From b3667b7a8e1dbc4d3413f147fa8ef0e0fafdbc12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?S=C3=A9bastien=20Szymanski?= Date: Thu, 6 Sep 2018 11:16:00 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 001/124] ASoC: cs4265: fix MMTLR Data switch control MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 90a3b7f8aba3011badacd6d8121e03aa24ac79d1 upstream. The MMTLR bit is in the CS4265_SPDIF_CTL2 register at address 0x12 bit 0 and not at address 0x0 bit 1. Fix this. Signed-off-by: Sébastien Szymanski Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/soc/codecs/cs4265.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/cs4265.c b/sound/soc/codecs/cs4265.c index 4fdd47d700e3..8ba4cbe277d6 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/cs4265.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/cs4265.c @@ -174,8 +174,8 @@ static const struct snd_kcontrol_new cs4265_snd_controls[] = { SOC_SINGLE("Validity Bit Control Switch", CS4265_SPDIF_CTL2, 3, 1, 0), SOC_ENUM("SPDIF Mono/Stereo", spdif_mono_stereo_enum), - SOC_SINGLE("MMTLR Data Switch", 0, - 1, 1, 0), + SOC_SINGLE("MMTLR Data Switch", CS4265_SPDIF_CTL2, + 0, 1, 0), SOC_ENUM("Mono Channel Select", spdif_mono_select_enum), SND_SOC_BYTES("C Data Buffer", CS4265_C_DATA_BUFF, 24), }; From 7ddd41b2558b213469ad911f03a929d5de02244f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Takashi Sakamoto Date: Sun, 9 Sep 2018 22:25:12 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 002/124] ALSA: bebob: use address returned by kmalloc() instead of kernel stack for streaming DMA mapping commit 493626f2d87a74e6dbea1686499ed6e7e600484e upstream. When executing 'fw_run_transaction()' with 'TCODE_WRITE_BLOCK_REQUEST', an address of 'payload' argument is used for streaming DMA mapping by 'firewire_ohci' module if 'size' argument is larger than 8 byte. Although in this case the address should not be on kernel stack, current implementation of ALSA bebob driver uses data in kernel stack for a cue to boot M-Audio devices. This often brings unexpected result, especially for a case of CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y. This commit fixes the bug. Reference: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=201021 Reference: https://forum.manjaro.org/t/firewire-m-audio-410-driver-wont-load-firmware/51165 Fixes: a2b2a7798fb6('ALSA: bebob: Send a cue to load firmware for M-Audio Firewire series') Cc: # v3.16+ Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/firewire/bebob/bebob_maudio.c | 24 ++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/firewire/bebob/bebob_maudio.c b/sound/firewire/bebob/bebob_maudio.c index 0215a9194d88..a6190fed2d60 100644 --- a/sound/firewire/bebob/bebob_maudio.c +++ b/sound/firewire/bebob/bebob_maudio.c @@ -96,17 +96,13 @@ int snd_bebob_maudio_load_firmware(struct fw_unit *unit) struct fw_device *device = fw_parent_device(unit); int err, rcode; u64 date; - __le32 cues[3] = { - cpu_to_le32(MAUDIO_BOOTLOADER_CUE1), - cpu_to_le32(MAUDIO_BOOTLOADER_CUE2), - cpu_to_le32(MAUDIO_BOOTLOADER_CUE3) - }; + __le32 *cues; /* check date of software used to build */ err = snd_bebob_read_block(unit, INFO_OFFSET_SW_DATE, &date, sizeof(u64)); if (err < 0) - goto end; + return err; /* * firmware version 5058 or later has date later than "20070401", but * 'date' is not null-terminated. @@ -114,20 +110,28 @@ int snd_bebob_maudio_load_firmware(struct fw_unit *unit) if (date < 0x3230303730343031LL) { dev_err(&unit->device, "Use firmware version 5058 or later\n"); - err = -ENOSYS; - goto end; + return -ENXIO; } + cues = kmalloc_array(3, sizeof(*cues), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!cues) + return -ENOMEM; + + cues[0] = cpu_to_le32(MAUDIO_BOOTLOADER_CUE1); + cues[1] = cpu_to_le32(MAUDIO_BOOTLOADER_CUE2); + cues[2] = cpu_to_le32(MAUDIO_BOOTLOADER_CUE3); + rcode = fw_run_transaction(device->card, TCODE_WRITE_BLOCK_REQUEST, device->node_id, device->generation, device->max_speed, BEBOB_ADDR_REG_REQ, - cues, sizeof(cues)); + cues, 3 * sizeof(*cues)); + kfree(cues); if (rcode != RCODE_COMPLETE) { dev_err(&unit->device, "Failed to send a cue to load firmware\n"); err = -EIO; } -end: + return err; } From b27adc00ceb6426c8e2e6a23a327acde678c28eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Willy Tarreau Date: Sat, 8 Sep 2018 08:12:21 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 003/124] ALSA: emu10k1: fix possible info leak to userspace on SNDRV_EMU10K1_IOCTL_INFO commit 49434c6c575d2008c0abbc93e615019f39e01252 upstream. snd_emu10k1_fx8010_ioctl(SNDRV_EMU10K1_IOCTL_INFO) allocates memory using kmalloc() and partially fills it by calling snd_emu10k1_fx8010_info() before returning the resulting structure to userspace, leaving uninitialized holes. Let's just use kzalloc() here. BugLink: http://blog.infosectcbr.com.au/2018/09/linux-kernel-infoleaks.html Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau Cc: Jann Horn Cc: Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c b/sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c index 745f0627c634..acce8c76eff0 100644 --- a/sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c +++ b/sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c @@ -2521,7 +2521,7 @@ static int snd_emu10k1_fx8010_ioctl(struct snd_hwdep * hw, struct file *file, un emu->support_tlv = 1; return put_user(SNDRV_EMU10K1_VERSION, (int __user *)argp); case SNDRV_EMU10K1_IOCTL_INFO: - info = kmalloc(sizeof(*info), GFP_KERNEL); + info = kzalloc(sizeof(*info), GFP_KERNEL); if (!info) return -ENOMEM; snd_emu10k1_fx8010_info(emu, info); From 05bc6cb652c2703d47d8ce91548eb024db17a40f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vaibhav Nagarnaik Date: Fri, 7 Sep 2018 15:31:29 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 004/124] ring-buffer: Allow for rescheduling when removing pages commit 83f365554e47997ec68dc4eca3f5dce525cd15c3 upstream. When reducing ring buffer size, pages are removed by scheduling a work item on each CPU for the corresponding CPU ring buffer. After the pages are removed from ring buffer linked list, the pages are free()d in a tight loop. The loop does not give up CPU until all pages are removed. In a worst case behavior, when lot of pages are to be freed, it can cause system stall. After the pages are removed from the list, the free() can happen while the work is rescheduled. Call cond_resched() in the loop to prevent the system hangup. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180907223129.71994-1-vnagarnaik@google.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic") Reported-by: Jason Behmer Signed-off-by: Vaibhav Nagarnaik Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c b/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c index 5821def0b7a0..d2b609412c3a 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c +++ b/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c @@ -1542,6 +1542,8 @@ rb_remove_pages(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer, unsigned long nr_pages) tmp_iter_page = first_page; do { + cond_resched(); + to_remove_page = tmp_iter_page; rb_inc_page(cpu_buffer, &tmp_iter_page); From b4570618fa02bcd9eec7d249c22f16ed503f8ec6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Joel Fernandes (Google)" Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2018 12:22:39 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 005/124] mm: shmem.c: Correctly annotate new inodes for lockdep commit b45d71fb89ab8adfe727b9d0ee188ed58582a647 upstream. Directories and inodes don't necessarily need to be in the same lockdep class. For ex, hugetlbfs splits them out too to prevent false positives in lockdep. Annotate correctly after new inode creation. If its a directory inode, it will be put into a different class. This should fix a lockdep splat reported by syzbot: > ====================================================== > WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected > 4.18.0-rc8-next-20180810+ #36 Not tainted > ------------------------------------------------------ > syz-executor900/4483 is trying to acquire lock: > 00000000d2bfc8fe (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9){++++}, at: inode_lock > include/linux/fs.h:765 [inline] > 00000000d2bfc8fe (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9){++++}, at: > shmem_fallocate+0x18b/0x12e0 mm/shmem.c:2602 > > but task is already holding lock: > 0000000025208078 (ashmem_mutex){+.+.}, at: ashmem_shrink_scan+0xb4/0x630 > drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c:448 > > which lock already depends on the new lock. > > -> #2 (ashmem_mutex){+.+.}: > __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:925 [inline] > __mutex_lock+0x171/0x1700 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1073 > mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1088 > ashmem_mmap+0x55/0x520 drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c:361 > call_mmap include/linux/fs.h:1844 [inline] > mmap_region+0xf27/0x1c50 mm/mmap.c:1762 > do_mmap+0xa10/0x1220 mm/mmap.c:1535 > do_mmap_pgoff include/linux/mm.h:2298 [inline] > vm_mmap_pgoff+0x213/0x2c0 mm/util.c:357 > ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x4da/0x660 mm/mmap.c:1585 > __do_sys_mmap arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:100 [inline] > __se_sys_mmap arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:91 [inline] > __x64_sys_mmap+0xe9/0x1b0 arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:91 > do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe > > -> #1 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}: > __might_fault+0x155/0x1e0 mm/memory.c:4568 > _copy_to_user+0x30/0x110 lib/usercopy.c:25 > copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:155 [inline] > filldir+0x1ea/0x3a0 fs/readdir.c:196 > dir_emit_dot include/linux/fs.h:3464 [inline] > dir_emit_dots include/linux/fs.h:3475 [inline] > dcache_readdir+0x13a/0x620 fs/libfs.c:193 > iterate_dir+0x48b/0x5d0 fs/readdir.c:51 > __do_sys_getdents fs/readdir.c:231 [inline] > __se_sys_getdents fs/readdir.c:212 [inline] > __x64_sys_getdents+0x29f/0x510 fs/readdir.c:212 > do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe > > -> #0 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9){++++}: > lock_acquire+0x1e4/0x540 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3924 > down_write+0x8f/0x130 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:70 > inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:765 [inline] > shmem_fallocate+0x18b/0x12e0 mm/shmem.c:2602 > ashmem_shrink_scan+0x236/0x630 drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c:455 > ashmem_ioctl+0x3ae/0x13a0 drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c:797 > vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline] > file_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:501 [inline] > do_vfs_ioctl+0x1de/0x1720 fs/ioctl.c:685 > ksys_ioctl+0xa9/0xd0 fs/ioctl.c:702 > __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:709 [inline] > __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:707 [inline] > __x64_sys_ioctl+0x73/0xb0 fs/ioctl.c:707 > do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe > > other info that might help us debug this: > > Chain exists of: > &sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9 --> &mm->mmap_sem --> ashmem_mutex > > Possible unsafe locking scenario: > > CPU0 CPU1 > ---- ---- > lock(ashmem_mutex); > lock(&mm->mmap_sem); > lock(ashmem_mutex); > lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9); > > *** DEADLOCK *** > > 1 lock held by syz-executor900/4483: > #0: 0000000025208078 (ashmem_mutex){+.+.}, at: > ashmem_shrink_scan+0xb4/0x630 drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c:448 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180821231835.166639-1-joel@joelfernandes.org Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) Reported-by: syzbot Reviewed-by: NeilBrown Suggested-by: NeilBrown Cc: Matthew Wilcox Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Hugh Dickins Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- mm/shmem.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/mm/shmem.c b/mm/shmem.c index fac22b578eb9..371d5eca80ed 100644 --- a/mm/shmem.c +++ b/mm/shmem.c @@ -1454,6 +1454,8 @@ static struct inode *shmem_get_inode(struct super_block *sb, const struct inode mpol_shared_policy_init(&info->policy, NULL); break; } + + lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key(inode); } else shmem_free_inode(sb); return inode; From 0aced03a0e2527b92241b3cc4994458759d021c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Toke=20H=C3=B8iland-J=C3=B8rgensen?= Date: Thu, 13 Sep 2018 16:43:07 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 006/124] gso_segment: Reset skb->mac_len after modifying network header MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit c56cae23c6b167acc68043c683c4573b80cbcc2c ] When splitting a GSO segment that consists of encapsulated packets, the skb->mac_len of the segments can end up being set wrong, causing packet drops in particular when using act_mirred and ifb interfaces in combination with a qdisc that splits GSO packets. This happens because at the time skb_segment() is called, network_header will point to the inner header, throwing off the calculation in skb_reset_mac_len(). The network_header is subsequently adjust by the outer IP gso_segment handlers, but they don't set the mac_len. Fix this by adding skb_reset_mac_len() calls to both the IPv4 and IPv6 gso_segment handlers, after they modify the network_header. Many thanks to Eric Dumazet for his help in identifying the cause of the bug. Acked-by: Dave Taht Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv4/af_inet.c | 1 + net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c | 1 + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/ipv4/af_inet.c b/net/ipv4/af_inet.c index d2f8184fc8f4..08f73e0207dd 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/af_inet.c +++ b/net/ipv4/af_inet.c @@ -1288,6 +1288,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *inet_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb, if (encap) skb_reset_inner_headers(skb); skb->network_header = (u8 *)iph - skb->head; + skb_reset_mac_len(skb); } while ((skb = skb->next)); out: diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c index 0ee8ef32320a..61ed9f99139f 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c @@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *ipv6_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb, ipv6h = (struct ipv6hdr *)(skb_mac_header(skb) + nhoff); ipv6h->payload_len = htons(skb->len - nhoff - sizeof(*ipv6h)); skb->network_header = (u8 *)ipv6h - skb->head; + skb_reset_mac_len(skb); if (udpfrag) { int err = ip6_find_1stfragopt(skb, &prevhdr); From 2ababd51858f71ef174a1bb2fe045f0b23f04c1c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Willy Tarreau Date: Wed, 12 Sep 2018 07:36:35 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 007/124] net/appletalk: fix minor pointer leak to userspace in SIOCFINDIPDDPRT [ Upstream commit 9824dfae5741275473a23a7ed5756c7b6efacc9d ] Fields ->dev and ->next of struct ipddp_route may be copied to userspace on the SIOCFINDIPDDPRT ioctl. This is only accessible to CAP_NET_ADMIN though. Let's manually copy the relevant fields instead of using memcpy(). BugLink: http://blog.infosectcbr.com.au/2018/09/linux-kernel-infoleaks.html Cc: Jann Horn Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/appletalk/ipddp.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/appletalk/ipddp.c b/drivers/net/appletalk/ipddp.c index 2e4649655181..4e98e5aff7c5 100644 --- a/drivers/net/appletalk/ipddp.c +++ b/drivers/net/appletalk/ipddp.c @@ -284,8 +284,12 @@ static int ipddp_ioctl(struct net_device *dev, struct ifreq *ifr, int cmd) case SIOCFINDIPDDPRT: spin_lock_bh(&ipddp_route_lock); rp = __ipddp_find_route(&rcp); - if (rp) - memcpy(&rcp2, rp, sizeof(rcp2)); + if (rp) { + memset(&rcp2, 0, sizeof(rcp2)); + rcp2.ip = rp->ip; + rcp2.at = rp->at; + rcp2.flags = rp->flags; + } spin_unlock_bh(&ipddp_route_lock); if (rp) { From a9b7eba12438c4b5219f56d920ed269e10dbb906 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Colin Ian King Date: Fri, 14 Sep 2018 17:39:53 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 008/124] net: hp100: fix always-true check for link up state [ Upstream commit a7f38002fb69b44f8fc622ecb838665d0b8666af ] The operation ~(p100_inb(VG_LAN_CFG_1) & HP100_LINK_UP) returns a value that is always non-zero and hence the wait for the link to drop always terminates prematurely. Fix this by using a logical not operator instead of a bitwise complement. This issue has been in the driver since pre-2.6.12-rc2. Detected by CoverityScan, CID#114157 ("Logical vs. bitwise operator") Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/ethernet/hp/hp100.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/hp/hp100.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/hp/hp100.c index 76a6e0c77d69..034471003249 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/hp/hp100.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/hp/hp100.c @@ -2637,7 +2637,7 @@ static int hp100_login_to_vg_hub(struct net_device *dev, u_short force_relogin) /* Wait for link to drop */ time = jiffies + (HZ / 10); do { - if (~(hp100_inb(VG_LAN_CFG_1) & HP100_LINK_UP_ST)) + if (!(hp100_inb(VG_LAN_CFG_1) & HP100_LINK_UP_ST)) break; if (!in_interrupt()) schedule_timeout_interruptible(1); From 3f0d9d15b163049af09ac66cd2a25d103307cd06 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vasily Khoruzhick Date: Thu, 13 Sep 2018 11:12:03 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 009/124] neighbour: confirm neigh entries when ARP packet is received [ Upstream commit f0e0d04413fcce9bc76388839099aee93cd0d33b ] Update 'confirmed' timestamp when ARP packet is received. It shouldn't affect locktime logic and anyway entry can be confirmed by any higher-layer protocol. Thus it makes sense to confirm it when ARP packet is received. Fixes: 77d7123342dc ("neighbour: update neigh timestamps iff update is effective") Signed-off-by: Vasily Khoruzhick Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/core/neighbour.c | 13 ++++++++----- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/core/neighbour.c b/net/core/neighbour.c index 73018d173223..59d6e962fdf4 100644 --- a/net/core/neighbour.c +++ b/net/core/neighbour.c @@ -1147,6 +1147,12 @@ int neigh_update(struct neighbour *neigh, const u8 *lladdr, u8 new, lladdr = neigh->ha; } + /* Update confirmed timestamp for neighbour entry after we + * received ARP packet even if it doesn't change IP to MAC binding. + */ + if (new & NUD_CONNECTED) + neigh->confirmed = jiffies; + /* If entry was valid and address is not changed, do not change entry state, if new one is STALE. */ @@ -1170,15 +1176,12 @@ int neigh_update(struct neighbour *neigh, const u8 *lladdr, u8 new, } } - /* Update timestamps only once we know we will make a change to the + /* Update timestamp only once we know we will make a change to the * neighbour entry. Otherwise we risk to move the locktime window with * noop updates and ignore relevant ARP updates. */ - if (new != old || lladdr != neigh->ha) { - if (new & NUD_CONNECTED) - neigh->confirmed = jiffies; + if (new != old || lladdr != neigh->ha) neigh->updated = jiffies; - } if (new != old) { neigh_del_timer(neigh); From 2e421bf4b9632dfd0a39edfa6d362f3de4461065 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Fri, 14 Sep 2018 12:02:31 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 010/124] ipv6: fix possible use-after-free in ip6_xmit() [ Upstream commit bbd6528d28c1b8e80832b3b018ec402b6f5c3215 ] In the unlikely case ip6_xmit() has to call skb_realloc_headroom(), we need to call skb_set_owner_w() before consuming original skb, otherwise we risk a use-after-free. Bring IPv6 in line with what we do in IPv4 to fix this. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f41 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: syzbot Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c index 087fe616bfaf..0c344ca515ab 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c @@ -183,9 +183,10 @@ int ip6_xmit(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi6 *fl6, kfree_skb(skb); return -ENOBUFS; } + if (skb->sk) + skb_set_owner_w(skb2, skb->sk); consume_skb(skb); skb = skb2; - skb_set_owner_w(skb, sk); } if (opt->opt_flen) ipv6_push_frag_opts(skb, opt, &proto); From d31152ba0f282348c9ffbd8436b7a3622064aea6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vincent Pelletier Date: Sun, 9 Sep 2018 04:09:26 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 011/124] scsi: target: iscsi: Use hex2bin instead of a re-implementation commit 1816494330a83f2a064499d8ed2797045641f92c upstream. This change has the following effects, in order of descreasing importance: 1) Prevent a stack buffer overflow 2) Do not append an unnecessary NULL to an anyway binary buffer, which is writing one byte past client_digest when caller is: chap_string_to_hex(client_digest, chap_r, strlen(chap_r)); The latter was found by KASAN (see below) when input value hes expected size (32 hex chars), and further analysis revealed a stack buffer overflow can happen when network-received value is longer, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to smash up to 17 bytes after destination buffer (16 bytes attacker-controlled and one null). As switching to hex2bin requires specifying destination buffer length, and does not internally append any null, it solves both issues. This addresses CVE-2018-14633. Beyond this: - Validate received value length and check hex2bin accepted the input, to log this rejection reason instead of just failing authentication. - Only log received CHAP_R and CHAP_C values once they passed sanity checks. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in chap_string_to_hex+0x32/0x60 [iscsi_target_mod] Write of size 1 at addr ffff8801090ef7c8 by task kworker/0:0/1021 CPU: 0 PID: 1021 Comm: kworker/0:0 Tainted: G O 4.17.8kasan.sess.connops+ #2 Hardware name: To be filled by O.E.M. To be filled by O.E.M./Aptio CRB, BIOS 5.6.5 05/19/2014 Workqueue: events iscsi_target_do_login_rx [iscsi_target_mod] Call Trace: dump_stack+0x71/0xac print_address_description+0x65/0x22e ? chap_string_to_hex+0x32/0x60 [iscsi_target_mod] kasan_report.cold.6+0x241/0x2fd chap_string_to_hex+0x32/0x60 [iscsi_target_mod] chap_server_compute_md5.isra.2+0x2cb/0x860 [iscsi_target_mod] ? chap_binaryhex_to_asciihex.constprop.5+0x50/0x50 [iscsi_target_mod] ? ftrace_caller_op_ptr+0xe/0xe ? __orc_find+0x6f/0xc0 ? unwind_next_frame+0x231/0x850 ? kthread+0x1a0/0x1c0 ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 ? iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod] ? deref_stack_reg+0xd0/0xd0 ? iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod] ? is_module_text_address+0xa/0x11 ? kernel_text_address+0x4c/0x110 ? __save_stack_trace+0x82/0x100 ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 ? save_stack+0x8c/0xb0 ? 0xffffffffc1660000 ? iscsi_target_do_login+0x155/0x8d0 [iscsi_target_mod] ? iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod] ? process_one_work+0x35c/0x640 ? worker_thread+0x66/0x5d0 ? kthread+0x1a0/0x1c0 ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 ? iscsi_update_param_value+0x80/0x80 [iscsi_target_mod] ? iscsit_release_cmd+0x170/0x170 [iscsi_target_mod] chap_main_loop+0x172/0x570 [iscsi_target_mod] ? chap_server_compute_md5.isra.2+0x860/0x860 [iscsi_target_mod] ? rx_data+0xd6/0x120 [iscsi_target_mod] ? iscsit_print_session_params+0xd0/0xd0 [iscsi_target_mod] ? cyc2ns_read_begin.part.2+0x90/0x90 ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x25/0x50 ? memcmp+0x45/0x70 iscsi_target_do_login+0x875/0x8d0 [iscsi_target_mod] ? iscsi_target_check_first_request.isra.5+0x1a0/0x1a0 [iscsi_target_mod] ? del_timer+0xe0/0xe0 ? memset+0x1f/0x40 ? flush_sigqueue+0x29/0xd0 iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod] ? iscsi_target_nego_release+0x80/0x80 [iscsi_target_mod] ? iscsi_target_restore_sock_callbacks+0x130/0x130 [iscsi_target_mod] process_one_work+0x35c/0x640 worker_thread+0x66/0x5d0 ? flush_rcu_work+0x40/0x40 kthread+0x1a0/0x1c0 ? kthread_bind+0x30/0x30 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0004243bc0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 flags: 0x17fffc000000000() raw: 017fffc000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff raw: ffffea0004243c20 ffffea0004243ba0 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8801090ef680: f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 01 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 ffff8801090ef700: f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 02 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 >ffff8801090ef780: 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 ^ ffff8801090ef800: 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 02 f2 f2 f2 f2 ffff8801090ef880: f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 ================================================================== Signed-off-by: Vincent Pelletier Reviewed-by: Mike Christie Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c | 30 +++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c index ab4915c0d933..f7940fa64d44 100644 --- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c +++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c @@ -26,18 +26,6 @@ #include "iscsi_target_nego.h" #include "iscsi_target_auth.h" -static int chap_string_to_hex(unsigned char *dst, unsigned char *src, int len) -{ - int j = DIV_ROUND_UP(len, 2), rc; - - rc = hex2bin(dst, src, j); - if (rc < 0) - pr_debug("CHAP string contains non hex digit symbols\n"); - - dst[j] = '\0'; - return j; -} - static void chap_binaryhex_to_asciihex(char *dst, char *src, int src_len) { int i; @@ -241,9 +229,16 @@ static int chap_server_compute_md5( pr_err("Could not find CHAP_R.\n"); goto out; } + if (strlen(chap_r) != MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE * 2) { + pr_err("Malformed CHAP_R\n"); + goto out; + } + if (hex2bin(client_digest, chap_r, MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE) < 0) { + pr_err("Malformed CHAP_R\n"); + goto out; + } pr_debug("[server] Got CHAP_R=%s\n", chap_r); - chap_string_to_hex(client_digest, chap_r, strlen(chap_r)); tfm = crypto_alloc_hash("md5", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { @@ -348,9 +343,7 @@ static int chap_server_compute_md5( pr_err("Could not find CHAP_C.\n"); goto out; } - pr_debug("[server] Got CHAP_C=%s\n", challenge); - challenge_len = chap_string_to_hex(challenge_binhex, challenge, - strlen(challenge)); + challenge_len = DIV_ROUND_UP(strlen(challenge), 2); if (!challenge_len) { pr_err("Unable to convert incoming challenge\n"); goto out; @@ -359,6 +352,11 @@ static int chap_server_compute_md5( pr_err("CHAP_C exceeds maximum binary size of 1024 bytes\n"); goto out; } + if (hex2bin(challenge_binhex, challenge, challenge_len) < 0) { + pr_err("Malformed CHAP_C\n"); + goto out; + } + pr_debug("[server] Got CHAP_C=%s\n", challenge); /* * During mutual authentication, the CHAP_C generated by the * initiator must not match the original CHAP_C generated by From 632ff8fc030cfeea463f81df608682edee6a7304 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Junxiao Bi Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2018 12:22:51 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 012/124] ocfs2: fix ocfs2 read block panic commit 234b69e3e089d850a98e7b3145bd00e9b52b1111 upstream. While reading block, it is possible that io error return due to underlying storage issue, in this case, BH_NeedsValidate was left in the buffer head. Then when reading the very block next time, if it was already linked into journal, that will trigger the following panic. [203748.702517] kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/buffer_head_io.c:342! [203748.702533] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP [203748.702561] Modules linked in: ocfs2 ocfs2_dlmfs ocfs2_stack_o2cb ocfs2_dlm ocfs2_nodemanager ocfs2_stackglue configfs sunrpc dm_switch dm_queue_length dm_multipath bonding be2iscsi iscsi_boot_sysfs bnx2i cnic uio cxgb4i iw_cxgb4 cxgb4 cxgb3i libcxgbi iw_cxgb3 cxgb3 mdio ib_iser rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm ib_sa ib_mad ib_core ib_addr ipv6 iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ipmi_devintf iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support dcdbas ipmi_ssif i2c_core ipmi_si ipmi_msghandler acpi_pad pcspkr sb_edac edac_core lpc_ich mfd_core shpchp sg tg3 ptp pps_core ext4 jbd2 mbcache2 sr_mod cdrom sd_mod ahci libahci megaraid_sas wmi dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [203748.703024] CPU: 7 PID: 38369 Comm: touch Not tainted 4.1.12-124.18.6.el6uek.x86_64 #2 [203748.703045] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R620/0PXXHP, BIOS 2.5.2 01/28/2015 [203748.703067] task: ffff880768139c00 ti: ffff88006ff48000 task.ti: ffff88006ff48000 [203748.703088] RIP: 0010:[] [] ocfs2_read_blocks+0x669/0x7f0 [ocfs2] [203748.703130] RSP: 0018:ffff88006ff4b818 EFLAGS: 00010206 [203748.703389] RAX: 0000000008620029 RBX: ffff88006ff4b910 RCX: 0000000000000000 [203748.703885] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000023079fe [203748.704382] RBP: ffff88006ff4b8d8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8807578c25b0 [203748.704877] R10: 000000000f637376 R11: 000000003030322e R12: 0000000000000000 [203748.705373] R13: ffff88006ff4b910 R14: ffff880732fe38f0 R15: 0000000000000000 [203748.705871] FS: 00007f401992c700(0000) GS:ffff880bfebc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [203748.706370] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [203748.706627] CR2: 00007f4019252440 CR3: 00000000a621e000 CR4: 0000000000060670 [203748.707124] Stack: [203748.707371] ffff88006ff4b828 ffffffffa0609f52 ffff88006ff4b838 0000000000000001 [203748.707885] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff880bf67c3800 ffffffffa05eca00 [203748.708399] 00000000023079ff ffffffff81c58b80 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [203748.708915] Call Trace: [203748.709175] [] ? ocfs2_inode_cache_io_unlock+0x12/0x20 [ocfs2] [203748.709680] [] ? ocfs2_empty_dir_filldir+0x80/0x80 [ocfs2] [203748.710185] [] ocfs2_read_dir_block_direct+0x3b/0x200 [ocfs2] [203748.710691] [] ocfs2_prepare_dx_dir_for_insert.isra.57+0x19f/0xf60 [ocfs2] [203748.711204] [] ? ocfs2_metadata_cache_io_unlock+0x1f/0x30 [ocfs2] [203748.711716] [] ocfs2_prepare_dir_for_insert+0x13a/0x890 [ocfs2] [203748.712227] [] ? ocfs2_check_dir_for_entry+0x8e/0x140 [ocfs2] [203748.712737] [] ocfs2_mknod+0x4b2/0x1370 [ocfs2] [203748.713003] [] ocfs2_create+0x65/0x170 [ocfs2] [203748.713263] [] vfs_create+0xdb/0x150 [203748.713518] [] do_last+0x815/0x1210 [203748.713772] [] ? path_init+0xb9/0x450 [203748.714123] [] path_openat+0x80/0x600 [203748.714378] [] ? handle_pte_fault+0xd15/0x1620 [203748.714634] [] do_filp_open+0x3a/0xb0 [203748.714888] [] ? __alloc_fd+0xa7/0x130 [203748.715143] [] do_sys_open+0x12c/0x220 [203748.715403] [] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase1+0x11b/0x180 [203748.715668] [] ? system_call_after_swapgs+0xe9/0x190 [203748.715928] [] SyS_open+0x1e/0x20 [203748.716184] [] system_call_fastpath+0x18/0xd7 [203748.716440] Code: 00 00 48 8b 7b 08 48 83 c3 10 45 89 f8 44 89 e1 44 89 f2 4c 89 ee e8 07 06 11 e1 48 8b 03 48 85 c0 75 df 8b 5d c8 e9 4d fa ff ff <0f> 0b 48 8b 7d a0 e8 dc c6 06 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 [203748.717505] RIP [] ocfs2_read_blocks+0x669/0x7f0 [ocfs2] [203748.717775] RSP Joesph ever reported a similar panic. Link: https://oss.oracle.com/pipermail/ocfs2-devel/2013-May/008931.html Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180912063207.29484-1-junxiao.bi@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi Cc: Joseph Qi Cc: Mark Fasheh Cc: Joel Becker Cc: Changwei Ge Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ocfs2/buffer_head_io.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/buffer_head_io.c b/fs/ocfs2/buffer_head_io.c index 1edcb141f639..d6eab71abe1f 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/buffer_head_io.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/buffer_head_io.c @@ -330,6 +330,7 @@ int ocfs2_read_blocks(struct ocfs2_caching_info *ci, u64 block, int nr, * for this bh as it's not marked locally * uptodate. */ status = -EIO; + clear_buffer_needs_validate(bh); put_bh(bh); bhs[i] = NULL; continue; From 83a27745d1f1ff554b7ac7cb27c248327bc4b9cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Theodore Ts'o Date: Mon, 27 Aug 2018 09:22:45 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 013/124] ext4: avoid divide by zero fault when deleting corrupted inline directories commit 4d982e25d0bdc83d8c64e66fdeca0b89240b3b85 upstream. A specially crafted file system can trick empty_inline_dir() into reading past the last valid entry in a inline directory, and then run into the end of xattr marker. This will trigger a divide by zero fault. Fix this by using the size of the inline directory instead of dir->i_size. Also clean up error reporting in __ext4_check_dir_entry so that the message is clearer and more understandable --- and avoids the division by zero trap if the size passed in is zero. (I'm not sure why we coded it that way in the first place; printing offset % size is actually more confusing and less useful.) https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200933 Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Reported-by: Wen Xu Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext4/dir.c | 20 +++++++++----------- fs/ext4/inline.c | 4 +++- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/dir.c b/fs/ext4/dir.c index c24143ea9c08..e6cef9426957 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/dir.c +++ b/fs/ext4/dir.c @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ int __ext4_check_dir_entry(const char *function, unsigned int line, else if (unlikely(rlen < EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(de->name_len))) error_msg = "rec_len is too small for name_len"; else if (unlikely(((char *) de - buf) + rlen > size)) - error_msg = "directory entry across range"; + error_msg = "directory entry overrun"; else if (unlikely(le32_to_cpu(de->inode) > le32_to_cpu(EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)->s_es->s_inodes_count))) error_msg = "inode out of bounds"; @@ -86,18 +86,16 @@ int __ext4_check_dir_entry(const char *function, unsigned int line, if (filp) ext4_error_file(filp, function, line, bh->b_blocknr, - "bad entry in directory: %s - offset=%u(%u), " - "inode=%u, rec_len=%d, name_len=%d", - error_msg, (unsigned) (offset % size), - offset, le32_to_cpu(de->inode), - rlen, de->name_len); + "bad entry in directory: %s - offset=%u, " + "inode=%u, rec_len=%d, name_len=%d, size=%d", + error_msg, offset, le32_to_cpu(de->inode), + rlen, de->name_len, size); else ext4_error_inode(dir, function, line, bh->b_blocknr, - "bad entry in directory: %s - offset=%u(%u), " - "inode=%u, rec_len=%d, name_len=%d", - error_msg, (unsigned) (offset % size), - offset, le32_to_cpu(de->inode), - rlen, de->name_len); + "bad entry in directory: %s - offset=%u, " + "inode=%u, rec_len=%d, name_len=%d, size=%d", + error_msg, offset, le32_to_cpu(de->inode), + rlen, de->name_len, size); return 1; } diff --git a/fs/ext4/inline.c b/fs/ext4/inline.c index 7762d365260e..27a3dcffe308 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/inline.c +++ b/fs/ext4/inline.c @@ -1738,6 +1738,7 @@ int empty_inline_dir(struct inode *dir, int *has_inline_data) { int err, inline_size; struct ext4_iloc iloc; + size_t inline_len; void *inline_pos; unsigned int offset; struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de; @@ -1765,8 +1766,9 @@ int empty_inline_dir(struct inode *dir, int *has_inline_data) goto out; } + inline_len = ext4_get_inline_size(dir); offset = EXT4_INLINE_DOTDOT_SIZE; - while (offset < dir->i_size) { + while (offset < inline_len) { de = ext4_get_inline_entry(dir, &iloc, offset, &inline_pos, &inline_size); if (ext4_check_dir_entry(dir, NULL, de, From 4fdc69da238112bb683ac42c625179c436859765 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Theodore Ts'o Date: Sat, 1 Sep 2018 14:42:14 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 014/124] ext4: recalucate superblock checksum after updating free blocks/inodes commit 4274f516d4bc50648a4d97e4f67ecbd7b65cde4a upstream. When mounting the superblock, ext4_fill_super() calculates the free blocks and free inodes and stores them in the superblock. It's not strictly necessary, since we don't use them any more, but it's nice to keep them roughly aligned to reality. Since it's not critical for file system correctness, the code doesn't call ext4_commit_super(). The problem is that it's in ext4_commit_super() that we recalculate the superblock checksum. So if we're not going to call ext4_commit_super(), we need to call ext4_superblock_csum_set() to make sure the superblock checksum is consistent. Most of the time, this doesn't matter, since we end up calling ext4_commit_super() very soon thereafter, and definitely by the time the file system is unmounted. However, it doesn't work in this sequence: mke2fs -Fq -t ext4 /dev/vdc 128M mount /dev/vdc /vdc cp xfstests/git-versions /vdc godown /vdc umount /vdc mount /dev/vdc tune2fs -l /dev/vdc With this commit, the "tune2fs -l" no longer fails. Reported-by: Chengguang Xu Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext4/super.