondly, I presume, whether his friends entrust him with an arbitration, or the state charges him to determine
-or judge any matter, it is disgraceful for him, my good friend, in such cases, to be found in the second or third place, and not to lead?I agree.Hence we see, my excellent sir, that philosophizing is very far from being much learning and that affair of busying oneself with the arts.On my saying this the cultivated youth was silent, feeling ashamed for what he had said before, while the unlearned one said it was as I stated; and the rest of the company praised the argument.
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-
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-Lovers
-Plato
-Perseus Project, Tufts University
-Gregory Crane
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-Prepared under the supervision of
-Lisa Cerrato
-William Merrill
-Elli Mylonas
-David Smith
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-The Annenberg CPB/Project
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-About 98Kb
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-Text was scanned at St. Olaf Spring, 1992.
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- PlatoPlatonis Opera, ed. John Burnet
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- Oxford University Press1903
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-Greek
-English
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-Tagged in conformance with Prose.e dtd.
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- split composite text and converted to unicode
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From 2f07443c29d846f694485e23d6baae1ba7725ea9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: lcerrato
Date: Wed, 17 May 2017 13:09:48 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 9/9] (tlg0059.tlg015_016) minor edits #414
---
data/tlg0059/tlg015/tlg0059.tlg015.perseus-eng2.xml | 4 ++--
data/tlg0059/tlg016/tlg0059.tlg016.perseus-eng2.xml | 2 +-
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/data/tlg0059/tlg015/tlg0059.tlg015.perseus-eng2.xml b/data/tlg0059/tlg015/tlg0059.tlg015.perseus-eng2.xml
index ed2efc7f9..c69e92dda 100755
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There are two such inscriptions of his: on the left side
- of each Hermes there is one in which the god says that he stands in the midst of the city or the township, while on the right side he says:The memorial of Hipparchus: walk with just intent.There are many other fine inscriptions from his poems on other figures of Hermes, and this one in particular, on the Steiria A town on the south-east coast of Attica. road, in which he says:
-The memorial of Hipparchus: deceive not a friend.I therefore should never dare, I am sure, to deceive you, who are my friend, or disobey the great Hipparchus, after whose death the Athenians were for three years under the despotic rule of his brother Hippias, and you might have heard anyone of the earlier period say that it was only in these years that there was despotism in Athens, On this point the writer agrees with Thuc. 6.59, who gives what is now the accepted story of Harmodius and Aristogeiton. and that at all other times the Athenians lived very much as in the reign of Cronos. And the subtler sort of people say
+ of each Hermes there is one in which the god says that he stands in the midst of the city or the township, while on the right side he says: The memorial of Hipparchus: walk with just intent. There are many other fine inscriptions from his poems on other figures of Hermes, and this one in particular, on the Steiria A town on the south-east coast of Attica. road, in which he says:
+The memorial of Hipparchus: deceive not a friend. I therefore should never dare, I am sure, to deceive you, who are my friend, or disobey the great Hipparchus, after whose death the Athenians were for three years under the despotic rule of his brother Hippias, and you might have heard anyone of the earlier period say that it was only in these years that there was despotism in Athens, On this point the writer agrees with Thuc. 6.59, who gives what is now the accepted story of Harmodius and Aristogeiton. and that at all other times the Athenians lived very much as in the reign of Cronos. And the subtler sort of people say
that Hipparchus’s death was due, not to the cause supposed by most—the disqualification of the assassin’s sister from bearing the basket, In the Panathenaic procession. for that is a silly motive—but because Harmodius had become the favorite of Aristogeiton and had been educated by him. Thus Aristogeiton also prided himself on educating people, and he regarded Hipparchus as a dangerous rival. And at that time, it is said, Harmodius
happened to be himself in love with one of the handsome and well-born youths of the day; they do tell his name, but I cannot remember it. Well, for a while this youth admired both Harmodius and Aristogeiton as wise men, but afterwards, when he associated with Hipparchus, he despised them, and they were so overcome with the pain of this “disqualification” that they slew Hipparchus. This curious version of the fall of the Pisistratid rulers (Hippias and Hipparchus) seeks to explain the conspiracy as due to a rivalry in a sort of pre-Socratic influence over young men which arose between the citizen Aristogiton and the ruler Hipparchus.
It would seem, then, Socrates, either that you do not regard me as your friend, or if you do, that you do not obey Hipparchus.
diff --git a/data/tlg0059/tlg016/tlg0059.tlg016.perseus-eng2.xml b/data/tlg0059/tlg016/tlg0059.tlg016.perseus-eng2.xml
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-
I entered the grammar school of the teacher Dionysius, and saw there the young men who are accounted the most comely in form and of distinguished family, and their lovers. Now it chanced that two of the young people were disputing, but about what, I did not clearly overhear: it appeared, however, that they were disputing either about Anaxagoras The Ionian philosopher who lived in friendship with Pericles at Athens. or about Oenopides A philosopher of Chios, distinguished as a geometer and astronomer.; at any rate, they appeared to be drawing circles,
+
I entered the grammar school of the teacher Dionysius, and saw there the young men who are accounted the most comely in form and of distinguished family, and their lovers. Now it chanced that two of the young people were disputing, but about what, I did not clearly overhear: it appeared, however, that they were disputing either about Anaxagoras The Ionian philosopher who lived in friendship with Pericles at Athens. or about Oenopides; A philosopher of Chios, distinguished as a geometer and astronomer. at any rate, they appeared to be drawing circles,
and they were imitating certain inclinations i.e., the slopes of the contours of the earth, and of the apparent course of the sun(ecliptic). with their arms, bending to it and taking it most earnestly. Then I—for I was sitting beside the lover of one of the pair—nudged him with my elbow and asked him what on earth the two youngsters were so earnest about, and I said: Is it then something great and fine, in which they are so earnestly immersed?
Great and fine, indeed! he replied: why, these fellows are prating about the heavenly bodies, and babbling philosophy. Then I, surprised at his answer, said: Young man, do you consider philosophizing to be shameful? Else, why do you speak so sharply?