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c index cd1fb8cf5161..fcecf54cda31 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -4237,11 +4237,13 @@ static int ext4_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) block = ext4_count_free_clusters(sb); ext4_free_blocks_count_set(sbi->s_es, EXT4_C2B(sbi, block)); + ext4_superblock_csum_set(sb); err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_freeclusters_counter, block, GFP_KERNEL); if (!err) { unsigned long freei = ext4_count_free_inodes(sb); sbi->s_es->s_free_inodes_count = cpu_to_le32(freei); + ext4_superblock_csum_set(sb); err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_freeinodes_counter, freei, GFP_KERNEL); } From c77f7ccd03716b0edb2a89e4bcf611a7221d63a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Theodore Ts'o Date: Mon, 3 Sep 2018 22:19:43 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 015/124] ext4: fix online resize's handling of a too-small final block group commit f0a459dec5495a3580f8d784555e6f8f3bf7f263 upstream. Avoid growing the file system to an extent so that the last block group is too small to hold all of the metadata that must be stored in the block group. This problem can be triggered with the following reproducer: umount /mnt mke2fs -F -m0 -b 4096 -t ext4 -O resize_inode,^has_journal \ -E resize=1073741824 /tmp/foo.img 128M mount /tmp/foo.img /mnt truncate --size 1708M /tmp/foo.img resize2fs /dev/loop0 295400 umount /mnt e2fsck -fy /tmp/foo.img Reported-by: Torsten Hilbrich Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext4/resize.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ext4/resize.c b/fs/ext4/resize.c index 397b0ffcef75..1a46ed4b6653 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/resize.c +++ b/fs/ext4/resize.c @@ -1957,6 +1957,26 @@ int ext4_resize_fs(struct super_block *sb, ext4_fsblk_t n_blocks_count) } } + /* + * Make sure the last group has enough space so that it's + * guaranteed to have enough space for all metadata blocks + * that it might need to hold. (We might not need to store + * the inode table blocks in the last block group, but there + * will be cases where this might be needed.) + */ + if ((ext4_group_first_block_no(sb, n_group) + + ext4_group_overhead_blocks(sb, n_group) + 2 + + sbi->s_itb_per_group + sbi->s_cluster_ratio) >= n_blocks_count) { + n_blocks_count = ext4_group_first_block_no(sb, n_group); + n_group--; + n_blocks_count_retry = 0; + if (resize_inode) { + iput(resize_inode); + resize_inode = NULL; + } + goto retry; + } + /* extend the last group */ if (n_group == o_group) add = n_blocks_count - o_blocks_count; From 17c3c6f9b249571ef7c40e1df35033ca795a273b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Li Dongyang Date: Sat, 15 Sep 2018 17:11:25 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 016/124] ext4: don't mark mmp buffer head dirty commit fe18d649891d813964d3aaeebad873f281627fbc upstream. Marking mmp bh dirty before writing it will make writeback pick up mmp block later and submit a write, we don't want the duplicate write as kmmpd thread should have full control of reading and writing the mmp block. Another reason is we will also have random I/O error on the writeback request when blk integrity is enabled, because kmmpd could modify the content of the mmp block(e.g. setting new seq and time) while the mmp block is under I/O requested by writeback. Signed-off-by: Li Dongyang Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext4/mmp.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/mmp.c b/fs/ext4/mmp.c index 8313ca3324ec..c3922ee59031 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/mmp.c +++ b/fs/ext4/mmp.c @@ -48,7 +48,6 @@ static int write_mmp_block(struct super_block *sb, struct buffer_head *bh) */ sb_start_write(sb); ext4_mmp_csum_set(sb, mmp); - mark_buffer_dirty(bh); lock_buffer(bh); bh->b_end_io = end_buffer_write_sync; get_bh(bh); From 5e290d8b45feead8ccc17df0118f52ca558a2722 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Catalin Marinas Date: Fri, 4 Dec 2015 12:42:29 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 017/124] arm64: Add trace_hardirqs_off annotation in ret_to_user commit db3899a6477a4dccd26cbfb7f408b6be2cc068e0 upstream. When a kernel is built with CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS the following warning is produced when entering userspace for the first time: WARNING: at /work/Linux/linux-2.6-aarch64/kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3519 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 4.4.0-rc3+ #639 Hardware name: Juno (DT) task: ffffffc9768a0000 ti: ffffffc9768a8000 task.ti: ffffffc9768a8000 PC is at check_flags.part.22+0x19c/0x1a8 LR is at check_flags.part.22+0x19c/0x1a8 pc : [] lr : [] pstate: 600001c5 sp : ffffffc9768abe10 x29: ffffffc9768abe10 x28: ffffffc9768a8000 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000001 x25: 00000000000000a6 x24: ffffffc00064be6c x23: ffffffc0009f249e x22: ffffffc9768a0000 x21: ffffffc97fea5480 x20: 00000000000001c0 x19: ffffffc00169a000 x18: 0000005558cc7b58 x17: 0000007fb78e3180 x16: 0000005558d2e238 x15: ffffffffffffffff x14: 0ffffffffffffffd x13: 0000000000000008 x12: 0101010101010101 x11: 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f x10: fefefefefefeff63 x9 : 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f x8 : 6e655f7371726964 x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : ffffffc0001079c4 x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : ffffffc001698438 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffffffc9768a0000 x0 : 000000000000002e Call trace: [] check_flags.part.22+0x19c/0x1a8 [] lock_is_held+0x80/0x98 [] __schedule+0x404/0x730 [] schedule+0x44/0xb8 [] ret_to_user+0x0/0x24 possible reason: unannotated irqs-off. irq event stamp: 502169 hardirqs last enabled at (502169): [] el0_irq_naked+0x1c/0x24 hardirqs last disabled at (502167): [] __do_softirq+0x17c/0x298 softirqs last enabled at (502168): [] __do_softirq+0x1fc/0x298 softirqs last disabled at (502143): [] irq_exit+0xa0/0xf0 This happens because we disable interrupts in ret_to_user before calling schedule() in work_resched. This patch adds the necessary trace_hardirqs_off annotation. Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas Reported-by: Mark Rutland Cc: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Will Deacon Cc: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S index b6bb97026fdd..00f7ba3d82b8 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S @@ -633,6 +633,9 @@ work_pending: bl do_notify_resume b ret_to_user work_resched: +#ifdef CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS + bl trace_hardirqs_off // the IRQs are off here, inform the tracing code +#endif bl schedule /* From 88fc9f86ad64f4480a4126e805eae9bace437e52 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Roderick Colenbrander Date: Fri, 7 Oct 2016 12:39:40 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 018/124] HID: sony: Update device ids commit cf1015d65d7c8a5504a4c03afb60fb86bff0f032 upstream. Support additional DS4 model. Signed-off-by: Roderick Colenbrander Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/hid/hid-core.c | 2 ++ drivers/hid/hid-ids.h | 1 + drivers/hid/hid-sony.c | 4 ++++ 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-core.c b/drivers/hid/hid-core.c index 39debe2f0c35..dd7b7de789ce 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hid-core.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-core.c @@ -1935,6 +1935,8 @@ static const struct hid_device_id hid_have_special_driver[] = { { HID_BLUETOOTH_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY, USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS3_CONTROLLER) }, { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY, USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS4_CONTROLLER) }, { HID_BLUETOOTH_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY, USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS4_CONTROLLER) }, + { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY, USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS4_CONTROLLER_2) }, + { HID_BLUETOOTH_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY, USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS4_CONTROLLER_2) }, { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY, USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_VAIO_VGX_MOUSE) }, { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY, USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_VAIO_VGP_MOUSE) }, { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_STEELSERIES, USB_DEVICE_ID_STEELSERIES_SRWS1) }, diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h b/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h index 334390bae33d..c1c967cb9aa6 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h @@ -846,6 +846,7 @@ #define USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS3_BDREMOTE 0x0306 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS3_CONTROLLER 0x0268 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS4_CONTROLLER 0x05c4 +#define USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS4_CONTROLLER_2 0x09cc #define USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_NAVIGATION_CONTROLLER 0x042f #define USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_BUZZ_CONTROLLER 0x0002 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_WIRELESS_BUZZ_CONTROLLER 0x1000 diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-sony.c b/drivers/hid/hid-sony.c index 15b3475e641d..62642f121697 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hid-sony.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-sony.c @@ -2042,6 +2042,10 @@ static const struct hid_device_id sony_devices[] = { .driver_data = DUALSHOCK4_CONTROLLER_USB }, { HID_BLUETOOTH_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY, USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS4_CONTROLLER), .driver_data = DUALSHOCK4_CONTROLLER_BT }, + { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY, USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS4_CONTROLLER_2), + .driver_data = DUALSHOCK4_CONTROLLER_USB }, + { HID_BLUETOOTH_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY, USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS4_CONTROLLER_2), + .driver_data = DUALSHOCK4_CONTROLLER_BT }, { } }; MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(hid, sony_devices); From 6b7066bc33fe1951939c04e14d95930f4e4f65d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Roderick Colenbrander Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 14:07:11 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 019/124] HID: sony: Support DS4 dongle commit de66a1a04c25f2560a8dca7a95e2a150b0d5e17e upstream. Add support for USB based DS4 dongle device, which allows connecting a DS4 through Bluetooth, but hides Bluetooth from the host system. Signed-off-by: Roderick Colenbrander Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/hid/hid-core.c | 1 + drivers/hid/hid-ids.h | 1 + drivers/hid/hid-sony.c | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-core.c b/drivers/hid/hid-core.c index dd7b7de789ce..ae88185d5d30 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hid-core.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-core.c @@ -1937,6 +1937,7 @@ static const struct hid_device_id hid_have_special_driver[] = { { HID_BLUETOOTH_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY, USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS4_CONTROLLER) }, { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY, USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS4_CONTROLLER_2) }, { HID_BLUETOOTH_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY, USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS4_CONTROLLER_2) }, + { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY, USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS4_CONTROLLER_DONGLE) }, { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY, USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_VAIO_VGX_MOUSE) }, { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY, USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_VAIO_VGP_MOUSE) }, { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_STEELSERIES, USB_DEVICE_ID_STEELSERIES_SRWS1) }, diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h b/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h index c1c967cb9aa6..cf3d4944fc12 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h @@ -847,6 +847,7 @@ #define USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS3_CONTROLLER 0x0268 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS4_CONTROLLER 0x05c4 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS4_CONTROLLER_2 0x09cc +#define USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS4_CONTROLLER_DONGLE 0x0ba0 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_NAVIGATION_CONTROLLER 0x042f #define USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_BUZZ_CONTROLLER 0x0002 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_WIRELESS_BUZZ_CONTROLLER 0x1000 diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-sony.c b/drivers/hid/hid-sony.c index 62642f121697..3998e69d132d 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hid-sony.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-sony.c @@ -2046,6 +2046,8 @@ static const struct hid_device_id sony_devices[] = { .driver_data = DUALSHOCK4_CONTROLLER_USB }, { HID_BLUETOOTH_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY, USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS4_CONTROLLER_2), .driver_data = DUALSHOCK4_CONTROLLER_BT }, + { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY, USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS4_CONTROLLER_DONGLE), + .driver_data = DUALSHOCK4_CONTROLLER_USB }, { } }; MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(hid, sony_devices); From 0d20b84ecbb6edbc7aebd82dc1df7f285aaae2e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stafford Horne Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2018 21:45:37 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 020/124] crypto: skcipher - Fix -Wstringop-truncation warnings MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit cefd769fd0192c84d638f66da202459ed8ad63ba ] As of GCC 9.0.0 the build is reporting warnings like: crypto/ablkcipher.c: In function ‘crypto_ablkcipher_report’: crypto/ablkcipher.c:374:2: warning: ‘strncpy’ specified bound 64 equals destination size [-Wstringop-truncation] strncpy(rblkcipher.geniv, alg->cra_ablkcipher.geniv ?: "", ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ sizeof(rblkcipher.geniv)); ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ This means the strnycpy might create a non null terminated string. Fix this by explicitly performing '\0' termination. Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Max Filippov Cc: Eric Biggers Cc: Nick Desaulniers Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- crypto/ablkcipher.c | 2 ++ crypto/blkcipher.c | 1 + 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/crypto/ablkcipher.c b/crypto/ablkcipher.c index 5061d7ad33e4..cad66af5a1ae 100644 --- a/crypto/ablkcipher.c +++ b/crypto/ablkcipher.c @@ -382,6 +382,7 @@ static int crypto_ablkcipher_report(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg) strncpy(rblkcipher.type, "ablkcipher", sizeof(rblkcipher.type)); strncpy(rblkcipher.geniv, alg->cra_ablkcipher.geniv ?: "", sizeof(rblkcipher.geniv)); + rblkcipher.geniv[sizeof(rblkcipher.geniv) - 1] = '\0'; rblkcipher.blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize; rblkcipher.min_keysize = alg->cra_ablkcipher.min_keysize; @@ -463,6 +464,7 @@ static int crypto_givcipher_report(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg) strncpy(rblkcipher.type, "givcipher", sizeof(rblkcipher.type)); strncpy(rblkcipher.geniv, alg->cra_ablkcipher.geniv ?: "", sizeof(rblkcipher.geniv)); + rblkcipher.geniv[sizeof(rblkcipher.geniv) - 1] = '\0'; rblkcipher.blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize; rblkcipher.min_keysize = alg->cra_ablkcipher.min_keysize; diff --git a/crypto/blkcipher.c b/crypto/blkcipher.c index 5ebfdd0d4543..5ba9916a33c8 100644 --- a/crypto/blkcipher.c +++ b/crypto/blkcipher.c @@ -514,6 +514,7 @@ static int crypto_blkcipher_report(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg) strncpy(rblkcipher.type, "blkcipher", sizeof(rblkcipher.type)); strncpy(rblkcipher.geniv, alg->cra_blkcipher.geniv ?: "", sizeof(rblkcipher.geniv)); + rblkcipher.geniv[sizeof(rblkcipher.geniv) - 1] = '\0'; rblkcipher.blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize; rblkcipher.min_keysize = alg->cra_blkcipher.min_keysize; From 64efd66f843eb190cad8ac5e89cf61a4c420d2c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matt Ranostay Date: Fri, 8 Jun 2018 23:58:15 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 021/124] tsl2550: fix lux1_input error in low light [ Upstream commit ce054546cc2c26891cefa2f284d90d93b52205de ] ADC channel 0 photodiode detects both infrared + visible light, but ADC channel 1 just detects infrared. However, the latter is a bit more sensitive in that range so complete darkness or low light causes a error condition in which the chan0 - chan1 is negative that results in a -EAGAIN. This patch changes the resulting lux1_input sysfs attribute message from "Resource temporarily unavailable" to a user-grokable lux value of 0. Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Matt Ranostay Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/misc/tsl2550.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/misc/tsl2550.c b/drivers/misc/tsl2550.c index b00335652e52..59b9e46c0a7b 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/tsl2550.c +++ b/drivers/misc/tsl2550.c @@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ static int tsl2550_calculate_lux(u8 ch0, u8 ch1) } else lux = 0; else - return -EAGAIN; + return 0; /* LUX range check */ return lux > TSL2550_MAX_LUX ? TSL2550_MAX_LUX : lux; From 9628ed40f6e4079be3d2b86fb44ee55468652016 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Williams Date: Fri, 6 Jul 2018 09:08:01 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 022/124] x86/numa_emulation: Fix emulated-to-physical node mapping [ Upstream commit 3b6c62f363a19ce82bf378187ab97c9dc01e3927 ] Without this change the distance table calculation for emulated nodes may use the wrong numa node and report an incorrect distance. Signed-off-by: Dan Williams Cc: David Rientjes Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Wei Yang Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/153089328103.27680.14778434392225818887.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/mm/numa_emulation.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/numa_emulation.c b/arch/x86/mm/numa_emulation.c index a8f90ce3dedf..dc6d99017f3f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/numa_emulation.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/numa_emulation.c @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ static int __init emu_setup_memblk(struct numa_meminfo *ei, eb->nid = nid; if (emu_nid_to_phys[nid] == NUMA_NO_NODE) - emu_nid_to_phys[nid] = nid; + emu_nid_to_phys[nid] = pb->nid; pb->start += size; if (pb->start >= pb->end) { From 81f7ce1dc8cdc1858c6340196396b6fc6fafbc3f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anton Vasilyev Date: Fri, 6 Jul 2018 15:32:53 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 023/124] uwb: hwa-rc: fix memory leak at probe [ Upstream commit 11b71782c1d10d9bccc31825cf84291cd7588a1e ] hwarc_probe() allocates memory for hwarc, but does not free it if uwb_rc_add() or hwarc_get_version() fail. Found by Linux Driver Verification project (linuxtesting.org). Signed-off-by: Anton Vasilyev Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/uwb/hwa-rc.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/uwb/hwa-rc.c b/drivers/uwb/hwa-rc.c index 1212b4b3c5a9..e9ff710a3d12 100644 --- a/drivers/uwb/hwa-rc.c +++ b/drivers/uwb/hwa-rc.c @@ -875,6 +875,7 @@ static int hwarc_probe(struct usb_interface *iface, error_rc_add: usb_put_intf(iface); usb_put_dev(hwarc->usb_dev); + kfree(hwarc); error_alloc: uwb_rc_put(uwb_rc); error_rc_alloc: From ec9147bf4f142d04086953591512a41c1c8da5c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hovold Date: Wed, 4 Jul 2018 17:02:18 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 024/124] USB: serial: kobil_sct: fix modem-status error handling [ Upstream commit a420b5d939ee58f1d950f0ea782834056520aeaa ] Make sure to return -EIO in case of a short modem-status read request. While at it, split the debug message to not include the (zeroed) transfer-buffer content in case of errors. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/serial/kobil_sct.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/kobil_sct.c b/drivers/usb/serial/kobil_sct.c index 02c420af251e..d056bdb42771 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/kobil_sct.c +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/kobil_sct.c @@ -396,12 +396,20 @@ static int kobil_tiocmget(struct tty_struct *tty) transfer_buffer_length, KOBIL_TIMEOUT); - dev_dbg(&port->dev, "%s - Send get_status_line_state URB returns: %i. Statusline: %02x\n", - __func__, result, transfer_buffer[0]); + dev_dbg(&port->dev, "Send get_status_line_state URB returns: %i\n", + result); + if (result < 1) { + if (result >= 0) + result = -EIO; + goto out_free; + } + + dev_dbg(&port->dev, "Statusline: %02x\n", transfer_buffer[0]); result = 0; if ((transfer_buffer[0] & SUSBCR_GSL_DSR) != 0) result = TIOCM_DSR; +out_free: kfree(transfer_buffer); return result; } From 084dad95d254443aefd23d512b34a2fd382eaeb1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sylwester Nawrocki Date: Tue, 15 May 2018 05:21:45 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 025/124] media: exynos4-is: Prevent NULL pointer dereference in __isp_video_try_fmt() [ Upstream commit 7c1b9a5aeed91bef98988ac0fcf38c8c1f4f9a3a ] This patch fixes potential NULL pointer dereference as indicated by the following static checker warning: drivers/media/platform/exynos4-is/fimc-isp-video.c:408 isp_video_try_fmt_mplane() error: NULL dereference inside function '__isp_video_try_fmt(isp, &f->fmt.pix_mp, (0))()'. Fixes: 34947b8aebe3: ("[media] exynos4-is: Add the FIMC-IS ISP capture DMA driver") Reported-by: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: Sylwester Nawrocki Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/media/platform/exynos4-is/fimc-isp-video.c | 11 ++++++++--- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/exynos4-is/fimc-isp-video.c b/drivers/media/platform/exynos4-is/fimc-isp-video.c index 76b6b4d14616..322677f2cbb0 100644 --- a/drivers/media/platform/exynos4-is/fimc-isp-video.c +++ b/drivers/media/platform/exynos4-is/fimc-isp-video.c @@ -389,12 +389,17 @@ static void __isp_video_try_fmt(struct fimc_isp *isp, struct v4l2_pix_format_mplane *pixm, const struct fimc_fmt **fmt) { - *fmt = fimc_isp_find_format(&pixm->pixelformat, NULL, 2); + const struct fimc_fmt *__fmt; + + __fmt = fimc_isp_find_format(&pixm->pixelformat, NULL, 2); + + if (fmt) + *fmt = __fmt; pixm->colorspace = V4L2_COLORSPACE_SRGB; pixm->field = V4L2_FIELD_NONE; - pixm->num_planes = (*fmt)->memplanes; - pixm->pixelformat = (*fmt)->fourcc; + pixm->num_planes = __fmt->memplanes; + pixm->pixelformat = __fmt->fourcc; /* * TODO: double check with the docmentation these width/height * constraints are correct. From 4fc95d5a395b369c89d076088752c318a4166b23 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hari Bathini Date: Thu, 28 Jun 2018 10:49:56 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 026/124] powerpc/kdump: Handle crashkernel memory reservation failure [ Upstream commit 8950329c4a64c6d3ca0bc34711a1afbd9ce05657 ] Memory reservation for crashkernel could fail if there are holes around kdump kernel offset (128M). Fail gracefully in such cases and print an error message. Signed-off-by: Hari Bathini Tested-by: David Gibson Reviewed-by: Dave Young Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/powerpc/kernel/machine_kexec.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/machine_kexec.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/machine_kexec.c index 015ae55c1868..8dff2b371219 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/machine_kexec.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/machine_kexec.c @@ -186,7 +186,12 @@ void __init reserve_crashkernel(void) (unsigned long)(crashk_res.start >> 20), (unsigned long)(memblock_phys_mem_size() >> 20)); - memblock_reserve(crashk_res.start, crash_size); + if (!memblock_is_region_memory(crashk_res.start, crash_size) || + memblock_reserve(crashk_res.start, crash_size)) { + pr_err("Failed to reserve memory for crashkernel!\n"); + crashk_res.start = crashk_res.end = 0; + return; + } } int overlaps_crashkernel(unsigned long start, unsigned long size) From 1edc2549fca165fc37602c57f47b00271c8f99c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andy Shevchenko Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2018 22:31:10 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 027/124] x86/tsc: Add missing header to tsc_msr.c MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit dbd0fbc76c77daac08ddd245afdcbade0d506e19 ] Add a missing header otherwise compiler warns about missed prototype: CC arch/x86/kernel/tsc_msr.o arch/x86/kernel/tsc_msr.c:73:15: warning: no previous prototype for ‘cpu_khz_from_msr’ [-Wmissing-prototypes] unsigned long cpu_khz_from_msr(void) ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Pavel Tatashin Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180629193113.84425-4-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/tsc_msr.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tsc_msr.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tsc_msr.c index 6aa0f4d9eea6..0e37e369b3a0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/tsc_msr.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tsc_msr.c @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include /* CPU reference clock frequency: in KHz */ #define FREQ_83 83200 From 17c3a52cb818e8036d80c80e27773b42ce13828c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bart Van Assche Date: Fri, 22 Jun 2018 14:53:01 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 028/124] scsi: target/iscsi: Make iscsit_ta_authentication() respect the output buffer size [ Upstream commit 35bea5c84fd13c643cce63f0b5cd4b148f8c901d ] Fixes: e48354ce078c ("iscsi-target: Add iSCSI fabric support for target v4.1") Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche Reviewed-by: Mike Christie Cc: Mike Christie Cc: Christoph Hellwig Cc: Hannes Reinecke Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_tpg.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_tpg.c b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_tpg.c index 5530321c44f2..afef70b1aaaf 100644 --- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_tpg.c +++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_tpg.c @@ -651,8 +651,7 @@ int iscsit_ta_authentication(struct iscsi_portal_group *tpg, u32 authentication) none = strstr(buf1, NONE); if (none) goto out; - strncat(buf1, ",", strlen(",")); - strncat(buf1, NONE, strlen(NONE)); + strlcat(buf1, "," NONE, sizeof(buf1)); if (iscsi_update_param_value(param, buf1) < 0) return -EINVAL; } From f5ba8279ebb621504b3cc116f998d819a61d2f65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Breno Leitao Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2018 17:35:16 -0300 Subject: [PATCH 029/124] scsi: ibmvscsi: Improve strings handling [ Upstream commit 1262dc09dc9ae7bf4ad00b6a2c5ed6a6936bcd10 ] Currently an open firmware property is copied into partition_name variable without keeping a room for \0. Later one, this variable (partition_name), which is 97 bytes long, is strncpyed into ibmvcsci_host_data->madapter_info->partition_name, which is 96 bytes long, possibly truncating it 'again' and removing the \0. This patch simply decreases the partition name to 96 and just copy using strlcpy() which guarantees that the string is \0 terminated. I think there is no issue if this there is a truncation in this very first copy, i.e, when the open firmware property is read and copied into the driver for the very first time; This issue also causes the following warning on GCC 8: drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvscsi.c:281:2: warning: strncpy output may be truncated copying 96 bytes from a string of length 96 [-Wstringop-truncation] ... inlined from ibmvscsi_probe at drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvscsi.c:2221:7: drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvscsi.c:265:3: warning: strncpy specified bound 97 equals destination size [-Wstringop-truncation] CC: Bart Van Assche CC: Tyrel Datwyler Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao Acked-by: Tyrel Datwyler Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvscsi.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvscsi.c b/drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvscsi.c index 7b23f21f22f1..e9331cf5478d 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvscsi.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvscsi.c @@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ static int max_requests = IBMVSCSI_MAX_REQUESTS_DEFAULT; static int max_events = IBMVSCSI_MAX_REQUESTS_DEFAULT + 2; static int fast_fail = 1; static int client_reserve = 1; -static char partition_name[97] = "UNKNOWN"; +static char partition_name[96] = "UNKNOWN"; static unsigned int partition_number = -1; static struct scsi_transport_template *ibmvscsi_transport_template; @@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ static void gather_partition_info(void) ppartition_name = of_get_property(rootdn, "ibm,partition-name", NULL); if (ppartition_name) - strncpy(partition_name, ppartition_name, + strlcpy(partition_name, ppartition_name, sizeof(partition_name)); p_number_ptr = of_get_property(rootdn, "ibm,partition-no", NULL); if (p_number_ptr) From 5c25cf14849f73e6b2dc1b008bb5eeb5265c6ee0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julia Lawall Date: Sun, 1 Jul 2018 19:32:04 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 030/124] usb: wusbcore: security: cast sizeof to int for comparison [ Upstream commit d3ac5598c5010a8999978ebbcca3b1c6188ca36b ] Comparing an int to a size, which is unsigned, causes the int to become unsigned, giving the wrong result. usb_get_descriptor can return a negative error code. A simplified version of the semantic match that finds this problem is as follows: (http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/) // @@ int x; expression e,e1; identifier f; @@ *x = f(...); ... when != x = e1 when != if (x < 0 || ...) { ... return ...; } *x < sizeof(e) // Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/wusbcore/security.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/wusbcore/security.c b/drivers/usb/wusbcore/security.c index cc74d669c802..63ab92af2473 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/wusbcore/security.c +++ b/drivers/usb/wusbcore/security.c @@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ int wusb_dev_sec_add(struct wusbhc *wusbhc, result = usb_get_descriptor(usb_dev, USB_DT_SECURITY, 0, secd, sizeof(*secd)); - if (result < sizeof(*secd)) { + if (result < (int)sizeof(*secd)) { dev_err(dev, "Can't read security descriptor or " "not enough data: %d\n", result); goto out; From f497869a6feab016c2dfd58bf80decfe57348ed9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Gleixner Date: Mon, 2 Jul 2018 09:34:29 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 031/124] alarmtimer: Prevent overflow for relative nanosleep [ Upstream commit 5f936e19cc0ef97dbe3a56e9498922ad5ba1edef ] Air Icy reported: UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/time/alarmtimer.c:811:7 signed integer overflow: 1529859276030040771 + 9223372036854775807 cannot be represented in type 'long long int' Call Trace: alarm_timer_nsleep+0x44c/0x510 kernel/time/alarmtimer.c:811 __do_sys_clock_nanosleep kernel/time/posix-timers.c:1235 [inline] __se_sys_clock_nanosleep kernel/time/posix-timers.c:1213 [inline] __x64_sys_clock_nanosleep+0x326/0x4e0 kernel/time/posix-timers.c:1213 do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x3a0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 alarm_timer_nsleep() uses ktime_add() to add the current time and the relative expiry value. ktime_add() has no sanity checks so the addition can overflow when the relative timeout is large enough. Use ktime_add_safe() which has the necessary sanity checks in place and limits the result to the valid range. Fixes: 9a7adcf5c6de ("timers: Posix interface for alarm-timers") Reported-by: Team OWL337 Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: John Stultz Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1807020926360.1595@nanos.tec.linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/time/alarmtimer.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/time/alarmtimer.c b/kernel/time/alarmtimer.c index 119847b93ba6..0436d5edbccf 100644 --- a/kernel/time/alarmtimer.c +++ b/kernel/time/alarmtimer.c @@ -776,7 +776,8 @@ static int alarm_timer_nsleep(const clockid_t which_clock, int flags, /* Convert (if necessary) to absolute time */ if (flags != TIMER_ABSTIME) { ktime_t now = alarm_bases[type].gettime(); - exp = ktime_add(now, exp); + + exp = ktime_add_safe(now, exp); } if (alarmtimer_do_nsleep(&alarm, exp)) From 8963aa53b25d7d41e187e793192c1d98082c0de0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vasily Gorbik Date: Sun, 17 Jun 2018 00:30:43 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 032/124] s390/extmem: fix gcc 8 stringop-overflow warning [ Upstream commit 6b2ddf33baec23dace85bd647e3fc4ac070963e8 ] arch/s390/mm/extmem.c: In function '__segment_load': arch/s390/mm/extmem.c:436:2: warning: 'strncat' specified bound 7 equals source length [-Wstringop-overflow=] strncat(seg->res_name, " (DCSS)", 7); What gcc complains about here is the misuse of strncat function, which in this case does not limit a number of bytes taken from "src", so it is in the end the same as strcat(seg->res_name, " (DCSS)"); Keeping in mind that a res_name is 15 bytes, strncat in this case would overflow the buffer and write 0 into alignment byte between the fields in the struct. To avoid that increasing res_name size to 16, and reusing strlcat. Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/s390/mm/extmem.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/s390/mm/extmem.c b/arch/s390/mm/extmem.c index 519bba716cc3..783aadec4e40 100644 --- a/arch/s390/mm/extmem.c +++ b/arch/s390/mm/extmem.c @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ struct qin64 { struct dcss_segment { struct list_head list; char dcss_name[8]; - char res_name[15]; + char res_name[16]; unsigned long start_addr; unsigned long end; atomic_t ref_count; @@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ __segment_load (char *name, int do_nonshared, unsigned long *addr, unsigned long memcpy(&seg->res_name, seg->dcss_name, 8); EBCASC(seg->res_name, 8); seg->res_name[8] = '\0'; - strncat(seg->res_name, " (DCSS)", 7); + strlcat(seg->res_name, " (DCSS)", sizeof(seg->res_name)); seg->res->name = seg->res_name; rc = seg->vm_segtype; if (rc == SEG_TYPE_SC || From 65ec1f1d5bc435f2d67553c189eec426b3a826c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicholas Mc Guire Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2018 19:07:42 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 033/124] ALSA: snd-aoa: add of_node_put() in error path [ Upstream commit 222bce5eb88d1af656419db04bcd84b2419fb900 ] Both calls to of_find_node_by_name() and of_get_next_child() return a node pointer with refcount incremented thus it must be explicidly decremented here after the last usage. As we are assured to have a refcounted np either from the initial of_find_node_by_name(NULL, name); or from the of_get_next_child(gpio, np) in the while loop if we reached the error code path below, an x of_node_put(np) is needed. Signed-off-by: Nicholas Mc Guire Fixes: commit f3d9478b2ce4 ("[ALSA] snd-aoa: add snd-aoa") Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/aoa/core/gpio-feature.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/aoa/core/gpio-feature.c b/sound/aoa/core/gpio-feature.c index f34153962d07..585b594bd838 100644 --- a/sound/aoa/core/gpio-feature.c +++ b/sound/aoa/core/gpio-feature.c @@ -88,8 +88,10 @@ static struct device_node *get_gpio(char *name, } reg = of_get_property(np, "reg", NULL); - if (!reg) + if (!reg) { + of_node_put(np); return NULL; + } *gpioptr = *reg; From 359c08de0a7b52f7c2674673aca35acf36f05e00 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Akinobu Mita Date: Sun, 10 Jun 2018 11:42:01 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 034/124] media: s3c-camif: ignore -ENOIOCTLCMD from v4l2_subdev_call for s_power [ Upstream commit 30ed2b83343bd1e07884ca7355dac70d25ffc158 ] When the subdevice doesn't provide s_power core ops callback, the v4l2_subdev_call for s_power returns -ENOIOCTLCMD. If the subdevice doesn't have the special handling for its power saving mode, the s_power isn't required. So -ENOIOCTLCMD from the v4l2_subdev_call should be ignored. Cc: Hans Verkuil Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita Acked-by: Sylwester Nawrocki Signed-off-by: Sakari Ailus Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/media/platform/s3c-camif/camif-capture.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/s3c-camif/camif-capture.c b/drivers/media/platform/s3c-camif/camif-capture.c index 97a52d4574e7..bb4a57e55aed 100644 --- a/drivers/media/platform/s3c-camif/camif-capture.c +++ b/drivers/media/platform/s3c-camif/camif-capture.c @@ -117,6 +117,8 @@ static int sensor_set_power(struct camif_dev *camif, int on) if (camif->sensor.power_count == !on) err = v4l2_subdev_call(sensor->sd, core, s_power, on); + if (err == -ENOIOCTLCMD) + err = 0; if (!err) sensor->power_count += on ? 1 : -1; From 4e8a8b0b720d5073179cfbea146084a8bd923f1e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Akinobu Mita Date: Sun, 10 Jun 2018 11:42:26 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 035/124] media: soc_camera: ov772x: correct setting of banding filter [ Upstream commit 22216ec41e919682c15345e95928f266e8ba6f9e ] The banding filter ON/OFF is controlled via bit 5 of COM8 register. It is attempted to be enabled in ov772x_set_params() by the following line. ret = ov772x_mask_set(client, COM8, BNDF_ON_OFF, 1); But this unexpectedly results disabling the banding filter, because the mask and set bits are exclusive. On the other hand, ov772x_s_ctrl() correctly sets the bit by: ret = ov772x_mask_set(client, COM8, BNDF_ON_OFF, BNDF_ON_OFF); The same fix was already applied to non-soc_camera version of ov772x driver in the commit commit a024ee14cd36 ("media: ov772x: correct setting of banding filter") Cc: Jacopo Mondi Cc: Laurent Pinchart Cc: Hans Verkuil Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita Signed-off-by: Sakari Ailus Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/media/i2c/soc_camera/ov772x.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/media/i2c/soc_camera/ov772x.c b/drivers/media/i2c/soc_camera/ov772x.c index 970a04e1e56e..a08502766474 100644 --- a/drivers/media/i2c/soc_camera/ov772x.c +++ b/drivers/media/i2c/soc_camera/ov772x.c @@ -834,7 +834,7 @@ static int ov772x_set_params(struct ov772x_priv *priv, * set COM8 */ if (priv->band_filter) { - ret = ov772x_mask_set(client, COM8, BNDF_ON_OFF, 1); + ret = ov772x_mask_set(client, COM8, BNDF_ON_OFF, BNDF_ON_OFF); if (!ret) ret = ov772x_mask_set(client, BDBASE, 0xff, 256 - priv->band_filter); From 59c5b0c0265aa726d8ef7c4bbd5fdc3b4c0915d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alistair Strachan Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2018 17:57:35 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 036/124] staging: android: ashmem: Fix mmap size validation [ Upstream commit 8632c614565d0c5fdde527889601c018e97b6384 ] The ashmem driver did not check that the size/offset of the vma passed to its .mmap() function was not larger than the ashmem object being mapped. This could cause mmap() to succeed, even though accessing parts of the mapping would later fail with a segmentation fault. Ensure an error is returned by the ashmem_mmap() function if the vma size is larger than the ashmem object size. This enables safer handling of the problem in userspace. Cc: Todd Kjos Cc: devel@driverdev.osuosl.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-team@android.com Cc: Joel Fernandes Signed-off-by: Alistair Strachan Acked-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) Reviewed-by: Martijn Coenen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c b/drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c index cf7c597e598f..22ddd4ce9dd6 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c +++ b/drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c @@ -370,6 +370,12 @@ static int ashmem_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) goto out; } + /* requested mapping size larger than object size */ + if (vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start > PAGE_ALIGN(asma->size)) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + /* requested protection bits must match our allowed protection mask */ if (unlikely((vma->vm_flags & ~calc_vm_prot_bits(asma->prot_mask)) & calc_vm_prot_bits(PROT_MASK))) { From 7376ca3d03cc2de83d30533a2369fa7b9e6e33db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhouyang Jia Date: Tue, 12 Jun 2018 12:36:25 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 037/124] drivers/tty: add error handling for pcmcia_loop_config [ Upstream commit 85c634e919bd6ef17427f26a52920aeba12e16ee ] When pcmcia_loop_config fails, the lack of error-handling code may cause unexpected results. This patch adds error-handling code after calling pcmcia_loop_config. Signed-off-by: Zhouyang Jia Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/tty/serial/8250/serial_cs.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/serial_cs.c b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/serial_cs.c index 4d180c9423ef..1a14948c86d6 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/serial_cs.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/serial_cs.c @@ -629,8 +629,10 @@ static int serial_config(struct pcmcia_device * link) (link->has_func_id) && (link->socket->pcmcia_pfc == 0) && ((link->func_id == CISTPL_FUNCID_MULTI) || - (link->func_id == CISTPL_FUNCID_SERIAL))) - pcmcia_loop_config(link, serial_check_for_multi, info); + (link->func_id == CISTPL_FUNCID_SERIAL))) { + if (pcmcia_loop_config(link, serial_check_for_multi, info)) + goto failed; + } /* * Apply any multi-port quirk. From f2286545cea1f25aba28ec54dc4f12d230e0032d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhouyang Jia Date: Mon, 11 Jun 2018 00:39:20 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 038/124] media: tm6000: add error handling for dvb_register_adapter [ Upstream commit e95d7c6eb94c634852eaa5ff4caf3db05b5d2e86 ] When dvb_register_adapter fails, the lack of error-handling code may cause unexpected results. This patch adds error-handling code after calling dvb_register_adapter. Signed-off-by: Zhouyang Jia [hans.verkuil@cisco.com: use pr_err and fix typo: adater -> adapter] Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/media/usb/tm6000/tm6000-dvb.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/tm6000/tm6000-dvb.c b/drivers/media/usb/tm6000/tm6000-dvb.c index 095f5db1a790..4f317e2686e9 100644 --- a/drivers/media/usb/tm6000/tm6000-dvb.c +++ b/drivers/media/usb/tm6000/tm6000-dvb.c @@ -275,6 +275,11 @@ static int register_dvb(struct tm6000_core *dev) ret = dvb_register_adapter(&dvb->adapter, "Trident TVMaster 6000 DVB-T", THIS_MODULE, &dev->udev->dev, adapter_nr); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_err("tm6000: couldn't register the adapter!\n"); + goto err; + } + dvb->adapter.priv = dev; if (dvb->frontend) { From ebfb72d5e3ecf723fa0433c0767da60058f74e87 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kai-Heng Feng Date: Thu, 28 Jun 2018 15:28:24 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 039/124] ALSA: hda: Add AZX_DCAPS_PM_RUNTIME for AMD Raven Ridge [ Upstream commit 1adca4b0cd65c14cb8b8c9c257720385869c3d5f ] This patch can make audio controller in AMD Raven Ridge gets runtime suspended to D3, to save ~1W power when it's not in use. Cc: Vijendar Mukunda Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c b/sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c index 5b89e110f6d4..7218e40f4d9f 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c @@ -2094,7 +2094,8 @@ static const struct pci_device_id azx_ids[] = { .driver_data = AZX_DRIVER_GENERIC | AZX_DCAPS_PRESET_ATI_SB }, /* AMD Raven */ { PCI_DEVICE(0x1022, 0x15e3), - .driver_data = AZX_DRIVER_GENERIC | AZX_DCAPS_PRESET_ATI_SB }, + .driver_data = AZX_DRIVER_GENERIC | AZX_DCAPS_PRESET_ATI_SB | + AZX_DCAPS_PM_RUNTIME }, /* ATI HDMI */ { PCI_DEVICE(0x1002, 0x0002), .driver_data = AZX_DRIVER_ATIHDMI_NS | AZX_DCAPS_PRESET_ATI_HDMI_NS }, From 1ae2ccc9298c7663025ce2b4d7be3720ba446569 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Carpenter Date: Tue, 5 Jun 2018 14:31:39 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 040/124] rndis_wlan: potential buffer overflow in rndis_wlan_auth_indication() [ Upstream commit ae636fb1554833ee5133ca47bf4b2791b6739c52 ] This is a static checker fix, not something I have tested. The issue is that on the second iteration through the loop, we jump forward by le32_to_cpu(auth_req->length) bytes. The problem is that if the length is more than "buflen" then we end up with a negative "buflen". A negative buflen is type promoted to a high positive value and the loop continues but it's accessing beyond the end of the buffer. I believe the "auth_req->length" comes from the firmware and if the firmware is malicious or buggy, you're already toasted so the impact of this bug is probably not very severe. Fixes: 030645aceb3d ("rndis_wlan: handle 802.11 indications from device") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/wireless/rndis_wlan.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/rndis_wlan.c b/drivers/net/wireless/rndis_wlan.c index 46dda22cec15..ebe762bf01dd 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/rndis_wlan.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/rndis_wlan.c @@ -2919,6 +2919,8 @@ static void rndis_wlan_auth_indication(struct usbnet *usbdev, while (buflen >= sizeof(*auth_req)) { auth_req = (void *)buf; + if (buflen < le32_to_cpu(auth_req->length)) + return; type = "unknown"; flags = le32_to_cpu(auth_req->flags); pairwise_error = false; From cbc56a12da05d5333a9020c4d7854ad7d0b5a31d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tony Lindgren Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2018 02:43:35 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 041/124] wlcore: Add missing PM call for wlcore_cmd_wait_for_event_or_timeout() [ Upstream commit 4ec7cece87b3ed21ffcd407c62fb2f151a366bc1 ] Otherwise we can get: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 55 at drivers/net/wireless/ti/wlcore/io.h:84 I've only seen this few times with the runtime PM patches enabled so this one is probably not needed before that. This seems to work currently based on the current PM implementation timer. Let's apply this separately though in case others are hitting this issue. Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/wireless/ti/wlcore/cmd.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ti/wlcore/cmd.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ti/wlcore/cmd.c index 05604ee31224..de43c0376143 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ti/wlcore/cmd.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ti/wlcore/cmd.c @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ #include "wl12xx_80211.h" #include "cmd.h" #include "event.h" +#include "ps.h" #include "tx.h" #include "hw_ops.h" @@ -187,6 +188,10 @@ int wlcore_cmd_wait_for_event_or_timeout(struct wl1271 *wl, timeout_time = jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(WL1271_EVENT_TIMEOUT); + ret = wl1271_ps_elp_wakeup(wl); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + do { if (time_after(jiffies, timeout_time)) { wl1271_debug(DEBUG_CMD, "timeout waiting for event %d", @@ -218,6 +223,7 @@ int wlcore_cmd_wait_for_event_or_timeout(struct wl1271 *wl, } while (!event); out: + wl1271_ps_elp_sleep(wl); kfree(events_vector); return ret; } From d02f9650dd436b105917657f9b16914c1d5db693 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ethan Tuttle Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2018 21:31:08 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 042/124] ARM: mvebu: declare asm symbols as character arrays in pmsu.c [ Upstream commit d0d378ff451a66e486488eec842e507d28145813 ] With CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE, memcpy uses the declared size of operands to detect buffer overflows. If src or dest is declared as a char, attempts to copy more than byte will result in a fortify_panic(). Address this problem in mvebu_setup_boot_addr_wa() by declaring mvebu_boot_wa_start and mvebu_boot_wa_end as character arrays. Also remove a couple addressof operators to avoid "arithmetic on pointer to an incomplete type" compiler error. See commit 54a7d50b9205 ("x86: mark kprobe templates as character arrays, not single characters") for a similar fix. Fixes "detected buffer overflow in memcpy" error during init on some mvebu systems (armada-370-xp, armada-375): (fortify_panic) from (mvebu_setup_boot_addr_wa+0xb0/0xb4) (mvebu_setup_boot_addr_wa) from (mvebu_v7_cpu_pm_init+0x154/0x204) (mvebu_v7_cpu_pm_init) from (do_one_initcall+0x7c/0x1a8) (do_one_initcall) from (kernel_init_freeable+0x1bc/0x254) (kernel_init_freeable) from (kernel_init+0x8/0x114) (kernel_init) from (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x2c) Signed-off-by: Ethan Tuttle Tested-by: Ethan Tuttle Signed-off-by: Gregory CLEMENT Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/mach-mvebu/pmsu.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-mvebu/pmsu.c b/arch/arm/mach-mvebu/pmsu.c index 6f8a85c5965c..7bbe32e56bbc 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mach-mvebu/pmsu.c +++ b/arch/arm/mach-mvebu/pmsu.c @@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ void mvebu_pmsu_set_cpu_boot_addr(int hw_cpu, void *boot_addr) PMSU_BOOT_ADDR_REDIRECT_OFFSET(hw_cpu)); } -extern unsigned char mvebu_boot_wa_start; -extern unsigned char mvebu_boot_wa_end; +extern unsigned char mvebu_boot_wa_start[]; +extern unsigned char mvebu_boot_wa_end[]; /* * This function sets up the boot address workaround needed for SMP @@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ int mvebu_setup_boot_addr_wa(unsigned int crypto_eng_target, phys_addr_t resume_addr_reg) { void __iomem *sram_virt_base; - u32 code_len = &mvebu_boot_wa_end - &mvebu_boot_wa_start; + u32 code_len = mvebu_boot_wa_end - mvebu_boot_wa_start; mvebu_mbus_del_window(BOOTROM_BASE, BOOTROM_SIZE); mvebu_mbus_add_window_by_id(crypto_eng_target, crypto_eng_attribute, From fafbfb107818e8110a8b0facec0aeaf2c087e77d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhouyang Jia Date: Thu, 14 Jun 2018 21:37:17 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 043/124] HID: hid-ntrig: add error handling for sysfs_create_group [ Upstream commit 44d4d51de9a3534a2b63d69efda02a10e66541e4 ] When sysfs_create_group fails, the lack of error-handling code may cause unexpected results. This patch adds error-handling code after calling sysfs_create_group. Signed-off-by: Zhouyang Jia Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/hid/hid-ntrig.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-ntrig.c b/drivers/hid/hid-ntrig.c index 600f2075512f..dc497b633e28 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hid-ntrig.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-ntrig.c @@ -953,6 +953,8 @@ static int ntrig_probe(struct hid_device *hdev, const struct hid_device_id *id) ret = sysfs_create_group(&hdev->dev.kobj, &ntrig_attribute_group); + if (ret) + hid_err(hdev, "cannot create sysfs group\n"); return 0; err_free: From b4bc21f12ccc54f30891fe0f33fb43343b4e422f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhouyang Jia Date: Tue, 12 Jun 2018 11:13:00 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 044/124] scsi: bnx2i: add error handling for ioremap_nocache [ Upstream commit aa154ea885eb0c2407457ce9c1538d78c95456fa ] When ioremap_nocache fails, the lack of error-handling code may cause unexpected results. This patch adds error-handling code after calling ioremap_nocache. Signed-off-by: Zhouyang Jia Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn Acked-by: Manish Rangankar Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/scsi/bnx2i/bnx2i_hwi.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/bnx2i/bnx2i_hwi.c b/drivers/scsi/bnx2i/bnx2i_hwi.c index fb072cc5e9fd..dada9ce4e702 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/bnx2i/bnx2i_hwi.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/bnx2i/bnx2i_hwi.c @@ -2742,6 +2742,8 @@ int bnx2i_map_ep_dbell_regs(struct bnx2i_endpoint *ep) BNX2X_DOORBELL_PCI_BAR); reg_off = (1 << BNX2X_DB_SHIFT) * (cid_num & 0x1FFFF); ep->qp.ctx_base = ioremap_nocache(reg_base + reg_off, 4); + if (!ep->qp.ctx_base) + return -ENOMEM; goto arm_cq; } From 8e74d31734f0124721d1200487e2708fea57c351 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Liam Girdwood Date: Thu, 14 Jun 2018 20:26:42 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 045/124] ASoC: dapm: Fix potential DAI widget pointer deref when linking DAIs [ Upstream commit e01b4f624278d5efe5fb5da585ca371947b16680 ] Sometime a component or topology may configure a DAI widget with no private data leading to a dev_dbg() dereferencne of this data. Fix this to check for non NULL private data and let users know if widget is missing DAI. Signed-off-by: Liam Girdwood Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/soc/soc-dapm.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/sound/soc/soc-dapm.c b/sound/soc/soc-dapm.c index 5c6ac0692fa3..d8ac9e5e2c00 100644 --- a/sound/soc/soc-dapm.c +++ b/sound/soc/soc-dapm.c @@ -3400,6 +3400,13 @@ int snd_soc_dapm_link_dai_widgets(struct snd_soc_card *card) continue; } + /* let users know there is no DAI to link */ + if (!dai_w->priv) { + dev_dbg(card->dev, "dai widget %s has no DAI\n", + dai_w->name); + continue; + } + dai = dai_w->priv; /* ...find all widgets with the same stream and link them */ From 5199f517a8a3caba1551ea59b6acb36b67cafc44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jessica Yu Date: Tue, 5 Jun 2018 10:22:52 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 046/124] module: exclude SHN_UNDEF symbols from kallsyms api [ Upstream commit 9f2d1e68cf4d641def734adaccfc3823d3575e6c ] Livepatch modules are special in that we preserve their entire symbol tables in order to be able to apply relocations after module load. The unwanted side effect of this is that undefined (SHN_UNDEF) symbols of livepatch modules are accessible via the kallsyms api and this can confuse symbol resolution in livepatch (klp_find_object_symbol()) and cause subtle bugs in livepatch. Have the module kallsyms api skip over SHN_UNDEF symbols. These symbols are usually not available for normal modules anyway as we cut down their symbol tables to just the core (non-undefined) symbols, so this should really just affect livepatch modules. Note that this patch doesn't affect the display of undefined symbols in /proc/kallsyms. Reported-by: Josh Poimboeuf Tested-by: Josh Poimboeuf Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/module.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c index 737d53099360..bc417377930b 100644 --- a/kernel/module.c +++ b/kernel/module.c @@ -3592,7 +3592,7 @@ static unsigned long mod_find_symname(struct module *mod, const char *name) for (i = 0; i < kallsyms->num_symtab; i++) if (strcmp(name, symname(kallsyms, i)) == 0 && - kallsyms->symtab[i].st_info != 'U') + kallsyms->symtab[i].st_shndx != SHN_UNDEF) return kallsyms->symtab[i].st_value; return 0; } @@ -3636,6 +3636,10 @@ int module_kallsyms_on_each_symbol(int (*fn)(void *, const char *, if (mod->state == MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED) continue; for (i = 0; i < kallsyms->num_symtab; i++) { + + if (kallsyms->symtab[i].st_shndx == SHN_UNDEF) + continue; + ret = fn(data, symname(kallsyms, i), mod, kallsyms->symtab[i].st_value); if (ret != 0) From 0fb40f7dd3f3db51592bb0b0d7417ab781d1b016 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "J. Bruce Fields" Date: Wed, 13 Jun 2018 15:21:35 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 047/124] nfsd: fix corrupted reply to badly ordered compound [ Upstream commit 5b7b15aee641904ae269be9846610a3950cbd64c ] We're encoding a single op in the reply but leaving the number of ops zero, so the reply makes no sense. Somewhat academic as this isn't a case any real client will hit, though in theory perhaps that could change in a future protocol extension. Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c index f6429b3d89e2..fb0bb5b2bcd8 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c @@ -1347,6 +1347,7 @@ nfsd4_proc_compound(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, if (status) { op = &args->ops[0]; op->status = status; + resp->opcnt = 1; goto encode_op; } From 0facefd1d7db43e1c220405ca773adb7b97975a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andy Whitcroft Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2018 09:09:48 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 048/124] floppy: Do not copy a kernel pointer to user memory in FDGETPRM ioctl commit 65eea8edc315589d6c993cf12dbb5d0e9ef1fe4e upstream. The final field of a floppy_struct is the field "name", which is a pointer to a string in kernel memory. The kernel pointer should not be copied to user memory. The FDGETPRM ioctl copies a floppy_struct to user memory, including this "name" field. This pointer cannot be used by the user and it will leak a kernel address to user-space, which will reveal the location of kernel code and data and undermine KASLR protection. Model this code after the compat ioctl which copies the returned data to a previously cleared temporary structure on the stack (excluding the name pointer) and copy out to userspace from there. As we already have an inparam union with an appropriate member and that memory is already cleared even for read only calls make use of that as a temporary store. Based on an initial patch by Brian Belleville. CVE-2018-7755 Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft Broke up long line. Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/block/floppy.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/block/floppy.c b/drivers/block/floppy.c index 56d46ffb08e1..f824836d2e7a 100644 --- a/drivers/block/floppy.c +++ b/drivers/block/floppy.c @@ -3459,6 +3459,9 @@ static int fd_locked_ioctl(struct block_device *bdev, fmode_t mode, unsigned int (struct floppy_struct **)&outparam); if (ret) return ret; + memcpy(&inparam.g, outparam, + offsetof(struct floppy_struct, name)); + outparam = &inparam.g; break; case FDMSGON: UDP->flags |= FTD_MSG; From 784a10df012185c0a49655f81523a742ffda25e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christophe Leroy Date: Fri, 14 Sep 2018 10:32:50 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 049/124] serial: cpm_uart: return immediately from console poll commit be28c1e3ca29887e207f0cbcd294cefe5074bab6 upstream. kgdb expects poll function to return immediately and returning NO_POLL_CHAR when no character is available. Fixes: f5316b4aea024 ("kgdb,8250,pl011: Return immediately from console poll") Cc: Jason Wessel Cc: Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/tty/serial/cpm_uart/cpm_uart_core.c | 10 +++++++--- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/cpm_uart/cpm_uart_core.c b/drivers/tty/serial/cpm_uart/cpm_uart_core.c index 533852eb8778..fd877ef1dc6e 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/cpm_uart/cpm_uart_core.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/cpm_uart/cpm_uart_core.c @@ -1054,8 +1054,8 @@ static int poll_wait_key(char *obuf, struct uart_cpm_port *pinfo) /* Get the address of the host memory buffer. */ bdp = pinfo->rx_cur; - while (bdp->cbd_sc & BD_SC_EMPTY) - ; + if (bdp->cbd_sc & BD_SC_EMPTY) + return NO_POLL_CHAR; /* If the buffer address is in the CPM DPRAM, don't * convert it. @@ -1089,7 +1089,11 @@ static int cpm_get_poll_char(struct uart_port *port) poll_chars = 0; } if (poll_chars <= 0) { - poll_chars = poll_wait_key(poll_buf, pinfo); + int ret = poll_wait_key(poll_buf, pinfo); + + if (ret == NO_POLL_CHAR) + return ret; + poll_chars = ret; pollp = poll_buf; } poll_chars--; From f4da70be9742a6c132995f8e971326a6e51e31eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marcel Ziswiler Date: Wed, 29 Aug 2018 08:47:57 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 050/124] spi: tegra20-slink: explicitly enable/disable clock commit 7001cab1dabc0b72b2b672ef58a90ab64f5e2343 upstream. Depending on the SPI instance one may get an interrupt storm upon requesting resp. interrupt unless the clock is explicitly enabled beforehand. This has been observed trying to bring up instance 4 on T20. Signed-off-by: Marcel Ziswiler Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/spi/spi-tegra20-slink.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/spi/spi-tegra20-slink.c b/drivers/spi/spi-tegra20-slink.c index 0b9e32e9f493..4ba5bbb61951 100644 --- a/drivers/spi/spi-tegra20-slink.c +++ b/drivers/spi/spi-tegra20-slink.c @@ -1063,6 +1063,24 @@ static int tegra_slink_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) goto exit_free_master; } + /* disabled clock may cause interrupt storm upon request */ + tspi->clk = devm_clk_get(&pdev->dev, NULL); + if (IS_ERR(tspi->clk)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(tspi->clk); + dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Can not get clock %d\n", ret); + goto exit_free_master; + } + ret = clk_prepare(tspi->clk); + if (ret < 0) { + dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Clock prepare failed %d\n", ret); + goto exit_free_master; + } + ret = clk_enable(tspi->clk); + if (ret < 0) { + dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Clock enable failed %d\n", ret); + goto exit_free_master; + } + spi_irq = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0); tspi->irq = spi_irq; ret = request_threaded_irq(tspi->irq, tegra_slink_isr, @@ -1071,14 +1089,7 @@ static int tegra_slink_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) if (ret < 0) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to register ISR for IRQ %d\n", tspi->irq); - goto exit_free_master; - } - - tspi->clk = devm_clk_get(&pdev->dev, NULL); - if (IS_ERR(tspi->clk)) { - dev_err(&pdev->dev, "can not get clock\n"); - ret = PTR_ERR(tspi->clk); - goto exit_free_irq; + goto exit_clk_disable; } tspi->rst = devm_reset_control_get(&pdev->dev, "spi"); @@ -1138,6 +1149,8 @@ static int tegra_slink_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) tegra_slink_deinit_dma_param(tspi, true); exit_free_irq: free_irq(spi_irq, tspi); +exit_clk_disable: + clk_disable(tspi->clk); exit_free_master: spi_master_put(master); return ret; @@ -1150,6 +1163,8 @@ static int tegra_slink_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) free_irq(tspi->irq, tspi); + clk_disable(tspi->clk); + if (tspi->tx_dma_chan) tegra_slink_deinit_dma_param(tspi, false); From 5a5b2a2bd334aedf3aa8520fc3b37484a72be5d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hiromitsu Yamasaki Date: Wed, 5 Sep 2018 10:49:37 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 051/124] spi: sh-msiof: Fix handling of write value for SISTR register commit 31a5fae4c5a009898da6d177901d5328051641ff upstream. This patch changes writing to the SISTR register according to the H/W user's manual. The TDREQ bit and RDREQ bits of SISTR are read-only, and must be written their initial values of zero. Signed-off-by: Hiromitsu Yamasaki [geert: reword] Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/spi/spi-sh-msiof.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/spi/spi-sh-msiof.c b/drivers/spi/spi-sh-msiof.c index d9044569b4fe..df6eca8088c2 100644 --- a/drivers/spi/spi-sh-msiof.c +++ b/drivers/spi/spi-sh-msiof.c @@ -332,7 +332,8 @@ static void sh_msiof_spi_set_mode_regs(struct sh_msiof_spi_priv *p, static void sh_msiof_reset_str(struct sh_msiof_spi_priv *p) { - sh_msiof_write(p, STR, sh_msiof_read(p, STR)); + sh_msiof_write(p, STR, + sh_msiof_read(p, STR) & ~(STR_TDREQ | STR_RDREQ)); } static void sh_msiof_spi_write_fifo_8(struct sh_msiof_spi_priv *p, From 6ea058b70a290b02f1d8a15f6503928cc21a85e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Geert Uytterhoeven Date: Wed, 5 Sep 2018 10:49:39 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 052/124] spi: rspi: Fix interrupted DMA transfers commit 8dbbaa47b96f6ea5f09f922b4effff3c505cd8cf upstream. When interrupted, wait_event_interruptible_timeout() returns -ERESTARTSYS, and the SPI transfer in progress will fail, as expected: m25p80 spi0.0: SPI transfer failed: -512 spi_master spi0: failed to transfer one message from queue However, as the underlying DMA transfers may not have completed, all subsequent SPI transfers may start to fail: spi_master spi0: receive timeout qspi_transfer_out_in() returned -110 m25p80 spi0.0: SPI transfer failed: -110 spi_master spi0: failed to transfer one message from queue Fix this by calling dmaengine_terminate_all() not only for timeouts, but also for errors. This can be reproduced on r8a7991/koelsch, using "hd /dev/mtd0" followed by CTRL-C. Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/spi/spi-rspi.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/spi/spi-rspi.c b/drivers/spi/spi-rspi.c index 54bb0faec155..4ee0bfa86e4a 100644 --- a/drivers/spi/spi-rspi.c +++ b/drivers/spi/spi-rspi.c @@ -538,11 +538,13 @@ static int rspi_dma_transfer(struct rspi_data *rspi, struct sg_table *tx, ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(rspi->wait, rspi->dma_callbacked, HZ); - if (ret > 0 && rspi->dma_callbacked) + if (ret > 0 && rspi->dma_callbacked) { ret = 0; - else if (!ret) { - dev_err(&rspi->master->dev, "DMA timeout\n"); - ret = -ETIMEDOUT; + } else { + if (!ret) { + dev_err(&rspi->master->dev, "DMA timeout\n"); + ret = -ETIMEDOUT; + } if (tx) dmaengine_terminate_all(rspi->master->dma_tx); if (rx) From 75e71d43b2451be4901e6be306abda2f28312dc0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alan Stern Date: Mon, 10 Sep 2018 13:59:59 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 053/124] USB: fix error handling in usb_driver_claim_interface() commit bd729f9d67aa9a303d8925bb8c4f06af25f407d1 upstream. The syzbot fuzzing project found a use-after-free bug in the USB core. The bug was caused by usbfs not unbinding from an interface when the USB device file was closed, which led another process to attempt the unbind later on, after the private data structure had been deallocated. The reason usbfs did not unbind the interface at the appropriate time was because it thought the interface had never been claimed in the first place. This was caused by the fact that usb_driver_claim_interface() does not clean up properly when device_bind_driver() returns an error. Although the error code gets passed back to the caller, the iface->dev.driver pointer remains set and iface->condition remains equal to USB_INTERFACE_BOUND. This patch adds proper error handling to usb_driver_claim_interface(). Signed-off-by: Alan Stern Reported-by: syzbot+f84aa7209ccec829536f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com CC: Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/core/driver.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/driver.c b/drivers/usb/core/driver.c index 31079f7e4e3b..1bd6d9bf4685 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/core/driver.c +++ b/drivers/usb/core/driver.c @@ -555,6 +555,21 @@ int usb_driver_claim_interface(struct usb_driver *driver, if (!lpm_disable_error) usb_unlocked_enable_lpm(udev); + if (retval) { + dev->driver = NULL; + usb_set_intfdata(iface, NULL); + iface->needs_remote_wakeup = 0; + iface->condition = USB_INTERFACE_UNBOUND; + + /* + * Unbound interfaces are always runtime-PM-disabled + * and runtime-PM-suspended + */ + if (driver->supports_autosuspend) + pm_runtime_disable(dev); + pm_runtime_set_suspended(dev); + } + return retval; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(usb_driver_claim_interface); From 48ba1bb31fcabbc1d1fd83acbafca8d553752897 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alan Stern Date: Mon, 10 Sep 2018 14:00:53 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 054/124] USB: handle NULL config in usb_find_alt_setting() commit c9a4cb204e9eb7fa7dfbe3f7d3a674fa530aa193 upstream. usb_find_alt_setting() takes a pointer to a struct usb_host_config as an argument; it searches for an interface with specified interface and alternate setting numbers in that config. However, it crashes if the usb_host_config pointer argument is NULL. Since this is a general-purpose routine, available for use in many places, we want to to be more robust. This patch makes it return NULL whenever the config argument is NULL. Signed-off-by: Alan Stern Reported-by: syzbot+19c3aaef85a89d451eac@syzkaller.appspotmail.com CC: Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/core/usb.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/usb.c b/drivers/usb/core/usb.c index 29ee9363faa5..b75776ae4664 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/core/usb.c +++ b/drivers/usb/core/usb.c @@ -79,6 +79,8 @@ struct usb_host_interface *usb_find_alt_setting( struct usb_interface_cache *intf_cache = NULL; int i; + if (!config) + return NULL; for (i = 0; i < config->desc.bNumInterfaces; i++) { if (config->intf_cache[i]->altsetting[0].desc.bInterfaceNumber == iface_num) { From 843b66cb63e99b0090592126e9f9b08b757815c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexey Dobriyan Date: Thu, 5 Apr 2018 16:21:10 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 055/124] slub: make ->cpu_partial unsigned int commit e5d9998f3e09359b372a037a6ac55ba235d95d57 upstream. /* * cpu_partial determined the maximum number of objects * kept in the per cpu partial lists of a processor. */ Can't be negative. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180305200730.15812-15-adobriyan@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan Acked-by: Christoph Lameter Cc: Pekka Enberg Cc: David Rientjes Cc: Joonsoo Kim Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: zhong jiang Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/slub_def.h | 3 ++- mm/slub.c | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/slub_def.h b/include/linux/slub_def.h index d82abd40a3c0..35a54b7a5123 100644 --- a/include/linux/slub_def.h +++ b/include/linux/slub_def.h @@ -67,7 +67,8 @@ struct kmem_cache { int size; /* The size of an object including meta data */ int object_size; /* The size of an object without meta data */ int offset; /* Free pointer offset. */ - int cpu_partial; /* Number of per cpu partial objects to keep around */ + /* Number of per cpu partial objects to keep around */ + unsigned int cpu_partial; struct kmem_cache_order_objects oo; /* Allocation and freeing of slabs */ diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c index b3e3c8f339a0..f127fc95f833 100644 --- a/mm/slub.c +++ b/mm/slub.c @@ -1577,7 +1577,7 @@ static void *get_partial_node(struct kmem_cache *s, struct kmem_cache_node *n, { struct page *page, *page2; void *object = NULL; - int available = 0; + unsigned int available = 0; int objects; /* @@ -4366,10 +4366,10 @@ static ssize_t cpu_partial_show(struct kmem_cache *s, char *buf) static ssize_t cpu_partial_store(struct kmem_cache *s, const char *buf, size_t length) { - unsigned long objects; + unsigned int objects; int err; - err = kstrtoul(buf, 10, &objects); + err = kstrtouint(buf, 10, &objects); if (err) return err; if (objects && !kmem_cache_has_cpu_partial(s)) From 530d537096f74d8400a647fb3cae45acb86fb27f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: ming_qian Date: Tue, 8 May 2018 22:13:08 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 056/124] media: uvcvideo: Support realtek's UVC 1.5 device commit f620d1d7afc7db57ab59f35000752840c91f67e7 upstream. media: uvcvideo: Support UVC 1.5 video probe & commit controls The length of UVC 1.5 video control is 48, and it is 34 for UVC 1.1. Change it to 48 for UVC 1.5 device, and the UVC 1.5 device can be recognized. More changes to the driver are needed for full UVC 1.5 compatibility. However, at least the UVC 1.5 Realtek RTS5847/RTS5852 cameras have been reported to work well. [laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com: Factor out code to helper function, update size checks] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: ming_qian Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart Tested-by: Kai-Heng Feng Tested-by: Ana Guerrero Lopez Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_video.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_video.c b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_video.c index df81b9c4faf1..beb8072b5761 100644 --- a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_video.c +++ b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_video.c @@ -155,14 +155,27 @@ static void uvc_fixup_video_ctrl(struct uvc_streaming *stream, } } +static size_t uvc_video_ctrl_size(struct uvc_streaming *stream) +{ + /* + * Return the size of the video probe and commit controls, which depends + * on the protocol version. + */ + if (stream->dev->uvc_version < 0x0110) + return 26; + else if (stream->dev->uvc_version < 0x0150) + return 34; + else + return 48; +} + static int uvc_get_video_ctrl(struct uvc_streaming *stream, struct uvc_streaming_control *ctrl, int probe, __u8 query) { + __u16 size = uvc_video_ctrl_size(stream); __u8 *data; - __u16 size; int ret; - size = stream->dev->uvc_version >= 0x0110 ? 34 : 26; if ((stream->dev->quirks & UVC_QUIRK_PROBE_DEF) && query == UVC_GET_DEF) return -EIO; @@ -217,7 +230,7 @@ static int uvc_get_video_ctrl(struct uvc_streaming *stream, ctrl->dwMaxVideoFrameSize = get_unaligned_le32(&data[18]); ctrl->dwMaxPayloadTransferSize = get_unaligned_le32(&data[22]); - if (size == 34) { + if (size >= 34) { ctrl->dwClockFrequency = get_unaligned_le32(&data[26]); ctrl->bmFramingInfo = data[30]; ctrl->bPreferedVersion = data[31]; @@ -246,11 +259,10 @@ static int uvc_get_video_ctrl(struct uvc_streaming *stream, static int uvc_set_video_ctrl(struct uvc_streaming *stream, struct uvc_streaming_control *ctrl, int probe) { + __u16 size = uvc_video_ctrl_size(stream); __u8 *data; - __u16 size; int ret; - size = stream->dev->uvc_version >= 0x0110 ? 34 : 26; data = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); if (data == NULL) return -ENOMEM; @@ -267,7 +279,7 @@ static int uvc_set_video_ctrl(struct uvc_streaming *stream, put_unaligned_le32(ctrl->dwMaxVideoFrameSize, &data[18]); put_unaligned_le32(ctrl->dwMaxPayloadTransferSize, &data[22]); - if (size == 34) { + if (size >= 34) { put_unaligned_le32(ctrl->dwClockFrequency, &data[26]); data[30] = ctrl->bmFramingInfo; data[31] = ctrl->bPreferedVersion; From 2ea01479e822245f5e334a164444b32ec3ee92c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oliver Neukum Date: Wed, 5 Sep 2018 12:07:02 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 057/124] USB: usbdevfs: sanitize flags more commit 7a68d9fb851012829c29e770621905529bd9490b upstream. Requesting a ZERO_PACKET or not is sensible only for output. In the input direction the device decides. Likewise accepting short packets makes sense only for input. This allows operation with panic_on_warn without opening up a local DOS. Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum Reported-by: syzbot+843efa30c8821bd69f53@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 0cb54a3e47cb ("USB: debugging code shouldn't alter control flow") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/core/devio.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/devio.c b/drivers/usb/core/devio.c index ba121afd28fc..be93fe17485a 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/core/devio.c +++ b/drivers/usb/core/devio.c @@ -1286,10 +1286,13 @@ static int proc_do_submiturb(struct usb_dev_state *ps, struct usbdevfs_urb *uurb struct async *as = NULL; struct usb_ctrlrequest *dr = NULL; unsigned int u, totlen, isofrmlen; - int i, ret, is_in, num_sgs = 0, ifnum = -1; + int i, ret, num_sgs = 0, ifnum = -1; int number_of_packets = 0; unsigned int stream_id = 0; void *buf; + bool is_in; + bool allow_short = false; + bool allow_zero = false; unsigned long mask = USBDEVFS_URB_SHORT_NOT_OK | USBDEVFS_URB_BULK_CONTINUATION | USBDEVFS_URB_NO_FSBR | @@ -1323,6 +1326,8 @@ static int proc_do_submiturb(struct usb_dev_state *ps, struct usbdevfs_urb *uurb u = 0; switch(uurb->type) { case USBDEVFS_URB_TYPE_CONTROL: + if (is_in) + allow_short = true; if (!usb_endpoint_xfer_control(&ep->desc)) return -EINVAL; /* min 8 byte setup packet */ @@ -1363,6 +1368,10 @@ static int proc_do_submiturb(struct usb_dev_state *ps, struct usbdevfs_urb *uurb break; case USBDEVFS_URB_TYPE_BULK: + if (!is_in) + allow_zero = true; + else + allow_short = true; switch (usb_endpoint_type(&ep->desc)) { case USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_CONTROL: case USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_ISOC: @@ -1383,6 +1392,10 @@ static int proc_do_submiturb(struct usb_dev_state *ps, struct usbdevfs_urb *uurb if (!usb_endpoint_xfer_int(&ep->desc)) return -EINVAL; interrupt_urb: + if (!is_in) + allow_zero = true; + else + allow_short = true; break; case USBDEVFS_URB_TYPE_ISO: @@ -1508,11 +1521,11 @@ static int proc_do_submiturb(struct usb_dev_state *ps, struct usbdevfs_urb *uurb u = (is_in ? URB_DIR_IN : URB_DIR_OUT); if (uurb->flags & USBDEVFS_URB_ISO_ASAP) u |= URB_ISO_ASAP; - if (uurb->flags & USBDEVFS_URB_SHORT_NOT_OK && is_in) + if (allow_short && uurb->flags & USBDEVFS_URB_SHORT_NOT_OK) u |= URB_SHORT_NOT_OK; if (uurb->flags & USBDEVFS_URB_NO_FSBR) u |= URB_NO_FSBR; - if (uurb->flags & USBDEVFS_URB_ZERO_PACKET) + if (allow_zero && uurb->flags & USBDEVFS_URB_ZERO_PACKET) u |= URB_ZERO_PACKET; if (uurb->flags & USBDEVFS_URB_NO_INTERRUPT) u |= URB_NO_INTERRUPT; From 24e5fc95faa3a8d279e7426c6689dda0fc4d25d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oliver Neukum Date: Wed, 5 Sep 2018 12:07:03 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 058/124] USB: usbdevfs: restore warning for nonsensical flags commit 81e0403b26d94360abd1f6a57311337973bc82cd upstream. If we filter flags before they reach the core we need to generate our own warnings. Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum Fixes: 0cb54a3e47cb ("USB: debugging code shouldn't alter control flow") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/core/devio.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/devio.c b/drivers/usb/core/devio.c index be93fe17485a..239e15adf1b1 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/core/devio.c +++ b/drivers/usb/core/devio.c @@ -1531,6 +1531,11 @@ static int proc_do_submiturb(struct usb_dev_state *ps, struct usbdevfs_urb *uurb u |= URB_NO_INTERRUPT; as->urb->transfer_flags = u; + if (!allow_short && uurb->flags & USBDEVFS_URB_SHORT_NOT_OK) + dev_warn(&ps->dev->dev, "Requested nonsensical USBDEVFS_URB_SHORT_NOT_OK.\n"); + if (!allow_zero && uurb->flags & USBDEVFS_URB_ZERO_PACKET) + dev_warn(&ps->dev->dev, "Requested nonsensical USBDEVFS_URB_ZERO_PACKET.\n"); + as->urb->transfer_buffer_length = uurb->buffer_length; as->urb->setup_packet = (unsigned char *)dr; dr = NULL; From f3096931113f78b97c697bbaa136350edada68d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Date: Tue, 11 Sep 2018 10:00:44 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 059/124] Revert "usb: cdc-wdm: Fix a sleep-in-atomic-context bug in service_outstanding_interrupt()" commit e871db8d78df1c411032cbb3acfdf8930509360e upstream. This reverts commit 6e22e3af7bb3a7b9dc53cb4687659f6e63fca427. The bug the patch describes to, has been already fixed in commit 2df6948428542 ("USB: cdc-wdm: don't enable interrupts in USB-giveback") so need to this, revert it. Fixes: 6e22e3af7bb3 ("usb: cdc-wdm: Fix a sleep-in-atomic-context bug in service_outstanding_interrupt()") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/class/cdc-wdm.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/class/cdc-wdm.c b/drivers/usb/class/cdc-wdm.c index 8e073c9739e9..df0878c4810c 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/class/cdc-wdm.c +++ b/drivers/usb/class/cdc-wdm.c @@ -452,7 +452,7 @@ static int clear_wdm_read_flag(struct wdm_device *desc) set_bit(WDM_RESPONDING, &desc->flags); spin_unlock_irq(&desc->iuspin); - rv = usb_submit_urb(desc->response, GFP_ATOMIC); + rv = usb_submit_urb(desc->response, GFP_KERNEL); spin_lock_irq(&desc->iuspin); if (rv) { dev_err(&desc->intf->dev, From 05bebb4387b811be64626b4657cfddf525de0c66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alan Stern Date: Mon, 10 Sep 2018 13:58:51 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 060/124] USB: remove LPM management from usb_driver_claim_interface() commit c183813fcee44a249339b7c46e1ad271ca1870aa upstream. usb_driver_claim_interface() disables and re-enables Link Power Management, but it shouldn't do either one, for the reasons listed below. This patch removes the two LPM-related function calls from the routine. The reason for disabling LPM in the analogous function usb_probe_interface() is so that drivers won't have to deal with unwanted LPM transitions in their probe routine. But usb_driver_claim_interface() doesn't call the driver's probe routine (or any other callbacks), so that reason doesn't apply here. Furthermore, no driver other than usbfs will ever call usb_driver_claim_interface() unless it is already bound to another interface in the same device, which means disabling LPM here would be redundant. usbfs doesn't interact with LPM at all. Lastly, the error return from usb_unlocked_disable_lpm() isn't handled properly; the code doesn't clean up its earlier actions before returning. Signed-off-by: Alan Stern Fixes: 8306095fd2c1 ("USB: Disable USB 3.0 LPM in critical sections.") CC: Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/core/driver.c | 15 --------------- 1 file changed, 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/driver.c b/drivers/usb/core/driver.c index 1bd6d9bf4685..73f392586786 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/core/driver.c +++ b/drivers/usb/core/driver.c @@ -506,7 +506,6 @@ int usb_driver_claim_interface(struct usb_driver *driver, struct device *dev; struct usb_device *udev; int retval = 0; - int lpm_disable_error = -ENODEV; if (!iface) return -ENODEV; @@ -523,16 +522,6 @@ int usb_driver_claim_interface(struct usb_driver *driver, iface->condition = USB_INTERFACE_BOUND; - /* See the comment about disabling LPM in usb_probe_interface(). */ - if (driver->disable_hub_initiated_lpm) { - lpm_disable_error = usb_unlocked_disable_lpm(udev); - if (lpm_disable_error) { - dev_err(&iface->dev, "%s Failed to disable LPM for driver %s\n.", - __func__, driver->name); - return -ENOMEM; - } - } - /* Claimed interfaces are initially inactive (suspended) and * runtime-PM-enabled, but only if the driver has autosuspend * support. Otherwise they are marked active, to prevent the @@ -551,10 +540,6 @@ int usb_driver_claim_interface(struct usb_driver *driver, if (device_is_registered(dev)) retval = device_bind_driver(dev); - /* Attempt to re-enable USB3 LPM, if the disable was successful. */ - if (!lpm_disable_error) - usb_unlocked_enable_lpm(udev); - if (retval) { dev->driver = NULL; usb_set_intfdata(iface, NULL); From be6f6eaabbaaf64b89c01c03ed3d082802ea7ddf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vincent Pelletier Date: Sun, 9 Sep 2018 04:09:27 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 061/124] scsi: target: iscsi: Use bin2hex instead of a re-implementation commit 8c39e2699f8acb2e29782a834e56306da24937fe upstream. Signed-off-by: Vincent Pelletier Reviewed-by: Mike Christie Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen [plr.vincent@gmail.com: hunk context change for 4.4 and 4.9, no code change] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c | 15 +++------------ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c index f7940fa64d44..8cf853f71c93 100644 --- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c +++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c @@ -26,15 +26,6 @@ #include "iscsi_target_nego.h" #include "iscsi_target_auth.h" -static void chap_binaryhex_to_asciihex(char *dst, char *src, int src_len) -{ - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < src_len; i++) { - sprintf(&dst[i*2], "%02x", (int) src[i] & 0xff); - } -} - static void chap_gen_challenge( struct iscsi_conn *conn, int caller, @@ -47,7 +38,7 @@ static void chap_gen_challenge( memset(challenge_asciihex, 0, CHAP_CHALLENGE_LENGTH * 2 + 1); get_random_bytes(chap->challenge, CHAP_CHALLENGE_LENGTH); - chap_binaryhex_to_asciihex(challenge_asciihex, chap->challenge, + bin2hex(challenge_asciihex, chap->challenge, CHAP_CHALLENGE_LENGTH); /* * Set CHAP_C, and copy the generated challenge into c_str. @@ -287,7 +278,7 @@ static int chap_server_compute_md5( } crypto_free_hash(tfm); - chap_binaryhex_to_asciihex(response, server_digest, MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE); + bin2hex(response, server_digest, MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE); pr_debug("[server] MD5 Server Digest: %s\n", response); if (memcmp(server_digest, client_digest, MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE) != 0) { @@ -431,7 +422,7 @@ static int chap_server_compute_md5( /* * Convert response from binary hex to ascii hext. */ - chap_binaryhex_to_asciihex(response, digest, MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE); + bin2hex(response, digest, MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE); *nr_out_len += sprintf(nr_out_ptr + *nr_out_len, "CHAP_R=0x%s", response); *nr_out_len += 1; From d82ad70e8aff4435baf4f5fe1abe54870a13436a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Hackmann Date: Tue, 4 Sep 2018 09:33:36 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 062/124] staging: android: ion: fix ION_IOC_{MAP,SHARE} use-after-free commit 2c155709e4ef2d86d0176aac82e44c048a7e0255 upstream. The ION_IOC_{MAP,SHARE} ioctls drop and reacquire client->lock several times while operating on one of the client's ion_handles. This creates windows where userspace can call ION_IOC_FREE on the same client with the same handle, and effectively make the kernel drop its own reference. For example: - thread A: ION_IOC_ALLOC creates an ion_handle with refcount 1 - thread A: starts ION_IOC_MAP and increments the refcount to 2 - thread B: ION_IOC_FREE decrements the refcount to 1 - thread B: ION_IOC_FREE decrements the refcount to 0 and frees the handle - thread A: continues ION_IOC_MAP with a dangling ion_handle * to freed memory Fix this by holding client->lock for the duration of ION_IOC_{MAP,SHARE}, preventing the concurrent ION_IOC_FREE. Also remove ion_handle_get_by_id(), since there's literally no way to use it safely. This patch is applied on top of 4.4.y, and applies to older kernels too. 4.9.y was fixed separately. Kernels 4.12 and later are unaffected, since all the underlying ion_handle infrastructure has been ripped out. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4- Signed-off-by: Greg Hackmann Acked-by: Laura Abbott Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/android/ion/ion.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/android/ion/ion.c b/drivers/staging/android/ion/ion.c index bce7e8ea361a..7b5f14867054 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/android/ion/ion.c +++ b/drivers/staging/android/ion/ion.c @@ -451,18 +451,6 @@ static struct ion_handle *ion_handle_get_by_id_nolock(struct ion_client *client, return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); } -struct ion_handle *ion_handle_get_by_id(struct ion_client *client, - int id) -{ - struct ion_handle *handle; - - mutex_lock(&client->lock); - handle = ion_handle_get_by_id_nolock(client, id); - mutex_unlock(&client->lock); - - return handle; -} - static bool ion_handle_validate(struct ion_client *client, struct ion_handle *handle) { @@ -1138,23 +1126,27 @@ static struct dma_buf_ops dma_buf_ops = { .kunmap = ion_dma_buf_kunmap, }; -struct dma_buf *ion_share_dma_buf(struct ion_client *client, - struct ion_handle *handle) +static struct dma_buf *__ion_share_dma_buf(struct ion_client *client, + struct ion_handle *handle, + bool lock_client) { struct ion_buffer *buffer; struct dma_buf *dmabuf; bool valid_handle; - mutex_lock(&client->lock); + if (lock_client) + mutex_lock(&client->lock); valid_handle = ion_handle_validate(client, handle); if (!valid_handle) { WARN(1, "%s: invalid handle passed to share.\n", __func__); - mutex_unlock(&client->lock); + if (lock_client) + mutex_unlock(&client->lock); return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); } buffer = handle->buffer; ion_buffer_get(buffer); - mutex_unlock(&client->lock); + if (lock_client) + mutex_unlock(&client->lock); dmabuf = dma_buf_export(buffer, &dma_buf_ops, buffer->size, O_RDWR, NULL); @@ -1165,14 +1157,21 @@ struct dma_buf *ion_share_dma_buf(struct ion_client *client, return dmabuf; } + +struct dma_buf *ion_share_dma_buf(struct ion_client *client, + struct ion_handle *handle) +{ + return __ion_share_dma_buf(client, handle, true); +} EXPORT_SYMBOL(ion_share_dma_buf); -int ion_share_dma_buf_fd(struct ion_client *client, struct ion_handle *handle) +static int __ion_share_dma_buf_fd(struct ion_client *client, + struct ion_handle *handle, bool lock_client) { struct dma_buf *dmabuf; int fd; - dmabuf = ion_share_dma_buf(client, handle); + dmabuf = __ion_share_dma_buf(client, handle, lock_client); if (IS_ERR(dmabuf)) return PTR_ERR(dmabuf); @@ -1182,8 +1181,19 @@ int ion_share_dma_buf_fd(struct ion_client *client, struct ion_handle *handle) return fd; } + +int ion_share_dma_buf_fd(struct ion_client *client, struct ion_handle *handle) +{ + return __ion_share_dma_buf_fd(client, handle, true); +} EXPORT_SYMBOL(ion_share_dma_buf_fd); +static int ion_share_dma_buf_fd_nolock(struct ion_client *client, + struct ion_handle *handle) +{ + return __ion_share_dma_buf_fd(client, handle, false); +} + struct ion_handle *ion_import_dma_buf(struct ion_client *client, int fd) { struct dma_buf *dmabuf; @@ -1330,11 +1340,15 @@ static long ion_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { struct ion_handle *handle; - handle = ion_handle_get_by_id(client, data.handle.handle); - if (IS_ERR(handle)) + mutex_lock(&client->lock); + handle = ion_handle_get_by_id_nolock(client, data.handle.handle); + if (IS_ERR(handle)) { + mutex_unlock(&client->lock); return PTR_ERR(handle); - data.fd.fd = ion_share_dma_buf_fd(client, handle); - ion_handle_put(handle); + } + data.fd.fd = ion_share_dma_buf_fd_nolock(client, handle); + ion_handle_put_nolock(handle); + mutex_unlock(&client->lock); if (data.fd.fd < 0) ret = data.fd.fd; break; From d26e09111cb7b9c3727c4621ee241cb408d47a7d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Martin Date: Thu, 27 Sep 2018 16:53:21 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 063/124] arm64: KVM: Tighten guest core register access from userspace commit d26c25a9d19b5976b319af528886f89cf455692d upstream. We currently allow userspace to access the core register file in about any possible way, including straddling multiple registers and doing unaligned accesses. This is not the expected use of the ABI, and nobody is actually using it that way. Let's tighten it by explicitly checking the size and alignment for each field of the register file. Cc: Fixes: 2f4a07c5f9fe ("arm64: KVM: guest one-reg interface") Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland Signed-off-by: Dave Martin [maz: rewrote Dave's initial patch to be more easily backported] Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier Signed-off-by: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/kvm/guest.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/guest.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/guest.c index 61ec16bd528b..5d93c9f24847 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/guest.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/guest.c @@ -46,6 +46,45 @@ static u64 core_reg_offset_from_id(u64 id) return id & ~(KVM_REG_ARCH_MASK | KVM_REG_SIZE_MASK | KVM_REG_ARM_CORE); } +static int validate_core_offset(const struct kvm_one_reg *reg) +{ + u64 off = core_reg_offset_from_id(reg->id); + int size; + + switch (off) { + case KVM_REG_ARM_CORE_REG(regs.regs[0]) ... + KVM_REG_ARM_CORE_REG(regs.regs[30]): + case KVM_REG_ARM_CORE_REG(regs.sp): + case KVM_REG_ARM_CORE_REG(regs.pc): + case KVM_REG_ARM_CORE_REG(regs.pstate): + case KVM_REG_ARM_CORE_REG(sp_el1): + case KVM_REG_ARM_CORE_REG(elr_el1): + case KVM_REG_ARM_CORE_REG(spsr[0]) ... + KVM_REG_ARM_CORE_REG(spsr[KVM_NR_SPSR - 1]): + size = sizeof(__u64); + break; + + case KVM_REG_ARM_CORE_REG(fp_regs.vregs[0]) ... + KVM_REG_ARM_CORE_REG(fp_regs.vregs[31]): + size = sizeof(__uint128_t); + break; + + case KVM_REG_ARM_CORE_REG(fp_regs.fpsr): + case KVM_REG_ARM_CORE_REG(fp_regs.fpcr): + size = sizeof(__u32); + break; + + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + + if (KVM_REG_SIZE(reg->id) == size && + IS_ALIGNED(off, size / sizeof(__u32))) + return 0; + + return -EINVAL; +} + static int get_core_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvm_one_reg *reg) { /* @@ -65,6 +104,9 @@ static int get_core_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvm_one_reg *reg) (off + (KVM_REG_SIZE(reg->id) / sizeof(__u32))) >= nr_regs) return -ENOENT; + if (validate_core_offset(reg)) + return -EINVAL; + if (copy_to_user(uaddr, ((u32 *)regs) + off, KVM_REG_SIZE(reg->id))) return -EFAULT; @@ -87,6 +129,9 @@ static int set_core_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvm_one_reg *reg) (off + (KVM_REG_SIZE(reg->id) / sizeof(__u32))) >= nr_regs) return -ENOENT; + if (validate_core_offset(reg)) + return -EINVAL; + if (KVM_REG_SIZE(reg->id) > sizeof(tmp)) return -EINVAL; From 683626073ac0f1ded012d8861b189350147eb86b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Theodore Ts'o Date: Thu, 14 Jun 2018 12:55:10 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 064/124] ext4: verify the depth of extent tree in ext4_find_extent() commit bc890a60247171294acc0bd67d211fa4b88d40ba upstream. If there is a corupted file system where the claimed depth of the extent tree is -1, this can cause a massive buffer overrun leading to sadness. This addresses CVE-2018-10877. https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199417 Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o [bwh: Backported to 3.16: return -EIO instead of -EFSCORRUPTED] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings Cc: Greg Hackmann Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext4/ext4_extents.h | 1 + fs/ext4/extents.c | 6 ++++++ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ext4/ext4_extents.h b/fs/ext4/ext4_extents.h index 3c9381547094..2d8e73793512 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/ext4_extents.h +++ b/fs/ext4/ext4_extents.h @@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ struct ext4_extent_header { }; #define EXT4_EXT_MAGIC cpu_to_le16(0xf30a) +#define EXT4_MAX_EXTENT_DEPTH 5 #define EXT4_EXTENT_TAIL_OFFSET(hdr) \ (sizeof(struct ext4_extent_header) + \ diff --git a/fs/ext4/extents.c b/fs/ext4/extents.c index f2f2b86936a5..6dbfa92bf78a 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/extents.c +++ b/fs/ext4/extents.c @@ -870,6 +870,12 @@ ext4_find_extent(struct inode *inode, ext4_lblk_t block, eh = ext_inode_hdr(inode); depth = ext_depth(inode); + if (depth < 0 || depth > EXT4_MAX_EXTENT_DEPTH) { + EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "inode has invalid extent depth: %d", + depth); + ret = -EIO; + goto err; + } if (path) { ext4_ext_drop_refs(path); From 4aee59581f6f056129f08c635a303743289f64a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anson Huang Date: Tue, 31 Jul 2018 00:56:49 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 065/124] thermal: of-thermal: disable passive polling when thermal zone is disabled [ Upstream commit 152395fd03d4ce1e535a75cdbf58105e50587611 ] When thermal zone is in passive mode, disabling its mode from sysfs is NOT taking effect at all, it is still polling the temperature of the disabled thermal zone and handling all thermal trips, it makes user confused. The disabling operation should disable the thermal zone behavior completely, for both active and passive mode, this patch clears the passive_delay when thermal zone is disabled and restores it when it is enabled. Signed-off-by: Anson Huang Signed-off-by: Eduardo Valentin Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/thermal/of-thermal.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/thermal/of-thermal.c b/drivers/thermal/of-thermal.c index 62143ba31001..3aeb476c2894 100644 --- a/drivers/thermal/of-thermal.c +++ b/drivers/thermal/of-thermal.c @@ -209,10 +209,13 @@ static int of_thermal_set_mode(struct thermal_zone_device *tz, mutex_lock(&tz->lock); - if (mode == THERMAL_DEVICE_ENABLED) + if (mode == THERMAL_DEVICE_ENABLED) { tz->polling_delay = data->polling_delay; - else + tz->passive_delay = data->passive_delay; + } else { tz->polling_delay = 0; + tz->passive_delay = 0; + } mutex_unlock(&tz->lock); From aa7ef1ed12e05b083f9f823a8fc5726ed3841a28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bo Chen Date: Mon, 23 Jul 2018 09:01:29 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 066/124] e1000: check on netif_running() before calling e1000_up() [ Upstream commit cf1acec008f8d7761aa3fd7c4bca7e17b2d2512d ] When the device is not up, the call to 'e1000_up()' from the error handling path of 'e1000_set_ringparam()' causes a kernel oops with a null-pointer dereference. The null-pointer dereference is triggered in function 'e1000_alloc_rx_buffers()' at line 'buffer_info = &rx_ring->buffer_info[i]'. This bug was reported by COD, a tool for testing kernel module binaries I am building. This bug was also detected by KFI from Dr. Kai Cong. This patch fixes the bug by checking on 'netif_running()' before calling 'e1000_up()' in 'e1000_set_ringparam()'. Signed-off-by: Bo Chen Acked-by: Alexander Duyck Tested-by: Aaron Brown Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_ethtool.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_ethtool.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_ethtool.c index b691eb4f6376..ab3d94d0c731 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_ethtool.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_ethtool.c @@ -666,7 +666,8 @@ static int e1000_set_ringparam(struct net_device *netdev, err_alloc_rx: kfree(txdr); err_alloc_tx: - e1000_up(adapter); + if (netif_running(adapter->netdev)) + e1000_up(adapter); err_setup: clear_bit(__E1000_RESETTING, &adapter->flags); return err; From 666a305425d5ca9514d56577a14646b416de18ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bo Chen Date: Mon, 23 Jul 2018 09:01:30 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 067/124] e1000: ensure to free old tx/rx rings in set_ringparam() [ Upstream commit ee400a3f1bfe7004a3e14b81c38ccc5583c26295 ] In 'e1000_set_ringparam()', the tx_ring and rx_ring are updated with new value and the old tx/rx rings are freed only when the device is up. There are resource leaks on old tx/rx rings when the device is not up. This bug is reported by COD, a tool for testing kernel module binaries I am building. This patch fixes the bug by always calling 'kfree()' on old tx/rx rings in 'e1000_set_ringparam()'. Signed-off-by: Bo Chen Reviewed-by: Alexander Duyck Tested-by: Aaron Brown Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_ethtool.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_ethtool.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_ethtool.c index ab3d94d0c731..615d2145f411 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_ethtool.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_ethtool.c @@ -646,14 +646,14 @@ static int e1000_set_ringparam(struct net_device *netdev, adapter->tx_ring = tx_old; e1000_free_all_rx_resources(adapter); e1000_free_all_tx_resources(adapter); - kfree(tx_old); - kfree(rx_old); adapter->rx_ring = rxdr; adapter->tx_ring = txdr; err = e1000_up(adapter); if (err) goto err_setup; } + kfree(tx_old); + kfree(rx_old); clear_bit(__E1000_RESETTING, &adapter->flags); return 0; From 4e249d032b15c9ad7e20ce62e82fe22fdfaa629b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Carpenter Date: Tue, 14 Aug 2018 13:07:47 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 068/124] hwmon: (adt7475) Make adt7475_read_word() return errors [ Upstream commit f196dec6d50abb2e65fb54a0621b2f1b4d922995 ] The adt7475_read_word() function was meant to return negative error codes on failure. Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Reviewed-by: Tokunori Ikegami Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/hwmon/adt7475.c | 14 +++++++++----- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/hwmon/adt7475.c b/drivers/hwmon/adt7475.c index 3cefd1aeb24f..9c262d955331 100644 --- a/drivers/hwmon/adt7475.c +++ b/drivers/hwmon/adt7475.c @@ -274,14 +274,18 @@ static inline u16 volt2reg(int channel, long volt, u8 bypass_attn) return clamp_val(reg, 0, 1023) & (0xff << 2); } -static u16 adt7475_read_word(struct i2c_client *client, int reg) +static int adt7475_read_word(struct i2c_client *client, int reg) { - u16 val; + int val1, val2; - val = i2c_smbus_read_byte_data(client, reg); - val |= (i2c_smbus_read_byte_data(client, reg + 1) << 8); + val1 = i2c_smbus_read_byte_data(client, reg); + if (val1 < 0) + return val1; + val2 = i2c_smbus_read_byte_data(client, reg + 1); + if (val2 < 0) + return val2; - return val; + return val1 | (val2 << 8); } static void adt7475_write_word(struct i2c_client *client, int reg, u16 val) From a46148c3ec2d0a74b646d9e34195cc0aafa0c6ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marc Zyngier Date: Thu, 27 Sep 2018 16:53:22 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 069/124] arm64: KVM: Sanitize PSTATE.M when being set from userspace commit 2a3f93459d689d990b3ecfbe782fec89b97d3279 upstream. Not all execution modes are valid for a guest, and some of them depend on what the HW actually supports. Let's verify that what userspace provides is compatible with both the VM settings and the HW capabilities. Cc: Fixes: 0d854a60b1d7 ("arm64: KVM: enable initialization of a 32bit vcpu") Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland Reviewed-by: Dave Martin Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier Signed-off-by: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h | 5 +++++ arch/arm64/kvm/guest.c | 10 +++++++++- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h index 865a7e28ea2d..3d0098d7b47e 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h @@ -38,6 +38,11 @@ void kvm_inject_undefined(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); void kvm_inject_dabt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long addr); void kvm_inject_pabt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long addr); +static inline bool vcpu_el1_is_32bit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + return !(vcpu->arch.hcr_el2 & HCR_RW); +} + static inline void vcpu_reset_hcr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { vcpu->arch.hcr_el2 = HCR_GUEST_FLAGS; diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/guest.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/guest.c index 5d93c9f24847..286453f462df 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/guest.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/guest.c @@ -141,17 +141,25 @@ static int set_core_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvm_one_reg *reg) } if (off == KVM_REG_ARM_CORE_REG(regs.pstate)) { - u32 mode = (*(u32 *)valp) & COMPAT_PSR_MODE_MASK; + u64 mode = (*(u64 *)valp) & COMPAT_PSR_MODE_MASK; switch (mode) { case COMPAT_PSR_MODE_USR: + if ((read_cpuid(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1) & 0xf) != 2) + return -EINVAL; + break; case COMPAT_PSR_MODE_FIQ: case COMPAT_PSR_MODE_IRQ: case COMPAT_PSR_MODE_SVC: case COMPAT_PSR_MODE_ABT: case COMPAT_PSR_MODE_UND: + if (!vcpu_el1_is_32bit(vcpu)) + return -EINVAL; + break; case PSR_MODE_EL0t: case PSR_MODE_EL1t: case PSR_MODE_EL1h: + if (vcpu_el1_is_32bit(vcpu)) + return -EINVAL; break; default: err = -EINVAL; From 10c134df948c2d581f5b89a44072a07ba8cf4069 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sakari Ailus Date: Tue, 11 Sep 2018 05:32:37 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 070/124] media: v4l: event: Prevent freeing event subscriptions while accessed commit ad608fbcf166fec809e402d548761768f602702c upstream. The event subscriptions are added to the subscribed event list while holding a spinlock, but that lock is subsequently released while still accessing the subscription object. This makes it possible to unsubscribe the event --- and freeing the subscription object's memory --- while the subscription object is simultaneously accessed. Prevent this by adding a mutex to serialise the event subscription and unsubscription. This also gives a guarantee to the callback ops that the add op has returned before the del op is called. This change also results in making the elems field less special: subscriptions are only added to the event list once they are fully initialised. Signed-off-by: Sakari Ailus Reviewed-by: Hans Verkuil Reviewed-by: Laurent Pinchart Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # for 4.14 and up Fixes: c3b5b0241f62 ("V4L/DVB: V4L: Events: Add backend") Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-event.c | 37 ++++++++++++++-------------- drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-fh.c | 2 ++ include/media/v4l2-fh.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-event.c b/drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-event.c index 8761aab99de9..4b1a347d2b3a 100644 --- a/drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-event.c +++ b/drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-event.c @@ -119,14 +119,6 @@ static void __v4l2_event_queue_fh(struct v4l2_fh *fh, const struct v4l2_event *e if (sev == NULL) return; - /* - * If the event has been added to the fh->subscribed list, but its - * add op has not completed yet elems will be 0, treat this as - * not being subscribed. - */ - if (!sev->elems) - return; - /* Increase event sequence number on fh. */ fh->sequence++; @@ -209,6 +201,7 @@ int v4l2_event_subscribe(struct v4l2_fh *fh, struct v4l2_subscribed_event *sev, *found_ev; unsigned long flags; unsigned i; + int ret = 0; if (sub->type == V4L2_EVENT_ALL) return -EINVAL; @@ -226,31 +219,36 @@ int v4l2_event_subscribe(struct v4l2_fh *fh, sev->flags = sub->flags; sev->fh = fh; sev->ops = ops; + sev->elems = elems; + + mutex_lock(&fh->subscribe_lock); spin_lock_irqsave(&fh->vdev->fh_lock, flags); found_ev = v4l2_event_subscribed(fh, sub->type, sub->id); - if (!found_ev) - list_add(&sev->list, &fh->subscribed); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&fh->vdev->fh_lock, flags); if (found_ev) { + /* Already listening */ kfree(sev); - return 0; /* Already listening */ + goto out_unlock; } if (sev->ops && sev->ops->add) { - int ret = sev->ops->add(sev, elems); + ret = sev->ops->add(sev, elems); if (ret) { - sev->ops = NULL; - v4l2_event_unsubscribe(fh, sub); - return ret; + kfree(sev); + goto out_unlock; } } - /* Mark as ready for use */ - sev->elems = elems; + spin_lock_irqsave(&fh->vdev->fh_lock, flags); + list_add(&sev->list, &fh->subscribed); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&fh->vdev->fh_lock, flags); - return 0; +out_unlock: + mutex_unlock(&fh->subscribe_lock); + + return ret; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(v4l2_event_subscribe); @@ -289,6 +287,8 @@ int v4l2_event_unsubscribe(struct v4l2_fh *fh, return 0; } + mutex_lock(&fh->subscribe_lock); + spin_lock_irqsave(&fh->vdev->fh_lock, flags); sev = v4l2_event_subscribed(fh, sub->type, sub->id); @@ -307,6 +307,7 @@ int v4l2_event_unsubscribe(struct v4l2_fh *fh, sev->ops->del(sev); kfree(sev); + mutex_unlock(&fh->subscribe_lock); return 0; } diff --git a/drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-fh.c b/drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-fh.c index c97067a25bd2..1d076deb05a9 100644 --- a/drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-fh.c +++ b/drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-fh.c @@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ void v4l2_fh_init(struct v4l2_fh *fh, struct video_device *vdev) INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fh->available); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fh->subscribed); fh->sequence = -1; + mutex_init(&fh->subscribe_lock); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(v4l2_fh_init); @@ -93,6 +94,7 @@ void v4l2_fh_exit(struct v4l2_fh *fh) if (fh->vdev == NULL) return; v4l2_event_unsubscribe_all(fh); + mutex_destroy(&fh->subscribe_lock); fh->vdev = NULL; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(v4l2_fh_exit); diff --git a/include/media/v4l2-fh.h b/include/media/v4l2-fh.h index 803516775162..4fdcd0d807d7 100644 --- a/include/media/v4l2-fh.h +++ b/include/media/v4l2-fh.h @@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ struct v4l2_fh { wait_queue_head_t wait; struct list_head subscribed; /* Subscribed events */ struct list_head available; /* Dequeueable event */ + struct mutex subscribe_lock; unsigned int navailable; u32 sequence; From 0a76f11d2ef896099e0881fb058d690d5c798e9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Mackerras Date: Mon, 20 Aug 2018 16:05:45 +1000 Subject: [PATCH 071/124] KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Don't truncate HPTE index in xlate function [ Upstream commit 46dec40fb741f00f1864580130779aeeaf24fb3d ] This fixes a bug which causes guest virtual addresses to get translated to guest real addresses incorrectly when the guest is using the HPT MMU and has more than 256GB of RAM, or more specifically has a HPT larger than 2GB. This has showed up in testing as a failure of the host to emulate doorbell instructions correctly on POWER9 for HPT guests with more than 256GB of RAM. The bug is that the HPTE index in kvmppc_mmu_book3s_64_hv_xlate() is stored as an int, and in forming the HPTE address, the index gets shifted left 4 bits as an int before being signed-extended to 64 bits. The simple fix is to make the variable a long int, matching the return type of kvmppc_hv_find_lock_hpte(), which is what calculates the index. Fixes: 697d3899dcb4 ("KVM: PPC: Implement MMIO emulation support for Book3S HV guests") Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu_hv.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu_hv.c b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu_hv.c index d40770248b6a..191cc3eea0bf 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu_hv.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu_hv.c @@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ static int kvmppc_mmu_book3s_64_hv_xlate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t eaddr, unsigned long pp, key; unsigned long v, gr; __be64 *hptep; - int index; + long int index; int virtmode = vcpu->arch.shregs.msr & (data ? MSR_DR : MSR_IR); /* Get SLB entry */ From 44e7dfa5eb55a089b59684528046698dc29455b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Danek Duvall Date: Wed, 22 Aug 2018 16:01:04 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 072/124] mac80211: correct use of IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_RXSTBC_X [ Upstream commit 67d1ba8a6dc83d90cd58b89fa6cbf9ae35a0cf7f ] The mod mask for VHT capabilities intends to say that you can override the number of STBC receive streams, and it does, but only by accident. The IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_RXSTBC_X aren't bits to be set, but values (albeit left-shifted). ORing the bits together gets the right answer, but we should use the _MASK macro here instead. Signed-off-by: Danek Duvall Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/mac80211/main.c | 5 +---- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/mac80211/main.c b/net/mac80211/main.c index 67943cb5df8a..9db06f642556 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/main.c +++ b/net/mac80211/main.c @@ -465,10 +465,7 @@ static const struct ieee80211_vht_cap mac80211_vht_capa_mod_mask = { cpu_to_le32(IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_RXLDPC | IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_SHORT_GI_80 | IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_SHORT_GI_160 | - IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_RXSTBC_1 | - IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_RXSTBC_2 | - IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_RXSTBC_3 | - IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_RXSTBC_4 | + IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_RXSTBC_MASK | IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_TXSTBC | IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_SU_BEAMFORMER_CAPABLE | IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_SU_BEAMFORMEE_CAPABLE | From 9f91fbeeceec8d92bedd6e3e227f96753dbff092 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Hennerich Date: Mon, 13 Aug 2018 15:57:44 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 073/124] gpio: adp5588: Fix sleep-in-atomic-context bug [ Upstream commit 6537886cdc9a637711fd6da980dbb87c2c87c9aa ] This fixes: [BUG] gpio: gpio-adp5588: A possible sleep-in-atomic-context bug in adp5588_gpio_write() [BUG] gpio: gpio-adp5588: A possible sleep-in-atomic-context bug in adp5588_gpio_direction_input() Reported-by: Jia-Ju Bai Signed-off-by: Michael Hennerich Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/gpio/gpio-adp5588.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpio/gpio-adp5588.c b/drivers/gpio/gpio-adp5588.c index 3beed6ea8c65..348cde425220 100644 --- a/drivers/gpio/gpio-adp5588.c +++ b/drivers/gpio/gpio-adp5588.c @@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ struct adp5588_gpio { uint8_t int_en[3]; uint8_t irq_mask[3]; uint8_t irq_stat[3]; + uint8_t int_input_en[3]; + uint8_t int_lvl_cached[3]; }; static int adp5588_gpio_read(struct i2c_client *client, u8 reg) @@ -177,12 +179,28 @@ static void adp5588_irq_bus_sync_unlock(struct irq_data *d) struct adp5588_gpio *dev = irq_data_get_irq_chip_data(d); int i; - for (i = 0; i <= ADP5588_BANK(ADP5588_MAXGPIO); i++) + for (i = 0; i <= ADP5588_BANK(ADP5588_MAXGPIO); i++) { + if (dev->int_input_en[i]) { + mutex_lock(&dev->lock); + dev->dir[i] &= ~dev->int_input_en[i]; + dev->int_input_en[i] = 0; + adp5588_gpio_write(dev->client, GPIO_DIR1 + i, + dev->dir[i]); + mutex_unlock(&dev->lock); + } + + if (dev->int_lvl_cached[i] != dev->int_lvl[i]) { + dev->int_lvl_cached[i] = dev->int_lvl[i]; + adp5588_gpio_write(dev->client, GPIO_INT_LVL1 + i, + dev->int_lvl[i]); + } + if (dev->int_en[i] ^ dev->irq_mask[i]) { dev->int_en[i] = dev->irq_mask[i]; adp5588_gpio_write(dev->client, GPIO_INT_EN1 + i, dev->int_en[i]); } + } mutex_unlock(&dev->irq_lock); } @@ -225,9 +243,7 @@ static int adp5588_irq_set_type(struct irq_data *d, unsigned int type) else return -EINVAL; - adp5588_gpio_direction_input(&dev->gpio_chip, gpio); - adp5588_gpio_write(dev->client, GPIO_INT_LVL1 + bank, - dev->int_lvl[bank]); + dev->int_input_en[bank] |= bit; return 0; } From 5f2da71a181a142bd6d94988b7de53afb5fddf2d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Arunk Khandavalli Date: Thu, 30 Aug 2018 00:40:16 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 074/124] cfg80211: nl80211_update_ft_ies() to validate NL80211_ATTR_IE [ Upstream commit 4f0223bfe9c3e62d8f45a85f1ef1b18a8a263ef9 ] nl80211_update_ft_ies() tried to validate NL80211_ATTR_IE with is_valid_ie_attr() before dereferencing it, but that helper function returns true in case of NULL pointer (i.e., attribute not included). This can result to dereferencing a NULL pointer. Fix that by explicitly checking that NL80211_ATTR_IE is included. Fixes: 355199e02b83 ("cfg80211: Extend support for IEEE 802.11r Fast BSS Transition") Signed-off-by: Arunk Khandavalli Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/wireless/nl80211.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/net/wireless/nl80211.c b/net/wireless/nl80211.c index fefc9a4d3592..2e1633ac93f7 100644 --- a/net/wireless/nl80211.c +++ b/net/wireless/nl80211.c @@ -9223,6 +9223,7 @@ static int nl80211_update_ft_ies(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) return -EOPNOTSUPP; if (!info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_MDID] || + !info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_IE] || !is_valid_ie_attr(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_IE])) return -EINVAL; From 3f5fc65eeb037515b7368d22a90704d793a03529 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xiao Ni Date: Thu, 30 Aug 2018 15:57:09 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 075/124] RAID10 BUG_ON in raise_barrier when force is true and conf->barrier is 0 [ Upstream commit 1d0ffd264204eba1861865560f1f7f7a92919384 ] In raid10 reshape_request it gets max_sectors in read_balance. If the underlayer disks have bad blocks, the max_sectors is less than last. It will call goto read_more many times. It calls raise_barrier(conf, sectors_done != 0) every time. In this condition sectors_done is not 0. So the value passed to the argument force of raise_barrier is true. In raise_barrier it checks conf->barrier when force is true. If force is true and conf->barrier is 0, it panic. In this case reshape_request submits bio to under layer disks. And in the callback function of the bio it calls lower_barrier. If the bio finishes before calling raise_barrier again, it can trigger the BUG_ON. Add one pair of raise_barrier/lower_barrier to fix this bug. Signed-off-by: Xiao Ni Suggested-by: Neil Brown Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/md/raid10.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/md/raid10.c b/drivers/md/raid10.c index bd26567248b3..d09e227a7213 100644 --- a/drivers/md/raid10.c +++ b/drivers/md/raid10.c @@ -4423,11 +4423,12 @@ static sector_t reshape_request(struct mddev *mddev, sector_t sector_nr, allow_barrier(conf); } + raise_barrier(conf, 0); read_more: /* Now schedule reads for blocks from sector_nr to last */ r10_bio = mempool_alloc(conf->r10buf_pool, GFP_NOIO); r10_bio->state = 0; - raise_barrier(conf, sectors_done != 0); + raise_barrier(conf, 1); atomic_set(&r10_bio->remaining, 0); r10_bio->mddev = mddev; r10_bio->sector = sector_nr; @@ -4532,6 +4533,8 @@ static sector_t reshape_request(struct mddev *mddev, sector_t sector_nr, if (sector_nr <= last) goto read_more; + lower_barrier(conf); + /* Now that we have done the whole section we can * update reshape_progress */ From 1ed8736a803e1aa910ab791b38f9b612c7ecf182 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jia-Ju Bai Date: Sat, 1 Sep 2018 20:11:05 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 076/124] net: cadence: Fix a sleep-in-atomic-context bug in macb_halt_tx() [ Upstream commit 16fe10cf92783ed9ceb182d6ea2b8adf5e8ec1b8 ] The kernel module may sleep with holding a spinlock. The function call paths (from bottom to top) in Linux-4.16 are: [FUNC] usleep_range drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c, 648: usleep_range in macb_halt_tx drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c, 730: macb_halt_tx in macb_tx_error_task drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c, 721: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave in macb_tx_error_task To fix this bug, usleep_range() is replaced with udelay(). This bug is found by my static analysis tool DSAC. Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb.c index 4d9fc0509af6..b3e134e53bf1 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb.c @@ -464,7 +464,7 @@ static int macb_halt_tx(struct macb *bp) if (!(status & MACB_BIT(TGO))) return 0; - usleep_range(10, 250); + udelay(250); } while (time_before(halt_time, timeout)); return -ETIMEDOUT; From 33865da6e8ae7cffdbd4b723afbf3256122bcc54 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jon Kuhn Date: Mon, 9 Jul 2018 14:33:14 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 077/124] fs/cifs: don't translate SFM_SLASH (U+F026) to backslash [ Upstream commit c15e3f19a6d5c89b1209dc94b40e568177cb0921 ] When a Mac client saves an item containing a backslash to a file server the backslash is represented in the CIFS/SMB protocol as as U+F026. Before this change, listing a directory containing an item with a backslash in its name will return that item with the backslash represented with a true backslash character (U+005C) because convert_sfm_character mapped U+F026 to U+005C when interpretting the CIFS/SMB protocol response. However, attempting to open or stat the path using a true backslash will result in an error because convert_to_sfm_char does not map U+005C back to U+F026 causing the CIFS/SMB request to be made with the backslash represented as U+005C. This change simply prevents the U+F026 to U+005C conversion from happenning. This is analogous to how the code does not do any translation of UNI_SLASH (U+F000). Signed-off-by: Jon Kuhn Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/cifs/cifs_unicode.c | 3 --- 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifs_unicode.c b/fs/cifs/cifs_unicode.c index 4c7752639067..a39cb5c01fcf 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/cifs_unicode.c +++ b/fs/cifs/cifs_unicode.c @@ -136,9 +136,6 @@ convert_sfm_char(const __u16 src_char, char *target) case SFM_LESSTHAN: *target = '<'; break; - case SFM_SLASH: - *target = '\\'; - break; case SFM_SPACE: *target = ' '; break; From 869ce9b1b8bb5d6b84080fb3d1c8adaa16c59f84 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Emmanuel Grumbach Date: Fri, 31 Aug 2018 11:31:06 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 078/124] mac80211: fix a race between restart and CSA flows [ Upstream commit f3ffb6c3a28963657eb8b02a795d75f2ebbd5ef4 ] We hit a problem with iwlwifi that was caused by a bug in mac80211. A bug in iwlwifi caused the firwmare to crash in certain cases in channel switch. Because of that bug, drv_pre_channel_switch would fail and trigger the restart flow. Now we had the hw restart worker which runs on the system's workqueue and the csa_connection_drop_work worker that runs on mac80211's workqueue that can run together. This is obviously problematic since the restart work wants to reconfigure the connection, while the csa_connection_drop_work worker does the exact opposite: it tries to disconnect. Fix this by cancelling the csa_connection_drop_work worker in the restart worker. Note that this can sound racy: we could have: driver iface_work CSA_work restart_work +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ | <--drv_cs ---| -CS FAILED--> | | | cancel_work(CSA) schedule | CSA work | | | Race between those 2 But this is not possible because we flush the workqueue in the restart worker before we cancel the CSA worker. That would be bullet proof if we could guarantee that we schedule the CSA worker only from the iface_work which runs on the workqueue (and not on the system's workqueue), but unfortunately we do have an instance in which we schedule the CSA work outside the context of the workqueue (ieee80211_chswitch_done). Note also that we should probably cancel other workers like beacon_connection_loss_work and possibly others for different types of interfaces, at the very least, IBSS should suffer from the exact same problem, but for now, do the minimum to fix the actual bug that was actually experienced and reproduced. Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/mac80211/main.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/mac80211/main.c b/net/mac80211/main.c index 9db06f642556..749b8e755d47 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/main.c +++ b/net/mac80211/main.c @@ -258,8 +258,27 @@ static void ieee80211_restart_work(struct work_struct *work) "%s called with hardware scan in progress\n", __func__); rtnl_lock(); - list_for_each_entry(sdata, &local->interfaces, list) + list_for_each_entry(sdata, &local->interfaces, list) { + /* + * XXX: there may be more work for other vif types and even + * for station mode: a good thing would be to run most of + * the iface type's dependent _stop (ieee80211_mg_stop, + * ieee80211_ibss_stop) etc... + * For now, fix only the specific bug that was seen: race + * between csa_connection_drop_work and us. + */ + if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION) { + /* + * This worker is scheduled from the iface worker that + * runs on mac80211's workqueue, so we can't be + * scheduling this worker after the cancel right here. + * The exception is ieee80211_chswitch_done. + * Then we can have a race... + */ + cancel_work_sync(&sdata->u.mgd.csa_connection_drop_work); + } flush_delayed_work(&sdata->dec_tailroom_needed_wk); + } ieee80211_scan_cancel(local); ieee80211_reconfig(local); rtnl_unlock(); From 3655a530e341b889a2275f4e73c6cd353b2f81a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ilan Peer Date: Fri, 31 Aug 2018 11:31:10 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 079/124] mac80211: Fix station bandwidth setting after channel switch [ Upstream commit 0007e94355fdb71a1cf5dba0754155cba08f0666 ] When performing a channel switch flow for a managed interface, the flow did not update the bandwidth of the AP station and the rate scale algorithm. In case of a channel width downgrade, this would result with the rate scale algorithm using a bandwidth that does not match the interface channel configuration. Fix this by updating the AP station bandwidth and rate scaling algorithm before the actual channel change in case of a bandwidth downgrade, or after the actual channel change in case of a bandwidth upgrade. Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/mac80211/mlme.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 53 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/mac80211/mlme.c b/net/mac80211/mlme.c index 690fbac121d2..56eb7516c7c9 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/mlme.c +++ b/net/mac80211/mlme.c @@ -970,6 +970,10 @@ static void ieee80211_chswitch_work(struct work_struct *work) */ if (sdata->reserved_chanctx) { + struct ieee80211_supported_band *sband = NULL; + struct sta_info *mgd_sta = NULL; + enum ieee80211_sta_rx_bandwidth bw = IEEE80211_STA_RX_BW_20; + /* * with multi-vif csa driver may call ieee80211_csa_finish() * many times while waiting for other interfaces to use their @@ -978,6 +982,48 @@ static void ieee80211_chswitch_work(struct work_struct *work) if (sdata->reserved_ready) goto out; + if (sdata->vif.bss_conf.chandef.width != + sdata->csa_chandef.width) { + /* + * For managed interface, we need to also update the AP + * station bandwidth and align the rate scale algorithm + * on the bandwidth change. Here we only consider the + * bandwidth of the new channel definition (as channel + * switch flow does not have the full HT/VHT/HE + * information), assuming that if additional changes are + * required they would be done as part of the processing + * of the next beacon from the AP. + */ + switch (sdata->csa_chandef.width) { + case NL80211_CHAN_WIDTH_20_NOHT: + case NL80211_CHAN_WIDTH_20: + default: + bw = IEEE80211_STA_RX_BW_20; + break; + case NL80211_CHAN_WIDTH_40: + bw = IEEE80211_STA_RX_BW_40; + break; + case NL80211_CHAN_WIDTH_80: + bw = IEEE80211_STA_RX_BW_80; + break; + case NL80211_CHAN_WIDTH_80P80: + case NL80211_CHAN_WIDTH_160: + bw = IEEE80211_STA_RX_BW_160; + break; + } + + mgd_sta = sta_info_get(sdata, ifmgd->bssid); + sband = + local->hw.wiphy->bands[sdata->csa_chandef.chan->band]; + } + + if (sdata->vif.bss_conf.chandef.width > + sdata->csa_chandef.width) { + mgd_sta->sta.bandwidth = bw; + rate_control_rate_update(local, sband, mgd_sta, + IEEE80211_RC_BW_CHANGED); + } + ret = ieee80211_vif_use_reserved_context(sdata); if (ret) { sdata_info(sdata, @@ -988,6 +1034,13 @@ static void ieee80211_chswitch_work(struct work_struct *work) goto out; } + if (sdata->vif.bss_conf.chandef.width < + sdata->csa_chandef.width) { + mgd_sta->sta.bandwidth = bw; + rate_control_rate_update(local, sband, mgd_sta, + IEEE80211_RC_BW_CHANGED); + } + goto out; } From 15ace3408120927c45f4707f277111676716641b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Emmanuel Grumbach Date: Fri, 31 Aug 2018 11:31:13 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 080/124] mac80211: shorten the IBSS debug messages [ Upstream commit c6e57b3896fc76299913b8cfd82d853bee8a2c84 ] When tracing is enabled, all the debug messages are recorded and must not exceed MAX_MSG_LEN (100) columns. Longer debug messages grant the user with: WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 32642 at /tmp/wifi-core-20180806094828/src/iwlwifi-stack-dev/net/mac80211/./trace_msg.h:32 trace_event_raw_event_mac80211_msg_event+0xab/0xc0 [mac80211] Workqueue: phy1 ieee80211_iface_work [mac80211] RIP: 0010:trace_event_raw_event_mac80211_msg_event+0xab/0xc0 [mac80211] Call Trace: __sdata_dbg+0xbd/0x120 [mac80211] ieee80211_ibss_rx_queued_mgmt+0x15f/0x510 [mac80211] ieee80211_iface_work+0x21d/0x320 [mac80211] Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/mac80211/ibss.c | 22 +++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/mac80211/ibss.c b/net/mac80211/ibss.c index 76de04be8900..1e3966750b4d 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/ibss.c +++ b/net/mac80211/ibss.c @@ -944,8 +944,8 @@ static void ieee80211_rx_mgmt_deauth_ibss(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, if (len < IEEE80211_DEAUTH_FRAME_LEN) return; - ibss_dbg(sdata, "RX DeAuth SA=%pM DA=%pM BSSID=%pM (reason: %d)\n", - mgmt->sa, mgmt->da, mgmt->bssid, reason); + ibss_dbg(sdata, "RX DeAuth SA=%pM DA=%pM\n", mgmt->sa, mgmt->da); + ibss_dbg(sdata, "\tBSSID=%pM (reason: %d)\n", mgmt->bssid, reason); sta_info_destroy_addr(sdata, mgmt->sa); } @@ -963,9 +963,9 @@ static void ieee80211_rx_mgmt_auth_ibss(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, auth_alg = le16_to_cpu(mgmt->u.auth.auth_alg); auth_transaction = le16_to_cpu(mgmt->u.auth.auth_transaction); - ibss_dbg(sdata, - "RX Auth SA=%pM DA=%pM BSSID=%pM (auth_transaction=%d)\n", - mgmt->sa, mgmt->da, mgmt->bssid, auth_transaction); + ibss_dbg(sdata, "RX Auth SA=%pM DA=%pM\n", mgmt->sa, mgmt->da); + ibss_dbg(sdata, "\tBSSID=%pM (auth_transaction=%d)\n", + mgmt->bssid, auth_transaction); if (auth_alg != WLAN_AUTH_OPEN || auth_transaction != 1) return; @@ -1130,10 +1130,10 @@ static void ieee80211_rx_bss_info(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, rx_timestamp = drv_get_tsf(local, sdata); } - ibss_dbg(sdata, - "RX beacon SA=%pM BSSID=%pM TSF=0x%llx BCN=0x%llx diff=%lld @%lu\n", + ibss_dbg(sdata, "RX beacon SA=%pM BSSID=%pM TSF=0x%llx\n", mgmt->sa, mgmt->bssid, - (unsigned long long)rx_timestamp, + (unsigned long long)rx_timestamp); + ibss_dbg(sdata, "\tBCN=0x%llx diff=%lld @%lu\n", (unsigned long long)beacon_timestamp, (unsigned long long)(rx_timestamp - beacon_timestamp), jiffies); @@ -1414,9 +1414,9 @@ static void ieee80211_rx_mgmt_probe_req(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, tx_last_beacon = drv_tx_last_beacon(local); - ibss_dbg(sdata, - "RX ProbeReq SA=%pM DA=%pM BSSID=%pM (tx_last_beacon=%d)\n", - mgmt->sa, mgmt->da, mgmt->bssid, tx_last_beacon); + ibss_dbg(sdata, "RX ProbeReq SA=%pM DA=%pM\n", mgmt->sa, mgmt->da); + ibss_dbg(sdata, "\tBSSID=%pM (tx_last_beacon=%d)\n", + mgmt->bssid, tx_last_beacon); if (!tx_last_beacon && is_multicast_ether_addr(mgmt->da)) return; From 2579073588ece7163366b00c397d38312c08a477 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Naoya Horiguchi Date: Tue, 4 Sep 2018 15:45:48 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 081/124] tools/vm/slabinfo.c: fix sign-compare warning [ Upstream commit 904506562e0856f2535d876407d087c9459d345b ] Currently we get the following compiler warning: slabinfo.c:854:22: warning: comparison between signed and unsigned integer expressions [-Wsign-compare] if (s->object_size < min_objsize) ^ due to the mismatch of signed/unsigned comparison. ->object_size and ->slab_size are never expected to be negative, so let's define them as unsigned int. [n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com: convert everything - none of these can be negative] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180826234947.GA9787@hori1.linux.bs1.fc.nec.co.jp Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1535103134-20239-1-git-send-email-n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton Cc: Matthew Wilcox Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/vm/slabinfo.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/vm/slabinfo.c b/tools/vm/slabinfo.c index 808d5a9d5dcf..c75c42281a73 100644 --- a/tools/vm/slabinfo.c +++ b/tools/vm/slabinfo.c @@ -29,8 +29,8 @@ struct slabinfo { int alias; int refs; int aliases, align, cache_dma, cpu_slabs, destroy_by_rcu; - int hwcache_align, object_size, objs_per_slab; - int sanity_checks, slab_size, store_user, trace; + unsigned int hwcache_align, object_size, objs_per_slab; + unsigned int sanity_checks, slab_size, store_user, trace; int order, poison, reclaim_account, red_zone; unsigned long partial, objects, slabs, objects_partial, objects_total; unsigned long alloc_fastpath, alloc_slowpath; From 792de67fce1f805a0e7f167b37886206966117c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Naoya Horiguchi Date: Tue, 4 Sep 2018 15:45:51 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 082/124] tools/vm/page-types.c: fix "defined but not used" warning [ Upstream commit 7ab660f8baecfe26c1c267fa8e64d2073feae2bb ] debugfs_known_mountpoints[] is not used any more, so let's remove it. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1535102651-19418-1-git-send-email-n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton Cc: Matthew Wilcox Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/vm/page-types.c | 6 ------ 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/vm/page-types.c b/tools/vm/page-types.c index 264fbc297e0b..881bad578f1e 100644 --- a/tools/vm/page-types.c +++ b/tools/vm/page-types.c @@ -151,12 +151,6 @@ static const char * const page_flag_names[] = { }; -static const char * const debugfs_known_mountpoints[] = { - "/sys/kernel/debug", - "/debug", - 0, -}; - /* * data structures */ From e467ada01794493adff31c8f9c95718d3f9bae69 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Black Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2018 15:52:19 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 083/124] mm: madvise(MADV_DODUMP): allow hugetlbfs pages commit d41aa5252394c065d1f04d1ceea885b70d00c9c6 upstream. Reproducer, assuming 2M of hugetlbfs available: Hugetlbfs mounted, size=2M and option user=testuser # mount | grep ^hugetlbfs hugetlbfs on /dev/hugepages type hugetlbfs (rw,pagesize=2M,user=dan) # sysctl vm.nr_hugepages=1 vm.nr_hugepages = 1 # grep Huge /proc/meminfo AnonHugePages: 0 kB ShmemHugePages: 0 kB HugePages_Total: 1 HugePages_Free: 1 HugePages_Rsvd: 0 HugePages_Surp: 0 Hugepagesize: 2048 kB Hugetlb: 2048 kB Code: #include #include #define SIZE 2*1024*1024 int main() { void *ptr; ptr = mmap(NULL, SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_HUGETLB | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0); madvise(ptr, SIZE, MADV_DONTDUMP); madvise(ptr, SIZE, MADV_DODUMP); } Compile and strace: mmap(NULL, 2097152, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_HUGETLB, -1, 0) = 0x7ff7c9200000 madvise(0x7ff7c9200000, 2097152, MADV_DONTDUMP) = 0 madvise(0x7ff7c9200000, 2097152, MADV_DODUMP) = -1 EINVAL (Invalid argument) hugetlbfs pages have VM_DONTEXPAND in the VmFlags driver pages based on author testing with analysis from Florian Weimer[1]. The inclusion of VM_DONTEXPAND into the VM_SPECIAL defination was a consequence of the large useage of VM_DONTEXPAND in device drivers. A consequence of [2] is that VM_DONTEXPAND marked pages are unable to be marked DODUMP. A user could quite legitimately madvise(MADV_DONTDUMP) their hugetlbfs memory for a while and later request that madvise(MADV_DODUMP) on the same memory. We correct this omission by allowing madvice(MADV_DODUMP) on hugetlbfs pages. [1] https://stackoverflow.com/questions/52548260/madvisedodump-on-the-same-ptr-size-as-a-successful-madvisedontdump-fails-wit [2] commit 0103bd16fb90 ("mm: prepare VM_DONTDUMP for using in drivers") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180930054629.29150-1-daniel@linux.ibm.com Link: https://lists.launchpad.net/maria-discuss/msg05245.html Fixes: 0103bd16fb90 ("mm: prepare VM_DONTDUMP for using in drivers") Reported-by: Kenneth Penza Signed-off-by: Daniel Black Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- mm/madvise.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/mm/madvise.c b/mm/madvise.c index 3440d5da408e..b363890542e7 100644 --- a/mm/madvise.c +++ b/mm/madvise.c @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ static long madvise_behavior(struct vm_area_struct *vma, new_flags |= VM_DONTDUMP; break; case MADV_DODUMP: - if (new_flags & VM_SPECIAL) { + if (!is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma) && new_flags & VM_SPECIAL) { error = -EINVAL; goto out; } From d90c014001768c1398580a677718a171fec81ed4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jann Horn Date: Mon, 3 Sep 2018 18:54:14 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 084/124] RDMA/ucma: check fd type in ucma_migrate_id() [ Upstream commit 0d23ba6034b9cf48b8918404367506da3e4b3ee5 ] The current code grabs the private_data of whatever file descriptor userspace has supplied and implicitly casts it to a `struct ucma_file *`, potentially causing a type confusion. This is probably fine in practice because the pointer is only used for comparisons, it is never actually dereferenced; and even in the comparisons, it is unlikely that a file from another filesystem would have a ->private_data pointer that happens to also be valid in this context. But ->private_data is not always guaranteed to be a valid pointer to an object owned by the file's filesystem; for example, some filesystems just cram numbers in there. Check the type of the supplied file descriptor to be safe, analogous to how other places in the kernel do it. Fixes: 88314e4dda1e ("RDMA/cma: add support for rdma_migrate_id()") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c index eaadd636c21b..a399d7da7774 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c @@ -113,6 +113,8 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(mut); static DEFINE_IDR(ctx_idr); static DEFINE_IDR(multicast_idr); +static const struct file_operations ucma_fops; + static inline struct ucma_context *_ucma_find_context(int id, struct ucma_file *file) { @@ -1416,6 +1418,10 @@ static ssize_t ucma_migrate_id(struct ucma_file *new_file, f = fdget(cmd.fd); if (!f.file) return -ENOENT; + if (f.file->f_op != &ucma_fops) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto file_put; + } /* Validate current fd and prevent destruction of id. */ ctx = ucma_get_ctx(f.file->private_data, cmd.id); From 8c44ff3798e7189aa6b0d47e09b14653381ac881 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ben Hutchings Date: Wed, 15 Aug 2018 21:45:37 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 085/124] USB: yurex: Check for truncation in yurex_read() [ Upstream commit 14427b86837a4baf1c121934c6599bdb67dfa9fc ] snprintf() always returns the full length of the string it could have printed, even if it was truncated because the buffer was too small. So in case the counter value is truncated, we will over-read from in_buffer and over-write to the caller's buffer. I don't think it's actually possible for this to happen, but in case truncation occurs, WARN and return -EIO. Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/misc/yurex.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/misc/yurex.c b/drivers/usb/misc/yurex.c index 83eaccfa9ee5..fbcb1cd4c118 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/misc/yurex.c +++ b/drivers/usb/misc/yurex.c @@ -430,6 +430,9 @@ static ssize_t yurex_read(struct file *file, char *buffer, size_t count, loff_t spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags); mutex_unlock(&dev->io_mutex); + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(len >= sizeof(in_buffer))) + return -EIO; + return simple_read_from_buffer(buffer, count, ppos, in_buffer, len); } From 699c47709d969a7dd28d5f16734675347cef44b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stephen Rothwell Date: Mon, 3 Sep 2018 13:15:58 +1000 Subject: [PATCH 086/124] fs/cifs: suppress a string overflow warning MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit bcfb84a996f6fa90b5e6e2954b2accb7a4711097 ] A powerpc build of cifs with gcc v8.2.0 produces this warning: fs/cifs/cifssmb.c: In function ‘CIFSSMBNegotiate’: fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:605:3: warning: ‘strncpy’ writing 16 bytes into a region of size 1 overflows the destination [-Wstringop-overflow=] strncpy(pSMB->DialectsArray+count, protocols[i].name, 16); ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Since we are already doing a strlen() on the source, change the strncpy to a memcpy(). Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/cifs/cifssmb.c | 11 ++++++++--- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifssmb.c b/fs/cifs/cifssmb.c index 949deb938dc9..db72c5284d13 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/cifssmb.c +++ b/fs/cifs/cifssmb.c @@ -577,10 +577,15 @@ CIFSSMBNegotiate(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses) } count = 0; + /* + * We know that all the name entries in the protocols array + * are short (< 16 bytes anyway) and are NUL terminated. + */ for (i = 0; i < CIFS_NUM_PROT; i++) { - strncpy(pSMB->DialectsArray+count, protocols[i].name, 16); - count += strlen(protocols[i].name) + 1; - /* null at end of source and target buffers anyway */ + size_t len = strlen(protocols[i].name) + 1; + + memcpy(pSMB->DialectsArray+count, protocols[i].name, len); + count += len; } inc_rfc1001_len(pSMB, count); pSMB->ByteCount = cpu_to_le16(count); From b4387536c7c1ab7b7d08908887d23c52bcf6bef7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joe Thornber Date: Mon, 10 Sep 2018 16:50:09 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 087/124] dm thin metadata: try to avoid ever aborting transactions [ Upstream commit 3ab91828166895600efd9cdc3a0eb32001f7204a ] Committing a transaction can consume some metadata of it's own, we now reserve a small amount of metadata to cover this. Free metadata reported by the kernel will not include this reserve. If any of the reserve has been used after a commit we enter a new internal state PM_OUT_OF_METADATA_SPACE. This is reported as PM_READ_ONLY, so no userland changes are needed. If the metadata device is resized the pool will move back to PM_WRITE. These changes mean we never need to abort and rollback a transaction due to running out of metadata space. This is particularly important because there have been a handful of reports of data corruption against DM thin-provisioning that can all be attributed to the thin-pool having ran out of metadata space. Signed-off-by: Joe Thornber Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/md/dm-thin-metadata.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++- drivers/md/dm-thin.c | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 100 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-thin-metadata.c b/drivers/md/dm-thin-metadata.c index 3f3ab7586dc0..096de9433da2 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm-thin-metadata.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm-thin-metadata.c @@ -190,6 +190,12 @@ struct dm_pool_metadata { sector_t data_block_size; bool read_only:1; + /* + * We reserve a section of the metadata for commit overhead. + * All reported space does *not* include this. + */ + dm_block_t metadata_reserve; + /* * Set if a transaction has to be aborted but the attempt to roll back * to the previous (good) transaction failed. The only pool metadata @@ -824,6 +830,22 @@ static int __commit_transaction(struct dm_pool_metadata *pmd) return dm_tm_commit(pmd->tm, sblock); } +static void __set_metadata_reserve(struct dm_pool_metadata *pmd) +{ + int r; + dm_block_t total; + dm_block_t max_blocks = 4096; /* 16M */ + + r = dm_sm_get_nr_blocks(pmd->metadata_sm, &total); + if (r) { + DMERR("could not get size of metadata device"); + pmd->metadata_reserve = max_blocks; + } else { + sector_div(total, 10); + pmd->metadata_reserve = min(max_blocks, total); + } +} + struct dm_pool_metadata *dm_pool_metadata_open(struct block_device *bdev, sector_t data_block_size, bool format_device) @@ -858,6 +880,8 @@ struct dm_pool_metadata *dm_pool_metadata_open(struct block_device *bdev, return ERR_PTR(r); } + __set_metadata_reserve(pmd); + return pmd; } @@ -1625,6 +1649,13 @@ int dm_pool_get_free_metadata_block_count(struct dm_pool_metadata *pmd, down_read(&pmd->root_lock); if (!pmd->fail_io) r = dm_sm_get_nr_free(pmd->metadata_sm, result); + + if (!r) { + if (*result < pmd->metadata_reserve) + *result = 0; + else + *result -= pmd->metadata_reserve; + } up_read(&pmd->root_lock); return r; @@ -1746,8 +1777,11 @@ int dm_pool_resize_metadata_dev(struct dm_pool_metadata *pmd, dm_block_t new_cou int r = -EINVAL; down_write(&pmd->root_lock); - if (!pmd->fail_io) + if (!pmd->fail_io) { r = __resize_space_map(pmd->metadata_sm, new_count); + if (!r) + __set_metadata_reserve(pmd); + } up_write(&pmd->root_lock); return r; diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-thin.c b/drivers/md/dm-thin.c index 0e8d19b65678..68c7102a64c8 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm-thin.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm-thin.c @@ -140,7 +140,13 @@ struct dm_thin_new_mapping; enum pool_mode { PM_WRITE, /* metadata may be changed */ PM_OUT_OF_DATA_SPACE, /* metadata may be changed, though data may not be allocated */ + + /* + * Like READ_ONLY, except may switch back to WRITE on metadata resize. Reported as READ_ONLY. + */ + PM_OUT_OF_METADATA_SPACE, PM_READ_ONLY, /* metadata may not be changed */ + PM_FAIL, /* all I/O fails */ }; @@ -994,7 +1000,35 @@ static void set_pool_mode(struct pool *pool, enum pool_mode new_mode); static void requeue_bios(struct pool *pool); -static void check_for_space(struct pool *pool) +static bool is_read_only_pool_mode(enum pool_mode mode) +{ + return (mode == PM_OUT_OF_METADATA_SPACE || mode == PM_READ_ONLY); +} + +static bool is_read_only(struct pool *pool) +{ + return is_read_only_pool_mode(get_pool_mode(pool)); +} + +static void check_for_metadata_space(struct pool *pool) +{ + int r; + const char *ooms_reason = NULL; + dm_block_t nr_free; + + r = dm_pool_get_free_metadata_block_count(pool->pmd, &nr_free); + if (r) + ooms_reason = "Could not get free metadata blocks"; + else if (!nr_free) + ooms_reason = "No free metadata blocks"; + + if (ooms_reason && !is_read_only(pool)) { + DMERR("%s", ooms_reason); + set_pool_mode(pool, PM_OUT_OF_METADATA_SPACE); + } +} + +static void check_for_data_space(struct pool *pool) { int r; dm_block_t nr_free; @@ -1020,14 +1054,16 @@ static int commit(struct pool *pool) { int r; - if (get_pool_mode(pool) >= PM_READ_ONLY) + if (get_pool_mode(pool) >= PM_OUT_OF_METADATA_SPACE) return -EINVAL; r = dm_pool_commit_metadata(pool->pmd); if (r) metadata_operation_failed(pool, "dm_pool_commit_metadata", r); - else - check_for_space(pool); + else { + check_for_metadata_space(pool); + check_for_data_space(pool); + } return r; } @@ -1093,6 +1129,19 @@ static int alloc_data_block(struct thin_c *tc, dm_block_t *result) return r; } + r = dm_pool_get_free_metadata_block_count(pool->pmd, &free_blocks); + if (r) { + metadata_operation_failed(pool, "dm_pool_get_free_metadata_block_count", r); + return r; + } + + if (!free_blocks) { + /* Let's commit before we use up the metadata reserve. */ + r = commit(pool); + if (r) + return r; + } + return 0; } @@ -1124,6 +1173,7 @@ static int should_error_unserviceable_bio(struct pool *pool) case PM_OUT_OF_DATA_SPACE: return pool->pf.error_if_no_space ? -ENOSPC : 0; + case PM_OUT_OF_METADATA_SPACE: case PM_READ_ONLY: case PM_FAIL: return -EIO; @@ -1823,8 +1873,9 @@ static void set_pool_mode(struct pool *pool, enum pool_mode new_mode) error_retry_list(pool); break; + case PM_OUT_OF_METADATA_SPACE: case PM_READ_ONLY: - if (old_mode != new_mode) + if (!is_read_only_pool_mode(old_mode)) notify_of_pool_mode_change(pool, "read-only"); dm_pool_metadata_read_only(pool->pmd); pool->process_bio = process_bio_read_only; @@ -2727,6 +2778,10 @@ static int maybe_resize_metadata_dev(struct dm_target *ti, bool *need_commit) DMINFO("%s: growing the metadata device from %llu to %llu blocks", dm_device_name(pool->pool_md), sb_metadata_dev_size, metadata_dev_size); + + if (get_pool_mode(pool) == PM_OUT_OF_METADATA_SPACE) + set_pool_mode(pool, PM_WRITE); + r = dm_pool_resize_metadata_dev(pool->pmd, metadata_dev_size); if (r) { metadata_operation_failed(pool, "dm_pool_resize_metadata_dev", r); @@ -2974,7 +3029,7 @@ static int pool_message(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned argc, char **argv) struct pool_c *pt = ti->private; struct pool *pool = pt->pool; - if (get_pool_mode(pool) >= PM_READ_ONLY) { + if (get_pool_mode(pool) >= PM_OUT_OF_METADATA_SPACE) { DMERR("%s: unable to service pool target messages in READ_ONLY or FAIL mode", dm_device_name(pool->pool_md)); return -EINVAL; @@ -3047,6 +3102,7 @@ static void pool_status(struct dm_target *ti, status_type_t type, dm_block_t nr_blocks_data; dm_block_t nr_blocks_metadata; dm_block_t held_root; + enum pool_mode mode; char buf[BDEVNAME_SIZE]; char buf2[BDEVNAME_SIZE]; struct pool_c *pt = ti->private; @@ -3117,9 +3173,10 @@ static void pool_status(struct dm_target *ti, status_type_t type, else DMEMIT("- "); - if (pool->pf.mode == PM_OUT_OF_DATA_SPACE) + mode = get_pool_mode(pool); + if (mode == PM_OUT_OF_DATA_SPACE) DMEMIT("out_of_data_space "); - else if (pool->pf.mode == PM_READ_ONLY) + else if (is_read_only_pool_mode(mode)) DMEMIT("ro "); else DMEMIT("rw "); From ece65461b4b10f2accbb64e9198adb94bbf8cd16 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Randy Dunlap Date: Fri, 20 Jul 2018 20:17:35 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 088/124] arch/hexagon: fix kernel/dma.c build warning [ Upstream commit 200f351e27f014fcbf69b544b0b4b72aeaf45fd3 ] Fix build warning in arch/hexagon/kernel/dma.c by casting a void * to unsigned long to match the function parameter type. ../arch/hexagon/kernel/dma.c: In function 'arch_dma_alloc': ../arch/hexagon/kernel/dma.c:51:5: warning: passing argument 2 of 'gen_pool_add' makes integer from pointer without a cast [enabled by default] ../include/linux/genalloc.h:112:19: note: expected 'long unsigned int' but argument is of type 'void *' Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap Cc: Yoshinori Sato Cc: Rich Felker Cc: linux-sh@vger.kernel.org Patch-mainline: linux-kernel @ 07/20/2018, 20:17 [rkuo@codeaurora.org: fixed architecture name] Signed-off-by: Richard Kuo Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/hexagon/kernel/dma.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/hexagon/kernel/dma.c b/arch/hexagon/kernel/dma.c index b74f9bae31a3..5a821e1c4b9b 100644 --- a/arch/hexagon/kernel/dma.c +++ b/arch/hexagon/kernel/dma.c @@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ static void *hexagon_dma_alloc_coherent(struct device *dev, size_t size, panic("Can't create %s() memory pool!", __func__); else gen_pool_add(coherent_pool, - pfn_to_virt(max_low_pfn), + (unsigned long)pfn_to_virt(max_low_pfn), hexagon_coherent_pool_size, -1); } From 43f67da4e5d71337cb19f333fe9d37d13b627a91 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Randy Dunlap Date: Sun, 22 Jul 2018 16:03:58 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 089/124] hexagon: modify ffs() and fls() to return int [ Upstream commit 5c41aaad409c097cf1ef74f2c649fed994744ef5 ] Building drivers/mtd/nand/raw/nandsim.c on arch/hexagon/ produces a printk format build warning. This is due to hexagon's ffs() being coded as returning long instead of int. Fix the printk format warning by changing all of hexagon's ffs() and fls() functions to return int instead of long. The variables that they return are already int instead of long. This return type matches the return type in . ../drivers/mtd/nand/raw/nandsim.c: In function 'init_nandsim': ../drivers/mtd/nand/raw/nandsim.c:760:2: warning: format '%u' expects argument of type 'unsigned int', but argument 2 has type 'long int' [-Wformat] There are no ffs() or fls() allmodconfig build errors after making this change. Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap Cc: Richard Kuo Cc: linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven Patch-mainline: linux-kernel @ 07/22/2018, 16:03 Signed-off-by: Richard Kuo Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/hexagon/include/asm/bitops.h | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/hexagon/include/asm/bitops.h b/arch/hexagon/include/asm/bitops.h index 5e4a59b3ec1b..2691a1857d20 100644 --- a/arch/hexagon/include/asm/bitops.h +++ b/arch/hexagon/include/asm/bitops.h @@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ static inline long ffz(int x) * This is defined the same way as ffs. * Note fls(0) = 0, fls(1) = 1, fls(0x80000000) = 32. */ -static inline long fls(int x) +static inline int fls(int x) { int r; @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ static inline long fls(int x) * the libc and compiler builtin ffs routines, therefore * differs in spirit from the above ffz (man ffs). */ -static inline long ffs(int x) +static inline int ffs(int x) { int r; From f56aa68da4ade0f757ab7c05e09959c3c1687bbe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kai-Heng Feng Date: Tue, 11 Sep 2018 01:51:43 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 090/124] r8169: Clear RTL_FLAG_TASK_*_PENDING when clearing RTL_FLAG_TASK_ENABLED [ Upstream commit 6ad569019999300afd8e614d296fdc356550b77f ] After system suspend, sometimes the r8169 doesn't work when ethernet cable gets pluggued. This issue happens because rtl_reset_work() doesn't get called from rtl8169_runtime_resume(), after system suspend. In rtl_task(), RTL_FLAG_TASK_* only gets cleared if this condition is met: if (!netif_running(dev) || !test_bit(RTL_FLAG_TASK_ENABLED, tp->wk.flags)) ... If RTL_FLAG_TASK_ENABLED was cleared during system suspend while RTL_FLAG_TASK_RESET_PENDING was set, the next rtl_schedule_task() won't schedule task as the flag is still there. So in addition to clearing RTL_FLAG_TASK_ENABLED, also clears other flags. Cc: Heiner Kallweit Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c index d1ea2dfbe16f..c9aa42ca2b64 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c @@ -749,7 +749,7 @@ struct rtl8169_counters { }; enum rtl_flag { - RTL_FLAG_TASK_ENABLED, + RTL_FLAG_TASK_ENABLED = 0, RTL_FLAG_TASK_SLOW_PENDING, RTL_FLAG_TASK_RESET_PENDING, RTL_FLAG_TASK_PHY_PENDING, @@ -7523,7 +7523,8 @@ static int rtl8169_close(struct net_device *dev) rtl8169_update_counters(dev); rtl_lock_work(tp); - clear_bit(RTL_FLAG_TASK_ENABLED, tp->wk.flags); + /* Clear all task flags */ + bitmap_zero(tp->wk.flags, RTL_FLAG_MAX); rtl8169_down(dev); rtl_unlock_work(tp); @@ -7679,7 +7680,9 @@ static void rtl8169_net_suspend(struct net_device *dev) rtl_lock_work(tp); napi_disable(&tp->napi); - clear_bit(RTL_FLAG_TASK_ENABLED, tp->wk.flags); + /* Clear all task flags */ + bitmap_zero(tp->wk.flags, RTL_FLAG_MAX); + rtl_unlock_work(tp); rtl_pll_power_down(tp); From 50997bdef00b6a449e92c843cc4885fd96ef581e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julian Wiedmann Date: Wed, 12 Sep 2018 15:31:35 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 091/124] s390/qeth: don't dump past end of unknown HW header [ Upstream commit 0ac1487c4b2de383b91ecad1be561b8f7a2c15f4 ] For inbound data with an unsupported HW header format, only dump the actual HW header. We have no idea how much payload follows it, and what it contains. Worst case, we dump past the end of the Inbound Buffer and access whatever is located next in memory. Signed-off-by: Julian Wiedmann Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/s390/net/qeth_l2_main.c | 2 +- drivers/s390/net/qeth_l3_main.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/s390/net/qeth_l2_main.c b/drivers/s390/net/qeth_l2_main.c index 1405fe4c0c96..da8d94b27ec9 100644 --- a/drivers/s390/net/qeth_l2_main.c +++ b/drivers/s390/net/qeth_l2_main.c @@ -452,7 +452,7 @@ static int qeth_l2_process_inbound_buffer(struct qeth_card *card, default: dev_kfree_skb_any(skb); QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 3, "inbunkno"); - QETH_DBF_HEX(CTRL, 3, hdr, QETH_DBF_CTRL_LEN); + QETH_DBF_HEX(CTRL, 3, hdr, sizeof(*hdr)); continue; } work_done++; diff --git a/drivers/s390/net/qeth_l3_main.c b/drivers/s390/net/qeth_l3_main.c index 908c294aebae..f3a765655072 100644 --- a/drivers/s390/net/qeth_l3_main.c +++ b/drivers/s390/net/qeth_l3_main.c @@ -1993,7 +1993,7 @@ static int qeth_l3_process_inbound_buffer(struct qeth_card *card, default: dev_kfree_skb_any(skb); QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 3, "inbunkno"); - QETH_DBF_HEX(CTRL, 3, hdr, QETH_DBF_CTRL_LEN); + QETH_DBF_HEX(CTRL, 3, hdr, sizeof(*hdr)); continue; } work_done++; From fd51d7c1699b00a869d29eb6607bdfcc93d4c800 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Carpenter Date: Thu, 6 Sep 2018 12:47:01 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 092/124] cifs: read overflow in is_valid_oplock_break() [ Upstream commit 097f5863b1a0c9901f180bbd56ae7d630655faaa ] We need to verify that the "data_offset" is within bounds. Reported-by: Dr Silvio Cesare of InfoSect Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: Steve French Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/cifs/misc.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/cifs/misc.c b/fs/cifs/misc.c index eedbc34e19db..c8662e212afc 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/misc.c +++ b/fs/cifs/misc.c @@ -405,9 +405,17 @@ is_valid_oplock_break(char *buffer, struct TCP_Server_Info *srv) (struct smb_com_transaction_change_notify_rsp *)buf; struct file_notify_information *pnotify; __u32 data_offset = 0; + size_t len = srv->total_read - sizeof(pSMBr->hdr.smb_buf_length); + if (get_bcc(buf) > sizeof(struct file_notify_information)) { data_offset = le32_to_cpu(pSMBr->DataOffset); + if (data_offset > + len - sizeof(struct file_notify_information)) { + cifs_dbg(FYI, "invalid data_offset %u\n", + data_offset); + return true; + } pnotify = (struct file_notify_information *) ((char *)&pSMBr->hdr.Protocol + data_offset); cifs_dbg(FYI, "dnotify on %s Action: 0x%x\n", From f1cf612e3822e35b3ceb8731f62a3147b3f0cf35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vitaly Kuznetsov Date: Thu, 6 Sep 2018 13:26:08 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 093/124] xen/manage: don't complain about an empty value in control/sysrq node [ Upstream commit 87dffe86d406bee8782cac2db035acb9a28620a7 ] When guest receives a sysrq request from the host it acknowledges it by writing '\0' to control/sysrq xenstore node. This, however, make xenstore watch fire again but xenbus_scanf() fails to parse empty value with "%c" format string: sysrq: SysRq : Emergency Sync Emergency Sync complete xen:manage: Error -34 reading sysrq code in control/sysrq Ignore -ERANGE the same way we already ignore -ENOENT, empty value in control/sysrq is totally legal. Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov Reviewed-by: Wei Liu Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/xen/manage.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/xen/manage.c b/drivers/xen/manage.c index 77909a2c6723..101189fbf032 100644 --- a/drivers/xen/manage.c +++ b/drivers/xen/manage.c @@ -277,9 +277,11 @@ static void sysrq_handler(struct xenbus_watch *watch, const char **vec, /* * The Xenstore watch fires directly after registering it and * after a suspend/resume cycle. So ENOENT is no error but - * might happen in those cases. + * might happen in those cases. ERANGE is observed when we get + * an empty value (''), this happens when we acknowledge the + * request by writing '\0' below. */ - if (err != -ENOENT) + if (err != -ENOENT && err != -ERANGE) pr_err("Error %d reading sysrq code in control/sysrq\n", err); xenbus_transaction_end(xbt, 1); From b4f13b6865bd37ff0cfff399b733aa547e892b63 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Abraham Date: Wed, 12 Sep 2018 15:13:54 -1000 Subject: [PATCH 094/124] xen: fix GCC warning and remove duplicate EVTCHN_ROW/EVTCHN_COL usage MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 4dca864b59dd150a221730775e2f21f49779c135 ] This patch removes duplicate macro useage in events_base.c. It also fixes gcc warning: variable ‘col’ set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable] Signed-off-by: Joshua Abraham Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/xen/events/events_base.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c b/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c index f7297217b83c..da6f2b6b726c 100644 --- a/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c +++ b/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c @@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static int set_evtchn_to_irq(unsigned evtchn, unsigned irq) clear_evtchn_to_irq_row(row); } - evtchn_to_irq[EVTCHN_ROW(evtchn)][EVTCHN_COL(evtchn)] = irq; + evtchn_to_irq[row][col] = irq; return 0; } From ada05f73eecdc57f74525382a942ecc97fe48151 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Aurelien Aptel Date: Thu, 17 May 2018 16:35:07 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 095/124] smb2: fix missing files in root share directory listing commit 0595751f267994c3c7027377058e4185b3a28e75 upstream. When mounting a Windows share that is the root of a drive (eg. C$) the server does not return . and .. directory entries. This results in the smb2 code path erroneously skipping the 2 first entries. Pseudo-code of the readdir() code path: cifs_readdir(struct file, struct dir_context) initiate_cifs_search <-- if no reponse cached yet server->ops->query_dir_first dir_emit_dots dir_emit <-- adds "." and ".." if we're at pos=0 find_cifs_entry initiate_cifs_search <-- if pos < start of current response (restart search) server->ops->query_dir_next <-- if pos > end of current response (fetch next search res) for(...) <-- loops over cur response entries starting at pos cifs_filldir <-- skip . and .., emit entry cifs_fill_dirent dir_emit pos++ A) dir_emit_dots() always adds . & .. and sets the current dir pos to 2 (0 and 1 are done). Therefore we always want the index_to_find to be 2 regardless of if the response has . and .. B) smb1 code initializes index_of_last_entry with a +2 offset in cifssmb.c CIFSFindFirst(): psrch_inf->index_of_last_entry = 2 /* skip . and .. */ + psrch_inf->entries_in_buffer; Later in find_cifs_entry() we want to find the next dir entry at pos=2 as a result of (A) first_entry_in_buffer = cfile->srch_inf.index_of_last_entry - cfile->srch_inf.entries_in_buffer; This var is the dir pos that the first entry in the buffer will have therefore it must be 2 in the first call. If we don't offset index_of_last_entry by 2 (like in (B)), first_entry_in_buffer=0 but we were instructed to get pos=2 so this code in find_cifs_entry() skips the 2 first which is ok for non-root shares, as it skips . and .. from the response but is not ok for root shares where the 2 first are actual files pos_in_buf = index_to_find - first_entry_in_buffer; // pos_in_buf=2 // we skip 2 first response entries :( for (i = 0; (i < (pos_in_buf)) && (cur_ent != NULL); i++) { /* go entry by entry figuring out which is first */ cur_ent = nxt_dir_entry(cur_ent, end_of_smb, cfile->srch_inf.info_level); } C) cifs_filldir() skips . and .. so we can safely ignore them for now. Sample program: int main(int argc, char **argv) { const char *path = argc >= 2 ? argv[1] : "."; DIR *dh; struct dirent *de; printf("listing path <%s>\n", path); dh = opendir(path); if (!dh) { printf("opendir error %d\n", errno); return 1; } while (1) { de = readdir(dh); if (!de) { if (errno) { printf("readdir error %d\n", errno); return 1; } printf("end of listing\n"); break; } printf("off=%lu <%s>\n", de->d_off, de->d_name); } return 0; } Before the fix with SMB1 on root shares: <.> off=1 <..> off=2 <$Recycle.Bin> off=3 off=4 and on non-root shares: <.> off=1 <..> off=4 <-- after adding .., the offsets jumps to +2 because <2536> off=5 we skipped . and .. from response buffer (C) <411> off=6 but still incremented pos off=7 off=8 Therefore the fix for smb2 is to mimic smb1 behaviour and offset the index_of_last_entry by 2. Test results comparing smb1 and smb2 before/after the fix on root share, non-root shares and on large directories (ie. multi-response dir listing): PRE FIX ======= pre-1-root VS pre-2-root: ERR pre-2-root is missing [bootmgr, $Recycle.Bin] pre-1-nonroot VS pre-2-nonroot: OK~ same files, same order, different offsets pre-1-nonroot-large VS pre-2-nonroot-large: OK~ same files, same order, different offsets POST FIX ======== post-1-root VS post-2-root: OK same files, same order, same offsets post-1-nonroot VS post-2-nonroot: OK same files, same order, same offsets post-1-nonroot-large VS post-2-nonroot-large: OK same files, same order, same offsets REGRESSION? =========== pre-1-root VS post-1-root: OK same files, same order, same offsets pre-1-nonroot VS post-1-nonroot: OK same files, same order, same offsets BugLink: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13107 Signed-off-by: Aurelien Aptel Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg Signed-off-by: Steve French CC: Stable Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/cifs/smb2ops.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c b/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c index d23a41652b4c..6796ca994d64 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c +++ b/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c @@ -847,7 +847,7 @@ smb2_query_dir_first(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon, } srch_inf->entries_in_buffer = 0; - srch_inf->index_of_last_entry = 0; + srch_inf->index_of_last_entry = 2; rc = SMB2_query_directory(xid, tcon, fid->persistent_fid, fid->volatile_fid, 0, srch_inf); From 1b42ccdcee9158005140812fa6ec8d34e0a69b27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Leonard Crestez Date: Fri, 21 Sep 2018 18:03:18 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 096/124] crypto: mxs-dcp - Fix wait logic on chan threads commit d80771c08363ad7fbf0f56f5301e7ca65065c582 upstream. When compiling with CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP=y the mxs-dcp driver prints warnings such as: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 120 at kernel/sched/core.c:7736 __might_sleep+0x98/0x9c do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING; state=1 set at [<8081978c>] dcp_chan_thread_sha+0x3c/0x2ec The problem is that blocking ops will manipulate current->state themselves so it is not allowed to call them between set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE) and schedule(). Fix this by converting the per-chan mutex to a spinlock (it only protects tiny list ops anyway) and rearranging the wait logic so that callbacks are called current->state as TASK_RUNNING. Those callbacks will indeed call blocking ops themselves so this is required. Cc: Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c b/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c index b5f7e6db24d4..e94857e56c70 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ struct dcp { struct dcp_coherent_block *coh; struct completion completion[DCP_MAX_CHANS]; - struct mutex mutex[DCP_MAX_CHANS]; + spinlock_t lock[DCP_MAX_CHANS]; struct task_struct *thread[DCP_MAX_CHANS]; struct crypto_queue queue[DCP_MAX_CHANS]; }; @@ -349,13 +349,20 @@ static int dcp_chan_thread_aes(void *data) int ret; - do { - __set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE); + while (!kthread_should_stop()) { + set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE); - mutex_lock(&sdcp->mutex[chan]); + spin_lock(&sdcp->lock[chan]); backlog = crypto_get_backlog(&sdcp->queue[chan]); arq = crypto_dequeue_request(&sdcp->queue[chan]); - mutex_unlock(&sdcp->mutex[chan]); + spin_unlock(&sdcp->lock[chan]); + + if (!backlog && !arq) { + schedule(); + continue; + } + + set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING); if (backlog) backlog->complete(backlog, -EINPROGRESS); @@ -363,11 +370,8 @@ static int dcp_chan_thread_aes(void *data) if (arq) { ret = mxs_dcp_aes_block_crypt(arq); arq->complete(arq, ret); - continue; } - - schedule(); - } while (!kthread_should_stop()); + } return 0; } @@ -407,9 +411,9 @@ static int mxs_dcp_aes_enqueue(struct ablkcipher_request *req, int enc, int ecb) rctx->ecb = ecb; actx->chan = DCP_CHAN_CRYPTO; - mutex_lock(&sdcp->mutex[actx->chan]); + spin_lock(&sdcp->lock[actx->chan]); ret = crypto_enqueue_request(&sdcp->queue[actx->chan], &req->base); - mutex_unlock(&sdcp->mutex[actx->chan]); + spin_unlock(&sdcp->lock[actx->chan]); wake_up_process(sdcp->thread[actx->chan]); @@ -645,13 +649,20 @@ static int dcp_chan_thread_sha(void *data) struct ahash_request *req; int ret, fini; - do { - __set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE); + while (!kthread_should_stop()) { + set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE); - mutex_lock(&sdcp->mutex[chan]); + spin_lock(&sdcp->lock[chan]); backlog = crypto_get_backlog(&sdcp->queue[chan]); arq = crypto_dequeue_request(&sdcp->queue[chan]); - mutex_unlock(&sdcp->mutex[chan]); + spin_unlock(&sdcp->lock[chan]); + + if (!backlog && !arq) { + schedule(); + continue; + } + + set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING); if (backlog) backlog->complete(backlog, -EINPROGRESS); @@ -663,12 +674,8 @@ static int dcp_chan_thread_sha(void *data) ret = dcp_sha_req_to_buf(arq); fini = rctx->fini; arq->complete(arq, ret); - if (!fini) - continue; } - - schedule(); - } while (!kthread_should_stop()); + } return 0; } @@ -726,9 +733,9 @@ static int dcp_sha_update_fx(struct ahash_request *req, int fini) rctx->init = 1; } - mutex_lock(&sdcp->mutex[actx->chan]); + spin_lock(&sdcp->lock[actx->chan]); ret = crypto_enqueue_request(&sdcp->queue[actx->chan], &req->base); - mutex_unlock(&sdcp->mutex[actx->chan]); + spin_unlock(&sdcp->lock[actx->chan]); wake_up_process(sdcp->thread[actx->chan]); mutex_unlock(&actx->mutex); @@ -984,7 +991,7 @@ static int mxs_dcp_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) platform_set_drvdata(pdev, sdcp); for (i = 0; i < DCP_MAX_CHANS; i++) { - mutex_init(&sdcp->mutex[i]); + spin_lock_init(&sdcp->lock[i]); init_completion(&sdcp->completion[i]); crypto_init_queue(&sdcp->queue[i], 50); } From 1c07a7cc5ce3f15398c470e661310588565fd5db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ashish Samant Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2018 15:52:15 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 097/124] ocfs2: fix locking for res->tracking and dlm->tracking_list commit cbe355f57c8074bc4f452e5b6e35509044c6fa23 upstream. In dlm_init_lockres() we access and modify res->tracking and dlm->tracking_list without holding dlm->track_lock. This can cause list corruptions and can end up in kernel panic. Fix this by locking res->tracking and dlm->tracking_list with dlm->track_lock instead of dlm->spinlock. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1529951192-4686-1-git-send-email-ashish.samant@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Ashish Samant Reviewed-by: Changwei Ge Acked-by: Joseph Qi Acked-by: Jun Piao Cc: Mark Fasheh Cc: Joel Becker Cc: Junxiao Bi Cc: Changwei Ge Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmmaster.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmmaster.c b/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmmaster.c index d14b28e832a7..2e49c35d7a9b 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmmaster.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmmaster.c @@ -599,9 +599,9 @@ static void dlm_init_lockres(struct dlm_ctxt *dlm, res->last_used = 0; - spin_lock(&dlm->spinlock); + spin_lock(&dlm->track_lock); list_add_tail(&res->tracking, &dlm->tracking_list); - spin_unlock(&dlm->spinlock); + spin_unlock(&dlm->track_lock); memset(res->lvb, 0, DLM_LVB_LEN); memset(res->refmap, 0, sizeof(res->refmap)); From 8c6fbba67e9c7ff7db7bc4fa3de80e7e05fab88c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mike Snitzer Date: Thu, 13 Sep 2018 21:16:20 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 098/124] dm thin metadata: fix __udivdi3 undefined on 32-bit commit 013ad043906b2befd4a9bfb06219ed9fedd92716 upstream. sector_div() is only viable for use with sector_t. dm_block_t is typedef'd to uint64_t -- so use div_u64() instead. Fixes: 3ab918281 ("dm thin metadata: try to avoid ever aborting transactions") Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer Cc: Sudip Mukherjee Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/md/dm-thin-metadata.c | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-thin-metadata.c b/drivers/md/dm-thin-metadata.c index 096de9433da2..d8eb8655925b 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm-thin-metadata.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm-thin-metadata.c @@ -840,10 +840,8 @@ static void __set_metadata_reserve(struct dm_pool_metadata *pmd) if (r) { DMERR("could not get size of metadata device"); pmd->metadata_reserve = max_blocks; - } else { - sector_div(total, 10); - pmd->metadata_reserve = min(max_blocks, total); - } + } else + pmd->metadata_reserve = min(max_blocks, div_u64(total, 10)); } struct dm_pool_metadata *dm_pool_metadata_open(struct block_device *bdev, From 685adc73d6118863b385cd7084ecde7cd805b0a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Linus Torvalds Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2016 11:22:00 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 099/124] Make file credentials available to the seqfile interfaces commit 34dbbcdbf63360661ff7bda6c5f52f99ac515f92 upstream. A lot of seqfile users seem to be using things like %pK that uses the credentials of the current process, but that is actually completely wrong for filesystem interfaces. The unix semantics for permission checking files is to check permissions at _open_ time, not at read or write time, and that is not just a small detail: passing off stdin/stdout/stderr to a suid application and making the actual IO happen in privileged context is a classic exploit technique. So if we want to be able to look at permissions at read time, we need to use the file open credentials, not the current ones. Normal file accesses can just use "f_cred" (or any of the helper functions that do that, like file_ns_capable()), but the seqfile interfaces do not have any such options. It turns out that seq_file _does_ save away the user_ns information of the file, though. Since user_ns is just part of the full credential information, replace that special case with saving off the cred pointer instead, and suddenly seq_file has all the permission information it needs. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Cc: Jann Horn Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/seq_file.c | 7 ++++--- include/linux/seq_file.h | 13 ++++--------- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/seq_file.c b/fs/seq_file.c index fbb1688bff87..8f393353880b 100644 --- a/fs/seq_file.c +++ b/fs/seq_file.c @@ -69,9 +69,10 @@ int seq_open(struct file *file, const struct seq_operations *op) memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p)); mutex_init(&p->lock); p->op = op; -#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS - p->user_ns = file->f_cred->user_ns; -#endif + + // No refcounting: the lifetime of 'p' is constrained + // to the lifetime of the file. + p->file = file; /* * Wrappers around seq_open(e.g. swaps_open) need to be diff --git a/include/linux/seq_file.h b/include/linux/seq_file.h index 52e0097f61f0..8f5b241932ee 100644 --- a/include/linux/seq_file.h +++ b/include/linux/seq_file.h @@ -7,13 +7,10 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include struct seq_operations; -struct file; -struct path; -struct inode; -struct dentry; -struct user_namespace; struct seq_file { char *buf; @@ -27,9 +24,7 @@ struct seq_file { struct mutex lock; const struct seq_operations *op; int poll_event; -#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS - struct user_namespace *user_ns; -#endif + const struct file *file; void *private; }; @@ -151,7 +146,7 @@ int seq_put_decimal_ll(struct seq_file *m, char delimiter, static inline struct user_namespace *seq_user_ns(struct seq_file *seq) { #ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS - return seq->user_ns; + return seq->file->f_cred->user_ns; #else extern struct user_namespace init_user_ns; return &init_user_ns; From 01f7e0293f214aece9c56151d8b91fa516063833 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Han Xu Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2015 13:18:28 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 100/124] mtd: fsl-quadspi: fix macro collision problems with READ/WRITE commit 04850c4d8613127a9b488321c0ad83bff7519311 upstream. Change the READ/WRITE to FSL_READ/FSL_WRITE to resolve any possible namespace collisions with READ/WRITE macros (e.g., from ). Problems have been seen, for example, on mips: >> drivers/mtd/spi-nor/fsl-quadspi.c:186:5: error: 'LUT_0' undeclared (first use in this function) ((LUT_##ins) << INSTR0_SHIFT)) ^ >> drivers/mtd/spi-nor/fsl-quadspi.c:188:30: note: in expansion of macro 'LUT0' On SPARC: drivers/mtd/spi-nor/fsl-quadspi.c: In function 'fsl_qspi_init_lut': drivers/mtd/spi-nor/fsl-quadspi.c:369:1: error: 'LUT_0' undeclared (first use in this function) drivers/mtd/spi-nor/fsl-quadspi.c:418:1: error: pasting "LUT_" and "(" does not give a valid preprocessing token drivers/mtd/spi-nor/fsl-quadspi.c:418:2: error: implicit declaration of function 'LUT_' And surely on others. Fixes: d26a22d06708 ("mtd: fsl-quadspi: allow building for other ARCHes with COMPILE_TEST") Reported-by: Guenter Roeck Reported-by: kbuild test robot Signed-off-by: Han Xu [Brian: rewrote commit description] Signed-off-by: Brian Norris Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/mtd/spi-nor/fsl-quadspi.c | 20 ++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/mtd/spi-nor/fsl-quadspi.c b/drivers/mtd/spi-nor/fsl-quadspi.c index d5269a26c839..56d39f2b22ce 100644 --- a/drivers/mtd/spi-nor/fsl-quadspi.c +++ b/drivers/mtd/spi-nor/fsl-quadspi.c @@ -138,15 +138,15 @@ #define LUT_MODE 4 #define LUT_MODE2 5 #define LUT_MODE4 6 -#define LUT_READ 7 -#define LUT_WRITE 8 +#define LUT_FSL_READ 7 +#define LUT_FSL_WRITE 8 #define LUT_JMP_ON_CS 9 #define LUT_ADDR_DDR 10 #define LUT_MODE_DDR 11 #define LUT_MODE2_DDR 12 #define LUT_MODE4_DDR 13 -#define LUT_READ_DDR 14 -#define LUT_WRITE_DDR 15 +#define LUT_FSL_READ_DDR 14 +#define LUT_FSL_WRITE_DDR 15 #define LUT_DATA_LEARN 16 /* @@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ static void fsl_qspi_init_lut(struct fsl_qspi *q) writel(LUT0(CMD, PAD1, cmd) | LUT1(ADDR, PAD1, addrlen), base + QUADSPI_LUT(lut_base)); - writel(LUT0(DUMMY, PAD1, dummy) | LUT1(READ, PAD4, rxfifo), + writel(LUT0(DUMMY, PAD1, dummy) | LUT1(FSL_READ, PAD4, rxfifo), base + QUADSPI_LUT(lut_base + 1)); /* Write enable */ @@ -327,11 +327,11 @@ static void fsl_qspi_init_lut(struct fsl_qspi *q) writel(LUT0(CMD, PAD1, cmd) | LUT1(ADDR, PAD1, addrlen), base + QUADSPI_LUT(lut_base)); - writel(LUT0(WRITE, PAD1, 0), base + QUADSPI_LUT(lut_base + 1)); + writel(LUT0(FSL_WRITE, PAD1, 0), base + QUADSPI_LUT(lut_base + 1)); /* Read Status */ lut_base = SEQID_RDSR * 4; - writel(LUT0(CMD, PAD1, SPINOR_OP_RDSR) | LUT1(READ, PAD1, 0x1), + writel(LUT0(CMD, PAD1, SPINOR_OP_RDSR) | LUT1(FSL_READ, PAD1, 0x1), base + QUADSPI_LUT(lut_base)); /* Erase a sector */ @@ -356,17 +356,17 @@ static void fsl_qspi_init_lut(struct fsl_qspi *q) /* READ ID */ lut_base = SEQID_RDID * 4; - writel(LUT0(CMD, PAD1, SPINOR_OP_RDID) | LUT1(READ, PAD1, 0x8), + writel(LUT0(CMD, PAD1, SPINOR_OP_RDID) | LUT1(FSL_READ, PAD1, 0x8), base + QUADSPI_LUT(lut_base)); /* Write Register */ lut_base = SEQID_WRSR * 4; - writel(LUT0(CMD, PAD1, SPINOR_OP_WRSR) | LUT1(WRITE, PAD1, 0x2), + writel(LUT0(CMD, PAD1, SPINOR_OP_WRSR) | LUT1(FSL_WRITE, PAD1, 0x2), base + QUADSPI_LUT(lut_base)); /* Read Configuration Register */ lut_base = SEQID_RDCR * 4; - writel(LUT0(CMD, PAD1, SPINOR_OP_RDCR) | LUT1(READ, PAD1, 0x1), + writel(LUT0(CMD, PAD1, SPINOR_OP_RDCR) | LUT1(FSL_READ, PAD1, 0x1), base + QUADSPI_LUT(lut_base)); /* Write disable */ From ea20fab573d999205f8b1438d792486dcf76aa4c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jann Horn Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2018 15:51:58 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 101/124] proc: restrict kernel stack dumps to root commit f8a00cef17206ecd1b30d3d9f99e10d9fa707aa7 upstream. Currently, you can use /proc/self/task/*/stack to cause a stack walk on a task you control while it is running on another CPU. That means that the stack can change under the stack walker. The stack walker does have guards against going completely off the rails and into random kernel memory, but it can interpret random data from your kernel stack as instruction pointers and stack pointers. This can cause exposure of kernel stack contents to userspace. Restrict the ability to inspect kernel stacks of arbitrary tasks to root in order to prevent a local attacker from exploiting racy stack unwinding to leak kernel task stack contents. See the added comment for a longer rationale. There don't seem to be any users of this userspace API that can't gracefully bail out if reading from the file fails. Therefore, I believe that this change is unlikely to break things. In the case that this patch does end up needing a revert, the next-best solution might be to fake a single-entry stack based on wchan. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180927153316.200286-1-jannh@google.com Fixes: 2ec220e27f50 ("proc: add /proc/*/stack") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn Acked-by: Kees Cook Cc: Alexey Dobriyan Cc: Ken Chen Cc: Will Deacon Cc: Laura Abbott Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Catalin Marinas Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/proc/base.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index 71e586465168..c6ab2e709783 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -279,6 +279,20 @@ static int proc_pid_stack(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, int err; int i; + /* + * The ability to racily run the kernel stack unwinder on a running task + * and then observe the unwinder output is scary; while it is useful for + * debugging kernel issues, it can also allow an attacker to leak kernel + * stack contents. + * Doing this in a manner that is at least safe from races would require + * some work to ensure that the remote task can not be scheduled; and + * even then, this would still expose the unwinder as local attack + * surface. + * Therefore, this interface is restricted to root. + */ + if (!file_ns_capable(m->file, &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EACCES; + entries = kmalloc(MAX_STACK_TRACE_DEPTH * sizeof(*entries), GFP_KERNEL); if (!entries) return -ENOMEM; From 39e616e07470aeacac6a5158cd093dd3d35f0fbb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tomi Valkeinen Date: Wed, 26 Sep 2018 18:11:22 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 102/124] fbdev/omapfb: fix omapfb_memory_read infoleak commit 1bafcbf59fed92af58955024452f45430d3898c5 upstream. OMAPFB_MEMORY_READ ioctl reads pixels from the LCD's memory and copies them to a userspace buffer. The code has two issues: - The user provided width and height could be large enough to overflow the calculations - The copy_to_user() can copy uninitialized memory to the userspace, which might contain sensitive kernel information. Fix these by limiting the width & height parameters, and only copying the amount of data that we actually received from the LCD. Signed-off-by: Tomi Valkeinen Reported-by: Jann Horn Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: security@kernel.org Cc: Will Deacon Cc: Jann Horn Cc: Tony Lindgren Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/video/fbdev/omap2/omapfb/omapfb-ioctl.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/omap2/omapfb/omapfb-ioctl.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/omap2/omapfb/omapfb-ioctl.c index 146b6f5428db..2dbd5687c453 100644 --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/omap2/omapfb/omapfb-ioctl.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/omap2/omapfb/omapfb-ioctl.c @@ -493,6 +493,9 @@ static int omapfb_memory_read(struct fb_info *fbi, if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, mr->buffer, mr->buffer_size)) return -EFAULT; + if (mr->w > 4096 || mr->h > 4096) + return -EINVAL; + if (mr->w * mr->h * 3 > mr->buffer_size) return -EINVAL; @@ -506,7 +509,7 @@ static int omapfb_memory_read(struct fb_info *fbi, mr->x, mr->y, mr->w, mr->h); if (r > 0) { - if (copy_to_user(mr->buffer, buf, mr->buffer_size)) + if (copy_to_user(mr->buffer, buf, r)) r = -EFAULT; } From 430d094da434246199406b48ea1d17e7cdc532f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andy Lutomirski Date: Mon, 1 Oct 2018 12:52:15 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 103/124] x86/vdso: Fix asm constraints on vDSO syscall fallbacks commit 715bd9d12f84d8f5cc8ad21d888f9bc304a8eb0b upstream. The syscall fallbacks in the vDSO have incorrect asm constraints. They are not marked as writing to their outputs -- instead, they are marked as clobbering "memory", which is useless. In particular, gcc is smart enough to know that the timespec parameter hasn't escaped, so a memory clobber doesn't clobber it. And passing a pointer as an asm *input* does not tell gcc that the pointed-to value is changed. Add in the fact that the asm instructions weren't volatile, and gcc was free to omit them entirely unless their sole output (the return value) is used. Which it is (phew!), but that stops happening with some upcoming patches. As a trivial example, the following code: void test_fallback(struct timespec *ts) { vdso_fallback_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, ts); } compiles to: 00000000000000c0 : c0: c3 retq To add insult to injury, the RCX and R11 clobbers on 64-bit builds were missing. The "memory" clobber is also unnecessary -- no ordering with respect to other memory operations is needed, but that's going to be fixed in a separate not-for-stable patch. Fixes: 2aae950b21e4 ("x86_64: Add vDSO for x86-64 with gettimeofday/clock_gettime/getcpu") Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/2c0231690551989d2fafa60ed0e7b5cc8b403908.1538422295.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/vdso/vclock_gettime.c | 18 ++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/vdso/vclock_gettime.c b/arch/x86/vdso/vclock_gettime.c index 9793322751e0..4fef19cce4bb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/vdso/vclock_gettime.c +++ b/arch/x86/vdso/vclock_gettime.c @@ -46,8 +46,9 @@ static notrace cycle_t vread_hpet(void) notrace static long vdso_fallback_gettime(long clock, struct timespec *ts) { long ret; - asm("syscall" : "=a" (ret) : - "0" (__NR_clock_gettime), "D" (clock), "S" (ts) : "memory"); + asm ("syscall" : "=a" (ret), "=m" (*ts) : + "0" (__NR_clock_gettime), "D" (clock), "S" (ts) : + "memory", "rcx", "r11"); return ret; } @@ -55,8 +56,9 @@ notrace static long vdso_fallback_gtod(struct timeval *tv, struct timezone *tz) { long ret; - asm("syscall" : "=a" (ret) : - "0" (__NR_gettimeofday), "D" (tv), "S" (tz) : "memory"); + asm ("syscall" : "=a" (ret), "=m" (*tv), "=m" (*tz) : + "0" (__NR_gettimeofday), "D" (tv), "S" (tz) : + "memory", "rcx", "r11"); return ret; } @@ -136,12 +138,12 @@ notrace static long vdso_fallback_gettime(long clock, struct timespec *ts) { long ret; - asm( + asm ( "mov %%ebx, %%edx \n" "mov %2, %%ebx \n" "call __kernel_vsyscall \n" "mov %%edx, %%ebx \n" - : "=a" (ret) + : "=a" (ret), "=m" (*ts) : "0" (__NR_clock_gettime), "g" (clock), "c" (ts) : "memory", "edx"); return ret; @@ -151,12 +153,12 @@ notrace static long vdso_fallback_gtod(struct timeval *tv, struct timezone *tz) { long ret; - asm( + asm ( "mov %%ebx, %%edx \n" "mov %2, %%ebx \n" "call __kernel_vsyscall \n" "mov %%edx, %%ebx \n" - : "=a" (ret) + : "=a" (ret), "=m" (*tv), "=m" (*tz) : "0" (__NR_gettimeofday), "g" (tv), "c" (tz) : "memory", "edx"); return ret; From b1f378d8378c9c05548e7e7ddd9c65894d482afa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andy Lutomirski Date: Wed, 3 Oct 2018 16:23:49 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 104/124] x86/vdso: Fix vDSO syscall fallback asm constraint regression commit 02e425668f5c9deb42787d10001a3b605993ad15 upstream. When I added the missing memory outputs, I failed to update the index of the first argument (ebx) on 32-bit builds, which broke the fallbacks. Somehow I must have screwed up my testing or gotten lucky. Add another test to cover gettimeofday() as well. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 715bd9d12f84 ("x86/vdso: Fix asm constraints on vDSO syscall fallbacks") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/21bd45ab04b6d838278fa5bebfa9163eceffa13c.1538608971.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/vdso/vclock_gettime.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/vdso/vclock_gettime.c b/arch/x86/vdso/vclock_gettime.c index 4fef19cce4bb..5360c6591b8e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/vdso/vclock_gettime.c +++ b/arch/x86/vdso/vclock_gettime.c @@ -140,11 +140,11 @@ notrace static long vdso_fallback_gettime(long clock, struct timespec *ts) asm ( "mov %%ebx, %%edx \n" - "mov %2, %%ebx \n" + "mov %[clock], %%ebx \n" "call __kernel_vsyscall \n" "mov %%edx, %%ebx \n" : "=a" (ret), "=m" (*ts) - : "0" (__NR_clock_gettime), "g" (clock), "c" (ts) + : "0" (__NR_clock_gettime), [clock] "g" (clock), "c" (ts) : "memory", "edx"); return ret; } @@ -155,11 +155,11 @@ notrace static long vdso_fallback_gtod(struct timeval *tv, struct timezone *tz) asm ( "mov %%ebx, %%edx \n" - "mov %2, %%ebx \n" + "mov %[tv], %%ebx \n" "call __kernel_vsyscall \n" "mov %%edx, %%ebx \n" : "=a" (ret), "=m" (*tv), "=m" (*tz) - : "0" (__NR_gettimeofday), "g" (tv), "c" (tz) + : "0" (__NR_gettimeofday), [tv] "g" (tv), "c" (tz) : "memory", "edx"); return ret; } From 8858d0c43629bb7ac78f9ecd35e447c4a7f79edb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Drake Date: Thu, 27 Sep 2018 15:47:33 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 105/124] PCI: Reprogram bridge prefetch registers on resume commit 083874549fdfefa629dfa752785e20427dde1511 upstream. On 38+ Intel-based ASUS products, the NVIDIA GPU becomes unusable after S3 suspend/resume. The affected products include multiple generations of NVIDIA GPUs and Intel SoCs. After resume, nouveau logs many errors such as: fifo: fault 00 [READ] at 0000005555555000 engine 00 [GR] client 04 [HUB/FE] reason 4a [] on channel -1 [007fa91000 unknown] DRM: failed to idle channel 0 [DRM] Similarly, the NVIDIA proprietary driver also fails after resume (black screen, 100% CPU usage in Xorg process). We shipped a sample to NVIDIA for diagnosis, and their response indicated that it's a problem with the parent PCI bridge (on the Intel SoC), not the GPU. Runtime suspend/resume works fine, only S3 suspend is affected. We found a workaround: on resume, rewrite the Intel PCI bridge 'Prefetchable Base Upper 32 Bits' register (PCI_PREF_BASE_UPPER32). In the cases that I checked, this register has value 0 and we just have to rewrite that value. Linux already saves and restores PCI config space during suspend/resume, but this register was being skipped because upon resume, it already has value 0 (the correct, pre-suspend value). Intel appear to have previously acknowledged this behaviour and the requirement to rewrite this register: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116851#c23 Based on that, rewrite the prefetch register values even when that appears unnecessary. We have confirmed this solution on all the affected models we have in-hands (X542UQ, UX533FD, X530UN, V272UN). Additionally, this solves an issue where r8169 MSI-X interrupts were broken after S3 suspend/resume on ASUS X441UAR. This issue was recently worked around in commit 7bb05b85bc2d ("r8169: don't use MSI-X on RTL8106e"). It also fixes the same issue on RTL6186evl/8111evl on an Aimfor-tech laptop that we had not yet patched. I suspect it will also fix the issue that was worked around in commit 7c53a722459c ("r8169: don't use MSI-X on RTL8168g"). Thomas Martitz reports that this change also solves an issue where the AMD Radeon Polaris 10 GPU on the HP Zbook 14u G5 is unresponsive after S3 suspend/resume. Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=201069 Signed-off-by: Daniel Drake Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas Reviewed-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Reviewed-By: Peter Wu CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/pci/pci.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci.c b/drivers/pci/pci.c index 1563cfadeaef..95521b82eaa7 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/pci.c +++ b/drivers/pci/pci.c @@ -1023,12 +1023,12 @@ int pci_save_state(struct pci_dev *dev) EXPORT_SYMBOL(pci_save_state); static void pci_restore_config_dword(struct pci_dev *pdev, int offset, - u32 saved_val, int retry) + u32 saved_val, int retry, bool force) { u32 val; pci_read_config_dword(pdev, offset, &val); - if (val == saved_val) + if (!force && val == saved_val) return; for (;;) { @@ -1047,25 +1047,36 @@ static void pci_restore_config_dword(struct pci_dev *pdev, int offset, } static void pci_restore_config_space_range(struct pci_dev *pdev, - int start, int end, int retry) + int start, int end, int retry, + bool force) { int index; for (index = end; index >= start; index--) pci_restore_config_dword(pdev, 4 * index, pdev->saved_config_space[index], - retry); + retry, force); } static void pci_restore_config_space(struct pci_dev *pdev) { if (pdev->hdr_type == PCI_HEADER_TYPE_NORMAL) { - pci_restore_config_space_range(pdev, 10, 15, 0); + pci_restore_config_space_range(pdev, 10, 15, 0, false); /* Restore BARs before the command register. */ - pci_restore_config_space_range(pdev, 4, 9, 10); - pci_restore_config_space_range(pdev, 0, 3, 0); + pci_restore_config_space_range(pdev, 4, 9, 10, false); + pci_restore_config_space_range(pdev, 0, 3, 0, false); + } else if (pdev->hdr_type == PCI_HEADER_TYPE_BRIDGE) { + pci_restore_config_space_range(pdev, 12, 15, 0, false); + + /* + * Force rewriting of prefetch registers to avoid S3 resume + * issues on Intel PCI bridges that occur when these + * registers are not explicitly written. + */ + pci_restore_config_space_range(pdev, 9, 11, 0, true); + pci_restore_config_space_range(pdev, 0, 8, 0, false); } else { - pci_restore_config_space_range(pdev, 0, 15, 0); + pci_restore_config_space_range(pdev, 0, 15, 0, false); } } From 726063c5d051b819bab6fc12bf5022337577b6e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Felix Fietkau Date: Sat, 29 Sep 2018 16:01:58 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 106/124] mac80211: fix setting IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_RX_MGMT for AP mode keys commit 211710ca74adf790b46ab3867fcce8047b573cd1 upstream. key->sta is only valid after ieee80211_key_link, which is called later in this function. Because of that, the IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_RX_MGMT is never set when management frame protection is enabled. Fixes: e548c49e6dc6b ("mac80211: add key flag for management keys") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/mac80211/cfg.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/mac80211/cfg.c b/net/mac80211/cfg.c index 9d224151f639..6ba5240dd61d 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/cfg.c +++ b/net/mac80211/cfg.c @@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ static int ieee80211_add_key(struct wiphy *wiphy, struct net_device *dev, case NL80211_IFTYPE_AP: case NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN: /* Keys without a station are used for TX only */ - if (key->sta && test_sta_flag(key->sta, WLAN_STA_MFP)) + if (sta && test_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_MFP)) key->conf.flags |= IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_RX_MGMT; break; case NL80211_IFTYPE_ADHOC: From d9e61bdd84b279ec94207ed335de5991ffd384d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" Date: Thu, 4 Oct 2018 11:08:12 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 107/124] PM / core: Clear the direct_complete flag on errors commit 69e445ab8b66a9f30519842ef18be555d3ee9b51 upstream. If __device_suspend() runs asynchronously (in which case the device passed to it is in dpm_suspended_list at that point) and it returns early on an error or pending wakeup, and the power.direct_complete flag has been set for the device already, the subsequent device_resume() will be confused by that and it will call pm_runtime_enable() incorrectly, as runtime PM has not been disabled for the device by __device_suspend(). To avoid that, clear power.direct_complete if __device_suspend() is not going to disable runtime PM for the device before returning. Fixes: aae4518b3124 (PM / sleep: Mechanism to avoid resuming runtime-suspended devices unnecessarily) Reported-by: Al Cooper Tested-by: Al Cooper Reviewed-by: Ulf Hansson Cc: 3.16+ # 3.16+ Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/base/power/main.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/base/power/main.c b/drivers/base/power/main.c index 508a8f67c028..951b23d02a68 100644 --- a/drivers/base/power/main.c +++ b/drivers/base/power/main.c @@ -1341,8 +1341,10 @@ static int __device_suspend(struct device *dev, pm_message_t state, bool async) dpm_wait_for_children(dev, async); - if (async_error) + if (async_error) { + dev->power.direct_complete = false; goto Complete; + } /* * If a device configured to wake up the system from sleep states @@ -1354,6 +1356,7 @@ static int __device_suspend(struct device *dev, pm_message_t state, bool async) pm_wakeup_event(dev, 0); if (pm_wakeup_pending()) { + dev->power.direct_complete = false; async_error = -EBUSY; goto Complete; } From 974abf888c6a227b3578737ec925872e19b70baf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hovold Date: Mon, 24 Sep 2018 15:28:10 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 108/124] USB: serial: simple: add Motorola Tetra MTP6550 id commit f5fad711c06e652f90f581fc7c2caee327c33d31 upstream. Add device-id for the Motorola Tetra radio MTP6550. Bus 001 Device 004: ID 0cad:9012 Motorola CGISS Device Descriptor: bLength 18 bDescriptorType 1 bcdUSB 2.00 bDeviceClass 0 (Defined at Interface level) bDeviceSubClass 0 bDeviceProtocol 0 bMaxPacketSize0 64 idVendor 0x0cad Motorola CGISS idProduct 0x9012 bcdDevice 24.16 iManufacturer 1 Motorola Solutions, Inc. iProduct 2 TETRA PEI interface iSerial 0 bNumConfigurations 1 Configuration Descriptor: bLength 9 bDescriptorType 2 wTotalLength 55 bNumInterfaces 2 bConfigurationValue 1 iConfiguration 3 Generic Serial config bmAttributes 0x80 (Bus Powered) MaxPower 500mA Interface Descriptor: bLength 9 bDescriptorType 4 bInterfaceNumber 0 bAlternateSetting 0 bNumEndpoints 2 bInterfaceClass 255 Vendor Specific Class bInterfaceSubClass 0 bInterfaceProtocol 0 iInterface 0 Endpoint Descriptor: bLength 7 bDescriptorType 5 bEndpointAddress 0x81 EP 1 IN bmAttributes 2 Transfer Type Bulk Synch Type None Usage Type Data wMaxPacketSize 0x0200 1x 512 bytes bInterval 0 Endpoint Descriptor: bLength 7 bDescriptorType 5 bEndpointAddress 0x01 EP 1 OUT bmAttributes 2 Transfer Type Bulk Synch Type None Usage Type Data wMaxPacketSize 0x0200 1x 512 bytes Interface Descriptor: bLength 9 bDescriptorType 4 bInterfaceNumber 1 bAlternateSetting 0 bNumEndpoints 2 bInterfaceClass 255 Vendor Specific Class bInterfaceSubClass 0 bInterfaceProtocol 0 iInterface 0 Endpoint Descriptor: bLength 7 bDescriptorType 5 bEndpointAddress 0x82 EP 2 IN bmAttributes 2 Transfer Type Bulk Synch Type None Usage Type Data wMaxPacketSize 0x0200 1x 512 bytes bInterval 0 Endpoint Descriptor: bLength 7 bDescriptorType 5 bEndpointAddress 0x02 EP 2 OUT bmAttributes 2 Transfer Type Bulk Synch Type None Usage Type Data wMaxPacketSize 0x0200 1x 512 bytes bInterval 0 Device Qualifier (for other device speed): bLength 10 bDescriptorType 6 bcdUSB 2.00 bDeviceClass 0 (Defined at Interface level) bDeviceSubClass 0 bDeviceProtocol 0 bMaxPacketSize0 64 bNumConfigurations 1 Device Status: 0x0000 (Bus Powered) Reported-by: Hans Hult Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/serial/usb-serial-simple.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/usb-serial-simple.c b/drivers/usb/serial/usb-serial-simple.c index 35f6b121f9d8..f9f52187beff 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/usb-serial-simple.c +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/usb-serial-simple.c @@ -74,7 +74,8 @@ DEVICE(moto_modem, MOTO_IDS); /* Motorola Tetra driver */ #define MOTOROLA_TETRA_IDS() \ - { USB_DEVICE(0x0cad, 0x9011) } /* Motorola Solutions TETRA PEI */ + { USB_DEVICE(0x0cad, 0x9011) }, /* Motorola Solutions TETRA PEI */ \ + { USB_DEVICE(0x0cad, 0x9012) } /* MTP6550 */ DEVICE(motorola_tetra, MOTOROLA_TETRA_IDS); /* Novatel Wireless GPS driver */ From 8d419749b27419caf8eb914cd2d6b7fc19efc316 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Theodore Ts'o Date: Thu, 14 Jun 2018 00:58:00 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 109/124] ext4: only look at the bg_flags field if it is valid commit 8844618d8aa7a9973e7b527d038a2a589665002c upstream. The bg_flags field in the block group descripts is only valid if the uninit_bg or metadata_csum feature is enabled. We were not consistently looking at this field; fix this. Also block group #0 must never have uninitialized allocation bitmaps, or need to be zeroed, since that's where the root inode, and other special inodes are set up. Check for these conditions and mark the file system as corrupted if they are detected. This addresses CVE-2018-10876. https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199403 Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Cc: stable@kernel.org [bwh: Backported to 3.16: - ext4_read_block_bitmap_nowait() and ext4_read_inode_bitmap() return a pointer (NULL on error) instead of an error code - Open-code sb_rdonly() - Adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings [ghackmann@google.com: forward-port to 3.18: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Greg Hackmann Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext4/balloc.c | 11 ++++++++++- fs/ext4/ialloc.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- fs/ext4/mballoc.c | 6 ++++-- fs/ext4/super.c | 11 ++++++++++- 4 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/balloc.c b/fs/ext4/balloc.c index e19719ecff69..7b7691353cf3 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/balloc.c +++ b/fs/ext4/balloc.c @@ -451,9 +451,18 @@ ext4_read_block_bitmap_nowait(struct super_block *sb, ext4_group_t block_group) goto verify; } ext4_lock_group(sb, block_group); - if (desc->bg_flags & cpu_to_le16(EXT4_BG_BLOCK_UNINIT)) { + if (ext4_has_group_desc_csum(sb) && + (desc->bg_flags & cpu_to_le16(EXT4_BG_BLOCK_UNINIT))) { int err; + if (block_group == 0) { + ext4_unlock_group(sb, block_group); + unlock_buffer(bh); + ext4_error(sb, "Block bitmap for bg 0 marked " + "uninitialized"); + put_bh(bh); + return NULL; + } err = ext4_init_block_bitmap(sb, bh, block_group, desc); set_bitmap_uptodate(bh); set_buffer_uptodate(bh); diff --git a/fs/ext4/ialloc.c b/fs/ext4/ialloc.c index 28aaf640745f..ab2b6f082633 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/ialloc.c +++ b/fs/ext4/ialloc.c @@ -117,7 +117,16 @@ ext4_read_inode_bitmap(struct super_block *sb, ext4_group_t block_group) } ext4_lock_group(sb, block_group); - if (desc->bg_flags & cpu_to_le16(EXT4_BG_INODE_UNINIT)) { + if (ext4_has_group_desc_csum(sb) && + (desc->bg_flags & cpu_to_le16(EXT4_BG_INODE_UNINIT))) { + if (block_group == 0) { + ext4_unlock_group(sb, block_group); + unlock_buffer(bh); + ext4_error(sb, "Inode bitmap for bg 0 marked " + "uninitialized"); + put_bh(bh); + return NULL; + } memset(bh->b_data, 0, (EXT4_INODES_PER_GROUP(sb) + 7) / 8); ext4_mark_bitmap_end(EXT4_INODES_PER_GROUP(sb), sb->s_blocksize * 8, bh->b_data); @@ -873,7 +882,8 @@ struct inode *__ext4_new_inode(handle_t *handle, struct inode *dir, /* recheck and clear flag under lock if we still need to */ ext4_lock_group(sb, group); - if (gdp->bg_flags & cpu_to_le16(EXT4_BG_BLOCK_UNINIT)) { + if (ext4_has_group_desc_csum(sb) && + (gdp->bg_flags & cpu_to_le16(EXT4_BG_BLOCK_UNINIT))) { gdp->bg_flags &= cpu_to_le16(~EXT4_BG_BLOCK_UNINIT); ext4_free_group_clusters_set(sb, gdp, ext4_free_clusters_after_init(sb, group, gdp)); diff --git a/fs/ext4/mballoc.c b/fs/ext4/mballoc.c index 6f51f016f80b..d8a729754e2c 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/mballoc.c +++ b/fs/ext4/mballoc.c @@ -2415,7 +2415,8 @@ int ext4_mb_add_groupinfo(struct super_block *sb, ext4_group_t group, * initialize bb_free to be able to skip * empty groups without initialization */ - if (desc->bg_flags & cpu_to_le16(EXT4_BG_BLOCK_UNINIT)) { + if (ext4_has_group_desc_csum(sb) && + (desc->bg_flags & cpu_to_le16(EXT4_BG_BLOCK_UNINIT))) { meta_group_info[i]->bb_free = ext4_free_clusters_after_init(sb, group, desc); } else { @@ -2942,7 +2943,8 @@ ext4_mb_mark_diskspace_used(struct ext4_allocation_context *ac, #endif ext4_set_bits(bitmap_bh->b_data, ac->ac_b_ex.fe_start, ac->ac_b_ex.fe_len); - if (gdp->bg_flags & cpu_to_le16(EXT4_BG_BLOCK_UNINIT)) { + if (ext4_has_group_desc_csum(sb) && + (gdp->bg_flags & cpu_to_le16(EXT4_BG_BLOCK_UNINIT))) { gdp->bg_flags &= cpu_to_le16(~EXT4_BG_BLOCK_UNINIT); ext4_free_group_clusters_set(sb, gdp, ext4_free_clusters_after_init(sb, diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c index fcecf54cda31..c9149545d593 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -3132,13 +3132,22 @@ static ext4_group_t ext4_has_uninit_itable(struct super_block *sb) ext4_group_t group, ngroups = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_groups_count; struct ext4_group_desc *gdp = NULL; + if (!ext4_has_group_desc_csum(sb)) + return ngroups; + for (group = 0; group < ngroups; group++) { gdp = ext4_get_group_desc(sb, group, NULL); if (!gdp) continue; - if (!(gdp->bg_flags & cpu_to_le16(EXT4_BG_INODE_ZEROED))) + if (gdp->bg_flags & cpu_to_le16(EXT4_BG_INODE_ZEROED)) + continue; + if (group != 0) break; + ext4_error(sb, "Inode table for bg 0 marked as " + "needing zeroing"); + if (sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY) + return ngroups; } return group; From 08b1fd27cdb8ae33f6785badf907cf4fb460567d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Theodore Ts'o Date: Sat, 28 Jul 2018 08:12:04 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 110/124] ext4: fix check to prevent initializing reserved inodes commit 5012284700775a4e6e3fbe7eac4c543c4874b559 upstream. Commit 8844618d8aa7: "ext4: only look at the bg_flags field if it is valid" will complain if block group zero does not have the EXT4_BG_INODE_ZEROED flag set. Unfortunately, this is not correct, since a freshly created file system has this flag cleared. It gets almost immediately after the file system is mounted read-write --- but the following somewhat unlikely sequence will end up triggering a false positive report of a corrupted file system: mkfs.ext4 /dev/vdc mount -o ro /dev/vdc /vdc mount -o remount,rw /dev/vdc Instead, when initializing the inode table for block group zero, test to make sure that itable_unused count is not too large, since that is the case that will result in some or all of the reserved inodes getting cleared. This fixes the failures reported by Eric Whiteney when running generic/230 and generic/231 in the the nojournal test case. Fixes: 8844618d8aa7 ("ext4: only look at the bg_flags field if it is valid") Reported-by: Eric Whitney Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o [bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Greg Hackmann Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext4/ialloc.c | 5 ++++- fs/ext4/super.c | 8 +------- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/ialloc.c b/fs/ext4/ialloc.c index ab2b6f082633..2bd846f84b8b 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/ialloc.c +++ b/fs/ext4/ialloc.c @@ -1253,7 +1253,10 @@ int ext4_init_inode_table(struct super_block *sb, ext4_group_t group, ext4_itable_unused_count(sb, gdp)), sbi->s_inodes_per_block); - if ((used_blks < 0) || (used_blks > sbi->s_itb_per_group)) { + if ((used_blks < 0) || (used_blks > sbi->s_itb_per_group) || + ((group == 0) && ((EXT4_INODES_PER_GROUP(sb) - + ext4_itable_unused_count(sb, gdp)) < + EXT4_FIRST_INO(sb)))) { ext4_error(sb, "Something is wrong with group %u: " "used itable blocks: %d; " "itable unused count: %u", diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c index c9149545d593..2dd4abc61c80 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -3140,14 +3140,8 @@ static ext4_group_t ext4_has_uninit_itable(struct super_block *sb) if (!gdp) continue; - if (gdp->bg_flags & cpu_to_le16(EXT4_BG_INODE_ZEROED)) - continue; - if (group != 0) + if (!(gdp->bg_flags & cpu_to_le16(EXT4_BG_INODE_ZEROED))) break; - ext4_error(sb, "Inode table for bg 0 marked as " - "needing zeroing"); - if (sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY) - return ngroups; } return group; From 6f6da33decb7d9de01447638ca737a846bf0181b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Theodore Ts'o Date: Wed, 13 Jun 2018 23:00:48 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 111/124] ext4: always check block group bounds in ext4_init_block_bitmap() commit 819b23f1c501b17b9694325471789e6b5cc2d0d2 upstream. Regardless of whether the flex_bg feature is set, we should always check to make sure the bits we are setting in the block bitmap are within the block group bounds. https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199865 Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o [bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Greg Hackmann Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext4/balloc.c | 10 +++------- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/balloc.c b/fs/ext4/balloc.c index 7b7691353cf3..c56b9b4f6f76 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/balloc.c +++ b/fs/ext4/balloc.c @@ -184,7 +184,6 @@ static int ext4_init_block_bitmap(struct super_block *sb, unsigned int bit, bit_max; struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb); ext4_fsblk_t start, tmp; - int flex_bg = 0; struct ext4_group_info *grp; J_ASSERT_BH(bh, buffer_locked(bh)); @@ -217,22 +216,19 @@ static int ext4_init_block_bitmap(struct super_block *sb, start = ext4_group_first_block_no(sb, block_group); - if (EXT4_HAS_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_FLEX_BG)) - flex_bg = 1; - /* Set bits for block and inode bitmaps, and inode table */ tmp = ext4_block_bitmap(sb, gdp); - if (!flex_bg || ext4_block_in_group(sb, tmp, block_group)) + if (ext4_block_in_group(sb, tmp, block_group)) ext4_set_bit(EXT4_B2C(sbi, tmp - start), bh->b_data); tmp = ext4_inode_bitmap(sb, gdp); - if (!flex_bg || ext4_block_in_group(sb, tmp, block_group)) + if (ext4_block_in_group(sb, tmp, block_group)) ext4_set_bit(EXT4_B2C(sbi, tmp - start), bh->b_data); tmp = ext4_inode_table(sb, gdp); for (; tmp < ext4_inode_table(sb, gdp) + sbi->s_itb_per_group; tmp++) { - if (!flex_bg || ext4_block_in_group(sb, tmp, block_group)) + if (ext4_block_in_group(sb, tmp, block_group)) ext4_set_bit(EXT4_B2C(sbi, tmp - start), bh->b_data); } From 5141d333432e3c1dc888feb6a4b93f4d39ad0e1c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Theodore Ts'o Date: Sun, 8 Jul 2018 19:35:02 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 112/124] ext4: fix false negatives *and* false positives in ext4_check_descriptors() commit 44de022c4382541cebdd6de4465d1f4f465ff1dd upstream. Ext4_check_descriptors() was getting called before s_gdb_count was initialized. So for file systems w/o the meta_bg feature, allocation bitmaps could overlap the block group descriptors and ext4 wouldn't notice. For file systems with the meta_bg feature enabled, there was a fencepost error which would cause the ext4_check_descriptors() to incorrectly believe that the block allocation bitmap overlaps with the block group descriptor blocks, and it would reject the mount. Fix both of these problems. Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o [bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Greg Hackmann Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext4/super.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c index 2dd4abc61c80..ad620f43a304 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -2064,7 +2064,7 @@ static int ext4_check_descriptors(struct super_block *sb, struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb); ext4_fsblk_t first_block = le32_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_first_data_block); ext4_fsblk_t last_block; - ext4_fsblk_t last_bg_block = sb_block + ext4_bg_num_gdb(sb, 0) + 1; + ext4_fsblk_t last_bg_block = sb_block + ext4_bg_num_gdb(sb, 0); ext4_fsblk_t block_bitmap; ext4_fsblk_t inode_bitmap; ext4_fsblk_t inode_table; @@ -4018,12 +4018,12 @@ static int ext4_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) goto failed_mount2; } } + sbi->s_gdb_count = db_count; if (!ext4_check_descriptors(sb, logical_sb_block, &first_not_zeroed)) { ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "group descriptors corrupted!"); goto failed_mount2; } - sbi->s_gdb_count = db_count; get_random_bytes(&sbi->s_next_generation, sizeof(u32)); spin_lock_init(&sbi->s_next_gen_lock); From 912e35d18cd2d4f3dd2baec33b871b8faa81f1f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Theodore Ts'o Date: Wed, 13 Jun 2018 00:23:11 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 113/124] ext4: add corruption check in ext4_xattr_set_entry() commit 5369a762c882c0b6e9599e4ebbb3a9ba9eee7e2d upstream. In theory this should have been caught earlier when the xattr list was verified, but in case it got missed, it's simple enough to add check to make sure we don't overrun the xattr buffer. This addresses CVE-2018-10879. https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200001 Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger [bwh: Backported to 3.16: - Add inode parameter to ext4_xattr_set_entry() and update callers - Return -EIO instead of -EFSCORRUPTED on error - Adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Greg Hackmann Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext4/xattr.c | 22 ++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/xattr.c b/fs/ext4/xattr.c index c8d782bf8c5c..5b391e74c0cc 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/xattr.c +++ b/fs/ext4/xattr.c @@ -637,14 +637,20 @@ static size_t ext4_xattr_free_space(struct ext4_xattr_entry *last, } static int -ext4_xattr_set_entry(struct ext4_xattr_info *i, struct ext4_xattr_search *s) +ext4_xattr_set_entry(struct ext4_xattr_info *i, struct ext4_xattr_search *s, + struct inode *inode) { - struct ext4_xattr_entry *last; + struct ext4_xattr_entry *last, *next; size_t free, min_offs = s->end - s->base, name_len = strlen(i->name); /* Compute min_offs and last. */ last = s->first; - for (; !IS_LAST_ENTRY(last); last = EXT4_XATTR_NEXT(last)) { + for (; !IS_LAST_ENTRY(last); last = next) { + next = EXT4_XATTR_NEXT(last); + if ((void *)next >= s->end) { + EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "corrupted xattr entries"); + return -EIO; + } if (!last->e_value_block && last->e_value_size) { size_t offs = le16_to_cpu(last->e_value_offs); if (offs < min_offs) @@ -825,7 +831,7 @@ ext4_xattr_block_set(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, ce = NULL; } ea_bdebug(bs->bh, "modifying in-place"); - error = ext4_xattr_set_entry(i, s); + error = ext4_xattr_set_entry(i, s, inode); if (!error) { if (!IS_LAST_ENTRY(s->first)) ext4_xattr_rehash(header(s->base), @@ -877,7 +883,7 @@ ext4_xattr_block_set(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, s->end = s->base + sb->s_blocksize; } - error = ext4_xattr_set_entry(i, s); + error = ext4_xattr_set_entry(i, s, inode); if (error == -EIO) goto bad_block; if (error) @@ -1038,7 +1044,7 @@ int ext4_xattr_ibody_inline_set(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, if (EXT4_I(inode)->i_extra_isize == 0) return -ENOSPC; - error = ext4_xattr_set_entry(i, s); + error = ext4_xattr_set_entry(i, s, inode); if (error) { if (error == -ENOSPC && ext4_has_inline_data(inode)) { @@ -1050,7 +1056,7 @@ int ext4_xattr_ibody_inline_set(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, error = ext4_xattr_ibody_find(inode, i, is); if (error) return error; - error = ext4_xattr_set_entry(i, s); + error = ext4_xattr_set_entry(i, s, inode); } if (error) return error; @@ -1076,7 +1082,7 @@ static int ext4_xattr_ibody_set(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, if (EXT4_I(inode)->i_extra_isize == 0) return -ENOSPC; - error = ext4_xattr_set_entry(i, s); + error = ext4_xattr_set_entry(i, s, inode); if (error) return error; header = IHDR(inode, ext4_raw_inode(&is->iloc)); From f8b8db07ab693cce95ac0289d4c6adc3e7b60dd3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Theodore Ts'o Date: Wed, 13 Jun 2018 00:51:28 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 114/124] ext4: always verify the magic number in xattr blocks commit 513f86d73855ce556ea9522b6bfd79f87356dc3a upstream. If there an inode points to a block which is also some other type of metadata block (such as a block allocation bitmap), the buffer_verified flag can be set when it was validated as that other metadata block type; however, it would make a really terrible external attribute block. The reason why we use the verified flag is to avoid constantly reverifying the block. However, it doesn't take much overhead to make sure the magic number of the xattr block is correct, and this will avoid potential crashes. This addresses CVE-2018-10879. https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200001 Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger Cc: stable@kernel.org [ghackmann@google.com: 3.18 backport: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Greg Hackmann Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext4/xattr.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/xattr.c b/fs/ext4/xattr.c index 5b391e74c0cc..bb4faf2d0c5c 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/xattr.c +++ b/fs/ext4/xattr.c @@ -218,12 +218,12 @@ ext4_xattr_check_block(struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head *bh) { int error; - if (buffer_verified(bh)) - return 0; - if (BHDR(bh)->h_magic != cpu_to_le32(EXT4_XATTR_MAGIC) || BHDR(bh)->h_blocks != cpu_to_le32(1)) return -EIO; + if (buffer_verified(bh)) + return 0; + if (!ext4_xattr_block_csum_verify(inode, bh->b_blocknr, BHDR(bh))) return -EIO; error = ext4_xattr_check_names(BFIRST(bh), bh->b_data + bh->b_size, From fd2634366fca1f93e7d4cf36c8a919dfe11cd0ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Theodore Ts'o Date: Sat, 16 Jun 2018 15:40:48 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 115/124] ext4: never move the system.data xattr out of the inode body commit 8cdb5240ec5928b20490a2bb34cb87e9a5f40226 upstream. When expanding the extra isize space, we must never move the system.data xattr out of the inode body. For performance reasons, it doesn't make any sense, and the inline data implementation assumes that system.data xattr is never in the external xattr block. This addresses CVE-2018-10880 https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200005 Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o [bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Greg Hackmann Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext4/xattr.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ext4/xattr.c b/fs/ext4/xattr.c index bb4faf2d0c5c..5f67ef828ccd 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/xattr.c +++ b/fs/ext4/xattr.c @@ -1391,6 +1391,11 @@ int ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea(struct inode *inode, int new_extra_isize, /* Find the entry best suited to be pushed into EA block */ entry = NULL; for (; !IS_LAST_ENTRY(last); last = EXT4_XATTR_NEXT(last)) { + /* never move system.data out of the inode */ + if ((last->e_name_len == 4) && + (last->e_name_index == EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_SYSTEM) && + !memcmp(last->e_name, "data", 4)) + continue; total_size = EXT4_XATTR_SIZE(le32_to_cpu(last->e_value_size)) + EXT4_XATTR_LEN(last->e_name_len); From 292dc9673821842c0762b5d095a05e354e795392 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Theodore Ts'o Date: Sun, 17 Jun 2018 00:41:14 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 116/124] ext4: add more inode number paranoia checks commit c37e9e013469521d9adb932d17a1795c139b36db upstream. If there is a directory entry pointing to a system inode (such as a journal inode), complain and declare the file system to be corrupted. Also, if the superblock's first inode number field is too small, refuse to mount the file system. This addresses CVE-2018-10882. https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200069 Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o [bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Greg Hackmann Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext4/ext4.h | 5 ----- fs/ext4/inode.c | 3 ++- fs/ext4/super.c | 5 +++++ 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/ext4.h b/fs/ext4/ext4.h index bd997b3d6a6f..beea7a33f5ee 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/ext4.h +++ b/fs/ext4/ext4.h @@ -1386,11 +1386,6 @@ static inline struct timespec ext4_current_time(struct inode *inode) static inline int ext4_valid_inum(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long ino) { return ino == EXT4_ROOT_INO || - ino == EXT4_USR_QUOTA_INO || - ino == EXT4_GRP_QUOTA_INO || - ino == EXT4_BOOT_LOADER_INO || - ino == EXT4_JOURNAL_INO || - ino == EXT4_RESIZE_INO || (ino >= EXT4_FIRST_INO(sb) && ino <= le32_to_cpu(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_es->s_inodes_count)); } diff --git a/fs/ext4/inode.c b/fs/ext4/inode.c index eb06f62fa95b..75dc9da78196 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/inode.c +++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c @@ -3737,7 +3737,8 @@ static int __ext4_get_inode_loc(struct inode *inode, int inodes_per_block, inode_offset; iloc->bh = NULL; - if (!ext4_valid_inum(sb, inode->i_ino)) + if (inode->i_ino < EXT4_ROOT_INO || + inode->i_ino > le32_to_cpu(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_es->s_inodes_count)) return -EIO; iloc->block_group = (inode->i_ino - 1) / EXT4_INODES_PER_GROUP(sb); diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c index ad620f43a304..e55d36b04b50 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -3794,6 +3794,11 @@ static int ext4_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) } else { sbi->s_inode_size = le16_to_cpu(es->s_inode_size); sbi->s_first_ino = le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_ino); + if (sbi->s_first_ino < EXT4_GOOD_OLD_FIRST_INO) { + ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "invalid first ino: %u", + sbi->s_first_ino); + goto failed_mount; + } if ((sbi->s_inode_size < EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE) || (!is_power_of_2(sbi->s_inode_size)) || (sbi->s_inode_size > blocksize)) { From 524100251d15d4dc491671b84854017327ff2dba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Theodore Ts'o Date: Sat, 16 Jun 2018 20:21:45 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 117/124] jbd2: don't mark block as modified if the handle is out of credits commit e09463f220ca9a1a1ecfda84fcda658f99a1f12a upstream. Do not set the b_modified flag in block's journal head should not until after we're sure that jbd2_journal_dirty_metadat() will not abort with an error due to there not being enough space reserved in the jbd2 handle. Otherwise, future attempts to modify the buffer may lead a large number of spurious errors and warnings. This addresses CVE-2018-10883. https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200071 Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o [bwh: Backported to 3.16: Drop the added logging statement, as it's on a code path that doesn't exist here] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Greg Hackmann Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/jbd2/transaction.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/jbd2/transaction.c b/fs/jbd2/transaction.c index f3818e7cfa60..ab034f48ffe4 100644 --- a/fs/jbd2/transaction.c +++ b/fs/jbd2/transaction.c @@ -1283,11 +1283,11 @@ int jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata(handle_t *handle, struct buffer_head *bh) * of the transaction. This needs to be done * once a transaction -bzzz */ - jh->b_modified = 1; if (handle->h_buffer_credits <= 0) { ret = -ENOSPC; goto out_unlock_bh; } + jh->b_modified = 1; handle->h_buffer_credits--; } From 4faa5582856e2cb05b73e0ca8e565c3e1acfb561 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Theodore Ts'o Date: Sat, 16 Jun 2018 23:41:59 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 118/124] ext4: avoid running out of journal credits when appending to an inline file commit 8bc1379b82b8e809eef77a9fedbb75c6c297be19 upstream. Use a separate journal transaction if it turns out that we need to convert an inline file to use an data block. Otherwise we could end up failing due to not having journal credits. This addresses CVE-2018-10883. https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200071 Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o [bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Greg Hackmann Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext4/ext4.h | 3 --- fs/ext4/inline.c | 38 +------------------------------------- fs/ext4/xattr.c | 18 ++---------------- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/ext4.h b/fs/ext4/ext4.h index beea7a33f5ee..a27ccb098558 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/ext4.h +++ b/fs/ext4/ext4.h @@ -2663,9 +2663,6 @@ extern struct buffer_head *ext4_get_first_inline_block(struct inode *inode, extern int ext4_inline_data_fiemap(struct inode *inode, struct fiemap_extent_info *fieinfo, int *has_inline); -extern int ext4_try_to_evict_inline_data(handle_t *handle, - struct inode *inode, - int needed); extern void ext4_inline_data_truncate(struct inode *inode, int *has_inline); extern int ext4_convert_inline_data(struct inode *inode); diff --git a/fs/ext4/inline.c b/fs/ext4/inline.c index 27a3dcffe308..fe19a2612b44 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/inline.c +++ b/fs/ext4/inline.c @@ -873,11 +873,11 @@ int ext4_da_write_inline_data_begin(struct address_space *mapping, } if (ret == -ENOSPC) { + ext4_journal_stop(handle); ret = ext4_da_convert_inline_data_to_extent(mapping, inode, flags, fsdata); - ext4_journal_stop(handle); if (ret == -ENOSPC && ext4_should_retry_alloc(inode->i_sb, &retries)) goto retry_journal; @@ -1842,42 +1842,6 @@ int ext4_inline_data_fiemap(struct inode *inode, return (error < 0 ? error : 0); } -/* - * Called during xattr set, and if we can sparse space 'needed', - * just create the extent tree evict the data to the outer block. - * - * We use jbd2 instead of page cache to move data to the 1st block - * so that the whole transaction can be committed as a whole and - * the data isn't lost because of the delayed page cache write. - */ -int ext4_try_to_evict_inline_data(handle_t *handle, - struct inode *inode, - int needed) -{ - int error; - struct ext4_xattr_entry *entry; - struct ext4_inode *raw_inode; - struct ext4_iloc iloc; - - error = ext4_get_inode_loc(inode, &iloc); - if (error) - return error; - - raw_inode = ext4_raw_inode(&iloc); - entry = (struct ext4_xattr_entry *)((void *)raw_inode + - EXT4_I(inode)->i_inline_off); - if (EXT4_XATTR_LEN(entry->e_name_len) + - EXT4_XATTR_SIZE(le32_to_cpu(entry->e_value_size)) < needed) { - error = -ENOSPC; - goto out; - } - - error = ext4_convert_inline_data_nolock(handle, inode, &iloc); -out: - brelse(iloc.bh); - return error; -} - void ext4_inline_data_truncate(struct inode *inode, int *has_inline) { handle_t *handle; diff --git a/fs/ext4/xattr.c b/fs/ext4/xattr.c index 5f67ef828ccd..9b4f642d6dea 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/xattr.c +++ b/fs/ext4/xattr.c @@ -1045,22 +1045,8 @@ int ext4_xattr_ibody_inline_set(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, if (EXT4_I(inode)->i_extra_isize == 0) return -ENOSPC; error = ext4_xattr_set_entry(i, s, inode); - if (error) { - if (error == -ENOSPC && - ext4_has_inline_data(inode)) { - error = ext4_try_to_evict_inline_data(handle, inode, - EXT4_XATTR_LEN(strlen(i->name) + - EXT4_XATTR_SIZE(i->value_len))); - if (error) - return error; - error = ext4_xattr_ibody_find(inode, i, is); - if (error) - return error; - error = ext4_xattr_set_entry(i, s, inode); - } - if (error) - return error; - } + if (error) + return error; header = IHDR(inode, ext4_raw_inode(&is->iloc)); if (!IS_LAST_ENTRY(s->first)) { header->h_magic = cpu_to_le32(EXT4_XATTR_MAGIC); From e289e19591919bbe760db1479d76d294f51b0aeb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Prateek Sood Date: Tue, 19 Dec 2017 12:56:57 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 119/124] cgroup: Fix deadlock in cpu hotplug path commit 116d2f7496c51b2e02e8e4ecdd2bdf5fb9d5a641 upstream. Deadlock during cgroup migration from cpu hotplug path when a task T is being moved from source to destination cgroup. kworker/0:0 cpuset_hotplug_workfn() cpuset_hotplug_update_tasks() hotplug_update_tasks_legacy() remove_tasks_in_empty_cpuset() cgroup_transfer_tasks() // stuck in iterator loop cgroup_migrate() cgroup_migrate_add_task() In cgroup_migrate_add_task() it checks for PF_EXITING flag of task T. Task T will not migrate to destination cgroup. css_task_iter_start() will keep pointing to task T in loop waiting for task T cg_list node to be removed. Task T do_exit() exit_signals() // sets PF_EXITING exit_task_namespaces() switch_task_namespaces() free_nsproxy() put_mnt_ns() drop_collected_mounts() namespace_unlock() synchronize_rcu() _synchronize_rcu_expedited() schedule_work() // on cpu0 low priority worker pool wait_event() // waiting for work item to execute Task T inserted a work item in the worklist of cpu0 low priority worker pool. It is waiting for expedited grace period work item to execute. This work item will only be executed once kworker/0:0 complete execution of cpuset_hotplug_workfn(). kworker/0:0 ==> Task T ==>kworker/0:0 In case of PF_EXITING task being migrated from source to destination cgroup, migrate next available task in source cgroup. Signed-off-by: Prateek Sood Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo [AmitP: Upstream commit cherry-pick failed, so I picked the backported changes from CAF/msm-4.9 tree instead: https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/kernel/msm-4.9/commit/?id=49b74f1696417b270c89cd893ca9f37088928078] Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/cgroup.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup.c index f033fbd94ac3..a8f41143c3e2 100644 --- a/kernel/cgroup.c +++ b/kernel/cgroup.c @@ -3669,7 +3669,11 @@ int cgroup_transfer_tasks(struct cgroup *to, struct cgroup *from) */ do { css_task_iter_start(&from->self, &it); - task = css_task_iter_next(&it); + + do { + task = css_task_iter_next(&it); + } while (task && (task->flags & PF_EXITING)); + if (task) get_task_struct(task); css_task_iter_end(&it); From 72c6877269634ae6c70112c34c5961e6dd520799 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Weinberger Date: Mon, 3 Sep 2018 23:06:23 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 120/124] ubifs: Check for name being NULL while mounting commit 37f31b6ca4311b94d985fb398a72e5399ad57925 upstream. The requested device name can be NULL or an empty string. Check for that and refuse to continue. UBIFS has to do this manually since we cannot use mount_bdev(), which checks for this condition. Fixes: 1e51764a3c2ac ("UBIFS: add new flash file system") Reported-by: syzbot+38bd0f7865e5c6379280@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ubifs/super.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ubifs/super.c b/fs/ubifs/super.c index 2f7a74e73b7d..a6a2108bf620 100644 --- a/fs/ubifs/super.c +++ b/fs/ubifs/super.c @@ -1917,6 +1917,9 @@ static struct ubi_volume_desc *open_ubi(const char *name, int mode) int dev, vol; char *endptr; + if (!name || !*name) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + /* First, try to open using the device node path method */ ubi = ubi_open_volume_path(name, mode); if (!IS_ERR(ubi)) From ab94214d643ed15ea0737db9c04c9c223201f346 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gao Feng Date: Tue, 16 May 2017 09:30:18 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 121/124] ebtables: arpreply: Add the standard target sanity check commit c953d63548207a085abcb12a15fefc8a11ffdf0a upstream. The info->target comes from userspace and it would be used directly. So we need to add the sanity check to make sure it is a valid standard target, although the ebtables tool has already checked it. Kernel needs to validate anything coming from userspace. If the target is set as an evil value, it would break the ebtables and cause a panic. Because the non-standard target is treated as one offset. Now add one helper function ebt_invalid_target, and we would replace the macro INVALID_TARGET later. Signed-off-by: Gao Feng Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso Cc: Loic Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/netfilter_bridge/ebtables.h | 5 +++++ net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_arpreply.c | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/netfilter_bridge/ebtables.h b/include/linux/netfilter_bridge/ebtables.h index 34e7a2b7f867..78cd1b2cd56c 100644 --- a/include/linux/netfilter_bridge/ebtables.h +++ b/include/linux/netfilter_bridge/ebtables.h @@ -124,4 +124,9 @@ extern unsigned int ebt_do_table(unsigned int hook, struct sk_buff *skb, /* True if the target is not a standard target */ #define INVALID_TARGET (info->target < -NUM_STANDARD_TARGETS || info->target >= 0) +static inline bool ebt_invalid_target(int target) +{ + return (target < -NUM_STANDARD_TARGETS || target >= 0); +} + #endif diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_arpreply.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_arpreply.c index 070cf134a22f..f2660c1b29e4 100644 --- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_arpreply.c +++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_arpreply.c @@ -67,6 +67,9 @@ static int ebt_arpreply_tg_check(const struct xt_tgchk_param *par) if (e->ethproto != htons(ETH_P_ARP) || e->invflags & EBT_IPROTO) return -EINVAL; + if (ebt_invalid_target(info->target)) + return -EINVAL; + return 0; } From 0d63979c1bc9c85578be4c589768a13dc0a7c5eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Sat, 13 Oct 2018 09:09:32 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 122/124] Linux 3.18.124 --- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 7943b4c59499..595392549dfb 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ VERSION = 3 PATCHLEVEL = 18 -SUBLEVEL = 123 +SUBLEVEL = 124 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Diseased Newt From 18c3b12972ba222ee5fae027ee5592876e9eab16 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Laura Abbott Date: Wed, 7 Sep 2016 11:49:58 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 123/124] BACKPORT: staging: android: ion: Pull out ion ioctls to a separate file commit b1fa6d8acb50c8e90f50fb262e5d4b7d478592bf upstream. The number of Ion ioctls may continue to grow along with necessary validation. Pull it out into a separate file for easier management and review. Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman [nc: Partial backport, only needed for the next commit] Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor --- drivers/staging/android/ion/ion.c | 75 ------------------------- drivers/staging/android/ion/ion_priv.h | 76 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 75 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/android/ion/ion.c b/drivers/staging/android/ion/ion.c index c0ea623ceda3..8013107b186e 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/android/ion/ion.c +++ b/drivers/staging/android/ion/ion.c @@ -47,81 +47,6 @@ #include "ion_priv.h" #include "compat_ion.h" -/** - * struct ion_device - the metadata of the ion device node - * @dev: the actual misc device - * @buffers: an rb tree of all the existing buffers - * @buffer_lock: lock protecting the tree of buffers - * @lock: rwsem protecting the tree of heaps and clients - * @heaps: list of all the heaps in the system - * @user_clients: list of all the clients created from userspace - */ -struct ion_device { - struct miscdevice dev; - struct rb_root buffers; - struct mutex buffer_lock; - struct rw_semaphore lock; - struct plist_head heaps; - long (*custom_ioctl)(struct ion_client *client, unsigned int cmd, - unsigned long arg); - struct rb_root clients; - struct dentry *debug_root; - struct dentry *heaps_debug_root; - struct dentry *clients_debug_root; -}; - -/** - * struct ion_client - a process/hw block local address space - * @node: node in the tree of all clients - * @dev: backpointer to ion device - * @handles: an rb tree of all the handles in this client - * @idr: an idr space for allocating handle ids - * @lock: lock protecting the tree of handles - * @name: used for debugging - * @display_name: used for debugging (unique version of @name) - * @display_serial: used for debugging (to make display_name unique) - * @task: used for debugging - * - * A client represents a list of buffers this client may access. - * The mutex stored here is used to protect both handles tree - * as well as the handles themselves, and should be held while modifying either. - */ -struct ion_client { - struct rb_node node; - struct ion_device *dev; - struct rb_root handles; - struct idr idr; - struct mutex lock; - char *name; - char *display_name; - int display_serial; - struct task_struct *task; - pid_t pid; - struct dentry *debug_root; -}; - -/** - * ion_handle - a client local reference to a buffer - * @ref: reference count - * @client: back pointer to the client the buffer resides in - * @buffer: pointer to the buffer - * @node: node in the client's handle rbtree - * @kmap_cnt: count of times this client has mapped to kernel - * @id: client-unique id allocated by client->idr - * - * Modifications to node, map_cnt or mapping should be protected by the - * lock in the client. Other fields are never changed after initialization. - */ -struct ion_handle { - struct kref ref; - unsigned int user_ref_count; - struct ion_client *client; - struct ion_buffer *buffer; - struct rb_node node; - unsigned int kmap_cnt; - int id; -}; - static struct ion_device *ion_dev; bool ion_buffer_fault_user_mappings(struct ion_buffer *buffer) diff --git a/drivers/staging/android/ion/ion_priv.h b/drivers/staging/android/ion/ion_priv.h index 1313f838ba38..0b273be922ab 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/android/ion/ion_priv.h +++ b/drivers/staging/android/ion/ion_priv.h @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_ION_POOL_CACHE_POLICY #include #endif +#include #include "ion.h" @@ -97,6 +98,81 @@ struct ion_buffer { }; void ion_buffer_destroy(struct ion_buffer *buffer); +/** + * struct ion_device - the metadata of the ion device node + * @dev: the actual misc device + * @buffers: an rb tree of all the existing buffers + * @buffer_lock: lock protecting the tree of buffers + * @lock: rwsem protecting the tree of heaps and clients + * @heaps: list of all the heaps in the system + * @user_clients: list of all the clients created from userspace + */ +struct ion_device { + struct miscdevice dev; + struct rb_root buffers; + struct mutex buffer_lock; + struct rw_semaphore lock; + struct plist_head heaps; + long (*custom_ioctl)(struct ion_client *client, unsigned int cmd, + unsigned long arg); + struct rb_root clients; + struct dentry *debug_root; + struct dentry *heaps_debug_root; + struct dentry *clients_debug_root; +}; + +/** + * struct ion_client - a process/hw block local address space + * @node: node in the tree of all clients + * @dev: backpointer to ion device + * @handles: an rb tree of all the handles in this client + * @idr: an idr space for allocating handle ids + * @lock: lock protecting the tree of handles + * @name: used for debugging + * @display_name: used for debugging (unique version of @name) + * @display_serial: used for debugging (to make display_name unique) + * @task: used for debugging + * + * A client represents a list of buffers this client may access. + * The mutex stored here is used to protect both handles tree + * as well as the handles themselves, and should be held while modifying either. + */ +struct ion_client { + struct rb_node node; + struct ion_device *dev; + struct rb_root handles; + struct idr idr; + struct mutex lock; + char *name; + char *display_name; + int display_serial; + struct task_struct *task; + pid_t pid; + struct dentry *debug_root; +}; + +/** + * ion_handle - a client local reference to a buffer + * @ref: reference count + * @client: back pointer to the client the buffer resides in + * @buffer: pointer to the buffer + * @node: node in the client's handle rbtree + * @kmap_cnt: count of times this client has mapped to kernel + * @id: client-unique id allocated by client->idr + * + * Modifications to node, map_cnt or mapping should be protected by the + * lock in the client. Other fields are never changed after initialization. + */ +struct ion_handle { + struct kref ref; + unsigned int user_ref_count; + struct ion_client *client; + struct ion_buffer *buffer; + struct rb_node node; + unsigned int kmap_cnt; + int id; +}; + /** * struct ion_heap_ops - ops to operate on a given heap * @allocate: allocate memory From 0bd75951944f2330b62b45ec16404bba085a1081 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nathan Chancellor Date: Fri, 31 Aug 2018 19:15:38 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 124/124] staging: ion: msm: Apply d82ad70e8aff to msm_ion_custom_ioctl Commit d82ad70e8aff ("staging: android: ion: fix ION_IOC_{MAP,SHARE} use-after-free") removed the definition of ion_handle_get_by_id, replacing it with a lockless version. Update msm_ion_custom_ioctl with this same definition and scheme. Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor --- drivers/staging/android/ion/ion.c | 4 ++-- drivers/staging/android/ion/ion_priv.h | 4 ++-- drivers/staging/android/ion/msm/msm_ion.c | 5 ++++- 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/android/ion/ion.c b/drivers/staging/android/ion/ion.c index 8013107b186e..eb5cba989e19 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/android/ion/ion.c +++ b/drivers/staging/android/ion/ion.c @@ -420,8 +420,8 @@ static struct ion_handle *ion_handle_lookup(struct ion_client *client, return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); } -static struct ion_handle *ion_handle_get_by_id_nolock(struct ion_client *client, - int id) +struct ion_handle *ion_handle_get_by_id_nolock(struct ion_client *client, + int id) { struct ion_handle *handle; diff --git a/drivers/staging/android/ion/ion_priv.h b/drivers/staging/android/ion/ion_priv.h index 0b273be922ab..73af01fca13a 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/android/ion/ion_priv.h +++ b/drivers/staging/android/ion/ion_priv.h @@ -579,8 +579,8 @@ int ion_walk_heaps(struct ion_client *client, int heap_id, enum ion_heap_type type, void *data, int (*f)(struct ion_heap *heap, void *data)); -struct ion_handle *ion_handle_get_by_id(struct ion_client *client, - int id); +struct ion_handle *ion_handle_get_by_id_nolock(struct ion_client *client, + int id); int ion_handle_put(struct ion_handle *handle); diff --git a/drivers/staging/android/ion/msm/msm_ion.c b/drivers/staging/android/ion/msm/msm_ion.c index e112a4fe6682..dfd4c3d65802 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/android/ion/msm/msm_ion.c +++ b/drivers/staging/android/ion/msm/msm_ion.c @@ -695,13 +695,16 @@ long msm_ion_custom_ioctl(struct ion_client *client, struct mm_struct *mm = current->active_mm; if (data.flush_data.handle > 0) { - handle = ion_handle_get_by_id(client, + mutex_lock(&client->lock); + handle = ion_handle_get_by_id_nolock(client, (int)data.flush_data.handle); if (IS_ERR(handle)) { + mutex_unlock(&client->lock); pr_info("%s: Could not find handle: %d\n", __func__, (int)data.flush_data.handle); return PTR_ERR(handle); } + mutex_unlock(&client->lock); } else { handle = ion_import_dma_buf(client, data.flush_data.fd); if (IS_ERR(handle)) {